CORPS REAR AREA SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF THREAT, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE OPTIONS.

Edward B. Bryson, MAJ, USA
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

Final report, 11 June 1976

171 p.

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis presented to the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER

2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.

3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITLE (and Subtitle)
CORPS REAR AREA SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF THREAT, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE OPTIONS

5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED
FINAL REPORT
11 JUN 76

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUTHOR(s)
BRYSON, EDWARD B., MAJ, USA

8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS
Student at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Ks.66027

10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS
U.S. Army Command & General Staff College
ATTN: ATSW-SE

12. REPORT DATE
11 JUN 76

13. NUMBER OF PAGES
158

14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office)

15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)
UNCLASSIFIED

15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)
Approved for Public Release; distribution unlimited.

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS). Thesis prepared at CGSC in partial fulfillment of the MASTERS Program requirements, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Ft Leavenworth, Ks., 66027.

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)
This study investigates Rear Area Security for a Corps in Europe in a mid-intensity war. The investigation includes the threat of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armies; current U.S. Army doctrine for Rear Area Security; and analysis of the geographic and organizational aspects of the Corps rear area; and an analysis of the mission, organization and training, and command and control capabilities of the Armored Cavalry Regiment, the Corps reserve force, and the military police brigade. The primary focus of the

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

investigation is to determine what force is best suited for Corps rear area security.

Investigation records that Soviet and Warsaw Pact Armies have developed substantial forces and doctrine to employ guerrilla and conventional forces against targets in the Corps rear area. The conventional threat includes air assault, airborne, and air landed forces supported by tactical air. Current U.S. doctrine employing combat service support forces is not a practical defense. Federal Republic of Germany Territorial Forces are not generally employed forward of the Corps rear boundry. Further investigation reveals that by applying the principals of war to the organizational characteristics of the Corps rear area, certain criteria for rear area security can be applied to the selection of forces. Applying these criteria to the forces examined, this investigation reveals that an augmented military police brigade is best suited for rear area security.



CORPS REAR AREA SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF THREAT, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE OPTIONS



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1976

CORPS REAR AREA SECURITY: ANALYSIS OF THREAT, DOCTRINE, AND FORCE OPTIONS

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

EDWARD B. BRYSON, MAJ, USA
B.S., University of Arkansas, 1962
M.S., Florida Institute of Technology, 1975

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
1976

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate Major Edward B. Bryson

Title of thesis Corps Rear Area Security: Analysis of Threat, Doctrine, and Force Options

Approved by:

_____, Research Advisor

_____, Member, Graduate Research Faculty

Don Martin, Jr., Member, Consulting Faculty

Accepted this 10th day of May 1976 by _____,
Director, Master of Military Art and Science.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the individual student author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to determine what force is best suited for corps rear area security in a mid-intensity war in Europe. The three forces examined are the armored cavalry regiment, the corps reserve force and the military police brigade.

In arriving at a determination, the requirement for such a force is established. This is done by an analysis of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat and the current U.S. Army doctrine for rear area security. The threat is then combined with the geographical and organizational characteristics. This situation is then analyzed to determine the criteria for corps rear area security. This is followed by an analysis of the three types of forces to determine which force is best suited for corps rear area security.

Extensive research is conducted on existing literature concerning U.S. and Soviet doctrine as well as the mission, organization, training, capabilities, and command and control of the U.S. forces under consideration.

As a result of this research, it was determined that the Soviets emphasize the desant concept in training. This poses a threat to the corps rear area that ranges from partisan guerrilla activities to regimental size airborne and airmobile operations. Current U.S. doctrine emphasizes the employment of combat support and combat service support troops in ad hoc

tactical organizations to provide rear area security. This doctrine is found not acceptable in view of the threat. An analysis of forces reveals that the military police brigade is the force best suited for the rear area security mission. However, the military police would require additional tactical training and equipment augmentation to adequately provide corps rear area security.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

BACKGROUND

A study of rear area operations reveals that U.S. forces, as well as the Soviet Union and its allies, have traditionally been successful in employing forces in the enemy's rear areas. These operations were conducted to disrupt or to destroy enemy combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) operations and as economy of force measures to force enemy commanders to divert tactical units to secure their rear areas. Some examples of successful rear area operations in recent military history serve to emphasize the magnitude of the problem.

In Burma in World War II, a regiment of Merrill's Marauders and three brigades of Chindits tied down seven of nine Japanese Divisions in rear area security operations.[1] Perhaps a more significant example was the effectiveness with which the Soviet Army employed partisan forces to disrupt the German rear areas and to force the German commanders to divert entire divisions to rear area security. In 1943, two nights prior to the Russian counteroffensive, Russian partisan forces cut the German rail lines of communication in over 8,400 places. This operation rendered nearly 7,000 miles of

rail lines useless for the needed movement of German reinforcements during the critical phase of the German defense. Again in June 1944, Russian partisan forces in White Russia cut the German Rail LOC in over 5,000 places in one night (three days prior to the opening of the Russian offensive). That same summer, 1944, in Byelorussia, the Russian Army organized a partisan force of over 370,000 men. To counter this problem, the German Army was forced to employ nearly 13 divisions in a rear area security role.[2]

In Korea, the United Nations forces failed to effectively deal with the problem of infiltration of enemy forces into the rear areas. This buildup resulted in effective guerrilla operations in the rear area, forcing United Nations forces to employ up to three divisions in counterguerrilla operations.[3]

More recently in Vietnam, tremendous manpower requirements were pulled from CS and CSS units to man static defense positions. Armored combat power and air assets were continuously diverted from offensive operations to provide convoy escort and LOC security. Still, the VC and North Vietnamese forces succeeded in harrassing, disrupting and often destroying rear area support operations.

These historic examples support the fact that: (1) rear area security (RAS*) has often failed to receive command

---

*RAS--Rear area security includes those measures taken prior to, during and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage actions, infiltration-guerrilla action and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof.

attention proportionate to the threat; (2) rear area operations have, historically, been an effective tactic; and (3) the Soviet Army is cognizant of the effectiveness of operations in the enemy rear area. Yet our examination of this threat is cursory and our doctrine (FM 31-85) is relatively untested and out of date.

Current doctrine, as set forth in FM 31-85, provides for a rear area operations center (RAOC*) to organize, train, and employ rear area protection (RAP**) potential forces,*** The RAP potential forces are drawn from CS, CSS, transient and indigenous units within the area of responsibility of the controlling RAOC and are organized into RAP task forces tc be employed against a potential threat. This concept will be discussed in more detail in Chapter II; however, it is important to note that such a force can be employed for a maximum of 12 hours in a RAS mission.[5] Thereafter, combat units would have to be diverted to the rear area.**** The practicality of this concept was doubtful even before the 18,000 man

---

*RAOC--Rear area operations center--a unit assigned to each support group whose mission is to provide RAP contingency planning, training, control of operations and command for designated RAP forces.[6]

**RAP--Rear area protection includes all measures taken to prevent interruptions to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) operations. RAP is divided into two separate functions: rear area security (RAS) and area damage control (ADC).[7]

***RAP POTENTIAL--That portion of a TOE unit which may be used for short periods of time to participate in RAP operations with minimum degradation to overall mission capability.[8]

****REAR AREA--The area in the rear of the combat and forward areas. (The corps rear area extends from the rear boundary of the divisions to the corps rear boundary.)[9]

reduction in noncombat component strength in Europe required by PL 93-365 (Nunn Amendment)[10] and the additional reductions directed by the Secretary of Defense. With these reductions, the RAP potential of noncombat units has been reduced to a limited capability to provide local installation security. Thus, RAS doctrine as outlined in FM 31-85 is outdated.

In Europe, territorial security of the rear area is provided by host country territorial forces. General provisions for rear area security by the armed forces of the NATO nations is covered in NATO STANAG 2079, Rear Area Security and Area Damage Control (see Appendix I). It should be noted that, within this agreement, "Rear Area" is defined to include:

1. The land communications zone.
2. The rear of the land combat zone, in which are located the bulk of the logistical installations. (Army Service Area)[11]

Within this definition it appears that host countries are oriented primarily to protection of the COMMZ and that little, if any, RAS support could be expected within the corps area. Major Jens E. Prause, a German student officer at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC) who recently served with the German Territorial Army, explains that the Territorial Army's rear area security responsibility is in the "Rear Combat Zone" (behind the forward corps). Major Prause agrees that little RAS support could be expected within the U.S. corps area.[12]

Another consideration affecting host country RAS in Germany is that in time of war the Territorial Army (TA) remains under the National Command.[13] Within this relationship, the TA may not be responsive to the U.S. Commander. Thus, we still lack rear area security in the corps rear area, where a real threat exists.

The lessons of World War II are still vivid in the minds of the Soviet military hierarchy. This is reflected in Soviet doctrine, which emphasizes the "Desant Concept." Under this concept, operations range from small scale desant operations wherein a single plane load of paratroopers or a ship's complement of men are delivered to organize partisans or for a sabotage operation, to larger scale tactical or strategic desant operations. Soviet military literature emphasizes that desant operations should not only be carried out as adjuncts to large offensive operations, but also during periods of strategic defense to make the most effective use of resources to cause the enemy to deploy forces out of proportion to the threat to protect his flank or rear.[14]

To support this concept, the Soviets currently have eight airborne divisions, also called "Air Desant Divisions," trained for air drop or helicopter assault and Marine Infantry and Army forces trained in naval desant operations (landings).[15] Thus, any encounter with Soviet or Warsaw Pact forces is certain to entail an enemy effort to disrupt or destroy rear area support operations and to cause the commander to shift combat

power from the forward area to the rear to counter this effort.

Under the new defense doctrine for a war in Europe, maximum combat forces are retained forward along the FEBA and the corps retains a relatively small reserve that would probably be committed as soon as the location of the main attack is determined. The Corps Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) is employed as a reinforced covering force. Upon withdrawal of the covering force, units are "integrated into the MBA defensive scheme by the division or brigade through whose sector they withdraw."[16]

Under this concept, the corps commander must assess the threat and task combat units on an "as required" basis for RAS. The decision to divert combat units to RAS in such an environment is a difficult one at best; however, a continuous requirement exists for some degree of rear area territorial security, even at low intensity threat levels. At some level of intensity of enemy activity in the rear area, the problem ceases to be one of RAS and becomes a problem of a major battle in the rear area. That point is determined: (1) by our capability to provide security in the rear areas; and (2) by the enemy capability and willingness to attack that security. Failure to develop definitive doctrine on what our security capability will be has limited our ability to plan to provide for continuous and effective rear area security.

Under these circumstances, there is an apparent need to reevaluate the basic philosophy of RAP, and particularly RAS.

PROBLEM STATEMENT AND SCOPE

The purpose of this research is to examine three corps units--the armored cavalry regiment (ACR), the corps reserve force, and the military police (MP) brigade--to determine which force is best suited for a corps RAS force in a mid-intensity war in Europe.

The scope of this research is limited by the following parameters:

a. The demands of corps rear area security, excluding the area damage control aspect of RAP.

b. A mid-intensity war in Europe.

c. The single threat of the Warsaw Pact nations.

Within these parameters, the intent of this research is to present: (1) an analysis of the threat; (2) a review of current U.S. Army doctrine for RAS; (3) an analysis of the doctrine as related to the threat; (4) an analysis of a type corps rear area in Europe; (5) the criteria for corps RAS; (6) an analysis of the three "type" forces that have potential for performing RAS for the corps; (7) conclusions and recommendations for a corps RAS force; and (8) areas for further research.

ASSUMPTIONS

Certain assumptions are necessary to provide a basis for discussion of the factors under study. These assumptions are--

-The primary military threat today and for the foreseeable future is a nonnuclear attack against central Europe by the Warsaw Pact countries.

-In the event of an attack in Europe by the Warsaw Pact Armies, the NATO forces will employ the defensive concept as set forth in the "new defense doctrine."

-A three division corps force is deployed as shown in Figure 1-1.

-There is a requirement for an area security force that would be responsive to the corps commander on a continuous basis.

METHODOLOGY

The first step is a presentation of the threat. This is done by a review of literature on Soviet operations in the enemy rear area. From this review, an analysis of the threat to the corps rear area is made and conclusions are drawn to provide the probable threat.

The next step is a presentation of current army doctrine for rear area security. This presentation is a review of U.S. Army field manuals, instructional material from army schools, and official briefing manuscripts. This review provides a basis for the next step, which is an evaluation of doctrine in view of the threat. If the doctrine is valid there is little need to pursue the research further. If the doctrine is determined to be invalid, the next step is an examination of the



FIGURE 1-1. THREE DIVISION CORPS DEPLOYED

SOURCE: USACGSC, M3141, Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting), (Fort Leavenworth: Department of Logistics, 1976).

environmental and organizational characteristics of the corps rear area. These characteristics are examined in view of the probable threat and the criteria for a rear area security force is established.

Next, the forces are evaluated to determine the type force best suited for this mission. This is accomplished by comparing the rear area security mission to be performed with the established criteria. Each of these forces will be analyzed within the framework of its role in the new defense doctrine.

The three forces selected for analysis are representative of divergent types of forces. The Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) is a highly mobile force with the capability of conducting independent operations. One of the missions traditionally assigned to the ACR is the mission of RAS.

The corps reserve force was selected because of its unique mission and location in or near the corps rear area. The corps reserve can be uniquely tailored to perform security operations and is a candidate for the RAS force. A separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) was selected for this study.

The corps military police brigade was selected because it is a unit normally located in the corps rear area (heavy corps) that deals with security and low intensity combat problems in the rear area.

This comparison and evaluation is the basis for conclusions and recommendations.

CHAPTER I

ENDNOTES

[1]Statement by LTC Edwin L. Wallace, Fifth Army Commander's Briefing, 1975.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]DA, FM 31-85, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 2-3.

[5]Ibid., p. 3-1.

[6]Ibid., p. 4-3.

[7]Ibid., p. 2-3.

[8]Ibid., p. 3-1.

[9]DA, AR 310-25, Dictionary of United States Army Terms (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1972), p. 430.

[10]DOD, "How DoD is Improving the Combat Proportions of the U.S. Forces in Europe," Commanders Digest, XVIII. (November 20, 1975), p. 2.

[11]DA, FM 31-85, op. cit., pp. B-1--B-4.

[12]Statement by Major Jens E. Prause, Personal interview November 12, 1975.

[13]Major Leonard Thomas Graham, "The West German Territorial Army in Support of NATO" (Unpublished research paper, USACGSC, 1975), p. 7, Citing Force Structure Commission of the Federal Republic of Germany, The Force Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bonn: The Force Structure Commission of the FRG, 1972), (npn).

[14]C. L. Donnelly, "The Soviet Desant Concept," International Defense Review, July 1971, pp. 544-546.

[15]Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops," Military Review, April 1973, p. 61.

[16]U.S. Army Armor School, FM 17-95 (Draft), How to Fight Manual-Cavalry (Fort Knox: U.S. Army Armor School, 1975), p. 6-11.

CHAPTER II

THREAT

HISTORY OF THREAT DEVELOPMENT

The two principles of war which seem to dominate Soviet military doctrine are the principles of offensive and mass. Western strategists and tacticians are continuously improving on ways to counter these Soviet capabilities. However, we have seemingly failed to fully recognize the fact that inherent in the principle of mass is the reciprocal principle of economy of force. This military truism has become an inseparable part of Soviet doctrine. The desant concept, which was mentioned briefly in Chapter I and will be discussed in greater detail in this chapter, is a concept of Soviet strategic and tactical doctrine for achieving the capability to effectively mass via economy of force measures inside enemy held territory. This concept has been a driving force in the development of Soviet equipment, organization and capabilities since the early 1900's, and it has received special emphasis in the post-World War II period.

The immediate question might be "What is the threat today?" However, it is essential that we gain an understanding of the history of Soviet experience in the development of this doctrine. This introspection will enable us to more

fully understand and appreciate the importance of rear area operations as an economy of force multiplier in Soviet doctrine.

The earliest Soviet experience concerns the use of partisan forces. In 1906 Lenin wrote of the terrorist tactics that might be employed by the Bolsheviks against the Czarist authorities. In the Russian Civil War of 1918-1920, the Bolsheviks employed partisan guerrilla units extensively. Because of the special objectives of communist movements, there exists a very natural affinity between communism and partisan (guerrilla) warfare. This relationship enables the communists to employ guerrilla tactics with unusual effectiveness.[1]

World War II is still a vivid memory in the minds of the Soviet people. In Chapter I, several examples of the employment of partisan forces against the Germans were given. That experience is embedded in the minds of Soviet leaders, many of whom were leaders in the partisan forces in World War II.[2]

The evolution of Soviet doctrine for the employment of ground forces developed rapidly in the post-World War II period. The Soviets appear to have adopted a blitzkrieg concept similar to that of the Germans. This concept took on added importance with the idea that any war would involve conventional forces exploiting the effects of nuclear weapons. Thus, conventional ground forces were trained and equipped to move large tank and motorized rifle units to seize objectives deep in the enemy rear areas during the exploitation of a nuclear attack.

Soviet doctrine continues at present to emphasize the offensive and high-speed penetration to seize deep (corps and COMMZ area) objectives. Although this doctrine complements the concept of a short war in a nuclear environment, Soviet interest in the possibility of substantial nonnuclear operations has recently increased.[3] As a result, there is continued emphasis on airborne, airmobile and amphibious operations.

In the early 1930's, the Soviets pioneered parachute assault concepts as a means of achieving surprise by vertical assault into the enemy's rear area. By 1934, the Soviets had three airborne divisions and had developed tactical concepts to support their published doctrine that stated,

> Parachute units are an efficient means for disorganizing the enemy's command and control and for operating in close coordination with the forces attacking from the front. Parachute units are able to exert a decisive influence on the complete defeat of the enemy in a given direction.[4]

The employment of Soviet airborne operations during World War II was limited due to tactical considerations and the lack of transport aircraft. Most airborne operations during this period were to support isolated battles or amphibious landings and to supply partisan guerrilla units operating in the enemy rear areas.[5]

In the post-World War II period, the Soviets have placed greater emphasis on the development of airborne assault concepts and capabilities than have western armies. The Soviets appear to have borrowed heavily from the wartime airborne experiences of the British, Americans and Germans in

developing their own doctrine; however, they effectively improved that capability and integrated equipment of the other combat arms into the airborne units.

In the early 1950's, the Soviets began experimenting with the transport of airborne troops and equipment by helicopter. With the introduction of the Mi-6 Hook in the late 1950's, the Soviets acquired a lift capability that made the employment of helicopter-delivered airborne troops with organic heavy weapons, such as the ASU85 assault gun, a real capability.

