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
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A Soviet View



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
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A Soviet View,



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A. A. GRECHKO

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American Editor's Comments

The Armed Forces of the Soviet State is the twelfth volume in the "Soviet Military Thought" series translated and published under the auspices of the United States Air Force. The first Soviet edition of this book appeared in the spring of 1974 in 50,000 copies. An expanded second edition, 32 pages longer than the first and published in 200,000 copies, was issued in 1975.

It was written by the late Marshal Andrey Antonovich Grechko when he was serving as Minister of Defense of the USSR. Besides the authority of his position he brought to the task the experience gathered in a long and varied military career.

Born in 1903 in what is now the Rostov Oblast' of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic of the USSR, he joined the Red Army in 1919. He took part in subsequent Civil War campaigns and became a member of the Communist Party in 1928. As a result of outstanding performance in a variety of assignments, he was sent to the Frunze Military Academy, and graduated from it in 1936. Four years later he entered the General Staff Academy, and graduated in 1941 on the eve of Hitler's attack against the Soviet Union.

The war gave Grechko the opportunity to put into practice all he had learned. Promoted to the rank of General-Major (one star) in 1941, he commanded successively the 12th, 47th, 18th and 56th Armies. As hostilities ended he was a General-Colonel (three stars) and commander of the 1st Guards Army.

Grechko's postwar assignments took him ever higher in the Soviet military hierarchy. In 1945, he became commander of the Kiev Military District, traditionally one of the most important military districts, and in 1953 was assigned Commander-in-Chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, the most prestigious Soviet field command. He was in that position when he was promoted to General of the Army (1953) and then Marshal of the Soviet Union (1955).

In November 1957, shortly after Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskiy replaced Marshal G. K. Zhukov as Minister of Defense, Grechko was called to

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Moscow to become Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Ground Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense. He retained the latter position when, in 1960, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact Nations. In 1967, upon the death of Malinovskiy, he assumed the post of Minister of Defense. On April 12, 1973, he became a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU. He died on April 27, 1976.

Grechko's broad background and high position made all his statements and writings authoritative. This particular book is his most comprehensive work and thus a logical selection for the "Soviet Military Thought" series.

Since *The Armed Forces of the Soviet State* was published after the USSR signed the International Copyright Convention, publication in English required a copyright release from the author. This release was obtained through a contractual agreement with the All-Union Copyright Agency (VAAP), whose cooperation the American editor would like to acknowledge. In keeping with the terms of the contract, VAAP reviewed the entire translation and suggested certain changes. They have been incorporated into the text. VAAP also informed the American editor that Marshal Grechko continued to work on the book during the last period of his life. Acting on behalf of his heirs and the Military Publishing House, VAAP suggested a number of changes to the text, changes which correspond to the author's final wording. The American editor has complied with this request. The changes are few in number and are spread throughout the book. They total some two pages of text in all and in no way affect the basic substance of the work. This publication is thus a slightly revised version of the 2nd Soviet edition.

The book of the late Marshal A. A. Grechko is an authoritative Soviet exposition of the development and essence of Soviet military power, written by one of the leading Soviet military commanders of the century.

*The translation and publication of **The Armed Forces of the Soviet State** does not constitute approval by any U.S. Government organization of the inferences, findings and conclusions contained therein. Publication is solely for the exchange and stimulation of ideas.*

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Foreword

The history of the Soviet Armed Forces is brief in time but rich in very great events. Their path is marked by heroic victories and their combat banners are covered by unfading glory. They have won the deep love and gratitude of the Soviet people and all progressive mankind by their humanism and wholehearted service and devotion to the socialist Homeland and the great ideals of communism. Having repulsed repeated attempts by world imperialism to test with force the firmness of the Soviet State and having won a world-historic victory in the Great Patriotic War, our Armed Forces continue to this day their remarkable traditions. They multiply these traditions in the routine of military labor and the heroic spirit of intensive combat training and vigilant performance of service in guarding the peace and building communism.

The continuous string of vivid victories and successes of the Soviet Armed Forces is no accident. It is naturally caused by the entire course of social development and is organically linked with the grandiose achievements and deeds of all the Soviet people, who were the first to begin laying a path toward a bright new life—toward socialism and communism—along which all mankind inevitably will pass.

There are many armies in the world with long centuries of history in which one can find the pages of their military victories. But those were only solitary high points which, like sparks, flared up and went out. Then for many decades and even centuries nothing noteworthy happened in the combat activity of these armies or they suffered inglorious defeats. Even these victorious high points were chiefly inherent to those armies which waged just wars. True, there are examples of a different type. It happened even in reactionary, unjust wars that troops displayed courage and won major victories. In these wars, however, people met danger head on not in response to their heart, but due to bribery, deception or fear of punishment. Victories won in these wars were not the result of a conscious mass heroism for the sake of just goals. They did not bear a socially useful character. They served not the cause of progress, but the predatory plans of exploiting classes. But sooner or later, the real truth about wars was revealed through the prism of time, and then the exploits of many so-called "invincible" armies paled, even though they often left

a trace in world history and made a certain contribution to the development of military art.

The peoples also know those armies which covered themselves with eternal shame, though they had victories to their credit. These were not only the armies of distant times, of slave-owning or feudal states, but also imperialist armies of the modern era. One can include among them, for example, the fascist German Wehrmacht, the tool of the most reactionary forces of imperialism, their instrument of oppression, violence and piracy. The bloody path of the Hitlerites through the countries of Europe was marked by barbaric reprisals against unarmed peaceful populations, executions of old men, women and children who were guilty of nothing, pillage and destruction of unique historical values, cultural monuments, and the destruction of cities and villages. The armed forces of the United States used no less cruel methods in the war in Vietnam. Many inhuman acts are credited to the Israeli aggressors and other capitalist armies.

In an exploiting society, however, there never was, nor is there now, an army whose predestination always would be to fight for a just cause, or the entire history of which would consist of victorious achievements, with its actions making fundamental progressive changes in all areas of military development, methods of waging war, strategy, operational art and tactics.

Only the socialist social system creates a fundamentally new army with the most just and noble goal of defense of the revolutionary achievements of the working people. This goal serves as an incentive for mass heroism by soldiers of the socialist army and predetermines the natural pattern of its victories. Our Armed Forces are such an entity. All their history is filled with heroic exploits for the glory of the socialist Motherland. And today the Soviet Armed Forces stand unflinchingly on guard of our socialist Homeland and the peaceful labor of the people who are building a communist society. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU CC, said at the 24th Party Congress that "Soviet citizens can be certain that our glorious Armed Forces are ready at any time of the day or night to repulse an enemy attack no matter where it originates. Any possible aggressor knows full well that in case of an attempted nuclear missile attack against our country, he will receive a destructive retaliatory strike."¹

Many books have been written about our army. The whole world knows about the historic victories of Soviet arms. And still to this day those in the West often speak of the Soviet Armed Forces as an "unsolved riddle." They cannot understand the roots of their combat might and sometimes make erroneous suppositions and conclusions. There also is such a category of military ideologists of imperialism which disseminates

¹ *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress). Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p. 81.

deliberate lies and slander, attempting to degrade the historic services of the Soviet Armed Forces to mankind and distort their modern role. But nothing can eclipse the truth of the USSR Armed Forces or shake the faith in their great liberating mission. It is impossible to blacken our world-historic victories with any kind of slander. The fame of the Soviet Armed Forces will live forever.

It will live forever because the Soviet Armed Forces represent an army of a new type, an army of the people—the creators of a new history of mankind, a history of its socialist era. The glory of our Armed Forces belongs to all the Soviet people. The glory of the heroic accomplishments of the people cannot fade, and at the same time the glory of its Armed Forces also will not be extinguished.

The glory of the heroic victories of the Soviet Armed Forces will live forever because its leadership—the great Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the directing and organizing force of the Soviet socialist state and of the Soviet people—remains eternally alive. It was the Communist Party which created, trained and educated a new people's army and inspired it and all the Soviet people to the greatest exploits for the sake of freedom, peace and socialism. It was our Communist Party which stood during the menacing war years at the head of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces, and which together with them accomplished heroic deeds and crushed the hostile hordes infringing upon the sacred Soviet soil. It was her best sons and daughters who always were in front, at the most difficult sectors of the military and labor front, presenting mass examples of daring and bravery, of firmness and selflessness, and of utter devotion to the people and the great cause of communism. It is our Party, grown wise with historic experience, which now stands at the head of the Soviet Socialist State, the Soviet people, and the Soviet Armed Forces, and which firmly and wisely manages communist development in the USSR and the strengthening of the country's defensive might.

The glory of the Soviet Armed Forces will never fade because they have always fought for a just cause. In defending the Soviet Union they have also honorably fulfilled their international duty. They defended the socialist Homeland of the working people of all the world, brought freedom and independence to other peoples, and vigilantly stood and continue to stand on guard in defense of peace and socialism, and the building of communism.

The eternally living glory of the Soviet Armed Forces also is evidenced by the fact that their heroic accomplishments do not remain merely the property of history. They are embodied, live and are furthered in today's affairs of the Soviet Armed Forces, as well as of armies of other socialist states. The invaluable combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces is like an inextinguishable beacon which shows the fraternal armies the

true road to the heights of success in training and service in peacetime and to the achievement of victory in battle.

Finally, the fame of our Armed Forces will live through the ages also because they not only protect the peaceful labor of the Soviet people, but also objectively fulfill the role of a faithful guardian of the security of nations on the entire planet.

Our Communist Party consistently and persistently puts into effect the peace program outlined by the 24th CPSU Congress, as well as the program of further struggle for peace and international cooperation, for freedom and independence of peoples—the Program worked out at the 25th Congress of our Party. Soviet soldiers along with all the people fervently support the fundamental, class-oriented foreign policy of the Party and government, which is directed toward a relaxation of international tension, a further strengthening of the unity of socialist countries, all possible assistance to peoples fighting for their social and national liberation, and cooperation with all states in ensuring the peace and security of nations.

At the same time one cannot help but consider that in spite of the process of relaxation of international tension taking place under the influence of the peaceloving policy of the USSR and other countries of the socialist community, the reactionary imperialists circles have not given up their aggressive schemes. They are attempting to hinder the practical implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. They are trying to set up a curtain of lies and slander about countries of socialism, to distort the truth about the new society, and unleash anti-Soviet hysteria at any cost. They are stubbornly drawing the nations onto the path of the "cold war" and a continuation of the arms race. This confirms in all obviousness the truth of the statement by the Communist Party that the aggressive nature of imperialism has not changed, and as long as it exists, the threat of a new world war is also preserved. Therefore our Party takes measures to further develop the economic and defense might of the USSR, to strengthen the combat power of the Soviet Armed Forces.

This book is not a history of the Soviet Armed Forces. That is rather widely illuminated in our literature. The historical background is taken only as a basis for revealing the main content of the book: the sources of the inexhaustible force and combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, the natural patterns of their victories, and the nature of action of these patterns under present conditions and in a possible future war in case the reactionary circles of imperialism attempt to impose one on us.

Among the most important factors determining the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces are above all the socialist social system of our state, its economy, policy and Marxist-Leninist ideology, the ideological-

political unity of society, Soviet patriotism and friendship of peoples of the USSR, the national and international character of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the Communist Party's management of all military development.

Taking advantage of the objective opportunities which are part of the socialist system, the Communist Party ensures the thorough equipping of the Armed Forces with modern weapons, combat equipment and other supplies, the steady development of Soviet military science and military art, training of personnel and instilling in them high combat efficiency and morale and an unwavering faith in the triumph of the cause of communism.

In preparing this book the author has attempted to show the noble countenance of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Socialist State and their high combat power, utter devotion to the people, the Communist Party and the bright ideals of communism, and their readiness at any moment to offer a resolute rebuff to any enemy who dares infringe on the integrity and inviolability of the sacred borders of the Homeland, and its state interests.

The author hopes that the book will help readers abroad to understand correctly the social role of the Soviet Armed Forces, their national nature, the sources of high moral and combat qualities of Armed Forces personnel, the basis of their combat might and invincibility in battles with aggressors.

Chapter 1. An Army Born of the Great October

The Soviet Armed Forces—an army of liberated working people and peasants and a tool for defending their revolutionary achievements—were created together with the formation of the first socialist state in the world. They have been carrying out this mission with honor and dignity throughout their entire history.

In less than 30 years—from their birthday to 1945—our Armed Forces spent some 10 years in battles and military campaigns. They were able to withstand such a strain and win world-historic victories only because they are one flesh with the people and invariably enjoy the people's love and support; because the Soviet Armed Forces have highly aware personnel armed with leading Marxist-Leninist theory and devoted to their people and the socialist Motherland; because they are directed by the great party of communists, the fighting vanguard of the working class and all the toiling people, which has been tested and tempered in class battles; and because they have always waged just wars in the interests of the working people and have defended both their socialist achievements and the most just and humane social system—socialism.

The birth and development of the Soviet Armed Forces and their heroic combat path are inseparably connected with the activity of the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin. Vladimir Il'ich Lenin worked out and scientifically based the military program of the proletarian revolution, the doctrine on defense of the socialist Homeland, and the fundamental principles of developing a military organization of a victorious proletariat. Being at the head of the Party and state, he directly managed the creation of the Red Army, precisely determined its missions and paths of further improvement, and laid the foundations for the military science of socialism. Herein lies one of the greatest historic services of V. I. Lenin to the Soviet people and to the entire world revolutionary movement.

1. Defense of the Revolution—An Objective Necessity

One of the most important places in the Marxist-Leninist teaching on the revolutionary transformation of society is occupied by the problem

of the proletariat's armed defense of its socialist achievements. K. Marx and F. Engels, in developing a theory of proletarian revolution under concrete historical conditions—the era of premonopoly capitalism—arrived at the conclusion that a socialist revolution is capable of achieving victory simultaneously in all or, at the very least, in the most developed capitalist countries. They were viewing the proletarian revolution not in the form of a brief act, but as a prolonged period of fierce struggle of the working class against the exploiters.

The great founders of scientific communism cautioned that the exploiting classes which had been overthrown and the external counterrevolutionary forces of those states where the revolution had not yet taken place would offer stubborn resistance to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat, would employ reactionary violence, and would attempt to crush the revolution by using a military organization and well-trained standing armies. In this case the workers would be forced to defend their socialist achievements with weapons in hand.

K. Marx and F. Engels pointed out that the question of the need for armed defense of socialist achievements would arise before the working class immediately after accomplishment of the revolution. They showed in detail in a number of works that in order for the proletariat to accomplish a victorious socialist revolution, consolidate its dictatorship and ensure development of a socialist society, it would need its own military organization. K. Marx and F. Engels taught that in order to win victory over the class enemies the proletariat had to be armed, organized and disciplined. A resolute rebuff had to be given to any attempt on the part of the bourgeoisie to disarm it.

The experience of the Paris Commune and the subsequent revolutionary struggle by the international proletariat fully confirmed the correctness of these propositions. On the path to socialist transformations of society the working class each time has been faced by united world counterrevolutionary forces which in order to stifle the proletarian revolution inflicted cruel reprisals on its fighters and employed all forms of violence. Life itself advanced an urgent task for the revolution: the arming of the working class, and the creation of its military organization.

Meanwhile, K. Marx and F. Engels did not examine in their works the question of an armed defense of the proletarian revolution if it won initially only in one country. History presented that problem later, and it was up to the party of Bolsheviks and V. I. Lenin to solve it.

In developing the thoughts of K. Marx and F. Engels as applied to new historical conditions, V. I. Lenin worked out a complete doctrine on defense of the socialist Homeland, thus making a very major contribution to the treasure house of Marxism. In this doctrine he developed the ideas of the founders of Marxism about the essence and content of war and its

dependence on politics and economics, on the need for armed defense of the socialist state, and on creation of its military organization. He provided an answer to many other military questions which arose from the experience of the struggle by the working class and all toilers against the aggressive forces of the old world.

V. I. Lenin's scientific substantiation of the objective need for an armed defense of the state of a dictatorship of the proletariat against the military onslaught of capitalist states stemmed directly from the great scientific discovery he made of the possibility of breaking the chain of world imperialism at its weakest link and of a victory of socialism initially in one or more countries. V. I. Lenin wrote that "this has to give rise not only to friction, but the direct attempt by the bourgeoisie of other countries to rout the victorious proletariat of the socialist state. In these cases a war on our part would be legal and just. It would be a war for socialism and for the liberation of other nations from the bourgeoisie."¹

V. I. Lenin's substantiation of the question about the need for an armed defense of the socialist Homeland is extremely clear, logical and well argued: because imperialism, which is aggressive in nature, possesses military force, a socialist state cannot hold back capitalism's predatory aspirations or deal it a defeat in case of war in any way other than by having at its disposal the appropriate armed forces. Revolutionary violence against the exploiters in retaliation for violence on their part is the sacred right of the people who have risen to fight for their liberation.

V. I. Lenin relied on the theory of scientific communism and the practice of the masses' revolutionary creativity in working out the socio-political and organizational principles of the military organization of a socialist state. V. I. Lenin's doctrine on defense of the socialist Homeland became a component of his plan for building socialism and communism by means of the victorious proletariat. This lay at the foundation of the Communist Party's policy in the field of organization of the country's defense, military development and management of the Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin foresaw, from the very first days of the Soviet Republic's existence it was faced with the necessity of defending its freedom and independence in fierce military battles against numerous foreign and domestic enemies. In organizing the country's defense, the Communist Party was constantly guided by V. I. Lenin's doctrine on defense of the socialist Homeland. The entire history of the USSR, the victorious struggle by our people against the class enemy in the October Revolution and in the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, and the labor successes during the years of peaceful construction provided a brilliant confirmation to the correctness of genial V. I. Lenin's plans.

¹V. I. Lenin, *Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy* (Complete Collected Works), XXX, 133. [All subsequent references to V. I. Lenin's *Complete Collected Works* will list only volume and page numbers.]

Thus, the conclusions of K. Marx and F. Engels on the possibility of defensive wars of victorious socialism and the doctrine developed by V. I. Lenin on defense of the socialist Homeland armed the Party with scientific theses about the need for creating a new type of army which was called upon to serve the interests of the proletariat in its struggle against the overthrown exploiting classes of our country and for repulsing foreign imperialist aggression. Development of such an army—the army of the Great October—was a concrete expression of one of the general patterns of the revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.

Along with the birth of the Soviet Republic there arose internal sources of an economic, political and spiritual nature that were thoroughly developed; they determined the superiority of the socialist military organization over the bourgeois organization. With his insight of genius, V. I. Lenin revealed these sources and indicated to the Party the real path to strengthening the state's defenses. While still on the eve of October he stressed that our country could be given a defensive capability only through elimination of the dominance of capital, nationalization of banks and plants, transfer of land to the peasants, a decisive break with imperialism in domestic and foreign policy, overthrow of the bourgeois government and establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat. This was a revolutionary path of fundamental economic and social transformations, of conversion of an imperialist war into a civil war, of elimination of the dominance of capitalists, and transfer of power to Soviets of Working People's, Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies.

With the transfer of power into the hands of the working people, the First Party Program provided for the replacement of a standing army by an armed populace. This was supposed to find its embodiment in creation of a militia system of armed forces.

In working out the basic posture for a military organization of the proletariat, F. Engels noted that with respect to military development there was—by that time—experience in the organization and combat application of two systems of armed forces. This consisted of a regular army (mercenary or recruited) and a militia (armed home guard), based on universal military obligation. F. Engels preferred the militia system as one which most fully met the task of breaking the bourgeois state machine, destroying the old army and creating a military organization of a victorious proletariat. In his opinion, the victory of a socialist revolution in the chief capitalist countries would remove from the agenda the requirement for a permanent cadre army.

Later, after he analyzed the experience of the US Civil War and noted the shortcomings of the militia system, which especially began to appear with the development of weapons and methods of employing combat troops, F. Engels arrived at the conclusion that in order to wage defensive

wars against the bourgeoisie under specific conditions the proletariat would require a mass army, the base of which would be made up of regular armed forces. He wrote that "... any rational military organization cannot help but represent something between the Prussian (regular army—A.G.) and Swiss (militia—A.G.) systems, but exactly what? That will depend in each individual instance on the circumstances. Only a society which is arranged and *brought up* in a communist spirit can very closely approximate a militia system, but even then will not fully achieve it."² Consequently, the proletariat has to determine the concrete form of military organization based on the historic situation.

V. I. Lenin carefully took account of F. Engels' theses on the army of a socialist state. He developed them theoretically and brilliantly implemented them in practice. He believed that to break the military bureaucratic machine of the bourgeoisie, the socialist revolution had to arm the working class, create a working people's militia in the form of detachments of the Red Guards, and win the soldiers and sailors of the old army over to the side of the proletariat. In accordance with this, even before the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party advanced the thesis on replacement of a standing army with general arming of the people in the form of a working people's and peasants' militia. This would serve the purpose of completely freeing the working people from the yoke of the exploiters and would consolidate the success of the revolution. A militia having close ties with the people was to combine military and state functions.

After the establishment of Soviet power, the Party expected to accomplish this task. It was decreed that there would be a general arming of the working people and disarming of the propertied classes. This signified elimination of the monopoly of the imperialist bourgeoisie in the field of military affairs. For the first time in history a state military organization was formed, not for oppressing working people, but for defending the results of their social and national liberation struggle.

The creation of a military organization of a young socialist state passed through an extremely difficult situation. The intervention of capitalist states and the Civil War imposed on the Soviet people immediately reached threatening proportions and continued to expand. It became clear to the Communist Party that small, poorly armed and weakly trained volunteer units and militia formations of the young land of Soviets, formed at the beginning of the revolution for putting down the resistance of landowners and bourgeoisie, were in no condition to operate successfully against the united forces of external and internal counter-revolution.

The altered conditions required a new solution to the questions involving development of an army. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party

² K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), XXXII, 17-18.

arrived at the conclusion of the need for creation of a mass, regular, well organized and trained army capable of defending Soviet power and withstanding the large armed forces of imperialist states. The volunteer principle of recruiting did not ensure development of such an army. It was necessary to immediately convert to obligatory military service by the compete male population of the country and introduce universal military training of working people. It was a new solution in Marxist theory to the question of forming an army of the victorious proletarian revolution.

The development and practical realization of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army and the fundamental directions of development of the Soviet Armed Forces took place under conditions of a fierce struggle against the Party's manifest and hidden enemies and against "left communists" and their accomplices.

Hiding behind lofty phrases about the "revolutionary path" and "decisive class international policy," the "left communists" headed by Bukharin and with Trotsky's support advocated a course dangerous for the Soviet State. They oriented themselves to "prolonging" the war against German imperialism. In the atmosphere on the eve of the Peace of Brest-Litovsk, when the Republic of Soviets could oppose the military might of Kaiser Germany only with regiments left over from the Czarist Army which had lost their combat effectiveness, such actions threatened the very existence of Soviet power. This adventuristic course, in V. I. Lenin's opinion, was helping imperialists to stifle Soviet Russia and was shoving it into a trap. Under the circumstances, although conclusion of a peace was unprofitable, it still was one of the forms of defense of the socialist Homeland.

The "left communists" blindly followed the slogan of inadmissibility of "defensism" and "defense of the homeland." They scorned the historic circumstances under which the slogan had been born and did not notice the fundamental changes which the Great October Socialist Revolution had introduced. As we know, this slogan was advanced by the Bolsheviks at the beginning of World War I. It exposed the entire falsity of the bourgeois interpretation of homeland. Our Party explained to the masses that a capitalist state is not in the true sense a homeland for the proletariat. It serves as a tool for confirming and supporting the dominance of the bourgeoisie over the laboring masses. Therefore, in a predatory war which is waged by a capitalist state, the proletariat cannot be interested in defending such a homeland. Only by overthrowing the rule of the exploiters and winning political power can the working class create its genuine socialist Homeland, defense of which becomes an objective historic necessity. V. I. Lenin taught that "we are defenders as of 25 October 1917. We are for 'defense of the homeland,' but the patriotic war toward which we are headed is a war for the socialist homeland, for

socialism as the homeland and for the Soviet Republic as the *detachment* of the world army of socialism."³

With the victory of the revolution and having become the ruling class, the proletariat was obligated to defend the socialist Homeland with all resoluteness. This is lawful and just, since it facilitates the confirmation of a new and most advanced social system. It meets the interests not only of working people of its country, but also of the entire international communist and working people's movement and the interests of all progressive mankind. "If a war is waged by the class of exploiters for purposes of strengthening their dominance as a class, this is a criminal war and 'defensism' in such a war is infamy and a betrayal of socialism. If the war is waged by a proletariat which has conquered its bourgeoisie, and it is waged in the interests of strengthening and developing socialism, then the war is lawful and 'sacred.'"⁴ V. I. Lenin taught that one had to take a very serious attitude toward defense of revolutionary achievements and toward defense of the socialist state. One had to thoroughly prepare and strictly consider the correlation of forces.

The history of the Land of Soviets had fully confirmed that military defense of the revolution, and steadfast strengthening of the defenses of the socialist state and the combat capability of its Armed Forces are objective necessities stemming from the natural laws of social development and the features of class struggle between socialism and capitalism. After the victory of the Great October the Soviet people not only had to build a new society, but they also had to defend it with weapons in hand against the counterrevolution and against repeated attempts of international imperialism to destroy the Soviet Union. The Communist Party is constantly concerned to see that the achievements of the USSR in the field of economics, science and culture facilitate a strengthening of its military might and an increase in defensive ability. And V. I. Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist Homeland have served and continue to serve always as a true compass of the Party in determining methods to strengthen the country's defenses and military development.

2. Creation of the Red Army and Navy by the Party and V. I. Lenin, and Organization for Victory in the Civil War.

The task of creating the armed forces of a socialist state was brilliantly solved by the Communist Party under the leadership of V. I. Lenin. In creating the first army of working people and peasants in the world and strengthening its combat effectiveness, the Party was guided by provisions of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, its recommendations on forms and methods of defense of the socialist Fatherland, on the economic, moral-political and scientific-technological preparation of the

³ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 82.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 292.

country for defense and on ways to develop a military organization of a new socialist type.

The Land of Soviets is the most peace-loving state. Predatory goals and unjust wars are alien to it. It is no accident that V. I. Lenin's Decree on Peace was the first legislation of the Soviet Government. The Decree contained a proposal to all warring countries to establish an armistice immediately and begin talks on conclusion of a just and democratic general peace. The honest, consistent, peace-loving foreign policy, which was inherent to the nature of the socialist state, opened the way to justice and equality in international affairs and to peace throughout the world.

However, the Soviet Government's peace initiative was greeted with hostility by international reaction and internal counterrevolution. They were not satisfied by the peace, inasmuch as it did not meet the attempts of the bourgeoisie to achieve their chief goal—to restore the capitalist order in Russia. The war clouds began to gather and a real threat of foreign military intervention and internal counterrevolutionary acts hung over the young Soviet Republic.

The first to begin an uprising were the former Prime Minister of the Provisional Government, Kerenskiy, and the Czarist General Krasnov, who moved their troops against Petrograd. A counterrevolutionary organization knocked together by the right Social Revolutionaries and Mensheviks with the demagogic name of the "Committee to Save the Motherland and the Revolution" came to their aid within the city. An uprising of cadets was begun in Petrograd under the committee's leadership. White Cossack, officer, and cadet units on the Don, in Moscow, Baku, in the Ukraine and in other places offered armed resistance to the establishment of Soviet power. All of them allied themselves with various anti-Soviet scum and were supported by imperialists of the Entente. White Cossack uprisings on the Don headed by General Kaledin and in the South Urals headed by Ataman Dutov, which were generously subsidized by the United States, England and France, represented a special danger. Bourgeois nationalists of the Ukraine, the Caucasus, the Bashkir and Kazakhstan joined with them. This anti-Soviet alliance of counterrevolutionary forces contemplated a campaign against Petrograd and Moscow.

The Communist Party, headed by V. I. Lenin, continued a policy of peace as the basic foreign policy of the socialist state. It took the most energetic steps to defend the socialist Homeland and defeat the counterrevolutionary forces. Red Guard detachments created by the Party in Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Khar'kov, Ivanovo-Voznesensk, Voronezh, Tsaritsyn, the Donbass, the Urals and other industrial centers played an important role here. From the very beginning of the revolution they were the chief armed bulwark of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the matter of overthrowing the dominance of the bourgeoisie and landowners and the winning of power by the working class. Simultaneously, they were the

prototype of the future regular Working People's and Peasants' Red Army.

With the active support of all the toiling people, fighters of the Red Guards and the revolutionary sailors and soldiers used decisive and selfless actions to eliminate the main centers of counterrevolution and to assure conditions for a triumphal procession of Soviet power throughout the country. Internal reaction was in no condition, without outside assistance, to withstand the mighty revolutionary wave which rolled from Petrograd to the distant regions of Russia.

In December 1917, at the cost of enormous efforts, the Soviet Government attained an armistice with Germany and its allies. The Republic of Soviets was faced with the prospects of turning it into a prolonged and stable peace, tearing loose from the shackles of war, consolidating Soviet power in outlying areas, beginning a peaceful economic development and attaining a rapid uplift of the country's entire economy.

These prospects embittered and frightened international imperialism. The latter could not reconcile itself in any way with the existence of a state of working people and peasants or with the consolidation of a new social system. The departure of Russia from the war also was not in its interests. Then British Prime Minister, Lloyd George wrote: "If Russia is not drawn into the war, then the revolution will be one of the greatest factors to determine the fate of the masses in all countries which mankind has had to observe or experience at any time."⁵

The imperialists expanded aid to the Russian counterrevolution out of fear that the October Revolution would serve as an example for the working people of other countries and threaten the very existence of the capitalist system. In spite of the armistice concluded with Germany, it was still possible that Germany would renew military actions against the Republic of Soviets.

The Communist Party and V. I. Lenin realistically evaluated the military danger and indicated to the people the only correct path—to mobilize all forces for defense. On 28 (15) January 1918 the Council of Peoples' Commissars adopted a decree on organization of the Working People's and Peasants' Red Army, and on 11 February (29 January) a decree on creation of the Working People's and Peasants' Red Navy. Formation of military units of all sizes began throughout the country. This work was performed with special intensity after the hordes of Kaiser Germany broke the armistice and on 18 February attacked across the entire front, creating a threat to Petrograd.

On 21 February the Soviet Government appealed to the people with a decree proclamation written by V. I. Lenin entitled "The Socialist

⁵ David Lloyd George, *Voyennyye memuary* (War Memoirs), Vol. V, Translated from English. Moscow, Sotsekgiz, 1938, p. 63.

Homeland is in Danger!" Martial Law was introduced in Petrograd and troops and the Baltic Fleet were brought to military readiness. On 23 February working people's rallies were held everywhere in connection with general mobilization. To mark the beginning of mass mobilization of revolutionary forces for the defense of the socialist Homeland and also the courageous resistance of Red Army detachments against the German invaders, this day entered the history of our Motherland as the day of birth of the Red Army. V. I. Lenin wrote that "the week of 18 through 24 February 1918 will go down as one of the greatest historic turning points in the history of the Russian—and the international—revolution."⁶

From the very beginning the Red Army was organized around Red Guards detachments and detachments of revolutionary soldiers and sailors as a class army, connected by inseparable ties with the people and united by a high political awareness and an iron military discipline. It stood up staunchly in defense of the young Soviet Republic and blocked the path of the Kaiser's troops.

Right after the attack by the troops of Kaiser Germany in the spring of 1918, imperialists of the Entente undertook an intervention against the Land of Soviets. It began in the first days of March by an invasion of Anglo-French troops in the North with the aim of occupying the Murmansk region. In the middle of March a decision was made at a London conference of prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs of England, France and Italy on "allied intervention in Eastern Russia" with the inclusion of Japan.

The situation began to deteriorate rapidly. German troops occupied a considerable part of the Ukraine, captured the Crimea and the Donbass and developed an offensive against the Caucasus. A counterrevolutionary uprising of the Czechoslovakian Corps, provoked and supported by imperialists of the Entente, flared up in Siberia and the Far East in May. The English introduced troops into the Transcaucasus and Turkestan. The young Republic of Soviets was in a fiery ring of fronts.

The forces of the combatants were clearly uneven. While immediately after the Great October Socialist Revolution the victorious proletariat had to overcome the armed resistance chiefly of the overthrown exploiting classes, in the spring of 1918 the chief danger was foreign military intervention, which again allowed the still functioning internal counter-revolution to raise its head. It was in the spring of 1918 that the Civil War took on especially acute forms. Without the assistance of foreign interventionists and their direct participation in military actions against the Soviet Republic, the internal counterrevolution would not have been able to hold out so long and the Civil War in Russia would have ended much earlier. V. I. Lenin said at the 8th All-Russian Confederation of the RKP (b) [Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) that "worldwide

⁶ V. I. Lenin, XXXV, 393.

imperialism . . . caused us essentially to have a civil war and it is guilty of dragging it out. . . ."⁷

All reactionary forces united under the banner of anti-Sovietism. It was a rather ill-assorted mass of many faces, but it had a common goal of crushing the power of the Soviets and restoring capitalism in Russia. From the military point of view it represented a serious danger. The largest capitalist countries of Europe as well as the United States and Japan took part in the intervention. In 1918 the strength of interventionist troops in Siberia and the Far East exceeded 150,000. Up to 130,000 of the Entente imperialists landed in the southern Ukraine, in the Crimea and in the Transcaucasus. In the North, Miller's White Guards Army was supported by occupation forces numbering over 31,000 men.

Territory seized by the interventionists was converted into bases for supplying the White Guards. World imperialism armed and supplied the armies of Kolchak and Denikin with everything necessary. At different periods the strengths of these two armies reached 400,000 and 110,000 men respectively. As early as May 1918 the overall strength of White Guards and interventionist troops was at least 700,000. At that time, a little over 300,000 men were in the Red Army.

In order to repulse the onslaught of numerous enemies, the Soviet State had to mobilize all its material resources and all the revolutionary energy of the people. At that time the Soviet power existed only over the territory of 28 provinces of the European part of Russia with a population of 64.5 million. Important industrial and food producing areas were in the hands of the interventionists and White Guards. The Civil War drew not only troops, but also broad layers of the population into the orbit of active struggle. One has to consider here that industry, agriculture and transport were exhausted by four years of imperialist war. All this created unbelievable difficulties.

Simultaneously with development of the Red Army, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin directed its heroic struggle at the fronts. The life of the country, which had been turned into a single military camp, was re-adjusted to conform to the demands of war. Although the national economy already was experiencing an enormous strain, it was necessary to expand military production. Steps were taken to strengthen command and political cadres of the Red Army and to begin underground and guerrilla warfare in regions seized by the interventionists and White Guards.

The year of 1918 was truly a fighting year for the Red Army. It brought the first victories on almost all fronts. In the fall, part of the middle Volga area was freed from the enemy and formations of the Red Army moved into the foothills of the Urals. In the North the Soviet troops halted the interventionists in fierce fighting. The latter had rushed into the central

⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXXIX, 343.

regions of the country and to a link-up with the Siberian counterrevolution. At the same time the Red Army disrupted the crafty schemes of the White Cossack Ataman Krasnov and General Denikin, who were operating on the Don and in the Northern Caucasus and trying to organize a united campaign against Moscow with other White Guards armies attacking from the east. An important role here was played by the heroic defense of Tsaritsyn by units of the Red Army, the city's proletarian detachments and Donetsk working people. Their selfless actions pinned down the main forces of Denikin's army and prevented the attack it was preparing on Moscow. Counterrevolutionary White Cossacks of the Urals and Astrakhan' were not able to link up with Denikin. By the end of 1918 the German occupiers were, for the most part, finally chased from the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Baltic.

Red Army successes had enormous significance not only in the military-political, but also in the psychological morale aspect. The confidence of working people and peasants, soldiers and sailors, and all the people in the stability of Soviet power and its ability to repulse enemies and achieve victory was strengthened.

This helped to win increasingly broad popular masses, especially the working peasantry, over to the side of the revolution. It allowed the army to be filled with a considerable number of aware defenders of Soviet power. In October 1918 V. I. Lenin said that "... around a half year was needed for the turning point to come. It did come, and it changed the force of the revolution. ... New people came into the army who are giving their lives by the thousands." *

At the same time the brilliant victories of the Red Army brought disorder and uncertainty into the ranks of the counterrevolution and the interventionists, and caused panic and fear in them.

The Party's Central Committee and V. I. Lenin analyzed the military-political situation at hand and the actions of the Red Army. They took steps for further improvement in mobilization, in forming military units, creating permanent reserves, reorganizing supply, realigning control in front and army apparatus, developing Party organizations of the army and navy and strengthening their influence in the troop units. All this led to a strengthening of the Red Army and an increase in its combat might.

The major victories of the Red Army and the steady growth of its combat effectiveness could not help but affect the policy of the imperialists. They undertook a feverish preparation for a broader intervention and support of the White Guards. At a conference at Jassy, where representatives of the United States, England, France and the Russian White Guards organizations took part, and also at the main headquarters of allied forces in Paris, it was decided to begin active operations against the

*V. I. Lenin, XXXVII, 123.

Soviet Republic on all fronts. They planned a main attack against Moscow from the south.

This campaign by the Entente began in November 1918 with the introduction of French and British warships into the Black Sea and landings by interventionists in the ports of Novorossiysk and Odessa and at Sevastopol'. Greek, Romanian and other troops took the place of the ousted German occupiers along with the French and British. The Russian White Guards received large amounts of artillery, small arms, ammunition and supplies.

Yudenich in the Baltic and Kolchak in Siberia prepared their campaigns simultaneously. Having taken the leadership of White Guards troops, Kolchak pronounced himself the "supreme ruler of Russia." The Ukrainian Directory [i.e., Council] deserted to the side of the Entente. The fate of revolutionary achievements again was greatly threatened.

Under these conditions the Soviet Republic concentrated its main efforts against Denikin. At V. I. Lenin's suggestion, the southern front was declared the chief one. Vladimir Il'ich demanded: "Nothing to the West, a little to the East, and (almost) *all* to the South."⁹ This was substantiated strategically by the fact that by using their navy in the Black Sea, the imperialists could deliver reinforcements in a comparatively short time to their own troops and to Denikin's army. In order to prevent this, the Party Central Committee decided to deal a defeat first of all to Denikin's army and to interventionist troops in the South before their reinforcement by the Entente, after which they would begin defeating the enemy on the other fronts.

The proper choice of the decisive battle front and the concentration there of the main efforts brought a turning point in the situation. During January and February 1919 the Red Army routed Denikin's troops and liberated the Left-Bank Ukraine from the enemy.

The 8th RKP(b) Congress held in March 1919 adopted the Second Party Program, worked out under V. I. Lenin's direction. This provided a clear perspective of the Soviet people's struggle for building a socialist society. The policy of a firm alliance of the working class with the middle peasantry, with reliance on the poor and under the leading role of the working class, as worked out by the Party and confirmed by the Congress, played an enormous part in rallying all the republic's forces to the fight against external and domestic enemies and in strengthening Soviet power. The Congress approved V. I. Lenin's course of military development aimed at the organization of a class-based regular army with centralized control and a high discipline. V. I. Lenin defended the Party's line in the sharp political struggle against representatives of the "military

⁹ V. I. Lenin, *L*, 221.

opposition," who were against creation of such an army and were for preservation of partisan methods of controlling troops and waging war.

V. I. Lenin's idea about an alliance with the middle peasants and about building an army on a strictly centralized basis was of particularly urgent and fundamental importance under those specific conditions. In the spring of 1919 the situation of the Land of Soviets despite successes achieved in the South, still remained serious. Active combat operations were going on across a front of up to 8,000 kilometers. However, in contrast to the past, the main front was the Eastern Front where Kolchak's army, well armed by the Entente, was situated. The United States alone, in the first half of 1919, gave it over a quarter million rifles, hundreds of artillery pieces, thousands of machine guns, and a large amount of ammunition and equipment. The army of Kolchak was a military force to be reckoned with.

Not only the Volga area, but the entire republic as well was threatened. Therefore, the Party's main attention was focused on the Eastern Front for immediate organization of a rebuff to Kolchak. In the spirit of decisions of the 8th RKP(b) Congress, the Central Committee adopted a program of action for combating the Kolchak army. The main provisions of this program were set forth in "theses of the RKP(b) CC in connection with the situation on the Eastern Front," which were prepared by V. I. Lenin, and which expressed a firm confidence in a quick and final victory over Kolchak. The theses ended with the appeal: "We must strain every nerve and unfold revolutionary energy, and Kolchak will be defeated quickly. The Volga, the Urals, and Siberia can and must be defended and won."¹⁰

In those same days V. I. Lenin appealed to the Petrograd working people: "We ask the Petrograd working people to *raise up everything, to mobilize all forces* to assist the Eastern Front . . . for there the fate of the revolution is being decided."¹¹

And the country strained every nerve to carry out the appeals of the Party and its leader. The front was reinforced with new Red Army units and with equipment and ammunition. Party, Komsomol and trade union mobilizations were carried out. The Party sent over 15,000 members to the Eastern Front as commissars, commanders and rank and file Red Army men. The Komsomol sent over 3,000 of its members to the front. Trade unions mobilized over 60,000 working people. Party members brought a revolutionary enthusiasm, Bolshevik organization and the spirit of proletarian discipline to the troops tired from constant fighting. After receiving these reinforcements, the political organs and Party organizations began an enormous amount of work to mobilize the soldiers to defeat Kolchak.

¹⁰V. I. Lenin, XXXVIII, 274.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 268.

A turning point soon came to the Eastern Front as a result of the great and intense work of the Party and V. I. Lenin. By the middle of summer 1919 the Red Army had dealt defeat to Kolchak's troops, liberated the Urals and moved into areas of Western Siberia.

The rout of Kolchak did not bring sense to the enemies of Soviet rule. The imperialists again placed reliance on their lost card, Denikin. Military aid was urgently increased for him. During the summer and autumn of 1919, Denikin's troops had captured a large amount of territory in the South and had taken Tsaritsyn, Voronezh, Orel, Chernigov and Kiev. Danger hung over the central regions of Russia. Denikin was threatening to seize Moscow. The Party Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin aroused all the people to eliminate the new threat.

V. I. Lenin's letter to the RKP(b) CC, "Everything for the fight against Denikin!" became a passionate battle call to the communists and all workers of the Soviet Republic, and a political directive of the Red Army. It formulated the Party's political and strategic line: "All forces of working people and peasants and all forces of the Soviet Republic must be strained to repulse the onslaught of Denikin and defeat him without halting the victorious offensive by the Red Army against the Urals and Siberia."¹²

At the Party's call the Soviet Republic mobilized all its resources for the defense of the great achievements of October. Our best units were shifted to the Southern Front. The most experienced Party managers and commanders were sent there from other fronts. Management of military actions was improved and the front's requirements for weapons, ammunition, clothing and food began to be satisfied more fully. Into the regiments of the Southern Front poured 30,000 communists, 10,000 Komsomol members and tens of thousands of trade union members.

By the end of 1919 Denikin's army had been routed and the Red Army had moved to the Black Sea. Yudenich was dealt a defeat at Petrograd.

Having smashed Denikin in the South, Kolchak in the East and Yudenich in the Northwest, the Red Army provided the country a peaceful breather which the Party immediately used to fight economic ruin, restore industry, transport and communications and build up agriculture. But the breathing spell did not last long. In April 1920, fed and urged on by the Entente, the White Polish militarists attacked Soviet Russia. In June they were supported by Vrangel' [Wrangel] with an attack from the Crimea.

By this time the Red Army, which had passed through the forge of battle, numbered over three million fighters who had been tempered in

¹² V. I. Lenin, XXXIX, 45.

battle and who were utterly devoted to the revolution. But the Soviet troops were scattered across enormous fronts. The situation, on the other hand, forced a rapid concentration of main efforts on the Western Front. This was a difficult matter with transportation destroyed. Nevertheless, thanks to the steps taken by the Party Central Committee and the Soviet Government, our troops fighting against the White Polish forces as well as Vrangels' army received considerable reinforcements in a short time. After accomplishing a rapid regrouping, they moved into the offensive and defeated the troops of White Poland and then of Vrangels'.

In this manner, the last henchmen of the Entente were routed at the end of 1920. The Civil War actually ended with this, although the Red Army was still forced to continue for some time in destroying remnants of counterrevolutionary forces in the country's outskirts. With the conclusion of the struggle against the Japanese interventionists and White Guards in the Far East at the end of 1922 and with the elimination of the basmatch* problem in Central Asia at the beginning of 1923, Soviet power triumphed once and for all in every corner of our vast Motherland and military operations ceased everywhere.

For three years the country had been gripped by the flame of civil war. These were years of development and strengthening of the young Soviet State and its army. Under extremely difficult conditions—under enemy blows and during the break-up of the old army, in an unprecedented short period of time, and without experience in military development—V. I. Lenin's Party had to create a new army and direct its combat operations. At the 8th RKP(b) Congress V. I. Lenin said that "we took up a matter which no one in the world had yet undertaken with such a breadth. . . . We went from experience to experience. We were trying to create a volunteer army, feeling our way, groping and testing to see in what manner the task could be accomplished under the given situation. The task was clear. Without the armed defense of the socialist republic we could not exist. The ruling class would never give up their power to the oppressed class. The latter, however, had to prove in fact that it was not only capable of overthrowing the exploiters, but of organizing itself for self-defense and staking everything it had."¹³

In an unbelievably difficult situation, experiencing a shortage of weapons, often half-starving and poorly clothed, but always filled with a high revolutionary spirit and a faith in the rightness of their cause, the Soviet soldiers selflessly fought the well armed, equipped and trained troops of the interventionists and White Guards. The Red Army's victory was above all a victory of the great ideas of the socialist revolution, a victory of the forces of progress and peace over the forces of imperialist reaction.

* [Basmach—a member of the counterrevolutionary band in Central Asia during the Civil War.—U. S. Ed.]

¹³ V. I. Lenin, XXXVIII, 138-139.

The Red Army grew, was tempered and acquired a great deal of experience in battles of the Civil War. Its combat operations unfolded over enormous expanses. They were distinguished by a high activeness, boldness and decisiveness. To this day the Red Army's operations are a source of admiration of our friends and astonishment for our enemies: the defeat of troops of the White Guards and interventionists in the Urals and Siberia, and on the Volga, Don and Kuban'; the assault of Perekop Isthmus and Volochayevka; and the glorious combat exploits of the revolutionary navy in defending Petrograd.

The Red Army won a heroic victory because it fought for a just cause and for freeing working people from capitalist slavery. It also won thanks to the fact that it was led directly by the Communist Party and the great Lenin. The Party and V. I. Lenin outlined the main lines for deciding military tasks. They literally fostered a new army and gave it a revolutionary content and a fighting, revolutionary soul.

The Party Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin was the genuine headquarters for directing the country's defense. Its instructions were the basis for determination of the axes of main attacks, development of plans for military operations, coordination of the combat efforts of the fronts, formation of strategic reserves and accomplishment of their maneuver. A great deal of attention was devoted to supplying the troops with everything necessary. Vladimir Il'ich was constantly concerned with restoration and modernization of plants engaged in the production of weapons, ammunition and military equipment, with supplying the Red Army with food, and with improving the operation of rail and water transportation. He attached particular importance to the development of combat equipment and weapons. His name is connected with the creation of the first Soviet tanks, the output of armored cars and armored trains, and the first experience of combat application of aviation and radio-technical means.

V. I. Lenin was always in the center of political and military events. He had a good knowledge of the situation at the fronts. He masterfully applied the Marxist dialectical method to the solution of military problems. V. I. Lenin operationally directed from day to day the work of the republic's Revvoyensovet [Revolutionary Military Council]. He constantly kept an eye on fulfillment of strategic plans and military directives of the Party and government and controlled the preparations for and conduct of the most important operations.

The following facts attest to V. I. Lenin's colossal activity in directing the armed defense of the Homeland and development of the Red Army and Navy during the years of foreign intervention and civil war. From December 1918 through December 1920 there were 143 sessions of the Defense Council (from the end of March 1920—The Council of Labor and Defense) chaired by V. I. Lenin. During 1919 alone he directed the work of 14 Central Committee plenums and 40 sessions of the RKP(b)

CC Politburo at which military problems were decided which were of vital importance for the country. During the war years Vladimir Il'ich sent over 600 letters and telegrams on military questions to various agencies.

V. I. Lenin's co-workers, prominent figures of the Party and state, also took a direct part in creating and strengthening the new army and in organizing the struggle against interventionists and White Guards. These included A. S. Bubnov, S. I. Gusev, F. E. Dzerzhinskiy, M. I. Kalinin, S. M. Kirov, S. V. Kosior, G. M. Krzhizhanovskiy, V. V. Kuybyshev, A. F. Myasnikov, G. K. Ordzhonikidze, G. I. Petrovskiy, N. I. Podvovskiy, Ya. E. Rudzutak, Ya. M. Sverdlov, I. V. Stalin, M. V. Frunze, A. D. Tsyurupa, Ye. M. Yaroslavskiy and many others. A large group of talented military commanders was brought up under V. I. Lenin's leadership. They played an important part in the subsequent development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Thus the first onslaught of world imperialism, the first attempt by enemies of the revolution to overthrow the power of the Soviets by armed force ended with their total failure. Created and led by the Communist Party and the great Lenin, the Red Army covered itself with undying glory in numerous battles and engagements. It passed the most important stage of its path with honor—that of its formation and coming to manhood in the fight against foreign intervention and the internal counter-revolution. Our victory was a graphic example of the invincible force of the Soviet State, of the firmness of the combat alliance of working people and peasants, and of the might of the military organization of the victorious proletariat.

3. V. I. Lenin's Principles for Creating an Army of a New Type

One of the causes of the brilliant successes in organization of defense and creation of an army of the first socialist state in the world is that the Communist Party managed to properly implement V. I. Lenin's theses on military development and reveal and substantiate the most important principles of organization of the Armed Forces, training and education of personnel, and forms and methods for working people to wage a just, progressive war against internal and external reaction. These theses and principles were checked and refined in the fire of fierce engagements and acquired the force of military doctrine of the proletarian state. In following this doctrine, the Red Army came out the winner in the uneven struggle against the enemies of the socialist Motherland.

Soviet military development—in its broad meaning—is a combination of economic, political, and strictly military measures of our state implemented under the direction of the Communist Party and aimed at ensuring the armed defense of our state. The main component part of

military development is the creation and subsequent strengthening of the Armed Forces.

The most important principles in the development of the Armed Forces of a proletarian state were formulated for the first time in V. I. Lenin's works chiefly on the eve of the October Revolution and in the period of foreign intervention and civil war. V. I. Lenin did not separate them from general principles of Party and state development or from the overall tasks of building socialism. To the contrary, he viewed them as an inseparable, organic unity. V. I. Lenin said that "the development of our army was able to lead to successful results only because it was carried out in the spirit of overall Soviet development . . ." ¹⁴

The permanent significance of V. I. Lenin's principles of the development of the Armed Forces lies in the fact that these principles represent deductions from the generalized military-historical experience of revolutionary struggle by working people against exploiters, the experience of proletarian revolutions and civil wars, and the practice of socialist development. They stem from the objective laws of social development and the laws of warfare. A deep understanding of the content of these principles by military cadres will help them to orient themselves correctly in a military-political situation, find the correct ways to solve complex problems of military development in peacetime, and successfully accomplish combat missions in wartime.

Among the most important of V. I. Lenin's principles of the development of the Soviet Armed Forces are:

- a. direction of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party;
- b. a class approach to development of the Armed Forces;
- c. unity of the army and the people;
- d. loyalty to proletarian internationalism;
- e. cadre organization;
- f. centralization of command of the Armed Forces;
- g. unity of command;
- h. a high degree of military discipline; and
- i. constant readiness of the Armed Forces to repel aggression.

These principles are closely interrelated. They embody the sociopolitical and organizational principles of Soviet military development, as well as the initial theses for leadership of the Armed Forces.

Let us briefly examine the content of these principles.

Direction of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party is the chief principle of Soviet military development. V. I. Lenin believed that the Communist Party's direction was the deciding source of the might of the Red Army and the basis for all its victories. Questions of military policy and direction of the Armed Forces always served as a subject of unremit-

¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, XL, 76-77.

ting attention by V. I. Lenin and the Party Central Committee. The energetic, diversified work of the Party and V. I. Lenin personally in this field during the years of foreign intervention and civil war permitted turning objective premises and potential chances for victory over the enemy into reality. V. I. Lenin stressed that "... only thanks to the fact that the Party was on guard, that the Party was very strictly disciplined, and because the Party's authority united all departments and establishments; and according to the slogan which the Central Committee gave, that tens, hundreds, thousands, and in the final account millions went as one; and only because unheard-of sacrifices were made—only for this reason, could the miracle which happened take place. Only for this reason, in spite of a second, third and fourth campaign by the Entente imperialists and imperialists throughout the world, were we in a position to win."¹⁵

The Party's directing and guiding role in military development was clearly manifested in the Central Committee's efficient, purposeful solutions to all fundamentally important questions involving the defense of the state, creation of the Red Army and Navy, and their arming, supply and conduct of their combat operations. Comprehensively analyzing the developing military-political situation in the country and in the international arena, the Central Committee headed by V. I. Lenin determined the most important measures for strengthening the defensive ability of the Soviet republic and developed concrete strategic plans for defeating troops of the external and internal counterrevolution. It saw to the implementation of operations and skillfully mobilized all forces of the people and the army for defense of the socialist Homeland.

The Party's greatest service in organizing the country's defense and increasing the Armed Forces' combat might also consists in the fact that in any exceptionally difficult situation it always found the most advisable structure and flexible forms and methods of political and military leadership.

The entire history of the Soviet State and its world-historic victories won in battles against enemies of socialism clearly and convincingly demonstrated the vitality of the principle of direction of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party. This principle still remains firm under present conditions. The CPSU Program states: "The most basic fundamental of military development is the Communist Party's direction of the Armed Forces and strengthening of the role and influence of Party organizations in the Armed Forces. The Party devotes unremitting attention to increasing its organizing and guiding influence on the entire life and work of the army, aviation and navy, to rallying personnel of the Armed Forces about the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, to strengthening the unity of the army and the people, and to educating the soldiers in a

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, XL, 240.

spirit of courage, valor, heroism and combat cooperation with armies of socialist countries; they are ready to defend at any moment the Land of the Soviets, which is building communism."¹⁶

This principle requires that military cadres steadily put into effect the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government, proceed always from the interests of the people, and place the interests of defending the socialist Homeland above all else.

The Communist Party's organizing and guiding role in strengthening the country's defensive capability is manifested in the unity of political, economic and military leadership. This unity is determined by the very nature of a socialist society and by the conscious and purposeful nature of its development. This development is being accomplished on the basis of a knowledge and use of the objective laws of social development. During every stage in the history of the Soviet land, the strict coordination in the work of the Party, state and military apparatus, under the directing and guiding role of the Communist Party, made it possible to accomplish state tasks purposefully and efficiently and to concentrate the country's political, economic and military efforts on the resolution of urgent problems of defending the Soviet State and on the creation of an Armed Forces with high combat effectiveness.

The vitality and effectiveness of such unity is also determined by the fact that it reflects the dependence of strategy on politics and economics, of strategic tasks on the political goals of war and the state's economic capabilities, and their close interconnection.

The very existence of the unity of political, economic and military control is determined by the system of socialist social relations and by the Soviet state system. The implementation of this principle in practice permits scheduled use of the advantages of socialism in the fight against the enemies of our state and in strengthening the defensive might of the Motherland.

The consistent and steadfast observance of unity of political, economic and military control at all levels of responsibility was of very great importance in winning victory over the interventionists and White Guards. The Red Army's successes would have been unthinkable without the enormous organizational and ideological-educational work of the Party and its Central Committee in mobilizing the people to decisively rebuff the counterrevolution.

Observance of this requirement also played an enormous role in the winning of victory by the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War. The concentration of the basic functions of the country's leadership by the Party during the war in a single agency—the State Committee for

¹⁶ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (Program of the CPSU). Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, p. 112.

Defense (GKO)—made it possible to make most rational use of all the material and spiritual forces of the Soviet people to ensure the vitality of the state and the defeat of the enemy.

In accomplishing the complex and many-sided tasks of strengthening the state's defensive capability, the Party indisputably fulfills V. I. Lenin's demands for a scientific, objective and competent management of military development at all echelons, and for a precise and rigid control over the fulfillment of issued directives and instructions.

The scientific approach to questions of military development is determined by the nature of direction as a process aimed toward fullest use of the objective laws of social development and the laws of warfare. Lenin taught that science "shows us the manifestation of fundamental laws in the seeming chaos of phenomena."¹⁷ Successful direction of military development presumes constant reliance on a firm base of Marxist-Leninist science.

During the period of foreign intervention and civil war, the Party's implementation of the demand for scientific direction of military development took place in the fight against subjectivism, spontaneity and the anarchism of "left" oppositionists and Trotskyites. In overcoming their resistance, the Party built its military policy on a genuinely scientific basis, with consideration for the real military-economic capabilities of the young Republic of Soviets.

The steadfast observance of V. I. Lenin's thesis on scientific management in the field of military development became one of the most important premises for the Red Army's defeat of foreign interventionists and White Guards during the Civil War, for steady strengthening of the Soviet State's defensive ability in the years of peaceful socialist construction, and also for achievement of victory by the Soviet Armed Forces during the Great Patriotic War.

This thesis has prime significance under present conditions. It orients military cadres on the profound study of military affairs and the laws and natural patterns of warfare, and on mastery of the art of leading troops. Scientific basis in the resolution of questions of military development demands that commanders-in-chief and commanders, staffs and political organs be thorough and objective in analyzing the factors influencing the effectiveness of combat, operational and political training of troops, and in making decisions, that they carefully evaluate all elements of the situation and reveal the political, military-technical and moral-psychological potentials of their own troops and those of the enemy.

The scientific principle in military affairs is manifested in the unity of theory and practice, in the capability of commanders to seek out all

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXV, 46.

possibilities to increase the troops' combat readiness and find the optimum version of actions in performing the assigned mission, in the flexibility of operational-tactical thinking, in the proper choice of the most effective forms and methods of military operations in a specific situation, and also in the skillful use of historical experience and the latest achievements of science and technology.

A scientific approach is unthinkable without objectivity of management or without the ability to see and consider the phenomena of life as they are, in all their complexity and dialectical contradictory nature. In resolving military problems it is extremely important to approach matters "from the standpoint of the factors of warfare and class relationships. . . ." ¹⁸

Objectivity is inseparable from the competence of the manager. V. I. Lenin remarked that "any aspect of management demands special attributes. . . In order to manage, one must be competent, one has to know all conditions of production fully and to the letter, and one has to know the technology of this production at its contemporary level. . . ." ¹⁹

The importance of objectivity and competence of management in military affairs has risen in our days in connection with the outfitting of troops with new combat equipment and the sharp increase in complexity of the organization and conduct of military operations. Without a deep knowledge of contemporary weapons, their combat capabilities and methods of employment, one cannot organize a battle or operation, or lead troops.

Control of execution plays a large part in military development. In directing the actions of the Red Army to defeat the interventionists and White Guards, the Party and V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed that skillful control over the execution of directives and orders is an important component of military management. They sought to achieve the strictest precision and punctuality of fulfillment of missions assigned to fronts, armies, divisions, units, and warships. An objective, well adjusted, effective control helped opportunely to reveal weak places and mistakes in work, and to identify the needs of fronts and react in a timely manner to them.

Improvements in the forms and methods of control and strengthening of its effectiveness continued during the Great Patriotic War.

In developing V. I. Lenin's thesis on the organization of control under contemporary conditions, the Communist Party is concerned to see that its effectiveness is increased even more and that a check of execution is improved. It teaches us to provide an evaluation from actual results, from deeds, and not words. Control and check of execution not only

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, XXXVIII, 283.

¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, XL, 215.

mean a determination of shortcomings, but a deep study, generalization and active adoption in practice of positive experience and the dissemination of advanced techniques and methods of activity.

One of the important principles is the **class approach to development of the Armed Forces**. The class principle is used in armies of all states, but bourgeois military theoreticians attempt to camouflage the class essence of imperialist armies because it is deeply antinational. We, however, proclaim the class principle openly, thus stressing the truly popular nature of the socialist army and its inseparable ties with the people.

The class principle of development of the Soviet Armed Forces expresses their qualitatively new essence and new content. It is diametrically opposed to the class character of imperialist armies. While in a bourgeois state the army is used to support and strengthen the dominance of exploiting classes, our Armed Forces protect the interests of all Soviet people and their great socialist achievements.

The class essence of our army is clearly expressed in one of the first legislative acts of Soviet rule, the "Declaration of the rights of the toiling and exploited people," which states: "In the interests of providing the full completeness of power to the toiling masses and eliminating any possibility of the restoration of power of the exploiters, it is decreed that the working people be armed, that a socialist Red Army of working people and peasants be formed, and that the propertied classes be totally disarmed."²⁰ As can be seen from this document, the honor and the right to bear arms for the defense of the socialist Motherland was given only to working people. The non-working elements were given other military responsibilities connected with supporting the defense of the USSR.

Approaching the forms of organization of the army dialectically, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin viewed the class limitations of recruitment into the Armed Forces as temporary as far back as the first years of Soviet power. The need for these limitations in manning the Armed Forces disappeared with the victory of socialism in the USSR. The principle of equality of the right and duty of all citizens to serve in the Armed Forces began to be carried out widely and comprehensively, inasmuch as the exploiters as a class were eliminated in our country and an inviolable sociopolitical and ideological unity of Soviet society formed on the basis of a commonality of interests of working people, peasants and the popular intelligentsia. Defense of the socialist Homeland became the sacred duty of every citizen of the USSR. However, even after this our army did not lose its class, sociopolitical content. As before, it is a faithful defender of the achievements of the Great October and the cause of building communism. However, its class direction is now turned exclusively toward the outside.

²⁰ *Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti* (Decrees of Soviet Power), Vol. I. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1957, p. 322.

Among the determining sociopolitical principles in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces an important one is that of **unity of the army and people**. Its basis is the deep closeness of the Soviet power to the popular masses and its close and organically inseparable ties with working people, peasants and the popular intelligentsia. V. I. Lenin wrote that the "Soviets are a new state apparatus which provides, first of all, an armed force of working people and peasants. This force is not separated from the people as was that of the old standing army, but is connected with them in the closest manner. In the military sense this force is incomparably more powerful than previous ones. In the revolutionary sense it is absolutely irreplaceable."²¹

One of the most important sources of the might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces is their revolutionary character and very close ties with the people. The Soviet people love their army and do everything necessary to steadily strengthen its combat effectiveness.

The Communist Party instills in the Soviet people a spirit of constant readiness to defend the socialist Homeland and of respect for their Armed Forces. The Soviet soldiers in turn answer with a deep, mutual national love. They are utterly devoted to the people and selflessly defend their interests against infringement by the imperialists.

Faithfulness to proletarian internationalism is also among the fundamental principles in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. In conformity with V. I. Lenin's ideas about the equal rights of all nations and nationalities, the Red Army and Navy were created from the very beginning as a uniform, multinational military organization of the socialist state. To bring up personnel in a spirit of friendship and brotherhood among peoples of the USSR and in unquestioning dedication to the Soviet Motherland is one of the decisive conditions for the monolithic stability of the Soviet Armed Forces.

At the international level the Leninist principle of proletarian internationalism is expressed under present day conditions in the commonality of social goals and tasks, in the fraternal solidarity of countries of socialism, in the combat cooperation of their armies, and in solidarity with the working people of the whole world. In defending the class interests of their people, the Soviet Armed Forces are also defending the interests of the working people of countries of the socialist community and their peaceful creative labor. Together with armies of the fraternal socialist states, they ensure the stability of the borders of the socialist community as the most important achievement of the international working class. Armies of countries of the socialist community stand a vigilant guard over universal peace and the security of nations. Their noble work answers the goals of all progressive mankind.

²¹ V. I. Lenin, XXXIV, 304.

The principle of **cadre organization** of the Armed Forces means that the functions of defense of the people's socialist achievements can be accomplished only by a regular, well trained and strictly disciplined army. This principle was substantiated by V. I. Lenin in the years of foreign intervention and civil war and received further development in subsequent stages of Soviet military development. It now serves as the basis for the entire military system of the Soviet State. The need for this is dictated by the nature of the international situation, the importance of missions of our Armed Forces, the presence of complex military equipment in the arsenal of units and warships and the high demands on training of personnel which stem from this.

Under conditions of an existing threat of war, including a nuclear missile war, the cadre organization of the Soviet Armed Forces makes it possible to maintain their high combat readiness and in case of an aggressor's attack to mobilize and deploy strategically in the shortest possible time.

The principle of **centralization of command** is determined by the very specifics of military organization and the missions to be performed by the army. Its essence is that the military command, guided by decisions of the Communist Party, its Central Committee, and the Soviet Government, unifies the efforts of subordinate troops and directs them toward steadfastly increasing the state's defensive capability, the combat readiness of the Armed Forces in peacetime, and toward winning victory in wartime.

The principle of centralization is expressed in the precise delineation of functions of military command organizations, in the absolute subordination of lower echelons to superior echelons, and in assurance of the strictest organization and discipline in the Armed Forces. In V. I. Lenin's evaluation, only the "uniform command of all detachments of the Red Army and the strictest centralization in the disposition of all forces and resources of the socialist republics"²² were capable of creating the necessary prerequisites for routing the White Guard armies and interventionist troops.

V. I. Lenin understood the principle of centralization in the command of the Armed Forces as an aspect of the principle of democratic centralism as it applied to the conditions of a military organization. Such democratic centralism lies at the basis of Party and Soviet development.

Observance of the principle of centralization during the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars ensured an effective and at the same time an economic application of available forces and means. It permitted the command to have a decisive influence on the course of military operations, to maneuver reserves skillfully and to coordinate with precision the operations of units of all sizes.

²² V. I. Lenin, XXXVIII, 400.

The Party firmly and strictly puts the principle of centralization into effect in the development of the Armed Forces. At the same time, the Party never lets the principle conflict with the creativity and initiative of the military leaders or with their display of boldness and independence in seeking out the best ways to accomplish combat missions and in using forces and means to achieve the overall goal of defeating the enemy.

At the present stage, centralism in the organizational structure and at the command level of the Soviet Armed Forces is determined by the complexity and diversity of tasks which face them. In this situation, as the CPSU Program notes, the Party is doing everything to ensure that the Soviet Armed Forces are an efficient and well adjusted organism, that they have high organization and discipline, that they perform the tasks assigned them by the Party, government and people in exemplary fashion, and that they are ready at any moment to offer a crushing rebuff to the imperialist aggressors.

The principle of **unity of command** is closely allied with the principle of centralization and proceeds from it. This is the most important organizational principle in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces. It arose and was confirmed in our Armed Forces over a period of time. In the years of foreign intervention and civil war, in connection with an absence of a sufficient number of command cadres from among the people who were trained in the military and political sense, the organization of control of various Red Army units was built on the basis of the equal responsibility of two persons—the commander and the commissar—for the state of combat readiness of the division or regiment and for their performance of combat missions. Under those concrete historical conditions, such a form of control was justified. The commissars played an important role in increasing the combat effectiveness of the army and navy.

Subsequently, as the command element in the Armed Forces grew stronger and its political awareness and military-theoretical level grew, there was no longer reason for preserving the institution of military commissars. Relying on civil war experience, V. I. Lenin concluded that it was necessary to convert to the principle of unity of command in the Red Army and Navy, and he proved it was an objective and natural adaptation.

The Trotskyites and "left" opportunists offered a great deal of resistance to the establishment of unity of command. Under the guise of a diffuse collegiality they attempted to implant a plurality of authority in the Armed Forces and in the final account to disorganize military command and control. V. I. Lenin acted decisively against this. He stated that "irresponsibility cloaked in references to collective leadership is the most dangerous evil which threatens everyone who does not have a great deal of experience in business-like collective leadership work, and which

quite often leads unavoidably to catastrophe, chaos, panic, a multiplicity of authority and defeat in military affairs.”²³

V. I. Lenin's works show the insolvency of petty-bourgeois assertions that one-man management [unity of command] as a form of organization and leadership allegedly contradicts socialist social relations, and that this allegedly is an attribute of the past. V. I. Lenin wrote that “. . . any major machine industry, i.e., the material and production source and the foundation of socialism, demands absolute and very strict *unity of will*, which guides the joint work of hundreds, thousands and tens of thousands of people. This need is technically, economically and historically obvious. Everyone who has thought about socialism has always recognized this need as its condition. But how can this very strict unity of will be assured? By subordinating the will of thousands to the will of one.”²⁴ “The will of hundreds and tens of thousands can be expressed in one person. This complex will is being developed by a Soviet method.”²⁵

In supporting the principle of unity of command, V. I. Lenin simultaneously cautioned against its narrow, one-sided understanding so that leadership would not turn into sheer administration by mere injunction or of an abuse of authority, but would be politically mature and highly qualified.

V. I. Lenin's principle of unity of command is founded on a Party basis. This means that the commander or one-man manager is a representative of the Communist Party and Soviet State among the troops, that he is their trusted agent, the steadfast conductor of their line and the strict observer of Soviet laws and military regulations. He bears full responsibility for the combat effectiveness of the subunit, unit, warship or large unit and for successful fulfillment of combat missions.

Authority and responsibility are merged in the person of the Soviet commander and one-man manager. He is a qualified specialist, an expert in his field, and at the same time a skillful organizer, a perceptive leader and a thoughtful educator. Only by embodying the qualities of a political and military leader is the commander equal to his tasks and capable of uniting and expressing the will of many people. By steadfastly putting Party decisions into effect, the commander relies on the support and authority of political organs, Party organizations and all communists.

Application of the principle of unity of command does not deny the collective forms of control. In the Soviet Armed Forces, collective leadership and one-man management act at different levels in dialectical unity,

²³ V. I. Lenin, XXXIX, 46.

²⁴ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 200.

²⁵ V. I. Lenin, XL, 309.

forming a harmonious and historically justified system of military leadership. An example of this may be found in military councils that exist in the services of the Armed Forces and in military districts and fleets.

As a principle in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces, **a high degree of conscious military discipline** is an inalienable quality of the Soviet Armed Forces. V. I. Lenin attached an enormous amount of importance to military discipline. He viewed it as the most important factor of troop combat effectiveness and demanded that commanders and commissars maintain strict order and organization in units and on warships. V. I. Lenin's words are well known from his "Letter to Working People and Peasants on the Occasion of the Victory over Kolchak:" "Whosoever does not help the Red Army wholly and selflessly, and does not maintain order and discipline in it with all his might is a traitor and turncoat. . . ." ²⁶

V. I. Lenin revealed the class content of Soviet military discipline. He showed that it is built on a high political awareness on the part of personnel. He stressed that "the Red Army has created an unprecedented firm discipline, not under the lash, but on the basis of awareness, devotion and selflessness on the part of the working people and peasants themselves." ²⁷

It was the high discipline and moral steadfastness of Soviet soldiers and their understanding of their duty and responsibility for the fate of the socialist Motherland which was one of the most important reasons for our victories over the forces of external and internal counterrevolution in the years of foreign intervention and civil war and over fascist Germany and militarist Japan during the Great Patriotic War.

Under contemporary conditions the role of discipline has risen even higher. The nature of possible war and increasing complexity of all military affairs demand a strict and unquestioning fulfillment of regulations and commanders' orders, a high degree of organization, and rapid, precise and smooth actions both by individual soldiers and by soldiers' collectives as a whole.

The principle of **constant readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces to repel aggression** and to defend the socialist achievements of working people is predetermined by the existence of a threat of war emanating from the imperialist states. V. I. Lenin repeatedly stressed the exceptionally great role of this principle. He cautioned the Soviet people and the Armed Forces about the vital necessity to be on the alert for the intrigues of enemies, observe revolutionary vigilance and be always on guard. The Communist Party, in strictly fulfilling V. I. Lenin's behests, is doing everything to keep the Armed Forces in a state of high combat readiness, the importance of which has now grown immeasurably.

²⁶ V. I. Lenin, XXXIX, 152.

²⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXXVIII, 240.

These are the most important principles of development of the Soviet Armed Forces. Some of them are similar in form to those which are also applied in capitalist armies. They include, for example, the principles of unity of command and centralization. But this is only a superficial, apparent similarity. The class basis and mechanism of operation of the given principles in a bourgeois society are completely different. They embody the system of capitalist relationships based on the exploitation of man by man. While in bourgeois armies unity of command is built exclusively on administration and the mechanical obedience of juniors to seniors, supported by a special system of ideological cultivation of servicemen, in the Soviet Armed Forces it is based on the recognition by all personnel of their military duty, on a profound respect for the commander and supervisor as one who expresses the interests of the people, on unquestioning faith in him on the part of subordinates, on the commander's high authority, and on the firm principles of communist morality.

Socialist social relationships determine the social nature of the development principles of the Soviet Armed Forces. Their foundation is the Soviet social and state system. These principles serve to express the scientifically based, purposeful activity of the Communist Party and its Central Committee in the field of military development. They embody V. I. Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist Homeland and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army.

V. I. Lenin's principles of the development of the Armed Forces convincingly showed their effectiveness in the years of foreign intervention and civil war. They were tested by the practice of military operations in the Great Patriotic War. Being a concentration of historical military experience, V. I. Lenin's principles entirely retain their primary role even now. Figuratively speaking, they are a lodestar, the main orientation point for all cadres of the Soviet Armed Forces. They comprise a most valuable scientific resource for our Armed Forces.

The rich sociopolitical and military-technological experience in Soviet military development shows that the consistent implementation of V. I. Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist Homeland and the principles of the development of the Armed Forces reveals the most reliable ways to strengthen and improve the defensive capability of the Soviet State. These ideas and principles make up the methodological basis for developing effective methods and forms of preparing the country and its army for a crushing rebuff to any aggressor. They allow proper orientation in resolving problems on the most advisable use of material and spiritual resources of the state for defense needs.

V. I. Lenin's ideas on defense of the socialist Homeland and principles of developing an army of a new type were further developed in decisions of CPSU congresses, CC plenums and other Party documents. Our Party is constantly guided by them in strengthening the country's defenses.

Chapter 2. Guarding Socialism

The further strengthening of the Soviet Armed Forces after the Civil War is inseparably connected with the practical implementation of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin's brilliant ideas on defense of the achievements of socialism, and with the Communist Party's implementation of V. I. Lenin's policy in the field of Soviet military development. Under the direction of the Communist Party, the Soviet Armed Forces have continued their heroic combat path. They have disrupted the crafty schemes of imperialists who attempted to violate the integrity of the Soviet borders and eliminate the Soviet State. They won a world-historic victory in the Great Patriotic War, thus multiplying the unfading glory of their combat banners.

1. From the Civil War to the Great Patriotic War

The last shots of the Civil War had sounded. A period of peaceful development had come for the young Soviet republic. However, the peace was extremely unstable. Imperialism had not given up its plans to destroy the Soviet system. It was hindered in accomplishing these schemes, however, by the interstate and class contradictions in the capitalist camp, which were aggravated as a result of the economic crisis which broke out in 1920. In evaluating the international situation which had taken shape at that time, V. I. Lenin characterized it as a certain balance of forces which, although unstable, nevertheless permitted the young Soviet State to exist and develop. The Party relied on V. I. Lenin's conclusion that "we have not only a breather, but something enormously more important. . . . We have a new period where our main international existence has been won in the network of the capitalist states."¹ The Party steered a course toward practical accomplishment of the tasks of building socialism.

With their selfless labor, the Soviet people each year sought to achieve increasingly more significant successes in the country's economic transformation. This steadily increased the authority of the USSR throughout the world. During the years 1922-1925 the Soviet Union was recog-

¹ V. I. Lenin, XLII, 22.

nized by 21 states including Germany, England, Italy, and France, as well as Japan and almost all of our other neighboring countries. Trade agreements and treaties were concluded with a majority of them. This was an important prerequisite for the Soviet State to break through the economic and political blockade which imperialist reaction tried to impose. Good neighborly relations were established with a majority of the countries bordering on the Soviet Union on a basis of treaties of friendship and cooperation.

The policy of peaceful coexistence with capitalist states conducted by the Communist Party pursued the goal of ensuring favorable external conditions for the successful development of socialism in the USSR. At the same time, all the international activities of our Party were imbued with ideas of internationalism based on a unity of the vital interests of the Soviet people and toiling masses of all countries, and on an expansion of mutual ties with the international proletariat and progressive forces of the national liberation movement, which by their struggle gave a great deal of help in the formation of the young Soviet State.

The Party's consistent struggle for peace strengthened even more the Soviet State's position in the international arena. It disrupted attempts by imperialists to isolate the Soviet State and organize a new military campaign for the purpose of smothering the socialist Homeland of working people and peasants. The period of peaceful coexistence established between the USSR and the capitalist camp, achieved by the Soviet people's victories over the forces of imperialist reaction in fierce engagements with the interventionists and White Guards, by the country's labor successes and by a peace loving foreign policy course of the Party, created the premises for fulfilling the five-year plans for developing the national economy as the most important condition for strengthening the state's economic and defensive might.

In its conduct of a foreign policy course, the Party firmly adhered to V. I. Lenin's direction that "our steps toward peace must be accompanied by a straining of all our military readiness, and with absolutely no disarming of our army."² Lenin saw this above all as a real guarantee against encroachment by imperialist powers upon our country's independence and as the chief factor for their shift to cooperation and establishment of mutual relations with the young Soviet republic on a businesslike and mutually advantageous basis.

At the end of the Civil War our primary task in the field of military development consisted of the organized conversion of the army and navy to a peacetime footing. Simultaneously with a reduction in the Armed Forces, it was necessary not only to preserve, but to increase their combat effectiveness and combat readiness, and also to expand the country's mobilization potential.

² V. I. Lenin, XL, 248.

Based on the program tasks of ensuring socialist development, the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee worked out at each stage of the Soviet State's development the fundamental line in the field of improvements in military affairs. They determined the specific measures for increasing the combat power of the Armed Forces. They guided the work of all state and public organizations and all the Soviet people toward creation of a reliable defense of the socialist Motherland. Problems of consolidating the country's defensive capability were discussed at Party congresses and CC plenums. The Party paid particular attention to problems of technical outfitting, improvement in the Armed Forces organizational structure, training and education of personnel and development of Soviet military science.

In the first years after the end of the Civil War the 10th, 11th, and 13th Party Congresses and the February and March—April (1924) CC Plenums played a particularly great role in fulfillment of these tasks. These meetings determined the ways for further military development and the directions for military reform, which was called upon to bring the Armed Forces into conformity with the military-political situation at hand, with the new conditions of development of the socialist state, the capacities of its economy and the state of science and technology. The decree of the 10th Party Congress on the military question noted that "for the near-term the basis of our Armed Forces must be the present Red Army, reduced where possible at the expense of older personnel and with an increase in proletarian and communist composition."³

The most important question of military reform was the determination of a system of staffing which would allow, on the one hand, having a small cadre army in peacetime with a minimum expenditure of funds for it, and on the other hand, would ensure the proper military training of draft contingents without their long separation from production-labor work in the national economy.

The mixed staffing of the Armed Forces, which provided for a combination of cadre troops with territorial militia units, was such a system. A great number of units greater than regimental size and units of border military districts, technical and special troops, as well as the navy remained on a cadre basis. Territorial troops were local units of internal districts. As a rule, these were various sized rifle or cavalry units which contained 16–20 percent cadre personnel, while the remainder were signed up from surrounding villages and cities. The combat training of the signed-up (transient) personnel was conducted at annual assemblies lasting one to three months over a period of five years, after which these soldiers of the territorial troops became part of the reserve.

³ *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK* (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and CC Plenums), Vol. II, 1917–1924. Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 264.

Introduced in 1924, this system played a large part in strengthening the country's defensive capability. It ensured a constant combat readiness of troops in border regions and high mobilization potential of the Armed Forces as a whole thanks to the ability of territorial units to rapidly expand to a wartime footing. However, its shortcoming was that it did not allow reaching an equally high level of training of all personnel in the army or the necessary combat coordination of territorial units and units above regimental size.

The mixed system of staffing was a forced and temporary measure. In that period the Soviet State was in no position economically to have a full cadre army. We received an extremely backward technical-economic base as a heritage from czarist Russia—a base, moreover, that was heavily destroyed by the imperialist and civil wars. At the beginning of the twenties the country's gross output from all industries comprised less than a third of the volume of 1913, while the output of heavy industry and the freight tonnage of railroad transport was just barely over one-fifth of the prewar level. The Russia of 1913, after all, was only fifth to eighth in the world according to indicators of the basic branches of industry. It was necessary to overcome these enormous difficulties in order to withstand economic combat with the capitalist world single-handedly and in order to restore and develop the economy as the foundation of socialist development and strengthening of the state's defensive capability.

The Party chose to adopt a mixed system of staffing of the Armed Forces for the additional reason that at that time there was no immediate threat of an armed attack against the USSR on the part of imperialist powers. As has already been stated, many of them were in the grips of a deep economic crisis, as a result of which internal contradictions were aggravated in the enemy camp. The Communist Party skillfully used this situation to rapidly restore the country's economy, reorganize the Armed Forces and strengthen their power.

Along with the transition to a mixed system of staffing, the Red Army conducted a reorganization of its command control. A precise order of performance of service and training of the draft contingent was established. Personnel training was improved. Uniform organizational T/O&E's* were introduced. Steps were taken to improve the technical outfitting of troops, to standardize weapons and combat equipment, and to replace old models with new ones.

Regulations and manuals were produced in conformity with the new tasks and the level of development which the Armed Forces had attained. These documents reflected a fundamentally different social basis for military development than in bourgeois armies. They reflected the com-

*[T/O&E—table of organization and equipment, superseded by the unit manning document (UMD) by the USAF.—U.S. Ed.]

bat experience of World War I and the Civil War, as well as the requirements of Soviet military science.

Daily attention was devoted to the constant improvement in Party-political work in troop units. In the Party Rules adopted by the 14th VKP(b)* Congress, a section was introduced entitled "On Party Organizations in the Red Army." This section defined the rights and duties of political organs, the missions of army and navy Party organizations and the procedure for maintaining close ties with local Party committees. In this manner the Congress consolidated the results of a reorganization of political organs and Party organizations in the army which had taken place during the military reform period. The Congress increased their responsibility for the quality of political education of soldiers and for improvements in Party-political work in troop units.

As we see, the military reform bore a many-sided character. It actually encompassed all spheres of activity of the Armed Forces and facilitated their gradual transformation into an army which was contemporary for that period and a reliable defender of the working people's socialist achievements.

It must be stressed that the resolution of complex tasks of further strengthening of the Red Army and Navy continued under conditions of fierce struggle against the Trotskyites, who denied the need for creation of a regular army, who denigrated the role of Party-political work in troop units, and who undertook attempts to discredit the directing role of the Communist Party in military development. This was given the rebuff it deserved. The Party's Central Committee defended the Leninist course of military development—the only true and scientifically based course for organizing the armed defense of the socialist Homeland.

As a result of fulfillment of the defensive measures outlined by the Party, by the end of the twenties and beginning of the thirties the combat power of our Armed Forces had grown substantially. Still, in the technical sense they lagged considerably behind armies of the most developed capitalist states. Meanwhile, the international situation had begun to grow increasingly complex. The military threat to the Soviet Union on the part of imperialism grew, primarily from German fascism and Japanese militarism. Armies of the capitalist countries were constantly being outfitted with the latest weapons and combat equipment.

All this created an insistent demand for a fundamental technical reequipping of the Red Army and Navy and a further increase in their combat power.

The Party understood that in order to strengthen the country's defensive capability and successfully rearm the army and navy on a new

*[VKP(b)—Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (bol'shevikov) is the Russian for All-Union Communist Party (Bolshevik).—U. S. Ed.]

technical basis it was necessary to make full use of the results achieved in development of the Soviet economy and raise its effectiveness in the production of weapons and combat equipment. At the 17th Party Congress held at the beginning of 1934 this problem was considered an important one. The Congress set the task of expanding the mobilization potential of industry and of the entire national economy and of building and dispersing industrial installations in such a manner that in case of an attack by imperialist states the industry could be immediately shifted to a military footing and supply the Armed Forces with everything needed to repulse the aggression.

The Party performed this task with all decisiveness and consistency. Its farsighted policy, the opportune course steered toward industrialization of the country and collectivization of agriculture, the planned character of the socialist economy, and the selfless labor and inexhaustible creative activity of the Soviet people permitted making the USSR into a leading industrial power in a short span of history and laying a firm foundation for further economic and technical progress, fundamentally resolving the problem of increasing the state's military-economic potential, and creating the necessary conditions for steadfast strengthening of its defensive capability and complete technical reequipping of the Red Army and Navy.

Thanks to the socialist transformation implemented in the country's economy, by 1937 the USSR had gained first place in Europe and second (after the United States) in the world in volume of industrial production. A mighty defense industry grew up on the base of the socialist economy. The Armed Forces were equipped with new types of weapons and combat equipment. A great achievement consisted of the creation of new types of aircraft, tanks, artillery systems, and the construction of powerful surface warships and submarines and other weapons and military equipment, including that for engineer, chemical and other special forces.

The exploiting classes were eliminated with the victory of socialism in the USSR. By the end of the second five-year plan only a little more than five percent of the population was employed in the private sector. The union of the working class and kolkhoz peasantry, the moral-political unity of the Soviet people and the friendship of peoples of the USSR, who were rid forever of national oppression and inequality, were consolidated on the basis of socialist state and cooperative ownership. As a result, there was an improvement in the social composition of the Red Army. In the first two five-year periods the number of working people in its ranks rose by 2½ times.

The cultural revolution in the USSR was of great importance for strengthening the state's defensive capability. The Communist Party and Soviet Government consistently conducted measures to eliminate illit-

eracy and expand the network of general educational schools and higher educational institutions. The professional technical training of workers improved. Special attention was directed to the affirmation of communist ideology and morals in the masses and to instilling in Soviet citizens a conscientious attitude toward their duties. All this permitted a rapid transition of the working people and peasants into highly skilled military cadres of the Armed Forces, dedicated to the Party and the people. It permitted staffing various sized units and warships with literate replacements capable of mastering complex military equipment quickly and well.

Thus, thanks to the untiring concern of the Communist Party and Soviet Government all conditions were created in the country for continuous increases in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces and for converting them into one of the strongest armies in the world.

As the Party foresaw, in the interwar years imperialist reaction did not let up on its provocative intrigues. The enemies of socialism did not let a single chance go by in order to attempt to disrupt the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and hinder the development of a new society. Not having been able to eliminate the revolutionary achievements of workers during the period of foreign intervention and civil war and fearing a further strengthening of the Soviet Union and increasing of its authority in the world arena, international imperialism repeatedly organized military provocations and armed conflicts on our borders.

One of these acts was the Chinese militarist seizure in 1929 of the Chinese Eastern Railway (KVZhD). The resolute protests of the Soviet Government did not halt the violence of Chinese reaction. Our state was forced to set up the Special Far East Army and give a decisive rebuff to the invaders. The Red Army's swift strikes utterly defeated the troops of the Chinese-Manchurian militarists.

This was the first test of force of the Red Army by international imperialism since the foreign intervention and civil war, and it was not in their favor. Soviet soldiers displayed a high morale, courage, heroism, good combat training and a readiness to rout any aggressor. Meanwhile it became clear that the enemies of socialism would not reconcile themselves with the existence of the USSR and that a military encounter with them was inevitable on a much larger scale. The Party drew the appropriate conclusions from this and applied new efforts to further strengthen the country's defensive capability and increase the might of the Red Army and Navy. Reequipping units and warships with new technology and weapons went on at stepped-up tempos.

