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24 NOVEMBER 1976

THE RELATIONS OF KENYA WITH ITS BORDERING STATES

BY

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for their studies of the East Coast of Africa and the Horn of Africa. The analysis of the relations of Kenya's bordering nations covered the major points of harmony or discord between them. Both the forces of political and economic division as well as the forces which tend to push these nations into regional solidarity were considered. It is the view of the author that the rewards of regional cooperation are such that a measure of solidarity among the subject nations will prevail; and that radical forces on the East Coast will endeavor, probably with limited success, to pull the interior nations leftward.



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⑥ THE RELATIONS OF KENYA
WITH ITS BORDERING STATES

⑨ Student essay,

by

⑩ Lieutenant Colonel Richard D. Hirtzel
Infantry

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ABSTRACT

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THE RELATIONS OF KENYA WITH ITS BORDERING STATES

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this essay is to review and analyze the relations of the East African state of Kenya with its bordering states. Most analyses of the Horn of Africa and the East Coast of Africa are concerned primarily with the impact of the major powers in these areas, questions of neo-colonialism, and the importance of this locale in global strategy. Seldom are the relations of a nation in Africa with those countries which directly border on it addressed in a single article, and it therefore is the purpose of this article to do so. It is observed however that the strategic importance of the nations in this locale is such that they cannot properly be considered entirely out of the context of their involvement with the major powers, since the latter have been important factors both in determining the division and polarization in the area, in the colonial heritage with which it has been left, and in shaping the ideologies of the present moment.

Limitations on the length of this study preclude the development of a hypothesis which can be definitively answered in a research work of this scope. However a question is posed and addressed to the extent that trends may be observed which will either tend to refute or confirm the statement. This question is as follows: "Will the external and internal forces which influence Kenya and its bordering states force an 'osmosis' effect which will make it necessary for these nations to adopt domestic and foreign policies on a left-right political spectrum which are similar to one another?"

Part One of this essay is descriptive in nature, providing necessary background information for an analysis of the relations of Kenya with its bordering states and at the same time providing information which will serve

as a basis for analysis of the fundamental question which has been posed. Part Two, as indicated above, cannot provide a definitive answer in this limited space, nevertheless will present arguments on both sides of the issue, which lead in turn to several tentative conclusions.

PART ONE

KENYA

One of the major matters of interest concerning Kenya centers on speculation as to how long the eighty-five year old President Jomo Kenyatta, leader of the country since independence, will remain in power. The Kikuyu tribesman and former anthropologist now shows some indication of physical decline, and there is a general awareness that the end of his reign as head of government may come in the not-too-distant future. The abilities of Kenyatta have been recognized by numerous high-ranking government officials from many countries, and he obviously has a firm control over governmental and political activities. His ability to consolidate political power and balance the major tribal groups will be difficult for a new leader to parallel or surpass.

Kenya under Kenyatta is seen as a balancing force between Uganda and Tanzania in their current strife arising from the ousting from power of former President A. Milton Obote through a military coup d'etat in 1971. Kenyatta also has worked to improve relations between socialist Tanzania and conservative Malawi, which have abrasive relations with each other over such issues as the proper location of the border between the two countries on Lake Malawi, and Southern African racism. Kenyatta has a close relationship with Dr. Kamuzu Banda, President of Malawi, and is a restraining influence upon Julius K. Nyerere, President of Tanzania, in areas of potential conflict between left-leaning Tanzania and the ultra-conservative government of President Banda.

Also, if the East African Community (which consists of Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya) is to remain intact in view of the current strife between Uganda and Tanzania, it will be a result largely of the political influence and conciliatory efforts of the Kenyan president.

President Kenyatta also has worked toward maintaining an even-handed balance between the forces of progress in this developing area of East Africa and the forces of radicalism of the type promulgated by the Communist Chinese and the Soviet Union. Kenyatta is neither isolationist in his views nor does he aspire to a role of dynamic leadership in Africa extending beyond problems which bear directly upon his own nation. Under such conditions, so long as Kenyatta is in power, the potential for internal radicalism or political extremism is not great.