By the early 1960's, Soviet planners had introduced the doctrine of bypassing nuclear contaminated areas using tactical heliborne and airborne assaults to ensure rapid rates of advance. To accommodate this nuclear oriented doctrine, the helicopter fleet was continuously upgraded to accommodate the lifting of motorized rifle units. By 1965 helicopters began appearing in Soviet field exercises with a variety of armament. During "Exercise Dnieper" in 1967, Soviet helicopters were reportedly employed in a fire support role, effectively firing ATGMs. By 1970, the Soviets had developed a true helicopter gunship, the Mi-24 Hind.[6]

Currently, the Soviet army maintains the largest airbrone force in the world. This force consists of eight guards airborne divisions (Figure 2-1) supplemented by a force of 2,500 helicopters which are organized into combat helicopter regiments.[7]



FIGURE 2-1. SOVIET AIRBORNE DIVISION

SOURCE: USACGSC, RB30-1, The Enemy Force (Fort Leavenworth, 1975), p. 14-4.

Since World War II, the Soviets have significantly improved their military transport aviation (VTA) capability. Most estimates credit the VTA with the capability to lift one fully equipped airborne division over short to medium distances.[8] Some experts estimate this capability to be up to two complete divisions over medium ranges.[9] This capability is rapidly expanding with the acquisition of additional transport aircraft of the An-22 Cock class. This aircraft is the successor to the An-12 Cub. The Cock has increased lift capability from 11 to 72 metric tons and has increased range from 1,200 nautical miles to 2,600 nautical miles. As of July 1973, the Soviet VTA strength was reported at 1,700 aircraft, 800 of which were the An-12 Cub class and 15 were of the An-22 Cock class.[10]

The development of the Soviet desant concept has been enhanced by the post-World War II growth in Soviet naval capability. Certainly a major reason for this rapid expansion has been the realization by the Soviet Union that this is a means of projecting power. However, for purposes of this research we are more interested in this development from the standpoint that the Soviets have developed an extensive capability to enter an enemy's rear area by means of naval amphibious landings.

The Soviet naval capability at the close of World War II was almost nonexistent as a threat. Today the Soviets have one of the largest naval capabilities in the world. Concurrent with the development of a force with which to

deliver nuclear weapons, the Soviets have developed a significant capability and doctrine to conduct tactical and strategic envelopments by sea. This doctrine bears many of the characteristics of General Douglas McArthur's tactics and strategy in the Pacific in World War II and at Inchon, Korea, in 1951.

THE DESANT CONCEPT[11]

The Soviet desant concept is a concept for employing forces in the enemy rear or flank. This concept is a consolidation of Soviet thinking with regard to the employment of airborne, heliborne, amphibious and partisan forces in economy of force operations to disrupt the enemy rear area. The word "desant" is reserved to describe the entire Soviet strategic and tactical thinking with regard to operations in enemy held territory; it should not be confused with words such as "assault" or "landings" which have more limited meanings.

Soviet military specialists distinguish three types of desant operations: (1) strategic; (2) operational; and (3) tactical. In addition, small-scale desant operations may be organized for special missions such as sabotage, organization and support of partisans, or in preparation for further desant operations of larger units. These types of operations are identical to the types of missions discussed in conjunction with airborne desant operations.

Important to understand in considering methods to counter this threat are the factors which the Russians consider must be strictly observed to insure the success of desant operations. These factors are:

a. Absolute conformity of aims of mission and coordination of all land, sea and air forces involved, with one master plan and one supreme commander.

b. The existence of favorable circumstances for transportation and landing.

c. Careful choice of place and time of landing so as to achieve the best results.

d. Preparations and training must be thorough.

e. Complete secrecy maintained to achieve the essential element of surprise.

The important aspect of this concept is that it makes no distinction in limiting factors between operations by sea or by air. We will now examine the techniques of each.

Airborne desant operations are initiated by airdropping small groups of about 20 men to perform reconnaissance for the larger force. The main force may then be landed by one of two methods. One method is to airdrop a large force of paratroops to seize a landing area (airfield) for subsequent airlanding operations. The second method is to insert the main force by helicopter. These methods and combinations thereof will be discussed in more detail later.

Soviet doctrine assigns three basic missions to airborne desant troops: (1) strategic; (2) operational; and (3) tactical. (As noted in the discussion of desant operations, small special purpose missions may also be organized).[12] The principal difference in the missions is in the depth of the operation and the nature of the objectives.

Strategic missions are under the direction of the Ministry of Defense and would include such targets as key industrial and logistical complexes and major ports. Of more importance to this research are the operational, tactical and special purpose missions.

Operational missions in support of the front (army group) are carried out under the control of the front commander. These missions include seizing bridgeheads, crossing points, airfields and road junctions as well as neutralizing enemy nuclear delivery means. Operating in the enemy rear areas, these units may prevent the effective and timely employment of reserve forces and generally disrupt the enemy's offensive and defensive capabilities. Standard procedure for operational missions of this nature would involve the dropping of regimental-sized units up to 320 kilometers beyond the battlefront.

Tactical missions are conducted in support of division sized units. These missions have objectives similar to the operational missions, but on a smaller scale and in less depth.

Standard procedure for tactical missions is to airdrop battalion-sized groups within 160 kilometers of the battlefront.[13]

Special purpose missions employ small contingents of airborne troops to perform missions similar to those assigned to U.S. Special Forces. Each airborne division has an organic reconnaissance company. These companies, or elements of the company, may be dropped behind enemy lines to gather information for nuclear strikes or to support conventional offensive operations. Furthermore, such units may be dropped in enemy rear areas to organize or work with local guerrilla or partisan groups and/or to conduct sabotage or other special missions.

Most recent Soviet doctrine has combined the heliborne assault with airborne operations. This combination adds increased mobility and flexibility to the Soviet concept of a high speed offense. The helicopters are organic to the military transportation regiments of the air army. Furthermore, Soviet ground forces do not include special helicopter assault troops; rather, troops from airborne and/or motorized rifle divisions are used in heliborne assaults. It is anticipated that special air assault troop units will come into the Soviet ground force structure as the Soviets continue to improve their doctrine and capability to conduct both day and night airmobile assault operations.

Major Soviet field exercises such as "Dnieper" in 1967, "Dvina" in 1970, and "Yug" in 1971 have demonstrated the development of tactical doctrine for the employment of

airborne and airmobile forces which have been developed to date. (The following scenario of these exercises is a significant basis for establishing an optimum threat level from which to examine our forces required to provide rear area security.) These exercises were all generally along the same doctrinal lines as follows: the objective is to seize and hold an important river crossing ahead of a rapidly moving armor unit. (In some scenarios the advancing units were in the conduct of an assault crossing; in others the advancing unit was 30 to 50 kilometers from the river.) Heliborne troops (up to a battalion-sized unit) conduct a heliborne landing on the near and/or the opposite bank. These units are supported by artillery antiaircraft weapons and strong fighter cover when available. In most cases, airborne forces were subsequently airdropped at greater "operational depths" to secure airfields to airland additional forces and heavy equipment. The missions assigned to these units were to disrupt the rear area and prevent the opposing commander from committing his reserves. Thus, airborne troops employing heliborne assault tactics for close <u>tactical</u> missions and airdrop and airlanded operations for <u>operational</u> missions, provided the necessary support to enable the main attack to continue unabated.

Naval desant operations are initiated with the amphibious landings of marine infantry in amphibious PT-76 tanks and BTR 60 APC's under the cover of air and naval bombardment. The marine infantry have the mission to seize

the beachhead, clear the beach of mines and conduct coastal defense tasks. In large desant operations the marine infantry will be withdrawn once the beachhead is secure and the main force is landed.

The main force consists of specially trained army units with medium tanks which are landed across the beach to press the attack. If helicopter carriers are available, a heliborne or airborne desant will be inserted into the defenders rear to link up with the marine infantry or army main force. In this case, a combined attack may subsequently be conducted to break through and join up with the main land force.

A desant at night is emphasized by the Soviets as a most effective operation enabling the unit to achieve maximum surprise. Quick and unexpected strikes at night by small forces are, according to the Soviets, able to achieve greater success than large-scale daytime operations. This concept provides that landings should be close to the objective so that the battle can be joined at once. Different tactics are used when the objective is to prevent the employment of reserves. In situations such as this, small desant groups would be inserted across a broad front to create several centers of combat to confuse the enemy.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this discussion has been to relate the research findings on what constitutes the optimum threat to

the corps rear area. The conclusions are as follows:

a. The development of Soviet military doctrine in the post-World War II era has emphasized operations in the enemy rear area as an economy of force multiplier for achieving mass and offensive initiative on the battlefield.

b. Soviet operations in an enemy rear area will include partisan operations, airborne operations, airmobile operations and/or naval amphibious operations.

c. Operations in the rear areas may be conducted against strategic, operational or tactical targets. At the corps level, operational, tactical and small-scale special operations are the most likely.

d. The enemy has the capability to conduct an airborne assault with one or more divisions; however, the most probable force is a motorized rifle regiment. Battalion sized forces are most likely to be employed to secure river crossings within 50 kilometers of the advancing units. Regiments may be parachuted or air assaulted into deeper objectives, such as airfields in the corps rear area.

e. Operational and tactical targets favored by the Soviets for desant operations include river crossing sites, airfields to support airlanded operations and blocking forces to prevent commitment of reserves.

f. Partisan guerrilla operations supported by small contingents of specially trained regular forces will be conducted on a continuous basis. These operations will closely

support the main force offensive or defensive operations.

g. Night desant operations by small forces are favored to optimize the element of surprise and to create confusion.

CHAPTER II

ENDNOTES

[1]John A. Armstrong (ed.), Soviet Partisans in World War II (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964), p. 11.

[2]Ibid., p. vi.

[3]John Erickson, "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," Military Review, January 1976, p. 59. Citing Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies (Great Britain), March 1975.

[4]Graham H. Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops," Military Review, April 1973, p. 61.

[5]United States Army Command and General Staff College, RB-30-1 The Enemy Force, "Airborne Operations," (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USACGSC, 1975), p. 14-1.

[6]Turbiville, "A Soviet View of Heliborne Assault Operations," Military Review, October 1975, pp. 3-5.

[7]Ibid.

[8]USACGSC, op. cit., p. 14-1.

[9]Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops," Military Review, April 1973, p. 61.

[10]The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1973-1974 (London: ITSS, 1973), p. 7.

[11]C. L. Donnelly, "The Soviet Desant Concept," International Defense Review, July 1971, pp. 544-546.

[12]Turbiville, "Soviet Airborne Troops," p. 61.

[13]USACGSC, loc. cit.

CHAPTER III

REVIEW OF CURRENT DOCTRINE

BACKGROUND

The primary source of current RAS doctrine for the Army is contained in FM 31-85. This version was developed under the COSTAR (Combat Support Theater Army) concept which introduced the FASCOM (Field Army Support Command) organization. Under this concept, most of the CSS units were field army units operating in the field army service area. RAP in the field army service area was then a responsibility of the FASCOM commander. Any FASCOM units operating in the corps area were put under the authority of the corps commander for RAP purposes. Under this concept, overall responsibility for RAP in the combat zone rested with the field army commander.[1]

Today the theater of operations is organized using TASTA-70 (The Administrative Support Theater Army) doctrine and EAD (Echelons above Division) concept. Under these concepts, the field army service area and FASCOM have been eliminated and all CSS units necessary to conduct operations have been given to the corps.[2] Notice that prior to TASTA-70 and EAD the corps was purely a tactical organization with CSS from the FASCOM. When the field army was eliminated under EAD,

the corps support command (COSCOM) assumed the function of the old FASCOM.[3] The corps has not only inherited the CSS function but also an expanded rear area (up to 250 km in depth)[4] and thus a much larger RAP responsibility.

In summary, the EAD concept has impacted on the corps RAP mission by the following changes:

1. Elimination of the field army and the FASCOM.
2. Assignment of the CSS functions to the corps organization (COSCOM).
3. Creation of a deeper corps area of responsibility.
4. Assignment of one RAOC to each support group.[5]

RAP PURPOSE AND PHILOSOPHY

The mission of RAP is to prevent interruptions to CS and CSS operations, whether such interruptions be caused by hostile action or natural or manmade disasters. The purpose of RAS is to prevent interruptions to CS and CSS operations by enemy attack, sabotage, infiltration-guerrilla action or other hostile actions on rear area units, activities and installations. The control of the effects of disaster is a function of ADC.[6] (Although "RAP" and "RAS" doctrine are basically the same, except in specific references to ADC, the term "RAS" will be used for the remainder of this discussion to emphasize the combat nature of its function.) The basic philosophy of RAP doctrine (and thus RAS doctrine) is to maximize the use of organic CS and CSS resources to provide self-defense and mutual support without requiring the assistance of combat forces. If

assistance from combat forces becomes necessary, ". . . a progressive integration of resources is implemented and continues until a point is reached where control is passed from the area commander to a tactical commander as the threat increases."

PRINCIPLES OF RAS

Within the framework of purpose and philosophy, there are eight principles which guide the implementation of RAS. These principles are austerity, command, economy of force, integrated protection, offensive, responsiveness, supervision, and priority of risks. (The following explanation of these principles is a summary from FM 31-85.)

The principle of AUSTERITY provides for the maximum use and effectiveness of RAS potential elements as opposed to a dedicated force, and minimizes the degradation of unit mission performance.

The principle of COMMAND requires that within a clearly defined geographic area of responsibility there must be a single responsible commander who is knowledgeable of the area, the RAS potential, intelligence and current operations.

The ECONOMY OF FORCE principle as applied to RAS emphasizes the fact that CS and CSS elements are employed to counter hostile actions in the rear area to avoid diverting combat forces to the rear; however, this is a role and configuration for which these units are not principally designed and their capability is limited. Thus, CS and CSS elements

should be employed in RAS operations for short periods of time, usually less than 12 hours (less than 24 hours for ADC operations).

The principle of INTEGRATED PROTECTION provides that each RAS measure must complement the total RAS effort. An example of integrated protection is the collocation of units, activities and facilities to provide mutual support for base security.

OFFENSIVE capability is inherent to security. The RAS potential is the commanders' offensive capability. This force must be identified, organized, trained and employed to conduct limited offensive actions against small enemy forces.

Rapid and effective RESPONSIVENESS of elements with a RAS commitment is critical to success. Responsiveness is enhanced by clearly established authority, effective and flexible communications, organic mobility of units and periodic alerts to test responsiveness.

SUPERVISION of the RAS potential element to insure that the RAS mission is not neglected is a responsibility of the headquarters charged with the RAS responsibility and the parent organization.

PRIORITIES OF RISK should be established to improve the capability to use manpower and material. The fixed nature of operations in the rear area makes these facilities vulnerable to enemy action. Usually the limited resources available preclude the simultaneous protection of all activities.

Therefore, the commander should establish priorities based on vulnerability and risk.[7]

REAR AREA OPERATIONS CENTER

The organization for RAS includes elements which are permanently assigned RAS responsibilities and those which are assigned RAS responsibilities on an as required basis. The elements assigned on an as required basis are those CS and CSS units located within the corps rear area (or in the COMMZ). The organizations with permanent responsibilities for RAS (all RAP responsibilities) are the RAOCs.

In an independent corps, one RAOC would be assigned to the COSCOM, which has RAS responsibility. Otherwise, each support group within the corps will have a RAOC assigned. Also, within the COMMZ, each area support group within the Theater Army Area Command (TAACOM) will have one RAOC under its control.[8] At present the nineteen RAOCs in the force structure are in National Guard units.[9]

The purpose of the RAOC is to keep the commander informed on the RAP situation and the resources available within his area of responsibility. It provides the commander with a permanent planning capability and exercises command and control over RAP forces when those forces are committed.

The RAOC is organized into five sections: the center headquarters; the administration and logistics section; the security, plans, and operations section; a RAS task force command section; and the ADC task force command section. Of

particular interest to this study is the RAS task force command section.

Normally, CS and CSS units are functionally organized and are not trained to conduct combat operations. The RAS task force commander is responsible for organizing, training, and assuming operational control of RAS potential units when activated. The RAS task force command section can effectively control up to four company size units. In effect, the task force commander is a battalion commander, assisted by an operations officer.[10]

RAS TASK FORCES

Any military unit within the COMMZ or corps rear area will report its status to the controlling RAOC for that area. The RAOC reviews the unit's TOE, determines the RAP potential (RAS and/or ADC) and establishes priorities based on existing capabilities. Unit priorities are assigned by the TASCOM (in the COMMZ) and by the corps commander in the corps area. The assigned priority indicates to the area commander the degree of participation in RAP which he can expect from a unit. Priority designations and their expected participation levels are:

RAP-I. Most RAS missions are executed by priority I units with not more than 25 percent degradation in the unit's primary mission.

RAP-II. These units are limited to conducting surveillance and defense for their static locations. They may be required to increase their local security for up to 24 hours to release forces previously provided by the commander for high priority missions.

RAP-III. These units have such a critical mission that their participation in RAP missions is restricted to close-in defense of the critical site. Additional security may be required for these units.

The size and number of task forces required for RAS is based on the current intelligence estimates. Based on this information, the RAOC commander determines his requirements and organizes his task force. Task Forces are organized using both military and indigenous personnel. Every effort is made to maintain platoon integrity and, if possible, entire companies are organized from the same facility or location.

Platoons making up a RAS company must have the same RAP priority. Furthermore, the impact of activation on the vulnerability of the parent unit must be considered and compensated for. Once the RAOC commander has designated the RAP elements the unit is to provide, those elements and the designated company/platoon command and control teams are assigned to a task force command and control section.

The RAS company may be organized in one of several ways depending on the mission and other factors as discussed above. One type of company organization consists of a RAS

command and control team and three RAS reaction platoons. Another organization has only two reaction platoons and a RAS reconnaissance and escort platoon. All organizations are characterized by 100 percent mobility from existing unit resources and a limited small arms only firepower capability.

Combat support for RAS task forces is limited. Field artillery, army aviation and tactical air will not normally be in support of RAS operations. As noted earlier, tactical forces may be requested when in the judgment of the area commander the net effect of enemy activities is likely to exceed the capabilities of CS and CSS resources.[11]

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The corps commander determines the authority, procedures and policies by which the RAS mission is executed. The authority for RAS execution is passed through the COSCOM commander to the subordinate support group commanders who are responsible for RAS within their geographical areas. In assuming responsibility for RAS, the support group commander is given authority for the following:

a. Operational control of all assigned, attached, and tenant units for RAS missions.

b. Planning, training and execution of RAS missions through RAS task force identification and commitment.

c. Declaration and termination of emergency situations calling for RAS response.

d. Requesting, integrating and supporting tactical resources.