At the end of the thirties international imperialism undertook still another attempt at feeling out the Soviet State's military might, this time using the hands of the Japanese militarists. Openly pursuing an anti-Soviet foreign policy, Japan moved its troops that were based in China to the borders of the USSR and the MPR [Mongolian People's Republic]

with the aim of seizing the Soviet Far East. In 1938 the Japanese militarists invaded Soviet territory in the vicinity of Lake Khasan. However, the aggressors were duly repulsed. The Red Army dealt a quick defeat to the invaders and chased them from Soviet soil.

In May 1939 Japanese militarists committed a second broader aggression by attacking the friendly Mongolian People's Republic in the vicinity of the Khalkhin-Gol River. If successful, they counted on moving to the borders of the Soviet Union, cutting the Soviet Far East off from the central oblasts of the country and subsequently taking the Far East. The Red Army together with the Mongolian troops again routed the invaders and cleared them from the territory of the MPR.

In these combat actions the Red Army demonstrated a high combat effectiveness and a readiness to reliably defend the achievements of socialism against the encroachments of aggressors. However, the reactionary forces of world imperialism still did not draw the proper conclusions for themselves from the lessons they had received. They continued to prepare new provocations against the Soviet Union. The threat of military attack on the USSR grew particularly in connection with the aggressive actions of fascist Germany.

The ruling circles of the United States, England and the other capitalist countries viewed German fascism as the shock force in the struggle against the Soviet Union and placed great hopes on it. They encouraged fascism in every way possible, helped it arm and used every means to direct the predatory aspirations of Hitler's clique against the USSR. The danger of a new onslaught of international imperialism hung more and more distinctly over our Motherland. The Communist Party carefully considered the aggravated international situation. While following a Leninist peace loving policy, it applied great efforts to curb the fascist aggressors from the start and prevent them from unleashing a war.

An important step in this direction was the struggle of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government to ensure collective security in Europe and throughout the world. The USSR developed and proposed for consideration of an international conference on disarmament a number of effective measures. It was proposed to give a precise definition of aggressor and aggression. Using the League of Nations as a tribune, Soviet representatives exposed the aggressive plots and intrigues of the imperialist powers and spoke out for turning the League of Nations into an effective organ for defending peace and ensuring the security of nations. The Soviet Union proposed an initiative for concluding an Eastern Pact in Europe and a regional pact in the Far East. These documents provided for an organization to counter the outbreak and expansion of aggression and for giving any kind of aid, including military, to a state which was subjected or which could be subjected to attack on the part of any aggressor.

However, the imperialist powers, and above all the United States and England, hindered the signing of these pacts and thus disrupted the opportunity for jointly curbing the warmongers. This forced the Soviet Government to take another path. In the circumstances at hand, it concluded bilateral treaties on mutual aid with France and Czechoslovakia. Such acts could have become the basis for creation of a pan-European collective security system, but the double-dealing actions of ruling circles of Western countries sharply reduced their effectiveness and they were not able to play a deciding role in preserving peace in Europe.

Through the fault of the imperialists, the active work of the Soviet Government was not crowned with success in uniting the military-political efforts of the USSR. England and France to prevent the aggression which Hitler Germany had begun. Austria, which the Hitlerites occupied in March 1938, was its first victim. Exactly one year later Germany seized Czechoslovakia. For the fight against the aggressor in Europe the Soviet Union was agreeable to using major forces—120 rifle and 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9–10 thousand tanks, and from 5 to 5.5 thousand combat aircraft.⁴ The powerful Soviet-Anglo-French coalition could have tamed the raging fascist beast, but the British and French governments, having shamefully capitulated at Munich to fascist Germany and having made no attempts to cut short the Hitlerite aggression, broke off talks on concluding a tripartite pact in the summer of 1939.

The inactivity, and at times the direct connivance of imperialist powers with aggressors, facilitated the growth in the predatory appetites of German fascism in Europe and of Japanese militarism in the Far East. As a result mankind was plunged into the abyss of World War II, with fascist Germany being the chief culprit for its outbreak. The war arose as a result of the uneven development of world economic and political forces of capitalism on the basis of contradictions and a general crisis of this exploiting system. The war did not begin as the governments of certain imperialist powers wished. Before undertaking an "eastern campaign," Hitler decided to establish a "new order" in Europe and take the Western countries in hand.

On 1 September 1939 fascist Germany attacked Poland and World War II began. In 1940 the Hitlerites occupied Denmark, Norway, Belgium and Holland, invaded France, and defeated the British expeditionary force. In the spring of 1941 the fascist German troops seized Yugoslavia and Greece.

The Soviet Union was forced to undertake a number of steps to ensure its security. With the attack by Hitler Germany on Poland and the downfall of the Polish bourgeois-landowner state, the fascist armies

⁴ See *Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny 1939–1945*. (History of World War II, 1939–1945), Vol. II. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1974, pp. 144–45.

approached the western borders of the USSR. Interests of the country's defense required halting the Hitlerite troops as far as possible from the vitally important regions of our state and preventing them from moving their strategic lines to the Soviet border. It was also impossible to ignore the fate of the fraternal nations of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia, who were threatened by fascist enslavement. On 17 September 1939 troops of the Red Army, on orders from the Soviet Government, entered the territory of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia. The populace greeted their liberators enthusiastically. As a result of the voluntary desire of the working people in these areas, Soviet power was proclaimed and these areas were reunited with the Soviet Ukraine and Soviet Belorussia. In the summer of 1940 socialist revolutions won out in Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. In accordance with the wishes of the working people of these states, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia joined the friendly family of nations of the USSR as union republics. In that same year Bessarabia was reunited with the Soviet Union. It had been illegally torn from our state in 1918 by the Kingdom of Romania. Northern Bukovina, whose Ukrainian populace gravitated toward the Soviet Ukraine, also reunited with the Soviet Union.

As a result of these steps, as well as Finland's defeat in the military conflict which imperialist circles provoked with the Soviet Union, the USSR state border was moved 200-350 kilometers to the west and there was an improvement in the strategic position of the northern part of Murmansk, Leningrad and the economic regions of Belorussia and the Ukraine. In the southwest, a base of operations which Romania had been preparing for an attack on the USSR, was eliminated.

The change in borders also created certain difficulties in their defense. It was necessary to quickly erect fortifications, reequip the railroads in the border regions for the uniform All-Union gauge, improve the system of communications and shift troops. Although we did not succeed in doing this to the full extent, nevertheless the liberated regions played an important role in repelling the fascist aggression. Here the first major engagements of the Red Army took place with Hitler's hordes and this was the beginning of the disruption of the plans for a "Blitzkrieg" by fascist Germany against the Soviet Union.

Seeing the whole danger of the policy of the fascist states, the Communist Party and Soviet Government continued to fight persistently for the restoration of peace in Europe and in the Far East, and for stopping the aggressive aspirations of fascism. Simultaneously everything necessary was being done for further strengthening the USSR's defensive capabilities. The decisions of the 18th Party Congress were energetically implemented. As the most important task of the Third Five-Year Plan, this Congress set the accelerated development of the most important branches of the defense industry, creation of major power and fuel

reserves and a new high-capacity metallurgical base in the eastern part of the country, and construction there of many duplicate plants. In 3½ years of the prewar Five-Year Plan around 3,000 new industrial enterprises were put into operation. Many of them produced military goods in the war years. The Party Central Committee directly managed the operation of the defense industry. It sent the most experienced Party cadres there and responded to the requests and needs of production perceptively and attentively. Thanks to the Party's concern the output of defense products rose an average of 39 percent every year, while the increase in output of industry as a whole was 13 percent. All this strengthened our rear areas and ensured a reliable material base for waging the prolonged and intense war which was upon us.

At the very same time a number of measures were taken to strengthen labor discipline, increase labor productivity in the national economy and expand the base of training of qualified working cadres. The Soviet Union was forced to increase defense expenditures. In 1940 these expenditures comprised 56 billion rubles as against 23 billion rubles in 1938.⁵ The main efforts of the defense industry were directed at increasing the output of new types of weaponry.

Our state was faced with many important and difficult tasks caused by the necessity to introduce rapidly into the Armed Forces a number of technical innovations with consideration of the experience of World War II, which had broken out in Europe. It is doubtful that there was ever a previous time when history had allotted so little time to the military and political leadership of the Soviet land for solving such an abundance of major problems, primarily military. Beginning in the spring of 1941 it was intended to form around 20 new mechanized corps, but realization of this plan was frustrated not only by an extremely compressed time frame, but mainly by the insufficient capacities of industry to produce tanks of new design. No less complex problems arose in carrying out the program of accelerated formation of new air units, supplying them with more improved combat aircraft, and constructing and reconstructing an airfield network. The primary problem was the immediate buildup of armored troops and aviation in those years of military development, and the Party was energetically solving it.

The manpower of the Armed Forces increased simultaneously with their technical reequipping. As a result of the victory of socialism in the USSR and the economic and political changes which took place in this regard it became possible to shift to a cadre system of staffing and organizing the troops. This system had been adopted by the extraordinary 4th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on 1 September 1939 and fixed in the Law on Universal Military Obligation. This permitted an

⁵ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza* (History of the CPSU), Vol. V, Book 1. Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 41.

increase in the personnel strength of the Armed Forces in the years 1939-1941 by almost threefold, the formation of 125 new divisions, and an increase in the combat readiness of the Red Army. The might of the navy grew noticeably. In only 11 months of 1940, 100 new warships became operational. The system of air defense was improved and airborne assault troops were created.

Command and control organs of the Armed Forces also were subjected to substantial reorganization. In particular, in view of the expansion in functions and role of the RKKA [Working People's and Peasants' Red Army] Staff, it was transformed into the General Staff of the Red Army. Leadership of the Armed Forces became more efficient and qualified.

The Party Central Committee devoted a great deal of attention to improving the combat and operational training of troops and the combat coordination of various sized units. The VKP(b) CC Plenum held in March 1940 demanded that the heads of the People's Commissariat of Defense make a fundamental realignment of the system of training and education of personnel of the Armed Forces, bring all exercises as closely as possible to actual combat reality and improve the training of command cadres.

A decree of the CC Plenum played an important part in resolving problems of further strengthening of the Armed Forces and increasing the quality of combat and operational training and the growth in combat effectiveness of the troops. The entire training process and all maneuvers and exercises for troops began to be conducted on a higher plane.

Soviet military science attained significant successes. It drew valuable conclusions in the interests of constant improvements in military development, the technical equipping of troops and the development of Soviet military art.

Educational work in units and on warships improved, and the soldiers' political conditioning increased. The Party conducted a number of measures to strengthen Armed Forces Party organizations and to reinforce the Party layer among commanders. At the beginning of 1941 there were over a half million communists in the Armed Forces—a little over three times as many as at the beginning of 1938.

The titanic work of the Communist Party and all the Soviet people ensured a manifold growth in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. In their combat qualities they did not concede anything to the strongest capitalist armies, and in the moral sense they exceeded the latter immeasurably. A firm foundation for the defensive might of our state had been created. And today, when it is possible to judge the importance of every event of prewar years by basing it on the data of historical experience, it becomes completely clear that all the deciding prerequisites for successful repulse of imperialist aggression were laid in

the economic, political and cultural achievements of the prewar five-year plans and in the might of the Armed Forces, which was forged in the course of building socialism.

2. A Victory of World-Historical Significance

The perfidious attack by fascist Germany on 22 June 1941 interrupted the peaceful labor of Soviet citizens and required immediate mobilization of all material and spiritual capabilities of the country to organize a decisive rebuff to the invaders. This extremely complex task was successfully carried out by the Soviet people under the direction of the Communist Party.

A blow of enormous force fell upon the Soviet land. At that time fascist Germany possessed a military-economic potential which included not only its own economy, but also the resources of the occupied states of Western Europe. At the beginning of the war against the USSR, Germany had the potential to produce from two to two-and-one-half times more metal, electrical power, and coal than the Soviet Union. In 1941 German industry put out over 11,000 aircraft, more than 5,000 tanks and armored vehicles, around 30,000 artillery pieces and much more combat equipment and weapons. The fascist German army, which had been fully mobilized and deployed for the attack on the USSR, surpassed the combat forces of our western border military districts and fleets by 1.9 times in personnel, 1.5 times in medium and heavy tanks, over 2.3 times in modern aircraft, and 1.2 times in artillery pieces and mortars. The majority of its units had experience in military operations in the West and had thoroughly prepared for predatory wars. It was this military machine against which the Soviet Union had to fight single-handedly.

The hostile armies, armed to the teeth and well trained, dashed desperately toward the vitally important centers of our country. The Soviet State was in a difficult position. However, the enormous difficulties did not break the fighting spirit of the Soviet soldiers, nor did they shake the steadfastness of the people and their boundless faith in a victory for a just cause. Under the Communist Party's leadership, the Soviet citizens at the front and in the rear demonstrated a mass heroism, selflessness and fantastic staunchness and courage under the most unfavorable conditions—qualities never before seen in the history of wars.

The organizing and directing role of the Communist Party in defense of the achievements of socialism was displayed with new vigor in the years of the Great Patriotic War. The Party firmly believed in the inexhaustible energy of the Soviet people, in their devotion to the cause of communism, and in their ability to rout the aggressor no matter what the adversities.

On the very first day of the war the Communist Party and Soviet Government turned to the people with a patriotic appeal. They thoroughly revealed the criminal aims of the fascist aggressors, the great threat hanging over our country, and the just character of the war on the part of the Soviet Union. In so doing they inspired the people for the sacred struggle against the foe.

The Party Central Committee defined precisely the tasks of Party and Soviet organs to shift the economy to a wartime footing in a very short time and to provide the Armed Forces with everything needed to successfully wage war. Party and Soviet organizations of front area oblasts were aimed at developing guerrilla warfare in the enemy rear. The Party rallied the people and army even more firmly. Front and rear compressed into one mighty fist. A directive of the USSR Sovnarkom [Council of People's Commissars] and VKP(b) CC published on 29 June 1941 demanded "defending every inch of Soviet soil in merciless battle against the enemy, fighting to the last drop of blood for our cities and villages, and displaying the boldness, initiative and gumption inherent in our people. . . . Creating partisan detachments and diversionary groups in regions occupied by the enemy to fight units of the enemy army . . . creating unbearable conditions for the enemy and all his accomplices, pursuing and destroying them at every step, and disrupting all their activities." ⁶

The Soviet people and their Armed Forces unanimously responded to the appeal of the Party and government. They supported the proposed program for defeating the enemy. Soldiers of the Armed Forces, filled with a sense of deep responsibility for the fate of their Homeland, staunchly rose to the defense of their native soil. They displayed high moral-combat qualities both in the difficult defensive battles as well as in offensive operations. They were not broken by the failures of the first days of the war. Laborers of plants and factories, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, fulfilled their duties in just as selfless a fashion. Everywhere there began a mass movement under the slogan "Everything for the front, everything for victory!"

Under wartime conditions the Party realigned its ranks and changed forms and methods of work to be on a war footing. This was expressed above all in a reinforcement of organizational centralism, in a certain curtailment of collective organs of Party organization, and in a reallocation of forces in the interests of the war. Exactingness toward communists was increased to observe Party discipline and to fulfill all decisions of superior Party organs strictly and efficiently. Extraordinary forms of Party control were introduced everywhere. An extraordinary agency—the State Committee for Defense—was formed under the chairmanship

⁶ *KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1968* (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents of 1917-1968). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1969, p. 300.

of I. V. Stalin to unite the efforts of the country's rear and front and the direction of the work of all state organs and Party and public organizations to repel aggression and defeat the enemy. Absolute power in the state was concentrated in the hands of the GKO*. It directed the realignment of the national economy and the mobilization of all the country's forces and means for war needs. In the area of direction of the Armed Forces the GKO determined the general character of their use, assigned military-political missions to the Supreme High Command and to the Armed Forces as a whole, improved the structure of the Armed Forces, and made decisions to establish their strength and procedures and deadlines for supplying them with everything necessary based on the demands of war and the capabilities of the Soviet economy, as well as decisions on other very important questions.

City defense committees were created in frontline regions. Party organizers of the VKP(b) CC and the CC of Communist Parties of Union Republics as well as kray and oblast' committees were appointed to the most important industrial enterprises. There were Party organizers of the Party Central Committee at 1,170 enterprises in the initial and most difficult period of the war. Extraordinary Party organs—political sections of MTS [machine-tractor stations] and sovkhozes—were introduced in order to reinforce Party control of agriculture. A system of political organs was created to direct the political sections. There were political administrations set up under People's Commissariats of Agriculture and sovkhozes of the USSR and Union Republics and political sectors were established under kray and oblast' agricultural administrations. There was a total of 14 political administrations and over 200 political sectors and 7,200 political sections organized.⁷

The institution of military commissars was introduced into the Armed Forces. They were assigned in all regiments, divisions, warships, staffs, military schools and establishments of the Red Armed Forces. Political instructors were appointed in companies and batteries.

With its centralized direction the Party encompassed all spheres of the life and work of the Soviet State to even a greater extent, fused the energy of the Soviet people and led them confidently to victory over the fascist invaders.

As in the years of foreign intervention and civil war, the Party mobilized its best forces to reinforce the army. Many members of the VKP(b) CC, of Central Committees of Communist Parties of Union Republics, kray and oblast' committees, and other Party control organs were sent to the front in the first days of the war as members of military councils, chiefs of political organs, and political affairs officers of forma-

*[GKO—Gosudarstvennyy Komitet Oborony—Russian name for State Committee for Defense.—U.S. Ed.]

⁷ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. V, Book 1, p. 166.

tions and units. In just the first six months of war alone, by decision of the Party Central Committee of the VKP(b) around 8,800 leading party workers were sent into the Armed Forces. In this period over 1.1 million communists went into the Armed Forces.⁸ With their personal examples of bravery, staunchness and heroism they inspired the soldiers to combat exploits and cemented the ranks of defenders of the socialist Motherland.

Under the direction of the Party Central Committee the entire life of the country was intensively readjusted to a wartime footing. The main branches of the economy shifted to war production. A large number of industrial enterprises were relocated into the eastern part of the country under exceptionally difficult conditions. In just the period July through November 1941, 1,523 enterprises were evacuated from the frontline areas. This included 1,360 major plants, primarily military, which soon began to put out weapons and combat equipment at the new site for the front. History had never before known such an exploit of labor by a nation. All this permitted the elimination of the enemy's superiority in the field of production of combat equipment in a comparatively short time, and later it allowed us to considerably surpass the output of military products by fascist Germany.

From the beginning of the war one of the most important sectors of Party work was implementation of war mobilization measures. On instructions of the VKP(b) Central Committee, people's volunteer divisions were created and volunteers filled military units and subunits. In just the first eight days of the war, thanks to active work by local Party organizations, 5.3 million persons were mobilized into the Armed Forces.⁹ Such large-scale human reserves permitted the formation of many new units which played an exceptionally important role in the fight against the aggressor. In just the first five months 291 divisions and 94 brigades were sent into the army in the field.¹⁰ Mobilization was accompanied by enormous patriotic enthusiasm on the part of the entire population.

The Party and government took account of the experience of the first encounters and took urgent steps to improve the system of military development and bring it into conformity with the changed situation. New models of tanks, aircraft and artillery systems were developed at a stepped-up pace. The organizational forms of the Armed Forces were improved. The firepower, mobility and maneuverability of units of the Armed Forces increased.

Every passing day one could perceive more and more the results of the Party's strenuous work and the fervent enthusiasm and patriotism of

⁸ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. V, Book 1, pp. 171-172.

⁹ See *50 let Vooruzhennykh Sil SSSR* (Fifty Years of the USSR Armed Forces). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1968, p. 257.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 273.

the Soviet people, who had risen to do sacred battle with the fascist German enslavers. Resistance to the aggressor grew steadily. The Communist Party and Soviet Government turned the country, as Lenin had taught, into a united military camp. To repulse the enemy they mobilized enormous material and human resources and all the state's forces, thus creating the necessary conditions to rout the aggressor.

During tough defensive battles of the first months of the war the Soviet troops annihilated and exhausted elite divisions of a strong and experienced enemy, inflicting irreplaceable losses on him. The first tank battle at Lutsk, Brody and Rovno, the heroic defense of Brest, Liepaya, Kiev and Odessa, the defeat of the Hitlerites at Tikhvin and Rostov and the stubborn defense of Leningrad and Sevastopol' dispelled for the fascist command any illusions of easy victories such as the ones it had won without particular effort in the West. *The battle of Smolensk disrupted his schemes of immediately breaking through to Moscow.*

The historic Battle of Moscow was the decisive event of the first year of the Great Patriotic War. Here the main groupings of Soviet and fascist German troops clashed. In stubborn and difficult fighting the enemy was routed and thrown back from the capital of the socialist Motherland. Hitler's adventuristic plan for Blitzkrieg burst.

Our victory at Moscow was of enormous military-political significance. It marked the beginning of a fundamental turning point in the course of the war. German fascism suffered its first major military defeat in World War II. The myth of the invincibility of the fascist German army went up in smoke. Nations of the world began to have faith in the real possibility of crushing the aggressor. The rout of the invaders at Moscow was an ominous precursor of the inevitable defeat of fascism. The Hitlerite clique was faced with the prospect of a prolonged war on which it had not counted.

In the summer of 1942 a fierce battle broke out on the southwestern direction of the Soviet-German front against a major grouping of fascist troops which had broken through here. The struggle developed into two very important and mutually connected events of the war—the supreme *Battle of Stalingrad and the Battle for the Caucasus.*

The enemy was able to move to Stalingrad and the Main Caucasus Range by creating a superiority in men and materiel, especially in tanks, aviation and artillery. The fascist invaders were attempting to cut the Volga, an important water artery of the country, capture Baku, and, with the taking of the Caucasus, place our Motherland in a difficult economic position and force it to capitulate.

However, the advance of the Hitlerite army broke against the invincible steadfastness of the defenders of Stalingrad and the Caucasus. The

strategic plan of the fascist German command was again disrupted, as it had been in 1941.

The Battle on the Volga ended with the encirclement and total defeat of an enemy grouping numbering 330,000 men. The Red Army showed unprecedented heroism and a high combat expertise in this truly great battle. Stalingrad became a symbol for steadfastness and courage, and of valor and heroism of Soviet soldiers. The victory at Stalingrad was a major military-political event. It made an enormous contribution to the achievement of a fundamental turning point in the Great Patriotic War and in the entire Second World War.

The Soviet troops exhausted fascist groupings rushing toward Baku and Tuapse in heavy defensive battles in the North Caucasus. Then, shifting to the offensive, they dealt the enemy a decisive defeat in fierce engagements at Novorossiysk and Taman', in the Sal'sk Steppe and at Rostov.

The destructive wave of fascist aggression, which had rolled to the shores of the Volga and the Main Caucasus Range, was turned back. In January 1943 the Red Army delivered a new blow against the Hitlerites. The blockade of Leningrad was broken—a blockade which had been on the hero-city since September of 1941. The Soviet troops hit the invaders harder and harder. Unfurling the attack along almost the entire front from Leningrad to the Caucasus, in a series of consecutive operations in the winter of 1943 they pushed the enemy to the west a distance of 600–700 kilometers on some sectors and liberated a territory of around 500,000 square kilometers. The echo of these victories sounded far beyond the borders of our Motherland.

The Red Army's strikes brought discord in the fascist bloc and aggravated the internal political and economic situation of Germany and its allies—Italy, Romania and Hungary. Japan and Turkey were forced to keep from their intentions to act on Germany's side against the USSR. The national liberation movement grew stronger in the majority of European countries occupied by the Hitlerites. The forces of resistance to the fascist regime grew. The authority of the Land of the Soviets rose even higher in the world.

In a very great battle at Kursk in the third year of the war, the Hitlerites undertook a last attempt to regain the strategic initiative they had lost. In the first phase of the Battle of Kursk, Soviet troops employed a preplanned defense in contrast to the defensive battles of 1941 and 1942, and used it under conditions favorable to themselves with the aim of bleeding and exhausting the attacking enemy force. The enemy's defeat was concluded subsequently with the move of our fronts into a decisive counteroffensive, which grew into a general offensive by the Red Army from Velikiye Luki to the Black Sea. In the Battle of Kursk 30

fascist German divisions were destroyed (of which almost one-fourth were tank divisions), over 3,700 aircraft were destroyed, and air supremacy was won which was firmly retained by our aviation until the war's end.

After the Battle of Kursk defense was the only alternative for the fascist army, which was manifested in part by the creation of the so-called East Wall [Panther Line] and "scorched earth zones." This was the dying throes of a mortally wounded beast. The barbarity of the occupation troops reached its highest limit. The enemy raged. He burned and destroyed everything that could be burned or destroyed. In their own country the fascists conducted total (general) mobilization. Fearing the inevitable retribution, they now relied on drawing out the war and concluding a separate peace with England and the United States by playing on the conflicts between participants in the anti-Hitler coalition.

But even this plan was not fated to come about for the fascist clique. The major offensive operations of our troops in the liberation of the left bank of the Ukraine and of the Donbass, the assault crossing of the Dnepr along a broad front, and the offensive at Leningrad and on the right bank of the Ukraine, in Belorussia, Moldavia and the Baltic led to the expulsion of the enemy from Soviet soil. In 1944 the Red Army began liberating other nations from the oppression of Hitlerites and finishing the rout of fascism.

As far back as the terrible days of the beginning of the Great Patriotic War the Chairman of the State Committee for Defense, I. V. Stalin, announced in the name of the Communist Party and Soviet Government that the goal of this war was "not only the elimination of the danger hanging over the country, but also help for all nations of Europe suffering under the yoke of German fascism."¹¹ As a result of the Red Army's successful offensive beyond the borders of the Soviet Union, selfless help was given to the peoples of a large number of European states in the form of their liberation from the fascist yoke.

The grandiose Berlin Operation was the finale of World War II in Europe. A force of a million men of the enemy was crushed during this operation. Fascist Germany was thrown down and its leaders were forced to sign an unconditional surrender. Thus the Hitlerite military adventure ended ingloriously. It cost the nations of the world many millions of victims.

With the defeat of fascist Germany the main center of World War II was eliminated, but its fire still had not gone out. It continued to rage in Asia and in the Pacific. The USSR, in fulfilling the obligations to its

¹¹ *Kommunisticheskaya partiya v Velikoy Otechestvennoy voyne (Iyun' 1941 g.-1945 g.). Dokumenty i materialy.* (The Communist Party in the Great Patriotic War [June 1941-1945]: Documents and Materials). Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 149.

allies which it had assumed, declared war on imperialist Japan on 8 August 1945. This was a forced measure. For over 20 years the Japanese militarists had fostered plans of attack against the USSR and of seizing the Soviet Far East. They had attempted to carry them out more than once. During the years of the Great Patriotic War we had to keep up to 40 divisions to cover and defend the far-eastern borders against a possible invasion by Japanese troops.

The Red Army together with the armed forces of the Mongolian People's Republic smashed the main striking force of Japanese militarism—the Kwantung Army—in 23 days. Imperialist Japan also capitulated. Thus the last center of World War II, in the Far East, was eliminated.

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War was of world-wide historical significance. It had an enormous influence on all post-war development of mankind. The achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution were defended and consolidated. The authority of our Motherland rose immeasurably. The Soviet Armed Forces had accomplished not only a national, but a great international mission as well. They had saved the world from the brown plague and rescued *many nations of Europe from fascist slavery*. The Red Army played a deciding role in liberating Austria, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Norway, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia from the fascist German yoke. Its actions were supported by the nations of these countries. And if Europe now is enjoying the longest period of peace in this entire century, and if mankind is looking with increasing confidence into the future, then the people of our planet are in many ways obligated for this to the Soviet Union and its victory in the Great Patriotic War.

In the Far East the Soviet Armed Forces cleared the Japanese imperialists from areas of Northeastern China and North Korea, giving selfless fraternal help to the peoples of these countries.

The defeat of fascism and militarism and the activation of democratic forces created favorable conditions for the victory of socialist revolutions in a number of states of Europe and Asia. This led to the formation of a powerful world system of socialism.

Our victory caused a powerful wave of national liberation movements to rise up in colonial and dependent countries. The world colonial system of imperialism fell apart.

The influence of communist parties on the popular masses increased sharply. Their number increased from 61 in 1939 to 76 as of 1 September 1945. The membership of these parties multiplied.

The Soviet Union won a victory in a war which in scope, intensity and influence on postwar world development exceeded everything that past

wars had ever known, and there are few examples in the annals of history where such an initial unfavorable development of military events was changed so decisively and abruptly, and where, after having achieved initial successes, the enemy finally suffered total defeat.

After its victory in the Great Patriotic War the Soviet people could repeat with complete justification the prophetic words of V. I. Lenin that "our cause stands firm, and that no matter what attempts are made to invade Russia or what military undertakings are attempted against Russia—and there will probably be more than one such attempt in the future—we have already been tempered by our experience and we know on the basis of actual experience that all these attempts will be scattered like dust." ¹²

3. Decisive Contributions of the Soviet Union in the Destruction of Fascist Germany and Imperialist Japan

The Second World War drew into its orbit sixty-one countries with a population of 1.7 billion people—three quarters of the population of the world. The arena of combat operations involved the territories of three continents—Europe, Asia, and Africa. International imperialism, whose main striking force was German fascism, prepared and unleashed the war. Victory over fascism was of great importance for the fate of all mankind. This victory was achieved through the efforts of many countries. However, the most difficult trials fell on the Soviet Union, which conducted the sacred Patriotic War not only for its own freedom and independence, but for the triumph of progress and democracy in the whole world.

The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people was fused with the liberation struggle of other peoples who were under the yoke of enemy occupation. An important role in the struggle against fascism, as noted in the Resolution of the CPSU CC "The 30th Anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945," was played by the resistance movement, which had developed on a large scale in the occupied countries.

Partisan operations, armed revolts, and the heroism of soldiers of the national liberation forces will be forever enshrined in the annals of the anti-fascist struggle. In the vanguard of the struggle against the most dangerous enemy of mankind marched the communist and working parties. The communists proved themselves to be real patriots and internationalists who were steadfast fighters for freedom and independence of nations. Both the people and the armies of the countries belonging to the anti-Hitler coalition contributed greatly to total victory over the enemy. At the same time, we note with justifiable pride that our country was the major power in having blocked the path of German fascism toward

¹² V. I. Lenin, XLI, 356.

world supremacy. In addition, we carried the major burden of the war, played a decisive role in destroying Hitler's Germany, and then militarist Japan.

Until the attack on the USSR, Hitler's Germany in essence did not meet serious resistance and gained easy military victories. The situation changed sharply after the fascist Wehrmacht invaded the territory of the Soviet state. The center of gravity of the Second World War immediately shifted to the Soviet-German front. The struggle took on an intense and relentless character.

From the first to the last days of the war, the Soviet-German front tied down the main body of fascist Germany's armed forces. Here, Hitler's command had available 55-77 percent of its ground forces, more than half of its aviation, and the best tank formations. Thus, on 22 June 1941 153 of the 217.5 German fascist divisions* were concentrated on the Soviet-German front. On 1 November 1942, 193.5 of 268.5 divisions were concentrated on this front. After the landing of American and British troops in France in the summer of 1944, the importance of the Soviet-German front did not change. Here, the Red Army resisted 235 enemy divisions, a number 1.7 times greater than the Allied forces faced in the West.

For all of the 1,418 days of the war, continuous violent battles raged between the Soviet Union and fascist Germany. Such intensity of military operations was not experienced by any other front or theater of the Second World War, neither in Western Europe, Africa, South East Asia, or on the Pacific Ocean.

The victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the most important battles and engagements of the Great Patriotic War had a primary influence on the course of the entire Second World War. This is witnessed by the indisputable facts which we previously noted in the foregoing part of this book. Let us review some more highly significant examples.

Until the battle of Moscow, German fascist aggressors, believing in their "invincibility," engaged mainly in offensive actions. This is the way it was for two years of the Second World War. However, in December 1941, that is, only 5½ months after the attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, Hitler gave an order to his forces to change over to a strategic defense along the entire Soviet-German front. For the first time, the entire German fascist army was halted, not because of the will of the Hitlerite command, but because of the growing resistance and constantly intensifying attacks of the Soviet forces.

As early as May 1942, less than a year after the beginning of the Great Patriotic War—the President of the U.S.A., Franklin D. Roosevelt, evaluated the contribution of the Red Army in the victory over

*In counting German fascist army forces, two brigades equal one division.—Ed.

fascism as follows: "... It is difficult for me to ignore the simple fact that the Russians are killing more enemy soldiers and destroying more of his weapons than all other 25 countries of the United Nations combined."¹³

The year 1942 was marked by new and large battles on the Soviet-German front. Hitler's command, not yet believing in the complete downfall of their aggressive aspirations, planned an offensive "In order to destroy completely the forces which still remained under Soviet command and deprive them, as much as possible, of the most important military economic centers. In order to accomplish this, all the forces under our command and under the command of our allies will be used."¹⁴

As can be seen from this direction of Hitler, the fascist command again concentrated its main efforts on the Soviet-German front. It is precisely here they strove to achieve the basic goals of World War II. However, this plan, just as the "Blitzkrieg" plan, proved to be unattainable. The victory of the Red Army in the Battle of Stalingrad played a decisive role in the collapse of the [German] plan by delivering a new major defeat to the aggressor, resulting in the destruction of a huge grouping of fascist forces.

Sometimes in the West, attempts are made to belittle the significance of the Battle of Stalingrad and to minimize its place in World War II. Some bourgeois historians and memoirists either consider that the Red Army's shift to the counterattack on the Volga was dependent on the victory of the English forces at El Alamein in North Africa, or else they equate the importance of both of these events.

Neither version corresponds to the facts. First, our counterattack on the Volga had been planned and readied since the middle of September 1942, more than a month before the 8th English Army began its offensive at El Alamein. It is doubtful that anyone at that time could have predicted, with full confidence, the outcome of this offensive of the English forces. Therefore, in planning the destruction of the enemy at Stalingrad, the Soviet command depended strictly on its own resources.

Second, as to the size of the opposing forces and the damage caused by the Hitlerites, the North African theater of military operations and the battle of El Alamein cannot be compared with the operations on the Soviet-German front and the Battle of Stalingrad. The German-Italian forces in North Africa were estimated at 14 divisions and 1 brigade. Of these, 4 German and 8 Italian divisions fought at El Alamein. However, the fascist forces on the Soviet-German front at this time were estimated at 258 divisions, and 16 brigades, 50 of which were headed toward Stalingrad.

¹³ *The New York Times*, 20 October 1955, p. 10.

¹⁴ "Sovershenno sekretno! Tol'ko dlya komandovaniya!" *Dokumenty i materialy* ("Top Secret! For the Command Only!": Documents and Materials). Moscow, Izd-vo Nauka, 1967, p. 380.

At El Alamein, four Italian divisions were destroyed, but only because the German command abandoned them to their fate. The remaining German-Italian forces, although greatly battered, retreated westward along the Mediterranean coastline in good order. Without a doubt, the Battle of El Alamein influenced the course of events in the North African theater of operations by setting the stage for the following series of successful operations conducted by the Anglo-American land and sea forces in the Mediterranean. But it was only in this respect that it had an impact; it had no influence whatsoever on the course of the entire World War.

In contrast, the Soviet forces fighting along the Volga defeated 48 enemy divisions and 3 brigades—twelve times the number the Eighth English Army defeated in the entire battle of North Africa. Hitlerite losses in killed and captured at Stalingrad were almost twenty times greater than those at El Alamein. During their offensive between the Don and the Volga alone (July to November 1942) the enemy lost up to 700,000 soldiers and officers killed and wounded, more than 1,000 tanks, 2,000 guns and mortars, and 1,400 aircraft. But during the counter-offensive of the Red Army (19 November 1942 to 2 February 1943), the losses of the Germans and their allies were more than 800,000 men, about 2,000 tanks and assault weapons, over 10,000 guns and mortars, up to 3,000 fighter and transport aircraft, and more than 70,000 vehicles. Overall enemy losses during the Battle of Stalingrad exceeded a quarter of his entire army operating on the Soviet-German front.

"The defeat at Stalingrad" writes the Hitlerite General Westphal, "was as much a shock to the German people as it was to the army. For never before in the entire history of Germany was there any event in which that many of its forces suffered such awesome destruction."¹⁵

The losses were so great that the German-fascist forces were once again forced, as after their defeat at Moscow, to go on the defensive along the entire Soviet-German front. And never again were the Hitlerites able to achieve any significant gains. Positive preconditions for the irrepressible growth of our resources now began to appear, ensuring the development of broad offensive operations of Soviet armies with the goal of driving the fascist invaders completely from Soviet soil.

The next important highpoint of World War II was the Battle of Kursk, whose importance the West often attempted to minimize or simply ignored. It is appropriate at this point to recall the importance that Hitler himself attributed to the Battle of Kursk. The day before the offensive, he issued a command which declared: "This . . . operation will not only strengthen our own people and impress the rest of the world, but most of all will instill a new faith in the German soldier himself. It will

¹⁵ *Rokovyye resheniya* (The Fatal Decisions). Translation from English. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1958, p. 210.

strengthen the faith of our allies in a final victory and force the neutral states to exercise caution and restraint. The defeat Russia will suffer as a result of this offensive should—at least in the immediate future—wrest the initiative away from the Soviet leadership, if not exert a decisive influence on the future course of events. . . . The success of this first great battle of 1943 will decide more than just an ordinary victory.”¹⁶

It is clear that with this battle Hitler expected to raise the low morale of his army and of the German people, who had not yet had time to recover from the defeat at Stalingrad, and also to enhance his own international prestige, which was based solely on the barbarous uses of armed force. However, the outcome of the Battle of Kursk was otherwise—it confronted the Hitlerites with a catastrophe. This new, most severe defeat of fascist forces shook to its very foundations not only the Wehrmacht and Germany, but also the entire block of aggressors.

After the victory of the Red Army at Kursk, the USA and England clearly saw that any further delay in opening the second front was not in their interest; the Soviet Union with its own forces, and without participation of the Anglo-American forces, could defeat the enemy and liberate the peoples of Europe. While the question of a second front against Hitlerite Germany was being considered by our erstwhile allies only on paper prior to the battle of Kursk, in the summer of 1943 they were forced to think seriously about landing their forces in the North of France. This is how the President of the USA, Franklin Roosevelt, assessed the outcome of the Battle of Kursk: “. . . If matters continue in Russia as they are now, it is possible that by next spring a second front will not be needed.”¹⁷ The situation finally forced the USA and England to revert from talks and promises, from tactics of delay and “small time” strategy, to practical action.

The second front was opened on 6 June 1944. But by this time the defeat of Germany was already a foregone conclusion. Toward the spring of 1944, it lost on the Soviet-German front, according to sources of the fascist command, over 5.5 million officers and soldiers, tens of thousands of guns and mortars, tanks and aircraft. These losses were greater than the number of men in the army of fascist Germany which invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941. In order to replace them, the Hitlerite command sent forces to the East from Western Europe and from other fascist German occupied territories. In all, from the beginning of the war to 1944 over 200 divisions were transferred to the East. “One can say without exaggeration,” observed Zimmerman, former chief of operations,

¹⁶ Quoted from the book *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941–1945. Kratkaya istoriya* (The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union, 1941–1945: A Short History), 2nd ed. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, p. 242.

¹⁷ Elliot Roosevelt. *Yego glazami* (As He Saw It). Trans. from English. Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1947, p. 161.

Headquarters, Western Front of the fascist army, "that the Eastern Front continually drained the German armies stationed in the West of all their combat-ready men and equipment."¹⁸

As a result of the crushing blows inflicted by the Red Army in 1944, not only was Soviet soil cleared of the fascist invaders, but also the allies of Hitlerite Germany—Rumania, Finland, Bulgaria, and Hungary—were forced to withdraw from the war. Germany was now the only country* in Europe still confronting the anti-Hitler coalition. The second front, opened by the Western Allies after great delay, did not have as much influence on the course of World War II as it would have had at the beginning of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union.

The major role played by the USSR and its Armed Forces in the achievement of victory over fascist Germany was convincingly demonstrated by the fact that on the Soviet-German front during the war years 607 fascist divisions were destroyed; at the same time the Anglo-American forces in North Africa, Italy, and Western Europe destroyed and captured only 176 enemy divisions—and most of these only toward the end of the war when Germany was on the verge of capitulation. In the war with the USSR, Hitlerite Germany lost 10 million men killed, wounded, and captured—a total amounting to three-fourths of all its losses in World War II.

A decisive factor in the victory achieved in the Far East was the contribution of the Soviet Armed Forces. The entry of the Soviet Union into the war against militarist Japan considerably hindered its further resistance. A new front stretching over 5,000 kilometers in length was opened. One of the strongest concentrations of Japanese ground forces located on the territories of Manchuria, Korea, Southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands was engaged in active military operations. On 9 August 1945 a few hours after the beginning of the Soviet offensive, the prime minister of Japan, Suzuki, during a meeting of the supreme military cabinet, was forced to acknowledge: "The entry this morning of the Soviet Union into the war places us in a completely hopeless position and makes further continuation of the war impossible."

In the war with Japan, as with fascist Germany, the Soviet Union set precise goals: to defeat the Kwantung Army, which was the nucleus of the Japanese ground forces, and to force Japan to surrender unconditionally. It was the decisiveness of the goals, the swift advance of the Soviet Armed Forces, and the skillful conduct of their operations that predetermined the brevity and the unqualified success of their operations.

Until the entry of the USSR into the war with Japan, the USA did not expect such a rapid conclusion of the war. US military operations were projected for as late as 1946. The conclusion of the Second World

¹⁸ *Rokovyye resheniya*, p. 219.

*Italy had been forced out of the war as early as 1943.—Ed.

War was being delayed to some indefinite time. The war would have cost many more thousands of lives, and it was due to the actions of the Soviet Armed Forces that these sacrifices were averted.

In the light of these historical facts, the contention by the western press that the victory over Japan was allegedly due to the American atomic bombs is not valid. They obviously contradict the history of warfare. The atomic bomb, admittedly, is a powerful weapon. But another well-known fact is that a new weapon can only have a decisive influence in a war if used on a massive scale. The US, however, used two atomic bombs against Japan, which of course could not have played a decisive role in the outcome of the war. In the field of military art it is axiomatic that the greatest objective in war is achieved with the defeat of the enemy's main force. However, the American command used the new weapon not on enemy forces, but on cities having little strategic or economic importance.

In evaluating the fulfillment of Allied obligations, on the part of the USSR in the Far East, and its decisive contribution toward the rout of militarist Japan, the terrible days of 1941–1943 are unwittingly recalled when the USSR was in an exceptionally difficult position, and the USA and England did not hasten to provide their ally any effective support in the war against fascist Germany. They were looking for victories in North Africa, in the waters of the Mediterranean—*everywhere but in* the struggle against the major Hitlerite forces, thus prolonging the war and the bloodshed. The main weight of the war rested on the shoulders of the Soviet people and its army. But the USSR could not allow a similar situation in the Far East with respect to its allies. With its available forces, it struck a blow on the powerful concentration of Japanese ground forces and brought nearer the victorious conclusion of the Second World War.

Thus, the participation of the USSR in the war against fascist Germany and militarist Japan was the decisive factor, eliminating any compromise with the aggressors. Our state made the major contribution in achieving victory, and no fantasy of bourgeois falsifiers of history with their juggling of facts and events can diminish this great role of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces.

4. The Lessons of War

The Great Patriotic War—the most difficult of all wars of world history—had ended. The Armed Forces of our Motherland had covered themselves with undying glory in that war. In a struggle against a strong and clever foe, a struggle unprecedented in scope and ferocity, they carried the victorious Red Banner through the fire of bloody battles and planted it in the lair of defeated fascism as a symbol of the triumph and

invincibility of socialism. Our army convincingly demonstrated its historic mission of being a defender of everything advanced and progressive against encroachment by forces of reaction and aggression. The Soviet Armed Forces, as a mighty factor in the preservation of peace and tranquility on earth is fulfilling this noble mission with dignity at the present time as well.

The experience of such a severe and prolonged war as the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people has enormous significance. It is an invaluable asset. It is the brightest page in the annals of the entire world revolutionary and liberation movement.

What does the experience of the Great Patriotic War teach? What are its most important lessons?

Above all it must be said that the victory of the USSR was no accident, as the bourgeois falsifiers of history assert to this day. They attempt, for example, to explain the defeat of the fascist German army by the complex natural geographic features of our country, by the fact that the Hitlerite troops could not adapt to it, and by the mistakes of the Wehrmacht command. But the decisive influence lay not with the cold, not with the snows, not with the large expanses of the Soviet Union, and not with the mistakes of the fascist command (which, by the way, were numerous). **The victory of the Soviet people and the defeat of the forces of fascism and militarism were historically determined and axiomatic.** This is the first and foremost lesson of the Great Patriotic War. The knowledge and consideration of established patterns which permitted the Soviet State to be victorious in the most difficult and fiercest of all wars ever experienced by our Motherland have great importance for a proper understanding of history and for a successful resolution of contemporary problems of military development.

First of all, it must be noted that our victory has profound social origins. It was determined by the entire historical development of the Soviet State, by the objective capacities laid down in the very nature of socialism, and by the fundamental advantages of the socialist social and state system over the capitalist system. Marxism-Leninism teaches that in the life and struggle of two opposing tendencies or two principles the one that always wins out is the new, advanced, and developing one which has a future ahead of it. War subjected the *socialist social system* to a severe and comprehensive test in which it honorably endured all trials and proved its vitality and indisputable superiority over the capitalist system in all the basic areas: economic, political, ideological and military.

The war convincingly demonstrated the mighty force of the *socialist state and political system*. The uniqueness of the Soviet State lies in the fact that it possesses not only the tools of political power, but in its hands,

as a general national property, are also the deciding means of production. Therefore, during the war years it was able to influence the achievement of victory over the enemy in a more active manner than any capitalist state.

It has been proven historically that a state's ability to win a war depends primarily on its social nature, its class and political foundations, and also on the attitude of the broad popular masses toward the state and the war which it is waging.

Being a bulwark of working people around the world, the Soviet Union in the war pursued just goals of liberation. It defended socialism, the most advanced state and social system. The Soviet socialist system called to life and set in motion such mighty moving forces of the new society as the ideological political unity of the Soviet people on the basis of an indissoluble union of working people and peasants, fiery Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, and the friendship of peoples of the USSR and their solidarity around the Communist Party. This multiplied many times over the might of the Soviet Armed Forces and gave them unprecedented staunchness and confidence in the rightness of our cause.

The experience of the war confirms that the strengthening of the Soviet State and the socialist social system is the most important condition for preserving peace on earth. In implementing their policies the imperialist reactionary circles have relied on and reckoned only with force, and continue to do so. From this position they build their relations with other states and attempt to manage their fate at their own discretion, as required by the interests of capitalist monopolies. Therefore, the slightest weakening in the defensive might of the Soviet Motherland and its Armed Forces may be used by the imperialists to their own aggressive ends.

Our victory was natural because *the actions of the Armed Forces were supported by the entire economic might of the Soviet State*. This was a victory of the Soviet economic system as a whole and of a military economy in particular. The Soviet system provided the best forms of organizing an economy not only for resolution of national economic tasks in peacetime, but also for the mobilization of all the country's economic capacities in wartime. Having overcome the colossal difficulties of the war years, the Soviet economy gave the front everything needed for victory: guns and ammunition, food and clothing.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War Soviet industry produced 137,000 aircraft, 104,000 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 488,000 other artillery pieces. This was more than fascist Germany manufactured of these types of weapons and combat equipment.¹⁹

¹⁹ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, (History of the CPSU), Vol. V, Book 1, p. 644.

The Soviet economy not only replaced combat losses in equipment and weapons, but in steadily building up the tempos of the output of military products, created the necessary reserves for satisfying the growing needs of the troops.

Public ownership of means of production, socialist production relationships, a planned economy, the labor heroism of the masses and leadership by the Communist Party all allowed the Soviet economy to win single-handedly an unparalleled tough and strenuous duel with the capitalist economy of not only fascist Germany, but of almost all Western Europe.

Postwar successes in the development of the national economies of the USSR and the other fraternal countries, achieved on the basis of socialist relations and mutually advantageous cooperation, considerably increased the socialist states' share in the world economy. This creates favorable conditions for strengthening their economic influence in the international arena and winning victory in the economic competition with the capitalist system. It serves as one of the most important conditions for constantly strengthening the defensive might of countries of the socialist community.

Our victory over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan was determined, further, by the fact that *the great Soviet people were the creators of this victory*. It was the Soviet people who determined the fate of the war, having demonstrated to the entire world their revolutionary endurance, devotion to the cause of socialism and the Communist Party, and their ideological monolithic spirit, moral-political unity, iron will and mass heroism.

The victory of socialism in the USSR predetermined the unprecedented moral-political solidarity of the Soviet people, the commonality of its interests, and the unity of Party and people and their will and actions. This victory raised even higher the conscious, creative activeness of the workers. The Soviet people exerted their decisive influence on the course and outcome of the war by taking part in fighting on the battlefield, selflessly laboring in the rear, and helping and supporting the front in every way possible.

The Great Patriotic War showed once again the truly boundless power which is hidden in the popular masses if they are organized and inspired, if their energy is directed at the achievement of a high goal, and if these masses wage a sacred struggle for their freedom and independence and for the great ideals of communism.

The role of the people as a creator of history grows more and more. The people create material and spiritual wealth, but only under socialism are the people unified and one. They are the bearers of a high moral-political spirit, the complete masters of social life, the creators both of peace and of military victories, and reliable defenders of their Home-

land, since only under socialism do the interests of all classes and social groups coincide. Therefore, the people of a socialist state are invincible. The constant strengthening of their unity and solidarity, the rising creative activity and awareness, and the upbringing of Soviet citizens in a spirit of communist attitude toward labor and military duty and of unwavering faith in the socialist Motherland always were and will remain an object of constant concern on the part of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government.

The friendship of the peoples of the USSR is a great source of our victory. The Soviet system ensured genuine equality of all nations and peoples and the flowering of the economies and national cultures of the fraternal republics. It merged and repeatedly multiplied the forces and capabilities of all our great multinational family. All peoples of the Soviet Union made a worthy contribution to the rout of the fascist aggressors.

In the postwar years our country achieved major successes in communist development. The friendship of peoples of the USSR grew even stronger. Relations among classes and social groups, nations and peoples became closer and more harmonious.

The Armed Forces are an inalienable part of the Soviet people. They somehow represent a mold of our society, as they have embodied its best features. During the years of the Great Patriotic War, our soldiers displayed exceptionally high moral-combat qualities. F. Engels' prophetic words that a victorious proletariat will create a new army with soldiers who would act with tactical know-how on the battlefield and in strength and adroitness would surpass the soldiers of a capitalist society came true.²⁰

Soldiers of the Great October fought against the imperialist aggressors. These were Soviet citizens who with their hands erected the bright edifice of socialism. The people themselves also changed in this process of historic renewal. Personnel of the Red Army and Navy had no equals in history in their political, moral-psychological and combat qualities. They went into mortal combat against the foe out of their deep conviction. The mass heroism, which reached even self-sacrifice, was a daily, clearly understood occurrence. A fervent love for the Motherland and utter devotion to the Party and people inspired Soviet soldiers and officers to heroic deeds and led from victory to victory.

During the first three years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet Armed Forces had to wage a difficult struggle, essentially one-to-one against the most powerful army of the capitalist world. An unbelievable moral and physical exertion was required of all our people. No other state could have stood up under such unfavorable circumstances as existed for us at the beginning of the war, and no other army would have

²⁰ See K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), VI, 512.

been able to retain its morale and capability to deliver crushing blows against the enemy under these conditions. The Soviet Union and its Armed Forces not only withstood it, not only did not waver, but also achieved total victory.

The Soviet Armed Forces, in spite of the expectations of its enemies, came out of the war even stronger and more powerful. In preparing his attack against the USSR, Hitler boastfully declared: "It can be expected that at the very first blow by German troops the Russian Army will suffer an even greater defeat than did the army of France in 1940."²¹ He was seconded by the fascist General Jodl, who even determined the specific dates of the downfall of the Red Army: "Three weeks after our attack this house of cards will tumble down."²² The course and results of the Great Patriotic War and the victories of the Soviet Armed Forces over the fascist army refuted once and for all the adventuristic calculations and boastful prognoses of the Nazi maniacs and showed the pseudo-scientific nature of their military theory.

One of the decisive factors of our victory was that *the Soviet people and its army are brought up in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist ideology.*

The war was a decisive clash of two opposing ideologies: the most humane—socialist, and the most inhuman and reactionary—fascist. The Soviet people won in the war not only a military, political and economic, but also an ideological victory over the enemy.

Marxist-Leninist ideology confirmed in the war years the noble ideas of the sacred struggle against fascism, for a stable peace and the security of nations, and for a bright future for all mankind. They inspired the Soviet citizens to a great exploit and gave birth to a mass heroism.

Chauvinism and racism were closely interwoven in fascist ideology with shameless anticommunism, frank social demagoguery and the espousal of the cult of force. By propagating the idea of the "superiority of the Aryan race," the Nazis succeeded in stupefying considerable masses of people. The combat spirit of soldiers brought up on such "ideals," however, could not be stable. It was in no condition to withstand combat with the mighty combat spirit of the socialist army, whose liberating mission reflected the historic mission of defending the progress of all mankind.

The defeat of fascism was the triumph of a humane, life-asserting socialist ideology and evidence of its indubitable advantage over the corrupt ideology of Nazism.

²¹ H. Greiner, *Die Oberste Wehrmachtsführung 1939 bis 1943* (The Supreme Armed Forces Command, 1939-1943), Wiesbaden, 1951, p. 326.

²² Quoted from the book *Nürnbergskiy protsess. Sbornik materialov v sem' tomakh* (The Nuremberg Trial: Collection of Materials in Seven Volumes), Vol. II, Moscow, Gosyurizdat, 1958, p. 597.

The Soviet people's victory was also determined by *the Leninist international policy of the Communist Party, which ensured the consolidation of antifascist forces*. The problems of defending the socialist Fatherland and destroying Hitlerite Germany and Imperialist Japan were considered and resolved by the Communist Party in close liaison with the giving of assistance and support to the people who were fighting for their national independence and for liberation from the oppression of fascism and militarism. In turn, these people gave assistance to the USSR by drawing off a part of the enemy's forces upon themselves and weakening the fascist block, both on the homefront and in the combat zone.

Having smashed the shock forces of world imperialism, the Soviet people fulfilled their international duty to the end.

At the present stage, too, the Party consistently holds in its foreign policy to Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism. Herein lies one of the reasons for the steady increase in the international authority of the Land of Soviets. The experience of history teaches that the stronger the alliance of peaceloving forces and the higher the economic and combat might of the countries of the socialist community which are the stronghold of peace on earth, the more reliable is the guarantee of security for all freedom loving peoples.

Our victory in the Great Patriotic War is natural, finally, because *the Soviet people's struggle against the imperialist invaders was headed by the Communist Party—the political leader of Soviet society, tested and tempered in class battles*. The Party purposefully guided the country's preparations for defense and its armed protection. The Party's strategy was based on the rock-hard basis of Marxism-Leninism and on a thorough consideration and use of the laws of social development and the laws of war. The Party ensured most effective realization of the economic, moral-political, scientific-technical and strictly military potentials of the Soviet State for the complete rout of the enemy.

The Party's organizational genius was fully manifested in the war years. It lifted the Soviet people up for a war of liberation, determined precisely its goals and missions, inspired them to exploits in battle and selfless labor in the rear, mobilized the country's economy for defense needs, and skillfully directed military operations. The people unquestioningly believed in the Party. They followed it and invariably achieved success under its leadership.

Proper organization of governing the state and direction of military operations was one of the extremely important factors for a victorious conclusion of the war. The concentration of political and military leadership in one organ—the State Committee for Defense—permitted successful direction of the efforts of the Soviet people and the work of all

Party, soviet, military, economic and trade-union organs and organizations toward a common goal—winning victory over the enemy.

Direction by the Communist Party is a firm basis for state and military development at the contemporary stage as well. The Party develops military affairs on the basis of a profound Marxist-Leninist analysis of the international situation and the alignment of military-political forces in the world, with consideration of the laws of social development and the achievements of science and technology.

The Soviet Union's victory over imperialist aggressors demonstrated to all mankind the truly invincible might of our country's economic and political foundations, the unprecedented solidarity of its peoples, their unconquerable will to win and their steadfastness in battle. The outcome of the war dealt a blow to the calculations of imperialist reaction, which relied first on a defeat of the Soviet State, and later, when this did not occur, on its total exhaustion in a prolonged, bloody struggle. Reactionary circles wanted to see the USSR become a second-rate power on which their will could be imposed in the concluding phase of the war and in resolution of the postwar peace settlement.

Any bourgeois state which suffered the sacrifices of the Soviet Union would not have been able to recover for a long while from the consequences of war and would have fallen into the bondage of the large imperialist countries. This did not happen to our socialist Motherland. In spite of its enormous human and material losses, it remained a mighty power capable of quickly healing its wounds, and also giving help to the forces of democracy and progress in the world arena. The Soviet Union's international position and ties had become much firmer. This was shown by the fact that before the war 25 states had diplomatic relations with us, while by the end of the war there were 49.

The CPSU CC Theses entitled "Fifty Years of the Great October Socialist Revolution" stressed that "Results of the Soviet Union's Great Patriotic War showed convincingly that there are no forces in the world which could crush socialism or bring to their knees a nation faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, dedicated to the socialist Motherland and rallied about the Leninist Party. These results are a formidable warning to imperialist aggressors and a stern and unforgettable lesson of history."²³ It states that any military adventures by imperialism against the USSR will be doomed to failure in the future as well. This lesson of the Great Patriotic War should not be forgotten by those who set their sights on the property of others.

The second lesson of the Great Patriotic War and of the whole Second World War is that **the war laid bare the true culprit of the aggression—**

²³ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh . . . (CPSU in Resolutions . . .), Vol. IX, 1966-1968. Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p. 303.

international imperialism—and posed the question in all its acuteness of not allowing the outbreak of a new and still bloodier world war, of curbing the aggressive forces of imperialism, and of ensuring a stable peace on our planet.

Now many secrets of the archives of Hitler's Germany have been uncovered. They have allowed us to obtain fully sufficient proof of the truth that the fascist aggression against the USSR represented the result of more than 20 years of a general course of policy of international, and especially German, imperialism. No matter what complicated zigzags were taken by the history of international relations in the thirties, no matter how acute contradictions became within the capitalist world, it remains undisputed that not only the efforts of Germany, but, directly or indirectly, also the assets of other imperialist states, contributed to creation of a powerful Nazi army which on the memorable morning of 22 June 1941 struck a blow against Soviet troops. In just the period from 1924 through 1930 at least 63 billion marks were put into German industry. Of this, over 30 billion marks were from foreign loans obtained chiefly from America.²⁴

Without these loans, without technical assistance from the United States and England, and without the politics of Versailles, Locarno and Munich the rulers of fascist Germany would not have taken the risk of unleashing World War II, and the Nazi army would not have been able to accumulate the monstrous military potential which it possessed in the attack on the Soviet Union. This was a genuine striking fist of world imperialism.

The bosses of what was then Germany succeeded in creating a bloc of imperialist states for a criminal war and uniting under the black banners of aggression fascist Italy, the Kingdom of Romania, Horthy's Hungary and Mannerheim's Finland in Europe and militarist Japan in Asia.

The most reactionary forces of imperialism—fascism and militarism—bore a special threat to peace and socialism. Their aggression could have been prevented if they had been presented with a solid front of peaceloving and progressive forces within the capitalist countries and on an international scale. But this did not take place.

Unleashed by the aggressive imperialist states, the war did not immediately assume a truly worldwide character. For over 1½ years it essentially represented local campaigns by aggressors to win individual states. Many countries declared war on Germany and Japan, but did not wage active combat operations. The impunity gave heart to and encouraged the aggressors. Their predatory actions did not serve as an alarm for the resolute unification of all anti-Hitler forces. This unification unfortu-

²⁴ See A. Norden, *Uroki germanskoy istorii* (Lessons of German History). Translated from German. Moscow, Gos. izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1948, p. 75.

nately took place much later, when fascist Germany had attacked the Soviet Union, when the brown plague had extended almost to all Europe, and when Berlin was already nurturing concrete plans for establishing world supremacy.

Today, when the world is enmeshed in a network of imperialist blocs and a system of shackling agreements, when the arms race is continuing and armed forces outfitted with sophisticated combat equipment are being held in a high state of combat readiness in the most important regions of our planet, the aggressive actions of imperialist reaction may develop considerably faster into a world war and lead to enormously more serious consequences than was the case in World War II. In unleashing numerous military conflicts, reactionary imperialist circles have more than once placed the world on the verge of a new world war. This requires that all peace-loving forces have high vigilance and unity and solidarity in the struggle against the intrigues of the aggressive imperialist circles. Therefore, the Communist Party and Soviet State in close cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries and other peace-loving states, and with the support of all progressive forces of mankind, are conducting a policy of active defense of peace and strengthening of international security. The heart of this policy consists of the proposals advanced by the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses.

The third lesson of the last war is that **it revealed the most characteristic and especially dangerous method of unleashing war by imperialism.** The German General Staff, in preparing for aggression, relied on the crushing power of the first surprise attack by large masses of tanks, aviation and motorized infantry and on the swiftness of operations to capture vital centers of the states chosen for attack. The calculations of Hitler's strategists rested on Blitzkrieg and on achieving an easy victory, after which they planned the total plundering of all resources and riches of the subjugated country and the physical destruction of millions of people.

Perfidy and intrusion on another's territory without a declaration of war became a sort of norm or stereotype for the piracy of imperialist aggressors. Repeating the experience of fascist Germany, Japan made a surprise attack on the American base at Pearl Harbor. The factor of surprise was also used by the contemporary Israeli aggressors to capture Arab lands.

With a surprise attack, the imperialist invaders provide all nations with a fait accompli of a war already begun, including the people of their own country, who are drawn into the whirlpool of bloody events against their will and are deprived of many opportunities to actively oppose aggression from within. The states, peoples and armed forces which have been subjected to a surprise attack are placed in difficult

and unequal situations. We must never forget this under any circumstances.

When there is a threat of aggression it is necessary to follow the military preparations of the enemy especially vigilantly, reveal his intentions in time and take the necessary steps to repulse a hostile attack. Any omission here provides the aggressor with the chance of taking the initiative, and it will be extremely difficult to get it back subsequently. This situation plays a greater role as the armies of warring sides possess more powerful means of warfare.

It is proper to count on a favorable outcome of the first battles only if, before a possible enemy attack, an advantageous grouping of armed forces is created which is based on a farsighted calculation and is fully ready to conduct military operations.

The experience of 1941 is very instructive in this regard. At the moment of the invasion of the USSR the Hitlerite command had deployed all troops beforehand which had been assigned for aggression. With powerful army echelons, the enemy created overwhelming superiority in personnel, artillery, tanks, and aviation in narrow sectors of the line of attack. *The delay in deployment, the absence of a completed operational-strategic formation, and excessive extension in the depth of our troop grouping* permitted the fascist army to deliver the first attack with considerably superior forces, seize the initiative and attack the forces of our border military districts piecemeal as they came up from the rear areas. This situation deprived us of an opportunity during the first weeks of the war of creating a single shock force and compelled us to commit troops to action successively, stretched out in time.

Now high combat readiness has even greater significance. The nature of contemporary warfare is such that, in case the imperialists unleash it, too little time will remain for organizing retaliatory actions. This means that the problem of surprise today has acquired a particular keenness. Therefore, the importance of a proper and timely estimate of the situation before the war begins and adoption of appropriate decisions increases to the very same extent as did the role of surprise.

It is vital, moreover, to coordinate planning and work rates of military production with the tasks and deadlines of making the army combat-ready. This should be done in a scientific basis with consideration for developing international events and the degree of the threat of imperialist aggression. The process of improving weapons and military equipment and replacing old weapons with new ones also must be formulated in accordance with the development of the situation and the military policy and strategy of the state. In this light the correctness and farsightedness of those steps which the Communist Party and Soviet Government take ahead of time for strengthening the defensive capability of

the country and increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces become especially understandable.

Finally, it is necessary to mention one more important lesson of the past war. It is that **Soviet military science and art, like military science and art of the socialist social order, has an indisputable advantage over the military theory and art of the capitalist world, which has outlived its time.** This was one of the important factors of our victory in the Great Patriotic War.

Hitler's army was not helped by the superiority in men and materiel over Soviet troops created before the beginning of the aggression, by the enormous economic resources of almost all Western Europe, which were placed at the service of the fascist Wehrmacht, by the surprise attack, or by the social-class demagogy directed toward poisoning the consciousness of German soldiers with ideas of chauvinism and nationalism.

During the war years, the most characteristic features of Soviet military science manifested themselves brilliantly: a profound Party spirit and class direction; creativity, dynamic development; a broad spectrum of research; rapid introduction and implementation of the latest achievements; daring and flexibility in operational-tactical and strategic thinking; strict objectivity and depth of scientific forecasting.

Soviet military art also had such inherent characteristics as high combat activeness, purposefulness, and flexibility in the choice of forms and methods of combat operations which meet the changing conditions of the situation. Soviet strategy has resolved complex problems of deployment of the Armed Forces with their simultaneous conduct of a strategic defense under unfavorable conditions at the beginning of the war. It brilliantly seized the strategic initiative and conducted a broad strategic offensive until the total defeat of the enemy.

Soviet operational art and tactics of all services of the Armed Forces and the combat arms attained a high degree of perfection in the Great Patriotic War.

Outstanding Soviet commanders performed an enormous amount of creative organizational work in preparing many successful operations and in leading the troops. These were A. I. Antonov, I. Kh. Bagramyan, S. S. Biryuzov, A. M. Vasilevskiy, N. F. Vatutin, K. A. Vershinin, N. N. Voronov, L. A. Govorov, A. G. Golovko, S. G. Gorshkov, A. I. Yermenko, G. K. Zhukov, M. V. Zakharov, I. S. Isakov, I. S. Konev, N. I. Krylov, N. G. Kuznetsov, R. Ya. Malinovskiy, K. A. Meretskov, K. S. Moskalenko, A. A. Novikov, F. S. Oktyabr'skiy, I. Ye. Petrov, M. M. Popov, K. K. Rokossovskiy, V. D. Sokolovskiy, F. I. Tolbukhin, V. F. Tributs, I. D. Chernyakhovskiy, V. I. Chuykov, B. M. Shaposhnikov, I. S. Yumashev and others. Much was done in this regard by S. M.

Budennyi, K. Ye. Voroshilov and S. K. Timoshenko, whose names are widely known among the people since the time of the Civil War.

The interests of defending the achievements of socialism require developing even further the foremost Soviet military science and art, and in accordance with their principles, thoroughly preparing the Armed Forces to repulse possible aggression.

The few most important lessons of the Great Patriotic War examined in this chapter do not, of course, exhaust the list of the enormous amount of valuable military experience which the Soviet Armed Forces acquired and which is of great importance for further increasing their combat might, strengthening the country's defensive capability, and developing military affairs. The task is to thoroughly study this experience, making skillful use of the lessons of war in the fight against the enemies of socialism. The Party teaches that to apply the experience of history practically does not at all mean to copy or mechanically transfer it into our reality. Success comes only from an intelligent combination of conclusions from the historic past with the problems of modern times. In V. I. Lenin's estimation, the assimilation of historical experience—let alone the experience of such a complex and highly variegated social phenomenon as war—will be of use only when it is based on principles of Marxist-Leninist Party-mindedness and on a profound, comprehensive, objective and creative investigation of historical events.

One cannot help but consider that there is now a different alignment in the world and a different correlation of military-political forces. The combat capabilities of means of waging war have undergone great qualitative changes. Therefore, the task is not to seek out the external similarity of phenomena or the repetition of historical situations. The main task is to reveal the deep-seated processes and historical patterns, and to study the most important factors and reasons which determined the course and results of the past war.

Only by means of an analysis of the dialectical interconnection of historical events and by a determination of their causal relationship is it possible to establish the logical succession and the progressive nature of the historic process and on this basis to creatively develop contemporary military affairs.

The heroic combat path of our army—from a poorly equipped army built on the basis of a mixed system of manning to the modern, powerful Armed Forces which won a victory over the strongest imperialist armies—is clear proof of the correctness of V. I. Lenin's behests and the Party line on the defense of the socialist Homeland and on the organization of military development.

Chapter 3. At a New Stage

The Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War over the main shock force of imperialism—fascist Germany and militarist Japan—led on the one hand to a weakening of the entire capitalist system, and, on the other, to an expansion and consolidation of the positions of socialism. Fundamental changes took place on the globe under the effects of this world-historic victory and the growth of the USSR's international authority. Socialist revolutions took place in a number of countries of Europe and Asia. As a result, a mighty community of socialist states took shape. The labor movement in capitalist countries made greater strides; the communist and working people's parties developed and grew stronger. *The national liberation movement of peoples took on even greater scope.* Under its pressure, the shameful colonial system of imperialism crumbled. Capitalism finally ceased to be the force exercising absolute sway in the world.

However, this does not mean that the danger of new wars has been eliminated. While imperialism has been powerless to restore its lost positions and retard the historic development of mankind along the path of progress and socialism, it still is in a position to throw the nations into the abyss of a new world war. One must be vigilant every day and every hour. This is why the Communist Party is constantly concerned with strengthening the state's defensive capability and with increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces. Their high state of combat readiness serves as an important guarantee of peace and security on the planet, a guarantee for the creative labor of Soviet citizens not to be interrupted by any intrigues of imperialist reaction.

1. The Further Growth of the Combat Might of the Armed Forces

Having defended the freedom and independence of their Motherland in a difficult clash with imperialism, the Soviet people again began peaceful labor. They were faced with a large amount of intense work to restore a national economy destroyed by war and to increase the rates of its development so that under conditions of economic competition with capitalism they could consolidate the socialist achievements and confidently build a communist society in the country.

The fact that this was not easy is shown by the figures of the enormous loss which the Hitlerites inflicted on our state. In the war years over twenty million Soviet citizens perished. The invaders destroyed and burned 1,710 cities and suburban areas and more than 70,000 villages and rural communities. They destroyed around 32,000 industrial enterprises, put 65,000 kilometers of rail lines out of commission and plundered and ravaged many thousands of kolkhozes, sovkhozes, MTS [machine-tractor stations], hospitals, schools and scientific and cultural establishments. The direct and indirect loss was for a total of 2,600 billion rubles (in prewar prices). After the war, production of the most important types of industrial goods was only two-thirds of the volume of the prewar level in the country.

Under these difficult conditions, the Communist Party placed before the people as prime tasks the restoration and development of heavy industry and transport, the development of agriculture and branches of industry producing consumer goods, the increase in technological progress in all spheres of the national economy and assurance, on this basis, of a further strengthening of the state's defensive capability, and the equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces with the latest combat equipment and weapons. Resolution of these tasks depended on internal and external conditions under which our country found itself after the Great Patriotic War.

Under direction of the Party the Soviet people took up the restoration of the national economy with enormous enthusiasm. The transition of the economy to a peacetime footing and its development were facilitated by such Party and governmental steps as the reduction in military expenditures and increases in capital investments in the national economy, and the switching over of the greater part of industrial enterprises engaged in manufacture of military goods to the production of peacetime goods. Skilled personnel with rich experience in work and high organizational abilities returned to industry, agriculture and other sectors of the economy from the Armed Forces.

The increased international authority of the Soviet Union permitted Party and government to carry on a peace-loving foreign policy firmly and confidently and at the same time give an even stronger rebuff to imperialist reaction. Having come out the victor in the Great Patriotic War, the USSR was no longer alone. New states stood next to it which were actively building socialism and acting in a united front with the Soviet Union on foreign policy matters. Now there was no longer a single question of any importance in the international arena which could be resolved without the participation of the USSR and other socialist countries. There was a growing influence in our proposals directed toward relaxing tensions in the world. There was an increase in the effectiveness

of the struggle to halt any aggressive acts by imperialism against states of the socialist community.

At the same time the overall crisis of the capitalist system continued to deepen. A powerful national liberation and anti-imperialist movement developed in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Real ways were opened for many nations of the world to reach freedom, independence and social progress.

However, in spite of a sharp weakening of the position of capitalism, the reactionary circles of imperialist powers continued to think in the old categories of the policy of dictate and coercion. They did not wish to consider the objective course of the development of history. They did not reckon with the fact that it had become extremely dangerous under the changed conditions to attempt to resolve international problems by military means. Immediately after the end of the war imperialist reaction began a campaign of hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union, unleashed the so-called "cold war," and began to call openly for a new "crusade" against our Motherland and for delivery of "preventive" strikes against her, but now with the use of atomic weapons. Under a false motto of defending the "free world" against the "threat of communism," the aggressive circles of imperialism stepped up the arms race, began creating "defensive zones" and military bases and reequipped their armies with the latest military technology. The American and British imperialists were especially zealous. Under their pressure the aggressive military blocs of NATO, SEATO, and CENTO were knocked together. A chain of numerous military bases and bases of operation was hastily set up around the USSR and the young socialist states.

It is completely understandable that under such circumstances the Communist Party and Soviet Government, while continuing their unchangeable policy of peaceful coexistence of states with differing social systems, were forced to be concerned about the steady increase in the defensive capability of the Soviet land and the combat power of its Armed Forces. There was a continuation of perfection of weapons and military technology and of the organizational structure of the Armed Forces on the basis of a profound study of the lessons and combat experience of the past war. The combat and operational training of troops was improved. The creation of our own nuclear missiles was of great significance for strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet State. This was a forced measure in response to the waving of the "atomic club" by American imperialism. When the United States was deprived of a monopolistic ownership of nuclear weapons, this knocked from the hands of the militarists the chief means of blackmail and threats, and in the end they were forced to take into account the fully-developed might of the Soviet Union.

The postwar Party Congresses and CPSU CC Plenums played a large part in strengthening the USSR's defensive capabilities. They outlined

the ways for further development of the country's economy, for creating a material-technical basis of communism, and for nurturing the new man—the builder of a communist society. In solving these questions, the Party never lost sight of the interests of the security of the USSR or the task of steadily increasing its defensive capability and strengthening the combat might of the Armed Forces. The Resolution of the 24th CPSU Congress concerning the CC Summary Report states: "The Congress notes with satisfaction that the Party and its Central Committee are constantly focusing on questions of military development and strengthening of the might and combat effectiveness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The increase of the defensive might of our Motherland in every way possible and the upbringing of Soviet citizens in a spirit of high vigilance and constant readiness to defend the great achievements of socialism must continue to remain one of the most important tasks of the Party and the people."¹

The entire life and work, the training, education and political upbringing of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces are under the unremitting attention of the CPSU Central Committee and its Politburo. Sessions of the Politburo and Party CC Plenums regularly discuss questions of the state's defenses and examine the course of affairs in the Armed Forces. The CPSU Central Committee keeps an attentive eye on the development of the world military-political situation, reveals sources of military danger, determines the demands on the country's organization of defense at different historical stages, and does everything necessary to prevent a lag in the technical equipping of the Armed Forces.

An important role in the direction of the Armed Forces is played by meetings of Party and government leaders with soldiers at exercises, maneuvers, conferences, receptions in honor of military academy graduates and at other activities. These meetings embody the unity and indestructible ties of personnel of the Armed Forces with the Party, government and people. They attest to the daily concern of the CPSU Central Committee for steady increases in the ideological level and combat skill of all Soviet soldiers, for the training of command, political and engineer-technical personnel, for a steady improvement in supplying technical equipment and providing material support of troops, and for a continuous strengthening of our combat cooperation with the armies of other socialist states.

The contemporary stage of military development is characterized by further increases in the role of the Communist Party's direction of the entire work of the Armed Forces. This is an objective conformance to law. It is determined by the conditions under which questions of a steady strengthening of the country's defenses are decided. Among these conditions are the following: complexity of the international situation, which

¹ *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS* (Materials of the 24th CPSU Congress), p. 205.

makes it necessary to thoroughly analyze the political and military-strategic situation in the world; the importance of military, economic and sociopolitical problems of military development requiring thorough consideration of the possibilities and prospects for development of the Soviet State; the need for steadfast development of the creative activity of Soviet soldiers and a reinforcement of their communist upbringing; the increased scale of international tasks facing the Soviet Armed Forces and the responsibility for their performance. One can resolve all these questions successfully only under the Communists Party's unremitting direction and with its constant influence on all aspects of the life and activity of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces. Only a Party armed with Marxist-Leninist theory is capable of grasping all political, economic, social and military phenomena and events, performing a thorough analysis of all sociopolitical life, and outlining the correct paths for resolution of complex problems of building communism, defending its just cause and strengthening peace on earth.

In deciding the questions of increasing the country's defensive might and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the Communist Party constantly follows V. I. Lenin's behests and the deeply scientific line it developed for direction of the Armed Forces. This line fully corresponds to the political, economic, spiritual and military resources of the Soviet State and the requirements of communist development.

The level of economic development presently reached by the Soviet State permits it to perform successfully any defensive tasks and create all modern warmaking means. *Fulfillment of plans for developing the USSR national economy facilitates a constant growth in the defensive might of our Motherland, makes it possible to reliably protect the Soviet people and all countries of the socialist community against the danger of imperialist aggression, and strengthens the position of peace-loving and liberation forces throughout the globe.*

Thanks to the constant growth of the socialist economy, the remarkable achievements of Soviet science and technology and the selfless labor of the Soviet people, our Armed Forces have changed beyond recognition. Truly revolutionary transformations are taking place within them. They are being constantly equipped with the most up-to-date types of weapons and combat equipment. Their organizational structure is being improved and there has been further development of military art, the theory and practice of training and educating troops, and of military science as a whole.

Great changes have occurred in every service of the Armed Forces, and their relationship has changed. **The Strategic Rocket Forces**, which have most fully absorbed the achievements of modern scientific-technological progress, comprise the basis for the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. They are equipped with intercontinental and medium-

range ballistic missiles and the latest automated control means. They are always on combat watch and are always ready to retaliate against an aggressor.

The Ground Forces make up the largest service of the Armed Forces in numbers and combat composition. Their development follows the line of increases in firepower, striking power, mobility and maneuverability.

Operational and tactical rocket weapons, which continue to be improved, are the basic firepower of the Ground Forces. There is simultaneous development of conventional and rocket artillery, antitank weapons and mortars, which will find widest employment in case of war.

Our motorized rifle and tank troops have greatly changed. Armored equipment is the basis for their striking force. Tanks and armored vehicles have reliable armor protection, powerful rapid-fire weapons, effective instruments for navigating and for conducting direct fire, and increased mobility, maneuverability and operational life. There has been a sharp increase in the firepower of motorized rifle and tank units through the mass supply of personnel with automatic small arms and various antitank and other weapons.

There have been steady increases in the combat capabilities of air defense for the Ground Forces. Considerable success has been achieved in surface-to-air missiles and radar, especially in their range, antijamming capabilities and mobility. Antiaircraft artillery, which remains a very effective means of combating aircraft at low altitudes, continues to be improved along with other weapons. Air defense troops are capable of reliably protecting Ground Forces against air strikes under any conditions, day or night, while stationary or in movement.

Signal troops have improved a great deal. They possess radio, radio-relay and other means of communication, and electronic apparatus which allows for reliable troop control under any circumstances and in the presence of enemy jamming.

Engineer troops are equipped with diverse, high-capacity equipment making it possible to perform complex and laborious work in support of combat operations of the Ground Forces and other services of the Armed Forces. They are equipped with assault crossing and pontoon bridge equipment which permit rapid assault crossing over wide water obstacles. The engineer troops also possess the necessary forces and means for laying different antitank, antipersonnel and antivehicular minefields.

The airborne troops, which are designed for operations in the enemy rear, have developed at accelerated tempos in recent years. Their arsenal includes airtransportable self-propelled artillery pieces; rocket, antitank

and antiaircraft weapons; armored personnel carriers; automatic small arms; and reliable means of communication and control. The assault parachute equipment makes it possible to drop landing parties and cargoes under any conditions of weather or terrain, day or night, and in areas of limited size.

The National Air Defense Forces have attained a new combat efficiency. They are an important means for defending the state and Armed Forces against enemy air attack. This new efficiency results from the fact that aggressive imperialist blocs are constantly improving their air attack means and not letting up in their efforts in the field of quantitative and qualitative growth.

The National Air Defense Forces are forces in constant combat readiness. They are also called upon in peacetime to always be combat-ready in order to be capable of immediately performing the important combat missions of defending the populace, the state's administrative-political and economic centers, and also units of the Armed Forces against enemy air attack. For this purpose the National Air Defense Forces have been equipped with modern means for warning of an air attack and powerful surface-to-air missile, aviation and radar technology capable of detecting and destroying existing and future targets at different altitudes, in bad weather and in the presence of heavy enemy radioelectronic counter-measures, and on both close-in and distant approaches to defended objects. A distinctive feature of this service of the Armed Forces is the high combat performance of its weapons and combat equipment and the broad automation of troop command and control processes.

Our **Air Force** is a powerful service of the Armed Forces. The rapid development of military aviation has been supported by fundamental achievements of science and technology, especially in creation of new jet engines and aerodynamic configurations of aircraft and helicopters, as well as by the broad application in aircraft construction of the most sophisticated materials and radio and radioelectronic equipment.

The modern Air Force is all-weather. Its basis is the missile-carrying aircraft, which can deliver nuclear or conventional strikes against any target on land or sea without entering the zone of operations of enemy air defense weapons. The Air Force also includes missile-equipped fighter aviation, military transport aviation and combat helicopters.

The combat machines in the Air Force arsenal possess supersonic speeds and can fly in the stratosphere. They are outfitted with powerful missiles and cannon, and sophisticated radioelectronic equipment. New aircraft have been created with a variable geometric configuration, as well as a capability of vertical take-off and landing. These machines can take off and land on an area of limited size. They can operate successfully under difficult meteorological conditions and at night, and they can fly

at supersonic speed over great distances. The modern helicopters are above all combat machines which are capable of accomplishing a wide range of missions in support of the Ground Forces on the battlefield, including operations in the enemy rear. They can also successfully conduct aerial reconnaissance, land troops, deliver cargoes and provide communications and control.

The Navy has turned into a formidable force. The development of missile technology and of atomic power plants led to an abrupt change in the direction of warship construction. This was expressed in an increased role of atomic submarines carrying nuclear missiles. At the present time the chief means capable of accomplishing the Navy's basic missions are the atomic submarines armed with various missiles and self-homing torpedoes, and equipped with sophisticated means of navigation, control and communications. They can deliver strikes from great distances both against naval targets and against land installations located on the shore and in the enemy rear. Missile-carrying naval aviation is an important means of destruction of the enemy.

The Navy also possesses missile-carrying antisubmarine vessels, mine sweepers, assault-landing craft and other surface warships, shore-based rocket artillery troops, and naval infantry. The Navy emerged from coastal waters and closed seas and mastered the expanses of the World ocean. It has everything it needs for the simultaneous and prolonged conduct of combat operations on the oceans and seas.

The Rear Services of the Armed Forces are constantly improving along with the Armed Forces. They have been fully motorized, which has increased maneuverability and mobility of their elements. Railroad, motor transport and road construction troops and pipeline transport have been developed further. There has been an increase in mechanization of supply processes, and an improvement in medical and other troop support. In their organization and support, the rear services are capable of reliably fulfilling the important missions assigned.

In recent years a great deal of varied work has been done to improve **National Civil Defense**, whose role has been growing considerably in modern war.

Border and internal forces, which are a component part of the Soviet Armed Forces, have been further developed.

With all the colossal military-technological capabilities of the Soviet Armed Forces, their main force is represented by people. The patriots and internationalists, rallied closely about the Communist Party and utterly devoted to the socialist Motherland and the great cause of communism, are the model of a socialist army. Inalienable qualities of our soldiers and sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's, ensigns and warrants, officers, generals and admirals are their wide political outlook, high

degree of discipline, efficiency and assiduousness, and deep specialized knowledge and mastery in handling different types of weapons. Party members cement the ranks of the Armed Forces. Together with the Komsomol members, they make up an absolute majority of Soviet soldiers.

On the whole one can say that in their military-technological capabilities, ideological-political maturity, moral-combat qualities and personnel training, the Soviet Armed Forces are up to meeting modern requirements. They are capable of conducting active combat operations at high tempos over a great depth, under various conditions of the situation, with or without the employment of nuclear weapons, and thus of successfully accomplishing operational-tactical and strategic missions of any scale.

2. High Combat Readiness—A Call of the Times

A high constant combat readiness is the decisive indicator of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. "Everything created by the people must be readily defended." These words from the CPSU CC Summary Report to the 24th Party Congress express the main mission of the Soviet Armed Forces. They call upon personnel to make further *improvements in combat and political training, to raise military skills, discipline and orders, effect coordination of units and formations, and, in the final account, to steadily strengthen the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.* The military workday in units and on board ships begins with these words. They accompany Soviet soldiers on the training fields and firing ranges, on short and long marches, in flight and on combat watch.

The Soviet Armed Forces have been performing their patriotic and international duty of defending the socialist achievements of working people against the aggressive intrigues of imperialist reaction honorably and with dignity. They vigilantly stand combat watch on land, in the air, and on sea and ocean expanses.

Recently, thanks primarily to the active foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, a change has been taking place in the international situation away from hostile confrontation toward the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems and toward intelligent cooperation among them on the basis of mutual advantage and equal security. Through the common efforts of the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties of countries of the socialist community, unity is being strengthened and comprehensive cooperation is developing among the fraternal socialist countries. The positions of world socialism are becoming firmer and firmer. The influence of its peace-loving policy on the entire international situation is becoming stronger.

Prevention of a world nuclear war is the object of special concern for the Communist Party and the Soviet Government. If the imperialists should

begin such a war, it will bring enormous disaster to all mankind. In light of this it is clear that the conclusion in 1973 of the "Agreement on Prevention of Nuclear War" between the USSR and the United States, which is of unlimited duration, was an important step.

While conducting a peaceloving foreign policy consistently and steadfastly, the Soviet Union at the same time is irreconcilable to all manifestations of aggressive attempts by imperialist reaction. It supports the struggle of freedom loving peoples against social and national oppression. Solidarity with comrades in class—liberation and anti-imperialist movements—in no way contradicts the struggle for peace and for peaceful cooperation among states. In a speech before the World Congress of Peaceloving Forces in Moscow on 26 October 1973, L. I. Brezhnev said: "While defending principles of peaceful coexistence, we fight for what is most dear for billions of people on earth: for the right to life itself and for getting rid of the danger of its destruction in the flames of war. Thus we are simultaneously fighting for assurance of favorable international conditions for advancing the cause of social progress of all countries and peoples. We are speaking of the recognition of the right of every nation to choose the social system it wishes, and of the simple and clear norms of intercourse among states."² This policy enjoys invariable support on the part of other socialist states, fraternal Communist Parties, and the progressive public of the entire world. It expresses the interests of all peaceloving peoples on our planet.

However, in spite of a certain relaxation of tensions, the international situation still is not so favorable that one can reduce vigilance and the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces, or weaken the country's defenses. The reactionary circles of imperialism, which still are rather numerous possess an imposing force and continue to poison the international atmosphere. They oppose international relaxation and are for a buildup of military preparations, a continuation of the arms race and the inflating of military budgets. There also still is no end to the adventurers who are capable of unleashing a new military fire for the sake of their own egotistical ends.