Kenyatta has provided decisive leadership for his own country as well as firm support for Ethiopia and France in refuting the claims of the government of Somalia for control over the territories bordering on Somalia which are occupied by semi-nomadic Somali herdsmen.¹ A man of lesser resolve and ability holding the position of president of Kenya could be victimized by the Somali efforts which are supported through military aid by the Soviet Union, the Chinese Communists, and other nations of the communist bloc.

On the other hand, effective diplomacy in East Africa could result in the extension of a viable East African Common Market with membership expanded beyond the current organization of the East African Community.² Membership could be enlarged to include Ethiopia, Somalia, and Zambia -- all of which in the past have indicated an interest in such an enterprise. Indeed the reward for maintaining a peaceful stance in foreign relations in East Africa could be preferential trade arrangements among the nations of that locale, certainly a potentially moderating influence. If the economic advantages are

great enough, expansion of the East African Community could lead to greater East African unity.

There have been internal disturbances in the past in Kenya, in part resulting from tribal conflicts but also related to the broader issues of racism and strife among the black, the white and the Asian populations. President Kenyatta has established the dominant role of the blacks in the government but not without considerable stress on the existing societal orders and economic structure. Tribalism, racism, the terrorist heritage of the Mau-Mau, the territorial claims of the Somalis -- all have created a volatile and uneasy structure which one feels could come apart with a lesser leader than the dominant Jomo Kenyatta in command.

MAIN ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF KENYA WITH THE SUDAN

Kenya has less involvement with the Sudan than with its other neighbors. Although they share a 135-mile border, there has been little conflict between them. Sudan is socialistic, but at the same time is anti-Communist. Sudan is in the Arab world, and Kenya is in black Africa.³ The diplomatic, economic and political involvement of these nations with one another is not extensive. Sudan is controlled by Arabs who reside mostly in the central and northern areas of the nation. Blacks in the southern part of Sudan have been oppressed by the Arabs and this has been one source of conflict with Kenya. However, Kenyatta is not overly concerned with what his neighbors do as long as there is no threat to his interests or those of Kenya. The people of Sudan are Moslem, while there are a large number of Christians in Kenya resulting from the influence of white missionaries in the former British colony. The blacks in southern Sudan are more tied ethnically to the Watusi of Rwanda and Burundi than to the people of Kenya.

Kenya and Ethiopia both have a common conflict with Somalia, a fact that has strengthened the ties between these two nations, and which has ramifications for Sudan.⁴ "My enemy's enemy is my friend." Since Sudan for a time supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) and other liberation groups in Eritrea and the Ethiopians supported the rebellion of blacks in southern Sudan and since Somalia also was (and is) supporting the ELF, the natural alliances have been Ethiopia and Kenya versus Somalia, Sudan, and the ELF. However, this point with respect to Sudan could be easily overstated. Particularly since the attempted communist coups e'tat against the government of President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri, Sudan has become more suspicious and distrusting of the communists, just as Kenyatta is becoming concerned with the Soviet build-up of Somalia and Uganda. In addition, Sudan has more recently been attempting to serve as a mediator between Ethiopia and the Eritrean Liberation Forces.

Sudan also shares the concern of Kenya as well as other nations of the world over the erratic conduct of General Amin in Uganda, which borders on the Sudan. In part because of the volatile nature of the Ugandan leader, Sudan and Kenya have reached an agreement to construct a railroad and a highway from Sudan through Kenya to its major port city, Mombasa. At present, the major roads connecting Sudan and Kenya pass through Uganda.⁵

MAIN ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF KENYA WITH TANZANIA

Tanzania has attracted interest and attention from political observers on a scale disproportionate to the economic and geographic importance of the country, largely as a result of the style of leadership of its president, Julius K. Nyerere, and the innovative political structure and ideology of the society as shaped and fostered by Nyerere through the governing political party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU).⁶