This area commander monitors the threat situation and friendly operations through the RAOC. When he determines that subordinate elements cannot carry out defensive measures, he may implement the RAS operational command. At this time command and control of designated RAS potential units shifts from their parent functional units to the area commander for RAS missions.[12] The threat is based on a scale of intensity and response as shown in Figure 3-1. Thus, command and control of RAS is a functional command responsibility at the tranquil to disorderly level of intensity. Once the situation becomes threatening to the point that disorder is out of control of the civil institutions, the area commander activates the RAS potential forces, to include indigenous forces in the area, and takes control of those units from the functional commanders. As the situation develops into major actions of a prolonged to severe, nature, some combat resources are required. Control at this stage will vary with directives from higher headquarters. As a second front develops, tactical operations are begun and the major tactical commander assumes command and control of the tactical units.[13] The area commander exercises command and control of RAS forces and operations through the RAOC.

SUMMARY

The purpose of this chapter has been to present official doctrine for rear area security. The basis for official



FIGURE 3-1. COMMAND AND CONTROL SPECTRUM FOR RAP

SOURCE: Department of the Army, FM 31-85, Rear Area Protection Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1970), p. 3-4.

doctrine is FM 31-85. Modifications to that doctrine have been made to meet changes in the organizational concepts of the theater of operations. However, the basic purpose, philosophy, and principles remain the same. The salient points in this doctrine are as follows:

a. RAS doctrine as defined in FM 31-85 was developed under the COSTAR concept. Today the theater of operations is organized using TASTA-70 doctrine and EAD concepts.

b. EAD concepts affected RAS by:

(1) The elimination of the field army and the FASCOM.

(2) The assignment of CSS functions to the corps COSCOM.

(3) The creation of a deeper corps area of responsibility.

(4) The assignment of one RAOC to the COSCOM or to each support group within the COSCOM.[4]

c. The purpose of RAS is to prevent interruptions to CS and CSS operations by enemy attack, sabotage action, infiltration-guerrilla action or other hostile actions.

d. The basic philosophy of RAS is to maximize the capability of CS and CSS elements to defend themselves and to render mutual support without requiring assistance from combat forces.

e. The principles of RAS are:

(1) Austerity.

(2) Command.

(3) Economy of Force.

(4) Integrated Protection.

(5) Offensive Action.

(6) Responsiveness.

(7) Supervision.

(8) Priority of Risks.

f. Each military units in the corps rear area is assigned a RAP priority designation by the corps commander. This designation indicates to the RAP planners the degree to which a unit is capable of participating in RAP.

g. The RAOC(s) have a permanent responsibility for RAS planning and command and control of RAS forces. This includes responsibility for training as well as employment when committed.

h. There are 19 RAOCs in the force structure; all RAOCs are assigned to the Army National Guard.

i. RAS task forces are organized based on current intelligence estimates and available military and indigenous resources. Designated elements and company platoon command and control teams are assigned to the task force command and control section of the RAOC. This task force is the RAS operational command.

j. Command and control authority and responsibility is delegated from the corps commander to the COSCOM commander. The COSCOM commander further delegates this authority and responsibility to support group commanders. Each support group commander is responsible for RAS within his geographical area; he is the area commander.

k. Hostile activity at the tranquil to disorderly level of intensity is the responsibility of functional commanders and the civil institutions.

l. Hostile activity which becomes overt and threatening may be cause for the area commander to activate the RAS operational command. This action shifts command and control of RAS designated elements from the functional commander to the area commander.

m. Hostile activity which becomes severe or prolonged in nature is cause for progressive integration of tactical combat units into the RAS force.

n. As a new front develops, the tactical commander assumes control of the tactical units; the area commander continue to command the RAS operational command.

CHAPTER III

ENDNOTES

[1]U.S. Department of the Army, FM 31-85, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 2-3.

[2]U.S. Military Police School, "Organization of a Type Theater of Operations," Rear Area Protection Operations Lesson Plans (Fort McClellan: Military Police School, 1975), pp. A-3--A-4. (Mimeographed)

[3]U.S. Military Police School, "Support Group Organizations, Functions and Responsibilities," (Fort McClellan: Military Police School), pp. B-3--B-4.

[4]U.S. Military Police School, loc. cit.

[5]U.S. Military Police School, "Support Group Organizations, Functions and Responsibilities," p. B-21.

[6]U.S. Department of the Army, loc. cit.

[7]Ibid., p. 3-1.

[8]U.S. Military Police School, "Support Center (RAO) Command and Control Procedures," p. C-3.

[9]Statement by LTC Edwin L. Wallace, briefing to the Fifth Army Commander, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, 1975.

[10]U.S. Department of the Army, op. cit., pp. 4-3--4-6.

[11]Ibid., pp. 4-6--5-6.

[12]U.S. Military Police School, "Support Center (RAO) Command and Control Procedures," pp. D-4--D-5.

[13]U.S. Department of the Army, op. cit., pp. 3-4--3-5.

CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS OF THREAT VS. DOCTRINE

In the preceeding chapters the threat to rear area security and the official army doctrine for rear area security were presented.

Following the presentation of research findings on the threat, conclusions were drawn to establish the parameters of the most probable threat. These parameters are now assumptions of fact for the analysis of doctrine and forces in this and succeeding chapters.

The presentation of army official doctrine for rear area security was made without analysis or conclusions. The salient features of that doctrine were presented in summary form. This chapter will examine that doctrine.

It is not the purpose of this analysis to examine every detail of rear area security doctrine. It is important, however, to establish or to discredit the salient features of that doctrine.

PURPOSE AND PHILOSOPHY

"The purpose of RAP is to prevent interruptions to combat support and combat service support operations."[1] Thus, the purpose of RAS, as one function of RAP, is to prevent

interruptions to CS and CSS operations by hostile actions. Our ability to prevent such interruptions relates directly to our ability to maximize support to our combat units. This relationship emphasizes the need to "prevent interruption" as opposed to "minimizing interruptions" to support operations. This concept takes on added significance when it is considered in light of the Nunn-amendment requirement to reduce military support positions in Europe by 18,000 (12,175 Army).[2] These army support reductions actually have a greater impact than the net change shows. Two additional combat brigades are being deployed to Europe. However, the brigade headquarters and support battalion of each brigade do not meet the definition of combat units as provided for in the Nunn amendment. Therefore, an additional 1,328 army support positions were eliminated to offset this increase. To maintain an acceptable level of support for its combat units, the army will, after the period governed by the amendment, shift civilians into positions being vacated by military support personnel.[3]

The above discussion adds significance to the stated purpose of RAS; however, it discredits the basic philosophy of employing CS and CSS elements in RAS missions other than for point or base security. The reductions in support positions discussed above have been met by eliminating some corps general support units and headquarters elements and by consolidating the remaining units at <u>combat oriented general</u> support centers (COGSC). Under this concept, which is

currently being implemented in Europe as the "wartime" posture, a COGSC is assigned to a support group for RAS on an area basis.[4] This colocation of general support (GS) units should enhance their capability to provide local installation security and mutual support. However, such a consolidation increases the degree to which the support to combat units will be degraded should the support operations of the COGSC be interrupted or destroyed. Although the consolidation of these general support activities is more cost effective, efficient, and is required to meet the force reduction requirements, it increases the vulnerability of the logistics support system required to sustain the corps in combat operations.

The associated increase in potential for economy of force to be attained by the enemy in a single, operational level, surprise attack on a COGSC is certain to increase the enemy's willingness to assume the associated risks. The potential for success of such an operation is particularly significant when enemy planners consider that they would initially encounter lightly armed, relatively untrained support troops. Any integration of combat tactical forces to counter the attack is likely to be after the attacking force is inserted and has, at least, partially achieved its mission. A decision by the corps commander to withdraw forces from the forward defenses to protect the rear area would support the enemy design to achieve economy of force.

Another aspect of the current philosophy is concerned with the organization, training and deployment of RAOCs and

the associated CS and CSS units. As noted earlier, all RAOCs are assigned to the Army National Guard (ARNG), which is organized predominantly into combat units. The CS and CSS units are either in the active army or in the Army Reserve (USAR).[5] This separation creates problems in training and in deployment.

From the standpoint of training, there is little or no opportunity for RAOCs assigned to ARNG units to train with CS/CSS units. Certainly there is no opportunity for CS/CSS units in Europe to train with the task force command section of the RAOC which will command and control them in combat. Active army training for rear area security is almost non-existent. Furthermore, it seems improbable that the tempo of mission requirements for support units in the early stages of deployment would allow the personnel and equipment resources of the CS and CSS units to be diverted for RAS training.

It is generally agreed that the RAOCs would <u>not</u> be deployed early in an emergency. Generally speaking, RAOCs could be expected to start arriving in Europe at about D+60.[6] Thus, the corps is without its RAS command and control element for the initial period of hostilities. In view of the threat capability this is a serious weakness in our RAS doctrine.

In consideration of the above discussion, it seems appropriate to establish and conduct an analysis of a hypothetical RAS problem. The time frame is prior to the arrival of the RAOCs. The purpose of this situational analysis

is to wargame the corps commanders courses of action. A realistic threat in such a situation is a regimental sized airborne assault on a COGSC in conjunction with a tactical air assault operation within the division rear areas. Such an assault is highly probable very early in the "first battle." Within the corps, RAS task forces would have been organized from the CS and CSS units, transient units, replacement personnel and indigeous police forces. The size of the RAS force would depend on the commander's intelligence estimate and forces available. Command and control of this force would probably be exercised by a provisional RAOC organized by the area commander or by the COSCOM ACofS, Security, Plans, and Operations. Since RAS is a responsibility of each area commander, that commander would certainly evaluate his own assets first; however, an accurate assessment of the size and intent of the enemy action may be difficult until it is too late to stop the enemy from organizing his force on the ground. The area commander would consider the following courses of action:

a. Employment of the RAS task force.

b. Employment of transient combat units in the area.

c. Employment of the corps reserve.

d. Employment of the combat units from other areas due to the proximity of those units to the threat.

In courses of action one and two, the area commander has absolute discretion due to his authority to employ units in his area for RAS.

The transient combat units may be integrated into the reaction force (course of action 1) or they may be employed separately (course of action 2). The primary difference would be in command. In either case, considerable confusion could be expected to exist in organizing for combat. Assuming that such a situation had been anticipated, command relationships would have been established. Assuming course of action one initially, the time it takes to assemble the force, organize for combat and accomplish minimum planning and troop leading procedures is the time that the parachutes of enemy troops are opening over the target. The probability that such a force could be effectively employed to prevent a enemy regimental size airborne assault from interrupting CS and CSS operations is questionable.

The employment of transient combat units against such a threat would encounter many of the same problems and time delays in organizing for combat. These forces cannot be expected to have knowledge of the area or to be psychologically ready for a rapid employment against such a force. The capability of combat tactical units to provide a high degree of mobility and/or effective firepower is a positive factor when considering them for employment.

Course of action three, employment of the corps reserve, will require that the area commander request such support from the corps commander. Due to the difficulty that the area commander may encounter in analyzing the enemy intent in the

early phases, he cannot be expected to make such a request until the enemy situation is well developed. The corps commander's decision to employ his reserve is a difficult one. It is obviously a reaction desired by the enemy. The capability of the corps reserve to perform RAS will be analyzed in depth in a later chapter. However, it suffices to say that a decision to employ the reserve will weaken, if not eliminate the commander's capability to reinforce his forward units.

Course of action 4, the employment of combat units from other areas, requires a decision by the COSCOM commander. Depending on the situation, a decision may be made to shift a support group boundary or to place a reaction force from the adjacent area under operational control of the area commander in whose area the threat exists. In either case, the same disadvantages exist as existed in course of action one, plus any problems encountered in shifting the boundary or changing command and control of the reaction forces.

The examination of courses of action available under current doctrine point out many of the organizational, training and deployment problems which exists.

PRINCIPLES OF RAS

The implementation of the current doctrinal philosophy is based on the eight (8) principles discussed in Chapter III. These fundamental principles are guides and considerations for commanders and units involved in the RAS system. As

fundamentals of the system, each principle will be analyzed in light of the current threat situation.

The principle of <u>austerity</u> provides for[7]

a. The utilization of RAS potential forces as opposed to a dedicated RAS force.

b. Minimum degradation of the unit mission performance while providing RAS forces.

c. Maximum effectiveness of the RAS task force.

With the reduction in force of the CS and CSS units, the capability of these units to provide personnel and equipment resources for training and employment in RAS without a significant degradation of mission performance is questionable. This appears to be particularly true in the early phases of an attack in Europe when the tempo of support missions and the threat to RAS is greatest. The consideration of <u>maximum</u> effectiveness of the RAS task force seems incompatible with the consideration of <u>minimum</u> degradation to unit mission performance. The organization of support units into COGSCs will provide some economy of resources. However, this capability is limited to point and base type security. Although this concept has not been field tested to the extent that objective conclusions can be drawn as to the validity of the principle of austerity as set forth in current doctrine, a subjective evaluation would conclude that it is invalid in view of the current organization and threat.

The principle of <u>command</u> is essentially the same as the principle of war known as "unity of command." This

principle is employed to eliminate confusion, indecision, divisiveness, and to achieve a cohesive RAS effort. These are some of the types of problems discussed earlier in the situational analysis. To properly employ the principle of command, the following requirements must be met.[8]

a. There must be a single responsible commander.

b. Geographic areas of responsibility must be clearly defined.

c. The commander must know his area, the strength and RAS potential of available units, terrain data, intelligence information, and current operations.

The principle of command is a combat tested and proven principle for effective military operations. However, the current philosophy of RAS imposes some unique problems. The strength reductions in CS and CSS units will increase the reliance on transient units for designation in the priority I RAS potential category. The high rate of turnover of these units creates command problems in maintaining an inventory of units, unit locations and unit RAS potential. This turnover of units degrades the commander's ability to organize and to train a cohesive RAS task force. Effective unity of command must depend on the ability of subordinate commanders to know and work for superiors without constant and detailed orders. This would seem particularly true in RAS missions where the task force is organized and employed in a reaction force role. Another obstacle to the effective use of the principle of command is the transition of command and control from functional commanders at low threat levels to the RAS task force

commander at intermediate threat levels and finally to the tactical commander as the threat becomes prolonged or severe. Although the area commander may retain overall command and control, command and employment of forces at the operational level is impeded by the failure to maintain continuity at all levels of command and throughout the various levels of threat. This is a seriously limiting factor which is likely to result in confusion, indecision and divisiveness, particularly at the task force, company and platoon levels.

The principle of economy of force is another combat proven principle of war. The commander's ability to economize on the employment of forces in one area (i.e., the rear area) allows him to mass his combat power in a more critical area to obtain the desired combat ratio to accomplish his mission. To achieve economy of force in RAS operations in order to mass the maximum combat forces forward, the following considerations are provided in current doctrine:[9]

> a. No organization should be employed in a role or configuration for which it is not principally designed unless such action is unavoidable.
>
> b. RAS potential elements are normally employed for short periods of less than 12 hours.
>
> c. The RAS potential of CS and CSS units is employed to counter hostile actions in RAS missions. Combat forces are not diverted for RAS missions unless essential.

Although this is an unquestionably valid principle of war, its validity in the context presented here is questionable. In consideration of the threat, it is doubtful that the RAS task forces could be activated, employed, and deactivated

within the short time periods contemplated. Thus, either the parent unit's functional mission or the RAS mission will be degraded. The consideration not to employ a unit in a role for which it is not principally designed increases in importance with the increased intensity of the threat. The increasing probability of tactical and operational level desant operations in the corps rear area increases the scope of RAS operations necessary to obtain security in the rear area as an effective economy of force measure. A primary consideration is to prevent the enemy from successfully attacking the rear area to achieve economy of force by causing the corps commander to divert a disproportionate amount of combat resources to RAS and, thereby, improving the enemy's combat power ratio in the forward combat areas.

The principle of integrated protection considers that each RAS measure must complement the total RAS effort.[10] Thus, the security of each component of the support system should be integrated with the protection of the other components of the system. The consolidation of units into the COGSCs enhances the capability of support units to provide integrated point and base security.

This consolidation provides the enemy a more lucrative target and increases the requirement to provide improved security for the system. Such an increase in security requirements does not seem compatible with the overall reduction in CS and CSS strength and the anticipated intense requirements on the support system.

The principle of offensive is another proven principle of war. In the context of RAS doctrine, the employment of this principle is achieved by the following:[11]

a. Aerial surveillance, ground sensors, patrolling and other intelligence collecting activities to detect planned enemy action.

b. The identification, organization, and training of the RAS potential to conduct limited offensive actions against small enemy elements and to hostile aircraft with organic nonair defense weapons.

The practical capability of the area commander and the RAOC to employ resources in an effective intelligence collection activity is doubtful, primarily due to the nonavailability of assets. Such an effort against organized guerrillas requires extensive and sophisticated resources, as was experienced in Vietnam. Most of the intelligence pertaining to a major threat would come from United States sources such as the corps G-2. Local intelligence in the rear area would primarily be obtained from the military police elements in the corps rear area. The problems of identifying, organizing, and training the RAS potential forces has already been discussed. The primary point to be considered is that the threat spectrum and the continuous nature of the threat has increased the offensive capability required in the rear area beyond that contemplated in the current doctrine.

The principle of responsiveness is directly related to the principle of offensive. This principle is based on the following concepts:[12]

a. Functional units assigned RAS commitments are responsible to fulfill that commitment rapidly and effectively.

b. An effective and flexible communications system must be available to the commander to communicate RAS operational requirements.

c. Clearly established authority, organic mobility of RAS elements, and the periodic tests of the RAS plan to insure effectiveness of the system are the means by which responsiveness is attained.

Responsiveness of RAS potential elements to the threat contemplated is likely to have serious deficiencies, such as those discussed earlier in the situational analysis. Even where the RAS potential elements are well rehearsed, the time it takes to activate, brief and deploy the personnel and vehicles from their functional mission performance to the area of the threat is not likely to be effectively responsive. Organic mobility is another problem. Vietnam demonstrated the ineffectiveness of ground mobility as a means to respond to an attack. Within the confines of an installation, wheeled vehicle mobility is required to move personnel rapidly to a muster area or to deploy them on local defensive positions. However, there are multiple remote area objectives subject to enemy assault within a support group area in Europe. Any attempt to react to an assault several kilometers away by wheel vehicles is not likely to be responsive. .