Militarism always was an inalienable feature of imperialism, but today it has attained a truly unprecedented scale. The labor of many millions of people, the greatest achievements of human intellect and the talent of scientists, researchers and engineers are being used by the imperialists for barbaric, reactionary goals and for the preparation of new predatory wars. Each year the military budgets of countries of the North Atlantic bloc increase by 2–3 billion dollars.

The militant forces of imperialism have not given up their aggressive

² L. I. Brezhnev, *Za spravedlivyy, demokratcheskiy mir, za bezopasnost' narodov i mezhdunarodnoye sotrudnichestvo* (For a Just and Democratic Peace, for the Security of Nations and International Cooperation). Moscow, Politizdat, 1973, p. 37.

schemes. They are waging a constant struggle against the world system of socialism in different forms. They attempt to hinder the economic growth of socialist states, limit their international influence, disarm them ideologically and split and isolate them politically.

The most reactionary imperialist circles are attempting to find a way out of the contradictions of capitalism by aggravating the international situation and through acts of aggression and piracy. They have unleashed over 30 wars and military conflicts in postwar years, and as a result enormous material losses were incurred and millions of people perished or were crippled. However, the aggressors are encountering the growing opposition of freedom loving nations and progressive forces throughout the world. After unleashing a war in Indochina, imperialism was in no condition to break the will of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, who were fighting for their freedom and independence, and was forced to cease the aggression. The Israeli extremists treacherously attacked peace-loving Arab states, seized a portion of their territory and are striving to consolidate their hold on these lands. They have created and are maintaining a tense situation in the Middle East. But even here the aggressors are encountering growing resistance; the Arab nations are decisively repulsing them.

Influential imperialist circles also exist and operate on the European continent. They are attempting to retard the process of relaxation of tensions. Revanchists in West Germany still cherish the idea of a revision of the results of World War II. The NATO bosses are fighting for a further arms race and an increase in military appropriations.

Among reactionary representatives of imperialist states, here and there calls still continue to be heard for conducting a policy "from a position of strength" toward the USSR, although this policy has always backfired. The Soviet Union has more than once given imperialists graphic lessons to the effect that a solution to thorny international problems must be sought, not in the application of methods of blackmail and pressure, but by means of peaceful cooperation, equality, mutual respect and trust. But they obviously did not assimilate all these lessons, and the most reactionary imperialist circles continue to do everything to return the world to "cold war" times. The Maoists are forming a block with the reactionary forces of imperialism. They have already started an open interstate confrontation with countries of the socialist community. At the 25th Congress of our Party the General Secretary of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev, said that the policy of China's current leaders "is openly directed against the majority of the socialist states."³ Therefore, so long as there remains the danger of war, the Soviet Armed Forces are obligated to be constantly

³ L. I. Brezhnev, *Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS i ocherednyye zadachi v oblasti vnutrenney i vneshney politiki* (Report of the CPSU Central Committee and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in the Spheres of Internal and External Policy). Moscow, 1976, p. 12.

on guard, to possess a high state of combat readiness, and to maintain it at the level of constantly growing requirements.

Combat readiness is no motto or high-flown phrase, but a totally concrete concept. It is that state of the Armed Forces in which they are capable of repelling and disrupting aggression at any moment and under the most difficult conditions of the situation, no matter what the source or the means and methods used, including nuclear weapons.

Concentrated around the concept of combat readiness of the Armed Forces are: the enormous efforts and material expenditures by the people to supply the Armed Forces with weapons, combat equipment and other necessary material; conscientiousness, combat training and discipline of all soldiers; and the proficiency of commanders in controlling troops and combat resources. One can say that the high state of combat readiness of the Armed Forces is the pinnacle of their military expertise and a guarantee of victory in war.

The main components of the combat readiness of our Armed Forces are the following: a deep Communist conviction, unswerving dedication to the Party cause and to the people; high military discipline of personnel and their training and physical conditioning; providing the Armed Forces with sophisticated weapons and combat equipment, and maintenance of these weapons and equipment in operating condition; the high level of military and specialized training of commanders and their ability to skillfully control troops and to organize and implement the uninterrupted provisions of material resources; readiness of political organs, Party organizations and all Party members to inspire soldiers by word and personal example to perform combat missions.

Combat readiness encompasses all aspects of the many-sided activity of the Armed Forces and reflects the level they have attained in combat and operational training, the combat coordination of different-sized units and the ideological-political education of soldiers. All components of combat readiness must be viewed as a set. Just as it is impossible to tear a link from a chain without breaking it, so in combat readiness one cannot give reduced attention to a single one of its components without affecting all the rest. Constant high combat readiness for a military man is a natural thing, the condition determined by a sense of duty.

High combat readiness is achieved by persistent, daily work; the intensive training of all personnel; the constant improvement of commanders, staffs, political organs, Party organizations, rear service units and establishments; purposeful Party-political work in the ideological education of soldiers and increase in their moral-political and psychological qualities. The more intensive troop training and the closer it is to an actual combat situation, the more complete and of higher quality is the performance of combat missions and the higher is the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

In the final account, the steady strengthening of combat readiness is the main goal of combat, operational and political training and of Party-political work. The struggle for high achievements in training is a struggle for increasing the combat readiness of the subunit, the unit, and the formation. It represents a constantly developing process. There is no place in it for hardened, outmoded forms and methods of training and education of personnel, or obsolete methods of accomplishing combat missions, troop actions and the employment of weapons and combat equipment. Here everything is in motion. That which satisfied us just yesterday becomes a past phase today.

Therefore, keeping the Armed Forces at the proper level of combat readiness depends primarily on the persistent performance of tasks of combat, political and operational training, continuous improvement in the methods of training and educating personnel, and the day-to-day struggle for new successes in perfecting military expertise, the forms and methods of combat operations, and the employment of weapons and military equipment. This struggle is waged in classrooms and on training fields, on the firing ranges and tank ranges, and when standing combat watches.

Our Armed Forces always keep abreast of scientific-technological progress. The Party, government and people do everything necessary to strengthen the defensive capability of the Soviet State and to raise the combat might of the Armed Forces. A powerful economic base and special branches of the defense industry have been created in the country which ensure that the Armed Forces have a sufficient amount of sophisticated weapons and combat equipment.

The latest equipment and weapons involve fundamental changes in strategy, operational art and tactics, and in methods and forms of conducting combat operations. It is important that these weapons and combat equipment are in constant working order and fully ready for action, that all components of combat missiles, tanks, aircraft, surface ships, submarines, radars and other systems always operate faultlessly, and that personnel have an excellent knowledge of the tactical and technical capabilities of combat equipment, master it to perfection, and use it skillfully and with greatest effect, under different and particularly difficult and critical combat conditions. This can by rights be called mission number one.

At the same time, one has to remember that technical equipping is fully felt only if it is combined with a superiority over the enemy in the art of warring and conducting an operation or battle. The experience of wars shows that new weapons and combat equipment take on real force only with an advanced strategy, operational art and tactics.

A decisive role in the steadily increasing combat readiness of the

Armed Forces belongs to command, political and engineer-technical cadres. The combat readiness of subunits, units, warships, and formations depends on the level of their military, political, specialized and technical training.

Maintenance of constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces is always fraught with certain difficulties. But military people are people with a stern profession and they are equal to the difficulties and trials. A man who is a master of his profession and stands face-to-face with the enemy is the person who directly decides the outcome of a battle. One should particularly mention the warrants and ensigns, sergeants and senior NCO's and soldiers and sailors in this regard. In order to win a battle, they must master a complicated weapon to perfection and be able to employ it under any circumstances with the greatest effectiveness. These qualities are developed during days of intensive combat and political training while still at peace. Active participation in classes, exercises, marches and alert duty will permit our military personnel to learn to concentrate their spiritual and physical forces on surmounting difficulties and to instil in themselves presence of mind, steadfastness, independence, decisiveness, discipline, efficiency, composure and an unswerving will to win.

Soviet military science and the use of experience of past wars has an important place in the constant strengthening of the Armed Forces' combat readiness. While the role of science in the country's national economy appears more and more as an immediate productive force, military science in the Armed Forces is becoming an increasingly active and effective stimulus in the development of military art and one of the basic means of perfecting combat and operational training, improving the system of training and education of troops, and strengthening their combat readiness in peace and winning victories in war.

The Soviet Armed Forces have everything necessary to maintain a high state of combat readiness. The task consists of constantly directing the efforts of all personnel, commanders and Party organizations toward fulfillment of the tasks of combat, operational and political training, toward further increases in troop organization and procedures and in the coordination of all echelons of the military organism.

3. Combat Readiness of the Armed Forces and the Country's Defensive Capability

The combat readiness of the Armed Forces, their quantitative composition and especially their qualitative status and combat capabilities comprise the basis for the state's defensive capability. However, the country's defensive capability is not exhausted with just the might of the Armed Forces. Its important factors include the state of the economy, science

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
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and technology, the size and quality of the population and their readiness for a possible war.

Consequently, the strengthening of the country's defensive capability and the combat might and readiness of the Armed Forces presumes full development of the economy—industry, agriculture, transportation, communications; preparations for supporting the Armed Forces and populace in wartime; the accumulation of reserves of strategic materials; and also the execution of other measures. In other words, the strengthening of a country's defensive capability demands above all the creation and maintenance of its military-economic potential at a level sufficient for successful fulfillment of the tasks of repelling and disrupting any aggression.

The Communist Party and its Central Committee devote daily attention to the constant growth of the Soviet State's defensive capability. This is expressed primarily in the consolidation of the combat power of the Armed Forces, in their supply with the latest types of weapons and combat equipment, and in increases in the combat readiness and effectiveness of the Armed Forces. The Party's concern is also manifested in the comprehensive development of the country's economy and its ability to fully satisfy the needs of the Armed Forces, the populace and the national economy in wartime. Each of our five-year plans and each year of communist development provide an enormous increase in all areas of the economy and thus make a great contribution to the steady strengthening of the state's defensive capability and to increases in the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Under present conditions there is great significance in ensuring both a high probability of the country's economic survival in case of an aggressor's attack and a rapid conversion of military-economic potential into a real military force.

As a material base for war, the economy of any state is increasingly becoming a target for military action. Even in World War II the warring sides tried to disrupt the economic life in an enemy state, hinder his army's supply of weapons, combat equipment and other supplies, and hinder the arrival of replacements for the front and the maneuver of reserves through bombing raids against industrial installations and lines of communication. However, the limited combat capabilities of aviation at that time still did not produce the necessary effect. Even allied bombing raids against fascist Germany, which had a shallow rear area and a concentrated deployment of main industrial installations, did not achieve their goal. The industrial installations and road junctions were restored comparatively quickly and continued to operate.

It is a different situation today. If one does not opportunely conduct activities to increase the stability of operation of the national economy and to protect the populace, then right at the beginning of a war this may

lead to a sharp drop in industrial output; the disruption of economic ties among individual regions; the disabling of transportation, means of control, and power systems; the destruction of cities and enormous human and material losses.

And as is well known, it is impossible to conduct a war without a reliable and functioning home front.

Modern war requires the creation of a reliable defense of not only individual installations, as was the case in the past, but even a carefully thought out and organized system of measures to ensure stability of the operation of the entire national economy and reliable protection of the populace throughout the country. Civil Defense, which now is a factor of strategic significance in ensuring a state's vital activity, plays a special role in accomplishment of this mission.

Civil Defense is called upon first of all to train the populace in organized actions in a difficult situation and to prepare it for putting out fires over large areas, combating floods, giving victims medical aid on a mass scale, clearing obstructions, laying roads, rapidly restoring the power and water supply network, getting the disrupted production and management running again, and, in a number of cases, resolutely engaging the enemy.

Civil Defense obtained some experience in this vein during the years of the Great Patriotic War. It is true that in that period its role was limited primarily to tasks of local air defense, which were considerably simpler and less voluminous in nature and scope than the duties of present-day Civil Defense. But even then the entire able-bodied population, from the young schoolboy to the pensioner, forged a formidable weapon for the Soviet Army and heroically defended plants, kolkhozes, power stations, mines, pits, and railroad lines. The residents of Leningrad, Odessa, Stalingrad, Sevastopol' and other industrial centers ensured the uninterrupted manufacture of weapons, combat equipment and ammunition under difficult conditions and incessant enemy air and artillery strikes, and, when necessary, fought off enemy attacks with weapons in hand.

The working conditions of the homefront in a future war would become considerably more complicated. Therefore, we need a timely and comprehensive preparation of the economy and populace for such a war.

The Communist Party's concern for strengthening the country's defensive capability is also expressed in its organization of military-patriotic work among the populace. Its importance is confirmed by all the experience of the Great Patriotic War. The unparalleled exploits of the Soviet people, their mass heroism, unprecedented endurance and steadfastness, contempt for death and readiness to give their lives for the socialist Motherland are the qualities of our people which the whole world admired. They did not arise of themselves. They were a result of out-

standing achievements in socialist development, of the gigantic amount of work by the Communist Party in the ideological-political education of Soviet citizens, and, in particular, of the skillfully organized military-patriotic work in prewar years and during the war.

Now military-patriotic work has acquired still greater significance. If the aggressive circles of monopolistic capitalism should unleash a war, it will take on an unprecedented fierce and destructive nature. It will require the extreme exertion of moral and physical forces of the people, colossal endurance and steadfastness, and the ability to overcome enormous difficulties at the front and in the rear areas. Therefore, it is necessary to thoroughly prepare all the populace for this eventuality.

The Communist Party views military-patriotic work as a component of the communist upbringing of the Soviet people. To this end it uses the full and rich combination of mass political measures and all the ideological power of Soviet art, literature, press, radio, television and movies. Work is carried on constantly and encompasses the most diverse layers and age categories of the population. The principles of military-patriotic upbringing are already instilled in the family and in the school. Later this upbringing continues at industrial enterprises, in kolkhozes and sovkhozes, and while performing military service. Millions of workers and kolkhoz members, employees and pupils are united in the All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy (DOSAAF). Broad military-patriotic propaganda and mass sports defense work is carried on with the assistance of Party, Komsomol and trade-union organizations and sports societies.

Military-patriotic work is conducted in two basic directions in the country. The first is moral-political and psychological preparation, which is designed to instill in Soviet citizens a spirit of revolutionary vigilance as steadfast fighters for the cause of communism and confirmed patriots who are able to withstand any tests of wartime and to perform with dignity the duties of a Soviet citizen under the most trying conditions at the front and in the rear areas. It is very important to form in future defenders of the Motherland firm psychological stability—the ability to display self-control, courage, fearlessness and selflessness under difficult situations. The most fundamental principle here is a high spiritual steadfastness, political consciousness and dedication to the Party, the Motherland and the people. The second direction is military training of the populace. The range of tasks here is also great. There is particular importance in training the population to defend against weapons of mass destruction, to quickly eliminate the aftereffects of enemy nuclear strikes, to give timely assistance to victims and to ensure conditions for normal operation of the country's national economic installations. Both these directions are closely interrelated and supplement each other. They are subordinated to one common goal—educating worthy defenders of the Soviet Motherland.

The propaganda of revolutionary, combat and labor traditions, the heroic past of our people and the experience of the Great Patriotic War has a great role in military-patriotic education of the population. This task is advanced in Party decisions as one of the most important in molding the character of young builders of communism and defenders of the working people's revolutionary achievements.

The succession of generations that were faithful to patriotic duty can be traced back to the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions, the ideological basis of which is Marxism-Leninism. Our youth receives like a baton everything that is valuable and everything that is most dear which has been forged by the Soviet people. The best traits of our people are reflected in the moral code of a builder of communism. These include dedication to the cause of communism, love for the socialist Motherland and countries of socialism, conscientious labor for the good of society, a high awareness of social duty, friendship and brotherhood of all peoples of the USSR, intolerance for national or racial enmity, collectivism and comradely mutual assistance, irreconcilability toward the enemies of communism and the cause of peace and freedom of nations, fraternal solidarity with the workers of all countries and with all nations, and other high moral-political qualities of the Soviet man.

Upbringing on revolutionary, combat and labor traditions is especially effective when it is combined with propaganda about decisions of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, with a profound explanation of the international situation, the Armed Forces' role in modern times, and of the need for constantly strengthening the USSR's defenses, and with a demonstration of the achievements of the Soviet people in communist development and the successes of soldiers in combat and political training.

The public (non-governmental) organizations which prepare youths for service in the Armed Forces make a great contribution toward increasing the country's defensive capability and the combat might and readiness of the Armed Forces. Military service is honorable and romantic, but it is not easy. One must prepare for it morally, psychologically and physically.

Twice a year the troops receive the young replacements. As a rule, these are highly educated young people with good theoretical knowledge, but not possessing sufficient experience in life. For them the service in units and on ships is a time for maturing and for the shaping of a genuine soldier. Everything is being done in the Armed Forces to ensure that young men master military specialties in a very brief time and are capable of performing their honorable duty of defending the socialist Homeland skillfully, with honor, and with dignity. But in order to accelerate the development of the young replacements, it is necessary to have an appropriate training of youths for military service even before they are called

up. Such training is conducted by social organizations, and above all by DOSAAF. This patriotic society helps hundreds of thousands of young people master military technical specialties and acquire initial knowledge and skills of military service.

Along with DOSAAF organizations, the Komsomol, schools, and other educational institutions and enterprises play a large part in preparing the youth for service in the Armed Forces. Of great importance for the patriotic upbringing of future soldiers are the constant ties of youth organizations with units and ships, the development of Komsomol political, cultural and patronage work with the Navy, Air Force and Border Troops, and also the enormous educational work of veterans of the Great Patriotic War.

Among the important tasks of training the youth for service in the Armed Forces are physical conditioning, regular practice in different forms of sports, above all applied military sports, the development of endurance and adroitness, and active completion of the sports norms of the GTO* system. The new GTO system recently adopted has acquired broad popularity among people of all ages, especially the youth. For us the preparation for passing the norms for the GTO emblem has become a sort of springboard to major sports and to life without illnesses or ailments. Having become physically fit, the young people in units and aboard ships are quicker to master a military specialty, are more successful in overcoming the hardships of Armed Forces service and more confidently enter the ranks of experienced armed defenders of the Motherland.

Thus, under the leadership of the Communist Party the efforts of the Soviet people in comprehensive development of the state's economic might, the struggle of Soviet soldiers for steadily increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the work of Civil Defense, and the military-patriotic work of DOSAAF, the Komsomol and other social organizations merge into a single stream and are directed toward a further strengthening of the country's defensive capability and its readiness to offer a crushing rebuff to any aggressor.

All this in the final account is concentrated in the combat power of the Armed Forces and in their high combat readiness. The efforts of the Soviet people in raising the country's defensive capability are not in vain. Everything they have created and are creating is constantly under the reliable protection of the Soviet Armed Forces.

*[GTO—"Gotov k trudu i oborone SSSR" is the Russian for "Ready for Labor and Defense of the USSR."—U.S. Ed.]

Chapter 4. The Popular Character of the Soviet Armed Forces

One of the most important sources of the invincible might of the Soviet Armed Forces is their immediate closeness and blood relationship with the people. The Soviet Armed Forces are a favorite creation of the people. They are connected with them by thousands of inseparable threads, and the inexhaustible wellspring of their power, steadfastness, courage, selflessness and mass heroism is the people.

In a report before the 3rd All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Working People's Soldier's and Peasant's Deputies, V. I. Lenin stressed the distinguishing feature of the new army—its popular character. This feature stems from the very nature of the Soviet Socialist State as a state of working people, from the class essence and purpose of our Armed Forces as a tool in the defense of the achievements of socialism, and from the unity of interests of the Soviet State, its people and troops of the Armed Forces.

1. Armed Forces of the State of All the People

We know that as a special organization of armed individuals the army arose at a specific historical stage in the development of society. It was required when private ownership of means of production was formed, when society was divided into classes, and when the need appeared for protection of the private property of exploiters and for ensuring their coercion of the exploited. Thus, the army was created as a means of dominance, a tool of the state, and the most important instrument of the domestic and foreign policy of ruling classes. In all presocialist socioeconomic structures, the army served and still serves the interests of oppressors. It was used and is still used by them for aggression and the enslavement of peoples.

The Soviet Armed Forces, as well as the armies of other socialist countries, are radically different from these armies. They were brought to life by new historical conditions and objectively represent a qualitatively different military organization which in its essence is diametrically opposed to all previously existing types of armies and to the bourgeois armies which now exist.

While the armies of capitalist states serve as tools of the exploiting classes, protect their interests, and are directed against the toiling masses, the Soviet Armed Forces are a tool of a socialist state and of its truly popular power. They express the unity of class interests of working people and peasants, the friendship of nations, the moral-political unity of Soviet society and socialist patriotism and internationalism. In all their aspects, goals and missions they reflect the character of the socialist social and state system and the impelling forces and advantages of socialism over capitalism. Their ideological basis is Marxism-Leninism. By its nature, the Soviet military organization is designed to be used in the interests of a just and progressive cause. This predetermines the fundamentally new and truly national social role, and the meaning and significance of all the work of the Soviet Armed Forces. They are national in composition, purpose and place in the political organization of society.

The fundamental contrast between socialist and capitalist armies is revealed most fully in an examination of their functions.

It follows from a Leninist analysis of the class essence and purpose of the armed forces of capitalist states that in all bourgeois republics, even the most democratic ones, the army remains as the instrument of oppression of the popular masses. It constantly carries out two functions: domestic and foreign. The former is connected with carrying out the will of the governments and the exploiting classes behind them for imposing an "order" suitable to the bourgeoisie in the country. The latter is connected with the conquest of foreign territories for purposes of dividing up the world, capturing new sales markets, expanding the sphere of oppression of peoples of colonial countries and fighting the national liberation movement.

Contemporary bourgeois armed forces continue to carry out these functions. They are used by imperialist reaction to suppress demonstrations by the toiling masses in their own country who are struggling for their rights and social liberation. At the same time, bourgeois armies act as the basic means of enslaving and pillaging other nations, suppressing the national liberation movement and exporting counterrevolution. They have been and remain that force of a capitalist state, hostile to the workers, which as early as 1905 was termed by V. I. Lenin to be "the tool of reaction, the servant of capital in the struggle against labor, and the executioner of popular freedom."¹

Western theoreticians attempt to hide the genuine essence of bourgeois armies and their purpose, functions and social role. They try to present the armed forces of capitalist states as allegedly nonclass organizations which stand outside politics. In reality things are not this way. Life long ago overturned these false assertions. V. I. Lenin wrote that "The army cannot and must not be neutral. To keep the army out of

¹ V. I. Lenin, XII, 113.

politics is a motto of the hypocritical servants of the bourgeoisie, . . . who in fact always have drawn the army into reactionary politics. . . .”²

In their essence, bourgeois armies are reactionary and antipopular. This has been reinforced in the era of imperialism, and especially after the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution, in the modern era—an era of transition from capitalism to socialism. This was expressed in the use of armies by ruling imperialist circles against the first socialist state in the world, in the mass murders and atrocities which these armies committed in the period of foreign intervention, in the fascist invasion of the USSR, and in the merciless suppression of anti-imperialist demonstrations by peoples of colonial and dependent countries.

The reactionary, antipopular role of bourgeois armed forces was clearly manifested not only in the past, but throughout all postwar history. This can be seen in the examples of aggressive actions by the U.S. Army against the KNDR [Korean People's Democratic Republic] in 1950–1953, against Guatemala in 1954, Peru and Honduras in 1956, Lebanon in 1958, Panama in 1959–1964, etc. It was only in 1973 that American imperialism was forced to cease the prolonged dirty war against the peoples of Vietnam, during which many thousands of peaceful people were killed and a great number of populated areas were destroyed and burned.

It is true that in the case of an attack by one capitalist state against another, the weaker of the two has been forced to defend itself. Under these conditions its armed forces may fulfill a nationwide mission in fighting an aggressor for the independence of the state. However, the antagonistic contradictions and class discord between working people and exploiters are retained as before and even grow as the ruling classes achieve the political goals of the war. The social essence of the bourgeois army also remains unchanged. It is the tool of the exploiting classes. In the final account, the armed forces of capitalist states have all the sins of their order, which takes on a more militaristic character as time goes on.

There are numerous instances of capitalist armies used for suppressing anti-military demonstrations of working people, for reprisals against striking workers struggling for their political and economic rights, and against the Negro population, who are seeking an end to racial discrimination. According to the *National Guardsman*, a military journal, in just the period from the beginning of 1965 through May of 1970 American troops took part over 290 times in putting down “civil disturbances.” The bloody activities of British troops in Ulster (Northern Ireland) also is an example of how antipopular functions are carried out in practice by bourgeois armies in our times.

At the contemporary stage of capitalism, with the achievement of an unprecedented concentration of capital and the interlocking of monopo-

² *Op. cit.*

lies with the state apparatus, bourgeois armies fall even more under the influence of the monopolistic clique and into a political dependence upon it. The so-called military-industrial complex has evolved in the most developed capitalist countries.

This is a close association of the largest monopolies with the militarists in the state apparatus. It laid bare even more distinctly the antipopular essence of imperialist armies. The military-industrial complex actually runs the country. It imposes militarism and creates an atmosphere of war psychosis and hysteria within its own state and it increases tension in the international arena.

The reactionary nature of bourgeois armies has intensified as a result of the creation of aggressive military-political blocs of imperialism with their cutting edge directed primarily toward the socialist countries, but also against the national liberation movement of oppressed and dependent nations and the revolutionary demonstrations of the working class within the capitalist states themselves.

In many capitalist states a transition is taking place toward a mercenary system of raising an army in order to separate even further the army from the people, camouflage its antipopular essence, and make it a submissive executor of the will of the imperialists. The militarists count on professional mercenaries being able to kill not only unarmed women, children and old people of other countries for money, but their own working people and peasants who are fighting for social liberation as well.

In conformity with the purpose and essence of bourgeois armies, the latter are also training personnel in a manner which, in imperialist states, bears a clearly expressed aggressive, anticommunist, inhuman character. The basis of ideological cultivation of servicemen is anti-communism, slander against the communist parties, distortion of their goals and policies, dissemination of lies about the "growing communist danger" and the "threat of imposition of communism by force of arms," and falsification of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. Here the actual state of affairs within the USSR and other socialist states is concealed and at the same time the capitalist way of life is extolled and aspirations for private ownership are developed and encouraged.

The whole system of training and ideological cultivation in bourgeois armies is aimed at trampling the class consciousness of soldiers who, on the whole, represent the toiling masses, and passing off the armed forces of the capitalist state as instruments for allegedly carrying out the will of the people and of the nation. Ideologists of imperialism attempt to prove that capitalist armies are designed for "maintaining peace and justice." In order to achieve its aims, bourgeois propaganda does not shrink from anti-Soviet fabrications of Trotskyites, anarchists, traitors of different types, revisionists, Maoist "theoreticians" and the like.

Imperialist propaganda finds especially favorable soil among the officer personnel of bourgeois armies, and, above all, among the generals and admirals. In the United States, for example, the main group of officers adhere in their political views to the right reactionary wing. They actively support the policy "from a position of strength" and are a subservient tool in the hands of their bosses. The functions of the officer corps are far from exhausted with the fulfillment of purely military duties. Associated with monopolies by common class and corporative interests, this military elite has long been an organized social group of people which has had an ever increasing influence on the politics of a state. It plays an important role in the state's sociopolitical life and in the activities of the military-industrial complex.

But, as life shows, the results of ideological cultivation of troops often are not those which the imperialists would have liked to see. Under the powerful influence of the steadily growing authority of socialism, personnel of armed forces of capitalist countries, and the enlisted masses above all, are beginning to understand the unjustness of wars which the imperialists wage. Leaders of the bourgeois world admit that no propaganda can keep progressive ideas and disappointment with the capitalist order from penetrating into their armies. This explains numerous instances of insubordination of privates toward officers, desertion, and the refusal to use arms against defenseless people. And these are not chance phenomena, but deep-seated processes inherent in the nature of imperialist armies. They are occasioned by internal weakness and fundamental contradictions of capitalist society, and by the social and racial inequality existing within it.

After the victory of the Great October, our army also was fulfilling two functions: domestic and foreign. However, their content and social direction were fundamentally opposed to the functions of bourgeois armies from the very first days of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The Soviet Armed Forces carried out their domestic function at a time when there were still remnants of exploiting classes in the country which were fighting against the new social system. The army then acted as a tool of the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was used against the exploiting minority for protection of the interests of the toiling classes. Herein lies the fundamental distinction of its domestic function from that of capitalist armies.

The domestic function of a socialist army is relatively short-lived. In the Soviet Union, a country of victorious socialism, there are no oppressed peoples, no antagonistic classes, and no political struggle expressing the antagonistic class contradictions; consequently, there are no grounds for a domestic function of the armed forces. In other words, fulfillment of a domestic function by a socialist army is characteristic only of a specific historical stage in the development and consolidation of a

new society, i.e., of the transitional period from capitalism to the first phase of communist society, or socialism.

It stands to reason that the domestic function can wither away only for a socialist army. In a capitalist society the army not only preserves, but reinforces its domestic function—the function of suppressing the growing revolutionary movement of working people.

The absence of a domestic function for our army does not mean that Soviet soldiers stand apart from the country's social life. To the contrary, they take an active part in accomplishing many national economic tasks and in political, social and cultural activities of the state. They make a worthy contribution to construction of the material-technical base of communism.

With regard to the foreign function of the socialist army, it is directed toward defending the country against attack by aggressive imperialist states who have the goal of eliminating the revolutionary achievements of working people by force of arms. This threat was present at the time of the birth of the Land of Soviets, and it has not disappeared at the present time. The CPSU Program states: "From the standpoint of domestic conditions, the Soviet Union has no need for an army. But inasmuch as there remains a military danger emanating from the imperialist camp, and insofar as complete and general disarmament has not been achieved, the CPSU considers it necessary to maintain the defensive might of the Soviet State and the combat readiness of its Armed Forces at a level ensuring the full and decisive rout of any enemy who dares set foot on the Soviet Motherland."³

In comparison to the prewar period, the external function of the Soviet Armed Forces has received further development at the present time. With the formation of a world system of socialism, the function of defense of the socialist Motherland has assumed a broader international character for the Soviet Armed Forces as well as for the other socialist armies. This lies not only in the protection of one's Homeland against imperialist attack, but also in the participation of each of the socialist armies in repelling aggression aimed against the community of socialist countries.

The external function of the Soviet Armed Forces is inseparably linked with other most important directions of the foreign policy activity of the Soviet State. The USSR actively and purposefully opposes the export of counterrevolution; it opposes the policy of oppression; it supports the national liberation struggle of peoples, and it strongly rebuffs the imperialist policy of aggression. In carrying out these tasks, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government are supported by the economic and defensive might of the country. The economic and defensive might of the USSR and other socialist states are seen by the working

³ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, (Program of the CPSU), p. 111.

people of the whole world and all progressive mankind as reliable support in the struggle for freedom and independence, for the security of nations, and for social progress. The combat power of the Armed Forces of the fraternal socialist states restrains the reactionary circles of imperialism from unleashing a new world war and new, local military conflicts. This realistically serves the interests of all the peoples of the world.

The army, being the weapon of destruction throughout the entire history of antagonistic societies, becomes under socialism one of the main factors in the preservation of peace on earth. The development of the external functions of socialist armies is a natural process and it will continue for as long as there exists a threat of war from the camp of the imperialist states.

In spite of the facts, bourgeois ideologists attempt to represent our country and its army as some kind of militaristic force. They widely disseminate groundless fabrications about the "aggressiveness of communism." However, the truth is that there has been nothing in the history of the Soviet State or its Armed Forces which would cast a shadow on our combat banners. All wars which the USSR has had to fight were forced on it. The goal pursued in them was to repel the aggression of imperialism and defend the socialist achievements of the people. Our army's victories have not been simply victories of one army over another, but an expression of the triumph of what is new and advanced over what is old and reactionary; the triumph of genuine humanism over imperialist piracy. The victories embodied a nobility of spirit and a grandeur of communist ideals of the Soviet people, the invincibility of the socialist system created by the Great October, and its superiority over the capitalist system.

As a result of the complete and total victory of Socialism in our country, the Soviet State became the state of all the people. It combines the goals and tasks of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia—all the people and the entire society. A state of all the people embodies the social unity of Soviet society. It acted as the successor to the state of a dictatorship of the proletariat after this main instrument of the building of socialism had fulfilled its historic role and our society had entered the period of building communism. The Soviet Armed Forces also took on a popular character with the formation of a state of all the people.

The socialist state of all the people and the state of a dictatorship of the proletariat represent two levels of one and the same state of a socialist type. The state of all the people is a natural continuation and development of that which is basic and was laid down in the dictatorship of the proletariat from the very first years of Soviet power: the leading role of the working class; socialist democracy; the universal interest of Soviet citizens in building a communist society; the free creative initiative of the

entire people, and their efficiency, discipline, awareness and responsibility for the fate of the Motherland. Under the modern conditions of communist development, the importance of these factors in strengthening the might of our state, in successfully developing the national economy, and in raising the country's defensive capability constantly increases. A state of all the people is one of the stages on the path to communist social self-government.

At the present time, the Soviet State has entered a period of well-developed socialist society with the following characteristic features: powerful productive forces; mature production relationships; a heightened level of public welfare; flourishing of social awareness; assertion of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and communist ideology among all society; a Soviet socialist culture which is uniform in spirit and fundamental content; and collectivism, socialist patriotism and internationalism. Inherent in a well developed socialist society is a further rapprochement of the working class, kolkhoz peasantry and intelligentsia, a strengthening of their cooperation, and a steady consolidation of the moral-political unity of the Soviet people.

The building of a developed socialist society in the USSR intensifies even more the popular character of our army. The constant improvement of sociopolitical relations in the USSR under conditions of well developed socialism has led to a substantial expansion of the social base of the Armed Forces. The systematic growth of the working class and an increase in its proportion of the country's population have a favorable effect on their social composition. An increase of representatives of the working class in the Armed Forces strengthens the efficiency and order in units and on warships and raises the morale of soldiers along with their combat readiness and effectiveness. Meanwhile, the convergence of classes and social groups of our society is leading to a situation where now, in any military group, it is already difficult to distinguish the worker, peasant, or representative of the intelligentsia by general level of education, political development, or culture. The country's shift to a universal secondary education and fulfillment of the decisions of the 24th and 25th Party Congresses in the field of higher, secondary and professional-technical education ensure the Armed Forces with replacements of an even higher level of ideological-political conditioning and intellectual and physical development.

The profound socioeconomic, spiritual and cultural transformations which have taken place in the life of our society have raised the personal responsibility of each Soviet citizen for the fulfillment of his sacred duty to the Motherland in the ranks of the Armed Forces. The considerable growth of the general educational and technical level of Soviet youth and their high moral-political and physical preparation permit them to master a military specialty, weapons and combat equipment in shorter periods of time. These changes were fixed in the new

USSR law "On Universal Military Obligation," adopted by the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Seventh Convocation, on 12 October 1967. The law contains a number of fundamentally new provisions concerning the procedure for fulfilling honorable military duty by USSR citizens. We are speaking of such important questions as reduction of active military service for privates and sergeants, establishment of a uniform draft age for all USSR citizens, a decrease of various deferments from draft, and intensification of basic military training of youth, and others. This leads to a further growth in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and an improvement in preparation of the entire populace of the country to repel any aggressor.

On a social plane it is also impossible not to see the enormous educational role of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Soviet Armed Forces are a part of our people, living one life with them. Military service for us is not just a school of military expertise, but also a school of ideological and physical conditioning, discipline, and organization. In essence, our army plays the role of a unique nationwide university which is completed by practically all young men who are citizens of the Land of Soviets.

The formation of a well developed socialist society has created even more favorable conditions for further improvements in Soviet military organization. This is as it should be, since military development in the USSR is an inalienable part of the overall process of Soviet state development. The more significant are the successes of the Soviet people in communist development, the more powerful the Armed Forces become and the higher is their combat effectiveness. The country's powerful material-technological base, the major achievements of Soviet science, along with the monolithic moral-political unity of the people, permit the Party to carry on important activities in the field of improving the Armed Forces by giving them a high degree of material support, scientific foundation and a promising future. The level of sociopolitical and economic development of our state creates all opportunities for accomplishing the central mission of the Armed Forces: the highest possible increase in their combat readiness. Now as never before, the high state of combat readiness of the Armed Forces have taken on an important social significance. Therefore, the entire population is vitally interested in seeing that the Soviet Armed Forces receive everything necessary for their life and work and that their combat status always meets today's needs.

Confirmation of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook in all spheres of the life and work of Soviet citizens and the flourishing of social awareness and culture on this basis have a decisive influence on the moral-political aspect of the Soviet Armed Forces. In contrast to the moral-political state of armies of bourgeois countries, this aspect is characterized by a profound understanding on the part of all personnel of the social and

military duty and by collectivism and comradely mutual help. V. I. Lenin stressed that the Red Army was strong through the awareness of its soldiers, since "every worker and peasant taken under arms knows what he is fighting for, and consciously sheds his blood for the sake of a triumph of justice and socialism."⁴

Our soldiers are confirmed patriot-internationalists. They have a deeply developed sense of pride for their Motherland and the entire socialist community, of confidence in its might, and of respect for and inviolable friendship with the nations of fraternal countries. There are many examples where Soviet soldiers, sergeants, warrants and officers risked their lives to come to the help of citizens of the GDR, Hungary, Poland and other socialist states. In Yugoslavia they helped eliminate the aftereffects of an earthquake in Skoplje. The class solidarity with working people around the world is a remarkable tradition of Soviet soldiers which stems objectively from the character of our Armed Forces.

In the Soviet Armed Forces there are different relationships between officers and enlisted men than in bourgeois armies. While in bourgeois armies there exists a social discord between the officer corps and the enlisted masses, our Armed Forces are internally monolithic and unified. It can be no other way, since both Soviet officers and Soviet soldiers and sailors are, above all, working people. Relationships among different categories of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces based on a unity of class interests and goals in defense of the revolutionary achievements of the people are characterized by mutual understanding, mutual respect and comradely cooperation.

Indicative in this sense is the statement by the former chairman of the "France-USSR Association," the French patriot General Ernest Petit, who wrote that Soviet officers have an inherent "love for their soldiers, toward whom the word 'comrade' always was permeated with a fervent sense of fraternal affection and deep awareness of their great responsibility for the fate of subordinates. This inborn sense of brotherhood has in no way undermined the authority of officers as supervisors, nor will it. To the contrary, it only heightens it."⁵

The Soviet officer always remembers that his subordinate is a Soviet citizen in military uniform, brought up in the freest society and on the noblest principles of the moral code of a builder of communism. It is these principles which determine not only the honor and dignity of a soldier, sailor, sergeant, senior NCO, ensign and warrant,* but also their

⁴ V. I. Lenin, XLI, 121.

⁵ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, (Red Star), 19 February 1963.

*[The ranks of ensign (*praporshchik*) and warrant (*michman*) are enlisted ranks and are somewhat similar to the British rank of Warrant. *Michman* is used by the Soviet Navy exclusively, while *praporshchik* appears in the remaining four services. See Section 3, Chapter 7.—U.S. Ed.]

attitude toward military obligation, the assigned task, the military collective and comrades in arms.

As a new type of army, the Soviet Armed Forces have embodied the basic traits of the most progressive socialist social system and of our heroic people. They were created and are developing on the basis of Leninist principles of equality and friendship of all nations and nationalities who populate the great Soviet Union, on the basis of proletarian solidarity with working people of the entire world, and of a high degree of responsibility for fulfillment of their obligation to defend socialism.

2. The Army of Friendship of Nations

The world-historic victories of the Soviet Armed Forces in the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars demonstrated the inexhaustible capabilities of a socialist social system in creating and strengthening a truly popular military organization and in militarily defending the multinational socialist state.

One can identify several basic stages in the history of the formation and development of our army as a multinational army, an army of internationalists. The *first stage* takes in the period of formation of a new type of army within the framework of individual socialist republics and their initial steps in organizing a joint defense against the onslaught of international imperialism and internal counterrevolution.

Immediately after the Great October, the Communist Party proclaimed and consistently conducted within the country a policy of all possible strengthening of the new socialist society, free from economic, sociopolitical and national inequalities, and in the international arena—a policy of peace and friendship among all nations.

Well-prepared studies on the problem of nationalities and the scientific principles underlying the national policy of the Communist Party, as worked out by V. I. Lenin on the basis of the creative development of the thoughts of K. Marx and F. Engels, play a great role in motivating working people of all the nations of our Fatherland toward building a new society. The most important of these principles is the need for international unity and education of the working class and of all working people. Proletarian internationalism is the ideology and the policy of the working class, so brilliantly expressed by K. Marx and F. Engels in the famous slogan, "Proletariat of all countries, unite!"

Given the conditions in czarist Russia, the mandatory prerequisites in resolving problems of uniting the working people of different nations were the overthrowing of the supremacy of the exploiters, the annihilation of social and national inequality, and the opportunity for each nation to have the right for self-determination. V. I. Lenin felt that the proletarian party must proclaim that each nation and nationality has the free-

dom to secede: "Complete freedom of secession, the broadest local (and national) autonomy, and elaborate guarantees of the rights of national minorities—this is the program of the revolutionary proletariat." ⁶

The Leninist principles embodied in the solution of the problem of nationalities formed the basis of the "Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia," approved by the Soviet Government on November 2 (15) 1917. This historical document proclaimed: "(1) *The equality and sovereignty of the peoples of Russia.* (2) *The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of secession and the formation of an independent state.*" ⁷

The creation of sovereign Soviet socialist republics on the territory of the former czarist empire was a positive sign of the equality of all nations and of their right to free self-determination. This act and the elimination of all forms of social and national oppression permitted the Party to consolidate even more the trust that previously enslaved nations had in it.

The proclamation and practical implementation by Soviet power of full equality of the nations and nationalities of Russia in all spheres of life and activity, also assured their equality in the military sphere. Proletarian internationalism, and the friendship and brotherhood of the Soviet peoples became most important principles in the development of the Red Army.

Foreign intervention and civil war were a severe test of the Leninist national policy. The Party managed to create an army of the proletariat to repel the enemy. The basis for its organization was made up of Leninist ideas about the unity of all nations in the cause of defense of the achievements of the Great October.

At first these were detachments of revolutionary working people, sailors and soldiers organized by the Party even before October 1917 to overturn the power of the landowners and capitalists. Subsequently a united army of sovereign Soviet republics which arose on the territory of former czarist Russia was formed on their base. Creation of such an army became possible thanks to a strengthening of the military-political alliance between the Russian people and other peoples of the country. V. I. Lenin said: "... standing up against the enormous front of imperialist powers, we who struggle against imperialism represent an alliance demanding close military solidarity, and any attempts to disrupt this solidarity will be viewed as a totally inadmissible phenomenon, as betrayal of the interests of the struggle against international imperialism. . . . We say that it is necessary to have a unity of military forces, and deviation from such unity is inadmissible." ⁸

⁶ V. I. Lenin, XXXI, 168.

⁷ *Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti* (Decrees of Soviet Power), Vol. I, p. 40.

⁸ V. I. Lenin, XL, 98-99.

V. I. Lenin taught that "for elimination of national oppression it is necessary to have the foundation of socialist production, but on this foundation we *also* need a democratic organization of the state, a democratic army, etc."⁹ Thus, creation of a new type of army capable of defending the achievements of the revolution was viewed by V. I. Lenin as the most important condition for building socialism and communism.

The autocracy, not entrusting weapons to many nationalities, subjected them to discrimination in the military sphere. Thus, nearly 40 nationalities of the Russian Empire had been deprived of the right to serve in the army or navy. In contrast to czarism, the Soviet State, being true to the Leninist national policy of brotherhood, friendship and the equal rights of peoples, ensured the participation of all nations and nationalities in performance of military service. The right to defend the achievements of the Great October was given to every worker of our multinational power.

A special decree of the Soviet Government adopted on 15 (28) January 1918 noted that the "Working People's and Peasants' Red Army is created from the most aware and organized elements of the toiling masses."

"... Every person who is ready to give his energy and his life for protection of the achievements of the October Revolution, the power of the soviets, and socialism enters the Red Army."¹⁰

Creation of the Red Army signified the birth of a new type of army with a clearly expressed class proletarian character, formed exclusively from representatives of the working class and working peasantry of all nationalities. The peoples of our country ceased to fear a "man with a gun." The armed worker and peasant and the revolutionary soldier and sailor became a symbol of the bulwark of Soviet power, of a defender of friendship and peace among peoples.

The Communist Party consistently carried out principles of the Leninist national policy in military development. Resolution of the question of nationalities in this area signified that the Soviet Armed Forces were being created as a united, combat-effective organism and were a reliable guarantee of the security of the socialist Homeland.

The overwhelming majority of units and formations of the Red Army were organized in 1918-1920, as multinational collectives, in which representatives of many other nations and nationalities served and went into combat together with Russians. But, the Party's national policy in military development was not limited to guaranteeing the right to the free entry of working people of all nationalities into the Red Army and the organization of multinational formations. In working out the ways for non-Russian peoples to take an active part in the armed defense of the

⁹ V. I. Lenin, XXX, 22.

¹⁰ *Dekrety Sovetskoy vlasti* (Decrees of Soviet Power), I, 356.

socialist Motherland, V. I. Lenin and the Party considered it necessary to organize national military units and formations alongside the multinational ones. In doing this, they took account of the unique characteristics of each nation and nationality. Thus, independent national units were organized from representatives of nationalities with military experience. For example, three national divisions in the Ukraine successfully waged combat operations against Petlyura's bands and troops of the Entente. The Vitebsk, Polotsk and other national regiments fought the enemy on the fronts of Belorussia in a selfless manner. Units of Latvian riflemen covered themselves with unfading glory when at the beginning of 1918 a Latvian Soviet rifle division was formed from them.

Military national units and formations made up of representatives of the peoples of Central Asia, the Transcaucasus and other regions of the country were the best form for accustoming the toiling masses of outlying national areas of former czarist Russia to armed defense of socialism, and played a large part in the fight against internal and external counterrevolution. They were an important base for bringing up future cadres of Party and soviet workers. Many of the commanders, political workers and soldiers subsequently occupied leading posts in their own republics, in the Party apparatus, in soviets of working people's deputies, and in economic and other organs. The Leninist national policy in the field of development of the Armed Forces made a great contribution to strengthening the friendship of nations and increasing the defensive capability of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The first military units organized in the RSFSR, the Ukrainian, Belorussian and other Soviet republics had neither unified centralized leadership of troops, nor an overall system for manning and supply and for training command cadres, although they were being set up on common principles and with the assistance and under the direction of the RKP(b) CC and central military organs.

The units often acted without any coordination and at times their leadership displayed parochial, nationalistic tendencies. The dispersion of the armed forces of the Soviet republics caused irreparable harm to their common goal of fighting against the foreign interventionists and White Guards.

The interests of defense of the achievements of the Great October demanded all possible centralization of military command and control. Therefore, V. I. Lenin, the Party Central Committee, the Council of People's Commissars, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, the All-Russian Main Staff, and, from November 1918, the Council of Working People's and Peasants' Defense, sought to conduct a single Party policy in the military field through their instructions and directives and through Party members who had entered the government of the Soviet republics.

The logic of armed warfare and common goals and tasks objectively led to the creation of a military-political union of the Soviet republics and to the consolidation of their military forces into a single organization on the basis of principles of proletarian internationalism and the complete equality of all nations and nationalities.

The necessity of such a union was comprehensively substantiated by V. I. Lenin in a number of his works. In his "Draft of the CC Directive on Military Unity," it was noted that "the RSFSR, in union with the fraternal Soviet republics of the Ukraine, Latvia, Estonia, and Belorussia, had to conduct a defensive struggle against a common enemy—world imperialism and the Black Hundred and White Guard counter-revolution that is being supported by it. . . ." ¹¹ Further, it was emphasized in the draft of the directive that "a necessary condition for the success of this war is a unified command of all Red Army detachments and a most strict centralization in commanding all forces and resources of the socialist republics, especially the entire military supply system, as well as rail transportation, which is the most important material factor of the war, in that it is of primary significance not only for carrying out military operations, but also for supplying the Red Army with combat and material goods and foodstuffs." ¹²

V. I. Lenin taught that a durable union of Soviet socialist republics has an enormous significance, not only domestic, but also international. He considered the preservation and the strengthening of this union to be a vitally necessary measure that is "needed by the worldwide communist proletariat for its struggle against worldwide bourgeoisie and for defending itself against its intrigues." ¹³

The unity of the basic interests of working people of all nationalities comprised a sound class basis for a military-political union of soviet republics. However, its creation under conditions of fierce engagements with forces of the foreign and domestic counterrevolution was a very complex and crucial problem. While repulsing the fierce onslaught of the enemies of the Soviet government on the front lines, it was necessary to simultaneously overcome the enormous difficulties connected with the economic backwardness of Russia and the unceasing attempts by the counterrevolution to use in its favor the national enmity and bourgeois nationalism that had remained from the past.

For this reason, in military development, as in the resolution of the entire task of creating a voluntary alliance of nations, it was necessary to work, using V. I. Lenin's words, "with the greatest of patience and caution so as not to spoil the matter, so as not to cause mistrust, so as to allow the mistrust to fall away which had been left by centuries of

¹¹ *Leninskiy sbornik* (Lenin Anthology), Vol. XXXIV, p. 120.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ V. I. Lenin, XLV, 360.

oppression by landowners and capitalists, private ownership, and enmity due to its divisions and redivisions." ¹⁴ Only the genius and titanic work of V. I. Lenin and the collective wisdom and colossal, many-sided organizational work of the Party permitted preparation and practical accomplishment in a very short time of the program of development of a new type of army and armed protection of the first socialist state in the world.

The policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet Government was met with great understanding and support on the part of all the working people of our country. Based on the experience of the Civil War, they became convinced that the revolution could be defended and a new, socialist state could be built only through joint effort. The concept of creating a military-political union was enthusiastically approved by the peoples. Thus, on 18 May 1919 the All-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee adopted a resolution calling for the unification of the armed forces of the Soviet republics which stated that "the common enemy requires a common struggle and a united leadership in that struggle on the part of all Soviet republics." ¹⁵ Following the Ukraine, Soviet Belorussia also transferred control of its forces to the unified command of the Armed Forces of the fraternal republics.

These and other decisions prepared for the creation of a military-political union of Soviet republics, and led to the final development of mass, regular, unified Armed Forces of the Soviet republics, and assured a unity of command and action of the front lines.

On 1 June 1919 a festive meeting of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] was held in Moscow, which was attended by representatives of all the Soviet republics. The VTsIK passed a decree on forming a military union and a unified command, and on unifying the Councils on the National Economy and Transportation and the Commissariats of Labor of the Russian, Ukrainian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Belorussian Soviet Republics. Subsequently, other Soviet republics joined this union, as they came into existence and became officially recognized. The military unity of the socialist republics allowed a centralization of military and material resources for the struggle against the enemies of Soviet power, and it increased the defensive might of the country.

The Russian working class and Russian people performed a great service in forming and strengthening the military-political union of nations and nationalities of our Motherland. Their revolutionary energy, selflessness, internationalism and selfless assistance to the working people of national regions won the sincere respect and strengthened the trust of all peoples of the fraternal socialist republics. The resolution on the na-

¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, XL, 43.

¹⁵ The Communist Party is the motivating force and the organizer of the unification movement of the Ukrainian people for the formation of the USSR. *Sbornik dokumentov i materialov* (Collection of Documents and Materials). Kiev, Gospolitizdat of the Ukr. SSR, 1962, p. 129.

tionality problem, passed by the Twelfth Party Congress states that "One hardly need prove the fact that without such trust the Russian proletariat could not have defeated Kolchak and Denikin, Yudenich and Vrangeli. On the other hand, there is no doubt but that the oppressed nationalities could not have achieved their freedom without a dictatorship of the proletariat having been established in the center of Russia."¹⁶

The Leninist national policy in military development played an important role in increasing the combat capability of the multinational Red Army. The powerful force of friendship of the nations of Russia, liberated from social and national oppression, was clearly displayed in the fight against the enemies.

In its spirit and composition, the Red Army developed as a truly international army. Soviet reality refuted the slanderous assertions of Western ideologists to the effect that many peoples of Russia are allegedly not capable of military matters and are useless for military service. During the years of foreign intervention and civil war, the Ukrainians, Belorussians, Latvians, Georgians, Armenians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Kirgiz, Estonians and representatives of other nations fought bravely along with the Russians in the ranks of the Red Army. By the war's end the army included 77.6 percent Russians, 13.7 percent Ukrainians, 4.0 percent Belorussians, and 4.7 percent Latvians, Tatars, Bashkirs and representatives of other nationalities.

History has seen examples of the creation of armed forces of multinational states. The troops of subjugated countries were forcibly included in these armed forces. Such were the armies of the Persian King Cyrus II and of Alexander of Macedonia, the armies of Rome, Byzantium and the Arabian caliphate, the armies of the vast empires of the Franks, the Tatar-Mongols and Osman Turks, and the armies of Napoleonic France and Austro-Hungary. While representing a rather impressive force, they quickly fell apart, either on encountering a serious enemy or as a result of the decay of the empires themselves. The most important causes for the short-lived nature of these armies were the unjust goals for which they were formed and fought, class antagonisms, and a lack of a cementing force such as the unity of social interests of all ethnic groups, nationalities and nations which were part of the state.

For example, Napoleon won victories only in a period when his army was feeding on the ideas, albeit illusory, of the French bourgeois revolution of 1789-1794. He ably took advantage of the high enthusiasm of the army and traditions developed at that time. However, after the upper middle class had seized power and a Napoleonic dictatorship had been

¹⁶ KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'yezdov, konferentsiy i plenumov TsK (The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences and Plenums of the CC), 8th revised ed., Vol. II. Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 436.

established, the broad popular masses saw more and more clearly the predatory, unjust nature of the wars which France had begun to wage at the turn of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries. The hordes of Napoleon, whom the Russian people called an army of "twelve languages" (it included not only the French, but also the Italians, Germans, Austrians, Swiss, Dutch, Poles, Spaniards and others), had only to encroach upon the borders of Russia to be placed in a position of not being able to wage a victorious war. The Napoleonic Army was shattered by the blows of the Russian Army. The failure of Napoleon's attempts to wage a war with the aim of subjugating other countries and nations was predetermined by the predatory character of these wars, which gave rise "*in its turn*" to the national liberation wars *against* Napoleon's imperialism." ¹⁷ The Patriotic War of the peoples of Russia against Napoleon's Army in 1812 was just such a war of national liberation.

The mercenary royal West European armies, which were especially widespread in the era of the decay of feudalism (15th-16th centuries), were also unstable. They usually were manned by declassed elements of different nationalities. The national interests of the countries in whose armies the mercenaries served were foreign to them. The mercenaries were distinguished by their extreme lack of discipline, their cruelty, low moral and combat qualities, and a gravitation toward enrichment and pillage. The mercenaries served whoever paid the most. Often they moved to the side of the enemy in entire detachments before a decisive engagement or even during the engagement, thus subjecting their former army to the danger of defeat.

The problem of nationalities was extremely complex in the czarist army, which always was a tool for oppression of working people. Soldiers were called up to defend the czarist autocracy, bring fear to the popular masses and suppress everything that was progressive and revolutionary in the country. Chauvinism and nationalism were consciously imposed in the state, and peoples were set one upon another. The slaughter of the Armenians, the Jewish pogroms, and forced exile of people of non-Russian nationality to remote regions were all used for unleashing national enmities. This system was retained in the czarist empire for hundreds of years with the support and the blessing of the church.

Modern imperialist states also are permeated through and through with a spirit of nationalism, chauvinism and racism. A national inequality flourishes in them. All this throws an ineradicable imprint on the bourgeois armed forces.

The United States of America is particularly characteristic in this regard. Although racial discrimination is formally prohibited in the U. S. Army, racial conflicts typical of American society as a whole are inherent in the armed forces as well. Under the pressure of irrefutable

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXX, 6.

facts, even the western press has been forced to admit that there has been a sharp increase in recent years in the number of clashes between whites and blacks on the ground of racial discrimination. The American journal *Military Review* reported that in 1969, 129 major disorders on racial grounds were officially recorded in just U. S. Army units in the continental United States. The West German newspaper *Deutsche Nachrichten* wrote that for the first nine months of 1971 there were 1,002 cases of group fights and armed clashes between whites and blacks in the American armed forces. We also know that in October–November 1972 mass demonstrations of black servicemen against racial discrimination took place on the strike aircraft carriers “Kitty Hawk” and “Constellation” and the fleet tanker “Hassayampa.” After the “Kitty Hawk” had left Pearl Harbor, a clash erupted between whites and blacks on the aircraft carrier, resulting in 46 persons injured and over 20 black seamen held for trial. In November 1972 around 120 black seamen on board the aircraft carrier “Constellation” refused to report to the ship, which was preparing to leave for Vietnamese waters. They accused its commander of attempting to provoke racial incidents on board the carrier. In June 1974 over 300 men from the crew of the US carrier “Midway,” protesting against the arbitrariness of the command staff and the growing racial discrimination aboard ship, demonstrated in the Japanese city of Yokosuka. Following this, over 100 men did not return to the aircraft carrier.

From year to year a Zionist propaganda campaign intensifies in the Israeli Army, especially among young soldiers and officers. Aggressive expansionist aspirations are cultivated and racism is propagated. The idea of their racial and intellectual “superiority” over the Arab nation is constantly instilled in young people of Jewish origin.

The minority question in military development is an insoluble problem for a capitalist society based on social, racial and national oppression. However, in a socialist state, where equal rights of peoples has been proclaimed and is assured in deed, such a problem does not exist. It is also absent in the Soviet Armed Forces, which from the first days were created as multinational forces welded together by the unity of class interests of personnel and by a commonality of national and international tasks.

The utter devotion of all nations and nationalities to the socialist Motherland serves as a foundation for the might of our multinational Armed Forces. Their combat cooperation is an expression of the organic merging of key interests of all Soviet people with the noble national traditions of each nation and nationality. This inseparable unity has become a rich soil in which socialist patriotism of Soviet soldiers has grown and become strong.

After the Red Army’s victory over the interventionists and White

Guards, the Soviet land was faced with the task of further strengthening the union of peoples. The necessity for overcoming economic ruin, solving grandiose problems of building socialism, and defending the achievements of the Great October from foreign and domestic enemies required the tightest possible union of economic, political, and military resources of the Soviet republics, and of their diplomatic efforts.

The formation of a military-political alliance of Soviet republics in the years of foreign intervention and civil war was an important step on the path to creation of a new type of state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The CPSU CC resolution on preparations for the fiftieth anniversary of the formation of the USSR noted that the “military-political union which took shape in the course of the Civil War, the closest coordination of foreign political activities, and the joint efforts to restore the national economy, develop the economy and strengthen the defense capability naturally facilitated the transition to an association of equal nations in one socialist family.”¹⁸

V. I. Lenin attached the utmost importance to a union of all the Soviet republics into a single state. In his greetings to the “All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets” he wrote that “one of the most important problems that the congress must examine is that of uniting the republics. The future organization of our state apparatus will depend on the correct solution to this problem. . . .”¹⁹

The Communist Party consistently carried out Leninist national policy and V. I. Lenin's ideas on uniting the Soviet republics into a single united state. The decree of the October 1922 Party Central Committee Plenum on creating a fraternal union of equal and sovereign republics was warmly supported by all working people of our Motherland. The plenums of the CC's of the communist parties of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia, as well as the 7th All-Ukrainian, 4th All-Belorussian, 1st Transcaucasian and 10th All-Russian Congresses of Soviets which were held in October-December 1922 supported the formation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Thus, the Declaration of the 7th All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets stated: “The 7th Congress of Soviets, in total agreement with the desires and will of the working people of the Ukraine, appeals to the workers and peasants of Russia, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan with a fraternal proposal to immediately begin the formalization of the Union of Soviet Republics, which now already exists in fact, and the formation by this means of a single socialist worker-peasant front against the front of world bourgeoisie.”²⁰

¹⁸ *O podgotovke k 50-letiyu obrazovaniya Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 21 fevralya 1972 goda* (“On Preparations for the 50th Anniversary of the Formation of the USSR.” CPSU CC Resolution of 21 February 1972). Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p. 10.

¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, XLV, 330.

²⁰ *Obrazovaniye SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov 1917-1924* (Formation of the USSR: Collection of Documents 1917-1924). Moscow-Leningrad, Izd-vo Akademii nauk SSSR, 1949, p. 299.

On 30 December 1922 the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR assembled in Moscow. A historic decision on unifying republics into a single state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—was adopted by 2,215 delegates of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Transcaucasus. There were 206 military delegates present at the congress who represented soldiers, commanders and political workers of the multinational Red Army.

In the Declaration of the Formation of the USSR the congress emphasized the fact that only under the dictatorship of the proletariat was it possible to destroy national oppression, create an environment of mutual trust, and lay the basis for fraternal cooperation of nations.

The voluntary unification of Soviet republics into one state—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—was a triumph of Marxist-Leninist ideas and a triumph for the national policy of the Communist Party. Great prospects for economic, political, and cultural development opened up for all the peoples of our country. All of progressive mankind was shown the way in which the national problem was resolved, how inequality of nations and nationalities was eliminated, and how nations were united into a single fraternal family for the building of a new society.

Leninist ideas on the unity of nations in the cause of defending the achievements of socialism formed the basis for the development of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Proclamation of a united state signified that leadership of the Armed Forces was concentrated in the hands of a single centralized organ. This organ was the All-Union People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs (subsequently the People's Commissariat of Defense), which was created on the basis of the Declaration and Agreement on the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, approved by the 1st Congress of Soviets of the USSR on 30 December 1922.

Formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics opened new paths for strengthening the defensive might of the Soviet State. The fraternal cooperation of nations and nationalities increased many times over the possibilities for building socialism and for its armed defense. It gave the socialist Homeland new energy for resolution of historic tasks.

V. I. Lenin taught that the experience of the national policy of the Communist Party under conditions of the proletarian revolution and Civil War showed that the best means for strengthening the fraternal union of working people of different nationalities was joint work to defend the dictatorship of the proletariat and Soviet power in the struggle against landowners and capitalists of all countries, and against their attempts to restore their unlimited power. This Leninist instruction has a direct relationship to military development. Our army is an organ of the Soviet State. M. V. Frunze wrote that the "Union of Soviet Republics is a

union of working people of different nationalities. The Red Army, being a reflection of this, is not a national army. It also is a union, but a combat union to which the workers of all our Soviet republics send their sons to learn military matters and, hand in hand, as a single concerted wall, to stand guard over the Soviet land."²¹

The second stage in the life of our Armed Forces began with the formation of the USSR. It involves their development and strengthening as a single multinational army of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. This stage encompasses in time the period of the building of socialism, the years of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people, its victorious end and further accomplishment of plans of peaceful construction—up to the middle fifties. The Soviet Armed Forces in this stage received broad and comprehensive development in technology and weaponry, in forms of organization, in state of training of personnel, in methods of conducting combat operations, in the steadfast strengthening of the moral-political unity of their ranks and in other areas of military development. There probably has not been a single branch of military affairs in which the Armed Forces have not made an enormous leap forward. This was a result of the Party's scientific management of the Armed Forces and its continuous concern for increasing the defensive might of our socialist state.

After the formation of the USSR, the Communist Party, the Soviet Government, and V. I. Lenin personally, in consistently implementing the principle of equality and fraternal cooperation of nations for all spheres of social life, devoted a great deal of attention to the future expansion of the national structure in the Red Army.

The 12th Congress of the RKP(b), April 1923, made a basic decision on this problem. It pointed to the necessity of intensifying educational work in the Red Army in the spirit of the concept of fraternity and solidarity of the peoples of the Soviet Union and taking practical measures in organizing national military units. Directed by the decisions of the Congress, in June 1923 the CC of the RKP(b), together with key personnel of the national republics and regions [oblast'], took measures to create military units and military schools in the national republics and regions in order to train command staff personnel from the local populace.

In March 1924, four Ukrainian, two Georgian, a Belorussian, an Armenian, and an Azerbaijanian territorial rifle division, as well as separate Dagestan, Yakut, Bukhar, Khorezm, and other national units and subunits were formed in the Red Army. At the end of 1924, the Plenum of the Revolutionary Military Council [Revvoyensovet] of the USSR approved a five-year plan for creating national formations, having

²¹ M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), Vol. II. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1957, p. 194.

taken into consideration the increase in the number of national units in the Uzbek and Turkmen SSR's, the Transcaucasian Soviet Federated Republic, the Tadzhik, Kirgiz, Kazakh, Buryat-Mongolian, Yakut, Tatar, and Bashkir ASSR's, and other areas.²²

The center of the national structure of the Red Army was shifting to the east, to the Central Asian and Volga republics.

The Third Congress of Soviets of the USSR, convening in May 1925, approved the work of the Revolutionary Military Council with regard to the national structure in the Red Army, and empowered the Central Executive Committee [TsIK] and the Council of People's Commissars [SNK] of the USSR "to ensure the fulfillment of the approved program for national formations as one that answers the interests of all the peoples of the USSR in the task of defending their common socialist fatherland."²³ The resolution of the Congress devoted its attention to having the program of national formations implemented in a strict and gradual manner, "so that the newly organized units would not lag behind the existing units of the Working People's and Peasants' Red Army in their combat capability."²⁴

Just as in the years of the Civil War, the national formations continued to be a remarkable school for training and indoctrination of cadres who were literate in a political and general educational sense, who were devoted to Soviet power, and whom the republics needed so much.

The relationships of fraternal friendship among all peoples of the USSR continually strengthened in the years of the prewar five-year plans. Their close cooperation in state, political, economic and cultural development, the unprecedented development of productive forces of Soviet socialist republics, the elimination of de facto inequality among nations and nationalities as well as the elements of mutual mistrust that had remained between them fundamentally changed the countenance of all peoples of our country. The changes that took place in the economy and social structure of the Soviet State were reflected and fixed in the USSR Constitution, adopted on 5 December 1936 by the Extraordinary 8th All-Union Congress of Soviets. Service in the Red Army was proclaimed in the Constitution of the USSR to be the honorable duty of all citizens of the Soviet Union. The law on universal military obligation passed on 1 September 1939 established a uniform obligation for performance of military service for all USSR citizens, regardless of race, nationality, religion, educational qualification, origin or status.

The victory of socialism in the USSR, the liquidation of capitalist and feudal-landowner elements, the equalization in the economic and cul-

²² TsGASA, folio 7, list 1, file 46, sheet 10.

²³ *S"yezdy Sovetov Vserossiyskiye i Soyuznaya SSR v postanovleniyakh i rezolyutsiyakh* (Congresses of Soviets—All-Russian and of the USSR—in Decrees and Resolutions). Moscow, Izd-vo Vlast' Sovetov, Presidium of the VTsIK, 1935, p. 352.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

tural development of all peoples of the Soviet Union and the formation of socialist nations—for whom general Soviet characteristics were typical—put the problem of national units, formations, military academies and schools of the RKKA* in a different light. National formations, having completed their positive role in strengthening the military-political situation in the USSR, and in training and educating military cadres of previously backward republics, had already outlived their value as a one-time useful structural component of the Armed Forces of the multinational Soviet state. Experience was irrefutably proving that the factor that would best facilitate the further strengthening of the friendship of peoples and the combat cooperation of all nationalities of the USSR, as well as personnel proficiency in military affairs, would be a mixed—in a national sense—personnel staffing within the formations of the Red Army.

The advisability of this move was also caused by a number of other important factors. For example, at the end of the 1930's, the Red Army fully shifted over to an exterritorial cadre system of staffing. At the same time, the national units were unavoidably tied to their own territory, which prevented their training for action under different climatic, terrain, and combat conditions. The process of training and education was also seriously complicated by the fact that the study of military affairs had to be conducted simultaneously in two languages: the national and Russian. Great difficulties arose in producing regulations, manuals, and teaching aids in the many languages of the national formations.

All of these circumstances provided the reason for the adoption of a decree by the CC of the VKP(b) and the SNK of the USSR in March 1938 "On National Units and Formations of the RKKA" in which it was proposed to reorganize national units, formations, academies, and schools of the RKKA into all-union ones having exterritorial personnel staffing and—at the same time—changing the corresponding deployment of units and formations. "Citizens of national republics and regions," the decree stated, "will be called up for military duty on the same basis as all other nationalities of the USSR."²⁵

Joint fulfillment of military service and side-by-side military duty in mixed units and subunits resulted in opening up even greater opportunities for the military training and education of national military cadres for all peoples of the USSR.

During the period of socialist development the power of our multinational army was repeatedly tested in military clashes with reactionary forces of imperialism, who tried through armed means to check the defensive capability of the USSR. Standing vigilantly on guard of the

*RKKA—Raboche-Krest'yanskaya Krasnaya Armiya is the Russian for Working People's and Peasants' Red Army.—U. S. Ed.]

²⁵ KPSS o Vooryzheniih Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza. Dokumenty 1917-1968, (The CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union: Documents of 1917-1968), p. 294.

socialist Motherland, Soviet soldiers showed high moral-combat qualities, and ability to employ new weapons and new methods of combat operations.

With the victory of socialism there was a consolidation of the union of the working class and peasantry, the ideological-political unity of Soviet society and friendship among peoples. The ties of brotherhood among soldiers of different nations and nationalities grew even stronger in the Armed Forces, and Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism were further developed. These features were clearly displayed in international solidarity with other peoples fighting for liberation from social and national oppression.

The Great Patriotic War was a comprehensive, stern test of the stability of the multinational Soviet State and its Armed Forces. In battles at Moscow and Stalingrad, in the North Caucasus and the Ukraine, in Belorussia and the Baltic all the Soviet people as one staunchly and bravely defended the socialist system. Soldiers of all nationalities of our country fought shoulder to shoulder against fascist invaders for the honor, freedom and independence of their Motherland and for communism. They understood full well that their Motherland was the great Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and they fought against the common enemy with identical selflessness and self-sacrifice. Isn't this the most vivid proof of the correctness of Leninist national policy, of the firmness of the socialist system, of the ideological-political unity of all workers, and of their solidarity about their vanguard, the Communist Party?!

All who took the front-line roads could give thousands and thousands more examples of this courage, genuine friendship and brotherhood of soldiers. Here are only a few of them. The soldiers of over 30 nationalities defended the Brest Fortress. Among the 28 Panfilov heroes were the sons of Russia, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Kirgizia. Representatives of essentially all peoples of the USSR took part in the grandiose Battle of Stalingrad. A unity of thought and actions of sons of all our glorious union republics was one of the most important factors which ensured victory on the great Russian river. For example, the composition of troops of the Transcaucasus Front was also truly multinational. Among them were up to 12 large units [soyedineniya] almost wholly manned by representatives of peoples of the Caucasus.

Now, several decades later, it is impossible to read without profound emotion the letters of many, many courageous patriots from all our socialist republics requesting that they be given an opportunity to fight with weapons in hand the hated foe. For example, draftee Rakhmat Nazarov wrote the following to the Dushanbe City Military Commissariat: "... The Komsomol organization taught me to be utterly devoted to the Motherland. I am ready to perform my military duty. I do not fear difficult tests. I have lived a short while, and I love living very much.

I love my Homeland and wish to see it always free and happy. If I have to perish on the battlefield, then consider that I did not give my life in vain."²⁶

National formations and units created in the war years whose organization was dictated by the conditions of that period also smashed fascist invaders as part of the Soviet Armed Forces. They included three Kazakh Guards divisions, an Estonian and Latvian corps, Lithuanian, Azerbaijan, Bashkir, Georgian, and Armenian divisions and other national units and formations. The representatives of many peoples courageously fought in partisan detachments. Thus, over 40 nationalities of our country were represented in the formation of Ukrainian partisans under the command of S. A. Kovpak.

All peoples of the single multinational Soviet family proudly give the names of their glorious sons and daughters awarded high governmental honors for military exploits in the Great Patriotic War. Among soldiers who were Heroes of the Soviet Union were 8,160 Russians, 2,069 Ukrainians, 309 Belorussians, 161 Tatars, 108 Jews, 96 Kazakhs, 90 Georgians, 90 Armenians, 69 Uzbeks, 61 Mordvinians, 44 Chuvash, 43 Azerbaijanis, 39 Bashkirs, 32 Ossets, 18 Mari, 18 Turkmen, 15 Lithuanians, 14 Tadzhiks, 13 Latvians, 12 Kirghiz, 10 Komi, 10 Udmurts, 9 Estonians, 9 Karelians, 8 Kalmyks, 7 Kabardinians, 6 Adygeys, 5 Abkhazians, 3 Yakuts and the representatives of many other nationalities.²⁷

The very great exploits accomplished in the war years by the remarkable soldiers, sailors, sergeants, senior NCO's, officers, generals and admirals of our multinational army are a vivid example of their dedication to military duty and of their readiness to give all their energies, and if required, even their lives for the sake of defense of the socialist Motherland. Heroic feats are not simply bursts or flights of moral and physical strength, but are first and foremost iron discipline and hard work. The young people who are successors to the glorious traditions of the older generation must assimilate this truth well. They inherit the cause and honor of defending the socialist Homeland. They are to prepare themselves for new heroic accomplishments.

It was not without purpose that the Great Patriotic War went down in history as a war of all peoples. All four years, while the earth was shaken by artillery volleys, there was not a single Soviet citizen who did not contribute his bit to the defeat of the fascist aggressors, whether he was in the first ranks of attacking troops, whether he was carrying wounded soldiers from the battlefield, whether he fought in a partisan detachment or whether he was forging armor for tanks or growing grain

²⁶ *Armia bratstva narodov* (Army of the Brotherhood of Peoples). Moscow, Voenizdat, 1972, p. 224.

²⁷ See *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Kratkaya istoriya*, p. 581.

for supplying the army in the field and the country's population. All thoughts and all deeds of Soviet citizens were directed toward a common goal—clearing our sacred soil of the fascist evil as quickly as possible and completely crushing the hated enemy.

The victory in the war against a strong and crafty enemy showed the great invincible might of the friendship and brotherhood of peoples and of proletarian internationalism. The victory convincingly confirmed the vitality of Leninist ideas on a new type of army—a truly popular multinational army of a socialist state.

In preparing for aggression the fascist ringleaders viewed the USSR and its Armed Forces as an artificial conglomeration of a large number of nations and nationalities. They counted on disarming the Soviet multinational people morally, undermining their faith in victory, destroying the friendship of peoples and fanning anti-Russian sentiments in soldiers of non-Russian nationalities. They used the most treacherous techniques for this, beginning with ideological diversions against our populace and army and ending with the use of remnants of the White emigre rabble and bourgeois-nationalistic elements.

However, the enemy was severely mistaken. The mortal danger looming over the socialist Motherland not only did not disunite the peoples of the Soviet State and its Armed Forces or shake their confidence in victory, but to the contrary, it solidified all Soviet citizens even more. History knows no other examples where patriotism assumed such a national character as it did in the Soviet land in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Its main hero was the multinational Soviet people, rallied as one. Each nation and each nationality wove its laurel branch into the wreath of victory.

The proletarian internationalism of our Armed Forces was clearly evident during the Great Patriotic War. The peoples of Europe, and other continents saw in the Soviet soldier a person of a new world, whose image became a symbol of heroism and the embodiment of the class fighter for peace and happiness of working people around the world.

The repeated attempts by imperialism, including its monstrous offspring fascism, to eliminate Soviet power by means of arms inevitably suffered failure. The Great Patriotic War demonstrated to the whole world the invincible might of the country of socialism and the great vital force and invincibility of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Soviet social and state system and the friendship of peoples of our country withstood severe tests with honor and became even more firm.

The causes for the defeat of the fascist aggressors in the last war are well known. However, there are bourgeois falsifiers of history abroad who, to please their imperialist bosses, name anything they like as the basis for the defeat of Hitler's military machine except for the chief

sources of victory—the superiority of the Soviet social and state system and the moral-political unity and friendship of peoples of the USSR.

K. Marx wrote that “war subjects a nation to a test. . . . As mummies instantaneously disintegrate on being subjected to the effects of the atmosphere, so war passes a final sentence on social establishments which have lost their vital capacity.”²⁸ Our victory in the Great Patriotic War dealt a death sentence to fascism as the most reactionary, antipopular and aggressive of regimes which ever existed in the history of mankind, and showed the insurmountable life-asserting force of the socialist system.

The postwar period in the life of the Soviet Union was marked by new successes in all fields of communist development. Socialist social relationships are developing successfully, along with Soviet democracy. Every year the moral-political unity of working people, kolkhoz members and the intelligentsia and the fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR are growing even stronger. The defensive might of the Soviet State is increasing and the Armed Forces are growing stronger on this basis.

The third stage in life of the multinational Soviet Armed Forces began in the middle fifties. It is connected with the formation of a world system of socialism and the steady strengthening of the Soviet Union's economic and political might on the one hand, and with a further growth in the aggressiveness of international imperialism on the other.

Aggravation of the “cold war” against the USSR by reactionary forces of imperialism, their fanning of dangerous centers of tension in various parts of the globe, and a shift to acts of open aggression demanded that the Soviet people increase vigilance and strengthen the state's defensive capability in every possible way. Simultaneously a new task was coming to the fore for the Soviet Union—assurance of reliable protection, security and sovereignty of the entire socialist community, together with other fraternal countries, within the framework of the established Warsaw Pact Organization.

Performance of these tasks by the Armed Forces facilitates an even greater consolidation of the unity of Soviet socialist nations and a strengthening of bonds of friendship and brotherhood among soldiers of different nationalities. As a result of the comprehensive sociopolitical, economic and cultural development, Soviet society was lifted to a new level. There was a further drawing together of all socialist republics. The objective process of internationalization of our Soviet life is being manifested ever more clearly. What is national is being supplemented by the achievements of other fraternal republics and becomes their common property. The peoples of the USSR have a single economy which satisfies to an equal degree the requirements of all republics. They have a

²⁸ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), XI, 551.

single political organization of society which provides all nations and nationalities with equal rights and obligations. They have a culture which is national in form, socialist in content and international in spirit, and also a single *Marxist-Leninist* ideology.

The Soviet Armed Forces are making a great contribution to the matter of bringing up Soviet youth in a spirit of socialist patriotism and internationalism. They are a single harmonious family and a genuine school of international upbringing.

The requirements of the Communist Party for educating servicemen in a spirit of fraternal friendship of nations are set forth in decisions of CPSU Congresses and CC Plenums, in the Statute on Political Organs and Instructions to Organizations of the CPSU in the Soviet Armed Forces, and in other Party documents. They are reflected in regulations and manuals of the Armed Forces as well.

The appeal to "Peoples of the World" adopted at a joint ceremonial session of the CPSU CC, the USSR Supreme Soviet and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet on 22 December 1972 in honor of the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR serves as a remarkable program document in the matter of international upbringing of Soviet soldiers. The words of this appeal are permeated with an oath of allegiance to the Leninist banner, the Party, our great Soviet Union, sacred communist ideals, the inseparable friendship of nations and principles of selfless defense of the socialist Homeland. The welcome by soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces to participants of the ceremonial session sound in unison with them: "In the name of defense of our native Homeland we will not spare our energies or, if necessary, life itself. Our heroic and powerful people can be sure that Soviet soldiers are always on guard. . . ." ²⁹ The friendship of peoples of the USSR serves as an inexhaustible source of the monolithic substance of the Soviet people's state and its Armed Forces.

Commanders, political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces regularly improve the content, forms and methods of the international education of servicemen. Particular attention is given to the fight against vestiges of nationalism. One cannot ignore the fact that a certain part of the people, albeit a very insignificant part, sometimes displays elements of national conceit and aloofness. There have been attempts to make a nationality issue out of various disagreements or personal affronts. The experience of progressive units and warships shows that an international upbringing has greatest results where a sensitive and attentive approach is taken to the needs of soldiers stemming from national features, and where there is respect shown for the most important national traditions and customs. In order to provide an international upbringing we use all the collective resources of military life, the performance of service by the soldiers outside the bounds of their

²⁹ *Pravda*, 23 December 1972.

native republic, kray, oblast', or national okrug, daily contact with other fraternal peoples and familiarity with their culture, daily routine, customs and traditions. Exceptionally effective is propaganda of the experience of the Great Patriotic War and a study of documents and instances of the front-line years, the exploits of soldiers—representatives of different peoples of the USSR—and examples of internationalism sealed with blood.

The Soviet Armed Forces are an inalienable part of the Soviet people, a new historic community of people which took shape in the years of building socialism and communism in the USSR. They embody the traits and qualities inherent in all our multinational people. The world has never seen a multinational army possess such a unity of interests and goals, of will and action, or such spiritual kinship and solidarity of ranks as the Armed Forces of the Land of Soviets. The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces is an example of utter service to the socialist Motherland and the fraternal family of nations—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

3. Inseparable Unity of the Army and the People

The popular, multinational character of the Soviet Armed Forces facilitates the fullest display of one of the most important principles of their development—unity of the army and the people. The constant strengthening of this unity is an indisputable principle of the steady development and improvement of the socialist army. The inexhaustible source of the might and invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces lies in the unity of the army and the people.

The army and the people. These concepts have existed side by side since ancient times, but they were able to merge as one only when the oppression of exploiters was destroyed in the state and the working people became the full-fledged masters of their country.

The attitude of the people toward the army is determined by its social nature, goals and tasks, and, in the final account, by the political and economic system dominant in society. The armies of capitalist states serve the interests of the bourgeois class. Armies of socialist states are armed forces of a liberated people, and their main task consists of defending the peace, freedom and independence of the countries of the working classes. From this come the fundamentally opposite attitudes of peoples toward capitalist and socialist armies.

Things also are not changed by the fact that the overwhelming portion of servicemen of capitalist armies consists of soldiers and sailors who represent the working class and peasantry. Through threats, coercion and deceit, the ruling exploiting classes use their armies for reactionary, antipopular goals.

The czarist army also fulfilled this same antipopular role. The autocracy, landowners and capitalists used it widely for fighting the revolutionary movement and for executing working people and peasants. The masters of the Russian Empire tried in every way possible to tear the army away from the people, to prevent revolutionary ideas from getting into the barracks and to exclude soldiers from participation in social life.

From the first days of their existence, the Soviet Armed Forces have been defending the interests of working people. The Communist Party has consistently implemented the principle of inseparable unity of the army and the people. It has steadfastly concerned itself with strengthening the bonds of friendship and mutual trust among them, with equality of rights of Soviet soldiers, and with their active participation in the country's political and social life.

The unity of the army and the people is expressed in the fact that all working people and all soldiers of the Armed Forces live with common interests and aspirations. Their energy is directed toward one goal—ensuring a stable peace and security of the Soviet State and countries of the socialist community, and building a communist society in the USSR.

The unity of the Soviet people and their army has firm objective foundations.

The sociopolitical basis of the unity of the army and the people is made up of the socialist social and state system, the invincible moral-political unity of all Soviet society, the close union of the working class and peasantry and friendship of peoples of the USSR. This determines the common class interests of the army and people in building communism, in defending socialist achievements, and in struggling for peace and social progress. The commonality of the social basis facilitates a continuous deepening of ties between the army and people. The soldiers' and sailors' hearts are connected through thousands of invisible threads with the hearts of laborers of industry, agriculture and transport—all areas of the country's national economy. Earnestly fulfilling their honorable duties of defending the Homeland, the soldiers draw strength and inspiration for military service from the mighty source of labor successes of the Soviet people building communism.

As with any USSR citizen, the Soviet soldier is a full-fledged citizen in the state. He widely enjoys all sociopolitical rights granted Soviet citizens by the Constitution. He takes an active part in the country's political and social life. He is brought up in a spirit of the state approach to fulfillment of one's duty to the Motherland.

The social community of different nationalities of the Soviet Union determines the objective tendency for the unwavering strengthening of their solidarity and friendship, and expansion of international ties, including military ties, since socialist nations have one enemy—imperial-

ism, and the threat of its aggression is a threat to all socialist nations in general and to each one individually.

The unity of the army and the people, which arose with the birth of the socialist state, is becoming stronger in a natural way in the course of building socialism and communism, since development of socialist class relations leads to an expansion of the social base of the army. With the victory of socialism, the entire population becomes this base. The social structure of a socialist society determines the organic unity of the army and people, and its full and natural expression.

The Communist Party's direction of all the life and work of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces, the CPSU's nearness to the popular masses, and its close and kindred ties with workers comprise a firm foundation for the unity of the army and people. The Party program adopted as far back as the 8th RKP(b) Congress indicated that "the Party's task is to defend and develop this unity of workers and soldiers in the Soviets, strengthening the inseparable ties of the armed forces with the organizations of the proletariat and semiproletariat."³⁰ The Party sacredly fulfills V. I. Lenin's behest about armed defense of socialist achievements. It does everything necessary to ensure the reliable defense of the Soviet State. This meets the full understanding and support of the army and people. It develops into a powerful political and labor enthusiasm of all Soviet citizens, into their desire to better and faster fulfill plans drawn up by the Party.

The CPSU ties the army and the people ideologically and organizationally by a single scientific policy and comprehensive practical work, and enriches these ties with new content.

The economic base of the unity of the army and people lies in the socialist method of production, in public ownership of means of production and in socialist production relationships. The people are masters of all the country's riches, and the army is an inseparable part of the people.

Born of the Great October, the Soviet state and social system opened unprecedented vistas for a powerful development of productive forces. The successful implementation of the Leninist plan for building socialism predetermined a rapid uplift of the national economy and fundamental improvement in the material welfare of all working people. The country's increased economic possibilities were a firm base for its defensive capability and a material base for the combat might of the Armed Forces.

The major successes of the Soviet people in fulfilling plans charted by the Party for the economic development of the country, assure the

³⁰ *Vos'moy s'yezd RKP(b). Protokoly* (Eighth RKP(b) Congress: Protocols). Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1959, p. 396.

strengthening of the socialist social structure, increase the economic and defensive might of the socialist Motherland, lead to an even greater unity of our people under the Leninist Communist Party, bring closer the completion of a material-technical basis for communism, and facilitate the creation of communist social relations, the development of the new man, and a further solidarity in the unity of the army and the people.

Marxism-Leninism acts as **the ideological basis** of the unity of the army and people. The formation in all Soviet citizens of a communist world outlook, an ideological conviction, communist morality, faith in the ideals of socialism and communism, class solidarity, devotion to the socialist Motherland, the Communist Party and Soviet State, and a profound understanding of one's duty of defending the Homeland ensures a conscious, very broad and active participation of the people in development of the Armed Forces and in the continuous increase of their combat readiness.

The unity of the army and people, which has objective foundations, is manifested in the most diverse forms, and above all in the service of USSR citizens in the ranks of the Armed Forces, in their fulfillment of honorable duties and a sacred obligation to defend the socialist Homeland, in equipping the Armed Forces with first-rate weapons and combat equipment, and in an uninterrupted supply of food, gear and clothing. The people's moral support is of inestimable value for personnel of the Armed Forces. It inspires them to immortal deeds in the name of the socialist Homeland.