Mainland Tanzania, then known as Tanganyika, received its independence from the British in 1961. It was merged with the government of the island of Zanzibar in 1964 and the federation was then renamed Tanzania. Initially a multi-party state created in the parliamentary image of the colonial power, Great Britain, Nyerere subverted and eliminated the role of political opposition to the point where the country now is a one-party state over which the president exercises generally uncontested control. Nyerere is socialistic in his orientation and practice, enunciating an African type of socialism which does not include as in Marxism the concept of class struggle but which instead views socialism as an economic enterprise designed to help the nation's struggling economy. Limited in its natural resources and fertile land for agriculture, and restricted in cattle-raising by the tsetse fly which is a carrier of sleeping sickness, the economy has remained at the subsistence level for most of the population, with an annual per capita income of less than \$100.00.

Tanzania, along with Uganda, shares membership with Kenya in the East African Community. Both Tanzania and Kenya are Indian Ocean states. Both are former British colonies. However, Tanzania has an ideology resembling more that of Somalia, the troublesome neighbor of Kenya, than that of Kenya. Even in the best of times, the socialism of Tanzania inherently finds points of conflict with the capitalistic system of Kenya when operating in a Common Market, and Kenyatta on several occasions has temporarily sealed off the border with Tanzania. The stress which is placed on the East African Community by Uganda at this time makes this situation even more difficult. Conversely, common opposition to General Amin is a force that could unite these two nations.

Nyerere appears to be more interested in shaping events of South Africa and the Indian Ocean nations than does Kenyatta. Kenyatta endeavors to maintain a tight grip within his country and a broad base of support, particularly among the members of the Kikuyu tribe, from which, for the most part, the Mau Mau came. Kenyatta does not vigorously project himself into conflicts which do not affect him or his nation, with the exception of the major issues such as Southern African racial discord and the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are, however, some elements of commonality between the two presidents. Kenyatta and Nyerere both are the only heads of state which their respective nations have known since they gained their independence. Both run for office unopposed. Both utilize the practice of preventive detention. Both have had political assassinations at a high level, Tom Mboya, Minister of Economic Planning, in Kenya in 1969, and Abeid Karume, vice-president of Tanzania and leader of Zanzibar, in 1972. Both are strong leaders with charismatic appeal and enjoy the reputation of having led their countries to independence. However Kenyatta is very much the effective practitioner of politics, in contrast to Nyerere who is absorbed in ideological considerations such as the Arushu Declaration and the Uhuru philosophy.⁷ Tanzania clearly is the more radical of the two nations. Kenyatta is more than 30 years the senior of Nyerere in age. Neither tries to, nor dares to, meddle in the internal affairs of the other's nation. Kenyatta is hospitable to western influence whereas Nyerere is hostile to neo-colonialism.

Consistent with his socialistic views President Nyerere has aligned his country with the Communist Chinese to the extent that the latter have constructed a railroad, called the Tan-Zam (now Uhuru⁸) Railroad, from Zambia through Tanzania to the latter's major port and capital city, Dar es Salaam. For its part, the United States agreed to construct a highway across the country. Nyerere asserts that he is not a communist, and points out that

although he has visited Peking he also has visited the United States. While his domestic policy is socialistic rather than Marxist, he has tended to take a leftist to radical position in foreign policy.

Nyerere allows a degree of freedom of expression within the one-party system, which is considered by the state to be a mass party rather than an elite party. Ultimately, however, Nyerere remains in control of both the government and the party, and he considers unlimited democratic processes to be inconsistent with his concept of socialism.⁹ Academic freedom appears to not be a part of his liberalism, as evidenced by the fact that he has closed the universities on several occasions and has suspended students for a minimum period of two years for voicing opposition to his regime. The use of languages other than Swahili also has been greatly curtailed by presidential decree.