The principle of <u>supervision</u> charges the responsible RAS commander and the parent unit commander with the responsibility to insure that the RAS mission is not neglected. It also charges the RAS commander to insure that the RAS plans

are workable.[13] The salient point in this principle is the dual responsibility for mission readiness. This concept is a potential source of conflict between commanders at the functional level where cooperation and unity of effort should be maximized. A particular problem that can be anticipated is competition between the RAOC commander and the parent unit commander for training resources (personnel, equipment and time). This is especially apparent in light of the intense support requirements that are anticipated. Thus, as this principle is currently contemplated, it appears to violate the principle of unity of command.

The principle of vulnerability is achieved by establishing a priority of risks based on the sensitivity and vulnerability of potential targets and the employment of resources in consonance with those priorities.[14] This is a statement of the principle of economy of force as applied to RAS. The reduction of available resources has been partially relieved by the organization of units into COGSCs. Multiple targets of a sensitive and vulnerable nature exist outside those centers. Some examples are: bridges, MSR's, and airfields, which if quickly captured by an enemy airborne force, could serve as a base for airlanding motorized rifle regiments and moving rapidly to attack critical installations and activities in the corps rear area.

Planning for military operations is a complex task under the best of conditions. Therefore, where possible

conformity should be implemented in establishing principles for the commander to consider in formulating his course of action. The principles of war govern the conduct of all military operations.[15] These established principles are familiar to every student of military operations and are applicable to security operations in the rear areas. Each of the principles of RAS discussed above has a counterpart in the nine principles of war. On the other hand, some of the principles of war are not adequately considered in the doctrinal application of the principles of RAS.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control for RAS has several unique aspects which should be examined. First, operational responsibility for RAS is assigned to the support group commander (area commander). The area commander is given a broad authority with which to exercise this responsibility. Subordinate units over which this authority is exercised include units organic to the support group, GS units of the COGSC, which is located within the support group area, and other tenant and transient units located within the area. In addition to the area commander's responsibility to command the support group, he is also responsible for tactical command at the operational level. In relatively low tempo operations such dual responsibilities may not present a major command and control problem. In view of the intensity of the potential threat to the Corps

rear area, however, the area commander's capability to effectively command and control intense levels of support operations and to deal with the complicated command coordination problems of RAS is questionable. Staff coordination at the support group level is a function of the S2/S3 staff section which will interface with the SPO at COSCOM and with the RAOC.

Another unique aspect of RAS command and control is the evolution of command and control based on the intensity of the threat as portrayed in Figure 3-1, Command and Control Spectrum for RAP. Within the scope of the current philosophy for RAS, this is a logical concept. In view of the potential threat and force reductions, it may not be a practical one. This concept assumes a graduated intensity of enemy operations in the rear area. In the threat analysis, it was noted that Soviet training exercises have emphasized the rapid employment of relatively large units at operational depths to achieve surprise. Within this framework, a smooth transition of command and control may be impossible to meet the urgency of the situation. If, on the other hand, the enemy gradually intensifies operations from a low threat level, transitional problems may be encountered in gaining accurate and timely intelligence on which to base decisions to move into another phase of the command and control spectrum. Within the scope of the current manning levels, it is doubtful that adequate company/platoon command and control elements or units would be available on a priority I basis for deployment in area or

remote security missions. If this is the case, the command and control capability of the RAS task force is depreciated to the extent that other alternatives should be examined.

CONCLUSIONS

The analysis of rear area security doctrine was limited to an examination of the purpose, philosophy, principles and command and control factors. Based on these considerations, the following conclusions were drawn:

a. The purpose of rear area security is valid as stated in current doctrine.

b. The basic implementing philosophy of rear area security is not valid.

c. The principles governing the conduct of RAS operations are the principles of war.

d. The evolutionary concept of command and control is not realistic in view of the threat and the requirement not to degrade the support capability.

CHAPTER IV

ENDNOTES

[1]DA, FM 31-85, Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1970), p. 2-3.

[2]U.S., Department of Defense, "How DoD is Improving the Combat Proportions of U.S. Forces in Europe," Commanders Digest, American Forces Press Service, XVIII, No. 21, (November 20, 1975), p. 1-8.

[3]Ibid.

[4]U.S., Army Ordnance Center and School, Combat Oriented General Support Information Briefing (Aberdeen Proving Ground: Office of the Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments, Concepts and Studies Division, January 29, 1976), npn.

[5]USACGSC, Reserve Components Programmed Text (PT 135-1), March 1975, p. 2-1.

[6]Statement by LTC J. D. Sheldon, Department of Logistics, USACGSC, personal interview, March 17, 1975.

[7]DA, FM 31-85, op. cit., p. 3-1.

[8]Ibid.

[9]Ibid.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ibid.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid., p. 3-2.

[15]DA, FM 17-1, Armor Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1966), pp. 8-9.

CHAPTER V

THE CORPS REAR AREA

The purpose of this chapter is to establish a basis for the examination of forces, other than CS and CSS, which are available for RAS. This will be done by an examination of the characteristics of the corps rear area and the establishment of criteria for corps rear area security. The examination of the characteristics of the corps rear area is based on the scenario of the X (US) corps deployed in the central army group (CENTAG) region of NATO. This scenario was developed as instructional material for the study of forward deployed forces (European setting) at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. As such, it reflects a realistic European environment and current organizational doctrine for the corps rear area.

The discussion of criteria for rear area security combines the environmental characteristics and a type support organization with the probable threat to establish definitive criteria for rear area security.

ENVIRONMENTAL CHARACTERISTICS

The rear area for a three division corps is approximately 130 kilometers wide by 120 kilometers deep, or a total

area of approximately 15,600 square kilometers (Figure 5-1). The southern half of the corps rear area includes the Frankfurt metropolitan area. This includes the cities of Hanau and Wiesbaden. The area is heavily populated and is a major communications center for air, land, rail and river traffic. From a military standpoint, the metropolitan complex is located astride a major avenue of approach to crossings over the Rhine River (the historic Hessian invasion corridor). This avenue of approach is a relatively low, rolling area running north to south through the corps area. A major portion of the favorable terrain in this avenue of approach is within the corps rear area. As such, it should be considered a probable enemy objective of concern to the RAS forces.[1]

The northern half of the corps rear area is predominately rural and has a lower population density. This area provides avenues of approach to crossings over the Rhine River, with several intermediate airfields which, if captured by the enemy, would support an operation to airland a motorized rifle division within a short time frame.[2]

The road network is well developed throughout the corps rear area. Rivers and streams generally flow east to west and except for the Main and the Rhine, the rivers are fordable.[3]

The civilian populace is friendly and well organized with police and paramilitary organizations trained in emergency procedures. However, enemy agents and organized



FIGURE 5-1. MAP OF X (US) CORPS AREA

SOURCE: USACGSC, M3141, Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting), (Fort Leavenworth, Ks.: Department of Logistic, 1976).

partisan groups can be expected to become active at the initiation of hostilities. Those groups may initiate rumor campaigns, conduct offensive guerrilla operations against civil and military facilities, provide intelligence and control elements for enemy desant operations and other activities of a covert or overt nature. Civilian police and paramilitary organizations have a limited combat capability. These organizations operate extensive civilian intelligence nets and will capture or neutralize known and suspected enemy agents. These organizations will operate rumor control centers in each town. In addition, they will assist in the evacuation and relocation of civilians from critical forward areas, assist with traffic control, and will enforce the FRG "stay-at-home" policy.[4]

SUPPORT ORGANIZATION

Under the COSTAR concept, the corps was a tactical organization with a relatively small rear area. Under this concept, combat service support was a function of the FASCOM. With the implimentation of TASTA-70 and EAD, the corps rear area has been expanded. The combat service support function is now a corps responsibility. The corps support command (COSCOM) provides combat service support to all corps elements in support of tactical operations, relieving the corps commander and staff of detailed planning and operational responsibilities for CSS and RAP. Additional combat service support is provided by the engineer brigade and the signal brigade.

These units are directly subordinate to corps headquarters. The military police group/brigade may be assigned to the COSCOM or it may operate directly subordinate to the corps headquarters.[5]

The COSCOM elements in the corps rear area consist of corps-wide service organizations (Figure 5-2) and support groups. The COSCOM health services, personnel and administration, transportation, ammunition, and civil affairs units provide corps-wide services. The support groups provide supply, maintenance and field services on an area basis to units located in the corps rear. Those support groups located in the forward portion of the corps rear also provide general support and back up direct support to divisional units.[6] The general support services are organized into COGSCs to provide commodity (systems) oriented general support for conventional material.[7] These COGSCs are assigned to the support groups for RAP and may be assigned to the groups for command less operational control.[8] In any case, these consolidated support centers will exist as a major concern for RAS.

Within the scenario under study, the corps rear area is divided into two support group areas of responsibility: a forward support group and a rear support group (Figure 5-3). A heavy density of support facilities and installations are located in the forward area. However, the heaviest density of facilities and installations centers around the Frankfurt metropolitan area.



FIGURE 5-2. COSCOM SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS

SOURCE: USACGSC, M3141, Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting), (Fort Leavenworth: Department of Logistics, 1976).



FIGURE 5-4. FORWARD AND REAR SUPPORT GROUP AREAS

SOURCE: USACGSC, M3141, Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting) (Fort Leavenworth: Department of Logistics, 1976).

The corps main supply routes (MSRs) as shown in Figure 5-4 are major security considerations. Within the corps rear area there are three lateral (east-west) MSRs (approximately 435 kilometers) and five vertical (north-south) MSRs (approximately 340 kilometers). In addition, there is one eight-inch pipeline which extends approximately seventy kilometers into the corps rear area.[9]

In summary, the corps rear area is characterized by the following features which are considerations for security.

a. A geographical area of approximately 15,600 square kilometers.

b. A large metropolitan complex and communications center located astride a major avenue of approach to crossings over a river obstacle.

c. A good avenue of approach to the river crossings in the northern area which bypasses the heavily populated metropolitan area. This avenue of approach is supported with several sizeable airfields, a high speed road network, and multiple remote areas which are potential landing zones or drop zones.

d. A well-organized and friendly civilian populace with well-trained police organizations.

e. A well-developed road network to support movement in all directions.

f. A relatively dispersed pattern of corps support units including the corps headquarters, the COSCOM, the



FIGURE 5-4. CORPS MSRS

SOURCE: USACGSC, M1161, Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting) (Fort Leavenworth: Department of Logistics, 1976).

engineer brigade, the signal brigade and the military police brigade.

g. A division of the two support groups' areas of responsibility that creates a forward and a rear support group area.

h. A physical consolidation of general support elements at COGSCs.

i. A complex of lateral and vertical MSRs consisting of approximately 775 kilometers of road networks.

j. A eight-inch pipeline extending approximately seventy kilometers into the corps rear area.

CRITERIA FOR RAS

The overriding criteria for RAS is the "purpose" of RAS; that being to "prevent interruptions by hostile action to CS and CSS operations." This purpose statement was analyzed and validated earlier. The departure from current doctrine lies in the implementing philosophy. This departure from current doctrinal philosophy resulted primarily from the following findings:

a. The CS and CSS force structure has been significantly reduced.

b. The organizational changes have placed CS and CSS elements under the corps and have necessarily allotted more area to the corps rear.

c. The perception of a conventional war in Europe has changed from a relatively long engagement to a short, intensive war with accompanying intense demands on the support structure.

d. The threat to the corps rear area is broader in scope and more intense than was perceived under current doctrine.

The search for a new philosophy (course of action) for rear area security should consider these and other characteristics of the situation. According to standard military tactical doctrine, these characteristics are commonly referred to as the "factors affecting employment."[10] These factors are grouped under the four headings of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, and troops available (METT). In this case, the mission is contained in the purpose statement; the probable enemy threat was developed within this research; terrain was discussed earlier in this chapter; and the capability of troops available is the subject of an analysis to be conducted in the next chapter. The three types of forces to be considered are the courses of action under consideration. As with any decisionmaking process concerning military operations, each course of action must be considered and compared in light of the principles of war.[11] Thus, the <u>principles of war</u> combined with the <u>factors affecting employment</u> in the corps rear area provide the doctrinal and environmental basis for establishing the following criteria for RAS.

a. The principle of OBJECTIVE is the goal for which the force is constituted. This principle is overriding and is generally expressed as the mission.[12] The objective of RAS is to "prevent interruptions by hostile action, to combat support and combat service support operations."

b. The principle of OFFENSIVE is achieved when commander imposes his will on the enemy. In the defense the commander must be able to meet unexpected contingencies and to regain the initiative by offensive counteractions.[13] The application of the principle of offensive in RAS requires the following:

(1) An intelligence gathering and processing system that will provide the RAS commander with the capability to detect planned enemy action at all levels of the threat spectrum. This system should be fully operational at the initiation of hostilities and capable of interface with civilian police and U.S. intelligence organizations.

(2) A combat element trained and equipped to combat the full range of probable threats to RAS. This threat ranges from unconventional threats of terrorism, sabotage and guerrilla activities, to conventional threats of regimental sized airborne/air assault operations. To effectively combat the threat, this force should be specially trained and equipped with a high degree of:

(a) mobility

(b) air defense

(c) antiarmor

(d) counter-airborne

(e) counter-air assault in both day and night environments.

c. The principle of SIMPLICITY is achieved through detailed, simple plans.[14] This is accomplished best when plans are made, rehearsed and executed by a single organization under the command of the responsible commander. Personnel who will implement the plans should have firsthand knowledge of the terrain and should be rehearsed as often as possible.

d. The principle of UNITY OF COMMAND is the establishment of a single authority to insure unity of effort and cooperation by all elements of the command.[15] The responsible commander must have full knowledge of the area for which he is responsible. The subordinate commanders at company and platoon level should have full knowledge of their area and be able to act effectively without detailed supervision. This is only possible when a single organization is responsible for the area on a day-to-day basis.

e. The principle of MASS requires that forces be so disposed that maximum combat power can be concentrated at the decisive time and place.[16] The large geographical area combined with the high density of vulnerable targets requires that a RAS force be responsive. Responsiveness involves the following requirements:

(1) A combat force available for employment.

(2) A dedicated and flexible communications system

which will interface with civilian police networks for area-wide surveillance as well as command and control of organic units.

(3) A limited combat capability to contain an attack anywhere in the rear area until effective force can be massed.

(4) A capability to air assault a company-size reaction force.

(5) A clearly defined authority and responsibility to conduct RAS operations.

f. The principle of ECONOMY OF FORCE is directly related to the principle of mass. Economy of force requires that sufficient force be applied at other than the decisive time and place to permit mass to be applied at the critical point.[17] Within the scope of the overall corps operations, economy of force is employed in the corps rear area by providing sufficient security with the minimum resources to allow the maximum combat power to be employed forward. In this context, sufficient resources must be applied to prevent an enemy attack in the rear from becoming a threat which would force the corps commander to shift combat resources to the rear area. Sufficiency in RAS can be accomplished through the application of combat multipliers to a relatively small force and by providing a system of integrated protection throughout the rear area. The specific combat multipliers which are required include:

(1) Special training in RAS operations.

(2) Detailed knowledge of the rear area environment.

(3) The capability to effectively integrate intelligence and combat resources.

(4) The mobility to rapidly mass combat power before a threat can develop its combat power.

g. The principle of MANEUVER involves the capability to move and position combat power to destroy the enemy.[18] Thus, the RAS forces must have detailed knowledge of the organization of the area, the mobility to move to threatened areas rapidly, and the capability to employ supporting fires.

h. The principle of SUPRISE connotes striking the enemy when, where, and in a manner that he is unable to counter effectively.[19] The primary means of achieving surprise in RAS is through an effective intelligence system and the capability to react to intelligence faster and more effectively than the enemy expects. This is achieved through:

(1) An integrated intelligence and surveillance system.

(2) A rapid reaction capability provided by air mobility.

(3) A force trained to combat the various types of operations that the enemy is capable of conducting.

i. The principle of SECURITY involves readiness for action or counteraction. Its attainment embraces all measures

designed to avoid surprise and the retention of freedom of action.[20] In the context of RAS, this involves the use of an effective intelligence and surveillance system on an area-wide basis and the elimination of a threat without becoming decisively engaged in combat.

Based on the above discussion, an evaluation of forces for RAS should consider specific criteria. The following list summarizes the specific criteria tablished in the above analysis of the principles of war as applied to RAS.

a. Provide a capability to prevent interruptions, by hostile action, to combat support and combat service support operations.

b. Provide an integrated intelligence system capable of detecting planned enemy actions at all levels of threat.

c. Provide a combat organization specially trained and equipped for internal security, air defense, antiarmor, and counterairborne/air assault, operations in a day or night environment.

d. Provide a single organization capable of planning, rehearsing, and executing detailed, simple plans.

e. Provide a single commander with authority and responsibility for RAS on a corps-wide, area basis.

f. Provide a command structure with company and platoon level commanders capable of limited independent operations.

g. Provide a dedicated and flexible communications system which can interface with civilian police as well as military communications systems.

h. Provide a air lift capability for a company-size reaction force.

i. Provide an organization capable of obtaining detail knowledge of the environmental factors in the corps rear area.

j. Provide the capability to rapidly mass and position combat power at any location in the corps rear area.

k. Provide sufficient combat power to eliminate any probable threat without committing the entire force to decisive engagement.

CHAPTER V

ENDNOTES

[1]USACGSC, "Appendix II to Advance Sheet. Description of Area of Operations," Forward Deployed Force Operations (European Setting), M3161-1 (Fort Leavenworth: Department of Tactics, 1975), p. P1-6--P1-9.

[2]Ibid.

[3]Ibid.

[4]Ibid., p. P1-3.

[5]USACGSC, RB54-1, The Corps Support Command (Fort Leavenworth: 1975), p. 1-7.

[6]Ibid.

[7]U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School, Combat Oriented General Support Material Information Briefing (Aberdeen Proving Ground, Office of the Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments, 1976), slide 4.

[8]Ibid., p. 1 of Questions and Answers.

[9]Statement by LTC J. D. Sheldon, Personal interview, March 17, 1975.

[10]DA, FM 17-1, Armor Operations (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, October 1966), pp. 12-14.

[11]Ibid., p. 8.

[12]Ibid.

[13]Ibid.