The entire heroic history of the Soviet Armed Forces is a very vivid example of the inseparable unity of the people and the army. From the day of its birth our army has been created as an army of working people and peasants. It sensed that it had nationwide support and help at every step. Here are several examples. The working people of the 7th okrug of the Putilovo plant decreed at their meeting of 21 February 1918: "... Immediately join the ranks of the Red Guards for defense of our people's Soviet power, in fulfillment of a universal obligation. ..." ³¹ A telegram from a meeting of working people's and Red Army organizations of Voronezh to V. I. Lenin on 11 May 1920 stated that "the Voronezh people . . . are ready at any moment at the summons of the central authority to assign the best and most steadfast of their comrades for the decisive engagement and victory over the Polish White Guards oppressors." ³² At an extraordinary volost' [small rural district] congress of soviets on 11 July 1920 the peasants of Rovenskaya Volost' assured that "we will support the Red Army in every possible way with urgently needed products; we will urgently implement the apportionment of the regional [rayon] food committee, and, in case of necessity, recruitment

³¹ *Iz istorii grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR* (From a History of the Civil War in the USSR), Vol. I. Moscow, Izd-vo Sovetskaya Rossiya, 1960, pp. 114-115.

³² *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 1961, p. 196.

into the Red Army. We will give everything for the struggle against the bourgeoisie." ³³

And there are a great multitude of such examples of the people's love and concern for the Red Army. All this raised the morale of soldiers, doubled their energies and served as one of the important conditions for victory in the Civil War.

Attaching enormous significance to consolidation of the bonds of friendship between the army and the working people, the Party from the first days of the revolution drew Soviet soldiers to active participation in the country's political life. V. I. Lenin's ideas on the full rights of working people and servicemen were fixed by law in the Constitution of the RSFSR—the first Soviet Constitution, adopted in July 1918. The fact of the inseparable unity of the army and people was clearly expressed in the very titles of the first organs of state power of the Soviet republic—Soviets of Working People's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies and the Soviets of Working People's, Red Army and Peasants' Deputies. V. I. Lenin wrote that "... for the first time in history the army is built on the nearness, on the inseparable nearness—one could say on the inseparable togetherness—of the Soviets and the army. The Soviets unite all working people and the exploited, and the army is built on principles of socialist defense and awareness." ³⁴

In the years of peaceful socialist development of the country, the principle forms of immediate participation by workers in the building of the Armed Forces consisted of military service in units and on warships, in training potential draftees, and in the sponsorship by trade unions, the Komsomol and other mass organizations of aviation, the Navy and border troops. In this period a tradition became firmly seated of sending the best of the Komsomol and unaffiliated youth on Komsomol trips to military schools, the Air Force, the Navy and border troops. The Soviet people did an enormous amount of work in the technical supply of the Armed Forces and in manning them with competent personnel capable of controlling and operating complex types of weapons and combat equipment.

The close ties of the army and people were displayed with unprecedented vividness in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Millions of USSR citizens took weapons in hand. Hundreds of thousands of Soviet patriots set off for the front voluntarily. Volunteers were used to create such large combat units as the Urals Volunteer Tank Corps, the Siberian Volunteer Rifle Corps and other units which successfully routed the enemy. The working people did not spare either energy or means to help the Armed Forces. They voluntarily assumed a considerable portion of state expenditures involved with waging war. In the course of the war the influx of funds from the populace into the defense fund, for con-

³³ *Op. cit.*, p. 315.

³⁴ V. I. Lenin, XXXVIII, 50.

struction of combat equipment, in loans and lotteries was in the amount of 118.2 billion rubles. In order to imagine the significance of this amount, suffice it to say that it almost equalled the average annual expenditure for the people's commissariats of defense and the navy.³⁵

Over 2,500 combat aircraft, several thousand tanks and artillery pieces, over 20 submarines and military cutters, and a large amount of other military equipment was built from the funds contributed by the population.³⁶

Soviet citizens performed a truly heroic exploit by supplying the Armed Forces with weapons and military equipment in amounts necessary to defeat the aggressor, under unbelievably difficult conditions. The production growth in the most important branches of industry became an indicator of the high labor enthusiasm of the Soviet people during the war. While in 1942, 75.5 million tons of coal, 4.8 million tons of pig iron and 8.1 million tons of steel were produced, in 1945 the figures were 149.3, 8.8 and 12.2 million tons respectively. The output of oil in 1945 reached 19.4 million tons as against 17.9 in 1943. Production of electrical power was increased from 29 billion kilowatt-hours in 1942 to 43.2 billion in 1945.

One cannot help mentioning in particular how heroically the Soviet women, people of old age and juveniles labored on the homefront. Each one laid everything he could on the altar of the Homeland.

The partisan movement was one of the important forms of support given to the army by the people. In Russia we know of this form of voluntary participation of the people in destroying foreign invaders as far back as the 13-15th centuries, when the Russian people offered active resistance to the Mongol-Tatar invasion. It also took place at the beginning of the 17th century, in the fight against Polish and Swedish interventionists, and during the Patriotic War of 1812.

The partisan movement assumed fundamentally new forms and socio-political features in the Civil War. In a number of cases it developed into a popular uprising of the population of occupied oblasts and rayons against White Guards and interventionists. All the main rayons of the Far East, Siberia, the Urals, the Ukraine, Belorussia and the Caucasus were gripped in a massive partisan movement.

The partisan movement took on exceptionally broad scope in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Even the enemy was forced to admit its high political and strategic effectiveness. Former Hitlerite General L. Rendulic wrote: "The history of war knows no example where the partisan movement played such a great role as it did in the last world war. In size it represented something completely new in military art.

* See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*, Vol. V, Book 1, p. 327.

* *Ibid.*, p. 326.

Because of the colossal effects it had on front-line troops and on problems of supply, rear area operation and control in occupied regions, it became part of the concept of total war."³⁷

The people's fight in the enemy rear area was carried out through actions of partisan units and underground groups in populated areas and in the population's mass participation in disrupting the occupiers' political, economic and military activities. These forms of struggle took in an overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens situated on our territory which had been temporarily occupied by the Hitlerites. The total strength of partisan units operating in the enemy rear area at the end of 1943 was over a million persons.³⁸

Party organizations in all large partisan units and detachments cemented the ranks of the fighters in the enemy's rear. The strength of communists in many of these units reached 20 percent of the total number of partisans.

The partisan movement had a specific influence on the development of combat operations at the fronts. Partisans destroyed hundreds of thousands of hostile soldiers, officers, officials of the occupation apparatus, and accomplices of the invaders. They put out of action many railroad trains, bridges, lines of communication, etc. They saved many thousands of Soviet citizens from being driven away to fascist penal servitude. They prevented the destruction of an enormous number of national economic installations. One of the most important results of the partisan movement was a disruption of attempts by the occupiers to place the economy of the Soviet territory they held temporarily at their own service. The fascists did not succeed in getting either industrial or agricultural production going on our land to any great degree. The Hitlerite command was forced to divert a considerable number of its ground forces at the Soviet-German Front to fight the partisans, in addition to the diversion of police and guard units. Hitler published a special directive in August 1942 which admitted that the partisan movement on occupied territory of the Soviet Union "was threatening to become a serious danger to supply of the front and the country's economic exploitation." Hitler demanded that partisan detachments in the rear of his troops be largely destroyed before the beginning of winter.³⁹ The fascist German command, in trying to carry out this mission, undertook major punitive expeditions in which regular troops with artillery, tanks and aviation took part. However, all the enemy's attempts failed. The partisan movement broadened and grew stronger, merging with operations of

³⁷ *Itogi vity mirovoy voyny* (Results of World War II): Collection of articles. Translated from German. Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1957, p. 135.

³⁸ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz* (4th revised ed.). Moscow, Politizdat, 1974, p. 500.

³⁹ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*, Vol. V, Book 1, p. 499.

the Soviet Armed Forces into a single mighty stream of popular struggle against the invaders.

Bourgeois propaganda attempts to prove that the chief reason for emergence of the Soviet partisan movement was allegedly a feeling of revenge in answer to the "inflexible" policy of the Hitlerites. This is a profoundly incorrect, false thesis. Marxist-Leninist conviction, a patriotic obligation to the socialist Homeland, and recognition of the need to defend bright human ideals against the infringements of the black forces of fascism are what led the Soviet people into combat on both sides of the front line. This line did not divide the Soviet people in the moral-political sense into two different parts. Our people remained Soviet citizens en masse even on occupied territory, in spite of the hardships.

One other truly popular form of building up the armed might of the country for the fight against hostile invasion became widespread in the difficult time of 1941. This was the people's volunteer corps [narodnoye opolcheniye]. It has also long been known historically, just as the partisan method of fighting. The volunteer corps, composed of the peoples of Russia, played a prominent part in repulsing aggression. However, in Soviet times, the old form of participation of broad popular masses to repulse foreign invaders received a new and significantly richer content. It began to serve the cause of the struggle for the honor, freedom and independence of the socialist Homeland.

The Soviet people's volunteer movement at the initial period of the Great Patriotic War was characterized by two fundamental varieties of armed groups—assault battalions and strictly people's volunteer units and formations.

The appearance of assault battalions was preceded by creation of numerous detachments of the Party-Soviet activists and working people's detachments in the frontal zone with the mission of stopping diversion by enemy agents to the rear of our fighting army. From as early as 24–25 June 1941, in accordance with a decision of the Party and government, assault battalions and their support groups began to be formed from among volunteers who were not subject to draft. By the end of July there were 1,755 assault battalions with an overall strength of over 328,000 men. In addition, over 300,000 men belonged to assault battalion support groups.

The assault soldiers performed service without a break in production, but with the approach of the front line, they shifted fully to a war status, and then merged entirely into the army in the field or switched to partisan methods of struggle. As a result, the Hitlerites did not succeed in disorganizing our rear area close to the front by sending across parachute landing parties, scouts or diversionists. This insidious weapon of fascism, which operated faultlessly in their attack against countries of Western

Europe, had no success in the war against the USSR. Herein lies a great service rendered by Soviet assault battalions.

The masses' patriotic aspirations to participate in the armed defense of the Motherland found broad embodiment in the organization of people's volunteer divisions, regiments and battalions. The people of Leningrad and Moscow were the initiators of this movement. Already at the end of June and the beginning of July 1941 they had begun to form a massive people's volunteer corps to help the Red Army. The initiative was approved and spread to other cities. The largest people's volunteer units were created by workers of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, Rostov on the Don), the Ukraine (Kiev, Odessa, Zaporozh'ye and the Donbass) and Belorussia (Mogilev, Gomel'). Local Party committees headed all the work of organizing the volunteer units. They began to form a large number of people's volunteer divisions, units and subunits.

Around 60 people's volunteer divisions, 200 separate regiments and a large number of battalions, detachments, companies and platoons were created in the summer and fall of 1941. In the difficult initial period of the war, the people's volunteer corps provided a grand total of around two million selfless fighters.⁴⁰ They demonstrated unbending courage, stubbornness and steadfastness in combat. Let us turn once again to an admission of the enemy himself. Hitlerite General Tippelskirch, in explaining the reasons for the failures of the fascist German troops at Leningrad, wrote: "The German troops reached the southern suburbs of the city, but in view of the very stubborn resistance of the defending troops, reinforced by fanatic Leningrad working people, the expected success did not materialize."⁴¹ As we see, the defeated fascist general could not or did not wish to understand the causes of the selfless actions by the Leningrad working people, who repulsed the furious onslaught of the Hitlerite hordes. It was not fanaticism which led them into battle, but a fervent love for the Motherland and allegiance to the Soviet socialist state.

The all-national struggle in enemy rear areas and the participation of working people in battles for the Soviet Motherland in the ranks of the people's volunteer corps represented one of the many forms of display of Soviet patriotism and the desire of the popular masses to aid the army in routing the aggressor and in defending socialist achievements with all their energies. This is vivid and convincing evidence of the utter devotion of the Soviet people to the ideas of communism, of full approval of the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government and of unwavering faith in the strength and might of the Soviet socialist state and its army.

⁴⁰ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, Vol. V, Book 1, p. 183.

⁴¹ K. Tippelskirch, *Istoriya vtoroy mirovoy voyny* (History of World War II). Translated from German. Moscow, Izd-vo inostrannoy literatury, 1956, p. 197.

In the postwar period the Communist Party and Soviet Government also have been devoting unremitting attention to further consolidation of the unity of the army and people.

The CPSU sees a solution to this task primarily in the development and strengthening of the social and state system, the socialist economy and the defensive might of the USSR. Under Party leadership, the Soviet people have performed truly titanic work in all these areas.

In implementing the decisions of its congresses, the CPSU also takes advantage of the very important media such as the press, radio, television, movies and the theater with the aim of steadily strengthening the ties between the army and the people. The Party brings up working people in a spirit of high socialist patriotism and internationalism, and of unlimited love for their Armed Forces and the armies of other fraternal countries of socialism. Every Soviet citizen considers himself to be personally responsible for the fate of the Motherland. He is vitally interested in strengthening the USSR's defensive capability and that of the entire community of socialist states.

The lives and service of Soviet soldiers are constantly under scrutiny by territorial Party organs, whose representatives take part in the work of military councils, Party conferences, activist groups, meetings and conferences in troop units. In turn, commanders, political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations and all personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces take an active part in establishing and strengthening close ties with Party and soviet organs, trade-union and Komsomol organizations, collectives of industrial enterprises, kolkhozes and sovkhozes, establishments and educational institutions. In these ties lies one of the remarkable expressions of the deep popular nature of our army, where the soldiers live with common interests and hopes with all working people of the country. It is a good tradition of the Soviet Armed Forces to seek advice from the people and consider their opinion and experience. Following this tradition helps commanders, political organs and army Party and Komsomol organizations correctly resolve tasks of combat and political training of troops.

Much that is new and interesting has appeared in recent years in the send-offs of youth to military service organized by local Party and soviet organs. Unique rituals have arisen in cities and villages. The draftees are warmly accompanied by local leaders and participants of the revolution and the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars. Labor groups give the future soldiers advice. The ceremonial send-offs of youth into the Armed Forces, involving the carrying of combat banners delivered from military historical museums, merge into a true demonstration of love and respect by the people for their Armed Forces and of the inviolable unity of the army and the people.

A great deal of diverse work is conducted in the Armed Forces to bring up Soviet soldiers in a spirit of unity with the people. The soldiers' visits to cities, in the liberation of which their formations and units participated, are interesting and meaningful, as are meetings with Old Bolsheviks, veterans of the revolution, and the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars, distinguished people of the country, former soldiers and front-rank production workers. Patriotic correspondence between production collectives, social organizations and soldiers' parents is of great educational importance. We have had good experience with the exchange of lecturers and speakers and amateur groups of units, warships, enterprises and establishments.

No matter in which little corner of our vast Motherland the Soviet soldier serves, he always recalls his high and honorable calling. Personnel take a lively interest in what is new in their native areas or at the local plant, kolkhoz or sovkhoz. Successes of toilers of one's own city or village inspire the armed defenders of the Homeland to perform their daily duties in exemplary fashion.

Commanders, political workers and Party and Komsomol organizations devote a great deal of work to instilling in personnel a high sense of organic ties with the people. This is shown by numerous examples of heroic behavior of Soviet soldiers outside their unit, when they dash into fire or water at the risk of their own lives to save old men, women and children or to defend the people's property. The Soviet soldier is alien to and hates such phenomena as disrespect toward the local populace, one of another nationality or a woman, or toward the best traditions and customs of peoples. Isolated cases of unworthy behavior by individual servicemen encounter the most decisive and severe condemnation by Armed Forces personnel.

Commanders, political workers and Party and Komsomol organizations take time to ensure that the diverse work to instill in soldiers a sense of inseparable unity with the people leads to an even deeper perception by personnel of their duty to the Motherland and the need to display activeness in service. It is a great honor to belong to the Soviet Armed Forces. The Party has a great trust in giving Soviet soldiers powerful weapons. This trust imposes on them an enormous responsibility for their assigned task—vigilantly guarding the people's peaceful creative labor.

In the final account, instilling in personnel a sense of inseparable ties with the people pursues a dual goal: *development of a conscientious builder of a new society and of high combat, moral-political and psychological qualities needed by the armed defender of the socialist Homeland.*

Many military units take part in the construction of industrial installations, residential housing, lines of communication, irrigation projects,

agricultural work, collection of scrap metal, and forestry projects. Together with the populace of cities and villages, they fight natural disasters to safeguard the lives of people and state property.

The active participation by Soviet soldiers in creating a material-technical base of communism, in developing scientific-technological progress, in strengthening the country's might and improving the well-being of Soviet citizens insures the further solidarity in the unity of the Armed Forces and people, filling it with new content.

Tens of thousands of youths who have served in the Armed Forces make annual Komsomol trips to work in different branches of the national economy. After having obtained a specialty during their period of service and having gone through the Armed Forces training schools, yesterday's soldiers make their contributions to further strengthening the spirit of comradeship, mutual help, discipline and competition in labor groups. Many reserve soldiers maintain ties with their subunits, units and warships and share with them plans, production successes and the successes of life.

Sponsorship ties between military units and subunits and the working people are constantly being improved. Now the sponsorship system can be defined as one of the important forms of social ties between the army and the people. It facilitates the indoctrination of personnel by examples of heroic labor of working people, kolkhoz members and the intelligentsia and by the revolutionary and combat traditions of the Party and the people.

Party, Soviet and Komsomol organs display constant concern for the families of servicemen. Much attention is devoted to improving their day-to-day and living conditions. It has become a good tradition in labor collectives in the city and village to do everything necessary to give help and assistance to the families of working people, kolkhoz members and employees called into the ranks of the Armed Forces. We give special care to the families of soldiers who died in the terrible war years, to war invalids, and veterans of the Armed Forces.

The Armed Forces are playing a large part in the country's socio-political life. Soviet soldiers show a high degree of activity in election campaigns. All take part as one in voting. As of the beginning of 1974 over 17,000 Armed Forces representatives were deputies of soviets or members of regional, city, oblast' or central Party organs. The best of the best soldiers are elected as delegates to Party congresses.

The Communist Party and Soviet State attach great significance to mass defense work among the populace. Main attention is given to heroic-patriotic upbringing of youth and to preparing them for service in the Armed Forces.

Many working people and employees of the Soviet Army work in military enterprises and construction projects and in military units, establishments and military schools. They are making a worthy contribution toward accomplishment of defense tasks. Many of them have become intimately linked with the Armed Forces and have become true helpers of soldiers. Trade union organizations give inestimable help to the command in improving the organization of production and work of military enterprises and establishments. They assure the wide dissemination of socialist competition and bring up working people and employees in a spirit of communist attitude toward work. The interests of defense of the socialist Homeland demand that military managers, political organs and Party organizations of the Armed Forces strengthen ties with trade union organizations and with working people and employees; that they help them in every way in activating day-to-day work, in fighting to raise labor productivity and fulfilling socialist obligations. The efficiently adjusted joint work of Soviet soldiers, working people and employees in military enterprises and construction sites, military units and establishments, and in military educational institutions is an important form of strengthening the unity of the army and the people and bringing up the Soviet citizen in a spirit of communist ideals.

Civil Defense plays a great part in unifying the Armed Forces and the people. In case of war, Civil Defense units will operate hand in hand with the Armed Forces. Civil Defense fighters will give inestimable help to the Armed Forces in winning victory over the enemy by ensuring the defense of the rear and the normal functioning of the national economy. The Armed Forces in turn will help Civil Defense by their actions to successfully accomplish the tasks assigned it.

The people and the army, in a common impulse, rally even closer about their native party. They work fast and well to accelerate communist development, increase the growth of the might and flourishing of the Soviet State, and to accelerate the further strengthening of the Armed Forces. This bespeaks the high political maturity of our people and its soldiers, and the Soviet citizens' sense of high responsibility for fulfilling their duty to the socialist Motherland.

While meeting the vital interests of USSR working people, the goals and missions of the Soviet Armed Forces at the same time do not contradict the interests of peoples of other nations. Moreover, in opposing the forces of imperialist aggression, our army thus also defends the security of all mankind and eases the struggle of peoples for social progress. Under the concrete conditions of the present situation, it is the purpose of the USSR Armed Forces to reliably safeguard the peaceful creative labor of the Soviet people, who are building communism; ensure the protection of the entire socialist community together with the fraternal armies; serve as a powerful bulwark in the peoples' fight against imperialistic

export of counterrevolution; and be an indestructible bulwark of peace and security on earth. It is impossible not to see in all this the truly popular character of the Soviet Armed Forces—the most progressive military organization in history.

Firmly rallied about the CPSU and surrounded by popular concern and love, Soviet soldiers are honorably fulfilling the historic mission assigned them. They watch closely the intrigues of the enemies of peace, democracy and socialism. They are raising in every way possible the combat might of the Armed Forces in order to be ready to come to the defense of the socialist achievements of the peoples at any moment.

Chapter 5. Scientific-Technological Progress and the Armed Forces

The equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces with all the modern means of war which ensure a reliable defense of the achievements of socialism is a most important indicator of their strength and combat might. The Communist Party constantly devotes the closest attention to this question. It is doing everything possible to see that the material-technical base of the Armed Forces always meets the highest requirements.

The economy, the role of which now has grown even more, has a determining influence on the level of the technical equipping of the Armed Forces. Modern scientific and technological progress actively facilitates the rapid growth of productive forces and increases in production efficiency. It opens very rich perspectives of development of all branches of the national economy. At the same time, it serves as one of the chief factors for strengthening the defensive might of our Motherland and improving military affairs. Its achievements permit the creation of new types of weapons and combat equipment at accelerated tempos, which considerably increases the firepower, shock force and mobility of the troops and leads to the emergence of new methods of combat operations. The skillful, purposeful use of the achievements of science and technology in military affairs comprises an essential prerequisite for ensuring a high quality of training and education of personnel and steady increases in the combat effectiveness of the Armed Forces.

1. Influence of Scientific-Technological Progress on the Combat Might of the Armed Forces

Not a single war in history began without preliminary material-technical preparations. To win victory, the troops of opposing sides were provided with the appropriate weapons, combat equipment and other supplies. The experience of numerous wars confirms a direct dependence of the combat might of armies on the state of the economy, productive forces, and timely adoption of the results of scientific and technological discoveries for military use.

Scientific-technological progress has a particularly great influence in military affairs on the qualitative development of weapons and combat equipment as the most changeable elements of the material base of war, in whose creation and production the latest scientific achievements are most fully applied.

New types of weapons and combat equipment in their turn inevitably cause changes in tactics, operational art, strategy and the organization of troops. These changes, however, do not come all at once, but only as new weapons are further improved, are widely disseminated to troop units and are turned into one of the basic tools for conducting war.

Thus, the appearance of a small amount of low-power tanks on the battlefields of World War I did not initially bring any fundamental innovations in tactics, let alone operational art. They were used basically within the framework of methods of conducting combat operations accepted at that time. However, 20 years after the war tanks acquired high combat qualities and began to enter the inventory in mass numbers. This required the introduction of serious changes in the organization of troops and in methods of conducting combat operations. In the years of World War II major tank units and even armies were formed which became the main strike force of ground forces. Alongside the employment of other means of warfare, this gave a highly maneuverable, dynamic character to military operations. Approximately the very same situation was also observed in aviation. It also was used in World War I, but had no decisive influence on combat operations. Its role began to grow beginning in the thirties and forties, when armies received hundreds and thousands of more sophisticated combat aircraft in their inventories.

Historical experience attests to the fact that the process of changes in military affairs which takes place under the influence of new weaponry can either proceed slowly in an evolutionary way, such as was the case, say, with the introduction of smoothbore and then rifled firearms, or it can occur in the form of abrupt revolutionary transformations in all areas of military affairs, as is seen now in connection with the creation and acceptance of nuclear weapons into the inventory. The duration of this process is being reduced all the time. While hundreds of years went into the transition to smoothbore and rifled firearms, only 15-20 years were required for affirmation of automatic small arms, tanks and aircraft as the main means of conducting war, and even less time was required for the adoption of nuclear missiles.

Scientific-technological progress is the catalyst of all transformations in the means and methods of conducting war. It accelerates the modernization of weapons and combat equipment and has a direct influence on the military might of the state and the condition of its armed forces. One can say that all areas of military development have always been closely connected with scientific-technological progress, and as science and the

practical realization of its achievements develop, so this connection becomes even closer and more multi-faceted. Now it is not only the individual inventions and discoveries which have an ever increasing effect on sophistication of weapons and combat equipment, but the entire front of scientific-technological progress and its material basis. They are facilitating an unprecedented growth of technical equipping of the armed forces, which forms a unique chain linking science, the production of equipment and its application in military affairs. In all this perhaps lies the main feature which distinguishes the tie of scientific-technological progress with military practice in our days from an analogous tie in past eras.

It has to be stressed that this tie bears a mutually active character. Changes in military affairs which occur under the influence of new weapons do not remain passive with regard to scientific-technological progress, but constantly influence it. This influence materializes in conjunction with the policy of states and the nature of their social structure. In imperialist countries it is expressed—in the final analysis—by a constant arms race. Under these circumstances, the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community, in order not to weaken their defensive capability, are forced to devote constant attention to improving weapons and combat equipment, supplying them to their armies and maintaining the defense branches of the national economy at the necessary level.

V. I. Lenin pointed out that to wage modern warfare one requires a highly developed economy, and above all, a gigantic industry capable of producing various weapons, war materials and equipment in enormous amounts. Based on the experience of history, V. I. Lenin concluded that in war "the one who gets the upper hand is the one who has the greatest technology, organization, discipline and the best machines. . . ." ¹ V. I. Lenin believed that to satisfy a country's national economic and defense needs, the material base of socialism had to be developed on the basis of achievements of modern science and technology. This also determines the possibility of creating sophisticated combat equipment—the main materiel component of a state's military might. This is why V. I. Lenin saw the decisive prerequisite for strengthening the defensive capability of a socialist country in the elimination of Russia's economic backwardness.

V. I. Lenin determined the concrete paths of development of the economy and of turning backward, agrarian Russia into a powerful industrial Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In the State Plan for the Electrification of Russia (GOELRO), developed under his management, there was an exact outline of the chief direction for creation of new productive forces based on electrical power, full use of the country's natural riches, and adoption of modern techniques, technology and organization

¹ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 116.

of production. V. I. Lenin taught that in a diversified national economy one must have above all those elements which have the greatest influence on the state's economic and defensive might. We are speaking of heavy industry, power engineering, high-capacity agriculture, modern transport, communications, etc.

In developing the defense industry of the first socialist power in the world, the Party and V. I. Lenin clearly recognized that in our country this process had nothing at all in common with the militarization of the entire life of capitalist states, which served the antipopular goals of monopolies. Now, as before, strengthening of the USSR's defensive might is caused only by external reasons and serves exclusively the aims of defending socialism against imperialist aggression.

V. I. Lenin attached great importance to mass inventions and the organic union of science and production. He viewed science as an important part of state activity. V. I. Lenin considered one of the basic tasks of Soviet science to be assurance of the country's defensive might. To these ends the great leader of the revolution also insistently recommended a broad study of the fundamental directions of scientific-technological thought and military-technological achievements abroad, and mastery of all types of weapons and combat equipment possessed by or which might appear in the hands of probable enemies.

The Communist Party has strictly followed V. I. Lenin's instructions. Thus, the decisions of the 15th VKP(b) Congress stressed: "Considering the possibility of a military attack on the part of capitalist states against the proletarian state, it is necessary, in developing the five-year plan, to devote maximum attention to the most rapid development of those branches of the national economy in general, and industry in particular, which have the main role in providing for the country's defense and economic stability in wartime."²

In July 1928 the VKP(b) CC Plenum determined the course toward acceleration of scientific-technological progress, toward the closest of ties among science, technology and production, and toward a bona fide, decisive attunement of scientific work to the tasks of industry and other branches of the national economy, as well as of military development. Decisions were also made in the very same direction at subsequent Party Congresses and Central Committee Plenums. These decisions were persistently carried out in the years of the prewar five-year plans.

In order to have an appreciation for the entire grandiose nature of tasks advanced by the Party for supplying the Red Army with new equipment, one has to consider that by the mid-twenties the rifle and heavy machine gun remained the basic weapons in the infantry, and the saber, carbine, and towed machine gun in the cavalry. The inventory

² KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh, IV, 33.

of artillery systems was small in size, consisting chiefly of light pieces. Tanks and armored cars were low-powered, lightly armed and not maneuverable enough. Obsolete aircraft of foreign types were in the inventory of aviation units.

The scientific research and test-design work which developed on a broad front in the country led to the creation of new models of domestically produced weapons which fully met the demands of those times. By the end of the twenties and beginning of the thirties, many types of equipment such as small arms, tanks, armored cars, artillery pieces and aircraft not only were not inferior in combat qualities to the best models of foreign combat equipment, but often even surpassed them. However, in order to shift from the development of test models of weapons and combat equipment to their mass production, it was necessary to speed up the development of industry which would have modern technology and equipment, the necessary raw materials, new and better quality materials and also trained, skilled production personnel. Without this it would have been impossible to count on a rapid rearmament of the Armed Forces.

The Party did everything to resolve these tasks. Through the heroic efforts of the Party and all the Soviet people in the thirties, a firm scientific-technological and industrial base of a diversified defense industry was created in the country. There was particularly intensive development of such branches as tank and aircraft construction and the production of new types of small arms and artillery pieces, ammunition, submarines, surface warships, and military-engineer equipment. This allowed us to begin a fundamental technological reconstruction of the Armed Forces and their mass rearmament on the basis of then modern means of conducting war. The general direction of development of the Armed Forces followed the line of increasing their firepower, motorization and mechanization. This ensured the growth of striking power, mobility and maneuverability of troops. Particular attention was directed at equipping the army in every way possible with new models of aviation, armored and artillery equipment. The defense industry considerably expanded the arsenal of troop weaponry. In this manner their combat capabilities increased.

As we know, we were not successful in completely implementing the measures outlined by the Party for rearming the Armed Forces. The treacherous attack by fascist Germany on the Soviet Union intervened. However, the country's scientific-technological and industrial base created in the thirties was the basis for further development of the defense industry in wartime. Its vitality was not shaken by any of the adversities or hardships of war, although for a certain period they delayed the conversion of the economy to a wartime footing and complicated the supply of troops with weapons and combat equipment.

The situation in which the Soviet economy had to provide the Armed Forces with weapons and combat equipment was characterized by the following basic points. First of all, our young industry had to compete under conditions of fierce fighting not only with the military-industrial potential of fascist Germany, but also of almost all Western Europe, which had been enslaved by the Hitlerites. Secondly, we lost a considerable number of enterprises and equipment of the defense industry in the territory of the Baltic, Belorussia, the Ukraine and a number of oblasts of the Russian Federation temporarily occupied by the invaders. Thirdly, the military economy suffered an acute shortage of fuel, electrical power, metal and other materials needed for the production of weapons. Fourthly, time was needed for plants evacuated from the country's western oblasts to the east to begin producing combat equipment in sufficient quantities. For this the technology and production process had to be adjusted in the shortest possible time, the previous cooperation had to be restored among related enterprises, new cooperation had to be arranged, and raw materials and component parts had to be obtained in sufficient amounts. And finally, the defense industry was constantly feeling a shortage of skilled specialists, since many experienced enterprise managers, engineers, technicians and workers had entered the ranks of the Red Army from the very beginning of military actions or had joined partisan detachments.

It is clear from this how difficult and complicated was the process of converting the economy to a wartime footing. The state's entire life was readjusted to a military tempo. In order to set in motion all economic levers, use all reserves and organize and direct the initiative of the masses toward a common goal, it was necessary to rebuild from top to bottom all the work of Party, Soviet and economic organs, scientific institutions, and trade-union and Komsomol organizations in conformity with the new conditions.

The Party's precise organizational and ideological-educational work and the titanic labor of Soviet citizens allowed us to overcome these enormous difficulties. From as early as the middle of 1942, the defense industry began to step up the output of war products and subsequently managed to fully meet the needs of the Armed Forces, thereby creating a reliable foundation for winning victory over the enemy. Throughout the entire war, with the exception of its initial period, military-technological supremacy was firmly retained by the Soviet State.

The average annual level of production of the USSR during the war exceeded the level of production of fascist Germany in field artillery pieces (75-mm and above), tanks, self-propelled artillery and aircraft by 1.4-2 times, and in mortars and submachine guns by almost five times.³ And this was at a time when Germany considerably surpassed the Soviet

³ See *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna Sovetskogo Soyuz 1941-1945*, p. 571.

Union in extraction and production of the most important types of strategic materials, above all steel and coal. One also has to note that our defense industry managed to surpass the enemy not only in numbers, but also in quality of manufactured weapons. This was particularly characteristic for automatic small arms, antitank guns, medium and heavy caliber artillery pieces, rocket systems, self-propelled artillery pieces, tanks, ground assault aircraft, long-range bombers, certain types of engineer equipment, antipersonnel and antitank mines and other weapons. It is very indicative, for example, that T-34 tanks, 76-mm, 100-mm and 152-mm artillery pieces and BM-13 and BM-31-12 rocket-launching combat vehicles surpassed analogous later models of foreign equipment in the basic combat and operational performance for a number of post-war years.

Thus, from the standpoint of scientific-technological progress, the Great Patriotic War was a sharp competition of scientific-technological thought, the production potential of the economy, the professional mastery of workers and employees, and the organizational abilities of the leadership of the two opposing social systems: on the one hand, Hitler Germany, which placed the economies of almost all the countries of Western Europe at its service and took advantage of the favorable conditions which took shape as a result of the surprise attack on the Soviet Union; and on the other hand, the first socialist state in the world, which was in an exceptionally difficult position as a result of the perfidy of the fascist aggressors and the loss at the beginning of the war of considerable territory with its human and economic resources.

The well-known Marxist-Leninist thesis was affirmed completely in the ordeals of the war years to the effect that in evaluating the economic potential of enemies, it is important to consider not only prewar quantitative indicators, but also the capability of states to rapidly mobilize their economic capacities in case of war. This depends primarily on the social and political organization of society and on the political and labor enthusiasm of the people. In spite of prognoses and hopes of world reaction, the Soviet Union was able to reorganize its economy to conform to wartime requirements in exceptionally short periods, practically in a few months. Our wartime economy turned out to be more powerful than the wartime economy of the fascist bloc. The socialist system of a planned economy demonstrated its irresistible vital force and very high effectiveness.

In sum, in spite of the enormous difficulties which fell to our lot, the Soviet people came out the victor. This was a victory of the socialist social system over the capitalist and of Soviet military-technological thinking over capitalist thinking. It was proof of the maturity of the Soviet production apparatus and of the rapid growth of scientific-technological progress in the country in prewar and war years. The

Great Patriotic War once again convincingly affirmed the immutable fact that one of the decisive conditions for winning victory in war is superiority over the enemy in the economic organization of society and in the level of development of the economy, science and technology.

2. Scientific-Technological Progress and the Development of the Armed Forces in Postwar Years

The war gave a strong impetus to the process of improvements in weapons and combat equipment throughout the world. Military-industrial complexes of the chief capitalist states not only did not cut back on the output of weapons and combat equipment after the war, but, to the contrary, continued to build up the capacity of the war industry, began a wild arms race and subordinated scientific-technological progress to preparations for a new world war.

In this situation the Communist Party and Soviet Government were faced with the question of further increasing the country's defensive might, strengthening the Armed Forces, and of ways to develop the latter on the basis of the latest achievements of science and technology.

In the fifties scientific-technological progress assumed the form of the scientific-technological revolution, which led to a qualitative change in the productive forces in general and of material means of waging war in particular. History knows many revolutionary leaps in science, but never before have scientific achievements had such an effect on the social lives of people or caused such an abrupt change in technology and production as in our times. This is taking place, first of all, because science with its research has encompassed the entire world around us and has deeply penetrated into the substance of each phenomenon. Secondly, there is a predominating tendency in all areas of knowledge for the amalgamation of many branches of science which investigate from different aspects a particular process and which thereby achieve effective results. Thirdly, science has reached such maturity that it has begun to develop by itself concrete directions for improving technology and production. Fourthly, there has appeared the possibility of developing science purposefully, for resolution of concrete tasks, to a considerably greater extent than in the past.

It can be said that contemporary science is undergoing a phase where there is a fundamental break with outmoded theses and methods of research. A transformation is taking place in concepts of many phenomena and in their theoretical explanation. All this accelerates the development of science and makes it, as never before, an effective instrument of man.

A most important result of the scientific-technological revolution in our time is mankind's practical development of the discoveries and

achievements in the field of physical-mathematical sciences, nuclear physics, solid-state physics, electronics, radiophysics, cybernetics, metallurgy and many other spheres. The adoption of the latest achievements of science and technology in the economy played a decisive role in the development of power engineering, especially atomic energy, in the exploration of space and in creation of new materials, highly complex machines and mechanisms, devices, and means of mechanization, automation, and control, etc. The increasingly broad use of mathematical methods of research and sophistication of electronic computers led to a sharp rise in the significance of quantitative methods of evaluating phenomena, not only in the technical fields, but also in the study of social, economic, biological and military problems. In some branches of production it has become possible to totally replace physical labor with the wide introduction of means of automation and mechanization, or to create machines which give enormous assistance in man's mental activities and in solving complex problems of logic.

The scientific-technological revolution has gripped all countries to one degree or another. It is occurring simultaneously both in socialist and in capitalist states, but its sociopolitical and economic goals and consequences are fundamentally different under socialism than under capitalism. In essence, the scientific-technological revolution now serves as a most important arena of struggle between two opposing socioeconomic systems, and as a means of confirming the historical advantages of socialism over capitalism.

In capitalist states the development of science and technology bears a contradictory and uneven character. Capitalism is attempting to adapt itself to the new world situation and make wide use of the achievements of the scientific-technological revolution for purposes of strengthening its class positions, resolving the contradictions inherent to it by militarization of society, preparing and unleashing new wars, and attempting military and economic offensives against socialism.

In socialist countries the achievements of science and technology are used in the interests of man. They are directed toward ensuring even greater successes in the development of socialist society, its national economy and socialist production relationships, and in the growth of the working people's welfare and culture. Scientific-technological progress under socialism facilitates the prospering of the individual and all possible increases in his social responsibility and activeness. The Soviet citizen looks upon the progress of science and technology without a shadow of fear. He is far from the sentiments which grip many representatives of the bourgeois world, who believe that the ever quickening stream of scientific and technological discoveries and inventions is capable of degrading the individual to be an appendage of a machine. In the hands of the Soviet people the achievements of science and technology are the

force which is aimed at fulfilling the great historical task of creating a communist society.

Thus, in a socialist state scientific-technological progress furthers peaceful goals. It is natural that the danger of aggression on the part of imperialism forces us to use the results of scientific-technological progress in the interests of strengthening the Motherland's defensive capability as well. This objective necessity for steadily increasing the military might of the socialist state serves as the political basis for revolutionary transformations in the Soviet Armed Forces. In supplying the Armed Forces with the latest weapons and combat equipment, the Soviet Union does not let up in its consistent struggle for preventing war, for furthering peace and security of all nations, and for peaceful coexistence of countries regardless of their social system.

All conditions have been created in the USSR to direct the efforts of scientists in a planned and purposeful manner toward resolution of the most important, key long-range, theoretical and practical problems having vital importance for the building of a communist society and for defense of the revolutionary achievements of working people.

The enormous advantage of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community in organizing scientific work lies in the fact that, being part of the people and being inseparably connected with them, our scientists rely on a truly scientific world outlook and methodological basis—Marxism-Leninism. Work for the glory of the Homeland and for the good of the people and the directing activity of the Communist Party are inexhaustible sources of their inspiration. The CPSU Program notes that "it is a manner of honor for Soviet scientists to consolidate the foremost positions held by Soviet science in the most important branches of knowledge and to assume a **leading position in world science** in all the basic fields."⁴

The rapid development of science and technology produced revolutionary changes in military affairs and had a determining influence on the weaponry and organization of the Armed Forces, on the methods of conducting combat operations and on methods of training and education of personnel.

Of the many factors characterizing the revolution in military affairs, one of the most important and decisive was the creation of nuclear weapons and the equipping of our Armed Forces with them. Another such factor has been the development and acceptance into the inventory of short, medium and intercontinental range missiles, ranging from operational-tactical to strategic. Armed with nuclear warheads, the missiles formed a fundamentally new system of weaponry—nuclear missiles.

⁴ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, p. 129.

They combine the enormous destructive might of nuclear warheads with the unlimited range and relative invulnerability of ballistic missiles.

It was necessary to possess a powerful scientific and economic potential in order to create nuclear missiles. The high level of development of nuclear physics, mathematics, electronics, cybernetics, chemistry and other sciences in the USSR, the successes of Soviet economics, the creative energy of workers and the leading role of the Communist Party permitted successful resolution of the most complex problem of contemporary military affairs—development of missiles and nuclear warheads and mass-equipping the Soviet Armed Forces with them. This resulted in the birth of a new Service of the Armed Forces—the Strategic Rocket Forces.

The appearance of nuclear missiles required a fundamental revision in all areas of military affairs. At the same time, it gave the Armed Forces a multitude of urgent problems which they had not previously encountered. It overturned all our previous ideas about the speed of phenomena and processes of war, and it radically changed the role and importance of time and space.

Conventional combat weapons were further developed alongside nuclear missiles. The Ground Forces were being outfitted with new models of automatic small arms, tanks with improved armor protection, increased firepower and higher speed and maneuverability, new medium and heavy artillery pieces, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, recoilless rifles, new antitank weapons and troop air defense weapons. The Air Force adopted qualitatively new jet aircraft and helicopters. Surface-to-air missiles, jet fighters, rapid-fire automatic antiaircraft guns and radars appeared in the National Air Defense Forces. New avionics systems were developed, distinguished by a high degree of accuracy in hitting targets and effectiveness in operating near targets. Primary examples of these are "air-ground" and "air-air" missiles having radio-electronic control systems, and others. The Navy received new types of submarines and surface warships with improved weaponry and diverse combat equipment. The progress of science and technology in post-war years has led to the appearance of other new types of weapons, the employment of which could have a specific influence on the character of possible combat operations.

The combat might of conventional means of destruction also became many times higher than in the past war. For example, contemporary multiple-round rocket launchers considerably surpass in firepower the legendary "Katyusha" of the wartime period. The penetrating ability of contemporary antitank projectiles has greatly increased. There has been a considerable increase in the rate of fire and accuracy of automatic small arms and artillery. Due to a qualitative improvement in conventional means of destruction and the increase of these weapons in units and formations, there has been a great improvement in the fire, shock

and maneuver capabilities of troops, which permits assigning them very decisive missions on the battlefield which they are capable of accomplishing without resorting to nuclear weapons.

Contemporary scientific-technological progress is marked by the fact that it is the chief cause for weapons and combat equipment becoming rapidly obsolete. Consequently, these weapons have to be replaced more rapidly. While at the beginning of our century it required 20-30 or more years for developing a new weapon prototype and equipping armies with it, now this process is 2-3 times faster in the armies of the largest states. In just the last 10-15 years, both here and abroad, there has been a replacement of two-three generations of missiles; a significant portion of the inventory of combat aircraft, surface ships and submarines has been replaced and systems of surface-to-air missile and radar weaponry, and means of control and communications have been changed several times. This trend is becoming more distinct, in spite of the fact that with the creation of new prototypes of weapons there is a continuous increase in the volume of scientific and test-design work, in the technical complexity of military-industrial items and of the economic expenditures for their production.

Another important feature of modern scientific-technological progress is that it is manifested not only in the field of creation of qualitatively new military technology, but also in improvements in combat performance characteristics of existing items. Therefore, a very current trend in scientific-technological progress in military affairs has been the modernization of combat equipment which has been in an army's inventory for a long while. Figuratively speaking, this gives it a second life if there is purpose in this both from a military and from an economic point of view.

Scientific-technological progress uncommonly aggravates the competition between offensive and defensive means of warfare. The appearance of new and more powerful offensive weapons from time to time has made it difficult to create sufficiently effective defensive means. This situation has also taken shape now in connection with the appearance of nuclear missiles, against which there are still no reliable defensive means. At the same time, one must keep in mind that in the hands of the Soviet State nuclear missiles in themselves act as a powerful defensive means which restrain an aggressor.

Scientific-technological progress has an enormous influence not only on qualitative improvements in weaponry, but also changes considerably the correlation of man and military equipment and the nature of military labor. In the practice of military development, arising with ever increasing acuteness is the necessity of not only adapting weaponry to the man operating it, but also actively shaping the capabilities of man himself with regard to the development of military equipment.

New weaponry more imperiously requires the formation in personnel of high-level, specialized training, creative thinking, an independent approach to the resolution of practical tasks and comprehensive development of intellectual and physical abilities. There is a sharp increase in each soldier's responsibility for performance of a mission as part of a crew, subunit or unit. The latest combat equipment with its enormous destructive power has also increased the demands on the moral-combat qualities of personnel to an unprecedented extent. In other words, an increase in man's role in modern warfare is an inevitable objective consequence of scientific-technological progress.

Certain types of weapons have become so complex that it becomes increasingly necessary to have the direct participation of scientists in the process of their operation. In turn, many line generals and officers in mastering such types of weapons, thoroughly study different branches of science and become genuine scientists.

Due to scientific-technological progress in military affairs, it has been possible to widely adopt means of automation and mechanization into the processes of managerial work and of training and educating personnel. Here the main goal of automation in our Armed Forces, in contrast to the capitalist armies, is not to "exclude" people from these processes, but to increase the troops' combat capabilities and the quality of combat training.

Achievements of science and technology in the field of military affairs have an increasingly tangible effect on methods of conducting combat operations. The appearance of qualitatively new and more powerful types of weapons and their mass adoption by the troops predetermine changes in troop combat formations, depth of missions, rates of advance, forms of maneuver, nature of defense and other forms of combat activity. While, as a rule, these changes previously were of an evolutionary character and were not particularly noticeable outwardly, they now at times acquire the character of an abrupt qualitative leap or, one could say, of a genuine revolution in methods of combat operations. There is a tendency toward the inevitability of making new leaps in the development of methods for conducting operations and combat which may be caused by the appearance of more powerful weapons.

Contemporary scientific-technological progress also has a substantial effect on the organizational structure of armies. An abrupt leap in the field of improving weapons of destruction and their means of delivery has caused fundamental changes in the resolution of the problem of development of existing and creation of new services and branches within the armed forces, determination of their role, place and ratio in the military organization of states, and establishment of the most favorable correlation and mutual relationship among them.

In the course of resolving this problem, the Soviet Armed Forces are working out a uniform system of weaponry and making an optimum distribution of combat and combat support means among the Services and branches of the Armed Forces. In essence, the entire process of improvements in military organization represents nothing more than a scientific search and creation of the most rational forms of combining people and technology in one troop organism. The more intelligently that people and technology are distributed in this organism, and control and support organs built, the greater are their capabilities in the employment of those methods of combat operations, which achieve the most effective use of weapons, swiftness of advance, steadfastness in defense, breadth and dynamic nature of maneuver and rapid transition from one form of operations to another.

Scientific-technological progress also has a profound influence on the development of military science and on the resolution of urgent problems of conducting war. It arms military science with new means and ways for investigating problems in military affairs. Relying on the growing combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces, our military science is studying the effects of the military-technological factor on the nature of contemporary warfare, the conditions under which it would begin and its duration.

In contrast to the views of many bourgeois military figures and in spite of the colossal might of nuclear missiles, Soviet military science does not absolutize such weapons. It also is not inherent in Soviet military science, as it is with various fashionable bourgeois military theories and concepts, to give preference in modern warfare to some certain individual service of the armed forces. Soviet military science believes that if imperialist reaction should unleash a modern war, it will include active and decisive operations by all services of the armed forces, coordinated as to goal, time and place. Each service of the armed forces and each branch, in fulfilling the missions peculiar to it, will bend its efforts to achieve the overall goals of war. In developing these and other problems of military theory and practice, Soviet military science exerts an influence on military-technological progress by giving it a purposeful character.

The Communist Party and Soviet people are doing everything necessary to reinforce the country's defensive capability, to develop the Armed Forces and keep their technological level even with the foremost achievements of science and technology. Today's material-technological base of the Armed Forces has far outstripped that which existed at the end of the Great Patriotic War and in the first postwar years. It provides our Armed Forces with a sufficient number of all sophisticated types of weapons and combat equipment. This allows them to constantly maintain their combat might at the proper level, increase combat readiness and successfully accomplish any combat missions on the land, in the air or at sea.

In considering the path covered by the Soviet Armed Forces, one cannot help but be struck by the enormous changes which have taken place in their technical equipping. The selfless labor of the Soviet people and their creative thinking allowed the Armed Forces to take a giant step forward from the field three-incher to the intercontinental missile, from the towed machine gun to the powerful tank, from slow moving aircraft to supersonic aircraft, and from unsophisticated submarines to the atomic missile carriers—the genuine masters of the ocean depths and expanses.

3. On the Prospects for Arms Development

The experience of history teaches that in reinforcing the defensive might of a socialist state one cannot lag behind demands of the times. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev remarked in a speech at a critique of the "Dvina" troop maneuvers in March 1970 that "we now have good equipment, but, as we know, we are living in an age of scientific-technological progress, where weapons are improved so swiftly that at times new models and systems are created not just in a year, but in even shorter periods. Stagnation in this area may be fraught with great consequences. Our scientists, both civilian and military, must constantly think about and remember this."

"The Party Central Committee and Soviet Government always take the necessary steps to develop the technological equipping of our Armed Forces. Of course, all this costs a great deal, but we are forced to spend part of our budget for the country's defense needs, and this is understood and supported by all the people."⁵

One cannot forget for a minute that imperialist reaction attempts to shift the center of gravity of the arms race it has unleashed into the sphere of qualitative improvements in weapons and combat equipment, counting on attaining an advantage in this area over the USSR and other countries of the socialist community. In this regard, the interests of reliable defense of the Soviet Motherland demand that we not weaken the front of scientific explorations, that we continue scientific research and test-design work, that we make use of the results of scientific-technological progress for creating new prototypes of weapons and combat equipment, and that we reduce the time needed to introduce results of scientific research into production.

One of the chief means for the practical realization of the achievements of scientific-technological progress in military affairs is a **uniform military-technological policy**. It is a system of scientifically based views on problems of developing weapons and combat equipment and is implemented for the purpose of keeping the technological equipping of the Armed Forces at the level of modern requirements.

⁵ *Dvina*. Moscow, Voenizdat, 1970, pp. 6-7.

Our country has accumulated a great deal of experience in developing and creating powerful, effective weapons. Measures are being taken for further improvements in the material-production base of the defense industry. Generalization of this experience on a broad plane and perception of what has been done and what must be done is a task of prime importance. Its resolution is possible only on the basis of a general fundamental approach, since, as V. I. Lenin stressed, "whoever takes up specific questions without the preliminary resolution of general questions will inevitably at every step of the way unconsciously 'stumble across' these general questions. And to stumble blindly upon them in every specific case means to doom one's policy to the worst vacillations and lack of principle."⁶ The search for such a general systems approach to resolution of military-technological problems comprises one of the most important goals of a uniform military-technological policy.

Just what are the chief tasks of a uniform military-technological policy? To put it briefly, as shown by all the experience of Soviet military development, they consist of the following:

First of all, a uniform military-technological policy is called upon to ensure the preferential development of those trends in scientific-technological progress in the military field which are capable of most fully and comprehensively satisfying the USSR's growing defense needs for effective means of conducting modern combat operations. At the same time our Party and the Soviet State consider that one of the major tasks (and it was once again stressed in the materials of the 25th Congress of the CPSU) is the struggle to ban new kinds and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This is an important aim of military détente.

Secondly, a uniform military-technological policy must ensure an alliance of industry and science in the interests of creating those models of weapons and combat equipment which would not become obsolete for a long while and which would be highly effective, i.e., each type of weapon or combat equipment should possess the highest tactical-technical capabilities, and primarily powerful destructive characteristics, with the least expenditure of means for its development, production and operation.

Thirdly, the task of a uniform military-technological policy is to monitor the rational improvement in weapons and combat equipment of all services and branches of the Armed Forces in conformity with their role and functions in modern warfare. Here it is extremely important to delve deeply into the patterns of development of military affairs, to study the basic directions of use of the achievements of scientific-technological progress abroad, and to consider the trends in development of weapons and combat equipment.

Fourthly, a uniform military-technological policy must give constant

⁶ V. I. Lenin, XV, 368.

attention to the creation of those weapons and combat equipment which permit savings of military labor and reductions in the sphere of employment of physical labor. This is achieved through broad mechanization of laborious work and a gradual shift to full automation of the most important processes of equipment operation.

Fifthly, a task of the uniform military-technological policy involves a comprehensive improvement in existing methods of troop and weapons control and development of new ones, development of control technology and improvement in the communications system. Here the automation of troop control and employment of diverse electronic computer technology both in the process of gathering all possible information and in the course of working out decisions and issuing various instructions to troops is a general policy.

Thus, military-technical policy can carry out its task successfully provided that conditions and long-range economic growth, achievements of the scientific-technical revolution are taken into consideration and provided it originates from the requirements of a possible war, its strategy, operational art and tactics.

When one speaks of a possible nuclear-missile war, one can state that it will be conducted mainly with strategic nuclear weapons: land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles, strategic aviation, and missile-carrying nuclear submarines.

The improvement of intercontinental ballistic missiles is being done in the area of improving their technical-tactical qualities.

A stable tendency in the development of strategic aviation is the increase in aircraft speed and range of flight, an increase in their combat potential for destroying various targets and for surmounting air defense.

During the last few years a greater importance has been placed on the submarine missile fleet. And this is understandable, because while nuclear missile-carrying submarines are not any less effective in their operations than ground or air nuclear systems, they possess a number of advantages among which the primary one would be that of greater survivability.

The perfecting of the submarine missile fleet as a whole involves a large number of measures of an engineering-technical nature.

Nevertheless, no matter how significant might be the role of strategic nuclear weapons, they cannot solve all of the problems of war. Therefore, great efforts are being directed, as before, toward the creation of new—as well as the improvement of existing—conventional types of weapons.

It is a normal procedure to conduct research on means for further developing the combat characteristics of conventional weapons in order

to improve them. Primarily, this is the broadening of the scope of assigned missions, the increase in the range, power and precision of fire, mobility, quick action, survivability and reliability, functional stability under conditions of interference, simpler maintenance, etc. Some of the most important trends in this respect include the development of original designs and plans for weapons, the use of new materials and explosives in their production and the adaptation of new and more accurate sighting devices and guidance systems. Laser electronics and computer technology continue to be introduced on a broad scale into weapons systems, and control systems are being automated so that ordnance may become more maneuverable. It is being mounted on various mobile devices (including land, sea and air types) with higher mobility and greater speed, greater range, and economical engines.

Combat activities in Southeast Asia at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's gave rich food for thought in regard to ways for further developing air attack and air defense weapons. It is known that in the aggressive "air war" against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, American aviation suffered great losses numbering in thousands of aircraft and helicopters of tactical naval [carrier] and army aviation. Aircrew losses were also great, although the most experienced American pilots participated in combat activities and the best models of US aviation technology were utilized, including experimental types of aircraft.

Proceeding from the results of combat activities of American aviation in Vietnam, scientific-technical intellect is intensely working on the problem of increasing the survivability of aircraft and helicopters and giving them a greater striking force when they break through modern air defense systems. The search for the best solution to this problem is being conducted simultaneously in two directions: technical and operational-tactical.

It is very probable that tomorrow's aviation technology will consist of complex combat systems and have a maximum of armament and equipment for electronic countermeasures. Vertical take-off and landing aircraft would find great utilization, as would fast combat and transport helicopters having sophisticated navigational and weapons systems. The appearance of new, more effective guided missiles of the "air-ground" type should not be excluded.

Combat activities in the Middle East, unleashed more than once during the past ten years by Israel's aggressive circles, have put a new slant on the problem of the relationship between offensive and defensive actions of ground forces; they have uncovered a number of characteristic phenomena in the opposing utilization of offensive and defensive weapons and in the ways of conducting a fire battle.

It should be noted that modern defensive systems, in connection with

the appearance of powerful fire weapons in the inventories, have become more stable. This is caused primarily by the fact that the main striking force during an offensive operation—tanks—has become more vulnerable, while their use on the battlefield has become more complex. The continuing process of improving antitank weapons has imposed grave tasks for science and technology. These tasks have to do with substantially improving the survivability of tank troops and developing more effective means and methods that would be reliable in neutralizing antitank defense measures.

The battle between armor and antitank missiles has now shifted to the science-research laboratories, the proving grounds and industry. The answer to the questions as to which one will win out will require the solution to numerous and complex problems. Obviously, the traditional method of improving the survivability of tanks—by increasing the thickness of the armor—is far from being the only solution and probably not the best one—to the existing problem.

The problem of the survivability of tanks is made even more complex because the development of antitank guided missiles (PTURS)* has essentially only begun and the possibilities of improving these powerful new weapons of antitank warfare appear to be quite significant. Too, the last word has not been said about antitank artillery, where possibilities for further development are far from having been totally explored.

The experience of events in the Middle East also provides evidence of changes that are beginning to be seen in tactical methods of ground forces, particularly with respect to the growing role of long-range fire. This is due to the fact that modern day ordnance makes it possible to make effective hits on the enemy tanks even from great distances. As a result, the advancing infantry loses its tank support and suffers heavy losses, and its attack either fails or loses its striking powers and does not attain its assigned objective. In order to guarantee the success of an attack it is necessary to successfully neutralize the defense's fire plan, especially long-range antitank weapons.

Local wars of the last few years have not given any basis for drawing any important conclusions with respect to either the use of naval forces or the armament of surface fleet forces in modern warfare, since in essence the only activity carried out was that by the imperialist aggressor fleets. Nevertheless, scientific and technical progress has also opened up great prospects in this sphere and has defined a variety of possibilities in the development of surface ships and their armament. Ships of various classes are being developed, commissioned and designed for carrying out a number of missions: strike, landing, transport, antisubmarine, support,

*[PTURS is the Soviet acronym for antitank guided missile (protivotankovyy upravlyayemyy snaryad).—U. S. Ed.]

etc. Research is being conducted on the optimum configuration of ships' hulls, new propulsion plants, and on-board armament.

The production of new weapons models and combat equipment is placing greater demands upon the country's economy. In order to manufacture these weapons and equipment it is not enough to make use of only the old branches of industry. It is necessary to develop new, long-range branches, capable of producing qualitatively different materials, which would also include such unique materials as those possessing a high degree of mechanical strength, heat resistance, purity of composition, and other properties.

The increasing complexity and cost of modern weapons and combat equipment, along with the need to reduce the time needed for development, series production and adoption in troop inventories lead to the very pointed question regarding the well-founded scientific basis for trends in developing weapons over a long period of time. An insufficient basis and miscalculations in this area could lead to unjustified expenditures of means and the country's economic and human resources. And it is well known that there is nothing more difficult than to make up for an omission, if indeed it is at all possible.

Consequently, problems of scientific prediction, complex long-term planning, and determination of the optimum correlation of different types of weapons and combat equipment now acquire primary importance. The level of technological equipping of the Soviet Armed Forces, as the most important factor of their combat might, always must correspond to the requirements of the tasks they face.

Chapter 6. Morale of the Socialist Army

The might of the Soviet Land and its military organization is based not only on a well developed socialist economy and equipping of the Armed Forces with all types of weapons and combat equipment. It also rests on the unshakeable moral-political and ideological unity of the people, on the spiritual riches of our entire society and on the vital interest of the toiling masses in accomplishing tasks of building communism and reliably defending our state. This nation-wide community of ideas, goals, and actions is a nutrient medium for high combat efficiency and morale of personnel which, together with material factors have played a decisive role in the past, and will play a decisive role in case of a new war, in winning victory over enemies of the Soviet Motherland.

The question of the significance of the morale factor is now attracting increasing attention in connection with greater demands on the combat efficiency and morale of personnel in modern warfare and with the necessity of seeking out new ways and methods of moral-political and psychological training of troops.

1. Role of the Morale Factor in War

No one question has probably received such a thorough investigation and broad illumination in military literature as the question of the role of the morale factor in war. There is nothing unusual about this. Man with his moral-political, psychological and combat qualities has always been and will remain the decisive force in war. No weapon or combat equipment can of themselves replace these qualities. And weapons can manifest their combat power to the full extent only in the hands of a man, or soldier, who possesses high morale.

The morale factor is made up of the spiritual qualities of people, their understanding of the goals and missions for the sake of which they are acting and waging war, and their readiness to make sacrifices for the sake of achieving these goals. As applied to the armed forces, the morale factor indicates the spiritual state of personnel and their resolve to wage combat operations and endure any trials, hardships or deprivations to win victory over the enemy.

The morale of an army is a direct reflection and a part of the morale of the people. The more that the goals of war correspond to the interests of the people, the higher is their morale, and consequently, the morale level of the army.

The morale factor is inseparable from a state's social system, its policy and its socioeconomic relationships. The morale factor bears a socio-political character, and in a number of cases it is justly called the moral-political factor. The concept of "combat efficiency and morale of troops" is often used to stress the inseparable tie between morale and combat qualities of personnel.

The best generals of the past always set aside an important place for the morale factor in winning victory. They attempted by every available means to raise the fighting spirit of the troops. Alexander Nevskiy and Dmitriy Donskoy, Alexander Suvorov and Mikhail Kutuzov, and other Russian military leaders before a battle appealed to the patriotic feelings of the soldier, to his allegiance and love for the Motherland and to his profound admiration for the exploits of the people who stood up staunchly in defense of the sacred soil of their fathers in the hard times of the enemy invasion.

But morale never before was such a *mighty weapon* as in the army of working people and peasants, in the new type of army which guards the interests of the toiling people. In organizing the defense of the socialist Homeland, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin constantly turned to this tested weapon and took care to see that it always was sharpened and ready for combat.

V. I. Lenin often spoke before the working people and the Red Army men in the difficult years of *foreign intervention* and civil war. His fiery words about defense of Soviet power, revolutionary duty and class awareness of fighters of the Working People's and Peasants' Red Army inspired them to selfless struggle against the interventionists and White Guards.

The Party Central Committee turned to the soldiers of the Armed Forces and to all the Soviet people with inspired calls in the years of fascist invasion of our land. The Party rallied the people to the Great Patriotic War against the Hitler invaders, and Soviet citizens received its calls with their hearts and souls and made extreme sacrifices and unparalleled exploits for the sake of defending the socialist Motherland.

The ruling circles of imperialism cannot appeal to their armies with such calls. They do not have the high goals for which their soldiers could consciously go into battle. They also cannot reveal the genuine goals of aggressive wars of the imperialist states, the basis of which is an attempt to *enslave other nations* politically and economically in order to increase the riches of the capitalistic monopolies. Therefore, the ruling circles of the West are forced either to speculate on the patriotic feelings of their

people and deceive them by employing the broad arsenal of means of ideological influence, or unleash base instincts in people, influence them with bribes and coercion, turn them into murderers and plunderers and make them active accomplices of their piracy.

However, even refined ideological conditioning does not and cannot ensure high morale in personnel of capitalist armies. The fact is that such spirit is not introduced from somewhere outside, nor is it only a result of the ideological influence of the propaganda apparatus on the minds and feelings of people. We stress once again that the moral qualities of the army are inseparably connected with the morale of the people. The source and basis of morale are the social system of the state and the policy it follows, the socioeconomic relationships in society and the character and political goals of war. As a rule, contemporary wars touch on the fundamental interests of states and classes. Enormous masses of people are drawn into wars and they are not indifferent as to why they are fighting and spilling their blood. A proper understanding of these questions has a decisive influence on the moral-political condition of the people and the armed forces.

Only the just nature of war gives rise in the people and army to an enormous energy, a high morale, mass heroism and self-sacrifice for the sake of achieving great goals. But just wars are not inherent to the very nature of imperialist states, which are characterized by aggressive, predatory wars unleashed in the interests of the monopolistic hierarchy and contradicting the fundamental interests of peoples. Such wars cannot evoke noble moral stimuli. Even coercion, bribery and deceit misfire more and more often. The aggressive war of the United States in Vietnam not only did not enjoy support among a significant portion of the American Army, but, to the contrary, gave rise to ever growing protest within it, in spite of the fact that American soldiers and officers were paid additional money for taking part in it.

But it would be a big mistake to underestimate the capability of militarists to have an ideological influence on the masses of working people of their countries and draw them into military adventures under the black banner of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. The fascist German army could serve as an illustration here. Stupefied by the poison of Nazism and chauvinistic propaganda about the "exclusive nature" of the German race and the "inferiority" of other peoples, the army, during all the years of World War II, engaged in beastly reprisals against prisoners of war and the peaceful populace of occupied countries and territories at the slightest sign of their dissatisfaction with the "new order" imposed by Hitlerites in Europe. Reprisals against Soviet citizens were particularly violent.

Unauthorized, barbaric methods of warmaking are also characteristic of the U.S. Army. We know, for example, the unseemly role performed

by their special forces, the so-called "Green Beret" detachments, "Rangers," and other diversionary-subversive units. The Pentagon attaches particularly great significance to the organization of such detachments. Three basic requirements are placed on all candidates for such detachments without exception: to have strong fists, a minimum of intellect and a faultless reputation from the viewpoint of the militarists. Sadism and cruelty are cultivated intentionally in the future saboteurs. The idea that they belong to a special "elite" of society—to "supermen"—for whom no moral or other barriers exist, is persistently instilled in them. The mission of these cutthroats also includes appropriate conditioning of new recruits from conventional troops and the display to them of personal "expertise" of inhuman actions.

And such "lessons" often are not in vain. The bestialities of American troops in Vietnam and their destruction of every last person of entire villages, including women, old people and children, are well known by all the world. They not only took place with impunity, but were encouraged by Pentagon leaders.

Aggressive, predatory wars are foreign to the Soviet Union and other socialist states. They use weapons only to repel aggression by imperialists and to protect socialist achievements of peoples and their freedom and independence. Such just wars *meld society into a single camp*. Such was the case in all wars which the Soviet land has been forced to wage in fighting invaders who infringed on its freedom and independence. The just nature of a war and the vital interest of a people in repelling aggression acted as motivating factors which increased the physical and spiritual forces of the Soviet people and gave rise to mass heroism and selfless performance of military and civilian duties.

The morale factor is inseparable from the material factor, from the provision to the Armed Forces of all necessary types of weapons, combat equipment and other supplies, as well as from the training of personnel and the combat coordination of units and subunits. Material and morale factors together then comprise the qualitative base of the Armed Forces which determines their combat effectiveness. That is how V. I. Lenin viewed this question. His instructions in this area stem from the historical experience of wars and have been tested by the combat practice of the Soviet Armed Forces. They form the basis in the development of the Soviet Armed Forces and of the training and education of personnel.

In fulfilling V. I. Lenin's instructions, the Communist Party at all stages in the development of our state has displayed the greatest concern for equipping the Armed Forces with the most sophisticated types of weapons and combat equipment, for training personnel, and for instilling high combat efficiency and morale in them. The Party resolves the problems of military-technological policy in inseparable unity with the tasks

of moral-political and psychological training of Soviet soldiers. In attaching prime importance to the morale factor, it proceeds from an assumption that ideological conditioning and a high level of awareness of personnel multiply the combat might of the Armed Forces, are converted into material force, and in certain conditions reduce the enemy's numerical superiority in people and equipment to naught. The other qualitative indicators of troops, and, in the final account, their combat effectiveness and readiness also depend largely on morale.

From the first days of the creation of the Armed Forces, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin relied on the advantages of the socialist social and state system and on the objective patterns of development of a new type of army to introduce socialist ideology into the awareness of soldiers and commanders, and to instill in them a communist ideological spirit, a sense of personal responsibility for the fate of the Soviet Motherland and a readiness to make any sacrifices for the sake of defending its freedom and independence. V. I. Lenin and the Party saw in the communist ideological spirit, awareness and loyalty to the people the sources of invincible forces, creativity and inspiration of our soldiers. This work of enormous scope was also performed in peacetime and on days of military tests. It united military collectives and mobilized them for combat exploits.

In the years of foreign intervention and civil war the young Red Army, while conceding technological supply to its enemies, had no equal in moral-political qualities. Thanks to this it smashed the interventionists and White Guards, protected the great achievements of the October Revolution and defended the independence of the Soviet State. In analyzing the sources of our victory, V. I. Lenin noted that "we won because the best people of the entire working class and all the peasantry displayed an unprecedented heroism in this war against the exploiters, performed wonders of bravery, endured unheard-of deprivations, sacrificed themselves and chased out the self-seekers and cowards mercilessly."¹

Extraordinarily high combat efficiency and morale were shown by the Soviet Armed Forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Everyone recalls the unprecedented valor Soviet soldiers displayed in the heavy fighting at the beginning of the war in the defense of Moscow and Leningrad, Stalingrad and the Caucasus, in the battles of Kursk, in crossing the Dnepr and Vistula, Danube and Oder, in the battles for Warsaw and Budapest, Vienna and Prague, in the assault on Koenigsberg and Berlin, as well as in many other battles and engagements of the Great Patriotic War. Our army was not broken either by the great misfortunes or heavy losses at the beginning of the war. In spite of the treacherous surprise attack by fascist German troops, it did not lose its head, as happened more than once in similar situations with armies of the capital-

¹ V. I. Lenin, XL, 232.

ist states, and it not only stood up to the strongest capitalist war machine, but also won a world-historic victory, defended the achievements of socialism in the USSR and saved mankind from the threat of fascist enslavement.

The most important moral-combat qualities of Soviet soldiers in the years of the Great Patriotic War were a high communist ideological spirit, profound devotion to the Party cause and to the people, Soviet patriotism, a sense of international obligation, unlimited faith in victory over the invaders, mass heroism, recognition of personal responsibility for the fate of the socialist Motherland, firm military discipline, steadfastness, and the state of organization and comradely cohesion of subunits and units.

Even our enemies were forced to recognize the high combat efficiency and morale of personnel of the Soviet Armed Forces. While fascist German generals termed the Red Army a "colossus with feet of clay" when planning the aggression, they spoke in a different way after the very first days of the war. Words appeared in their diary and other entries about the stubbornness, exceptional heroism and inexhaustible energy of the Soviet soldier and of his hatred for the enemy.

The Hitlerite General Kleist, who is not unknown, wrote the following about the Red Army: "The people were first-rate fighters from the very beginning of the war. . . . As they acquired experience, they became first-rate soldiers. They fought stubbornly, and possessed astounding endurance. . . . The staff quickly rid itself of its initial shortcomings and soon became very effective." And here is an evaluation by the fascist General Guderian: "It was Frederick the Great who said of his Russian enemies that they had to be shot twice and then given a shove in order to finally get them to fall. He correctly understood the substance of these soldiers. In 1941 we were forced to become convinced of this same thing. These soldiers staunchly defended positions at which they had been placed. Even when the greater part of the position had been occupied, the last defenders remained at their posts and they either had to be killed or taken prisoner in hand-to-hand combat. But they rarely surrendered."

One can cite many such forced admissions of the high combat efficiency and morale of Soviet soldiers.

The present young generation of Soviet soldiers assimilate high combat efficiency and morale under peacetime conditions which are filled with strenuous training and the performance of responsible duties of Armed Forces service. In their daily military labor, personnel exhibit a high degree of political awareness. This is shown by the successful fulfillment of socialist pledges, by the increasing numbers of men with excellent results in combat and political training and of qualified specialists, by coordinated actions in exercises and on combat alert duty, and by

strengthening of military order, organization, discipline and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

Today's Armed Forces life is rich in more than examples of exemplary accomplishment of tasks of combat and political training. More than once our soldiers have had to look mortal danger in the face and display true heroism, courage and valor in performing their service duties. It was not in vain that the words "peaceful days—combat exploits" became popular in accurately and amply describing the flush and romance of the military routine.

The role of the morale factor in modern warfare has grown many times over. This is explained by a large number of circumstances.

One has to include among such circumstances above all reasons of a political nature stemming from the social essence of possible war. If we speak of a world war, for which imperialist reaction is still preparing, it will inevitably assume the character of the greatest class encounter of two opposing social systems in the history of mankind. This will predetermine the fierceness and uncompromising nature of the war. It will intrude into all areas of social life and will require a colossal moral and physical exertion not only of the Armed Forces, but of all the people.

The second circumstance which increases the importance of the morale factor in modern warfare is the new nature of weapons and combat equipment, and primarily the appearance of nuclear weapons. V. I. Lenin said that "the spontaneity of war is a danger. In war there is not a single moment when one is not surrounded by dangers."² This danger will increase even more in case of the threat of employment of nuclear weapons. Not only will it constantly hang over the heads of the troops waging combat actions, but also the laborers on the home front in all sectors of their activity. In fact, the entire population of a country, the entire state, will be subjected to danger. In this situation it will be immeasurably more difficult to wage combat operations and work in the rear areas than in past wars. The constant awareness of a nuclear threat will unquestionably have an effect on the morale of the army and the people. It will give rise to an enormous strain on their spiritual and physical forces and will require special moral-psychological conditioning.

The morale factor will play a particularly large role in the event of nuclear strikes by the enemy, when the greatest exertion will be required to bring the troops to order in extremely short periods of time, to restore their combat effectiveness, and to mobilize all the moral and physical forces of personnel to perform a previous or a newly assigned mission. Prolonged and serious preparations are required for this even in peacetime, so that no dangers or hardships of a possible nuclear war will catch the troops by surprise.

² V. I. Lenin, XLIV, 210.

There is no need to go into detail on the consequences which would result from the use of nuclear weapons in a world war. As we know, it could lead to the deaths of hundreds of millions of people, the destruction of entire countries, and the contamination of the earth's surface and atmosphere. The enormous destructive properties of nuclear weapons—the colossal force of the shock wave, the powerful light radiation and the hidden action of radioactive contamination—are hundreds and thousands of times greater than conventional weapons. They increase the effect on people's moral principles and psychological outlook. This influence increases because of the inevitability of mass victims, destruction and fires. Under such conditions the personnel of the Armed Forces and the population of the country will be required to have exceptionally high moral stability and self-possession and a firmness of will in order not to give in to fright, not to panic and not to lose the resolve to fight or the belief in victory over the enemy.

Finally, increased influence on the morale of troops will be caused by a change in methods of conducting war. An enormous physical and moral burden on the troops, not seen in past wars, will also be created by the possibility of mass nuclear strikes, instantaneous destruction of entire subunits, units or even large units, or inflicting of massive and irreplaceable losses on them, an increase in the dynamic nature of combat operations in all spheres, rapid changes in the situation, fast shifts from one form of action to another, and the complexity of control.

The role of the morale factor in modern warfare will also increase in operations involving the employment of conventional weapons. The fact is that in this instance as well, the sociopolitical substance of war and the class acuteness and decisiveness of its goals will retain their influence on the troops' morale. There will also be an enormous effect exerted by the sharply increased combat capabilities of conventional weapons and the changed methods of conducting combat operations. In addition, one has to consider that the troops will accomplish missions under a dual strain. They will experience the danger of destruction by conventional means and will be in constant expectation of nuclear strikes and in readiness for operations if nuclear weapons are used.

In connection with the growing complexity of ways and means of conducting war, the significance of the morale factor in achieving victory has increased so much that many tenets of military art must undergo a thorough review. For example, the principle of attaining victory over an enemy through superiority in men and equipment at the decisive moment and at the decisive place will not bear the desired result if qualitative indicators relative to the troops are disregarded. Among the most important of these is morale of the personnel. A similar thing can be said for the well-known aphorism: "One does not fight with numbers, but with

knowledge." It will hold true only if knowledge is reinforced by high morale qualities of the troops.

Modern warfare has truly doubled the high demands on the combat efficiency and morale of the commander. He has to have the strength, like all soldiers, to overcome the hardships and dangers of combat, and in addition, to ensure precise and continuous troop control, not losing for a single minute the thread of commanding them in the most difficult situation, and to inspire his subordinates to absolute accomplishment of combat missions through *personal examples of steadfastness, endurance and self-control.*

Statements often appear in capitalist states, in connection with the ever growing technological supply of armies and the creation of new types of weapons and combat equipment, to the effect that man is allegedly becoming an appendage of a machine, and that the outcome of war will now be decided by weapons, primarily nuclear.

The true meaning of such statements by bourgeois propagandists is to degrade the role of the popular masses in historical events, and in war in particular, to elevate the blind force of military equipment and to attempt to convince people of the stability of a capitalist social system—which historically has become outdated—and of its alleged ability to control the destinies of the world by relying on its military and scientific-technical potential. Such propaganda is not being conducted because life is so good. It serves as a sign that the aggressive forces of imperialism, in preparing new military adventures, are not in a position to offer the people high moral stimuli or ideas which would inspire them to military exploits. On the other hand, exaggeration of the role of military equipment in war shows that the so-called "educational measures" being used by command personnel and the propaganda apparatus of capitalist armies are ceasing to operate effectively on soldiers. And finally, the exalting of military equipment to the absolute must, in the minds of the militarists, facilitate their continuation of the arms race.

Of course, one cannot degrade the significance of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, and there is no need for this. Their enormous destructive and contaminating power speaks for itself. But it would also be the crudest of mistakes to throw man with his moral-political qualities out of the picture. No matter how hard the ideologists of imperialism try to belittle man's capabilities, actual reality is against them.

The overwhelming majority of military ideologists of imperialism and the generals and officers of capitalist armies will finally be forced to admit this truth. For example, the U.S. Army field regulations state that "man as before is the basic tool of war." Therefore, the military propaganda apparatus of the bourgeoisie tries with all its might to invent "recipes" for shoring up the wobbly moral-political spirit of its soldiers.

Emphasis is placed on ideological cultivation of personnel and on propaganda measures. Numerous forms and methods of influence are used by the officers on subordinates—attempts to somehow conceal class distinctions between officers and soldiers, to camouflage the truth that the officer of a capitalist army is the servant of monopolies, and the bourgeois army itself is the tool of imperialists which they use against their own people and to carry out a policy of aggression with regard to other countries.

It stands to reason that in order to steer personnel of armies of capitalist states in the direction needed by the imperialists and to deceive the people, not only the military, but also the entire propaganda apparatus of the bourgeoisie is set in motion. The focus of bourgeois propaganda is shameless anticommunism, the spreading of lies and slander about the Soviet Union and other socialist states and their armies, and all possible embellishment and praise of the capitalist system and private-property ideology. "Imperialist bourgeoisie maintains power over the peoples of their countries not only through violence, but also through deceit. They resort on an ever broader scale to ideological means of enslaving the masses. They turn to 'total' ideological mobilization of all reactionary forces under the flag of anticommunism and anti-Sovietism."³

However, no matter how the ideologists of imperialism attempt to hide from the people and their armies the real essence of wars, no matter what slander about socialism they disseminate, the truth will get out and forge a path for itself. And while they still have succeeded in forcing their armies to do black deeds through lies, bribes and coercion, this will last only until the first serious test. History has shown irrefutably that capitalist armies are strong so long as they operate against a weak enemy and unarmed populace, but they quickly lose faith in themselves when they encounter an equal or stronger enemy. And they begin to suffer defeat when high moral and psychological exertion is required in a war against such an enemy.

The fascist German army was no exception in this regard. Its moral stability was broken by the powerful blows of the Soviet troops. While in the first period of the Great Patriotic War the Hitlerites displayed high combat effectiveness, were intoxicated by their easy victories in the West and underestimated the might of the Red Army, after the Battles of Moscow, Stalingrad, and the Kursk Bulge and on other sectors of the front their moral stability began to plunge abruptly and they began to surrender more and more often with the words "Hitler kaput."

Thus, there is an unprecedented rise in the role of the morale factor in modern warfare. This presents greater requirements for moral-political

³ *K 100-letiyu so dnya rozhdeniya Vladimira Il'icha Lenina. Tezisy TsK KPSS* (In honor of the Centennial of the Birth of Vladimir Il'ich Lenin: CPSU CC Theses). Moscow, Politizdat, 1970, p. 53.

and psychological training of Soviet soldiers. The Communist Party devotes constant and unremitting attention to this problem. It directs the efforts of command cadres, political organs and Party organizations, and all Party members of the Armed Forces toward successful resolution of tasks of educating aware, courageous, and skillful defenders of the achievements of socialism. There is no doubt that if imperialist reaction should impose a new war on us, the Soviet Armed Forces would display high moral stability in defense of the socialist Motherland and would write vivid new pages in the annals of our glorious victories.

2. Instilling High Moral-Political and Psychological Qualities in Personnel

The determining factors of our social life include the formation of a new historical community of people in the USSR—the Soviet people, development of harmonious relations among classes, social groups, nations and nationalities, a strengthening of friendship of the peoples of the USSR, growth of political awareness and culture in workers, and the Party's further increase in its leading role in the building of communism. These factors have a decisive effect also on Soviet military development and the steady improvement of the Armed Forces.

The Soviet Armed Forces embody the best features of the Soviet people—their unity and moral-political solidarity, socialist patriotism and internationalism. They are characterized by a high ideological spirit among their personnel and the latter's utter devotion to the Communist Party and the people.

A firm moral-political conditioning, military expertise and physical endurance—qualities needed for winning a victory over a strong enemy—do not come of themselves. Their development is achieved by the entire system of combat and political training, party-political work and military upbringing and by the entire tenor of Armed Forces life. It comprises a most important task in the moral-political, psychological and combat training of personnel in units and on ships.

The goal of moral-political training is to develop in soldiers a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, communist ideals, convictions and moral principles of behavior. It is aimed at arming personnel with a communist ideology and a profound understanding of the policies of Party and government, of the USSR's state interests, and of the essence and character of war in defense of the socialist Homeland.

Psychological training ensures the development in soldiers of courage, an inner readiness for exploits, even including self-sacrifice, resourcefulness, stability of positive psychological reactions, and other qualities extremely necessary in combat.

The role of psychological preparation now has grown immeasurably,

especially in connection with the possibility of the employment of nuclear weapons. Nuclear and other modern weapons are capable of affecting the psyche of personnel in an unprecedented manner, and will aggravate their emotional impressions and experiences.

Moral-political and psychological conditioning helps a soldier overcome all obstacles and adversities on the way to a goal. And to the contrary, a person who does not have profound ideological convictions or a firm will, will not be able to withstand the hardships or to overcome them resolutely. In moments of failures and danger he is inclined to have his spirits drop and be subject to feelings of panic.

Moral-political and psychological training are also inseparably linked with each other and with combat training, which is called upon—simultaneously with training personnel in military skill—to instill and develop in them courage, a sense of comradeship and collectivism, a readiness for mutual assistance and a helping hand, and other qualities of high combat efficiency and morale. The character, will, and endurance of soldiers grow strong in the process of exercises and maneuvers. At the same time, there is a serious test of readiness to withstand great physical and moral stress arising in a complex combat situation, the ability to preserve combat effectiveness over a prolonged period, not to lose self-control and endurance, to assist their comrades, and concentrate all their spiritual forces for the performance of combat missions.

Communist moral fiber and awareness is the foundation of high moral-political, psychological and combat qualities and the chief motivating force which gives soldiers courage and bravery and leads them to do exploits and to perform mass heroism in the name of defense of the Soviet Motherland. V. I. Lenin said that "conviction as to the just nature of a war and awareness of the need to sacrifice one's life for the good of one's brothers elevates the spirit of soldiers and forces them to endure unheard-of burdens. . . .

"This perception by the masses of the goals and causes of war has enormous importance and ensures victory."⁴

It is evident from this that only the soldier who can rapidly overcome the influence within himself of negative factors under any conditions of the situation, and in whom the conscious elements of moral forces and a sense of duty and responsibility for the success of the common cause always take the upper hand, can be considered prepared for combat in the moral-political and psychological sense. Inherent in such a person is a firm spiritual stability and a constant readiness to endure the most severe tests of contemporary warfare and retain a will to win.

Soviet patriotism and a sense of international duty are the most important elements characterizing the moral-political condition of per-

⁴ V. I. Lenin, XLI, 121.

sonnel. They are instilled in the Soviet people and soldiers of the Armed Forces by the entire tenor of our social life and the entire system of upbringing. Ideological work has a special place in this system.

A high political awareness and profound conviction in the justness of ideas of Marxism-Leninism serve as the basis for the patriotism of a Soviet citizen. Patriotism is manifested in such moral-political and combat qualities as dedication to the Soviet Motherland and the cause of the Communist Party, a sense of national and military pride, steadfastness, bravery, valor, discipline and irreconcilability toward enemies of socialism. Soviet patriotism is a source of high vigilance of soldiers who perceive their personal responsibility for the fate of the Motherland.

Soviet patriotism is connected inseparably with socialist internationalism. It organically combines the unity of national and international, which has become an inalienable feature of our society's ideology. The CPSU Program states that "the Party will tirelessly bring Soviet citizens up in a spirit of proletarian internationalism and aid in every way possible the strengthening of international solidarity of workers. In developing the Soviet people's love for their Homeland, the Party proceeds from the fact that with the formation of a world system of socialism, the patriotism of citizens of a socialist society is embodied in their devotion and allegiance to their Motherland and to the entire community of socialist countries. Socialist patriotism and socialist internationalism organically include proletarian solidarity with the working class and toilers of all countries."⁵

In the years of Soviet power a new type of soldier has developed in our country—that of a patriot and internationalist, raised in a communist spirit and utterly devoted to the people, the Party and the Motherland. The high political awareness of Soviet soldiers and sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's, ensigns and warrants, officers, generals and admirals, their clear understanding of the noble mission to defend the socialist Homeland, and the feeling of the soldier that he is a full-fledged citizen of the state serve as an inexhaustible source of the invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces. Socialist patriotism and internationalism is the force which makes our people and their soldiers steadfast, courageous and invincible in battles against enemies. The sense of patriotic and international duty inspires and mobilizes personnel of the Armed Forces to do heroic exploits for the sake of defending the socialist Motherland and the entire socialist community and for the sake of a victory of communism.

The moral-political training of Soviet soldiers includes also the instilling in them of a **class hatred for the enemy**. The basis of this feeling is a profound understanding by Soviet citizens of the aggressive essence of imperialism and perception of the class purpose of bourgeois armies and their role in carrying out the reactionary policy of imperialism. But class

⁵ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, p. 120.

hatred for the enemy is not hatred for the peoples of bourgeois countries. The Soviet Army always has acted as a liberating army bearing freedom to peoples of the world. It hated and destroyed the fascist invaders, not for their allegiance to the German nation, but because they invaded our country to enslave it, because they committed brutalities, pillaging and violence against a peaceful population and Soviet prisoners of war and because they brought innumerable disasters and suffering to the Soviet people. And finally, the Soviet Army destroyed them only in those cases when they refused to lay down their arms. It is appropriate here to recall the old popular saying: "One doesn't beat the wolf because he is gray, but because he ate the sheep."

In spite of the fact that Hitler's army brought incalculable disaster and deprivation to our country, the Soviet Armed Forces displayed a humane, peace-loving attitude toward the German people.

Discipline and organization serve as one of the indicators of the level of moral-political training of personnel. Under present conditions their significance as the most important factor of combat readiness of troops is extremely great. They play an even greater role in war, where swiftness, precision and timeliness of performing orders and instructions assume decisive importance.

Developing firm military discipline and instilling faultless behavior and a persistent habit of always behaving in accordance with laws, the oath, regulations and the orders of commanders are possible only on the basis of a high awareness by personnel and their profound communist conviction. The soldiers' legal upbringing and study of Soviet military legislation, the basis of which is the policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government on questions of military development and communist morality, play an important role in imposing and maintaining military order and organization and in the moral-political and psychological conditioning of soldiers.

In order to further strengthen military order, it is important to develop self-discipline in personnel, the ability to control their own actions, to display self-control and restraint, and to notice one's own mistake in time and eliminate it immediately. Self-discipline presumes a soldier's ability to make strict demands of himself, to evaluate his actions critically, and to profoundly perceive his personal responsibility for the success of accomplishment of tasks by the entire collective of the subunit, unit or warship.