Issues of concern and interest in the future include the following: Will the loose structure of TANU change into a more disciplined party; or, alternatively, can Nyerere maintain control of a large, mass-based party which is loosely organized? Will disillusionment set in among the Tanzanian people over the limited success of Nyerere's socialistic enterprises, discrimination against the 80,000 Indian population in the country, and nationalization of selected foreign and indigenous investments? Will socialism and other issues of conflict with Uganda jeopardize drastically the relations of the two countries and hence the future of the East African Community? Is there a possible shift ahead in Tanzanian relations with the Chinese as a result of a Chinese Communist -- United States rapprochement? (That is, will the Chinese position become softer, less strident, vis-a-vis East Africa, if closer ties with the United States develop?) If the influence of NATO in Europe is reduced will Nyerere's wariness toward western imperialism and neo-

colonialism be relaxed? (Nyerere viewed the presence of the colonial power Portugal in Mozambique, until the latter obtained its independence, to be a form of NATO-imperialism.) Will Nyerere be inclined to improve relations with Uganda's President Amin or will he await opportunities for the return of former President Obote to power? These are among the many variables to consider in appraising the future of Tanzania.

MAIN ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF KENYA WITH ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia, with a heritage of conservatism and deep-rooted traditions, now faces circumstances that may result in the creation of a new society dramatically different in its structure and orientation than the four millennia-old Ethiopia referred to by the authors and prophets of the Old Testament. Pressure is on, with some mitigation by astute diplomacy and internal political maneuvering, to force Ethiopia to conform to the radicalism of the political forces of the Horn of East Africa and the Arab Middle East. Confronted with a separatist movement in Eritrea by the Eritrean Liberation Front and other factions which could be formidable; while at the same time faced with irredentist claims from Somalia for parts of Ethiopia which are seasonally inhabited by Somalis, chiefly semi-nomadic herdsmen, the very borders of the nation are threatened. Additionally, the major port city of Ethiopia is not even in Ethiopia, but rather is Djibouti, the capital city of the French Territory of Afars and Issas, also the object of claims by the Somalis. In the event that these two territories are lost, Ethiopia would be land-locked, a situation which probably would be viewed to be intolerable and a possible justification for warfare. Further, pressure is felt from the radical position of bordering Sudan, and from neighboring states of the Arab world which do not border on Ethiopia but which nevertheless cannot be ignored in the formulation of foreign, as well as domestic,

policy. It is noted that the Ethiopian leaders have felt beholden to the French, since the presence of the latter in the French Territory of Afars and Issas has provided access to the sea by rail from Addis Ababa to Djibouti. The departure of the French in 1977 will result in considerable stress between Ethiopia and Somalia for the territory.

Of course, the major question facing the Ethiopians and Ethiopia-watchers is what will be the future of the country now that Emperor Haile Selassie is no longer on the scene.¹⁰ As was the case with France after DeGaulle, perhaps the changes, other than those of style, will not be monumental. However, the likelihood is that change will be of a magnitude somewhere along a continuum of gradual transformation through an osmosis effect to a political coloration more consistent with that found in other places in the Horn and in the Arab Middle East to the abrupt, radical and erratic upheaval of the type experienced in Libya as a result of the ousting of King Idris I in 1969.

Ethiopia, while socialist in its rhetoric, is not in league with the more radical states of the Horn of Africa and the Middle East because several of the latter support the movement of Eritrean for liberation. Among the supporters of the liberation movement are Somalia, Syria, and Iraq along with the USSR and the PRC.

While Ethiopia was never a British colony, both Ethiopia and Kenya have had a "British moment." Ethiopia was liberated by the British from five years of Italian conquest and occupation in 1941. Kenya of course is a former British colony. With the East African Community facing an uncertain future, a new organization could emerge which would include Kenya and Ethiopia. If the latter loses Eritrea, it will then be land-locked and would look for other options to the sea in addition to Djibouti, which could be accomplished through Kenya. A common concern for Ethiopia and Kenya which draws these

two nations together has been a rising Soviet threat in the Indian Ocean.