[14]Ibid.

[15]Ibid.

[16]Ibid.

[17]Ibid., p. 9.

[18]Ibid.

[19]Ibid.

[20]Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

ANALYSIS OF FORCES FOR RAS

The analysis of the three types of forces under consideration will be conducted within the framework of the specific criteria established in Chapter V. These criteria are grouped into three major categories for the analysis of each type force. These categories are: (1) mission; (2) organization and training; and (3) command and control. Within each category, the unit's capability to meet the specific criteria is evaluated. This evaluation is the basis for a discussion of the comparison of the forces.

THE ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

Mission

The statement of mission for the ACR as provided by TOE 17-51H is:

> To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the unit to which assigned or attached and to engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying action as an economy of force unit.[1]

In the scenario for forward deployed force operations (European setting), the defensive posture is organized into three areas: Covering force area, main battle area (MBA), and rear area. The ACR is normally assigned to the covering force.[2] The regiment may be reinforced to conduct the mission

under corps control or the squadrons of the regiment may be attached to the forward divisions to conduct covering force operations in sector. If the three squadrons are attached to the divisions in a three division corps, the regiment (-) would consist of one air cavalry troop and the headquarters and headquarters troop. In the scenario developed for instruction at the United States Army Command and General Staff College (USACGSC), subcourse 3161, the ACR (-) was attached to a separate brigade (Mech). The brigade mission was prepare to block, reinforce, and conduct RAS operations in the corps rear area. The attached ACR mission was two-phased to coincide with the two-phased corps operation (cover phase and defense phase). During the cover phase, the ACR (-) had the mission to "conduct surveillance in the corps rear" area. After the squadrons were returned to the regiment in the defense phase, the ACR mission was to prepare to screen to detect enemy infiltration through the divisions, to reinforce the divisions, and to conduct RAS.[3] It appears that in such a likely course of action, the RAS mission is within the mission capability of the ACR. It is interesting to observe the missions of the ACR which developed later in the scenario. As the corps conducted retrograde operations to defend the Frankfurt-Wiesbaden sector, the ACR and the separate brigade (Mech) were tasked to establish delay positions, cover withdrawal, and assist the passage of the divisions, and delay the enemy forward of the new defensive positions for six days.

This left no combat forces to conduct RAS for this time.

The ACR has an extensive air and ground reconnaissance organization combined with armor protected and highly mobile ground and air communications and antiarmor firepower. These capabilities make the ACR ideal for numerous types of missions. An organization such as this is capable of extended independent operations and is uniquely organized for operations in the covering force area.

The specific missions of the ACR discussed above are all part of the overall mission of the ACR to provide security, reconnaissance, and economy of force operations. The mission of RAS is one single aspect of providing security for the corps. In view of the criteria for a single organization to provide continuous integrated planning and operations in the corps rear area, the mission of the ACR is not compatible with RAS.

Organization and Training

The ACR is organized with a headquarters and headquarters troop (HHT), an air cavalry troop, and three armored cavalry squadrons as shown in Figure 6-1.[4] This organization is designed to provide a capability to conduct relatively independent operations over a large geographical area such as the corps rear area. At level 1 (100 percent operational capability), the ACR has the following TOE capabilities:

a. Conducts reconnaissance operations.

b. Conducts security operations.

MISSION: To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the unit to which assigned or attached and to engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying action as an economy of force unit.
ASSIGNMENT. To field army and corps.
CAPABILITIES. a. Conducts reconnaissance operations.
b. Conducts security operations
c. Operates in an economy of force role without being reinforced in offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations.
d. Operates as a task force when suitably reinforced in offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations.
e. Operates in support of forces engaged in stability operations.



SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS	
ARMT SUBSYS 7.62-MM MG LIGHT M23	6
ARMT SUBSYS 7.62-MM,DOOR MTD LW M24	2
ARMT SUBSYS 7.62-MM & 40-MM GL, HIGH RATE, M28	9
ARMT SUBSYS 20-MM AUTO GUN M35	4
GUN LAUNCHER 152-MM BILI	81
GUN TANK 105-MM BILI	51
HOWITZER 155-MM BILI	18
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	245
LAUNCHER RKT 2.75-INCH 7-TUBE M158A1	12
LAUNCHER RKT 2.75-INCH, 19-TUBE, XM159C	20
MACHINEGUN CAL .50 HB FLEX	95
MACHINEGUN CAL .50 HB BILI	441
MACHINEGUN 7.62-MM FLEX	53
MACHINEGUN 7.62-MM BILI	285
MORTAR 4.2-INCH	27
PISTOL CAL .45	1020
REVOLVER CAL .38	124
RIFLE 5.56-MM	2094
SUBMACHINEGUN CAL .45	302

VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT	
ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE/AIRBORNE ASSAULT VEHICLE M551	81
BRIDGE & LAUNCHER AVLB CL 60 60-FT	9
CARRIER COMD AND RECON M113A1	153
CARRIER CPLT TRACK M577A1	39
CARRIER MORTAR M106A1	27
CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACK M113A1	77
CARRIER CARGO M548	18
HOWITZER SP 155-MM M109A1	18
RECOVERY VEHICLE LIGHT M578	13
RECOVERY VEHICLE MEDIUM M88	6
TANK CBT FULL TRACK 105-MM GUN M60A1	51
TRAILER AMMO 1-1/2-TON M332	2
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	54
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	72
TRAILER TANK WATER 400 GAL M149	20
TRUCK AMB 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M792	4
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M561	41
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	78
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON W/WN M35A2	3
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 8x8 M656	27
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 8x8 W/WN M656	3
TRUCK CARGO 8-TON 4x4 M520	33
TRUCK TANK FUEL SVC 2500 GAL 4x4 M559	12
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	106
TRUCK VAN SHOP 2-1/2-TON M109A3	3
TRUCK WRECKER 5-TON 6x6 M816	1
TRUCK WRECKER 10-TON 4x4 M553	7

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT	
INTERCOMMUNICATION SET AN/VIC-1	21
RADAR SET AN/PPS-5	24
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	287
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	122
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	20
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-60	1
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	19
RADIO SET AN/GRC-160	99
RADIO SET AN/PRC-77	53
RADIO SET AN/PRC-90	98
RADIO SET AN/VRC-12	95
RADIO SET AN/VRC-24	2
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	115
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	64
RADIO SET AN/VRC-49	7
RADIO SET AN/VRC-64	180
RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	102
RADIO TT SET AN/GRC-142	2
RADIO TT SET AN/VSC-3	8
SPEECH SCTY EQUIP ABN TSEC/KY-28	27
SPEECH SCTY EQUIP TSEC/KY-38	62
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	26
TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	66
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	265
TELETYPEWRITER SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KW-7	10

AIRCRAFT	
HELICOPTER OBSERVATION OH-58A	18
HELICOPTER ATTACK AH-1G	9
HELICOPTER UTILITY UH-1H	22

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	
BATTERY COMMANDER SCOPE	6
BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN PAS-5	64
BULLDOZER EARTH MOVING TK MTG MAIN BATTLE TK	3
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	36
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PSS-11	36
DRUM FABRIC COLLAPSIBLE 500-GAL	17
FWD AREA REFUELING EQUIP(FARE)	2
METASCOPE AN/PAS-6	32
NIGHT SIGHT CREW-SERVED WPNS AN/TVS-2	261
NIGHT SIGHT INDIVIDUAL WPNS AN/PVS-2	287
NIGHT SIGHT TRIPOD MTD AN/TVS-4	33
RANGE FINDER AN/GVS-3(LASER)	39
SEARCHLIGHT AN/VSS-1	51
SEARCHLIGHT AN/VSS-3	81
TANK AND PUMP UNIT TRK MTD	3
TELESCOPE	3

FIGURE 6-1. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox: 1976), p. 191.

c. Operates in an economy of force role without being reinforced in offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations.

d. Operates as a task force when suitably reinforced in offensive, defensive, and retrograde operations.

e. Operates in support of forces engaged in stability operations.[5]

The regiment is assigned on the basis of one per corps and is one hundred percent mobile in its organic vehicles.[6]

The regiment's air mobility consists of forty-nine (49) regimental helicopters plus the twelve (12) helicopters organic to the squadrons (four in each squadron), as shown in Figures 6-1 and 6-2 respectively.[7] As can be determined from the summary of equipment provided in these figures, only twenty-two of these aircraft are utility type helicopters capable of providing troop lift. The primary troop lift capability is limited to the five UH-1H helicopters in the aviation platoon of HHT (Figure 6-3)[8] and the four UH-1H helicopters in the aerorifle platoon of the air cavalry troop (Figure 6-4).[9] Based on a planning factor of one rifle squad per aircraft,[10] this is approximately one platoon less than the criteria of a lift capability for a company. A concurrent question with lift capability is the question of what troops are available to conduct an airmobile assault. Within the ACR, the only troops trained in air assault operations are the four aerorifle squads of the aerorifle platoon in the air cavalry troop.[11] However, it is anticipated that the rifle squad organic to each armored cavalry platoon can be trained in air assault operations (Figure 6-5).[12]

MISSION To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the unit to which assigned or attached and to engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying action as an economy of force unit

ASSIGNMENT Organic to Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17 51.

CAPABILITIES a. Provides security and performs reconnaissance for a higher echelon

b. Executes combat missions suitable for light armored units.

c. Operates as an armored task force when suitably reinforced.



SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS	
ARMT SUBSYSTEM 7.62-MM MG HIGH RATE M27	2
GUN/LAUNCHER 152-MM BILI	54
GUN TANK 105-MM BILI	17
HOWITZER 155-MM BILI	6
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	76
MACHINEGUN CAL .50 HB FLEX	28
MACHINEGUN CAL .50 HB BILI	115
MACHINEGUN 7.62-MM FLEX	12
MACHINEGUN 7.62-MM BILI	71
MORTAR 4.2-INCH	9
PISTOL CAL .45	374
REVOLVER CAL .38	6
RIFLE 5.56-MM	>28
SUBMACHINEGUN CAL .45	87

VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT	
ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE AIRBORNE ASSAULT VEH M551	54
BRIDGE & LAUNCHER AVLB CL 60 60-FT	1
CARRIER CARGO FT M548	6
CARRIER CP LT TRACK M577A1	11
CARRIER MORTAR FT M106A1	9
CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACK M113A1	23
HOWITZER SP FT 155-MM M109A1	6
RECOVERY VEHICLE LIGHT M578	5
RECOVERY VEHICLE MEDIUM M88	2
TANK CBT FULL TRACK 105-MM GUN M60A1	17
TRAILER AMMO 1-1/2-TON M332	12
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	13
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	21
TRAILER TANK WATER 400-GAL M149	6
TRAINER LAUNCHER CONDUCT OF FIRE SHERIDAN	2
TRUCK AMB 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M792	1
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 4x4 W/WN M715	1
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M561	12
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	21
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON W/WN M35A2	1
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6x6 M54	20
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6x6 W/WN M54A2	14
TRUCK TANK FUEL-SERVICING 2500 GAL 4x4 M559	4
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	26
TRUCK WRECKER 5-TON 6x6 W WN M816	2

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT	
COMMAND CONSOLE ELECTRONIC AN/ASC-15	1
ELECTRONIC TT SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KW-7	3
INTERCOMMUNICATION SET AN/VIC-1	16
RADAR SET AN/PPS-5	6
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	66
RADIAC METER IM-147/PD	29
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	43
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	6
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	8
RADIO SET AN/GRC-160	15
RADIO SET AN/PRC-77	11
RADIO SET AN/PRC-90	8
RADIO SET AN/VRC-12	30
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	49
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	13
RADIO SET AN/VRC-49	1
RADIO SET AN/VRC-64	76
RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	43
RADIO TT SET AN/VSC-3	3
RECEIVER SET RADIO AN/PRR-9	9
SPEECH SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KY-8	8
SPEECH SCTY EQUIP AIRBORNE TSEC/KY-28	6
SPEECH SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KY-38	20
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-993/GT	1
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	7
TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	16
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	87
TRANSMITTER SET RADIO AN/PRT-4	9

AIRCRAFT	
HELICOPTER OBSERVATION OH-58A	2
HELICOPTER UTILITY UH-1H	2

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	
BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN/PAS-5	37
BULLDOZER EARTH MOVING TK MTD	1
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	12
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PSS-11	12
DRUM FABRIC COLLAPSIBLE 500-GAL	2
METASCOPE AN/PAS-6	47
NIGHT SIGHT CREW-SERVED WPNS AN/TVS-2	75
NIGHT SIGHT INDIVIDUAL WPN AN/PVS-2	66
NIGHT SIGHT TRIPOD MTD AN/TVS-4	18
RANGE FINDER AN/GVS-3	12
SEARCHLIGHT AN/VSS-1	17
SEARCHLIGHT AN/VSS-3	54

FIGURE 6-2. ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON (MODIFIED), ACR

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox: 1976), p. 257.

MISSION Provides command, control, and supervision of the operations of the Armored Cavalry Squadron and attached units
ASSIGNMENT Organic to Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17 55

CAPABILITIES a Commands, controls, provides staff planning, furnishes communications, and supervises operations.
b Furnishes supply, transportation, and organizational maintenance for organic and attached units.
c. Provides unit medical service to the cavalry squadron, to include furnishing aidmen to cavalry troops.



Note. Personnel figures represent strength authorized by MTOE.

SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS	
ARMT SUBSYSTEM 7.62-MM MG HIGH RATE M27	2
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	4
MACHINEGUN CAL .50 HB FLEX	20
MACHINEGUN CAL .50 HB BILI	6
PISTOL CAL .45	42
REVOLVER CAL .38	6
RIFLE 5.56-MM	156
SUBMACHINEGUN CAL .45	4
VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT	
BRIDGE AVL SCISSORING CL 60 ALUM 60-FT	1
CARRIER CP LT TRACK M577A1	6
CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACK M113A1	4
LAUNCHER M60-SERIES TANK CHASSIS FOR AVLB	1
RECOVERY VEHICLE LIGHT M578	1
RECOVERY VEHICLE MEDIUM M88	1
TRAILER AMMO 1-1/2-TON M332	9
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	5
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	16
TRAILER TANK WATER 400 GAL M149	1
TRAINER LAUNCHER CONDUCT OF FIRE SHERIDAN	2
TRUCK AMBULANCE 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M792	1
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M561	8
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	9
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6x6 M54	20
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6x6 W/WN M54A2	10
TRUCK TANK FUEL-SERVICING 2500 GAL 4x4 M559	4
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	9
TRUCK WRECKER 5-TON 6x6 W/WN M816	2
COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT	
COMMAND CONSOLE ELECTRONIC AN/ASC-15	1
ELECTRONIC TT SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KW-7	3
INTERCOMMUNICATION SET AN/VIC-1	1
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	13
RADIAC METER IM-147/PD	4
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	11
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	1
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	2
RADIO SET AN/GRC-160	6
RADIO SET AN/PRC-90	8
RADIO SET AN/VRC-12	1
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	15
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	4
RADIO SET AN/VRC-49	1
RADIO SET AN/VRC-64	6
RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	9
RADIO TT SET AN/VSC-3	3
SPEECH SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KY-8	8
SPEECH SCTY EQUIPMENT AIRBORNE TSEC/KY-28	6
SPEECH SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KY-38	20
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	2
TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	12
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	17
AIRCRAFT	
HELICOPTER OBSERVATION OH-58A	2
HELICOPTER UTILITY UH-1H	2
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	
BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN/PAS-5	6
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	1
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PSS-11	1
DRUM FABRIC COLLAPSIBLE 500-GAL	2
METASCOPE AN/PAS-6	4
NIGHT SIGHT CREW-SERVED WPNS AN/TVS-2	5
NIGHT SIGHT INDIVIDUAL WPNS AN/PVS-2	4

FIGURE 6-3. ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS TROOP, ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data

MISSION. To extend by aerial means the reconnaissance and security capabilities of ground units. To engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying actions within its capability and to seize and dominate lightly defended areas or terrain features
ASSIGNMENT. Organic to the Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-51.

CAPABILITIES. a. Performs air and ground reconnaissance and provides security for unit to which assigned or attached.
b. Engages in offensive, defensive, or delaying actions.
c. Conducts independent action when properly reinforced.



SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS	
ARMT SUBSYS 7.62-MM LIGHT M23	6
ARMT SUBSYS 7.62-MM MG DOOR MTD LW M24	2
ARMT SUBSYS 7.62-MM & 40-MM GL, HIGH RATE, M28	9
ARMT SUBSYS 20-MM AUTO GUN M35	4
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	9
LAUNCHER RKT 2.75-INCH, 7-TUBE M158A1	12
LAUNCHER RKT ACFT 2.75-INCH 19-TUBE M159C	20
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 HB FLEX	8
MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM FLEX	14
REVOLVER CAL .38	66
RIFLE 5.56-MM	120
VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT	
TRAILER AMMUNITION 1-1/2-TON M332	2
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	3
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	11
TRAILER TANK WATER 1-1/2-TON M149	1
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON M561	3
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	10
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 8x8 M656	3
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	3
TRUCK VAN SHOP 2-1/2-TON M109A3	1
TRUCK WRECKER 5-TON 6x6 M816	1
COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT	
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	1
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	32
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	11
RADIO SET AN/PRC-77	11
RADIO SET AN/PRC-90	54
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	4
RADIO SET CONTROL GP AN/GRA-39	1
RADIO TT SET AN/GRC-142	1
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	1
SPEECH SCTY EQUIP ABN TSEC/KY-28	27
SPEECH SCTY EQUIP TSEC/KY-38	2
TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	5
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	7
TELETYPEWRITER SCTY EQUIPMENT TSEC/KW-7	1
AIRCRAFT	
HELICOPTER OBSERVATION OH-58A	10
HELICOPTER ATTACK AH-1G	9
HELICOPTER UTILITY UH-1H	8
MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	
BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN/PAS-5	4
DRUM FABRIC COLLAPSIBLE 500-GAL SHORT	9
FWD AREA REFUELING EQUIP (FARE)	2
METASCOPE AN/PAS-6	6
NIGHT SIGHT INDIVIDUAL WPN AN/PVS-2	8

FIGURE 6-4. ORGANIZATION OF THE AIR CAVALRY TROOP, ACR

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox: 1976), p. 197.

MISSION. To provide security and perform reconnaissance for the unit to which assigned or attached, and to engage in offensive, defensive, or delaying action as an economy of force unit.
ASSIGNMENT Organic to Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-55.