Instilling a spirit of irreproachable discipline in personnel has greatest results when consideration is made of the growing role of the military collective—the squad, platoon, company and other subunits. Cooperation, close interdependence and mutual assistance of soldiers have become an obligatory element of military service. New weapons demand, on the

one hand, a high degree of responsibility and a sense of social duty of every soldier and sailor and, on the other hand, responsibility of the subunit for the behavior and actions of the individual soldier. This is one of the important circumstances which motivates the attempt to solidify military collectives on a fundamentally new, communist basis.

High military discipline is a guarantee of successes in the multifaceted activities of the Armed Forces. There is not and cannot be an army without discipline.

There is great significance for the strengthening of the soldiers' moral-political and psychological readiness to accomplish combat missions under conditions of modern war through their high personal combat and specialized training, knowledge of the combat attributes of the latest weapons, including nuclear weapons, the ability to master the means and methods of protection against such weapons, and an understanding of one's role in carrying out the common combat mission.

New types of weapons and combat equipment, increases in their destructive and contaminating force, and the heightened dynamic nature of combat operations increase many times over the physical burden on soldiers and the effects on their psyche. This requires an enormous strength of spirit, firmness of will and a capability not only to overcome fear and confusion, but to operate calmly and in an organized and purposeful manner. These qualities are instilled in personnel by the process of combat, political and psychological training.

In stressing the importance of all troop training and service in developing their moral steadfastness, ideological conviction, high combat training and firmness of will, one has to isolate specifically the educational opportunities of troop exercises, flights and ocean cruises which are as close as possible to an actual combat situation. In the course of these exercises a great moral stress and heavy burden are imposed on the psyche of the people. It is important to take full advantage of these opportunities.

The development of high moral-political and psychological qualities in personnel is a most important task of party-political work in the Armed Forces. The more active and purposeful such work is, the higher are the combat efficiency and morale of soldiers and the more successful is accomplishment of the missions of combat training in peacetime and assurance of victory in war.

3. Loyalty to Combat Traditions

In raising the moral-combat qualities of personnel and the strengthening of the monolithic quality of Armed Forces collectives, a major role is played by educating soldiers in the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Though combat traditions are common to all armies, they play different roles. Some of them are of a revolutionary or progressive nature, while others, on the contrary, are distinguished by their reactionary or conservative features. This is explained by the fact that specific features and the substance of military traditions are determined primarily by the social system of a state, the political and economic relations between people, and the purpose for which the armed forces are intended. Thus, just as the two worlds—the socialist and the capitalist—are opposites, so are the traditions engendered by them.

A capitalist society, torn by antagonistic contradictions, does not have and cannot have any common convictions and standards. Each class has its own viewpoints and customs. "Each social stratum," wrote V. I. Lenin in June 1914, "has its own 'way of life,' its own habits, and its own preferences."⁶ However, the bourgeoisie, using the state and the propaganda apparatus, constantly speculates in the traditions of the working people, and adapts them to their own interests.

The socialist social system, established in our country under the leadership of the Communist Party, predetermined the advanced, progressive character of the combat traditions of the Soviet Armed Forces: their lofty and inspiring power, their nobleness and vitality, and their beneficial influence in educating soldiers to become true defenders of the achievements of the Great October. The sources of these traditions were the glorious **revolutionary, labor, and combat achievements of the Soviet people.**

V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party, by uplifting and leading the people in battle against czarist autocracy and capitalism, united the working masses and brought them up to be true fighters for a new life. This made it possible to build socialism successfully in our country and make it an example for other countries, despite having to repulse the most fierce resistance by the exploiting classes and acts of flagrant imperialist aggression, which sapped much of the Soviet State's men and equipment. And in all heroic achievements of the Soviet people, the communists were always in the forefront—fighters in the Leninist guard. To be like them, to be like the great Lenin, and to be like all fighters who have dedicated their lives to the cause of freedom for the working people and to the victory of socialism and communism, became the foremost, inviolable commandment of the Soviet people and their fighting men.

Boundless loyalty to the socialist Homeland, unswerving steadfastness and constant preparedness to fight fearlessly for the triumph of communist ideas, faithfulness to the all-conquering education of Marxism-Leninism and to the principle of proletarian internationalism, selflessness and mass heroism, and a deep hatred for class enemies, imperialist

⁶ V. I. Lenin, XXV, 342.

exploiters and aggressors comprise our priceless revolutionary heritage, a powerful source of Soviet combat traditions.

The labor exploits of the people hold an important place in forming combat traditions of the Armed Forces. The Soviet people, having gained their freedom and having rid themselves of exploitation and oppression, are building the most progressive society on earth—communism—with great enthusiasm. The Great October, which ushered in an era of universal revolutionary rejuvenation of the world—an era of transition from capitalism to communism—has emancipated man's labor and has given full play to the infinite spiritual forces of the people. The indivisible unity of personal and public interests, which is typical of the citizen of a socialist state, serves as a strong stimulus for the growth of labor productivity, the rapid growth of the country's economy, and the constant improvement of the people's well-being. Labor in our country has become a matter of honor, valor, and heroism. "The awareness of the labor class of the fact they are working not for exploiters but for themselves, for their own society, engenders a working enthusiasm, innovation, creative initiative, and mass socialist competition. Socialism is the living creation of the working masses. The growth in activity of national masses in the building of a new life is the law of the era of socialism."⁷

The labor successes of the country inspire Armed Forces personnel to exemplary duty and the attainment of high marks in combat and political training. Soldiers and sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's, warrants and ensigns, officers, and generals and admirals, who vigilantly carry out their duty in defending the socialist achievements of the Soviet people, adopt good working habits, a creative attitude toward and love for work, self-sacrifice, and other qualities of the builders of the new society.

The heroic feats of the Soviet people in defending the socialist Fatherland from the encroachment of imperialist aggressors serve as a living source of combat traditions for the Armed Forces.

During the years of foreign intervention and the civil war, the soldiers of October did not know fear in fighting the enemy. They selflessly defended the Soviet State with a deep sense of revolutionary duty. Of greatest importance to them was to liberate the people from the yoke of capitalist exploitation. The feats of the Red Army soldiers and sailors have not dimmed even to this day nor have they lost their inspirational power. Even now, the heroic exploits of the 1st Cavalry Army, the 24th Samara-Ulianovsk Iron Division, the 25th Chapayev Division, and many other units which covered their battle flags with glory during the birth of the Soviet State are still fresh in the memories of the Soviet people.

⁷ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, p. 15.

The mass heroism of the Soviet people was especially brilliantly manifested during the years of the Great Patriotic War. Many facts convincingly attest to this. Seventeen armies, eighty corps, and hundreds of divisions, brigades, separate units and ships were awarded the honorary title of "Guard."* Some 11,000 awards of the Soviet Government were bestowed for collective exploits by formations, units and ships; 29 units and formations were awarded with five or more decorations each. Over 11,000 soldiers earned the elite title of "Hero of the Soviet Union"; more than seven million persons were decorated at the front for distinction in combat with orders and medals. Over 184,000 orders and medals were given to participants of the partisan movement; 234 partisans became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Over 204,000 awards of orders and medals were given to working people, kolkhoz workers and representatives of the intelligentsia for selfless work in the national economy during the war; 199 workers on the homefront received the title of Hero of Socialist Labor.

The unparalleled feat of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces dynamically underlined the words of V. I. Lenin to the effect that Russia is capable of producing not only a handful of heroes, but is able to turn out their heroes by the hundreds and thousands.⁸ The legacy of mass heroism is passed on from generation to generation, thus demonstrating with unusual force that the revolution and its defense is the common duty of all Soviet people.

The Soviet Armed Forces adopted and continue to adopt everything that was progressive in the prerevolutionary combat history of our people and in its centuries-old struggle against foreign aggressors. From soldiers and sailors of the Russian Armed Forces they inherited valor, courage and staunchness in battle, comradeship and friendship forged in battle, and unswerving devotion to the native land, and enriched all these qualities with a new, *revolutionary content*.

The combat traditions of our Armed Forces were formed and continue to evolve under the influence of the revolutionary, labor and combat achievements of the Soviet people and the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. These traditions are noble and progressive in content, effective and inspirational in an educational sense, and vital to the interests of all Soviet people and Armed Forces personnel. This is, first and foremost, an utter devotion to the great cause of communism and constant readiness to fight for it to the last drop of blood; it is an infinite love for the Communist Party, the socialist Motherland and the Soviet people; loyalty to the military oath and to duty; it is mass heroism. It is a love for one's unit or ship and loyalty to the Battle Standard and Flag. It is military camaraderie, respect for the commander, protection of the commander

*[The adjective "Guard" is added to the unit designation, e.g. the 10th Guard Division.—U.S. Ed.]

⁸ See V. I. Lenin, XLII, 4.

and one's comrade in battle; it is a constant striving toward mastery in the art of combat, mastery of combat and political knowledge, the strengthening of discipline, and an inexhaustible struggle to attain a high level of combat preparedness of the unit and ship. It has become traditional to exercise vigilance with respect to the intrigues and aggressive designs of imperialism, and irreconcilability toward enemies of the Soviet Motherland, the forces of imperialist reaction and aggression, the enemies of peace, progress, democracy, and socialism. At the same time, Soviet soldiers are taught to respect the sovereign rights of the peoples of other countries and to be loyal to proletarian internationalism.

A new and remarkable tradition of the Soviet Armed Forces is the combat cooperation with the armies of other socialist states. This cooperation embodies a class and ideological unity of soldiers of fraternal armies, their high feeling of international duty, and a commonality of interests in defending the achievements of socialism against the encroachments of international reaction.

Our combat traditions, born in battle against enemies of the socialist revolution and multiplied by all heroic deeds of the Armed Forces, have become moral laws in the lives of Soviet soldiers and a powerful means of developing high political-moral and combat traits in them.

K. Marx, F. Engels and V. I. Lenin placed a great value on educating the young generation in the traditions of the people. In order to assure the destiny of the revolution and the working classes, they considered it very important that the older comrades transmit their experiences to the youth and that the latter constantly enrich them. V. I. Lenin urged them to follow the example of the revolutionaries who fought against autocracy and brought about the Great October Socialist Revolution—"to follow in their footsteps, to imitate their fearlessness and their heroism."⁹ Noting the wonderful achievements of preceding generations, he wrote: "... These exemplary combat experiences should serve as a guiding light in nurturing new generations of soldiers."¹⁰

The Communist Party, in following the great Lenin's legacy, devotes unremitting attention to the education of the Soviet people and Armed Forces personnel in the rich and progressive traditions of our socialist society, including combat traditions which form an integral part of these traditions. It sees in this one of the more effective ways of increasing the unswerving awareness of the builders of communism and the training of defenders of the Motherland who are selflessly devoted to the Party and the people.

Soldiers are inculcated with combat traditions throughout their entire military service—during training and exercises on land, sea and in the

⁹ V. I. Lenin, XXXVII, 172.

¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, XVII, 50.

air, in classrooms, on firing ranges and tank training areas, and in everyday life. Personnel are imbued with a high political awareness, courage and selflessness, a thorough knowledge of their profession, and combat expertise.

In teaching youth about combat traditions, great importance is placed on retracing the paths of courage and visiting the places of combat glory, and meeting with veterans and heroes of war and labor. In their memories and tales of the Great Patriotic War come alive the heroic frontline exploits of infantrymen and tankmen, pilots and seamen, artillerymen and engineers, signalmen and scouts, the behind-the-lines exploits of partisans and underground members, and the achievements of steel mill and oil field workers, builders, and kolkhoz workers who made weapons and grew wheat for the front.

Indoctrinating soldiers through the propagandizing of combat traditions involves not only recalling the heroics of past years and the brilliant display of valor and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people at the front and in rear areas, but also involves a revelation of the living ties of the present generation with past generations and its moral responsibility for preserving its historical heritage. The most important task of youth is to preserve and add to what has been attained in the past and to retain from it as much as possible that which is most valuable and useful.

The inspiring power of traditions increases if they are constantly enriched by contemporary exploits of the Soviet people and Armed Forces personnel. Due to this, traditions respond to the spirit of the times and to the circumstances under which soldiers serve. Each Armed Forces collective, and branch and service of the Armed Forces introduces its own distinctive characteristic features into combat traditions—features that are engendered by the specific character of their combat record and assigned missions. There are many units, ships and formations in our Armed Forces whose history is distinguished by heroic deeds during the war years and glorious successes during peacetime. And even those units which were formed after the war have already acquired their own traditions in the course of training and the performance of combat alert duty.

In educating Soviet soldiers, it is very important for each of them, upon joining a regiment or ship, to find out all about its combat record, heroes, combat awards, and all its victories in war and achievements in peacetime training, so that he will be proud of his regiment, ship or formation and will always uphold its honor. Knowing the history of one's regiment, ship or formation raises personnel morale even higher, instills pride for one's military collective, motivates one to serve in an exemplary manner, and to sacredly uphold devotion to the unit Combat Banner, the Ship's Flag and the Military Oath.

Maintaining combat traditions and increasing their educational role is

facilitated by the wide use of historically developed military rituals. The taking of the Military Oath in a ceremonial setting, the presentation of the Unit Banner, the raising of the Ship's Flag, the parading of the colors and changing of the guard, military parades, inspection parades and evening roll-calls have a strong influence on the psyche, way of thinking and the feelings of the men. And this means a great deal. "... Without 'human emotions,'" emphasized V. I. Lenin, "there never has been, is not and never can be a human **search** for truth."¹¹

Experiencing a great emotional uplift, personnel more acutely sense their lofty responsibilities as defenders of the socialist Motherland and the need to perform heroic deeds and enhance the glory of their unit or ship, and in the final analysis, of all of our Armed Forces. Lofty patriotic feelings, evoked at celebrations and during discussions in front of unit and ship combat record charts, in unit trophy rooms, in museums and before heroes' monuments, during evening meetings with veterans of war and labor, are strengthened and actively contribute to developing communist convictions and standards of conduct in soldiers.

New traditions appear and old ones are reinforced in the course of everyday military life. The aspiration to be like a frontline soldier in every respect, to learn courage and combat skills from them, and to be worthy of the bright memory of heroes who fell in battle against imperialist aggressors creates experts in military specialties, rated specialists, and those who excel in studies, as well as outstanding subunits, units and ships. Many of them bear this esteemed title several years in a row, and strive to attain consistently high marks both in training and service. It is the duty of all commanders, political workers and Party and Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces to constantly develop and strengthen such traditions.

A proper utilization of combat traditions in training and education of soldiers facilitates the attainment of organic unity, the fusion of high moral-political, combat and physical qualities of personnel, and the successful training of skilled and courageous defenders of socialism.

The Soviet Armed Forces are developing on the basis of a revolutionary continuity of generations. Our remarkable youth—the sons and grandsons of those who selflessly fought in battles for the Motherland, who spared no effort in forging victory during the war years on the labor front—this youth earnestly adopts the experience of their predecessors, adds to it, and continues their work with honor. The glorious combat traditions of the Armed Forces call upon the Soviet soldiers to fulfill their obligations better today than yesterday, better tomorrow than today, to unceasingly create that which is new, and to enrich that which has already been achieved.

¹¹ V. I. Lenin, XXV, 112.

Chapter 7. Officer Cadres of the Armed Forces

The victories and combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces largely are determined by the high qualities of officer cadres. One cannot build and develop an army without having a sufficient number of commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians who are trained in the appropriate manner. This is a completely obvious truth. The officers are the basis and skeleton of the Armed Forces. The combat readiness and effectiveness of units and warships depend to a decisive degree on the level of their training and moral-political and job qualities. Therefore, the Communist Party devotes the most fixed attention to the training and education of officer cadres.

1. Soviet Officers—True Servants of the People

It is a great honor to be a Soviet officer. His duties are great and responsible. His noble labor is important and necessary. The Communist Party, the Soviet Government and all our people value this labor highly. The Soviet citizens regard the officers with deep gratitude and respect for their selfless performance of military duties.

Soviet officers are a reliable bulwark of the Party and government in the Armed Forces. They are bearers of the army's class, revolutionary and military spirit and its combat traditions. They are a most valuable asset of the Armed Forces. The Party and government exert their influence on all aspects of the life and work of troops through military councils, commanders, political organs and Party organizations, through the entire officer corps. The officers instil in personnel a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and of devotion to the ideas of communism. They infuse love for military affairs, teach the art of mastering complicated military equipment and tactical techniques of waging combat, develop in soldiers high combat efficiency and morale, shape a conscientious discipline and maintain strict order and efficiency in sub-units, units and on warships. The entire meaning of the official work of commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians of the Armed Forces in the final account is to constantly strengthen the combat might of the Armed Forces and increase their combat readiness.

Created by the Communist Party under the leadership of V. I. Lenin, the Soviet officer corps honorably withstood difficult tests in the fight against imperialist aggressors throughout the entire history of the USSR, displaying unshakeable allegiance to the ideals of communism, their people and the socialist Homeland.

Under difficult conditions of establishing the Land of Soviets and during the course of the struggle against interventionists and White Guards, the Communist Party built the Red Army and at the very same time trained command and political cadres for it. Performance of this task was complicated by the fact that the young Soviet State simultaneously had to take up the problem of training, educating, selecting and assigning numerous cadres for the Party, Soviet and economic apparatus, and it was necessary to resolve all these very important questions immediately, in extremely limited periods of time. Noting the exceptional importance of the matter of personnel training, V. I. Lenin wrote: "Success of the Russian and world socialist revolution depends on the energy with which working people take on control of the state and command of the army of working people and those exploited, who are fighting to overthrow the yoke of capital."¹

V. I. Lenin taught that, with the appropriate training, cadres are the decisive force of the Party and state in building socialism and strengthening the defenses of the Soviet Land. If there are no working people who are qualified and dedicated to the cause, then no policy, even the most correct one, and not even the very best decisions, will have the necessary influence on performance of the assigned tasks. Success in any sphere of activity depends primarily on the capability and know-how of leading cadres to bring the program worked out by the Party to the broad masses and organize them for practical accomplishment of the Party's policy.

These Leninist principles on the decisive role of leading cadres also relate entirely to the officers of the Armed Forces. They have been confirmed by the entire experience of the Soviet military development.

Our officer cadres grew up and improved together with development of the Armed Forces. Questions of the training of command, political and engineer-technical cadres, the procedures for their performance of military service, and their duties, rights, privileges and material support were determined depending on the concrete historical conditions, the status of the Armed Forces, their technical equipping, organizational structure, and qualitative characteristics of personnel. One might say that the history of the Soviet Armed Forces is at the same time the history of a constant qualitative improvement, of maturation and of ideological and combat conditioning of their officer corps. The combat experience of both large and small units of the Red Army grew strong and accumu-

¹ V. I. Lenin, XXXVII, 88.

lated in the fire of fierce class battles against White Guards armies and troops of interventionists, and together with it grew the combat experience of the Red officers who had just been placed at the head of these units by the Party. A majority of these officers had no military education. For them the battlefields were simultaneously a basic military school and a higher level academy.

Often one could encounter among the commanders of battalions regiments and even divisions young people 20–25 years old. Some commanders of armies and even fronts were just a bit older. The lack of command experience was compensated in junior Red officers by a fervent devotion to the cause of the revolution, by personal courage and selflessness in combat, and by the active support given their actions by the rank-and-file of the Red Army and Red Navy.

Assigned to command positions in the first days of development of the Armed Forces, were Party workers and progressive workers who had received specific experience in military combat work in the ranks of the Red Guards, as well as an insignificant number of military cadres—Bolshevik officers—who were at the Party's disposal. Simultaneously revolutionary soldiers, sailors and noncommissioned officers were advanced to command positions. But this was insufficient for creation of a mass army. Mobilization of former noncommissioned officers, as well as the arrival of hundreds and thousands of progressive, patriotically inclined officers and generals of the old army, both individually on a voluntary basis and as a part of revolutionary units, could not satisfy the need for command cadres. An organized system was required for the training of new commanders from among representatives of working people and peasants. Appearing before pupils of military courses who were parade participants on 24 November 1918, V. I. Lenin said: "... The old commanders consisted primarily of spoiled and perverted sons of capitalists who had nothing in common with the common soldier. Therefore, in building a new army now, we have to take commanders only from the people. Only Red officers will have authority among the soldiers and will manage to strengthen socialism in our army. Such an army will be invincible."²

And so the Party chose this way of preparing officer cadres for the new army as being the only correct one. In December 1917, at V. I. Lenin's instructions, the First Moscow Revolutionary Machine Gun Command School was formed. Later, a broad network of courses and schools began to be developed in different cities of Russia for training commanders and political workers for the Armed Forces. A military school for naval command personnel was established in Petrograd in 1919. The requirements for being accepted to courses and military schools, sent out to local Party organizations by the Party CC, stressed that "only working

² V. I. Lenin, XXXVII, 200.

people and toiling peasants dedicated to Soviet power can become Red officers: it is their power, their Red Army and their Red officers."³

Military academies began to be created anew or to be reorganized. The first Soviet higher military educational institution was the General Staff Academy, now the Frunze Military Academy. Right after this the Artillery, Military Engineer, Naval, Military Medical and Military Logistics academies began training command cadres.

Along with the development of a network of military schools in the rear, training courses for command cadres were organized at front, army and division levels.

The students of military schools created by the Party did a great deal to win victory over troops of the interventionists and internal counter-revolution. They also contributed much to subsequent development of the Soviet Armed Forces.

In accomplishing the task of training military cadres from among working people and peasants, the Party also made use of the experience of military specialists of the old army. Many of them were called into the Red Army on V. I. Lenin's initiative. This step proved itself. Speaking in November 1919 at the First All-Russian Conference on Party Work in the Village, V. I. Lenin said: "You have heard about a number of brilliant victories of the Red Army. Tens of thousands of old officers and colonels serve in it. If we hadn't taken them into service and forced them to serve us, we couldn't have created an army."⁴

The great number of military specialists of the old army called into the ranks of the Red Army honestly served the working people's and peasants' republic. The military commissars deserve great credit for bringing them to the side of Soviet power. Being constantly alongside the military specialists, the commissars helped them comprehend the events taking place, overcome vacillation and find their place in the people's fight for social liberation.

Thus, taking advantage of all opportunities—mobilization of Party officials into the Red Army, advancement of progressive working people and revolutionary soldiers, sailors and noncommissioned officers to command positions, training representatives of working people at command and political military-educational institutions, and bringing in officers and generals of the old army—the Party resolved in a short time, under difficult conditions of foreign intervention and civil war, the problem of preparing military cadres of a new, socialist type. The Communist Party showed in deed that there is hidden in the people an inexhaustible source of military talent capable of leading the army of victorious working

³ *TsPA IML pri CC CPSU* (Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CPSU CC), fond 17, opis' 6, yedinita khranilishcha 106, list 76.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, *XXXIX*, 313.

people and peasants and successfully handling tasks of the armed defense of the socialist Motherland. From their number there developed and were tempered commanders and political workers, many of whom became prominent commanders and generals and remarkable organizers of party-political work in troop units. The names of our first generals are widely known: M. V. Frunze, S. M. Budennyi, K. Ye. Voroshilov, V. K. Blyukher, S. S. Vostretsov, P. Ye. Dybenko, A. I. Yegorov, S. K. Timoshenko, M. N. Tukhachevskiy, I. P. Uborevich, Ya. F. Fabritsius, I. F. Fed'ko, I. E. Yakir. Our people carefully safeguard the memory of the legendary heroes of the Civil War: V. I. Chapayev, G. I. Kotovskiy, N. A. Shchors, A. Ya. Parkhomenko, S. G. Lazo and others.

The new command and political cadres of the Red Army were characterized by a high revolutionary enthusiasm, utter devotion to communism, an inherent military talent, daring, selflessness and firmness in achieving a goal, closeness to the common soldiers and similar interests with them. These traits of commanders and political workers of the Civil War period received further development in the interwar years and during the Great Patriotic War. They characterize the moral make-up and combat efficiency of today's Soviet officer as well.

After the victorious conclusion of the Civil War, training of cadres for the Armed Forces as before remained a subject of special concern of the Communist Party and its Central Committee. This question was debated at the 10th and 11th RKP(b) Congresses and at many CC Plenums and Politburo sessions. A number of decrees of the Party Central Committee and Soviet Government were issued concerning expansion of the network of military educational institutions, improvement of the system of training command cadres, increasing the Party and worker layer among such cadres, improving their Marxist-Leninist education, and military and special training, and on other questions.

The system of military schools was reorganized on the basis of these decrees. Command courses with an abbreviated period of education were eliminated. In place of them a single military school was introduced for training middle level army commanders. In the navy the number of naval schools was increasing. Training plans and curricula were refined and the instructional staff of military schools was reinforced. Various advanced courses were established for increasing the skills of military cadres. Political instructors were trained from among platoon commanders who had finished military schools. The commanders and supervisors received a higher military and military-specialized education in military academies. Political workers of the senior and highest levels began to be trained in the Military Political Academy, which was founded in 1925.

All this allowed for a considerable improvement in military and political training of command cadres of the Armed Forces, as well as improvement in their social composition. By 1928, 72 percent of them

were working people and peasants and around 53 percent Party and Komsomol members. Over 90 percent of the commanders had a specialized military education.

In the thirties, in connection with aggravation of the international situation and a growth of the threat of military attack by imperialists against our country, the Party was forced to set its course toward increasing the size of the Armed Forces, especially the armored troops, artillery and aviation, and toward technical reequipping of the Armed Forces. This advanced more complex tasks of training military cadres. We needed commanders and political workers who possessed a profound knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, who were well trained in the military and technical sense, and who were capable of skillfully training and educating personnel under new conditions.

In accordance with the more complex requirements, the military academies were reorganized, the network of secondary military schools was expanded, and there was an increase in the number of advanced courses and courses for retraining command supervisory personnel.

Military colleges with a 2-3 year period of instruction were formed on the base of the previous military schools. The Military Academy of Mechanization and Motorization, Military Electrotechnical Academy, Military Chemical Academy, and others were set up for the purpose of improving the training of command and engineer-technical cadres with a higher education. By 1939 there were 14 military academies and 109 military colleges and other schools in the country.

The Soviet Government's decision to introduce personal military rating for commanders and supervisors had great importance for further strengthening the Armed Forces. The military profession was becoming a life-long career for him. Therefore, military ratings were called upon to reflect the level of skill of the commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians, and to more precisely determine the prospect for their growth. This raised the authority of the commanders and supervisors, facilitated their consolidation in cadres and provided new stimuli for improving their knowledge and the entire system of training and education of military cadres. Military ratings were given to all commanders and supervisors in 1936.

With the onset of World War II, which had come right up to the borders of our Motherland, the Party undertook new steps to train military cadres. The network of military educational establishments was extended, the number of cadets and students was increased, and the forms and methods of their training and education was improved.

In 1941 we already had 203 military schools which were training around 240,000 students. In addition, military cadres were being prepared in 19 military academies, in 10 military departments of civilian

institutions of higher education and in 7 higher naval war colleges. This was of exceptionally great importance for strengthening the country's defenses and increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

By the beginning of the Great Patriotic War, the Armed Forces had been provided with commanders, political workers and technical specialists with high moral-political and combat qualities who were utterly devoted to the socialist Motherland.

The Great Patriotic War became a severe test of Soviet officer cadres. Under the very difficult conditions of the initial period of the war, the commanders and supervisors displayed selfless courage, heroism and selflessness, an inflexible will to win and an ability to command troops in a difficult situation in carrying out the leadership of troop combat operations to repulse the attack of superior forces of the fascist aggressors.

Soviet officers showed even higher combat efficiency and morale and military expertise in subsequent offensive operations. As they gained combat experience, they led the troops more and more confidently and firmly, their decisions became more mature and sophisticated, and they used great art in conducting operations which in a number of cases ended with the encirclement and defeat of major enemy groupings.

In the course of the war the Party continued the enormous work of preparing military cadres: training, educating and assigning. It sent its best forces into the Armed Forces. The number of military schools was increased in a limited amount of time. The entire system of education was revised, curricula changed, and numbers of disciplines and educational periods revised in conformity with the requirements of wartime.

In addition to the Armed Forces schools, the training of commanders and political personnel of the middle level took place right at fronts, armies and districts, where short-term courses for junior lieutenants and junior political instructors and advanced courses for supervisors were conducted. Military-political schools were set up in a number of fronts. The officer's rank was awarded under battlefield conditions to the most trained sergeants and enlisted men who had displayed heroism and an ability to command subunits in combat against the fascist invaders. By the war's end, many of them commanded units.

The training of command, political, and engineer-technical personnel of the most senior and highest echelon of the Armed Forces took place in academies and higher courses.

With the aim of increasing the authority of military cadres and their responsibility for performance of military duties for the Motherland, decrees of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated 24 July and 10 August 1943 introduced a new procedure for awarding military

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✓ ranks to servicemen of the Red Armed Forces. The command and supervisory personnel of the Armed Forces were now called officer personnel.

As a result of steps taken by the Party and government, the problem of military cadres was completely resolved. Toward the end of 1942 the Armed Forces no longer experienced an acute shortage of officer personnel. Moreover, as early as the fall of 1943 it became possible to begin shifting a portion of command, political and engineer personnel into the reserve and sending them into the national economy. The presence of an officer reserve also allowed us to increase the periods for training cadets and students in military schools and academies and to bring commanders, political workers and engineers with a great deal of combat experience into instructional work.

During the war years the Party reared and educated a brilliant galaxy of Soviet generals and outstanding commanders, and many thousands of skilled, courageous and brave officers. Their immortal exploits are too numerous to count. The people and Party highly esteemed the military expertise, bravery, heroism and selflessness of generals, admirals and officers. Hundreds of thousands of them were given orders and medals, and 6,437 were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

One of the decisive factors which led our people to the historic victory over fascist Germany and imperialist Japan consisted of high organizational abilities, political maturity, utter devotion to the socialist Motherland, and the diverse professional training of the Soviet officer corps.

The Great Patriotic War was a serious test of the correctness of the system of training and education adopted in the Soviet Armed Forces for command, political and engineer-technical cadres. The military schools, courses and academies successfully handled the missions assigned them.

During the war period military schools gave the Armed Forces around two million officers who honorably justified the trust of Party and people. They proved on the battlefields their total superiority over officers of Hitler's Wehrmacht.

Our officer corps came out of the war even more mature and with a very rich combat experience. Generals, admirals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces mastered to perfection the theory and practice of planning and conducting battles and operations of any scale. They showed high art in commanding subunits, units, warships, and major units in defensive and offensive actions while pursuing the enemy or destroying his surrounded groupings, and in conducting maneuvers or assaults on major water barriers. They set an example and used fiery words in any type of combat operations to motivate personnel for the performance of assigned missions, and they led the men confidently into battle.

Everything of value from the combat experience gained by the officers

in the Great Patriotic War has become the property of subsequent generations of officers and is being used widely in their training in postwar years.

The enormous work put in by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party on the matter of creating officer cadres of a new type of army and their daily concern for rearing ideologically tempered commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians for the Armed Forces, well trained in the military and technical sense, had remarkable results.

An utter devotion to the cause of the proletarian revolution and the socialist Homeland, allegiance to their people and an ability to skillfully command troops in peacetime conditions and in a wartime situation were displayed by the Soviet officer corps throughout the full extent of its formation, development and improvement. These qualities comprise the main characteristic of our military cadres of today. The constant striving by officers to direct all their knowledge, experience and energy for further increasing the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and for strengthening the defense of our Motherland has won them the boundless trust, respect and love of the Soviet people.

2. Present-day Requirements on Officer Cadres and Their Training

The system of training military cadres established by the Communist Party continues to develop in the postwar period as well. A number of new senior command and military-political schools have been opened. There has been a considerable expansion in the network of military schools with an engineering-technical profile. This has made it possible to substantially increase the numbers and proportion of engineer-technical personnel in the Armed Forces. New training periods have been revised and defined in all military schools; specialties and specialization of graduates have been refined; and educational plans and curricula have been reworked. Uniform requirements have been established for billeting and supporting cadets. Conditions have been improved for staffing institutions of higher education with scientific-pedagogic cadres. Courses for increasing the skills of instructors have been organized at military academies. A considerable number of new and more improved textbooks and training aids have been developed and technical means of instruction have received wide application.

On the whole, the military schools are successfully accomplishing the tasks set before them, and are providing the Armed Forces with worthy replacements for commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians.

At the present time, the Soviet Armed Forces have available politically mature officer cadres who are dedicated to the cause of the Party and to the people, trained in the military and technical sense and are capable

of confidently performing the complex and responsible duties placed on them. They skillfully lead major units, units and subunits, and train and educate subordinates. It is noteworthy that around 90 percent of the officers of the Armed Forces are Party and Komsomol members, and nearly 100 percent of the positions from brigade commanders and higher and more than 90 percent of the positions of regimental commanders and 100 percent of the positions of ship commanders of the 1st and 2nd ranks are filled with officers having a higher military education. On the whole, around half of the officers have a higher military or a specialized military education.

Cadres of command personnel possess rich experience and are well prepared in the operational-tactical sense. It is also characteristic that the officer corps has become noticeably younger. Many officers who were born after the end of the Great Patriotic War now command companies, batteries, squadrons, battalions, artillery battalions or warships.

Officers of the Soviet Armed Forces are worthy representatives of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the intelligentsia. They have a good understanding of the enormous importance of the job entrusted to them by the Motherland, the Party and the government, and they are honorably performing their military and civilian duties. Our commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians are not satisfied with what has been achieved. They understand that military theory and practice do not stand still, but constantly develop, become more complex and present increasingly new and higher demands on officer cadres. Modern warfare is warfare with the employment of complex combat equipment, a war of maneuverable and dynamic combat operations which create great stress and become the greatest moral test for all personnel of the warring sides.

If imperialist reaction should unleash such a war, it will see the use of the enormous military and economic might of the opposing states and the employment of diverse types of weaponry which are known or may be developed in the future. Operations and battles will be characterized by abrupt shifts from one form of operation to another, by large spatial scope, frequent changes in the situation, a rapid build-up of crisis situations, and a need to accomplish missions which suddenly arise. There will be increased importance in the time factor and control of troops will be more complicated. It is clear that all this cannot help but be considered in training military cadres.

The Soviet officer is primarily a Soviet leader and Soviet specialist. Therefore, the entire process of training military cadres is aimed at developing in them qualities which meet to the full extent the overall requirements of the Party for executive cadres of the Soviet State.

At the All-Union Rally of Students in October 1971, L. I. Brezhnev

gave a vivid characterization of the qualities needed by a Soviet specialist: "The Soviet specialist of today is a person who has mastered well the principles of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, who clearly sees the political goals of Party and country, who has a broad scientific and practical training and who has mastered his specialty to perfection."

"The Soviet specialist of today is a skilled organizer capable of employing in practice the principles of scientific organization of labor. He is able to work with people, esteems collective experience, heeds the opinion of his comrades, and critically evaluates what has been achieved."

"And, of course, the modern specialist is a person of high culture and broad erudition. In general, he is a real intellectual of a new, socialist society." ⁵

The Soviet officer also should without question possess all these qualities. Military service, however, is a special service. It is strictly regulated, involves great responsibility and risk, and presents officer cadres with many specific requirements. On the whole, the general and specific requirements of an officer can be reduced to the following basic provisions:

Above all, it is **communist conviction and utter dedication to the Party and people**. The Soviet officer is an active conductor of Party policy. He is called upon to disseminate its ideas among the ranks, to conduct political work tirelessly, to present regular talks and reports, and conduct political classes resourcefully and meaningfully. He must be a model of honest and conscientious service to the Motherland. He must always preserve allegiance to his military obligation and be ready at any moment to give all his energy, forces and, if necessary, his life for the cause of the Party.

The second requirement is **high discipline and execution**. Self-composure, a readiness and capability to carry out the order of a senior accurately and in a timely manner, honesty and truthfulness are those qualities without which a Soviet officer could not work at all in peacetime, let alone in wartime. A properly disciplined person is able to summon his willpower, display daring and persistence, and act under any difficult conditions so as to bring the battle to an end, to victory.

The third requirement is **initiative and independence**. These qualities are obligatory for any military person, especially an officer. Any battle invariably demands independent actions and decisions of him. Without initiative victory cannot be achieved. This, however, presumes a readiness to take a justified risk and display high courage—more than simply bravery.

Initiative and independence produce maximum success when they are intelligently combined on the basis of high awareness and responsibility,

⁵ L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskii kursom. Rech i stat'i* (By Lenin's Course: Speeches and Articles), Vol. 3. Moscow, Politizdat, 1972, p. 429.

job knowledge, and a creative attitude toward the job. An officer's independence in resolving assigned missions is determined by the framework of rights and obligations given him, but there are no bounds for intelligent initiative and energy in our Armed Forces.

The fourth requirement is a **commander's will and organizational abilities**. Under the complex conditions of war, firmness in decisions and actions, the ability of a commander or supervisor to organize and subordinate people to his will and direct them to perform a combat mission under difficult circumstances is of primary importance.

A strong will, a high degree of efficiency, businesslike attitude, and persistence in attaining a goal are also invariable components of an officer's character. Cowardice, indecision and sluggishness are alien to him. Once an order is given, then a genuine combat commander will get it done no matter what. Neither difficulties or obstacles will shake the officer's will. Along with a firm will, a real commander has inherent high organizational abilities and the capability of correctly determining the goal of the actions and methods to attain it, of rationally assigning men and equipment, and thoroughly coordinating and thoroughly providing for the actions of the troops.

The fifth requirement is **high professional training and general and military-technical culture of officer cadres**. The profound changes taking place in military affairs, the high general educational level of youth being called into the Armed Forces and the need to master complex equipment and weapons in short time periods demand that every officer have a large reserve of general scientific, military and ideological-theoretical knowledge, that he firmly know the principles of conducting a battle or operation and the design and use of combat equipment and weapons, and that he be able to employ them intelligently. We have to develop in every possible way the operational-tactical thinking of officers and their ability to thoroughly analyze the situation and foresee the course of events, forecast the battle and work out measures in advance of possible changes in combat situations.

And the sixth requirement is the **ability to train and educate subordinates**. The Motherland entrusts the officer with that which is most dear and valuable in our country—people, the remarkable Soviet youth, which he is obliged to educate and train, and, in the severe time of war, to lead into battle. Therefore, instilling in officers the proper methods for working with people and training and educating them comprises one of the most important tasks. The officer will only successfully handle his diverse duties if he masters Marxist-Leninist methodology, has a firm knowledge of the principles and methods of political and military education and the principles of military pedagogy and psychology, approaches each subordinate skillfully with consideration for his personal features, organizes classes and exercises in a methodologically intelligent and in-

structive manner and conducts them on a high level in conformity with the requirements of military art. Such an officer is a genuine tutor of subordinates. He is wise and penetrating in his resolution of complex day-to-day questions. He is concerned and just, and at the same time a strict and exacting supervisor.

The ability to train and educate subordinates is also very important because the Armed Forces are training not simply military specialists, but above all morally and physically fit, courageous, aware people who are capable of carrying out their civilian and social obligations in any field of communist development. One can rely on those who have experience in military service both in peaceful creative labor and in the hour of military tests. In performing the mission of securing the safety of the USSR and thus creating the conditions for successful communist development in our country, the Armed Forces make their contribution to this great popular cause also by educating and training the youth and forming in them the qualities needed by a builder of communism.

Thus, an obligatory condition for successful activity by every Soviet officer is a combination of ideological conviction, a commander's will, high and intelligent exactingness toward oneself and subordinates, organizational abilities, overall culture, a well-developed operational-tactical thinking and military-technical outlook.

There exists only one path to the full possession of these qualities and to the preparedness for accomplishing the responsible and complex tasks of Armed Forces service—to firmly remember and sacredly fulfill V. I. Lenin's behest of learning military affairs in a real way. Learn always and everywhere: within the walls of military schools and in troop units, on firing ranges and tank ranges, in the expanses of the skies and on the oceans. Education does not end with the completion of a military school or academy or with the receipt of any diploma. Training accompanies an officer's entire period of service. In our time, when the constant and rapid process of development of weapons and combat equipment occurs along with changes in forms and methods of combat operations, the only type of officer able to keep in step with the times is one who persistently studies, constantly supplements his knowledge, and makes skillful use of it in his practical work. There is every opportunity for this among the troops.

The Party and government have raised high the role of the officer. They have entrusted him with the training and education of Soviet soldiers and given him the right to order subordinates, lead them into battle and send them to perform the most difficult and complex missions. And the personnel unquestioningly follow their officers with a high sense of awareness of their military obligation, ready if necessary to sacrifice their lives for the cause of the Party and people.

The right to give orders to people involves not only authority, but also great responsibility. To have authority is not by any means everything. It is important to be able to use it intelligently. And here an officer's exacting attitude—to himself above all—comes to the fore. Without a profoundly perceived sense of the responsibility placed on him, without a high degree of inner discipline and a critical attitude toward himself, and without constant self-control an officer cannot count on the fact that he will make a mature commander and a thoughtful and skilled educator of subordinates. In giving orders and instructions, an officer himself is always ready to carry out the orders of a senior commander.

An officer's high quality of military training allows the people to place a high degree of confidence in the army and its ability to reliably defend the socialist Motherland. But it is not enough just to know military affairs. The commander, political workers and technical specialist also are models of morality, moral purity, faultless discipline, self-discipline and refinement. Without setting a personal example, he essentially loses the moral right to high authority among subordinates. An officer's personal example serves as the chief weapon and most important condition for successful fulfillment of his obligations and for his influence on the military collective. Connected with this is one other aspect of the officers' diverse and complicated activity—the ability to properly form mutual relations with subordinates and strengthen the military collective by relying on Party and Komsomol organizations.

The essence of this aspect is to constantly combine a high exactingness and persistence in attaining an assigned goal with an attentiveness toward people, with concern for them, and with a comradely attitude toward subordinates. An officer enjoys a special respect if he is able to give a precise and clear order, achieve its absolute fulfillment and, when necessary, hear a subordinate out and take account of his opinion.

There are many very fine lines in working with people, and it is an officer's art as an instructor to always sense these bounds of propriety and in no instance permit exactingness to be substituted by coarseness or a comradely attitude by familiarity. Constant contact with subordinates permits an officer to thoroughly study their moods, influence soldiers' character development, and instill in personnel high patriotic motivations and a feeling of friendship and military comradeship.

There are no identical "recipes" in this matter for all situations in life. But there are general guidelines. One of them involves the spiritual kinship of the senior and junior, the supervisor and the subordinate.

Soviet soldiers and officers are people of the same ideology and thought. They are solidified in a single indestructible family by a Marxist-Leninist world outlook and a striving for a common goal—the victory of communism. A subject of special concern for every officer is the correct

mutual relationships of supervisors and subordinates prescribed in regulations and based on a political maturity and class unity, on a deep respect for each other and on a desire to perform one's military obligation to the Motherland as best he can.

A commander's position in itself does not guarantee that an officer will not make mistakes in his official duties, but it is important to catch omissions in time and have the courage to admit and correct them opportunely. This does not weaken a commander's authority in the slightest. There is nothing shameful in admitting one's mistakes. To the contrary, it attests to a person's high conscientiousness. Only a person who does nothing makes no mistakes. The main thing is to err as little as possible, but having made a mistake, to correct it in time.

Relationships between supervisors and subordinates in the Soviet Armed Forces are based on high principle and veracity. All cases of lies, deceit or eyewash and attempts to embellish the real state of affairs are resolutely condemned among the officers. Officer cadres are required to have a Bolshevik irreconcilability toward shortcomings and indifference, a strict Party responsibility for an assigned job, deep knowledge of the status of troops, an ability to react rapidly to a change in the situation and to make decisions efficiently, to be active among the troops, during exercises and training, firings and on firing ranges, to make a systematic check and analysis of what has been done, to immediately correct mistakes which are discovered, and to have an ability to look ahead.

The Armed Forces are steadily renewing their officer personnel through an influx of young men. Here one of V. I. Lenin's principles of selection and assignment of cadres, which the Party invariably uses as a guide, is expressed. The Report of the Central Committee to the 24th CPSU Congress states that "our personnel policy is aimed at advancing young, promising workers in addition to having regard for old cadres and making maximum use of their experience and knowledge. This is an obligatory condition for continuity of the Party's political course and its revolutionary traditions."⁶

This Party line is also being consistently conducted in the Armed Forces. In addition to using the experience and knowledge of officers of the older generation, especially those who passed the severe school of the Great Patriotic War, the Armed Forces constantly advance junior officers who have proven themselves in practical work, to higher positions. It stands to reason that youth in itself is not the chief criterion in evaluating an officer. His job and moral-political qualities, along with his professional training are the determining factors.

The replacement of generations, influx of young officers and release

⁶ *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p. 99.

of those who have reached the age limit comprise an immutable law of military life and of the development of the Armed Forces. Therefore, it is important that young commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians take in and master more rapidly the experience of the seniors, and, on the other hand, that officers of the older generation generously share their experience, have more frequent contact with the young officers and pass on to them their knowledge.

At first the young officer naturally encounters difficulties and things which are not clear in his performance of duty. This disturbs the officer. He seeks answers to them and sometimes cannot find them independently. He needs the help of his seniors. Here we must avoid the extremes: both a lack of control as well as petty tutelage are equally harmful. The process of combat training and the entire tenor of military service allow the creation of a situation that facilitates the manifestation of creative initiative in a young officer and requires him to make bold decisions and take independent action.

Initiative, boldness and independence in decision making and actions are developed throughout a person's entire conscious life. The military educational institutions, from whose walls emerge young lieutenants, play an important part in developing these most valuable qualities in future officers.

The decisions of the 24th and 25th CPSU Congresses and the decree adopted by the July 1973 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Eighth Convocation, defined the tasks for further improvements in the entire system of popular education in the country. Much attention has been given to scientific forecasting in personnel training. Increased requirements have been introduced in higher-level schools. This also fully applies to military schools. Moreover, the complex nature of duties performed by officer personnel sets particularly important tasks before military academies and schools. They are called upon to put out highly educated officers with good erudition, who have a good knowledge of and a love for military affairs.

Personnel training in military schools is established in accordance with the following fundamental orientation in the work of officers in the Armed Forces:

First of all, day-to-day work to maintain high combat readiness of units and ships and to organize the efficient and vigilant performance of combat alert duty.

Secondly, the purposeful military and ideological-political education of subordinates, supervision of combat and political training and Party-political work, and training personnel under conditions of systematic replacement of weapons, combat equipment, and constant development of military art.

Thirdly, constant improvement in one's own political, operational-tactical, military-technical and special knowledge and expansion of one's overall outlook and elevating one's cultural level, or, in other words, preparing oneself to accomplish today's tasks and those which will arise in case of war.

Marxist-Leninist education and the ideological-political conditioning of students and cadets is a firm foundation for all work of training officer cadres. This presumes the most qualified instruction in academies and schools of social sciences. Departments of social sciences are obliged to exert an influence on the ideological-political course of the entire educational process and of all work of training specialists in military schools.

The tasks of military schools in developing the professional qualities of a Soviet officer are expanding considerably and becoming more complex. A comprehensive study of mathematics, physics, chemistry and other general educational disciplines provides a basis for firm mastery of the military specialty. The basis of professional training of officer cadres consists of the requirements of our regulations and manuals, as well as concrete tasks which are assigned each year by orders in combat, political and operational training.

Deserving of special attention is the cultivation in cadets and students of habits of applying theoretical knowledge in practice, in performing their duties among troops, and above all in organizing for combat and controlling subunits, units, and ships. V. I. Lenin stated that "... no school or university is worth anything if one does not have practical knowledge."⁷

Military schools are responsible for the training of students and cadets to lead the combat and political training of the subunit, unit, and ship, and giving them *firm habits of methodical work and skillful conduct* of classes with subordinates. One of the important aspects is the formation and development in students and cadets of creative thinking, an independent approach to resolution of practical questions, and an aspiration and ability to supplement and refresh their knowledge. This can be achieved if the educational process constantly relies on the independent work of students and cadets.

The task which faces both military schools and the officer cadres which they train is to be constantly in step with life and with the requirements of military science and military art.

3. Officers' Closest Assistants

In talking about officers, one cannot help but mention their immediate assistants—the warrants and ensigns, as well as the junior commanders

⁷ V. I. Lenin, XLII, 17.

—sergeants and senior NCO's. They play an important role in the Armed Forces. This is the largest detachment of command cadres, which is closely connected with the everyday life, routine, and training of soldiers and sailors. The combat effectiveness and readiness, solidarity and state of training of any military subunit depend largely on the level of their training and organizational abilities.

Before 1972 the corps of junior command personnel was represented by soldiers on their first term or extended term of service: in the army by the sergeants and in the navy by the petty officers.

The institution of extended-term servicemen had performed a great deal of useful work over a long period of time. A considerable number of extended-term junior commanders, after acquiring a rich experience in training and educating soldiers, and having become genuine masters of their trade and having developed a love for military service, linked their fate with the Armed Forces for a long period of time. In the positions of first sergeants of subunits, deputy platoon commanders, crew commanders, chiefs of radio and radar stations and of receiving and transmitting centers, and other responsible posts, the extended-term junior commanders were skillful educators of subordinates and the bearers of up-to-date experience. They contributed all their expertise to ensure firm prescribed order and a high state of combat readiness and effectiveness of subunits. However, life set before them increasingly newer tasks, and with time their duties became more and more complex and required a high degree of culture, a broad political and military-technical outlook, and professional and methodological expertise. All this made it necessary to increase the term of service for this category of soldiers and to further improve their special training.

The tasks of training and educating personnel became especially complex in connection with a reduction in the length of active military service. It became necessary to prepare soldiers, sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's considerably more rapidly. It is true that the contingent of draftees had begun to change noticeably in recent years. Their general educational, cultural and technical level had increased. The development of a soldier, however, does not take place in a vacuum. It is the result of the persistent labor by commanders of all levels, including the junior command echelon. Moreover, each year military equipment and military service become more complex. Therefore, it is necessary to apply much effort now as well, so that the junior soldiers and sailors become real fighting men.

The first-term junior commanders perform important and useful work in training and educating soldiers and sailors, maintaining military discipline and order and keeping weapons and combat equipment in working order. These are sergeants and senior NCO's who have been well trained in the military sense and who have received a certain amount

of practice in units and on warships. They are successfully handling their obligations; however, the short term of their service in the Armed Forces does not permit them to acquire that experience and high professional expertise which are needed under contemporary conditions for a large number of the most responsible positions.

The interests of combat readiness of the Armed Forces demanded with increasing persistence that a qualitatively new category of command personnel be placed in certain positions occupied by junior commanders. These were to be people with high general educational and specialized training who possessed sound methodological skills, who had a good knowledge of modern complex combat equipment, and weapons, and who were ready to dedicate themselves to military service for a long period of time. It stands to reason that such command personnel had to be specially trained.

All this, then, predetermined the need for introducing the institution of ensigns and warrants in the Armed Forces in 1972 and creating a special system of schools for their initial training and subsequent periodic refresher courses. Thus, the warrants and ensigns comprise a new detachment of professional commanders which closely adjoin the officer corps.

Establishment of the institution of ensigns and warrants is a measure of great state importance, and one more vivid manifestation of the concern by the Communist Party and Soviet Government for further strengthening the cadres of the army and navy and increasing the defensive capability of our Motherland. This question was thoroughly examined by the CPSU CC, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers.

The ranks of "warrants" and "ensigns" had existed for a long while in the Russian army and navy. The warrant was introduced as the lowest junior officer rank as far back as Peter I when he organized the regular army. In 1884 the rank of warrant was eliminated in the Russian Army for peacetime, but retained for officers of the reserve. In wartime it was awarded to persons who completed either schools for warrants or accelerated courses in military schools, as well as to the most deserving lower ranks to alleviate a shortage of officers.

The "ensign" was the lowest officer rank in the Russian navy.

At the present time the ranks of "ensign" and "warrant" have a different meaning. The ensigns and warrants of the Soviet Armed Forces are people molded by socialism. They have qualitatively new characteristic traits.

Above all, ensigns and warrants, just as officers, possess the qualities of active builders of communism and selfless defenders of the working

people's revolutionary achievements. They are utterly devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and the people, and deeply perceive their civilian responsibility. They are irreconcilable toward our class enemies and are always ready to do great deeds in the name of the Soviet Motherland. Good military traditions are being established within the institution of ensigns and warrants. All the good points that characterize our remarkable officer cadres are being included as the basis of these traditions. Primarily this is an unshakable ideological conviction, political awareness, socialist patriotism and internationalism, excellent professional knowledge, courage and daring, mutual assistance and a helping hand. The youth takes its example from those who heroically fought the enemies of our Motherland in the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic Wars without regard for their lives.

It stands to reason that ensigns and warrants are highly skilled specialists and true masters of their trade.

The rapid and constant process of technical reequipping of the Armed Forces assigns military cadres, including the ensigns and warrants, the task of not only knowing to perfection the equipment now in inventory, but also to have that knowledge and experience which permit them to familiarize themselves with new models in very short periods of time. This requires them to constantly and persistently increase their political and military knowledge. Without systematic study it is impossible to be an authoritative commander or the closest assistant of officers, and there will invariably be failures and mistakes in work. Here it must always be kept in mind that no matter how well thought out and meaningful is the system of command training and of ideological-theoretical conditioning, it is not capable of providing profound knowledge without independent work. This means that one cannot begrudge time for political and military self-education. One has to regularly read political and military literature, newspapers and journals, know the most important Party and governmental decisions and be in the know concerning the domestic life of our socialist state and the international situation. Of special importance for ensigns and warrants is a profound study of the principles of Marxist-Leninist theory. This will help to properly understand current events and better accomplish tasks of training and educating soldiers.

Ensigns and warrants are models of high military discipline and execution. Subordination to firmly established procedures, self-control, strict observance of regulations, instructions, orders and directives are invariable qualities of our command personnel. And it is important not only for oneself to be a model of military discipline and execution, but to bring up one's subordinates in the very same spirit.

The complexity of combat equipment increases the importance of discipline, execution and overall order, the basis of which are observance of laws, the oath, military regulations and orders. Firm order in

accordance with regulations is a guarantee for increasing military discipline and a necessary condition for high-quality training and education of soldiers.

Ensigns and warrants need comprehensive command qualities in order to successfully fulfill their military duties. These qualities are expressed above all in organizational abilities and because they have a solid knowledge of their job, they can confidently supervise subordinates in any situation, properly accomplish tasks of training and educating personnel and attain the soldiers' strict and precise performance of the duties assigned to them. It is completely obvious that command qualities include the ability not only to give orders, but also to persuade, conduct explanatory work, carefully prepare and conduct classes in an exemplary manner, properly build one's relations with subordinates and intelligently combine exactingness with concern, i.e., be an experienced educator and pedagogue.

The Party always has attached exceptionally high significance to questions of education, and it will continue to do so. These questions become particularly urgent in the period of building communism. The Party demands of supervisory personnel that the education and training of people be inseparably linked.

In order to handle this task successfully, commanders, including ensigns and warrants, need to have not only a profound knowledge of political and military matters, but also the ability to transmit this knowledge to subordinates. They must also have high moral and exemplary qualities.

At the present time ensigns and warrants already have occupied a firm place in the ranks of command cadres of the Armed Forces. They are actively participating in the education and training of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's. Outstanding soldiers and Party and Komsomol members were among the first to receive the new military ranks. They themselves have an excellent knowledge of military affairs and are masters of combat specialties. They are successfully passing on their knowledge to subordinates and educating them to be skillful soldiers dedicated to the Party, Motherland and the people.

The All-Army Conference of Warrants and Ensigns, held in January 1973, was an important milestone on the path to perfecting the new institution of command cadres. It was received by all personnel of the Armed Forces as a new manifestation of the great concern by Party and government for strengthening the command personnel of the Armed Forces.

The conference summed up results and generalized the experience of the work by ensigns and warrants. A majority of the latter have already proven themselves to be reliable assistants of the officers from their very

first moments in the new position. Their remarkable deeds and everything positive which had been achieved by ensigns and warrants in personnel training and education benefited the entire Armed Forces. The conference facilitated an increase in the role and authority of ensigns and warrants and gave new impetus for their growth.

There is no doubt that the role of ensigns and warrants will grow with each passing year. In connection with this we should note the great importance of the schools for ensigns and warrants, whose curriculum is calculated to thoroughly arm the future commanders with knowledge and skills. These schools are faced with the task of seeking out the most sophisticated forms of organizing the educational process and the best methods for training and educating military students and of accumulating and disseminating positive experience.

Together with further improvement in the training of sergeants and senior NCO's, the training of ensigns and warrants will facilitate the complete resolution of the problem of staffing the Armed Forces with command cadres both in peacetime and in case of war.

Thus did the Communist Party resolve the problem of training qualified cadres for the Armed Forces at different stages in Soviet military development. Now, too, it is doing everything necessary to ensure that Soviet officers, warrants, ensigns, sergeants and Senior NCO's fully meet the demands of modern military affairs and are capable not only of training and educating troops in peacetime conditions, but, if necessary, of leading them into battle.

The CPSU Program states that "the Party will continue to be steadfastly concerned about training command, political and technical cadres of the Armed Forces who are utterly devoted to the cause of communism and who are selected from the best representatives of the Soviet people. The Party believes it necessary that the command personnel be persistent in mastering Marxist-Leninist theory, that they have a high military-technical training, that they meet all demands of modern military theory and practice, and that they strengthen military discipline." *

* *Programa Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, pp. 111-112.

Chapter 8. Direction over the Armed Forces and Command and Control of Forces

The Communist Party attaches primary importance to raising the quality of direction at all levels of the Soviet State apparatus and requires that our cadres extensively study management science. The 25th CPSU Congress has pointed out that it is necessary to raise the direction over the economy to the level of the new demands.

The supply of the Soviet Armed Forces with contemporary weapons and combat equipment and the changes taking place in this regard in their organizational structure and in methods of conducting combat operations are having a most immediate effect on the forms and methods of direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces.

The interests of defense of the Motherland insistently demand that command cadres and all officers master to perfection the methods of command and control of forces, possess a sense of what is new, see the future of development of military affairs and be able to find effective ways to resolve new problems.

1. Direction over the Armed Forces and Command and Control of Forces from the Experience of the Great Patriotic War

Direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces is an important area in military development. Soviet military science has always devoted unremitting attention to this, and will continue to do so.

The concepts of "direction" [rukovodstvo] and "command and control" [upravleniye] are close in content. The first term is usually used in our military literature with respect to political and strategic direction over the Armed Forces, and the second term is used with regard to operational and tactical levels. The relationship between them in the accepted sense is the relationship of the general and the specific, as a result of which the spheres of their manifestation are different. However, their dialectical essence is identical. Both these terms have to do with bringing some process or phenomenon in the field of military affairs in conformity with the requirements of objective laws of war and the current situation.

Direction over the Armed Forces encompasses all aspects of their activity. Its chief task is to ensure that the Armed Forces are kept in a state of constant high combat readiness in peacetime based on a comprehensive evaluation of political and economic conditions and the current military-strategic situation; and in case of war, to mobilize all the efforts of the country and the Armed Forces to repel aggression and defeat the enemy with the least possible human and material losses of our own.

Command and control of forces lies in the skillful direction by commanders-in-chief, commanders, staffs and political organs of subordinate subunits, units, warships, large units and formations, in the thorough organization of troop combat operations and a purposeful direction of their efforts for successful accomplishment of assigned missions. In peacetime the center of gravity of command and control activity shifts to the comprehensive training of troops for possible combat operations, assurance of their high combat readiness and maintaining in them firm discipline, military order and efficiency.

Leninist principles of military development are embodied in the direction over the Armed Forces and in command and control of forces. Such direction and command and control are scientific inasmuch as they rest on the most advanced theory of social development—Marxism-Leninism, a knowledge and strict observance of the laws of war, the conclusions and recommendations of military science and a skillful application of principles of military art.

The combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces, especially during the Great Patriotic War, confirmed the correctness of our views on direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces. At the same time, this experience required further improvement in the structure, forms and methods of military direction based on the combat experience gained, the new conditions for conducting war, and changes in armament and the technical equipping of our troops and enemy troops.

Having launched a surprise attack against the USSR, the fascist German aggressors had as their primary goal to disrupt the system of state and military administration, to disorganize the direction of the Soviet Armed Forces, to deprive them of combat effectiveness, and to sow panic and fear among the people. Everything was set in motion to achieve this goal: surprise mass air attacks against administrative and political centers of our country, diversionary tactics, "psychological" attacks by motorized infantry, deep penetrations of tank wedges, and false propaganda and insidious misinformation.

With the help of this strategy the Hitlerites won major victories in military campaigns against quite a number of capitalist states. In spite of

initial temporary successes, the factor of surprise did not bring the Hitlerites the desired results in the war against the USSR. The upper hand was taken by the fundamental advantages of socialism, the self-control and extreme steadfastness of Soviet citizens, led by the Communist Party, their faith in the correctness of their cause, and the heroism and military art of our soldiers.

As early as the end of 1941 Soviet troops had forced the enemy to give up active offensive operations simultaneously along the entire Soviet-German front, and soon the enemy also experienced the full burden of military defeats. Skillful direction over the Soviet Armed Forces and command and control of forces played an important role in this.

The art of directing the Soviet Armed Forces during the years of the Great Patriotic War was demonstrated with unusual vividness. Its level was significantly higher than that of the fascist Germans. Soviet military-political direction by the Party Central Committee, the State Committee for Defense and the Supreme High Command carried out their plans at all stages of the war more flexibly and efficiently and it was more calculating and far-sighted in its concepts, more adaptable and decisive in methods of their realization, and more thrifty in expenditure of material resources.

In the course of the war the forms and methods of direction over the Soviet Armed Forces steadily improved, became more efficient and effective as combat experience was accumulated and their material-technical base was strengthened. The experience gained in this regard not only has great cognitive interest, but it largely retains its practical significance under contemporary conditions as well.

The art of Soviet military-political direction was manifested to the full in the effective use of the advantages of the socialist state and its economic, moral-political, scientific-technical and military potentials to defeat the aggressor. It was distinguished by purposefulness, flexibility and reality of planning operations and the war as a whole, by the innovative approach to development of forms and methods of military operations, by the high expertise at massing forces and materiel, by skilled use of surprise, by timely preparation and purposeful utilization of reserves, and by achievement of activeness, decisiveness and maneuverability in operations of the forces, and by precise organization of their coordination and all-round support. These Leninist principles of direction were further developed in the course of the Great Patriotic War and constituted the most important prerequisite for victory over a strong foe.

Purposefulness, flexibility and reality of strategic, operational and tactical planning were clearly manifested in all operations of the Great

Patriotic War as characteristic features of the direction over the Soviet Armed Forces and command and control of forces.

In planning operations, the Soviet command creatively brought to life V. I. Lenin's demands for scientific character and objectivity of direction. In estimating the operational-strategic and tactical situation, the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command, the commands of fronts and armies, and commanders of various sized units delved deeply into the enemy's concepts and plans, skillfully exposed his weak points and used them to deliver decisive attacks. This was facilitated by a good knowledge of the enemy's capabilities and his strategy and tactics. Particular importance in planning was attached to consideration of the moral-political and military-technical factors, both of friendly and enemy troops.

War experience showed again and again with complete obviousness that the basis of planning and control on the whole consists of the decision of the commander-in-chief or commander for an operation in which all their art is focused as to preparations for the operation or battle and direction of the troops. The faster the decision was made, the more advisable it was and the more fully it met the situation at hand, then the more it was that purposefulness, flexibility and reality of planning were achieved and the greater were chances for success.

These features of operational planning were concretely expressed in the thorough and comprehensive analysis of the situation; the precise determination of goals, missions, and concept of combat operations; the validity of the plan and timeliness with which it was brought to those who would execute it; the careful organization of the interaction of all men and materiel participating in the battle or operation; and the efficiency in resolving problems connected with support for combat operations. Plans for the operation or battle were viewed by our command not as a set scheme, but as the basis for creative command and control of forces. In the course of combat operations the commanders-in-chief and commanders attentively followed the situation, reacted in a timely manner to the slightest changes in it, made the necessary corrections to existing plans, and firmly and steadily put them into effect, seeking the precise fulfillment of combat missions by the troops.

Soviet strategy, operational art and tactics were enriched during the war by **new forms and methods of operations** of all scales. This was the result of great creativity and innovation on the part of the Soviet command in controlling troops. In organizing combat operations, the Soviet command strictly adhered to V. I. Lenin's instructions that the forms and methods used to defeat an enemy must conform to the situation. Based on this, our command made strategic, operational and tactical decisions which were unexpected by the enemy, placing the Hitlerites in a difficult

situation and forcing them to alter their plans. There are many examples of this.

For example, in the extremely unfavorable operational-strategic situation which took shape for the Soviet Land at the beginning of the war as a result of the treacherous attack by fascist Germany, our Armed Forces were faced with a mission of exceptional difficulty. They not only had to halt the aggressor, but also to sharply change the situation at the front, wrest the strategic initiative from the enemy's hands and create conditions for his defeat.

In this situation the Soviet Supreme High Command employed an active strategic defense. Soviet troops dealt the enemy irreplaceable losses in stubborn defensive encounters, exhausted and bled white his main groupings, halted their advance, substantially altered the correlation of forces to their advantage and won time, thus ensuring the training of reserves and creation of other conditions for subsequent offensive operations by the Soviet Armed Forces. From the standpoint of military art, this was the most advisable method for accomplishing the strategic missions which the Party had given the Armed Forces. The active and stubborn defense came as somewhat of a surprise for the enemy, who had not counted on stiff resistance by Soviet troops.

At the turning point of the war the counteroffensive became the effective form of strategic operations by our army. This permitted us to create the necessary conditions for seizing the strategic initiative. When, however, the events changed in our favor and favorable conditions shaped up for switching to highly active and decisive operations along the entire Soviet-German front, then the strategic offensive became the basis for military operations by the Soviet Armed Forces. This was accomplished in the form of consecutive and simultaneous offensive operations right up to the complete capitulation of fascist Germany.

The creativity and initiative of commanders-in-chief, commanders, staffs and political organs were aimed above all at accomplishing the combat missions in any situation, right on time and with least losses. Soviet generals and officers persistently sought new ways, techniques and methods for defeating the enemy, methods for command and control of troops and for using weapons and combat equipment. Much innovation was introduced into the choice of methods of hitting the enemy by fire, determining the axes of primary efforts, employing various forms of operational and combat troop formations and the maneuver of men and materiel, building the defense, organizing a system of fire and obstacles, and also resolving a number of other questions of planning and conducting combat operations under dynamic conditions.

The Soviet command carried out **the massing of men and materiel on decisive axes** with great expertise. As we know, V. I. Lenin attached

great importance to this principle. In his article "Advice of an Onlooker" (1917), in setting forth the prerequisites for gaining success in an armed uprising, he demanded: "... It is necessary to gather a *great superiority of forces* at the decisive point and at the decisive moment. . . ." ¹ In 1920 V. I. Lenin said that "the entire art of control and politics lies in considering opportunely and knowing where to concentrate one's main forces and one's attention." ²

The Soviet command gained major success in operations by skillfully using the principle of massing without having at times overall superiority in men and materiel over the enemy on a particular strategic axis. During an offensive this was achieved by a skillful selection of the axis of main attack, which was usually against a weak spot in the enemy defense, and by massing a quantitative and qualitative superiority in weapons, combat equipment and personnel at this point. It is indicative that in operations by the Soviet Armed Forces in 1944-1945, 50-80 percent of all rifle troops, from 60 to 80 percent of the artillery and up to 80-100 percent of tanks and aviation were concentrated on sectors of breakthrough of fronts and armies comprising approximately 7-12 percent of the width in their zone of operations. Such massing ensured an overwhelming superiority in men and materiel over the enemy on the main axis. The quantitative correlation attained was approximately in the following proportions: 3-5:1 in infantry, 6-8:1 in artillery and tanks, and 3-5:1 in aviation in favor of the attacking troops.

On the defense the main efforts were concentrated through a denser alignment of combat formations of large rifle units defending the more important axes, through the massing of antitank weapons, the flexible maneuver of artillery and aviation to conduct counteraction and counterstrikes and delivery of decisive counterblows against an enemy grouping which had wedged in.

The skillful achievement of surprise in offensive operations was a vivid indicator of the high level of Soviet military art. This gave Soviet troops a number of important advantages and placed the enemy in an unfavorable position. Surprise was ensured by various methods: keeping one's intentions a secret; dulling the enemy's vigilance by artful misinformation; creation of an incorrect impression of our forces and means being brought in for participation in an operation or battle; leading the enemy astray concerning the axis of main attack and readiness times of troops for shifting to the attack; and by using unexpected methods of conducting an operation or battle or using new types of weapons. In some offensive operations Soviet commanders achieved surprise by selecting the axes for attack over difficult terrain which was swampy, forested or in mountainous sectors, where the enemy did not expect our

¹ V. I. Lenin, XXXIV, 383.

² V. I. Lenin, XL, 85.

attack and was defending with light forces. Nighttime and difficult weather conditions also were used very effectively for this purpose.

The farsightedness and calculating nature of the Soviet military-political leadership was fully manifested in the **timely preparation and skillful use of strategic and operational reserves**. This played an important part in winning victory over the enemy, who possessed great strategic capabilities.

The presence of reserves in offensive operations permitted the Soviet command to rapidly create strategic and operational groupings on the necessary axes, to build up troop efforts for exploiting success, to create an external front of encirclement, to repulse enemy counterblows, to secure important strategic lines for us and to accomplish other missions.

In defense, reserves were used most often for restoring disrupted combat formations: for operational alignment of troops or building up a depth of defense on axes where the enemy had succeeded in breaking through our forces' front; for delivering decisive counterblows; for rapid regrouping of troops and shifting combat efforts to new axes; and also for creating an offensive grouping when shifting from defense to offense.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet command succeeded in successfully solving one of the thorny problems of troop command and control—the **organization of continuous mutual support**. If such mutual support was disrupted, it was restored quickly. The participation of a large number of different forces and means in battles demanded particularly precise coordination of their combat efforts. In this regard the organization of mutual support and its continuation in the course of an operation or battle were very important measures in commanding and controlling troops.

The principles of mutual support were laid down by the commander-in-chief or commander in working out his concept, making his decision and assigning combat missions to the troops. As a rule, the commanders-in-chief and commanders rode out to the area for more detailed organization of mutual support. Here they coordinated the combat efforts of troops and studied the different versions of accomplishing combat missions. When such a trip was impossible at a given moment, mutual support was worked out on maps or relief charts, but later all the main problems were refined right on the spot.

Mutual support was organized in greatest detail for the forces that were performing primary missions. Main attention in the attack was directed at coordinating the actions of rifle, tank, mechanized, artillery and engineer units and of aviation and air defense troops when conducting artillery and air preparations for the attack, when the troops were overcoming a system of engineer obstacles in front of the forward edge and in the depth of the enemy's defenses, when attacking enemy

strong points, and when maneuvering forces and means. Mutual support of troops of the front or army in supporting the introduction of mobile groups into a breakthrough, and their joint actions with large units of the first echelon were carefully prepared.

In defense, the goal of mutual support was to use common efforts in repulsing the attack of superior enemy infantry and tank forces in front of the forward edge, and in case the enemy wedged into our combat formations, to ensure a growing resistance to his attacking groupings as they moved into the depth of defense, to organize decisive counterattacks and counterblows, to eliminate the enemy grouping which had wedged in, to restore the position and, under favorable conditions, to shift into the counteroffensive.

All operations conducted by our army were **carefully and thoroughly supported in the combat and material-technical sense**. In fulfilling this responsible task, the Soviet command took heed of V. I. Lenin's thesis that "any battle includes the abstract possibility of defeat, and there is no other means to *reduce* this possibility than organized preparation for the battle."³

The organization and accomplishment of active, continuous reconnaissance, careful camouflage, engineer, chemical and rear area support, and effective Party-political work were all components of the activity of commanders-in-chief, commanders, staffs and political organs in directing troops in offensive and defensive operations, and they were a very important condition for winning victory. The development and improvement in forms and methods of directing the Armed Forces and commanding and controlling forces in the war years was not a direct and unhindered ascent from the simple to the complex, but represented persistent searches and a struggle between the new and the old. At times we did not get by on the thorny path without mistakes and failures, but in the end that which was new and progressive won out. This valuable combat experience from the days of the Great Patriotic War is considered carefully even now in training organs of command and control.

2. Direction over the Armed Forces and Command and Control of Forces under Contemporary Conditions

The changed means and methods of conducting war, the appearance of new types of weapons and combat equipment and substantial shifts in the alignment of military and political forces in the world arena after the last war are leaving their imprint on the forms and methods of directing the Armed Forces and commanding and controlling troops. They require a critical interpretation of the accumulated experience and its skillful use in the practice of training troops.

³ V. I. Lenin, VI, 137.

The creative application of principles of military direction which were tested on the battlefields and which retain to this day their vitality determines the need for consideration of many other factors under modern conditions, primarily those such as expansion of the scale of combat use of forces and means; increase of the spatial scope of combat operations, of their special decisiveness, intensity and short-lived nature; the possible growth in combat losses and material costs; and complexity of interaction and control, which often might be disrupted as a result of the enemy's active counteraction.

It must be kept in mind that the employment of powerful and long-range means of destruction in modern warfare and their high technical readiness and speed of action permit the warring sides to mutually destroy in a short time not only single targets and objectives, but also entire elements of troop combat formations—subunits, units, control centers, communications centers; to put rear area bases out of action; and also to destroy large sectors of lines of communication, with the simultaneous creation of vast zones of contamination, fires, obstructions and inundations. As a result of this the status of troops and the situation as a whole may change rapidly and abruptly.

In addition, an increase in mobility and maneuverability of troops, an overall growth in the dynamic nature of the situation, and frequent shifts from one method of combat operations to another make it necessary to reduce to a minimum the periods of preparation for an operation or battle. While during the Great Patriotic War each operation was usually preceded by a preparatory period, the length of which was measured in many days or even weeks, and 5–7 days were usually set aside for organizing offensive combat at the division-regimental level, now it is impossible to count on such a considerable amount of time. It is quite probable that a new operation or battle will often have to be organized in the course of continuing combat operations, under conditions of an unclear and oftentimes conflicting situation.

This obligates every commander-in-chief, commander and staff officer to introduce progressive methods of control more boldly and widely into practice, and everything new and advanced which the scientific-technological revolution has introduced into the given area. The task is to increase in every possible way the efficiency of work, to expand the operational-tactical outlook of commanders and staff officers and to improve the skills of their activity in a tense and dynamic situation with the complete and rational use of available technical means of control.

The fight to win time is the primary problem in the process of command and control. The saying by Suvorov "One minute decides the success of the battle, one hour the success of the campaign, and one day the fate of the war," now has acquired literal meaning. Victory in modern warfare will be on the side of the commander who best orga-

nizes control, who is more energetic in his actions, and who is more perspicacious in his plans and decisions. Time spent in accomplishing a particular activity serves as one of the basic criteria of the combat readiness of staffs and their ability to handle a difficult task of command and control of forces in an abruptly changing situation.

Naturally, swiftness of action as an important indicator of efficiency in the work of commanders-in-chief, commanders and staffs must not be to the detriment of another no less important demand—**increasing quality of command and control.**

Quality of command and control is above all the ability of a commander-in-chief or commander to confidently orient himself in a situation, make an expedient decision for an operation or battle, assign combat missions opportunely and competently, disseminate the decisions to units and subunits, organize interaction, render total support to troop operations and put the decision which has been made into effect firmly and resolutely. Success comes to those commanders-in-chief, commanders, and staff officers whose actions in the command and control of forces rest on a deep operational analysis of the situation and on scientific foresight.

The increased spatial scope of an operation or battle and their great saturation with active combat operations have substantial influence on command and control of forces. While in the Great Patriotic War period a commander-in-chief, commander or staff had to direct troops who usually were operating in compact combat formations arranged over a comparatively limited area, now the situation has changed greatly. The combat formations of large units, units and subunits will be more dispersed along the front and in depth. Troops will be forced to conduct combat operations along individual isolated axes, at times separated considerably from one another, with large intervals and gaps between combat formations. There will also be an increase in complexity, intensity, dynamic nature, and maneuverability of combat operations.

This will have an effect on the system and methods of command and control. Command and control posts will have to have their distance of separation increased, and moreover, they may be in movement more often than before. Commanders and staffs will often be forced to direct troops chiefly from mobile control posts and organize for combat in short periods of time, under conditions of maneuver, and with a sharply limited amount of time for estimating a situation, decision-making, assigning combat missions and organizing of interaction.

It must be kept in mind also that an increased flow of information about the situation may literally "engulf" an insufficiently experienced commander and staff. Therefore, the ability to analyze the situation rapidly and separate from the general mass of information which is

being received that which is basic and of prime importance is an indispensable quality for efficiency in the work of all command elements and staffs.

Special requirements are being placed on means of communications and on their reliability and survivability as the most important conditions for stability and continuity of troop command and control.

The increased vulnerability of command posts and the troops themselves to enemy fire seriously complicates the direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces in modern warfare. Massed fire is capable of seriously disrupting the system of troop command and control in a short time and causing prolonged outages in communications. A difficult situation may also develop for the troops. It is not precluded that large units, units and subunits will suffer large losses in personnel, weapons, and combat equipment which will result in a substantial reduction in their combat effectiveness. In such a situation only isolated, fragmentary information may come to the staffs which is at times contradictory and on which it will be difficult to visualize the overall situation at the front and in the rear areas. Success here will depend on how rapidly and efficiently the commander-in-chief, commander or staff will be able to restore the disrupted troop command and control and prevent pauses and breaks in troop operations.

The radioelectronic situation and employment of powerful means of electronic countermeasures by the warring sides will have a great effect on command and control of forces. This will make it harder to achieve stable and continuous communications.

Thus, in modern warfare conditions for direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces have become much more complex than in the past, and because of this the requirements on them have grown considerably.

High combat readiness of all directing elements and of the entire system of command and control and communications as a whole has now assumed exceptional importance. This is explained by the fact that any measure in an operation or battle, whether it be the preparation of troops, their support, the coordination of operations for accomplishing a combat mission or a maneuver—this above all begins with the work of the commander-in-chief, commander and staff to clarify the mission received, gather information on the situation, analyze it, make the decision for operation or battle and plan combat operations.

It is clear from this that high readiness of organs of command and control for directing the troops is one of the important factors of troop combat readiness as a whole. Readiness of the command control and communications system must be somewhat ahead of the overall readiness of large units, units and subunits. It has to precede the latter and be

higher and more mobile. This can be achieved through the timely and complete staffing of control organs with competent, highly qualified cadres; through scientific organization of staff work; through skillful placement, dispersal and thorough camouflage of command and control posts; comprehensive technical equipping of staffs; effective use of means of troop command and control automation; assurance of flexibility and high survivability of the system of communications and its protection against jamming; precise organization of combat alert duty; and the state of training of command and control organs in performing functional duties in difficult situations and in rapidly restoring interrupted interaction and command and control of troops.

In a situation of sharp, intensive and stubborn fighting characteristic of contemporary combat operations one of the primary tasks will be to ensure **firmness in troop command and control of forces**. Command and control must be accomplished clearly and steadily under any complex situation, regardless of the hardships, obstacles or interference.

This obligates the commander-in-chief and commander to make bold decisions which are at the same time well substantiated and to persistently seek their precise and timely accomplishment. Firmness of command and control is a true indicator of a high level in the direction of forces; the preparedness of a commander-in-chief, commander and staff officers for action under difficult, dynamic conditions; and precision, efficiency, good management and organization in their work. Such command and control is based on the command cadres' profound knowledge of military affairs and on their high professional training.

Concern for firmness of command and control is also a concern for instilling in generals, admirals and officers high moral-combat qualities of personal courage, will, self-control, resourcefulness and initiative. The substantiation of operational and tactical decisions, which rest on precise calculations, a deep and careful estimate of the combat situation and a thorough analysis of combat operations is an invariable prerequisite ensuring firmness of command and control. This imbues a commander with confidence in his abilities and in the expediency of the decision he has made.

It is especially important that the commander-in-chief and commander display determination in a critical situation and during abrupt and unexpected complications of the situation, when some subordinates may manifest elements of confusion and lack of organization. In such a situation a commander-in-chief and commander require composure, clearness of thought and leadership. As we know, a commander's personal example of steadfastness, courage and self-control always means a great deal.

Firmness has nothing in common with stubbornness. A stubborn

attempt to implement a previous decision in the face of logic and common sense, where the conditions already have changed and the decision has ceased to conform to them, can only do harm to the overall cause and lead to unjustified losses in battle. Therefore, firmness in direction also presumes a **flexibility in command and control**. To display flexibility means to make expedient adjustments opportunely in troop command and control with consideration of changes which are taking place. This is possible if a commander-in-chief, commander and staff constantly know the situation at the front and in the rear areas, attentively follow the enemy's behavior and expose his schemes and methods of operations.

The requirement for flexibility of command and control stems from the nature of contemporary operations and battles, which are fraught with great surprises, the frequent appearance of crisis situations, and rapidity and great maneuverability of combat operations. In a dynamic situation the experienced commander or staff officer senses with particular acuteness the need to always take the "pulse of combat" and not simply react to events that have occurred, but forestall them and opportunely prevent any complications.

Flexibility of command and control is also unthinkable without its efficient organization, a maximum of simplicity, skillful placement of men and equipment and well adjusted information and communications with the forces.

Flexibility is in no way identical with indecisiveness in a commander's decisions, which lead to frequent and unjustified changes in a decision which has been made and in instructions issued to troops. While flexibility of command and control is based on a deep knowledge by the commander and staff of the combat situation and on its thorough analysis, indecisiveness, on the other hand, is the companion of dilettantism and a result of a lack of confidence and organization. We know from the experience of wars how much harm can be done to troop command and control by frequent, groundless changes in decisions and by a vagueness and uncertainty in assigning combat missions to subordinates.

Assurance of **continuity and regularity** are important requirements for troop command and control. A well prepared commander-in-chief, commander or staff exert constant influence on the course of combat operations. They do not lose the thread of command and control for a minute, so as to target and coordinate opportunely the combat efforts of large units, units and subunits and to achieve the total attainment of the goal of the operation or battle.

Under modern conditions, where the importance of the time factor has increased immeasurably, the technical readiness of means of destruction has grown sharply, and the struggle to seize the initiative has become

one of the main criteria of success, it is important to prevent even small interruptions in the functioning of the command and control system.

Continuity of command and control of forces is achieved not only by knowledge of the situation and by rapid reaction to its changes, but also by forecasting the development of combat events. This allows one to parry possible surprises in time and overcome difficulties and obstacles easier. In other words, the path to victory opens for those commanders-in-chief, commanders and staff whose work in troop command and control is based not on random, attendant moments, but on a knowledge and skillful use of the patterns of development of combat operations. Continuity in command and control is also ensured by active, purposeful reconnaissance, by stable operation of means of communication and by high survivability and mobility of command and control posts. War experience has shown that command and control posts lived up to their purpose when they were highly mobile, small in number of personnel, equipped with reliable means of communication and protected against destruction by the enemy.

Secrecy in the command and control of forces has acquired increased importance in our time. The secrecy of all measures involving the planning of combat operations and direction of troops in the course of an operation or battle was one of the leading principles of success in all wars. Even the slightest deviation from it usually led to failure or serious losses.

The increase in the role of secrecy of command and control is explained by the fact that in modern warfare the combatants will possess very sophisticated and diverse means of surveillance which will permit monitoring the operation of technical means of communication. Any negligence or poor organization of the system of secret command and control may be used by the enemy to uncover the intent of the operations of our troops, deliver anticipatory strikes against them and disrupt a planned maneuver in an operation or battle. In order to prevent this, it is necessary to maintain a rigid regime of limitations and a precise procedure for use of means of communication, especially when conversing over the radio and telephone. Experience teaches that the circle of officials participating in developing plans for an operation or battle must always be limited, there must be constant concern for the secret placement and movement of command and control posts, and measures of operational camouflage must be widely employed.

These are the most important requirements for command and control of forces under contemporary conditions. Their steadfast and creative implementation by commanders-in-chief, commanders, staffs and political organs allows effective direction of troop combat activity.

The commander-in-chief and commander play a central, dominant

role in command and control of forces. The success of all command and control activity depends on their organizational abilities and military expertise. They have to orient themselves rapidly and well in any complex situation, think precisely in logically correct terms, and set forth their decisions—which are the basis for troop command and control—just as precisely and clearly. Such ability is based on a high degree of overall military culture, comprehensive specialized training and firm practical skills of the military leader which are acquired in peacetime in the command and control of forces.

A characteristic feature of the entire activity of a commander-in-chief or commander in directing forces is high creativity in his actions, initiative and independence. Without this, success in a modern operation or battle is unthinkable. Creative activity is a manifestation of genuine combat expertise of generals and officers. It is expressed in a desire to make fullest use of the combat capabilities of one's own troops, find effective ways to accomplish an assigned mission, attain surprise in an operation or battle, seek out new tactical techniques which are unexpected for the enemy, outfox the enemy in art, impose one's own will on him and defeat him in the shortest possible time.

In speaking of the command and control of forces, one cannot help but direct attention at the ever increasing role of **staffs**. The experience of past wars showed graphically that just by relying on the staff, the commander-in-chief or commander is in a position to accomplish successfully a broad range of difficult missions facing the formation or unit. The harmonious, creative collective work of the commander-in-chief, commander and staff is a guarantee of flexibility and efficiency, precision and swiftness in accomplishing all measures of command and control of forces. The functions of a staff have now as never before become responsible and multifaceted. The staff is the true brain of the forces, a unique master oscillator for the entire large complex of command and control work. It is fully understandable that all this requires that it be smooth-running, with high efficiency and a high degree of staff effectiveness.

3. The Role of Scientific Forecasting in Direction over the Armed Forces and Command and Control of Forces

In all ages, leading generals attempted to look into the future and mentally part the curtain of time so as to anticipate to some extent forthcoming events and foresee what military dangers, trials and "surprises" await their armies in forthcoming wars, engagements and battles. It was not simply an everyday curiosity which moved them. This was demanded insistently by life itself and by military necessity. At the cost of great sacrifices it usually was necessary for peoples and armies to pay for major mistakes and omissions allowed in preparing for war.

However, the importance of forecasting was not limited to this. It was just as important for the general, commander-in-chief or commander to correctly foresee the possible development of events in the course of military operations, as well. In practice, every decision made for an operation, engagement or battle always was based on forecasting. The more completely and precisely a military leader succeeded in prognosticating the development of a future engagement or battle, the more expedient was the decision he made, the shorter was the path to victory and the fewer the losses sustained by the troops.

V. I. Lenin believed that scientific forecasting was a complex, creative process, a necessary condition for perceiving the essence of social phenomena and for revealing the laws and patterns of their development. He wrote: "A miraculous prophesy is a fable, but scientific prophesy is a fact."⁴

V. I. Lenin himself possessed a remarkable gift of foresight. His prognoses in the years of the Civil War played an enormous role in the correct and timely making of strategic decisions and in the organization of maneuver by men and equipment to defeat the counterrevolution. Relying on a precise and comprehensive knowledge of the military-political situation and the state of affairs at the fronts, V. I. Lenin revealed the sources and inner mutual ties of events and processes taking place, and on this basis predicted with scientific authenticity the possible paths of their further development.