There are other elements of commonality between Ethiopia and Kenya.¹¹ Both Ethiopia and Kenya have a Christian population as well as a Moslem population. Both have a conflict with Somalia which claims part of Ethiopia as well as the northeastern province of Kenya. Both nations have in recent years suffered from drought and famine, more seriously in Ethiopia than in Kenya. Both nations are friendly to the West, to western tourism, and western investment as well as aid and trade. Both are opposed to foreign power control or domination of their portion of East Africa. Both provide formidable opposition to outsiders who meddle in their internal affairs. Both are opposed to the existence of the state of Israel and to discrimination against blacks in South Africa. Their foreign policy rests on the fact that they are both anti-Somali and anti-Communist.¹¹

The headquarters of the Organization of African Unity, established through the leadership of Ethiopia's former Emperor Haile Selassie, is located in Addis Ababa, the capital city of Ethiopia. Questions concerning the future of Ethiopia are: Will the headquarters of the Organization of African Unity remain in Addis Ababa now that the reign of one of its most instrumental founding fathers has ended? Will Ethiopia renew support for the Anya Nya, the black rebel group in southern Sudan, or is this issue rather permanently resolved? Will the nations of the Horn and elsewhere in East Africa of necessity or convenience turn to the Asians for economic and diplomatic interaction, with a sense of creeping isolationism vis-a-vis the western world? Will those who foster a stronger identity of brown men and black men prevail?

MAIN ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF KENYA WITH SOMALIA

One of the main elements of foreign policy with Somalia is the conflict over the Northeastern province of Kenya and the irredentist claims of Somalia for that area. This squabble has been patched up by previous leaders, President Shemarke and Prime Minister Egal, but flares up frequently under the leadership of President Mohammed Siad Barre. Kenya also is concerned over the extensive Communist aid and build-up in Somalia and the concurrent shipment of military equipment to Uganda, its neighbor to the west, with Kenya in between.

Part of Somalia, British Somaliland, in the northern part of the country, once was a British colony as was Kenya. The people of Somalia and the people of Kenya are of different racial groupings, however. Kenya's population, except for a small Asian community, is mostly Negroid, whereas in Somalia the people are a blend of Arabic, Negroid, Southern Asian, and probably Malayan and Polynesian origins. The two nations also have different languages. The Somali language now is expressed in written form. In Kenya, Swahili and English are used. Siad Barre has a socialist state while Kenya is capitalistic.

Somalia, torn with suspicion and intrigue from within, particularly at the high command level, also is caught up in an international conflict involving the major communist powers, as well as with the other nations of East Africa and the western powers. Of particular interest and concern are the claims of Somalia for territorial jurisdiction over the Somali people, principally nomadic and semi-nomadic herdsmen, who reside in parts of Kenya and Ethiopia, as well as the French-governed Territory of Afars and Issas.¹² This issue seems to represent a means of attempting to unify and rally the

Somali people against real or alleged foreign threats, but nevertheless is presented with a measure of restraint falling short of an all-out call to arms to liberate the subject foreign areas.

The government of Siad Barre has developed closer ties with the USSR, while maintaining liaison with the Communist Chinese and North Korean governments. In an effort to maintain a balance of influence between the major powers in spite of the present tilt toward the USSR, Somalia also has made peaceful and recurring overtures to the United States and may in the near future expand its sphere of diplomatic friendships with greater emphasis on western European contacts.

Obviously not able to do very much militarily about the French presence in the Territory of Afars and Issas until independence is granted, the Somalis efforts are reduced to those of propaganda and diplomacy. Anticipating the withdrawal of the French from the area in 1977, they would, of course, like to move in. Foreign radical support for the Somali effort at this time is consistent with other efforts against the Ethiopian government, including those of the Eritrean liberation movement. The area is important symbolically and pragmatically to both sides.