CAPABILITIES. a. Performs reconnaissance and provides security for unit to which assigned or attached
b. Engages in offensive, defensive, or delaying actions
c. Conducts independent action when properly reinforced



SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS	
GUN/LAUNCHER 152-MM BILI	18
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	22
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 HB FLEX	2
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 HB BILI	28
MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM FLEX	3
MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM BILI	18
MORTAR 4.2-INCH	3
PISTOL CAL .45	86
RIFLE 5.56-MM	78
SUBMACHINE GUN CAL .45	15

VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT	
ARMORED RECONNAISSANCE AIRBORNE ASSAULT VEH M551	18
CARRIER CP LT TRACK M577A1	1
CARRIER MORTAR FT M106A1	3
CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACK M113A1	6
RECOVERY VEHICLE LIGHT M578	1
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	1
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	1
TRAILER TANK WATER 400-GAL M149	1
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	2
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	3

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT	
INTERCOMMUNICATION SET AN/VIC-1	3
RADAR SET AN/PPS-5	2
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	13
RADIAC METER IM-147/PD	6
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	6
RADIO SET AN/PDR-27	1
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	1
RADIO SET AN/GRC-160	2
RADIO SET AN/PRC-77	3
RADIO SET AN/VRC-12	9
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	7
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	2
RADIO SET AN/VRC-64	16
RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	7
RECEIVER SET RADIO AN/PRR-9	3
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	1
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	14
TRANSMITTER RADIO SET AN/PRT-4	3

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	
BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN/PAS-5	6
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	3
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PSS-11	3
METASCOPE AN/PAS-6	13
NIGHT SIGHT CREW-SERVED WPNS AN/TVS-2	17
NIGHT SIGHT INDIVIDUAL WPN AN/PVS-2	20
NIGHT SIGHT TRIPOD MTD AN/TVS-4	6
RANGE FINDER AN/GVS-3	3
SEARCHLIGHT AN/VSS-3	18

FIGURE 6-5. ARMORED CAVALRY TROOP, ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON (MODIFIED), ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox: 1976), p. 263.

Although these infantry squads could be massed for planned air assault operations against guerrilla bases, etc., to withhold these squads as a reaction force for the troop or squadron would strip the platoons of infantry protection for the armored reconnaissance/airborne assault vehicles (AR/AAV). To withhold an entire platoon or troop as a reaction force will significantly increase the geographical area of responsibility for the remaining elements. Thus, the trained air assault capability of the regiment is one platoon. However, lift capability is available for one more platoon and within each squadron area of responsibility, nine infantry squads can be made available for air assault operations. It should be considered that the criteria of an infantry company air assault capability may be relaxed in view of the mobility and combined arms firepower capability of the armored cavalry platoon. This capability is reinforced by the rapid response and firepower of the nine attack helicopters of the aeroweapons platoon organic to the air cavalry troop.

Security of the corps rear area requires that MSRs be secured and that convoys be provided escort security. The ACR provides area security in much the same way that it performs area reconnaissance. This involves subdividing the area into squadron areas of responsibility. These areas are subsequently subdivided by the squadrons and troops for command and control. Units conduct screening operations based on successive screening lines established by the regiment and assigned to

the squadrons.[13] Although objectives are normally not used to control screening operations, the critical nature of MSRs and other LOCs will influence the assignment of areas of responsibility. All combat elements of the regiment are trained in route security operations and have the mobile firepower capability to conduct traffic escort. Training in traffic escort and control is limited. To improve the regiment's capability for traffic control, mobile security, and traffic escort operations a provost marshal section (one officer, two enlisted men) and a military police platoon (one officer, forty-one enlisted men) are provided by augmentation.

The ACR is a combined arms force capable of delivering a broad spectrum of types of firepower from its organic weapons. This spectrum includes aerial as well as ground delivered antitank fire; 155mm and 4.2 inch indirect fire; 2.75 inch aerial rocket artillery (ARA); high density, multicaliber, automatic weapons fire; and short range air defense (SHORAD) fires (Figure 6-1, p. 82). The concept of combined arms firepower is employed at all echelons of the regiment.

At the regimental level, the primary firepower capability is the air cavalry troop with its twenty-seven tactical helicopters. This unit provides aerial antitank, ARA, and automatic small arms fire as well as the capability to air assault a platoon-size infantry force. The SHORAD capability at regiment is limited to one redeye section (four teams with six launchers per team) which are normally employed to protect

the regimental CP, the air cavalry troop, the aviation platoon, and the regimental field trains.[14]

The armored cavalry squadron employs a tank company, and a 155mm howitzer battery, and three armored cavalry troops. The tank company consists of seventeen M60A1 tanks (Figure 6-6).[15] This company is normally employed as the squadron reserve. The howitzer battery (Figure 6-7)[16] provides both conventional and nuclear fire support for the squadron. In a rear area security mission, howitzer sections may be collocated with the armored cavalry troops or employed as a battery. The three armored cavalry platoons in each of the three armored cavalry troops are combined arms teams. Each of these platoons provide 152mm antitank fire with its six AR/AAVs, 4.2 inch (SP) mortar fire, and a mechanized infantry squad. The six redeye teams provide a one-team SHORAD capability for the squadron CP and each troop/company/battery.

The firepower capability of the regiment meets or exceeds the anticipated requirements for RAS in all areas except air defense (AD). The only dedicated AD capability is the limited number of redeye teams. The availability of small arms for air defense (SAFAD) is extensive. A 1975 USACGSC student thesis on the SHORAD requirements of the ACR examined the SAFAD capability and reached the following conclusions:

> 1. As a supplement to passive and other active air defense measures, properly employed SAFAD can degrade a Soviet air attack by the destruction of aircraft or the psychological effect of tracers employed in volume fire.

MISSION. To close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect.
ASSIGNMENT. Organic to Armored Cavalry Squadron Armored Cavalry Regiment, TOE 17-55.
CAPABILITIES. a. Attacks or counterattacks under hostile fire

b. Destroys enemy armor by fire.
c. Supports mechanized infantry, infantry, reconnaissance, or other tank units by fire, maneuver, and shock action.
d. Provides the mobility, armor protection, and firepower to successfully exploit the effects of nuclear and nonnuclear fire support.



SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS

GUN TANK 105-MM BILI	17
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	1
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 HB FLEX	2
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 HB BILI	19
MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM BILI	17
PISTOL CAL .45	71
RIFLE 5.56-MM	24
SUBMACHINE GUN CAL .45	36

VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT

CARRIER CP LT TRACK M577A1	1
CARRIER PERSONNEL FULL TRACK M113A1	1
RECOVERY VEHICLE MEDIUM M88	1
TANK CBT FULL TRACK 105-MM GUN M60A1	17
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	1
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	1
TRAILER TANK WATER 400-GAL M149	1
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	2
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	3

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT

RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	10
RADIAC METER IM-147/PD	
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	1
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	
RADIO SET AN/VRC-12	
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	
RADIO SET AN/VRC-64	2
RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	
TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN/PAS-5	
BULLDOZER EARTH MOVING TK MTG	
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PSS-11	
METASCOPE AN/PAS-6	
NIGHT SIGHT CREW-SERVED WPNS AN/TVS-2	1
NIGHT VISION SIGHT INDIVIDUAL WPN AN/PVS-2	
SEARCHLIGHT AN/VSS-1	1

FIGURE 6-6. ORGANIZATION OF A TANK COMPANY (MODIFIED), ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference

MISSION. To provide fire support for the armored cavalry squadron, armored cavalry regiment and to furnish its portion of the target acquisition, communication, and survey systems.

ASSIGNMENT. Organic to the armored cavalry squadron, armored cavalry regiment. TOE 17-55.

CAPABILITIES. a. Artillery fire support, cross-country mobility, rapid emplacement, and furnishing its portion of the armored cavalry squadron's target acquisition, communication and survey systems.

b. Transportation of 150 rounds per howitzer of the prescribed basic load of artillery ammunition of 275 rounds per howitzer.

c. Additional capability to safeguard nuclear materials will be provided by attachment of the appropriate number of teams for USA FA Security Team—Cannon, TOE 6-500.



* 3 sections have only 8 men each.

** 1 section has 1 officer and 2 enlisted men; 2 sections have 2 enlisted men each.

SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS

HOWITZER 155-MM BILI	6
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	5
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 HB BILI	6
MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM FLEX	3
PISTOL CAL .45	3
RIFLE 5.56-MM	114
SUBMACHINEGUN CAL .45	2

VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT

CARRIER CP LT TRACK M577A1	1
CARRIER CARGO FT M548	6
HOWITZER SP FULL-TRACK 155-MM M109A1	6
RECOVERY VEHICLE LIGHT M578	1
TRAILER AMMO 1-1/2-TON M332	3
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	4
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	1
TRAILER TANK WATER 400 GAL M149	1
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M561	4
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 4x4 W/WN M715	1
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	4
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON W/WN M35A2	1
TRUCK CARGO 5-TON 6x6 W/WN M54A2	4
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	5

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONICS EQUIPMENT

INTERCOMMUNICATION SET AN/VIC-1	6
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	4
RADIAC METER IM-147/PD	2
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	2
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	1
RADIO SET AN/GRC-106	2
RADIO SET AN/GRC-160	3
RADIO SET AN/PRC-77	2
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	9
RADIO SET CONTROL GROUP AN/GRA-39	8
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	1
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-993/GT	1
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	25

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT

BINOCULAR ELECTRONIC AN/PAS-5	7
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	1
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PSS-11	1
RANGE FINDER AN/GVS-3	3

FIGURE 6-7. ORGANIZATION OF 155MM FA BN (SP), ARMORED CAVALRY SQUADRON(MOD), ACR

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference

2. The armored cavalry regiment, the 3556 automatic weapons ranging from 5.56mm to 20mm, has an enormous SAFAD capability.

3. The highest percentage (69%) of 7.62mm to 20mm automatic weapon capability of the regiment is concentrated in the 9 armored cavalry troops.

4. Realistic, effective training in the volume of fire technique, as outlined in Test TC 23-44, must be conducted to produce soldier confidence and an instinctive, aggressive reaction to air attack.

5. Reflecting an apathetic attitude toward SAFAD in the past, current US Army automatic small arms lack efficient, effective sights and mounts for employment against aerial targets.[17]

The summary conclusion of this thesis is that the ACR does not possess an adequate air defense capability to protect itself from low altitude air attack or air assault by heliborne infantry escorted by armed helicopters and high performance aircraft such as the SU-7B, the MIG-21MF and the MIG-23.

Training for the employment of organic weapons is included in the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) being drafted at the U.S. Army Armor School. In its present draft form, the armored cavalry ARTEP includes training tasks for offensive, defensive, reconnaissance and security type missions, but does not provide for training in tasks associated with countering an airborne or air assault attack.[18]

The communications capability of the ACR includes AM, FM, and wire type voice communications, radio teletype (RATT), and speech security equipment. This entire spectrum of communications is available at regiment and squadron levels. At troop/company level, the secure voice capability is not available. The armored cavalry troop and the 155mm (SP)

battery have an AM capability which permits operations over extensive ranges (see equipment summaries at Figures 6-1 through 6-7). The regiment's communication equipment is allocated and employed to meet the requirements for communications with organic and higher echelon elements. In a stationary environment, the civilian communications system could be integrated using wire and voice integration techniques. Thus, the ACR provides dedicated, flexible communications capable of integrating military and civilian communications to provide area-wide surveillance and warning system.

The communications capability relates directly to the capability to gather and process information for intelligence. The basic mission capability of the regiment is oriented on reconnaissance, which is the gathering and reporting of information. The training of the ACR is oriented on conventional military information gathering and reporting. Personnel are trained in the techniques of ground and aerial terrain reconnaissance and the recognition of enemy vehicles and equipment. The regiment's capability to intermingle with the local populace and civilian agencies to gather information on enemy agents, terrorists, infiltrators and partisan organizations is limited by the combat nature of the organization. Under most circumstances, a military intelligence detachment, a psychological warfare team, and a civil affairs team will be provided from corps to assist in processing information, conducting propaganda campaigns, and interfacing

with the civilian populace.[19] This discussion serves to support the TOE capability statement that the ACR "operates in support of forces engaged in stability operations."

Command and Control

The ACR maintains unity of command and organizational integrity of the squadrons, the air cavalry troop and the attached or supporting units by centralized planning and decentralized execution.

Command Posts (CP's) and Command Groups are the principle command and control agencies from regiment through troop. At the platoon level, the focal point is on the platoon leader and on the platoon sergeant in his absence. The platoon sergeant plays a major role in assisting the platoon leader in control of the platoon, as the platoon is normally employed in two or more teams.[21]

The concept of centralized planning for decentralized execution provides the basic philosophy for control of subordinate elements at all levels in the regiment. Cavalry units are trained and equipped to conduct relatively independent operations down to and including the squad level. This concept is enhanced by the extensive and flexible communications discussed under organizational capabilities. The availability of command and control aircraft at regiment and squadron levels enhances the commander's capability to exercise personal control. These aircraft are frequently available at the

troop/company/battery level to facilitate command, control, reconnaissance and observation.

The command and control structure of the ACR provides an organic capability to plan and execute RAS. Particularly noteable is the organic combined arms force under a single commander responsible for the employment of his unit. The extensive communications and mobility at all levels of command provides the ACR with a capability to disperse subordinate command echelons over a wide geographical area and to retain responsiveness throughout the command structure.

THE CORPS RESERVE FORCE

(Separate Mechanized Brigade)

Mission

The corps normally retains a brigade-size reserve that includes ground maneuver forces and an attack helicopter capability. A primary consideration of the commander is to correctly visualize the battle so that reserve forces can be prepositioned for rapid deployment to thicken the defense in front of and on the shoulders of the main thrust(s) and net the advantages accrued by the defender. The reserve force is used to reinforce, block, or conduct limited objective counterattacks. It must be prepared to move rapidly over the battlefield to strike against major enemy thrust(s) to improve the combat power ratio and to gain time for other forces to mass and move to the threatened area. This concept of the

employment of reserve forces is provided as instructional material at USACGSC as a portion of a concept paper on emerging antiarmor doctrine.[22] The prepositioning of a corps reserve force applying the above concept is shown at Figure 6-8.

In the scenario for forward deployed force operations (European setting) the corps reserve force, a separate mechanized brigade, was given the following missions:

a. Prepare to block in avenues of enemy main effort.

b. Prepare to reinforce the 25th Armored Division, 23d Armored Division, or 52d Mechanized Division in order.

c. Prepare to conduct corps rear area security operations in the corps rear.

The ACR (minus the armored cavalry squadrons) was also assigned to the reserve force. The air cavalry troop provided the reserve force with an attack helicopter capability and a limited aeroscout and air assault (aerorifle platoon) capability. The regiment (-) had the initial mission of surveillance in the corps rear area. When, and if, the squadrons were returned from control of the committed divisions, the ACR mission was to:

a. Prepare to conduct screening operations to detect enemy units that may have infiltrated through the committed divisions.

b. Prepare to reinforce the 24th Armored Division, 23d Armored Division, or 52d Mechanized Division, in order.

c. Prepare to conduct corps rear area security operations in the corps rear.

The final component of the corps reserve force was an attack aviation (helicopter) battalion. Companies of the aviation



FIGURE 6-8. PREPOSITIONED CORPS RESERVE

SOURCE: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, M161, P3-11-15

battalion were assigned to the committed divisions during the covering force phase. After release from the divisions, the battalion was put in reserve.[23]

An interesting aspect of this scenario is that the updated OPLAN for use in the 1976/77 USACGSC year employs a two division force with only the separate mechanized brigade in reserve. Under this concept, only the brigade is tasked with RAS. The ACR is divided and assigned to the divisions with no "prepare to" mission to release those elements to corps for RAS. The aviation battalion is given a general support mission.[24]

The latter concept more closely conforms with the emerging doctrine of a small reserve force and of retaining the ACR forward with the divisions after their withdrawal from the covering force area. However, if the reserve is committed, there is no tactical force in the corps rear. This may not be a change in fact because under either concept the separate brigade reserve force must be positioned well forward in the corps rear area or division rear area to reduce the time/space required for employment against an enemy thrust. In the case of the first scenario, the ACR (-) capability to conduct effective surveillance of the 15,600 square kilometer corps rear area is questionable. If, in the first case, the reserve mechanized brigade were committed to block or reinforce in the division areas and the squadrons of the ACR were deployed

in the corps rear area for RAS, the time/distance factor would preclude the effective employment of the ACR as a reserve to the committed divisions.

In either case, the reserve mission is not compatible with the RAS mission criteria. Because of its mission, the reserve force could not effectively provide a single organization for continuous integrated RAS planning, rehearsing, and operations.

The TOE mission of the separate infantry brigade (mechanized) (Figure 6-9) is: "To destroy enemy military forces and to control land areas including populations and resources." On the surface, this statement appears compatible with the requirements for RAS. The independent nature of any of the separate brigades makes them a likely candidate for RAS. However, this analysis is intended as an evaluation of the corps reserve force being given the additional mission of RAS. The separate infantry brigade (mechanized) is used as a basis for evaluation since it is generally considered as an "ideal" brigade size reserve force.

Organization and Training

The organization and training factors vary with the particular force tasked to the reserve mission.

The separate infantry brigade consists of:

a. A headquarters and headquarters company (HHC).

b. An armored cavalry troop.



*Number and type Maneuver Battalions may vary.

FIGURE 6-9. ORGANIZATION OF THE SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED)

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 37-100H, Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970), p. 2.

c. A combat engineer company.

d. A support battalion.

e. A field artillery battalion, 155mm, self-propelled.

f. A maneuver force of up to five mechanized infantry and tank battalions.

At level one, the TOE capabilities of the brigade are as follows:

1. Conducts independent offensive and defensive operations in nuclear and non-nuclear warfare.

2. Conducts sustained combat operations against most types of opposing forces in areas where a military force of less than a division size is required, or as part of a larger force.

3. Conducts mobile offensive operations characterized by rapid movement and wide dispersal to include deep penetration, exploitation and pursuit.

4. Conducts operations requiring shielding against nuclear, small arms and shell fragment effects.

5. As part of a larger force performs covering force operations and/or acts as a mobile counterattack force.

6. Operates as part of a joint amphibious force.

7. Controls enemy populations and restores order.

8. May be attached to and operate as part of a division.

The capabilities of the brigade are limited by the following:

1. No organic airlift capability.

2. Restricted vehicular mobility in jungle, dense forest, untrafficable terrain and over water obstacles.

3. Requires considerable logistical support in order to maintain its mobility and striking power.

4. Limited air defense capability.[25]

The brigade also requires corps or army signal support for an external communication capability.