The methodology of V. I. Lenin's forecasting of complex social phenomena, particularly in the military field, was used by the Party in the period of peaceful construction. Scientific forecasting of conditions and nature of the war being prepared by the imperialists permitted the Party to carry out the necessary measures to prepare the Soviet State and its Armed Forces to repel the aggressor. Thanks to this, the Soviet people withstood a prolonged and stubborn fight against a strong foe—a fight to the finish.

In military development it is important to properly define both the role of the different services of the Armed Forces and service branches as well as the correlation of forms and methods of combat operations. In contrast to the bourgeois theoreticians, who were preaching a cult of individual types of weapons, Soviet military science from the very beginning substantiated a firm and logical course toward the harmonious development of different means of armed warfare. It opportunely evaluated the importance of such prospective types of weapons as tanks, aviation, submarines, rockets, automatic weapons and antitank weapons.

Showing concern for the continuous improvement of Soviet military art, the Party Central Committee constantly directed the efforts of mili-

⁴ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 472.

tary figures toward extensive development of fundamental military-theoretical problems and taught them to gaze boldly ahead. And this produced positive results.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet command demonstrated a high ability to orient itself rapidly in complex conditions, thoroughly analyze the military-political situation, make *farsighted*, substantiated forecasts and successfully directed large-scale operations. The scientific base of the forecast comprised V. I. Lenin's principles of direction of the Armed Forces—a comprehensive knowledge of the objective laws and patterns of war, a Marxist-Leninist methodology for analysis of military operations, and an ability to draw the necessary conclusions for practice out of this and to direct from a standpoint of long-term prospects, with anticipation.

The Soviet command's art of forecasting was manifested especially clearly in its comprehensive estimate of the enemy's moral-political, economic and military potential and in ascertaining his strong and weak sides. A comparison of conclusions obtained with an estimate of the moral-political, economic and military capabilities of our country helped in correctly determining the probable course of military operations, choosing the decisive sectors of the strategic front and concentrating there the main efforts to defeat the enemy. There are many examples on this account. We will refer to one of them—the Battle of Kursk. A thorough analysis of the situation at hand by the General Headquarters of the Supreme High Command and the timely and correct revelation of the enemy's intent permitted our forces to conduct the necessary measures ahead of time to repulse his attack and then shift into a decisive counteroffensive.

In the offensive, the forecasting of Soviet military leaders was shown by a skillful selection of the axis of main attack, a flexible deployment of troops for conducting operations, the delivery of powerful attacks by fire against vulnerable places in the enemy defense, the accomplishment of bold maneuver by men and equipment in the course of operations, the purposeful use of strategic reserves and supply of troops with everything necessary for combat operations.

In defensive operations the Soviet command uncovered the concept and nature of enemy operations in good time, as well as the concentration of enemy groupings and established periods for the attack. Forecasting of the possible nature of combat operations was used as the basis to build a firm and indepth defense, to skillfully select defensive lines and positions, to set up a system of fire and obstacles and to prepare for the maneuver of men and equipment.

Forecasting was typical not only of the activity of the strategic leadership, but also of the operational and tactical echelons. But it was natural

that the depth and the process of forecasting combat events itself had their differences in the strategic, operational, and tactical levels.

Scientific forecasting in the military sphere plays a particularly important role under contemporary conditions. In connection with a growing complexity of combat operations, there is an increase in the danger of miscalculations and mistakes in decisions being made, while it becomes an increasingly difficult matter to correct these omissions in the course of combat operations and to reduce their disastrous consequences for the forces.

Today, as never before, one cannot successfully direct forces or train them purposefully to repel an aggressor without having a precise and clear concept of the strategic aspect of a possible war—its scope, duration and methods of conduct. There is an increase in the importance of forecasting at the operational and tactical levels of control. The demand of the times is as follows: a commander-in-chief or commander must know more, see further, and be more penetrating and more calculating in his actions.

The problem of forecasting in the military field has many different inherent aspects and difficulties. It is a very complex task to reveal in all details the most essential features of such complex social phenomena as modern warfare, an operation, an engagement or a battle. A large number of mutually related factors influence the content and character of military operations: political, economic, ideological, diplomatic, strictly military and others. One is not always successful in fully considering this influence and foreseeing the dynamics of the complex intertwining of events. Nevertheless, by taking guidance from the Marxist-Leninist dialectical method and analyzing the sociopolitical processes in the world and the prospects of contemporary scientific-technological progress, it is possible to determine the basic paths and trends in development of the theory and practice in the direction of the Armed Forces and command and control of forces.

What are the tasks that have to be accomplished in this field and which tasks are commanding the primary attention of scientific military forecasting?

The first group of tasks is connected with research of the prospects for further improvement in the structure of military leadership in all echelons—strategic, operational and tactical; with a deeper identification of its mutual ties with the nature and demands of modern warfare, the economic and scientific-technological capabilities of the state, and the growth of the Armed Forces' combat might; and with an increase in their technical equipping and the development of military art. In this plane it is important to determine in which direction and how the structure of the system of troop command and control and the functioning of directing

organs can be improved, and under what conditions and how the commanders-in-chief, commanders, staffs and political organs will have to operate in commanding and controlling forces. In short, the essence of the problem is to identify how the missions, scope and content of the process of command and control of forces will change under the new conditions.

Data of scientific forecasting in this field will permit a steady improvement in the structure of direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces at all levels, and bringing them opportunely into conformity with the requirements of modern warfare and the objective patterns of development of military theory and practice.

The second group of tasks concerns the further improvement in working style of commanders-in-chief, commanders, staffs and political organs and the seeking out of new and more effective forms and methods of direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces.

A forecast in this direction will help to evaluate anew the significance of the time factor, the heightened technical readiness of means of warfare and the conditions influencing the combat readiness of troops. It will also help reveal the ways to increase such readiness.

The third group of tasks of military forecasting relates to the field of seeking out the most progressive methods of decision making and planning operations and battles. The development of the decision for an operation or battle by the commander-in-chief or commander and their planning always comprised the central element of direction over the *Armed Forces and command and control of forces*. Both these important measures are directly related to forecasting. They are based on forecasting and stem from it. The scientific basis of decisions and plans for an operation or battle is now extremely important. It rests on an extensive and comprehensive analysis of data on the situation, on the accuracy of strategic, operational and tactical calculations, and on a knowledge of the laws and patterns of warfare. Consequently, scientific forecasting, decision-making and combat planning now act as a single, organically inseparable whole, and as a necessary condition for successful direction over the Armed Forces and of command and control of forces.

Scientific forecasting in the resolution of this group of tasks is called upon to help the commander-in-chief, commander and staff identify the basic trends in improvements in the methods of decision-making, in planning the operation and battle, in improving the methods of operational-tactical calculations, in comparing the combat capabilities of the sides, in analyzing the dynamics of combat operations, and in determining the influence of the moral-psychological factor on the attainment of success in the operation or battle. Modeling of combat operations and the methods of their planning are important aids. To build a

model of a modern operation or battle is nothing more than to imagine in all details the nature of preparations and conduct of the operation or battle with the most complete consideration of men and equipment of the opposing sides, the features of tactics of their operations and conditions of maneuver.

The estimate of the operational-tactical situation of itself and the calculations for decision making for the operation or battle comprise the process of forecasting. The logical scheme of work of a commander in organizing for combat which has become established in military practice, beginning with elucidation of the mission and ending with the formulation of a plan of combat operations, issuance of the combat order and organization of interaction and comprehensive support of the troops fully meets today's requirements. The task is for the commander to rely more fully in this work on contemporary methods of military-scientific research and to skillfully use the technical means in command and control of forces which permit going through various versions of the solution to a particular task, with consideration of many factors, and choosing the most optimum one.

In examining the tasks and directions of scientific forecasting, one cannot help but touch on the important problem of **automation of command and control of forces**.

In recent years electronic computers and other technologically sophisticated apparatus have been finding increasingly wide application in the system of command and control of forces both here and in capitalist armies. The basic goal of automation is to increase the efficiency of troop direction, the effectiveness of employing weapons and combat equipment, and troop combat readiness as a whole, and also to sharply reduce labor expenditures of commanders-in-chief, commanders and staff officers on technical work. The accomplishment of an increasingly broad complex of operational-strategic and tactical tasks with the help of technical means and electronic computers opens up great prospects for improvements in the entire command and control system and facilitates the resolution of the problem of creating small, mobile and, at the same time, highly productive staffs. One could say that this is the main path to resolving the conflicts between the increased requirements for troop command and control and existing capabilities of commanders and staffs to accomplish complex and diverse operational-tactical calculations. Therefore, it is important to constantly improve the technology of command and control and the system of communications and to continue to introduce computer technology and other means of automation into staffs and use them skillfully.

It is, of course, inadmissible to make technical means and mathematical methods into a fetish. It is senseless to set man and technology, or the commander and the machine in opposition. To act in this way means

not to understand the theses of Marxism-Leninism that the decisive role in war belongs to man and his creative abilities. This thesis is displayed most vividly in military-organizational activity and in the sphere of command and control of forces. Only the commander-in-chief or commander is in a position to uncover all the refinements and details of the combat situation and find the true paths to victory over the enemy. With the highest degree of automation, the commander remains the central figure and the staff the basic control organ. The commander makes the decision and plans combat operations. The technical means, however, only make the work of the commander and staff officers easier in commanding and controlling forces.

Thus, forecasting as a special method of scientific cognition plays a very important role in the direction over the Armed Forces and command and control of forces. Data obtained as a result of forecasting comprise the scientific base of any decision and the data base of strategic operational and tactical direction. To command and control efficiently [operativno] means to command and control with extensive forecasting.

It must be stressed once again that the Party's overall requirements for the direction of the country's national economy, i.e. "to learn to control in a new way, on the basis of a broad mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory, the theory and practice of control, scientific organization of labor, new methods of planning and economic stimulation, and the application of economic-mathematical methods and contemporary computer technology,"⁵—also fully apply to direction in the military field.

⁵ *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p. 175.

Chapter 9. Training and Education of Military Personnel

The training and education of Soviet military personnel is the most important part of the development of the Armed Forces. It is a dual process with the goal of preparing aware and skilled defenders of the socialist Motherland, forming in them high combat efficiency and morale, gaining the combat coordination of subunits, units and warships, and, in the final account, increasing the combat effectiveness and readiness of the Armed Forces.

The constant development of weapons and combat equipment and the appearance of new and the improvement of existing methods of combat operations complicate the process of training and educating personnel, present increasing demands on officer cadres, and make it necessary to constantly improve methods of educational work. The success of combat, political and operational training, as well as the level of the combat might of the Armed Forces depend on the quality of this educational work.

1. A High State of Training for Military Personnel—One of the Most Important Components of the Combat Might of the Armed Forces

When we speak of the combat power of the Armed Forces, we at times reduce this concept to their armament and technical equipment. However, this is not the only source of combat power. Of themselves, weapons and military equipment do not determine the success of combat operations. What is important is in whose hands they are. We know that man was and remains the decisive force in war. Neither a missile, nor a plane, nor a tank—nothing is so formidable for the enemy as a soldier who has high combat morale and military expertise, who is capable of skillfully employing weapons and equipment and using their combat properties to the full extent to defeat the enemy and win victory.

Consequently, along with the quantitative supplying of troops with weapons and combat equipment and improving their quality, the political-moral status of personnel and the degree of their military prep-

aration act as the chief components of the combat might of the Armed Forces. The more weighty these components are, the higher is the combat might of the Armed Forces and the more reliable are their combat effectiveness and readiness. Not one of them can be replaced or decreased without detriment to combat power. Only together do they form that firm combat alloy in which the qualitative aspect of the Armed Forces and the defensive capability of our entire state are expressed.

Of the chief components of combat power named above, two relate directly to man, his state of training, and his moral-political, psychological and physical preparedness. Only a soldier who has these qualities highly developed is able to put weapons and combat equipment in operation and get everything out of it that it is capable of giving from its combat performance characteristics. Indeed, it is in these qualities of man that we see his decisive role in war, and it is precisely for this reason that we place the training and education of military personnel on the same level as the technical supplying of troops with contemporary weapons and combat equipment.

Combat experience shows that poorly trained armies always have suffered heavy losses in battle and often have suffered total defeat at the hands of an enemy that was inferior in number. And conversely, well-trained troops possessing high morale have won victories even over superior enemy forces. The significance of a unity of material and spiritual factors was great in the past, and it has grown even greater now.

In past wars, shortcomings in the state of training of soldiers and commanders were to some extent eliminated in the intervals between engagements and battles, and also while personnel were in reserve and replacement units. But even then, it was at a cost of unnecessary losses in personnel and combat equipment. If the imperialists unleash a new war, then regardless of what weapons are used to begin it and wage it, combat operations from the very first hours will assume active and decisive forms. Their intensity, great dynamic action and stress may continue for a long while. Troops will shift from one form of combat operations to another without pause. Under such conditions it is difficult to organize further schooling and refresher training of troops. Therefore, so as not to suffer useless casualties in war, it is necessary while it is still peacetime to ensure a high level of combat and political training of personnel.

This, of course, does not mean that in a future war there will be no place at all for improvement in the combat expertise of troops. Every war makes its own adjustments to the methods of conducting combat operations and gives birth to new combat experience of employing men and equipment. One cannot help but take them into account. And in a future war it will be necessary to take advantage of every opportunity for raising the state of training of troops, including in the course of combat operations.

In speaking of training troops for a possible war, we take account of its special character both in the sociopolitical and military-technical plane. It will require that every one of our soldiers have a firm ideological conditioning, high military knowledge, skillful mastery of equipment and weapons, skillful and aware actions, and an ability to withstand great moral-psychological and physical stress. This means that the readiness of personnel to conduct combat operations must be thorough and be formed both from military-technical and physical, as well as from moral-political and psychological training. As contemporary weapons develop and saturate the Armed Forces, the role of training constantly increases.

Under contemporary conditions **the chief task of training and education of military personnel** is to shape and cement together the combat, moral-political, psychological and physical qualities in every soldier and every Armed Forces collective, and on the basis of this, to develop high combat expertise, spiritual stability, constant readiness to endure any trials of war, and an ability to maintain combat activeness and an unshakable will to win under the most difficult conditions.

The development of these qualities is a complex, diverse and laborious process. It is connected organically with the entire life of the Soviet State and the Soviet people, with the entire system of combat and political training and military upbringing, and with the entire tenor of Armed Forces life, and it continues throughout a person's military service.

Tactical, weapons, technical and specialized training are of primary importance in troop training. Views exist to the effect that now the role of tactics is allegedly becoming less and less essential, and that in modern war strategy and operational art allegedly decide everything. This is incorrect. Regardless of the means used to wage a war, tactics remain the basis for achieving operational and strategic successes. And the higher the art of tactics and the richer and broader the arsenal of tactical techniques possessed by commanders and troops, the greater are chances for victory. Any operational or strategic maneuver begins with these tactical techniques. The implementation of operational and strategic schemes begins with tactics, is accomplished by means of tactical techniques and is concluded with such techniques.

Let us take as an example a well-known tactical technique such as an attack. This is the most important stage in the combat operations of troops. People, subunits and units are the true creators of an attack. Those who take part in war know well how much unique courage and utter bravery an attack embodies. An attack lays the first stones in the foundation of victory over the enemy. Within it is concentrated not only a common impulse of will and resolve of people, but also their expertise, the painstaking search and enormous creative labor of commanders and staffs, and the desire to provide for any event, to preclude fatal chance

happenings, and to find something new and yet unknown to the enemy in the employment of men and equipment. When there is success, the avalanche of the attack develops into an offensive, stupefies the enemy and leads to victory. And on the other hand, if the attack is not organized, and if people are not trained or prepared for it, it suffers failure, and along with it the concept of the entire offensive breaks down.

Thus, in spite of the increased significance of operational-strategic means of warfare and of strategy and operational art, tactics and the operations of small subunits—company, platoon, squad, crew, team—will continue even today to play a large part in winning victory. And in order to maintain their high degree of combat coordination and readiness for battle under difficult conditions, we must deal more with problems of increasing the quality of tactical training. We must not shirk either time or effort on this, and must display high principle, initiative and exactingness. Tactical training always must be the focus of attention for our commanders, political organs and Party organizations as the most important part of combat training of personnel.

Troops are required to learn to act boldly, decisively and persistently in offensive and defensive operations, and to display firmness and stubbornness. In both forms of combat operations there is a need for precise organization, reliable control and close interaction between subunits, units and large units.

A high degree of tactical training is unthinkable without exemplary mastery of equipment and weapons, and without the full use of their combat characteristics. In this regard we can clearly see the important role of weapon, technical and specialized training.

Firepower from all types of weapons is the decisive means for conducting a battle or operation. It prepares the attack and leads the attacking troops, and in defense it serves as the basis for defensive endurance and impregnability. No offensive or defensive actions are possible without destruction of enemy personnel and weapons by firepower. Here, the high dynamics of combat presume an ability to destroy a target with the first round, the first launch of a missile, or the first attack in aerial or naval combat. It is clear from this that training soldiers in the skillful conduct of firepower, both with individual and with group weapons, is one of the most important tasks of combat training.

Along with an ability to operate with tactical proficiency on the battlefield and to conduct accurate destructive fire, it is very important for soldiers to have excellent mastery of the complex combat equipment at their disposal. The high level of technical proficiency of personnel has now become one of the basic indicators of combat training and the combat readiness of troops. Therefore, the adoption of combat equipment

and a search for the most effective means for its combat use ranks among one of the first places in troop training.

Tactical, weapons, technical and specialized training comprise the basis for all combat training of troops and naval forces, but do not exhaust it. In order to successfully accomplish missions in combat, there is also a requirement for high physical and drill training and for the ability not only to use one's own weapon, but also to defend against all types of enemy weapons, create reliable engineering works and shelters, employ camouflage and recognize enemy camouflage, know enemy tactics and the combat capabilities of his military equipment, and skillfully oppose this with one's own tactics and equipment. In short, personnel training takes shape from an entire complex of knowledge and practical skills. These are not acquired all at once, but are accumulated gradually, in the course of all the training and service of soldiers. The high degree of thorough training of military personnel is one of the decisive prerequisites for high combat effectiveness and readiness of the Armed Forces.

Personnel training is inseparable from military education, which is carried out in accordance with the *general principles of development of the Armed Forces*. It is also closely correlated with ideological-political education, which is a leading factor with respect to military education.

The ultimate goal of training and education in the Armed Forces is to train soldiers as masters of their combat specialty who have high moral-political qualities, who are patriots and internationalists deeply aware and dedicated to the cause of the Party and the Soviet people, who are capable of overcoming any hardships, and who are ready to spare neither their energies nor life itself for the sake of defending the socialist Motherland.

The decisive position in training and educating Soviet soldiers and in accomplishing tasks of combat and political training belongs to the officers and the army of thousands of ensigns and warrants, sergeants and senior NCO's—to our command, political and technical-engineer cadres.

The leading role in training and educating personnel is played by the commander. He readies his subordinates for armed defense of the Motherland, and he leads them into battle. One need have no doubt that if a commander possesses the necessary store of general scientific, military, technical and political knowledge, if he has thoroughly assimilated the principles of battle and operational plans and the design and use of weapons and combat equipment at his disposal, if he is able to employ them intelligently, and if he possesses an ability to influence the hearts and minds of people and inspire them to great deeds by his per-

sonal example, then the troops which he leads will always be accompanied by success, both in peacetime and in wartime.

It is not said in vain among the people that the commander is capable of everything. This is really so. He is the organizer of training and education of subordinates, and the timely and qualitative resolution of combat training tasks depends on his high degree of comprehensive training. The commander's responsible position obligates him to be persistent and systematic in increasing his political, operational-tactical and technical-military knowledge and the skills of organizing and controlling troops and combat means under difficult conditions, in any weather, and at any time of day. He must thoroughly study the nature and character of war, the operation, and the battle and have a good knowledge of his own troops and those of the enemy, their strong and weak points, and all the diversity of weapons and combat equipment which might be employed in battle or operation. He must make use of their combat qualities with greatest effect, undertake those actions which would place the enemy in an unfavorable position and ensure achievement of victory with the fewest possible losses of friendly troops. Only a good theoretical knowledge of military art, solid methodological skills in organization of the training process, initiative and culture in work will help commanders to successfully accomplish tasks of combat and operational training and attain sound combat coordination in subunits, units, warships and large units.

Every commander has to understand precisely the requirements for training and education of troops and have a clear picture of the ways to accomplish this. His primary duty is to seek new techniques and methods for organizing procedures for classes and exercises and improving methodological expertise. This is achieved by systematic and scheduled commander's training and by classes on methods of conducting instruction and demonstrations. Here an officer cannot limit himself only to scheduled classes. What is needed here is a great deal of independent work and a critical attitude toward the results of one's labor. This will allow the commander to always be current with the latest achievements of military science and to use his knowledge creatively and with initiative for training and educating subordinates.

The personal example of senior supervisors and their ability to make their work as meaningful as possible to the people, has an enormous effect on achieving success in troop training. The direct participation of experienced military leaders in troop training and education is a fundamentally important matter that has been advanced by life itself. In recent times the commanders of the Armed Forces have become considerably younger. Many officers who recently completed military schools are becoming commanders of companies, battalions, squadrons, and the combat sections of warships. A number of command positions are held by officers called up from the reserve. It stands to reason that they

require constant attention and care, and supervision at the same time. And who is to do this, if not the senior supervisors? They must pass on to the youth their experience so that the successes of junior officers in the methodology of training and educating subordinates grow from day to day. This is, of course, a complex matter. It requires extensive political, military and specialized knowledge, a broad cultural outlook and a subtle pedagogic sense of tact.

The roles of a regimental commander and ship captain in training and educating personnel should be especially emphasized. The regiment and warship are the types of units in the Armed Forces and the types of organizations that are most adapted to the resolution of independent missions both in peace and in war. Military traditions are most fully manifested, preserved and developed within this organization. The military pride of officers, soldiers and sailors is largely connected with regiments and warships. And the better prepared these Armed Forces combat organisms are, the higher is the combat readiness of the Armed Forces as a whole.

The commander is the heart and soul of the regiment and warship. Success in combat and political training and in military discipline of personnel is inseparable from his efforts and style of work. He is given great authority needed for successfully accomplishing the complex responsibilities placed upon him. And his duty is to act in accordance with the demands of life and to have a daily concern for improving his knowledge and that of his subordinates, and for training the staff. It is the commander who is to lay new paths in increasing the combat effectiveness and readiness of the regiment and warship and in organizing training, especially in the area of field, naval and aerial training of personnel, and training of officers, ensigns, warrants, sergeants and senior NCO's by commanders.

We associate the regimental commander or warship captain with the most noble moral qualities of the Soviet citizen—high ideals, exactingness, principle, faultless honesty, responsiveness and fairness. After all, those qualities that the regiment commander or ship captain possesses become the property of all officers. They take their example from him, watch his behavior fixedly, listen with heightened attention to every word of the unit commander and attach special significance to all his deeds. He must take all this into account and not lose in the eyes of subordinates his high dignity, which is connected with his position as head of the regiment or ship's crew.

Favorable conditions exist in the Armed Forces for training and educating personnel. In the Soviet Armed Forces, the basis of this process is comprised of class unity—the commonality of goals and aspirations of both the trainers and the trainees, and their sole honorable and responsible duty as citizens of the USSR to defend the Motherland. The Armed

Forces have experienced officer cadres. Firm military order and discipline is maintained in units and on ships, work is well organized, and there is the necessary training equipment and stores. All this creates fertile soil for the creative training and education of troops and the successful accomplishment of training and combat missions.

The sociopolitical unity of personnel, the high quality of troop training and education and their technical equipping, as well as the comprehensive preparedness of officer cadres constitute the foundation upon which rests the combat might of the Armed Forces, their combat effectiveness and combat readiness. And this foundation as a whole, as well as in its individual parts, cannot be disrupted or weakened under any circumstances without damaging the country's defensive capability.

2. Principles of Troop Training and Education

The successful activity of commanders, political organs and staffs in training and educating personnel is possible on condition that they observe principles developed by theory and practice during the process of Soviet military development, which allow for consistent and skillful preparation of troops to accomplish their combat missions. These principles stem from the laws for the development of the socialist social system and the laws of war. They objectively consider the high degree of awareness of Soviet soldiers. They have a socialist class orientation and differ fundamentally from the principles of personnel training in armies of capitalist states.

The thesis of development of the best human qualities—humaneness, comradeship, a love for one's Homeland and solidarity with workers of all countries and aspirations for heroic deeds in the name of the people—runs through the principles of training and education of Soviet soldiers. In capitalist armies, however, if we discard the thoroughly false verbal camouflage of propagandists of imperialism about the "high mission" of bourgeois armies in "defense of the Western world," the training and ideological cultivation of troops are aimed at developing in them base instincts—careerism, winning by any means, contempt for other peoples, outrages against the conquered, cupidity and moneygrubbing. The entire system of training of capitalist armies pursues the goal of attaining the blind obedience of soldiers to their commanders who express the will of the dominant exploiting classes.

Our principles of training and education are stipulated by the ideas of V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party on the defense of the socialist Fatherland. They objectively reflect both the requirements of modern warfare for personnel training and the basic features and patterns of change in these requirements at each new stage in the development of the armed forces. They determine the general direction, content, ways and methods of training Soviet soldiers.

The basic principles of training and education of military personnel are the following: communist ideology and Party spirit; a unity of training and education; training troops in what is necessary in war and under conditions which approximate combat reality as closely as possible; a unity in training military personnel and their high degree of combat readiness; training and education of personnel in the spirit of active offensive actions, persistence, and decisiveness in attaining a goal; and a combination of the individual training of troops with the training of subunits, units, and ships.

Communist moral substance and Party spirit in training and education determine the **political orientation and class character** of the entire comprehensive process of training personnel. This principle reflects the leading role of the Communist Party in the development of the Armed Forces, including the development and perfection of the entire system of training and educating Soviet military personnel.

Shaping of the personality of a Soviet soldier does not mean only instilling in him specific combat qualities or making him a specialist in a specific military field of knowledge and skill, but also seeing to it that he is a confirmed and politically aware fighter, a fiery patriot of the socialist Motherland and an internationalist who is utterly devoted to the cause of the Communist Party and Soviet people.

Party-mindedness in training and education signifies the persistent and consistent following of the Communist Party line in all the activities of the Armed Forces and the steadfast implementation of V. I. Lenin's principles of ideological work: a high communist moral substance, ties with the life of the Soviet people, irreconcilability toward hostile ideology, and increases in vigilance and combat readiness. To these ends it is important to show clearly the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in communist development in all classes and exercises, in lectures and reports, in printed propaganda, and in the Armed Forces press. We must further show the remarkable achievements of the Soviet people in developing the state's economy and show the Party's concern for constantly raising the material standard of living of working people, for the upbringing of a new man, and for strengthening the country's defensive might and the combat effectiveness and readiness of the Armed Forces.

Every soldier must be made aware of the current problems in the foreign policy of the USSR and the significance of the Communist Party's struggle for further developing friendship and cooperation with countries of socialism and for peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems. Simultaneously we must uncover the aggressive intrigues of imperialist circles aimed at preparing for and unleashing a new world war.

The high communist moral substance and awareness of soldiers act as

an important indicator of their combat and political training. The level of combat readiness in subunits, units and warships is higher where personnel act more consciously and actively in performing their military duties and their training and combat missions.

Communist moral substance and Party spirit are closely interrelated with the principle of **unity of education and training**. This predetermines the inseparability of soldiers' training with their political and military upbringing. This inseparability is achieved through the joint activity of commanders, political workers, engineer-technical personnel, Party and Komsomol organizations, and the entire Armed Forces community, through their conduct of purposeful educational activities, and through their influence on personnel in the course of all training, service and life of the troops—at classes and exercises, while performing combat alert duty, during military routine, and while maintaining combat equipment and weapons. There is a rule: while you train [someone]—educate him, and while you educate—train him. This obliges officers to strive for having all training and educational measures quite thoroughly correlated with each other and directed toward a single goal.

The unity of training and education is based on a deep understanding by Soviet soldiers of their duties as armed defenders of the socialist Homeland and their strict compliance with the requirements of the oath and regulations. It is achieved through the utilization of interrelated and interdependent forms and methods of combat training, political and military education, and the psychological tempering of personnel. All knowledge and skills are imparted to the soldiers on the ideological basis of Marxism-Leninism, with an explanation of their political significance. Combat, moral-political, psychological and physical qualities are formed in personnel during theoretical and practical studies, and solidified during independent work and training exercises.

In the dialectically indivisible process of training and education of troops, communist ideas become stable personal convictions of soldiers, the norm of their behavior and the guiding principle of their daily activity.

An important requirement placed on the training and education of personnel is **training troops in what is necessary in war, under conditions which closely approximate those of combat reality**. This principle expresses the *practical orientation* of troop training. Many outstanding military leaders of the past also adhered to it. However, the content of this principle has constantly changed, encompassing ever broader fields of troop activity and penetrating into all spheres of their training for war.

In our time the principle of teaching the troops what is necessary in war has a richer and more comprehensive content than before. This has happened because, first of all, training is now carried out in a situation

where units and warships are in a state of high combat readiness and a great proportion of their activity consists of performing combat alert duty. Secondly, this principle encompasses the process not only of combat training of personnel, but the development in them of high moral-political, psychological and physical qualities, which, in the past, were not always required on such a vast scale of all soldiers without exception. Thirdly, there has been an increase in the scope of military-technical knowledge and an increasing complexity in mutual relationships and dependence of man and combat equipment. And fourthly, requirements have increased towards studying the probable enemy, his equipment and tactics.

The necessary ability and skills are imparted to troops best when exercises are conducted under conditions which most closely approximate combat reality, in a complex and tense situation, where combat training is inseparably connected with moral-political and psychological training of soldiers and with the development in them of spiritual and physical steadfastness in enduring the burdens and deprivations of war and persistence in attaining goals.

Nothing has as negative an impact on troop training as various types of indulgence and simplification. Personnel are left with an erroneous concept of modern combat, the development of essential combat qualities is hindered, and there is an undermining of the very essence, the very basis of the principle to teach the troops what is essential in war and under conditions that approach combat reality to the maximum extent possible.

The principle of **unity of troop training and their high degree of combat readiness** has great significance. In the final analysis, all measures related to the development of the Armed Forces, including training and education of personnel, are directed towards achieving a high state of readiness in the Armed Forces and constantly maintaining it at the necessary level. This is dictated by the complex contemporary international situation and the possibility of its sudden deterioration, even to the point of a war being unleashed by the aggressive circles of imperialism, as well as by the very nature of modern war, which could begin by having all combat-ready men and equipment being put into action.

As was already stated, combat readiness is determined by many components. One of the most important of these is the level of combat and political preparedness of personnel. There can be no high state of combat readiness without well-programmed and intensive study, without educating soldiers with political awareness and personal responsibility for the state of their subunit, unit, ship, or formation, and without forming many other qualities in them that an armed defender of the socialist Motherland would have. In turn, a high degree of combat

readiness is the most important factor stimulating the successful resolution of problems in troop training.

The unity of troop training and the high state of combat readiness of troops assumes the following: conduct of basic training and education of soldiers in the shortest possible time and their rapid assimilation into the system, as well as a high degree of combat coordination in subunits, units, and ships; constant improvement of practical skills and the knowledge to use weapons and combat equipment and maintain them in operational, combat-ready order; training each soldier to know not only his own specialty, but others, as well, in order to insure uninterrupted action of team weapons; correlation between training activity and combat alert duty; and instilling a high degree of vigilance in soldiers and a feeling of personal responsibility for a high state of combat readiness in subunits, units, and ships.

The principle of training and educating troops in the spirit of active offensive actions, persistence, and decisiveness in achieving goals stems from general propositions of Soviet military doctrine, the requirements of our regulations and manuals, the nature of modern war, and the intended missions of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Soviet military doctrine has always considered and still considers the offense to be the basic form of combat operations, while defense is a forced action which is used when the enemy has a superiority in forces and equipment and when the situation is clearly turning to his advantage. Only a decisive offensive can insure victory over an enemy.

Modern warfare is a highly maneuverable type of warfare, thus, the role of active offensive operations in achieving victory will increase immeasurably. Training the troops in such operations, and forming and developing their initiative, persistence, decisiveness, and drive to victory constitutes the most important requirement of combat and political training, and forms the basis for the entire process of training and educating personnel.

An aggressive spirit, dynamic action, and decisiveness in attaining assigned goals are all peculiar to the revolutionary spirit of the Soviet Armed Forces. These qualities constitute their characteristic features and reflect their high combat capabilities. But these qualities do not come of themselves; they are instilled and improved upon in the course of training and with hard, intensive work.

The ever-increasing complexity of training and indoctrination of troops requires a precise **combination of individual training of soldiers and the training of subunits, units, and ships**. This principle simultaneously determines both the *social* and *systematic orientation* in a soldier's training, taking into consideration his general educational level, physical and psychological characteristics, cultural development, and how his

combat assignment will contribute to strengthening the military collective.

The specific nature of combat and political training is such that individual military specialists are developed during its course and at the same time a combat-effective Armed Forces collective takes shape. Military labor is collective labor. Its results depend on the work of each person at his post and of the collective as a whole. Therefore, there is a requirement for irreproachable training of all specialists without exception, so as to ensure precision, swiftness and efficiency in the performance of individual duties, as well as coordinated combat activity in subunits, units, or on warships. Moreover, there is great importance in developing in all members of crews or teams not only a maximum of coordination, but also moral-psychological compatibility. Every subunit, warship or unit must be a firmly welded collective, where all soldiers act precisely and in coordination, have a deep faith in one another, help one another in every way, and look out for one another in every possible way.

Every soldier, sailor, sergeant and senior NCO is both a member of a military collective and at the very same time retains his individuality. He has his own life and work experiences, needs, interests and individual cast of character. There are also differences both in their general educational and cultural levels.

Individual work with the soldier makes possible an in-depth study of his character, views, interests, abilities, strong and weak points, and attitude toward military labor and his comrades in service. It allows us to learn whether he possesses the willpower, resolve and knowledge to finish a job.

In analyzing the actions of a subordinate, the officer-educator attempts to see the best and most valuable qualities in a person's character, and to determine how to overcome the negative and develop his positive aspects. He strives above all to find an ally in the subordinate himself, to motivate him to rid himself of his shortcomings, and to set an example in the performance of military duties. When personnel display a creative energy on a broad scale, independently seek answers to questions posed by life, and look for methods for the best utilization of weapons entrusted to them, then they genuinely possess military expertise. Let people not only understand what is said in class, but also obtain as many opportunities as possible to display their knowledge in practice, in the routine of military labor. *This greatly facilitates the development of solid skills and proper convictions in them, which dictate the correct line of behavior in the service and in everyday life.*

The individual approach to training and educating personnel is so

arranged that each individual is viewed as a member of a specific military collective—a squad, team, crew, platoon, company, battery, etc.

The Soviet military collective has an enormous educational force. Inherent to it is a high awareness, organization, joint and mutually-related activity, and a unity of interests of all its members. Therefore, the officer attempts to thoroughly learn and understand the psychology of the military collective and make skillful use of the potential it has in influencing the training and education of personnel. In his work with people he supports the useful initiative of subordinates and aids them in reinforcing and developing their positive qualities and eliminating shortcomings.

The stability and solidarity of a military collective is not based only on organizational-administrative forms and requirements. Such a collective would be merely a formal amalgamation of people with different interests and requirements, without firm internal mutual ties and a mutual dependence in joint activity. The inner solidarity and monolithic spirit inherent in Soviet Armed Forces collectives is supported and reinforced above all by the authority and skilled leadership of officers as full-fledged representatives of the Soviet State, by diverse educational work, by a unity of class interests of all personnel, and by a conscious fulfillment of all requirements placed on the military collective.

A soldier must not only have an excellent knowledge of his specialty, but must also be ready to replace any comrade on the combat team, or in the crew or subunit. Especially valuable here is comradely support and a sense of collectivism. Interchangeability presumes mutual training in which every specialist who has become an expert in his job teaches his comrades, while he himself comes to master related specialties. Mutual training is connected with the increasing role of the commander in leading and directing the training and education of subordinates and simultaneously, with persistent and purposeful work by the subordinates themselves—primarily by old-timers—who are thoughtful in their help for one another and for young soldiers, and who actively participate in solving new problems.

Instilling a genuine collectivism does not dissolve characteristic features or the best qualities of a personality. On the contrary, a Soviet collective assists in every possible way in developing vivid individual qualities in a person and in ridding him of shortcomings, defects and negative habits. Recognition of one's allegiance to the common cause multiplies the strength of the Soviet soldier and reinforces his spirit of combat comradeship and the ability to properly combine personal aspirations with social duties.

An intelligent combination of an individual approach, with reliance on the collective, in training and educating personnel facilitates success-

ful preparation for accomplishing combat missions both by individual soldiers and by entire subunits, units, and warships. It ensures that their combat coordination is achieved with the maximum speed.

In the training and education of troops, officers rely on *the degree of high awareness and activeness of personnel* that is characteristic of the Soviet Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin attached exceptionally great importance to the awareness and activeness of the masses in accomplishing tasks of socialist development, including those in the military field. He very highly esteemed the "ability to explain to the masses why we have to apply ourselves with all our might first to one, then to another aspect of Soviet work at a particular moment; and the ability to raise the level of energy, heroism and enthusiasm of the masses, focusing revolutionarily strenuous efforts on the most important task at hand."¹ Our officers are guided by this thesis of V. I. Lenin. They employ those forms and methods of organization and conduct of classes which permit the trainees to intelligently master knowledge, ability and skills and which facilitate the display and development of soldiers' awareness and activeness. In the process of combat and political training, personnel improve their cognitive abilities. In classes the difficulty of the material is steadily increased, requiring that trainees display initiative and creativity in order to assimilate it thoroughly. The activeness of soldiers and their desire to independently improve their combat expertise is encouraged in every way.

Socialist competition is an important means for bringing out these qualities. With its help, the commander develops the activeness of the military collective, directing it toward a further strengthening of the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or warship.

In connection with the constantly growing complexity of weapons, there is an increase in the scope of knowledge and practical skills necessary for mastering such weapons. It is extremely difficult to master everything to the last detail in a short time. Meanwhile, we have to prepare specialists without reducing the combat readiness of subunits, units or warships even for a short time. This may be achieved through first mastering individual assemblies and components and subsequently shifting to a more thorough and detailed study of the weapon as a whole and instilling skills necessary for its use. From the simple to the complex, from the specific to the general and with observance of the *systematic character and sequence* of training and education; this is one of the basic methodological rules for training the soldier—a first-rate specialist and a master in military matters.

An important role in the observance of this requirement is played by carefully thought out planning of combat and political training, which

¹ V. I. Lenin, XXXIX, 305.

considers the organic mutual dependence and relationship of some training subjects with others, the acquisition of some knowledge and skills on the basis of other knowledge and skills, and which pursues the goal of complete and qualitative accomplishment of all measures in troop training and education. It was in the organizing principle that V. I. Lenin saw the enormous force which improves any labor—both of the individual and of the collective. V. I. Lenin's demand that one constantly concern himself with the "theory of organization of that work to which they intend to dedicate themselves . . ." ² is fully applicable to military leaders. The essence of the systematic character and sequence of training and education of troops lies in training the individual soldier and sailor; at first working on separate themes and subjects of training and then, shifting to specialized training and to the combat coordination of subunits, units, and warships; continuously improving and broadening their knowledge and developing those techniques and skills acquired in the performance of their combat missions.

The creative use of principles of training and education which have been scientifically substantiated and tested in practice permits attainment of solid and comprehensive knowledge, ability and skills by personnel. The training of a soldier has specific features. It differs from all other types of training and education in that it is accomplished in a situation that is tense, often dangerous, and one that closely approximates combat. The complex situation of modern combat is considered in training and educating personnel. Enemy resistance, the high dynamics of combat operations, jamming, incomplete data on enemy men and equipment, terrain, climate and weather which are not always favorable, and great emotional experiences connected with the responsibility for carrying out an order and the responsibility for the lives of one's comrades are but a few of the conditions under which a soldier has to make decisions in combat. In spite of all the complexity of conditions, reaction must follow immediately: estimate of the situation, decision and action. Without solid skills and knowledge one will not be successful in achieving this. In addition, after service in the Armed Forces and while in the reserves, a soldier needs solid knowledge and ability in order to remain capable of again joining the ranks of the Armed Forces at any time the Motherland calls. Military knowledge and skills do not go into the reserves; they have to remain combat-ready for the soldier's entire lifetime.

Solid knowledge, abilities, and skills are developed in the soldier through an extensive and comprehensive explanation of their practical significance, through systematic extension and improvement of knowledge, and also by a conscious and active reinforcement of this knowledge by the trainee in independent work. In the course of such work he will better perceive the methods of actions being studied, more fully assimilate knowledge and skills, and acquire confidence in his own powers and

² V. I. Lenin, XLV, 396-397.

abilities, as well as in the combat capabilities of the equipment he is mastering.

Raising the quality of troop training and achieving high marks in personnel training depend in large part on officers' skillful use of the wholesome influence on the Soviet people resulting from the socialist social order, as well as from the entire aggregate of sociopolitical conditions in which they study, work, and fulfill their social and service responsibilities. V. I. Lenin emphasized the fact that in order to work successfully with the masses one must not only see, but also understand the changes that occur in people and, in accordance with this, one must introduce timely and essential corrections, clarification of contents, and forms and methods of influencing the masses, as well as training and educating them.

Even before they are called into the army, Soviet youth are instilled with deep communist convictions and awareness, as well as with a feeling of personal responsibility for the destiny of the Motherland. From the older generations, our youth have inherited high moral-political qualities, an utter devotion and love for the Communist Party and the Soviet people, and a readiness to give all their strength, knowledge, experience—and, if necessary, their lives—to the cause of defending the socialist Homeland.

The process of educating the youth continues in the Armed Forces with even greater intensity and purposefulness. The high moral and political qualities, acquired prior to their service in the Armed Forces, are constantly strengthened and skillfully guided toward fulfillment of combat and political training tasks.

From the first days of their arrival in the Armed Forces, the young people very enthusiastically begin to study military equipment and master the science of armed defense of the Motherland. Their enthusiasm for steadily increasing the combat readiness and combat capability of the Soviet Armed Forces is supported, developed and skillfully directed in every possible way by our commanders, political organs, and Party and Komsomol organizations. They take into account here the high general educational and cultural level of the youth. The majority has a higher and a secondary education. Many of them have acquired various technical trades, often related to military specialties. This allows them to assimilate theoretical principles of military affairs in a short time and acquire solid practical skills in their mastery of weapons and combat equipment.

Everyone, to one degree or another, knows the principles and requirements placed on training and education. But knowledge still does not assure success. It has to be multiplied by the ability to apply these principles in practice in a concrete situation, enrich their content creatively

and expand their influence on the entire process of combat and political training.

It is especially important that the principles always reflect changes in the character of modern warfare, in weapons, combat equipment and military art, and in the development of the Soviet people themselves—their views, interests, culture and working conditions. Results of the practical application of training and education principles must be subjected to thorough research, generalization and analysis on the basis of Marxist-Leninist methodology. The principles of training and educating personnel must help in finding the most effective forms and methods of training troops.

3. Improving Forms and Methods of Troop Training and Education

As we know, the scope, content and sequence of training and education of troops are determined by appropriate orders, and programs and plans for combat and political training are developed on the basis of those orders. The training of every specialist and military collective will be all the more purposeful when planning for combat and political training is more precise and concrete, and when there is a more comprehensive and thorough study and consideration of conditions under which personnel have to complete their assigned tasks.

But this is only one side of the matter. It characterizes only the organizational aspect of combat and political training. No matter how good programs and plans are, they will not in themselves ensure good results if the leader does not have a mastery of the methodology of training and education, if his classes are boring and monotonous, and if he is not capable of motivating the trainees' desires to understand and ponder the material presented. Any class is of value only if it presents something new and advanced, and if it incites interest and gives rise to a craving for acquiring knowledge and skills.

An important role in training and education is played by the forms and methods employed by the leader in conducting classes, i.e., the system of interrelated and interdependent techniques and methods by which knowledge is given to trainees graphically, clearly and intelligibly, the necessary skills are inculcated, moral-political, psychological and physical qualities are developed, and the combat coordination of military collectives is accomplished.

The question of the forms and methods of training and educating troops is essentially one of having the depth of knowledge, quality and breadth of those practical skills and abilities which are instilled in trainees in the process of combat and political training. Personnel will be qualitatively trained for successful accomplishment of combat missions to the extent that forms and methods of training and education are cor-

rectly chosen and all requirements and conditions of training are considered.

The Soviet Armed Forces have a large arsenal of forms and methods of troop training and education both in peacetime and in wartime. The basic forms of training and education employed include theoretical and practical study in classrooms, training fields, and firing ranges and various types of troop exercises, from tactical at the subunit level to strategic, in a scale encompassing all branches and services of the Armed Forces. A number of methods have given a good account of themselves including oral presentation of training material, talks, a practical demonstration of techniques by the leader, trainee practice that is either independent or under the guidance of the commander, the study of recommended materials, aids, and others.

The forms and methods of training and education are not set in concrete, once and for all. They take shape and are perfected along with development of the Armed Forces and depend primarily on those requirements which are placed on the combat effectiveness and readiness of the Armed Forces and on the level of training and education of the soldiers. The specific nature, characteristic features and peculiarities of training specialists in every combat and support service and branch of the Armed Forces, and the general educational and technical competence of trainees has substantial influence on them.

The training and education of Soviet soldiers are connected organically with all their everyday activity and their performance of official tasks. This expands the possibilities of training and education, permits broadening the knowledge and improving the skills of trainees in the course of practical activity, thoroughly evaluating results of this work, identifying shortcomings and raising the quality of troop training.

But this does not at all mean that the soldiers are in a position to acquire all knowledge and skills only in a practical way. Theoretical training plays a large part in mastering new and complex equipment and the contemporary methods of combat. Without extensive theoretical knowledge, combat practice cannot be successful. A vivid and graphic story and a very well-reasoned lecture, accompanied by examples and a demonstration of well-developed operational techniques and methods open the way for perceiving the extent of military affairs and allow the soldiers to form a precise impression of the combat equipment and weapons being studied and to approach the attainment of combat expertise in a rational way.

One must keep in mind that under present-day conditions the scope of knowledge needed by personnel grows in proportion to the development and growing complexity of weapons and combat equipment. This requires search for new forms and methods of training in order to bring

a greater volume of knowledge to trainees in a shorter period of time. This can be achieved by selection of the most optimum theoretical material needed for developing practical ability, through the high methodological skills of class leaders, by a continuous improvement in the training material base, and by broad application of programmed training, which permits integration of theoretical learning with the acquisition of practical skills in a specialty.

Development of theoretical training of personnel is facilitated by well organized military-theoretical propaganda in subunits, units and warships, the organization of evenings devoted to learning about equipment, to quiz games and to competitions in various questions of theory, and the work of lecture staffs, schools of advanced experience, military-technical circles, clubs and exhibits.

Theoretical knowledge is definitely reinforced in working with weapons and in practical sessions while performing exercises and servicing equipment. Here the trainee's ability, skills and techniques are polished and brought to a state of automatism. Figuratively speaking, practical actions are the touchstone and criterion of the correctness and viability of military theory.

Modern requirements of troop combat readiness have substantial influence on forms and methods of training and educating soldiers, and on the close interrelationship of theory and practice. They dictate that the phase of personnel training in which theoretical knowledge is acquired be supplemented and followed immediately by the development of skills in mastering weapons and combat equipment in practical classes and training sessions. This is one of the invariable criteria for ensuring a high state of field, naval and flight training of soldiers and their readiness for immediate application of knowledge in a combat situation. In the process of training and education, theory and practice always accompany one another and are in constant mutual dependence.

In his choice of the methodology and system of training and education, the skill of the class leader and the organizer of combat and political training lies in their ability to find the main link—that basic element or technique, and that concrete sum of knowledge—which when mastered, begins and lays the shortest path to developing a soldier-specialist—the path to combat expertise, high combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the subunit, unit, or warship. Tens and hundreds of specialties in which soldiers become proficient, the different characters and inclinations of people, and the different level of their preparedness do not allow the amalgamation and expression of the varied process of training and education in some one methodological formula. The chief and deciding factor here is a concrete approach to a choice of the most effective techniques and methods of training and education of personnel,

the leader's painstaking labor, and his creative search for development of new and more sophisticated forms and methods of troop training.

When we speak of the training and education of individual soldiers, we mean not only the rank and file, but also the officers who occupy key posts in any collective. It would be rash to assume that inasmuch as officers are trained and highly experienced people, they allegedly do not require much day-to-day training and practice. However, the true expertise of every specialist depends upon the one who sets the tone. For this reason, an officer who is a class leader can in no way get by without a high degree of comprehensive training, without a constant enrichment of his own knowledge and without a persistent polishing of his own skills. Otherwise, he will not be able to fully and clearly explain the theory underlying the problem, show his subordinates what is required of them, or teach them how to do their work more quickly and easily; nor will he be able to notice malfunctions or errors in the work of both men and apparatus.

One of the features of military training is that this is not just the individual training of a soldier, sailor, sergeant, senior NCO, ensign, warrant or officer, but the smooth adjustment of entire military collectives: subunits, units, large units, staffs and directorates. Each of them requires a special training methodology, sequence of classes, and different approach to development of the necessary cohesiveness and readiness to accomplish combat missions. Of great use in this regard are practical classes in the combat coordination of subunits and units, tactical drill and specialized tactical classes, tactical exercises, live firing exercises, practice launches of missiles, bombing practice, as well as Armed Forces maneuvers.

Tactical drill and specialized tactical classes comprise the first levels in the combat coordination between subunits, units, and ships' crews, and the first steps toward achieving a collective combat expertise. The attainment of close coordination is no simple matter. Difficulties may arise in the collective due to different attitudes of soldiers toward service and training or an uneven level of training and expertise even among specialists of the same year of service. It may happen, for example, that team members understand the mission and strive with all their might to fully perform their functional duties, but their work is not coordinated or synchronized. The people still have not learned to act in harmony, jointly, or in coordination. The team has not acquired its collective skills. Nervousness and failures stem from this. And if, let us say, something does not turn out in the right way for someone, his lack of confidence is transmitted to the others, and then mistakes in the work of the entire team are inevitable.

Collective skills are not born without persistent labor. We must patiently reveal shortcomings and their causes, show each member his

role and actual contribution to the end result of the collective's work, and direct the efforts of all specialists into a common channel. Everything is important here: correct selection of team members or crew; outfitting of work positions; creation of the most favorable conditions for a commander to control his subunit; and a broader application of both the technical means of training and the apparatus for objective control of personnel actions. But the most important would be bringing the training process as closely as possible in every way to a modern combat situation and conducting all tactical drill and specialized tactical exercises and practice against a tactical background and under difficult conditions.

Here, the process of organizing a smoothly-working collective should not be in the nature of "rote training"; stereotyped material and mechanical transference of techniques for operations in another situation and in a different area are quite inappropriate for this activity. Tactical drill and specialized classes are designed for facilitating the development in trainees of initiative, creativity and resourcefulness in the performance of combat missions.

Various types of **exercises and maneuvers** have enormous importance for training military collectives to operate under difficult conditions of modern warfare. They are the highest form of training and education and a most important means of increasing the personnel's field, aerial and naval training. They are conducted on terrain which varies in nature and in different areas of the seas and oceans, with authorized weapons and combat equipment. Combat expertise is honed in exercises and on ocean cruises and in flights. Firm skills are acquired, as is the ability of soldiers to conduct active and decisive combat operations, shifting rapidly from one form of combat to another. The expertise of officers in commanding and controlling troops is also perfected. It is here, on the training fields and firing ranges, in the air and on the ocean expanses, that genuine masters of military affairs and qualified specialists are born and their combat character is forged.

It is very important that a new situation be created each time in exercises, that the terrain and areas of operations be properly chosen, and that every field exercise, every air flight and naval cruise, every tactical and operational exercise be conducted at a high level, approximating actual combat reality to the maximum. Do not exert undue control over commanders in exercises, but encourage their independence and initiative. Only under these conditions will they develop operational-tactical thinking, creativity and the desire to employ the most effective and diverse methods of performing combat missions. This will allow the exclusion of elements of oversimplification and stereotype in practicing methods of combat operations. It will permit achieving absolute fulfillment of the requirements of regulations, and it will successfully instill in

personnel an indomitable offensive enthusiasm and high moral-combat and psychological qualities.

Each exercise must facilitate the development in soldiers of activeness, decisiveness and a desire to fall on the enemy with all their might from the first moments of combat and conduct combat operations until the enemy is completely defeated. It is not absolutely necessary to shift to the defense even to repel an enemy attack. The best method to repel the enemy is to attack. One must never give up the initiative. One has to teach troops not to beat off the enemy, but to seek him out, boldly impose their will and tactics, their methods of operation, and their decisions and plans on him, forestall his deployment, and destroy him. But activeness must not verge on foolhardiness. It has to rest on concrete factors, on skillful use of principles of military art and on precise calculations and careful organization of the combat and operation.

Combat training experience shows that the more realistic the situation created for troops, the more often missions are assigned which are more complex, and the more diverse the terrain, then the more useful will be the exercise. If troops are constantly in action, accomplishing missions which arise suddenly and overcoming the resistance of a strong and active "enemy," and the complex dynamics of practice combat are continuously maintained—this is exactly what we might encounter in a war.

A special role in the development in officers of the art of commanding and controlling units and subunits belongs to **operational-tactical training**. It is called upon to improve the theoretical knowledge and practical skills of command, political and engineer-technical cadres. A breadth of views in estimating the modern battle and operation is developed, high organizational abilities of officers are forged, and their expertise in troop command and control is improved in the process of operational-tactical training and in the everyday work of directing troops. In the course of theoretical and practical classes, they enrich their knowledge and develop firm skills in organizing combat operations.

The entire content of training of military cadres is aimed at instilling in them practical knowledge applied to those missions which they will accomplish, and on that terrain or body of water where they will have to operate. At the same time, it would be erroneous to hold practical classes and exercises every year in the very same area, especially under favorable weather conditions and time of day, without changes in the theme or a concept worked out at some previous time. All this leads to a stereotype and limits the outlook of trainees and the opportunities for independent creativity.

Training staffs as command and control organs occupy a large part in operational-tactical troop training. In directing subunits, units and formations, they fulfill special functions inherent only to them, which

become increasingly complex as military theory and practice develop. The chief tasks of staffs in planning and organizing combat operations and ensuring reliable and uninterrupted troop command and control are practiced in command-and-staff and staff exercises, war games and staff training sessions. Here, commanders, officers of staffs and political organs, engineers and technicians learn to apply their theoretical knowledge to practical matters of directing troops.

The Armed Forces need capable, active and decisive officers able to creatively accomplish every combat mission, prepare for combat thoroughly, and employ troops and combat equipment with high effectiveness. These qualities are instilled successfully when a well thought out and instructive situation is created in exercises which corresponds to the prescribed goals of training and which is filled with varied and oftentimes critical combat episodes. Commanders and staffs must learn not only to work out proper decisions, but to make them in a timely manner. The best decisions become useless if they are made tardily, if there is no time remaining for troops to carry them out, or if little time is given.

Exercise directors must analyze carefully the decisions of trainees and take thorough consideration of them in the further play of combat operations, even including changes in the subsequent situation data. It is inadmissible to impose decisions in conformity with a previously developed exercise plan, since such practice gives rise to trainee actions which lack initiative and leads to a superficial estimate of the situation and to attempts to learn the opinion of the leadership through various means. In the final account, this reduces responsibility for carrying out a decision and does not facilitate a growth in subordinates' skills.

We know that in the last war staffs never received a generalized situation. Data on the situation came in uncoordinated, and at times were very contradictory. They had to be refined and rechecked. This was painstaking, complex work. And now it is necessary to employ in exercises those methods of building up a situation under which staffs constantly gather information through various channels and from different sources. We must see that the staffs live in the situation created in the exercise, which requires strenuous work and creativity from them.

One of the important elements in training command and control organs is an increase in their staff culture. This concept includes not only the competent, graphic, and rapid filling out of combat documents, but also primarily the staff officers' profound and comprehensive knowledge of military matters, a high degree of efficiency in work, full and effective use of modern technical command and control means and electronic computers, the timely and concrete assignment of combat missions to subordinate troops and naval forces through different means of communication, and an ability to control troops in secrecy and organize constant supervision over their activities.

The simultaneous conduct of command-and-staff, troop and specialized exercises in the field, with actual command and control means and troops, facilitates an increase in the quality of training commanders and staffs. The organization of complex exercises expands the range of missions to be accomplished and permits creation of a complex and instructive situation, thorough and comprehensive practice of questions of command and control of diverse forces and means, and achievement of coordination in the work of staffs and their precise interworking with other command and control organs. Such complex exercises also facilitate practical checks of operational-tactical calculations and serve as a good basis for investigating current complex questions covered by combat and political training schedules.

Meanwhile, when holding major exercises and practical classes in the field, we must avoid becoming enthused with an excessively large number of missions to be accomplished simultaneously. In the final account, such practice does not give trainees firm skills in performing their duties in combat, dissipates their efforts and leads to haste and lack of organization. And conversely, in those cases where the amount of problems ensuring achievement of the exercise goals is held to those strictly needed to be worked out, one sees a noticeable growth in the expertise of officers and generals from one exercise to another. It is important to isolate the main element in the content of the theme of each exercise and focus the trainees' attention on it.

No matter how good and instructive every exercise or class may be, it is not the conclusion of the training of a specialist, subunit, unit, or ship, but is only the next step in their growth. Critiques play the part of a unique transitional bridge or binding element here. They not only sum up results of operations, but make theoretical generalizations and conclusions on the basis of fresh practical results just obtained, and indicate the ways and directions for raising combat expertise. Critiques are a continuation of training. They reflect the living tie of science and practice, and serve as a valuable source for military-theoretical thought. At critiques a common understanding is achieved of the theory of the topic to be worked and there is clarification of particular theses in the area of military art. Critiques end with the assignment of new missions and an indication of concrete steps for elimination of revealed shortcomings. A carefully prepared, scientifically grounded critique is of prime importance for troop training and education.

With the development of military theory and practice, the traditional forms and methods of training and education are being improved, and new ones arise at the same time. But not a single form or method of training taken separately can ensure the all-around training of a specialist, subunit, unit or warship. They must be combined and new ways must be found to bring knowledge to trainees, instill skills in soldiers,

and develop the most effective methodological system as the most important lever for continuous growth in the quality of combat and political training.

Command, political and engineer-technical cadres are called upon to inquisitively search for and boldly adopt those forms and methods of training founded on a firm scientific basis that facilitate the complex training of troops, reflect more fully the features of the contemporary organization of the Armed Forces, and consider the specifics of every branch and service of the Armed Forces. It is now not enough to have merely "pedagogic intuition" in order to find and implement in practice these forms and methods of training. We need a scientific approach to troop training. We must not only know what to teach, but also how to do it, taking cognizance of the sphere in which the soldier is or might be, what factors will affect him in combat, and what has to be developed in his character and psychology, so that he is able to endure under any complex conditions and successfully accomplish the combat mission. In other words, the directors of classes and exercises now cannot get by without extensive knowledge of military affairs, military pedagogy and military psychology, as well as the ability to foresee actual combat situations and bring the situation of combat training as closely as possible to them. All this cannot be done without comprehensive scientific analysis, both of the nature of contemporary combat and operations, as well as of the combat efficiency and morale and psychological qualities which have to be developed in personnel in the process of training and education.

Scientific improvement in the methodology of training and educating soldiers is connected with the study and use, timely generalization, and operational implementation of advanced experience. Scientific improvement presumes the ability to note, support and develop further everything that is new and progressive that is born in the theory and practice of troop training.

The spirit of innovativeness is extremely important in all our activity, including the methodology of training, educational work, and methods of conducting a battle or operation. This the Party teaches us. The Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress notes: "To possess a sense of the new means to see the prospects of development, to look into the future, and to find the truest paths to accomplishment of tasks which arise."³

Of course, difficulties are not excluded in this comprehensive work. Positive qualities of new forms and methods of training and education are always immediately obvious. But we must not stop halfway. We must go further with more boldness and look ahead more alertly. The

³ *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p. 99.

guarantee of successful fulfillment of the tasks before the Armed Forces lies in a steadfast affirmation of what is new.

It should be stressed that when we speak of innovativeness, we thus do not reject without grounds or throw out everything that is old. The experience of the past serves as a basis for developing the present and penetrating into the future. The new generation can only know more, see further and grow taller through assimilation of all the progressive achievements of past years. The combat experience accumulated by the Soviet Armed Forces in the years of the Great Patriotic War is our invaluable treasure. Not one army in the world has such experience, and herein lies our advantage. We must study to the fullest extent the best experience that we have accumulated, select the most effective methods or their elements, and on this basis develop new and more sophisticated techniques and methods of training and educating soldiers in the light of today's tasks.

A concrete analysis of requirements placed on the training of personnel and a growth in the cognitive abilities and cultural and general educational level of soldiers have permitted a broad operational implementation of technical means and program methods of training. They make it possible to assimilate material more extensively, develop in trainees *activeness* and independence, and form firm practical skills. The use of various training aids plays a large role. They sharply cut the time needed for specialist training and ensure a great savings of men and material.

We continue to further improve and widely adopt technical equipment in combat training practice and make use of it to create in classes a situation approximating that of combat.

The steady development of a training material base facilitates a scientific approach to sophistication of forms and methods of training and education. It is possible to achieve a high quality in field, aerial and naval training only with the help of well outfitted firing ranges, training centers, tank ranges, water ranges, and small arms ranges equipped with modern means of communication, electronic-technical apparatus, various mechanical and optical devices and attachments, and simulators.

A training material base which is systematically improved permits creation and periodic alteration of the situation depending on the character and goals of the exercise. A situation prepared one time for a long period, even with the application of the latest achievements of science and technology, leads in the end to stereotype and oversimplification in troop training and education, and to a weakening of *activeness* and creativity in directors and trainees.

With the retention, and even reduction, of periods for training specialists, and with the growing volume of knowledge and skills they need,

the time factor assumes ever increasing significance—the struggle for efficient use of literally every minute. Inasmuch as the high quality of training and educating soldiers depends primarily on the ability to solve important problems and determine the most promising trends, attention must be focused on these two aspects so as to save time and use it in the most expedient way for training. We must carefully analyze the entire training process and each training subject. We must boldly discard and rid ourselves of everything that is unnecessary and secondary in the successful training of troops. This will permit us to determine more concretely a particular form or method of training and educating troops, and, depending on the assigned missions and the requirements of combat readiness, develop the most expedient methodological system for training the Armed Forces.

All measures aimed at increasing the quality of combat and political training or the improvement of forms and methods of personnel training and education are impossible without a high degree of organization and a precise and businesslike style in the work of commanders, staffs, political organs, engineers and technicians.

The success of combat and political training of soldiers is determined to a great extent by the methodological culture of officers by their ability to pass on their knowledge, tell subordinates the content of the topic *clearly and intelligibly, bring to their awareness the need for precise fulfillment of techniques and actions being mastered, show correctly and confidently the individual elements and the entire action as a whole and require the very same of the trainees, train them patiently and persistently, and reveal, explain and eliminate the mistakes and shortcomings they allow, repeating a personal demonstration where necessary.*

It is important to see that direction of combat and political training of subunits, units and warships is businesslike, concrete and efficient, and that missions are always precisely formulated. In organizing personnel training and education, commanders, staffs and political organs must see the details of the entire process, the entire “technology” of training soldiers from the individual soldier and sailor to forming units and ships’ crews. They must determine on a scientific basis the goals, scope and content of general and concrete measures for training and education, outline the ways to accomplish them and arrange precise fulfillment. The officers’ thoughts and aspirations must focus on a creative search for new capabilities and reserves for the steadfast increase of the combat might of the Armed Forces.

It stands to reason that a brief examination of certain of the most important principles, forms and methods of training and education of soldiers does not reveal the entire extent, of their content and peculiarities. However, this was not even our goal. The main thing was to show the basic element inherent in the entire process of personnel training. A skill-

ful application of particular principles, forms and methods of training and education under concrete conditions will permit attainment of the outlined goals.

Chapter 10. Soviet Military Science and Military Art

Soviet military science is a system of knowledge about the character and laws of armed struggle, about the military preparation of the country and armed forces to rebuff aggression, and about the methods of waging war. Governed by Marxist-Leninist methodology, military science studies armed struggle in its inseparable linkage with the general laws of war and with factors of a socioeconomic and political nature. In its research work, Soviet military science is based on theoretical and methodological theses of Marxism-Leninism and uses data from other sciences.

The theory of military art is one of the fundamental areas in military science. This theory encompasses issues dealing with training the army for war and with conducting military operations.

Soviet military science is a military science of a new social system, the military science of socialism, and a most important factor in the combat might of our Armed Forces. Its role in military affairs has grown constantly as the Soviet Armed Forces have developed. The chief sources of Soviet military science are Marxism-Leninism, the practice of revolutionary struggle of the popular masses and the combat operations of the Soviet Armed Forces, experience of troop combat and operational training, and successes of scientific-technological progress. Soviet military science has assimilated also the best achievements of military-theoretical thought of the past, after reworking them critically in conformity with the new conditions. All this has allowed Soviet military science to arm the army of the first socialist state in the world with a wealth of knowledge.

In resolving urgent problems of military affairs, Soviet military science has gone its own special way from the first days of its emergence, differing sharply from bourgeois military science both in class goals and in its research method. While bourgeois military science serves the exploiting social system and its basis is the philosophical concepts of various idealistic and metaphysical orientations, Soviet military science serves the interests of socialism and an advanced social system and is based on a broadly scientific method—materialistic dialectics.

Application of the dialectical-materialistic method permits Soviet mili-

tary science to reveal the patterns of phenomena of armed struggle, foresee the nature of possible military encounters, and determine the basic trends in the development of the Armed Forces and in their preparations for armed defense of the socialist Homeland.

1. Emergence and Development of Soviet Military Science and Military Art

The process of the birth of military science and the theory and practice of military art has its roots in remote antiquity. However, only after K. Marx and F. Engels created dialectical and historical materialism did it become possible to create a true military science. It was the objective laws of the development of human society, discovered by K. Marx and F. Engels, which permitted the revelation of the causes of the appearance, conditions, motivating forces, nature and concrete forms in the development of wars and military art and which provided a key to a comprehensive scientific analysis of the phenomena of war. They helped obtain a materialistic understanding of war as a continuation of politics by violent means, and to establish the dependence of war on the social structure of society and its economy and the influence of weapons, military equipment and man on the organization of troops and methods of military operations. The founders of Marxism proved that a new army, a new military science and new methods of conducting war would be created with the victory of the proletarian revolution.

The experience of the Paris Commune had a certain amount of influence on the development of military-scientific thinking and the military practice of the proletariat in the fight against the bourgeoisie. Even then certain features of a new military art could be seen. A profound study of both the positive and negative aspects of this experience permitted us to draw important military-political conclusions. Among them, for example are principles of the proletarian party's direction of the struggle of popular masses, of the class character of the armed forces of a socialist state, and of the decisiveness of actions against enemies of the revolution, etc.

K. Marx and F. Engels foresaw the historical pattern of emergence and development of military science of a proletarian state. Thus, F. Engels wrote on this account that liberation of the proletariat "will have its special expression in military affairs and will create its new and special military method."¹ He asserted that "the new military science will be a necessary product of new social relationships to the very same degree that the military science created by the revolution and Napoleon was an inevitable result of new relationships born of the revolution."²

These thoughts were developed by V. I. Lenin in the process of creatively developing the Marxist doctrine on war and the army and on

¹ K. Marx and F. Engels, *Sochineniya* (Works), VII, 509.

² *Ibid.*, p. 510.

military science. Even in the pre-October years, V. I. Lenin showed his genius in his principles on the essence and character of wars, the role of the popular masses and importance of weapons in winning victory, creation of a revolutionary army of the working class, methods of waging military operations, the correlation of the offense and defense, and many others.

V. I. Lenin's creative military thinking was manifested with particular clarity in the difficult years of foreign intervention and civil war. The Red Army, which had just been formed and was poorly armed technically and without trained commanders, but was nevertheless unsurpassed in its strength of revolutionary awareness and filled with unshakeable faith in the correctness of the cause of the Communist Party, was forced to beat off furious attacks by hordes of interventionists and White Guards. V. I. Lenin's instructions to the fronts and his articles and speeches on military problems were the Red Army's substitute for the combat and field regulations which it did not have at that time, and which would have been responsive to its nature and its missions. V. I. Lenin's words inspired soldiers to do heroic deeds and had a great influence on the achievement of victory.

To V. I. Lenin belongs the great historical service of developing a wide range of urgent military problems and major military-theoretical questions. V. I. Lenin relied on the scientific principles of Marxism, on the fundamental theses of the teaching of K. Marx and F. Engels on war and the army, and on the combat experience of the past. Thoroughly investigating the economic and political essence of imperialism, V. I. Lenin uncovered the features of wars under new historical conditions and the basic factors which decided the fate of military engagements.

V. I. Lenin remarked that the one who wins a war is the one who possesses superiority in the economic, sociopolitical, scientific-technological, moral and military fields. These advantages find their concentrated expression in the armed forces, in a specific sociopolitical type of army, and in its combat capabilities. V. I. Lenin's works precisely characterize the dependence of military art, its theory and practice, on the social system of the state, the level of its economy, the spiritual forces of the people, the morale of army personnel, and other circumstances.

V. I. Lenin pointed out the ever expanding and deepening ties between politics and war; he developed a materialistic understanding of the essence and content of war; V. I. Lenin made a profound philosophical generalization on new factors that had arisen during wars in the age of imperialism; and he explained the role of wars in the history of social development and justified their division into just and unjust, progressive and reactionary. He revealed the fundamental laws of war and their close ties with the social system and military organization of the state, and

showed the decisive importance of the popular masses participating in war and the leading role of the Communist Party in the matter of strengthening the country's defenses and repelling aggression.

V. I. Lenin's definition of the nature of war serves as the key to a proper understanding of the sociopolitical content of past and present wars. V. I. Lenin teaches that "with respect to wars, the basic position of the dialectic . . . is that '*war is simply a continuation of politics by other*' (specifically violent) '*means*.' . . . This was always the viewpoint of Marx and Engels, who examined *every* war as *the continuation* of the policies of given, interested powers—and *different classes* within them—at a given point in time."³

Bourgeois ideologists assert that V. I. Lenin allegedly introduced nothing new into the revelation of the essence of war, and that he simply "restated" the words of the famous bourgeois military ideologist of the past, Karl [von] Clausewitz. This is an obvious falsification. There are fundamental differences between V. I. Lenin and Clausewitz in their conceptions of the nature of war.

First of all, Clausewitz considered war to be a continuation of merely foreign policy, while V. I. Lenin viewed foreign policy in inseparable unity with domestic policy. Here V. I. Lenin stressed that the determining role in this mutual relationship belonged to domestic politics.

Secondly, according to Clausewitz, politics is an expression of a faceless "higher intellect of the state," while according to V. I. Lenin, it bears a fully definitive class character, serves the goals of the ruling class and is accomplished by this class in the interests of consolidating its position.

Thirdly, Clausewitz's formula, the basis of which is an idealistic interpretation of politics, cannot serve as a methodological basis for defining the class essence of wars and their just or unjust character. V. I. Lenin's definition on the other hand, being materialistic, versatile, deeper and richer, permits a full revelation of the class essence, character, causes and sources of any war. The content of V. I. Lenin's definition exposes the bourgeois lie about war as an allegedly eternal and inevitable companion of human society. His definition shows that wars and armies owe their origin to the exploiting system. They appeared when society split into classes, and since that time have been used by exploiters as a means of asserting and consolidating their dominance.

There is nothing similar to this either from Clausewitz or from the contemporary bourgeois military ideologists. All of their reasoning is aimed at hiding from the people the real essence of the aggressive, predatory wars of the exploiting classes and the liberating wars of the working class.

³ V. I. Lenin, XXVI, 224.

The works of V. I. Lenin devote a great deal of attention to the role of economics in war. He wrote: "In modern warfare . . . the economic organization is of decisive importance."⁴ Developing the thoughts of K. Marx and F. Engels about the influence of the method of production and the economic and political structure of society on attaining victory in war, V. I. Lenin proved with great cogency that this influence will grow even more in the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions.

For the first time in history, V. I. Lenin revealed the effects of the economy of a socialist state on its defensive ability and showed the immeasurably greater capabilities of the socialist economy in comparison with the capitalist economy in the matter of increasing the state's defensive might. Vladimir Il'ich remarked that ". . . the defensive ability of a country which has thrown off the yoke of capital, has given the land to the peasants, and has placed banks and factories under working people's control, would be *many times* higher than that of a capitalist country."⁵ Here V. I. Lenin stressed that the new system would win once and for all "only when the country is electrified and when a modern large-scale technical industrial base is placed under industry, agriculture and transport. . . ."⁶

Guided by these theses, the Communist Party directed the state's basic efforts from the first days of Soviet rule toward creation of an economic base which would be capable of ensuring a reliable defense of the socialist Homeland. In order to satisfy the needs of fronts in the years of foreign intervention and civil war, the Party engaged in an enormous amount of activity to adjust the work of industry, transport and other branches of the national economy and to supply the Red Army with everything it needed.

In performing these extremely important tasks, the Party proceeded from V. I. Lenin's instructions about the unity of front and rear areas, about mobilization of all the state's resources to achieve victory, and about the fact that a truly strong and organized homefront was needed to wage war.

V. I. Lenin set aside an important role for the morale factor. He said that "In any war, victory in the final account is determined by the spiritual state of those masses which shed their blood on the field of battle."⁷

On the basis of an analysis of the Red Army's victories in the period of foreign intervention and civil war, V. I. Lenin revealed the sources of high morale in wars in defense of socialism. He stated that it was not the national sentiments taken of themselves, but the people's political motives,

⁴ V. I. Lenin, XXXIV, 194.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁶ V. I. Lenin, XLII, 159.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, XLI, 121.

views and convictions which created that spiritual uplift without which victory would be unthinkable. The just, lofty goals of war lead to mass heroism and to the creative activeness of the masses. They give rise to an unbending morale in the army and people.

V. I. Lenin taught us to examine people and combat equipment, man and weapon, and their role and place in war in their interrelationship and in dialectical unity. No matter how sophisticated the combat equipment may be and no matter what destructive properties a weapon may possess, in the final account it is only people with high morale who are capable of winning victory in war. And at the same time, "the best army and people most dedicated to the cause of revolution will be immediately annihilated by an enemy if they are not sufficiently armed, supplied with food and trained."⁸

V. I. Lenin made a major contribution to the development of military art. His comprehensive, profound knowledge of Marxism and of the most complex problems of military affairs and his enormous experience in strategic and tactical direction of the political struggle of the proletariat were a firm basis for V. I. Lenin's resolution of many key problems in Soviet military strategy, operational art and tactics.

V. I. Lenin left us many carefully worked out theoretical principles relating to the organization and conduct of operations and battles. He repeatedly pointed out a number of very important principles of conducting military operations which had great significance for the formation and development of Soviet military art. For example, there were V. I. Lenin's conclusions concerning determination of the chief danger and direction of main attack, the concentration of men and equipment at the decisive place at the decisive time, the employment of various forms and methods of military operations in conformity with the situation, the mastery of all methods and means of warfare which the enemy has or might have, the decisive role of the offensive, the need to create reserves in war, the objective estimate of the enemy and inadmissibility of exaggerating or degrading his combat capabilities, the seizure and maintenance of the initiative, the boldness and decisiveness of operations, surprise in delivering attacks, the opportune consolidation of success which has been achieved, and pursuit of the enemy right up until his total destruction.

The principles of Soviet military art, which were formed in the years of foreign intervention and civil war, underwent their combat test in the mortal engagement with the enemies of the revolution and showed their tenacity to the fullest extent. Even at that time the characteristic features of Soviet military art were clearly displayed: revolutionary creative activeness; irreconcilability toward routine and stereotype; the employment of methods of military operations which are unexpected by the

⁸ V. I. Lenin, XXXV, 408.

enemy; reliance on the revolutionary enthusiasm of soldiers who are utterly dedicated to the cause of the Party and that of the Great October; an ability to faultlessly determine the axis of the main attack, and take advantage of enemy miscalculations and attack him piecemeal; the swiftness and suddenness of attacks; the intelligent combination of offensive and defensive operations; the flexible maneuver of reserves; the economical expenditure of men and equipment and achievement of victory with small forces.

V. I. Lenin developed the scientific methodology of the analysis and evaluation of wars. He demanded an approach to their research from Party positions and an examination of war in the historical aspect in connection with politics, economics and other factors affecting the war.

V. I. Lenin attached a great deal of importance to a study of military history. He took thorough consideration of the objective laws and the concrete situation in brilliantly taking advantage of the experience of past wars in developing the Armed Forces of the first socialist state in the world and in directing their combat operations. At the same time, V. I. Lenin cautioned against mechanical application of previous experience. When the historic situation changes and the need arises to perform different missions, one cannot look back and attempt to accomplish them with yesterday's techniques. "... A Marxist has to consider living reality and the precise facts of *reality*, and not continue to hang onto the theory of yesterday. . . ." ⁹ In order to look confidently ahead and perform missions in conformity with new conditions, we must persistently master Marxist theory and apply it creatively in everyday life.

V. I. Lenin's ideas on problems of military development and the direction of a new socialist military organization, and his instructions about reliance on the popular masses, on the country's economic and political might and on the achievements of science are a model of creative, scientific resolution of the most important problems of defense of the socialist Homeland.

V. I. Lenin left us a truly inexhaustible military-theoretical treasure. He provided brilliant examples of theoretical and practical resolution of key problems of strategy, operational art and tactics. V. I. Lenin's contribution to military affairs was so great that he by rights is considered the founder of Soviet military science. And the more time passes since V. I. Lenin's theoretical creations were born and his practical military activity took place, the more clearly and fully seen are their depth and significance for the further development of Soviet military science and military art. M. V. Frunze's words are correct: "Comrade Lenin provides brilliant examples of strategic and tactical art both for us and for the future generation of revolutionaries." ¹⁰

⁹ V. I. Lenin, XXXI, 134.

¹⁰ M. V. Frunze, *Izbrannyye proizvedeniya* (Selected Works), II, 198.

The military science and the theory and practice of military art of the socialist social system have developed and are developing on the fertile soil of V. I. Lenin's military-theoretical heritage. V. I. Lenin's theses and conclusions in the field of military affairs permit determination of the basic orientation of further development of military-scientific thinking and military practice depending on the changing situation. They allow us to foresee the possible course and results of military operations, and to properly carry out the development of the Armed Forces.

In the process of its development, Soviet military science has been enriched with new knowledge. Its content has constantly expanded and its characteristic features have clearly become increasingly more visible. Soviet military science has persistently sought effective solutions to the questions of armed defense of the socialist Homeland and development of a new army. It has revealed the conformity to principles in all fields of military affairs. It has revealed its inner relationships and correlation with other social phenomena, with the state's social system, with its politics and economics and with the moral forces of the people.

Even in the years of foreign intervention and civil war, the military-theoretical journal *Military Affairs* [Voyennoye delo] began to come out, as well as other publications which summarized the combat experience of the Red Army and published military-theoretical works of leaders of the Red Army and instructors of military academies who had made a considerable contribution to the formation and development of Soviet military science and military art.

In particular, there was great significance in the discussion of the question of a uniform military doctrine in the pages of the military press of 1918-1921. M. V. Frunze took an active part in the discussion. In 1921 his major article entitled "A Uniform Military Doctrine and the Red Army" was published in the military-scientific journal *Army and Revolution* [Armiya i revolyutsiya] which had just appeared. This work for the first time provided the most correct definition of the concept of military doctrine as "the teaching accepted in the army of a given state which establishes the character of development of the country's armed forces, the methods of troop combat training, their leadership on the basis of views dominant in the state on the character of military tasks before the state and methods of their accomplishment stemming from the class essence of the state and determined by the level of development of the country's productive forces."¹¹

Later M. V. Frunze developed his thinking on a uniform military doctrine in the report entitled "The Military-Political Education of the Red Army," which he gave before a conference of commanders and commissars of troops of the Ukraine and the Crimea on 1 March 1922, as well

¹¹ M. V. Frunze, II, 8.

as in the report entitled "Basic Military Tasks of the Moment," given at a conference of military delegates to the 11th RKP(b) Congress.

The importance of the discussion lay in the fact that at that time it was necessary to develop uniform views on problems of development of the Armed Forces of a socialist state and the organization of its defense. And for the first time in the theory and history of wars and military art, Soviet military-theoretical thinking approached the question of military doctrine from scientific positions. The decisions of our Party Congresses and the works and speeches of V. I. Lenin have made an important contribution to the development of Soviet military doctrine.

The work of systematizing the basic elements of military doctrine was concluded in the thirties. Its results were reflected in regulations and manuals of the Red Army and Navy.

Soviet military science not only developed concurrently with the Armed Forces, but also looked boldly into the future. It revealed the combat capabilities of the new army, the sources of its soldiers' unsurpassed combat efficiency and morale, the main thrust in improving weapons and combat equipment and methods of their combat employment. Soviet military science examined the long-range conditions under which the Armed Forces had to defend the socialist achievements of the Soviet people and pointed out the ways to accomplish strategic tasks.

The years of a peaceful breathing spell were especially fruitful for Soviet military science and military art. This period was filled by the enormous creative work of the Communist Party and all the Soviet people in the restoration of the country's national economy, which had been ravaged by two wars and in the building of a socialist society. Great attention was devoted to strengthening the state's defenses, increasing the combat might of the Armed Forces and developing Soviet military science and military art.

In connection with the transition of the Armed Forces to a peacetime footing, Soviet military science was faced with a great number of urgent problems. The most pressing were problems concerning the character of further development of the Armed Forces, methods of training and educating personnel, the unity of views in the field of tactics, operational art and strategy, training of command cadres, and many others to which there were no ready answers. Soviet military science successfully handled its tasks.

Problems of formation of the Red Army were fundamentally resolved in a new way. As has already been noted, the accepted mixed territorial-cadre system of staffing the Armed Forces fully met the requirements existing at that time. It ensured the maintaining of troop combat effectiveness at the necessary level with minimum economic expenditures for their upkeep in a situation where the country's national economy had

just begun to be restored. The service of military-theoretical thought in this extremely important matter lies in the fact that it found flexible forms of development for a new type of army and for strengthening the state's defenses with consideration of the domestic and international situation.

Scientific research and theoretical generalization were conducted in a broad front on questions of military art. This permitted in essence the development from scratch of regulations and manuals of the Armed Forces which controlled the everyday life and combat activity of troops. These documents reflected the military experience of the past, which had retained its significance, and the combat experience of the Red Armed Forces, the method of their development and combat and operational training, as well as tasks for defending the socialist state. This was the first and most important result of research in Soviet military science, which laid a foundation for theoretical and practical resolution of the problem of a uniform military doctrine of the Red Army.

As the Armed Forces were supplied with new weapons and military equipment and their organizational structure was perfected, there were increases in the combat capabilities of troops and a growth in their firepower and maneuverability. In conformity with this, the limits and scale of military-scientific research were expanded, which allowed us to pose and solve problems of military art in a new way and make the necessary changes in methods of conducting combat operations and in regulations and manuals.

Soviet military science entered the stage of maturity. Mikhail V. Frunze made a large contribution to its development. Along with the development of problems of Soviet military doctrine, he made important conclusions on a number of other current problems of Soviet military development. In his works *Front i tyl v voyne budushchego* [The Front and Rear Areas in a War of the Future], *Itogi i perspektivy voyennogo stroitel'stva* [Results and Prospects of Military Development], *Lenin i Krasnaya Armiya* [Lenin and the Red Army] and other theoretical works, as well as in reports and speeches before Party congresses and Party CC Plenums, he developed theses on the nature of future war and methods of military operations, on improvements in services and branches of the armed forces, on their organization and role in warfare, on the correlation of men and equipment, on strategy, operational art and tactics, on Party-political work, on personnel training and education, and other problems.

At that time Soviet military science was already represented by an entire galaxy of military scientists who held Marxist-Leninist views. Foremost among them was B. M. Shaposhnikov. At the end of the twenties his three-volume work *Mozg armii* [Brain of the Army] was published, in which he showed the role and functions of the General Staff and expounded a number of theses on military strategy, the development of

plans for armed defense of the state and strategic direction on the basis of an analysis of a great volume of historical material and the probable nature of a future war.

M. N. Tukhachevskiy did a great deal of work investigating problems of warfare and military strategy. In his works, such as *Strategiya natsional'naya i klassovaya* [National and Class Strategy], *Voprosy sovremennoy strategii* [Questions of Contemporary Strategy] and *Kharakter pogranychnykh operatsiy* [Character of Border Operations], he revealed the content and scope of future warfare, set forth principles of strategy in such a war and comprehensively analyzed the initial period of war, the capabilities of new Services and branches of Armed Forces and their employment, and a number of other problems.

A considerable contribution to the development of military science and military art was also made by V. A. Alafuzov, N. Ye. Varfolomeyev, K. I. Velichko, L. A. Govorov, V. D. Grendal', A. I. Yegorov, I. S. Isakov, K. B. Kalinovskiy, D. M. Karbyshev, A. K. Kolenkovskiy, S. N. Krasil'nikov, A. N. Lapchinskiy, S. A. Mezheninov, V. K. Triandafilov, I. P. Uborevich, Ye. A. Shilovskiy, I. E. Yakir and others.

In prewar years Soviet military science as a whole correctly resolved problems involving a determination of the character of the oncoming war, methods of its conduct and ways of developing the Armed Forces. It was presumed, in particular, that a war against the Soviet Union would be waged by a coalition of imperialist states and that both sides would pursue decisive goals. Combat operations would assume primarily the character of maneuver. At the same time, it was considered possible that positional forms of warfare also would be used in some theaters and operational axes. In conformity with this, the basic form of combat operations was considered to be the offensive. Defense was viewed as a forced form of military operations, the chief goal of which was creation of conditions for subsequent transition to the offensive.

Operational art was further improved. It began to be viewed as an independent part of military art along with strategy and tactics. This is one of the important services of Soviet military-theoretical thinking, which correctly saw the trends in the development of military affairs and revealed the broad mutual relationship and dependence of components of military art.

On the whole, in the development of fundamental problems of military theory and practice, Soviet military science not only did not take a back seat to the bourgeois military science of developed capitalist states, but even surpassed it in many ways. It provided a more correct and objective estimate of phenomena of war and resolved with confidence and far-sightedness the primary questions of strategy, operational art and tactics.

Thus, the theory of in-depth operations and battles developed by

Soviet military science in the middle thirties reflected qualitative changes which had occurred in the technical equipping of troops. Military thinking in the West was not able to rise to such generalizations. There, they were carried away with the then fashionable onesided concepts such as "aerial warfare" and "tank warfare," which overestimated the role of individual types of weapons. The Soviet theory of in-depth operations and battles was a fundamentally new theory on the conduct of war by massive, highly mobile and technically well equipped armies. Its basic idea was the delivery of a simultaneous blow against the entire depth of the enemy's defenses and destruction of his main grouping through the decisive offensive actions of infantry and the mass employment of aviation, artillery, tanks and airborne troops.

The principal tenets of this theory had great influence on the course of the Red Army's combat and operational training, and subsequently became the basis of its offensive operations during the Great Patriotic War. To a certain extent, the provisions of the theory of in-depth operations and battles have retained their significance even for present conditions.