In Kenya, President Jomo Kenyatta, very much his own man, has not been inclined toward unconstrained friendship with either of the major communist powers, and his close ties with the west, particularly the former colonial power, the United Kingdom, have resulted in a somewhat abrasive and suspicious relationship between Kenya and the communists of both camps -- again a determinant on the part of the latter for support for the Somali effort. As part of a larger communist program of activity, Somalia is seen as an additional point of access to East Africa -- along with mainland Tanzania, Eritrea, Zanzibar, and Madagascar. The USSR naval buildup at Berbera is an example of communist activity in East Africa which is viewed by President Kenyatta as a threat to Kenyan national interests and security.

Public executions and imprisonment of high-ranking government officials in Somalia indicate considerable internal strife and a struggle for power that may surface to the detriment of the incumbent government, with ambitious leaders coveting the president's position. Indications are that the future of the Somali government, both internally, and in its relations with foreign powers, will be stormy.

MAIN ELEMENTS OF FOREIGN POLICY OF KENYA WITH UGANDA

The main characteristic of the government of Uganda under the direction of General Idi Amin Dada, who assumed and retained control after President Apollo Milton Obote was ousted in a 1971 coup d'etat, is a foreign policy which stresses independence from foreign domination or influence, with respect to the conduct of internal business and governmental matters of the country. President Amin has stopped Obote's move to the left, but this should not be construed necessarily to be a move to the right. Amin has been critical in public of his British benefactors, outspoken in attacks upon Israeli imperialism, and generally suspicious of "strings attached" foreign assistance from the major powers, although he has been the recipient of military aid programs from Libya and the USSR. His government is more militant and authoritarian than that of Obote. Obote had a narrow and tenuous power base, as does Amin, but the difference is that Amin to this point has exercised a more heavy-handed totalitarian control which brings subordinates into line through fear and intimidation. His reign is not popular but there appears to be no immediately acceptable alternative leader available who could rise up and seize control of the government and improve conditions in Uganda.¹³

President Amin has been active on the diplomatic front and claims to have received promises of aid from Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the Maghreb countries of North Africa. These offers of Arab support may be in grateful response to Amin's strongly worded attacks upon Israel, in which he has admonished the black governed countries of Africa to break off all diplomatic ties with the Israelis. Amin also has been active with other diplomatic contacts, and has signed a mutual defense pact with Sudan. Relations still remain tense with Tanzania, which favored the return of Obote to power and considered using force to achieve this end.

President Jomo Kenyatta probably did not initially oppose the ouster of Amin's predecessor President A. Milton Obote. Obote, in search of a power base, found little support from the right and the center of the political spectrum and began to follow the lead of Julius K. Nyerere in looking to the left -- a trend that threatened the viability of the East African Community and the national security of Kenya. However, in retrospect, the weak government of Dr. Obote was much more manageable than that of the erratic and unstable General Amin.

Uganda is land-locked and forced to cross through neighboring countries to reach the sea. In spite of this fact, and with good rail connections through Kenya to the latter's main port city of Mombasa, President Amin has been abrasive in his relations with Kenya, and Amin's Soviet ties and the shipment of USSR military hardware to Uganda has been a cause of concern for Kenya. Uganda has failed to meet its share of IBRD (World Bank) loan payments and the latter has cut off further assistance to the members of the East African Community. Kenya now insists on payment in advance and in Kenyan currency for its sales to Uganda. Kenya has cut off shipments of oil and other items through Kenya until such time as Uganda pays its bills to the IBRD

and to Kenya.

General Amin has made irredentist claims on portions of Kenya which border on Uganda, an action that some may see as hazardous in the extreme. Kenyatta himself is capable of mustering forces of terrorism to counter Amin. The alleged former leader of the fearsome Mau Mau of Kenya has resources for control and retaliation available to him through tribal groups loyal to him, particularly the Kikuyu.

Further stress was placed on the relations of the two nations as a result of the Entebbe Incident in July 1976 -- the Israeli rescue of hijacked Air France plane passengers at Entebbe. The three Israeli C-130 rescue planes were allowed to refuel in Kenya for their return trip, suggesting Kenyatta's advance approval of the Israeli action to free their countrymen who had been held as hostages in Uganda, allegedly with the sanction of General Amin.