A review of the mobility factors in the brigade TOEs indicates that, except for the support battalion, the brigade is one hundred percent mobile in organic vehicles. This provides the capability to rapidly mass combat power. The armor shielded firepower and mobility of mechanized infantry and tank battalions provides an excellent capability for convoy escort and response by ground forces to an airborne and/or air assault. The absence of an airlift capability limits the brigade's ability for rapid response over the large corps rear area. The lack of an organic observation helicopter and/or attack helicopter unit reduces the brigade's organic capability to provide flank security to convoys, area surveillance, and intermediate response to a surprise airborne/air assault attack. As a corps reserve force, the brigade will usually be augmented with aviation support from the corps aviation brigade. Training in airmobile operations is not included in the ARTEP training and evaluation outlines (T and E) of the mechanized infantry battalion.[26] This is particularly interesting in view of the stated TOE capability of the mechanized infantry battalion to "participate in airmobile operations when provided with air transport." In any case, if the brigade were assigned RAS, elements of the mechanized infantry battalions can be trained and employed in airmobile operations.

The firepower capability of the separate brigade is excellent in all calibers of automatic small arms, antiarmor

and artillery to include the 4.2 inch and 81mm mortars in the maneuver battalions. The augmentation of tactical air control parties and an attack helicopter unit broadens the spectrum of firepower. The most limiting aspect is the lack of AD weapons. The four redeye teams in HHC (Figure 6-10) provide only a limited SHORAD capability to the large headquarters, trains, and support activities of the brigade. The field artillery battalion (Figure 6-11) and each of the maneuver battalions (Figures 6-12 and 6-13) assigned have five redeye teams providing a one team SHORAD capability each to the battalion CP, trains and company/battery. This does not meet the AD criteria contemplated in countering the enemy aircraft associated with delivering and escorting an airborne/air assault in the corps rear area. In general, any single unit employed as the corps reserve force would not have the AD capability contemplated in the establishment of this criteria.

The brigade has an extensive internal communications system consisting of AM, FM, radio teletype, secure speech equipment, and wire. These components extend to each battalion size unit and provide a dedicated and flexible internal communication capability. The capability to extend this system externally to civilian agencies requires support from the corps signal brigade. As a corps reserve force, this integration capability is reduced. The practicability of extending a system of wire communications is questionable. The forward disposition of the reserve force limits its capability



FIGURE 6-10. ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED)

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 37-102H, HHC, Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975), p. 2.

MISSION. To provide field artillery fires in direct support of a separate armored brigade, or in general support of the supported forces. To reinforce fires of other artillery units.

ASSIGNMENT. Organic to Separate Armored Brigade, TOE 17-100.

CAPABILITIES. a. Providing close and continuous artillery support, including target acquisition, communication, ballistic meteorology, liaison, and survey.
b. Reinforcing the fires of other field artillery battalions.
c. Rapid displacement and crosscountry mobility.
d. Providing a field artillery battalion group headquarters for a brigade.
e. Providing survey control for organic batteries and attached units.
f. Provides air defense against low altitude hostile aircraft.
g. Procures and distributes all classes of supplies to organic batteries, maintains appropriate supply and materiel records, and transports its prescribed basic load of ammunition.



SUMMARY OF EQUIPMENT

WEAPONS	
HOWITZER 155-MM BILI	18
LAUNCHER GRENADE M203	46
LAUNCHER ROCKET MULTIPLE 115-MM	3
MACHINE GUN 7.62-MM FLEX	33
MACHINE GUN CAL .50 BILI	20
PISTOL CAL .45	25
RIFLE 5.56-MM	565
SUBMACHINE GUN CAL .45	4

VEHICLES AND VEHICLE EQUIPMENT	
CARRIER CP LT TRACK M577A1	10
CARRIER CARGO TRACK M548	18
HOWITZER SP 155-MM M109A1	18
RECOVERY VEHICLE LIGHT M578	2
TRAILER CARGO 1/4-TON M416	16
TRAILER CARGO 1-1/2-TON M105A2	10
TRAILER TANK WATER 400 GAL M149	5
TRUCK AMBULANCE 1/4-TON M718	1
TRUCK CARGO 1-1/4-TON 6x6 M561	15
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON M35A2	18
TRUCK CARGO 2-1/2-TON W/WN M35A2	5
TRUCK CARGO 8-TON 4x4 M520	18
TRUCK TANK FUEL SVC 2500 GAL 4x4 M559	2
TRUCK UTILITY 1/4-TON M151A2	22
TRUCK WRECKER 10-TON 4x4 M553	1

COMMUNICATION-ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT	
ELECTRONIC TT SCTY EQUIP TSEC/KW-7	3
HEADSET MICROPHONE H-182/PT	31
RADAR SET AN/MPQ-4	1
RADAR SET AN/TPS-25	1
RADIAC METER IM-93/UD	22
RADIAC METER IM-174/PD	9
RADIAC SET AN/PDR-27	5
RADIO SET AN/GRC-160	14
RADIO SET AN/PRC-77	8
RADIO SET AN/VRC-46	21
RADIO SET AN/VRC-47	8
RADIO SET AN/VRC-49	5
RADIO SET CON GP AN/GRA-39	35
RADIO TT SET AN/GRC-142	3
SPEECH SCTY EQUIP TSEC/KY-38	17
SWITCHBOARD TEL MANUAL SB-22/PT	8
TELEPHONE SET TA-1/PT	8
TELEPHONE SET TA-264/PT	1
TELEPHONE SET TA-312/PT	121

MISCELLANEOUS EQUIPMENT	
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PRS-4	5
DETECTING SET MINE PTBL AN/PPS-11	5
RANGE FINDER (LASER)	10

FIGURE 6-11. ORGANIZATION OF FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION 155MM, SP, SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED)

SOURCE: U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data (Fort Knox: 1976), p. 229.



1. MISSION

To close with the enemy by means of fire and maneuver in order to destroy or capture him or to repel his assault by fire, close combat, and counterattack.

2. ASSIGNMENT

Organic to:

a. Armored division, TOE 17.
b. Mechanized division, TOE 37.
c. Separate armored brigade, TOE 17-100.
d. Separate mechanized brigade, TOE 37-100.
e. Separate infantry brigade, TOE 7-100.

[1]Equipped with 18 TOWS and 27 Dragons.

3. CAPABILITIES

a. Provides base of fire and maneuver elements.
b. Secures and holds terrain.
c. Conducts independent operation on a limited scale.
d. Furnishes limited antitank protection.
e. Provides indirect fire support for organic and attached units.
f. Conducts long-range patrolling when appropriately equipped.
g. Participates in airmobile operations when provided with air transport.
h. Possesses high cross-country mobility to exploit the effects of mass destruction weapons.
i. Complements and enhances the inherent capabilities of tank elements employed in tank/infantry teams.

FIGURE 6-12. ORGANIZATION OF MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION

SOURCE: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, RB101-1 (Fort Leavenworth: 1975), p. 7-10.



1. MISSION

To close with and destroy enemy forces using fire, maneuver, and shock effect.

2. ASSIGNMENT

Organic to:

a. Armored division, TOE 17.
b. Infantry division, TOE 7.
c. Mechanized division, TOE 37.
d. Separate armored brigade, TOE 17–100.
e. Separate infantry brigade, TOE 7–100.
f. Separate mechanized brigade, TOE 37–100. 3.

3. CAPABILITIES

a. Conducts operations requiring a high degree of firepower, mobility, armor protection, and shock effect.

b. Attacks or counterattacks under hostile fire.

c. Destroys enemy armor by fire.

d. Organizes, commands, and controls combined arms teams through cross-attachment with infantry or mechanized infantry, to engage the enemy with fire, maneuver, and shock effect.

e. Provides the mobility, armor protection, firepower, and flexible communications to successfully exploit the effects of nuclear and nonnuclear fire support.

f. Conducts combat operations under limited visibility conditions employing night viewing devices and surveillance equipment.

FIGURE 6-13. ORGANIZATION OF TANK BATTALION

SOURCE: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, RB 101-1 (Fort Leavenworth: 1975), p. 7-8.

to communicate with elements in the rear of the corps rear area. To attain this capability would require a system of transmission relay points through other elements in the corps rear area; i.e., military police units that are in contact with civilian agencies and dispersed throughout the corps.

The tactical necessity to retain the reserve force in forward positions and in a ready posture eliminates its intelligence collecting capability. The armored cavalry troop (Figure 6-14), the scout platoons of the maneuver battalions, the engineer company (Figure 6-15), and the military police section provide the separate brigade the capability to obtain information about the area of operations. However, the brigade is excluded from intelligence operations because of its reserve mission. As was the case with the ACR, the reserve force does not have a real capability to establish and integrate an intelligence system with civilian agencies. A search of training references indicates that no training is conducted in the methods of integrating communications and intelligence between combat units and civilian agencies at the brigade and maneuver battalion levels. This void is normally filled by augmenting the brigade with a military intelligence detachment and civil affairs and psychological operations teams.

Command and Control

The unique aspect of command and control for the corps reserve force is that its primary mission is to provide



FIGURE 6-14. ORGANIZATION OF ARMORED CAVALRY TROOP, SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED)

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 17-107H, Armored Cavalry Troop, Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975), p. I-02.



*Title changes to Bridge Section when organized under Variation 20.

FIGURE 6-15. ORGANIZATION OF ENGINEER COMPANY, SEPARATE INFANTRY BRIGADE (MECHANIZED)

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 5-127H (Washington, D.C.: 1970), p. I-02.

reinforcements to the forward divisions. As such, the corps commander exercises direct control over its employment. The positioning of the reserve is dictated by the corps commander's estimate of the threat. If the corps retains control of division reserve forces, the corps reserve may be employed more actively in RAS. Even under such a condition, it is unlikely that the brigade would be dispersed throughout the corps rear area. To do so would significantly reduce its capability to mass rapidly for employment in the division areas. Control of operations must be highly centralized and thus less responsive to RAS requirements.

MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

Mission

The military police (MP) brigade assigned to the corps has the mission to provide area-oriented and function-oriented support to the corps.[28]

Function oriented military police support concerns a single functional area or mission as a part of the overall MP support to an operation. The general functional areas are:

a. Tactical and physical security.
b. Route and area reconnaissance.
c. Circulation control.
d. Enemy prisoner of war movement and control.
e. Crime prevention.
f. Enforcement.
g. Criminal investigation.
h. Confinement of military prisoners.
i. Rear area protection.[29]

Frequently, these missions require that specially organized, equipped, and trained personnel be dedicated to that mission. This requirement dictates that special TOE units be organized to perform that task.[30] These units are assigned to the corps MP brigade and attached to the supported unit. Area-oriented MP support is the performance by a single unit of a range of MP functions and missions throughout an assigned area of responsibility. The MP battalion may be assigned a population center or a larger geographical area including multiple CSS complexes and a main supply route (MSR). Missions associated with area support will be performed by the MP company (TOE 19-77H) operating under the command and control of a MP battalion (TOE 19-76H).[31] The TOE mission of the MP company is: "To provide military police support for an assigned area or command headquarters."[32] In support of this mission, the headquarters and headquarters detachment of the MP battalion has the TOE mission,

> . . . To provide command, control staff planning, crime investigation, and supervision of administration, training, operations, and logistics for assigned or attached military police units.[33]

The corps MP brigade mission is an area support mission consisting of numerous functional missions. The headquarters and headquarters company of the brigade provides the overall command and control element. Its TOE mission is ". . . To command, coordinate and control the operations of military police groups, battalions and other assigned or attached units."[34]

Thus, the corps MP brigade is a single organization with area and functional missions oriented primarily on the corps rear area. The brigade and battalion headquarters mission is parallel to the RAS criteria for continuous integrated planning, rehearsing, and execution of RAS operations.

Organization and Training

The corps MP brigade organization is flexible. The size of the brigade will be determined by the number of divisions supported, intensity of the threat, size of the corps rear area, and RAP requirements. A type brigade organization provided by the U.S. Army Military Police School (USAMPS) for a three division corps is shown at Figure 6-16. This brigade organization includes two MP battalions (TOE 19-76H) and two composite battalions (TOE 19-500H). The notable TOE capabilities of the brigade headquarters and headquarters company (Figure 6-17) are . . .

> 4. Operation of the brigade radio and wire communi cation system.
>
> 5. Coordination and direction of the brigade's rear area protection activities, to include participation in combat operations against minor enemy elements when required.
>
> 6. Liaison with appropriate headquarters and civil police agencies.
>
> 7. Organic aircraft to the brigade for command and control.[35]

The particularly unique aspect of these capabilities are the capabilities for RAS coordination and direction and the capability for liaison with civil police agencies.



FIGURE 6-16. ORGANIZATION OF A TYPE MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

SOURCE: U.S. Army Military Police School.



*Not required when organized under SRC 19262H420.
#Direct access to Commander, as a personal staff officer; as required.

FIGURE 6-17. ORGANIZATION OF HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 19-262H, HHC, Military Police Brigade TAACOM or Corps, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975), p. I-02.

The number of MP battalions (TOE 19-76H) assigned to the brigade may vary based on the factors discussed above. As a general rule, two battalions of this type are a minimum. One battalion is assigned forward in the corps area to support each of the committed divisions and one battalion is assigned to the corps rear area to provide area-wide support. The TOE capabilities of the headquarters and headquarters detachment of the MP battalion (Figure 6-18) are:

> 1. Command and staff planning, administration and supervision of battalion operations for two to six military police companies.
>
> 2. Supervision of subordinate units organizational supply, communications and maintenance.
>
> 3. Military police investigation support within the battalion area of responsibility.
>
> 4. Supervision of and assistance to subordinate units in training and administration.
>
> 5. Operation of the battalion communications system.
>
> 6. Coordination of battalion activities to include rear area protection, populace and resources control, and participation in combat offensive and defensive operations against minor enemy elements when required.
>
> 7. Within capability, support for rear area operations center, when directed.
>
> 8. Liaison with appropriate headquarters and agencies.
>
> 9. Supervision of selecting, organizing, training, equipping, and employing indigenous military and paramilitary police units.[36]

The MP company (TOE 19-77H) as shown in Figure 6-19 is the operating unit of most concern in this research. Each of these companies is assigned an area of responsibility for area oriented support. One company is generally placed in general support of the corps and MP brigade headquarters.[37] At level 1, the TOE capabilities with respect to its assigned area of



FIGURE 6-18. HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT MILITARY POLICE BATTALION

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 19-76H, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975), p. 2.



FIGURE 6-19. ORGANIZATION OF MILITARY POLICE COMPANY

SOURCE: Department of the Army, TOE 19-77H, Military Police Company (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975), p. 2.

operations are:

1. Circulation control of traffic and individuals.
2. Physical security protection of installations, facilities, and property.
3. Intransit protection of military supplies and equipment.
4. Route reconnaissance.
5. Handling of prisoners of war and civilian internees.
6. Rear area protection operations.
7. Crime prevention and investigation.
8. Enforcement of military laws, orders, and regulations.
9. Controls up to ninety miles of main supply route.
10. Operates up to three military police stations.
11. Operates military police patrols, checkpoints, and similar security posts or combinations thereof.
12. Participates in combat offensive and defensive operations against minor enemy elements when required.
13. When organized under SRC 19077H420, is capable of landing by parachute.[38]

The company is thirty-three percent mobile in its organic vehicles. However, an examination of the TOE reveals that there are three 1/4-ton trucks (Jeeps) organic to each of the twelve MP squads. When augmented, each platoon has two armored personnel carriers (M113).[39] This provides the company with ground mobility necessary for normal operations and particularly for convoy escort. To improve this capability, the company may be augmented with MP teams (TOE 19-1510) for additional armored vehicle security support. Currently, each of these teams consists of two armored personnel carriers (M113) and six personnel per MP armored vehicle squad. These armored personnel carriers may be replaced with a wheeled

armored vehicle similar to the V-100's used in Vietnam. Thus, the ground mobility of the MP battalion/company can be expanded by augmentation.

The two composite MP battalions (TOE 19-500H) are organized to command and control MP elements attached to other units or having specific missions. The brigade organization shown at Figure 6-14 includes an escort guard company, a guard company, a POW processing company, and a confinement facility team under one composite battalion (POW and confinement battalion) and two MP companies (TOE 19-77H) and a physical security company under the other composite battalion. The effect of these battalions on the brigade's RAS capability is limited by the specific missions that the assigned elements perform. The MP escort guard company's capability is limited to providing security for the movement of POWs and civilian internees. The MP guard company is normally tasked to provide guards for confinement facilities, other military facilities and installations, or to transportation railway operations.[40] Concerning the latter, this company may contribute significantly to the lines of communications (LOC) security system if so assigned. In any case, this is an important aspect of the overall capability of the MP brigade as a RAS force. The POW processing company and the confinement facility team are small, unarmed (except for individual weapons), administrative organizations with no impact on RAS except to the extent that they are detailed for local guard duty.

In the second composite battalion, the physical security company(s) are assigned based on the requirement to provide special weapons security in support of special ammunition supply points and engineer atomic demolition mine (ADM) companies.[41] This company provides a significant contribution to the overall RAS integrated system. However, it is not anticipated that this company would be deployed in another role except to the extent that a requirement for its specific mission ceased to exist, in which case it provides the brigade a significant company-size combat capability.

The two MP companies (TOE 19-77H) assigned to the composite battalion are assigned specific missions of headquarters security. However, these companies may be augmented, as previously discussed, and be assigned an area of responsibility for area support. The availability of these company command and control elements significantly enhances the brigade's RAS capability.

In view of the established criteria for mobility for RAS, the brigade is seriously deficient. It is entirely ground mobile with no airlift capability or force specifically tailored and trained for air mobile assault. Its ability to maneuver to position combat power is not only limited by its lack of air mobility but by the limited track and wheel mobility of the MP companies; thirty-three percent in organic vehicles. The significance of this deficiency is further highlighted by the deficiencies in training in critical tasks.