The Soviet theory of in-depth operations and battles differed fundamentally also from the concept of "total and lightning war," which was dominant in fascist Germany and which was basically fallacious and did not withstand the test of time. The Blitzkrieg concept did not correspond to the combat capabilities of the Hitlerite army. It was based on a weak and unprepared enemy and adventuristic methods of waging military operations.

The theoretical provisions of Soviet military science were tested in maneuvers and exercises, and some of them also underwent trials in the practice of combat operations by the Red Army in the vicinity of Lake Khasan and the Khalkhin-Gol River and in the Soviet-Finnish military conflict. Certain conclusions were drawn from the experience acquired in these military operations, and this allowed refinement and development of individual questions of military theory and further preparation of the Armed Forces. For example, it was graphically confirmed that the attainment of high tempos and continuity of the attack was a decisive condition for success in offensive operations. Troops had to be ready to conduct not only maneuver operations in the operational depth of the enemy defense, but also to break through well prepared defensive lines. Tactical success had to be developed immediately into operational success, for which major mobile formations had to be prepared. There had to be an in-depth defense capable of repelling the attack of large masses of tanks and of withstanding the massed effects of enemy aviation and artillery. Theoretical conclusions were drawn and practical steps undertaken to perfect the organizational structure of troops, improve their technical equipping and material support, and enrich the content, forms

and methods of personnel training and education in conformity with the requirements of future warfare.

Meanwhile, the Red Army's insufficient combat practice in conducting what was at the time modern military operations and a lack of the necessary time for pondering and generalizing the experience of World War II which had just begun, led to certain erroneous theoretical conclusions and practical recommendations. In particular, it was incorrectly believed that in all cases broad military operations had to be preceded by a period of mobilization and strategic deployment of the Armed Forces. Incomplete consideration was made of the possibility of secret deployment of the enemy army and its surprise attack. The importance of our troops' strategic defense was underestimated. An unfounded conclusion was drawn on the basis of a unilateral approach to study of the limited experience of the war in Spain as to the inexpediency of having major tank formations.

In spite of the shortcomings which have been mentioned, which basically had an objective cause and were subsequently eliminated, the research of Soviet military science in the period between the Civil and Great Patriotic wars on the whole ensured the Red Army of a solid theoretical base for successful conduct of military operations in upcoming engagements with fascist aggressors.

2. A Test of Maturity

Soviet military science and military art displayed their high degree of maturity in the years of the Great Patriotic War. They successfully withstood the test of fire, having proven their superiority over bourgeois military science and military art. Proof of this were the remarkable victories of the Red Army won on the fields of battle under difficult conditions of the military-political situation, at times when the ratio of men and equipment was unfavorable to us.

The leaders of the United States and England at that time were forced to recognize the indisputable superiority of Soviet military science and military art. U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt noted: "Such achievements can be made only by an army possessing skilled leadership, a stable organization, the appropriate training, and above all, the resolve to defeat the enemy. . . ." ¹² Winston Churchill wrote that "future generations will admit their debt to the Red Army just as completely as do we who have lived to see these grand victories." ¹³

Even our enemies paid reluctant respect to Soviet military art. The

¹² *Perepiska Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR s Prezidentami SShA i Prem'yer-Ministrami Velikobritanii vo vremya Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny 1941-1945 gg.* (Correspondence between the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the U.S. Presidents and Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945), Vol. II. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1957, p. 57.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Vol. I. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1957, p. 310.

fascist General Guderian remarked that in World War II the Soviet Supreme High Command displayed high abilities in the military field. He wrote: "In the military sense, it turned out during World War II that the Russian leadership was good and that technical and tactical achievements were at a high level."

The war was not only a test of maturity of military science and military art, but also an important stage in their accelerated development.

Soviet military science and military art passed their first test in the exceptionally complex and unfavorable situation which was created as a result of the enemy's treacherous attack. With the beginning of the war, the Soviet Armed Forces were forced to simultaneously resolve two difficult problems—carry out a strategic deployment and repel the enemy's attacks under conditions of an acute lack of time, men and equipment. From the first days, they encountered many surprises, operational and tactical innovations, and numerous technological "surprises" which the fascist troops used widely, counting on quickly breaking the Red Army's resistance. In spite of the fact that an attack by superior aggressor forces had fallen on our country, the Soviet troops stood their ground, displayed courage and endurance and thus disrupted Hitler's plan of a "Blitzkrieg."

In the fierce engagements of the initial period of the war, in addition to the very great heroism of Soviet soldiers and sailors, the leaders of the Armed Forces, command cadres of all levels, staffs, political organs and Party organizations displayed extensive military knowledge, ability and high organizational abilities. Correctly and comprehensively assessing the operational and tactical situation which was unfolding, our commanders countered the enemy attacks with powerful screening actions. Maneuvering the troops skillfully, they delivered counterblows and counterattacks, exhausted the Hitlerite invaders and contained their attack. The Soviet command and Soviet troops quickly guessed the crafty schemes of the enemy, disrupted his plans, and in the final account tore the strategic initiative from the aggressor's hands.

Under difficult conditions, Soviet military science and military art had to solve problems that arose as a result of the war. The complexity of the combat situation placed extremely high demands on Soviet strategy, operational art, and tactics. They steadily developed, improved and gathered vital force both in defensive operations and battles as well as, and especially, in offensive operations and battles. An important stage in this regard was the counteroffensive of Soviet troops at Moscow, as a result of which a major grouping of fascist German troops suffered defeat and the front line was pushed to the west hundreds of kilometers. It is noteworthy that the victory over the enemy was achieved with a general equality of forces, and even a superiority of fascist German troops in some means of warfare over the Soviet troops.

The Red Army's decisive transition from a protracted defense to the offensive was unexpected by the enemy. The force that had been defeated happened to be the very same one on which the political and military leaders of the "Third Reich" had placed their main hopes for a victorious conclusion to the war in the East.

Naturally, that sharp turn of events which decisively influenced the entire course of World War II was not accidental. It was prepared far-sightedly and systematically by the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command through opportune creation of strategic reserves, their movement to the flanks of enemy forces surrounding Moscow, and skillful commitment to battle. The moment of transition to the counteroffensive was determined with great precision. The attack followed when the enemy, who had been drained in prolonged and difficult offensive battles, did not have time either for regrouping his troops for the defense or for consolidating the lines he had reached.

The counteroffensive by our troops at Stalingrad was a genuine triumph of Soviet military art. It also began with an actual equality of men and equipment and led to the encirclement and defeat of a major fascist grouping. The advantages of our encircling position, with regard to enemy forces which had advanced a long way in an eastern direction and were exhausted from preceding battles, were used *effectively for conducting* the operation. The circumstance was also considered that the enemy's flanks were poorly covered. A skillful choice of axes of main attacks, secret concentration and deployment of strategic reserves, careful planning and thorough material support to the operation, the massing of men and equipment on chosen axes, suddenness of operations, high tempos of advance achieved through employment of tank and mechanized formations, and, finally, the courage and heroism of Soviet soldiers—all this together led to the great victory by Soviet troops in the Battle on the Volga.

The history of military art has many examples of some army manning to surround major enemy groupings. However, what the Soviet troops achieved in this historic battle exceeded all previously known scales. From that time on, it was not the classic Cannae which was the example of military art, but the encirclement of Stalingrad.

Soviet troops displayed a high level of military art in the Battle of Kursk. Here there was displayed with new vigor the ability of the Soviet command to assess the situation thoroughly and extensively, draw well-founded conclusions from it, foresee the possible development of military operations and creatively accomplish strategic and operational problems.

The achievements of Soviet military science and military art were multiplied in many other brilliantly conducted offensive operations. Their characteristic features were a creative, purposeful concept, con-

formity to the situation at hand, skillful choice of the time and axis of the main attack, a bold massing of men and equipment on the main axes, great spatial scope flexibility in selection of the forms and methods of combat operations, and large-scale maneuvering of men and equipment to deliver a crushing defeat to the enemy. Operations were thoroughly supported and conducted with the greatest resolve and full output of forces.

The successes of combat practice were immediately generalized and developed by military-theoretical thinking. The scope of scientific research during the war years not only did not decrease in comparison with prewar times, but even rose considerably. This was facilitated by the fact that the leaders of the Armed Forces, the commanders-in-chief and staffs of fronts, armies and fleets and the commanders and staffs of formations and units made skillful use of propositions worked out by military science, developed them creatively and provided new and often original solutions to problems of military art.

In performing the tasks with which it was faced, military science proceeded from the overall goal of war—achieving the total defeat of the aggressor—and conducted its research with regard to a specific enemy and specific conditions of a combat situation. Military-scientific thought decisively and boldly threw off everything that did not conform to the character of war. It refined and developed further those theses formulated before the war, the correctness of which was confirmed by combat practice. At the same time, it provided a theoretical basis for new questions that had arisen because of the war.

The conclusions drawn by military science during the front-line years conformed to the nature of war and facilitated an extensive development of military art, improvements in weapons and combat equipment and the development of the Armed Forces.

Military science made an especially tangible contribution to **strategy**, particularly in generalizing and developing problems of strategic offensive. A form of strategic offensive, the operation of a group of fronts with the participation of all Services of the Armed Forces, was conceived and received broad theoretical substantiation in the Great Patriotic War. Its most characteristic features were: decisiveness of goals, enormous spatial scope, the actions of great masses of troops, high tempos of offensive operations, and attainment of important military-political and strategic results. As a rule, these operations ended in the defeat of major enemy groupings, the seizure of important political centers, and economic and military-strategic areas and, in the concluding phase of the war, the withdrawal from the war of individual countries which had been allies of fascist Germany.

Military-scientific thinking devoted a great deal of attention to devel-

opment of the counteroffensive. It justifiably considered this one of the effective methods of operation in the struggle to seize the strategic initiative. Skilled application of this method at Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk ensured the defeat of major enemy groupings and development of the counteroffensive into a general offensive by our forces.

An outstanding success of military-theoretical thought was the resolution of a new problem—the consecutive and simultaneous conduct of strategic operations by groups of fronts united by a single plan of the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The implementation of sequential operations allowed the choice of the most advantageous axes and the time for conducting each successive operation. It ensured surprise in attacks against the enemy, the pinning down of his reserves, the imposition of our own will on him and retention of the strategic initiative. A decisive superiority over the enemy on the selected axes was created through maneuver, as was his piecemeal defeat.

In the concluding phase of the war, in connection with an increase in the combat power of the Armed Forces and a build-up of strategic reserves, the opportunity arose for the simultaneous and uninterrupted conduct of major offensive operations along almost the entire Soviet-German front. This was the most decisive and effective method of conducting military operations. It led to deep splits in the strategic front of the fascist forces along several axes and deprived them of their ability to maneuver reserves, take other countermeasures or restore their position. In the final account, it accelerated the defeat of the enemy.

Various forms of carrying out operations were employed to achieve the assigned goals: encirclement and destruction or capture of surrounded enemy troops through delivery of two attacks on converging axes with the simultaneous dismemberment of enemy groupings and exploitation of the attack in depth; delivery of one or several frontal attacks with a splitting of enemy troops and exploitation of the attack toward the flanks and into the depth; delivery of one attack with subsequent pinning of the enemy groupings against a natural obstacle and their subsequent destruction or capture.

The Soviet Armed Forces brilliantly mastered the complicated art of conducting encirclement operations. In the Battle of Stalingrad, 22 fascist divisions were surrounded and smashed or captured. Of 130 enemy divisions crushed in 1944 alone, over half were destroyed or captured as a result of encirclement operations. The Berlin and Prague offensive operations by Soviet troops ended with gigantic pockets in which the fascist Wehrmacht concluded its existence.

The success of encirclement operations depended largely on the precision and coordination of troop interaction, mobility of the strategic leadership and continuity of material-technical support. Soviet military

science also made a considerable contribution to the resolution of these and other problems.

The war showed that under certain conditions the Armed Forces would have to employ a strategic defense along with a strategic offense. In view of the fact that in prewar time insufficient attention had unfortunately been given to the creative development of this form of military operation, the problem of defense had to be understood and developed in the very course of the war.

Characteristic features of Soviet troop defense were a great depth and numerous zones, a flexible system of fire, careful engineer preparation of positions and zones, persistence and activeness of actions, which were achieved through firmly holding prepared defensive lines, conducting artillery and air counterbombardment on the most important axes, conducting decisive counterattacks and counterblows by second echelons and reserves, and maneuvering troops in order to shift combat efforts from one axis to another.

This system of defense permitted us to exhaust the enemy, inflict heavy losses on him and win time for building up our own forces and equipment, preparing and shifting into the counteroffensive. Indicative in this regard are the Red Army's defensive operations at Moscow, Stalingrad, in the Caucasus foothills, in the Kursk Bulge and on certain other strategic axes.

Many new things were introduced in the war years into **operational art and tactics** of all services of the Armed Forces. Views on the conduct of defensive and offensive operations by armies—and especially by fronts—had been developed by the Ground Forces before the war. Problems of destruction of the enemy by fire were solved in a new way in offensive operations. The effectiveness of firepower was achieved through a skillfully organized artillery and air offensive, the essence of which consisted of the continuous bombardment of the defending enemy in the sectors where formations and units had combat missions.

The ideas of prewar theory of operations in-depth examined above, were the basis of offensive operations. This theory was enriched with new principles, especially those involving the conduct of successive, in-depth, front and army operations. There was complete resolution of the problem of breaking through the enemy defense. This was achieved by a skillful concentration of men and equipment on the main axes, a dispositioning in depth of operational formations of armies and fronts, the suddenness of attacks, a powerful air and artillery offensive, and reliable fire suppression of the enemy for the entire depth of his defense. The creation of mobile groups of armies and fronts from tank and mechanized major field forces and formations was a qualitatively new aspect. This permitted a constant build-up of efforts in the operational depth and *increases in tempos* of offensive operations, giving them a decisive maneuverable character and increasing their effectiveness.

Problems on the stability of operational defense, especially in the antitank sense, were developed further. The system of antitank areas, artillery-antitank reserves, mobile obstacle detachments, and antitank minefields dispositioned in depth mainly on avenues of tank approach, along with an extensive deployment of operational defense and its engineer equipment ensured our troops the opportunity to repel an attack by enemy tanks and disrupt his plans.

The newly-developed theory of combat employment of tank armies in second echelons of fronts to deliver powerful counterblows and for independent conduct of defensive operations facilitated to a considerable extent an increase in the activeness of operational defense, its stability, and the opportunity for creating conditions for immediately shifting into a counteroffensive and having it develop into a general offensive.

With regard to tactics, they also were enriched by a number of new propositions. Development of the principles of offensive combat went chiefly along the line of increasing the massing of men and equipment in narrow sectors, a great disposition in depth of combat formations, a reduction in the time of artillery bombardment with a simultaneous increase in its firepower, achievement of continuity in attacks by artillery and aviation strikes against the enemy and advancement by troops directly after this, flexible maneuver of men and equipment, and continuous coordination from the beginning to the end of a battle.

The growth in tactical expertise of Soviet troops was focused on the constant increase in the tempo and depth of breakthrough of enemy defensive lines. In the operations of 1944-1945 the main defensive zone was broken through, as a rule, on the very first day of the offensive. It was often possible with the commitment of mobile groups to overcome the entire tactical defense zone of the enemy in the first days. This had a favorable effect on the further course of the offensive.

The theory and practice of encounter battles was greatly developed. In view of the overall increase in dynamic action of combat operations, its relative importance steadily rose. Certain tenets of defensive battle also were reworked, such as defending on a wide front with limited forces. The goals of such a defense were achieved by a concentration of main forces to hold key positions and objectives, the skilled organization of all types of firepower systems, extensive use of engineer obstacles, flexible maneuver of men and equipment, and high troop activeness.

Strongpoint defense, used at the beginning of the war, did not justify itself. Evolution of defense went along the line of an ever increasing depth, fire saturation, antitank defense, activeness and maneuverability. Soviet troops countered the mass attack of enemy tanks and infantry with an in-depth defensive disposition which turned out to be insurmountable for the enemy. The depth of the tactical zone reached 20 kilometers on

the most important axes. Defense was based on a combination of strong-points prepared with a ramified network of trenches and communicating trenches, with a well organized firepower system, engineer obstacles and a massing of antitank weapons on avenues of tank approach.

On the whole, Soviet tactics were distinguished by flexibility and decisiveness, the novelty of forms and methods of combat operations, and maneuverability and dynamism.

Problems of tactics and operational art of the Air Force, Navy and National Air Defense Forces were further developed and theoretically worked out.

The war required that military science provide theoretical substantiation and practical recommendations to improve the **technical equipping and organizational structure of the Armed Forces**. In the resolution of these questions, military-scientific thought proceeded from the country's realistic economic capacities, the level of personnel training, the character of the war, as well as the status of the enemy—his armed forces and military art.

While analyzing and creatively interpreting the employment of different types of weapons and military equipment under combat conditions, and also while taking account of the achievements of scientific-technological progress, military theory focused its main attention on identification of trends and prospects for development of means of warfare. This facilitated the creation of qualitatively more sophisticated types of weapons and combat equipment by military industry, an increase in their output and assurance of military-technological superiority over the enemy. There was a steady improvement of the troops' technical outfitting on this basis and of their organizational structure.

The war showed that the Soviet Armed Forces had successfully mastered all the means, forms and methods of warfare, the art of properly combining them and of shifting from one to the other on a tactical, operational and strategic scale.

Leaders of the Armed Forces and Soviet military scientists creatively resolved the major problematic questions of theory and practice of military affairs and moved them forward. Soviet commanders learned from their war experiences, drew correct theoretical and practical conclusions therefrom, displayed innovation in accomplishing their combat missions, and conquered the enemy according to all the rules of Soviet military science and military art.

The war convincingly demonstrated a correct understanding by Soviet military science of the nature and essence of military art. Bourgeois military theoreticians often slide down to an idealistic, subjectivistic interpretation of this question. Many of them underestimate the conformity to

principles of military art and exaggerate the role of personality and the random element of the "fortunes of war" in warfare. The formula of Clausewitz, who said that in war "talent and genius operate outside the law," still has not lost its influence in their midst. Such theories, which clearly bear an antiscientific character, also had their adherents among Hitler's generals. This is indicated by a multitude of facts, and above all by the downfall of fascist strategy in its aggression against the Soviet Union.

In questions of the nature and essence of military art, Soviet military science always proceeded and continues to proceed, from the fundamental provisions of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army. It stands to reason that the talent and gift of military leaders mean a great deal in warfare, but a military leader does not operate "outside the law." He has to thoroughly consider and skillfully use the objective conditions, the laws of warfare and the principles of military art. Only in this case can a military leader display all his creative abilities and achieve success.

Thus, Soviet military science and military art in the war years developed actively and fruitfully. They steadily progressed in difficult one-on-one combat with a strong enemy and became enriched with new tenets and conclusions. Their goal was to ensure the total downfall of the enemy.

Military-theoretical thinking developed on a firm objective basis. It took thorough account of the improvements in weapons and technical equipping of troops, the high morale and combat expertise of personnel, the steady improvement in organizational forms of our army, as well as changes in the organization, weapons and character of combat operations of fascist troops.

The combat experience and theoretical principles of wartime have not lost their importance in many respects under modern conditions. Their study, creative mastery and implementation is one of the important tasks of Soviet military science.

3. A New Creative Upsurge

Soviet military science was greatly developed in the postwar years. Continuing to generalize and creatively interpret the experience of the past war, it is investigating at the same time the basic directions in improvements in modern weapons and combat equipment. It is analyzing their influence on the methods of military operations and the organizational structure of the Armed Forces. It is studying the possible character of wars in the modern era and is resolving fundamental questions of development of military art and the overall problems of development of the Armed Forces.

Military-historical research plays an important role in working out the problems arising before military science. In making generalizations

based on experience attained in battles, this research makes a large contribution to the understanding of the essence and character of modern wars and of military art, and to the study of fundamental problems of military affairs. Relying on past combat experience, Soviet military-theoretical thinking is successfully analyzing problems of strategy, operational art, and tactics, as well as troop training and education, and logistic support, determining the prospects for improving weapons and combat equipment, and studying other problems relative to development of the Armed Forces.

It is completely obvious that as the Armed Forces develop and are equipped with new types of weapons and combat equipment, especially nuclear missiles, and as the methods and forms of military operations and the organizational structure of troops change, it has become insufficient to rely only on the experience of past wars. In addition to research on historical experience, life itself has required a greater and deeper study of problems of modern warfare, influence of the scientific-technological revolution on military theory and practice, and fundamental changes in the Soviet Armed Forces, in the armies of probable enemies and in the world military-political situation. Soviet military-theoretical thought is turning more and more to the future.

The CPSU CC manifests daily concern for further development of Soviet military science. It constantly and opportunely aims its leadership and scientific-military cadres at mastery of the Marxist-Leninist methodology of research into the phenomena of war, at creative solution of current tasks of military affairs, and at full use of the growing combat capabilities of the Armed Forces.

A considerable contribution to the development of military science is made by critiques of and theoretical research on large exercises and maneuvers, military-scientific conferences and meetings held at headquarters, in military districts, groups of forces, fleets, and military educational institutions, as well as by combat and operational training practice.

Soviet military-theoretical thought devotes a great deal of attention to the study of the contemporary military-political situation, the nature of wars and military conflicts unleashed by imperialists, and to an analysis of military-theoretical thinking abroad. It firmly and confidently defends the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army and exposes the falsifiers of history, particularly those falsifiers of the history of World War II, who attempt to degrade the role of the Soviet Union and its Armed Forces in the defeat of fascist Germany and militarist Japan, and spread lies and slander about our country, the Soviet Armed Forces.

Soviet military-theoretical thought has achieved significant results in its subsequent research on problems of military doctrine, the basic tendencies and directions in the development of the Armed Forces, and their training for repelling aggression.

What is the essence of our understanding of **military doctrine**?

As we know, the concept of doctrine, in its broad definition, encompasses teaching, a scientific or philosophical theory, and a system of guiding principles and views. Accordingly, military doctrine is understood to be an officially accepted system of views in a given state and in its Armed Forces on the nature of war and methods of conducting it and on preparation of the country and army for war.

Military doctrine, at the very least, answers the following basic questions:

- What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
- What is the nature of the war in which the state and its armed forces will have to take part; what goals and missions might they be faced with in this war?
- What armed forces are needed to complete the assigned missions, and in what direction must military development be carried out?
- How are preparations for war to be implemented?
- What methods must be used to wage war?

These questions comprise the main content of military doctrine. Their correct solution gives a certain purposefulness to the preparation of the country and army for a possible war, and ensures a high combat readiness of armed forces.

Military doctrine is a result of the complex process of development of national ideas on solving military problems. All the basic provisions of military doctrine stem from actually existing conditions, and above all from domestic and foreign policy, the sociopolitical and economic system, level of production, status of means for conducting war, and the geographic position both of one's own state and that of the probable enemy. In the final account, the entire content of military doctrine is determined by the character of the social system of the state and its policy. The theoretical basis of Soviet military doctrine consists of the following: Marxism-Leninism, military science, and, to a certain degree, branches of social, natural, and technical sciences related to the preparation and waging of armed struggle as well as to other forms of struggle (economic, ideological, and diplomatic). Military doctrine in its turn has a reverse influence on military-theoretical thought, directing its efforts toward a solution of problems which have great practical significance.

In a capitalist state, where private ownership relations dominate and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie exists, military doctrine has a reactionary, anticommunist orientation. Its basis is the desire of aggressive forces of imperialism to eliminate the world system of socialism and shackle other countries economically and politically. In a socialist state the basis

of military doctrine comprises progressive ideas of defense of socialist achievements of the working people, and of the peace and security of peoples.

Every state has its own military doctrine. Neither in the past nor in the present has a single country, let alone a group of countries, entered a war without having its own military doctrine or without adhering to the doctrine of its more powerful allies.

In World War II the military doctrine of Hitler Germany openly expressed the reactionary, racist and predatory policy conducted by fascism. It pursued the goal of winning world dominance and was directed primarily against the Soviet Union.

The military doctrines of the United States, England and France in World War II reflected the nature of their social systems and the interests of major capitalist monopolies. Ruling circles of these states were not interested in the total defeat of fascism. The main goal of their policy was to defeat Germany and Japan as their economic rivals, weaken the Soviet Union in every way possible, and ensure their dominant position in the world. Their military doctrines bore the imprint of the conciliatory Munich policy. The strategic plans and operations of these states were accordingly double-faced and contradictory.

Of the modern military doctrines, that of the United States of America should be mentioned above all. Its main idea is to confirm the U.S. world hegemony. This idea was proclaimed by former President Truman, who in his message to Congress in 1945 stressed that "the victory which we have won has placed the American people face to face with the constant and burning need to manage the world."¹⁴ This line was subsequently repeatedly proclaimed by other U.S. presidents.

In the interests of implementing its schemes, the American government keeps considerable numbers of armed forces in the more important parts of the globe, especially in Europe and Asia. It does not intend to withdraw them inside the U.S. national borders.

In recent decades the aggressive essence of U.S. military doctrine has not changed, but from time to time its content is adjusted in connection with the continuous shifts in the correlation of world sociopolitical forces which are taking place primarily under the influence of the growth in might of the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. This is reflected in a periodic replacement of some of the U.S. strategic concepts with others.

In the 1950's the basis of U.S. military doctrine was the so-called strategy of "massive retaliation," which provided for the waging of only nuclear warfare against the Soviet Union. In 1961, in connection with an

¹⁴ Quoted from *Pravda*, 23 December 1945.

increase in the USSR's nuclear capabilities, the United States adopted the strategy of "flexible response," also subsequently imposed on the other NATO countries. This permitted a "regulated" application of military force commensurate "with the scale of the imminent danger." It provided for the possibility of conducting war against the socialist states, first with conventional weapons for a brief time, then with tactical nuclear means, and in a critical situation—with strategic nuclear weapons.

In 1971 the United States proclaimed a variety of the strategy of "flexible response"—the so-called strategy of "realistic deterrence." Its basis comprised three main principles: superiority in strategic forces; a partnership with a considerable increase in the military contribution of allies; and negotiations based on strength. In the opinion of U.S. leaders, this eliminates a number of weak points in the strategy of "flexible response," especially its dependence on the possible actions of the enemy, and by providing for anticipatory actions it thus permits keeping an enemy under the constant threat of the use of all forces and means which the United States and its allies possess. The strategy of "realistic deterrence" has the goal of strengthening the leading role of the United States in the military blocs it creates and mobilizing the economic and military potentials of its allies for the struggle against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, as well as against the national liberation movement and working people of capitalist countries who act for social liberation. On a military plane, the strategy of "realistic deterrence" presumes the creation of forces which would ensure the guaranteed destruction of the enemy. Thus, this concept is even more aggressive in comparison with the strategy of "flexible response."

Recently, another strategic concept has appeared in the United States—the so-called strategy of "target selectivity." Its essence can be summarized as follows: in addition to employing strategic nuclear weapons against Soviet cities, there would be a variant whereby they would be used against our nuclear missile launching sites, nuclear weapons stockpiles, airfields, troop concentrations, and other important military objectives. The purpose would be to prevent the Soviet Union from making a retaliatory nuclear strike.

Soviet military doctrine acts in sharp contrast with the military doctrines of capitalist states. It is a system of scientifically founded views on the essence, character and methods of waging a war which might be imposed on the Soviet Union, as well as views on demands for military development and preparing our Armed Forces and the country to defeat an aggressor. We call Soviet military doctrine scientifically founded not by chance, for its provisions are based on laws of dialectical and historical materialism, V. I. Lenin's doctrine on armed defense of the socialist Homeland and on laws of Soviet military science. Herein lies its funda-

mental distinction from military doctrines of capitalist states, which express the aggressive desires of imperialism and attempt to halt the objective process of historical development of human society on the path to socialism and communism.

The entire content of Soviet military doctrine can be divided into two interconnected groups of questions—political and military. The political content of Soviet military doctrine stems from the socialist system of the USSR, from the policy of the Communist Party and Soviet State, and from the fundamental interests of the Soviet people. In its general form, it reduces to the fact that predatory wars are alien to the Soviet Union as a socialist state. It does not need an expansion of its borders, but it will defend with all resoluteness that which belongs to the Soviet people and that which they have created themselves.

With regard to the military content of Soviet military doctrine, it is fully reflected in our regulations and manuals. All of them are imbued with the spirit of high activeness and decisiveness of operations for the purpose of total defeat of any aggressor who attempts to infringe upon the socialist Motherland.

Ideas of activeness of offensive and defensive operations, and of resolute and total defeat of an enemy permeate the entire development of the Soviet Armed Forces—their technical equipping, organizations and methods of training and educating personnel. This stems from V. I. Lenin's instructions. He wrote: "... Hegemony in war belongs to the one who fights more energetically than all others and who uses any excuse to deliver an attack against the enemy. . . ." ¹⁵

Soviet military doctrine, especially its military part, does not remain unchanged. It is refined and developed depending on the alignment of political forces in the world and the policy followed by the state, the status of the country's economy, improvements in means of conducting war, and the growth in combat capabilities of the Armed Forces. However, its class essence is retained. Our doctrine is a doctrine of a peace-loving socialist state; it is a doctrine of armed defense of the socialist achievements of the Soviet people, of the USSR's state interests, and of ensuring favorable external conditions for building communism in our country. Herein lies its vitality and strength.

Soviet military doctrine attracts a great deal of attention in capitalist states. A large number of books and articles are published and many lectures given on this subject. Some of the authors falsify events and facts and try to discredit Soviet military doctrine and shape a false opinion of it. Others who are more sensible attempt to understand our doctrine, study the general principles of Soviet military art, and, as the bourgeois authors themselves declare, present the "anatomy of the Soviet

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, IX, 186.

Armed Forces" and the reasons for their invincibility. They see Soviet military doctrine as dynamic, realistic and conforming to the capabilities of the Soviet Union.

We have never and will never hide the basic, fundamental provisions of our military doctrine. They are expressed with utter clarity in the policy of the Communist Party and the Soviet State and in the status of our Armed Forces. In order to understand its vitality and strength one has to understand the consistent peaceloving policy of the Soviet State and its complete accordance with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people and all progressive mankind.

The cornerstone of military doctrine of any state is the understanding of the essence of war which is laid down in it. Soviet military science is guided in this question by the Leninist definition of the essence of war as a continuation of politics through other, specifically forcible means. "The very same policy," wrote V. I. Lenin, "that a given state—and a given class within that state—conducted over a long period of time before the war, is inevitably and unavoidably pursued during the war by that very same class, changing only the form of action."¹⁶ In order to understand war, V. I. Lenin taught that we must "study the politics before the war; the politics which lead and have led to war."¹⁷ Therefore, for a correct understanding of the essence of modern wars, one has to consider the content of that policy which is conducted by different states and its influence on the international situation.

A different viewpoint is propagandized by bourgeois military theoreticians. In a majority of cases they attempt in every way possible to bypass or ignore the chief question in the understanding of the essence of war—its political content, causes and goals. They view war either as "simply" an armed engagement of sides—a rivalry involving the use of weapons—or they reduce it to an attempt by one side to impose its will on the other side by force of arms. In other words, they remove political content from the concept of war.

There is another group of bourgeois military theoreticians which does speak about the political essence of war, but conceals the class character of politics and attempts to prove on this basis that wars unleashed by monopolistic reaction are allegedly in the interests of all the people of a given capitalist state. By this means, bourgeois ideologists conceal from working people the genuine essence of imperialist wars to please their masters and force the working people to shed blood for interests which are alien to them.

Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army and its fundamental provisions on the essence and causes of wars are an object of

¹⁶ V. I. Lenin, XXXII, 79.

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXX, 82.

constant attacks by the ideologists of the bourgeoisie. They distort V. I. Lenin's understanding of the essence of war as a continuation of politics of states and classes within them by violent means and resort to crude falsification of the correlation of war and politics. They attempt to belittle V. I. Lenin's role in developing the teaching on the essence of war. They have created and intensively maintain the myth of the so-called "Soviet threat" to peace. They spread false versions to the effect that the sources of wars in the modern era allegedly lie not in the aggressive nature of imperialism, but in the ideology of communism, and allegedly in the attempt by the Soviet State to "export revolution" to capitalist countries. By propagandizing these fabrications, bourgeois ideologists attempt to form a distorted impression about the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union among the population of capitalist states.

However, it is becoming more and more difficult for them to deceive the broad popular masses, who are more and more beginning to understand the true causes of wars, who is the real culprit, who is telling lies and who the truth about war. And the truth is that the source of wars is hidden in the aggressive nature of imperialism.

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, in his report to the American Congress in February 1972, gave a list of types of wars which are possible, in his opinion, in the modern era. These are a strategic nuclear war, a nuclear war in a theater of war, a conventional war in a theater of war and a conventional war in a theater of military operations or in a limited region of such a theater. But, Laird was silent about the political and class essence of these wars. There is no doubt that an unleashing of any of them by the imperialist states would be a continuation of their aggressive policy. At the same time according to the so-called "Guam Doctrine," U.S. direct participation in these wars is not at all obligatory. The American strategy of "realistic deterrence" lays stress on "partnership" and a more active inclusion of allies from aggressive blocs (NATO, SEATO, CENTO and others) for implementing U.S. military-political plans, including the fight against the national liberation movement.

The world has already witnessed some of the wars named by Laird. These were the U.S. wars against peoples of Korea and Vietnam, Israel's war against the Arab countries, backed by U.S. reactionary circles, and fascist Portugal's war against the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau, whom it had enslaved. All these wars had an unjust, predatory character with regard to the aggressive imperialist states, and at the same time, a just, liberating character with regard to the people and states—victims of aggression, defending their right to independent development.

The contemporary situation in the world, the opposition of forces of progress and reaction, and of socialism and imperialism, as well as the

presence of nuclear weapons in the armies of a number of countries predetermine the possibility of outbreak and conduct of wars which differ in character. They can be distinguished from one another by their sociopolitical content, by their scale and by the means used to wage them.

Based on the fundamental contradictions of the modern era one can distinguish the following types of wars by their sociopolitical signs: wars between states (or coalitions) of two opposing social systems—capitalist and socialist; civil wars between the proletariat and bourgeoisie or between popular masses and forces of extreme reaction which are supported by imperialists of other countries; wars between imperialist states and peoples of colonial and dependent countries fighting for their freedom and independence; and wars between capitalist states.

Depending on their scale, modern wars may be local, limited to the participation of two or several countries, or worldwide, between two opposing social systems of states. A considerable portion, or even all, countries of the world would be drawn into a world war.

In characterizing wars from the standpoint of use of modern means of warfare, the question of nuclear weapons stands apart. As we know, an agreement has been concluded between the USSR and United States on prevention of nuclear war. But other nuclear powers still have not joined in this agreement and, very importantly, an agreement has not been reached on unconditional prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the threat of war involving the use of nuclear weapons has not been removed.

In today's world V. I. Lenin's principle fully retains its significance, i.e., his division of wars into just and progressive if they pursue liberating goals, and unjust and reactionary if they are based on imperialist goals of capturing foreign lands and enslaving other peoples. With regard to a war which the imperialists might impose on the Soviet Union or other socialist states, it would be an unjust, reactionary war in all cases on the part of imperialist powers, and a continuation of their predatory politics. This war would be just and progressive on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist states. It will be a continuation of their revolutionary politics of defending the freedom and independence of their motherland and promoting the great cause of building socialism and communism.

These are our views on the essence and character of modern wars. They stem naturally from the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, from an objective estimate of the international situation and from the current alignment of sociopolitical forces in the world. They fully refute bourgeois theories about the essence of war and reveal their falsity and total insolvency.

Soviet military doctrine finds its concrete theoretical and practical

manifestation in development of the Armed Forces, in strategy, operational art and tactics, in methods of waging a war, operations or battles, and in personnel training and education.

Strategy is a component of military art and is its most important sphere. It encompasses questions of the theory and practice of preparing the Armed Forces for war, of planning and waging war, of using Services of the Armed Forces and directing them. Strategy is based on military doctrine and relies on a country's economic capabilities. At the same time, it stems directly from a state's policy and is subordinate to it.

Soviet military strategy stems from the policy of the CPSU regarding the defense of the country.

Strategy arose together with war. In any war each opposing side pursues its own strategic goals and conducts its own strategic line, which has great influence on the character of war and methods of military operations. If the strategy does not meet the military capabilities of the state and the conditions of a situation, the army suffers defeat. Proper strategy, which considers a country's capabilities and its armed forces, as well as the objective character of the situation, serves as one of the most important conditions for victory. This can be traced in an example of the Great Patriotic War, during which there was a competition of two strategies—fascist and Soviet.

In planning aggression against the Soviet Union, the Hitlerite leadership placed as the basis of its military strategy the idea of "Blitzkrieg." It was planned to use surprise attacks by major troop groupings simultaneously on all strategic axes to destroy the main body of the Red Army in the western part of the Soviet Union, and then by a swift advance into the depths of the country, to capture Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, move to the Arkhangel'sk-Volga line and force the USSR to capitulate.

This strategy of the Hitlerite leadership in the situation at the beginning of the war, which was unfavorable for us, was opposed by the Soviet strategy of stubborn defense in combination with front and army counterblows, frequent offensive operations and the unfolding of partisan warfare in the enemy's rear areas. In fierce fighting in the summer and fall of 1941, fascist troops were exhausted and drained. Hitler's strategy of Blitzkrieg suffered failure, and with the shift into the counteroffensive by our troops at Moscow, it suffered total downfall.

After their defeat at Moscow, the leadership of fascist Germany was forced to shift to a strategy of phased attainment of its goals by delivery of attacks only on individual strategic axes. This was shown by the system of operations to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus, planned for the summer of 1942.

The Soviet Supreme High Command at first chose an active defense

against this enemy strategy, with the conduct of anticipatory operations on a number of axes. When this strategic line did not justify itself, the strategy of active defense with a shift into the counteroffensive was again adopted. The Supreme High Command proceeded from the leading principle of Soviet military art, which requires not indiscriminate attack or attack *en masse*, but all possible economy of forces in inflicting the greatest possible loss on the enemy. Soviet military art does not pit art against force, but seeks to make full use of both of these factors to win victory over the enemy.

As a result of the stubborn defense of Soviet forces at Stalingrad, the enemy's shock forces were bled white, and in the course of our subsequent counteroffensive, they were smashed once and for all. Hitler's strategy of phased attainment of the goals of war suffered failure, and along with it, the entire offensive strategy of the fascist German army. With the victory of our troops at Stalingrad, the Soviet command took the strategic initiative firmly and finally into its hands. The basis of further operations of the Soviet Armed Forces was an offensive strategy which brought total victory over fascist Germany.

The fascist German command answered the Soviet offensive strategy with a strategy of stubborn defense and of "scorched earth." It strove to deprive the USSR of economic and human resources, exhaust it and attain an end to the war favorable to itself through the destruction of our cities and villages, the ravaging of our economy, and by driving Soviet citizens into Germany. But this strategy, too, met defeat. Soviet troops, by their successive operations, disrupted the Hitlerite command's attempts to use such strategic lines as the Dnepr, Vistula, the Carpathians, and the Oder to conduct a defense, to pin down our forces by stubbornly defending individual cities, and to draw out the war.

Thus, Soviet military strategy, based on an objective consideration of the military-political situation and the realistic correlation of forces of the opposing sides, came out on top in the struggle of two strategic concepts in all the phases of the Great Patriotic War.

In postwar years Soviet strategy has been developing in complete conformity with the policy of the Communist Party on the basis of a technical reequipping of our Armed Forces.

Speaking of strategy, we distinguish a strategy of waging a war as a whole, its main concept, the chief strategic goal, and a strategy of waging a war on axes to accomplish individual strategic missions and attain particular strategic goals. There is a close dialectical interconnection between them as between a whole and its parts. This connection consists above all of the fact that attainment of the overall strategic goal of war usually is ensured by accomplishing particular strategic missions. For example, our Armed Forces achieved particular strategic goals of war by

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forcing Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary on the Southwest Strategic Axis and Finland in the north to withdraw from the war. These actions, however, weakened the entire fascist bloc and created favorable conditions for us to achieve the overall goal of the war—defeat of Hitler's army and the unconditional surrender of fascist Germany.

The very same can be said with regard to the role of the Belorussian, Vistula-Oder and a number of other operations of our army in the Great Patriotic War.

Further, the tie between war strategy as a whole and war strategy along axes is manifested in their interdependence. War strategy is not constant. It usually changes depending on the military-political situation and on the successes or failures in war, i.e., depending on the winning of particular strategic goals. Changes in war strategy in their turn force us to make certain adjustments in the strategic troop operations along axes and correct particular strategic war goals and methods of attaining them.

This can also be traced through a number of examples. At the beginning of the war with the Soviet Union, fascist Germany placed the defeat of the Red Army and capture of the most important areas of our country as its chief strategic goal. Active offensive operations of Hitler's troops along axes were subordinated to its attainment. But later, especially after its defeat in the Kursk Bulge, fascist Germany fought only for an exit from the war that would be advantageous for it. This naturally had an effect on its particular strategic goals. The fascist German army at this stage of the war was attempting to dig in on the most important lines of captured territories and gain an honorable peace for Germany. This, however, did not come about. The particular strategic goals on the axes were not achieved, and at the same time, the overall strategic war goal of German fascism suffered defeat.

Nuclear missiles introduced fundamental changes in strategy. They increased by many times the role of strategy in winning war goals. While before, including in World War II, strategic planners possessed relatively limited means for taking direct action against distant enemy installations, with the adoption of nuclear missiles they obtained the opportunity of directly accomplishing major strategic missions and thus of exerting a decisive influence on the entire course of the war.

Operational art also received further development in postwar years. It occupies an intermediate position between strategy and tactics and plays a connecting role between them. Operational art stems from and is subordinate to strategy. While strategy encompasses questions dealing with the preparation and use of the Armed Forces in war, operational art involves resolution of problems of preparing for and waging joint and independent operations and combat actions by operational formations and Services of the Armed Forces in individual theaters of military

operations. With regard to tactics, operational art occupies a dominant position. It determines tactical missions, and the role and place of tactical operations by units and formations in achieving operational goals.

The appearance of nuclear weapons caused the emergence of new methods of conducting operations and of operational use of all Services of the Armed Forces.

When we speak of operations by the Ground Forces, then, considering the increased combat capabilities of weapons, we could say they are characterized by an increase in spatial scope, depth of missions and tempos of attack; high dynamic action of combat operations; a rapid transition from one form of operations to another—from the attack to defense and vice versa, from defense to attack and to encounter battles; the possibility of heavy losses; and the need in this regard for swift restoration of troop combat effectiveness.

New weapons and new military technology have also caused many fundamental changes in the operational art of other services of the Armed Forces. The increased combat capabilities of the Air Force and National Air Defense Forces, for example, permit them to independently accomplish important operational missions. At the same time, the increase in the role of aviation to achieve operational-strategic goals and the increase in aerial danger for the Ground Forces require joint conduct of operations by all Services of the Armed Forces in the interests of accomplishment of missions by the Ground Forces. Thus, both the Air Force and National Air Defense Forces must be ready to conduct operations and combat operations both independently as well as jointly with other Services of the Armed Forces, and primarily with the Ground Forces.

The operational art of the Navy stands somewhat apart. Qualitative changes in naval combat means have facilitated the rapid development of old methods and the emergence of new methods of combat operations at sea. New forms of naval operations have arisen which are connected with combating enemy atomic missile-carrying submarines and strike aircraft carrier forces, as well as anti-submarine forces, and waging warfare on sea and ocean lines of communication. This enriches the operational art of the Navy and requires its profound interpretation and theoretical development.

Tactics play a very important role in military art. It encompasses the theory and practice of combat by subunits, units and formations. It is subordinate to operational art and strategy and stems from them.

In comparison with strategy and operational art, tactics are more flexible and sensitive to all changes in the material base of making war, in people, and in military equipment. It is people and military equipment which have an immediate effect on tactics and on methods of combat

operations. No one battle is similar to another. Therefore, stereotype here is inadmissible. The tactics of all Services of the Armed Forces have an inherent diversity of forms and methods of combat operations. The richer and broader their arsenal, the greater are chances for success. Tactical troop operations in all forms of combat lead to victory when they are permeated by activeness and boldness, ability and resoluteness.

The offensive tactics of the Ground Forces lies in reliable fire suppression of the enemy along the entire depth of his combat deployment, in decisive attacks by infantry and tanks on the most important axes, and in the rapid breakthrough of the defense and swift advance into its depth in conjunction with the landing of airborne troops for subsequent defeat of opposing enemy forces and reserves and seizure of the most important defensive lines and areas of his territory. The basic requirements for a tactical offensive are the suddenness and swiftness of blows, a skillful combination of firepower and movement, the ensuring of superiority over the enemy at the decisive points and at the decisive moments of battle, a flexible maneuver of men and equipment, the prevention of enemy build-up efforts, encirclement and destruction of enemy groupings piecemeal, relentless pursuit of the enemy day and night, and consolidation of success. It is especially important to maintain a constant superiority over the enemy on the main axes and ensure reliable fire suppression and continuity of the attack right up until total defeat of the enemy.

Soviet military art also attaches proper importance to defensive battle. With a good organization of defense and a skillful use of firepower and favorable terrain conditions it is possible to deal the enemy a serious defeat having fewer forces than he.

Modern defense is characterized by high activeness and an ability to withstand a deep and powerful enemy blow with the use of all means of warfare. At the same time, defense is organized with the idea of using it as an initial position for going over into an offensive.

The encounter battle occupies a prominent place in tactical troop operations. It is a type of offensive combat where both sides strive to accomplish their assigned missions by attacking. An encounter battle is characteristic of maneuverable forms of combat operations. It arises both in offense as well as in defense. The tactical basis of an encounter battle is the inflicting of defeat on the enemy by air strikes and artillery fire at extreme ranges before he manages to deploy, forestalling him in deployment and in decisive operations by infantry and tanks, and making swift attacks on the flank and rear of the enemy main body.

Troop march movements play a large part. Units and formations in modern warfare will have to make marches over considerable distances and at extremely high speeds, shift quickly from one method of move-

ment to another, suddenly change direction of movement, deploy and enter battle from the march, and be well controlled both on the march and in battle.

The tactics of the remaining services of the Armed Forces are also developing with consideration of the appearance of new weapons and combat equipment, both here and abroad. Its basis consists of the use of more effective tactical techniques and methods of accomplishing missions than the enemy, an excellent mastery of technology, and complete use of its combat capabilities while conducting both independent as well as joint combat operations.

There are certain features embodied in the tactics of the Navy. These tactics cannot now be limited only to the creation of groupings of homogeneous forces and their assumption of favorable positions for the delivery of missile-artillery and torpedo attacks. Successful accomplishment of the missions facing the Navy is unthinkable without the skilled organization and conduct of naval battle with the participation of heterogeneous naval forces and various types of weapons in close tactical coordination.

The precise and coordinated combat actions of heterogeneous forces presume exemplary mastery by personnel of surface and underwater warships, and naval aviation of their weapons and combat equipment, an ability to maneuver, avoid enemy attacks and attack him suddenly.

The principal demands placed on tactics of Ground Forces—boldness, decisiveness and persistence in attack, stubbornness and activeness on defense—extended identically to the tactics of the remaining Services of the Armed Forces.

The above are some of the most important principles of strategy, operational art and tactics to which Soviet military doctrine adheres and which comprise the basis for the training of our Armed Forces.

4. Current Tasks of Soviet Military Science

The results attained by Soviet military science do not represent its apex or final word. The changes taking place in the military-political situation in the world, the continuing military-technological revolution, and continuous improvement in military affairs in our country and abroad all present military-theoretical thought with new tasks and problems.

The overall task of military science is to simultaneously conduct both basic and applied research in the interests of all possible assurance of the development and preparation of the Armed Forces in conformity with the character of war which might be imposed on the Soviet Union by imperialists. While basic research has the purpose of resolving major

military problems and discovering essentially new directions in the development and application of weapons and combat equipment, applied research involves the accomplishment of current tasks simultaneously with practice of military development. The applied portion of military science is more dynamic. It responds sensitively to innovations in weapons and technology. It is always in use and immediately brings tangible results. The basic portion, on the other hand, involves long-range development of military affairs. It is less visible and does not provide immediate results. It is, however, the basis for applied science and for practical work. Applied research could not be carried out without basic research.

Therefore, it is important to extensively develop further the fundamental theoretical problems connected with revelation of the content and character of war, its objective laws, the forms of their manifestation and the principles of military art stemming from these laws. It is important to creatively investigate the problems of strategy, operational art and tactics which arise. At the same time, it is necessary to constantly refine, in conformity with changing conditions of the situation, the missions of the Armed Forces, the directions of their development and training, the ways to improve existing forms of weapons and combat equipment and to create new ones.

Military-theoretical thought is obligated to study and generalize the experience of combat and operational training, especially of troop and operations exercises, draw theoretical conclusions and introduce everything positive into troop training.

It is also necessary to be attentive to the status of military affairs abroad and to thoroughly analyze the changes taking place in armies of capitalist states—in their organization, weaponry, political-moral state, military doctrine, strategy, tactics and in other problems connected with preparations for war and the combat readiness of imperialist armies.

Today, the study of military history has become more important. This is due to the following main reasons:

First of all, military history permits an understanding of the processes and changes taking place in the theory and practice of developing the armed forces, and the evolution of forms and methods of conducting war; it helps to correctly resolve current problems; it reveals established patterns and trends in the development of military affairs; it puts one on guard against groundless dreaming and extremes; and it introduces an element of practical experience into theoretical reasoning and provides rich material for making theoretical conclusions.

Secondly, military history is important as a means of constant improvement in military thinking and as a means of expanding the officers' military outlook. Its possibilities are very great in this respect.

Military history shows the extensive processes included in directing war, and preparing and conducting operations. It shows the motives which lie at the basis of various important decisions and teaches us to evaluate them comprehensively. It reveals the means by which victory was attained, and the causes of failures and defeats; and it helps us understand the errors of the past.

Thirdly, military history is of value as a means of ideological education of personnel. It facilitates not only the cultural growth of a soldier, but also the shaping of his character and his moral and psychological qualities. Military history is an irreplaceable means of instilling socialist patriotism and internationalism. A future world war, if the aggressive forces of imperialism unleash it, will inevitably become one of coalitions. The soldiers of armies of the fraternal socialist countries will fight shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers. In order to know each other better, it is useful to *mutually study the history, traditions and experience of allied armed forces.*

Military-historical science is called upon to thoroughly investigate problems of the history of wars, especially World War II and the Great Patriotic War, and reveal the decisive role of the Soviet Union and its army in the victory over the fascist coalition. The history of wars has become an arena of increasingly fierce struggle between the communist and bourgeois ideologies. One cannot count on the intensity of this struggle being reduced in the future. To the contrary, one has to expect that it will be reinforced and that the imperialists will continue to carry out ideological subversion against the USSR and its Armed Forces—and in even more sophisticated fashion. V. I. Lenin wrote: “When the ideological influence of the bourgeoisie on the working people drops, is undermined, and becomes weak, the bourgeoisie has *always and everywhere* resorted to the most desperate lies and slander, and will continue to do so.”¹⁸

It is very important to reveal the full extent of the motivating forces in Soviet society in the war years and the factors which determined the defeat of the imperialist aggressors.

The Communist Party's implementation of V. I. Lenin's ideas on defending the socialist Homeland must be shown more clearly and fully. Works which highlight the mobilizing and organizing role of the Communist Party in the war years occupy a special place in military history. They analyze the principles of Party leadership of the Armed Forces, the CPSU's work in strengthening the unity of the army and people, work to bring soldiers up in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, Party direction over the partisan movement, agitation-propaganda work among the troops and the enemy population, and

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, XXV, 352.

other points. Here is a truly boundless field of activity for military historians, and an inexhaustible source of good topics for researchers.

Questions of Soviet military development, strategic, operational, and tactical leadership during the war years require a fuller illumination. It is a very important task to show how victory was attained under difficult conditions, when the enemy possessed a superiority in men and equipment; and how we achieved a coordinated, precise interaction between the front, rear area, and partisan movement, and between heterogeneous forces and equipment in operations and battles.

More extensive research is needed on questions relevant to shifting the country's national economy at the beginning of war from a peacetime status to a war footing, creation of the Soviet defense industry, and its development during the prewar years as well as during the course of the war. Of great significance in this respect are the disclosure of the role in the economic preparation of the state to repel aggression, the unique features pertaining to creating and developing a Soviet military economy, as well as measures to prepare theaters of military operations on the eve of the Great Patriotic War.

In recent years more and more monographs and articles have been published here on the history of combat cooperation of armies of the socialist countries. The interest in this subject is understandable. The sources of combat cooperation of our fraternal peoples originated from the period of the Great October Socialist Revolution and defense of the young Soviet republic against foreign interventionists and White Guards. This combat community passed through the crucible of tests of the Great Patriotic War and has been sealed in blood shed in the joint battle against fascism. Here there are a number of problems which require thorough research and further development, such as problems of conducting joint operations, of troop command and control, coordination of combat efforts, thorough support of operations, operation of the rear area, and questions of international education.

Together with studying the history of wars of the Soviet people in their defense of the socialist Homeland, it is necessary to do research based on the experience of other nations which have conducted revolutionary wars, wars of liberation, and progressive wars.

One of the important tasks is to increase the effectiveness of military science in every way possible. Developing constantly, it is called upon to provide the greatest results with the least expenditures of time and supplies, efficiently resolve current problems of military affairs, boldly conduct scientific exploration, keep up with social and scientific-technological progress, and persistently seek a practical realization of its achievements. For this we must raise still higher the level of scientific research and exploration in staffs, troop units and fleets, activate the work of all

scientific organizations of the Ministry of Defense, and improve the content of theoretical journals and the organization of military-scientific and technical information.

It is important that scientific-research work not be shackled once and for all by established canons. Nothing has such a pernicious effect on the results of scientific research as dogmatism and an attempt to bring new theoretical conclusions into conformity with established views. Such practice inevitably limits and impoverishes thinking and leads to an endless repetition of well-known truths in various versions. Military-theoretical thought has to be free of obsolete theses.

It stands to reason that development of military-theoretical problems is no simple task. It requires much time and great effort. It often happens that original views which extend beyond customary bounds meet with doubt, but this is a natural phenomenon inasmuch as the development of military theory and practice always takes place amid a struggle of old and new ideas. The one who wins is the one who is in step with the demands of the time, possesses a sense of the new, and adheres to progressive views.

The chief requirement on Soviet military science is that it stay ahead of practice all the time, that it look further ahead, reveal the possible paths of development of military affairs, blaze a trail for practice, and thus accelerate and improve the process of personnel training and education, and facilitate a steady increase in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

At the same time, military science must continue to attentively study, generalize and interpret the experience of wars and the practice of troop training and education, and draw the appropriate conclusions for its further development. We must always be guided by V. I. Lenin's thesis that "the viewpoint of life and practice must be the first and basic viewpoint of the theory of cognition."¹⁹

Today, as never before, broad opportunities open up for the development of military science. Taking advantage of the achievements of mathematics, physics, cybernetics and other sciences, military science is in a position to make an objective and precise evaluation of the prospects for improvements in military theory and practice and provide more substantiated practical recommendations on various questions of military development.

The fundamental changes in military affairs and the development of new problems in military art require an even greater mastery of Marxist-Leninist methodology. It is impossible to successfully advance military

¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, XVIII, 145.

science, or resolve current problems relative to the training and indoctrination of troops, weapons and combat equipment, or the organization of the Armed Forces without applying the method of Marxist-Leninist dialectics.

It is necessary to have a good knowledge of and persistently follow the basic requirements of this method, i.e., Party principle in science, objectivity in examining any phenomenon, and comprehensiveness of scientific cognition. It is important to also assimilate a thesis of this method such as a concrete historical approach to questions under research. One must not picture the matter in such a way that the new historical period crosses out everything in the past in the field of military practice and military thinking and that now we have to resolve everything with a "clean slate." V. I. Lenin taught us to combine a succession of military experience of the past with the bold posing and resolution of new problems. His works provide examples of the use of past experience in the interests of the present and the future.

Of course, previous experience must be given a place which is proportionate to its significance. The revolution in military affairs primarily requires a forward movement, boldness in thought, and daring in the posing of new problems. When we stress the importance of accumulated experience, we have in mind the need for a knowledgeable use of conclusions from history for resolving today's problems. To correctly evaluate the role of history does not mean to go backwards, but there is a vital need to take from the past lessons for the future.

We have all the requisites for a steady development of military science: the most progressive social system, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, and the Party's constant concern for strengthening the defensive capability of the Land of the Soviets. Soviet military science opens up the real world of phenomena of war and its laws and patterns. It does not need a distortion of objective processes of social life and military affairs. Herein lies a true guarantee of successful accomplishment by Soviet military science of the tasks facing it.

Chapter 11. Party-Political Work in the Armed Forces

The Communist Party, in exercising direction over the Armed Forces, uses different means and methods to influence their development and the resolution of all questions concerning military development. Here, one of the main functions is devoted to Party-political work, which encompasses literally every aspect in the life and work of the Armed Forces, rallies Soviet soldiers about the CPSU, and motivates them to steadily raise the combat power and readiness of the Armed Forces.

V. I. Lenin attached exceptionally great significance to Party-political work. He considered it to be an integral part of overall Party work and demanded that it be conducted steadfastly, without letting up for a single day. Well known are Lenin's words to the effect that "wherever political work among soldiers is conducted most conscientiously . . . there is no slackness, drill and morale are better, and there are more victories."¹ The Communist Party, following V. I. Lenin's behests, constantly aims Party-political work in the Armed Forces at successful accomplishment of the missions facing them. It improves its content, forms and methods as applicable to the concrete historical conditions and makes use of it as an important lever of direction over the Armed Forces.

1. Party-Political Work—A Powerful Party Weapon

In creating a new type of army, the Communist Party and V. I. Lenin understood full well that it would be strong primarily because of the high awareness of the soldiers, their unlimited devotion to the cause of the socialist revolution and their unshakeable faith in the truth of those ideas for the sake of which they shed their blood. Therefore, from the very first days of development of the Soviet Armed Forces, educating personnel to have a high degree of political awareness and motivating them to accomplish combat missions were matters to which the Party always paid unremitting attention and comprised the main task of all Party-political work in units and on warships. The ideological-political

¹ V. I. Lenin, XXXIX, 56.

education of soldiers has a decisive influence on all processes taking place in the Armed Forces. It uplifts people to achieve new successes in combat and political training and in strengthening discipline and order in troop units. It determines not only the form of thinking, but also the line of conduct of Soviet soldiers and their readiness to go boldly into battle for their Homeland and defeat the enemy.

Party-political work conducted in the Armed Forces is exceptionally fruitful. In developing and strengthening high qualities in personnel, qualities formed by the entire Soviet way of life, it has resulted in the upbringing of a Soviet soldier with a human spirit unsurpassed in strength and intensity—a mature patriot and internationalist, utterly dedicated to the Party, people and Fatherland, a person with a profound Marxist-Leninist, general educational and military training, with a stable world outlook, a broad cultural horizon, and a clear understanding of his duties in defense of the achievements of socialism and the building of communism.

The effectiveness of Party-political influence on personnel has been repeatedly shown by those unparalleled exploits which Soviet soldiers performed in the years of the Civil and Great Patriotic wars. It was the high awareness, utter love for the Motherland, a healthy optimism, unlimited courage and selflessness of soldiers and commanders educated by the Party which allowed them to endure unheard-of deprivations and suffering hold out and win victory.

During the period of foreign intervention and civil war, the political organs and Party organizations of the Armed Forces used their tireless propaganda and agitation to bring into the Red Army and Red Navy masses the Party's living, truthful word. They explained the just nature of the war which the Armed Forces of the young Soviet republic were waging. They explained their noble goals, strengthened the alliance of the working class and peasantry in the person of the soldiers—sons of the working people, rallied the personnel, and brought them up in a spirit of the ideas of the Great October Socialist Revolution. They instilled in soldiers and commanders a hatred for the foreign interventionists and White Guards, a high vigilance, utter bravery and steadfastness in battle, and an absolute resolve to smash the foe. A great deal of attention was devoted, first to fighting against sabotage by some of the old [i.e., Tsarist] military specialists, slackness, lack of discipline, and the partisans; and second, to bringing a truly revolutionary order into units and onto ships.

Political organs and Party organizations exercised constant control over the work of the old military specialists called into the Red Army. They took an active part in training military cadres from the working people and peasants who were utterly devoted to socialism. They performed a considerable volume of the administrative and housekeeping tasks, help-

ing commanders smooth out the uninterrupted supply of troops with weapons, military equipment, ammunition, rations, clothing and other means of material support.

Political organs and Party organizations of the Armed Forces also gave considerable help to local Party organizations in the military training of workers. They took measures to have Party members reconstruct industrial establishments that had been demolished during the war and motivated troops to participate in this work.

In speaking of the victory of the Land of Soviets over the united forces of the external and internal counterrevolution, V. I. Lenin remarked that "never, under any one political regime, was there a tenth of the situation as under Soviet power, where Party and nonparty workers and nonparty peasants (peasants are by and large nonparty) were so solidly sympathetic to the war. Herein lay the basis of why we defeated a strong enemy in the end."²

In the years of the Great Patriotic War the political organs and Party organizations of the Armed Forces inspired personnel to rout the fascist invaders. They fixed socialist ideals and morality in the awareness of soldiers, as well as responsibility for the fate of the Motherland. They developed in them a sense of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, a sense of friendship of peoples and socialist humanism. They instilled hatred for the enemy and exposed the ideology of imperialism, especially its extreme manifestation—fascism.

Ideological conviction was a nutritive soil and inexhaustible source of mass heroism of Soviet soldiers and commanders and of their invincible morale and steadfastness. It supported the offensive enthusiasm of our soldiers and their drive to smash the invaders as quickly as possible and aid Soviet citizens on USSR territory temporarily occupied by the Hitlerites, and the peoples of other countries captured by the fascist aggressors in getting out from under the enemy yoke. The Soviet soldiers' high awareness became one of the most important factors which gave our Motherland a great victory.

Party-political work in the Armed Forces also plays an enormous role at the present time. It shapes a communist awareness in soldiers, an irreconcilability toward bourgeois ideology and a pride in their Soviet Motherland. It instills in them a sense of socialist patriotism and internationalism. Party-political work is a decisive means of influencing the consciousness and hearts of people. It increases by many times over the combat efficiency and morale of soldiers, facilitates the conversion of their spiritual strength into material strength, and multiplies the combat capabilities of the troops.

² V. I. Lenin, XLII, 140.

A clear manifestation of the effectiveness of Party-political work lies in the high moral-political state of personnel, their proper understanding and active support of the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU, the soldiers' monolithic solidarity about the Communist Party and its Leninist Central Committee, and their readiness to perform any assignment in defense of the state interests of the Soviet Union.

Political organs and Party organizations jointly with the commanders strengthen military discipline, order and efficiency in troop units. They increase the authority of command cadres day by day and attain improvements in the quality of combat, operational and political training of soldiers and personnel expertise in new types of weapons and military equipment which the Soviet people provide the Armed Forces. In the final account, they seek to maintain a high combat effectiveness and combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

The exceptional effectiveness of Party-political work in days of war and peace is explained primarily by the fact that it is conducted under the direct leadership of the Communist Party. The Central Committee and CPSU CC Politburo constantly direct the activity of political organs and Party organizations of the Armed Forces, see to it that personnel have a broad mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory, and determine the most important tasks for their moral-political education, including shaping their communist world outlook, their devotion to the Motherland, Party and people, and their allegiance to the oath and military duty.

Political organs and Party organizations and the entire combat detachment of Armed Forces communists are active conductors of CPSU policy in the Armed Forces, educators of enlisted men, and the bulwark of commanders in strengthening the combat readiness of units, warships and formations.

The leading role in resolving problems facing Party members of the Armed Forces belongs to primary Party organizations and their secretaries. This is no chance matter. Primary Party organizations conduct day-to-day work with Party members and all personnel who directly control weapons and combat equipment, and resolve other important problems relevant to a steady strengthening of troop combat readiness.

With regard to secretaries of primary Party organizations, these are political leaders, organizers and educators of the soldiers, who are called upon to continually stimulate their creative thinking and set examples of conscientiousness, industriousness and Party devotion and principle. For them it is very important to have a communist ideological spirit and an ability to rally a collective, arouse the people and lead them to perform the assigned tasks.

The CPSU CC periodically calls all-army conferences of Party organization secretaries, which serve as a good school for their education and

a highly effective means of mobilizing Party organizations, Party members and all soldiers of the Armed Forces to perform those concrete tasks which the Armed Forces are accomplishing at the given stage in their development.

The 5th All-Army Conference of Party Organization Secretaries, which was held in March 1973 by decision of the CPSU CC, occupied an important spot in the life of Party members of the Armed Forces. It was prepared and conducted in accordance with resolutions of the 24th Party Congress, the December 1972 CPSU CC Plenum, and the nationwide celebrations in honor of the 50th anniversary of the formation of the USSR. The conference discussed the status of, and measures for, further improvement in Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces and outlined tasks for Party organizations to ensure a high degree of troop combat readiness and ways to accomplish those tasks. It was a great political event in the life of Armed Forces Party members—the tested fighting detachment of the Leninist Party. The work of the conference and decisions made there were conducive to further increases in the activeness and combat spirit of Party organizations in the Armed Forces, to a reinforcement of propaganda of ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and to bringing up Soviet soldiers in a spirit of unshakeable allegiance to the behests of the great V. I. Lenin and to their patriotic and international obligation.

Thanks to the tireless efforts of the CPSU, Party-political work in the Armed Forces now is on a new upturn. It has become more vivid and rich in content. It has augmented the creative initiative of Party members and activated the personal participation of Party members—commanders, political workers, staff officers, engineers and technicians—in the activities of Party organizations. Armed Forces Party organizations have become stronger ideologically and organizationally. They have strengthened the bonds with the masses of servicemen and have reinforced their influence on the lives, training and service of the troops. They have begun to delve more concretely, purposefully and deeply into questions of combat training of troops and official work of Party members. It is important that all units and warships have full-fledged primary Party organizations. Inner Party work has come alive in them. The framework of inner Party democracy has expanded and criticism and self-criticism have received further development.

Party-political work in the Soviet Armed Forces is being improved on a firm social basis. Its content reflects a steady spiritual growth of Soviet society, culture, and education of all the people.

We have all the necessary conditions to conduct effective Party-political work and form in soldiers high morale and combat spirit. The main thing is that personnel of the Armed Forces be brought up on the great ideals of Marxism-Leninism and on our Party's historic deeds. The

situation of faith and respect for cadres which exists in the Party, improvements in the style and methods of work of the Party, and strict observance of Leninist norms of Party life, all have a beneficial influence on Party-political work and on the entire activity of military councils, commanders, political organs and Party organizations.

Party-political work is conducted in the Armed Forces by a large detachment of Party members who are tempered and highly trained in all respects. There is a harmonious system of the Party-political apparatus functioning in troop units. The very specifics of military life are conducive to organization of constant Party-political influence over every soldier and to high efficiency in the work of political organs and Party organizations.

2. The Cohesive Force of Military Collectives

The entire history of the Soviet Armed Forces convincingly attests to the decisive role of Party members in raising the combat might of the Armed Forces. Communists constitute the cohesive force of military collectives. This is why the CPSU constantly looks to the combat effectiveness of Party organizations in the Armed Forces, both in peacetime and during periods of military ordeals. During the war years the Party sent a large number of members into the Armed Forces from territorial Party organizations. V. I. Lenin wrote: "How did we act in the more dangerous moments of the Civil War? We concentrated our best Party forces in the Red Army; we resorted to the mobilization of the best of our working people; we appealed for people to seek new forces for labor, where the deepest root of our dictatorship lies."³ Suffice it to say, for example, that in August 1920 there were around 300,000 Party members in the army—almost half of the entire Party. In the Great Patriotic War over 1.64 million Party members were sent into the Armed Forces. This comprised half of the entire strength of territorial organizations as of the summer of 1941.

In the years of the Great Patriotic War, as was the case during the period of foreign intervention and civil war, there was vividly displayed the regularity of Party development, which consisted of the fact that it grew up and became strong basically through the soldiers of the Armed Forces who fought directly at the front. From 1 July 1941 through 1 July 1945, 3,788,000 soldiers became Party candidates and 2,376,000 became Party members. This comprised almost three-fourths of all those accepted as Party members and two-thirds of all those accepted as candidates.⁴

Obviously, it is not simply the number of Party members which deter-

³ V. I. Lenin, XLV, 383.

⁴ See *Istoriya Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, (History of the CPSU), Vol. V, Book 1, p. 370.

mines the strength of military collectives. The main point is that they are always in the vanguard everywhere, where the going is hardest. This immeasurably raises and strengthens the authority of Party members and gives them a moral right to educate nonparty soldiers, mobilize them for exemplary performance of service, and, under wartime conditions, to lead them into combat and inspire them to perform exploits. The personal example of Party members multiplies many times over the strength of Party-political influence on the masses of soldiers.

The CPSU attaches prime importance to education of Party members in their vanguard role. It was the 8th Party Congress which stressed that "belonging to a communist cell does not give a soldier any special rights, but only imposes on him an obligation to be a more selfless and courageous soldier."⁵ In the *Pamyatka kommunistu na fronte* (Instructions to a Party Member at the Front), issued during the Civil War years and approved by V. I. Lenin, the Party member was charged with being at the most prominent place everywhere and in any important matter, being the first to enter combat and the last to leave it.

And with their deeds the Party members justified the trust of their own Party. They were in the first ranks of the fighting troops, and always were and continue to be the soul of the soldier masses. By appealing to the soldiers in the name of the Party and with the Party word, Party members strengthened their faith in the triumph of our ideas, and sparked courage, will and fearlessness in the hearts of millions of soldiers. Being in the most difficult and dangerous sectors, they inspired their comrades to perform heroic deeds by personal example. The fiery call of "Communists, forward!" was a law for them.

Party members sacrificed themselves with the understanding that they were saving the lives of thousands and thousands of working people and peasants. According to incomplete data, around 50,000 sons and daughters of the Party gave their lives in the fight against enemies of the revolution during the period of foreign intervention and civil war. Around two million Party members, or over half of the Party as of the summer of 1941, died the death of the brave in the fight against fascism. Of more than 11,000 persons honored for exploits in the Great Patriotic War with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, around 74 percent were Party members. Our Party was justifiably called a fighting Party.

The Party members' personal example and their self-sacrifices for the sake of defending the revolutionary achievements of the working people determine the entire make-up and the combat achievements of our Armed Forces. The world was delighted with the mass heroism and selflessness of the Soviet soldiers and their readiness to give their lives and endure any deprivations for the sake of the victory of a just cause. And

⁵ KPSS o Vooruzhennykh Silakh Sovetskogo Soyuza (CPSU on the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union), p. 44.

the Party members always were the best of the best in military ranks. They made the most tangible contribution to our victories over the enemy. In summing up results of the Civil War, the RKP(b) CC declared with complete justification: "Everyone knows that this victory became possible only thanks to the enormous political work of members of the Communist Party, to their steadfastness, devotion to the cause of the revolution, and heroic example, which caught the attention of hundreds of thousands and millions of soldiers."⁶ The lines of one of the documents of the Political Administration of the Republic Revolutionary Military Council also are very indicative: "The future historian will note with astonishment that, while attempting to predict chances for victory, key personnel time and again were more careful in counting the number of Party members available than the number of cannon and machine guns."⁷

And during the Great Patriotic War, Party members, who were with soldiers in the field and with laborers in the midst of the rear area, reinforced their faith in victory over the foe, inspired them to selfless struggle for the honor and independence of the socialist Motherland, and constituted the force that ensured the defeat of fascist Germany and imperialist Japan.

Through the fullness of years and the prism of what has been lived through, we better understand the grandeur of the deed accomplished in the years of the war. Both the present and future generations always will admire the mighty spirit of the Party members and the valor of soldiers of the Soviet Armed Forces and of all our people.

Party members of the Armed Forces display models of performance of official duties even under peacetime conditions. It is no accident that officers who are Party members command all the outstanding regiments, battalions, artillery battalions and squadrons, as well as the majority of outstanding companies.

The Party is very demanding of its members. The Resolution of the 24th Congress on the CPSU CC Report states: "The force of the CPSU lies in the high ideological spirit, activeness and selflessness of its members. The party will not accept passivity, indifference or lack of interest in politics. Every member must be a conscientious political fighter who holds high the banner of a member of the Leninist Party always and everywhere with dignity."⁸

Army Party members consider it their sacred duty to carry out these Party instructions fully. They are at the head of the socialist competition and set an example in increasing their ideological conditioning, in com-

⁶ *Pravda*, 28 April 1921.

⁷ *Istoriya grazhdanskoy voyny v SSSR* (History of the Civil War in the USSR), Vol. V. Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1960, p. 79.

⁸ *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p. 209.

bat training, discipline and organization, in maintaining high political vigilance, in observing moral purity, and in overall culture. Their word does not deviate from the deed. Party members thoroughly explain to their comrades Marxist-Leninist theory, the domestic and foreign policies of the CPSU, the grandiose achievements of the Soviet people in building communism and in steadfastly increasing our country's defensive might, and the people's role in strengthening the socialist community. The ideological-educational activity of Party members is closely linked with the life of the troops. This allows personnel to accomplish with better understanding the tasks of combat and political training, strengthen military discipline and observe order according to regulations.

Party members actively promote ideas of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism among the masses of soldiers. They consistently and firmly observe the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism and instill high moral-political qualities in nonparty personnel. They fight any manifestations of vestiges of the past and delve into all aspects of the life of troops, boldly reveal shortcomings and take action against conceit, unconcern and mismanagement.

Speaking of Party members, we should particularly emphasize the outstanding role of military commissars. Their legendary exploits during the menacing years of the fight against imperialist aggressors will remain in the minds of the people for ages to come.

Relying in their work on Party members, political organs and Party organizations, the commissars persistently carried out the policies of the Communist Party in the Armed Forces. They introduced high awareness and discipline, lifted up the combat spirit of troops, rallied the Red Army and Navy masses with a unity of will in the fight against enemies of socialism, and instilled in personnel infinite devotion to the socialist revolution, the Party, and people and a high vigilance with regard to intrigues of imperialism. They took an immediate and active part in control of combat operations, concerned themselves with material support of troops, and considered it their immediate duty to satisfy the queries and needs of the soldiers.

Political workers conducted, and continue to conduct, a great amount of work in the Armed Forces to strengthen their combat readiness and keep up the personnel's high morale. They bring the troops a political awareness, strengthen order and discipline, develop courage and spirit in soldiers, and infuse them with energy.

In days of military trials, political workers were in the front ranks of defenders of the Motherland. They conducted comprehensive organizational and ideological work, instilling in personnel courage, heroism, a fervent hatred for the invaders and an unshakeable faith in our victory. By their personal example they inspired and elevated the soldiers to

defeat the enemy. Pravda wrote that "in the history of the Great Patriotic War, the figure of the political instructor will go down as one of its glorious and honorable figures, with submachine gun in hand, in a camouflage cape and helmet, going forward and drawing with him the soldiers to attain a lofty and noble goal—the defeat of the German fascists and the liberation of our Homeland."⁹

Even now, in days of peace, the work of the political workers is complex and multi-faceted. They are in the leading positions of the fight for new heights of combat power and combat readiness of the Armed Forces. Along with the commanders, Party organizations and all Party members, they persistently put Party policy into effect, educate personnel in Lenin's ideas, steadily rally them about the CPSU, strengthen military discipline in every possible way, increase the quality of combat training and accomplish many other important tasks. Political workers are highly skilled cadres who have been educated by our Party and who possess a thorough knowledge of both Marxism-Leninism and military theory and practice. Among personnel they enjoy the respect and authority that they have earned.

Thus, the Armed Forces communists are active fighters for our Party. They give fully of their knowledge and energy to the cause of serving the Party, the people, socialism and the building of a communist society.

3. Combat Helpers of Party Members

Members of our glorious Leninist Komsomol always march alongside Party members in the front ranks of fighters for the triumph of ideas of communism. The Communist Party rightfully considers the Komsomol to be its natural, trustworthy and reliable helper. V. I. Lenin stated that "we are the Party of the future, and the future belongs to the youth. We are a Party of innovators, and youth always follows innovators more willingly."¹⁰

The Party and the Soviet people are justly proud of the Komsomol. There is not a single aspect of life or activity in our country where the Komsomol does not demonstrate its high qualities. The Komsomol helps the Party educate Soviet youth in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and draw it into practical development of communist society. The Komsomol carries out the most important assignments of the Party, those that have state significance. Komsomol members are always among the trail blazers of unknown paths in creating a new society and among the loyal defenders of the Soviet Homeland. An entire generation of active fighters for communism has stepped out of the ranks of the VLKSM.* Nearly 100

* Pravda, 22 March 1942.

¹⁰ V. I. Lenin, XIV, 163.

*[VLKSM—All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League (Vsesoyuznyy Leninskiy Kommunisticheskiy Soyuz Molodezhi).—U. S. Ed.]

million persons have gone through its school of ideological education, and its school of labor and struggle. These persons are the celebrated working people and kolkhoz workers, scientists and designers, and writers and soldiers.

The Komsomol members of the Armed Forces represent an enormous force. They are the combat detachment of the Leninist Komsomol. Our Armed Forces consist basically of young people, a majority of whom are Komsomol members. A considerable number of officers are also young people. The youth and Komsomol members stand vigilantly on guard for the socialist Motherland, successfully accomplishing one of the most honorable and important missions of our time. For them there is not, nor can there be, any dearer feeling than that of a son's love for the Homeland. There is no greater concern than that for the people's welfare.

Komsomol members of the Armed Forces make up a truly advanced and the most active part of Armed Forces youth. They are its combat vanguard, the immediate reserve of Party organizations. Along with Party members, they are in the most important sectors. They determine the combat readiness of units and warships and make a considerable contribution to accomplishment of the most pressing tasks in all fields of activity of the Armed Forces. Servicemen-Komsomol members carry on their difficult, but honorable duties wherever the combat might of the Armed Forces is being forged—at the control panels of missile complexes, and at the controls of combat vehicles, in front of the screens at radar stations and in cockpits of jet aircraft, on land and in the air, on water and under water. The combat capability of subunits, units, and ships depends to a great extent on the level of military, technical, and special training of Komsomol members and young servicemen, as well as on their ideological conviction, attitude toward their duties, moral make-up, creative enthusiasm and their efficiency.

The history of the Komsomol is replete with heroic deeds on which today's youth are brought up. The first generation of Soviet youth passed through the fire of Civil War and was tested in the fierce clashes with foreign interventionists and internal counterrevolution. Under the unparalleled difficult conditions of blockade, ruin and hunger, Komsomol character was tempered, the political awareness of young servicemen grew, and with every battle their class perception became more acute, their ideological fortitude and combat expertise became better, their nerves became stronger, and their revolutionary eye became more vigilant.

The Komsomol and youth actively defended Soviet power. They understood full well that this was their own power, that they were fighting for the interests of the working people and peasants, for all the toiling people, against oppressors and enemies of freedom and democracy. The

Vyatka Komsomol members wrote in a resolution they adopted on 16 April 1919: "It is better to fall honorably in open combat than to lay down again under the bloody heel of the bourgeoisie. We will rally our ranks more closely, grip our rifles more firmly and give the enemy a formidable rebuff!"¹¹ These words express the thoughts and hopes of the Soviet youth of those war years.

The Komsomol held several all-Russian mobilizations in the years of foreign intervention and civil war. Entire Komsomol organizations went off to defend the Soviet Motherland. This was in those days when on the doors of Komsomol committees there appeared the words which became legendary: "District committee closed; everyone has gone to the front." Around two hundred thousand Komsomol members, or, nearly one-half of the entire membership of the Youth League, participated in frontline battles during the Civil War. Joining the ranks of the Red Army, they fought selflessly with the enemies of Soviet power, and gave all of their revolutionary zeal to the cause of V. I. Lenin's Party, their young strength, and the passion of their youthful hearts. Poorly armed, at times hungry and half-dressed, the young fighters, ignoring the difficulties and the deprivations, fearlessly smashed the White Guards and the foreign interventionists. People of the older generation remember well those clean-shaven fighters, wound round tightly with machinegun belts, in "Budenny" caps* and black peajackets, who instilled fear in our enemies.

History has recorded the mass exploits of Soviet youth. The heroic chronicle of the Komsomol will forever preserve for their descendents the names of Vitaliy Bonivur, Vasiliy Alekseyev, Nikolay Rudnev, Alexander Kondrat'yev, and many, many other youthful defenders of October, who became symbols of valor and patriotism.

In the years of foreign intervention and civil war many talented generals, commanders, political workers and leaders of the partisan movement came out of the ranks of Soviet youth. Accumulating combat experience, and attaining manhood and becoming tempered in battles, the Komsomol and Party alumni infused a fresh spirit into the development of military art. And the enemies of the revolution could not understand when, and in what academy the young generation of the Land of the Soviets had found such remarkable command qualities, when and where its young, innovative tacticians and farsighted strategists had been trained.

M. N. Tukhachevskiy, as a twenty-five-year-old, took over command of the army. Under his directions a number of brilliant operations took

¹¹ *V kol'tse frontov. Molodezh' v gody grazhdanskoy voyny* (In the Ring of Fronts: The Youth in Years of the Civil War), Collection of Documents. Moscow, Izd-vo Molodaya Gvardiya, 1963, p. 77.

*[Small fur caps with red stars, named after Marshal Budenny.—U. S. Ed.]

place that defeated the forces of the interventionists and White Guards. Notable features of his military leadership talent were: boldness of thought, sensible calculation, and in-depth insight into the situation. At the age of twenty-three, Nikolay Shchors commanded a brigade and a division. Even to this day legends are made up about the combat marches of units under his command and about the courage and valor of the young commander. Songs are sung about Anatoliy Zheleznyakov, a fearless sailor. The Danube Flotilla headed by him, and later, a regiment of the regular Red Army, a partisan detachment, and an armored train all distinguished themselves in battle more than once. Arkadiy Gaydar started commanding a regiment at the age of sixteen. He, just as many of his contemporaries, showed himself to be a fearless fighter for the revolution.

Truly, the spiritual strength of the Komsomol is inexhaustible. It is a true fount of military talent and heroism!

In recalling the Civil War, S. M. Kirov said: "And those of us who were then at the front remember the enormous and, I would say, exceptional role then played by the Komsomol. I have to say plainly, comrades, that we Bolsheviks generally speaking are a people who know how to fight without regard for our life, but even so, at times we looked 'with envy' on the heroes which the Komsomol came up with at that time."¹²

The Party and people highly esteemed the enormous contribution of the Leninist Komsomol in defeating foreign interventionists and White Guards, and in 1928 they awarded the Komsomol the Order of the Red Banner. Over 5,000 Komsomol members were honored with the Order of the Red Banner for courage, daring and heroism displayed in battles against enemies of the revolution.

The Party was given great assistance by the Komsomol in strengthening the defensive capability of the Soviet state during the period of peaceful socialist construction. It was with its active participation in those years that there developed the Osoaviakhim* voluntary society, which trained technically competent cadres for the Armed Forces. The Komsomol members displayed valuable initiative in developing mass forms of sport having a military application and in other important measures of a defensive nature.

A mass patriotic movement, directed at instilling love for the Soviet Armed Forces on the part of young men and women, was the sponsorship of the Navy by the Komsomol. The decision to establish this sponsor-

¹² S. M. Kirov, *O molodezhi* (About the Youth). Moscow, Izd-vo Molodaya Gvardiya, 1969, p. 176.

*[Osoaviakhim—Society for Assistance to the Defense, Aviation and Chemical Construction of the USSR.—U. S. Ed.]

ship was made in 1922, at the 5th Congress of the RKSM*. The youth fervently answered the call of the congress and many thousands of young patriots went to serve on warships and shore units. In 1922-23 alone, over eight thousand youths came to the navy on their Komsomol travel orders.

The rapid development of aviation was also taking place concurrently with that of the navy. The Komsomol also played a remarkable role here. In January 1931, at the 9th Congress of the VLKSM the Komsomol accepted sponsorship of the Air Force. And throughout the entire country resounded the words of a fighting slogan: "Komsomol member—to the airplane! You are building the Red fleet!", and thousands of youths forever linked their lives with military aviation.

Komsomol sponsorship of the border troops has a great positive influence on strengthening the protection of Soviet borders.

The dark threatening clouds of war gathered more than once over our country during the years of peaceful socialist construction. And young soldiers, together with their older comrades, decisively repulsed the high-handed enemies of socialism. The series of combat exploits by the heroes of the Civil War was continued by army communist and Komsomol members at Lake Khasan, on the Khalkhin-Gol River, and in the snow-covered forests of Karelia. Fulfilling their international duty, Soviet volunteers heroically fought alongside the Spanish people against the fascists.

The Komsomol made an enormous contribution to the cause of defeating fascist Germany and imperialist Japan during the Great Patriotic War. At the call of the Communist Party, 3.5 million Komsomol members went into the Armed Forces in the war years. Many thousands of Komsomol members became partisans and members of the underground in the enemy areas.

There was not a single battle against the enemy in which Komsomol members and the youth did not take an active part. Many Komsomol units and large units fought at the fronts: 930th Komsomol Mortar Regiment, 85th Red-Banner Komsomol Guards Mortar Regiment, the Smolensk Komsomol Assault Engineer-Sapper Brigade, 46th Guards Taman' Women's Komsomol Regiment of Light Night Bombers, and others.

The Komsomol members and the youth, following the example of senior comrades in arms—the Party member soldiers—displayed marvels of courage, steadfastness, fearlessness and heroism, and a readiness to defend the honor, freedom and independence of the Homeland at any cost, both in defensive battles and offensive operations. It was not about glory or

*[RKSM—Rossiyskiy kommunisticheskiy soyuz moledezhni (Russian Communist Youth League); later renamed VLKSM.—U.S. Ed.]

honor which they thought as they went into the attack and covered the embrasures of pillboxes with their bodies, as they went into mortal combat with the fascist tanks and rammed enemy planes, or as they waged a stubborn, unequal struggle in the rear of the Hitlerite army. A burning hatred for the invaders, infinite love for the Motherland and belief in the correctness of the Communist Party's cause gave rise to the mass heroism of Soviet soldiers. Thousands of names of glorious heroes have forever gone down in history, among them many young people and Komsomol members. Songs and legends have been written about them, as well as remarkable books.

Immortal are the names of Komsomol members Aleksandr Matrosov, Zoya Kosmodem'yanskaya, Viktor Talalikhin, Marite Mel'nikayte, Noy Adamiy, Mekhti Guseyn-zade, the heroes of the Krasnodon, and many, many others who gave their young lives for the Soviet Motherland. They live in our thoughts and deeds. They live in the names of streets, cities, settlements, youth brigades, schools, pioneer detachments and squads. Their heroic deeds always will be remembered by nations.

The Komsomol was honored with the highest award of the Motherland—the Order of Lenin—for its exploits in the years of the Great Patriotic War. Of the overall number of soldiers awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the war years, 11 percent were Komsomol members. Over 3.5 million Komsomol members were awarded combat orders and medals of the Soviet Union.

We also will never forget the heroic labor of the young people who took their fathers' and older brothers' places at the machine tools of plants and who went into kolkhoz farms and fields. They stoically endured the burdens of wartime and spared nothing for the front.