Relations in the East African Community have been very strained. A new Common Market of perhaps Somalia, Zambia, Malawi, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania could freeze out Uganda so long as the latter remains under the control of President Amin. The future of the East African Community of course, rests on the ability of Uganda and Tanzania, along with Kenya, to resolve their conflicts.

Bordered by five countries -- Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zaire -- and close to the borders of two others -- Ethiopia and Burundi -- Uganda is nestled between powerful forces which it cannot afford to ignore. As a land-locked country, it finds it necessary to maintain good relations with at least one of its two major land outlets, Kenya and Tanzania. The 270-mile border with Sudan also may eventually provide opportunities for access to the sea.

With Uganda's deteriorating economy and general unrest, and the heavy-handed rule of President Amin, the next two years could bring traumatic events to this controversial former British colony. While many nations enunciate positions of neutrality and non-alignment, Kenyatta has actually brought these policies into existence and is seldom provoked into action beyond his borders. However, Amin may provoke the old patriarch to action. That, combined with smoldering internal dissent in Uganda, could bring down the brash Ugandan dictator whose erratic behavior is offensive to most Africans.

PART TWO

CONCLUSIONS

One of the purposes of this essay, as indicated in the introduction, is to address itself to the question, "Will the external and internal forces which influence Kenya and its bordering states force an 'osmosis' effect which will make it necessary for these nations to adopt domestic and foreign policies on a left-right political spectrum which are similar to one another?" While a definitive answer to the question cannot be provided in this limited space and scope of this paper, nevertheless there are several discernible trends, as follows:

In Ethiopia, domestic and foreign pressures combined to bring down the government of the Emperor Haile Selassie. The traditional, ultra-conservative regime was faced with monumental pressures for change, particularly away from a monarchical form of government, and into a form of government that could coexist more comfortably with its neighboring states and one that enunciates in its public rhetoric at least a doctrine of socialism. Events else-

where in the Middle-East indicate similar trends, with the elimination of monarchies in Libya, Egypt, Yemen, the Hashimite dynasties in Iraq and Iran, assassination of King Faisal in Saudi Arabia and attempts on the lives of King Hassan of Morocco and King Hussein of Jordan.

Within the East African Community perhaps only the egocentric General Amin could have withstood the great pressures from Kenya and Tanzania for cooperation and conformity which would be mutually advantageous both politically and economically. Sudan, while socialistic, nevertheless shares with Ethiopia and Kenya distrust and apprehension concerning the communist bloc. The potential for destroying one another forces Sudan to adopt a more moderate position concerning blacks in southern Sudan, in order to placate black Africa and Ethiopia. At the same time, Sudan has provided mediation and good offices to assist Ethiopia in resolving the conflict with Eritrea.

Kenya, the most prosperous of the three member nations of the East African Community, may force President Nyerere to reconsider his commitment to socialistic economic enterprises which have resulted in a meager \$100 per capita annual income for the Tanzanian population. And while an expanded East African Community with other members added such as Ethiopia, Somalia, Zambia, and Malawi may never materialize, nonetheless the fact that such enterprises are discussed from time to time suggests a desire for some sort of regional solidarity, which of course would have to have, at least very broadly, a consensus on economic and political policy.

The solidarity of these third world nations on such issues as discrimination against blacks in southern Africa almost goes without saying. However in other areas a type of blackmail is involved. Why did Ethiopia, a Christian nation, in 1973, withdraw recognition from Israel, the land of the origin of its religious faith? Was it not under duress from its neighbors,


just as Chad withdrew its recognition of Israel in exchange for a reduction of Libyan support for Arab insurrections in its land?

There seems to be no question but what the countries have political and or economic leverage on one another. They do force one another to take their positions into account - through friendship, through common cause, or through duress.

On the other hand, we see that five years after his rise to power, General Amin still is in control of Uganda and is still involved in controversy with his neighbors. Also, it is observed that Tanzania, Somalia, and the insurgents in Eritrea are much more radical than other nations discussed in the Horn of Africa-East Africa locale. And while they have learned to accommodate their grievances with one another -- through discussion over the future access of Ethiopia to Djibouti, the attempts at reconciliation of border disputes and the irredentist claims of the Somalis, and the attempts to keep the East African Community afloat in spite of the widely divergent views held by its leaders -- nevertheless the radical position of Tanzania, which probably is inspired by ideology, and the radical position of Somalia, which probably is inspired by opportunism, nevertheless still prevail in these countries.

In addressing this paper to a more finite answer to the question which has been posed, it appears that one trend is emerging -- which is that several of the nations which border on the coast of the Indian Ocean -- namely, Tanzania, Somalia, and the liberation movements in Eritrea are more inclined toward radicalism, and seem to believe that they can coexist with their neighbors while still maintaining close ties to the communist bloc. The interior nations, on the other hand, Ethiopia (excluding Eritrea) and Sudan,

hold to a more conservative stance. If the study were concluded at this point without further comment then the question which has been postulated for this study probably would be answered in the negative. However, probing further, some interesting questions arise, as follows: Are the communist bloc leaders, with several significant apparent successes already to their credit in the Indian Ocean and its surrounding states, just waiting out the aged Jomo Kenyatta? Will aid from the USSR suffice to keep the mercurial General Amin from attacking the communist moves and ideology in the area, and will their arms be adequate to diffuse aspirations from other nations to bring down General Amin by force? Will the attempted coups d'etat against President Numayri, several of which have been clearly linked to the communists, one day succeed? The question appears to be one of whether the leftward drift of the Indian Ocean states of Africa will pull along with it the interior East African nations. The appraisal of the author, which would be subjective even in a much lengthier discourse, is that the forces for regional harmony, i.e., the 'osmosis' theory will prevail over the cooptation efforts of the communist bloc. Nations must accommodate bordering powerful states eventually, and that accommodation seems to suggest the dilution of internally-held ideologies when necessary to eventually obtain, or move in the direction of, regional harmony.


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FOOTNOTES

1. J. Bowyer Bell, The Horn of Africa: Strategic Magnet in the Seventies, p. 17.
2. "Economic Cooperation and Trade: East African Community," African Research Bulletin, 1-31 May 1976, p. 3867.
3. Richard P. Stevens, "The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan's Afro-Arab Policy," The Journal of Modern African Studies, June 1976, p. 247. In spite of its location in the Arab world, President Numayri nevertheless indicated on 3 March 1975 that, "It is the fate of the Sudan and the Sudanese people to be an inalienable part of the Afro-Arab entity." The issue as to whether Sudan's Arab ties should be sacrificed to African interests remains an important one in Sudan.
4. "Africa and the Indian Ocean," Africa Report, May-June 1976, pp. 41-45.
5. Ibid, p. 29.
6. Tanganyika African National Union, Arushu Declaration and TANU's Policy on Socialism and Self-Reliance, pp. 1-4.
7. Julius K. Nyerere, After the Arushu Declaration, pp. 1-5. One of the major tenets of Nyerere's ideology is that of self-reliance: "Self-reliance is a positive affirmation that we shall depend upon ourselves for the development of Tanzania." He adds however that ". . .if we get outside assistance to carry out purposes decided by us, then we shall welcome that assistance." (from page 5 of cited source.)
8. Uhuru is the Tanzanian word for freedom.
9. The Tanzanian Ministry of Information, Mwalimu Julius Kambarage Nyerere, pp. 8-10.
10. "Ethiopia: End of an Era," Africa Digest, October 1974, pp. 83-84.
11. "Ethiopia: Moves Toward Unity," Africa Confidential, 28 May 1976, pp. 6-7.
12. "Djibouti: Rough Road to Independence," Africa Confidential, 6 August 1976, pp. 1-3.
13. "Uganda: Amin vs. the World," Newsweek, 9 August 1976, pp. 35-36.

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