Today's Komsomol members are the immediate successors and continuers of the heroic deeds of their predecessors. Their guiding ideal is embodied in the words of N. Ostrovskiy: "Only forward, only to the line of fire, only through difficulties to victory, and only to victory—never otherwise!" In the Armed Forces the members of the VLKSM are a reliable support for commanders, political organs and Party organizations in strengthening military discipline and prescribed order, in achieving high results in combat and political training, in keeping weapons and combat equipment in constant readiness for combat, in supporting sport and the physical training of youth, and in organizing socialist competition. They persistently seek exemplary fulfillment of the central task assigned the Komsomol by the 24th CPSU Congress: "To educate the youth in a spirit of communist ideological spirit, Soviet patriotism, internationalism, high organization and discipline; conduct active propaganda among the youth of the achievements and advantages of the socialist system; see that every young person is an active builder of a new society."¹³

¹³ *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, pp. 204-205.

The Komsomol members bring into the Armed Forces a youthful fervor, inexhaustible energy, a life-asserting pathos, genuine combat spirit, creativity and initiative, which in combination with the rich military experience of officers and generals of the older generation, form a reliable basis for the skilled command and control of troops.

The activities of the Armed Forces Komsomol were not limited to only units and ships. It maintains close ties with VLKSM organizations in factories and plants, in sovkhozes and kolkhozes, in schools and higher educational institutions, and in DOSAAF organizations. The Komsomol members of the Armed Forces contribute toward the military-patriotic education of Pioneers and pupils, and preinductees. By actively participating in this important state matter, Komsomol Armed Forces organizations are striving to guarantee a high quality of basic military training for youth, to instill a love for military affairs on the part of the youth, and to prepare them for service in the Armed Forces.

The work and duties assigned to Komsomol members and young soldiers are very responsible, multi-faceted and often difficult. The soldier's service is not an easy stroll through life. It is a serious activity for the young person. At the same time, military service in our country presents a broad outlook for the creative development of youth, for their spiritual enrichment, and the instilling of courage, will, energy and initiative. It develops in them organization, industriousness and steadfastness. It conditions them physically and morally and accustoms them to discipline and order.

On coming into the army, the young person merges with a single combat family and becomes a member of a cohesive military collective. There opens up before him not only the romance of training and combat campaigns, but also the opportunity to learn much that is new and interesting and obtain a useful profession, needed to the same extent in both war and peacetime labor. We know that highly skilled specialists are trained in the Armed Forces—mechanics, radio operators, radar operators, vehicle drivers, builders, electrotechnicians and others.

Military service is an important stage in the life of every young person. Much that is acquired in the Armed Forces remains with him for long years, but the most important is that the young person experiences a feeling of deep satisfaction, and recognizes the usefulness and necessity of military duty. Years of service in the Armed Forces are not in vain. The army school develops in a young person the ability to properly understand life, thoroughly evaluate surrounding reality, and have a serious attitude for labor and an assignment. It whets and strengthens all those positive qualities needed both by the soldier and by the laborer of our industry, agriculture, culture and science. This is why the people have so much respect for military reservists who arrive at major construction sites throughout the country on their Komsomol travel orders.

In factories and plants, in kolkhozes and sovkhozes—everyone everywhere is happy to see them and everywhere they are always in the first ranks.

The strength of the Komsomol lies in Party leadership. The CPSU devotes its primary attention to its work in educating the younger generation as active builders of a communist society and future defenders of socialist achievements. The Party directs the activity of the Komsomol and conducts an enormous amount of work in the communist education of youth. The Komsomol is obligated to the Communist Party for everything there is in the Komsomol that is excellent and heroic, for all the successes and achievements, and for its eagle's wings and high flight.

Today's youth has not undergone the severe school of revolutionary struggle. It does not directly experience the difficulties and deprivations which war entails. Therefore, main stress is placed on educating youth in the rich experience of the Communist Party, in the revolutionary, combat and labor traditions of the Soviet people, and in the glorious deeds of the older generation of Party and Komsomol members. Political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations instill in young people a sense of love and respect for the Armed Forces and a constant readiness to defend the Motherland.

Following Party instructions, Komsomol members of the Armed Forces persistently study Marxist-Leninist theory, CPSU decisions, the Soviet people's heroic history, and their fight for the victory of socialism and communism.

Youth values the heroic deeds of grandfathers and fathers. We see proof of the fervent, sincere love and deep respect for those who gave their lives for the welfare of the people in the lovingly arranged trophy rooms, in the annals of the history of military units, warships and formations, in avenues and parks which bear heroes' names, and in school museums of combat glory.

The past several years have been marked by the Party's renewed attention and work with regard to Soviet youth. Issues having to do with Party direction over the Komsomol, Leninist ideas on the continuity of generations, and the revolutionary, class-tempering of Soviet youth, and its contribution to the building of communism have all been developed further in programmed Party documents, in the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU entitled "On the 50th Anniversary of the VLKSM and the Tasks of a Communist Education for Youth," and in the Message of Welcome from the CC of the CPSU to the 17th Congress of the VLKSM.

A great event in the lives of Komsomol members of the Armed Forces was the All-Army Conference of Secretaries of Komsomol Organizations held in March 1974. The conference summarized the activities of Armed

Forces Komsomol members and established tasks for the near future. Special attention of Komsomol members in the Armed Forces was directed at a further improvement in ideological work, mastery of modern military equipment, and more effective ways of using it in combat, and an unswerving increase in the combat readiness of the Armed Forces.

It is important to consolidate everything that is positive in the work of the VLKSM organizations in the Armed Forces, to support in every way possible and develop the useful initiative of the Komsomol members, to constantly raise the ideological level of activities conducted with the youth, to strengthen Komsomol organizations and turn them into energetic, fighting collectives, and unique staffs of youth capable of rallying them about the Communist Party, increasing ideological conditioning and developing the creative activeness of young soldiers. There is a special increase in the role of lower Komsomol organizations of companies, batteries and the equivalent, which stand closest to every individual soldier, know his needs and problems and by virtue of this can have a systematic, purposeful influence on the Komsomol members.

The activities of the Komsomol members in the Armed Forces are multi-faceted and fruitful, and their achievements in combat and political training are significant. But, Komsomol members do not rest on their laurels. With fighting spirit and enthusiasm characteristic of them, and under the leadership of communists, they firmly and confidently march on toward new successes in training and service. The strengthening of Party leadership within the Komsomol is the main source for a further increase in the activeness and fighting spirit of VLKSM organizations, and the guarantee that they will fulfill any task given them.

4. Increasing the Effectiveness of Party-Political Work

The primary mission of political organs and Party organizations of the Armed Forces is to maintain a constant watch over the strengthening of the combat readiness of the Armed Forces and maintain it at the level that meets the highest modern requirements. In organizing and conducting Party-political work, one should always consider the complexity and contradictory nature of the international situation, the military-political situation of the Soviet Union, the changes taking place in the technical equipping of the Armed Forces, in their organizational structure, methods of training and methods of combat employment, and the high cultural and general educational level of replacements coming into the Soviet Armed Forces.

The need for maintaining constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces makes it obligatory to make maximum use of the enormous motivating influence of Party-political work on the masses of soldiers.

Every Armed Forces Party member must clearly understand his personal responsibility for the state of affairs in the subunit, unit or warship, actively support all useful initiatives, and set the example of excellent performance of official duties and of mastery of a combat specialty.

Life insistently demands a constant improvement in Party-political work and a search for new and more effective forms and methods for conducting it. The central place in Party-political work belongs to ideological work and **ideological-political education of personnel.**

The Party considers problems of ideological work, the masses ideological-political education, and an increase in their culture to be of increasing importance. This is caused primarily by the need to form a new person—one who is a builder of a communist society.

The importance of ideological work is also growing in the Armed Forces. This is due to the fact that each year Armed Forces missions grow more complex, there is an increased requirement for moral-political, psychological, combat and physical training of personnel, and intellectual inquiries from the young men who are inducted into the service increase steadily.

In organizing and conducting ideological work in the Armed Forces, as noted in the materials of the All-Army Conference of Ideological Workers held in January 1975, a number of factors must be kept in mind. First of all is a noticeable increase in the volume and meaning of ideological work, which is one of the most important factors for successfully solving virtually all problems in the Armed Forces environment. Whether it is a matter of working out new methods of combat operations or introducing new forms of personnel organization, developing military science or resolving specific problems in training military cadres, the primary role belongs to ideological methods in every case. Combat and political training, the further strengthening of military discipline, socialist competition, patriotic and international education, and many other facets of life and everyday routine in the Armed Forces depend to a vast degree on the state of ideological work, the expertise of the propagandists and the scope of participation in this work on the part of all our cadres.

The second feature of ideological work consists in the fact that it is now being conducted in conditions of unceasing ideological struggle by the reactionary forces of imperialism against the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community. The well-known trends toward an interstate détente have not only not weakened the battle of ideas, but have given it a new and additional impetus. Certain bourgeois circles are persistently trying to extract an ideological "advantage" from the very fact of détente itself, to legalize their ideological diversions, and attempting to obtain

additional channels through which an inimical influence can be exerted upon the spiritual world of socialism.

The battle of ideas has always been in the vanguard of the class struggle. While there is a possibility of establishing lines of contact and settling new conflicts through peaceful means and the international relations between the countries of socialism and capitalism, in the sphere of ideology there can be no peaceful coexistence. No compromises of any kind are possible between the communist and bourgeois ideologies, and the struggle between them is inevitable. "... There *is only one* question: bourgeois or socialist ideology," wrote V. I. Lenin. "There is no middle ... every diminution of socialist ideology, every deviation from it means that the bourgeois ideology has been strengthened by that much."¹⁴

The Soviet state, together with the entire world of socialism, is continually subjected to massive ideological pressure on the part of imperialism. The enemies of socialism employ the most sophisticated forms of ideological diversions, aim the edge of their attack against the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, and attempt to discredit the experience of building socialism and communism. In place of blatant, crude, and open anti-communism, there are now more masked forms of action against Marxist-Leninist ideology. The apologists of capitalism are coming out with more and more new concepts and "theories" that call for "rising above the warring ideologies" and searching for ways to achieve "spiritual cooperation," which according to their assertions will result in eliminating animosity and wars between nations. Anticommunist and opportunistic propaganda has recently been particularly active in speculating on moral-ethical problems: the individual and society, fate of democracy, human rights and freedom, and the social consequences of the scientific-technical revolution.

The Soviet Armed Forces constitute one of the objectives against which the imperialists attempt to exert their ideological influence. Bourgeois propagandists try to distort the character and purpose of our Armed Forces and their great historic mission of defending the achievements of socialism; they attempt to falsify the fundamental ideas of Marxism-Leninism about the nature and causes of wars in modern times, and they try to weaken the morale of personnel and thus do harm to the combat might and readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. To this end imperialist reaction makes wide use of mass media for disseminating information, the widespread system of intelligence services, and the activities of diplomats.

The task is to skillfully expose methods of bourgeois propaganda, wage an active struggle against ideological enemies in every possible way, and convincingly prove the insolvency, and at the same time, the danger of military-ideological concepts of imperialism.

¹⁴ V. I. Lenin, VI, 39-40.

The third feature of ideological work lies in the fact that scientific achievements and recommendations are being ever more widely used in this work. V. I. Lenin's well-known thesis to the effect "that science should not be for us a dead letter or a fashionable phrase . . . that science should truly be part of the flesh and blood and be converted into a component element of life completely and realistically,"¹⁵ is being accomplished more substantially and with greater depth. In the practice of ideological-educational work, this is expressed by a systematic analysis of continuing processes, the application of concrete scientific recommendations given as most convincing arguments and proofs, and a skillful use of all mass media for disseminating information.

These features of ideological work must be constantly taken into consideration in all its aspects, most importantly, in its main trends, where they manifest themselves most clearly.

This refers primarily to forming a **Marxist-Leninist outlook and deep communist convictions** in personnel. The Party pays attention to the importance of all-round development in Soviet man—the builder of a communist society. Without a high level of political awareness, culture and education in people, communism is just as impossible as without the appropriate material-technical base. The Report of the Central Committee to the 24th CPSU Congress notes: "The heart of all the Party's ideological-educational work is the **creation of a communist outlook among the broadest masses of workers** and their education according to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism."¹⁶

This situation also fully applies to the process of training and educating personnel of the Armed Forces.

The education of Soviet servicemen in the ideas of Marxism-Leninism is the main way of forming their high moral-political and combat qualities. There is a folk saying to the effect that not even the strongest storm can fell a tree if it has strong roots. For Soviet soldiers, Marxist-Leninist ideology and deep communist convictions are those roots. It is the communist outlook that makes the foundation on which the entire process of combat and political training for personnel is built, as well as the ingrainings of selflessness in the struggle for great communist ideals. Political conviction and ideological conditioning of soldiers serve as the fundamental principle of their steadfastness, independence, resolve, and unswerving desire for victory, and of their ability to overcome any hardships and focus all spiritual and physical forces on performance of assigned tasks.

A solid and thorough knowledge of Marxism-Leninism and the ability to apply it in practice makes it possible for military cadres to approach

¹⁵ V. I. Lenin, *XI V*, 391.

¹⁶ *Materialy XXIV s"yezda KPSS*, p. 83.

the analysis of their everyday environment in a Leninist manner, determine the chief link in the complex chain of phenomena of Armed Forces life, draw correct conclusions for their everyday activities in directing troops, successfully accomplish tasks of personnel training and education, work with a sense of perspective, and evaluate their military labor from fundamental positions based on the interests of the Party and the state.

Propaganda of the Leninist military-theoretical heritage, decrees of Party congresses, CC plenums, and other Party documents play a paramount role in the ideological-political education of soldiers. They contain a comprehensive analysis of social changes taking place in the world. They reveal the fundamental issues in our country's development on the path to communism and make valuable generalizations and deductions in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, political economy, the theory of scientific communism, the practice of communist development, and the organization of ideological-political education of Soviet citizens. A thorough study of Party documents will help every soldier perceive even better his place in the fight for communism and help him realize the vital necessity of strengthening the Armed Forces in every possible way.

In a situation where there is a sharp ideological struggle in the international arena, our ideological propaganda always has to be active and assertive, relentless and purposeful. Its functions include not only the protection of our citizens against bourgeois and revisionist ideas penetrating into their minds, but also a better supported exposure of ideological diversions of bourgeois propaganda, of Zionists and Maoists, and the aggressive aspirations of imperialism, and a demonstration of the historic doom of the capitalist system. Simultaneously with this, while revealing the progressive nature of communist ideology, its scientific substantiation and conformity to the far-reaching vital needs of working people, it is necessary to instill in Soviet soldiers a class approach to phenomena of reality and strengthen in them the feeling of love for the socialist Motherland and the Soviet way of life, and a sacred hatred for enemies of socialism.

Today, as never before, we need active and goal-directed ideological-education work and an ability to carry out the attack and win on the ideological front, on the front of the struggle for the minds and hearts of people. As the Party teaches, we have to expose the ideological diversions of imperialism and persuasively, convincingly, intelligibly and clearly affirm the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. It is important each time to choose the most expedient and effective forms and methods of ideological work since this is a sphere which especially does not tolerate stereotypes, clichés or formalism inasmuch as it has to do with people's political awareness. Acting as the immediate organizers of ideological-political education of soldiers, propagandists are obligated to display more initiative and creative search in their work.

Ideological-political education of Soviet soldiers brings the most effective results when it is closely linked with the pressing problems of communist development in our country, with the lives and missions of the troops and with the military-political situation taking shape in the world, when vivid examples are used to reveal the inexhaustible capabilities and advantages of the socialist system and Marxist-Leninist ideology, and when personnel are brought up in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism and high responsibility for the defense of the socialist Homeland and the entire community of socialist countries.

The forms and methods of ideological education of soldiers are diverse. Among them, the most important are Marxist-Leninist training of officers, the political training of ensigns and warrants, and political classes with soldiers, sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's. To achieve a high level of political training of all personnel is one of the important jobs of commanders, political organs and Party and Komsomol organizations.

Guaranteeing that combat and operational training missions will be accomplished and that combat readiness of units and ships will be improved has always been and still is the crucial essence of ideological and—in general—Party political work. The entire arsenal of resources for ideological and organizational work is called upon to see to it that every serviceman has a clear understanding of the necessity to be vigilant, to be constantly ready to repel aggression from whatever direction it may threaten, and to educate the soldiers in a spirit of cognizant responsibility for constantly improving the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces. This is the pivotal line of the entire ideological-educational work in the Armed Forces.

High qualitative marks in combat readiness are achieved only if commanders, political organs and Party organizations, and all workers on the ideological front are able to attain completion of combat and operational training plans by various forms and methods of ideological influence on the awareness of people, if they can motivate personnel to become thoroughly proficient in the newest achievements of military theory and practice if they persistently fight for an intensification of training and a scientific organization of military labor, and for an effective utilization of every minute of training time, and the potentialities of training material resources, and for high results of every exercise.

An improvement in qualitative marks of combat and operational training and in the combat readiness of troops and naval forces assumes a more thorough consideration of new phenomena engendered by the military-technical revolution, the development of military science and military art, and a struggle against all manifestations of conceit and complacency, stereotype and formalism in conducting exercises. It assumes giving assistance to commanders who creatively resolve their

tasks; and it further assumes a search for new applications for combat operations, rational methods of training, and bold application of the more progressive methods of command and control.

Special attention must be devoted toward ensuring a high level of field, aerial and naval training of personnel, and of troop and command and staff exercises. In this regard, there is great importance in the planning and conduct of Party-political work in strict accordance with the operational-tactical concept of exercises, and with consideration of the peculiarities of the theater of military operations, the probable enemy and the possible nature of combat operations.

The goal of Party-political work will be achieved if its forms, methods and means answer the concrete and complex requirements of the field situation, and if main efforts are directly transferred into subunits and warships. In every case, but especially during field exercises, it is useful to conduct individual and differentiated work with soldiers of different specialties for the purpose of explaining the substance and methods of accomplishing forthcoming missions, as well as emphasizing the high degree of responsibility that is placed on each soldier.

A broad field of endeavor for commanders, political organs and Party organizations is the strengthening of moral-psychological conditioning of personnel and instilling of decisiveness, bravery, initiative and military sharpness in field operations, at target ranges, firing ranges, in the air and at sea.

The immediate closeness of political workers, Party leaders and all Party members to the soldiers and sailors permits them to have a good knowledge of the positive aspects and shortcomings in their training and service, to raise the combat spirit of soldiers, inspire them to excellent performance of functional duties, efficiently popularize the latest methods, and aid in creatively using them under different conditions.

Political organs and Party organizations understand full well that in modern warfare personnel are required to possess exemplary abilities to master military equipment and employ it without delay, with maximum effectiveness. They conduct a great amount of work directed toward further improving the upkeep and operation of weapons and combat equipment, the system of scheduled preventive maintenance and organization of maintenance periods and toward motivating people to reduce the time needed to become proficient in the use of new equipment, to have extensive knowledge of the capabilities of each type of weapon, and to instill in personnel a love for their weapon and an ability to squeeze from it the maximum for which it is capable.

The strengthening of military discipline as one of the basic components of combat readiness of the Armed Forces is a subject of daily concern to political organs and Party organizations.

In their work, political organs and Party organizations are guided by V. I. Lenin's instruction that we need conscious discipline which "must be created on completely new bases, a discipline of trust . . . a comradely discipline, a discipline of all possible respect, and a discipline of independence and initiative in battle."¹⁷ They proceed from the fact that military discipline represents a complex social phenomenon encompassing the multi-faceted relationships of servicemen: those equal in rank and position, subordinates and supervisors, juniors and seniors, the relationships of the soldier to the collective and to society; i.e., the vast field of social relationships which has been established here. Political organs and Party organizations are called upon, jointly with commanders, to constantly strengthen discipline absolutely in everything—in training and service and in the performance of combat alert duty—and to see that it combines absolute execution and intelligent initiative and that it is the starting point from which soldiers ascend to the apex of a great deed in the name of communism.

The basis of discipline of Soviet soldiers is their ideological-political conditioning. The higher the ideological conviction of personnel and their understanding of the policies of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, the goals and tasks facing the Armed Forces, and the requirements of Soviet laws and the military oath, the more aware is their attitude toward official duties.

Party-political work ensures a profound understanding by every soldier of the role of firm military discipline, and a realization that it gives troops organization multiplies their combat might, and turns them into a single, firmly cohesive collective capable of acting quickly, efficiently and precisely in the most difficult situation. It ensures an understanding that the great strength and invincibility of the Armed Forces lie in the conscious character of Soviet military discipline and in the personal responsibility of each serviceman for the defense of his socialist Motherland.

Today, increasing importance for the strengthening of discipline is being assumed by the ability to influence a person on the basis of a comprehensive study of the relationships existing in the collective. We are speaking about having a good knowledge of soldiers and of the educator's penetration into that unique, unofficial sphere of relationships among soldiers which is sometimes a breeding ground for misdeeds and other negative phenomena. This requires that political workers and Party leaders be closer to the soldiers, study their character, motives for behavior, everyday life, requirements and needs, display constant concern for the servicemen, and strengthen their relationships of mutual respect and mutual exactingness, mutual assistance, support and help. Such inter-relationships strengthen the collective and develop in personnel a sense

¹⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 500.

of belonging and attachment to it and of high responsibility to the collective and society for fulfillment of their military duty.

An important role in attaining conscious military discipline is played by the further strengthening of a unity of word and deed, support for the soldiers' mass enthusiasm, encouragement of creative initiative, and a development of a sense of pride for their subunit, unit or warship.

One of the important aspects of Party-political work is propaganda and an explanation of the importance and content of military regulations. Military regulations are basic documents which regulate the entire life and work of troops. They express the policies of our Party in military development. They concentrate and generalize many years of experience in this field, as well as the latest achievements of Soviet military-scientific thought.

Systematic and purposeful Party-political work conducted by political organs and Party organizations ensures the strict, precise and timely performance by personnel of orders and instructions, and observance of prescribed order and organization. In no case does such work replace unity of command or the official activity of the commander. He has the chief role in maintaining strict military order. In his work, the commander makes use of Party-political work as the most important means of influence on personnel.

Unity of command and Party-political work are organically connected and are stable foundations of Soviet military development. Therefore, in following the line calling for strengthening of unity of command, the Communist Party and its Central Committee work unflaggingly on further improving Party-political work.

An inseparable connection is achieved between unity of command and Party-political work by the fact that the commander is not only a military, but also a political leader and educator of subordinates. He personally participates in Party-political activities and an overwhelming majority of our commanders of units, warships and subunits are CPSU members. In their work, as defined by the Instruction to CPSU organizations in the Soviet Armed Forces, they rely on Party organizations and direct their work toward successful fulfillment of combat missions and plans of combat and political training, and toward the strengthening of military discipline.

Our Party always has considered the joint, harmonious work of commanders and political and Party leaders to be one of the most important conditions for continuous improvement in the process of troop training and education. Their businesslike, creative cooperation, mutual respect, coordination and unity of actions are built on a Party basis.

Political organs and Party organizations steadfastly strengthen unity

of command, increase the authority of commanders, show concern for their ideological-political growth, for their having knowledge and skills in the field of party-political work, instill a love and respect in soldiers toward their commanders, actively support the actions of commanders aimed at increasing combat readiness, and do not allow criticism of their orders. They instill in commanders a Leninist style of directing troops—communist conviction, businesslike attitude, purposefulness, principle, high sense of responsibility for an assigned job, irreconcilability toward shortcomings, self-criticism, and a proper attitude toward one's mistakes; i.e., all those qualities which are the principal indicators of the maturity of a leader both in a military as well as a social plane. A commander is subjected to just Party criticism for omissions in his service work, for keeping apart from the masses, and for ignoring or underestimating Party-political work. Party criticism does not undermine the authority of a military leader. V. I. Lenin wrote that "the authority of military workers and appointees is not undermined by the one who points out harmful extremes and corrects them, but [is undermined] by the one who resists such correction."¹⁸

Modern conditions insistently demand that political organs and Party organizations, jointly with commanders and staffs, *direct their energy at further improvement in the training and education of officer cadres*, and that they be even more persistent in seeking the officers' worthy fulfillment of military obligations.

The role of commanders, political organs and Party organizations is especially great in molding of young officers. We know that annually the ranks of the Armed Forces are replenished by graduates of military schools. All of them are full of the desire to give their knowledge, ability, and energy to the cause of constantly increasing the combat readiness of the army and navy. But naturally, many of them do not have sufficient practical or general experience. This imposes on senior commanders, political organs and Party organizations a great responsibility for the training and education of young officers, for the growth of their ideological-theoretical and methodological preparation, and for development of command qualities.

As we know, **military science** plays a steadily growing role in strengthening the country's defensive might and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces. It can be vital and effective only if it relies on the experience of troops and if there is active participation by political organs and Party organizations along with academies, scientific research establishments, military districts, groups of forces, fleets, commanders-in-chief, commanders, and operational and troops staffs in research, development and practical checks of scientific theses, especially questions of military art. It is the duty of political organs, Party organizations and all Armed

¹⁸ V. I. Lenin, XLII, 244.

Forces communists to give help to commanders, scientists and staffs for comprehensive development of military theory, for identification of capable people who are inclined toward scientific work, for the creation of the proper conditions for their scientific work, for their development as military scientists, and for resolute support of everything new and advanced.

One of the most important areas of Party-political work among the troops is a **broad development of socialist competition** among personnel. Socialist competition is a powerful means of motivating soldiers to perform the tasks assigned by the Communist Party to the Armed Forces. At the present stage in the development of the Armed Forces, the importance of competition is steadily growing. This is caused by a number of reasons.

First of all, the growth in political awareness and social activeness of servicemen makes it necessary to improve methods of directing military collectives. Here, one must not fail to consider that young people who serve in the Armed Forces have a highly developed sense of dignity as citizens of the USSR and masters of the Soviet land. This is how they were brought up by the Motherland and the Party. Youths in the army undergo comprehensive political schooling and a school of courage. It is important to make every possible use of their patriotic enthusiasm and penetrate deeply into those inner stimuli and motives which move their patriotic deeds. Competition, then, acts as the instrument by which commanders, political organs and Party organizations develop activeness in military collectives, directing it toward increasing the combat readiness of subunits, units and warships.

Secondly, the growing role of socialist competition in the Armed Forces is caused by the enormous influence of the scientific-technological revolution on development of military affairs. Mastery of complex technology and weapons requires that personnel display initiative and creativity. Here, the skilled use of the potentialities of socialist competition uncovers great possibilities.

Thirdly, the reduced terms of service of soldiers, sailors, sergeants and senior NCO's provided by the new USSR law "On universal military obligation" have required reductions in the time spent training specialists and more active help for the young soldiers on the part of skilled comrades. These factors also presume all possible development of socialist competition.

And fourthly and finally, there has been an expansion in the sphere of competition. Along with improvements in the quality of combat and political training, the potentialities of socialist competition are used for raising fighting efficiency and morale of personnel, as well as for im-

proving the service of troops, the internal order in units and on warships, cultural aspects, and the external appearance of soldiers.

In light of these provisions, it is important to steadily improve the organization and direction of socialist competition and seek to reinforce its influence on the growth of troop combat readiness, on the strengthening of communist convictions and high combat efficiency and morale in personnel, on the increase of the level of combat expertise and of field, flight and naval training, on the exemplary performance of combat alert duty, and guard and interior service, and on the strengthening of discipline and the solidarity of military collectives.

Competition is organized by commanders jointly with political organs and Party organizations, with the active participation of staffs. The quality of competition is raised if commanders and political organs determine its orientation during training duty periods and during exercises, flights, naval cruises, missile launches, firings and other combat training activities; and it is raised if they seek to ensure that the competition is an inalienable part of the entire process of combat and political training. An important part is played by assistance which staffs give to subunits in performing socialist obligations, in the effective organization of the training process, in rational use of training time and the training-material base, and by constant control over the course of training and status of troop service. Along with consideration of fulfillment of plans of combat and political training, staffs also consider the fulfillment of socialist obligations.

There is great motivational and educational significance in publicity and comparability of results of competition. Therefore, it is very important to sum up its results regularly. This is done by commanders with the active participation of political organs, staffs, Party and Komsomol organizations at established times.

It is necessary to consistently implement Leninist principles of socialist competition and develop a desire in all personnel, as V. I. Lenin taught, "*to invariably go farther, invariably achieve more, invariably shift from the easier tasks to the more difficult.*"¹⁹ To this end, it is necessary to elevate even more the role of competition, expand the spheres of its influence to all aspects of training and the life of troops, to manage it concretely, root out elements of formalism, create an atmosphere of creative exploration in units, and propagandize and adopt the experience of leading commanders and political workers, and Party and Komsomol organizations. Here, too, is an enormous field of endeavor for our political, Party and Komsomol workers, since the scope of competition and its effectiveness are determined primarily by the level of conscious attitude by personnel toward their obligations.

¹⁹ V. I. Lenin, XXXVII, 196.

The effectiveness of Party-political work is proportionate to its **scientific level**. This means above all that it is based on the granite foundation of Marxism-Leninism and on Leninist principles of Party development, the main ones of which, as applied to army conditions, are as follows: high communist ideological principle; a class approach to the education of soldiers; close ties between ideological-education work and all the life of troops, the practice of communist development in the country, and the activity of local Party organizations; concreteness, purposefulness, efficiency, and continuity of Party-political work, and its truthfulness, clarity and intelligibility. Scientific principle in Party-political work provides also for wide use of the conclusions of military pedagogy, psychology and other sciences. V. I. Lenin stated that "In political activity . . . there always has been and always will be a certain element of pedagogy."²⁰

Generalization of the leading experience of conducting Party-political work, a broad exchange of this experience and dissemination of everything positive which is conducive to strengthening the Armed Forces play an essential role in constantly increasing the quality of Party-political work. This permits a correct evaluation of results of military labor, the outlining of ways to eliminate present shortcomings, and a closer linking of tasks of Party direction in the Armed Forces with the overall tasks of continually improving Soviet military organization and strengthening the country's defenses.

Party organizations are called upon to be the bearers of a healthy dissatisfaction with what has been achieved, the pioneers of the fight for increasing exactingness, for instilling a high sense of responsibility in servicemen-Party members to the Party and people, and for ensuring their vanguard role absolutely in all fields of the multi-faceted work of the Armed Forces.

The army press serves as an effective means of Party-political influence on the broad masses of personnel. The Party considers the press to be the shock force of the ideological front and the sharpest ideological weapon, which must always be on guard and in constant action, which has to hit the target without a miss, keep in step with life, be the standard-bearer of everything that is new and progressive, and actively fight against that which has outlived its usefulness and is obsolete.

The press carries to the masses of soldiers the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism. It explains the policy of Party and government and on this basis mobilizes personnel for exemplary fulfillment of obligations imposed on them for defense of the socialist Homeland. The press considers it its noble duty to glorify the sage Leninist party, our hero-people and the heroes and heroines brought up by the Party.

The press facilitates a creative development of military theory and is

²⁰ V. I. Lenin, X, 357.

the all-army tribune of propaganda of the leading experience of soldiers' training and education. With a knowledge of contemporary military affairs, it illuminates the complex problems of combat training and readiness of the Armed Forces and fights steadfastly for all possible strengthening of unity of command and a reinforcement of the influence of Party organizations on all aspects of the life of the Armed Forces.

It stands to reason that those new tasks which arise in Party-political work must find full and profound expression in the army press. There is special significance in the steady increase of the ideological-theoretical level of published materials, in the concrete demonstration of the course of socialist competition, and in the active support of useful patriotic initiatives of soldiers, sailors, sergeants, senior NCO's, ensigns, warrants and officers.

Party passion, a lively manner of exposition, fighting spirit, and an appealing, motivating tone must distinguish every issue of the press. Its effectiveness increases many times over when it does not simply set forth the facts of Armed Forces life or of the reality surrounding us, but when it also deeply analyzes, generalizes, and gives practical recommendations to the troops. It is the noble function of the press to develop activeness on the part of personnel, to strengthen in them a sense of military duty, and to direct the intellect and will of every soldier toward patriotic deeds and toward the increase of vigilance and combat readiness of troops.

The obligations of political organs and Party organizations, and of all Party members of the Armed Forces, are diverse and responsible. The Central Committee of the Party teaches us that the persistent and consistent implementation of CPSU policies in the Armed Forces by military Party organizations is one of the decisive conditions for successful accomplishment of missions imposed on the USSR Armed Forces. Here, there is special significance in increasing the combat spirit of Party organizations and the activeness of all Party members.

Crucial tasks are set before political organs and Party organizations in the area of further improving the effectiveness of ideological work. These tasks may be divided into three basic groups.

The first group relates to problems of **raising the ideological maturity and expertise of ideological cadres and improving methods of selecting and assigning them.** It is well known that the quality of ideological work depends primarily on training cadres of propagandists and all ideological workers, their competence and authority, their theoretical preparedness and ideological maturity, their military knowledge, their moral qualities, and their mastery of methods to be used.

A propagandist is first and foremost the Party's ideological fighter. All his thoughts, deeds, and achievements are directed toward having the great ideas of Marxism-Leninism and Party decisions carried to the deep

consciousness of every man and creating a burning desire to implement them in life.

A propagandist is a highly educated person in theoretical, military, and special fields. His depth of thought is dialectically combined with a practical approach, and his argumentative reasoning with his impassioned presentation. He is a specialist of great culture and erudition, who generously shares his knowledge and who develops all his work so that it is closely tied in with the needs of life and the needs of complex military life.

A propagandist is the kind of fighter on the ideological front who does not accept indifference, formalism, or red tape. His characteristic features are: a striving for creativity, persistence, and consistency. A true propagandist is always studying, and he shows officers and all personnel an example of self-education, a striving to achieve his goal, and an example of moral purity.

The second group of tasks with respect to improving ideological work is tied in with the **all-round implementation of ideological-educational measures**. This means that ideological influence must embrace every sphere of military activity: combat and political training, military duty, and the servicemen's everyday life and leisure time. Only a broad and systematic ideological influence on all aspects of life and military duty of personnel can give firm, positive results. Of especially great significance is the close coordination between political education and combat training. Experience has proved that the specific tenets of Marxism-Leninism and political conclusions are successfully transformed into firm communist convictions on the part of servicemen only during training, duty, and the process of resolving problems having to do with improving combat readiness.

All-round ideological-educational work requires the skillful use of all means of ideological influence: political studies, lectures, discussions, evenings devoted to specific topics and meetings with interesting people, and all those means which are now open to us through the mass media. In doing this, the systematic combination of mass forms of work and individual educational influence noticeably increases the effectiveness of all ideological-educational work.

Finally, in speaking of an all-round approach to ideological-political education, consideration must be given to the specific nature of activities in each service and branch of the Armed Forces, each unit, and each ship.

The third group of tasks concerns the further **improvement in the quality of direction over ideological work**. For this, it is necessary to make greater use of principles of Party leadership that have been developed and proved by usage, primarily, principles of collective leadership,

close ties with the masses, a unity of political and organizational activities, correct selection and assignment of ideological cadres, and control and verification of performance. It is important for the content of ideological work to be fully responsive to the missions being accomplished by the Armed Forces as a whole and each service in particular, and for the forms and methods of ideological-political education of military personnel to correspond to the level of their training. An improvement in the direction over ideological work assumes that all measures undertaken would be supported, as needed, in a material-technical sense. The effectiveness and the results of ideological work depend—to a decisive degree—on the level of direction exercised by commanders and political workers in this work.

The great victories won by the Soviet Armed Forces over enemies of socialism and the present-day remarkable successes in strengthening the state's defensive might, convincingly show that the Communist Party has worked out the proper path for implementing its leading role in military development, and that it has found practical forms and effective methods for directing the educating in high moral-combat qualities of Soviet soldiers, and organizing and conducting Party-political work among the troops. Party-political work always has been and remains a powerful, effective Party weapon, the strength of which has been tested more than once in the fire of battle. This weapon still frightens the enemies of socialism.

Chapter 12. Military Cooperation of Armies of Socialist States

The Soviet people were the first in the history of mankind to lay the path to a new life. With their selfless labor they achieved a world-historical victory in building a developed socialist society, and now they are successfully erecting the bright edifice of communism.

The Soviet Union is no longer the only socialist state in the world. The peoples of a number of countries of Europe, Asia and Latin America are going surely down the path which it laid. A world system of socialism has formed and is developing. It is a decisive force in the anti-imperialist struggle. A close cooperation and mutual assistance in all fields of social life, including military, where the mutual relations of fraternal armies have assumed the form of military cooperation, are becoming ever stronger among the socialist states.

1. The Nature of Military Cooperation of Socialist Armies

The nature and content of military cooperation of armies of socialist countries stem from the Leninist thesis on the necessity of uniting all anti-imperialist progressive and revolutionary forces. Within the Soviet state this association of the efforts of peoples liberated from social and national oppression of capitalism has found concrete embodiment in the creation of an indestructible Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the stability of which has been tested by time. In the international arena it is manifested in the close friendship and cooperation among socialist states. These historically new relations are founded on principles of equality, sovereignty and comprehensive fraternal mutual assistance of countries of socialism.

In the CPSU CC decree "On Preparations for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR," it is stressed that "mutual relations of socialist countries are characterized more and more by constantly growing political, economic and cultural ties, the development of economic integration, active exchange of experience and knowledge, and close co-

operation in the field of foreign policy."¹ Equally close and fraternal relations continue to develop in the sphere of military development in the interests of strengthening the defensive might of socialist countries. Military cooperation of armies of socialist states acts not simply as a military alliance among several states and their armies, something which history has known much of, but as a qualitatively new sociohistorical phenomenon which has naturally arisen as a result of the development of a world system of socialism, and as a result of new sociopolitical and economic relations among socialist countries with equal rights.

Historic development attests with all persuasiveness that **military cooperation of armies of socialist states is an objective necessity**. One of its expressions has been the conclusion of a fraternal defensive alliance—the Warsaw Pact—among socialist countries of Europe in 1955. The alliance was created for protection of working people's socialist achievements against encroachment by aggressive imperialist forces. This was a retaliatory act by the socialist states of Europe to the formation of the aggressive NATO military alliance and to the increase in military threat on the part of imperialist reaction. It was not by chance that subsequently the participants in the Warsaw Pact repeatedly proposed to dissolve this alliance on condition of the simultaneous liquidation of NATO.

All mankind knows that the socialist states threaten no one, nor do they plan to attack anyone. Peace, not war, is needed for socialist and communist development. And, if the socialist countries are still forced to maintain their military might at the proper level, this is caused, not by internal reasons of their development at all, but by the conditions of the international situation and by the presence in the world of those forces which are not past attempting by military means to turn the wheel of history backwards and restore capitalism in socialist countries. And in order to defend the socialist achievements of peoples, the CPSU and other Marxist-Leninist parties constantly see to the steady growth in the defensive capability of socialist states, and to their close cooperation in the military field.

The class and political nature of defensive military cooperation of countries of socialism lies in the fact that it is a practical embodiment of Leninist ideas of proletarian internationalism, that it is directed against forces hostile to the cause of peace and socialism, and that it in no way touches on or does damage to the interests of other states and peoples. The chief goal of this cooperation is to ensure the total security of countries of socialism under conditions of the existence of two opposing social systems, to reliably protect our most progressive social system against

¹ *O podgotovke k 50-letiyu obrazovaniya Soyuzu Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik. Postanovleniye TsK KPSS ot 21 fevralya 1972 goda* ("On Preparations for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." CPSU CC Decree of 21 February 1972), pp. 20-21.

an aggressor's encroachments, and to ensure the necessary external conditions for successful development of socialism and communism. Military cooperation of socialist armies makes up part of the overall economic, political, military and cultural cooperation of fraternal states.

Historical experience has shown the vitality of the Leninist thesis on bringing closer and unifying the class forces of the proletariat, both on an individual national scale, as well as on an international plane. And today, when the threat of a new world war still has not been eliminated, the need for a close alliance of the working class of all states and for a unification of efforts of socialist countries still exists. The most important task of all progressive mankind is to prevent the outbreak of new military conflicts.

The community of socialist countries plays a large role in preventing a world war. Their monolithic solidarity, inviolable friendship and powerful military-economic potential are the surest guarantee both of their own security and of preservation of peace throughout the world. This is why concern for a steady strengthening of the unity and security of countries of the socialist community is continually the focus of foreign policy activity of the CPSU and the Soviet State. As the Communist Party Program notes, "the Soviet Union considers it to be its international obligation to ensure, along with the other socialist countries, reliable protection and security of the entire socialist camp."²

Thus, the formation, development and strengthening of military cooperation of armies of countries of socialism is an objective necessity brought to life by the conditions of the international situation and by the aggressive nature of imperialism. They are the embodiment of Leninist principles of internationalism and the most vivid and highest manifestation of the unity of international tasks and actions of socialist states in defense of their revolutionary achievements against the intrigues of international reaction.

The accomplishment of measures of further solidifying the military alliance of armies of countries of socialism and of increasing their combat readiness does not contradict the peaceloving foreign policy course of the CPSU and other fraternal parties, which is aimed at developing and strengthening positive results in smoothing out good-neighbor relations with all countries regardless of their social or political systems, inasmuch as these measures bear a strictly defensive character. The Soviet Union and all countries of the socialist community consistently act for a halt in the arms race, for a general reduction in the strength of armed forces, for peaceful regulation of controversial and unresolved international problems, and for peaceful coexistence of states having different social systems.

² *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, p. 111.

2. Principles and Foundations of Military Cooperation

The socialist states are developing in conformity with the laws and patterns of the socialist social system, the actions of which also extend to their armed forces. Therefore, the principles and foundations of the community of socialist countries characteristic of interstate and inter-party relationships also are immutable principles and fundamentals of military cooperation of their armies.

The most important of these principles is **the class proletarian solidarity of socialist states**, which rests on a unity of interests and goals of the working class and workers of all countries in the struggle against imperialism, in defense of the socialist achievements of peoples, and for peace throughout the world. This principle is expressed by the revolutionary solidarity of the socialist countries, by their close cooperation in all spheres, by the joint struggle against intrigues of imperialism, and by collective actions to strengthen the defensive might of the countries of socialism. The principle of class proletarian solidarity in the relations of socialist states acts simultaneously as a principle of military cooperation of their armies.

A close solidarity and unity of actions of the working class and all workers of socialist states in the struggle for common goals and in defense of revolutionary achievements is implemented on the basis of proletarian solidarity. It was K. Marx and F. Engels who pointed out the importance of observing this principle. They noted that a fraternal alliance, unity and solidarity must exist among the workers of different countries. K. Marx wrote that we have to "see that the working people of different countries not only **feel**, but **act** as brothers and comrades fighting for their liberation in a single army."³

This thesis was developed by V. I. Lenin. He saw in the close unity and monolithic solidarity of actions of working people a manifestation of the essence of internationalism. Stressing the need for unifying the proletariat, Vladimir Il'ich remarked: "Capital is an international force. In order to conquer it, an international alliance of working people and international fraternity of working people is needed."⁴

Under present conditions, when international imperialism considers the chief task to be the consolidation of its ranks against the forces of socialism, the solidarity and unity of actions of socialist countries has a vitally important significance. The united military strength and aggressive blocs of capitalist states must be countered by the united military might and close alliance of countries of socialism. Life itself dictates the need for cohesive collective actions by socialist states, and consequently, for a close military cooperation of their armies. The CPSU Program states:

³ K. Marx and F. Engels, XVI, 195.

⁴ V. I. Lenin, XL, 43.

"The united forces of the socialist camp reliably guarantee every socialist country against encroachment on the part of imperialist reaction. The consolidation of socialist states into a single camp, its increasingly strong unity and constantly growing might ensure the total victory of socialism and communism within the framework of the overall system."⁵

Mutual relations in the world system of socialism are also developing in conformity with the principle of **sovereignty and equal rights of socialist states and their armies.**

Observance of state sovereignty does not signify the setting of interests of certain socialist states against those of others. The sovereignty of a socialist state presumes not only the right to independence, but also a responsibility to the community of fraternal countries and the international communist and working people's movement for the fate of socialism. Joint defense of the great achievements of socialism is the international duty of communists and, consequently, the prime task of armies of states of the socialist community. It is based on principles of proletarian internationalism and is decided on the basis of obligations voluntarily assumed and in observance of democratic norms and principles of international law.

The principle of sovereignty of participating states of the Warsaw Pact is embodied in the legal status ensuring full and equal rights of members of this defensive alliance and respect for their independence. It is clearly expressed in the composition, powers and mode of actions of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact Organization, and in the organizational structure of the command of the Joint Armed Forces.

The principle of **mutual aid and mutual support** is closely linked with the principles enumerated above. It serves as the cornerstone of the Warsaw Pact and other agreements and obligations in the field of defense of the achievements of socialism. The forms of cooperation of armies of the socialist states are diverse, but their goal is but one—to increase in every possible way the combat readiness of the armed forces and ensure peace and security for peoples of the socialist countries. The closest unification, mutual trust, comprehensive aid and mutual assistance are what characterize the military cooperation of armies of the socialist states.

We must also stress the importance of the principle of **unity of national and international factors in defense of socialism.**

The world system of socialism is a great achievement of the international working class and a powerful accelerator of the social progress of all mankind. Therefore, it is completely natural that the working people of socialist countries and their armies have a high degree of

⁵ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuza*, p. 20.

responsibility to the international proletariat and all progressive mankind for the fate of socialism.

Life has proven that the force and effectiveness of proletarian internationalism are in direct proportion to how the working class of each country fulfills its international duty. V. I. Lenin taught "to think *not* only about one's own nation, but to place the interests of all *above it*,"⁶ and to always remember that "the interests of world socialism are above national interests. . . ."⁷ This principle contains the dialect of a unity of national and international factors in defense of socialism. The CPSU Program notes that "the practice of peoples of the world socialist community has confirmed that their fraternal **unity and cooperation** are in the highest national interests of each country. Strengthening of the unity of the world socialist system on the basis of proletarian internationalism is an absolute condition for further success by all states belonging to it."⁸

A life-giving source of the steadily growing and developing unity of fraternal countries and their armies is the day-to-day direction by communist and working people's parties of the development of socialism and communism and their conduct of a purposeful, consistent and coordinated policy in questions of interparty and interstate relations and of defense cooperation.

These are the most important principles on which the mutual relations of states of the socialist community and their armies are built. All of them are closely interrelated, and their strength and effectiveness lie in dialectical unity. They express a qualitatively new form of ties between armed forces of socialist states and comprise a firm foundation of fraternal military cooperation. They cement it, increase the combat efficiency and morale of personnel, increase the combat capabilities of the Joint Armed Forces, and strengthen the defensive might of the socialist community as a whole.

In the past, there were many examples of military cooperation of states and armies. Its character, forms and content have been quite diverse at different historical eras, but the chief criterion always has remained the political goals of the war which the allied states waged or prepared to wage. It was this circumstance which determined, and now determines, the political content of military cooperation—whether it had an advanced, progressive orientation or, conversely, a reactionary orientation.

In our time the military blocs concocted by imperialist states are reactionary. They have an inherent antipopular, aggressive nature. Mutual relations in these alliances are permeated by the dictate of the strong

⁶ V. I. Lenin, XXX, 44-45.

⁷ V. I. Lenin, XXXVI, 342.

⁸ *Programma Kommunisticheskoy partii Sovetskogo Soyuz*, p. 23.

with relation to the weak. When it enters an imperialist coalition, a bourgeois state possessing the greatest military might usually attempts to extract for itself the maximum economic and political advantage and ensure special strategic advantages at the expense of its weaker partners.

The military cooperation of socialist states is built on different and completely new terms. The Warsaw Pact Organization is a voluntary alliance of truly equal and sovereign socialist states. In contrast to NATO, which has an aggressive tendency, it does not pursue expansionist goals. Its purpose is to ensure a reliable protection of countries of the socialist community and their freedom and independence against encroachments by imperialist aggressors. This goal is equally vital for all socialist states. It strengthens their military alliance and the military cooperation of fraternal armies.

The principles of cooperation of socialist states and of military cooperation of their armed forces are neither temporary nor transient. They are determined by the very nature of socialist society and have firm sociopolitical, economic, ideological and military-strategic foundations.

The sociopolitical basis of cooperation of the socialist states and their armed forces is the *uniformity* of political rule and of the state and social system, and a unity of the goal of countries of socialism—the building of communism. All this has decisive influence on the character of military development, serves as a firm foundation of the moral-political unity of fraternal peoples and armies, and creates a common interest in defending the achievements of socialism.

The economic basis of cooperation of peoples and armies of countries of the socialist community rests on the socialist method of production which has been firmly established within those countries. Public ownership of means of production and socialist production relationships make socialist states cohesive and create broad opportunities for an international socialist division of labor, cooperation and specialization of production on the basis of full and equal rights and mutual advantage. Economic integration serves as a natural way for further consolidating countries of socialism in the economic field. It acts, on the one hand, as a natural continuation of results attained by the fraternal states in economic and scientific-technological cooperation, and on the other, it attests to a new historical stage of their convergence and to a reinforcement of tendencies of internationalization of their economic life. A commonality of economic relations in socialist countries and the economic integration of socialist states give rise to objective conditions of constant development of friendship and mutual assistance among their armies.

The ideological basis of cooperation of socialist states and armies is Marxist-Leninist ideology, socialist patriotism and internationalism, and unity in the understanding of goals and tasks to ensure a reliable defense

of the achievements of socialism through common efforts. The countries of socialism have one enemy—imperialism, and their armed forces are faced with one common task—to ensure the peaceful labor of fraternal peoples.

A common social orientation in educating soldiers in a spirit of principles of socialist patriotism and internationalism, the friendship of peoples, comradely mutual assistance, and class irreconcilability toward enemies of socialism and bourgeois ideology represent that spiritual force which consolidates personnel of allied armies and serves as a source of their high combat efficiency and morale and as a guarantee of might and invincibility.

The military-strategic basis of the military alliance of fraternal socialist countries and armed forces is determined by the unanimity of their goals and tasks of ensuring the reliable defense of socialist achievements through joint, collective efforts. A primary role is played by a commonality of military-strategic views and an identical understanding of the laws and patterns of war and principles of military art and military development. A common Marxist-Leninist scientific approach to an evaluation of phenomena and processes of military affairs is expressed by coordinated decisions on the most important questions of defense of the socialist countries.

Marxism-Leninism, which profoundly reveals the laws and patterns of development of society, is the methodological base which allows the military-theoretical thought of allied armies to become properly oriented in the military-political situation and take account of the effect of economic, political, moral and strictly military factors on the course and results of war. Based on this, military science of countries of socialism determines the general principles of military development, the direction of development and the nature of strategic employment of armed forces, the forms and methods of preparing the country, the armed forces for a possible war, the material-technical support of military operations, and also methods of directing the armed forces and commanding and controlling troops.

The theory of scientific communism has great ideological-political and methodological importance for the formation and development of military-strategic concepts of countries of socialism. This theory embodies all the achievements of science and social progress, and all the riches of revolutionary experience. It comprehensively and thoroughly reveals the chief patterns of the socialist revolution and socialist and communist development in their interrelationship and interdependence. One of these patterns is protection of the achievements of socialism against imperialist aggressors through the joint efforts of countries of the socialist community.

The social make-up of armies of socialist states corresponds to their high purpose and great historic mission which they bear in guarding the security of their peoples and peace throughout the world.

The sociopolitical, economic, ideological and military-strategic bases for the unity of socialist countries and their armies are realized thanks to the fruitful activity of communist and working people's parties which have the leading role in developing and consolidating the socialist social system. It is they, the communist and working people's parties of states of socialism, relying on the objective principles of cooperation of socialist countries, which determine the forms of combat cooperation by fraternal armies, display constant concern for maintaining their high combat readiness, and motivate the peoples and personnel of armies of their states to steadily strengthen the defensive might of the combat alliance of countries participating in the Warsaw Pact.

Thus, the Leninist ideas of unity and close alliance of socialist states and of consolidation of their economic, political and military efforts for defense of the revolutionary achievements of working people have found their embodiment and further development in the Warsaw Pact.

The Political Consultative Committee plays an important role in strengthening the comprehensive fraternal cooperation of socialist member countries of the Warsaw Pact. Its work is shared by the heads of communist and working people's parties and heads of governments of the fraternal states. It examines general political problems. An exchange of opinions takes place within the framework of the Political Consultative Committee on the most pressing problems of international relations touching on the vital interests of allied socialist countries, including those in the defense field. The efforts of socialist states are coordinated here with the aim of strengthening the entire world system of socialism. Decisions of the Political Consultative Committee are an important contribution to the cause of the struggle for peace and security of peoples, for a relaxation of international tensions and for normalization of the situation in Europe and throughout the world.

The defensive might of the fraternal countries is personified by their Joint Armed Forces, direction of which is handled on the basis of decisions worked out collectively by communist and working people's parties and governments of member states of the Warsaw Pact.

All fraternal communist and working people's parties are unanimous in conducting an international foreign policy and in striving to constantly develop mutually advantageous economic and political ties of the Warsaw Pact countries and to strengthen the military cooperation of their armies so long as the threat of aggression by imperialist states exists.

The need for such cooperation is substantiated in the documents of communist and working people's parties, in the decisions of the con-

gresses and plenums of their Central Committees, and in documents of the international communist and working people's movement. The CPSU CC Decree "On Preparations for the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Founding of the USSR" notes that "the CPSU sees its primary task to be a persistent striving to achieve an increasingly close consolidation and strengthening of the friendship of the Soviet people with peoples of other socialist countries, and comprehensive expansion of political, economic, ideological and cultural ties among them."⁹ First Secretary of the Bulgarian Communist Party CC and Chairman of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria Comrade Todor Zhivkov said: "Our people and our Party will be true to the end to their international duty. They will go relentlessly as one, now and in the future, in the solid ranks of countries of the socialist community, shoulder to shoulder with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and with the fraternal Soviet people."¹⁰

A truly international position in the matter of defense of achievements of socialism was expressed in documents of the 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which states: "We are living on the border of the imperialist world and have no right to forget even for a minute that we must be ready, together with our allies, to defend national and state independence and the socialist system. We perform this task within the framework of joint efforts by member countries of the Warsaw Pact, relying on the firm and inviolable friendship with the Soviet Union."¹¹

The importance of further strengthening the military cooperation of socialist countries is also stressed in program documents of the Hungarian Socialist Working People's Party, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany, the Polish United Working People's Party and the Romanian Communist Party. All fraternal communist and working people's parties display constant concern for the steadfast consolidation of their multilateral ties, including those in the military area. The unanimity and solidarity of communist and working people's parties is the chief source of invincibility and the indomitable might of the military alliance of socialist states.

3. The Inception and Development of Military Cooperation

The military friendship of armies of fraternal countries has its roots in the first years of Soviet power, when the young Land of Soviets stood on its feet with ever increasing firmness and confidence—a symbol of the hopes and aspirations of the oppressed peoples of the world, when foreign and domestic reaction attempted through armed means to obstruct the establishment of a new socialist society on one-sixth of the earth's

⁹ "On preparations . . ." p. 21.

¹⁰ *Pravda*, 14 November 1972.

¹¹ *XIV s'yezd Kommunisticheskoy partii Chekhoslovaki* (14th Congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia), Moscow, Politzdat, 1971, p. 67.

surface. In the years of foreign intervention and civil war, which were difficult for the Soviet Republic, the imperious demand of the working class rang throughout the planet: "Hands off Soviet Russia!" At that time around a quarter million internationalist soldiers poured into the Red Army for the battle against a common enemy; these were Hungarians, Poles, Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs, Slovaks, Finns, Chinese, Koreans and representatives of many other nations. V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party placed a high value on the contribution of these brave people in the struggle for our nation.

The internationalist soldiers fought on the fronts of the Civil War shoulder to shoulder with Soviet soldiers and commanders. Their banner was the Red Banner of the first socialist state in the world—the Republic of Soviets. In defending the achievements of the Great October together with the Soviet people, they were imbued with the spirit of proletarian solidarity and class fraternity. It was in that heroic time that the firm foundation was laid for a future military cooperation of armies of a new type which history had not yet known. This class proletarian military alliance was sealed by blood jointly shed on the battlefields for the bright ideals of communism.

V. I. Lenin saw in the proletarian solidarity of workers the true guarantee of the final victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. Addressing the soldiers of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment in August 1918, he said: "You have been given the great honor of defending with weapon in hand the sacred ideas and, fighting together with yesterday's front-line enemies—Germans, Austrians, and Magyars—of implementing in deed the international fraternity of peoples.

"And I am sure comrades, that if you join all military forces in the mighty international Red Army and move these iron battalions against the exploiters, against the tyrants, against the black hundreds of the entire world with the battle cry 'Death or Victory!'—then no force of the imperialists will stand up against us!"¹²

The proletarian solidarity of working people and support of the internationalists of all countries were an important factor for defense of the revolutionary achievements of the Great October. The Soviet people will keep in their heart forever the feeling of deep gratitude toward class brothers and toward all who were together with them in defending the sacred cause of proletarian Brotherhood, Equality, Freedom, and Independence in the years of foreign intervention and civil war which were difficult for our Motherland. Several thousand citizens of socialist states were given governmental awards of the USSR for active participation in the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Civil War, in the establishment of Soviet power in 1917–1922, in connection with the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Great October.

¹² V. I. Lenin, XXXVII, 26.

Accepting the fraternal assistance of working people of other countries with thanks, Soviet citizens always fulfilled their international obligation with honor. No matter how serious the situation was for the USSR and no matter what difficulties our people experienced, each time they sought an opportunity to give help and express their fraternal solidarity with the working people of other countries in their struggle for their rights and liberation. So it was in the past, so it is now, and so it will be in the future.

Here are only a few examples from the history of our military cooperation:

March 1919. A socialist revolution took place in Hungary and the Hungarian Soviet Republic was formed. On behalf of the 8th RKP(b) Congress, Lenin warmly welcomed the victory of the Hungarian people. This inspired the Hungarian working people for a decisive struggle against enemies of the republic. They saw the Soviet people to be reliable friends. The program document of the Hungarian communists stated that "the most complete and sincere military and ideological alliance should be concluded with the Russian Soviet Government to support the power of the proletariat against imperialists of the Entente."¹³ And they were not mistaken. The young Republic of Soviets did everything to give aid and support to the Hungarian revolutionists in spite of the difficulty of the situation at the fronts of the Civil War. At the call of our Party, former Russian prisoners of war on the territory of Hungary poured into the ranks of the Hungarian revolutionary forces in order to defend the achievements of the revolution through joint efforts. And although the imperialists succeeded in stifling the Hungarian revolution, the acts of proletarian solidarity and international friendship of working people left a deep imprint in the hearts of the Hungarian and Soviet peoples.

In 1921 the flame of revolutionary struggle gripped Mongolia. The Mongolian people heroically fought against foreign invaders, White Guards bands of the tsarist baron Ungern and internal reaction. Soviet citizens came to the aid of their Mongol brothers. At the decision of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, our troops took part in battles against the enemies of the Mongolian people. The counterrevolutionary forces were smashed by the joint actions of Mongolian revolutionary troops and the Red Army. This had a good influence on the socioeconomic and political development of Mongolia. Under the leadership of the People's Revolutionary Party, Mongolian working people followed the example of the Land of Soviets in taking the path toward building a new life. The Mongolian People's Republic was formed.

When Japanese militarists invaded the MNR [Mongolian People's

¹³ Quoted from the book by M. F. Lebov, *Vengerskaya sovetskaya respublika 1919 goda* (The Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919). Moscow, Izd-vo sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoy literatury, 1959, p. 88.

Republic] in 1939, the Soviet Union again set the example of fulfilling its international obligation. Working closely with the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army, Soviet troops smashed the Japanese aggressors in the vicinity of the Khalkhin-Gol River.

The Soviet State gave the Chinese people an exceptionally large amount of political and moral support, and military-economic assistance throughout its struggle for national independence and freedom. Thus, during the first civil revolutionary war in China (1924–1927), a group of talented commanders of the Red Army headed by prominent Soviet General V. K. Blyukher [Blücher] was sent to aid the command of the People's Revolutionary Army of China. China's revolutionary forces also received the weapons, provisions, equipment and drugs needed to successfully wage the struggle.

This help was given in even greater amounts during the anti-Japanese national liberation war and especially in the years of World War II, when Soviet troops smashed the Japanese Kwangtung Army. This was even admitted at one time by Mao Tse-tung. The Soviet Union, he said, was the only state which supported the liberation struggle of the Chinese people in the years of the first revolutionary civil war and was the first to come to its aid in the fight against the Japanese invaders.

With the formation of the Chinese People's Republic, the Soviet Union gave it all-round assistance—economic, technical, cultural and military. And while this is not mentioned now in China, and while the first socialist power in the world, the birthplace of the Great October—the Land of Soviets—has been declared by the Maoists to be “enemy number one,” this is nothing more than class betrayal.

The fraternal solidarity of our people was also clearly demonstrated in the years of civil war in Spain (1936–1939), when Soviet citizens decisively joined the side of the Republicans, who were defending the right of the Spanish people to freedom and independence in a fight against fascism. Together with antifascists of other countries, Soviet volunteers fought heroically at the fronts of Spain. Military cargoes also were sent from the USSR to Republican Spain—weapons, combat equipment, ammunition and also rations.

The grand revolutionary traditions of proletarian internationalism and international solidarity were multiplied in the Great Patriotic War period. In the course of this war the Soviet people's fulfillment of their national tasks was organically combined with fulfillment of their international obligation with respect to other peoples who had fallen under the fascist yoke.

The military alliance of the Soviet people with fraternal peoples of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Romania and Albania developed and strengthened in the fire of battle against fascism,

and qualitatively new international ties began to be formed in the area of building a new society and providing it with an armed defense.

The military alliance which was formed between peoples of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe fully met their international needs and expressed the fundamental interests of peoples of the countries under the heel of fascist occupiers. The fighting peoples saw that military cooperation with the Soviet Union was the only real path to national liberation.

This was not only a military, but also a political cooperation of the nations. The struggle for liberation was led by the communist and working people's parties. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people gave all-round support to peoples of the countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe occupied by the Hitlerite invaders. The formation, arming and training of a number of national large units and units of these countries took place on the territory of the USSR and with its direct participation. A total of 19 infantry, 5 artillery and 5 air divisions, 6 infantry and airborne brigades, 8 tank and motorized rifle brigades, 12 artillery and mortar brigades, 5 combat engineer brigades and many other units and subunits of allied states were armed and trained during the Great Patriotic War through the efforts of our state. The total number of troops of fraternal countries formed and equipped with the help of the Soviet Union was 555,000. Polish, Czechoslovak, Yugoslav, and later Bulgarian, Hungarian and Romanian national large units, units and detachments fought together with the Soviet Army against the common foe—German fascism.

The Soviet people highly esteemed the combat contribution of the fraternal armies to the common cause of victory. Many of their large units were given the honorary designations of cities which they helped to liberate. Soviet orders were awarded to 23 Polish and 10 Czechoslovak units, and 1 Romanian infantry division.

This was a genuine school of combat solidarity of national armies in a fight against a strong and well armed enemy. Soldiers of these armies displayed a true combat brotherhood. In the fierce fighting the soldiers came to manhood, their combat expertise and political maturity grew and their cooperation with Soviet soldiers developed and grew strong. The very fact of participation by soldiers of allied armies in joint operations with Soviet troops had an enormous revolutionizing effect on them. They were imbued even more deeply with the high ideals of socialism and proletarian internationalism, and they learned combat expertise from Soviet soldiers. The fraternal cooperation of the Soviet people with peoples of countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe served as a source of might and invincibility of the allied armies and of the mass heroism of their soldiers.

The multinational Soviet people played a decisive role in the defeat of fascist Germany and its satellites. In the war years they accomplished an unparalleled international exploit and saved the peoples of Europe from fascist enslavement.

With the smashing of Japanese aggressors by our army, the broadest opportunities were opened up for the national liberation of peoples of Asia.

Thus, relations of cooperation and friendship between the Soviet Armed Forces and the armies of countries in which popular democratic transformations had taken place formed in the course of the war, and qualitatively new international ties were formed in the field of armed defense of states.

Military cooperation of socialist countries received further development in the postwar period. In content, historical conditions and missions to be accomplished, it can be divided into two stages with their own characteristics.

The first stage of military cooperation of fraternal states encompasses the time from the end of the Great Patriotic War to the formation of the Warsaw Pact Organization (1945–1955). It is characterized by profound social transformations in countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe and by a most acute struggle of the toiling masses, headed by the communist and working people's parties, for democracy and socialism. As a result of this struggle, the power of the working peoples was affirmed in all countries of popular democracy. Under those conditions there appeared a fundamentally new basis for the USSR's mutual relations with these states on the basis of a commonality of sociopolitical and economic systems and a unanimity of Marxist-Leninist world outlook.

It was in the first stage that the task of creation of national armies was basically accomplished in the countries which took the path of socialism. The need for armed forces for each socialist state was determined by the interests in defending socialist achievements of working peoples in a situation of openly hostile aggressive policies of imperialist states with regard to the new and progressive social system. The difficult and multifaceted process of forming armies went different ways in different socialist countries, but the fundamental principles of their development were the same: a commonality of political goals and tasks, Marxist-Leninist ideology, the interests of the people and army, as well as principles of organization, political upbringing and education of soldiers. In their class essence, these were truly people's socialist armies—armies of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The creation of armed forces in the young socialist countries was made easier by the fact that it was accomplished with the great help and support of the Soviet Union and rested on the very rich experience of

the Soviet Armed Forces. Leninist principles tested in the practice of development of our army were made the basis for developing armies of the young socialist states: direction of the Armed Forces by the Communist Party; a class approach to development of the army; a unity of army and people; allegiance to proletarian internationalism, and other very important principles. The Soviet Armed Forces passed on their very rich experience to their military friends, helped them in training officer cadres and offered comprehensive material-technical assistance.

The international tension which grew in that period through the fault of imperialism caused a natural need for an even closer military cooperation of the young socialist countries with the Soviet Union and among themselves. Imperialism was seeking various means and methods to disrupt socialist development within them and restore capitalism. In response to this the socialist states were forced to smooth out and consolidate military cooperation, which at first was implemented in the form of bilateral agreements.

Beginning with the end of the nineteen forties, capitalist states began to knock together more intensively aggressive military alliances: the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO—1949); ANZUS (1951); SEATO (1954); the so-called Baghdad Pact (1955), renamed CENTO in 1959 (after Iraq left it); and ASPAK* (1966). The imperialists did not hide their antisocialist position. Creation of these blocs, as well as a number of other aggressive acts of the imperialists, increased the military danger.

The military danger grew for the European socialist countries especially with the acceptance of West Germany into NATO in the spring of 1955. At that time, the basis for its state policy was undisguised revanchism, a course toward revision of the state borders with socialist countries which formed after World War II, and the course toward seizure of foreign lands. In such a situation, the bilateral treaties the USSR had with socialist countries of Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe on friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance no longer fully satisfied the new conditions. There arose the insistent need for military cooperation on a multilateral collective basis. Only by joining into a single military-political alliance and relying on the military might of the Soviet state could the European socialist countries withstand the aggressive NATO military bloc. Thus, in May 1955, to counter imperialist intrigues and in response to them, there was formed the defensive Warsaw Pact with the purpose of ensuring the security of every fraternal socialist state and the socialist community as a whole. Pact participants declared that they would henceforth undertake "coordinated steps necessary to strengthen their defensive capability in order to safeguard the

*[The author apparently means ASPAC—Asian and Pacific Council.—U.S. Ed.]

peaceful labor of their peoples, guarantee the inviolability of their borders and territories and ensure protection against possible aggression."¹⁴

With the creation of the Warsaw Pact Organization in May 1955, there began the **second stage** of military cooperation of the socialist countries, which is characterized by the more active participation of every socialist state in strengthening the overall defensive might of the fraternal alliance.

The Warsaw Pact Organization is a qualitatively new form of collective defense of the countries of socialism against imperialist aggression. While in the first stage, military cooperation was built on the basis of bilateral treaty obligations, after the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact, as stated in its fourth article, each member state to the agreement has to give immediate help to a state which has been subjected to attack "with all the means which appear to it to be necessary, including the use of armed force."¹⁵

The period which has passed since the conclusion of the Warsaw Pact has shown how necessary and correct was the creation of this organization as a step to ensure the inviolability of borders of the socialist countries of Europe and their security in the face of possible aggression by imperialists.

The revolutionary significance of military cooperation of Warsaw pact states is enormous. The international solidarity, comprehensive, unselfish help to peoples struggling for their freedom and independence, and the firm position of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in the struggle against the intrigues of the imperialists more than once have been the decisive force in disrupting the aggressive plans of monopolistic reaction.

The defense of Warsaw Pact states rests on their common economic and military might, and above all on the military-economic and scientific-technological potentials of the mighty Soviet Power. The enormous combat experience of the Soviet Armed Forces and the high military expertise and combat efficiency and morale of their personnel are the basis for the security of countries of socialism and a powerful means for preventing a new world war. The First Secretary of the Polish United Workers Party CC, Comrade Eduard Gierek, said at the 24th CPSU Congress that the "Soviet Union bears the main burden in the struggle against forces of imperialism and war on a worldwide scale. It is the guarantor of security of the socialist system and gives decisive support and assistance to peoples struggling for their freedom. The great historic service of the Land of Soviets is that it opened real prospects for preventing

¹⁴ *Varshavskoye soveshchaniye yevropeyskikh gosudarstv po obespecheniyu mira i bezopasnosti v Yevrope* (Warsaw Conference of European States to Ensure Peace and Security in Europe). Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1955, p. 139.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 138.

world wars. Throughout all preceding history, aglow with the fires of wars, this was the magnificent but unattainable dream of mankind. It can be implemented only thanks to the might of the socialist camp, and especially the Soviet Union; a might which has given real force to the concept of 'peace'.¹⁶

The Soviet Armed Forces, together with their class brothers—the soldiers from armies of the member states of the Warsaw Pact—vigilantly watch the aggressive intrigues of imperialists and are ready at any moment to stand up fully armed in the defense of socialist achievements of peoples of the entire socialist community.

The historical path of the origin and development of military cooperation of countries of socialism is relatively short in time, but how rich and filled with remarkable events is this military friendship! The military alliance of socialist armies is firm and inviolable because it is based on principles of Marxism-Leninism.

4. For Further Consolidation of Military Cooperation

The hostile actions of reactionary forces of imperialism and their build-up of military preparations force the socialist states to take steps to increase their own defensive might and to strengthen the military alliance of fraternal armies.

Both within the framework of the Warsaw Pact Organization and also in the mutual relationships with armies of other socialist states, the practice of many years has developed effective forms of cooperation aimed at a steady growth in the combat readiness of each of the national armies and strengthening of military cooperation of countries of socialism as a whole. The character and forms of military cooperation of the socialist states are varied. Their basis is the Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army, a commonality of goals and tasks in defending the achievements of socialism, and general principles of development of the armed forces. The leadership of each of the national armies displays broad initiative and creativeness in resolving theoretical and practical issues of military development, and it thus makes its own contribution to the common cause of strengthening the defensive might of the socialist states.

An important factor in military cooperation is a **unanimity of views** on fundamental problems of theory and practice of military development, which rests on the unshakeable foundation of Marxism-Leninism and on a complete and comprehensive consideration of the contemporary military-political situation and changes which are taking place in the character and methods of conducting military operations. Development

¹⁶ *Privetstviya XXIV s'yezdu KPSS (Welcoming Remarks to the 24th CPSU Congress)*. Moscow, Politizdat, 1971, p. 55.

of problems of contemporary military theory is a result of the close cooperation of military scholars of the allied armies.

The existence of very comprehensive combat experience in the Soviet Armed Forces, a first-rate material-technical base, and well-trained military cadres ensures Soviet military scholars a vanguard role in resolution of problems of military science. Military scholars of other allied armies also make a tangible contribution to the development of military science. The results of theoretical research of military scientists of countries of socialism become the property of all fraternal armies, among which there is a regular exchange of military-scientific information. Thanks to this, the military art of armies of socialist states has achieved a high level. It is continuing to further improve under the influence of the scientific-technological revolution and changes in the means and methods of conducting military operations.

Joint troop and command and staff exercises play a large role in strengthening military cooperation. By accomplishing common missions in the course of such exercises, the soldiers of fraternal armies come to know each other more closely, learn together the art of modern combat, understand better their international duty, and become imbued even more deeply with a feeling of friendship and respect, and of mutual trust and understanding. It can be said with complete justification that joint exercises are a genuine school of inviolable friendship and combat comradeship of soldiers of the fraternal armies. They demonstrate the growing defensive might of the socialist states and motivate personnel of the allied armies to defend the revolutionary achievements of the peoples. At the same time these exercises enrich the theory of military art, facilitate the improvement of operational training of commanders and staffs, raise the state of combat training of troops, and permit a most effective development of problems of cooperation and of command and control of troops. Exercises check the combat readiness of the allied armies, the reliability of their combat equipment and weaponry, the organizational abilities of commanders and staffs and the military expertise of personnel.

The systematic exchange of experience in military development, combat and operational training, and training and education of personnel should be regarded as one of the important means for strengthening military cooperation. To this end, conferences and assemblies of the directing staff of the national armies of Warsaw Pact countries are held. Here, the results of combat and operational training are summed up, results achieved in matters of military development and troop training and education are evaluated, and shortcomings are revealed. Simultaneously, new training tasks and measures for preparing the armed forces are outlined, especially those tasks which maintain high combat readiness.

Exchanges of delegations, consultations by specialists in the most important and complex questions of military art, the mastery of new types

of weapons and combat equipment, and the exchange of opinions on its operation and combat employment are arranged in the interests of mutual study of the experience of combat and operational training of troops.

Military-technical cooperation provides tangible and mutually profitable results. It is aimed at ensuring the high technical equipping of armies of socialist states. This requires constant modernization of weapons and combat equipment and the development of new and more sophisticated prototypes of weaponry. The Soviet Union plays a leading role here. Possessing a powerful military-economic potential and scientific-technological base, it gives the necessary assistance to fraternal countries in strengthening their defensive might. Not only direct deliveries of new types of weapons and combat equipment are made, but also licenses and technical documentation are transferred for their production. Joint scientific research and test-design work is conducted, and scientific-technological consultations are widely employed.

The Soviet State plays a large role in the creation and development of the defense industry in the fraternal countries. One of the important ways for coordinating military-technical policy is to standardize weapons and combat equipment of the allied armies, which simplifies their material-technical support in case of military operations.

The productive forces of socialist states, primarily Warsaw Pact member countries, achieved such a degree of maturity that in recent years features of socialist integration are showing more and more clearly in the field of military industry, as well as in the economy as a whole. This concerns both the sphere of immediate scientific and production activity in the development and manufacture of military equipment, as well as problems of planning and implementing programs of scientific-technological progress in the interests of all possible expansion and strengthening of the material-technical base of the Joint Armed Forces.

Mutual assistance in training cadres is an important factor for further strengthening the friendly ties of socialist armies. The Soviet Armed Forces make a particularly significant contribution to this effort. For many years now the military schools of our country have been training highly skilled command, military-political and military-technical cadres for the fraternal armies. They are being educated in a spirit of utter devotion to the ideals of socialism and communism. While successfully mastering comprehensive ideological-theoretical, military and technical knowledge within the walls of Soviet military academies, the officers of fraternal countries are imbued with a feeling of profound respect for the heroic past of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces, and with a spirit of military friendship and comradeship. At the present time the armies of fraternal countries have numerous cadres successfully performing mili-

tary tours of duty who have completed military schools in the Soviet Union.

Soviet military specialists also give a great deal of help in the creation and organization of the training process in military schools of other countries of socialism.

Close working relationships among political organs of fraternal armies also play a substantial role in strengthening military cooperation. There is a systematic exchange of experience of Party-political work in the education of personnel in a spirit of Marxist-Leninist outlook and the training of ideologically persuaded, steadfast, tempered soldiers who are patriots and internationalists. All this solidifies and cements military cooperation of fraternal armed forces and facilitates an increase in their combat readiness.

The forms and methods of educating soldiers in the spirit of socialist internationalism are diverse. Their basis is comprised of Leninist ideas of class unity of the socialist states and a study of the history of the international working movement and the heroic past of peoples of socialist countries. Under the motto "Brothers in class are brothers in arms," soldiers of the socialist countries are brought up in a spirit of military cooperation.

A good rule has been established among Soviet troops abroad: to acquaint newly arrived servicemen with the traditions, state system, laws and customs of the friendly socialist country, and also with the combat history of the unit where they will perform service. Meetings with party and state figures of the fraternal countries have great significance in the international education of Soviet soldiers.

The propaganda of noble exploits of Soviet soldiers who, often at the risk of their lives, come to the aid of the populace of friendly states during natural disasters and accidents, saving people and national property, has a considerable influence on educating personnel in a spirit of socialist internationalism and military cooperation.

The Soviet Union continues to develop and consolidate military-political cooperation with fraternal states. On this basis there is an even greater strengthening of the combat alliance of their armed forces, aimed at ensuring the security of the socialist community as a whole and of each member state. At the same time, the friendship and combat alliance of countries of socialism objectively facilitates a relaxation in international tension and a strengthening of peace and security throughout our entire planet.

"The member countries of the Warsaw Pact," according to the April (1974) Communiqué of the Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact, "will continue to strengthen their inviolable

friendship in the interests of socialism, progress, and peace, raising even higher the prestige of socialism, which gives other nations an example of a new type of international relations, a truly democratic society, and an example of the socialist way of life. They will continue to speak out for strengthening the process of détente and for the triumph of the ideals of peace, security, and economic and social progress of nations."¹⁷

The fraternal countries hold dear the friendship growing strong among them and have a high esteem for the great political, economic and military help which the Soviet Union is giving them. Here is what Comrade Fidel Castro, for example, says about this: "... the Soviet People helped us repel imperialist aggression and the imperialist blockade. Without the help of the Soviet Union, our revolution would have been doomed to failure. At the minute when the question of the life or death of our country was being decided, the help of the Soviet Union came in a decisive way."¹⁸

Due to the comprehensive help and support given the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by the Soviet State and other socialist countries, the heroic Vietnamese people succeeded in defending their homeland against imperialist aggression.

The combat alliance of socialist states is firm and inviolable. It was born as a result of the victory of the Great October, was enveloped in the flame of battles in the menacing years of the Great Patriotic War, and was sealed by blood shed jointly by soldiers of the fraternal countries. Soviet people are doing everything necessary to solidify it even more. One of the vivid expressions of the inviolability of fraternal unity is the steadily developing and strengthening combat cooperation between the armies of the socialist states. The Soviet Armed Forces occupy a worthy place in their close combat formation. Soviet soldiers are performing their patriotic and international obligation with a sense of high responsibility.

¹⁷ *Pravda*, 19 April 1974.

¹⁸ *Pravda*, 8 February 1974.

CONCLUSION

In protecting the socialist Homeland with gun in hand and defending the freedom and independence of his people, the Soviet soldier has always dreamed that his blood on the battlefield would be the last blood shed on earth. Today this dream can be fulfilled since mankind is in a position to prevent war as a method of resolving controversial international issues. A stable peace, a peace without wars and bloodshed, is needed by the peoples of the planet. It is needed by our advanced socialist society, which is free from exploitation and which ensures the benefits of life to everyone who honestly labors in the name of the triumph of communism.

In this book the author has attempted to show how the army, being throughout all the history of mankind a tool of violence and war, has assumed new qualities embodied in the Soviet Armed Forces and has become an army of liberation, an army of defense of the peace and security of peoples.

From the first day of their origin, the Soviet Armed Forces were built like armed forces of a new type, inseparably connected with the people and their ideals and hopes, permeated by a spirit of fraternal friendship of peoples of the USSR, of socialist patriotism and internationalism, and utterly devoted to the socialist Homeland and the Communist Party. Created and raised by the great Lenin and the Communist Party for protecting socialist achievements of the working people, they honorably justify their historic purpose.

More than once the Soviet Armed Forces, standing vigilantly on guard of socialism and the building of communism, have had to enter fierce battles against a strong and dangerous aggressor. But in spite of all the difficulties, they have always come out the victors, demonstrating unprecedented heroism, staunchness, and self-sacrifice. The Soviet soldiers came to manhood in these battles and their combat expertise grew. The organizational structure of the Soviet Armed Forces, their weaponry, military art, and system of training and education underwent the test of fire and time in the proper manner.

The combat successes of the Soviet Armed Forces deeply conform to

principle. They have been determined by the wise leadership of the Communist Party, its proper determination of the ways for reliable assurance of the country's security, by the scientific nature of military development, by purposeful educational and organizational work of the Party, and by the titanic efforts of all Soviet people. The sources of victories of the Soviet Armed Forces are rooted in the midst of the people of our multinational country, in the superiority of the socialist system over the capitalist, in Soviet politics and economics, in Marxist-Leninist ideology, and in the correlation of sociopolitical forces in the world arena which are constantly changing in favor of socialism.

There is a good rule: in thinking about what has been experienced, one should always turn mentally to the future, to new tasks and accomplishments. In looking back on the path we have travelled and giving due and deep respect to the glorious deeds of the Soviet people and its Armed Forces, we fix our gaze at the communist tomorrow.

The building of a communist society has become an immediate practical task for the Soviet people. The Party has outlined a grandiose program for further development of our country and armed the Soviet people with a precise political line and a true Leninist course. The focus of all deeds and plans of the Party are the interests of the people, the raising of their welfare, the strengthening of the might of the Soviet Union and the entire world socialist system, and the fight for peace and international security.

The Communist Party firmly and consistently implements the Peace Program proclaimed by the 24th Congress as well as the program adopted by the 25th CPSU Congress of further struggle for peace and international cooperation, for freedom and independence of peoples. The active foreign policy work of the Central Committee and Politburo, aimed at ensuring a peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, has an enormous effect on the entire international situation. From year to year the international positions of our state and all countries of the socialist community grow stronger. Tasks of economic development of the USSR are being successfully fulfilled. There is a continuous strengthening of the moral-political unity of the multinational Soviet people.

Successes in building communism, the steadily growing international authority of the Soviet Union, its influence on the political climate of the planet, and the enormous revolutionary transformations in the world give no rest to imperialist reaction. The weakening of positions of imperialism and the doom of the capitalist system intensify the aggressiveness and adventurism of reactionary monopolistic circles. Here and there they provoke military conflicts aimed with a cutting edge against the Soviet Union, the entire socialist community and the forces of national

liberation. By means of political subversion, blackmail and aggressive wars, the militarists vainly try to overcome the insoluble internal social, economic and ideological contradictions of the capitalist system, to weaken the world socialist system, and deal with the international working people's and national liberation movement.

In spite of the developing relaxation of tension in the international arena, there are still forces in the imperialist camp which have not disappeared, but who act in the "cold war" spirit and try to inflate military budgets and build up military preparations. The policy of Maoism is directly linked up with these forces of extreme reaction the world over—enemies of détente. This policy in its essence has become an important reserve of imperialism in its struggle against socialism.

Our Party keeps a watchful eye on the actions of the enemies of peace and social progress. While conducting a policy of strengthening peace and international cooperation, and of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, it continually remembers that imperialism remains the bearer of a military threat. There is no doubt that if it were not for the enormous economic and military might of the Soviet Union and other countries of socialism, the imperialists would have tried long ago to carry out their ominous plans.

As a country of socialism, the Soviet Union is a stranger to predatory wars, but we will defend the socialist achievements of the Soviet people with all resolve and with the use of the entire might of our state. The Report of the CPSU CC to the 24th Party Congress states: "We have everything necessary—an honest policy of peace, military might, and the solidarity of the Soviet people—in order to ensure the inviolability of our borders against any encroachments and to defend the achievements of socialism."¹

We are fighting for peace because such a policy is inherent to a socialist state, and because there exists in the world imperialism, which has not given up the fight against socialism and which by virtue of its class nature creates a constant threat to peace, primarily for socialist countries. This is why the Communist Party combines all its active, peace-loving foreign policy with constant vigilance toward the imperialist states and their aggressive blocs, and why it steadfastly sees to the strengthening of the defensive ability of the country and the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces. Its directing and guiding role in organizing the armed defense of the Soviet state is growing uninterruptedly.

Now, as before, all combat and political training and Party-political work in units and on warships, and the day-to-day life and work of personnel are subordinated to preserving the high vigilance and strengthening the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. The Armed

¹ *Materialy XXIV s'yezda KPSS*, p. 28.

Forces always are ready to come to the defense of the Motherland to repel any aggression, from anyone and from any quarter.

Our Armed Forces are being equipped with modern weapons and combat equipment thanks to the concern of the Party and government and all the Soviet people. Sophisticated models of missile, aviation, naval, armored, artillery and other combat equipment are being introduced in units and on warships. This powerful technology is in the skilled and reliable hands of Soviet soldiers. Their motto is "Know and maintain your weapon with excellence, and master it expertly."

Soviet soldiers are profoundly grateful to the people, the Party and government for providing the Armed Forces with first-rate weapons, combat equipment and everything necessary for combat training, service and everyday routine. The growing uplift of the country's economy as a result of fulfilling the plans of the national economy, acceleration of scientific-technological progress, and broad introduction of its achievements into all spheres of the life of the state, including the field of military development, will ensure a strengthening in the defensive capability of the Soviet Union and an increase in the combat readiness of the Soviet Armed Forces. This permits us to guard our country and all states of the socialist community even more reliably against the intrigues of aggressive forces.

But the Soviet soldier is powerful and renowned not only because of his weapons. He possesses high moral-combat qualities. The Communist Party has armed him with invincible revolutionary Marxist-Leninist teachings which contain an inexhaustible source of ideological maturity and communist conviction of all personnel of the Armed Forces. Our people can be sure that today's generation of Soviet soldiers are worthy heirs and continuers of the revolutionary, combat, and labor traditions of their grandfathers and fathers and true guardians of the Party and people, ready to stand up staunchly in defense of the socialist Motherland.

The goals and tasks of our Armed Forces are lofty and noble. The Soviet soldiers know firmly what they must guard and against whom. They persistently improve their military mastery and strengthen organization and discipline in training fields and firing ranges, in the air and on the ocean expanses, and on combat alert duty while guarding the land, air and sea borders of the Motherland.

When one ponders the fate of our socialist Homeland and its Armed Forces, one always thinks about its majestic and heroic path. The Soviet people, especially the older generation, who were witness to and participants in the glorious deeds of Party and people in the years of foreign intervention and civil war, of the first five-year plans, the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period, see clearly the heights which the country has attained by following the Party's leadership along a Leninist path.

All of us are proud of the fact that socialism has won out here fully and finally, that a well-developed socialist society has been built, that now a talented and industrious Soviet people are successfully building communism, and that our great Motherland stands staunchly, as a mighty bastion of peace, inspiring admiration and respect from all progressive mankind. We are proud that the Soviet State belongs to the community of socialist countries—the greatest achievement of the international working class, the prototype of a future world community of free peoples.

Every Soviet citizen and every friend of our Motherland knows full well that the Armed Forces of the USSR comprise a firm and reliable foundation for the defensive might of the Soviet socialist state, and are the vigilant sentries of the Land of Soviets, which is building communism. Their very great steadfastness has not been broken by any hard tests of past wars. In the severe battle against enemies of our Motherland, the Soviet Armed Forces reached maturity, grew strong, learned about the laws of warfare, and were victorious. They are looking into the future with complete confidence. There is no force in the world which could shake their combat might or faith in the victory of communism. This is guaranteed by the growing economic and defensive might of the USSR, the increasing unity of the army and the people, and the wise leadership of the CPSU in every matter having to do with communist development and the defense of the socialist Homeland.