A USACGSC student (military police branch) made a comparative analysis between the tasks required to perform ARTEP missions and the MP soldiers institutional training (basic combat training, basic law enforcement training, noncommissioned officer basic/advanced courses). The purpose of that research was to identify individual soldier skills that require training at the unit level to prepare the unit for ARTEP missions at Level 1 and 2. The findings indicate that no training peculiar to the unit missions (including RAP) are taught in the following categories:

a. Communications in an electronic warfare environment.

b. Map reading.

c. Selection and preparation of defensive positions, to include terrain analysis.

d. Combat in built-up areas.

e. Planning for, requesting and adjustment of supporting fires.

f. Movement to contact techniques to include fire and maneuver.

g. NBC defense and operations an NBC environment.

h. Support of tactical river crossings.[42]

The purpose of including these findings in this analysis of the MP brigade is to highlight the research findings which indicate that military police training is heavy on the noncombat aspects of MP training and light on tactical training.

The MP brigade's organic capability for security of LOCs and convoy security is limited to ground movement. In open terrain flank security can be provided by vehicles accompanying the convoy. However, the lack of organic aircraft

to patrol the flanks in depth limits the degree of security provide in close terrain.

Firepower organic to the brigade is limited to small arms (to include the caliber 50 machineguns mounted on the armored personnel carriers), the M72A2 (LAW) antitank weapon that is issued on an "as required basis," and the redeye teams assigned for command post AD at the brigade and battalion level. A summary of weapons authorized by TOE is as follows (pistols and 7.62mm rifles excluded):

MP Brigade Headquarters Company:

-40mm grenade launcher	4
-Machinegun, 7.62mm	2

MP Battalion (TOE 19-76H):

-Machinegun, Caliber 50	1

MP Company (TOE 19-77H):

-40mm grenade launcher	12
-Machinegun, 7.62mm	16
-Machinegun, Caliber 50 (APC mount)	6

MP Escort Guard Company:

-Machinegun, 7.62mm	5

MP Guard Company:

-40mm grenade launcher	9
-Machinegun, 6.62mm	7

MP Composite Battalion (2):

-Machinegun, 7.62mm	2

MP Physical Security Company:

-40mm grenade launcher	9
-Machinegun, 7.62mm	11
-Recoilless rifle, 90mm	1

Thus, the MP brigade does not meet the criteria of providing effective antitank, air defense, or indirect fire support. Tactical air control parties (TACP) can be assigned to the

brigade to enhance its capability to counter an airborne (air assault) attack. However, there is no indication that this is a normal augmentation to the MP brigade.

The communications capability of the brigade is ideal for RAS. This system provides extensive AM, FM, radio teletype and wire communications as well as the capability to integrate the brigade communications system with that of civilian agencies (equipment augmentation required). The fact that this integrated communication system is established as a part of the normal MP support mission in the corps rear area is a significant advantage in employing this force in RAS.

The integrated communication system enhances the intelligence capability of the MP brigade. The functional and area-oriented missions of the brigade make it the primary source of information in the rear areas at all echelons.

> The close cooperation with local police elements, continual route reconnaissance, and planning for tactical and physical security threats frequently result in early production of intelligence describing an enemy rear area threat.[43]

Command and Control

At division and higher echelons of command, the Provost Marshal (PM) is a member of the special staff. The Theater Army PM is responsible for planning and coordinating MP activities within the theater and for exercising technical supervision over MP operations throughout the command. The PM staff section coordinates MP functional areas that are divided among the sections of the coordinating staff. An MP

officer and enlisted personnel are assigned to sections of the coordinating staff group to address tasks pertaining to MP missions. At the corps level, the commander of the MP brigade serves as the Provost Marshal on the corps commander's special staff and is supported by a PM section consisting of a deputy PM, operations branch, enforcement branch physical security branch, POW branch, and circulation branch. At the corps support command (COSCOM), MP areas of responsibility are coordinated by MP representatives on the coordinating staff, much as at the theater army level.[45] This command and staff organization provides unity of command for MP operations throughout the corps area. As such, the entire MP organization provides for centralized planning, coordination, and technical supervision at each major command level and decentralized operations down to the MP company that is assigned an area of responsibility for area support.

Summary and Conclusions

The criteria for RAS are grouped into the three categories of mission, organization and training, and command and control to evaluate the ACR, the corps reserve force, and the military police brigade as a potential force for RAS. The findings of this analysis are summarized below.

Armored cavalry regiment. a. Mission. The ACR's mission to provide security, reconnaissance, and economy of force for the corps is not compatible with the RAS requirement for a single organization capable of providing continuous,

integrated planning.

b. Organization and Training. The ACR is organized and trained for highly mobile operations which enhance its capability to provide convoy security and to maneuver combat power. The regiment's airmobile infantry capability is limited to one platoon, but in emergencies, each squadron can provide nine infantry squads and the regiment can draw on its twenty-two utility helicopters for airlift. Except in air defense, the regiment's firepower capability is beyond the expected requirements for RAS. The AD capability is limited to SHORAD and is below the minimum required for RAS. The regiment's communication system is capable of providing a flexible communication system throughout the rear area, but integrating this system with civilian agencies requires augmentation. The intelligence gathering capability of the ACR is limited to conventional military and terrain intelligence.

c. Command and Control. The ACR employs the philosophy of centralized planning and decentralized execution. This philosophy combined with an extensive communication system provides for responsive, but decentralized operations through platoon level.

Corps reserve. a. Mission. The primary mission of the reserve force is to retain the capability to rapidly reinforce the committed divisions. This restricts its ability to deploy in the corps rear area to rehearse and

execute RAS missions.

b. Organization and Training. The criteria for a corps reserve normally requires an adequate mobility and mix of firepower to meet the criteria for RAS. Most reserve forces will require support from assault and assault support helicopter units. The necessity to locate most of the reserve force forward in the corps rear area imposes severe restrictions on its capability to integrate communications and to conduct the requisite intelligence operations.

c. Command and Control. The corps commander exercises direct command and control of the reserve force. The degree of decentralization of operations allowed the reserve for RAS missions depends on the corps commander's estimate of the threat.

Military police brigade. a. Mission. The MP brigade has an area and function oriented mission throughout the corps area that parallels the requirements for RAS.

b. Organization and Training. The MP brigade possesses a limited capability for total security of LOCs. Its ability to provide convoy security is restricted to shallow flank security and roadbound combat vehicles traveling with the convoy. This limitation alone restricts its ability to maneuver and mass combat power against enemy attacks, conventional or unconventional. The lack of emphasis on MP training in fundamentals of tactical operations raises serious doubt as to the effectiveness of MP units employed in combat

operations. The firepower capability of the brigade is unacceptably limited in view of the threat. The extensive and integrated communications of the brigade provides an effective means of command and control and surveillance of the corps rear area. This enhances the intelligence effort. The MP missions in the corps rear area and the close cooperation maintained with civilian police and the local populace provides an intelligence capability unmatched by other units.

c. Command and Control. Command and control of MP units is centralized at the theater PM level and at each subordinate major command level. MP representatives are assigned to coordinating staff sections at each level to assist in MP task planning. At the operational level the execution of area support missions is the responsibility of MP company commanders. This concept of centralized planning, coordination and technical supervision and decentralized execution provides an exceptionally well-organized command and control structure within which to command and control RAS operations.

CHAPTER VI

ENDNOTES

[1]DA, TOE 17-51H, Armored Cavalry Regiment (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970), p. 1.

[2]USACGSC, M3161, "Antiarmor Doctrine," Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting) (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1975), p. 2.

[3]USACGSC, M3161, "X (US) Corps Operations Plan 1," Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting) (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1975), pp. P3-II-1--P3-II-5.

[4]U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, Armor Reference Data, II (Fort Knox: U.S. Army Armor School, 1976), p. 191, citing DA, TOE 17-51H (as changed) Armored Cavalry Regiment (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970), p. 2.

[5]DA, TOE 17-51H, op. cit., p. 3.

[6]Ibid.

[7]U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, op. cit., p. 257.

[8]Ibid., p. 192.

[9]Ibid., p. 197.

[10]DA, FM 101-10-1, Staff Officers Field Manual Organizational, Technical, and Logistical Data (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1971), p. 2-30.

[11]Captain Andrew G. Schnable, Air Cavalry ARTEP Action Officer, U.S. Army Armor School, personal interview, April 9, 1976.

[12]U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, op. cit., p. 263.

[13]U.S. Army Armor School, FM 19-95 (draft), Cavalry (Fort Knox: U.S. Army Armor School, August 1975), p. 6-66.

[14]William F. Daugherty, The SHORAD Requirement of the Armored Cavalry Regiment (unpublished Master's thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975), p. 49.

[15]U.S. Army Armor School, ST 17-1-1, op. cit., p. 266.

[16]Ibid., p. 268.

[17]William Daugherty, op. cit., pp. 73-74.

[18]Captain Andrew G. Schnabel, loc. cit.

[19]U.S. Army Armor School, FM 17-95 (draft), op. cit., pp. 7-16--7-18.

[20]Ibid., pp. 3-9--3-10.

[21]U.S. Army Armor School, FM 17-95 (draft), op. cit., p. G-1.

[22]USACGSC, M3161-1, "Antiarmor Dcotrine," op. cit., p. 3.

[23]USACGSC, M3161-3, OPLAN 1, loc. cit.

[24]USACGSC, M3161-3, "OPLAN 1," Forward Deployed Forces (European Setting) (Fort Leavenworth: USACGSC, 1976), npn.

[25]DA, TOE 37-100H, Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized) (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970), pp. 2-4.

[26]DA, ARTEP 7-45, "Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Combined Arms Task Force," Army Training and Evaluation Program (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 9 September 1975), pp. i-iii.

[27]U.S. Army Military Police School, FM 19-4 (draft), Combat Military Police Support Theater of Operations (Fort McClellan: U.S. Army Military Police School, March 1976), p. 1-3.

[28]Ibid., pp. 4-1--5-51.

[29]Ibid., p. 1-4.

[30]Ibid.

[31]Ibid.

[32]DA, TOE 19-77H, Military Police Company (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 28 June 1974), p. 1.

[33]DA, TOE 19-76H, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Military Police Battalion (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 20 February 1974), p. 1.

[34]DA, TOE 19-262H, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Military Police Brigade, TACOM or Corps (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975) p. 1-03.

[35]Ibid.

[36]DA, TOE 19-76, op. cit., p. 3.

[37]U.S. Army Military Police School, FM 19-4 (draft) op. cit., p. 3-22.

[38]DA, TOE 19-77H, op. cit., p. 3.

[39]Ibid., pp. 16-17.

[40]DA, TOE 19-247H, Military Police Guard Company (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 January 1975), p. I-03

[41]Lieutenant Colonel B. D. Friend, senior military police faculty member, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Personal Interview, March 3, 1976.

[42]Major W. N. Ferguson III, "A Comparative Analysis Between ARTEP 19-27 and Institutional Training," (unpublished research paper (subcourse 9605) United States Army Command and General Staff College, 1976), p. 22.

[43]U.S. Army Military Police School, FM 19-4 (draft), op. cit., p. 5-49.

[44]Ibid., pp. 3-6--3-8.

[45]Ibid., pp. 3-19--3-21.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The overriding objective of this research is to determine which of the three forces being examined is best suited to provide RAS to the corps. In arriving at this determination, it was necessary to first establish a requirement for such a force to be employed in PAS. This necessitated an analysis of the threat and of the current doctrine. This was followed by an analysis of the corps rear area, to provide a basis for criteria for RAS, and finally by an analysis of the forces under consideration. There are four basic questions to be answered by the conclusions drawn from these analysis.

a. What is the probable threat to the corps rear area?

b. Does the current RAS doctrine provide an acceptable defense against the probable threat?

c. What are the criteria for a corps RAS force?

d. What force is most compatible with the established criteria for RAS?

CONCLUSIONS

The corps MP brigade is the best suited force for RAS. This determination is a result of the conclusions drawn in research for the answers to the four questions stated above.

The Probable Threat

a. The Warsaw Pact military forces are organized, equipped, and trained to conduct operations in the enemy rear areas. These operations include partisan, airborne, airmobile, and naval amphibious operations.

b. Partisan guerrilla operations supported by small contingents of specially trained regular forces will be conducted on a continuous basis in support of the main force offensive or defensive operations.

c. Operations in the rear area may be conducted against strategic, operational, or tactical targets. Common to most Warsaw Pack field exercises is a tactical air assault combined with airborne and air landed operation at the greater operational depths. At the corps level, operational, tactical, and small scale special operations are probable.

d. Operational targets most favored by the Soviets include airfields and blocking positions to prevent commitment of the reserves.

e. Tactical air assault operations are commonly used to secure river crossing sites ahead of the main attack.

f. Battalion size forces are normally employed against targets at the tactical level. Airborne operations at the operational level are normally conducted by a regiment or larger force.

g. The Soviets are capable of transporting and air dropping one or more divisions. The most probable conventional

force to be encountered in the corps rear area is a motorized rifle regiment airlanded following an airborne operation.

h. Night descent operations by small forces are frequently employed to achieve surprise and cause confusion.

Doctrine Versus Threat

a. The doctrinal "purpose" of RAS is to prevent interruptions by hostile action to combat support and combat service support operations. In view of the reduced capability of combat support and combat service support units and the increasing threat capability, this purpose statement becomes an increasingly important consideration in the development of RAS doctrine.

b. For the same reasons that the purpose of RAS is becoming increasingly important, the implementing philosophy has become invalid.

c. The "principles of war" govern all military operations to include RAS. The "principles of RAP" provided in current doctrine do not provide a complete list of considerations for RAS operations.

d. The concept of command and control violates the principle of unity of command and degrades the performance capability of the support units and the RAS force.

Criteria for Rear Area Security

a. The primary consideration in establishing criteria for RAS is the "purpose" of RAS.

b. The principles of war combined with the factors effecting employment (METT) provide a basis for establishing the criteria for RAS.

c. The specific criteria to be considered in selecting a force for RAS include the following:

(1) Provide an overall capability to prevent interruptions by hostile action to CS and CSS operations.

(2) Provide a single organization capable of planning, rehearsing, and executing detailed, simple plans.

(3) Provide the capability to rapidly mass and position combat power at any location in the corps rear area.

(4) Provide an airlift capability for a company-size reaction force.

(5) Provide sufficient combat power to eliminate any probable threat without committing the entire force to a decisive engagement.

(6) Provide a dedicated and flexible communication system that can interface with civilian police agencies as well as with other military communication systems.

(7) Provide a combat organization trained and equipped for internal security, air defense, antiarmor, and counter airborne/air assault operations in a day or night environment.

(8) Provide an organization capable of obtaining detailed knowledge of the environmental factors in the corps rear area.

(9) Provide an integrated intelligence system capable of detecting planned enemy actions at all levels of threat.

(10) Provide a single commander with authority and area responsibility for RAS throughout the corps rear area.

(11) Provide a command structure with company and platoon level commanders capable of limited independent operations.

Force Compatibility

a. The specific criteria for a RAS force can be categorized into three elements:

(1) Mission.

(2) Organization and Training.

(a) Mobility.

(b) Firepower.

(c) Communications.

(d) Intelligence.

(3) Command and Control.

These categories provide a basis for a more general discussion of the forces.

b. The ACR is an excellent unit for RAS if it is dedicated to that mission. Its capabilities generally exceed the requirements for RAS except as pertains to its capability to interface with the civilian populace and agencies. If the regiment is not employed as a dedicated RAS force, it has a mission conflict that seriously degrades its capability to provide continuous RAS.

c. The corps reserve force is not a fixed "type" force. Most of the brigade size forces that would be employed as the corps reserve have the organic capability to effectively conduct RAS missions for the corps. However, the requirement to position the reserve force well forward in the corps rear and to maintain the capability to move rapidly to reinforce the committed divisions eliminates the reserve forces capability to provide continuous and effective RAS and communication on an area-wide basis.

d. The MP brigade's area-oriented mission, organization, and command and control structure are parallel to the requirements for RAS. The primary focus of the MP brigade's operations are in the corps rear area and include a significant TOE capability to plan, coordinate, and to a limited extent, to execute RAS operations. The day-to-day contact of the MP with the civilian police and the civilian populace provides a unique capability to maintain surveillance of the corps rear area and to gain access to intelligence sources not usually available to tactical combat units. A major limitation of the MP brigade is its lack of mobility, firepower and tactical training.

RECOMMENDATIONS

a. The role of CSS units in RAS should be to provide perimeter and internal guard for the facility or installation at which it is located.

b. The Corps MP brigade TOE should be changed to provide vehicle, aircraft, and weapons equipment allowances to enable the brigade to provide RAS to the corps.

c. MP organizations at division, corps, and theater army levels should be assigned the primary responsibility for RAS planning, coordination, and execution.

d. The RACC organization should be reduced in size and integrated into the MP battalion headquarters.

e. Except for coordination of local installation security, the COSCOM and support groups should be relieved of their responsibilities for RAS planning and control.

f. The U.S. Army Military Police School should be given the mission to develop RAP doctrine and to develop and conduct training in tasks and missions associated with RAP.

g. Further research should be conducted to determine a more effective doctrine and organization for area damage control operations.

h. Further research is needed to determine how to implement RAS in the COMMZ and the division rear areas.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

FIELD MANUALS

FM 17-1. Armor Operations. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966. Chapter 12, Section XIV provides a discussion of rear area security missions by armor units; the affect of hostile guerrillas on armor, and the deployment and conduct of rear area security by armor units.

FM 17-30. The Armored Brigade. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1969. Chapter 8, Section V, is doctrine concepts for the employment of the armored brigade in rear area security mission as part of corps reserve.

FM 17-36. Armored Cavalry: Platoon, Troop, and Division Armored Cavalry Squadron. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1973. Chapter 9, Section VII provides doctrine on the employment of the armored cavalry squadron in the conduct of rear area security operations for the division.

FM 17-95. The Armored Cavalry Regiment. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1966. This manual provides doctrinal guidance for the armored cavalry regiment in rear area protection missions in the combat and the COMMZ.

FM 17-95. Cavalry, How to Fight Manual. (Initial Draft Manuscript.) Fort Knox: U.S. Army Armor School, 1975. Chapter 6 provides the latest thinking on the employment of the ACR in security operations under the new defense doctrine.

FM 19-4. Combat Military Police Support Theater of Operations (draft). Fort McClellan: U.S. Army Military Police School, March 1976. This manual sets forth the basic concepts of Military Police Combat support doctrine to include organization and operations.

FM 31-85. Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1970. This manual provides the most recent doctrine for organization administration and employment of resources in the conduct of RAP in the COMMZ, Field Army and Corps Rear Area.

FM 100-5. Operation of Army Force in the Field. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1968. Chapter 6, Section VI, provides doctrine for RAP at levels above division.

FM 100-15 (Test). Larger Unit Operations. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1974. This manual prescribes Army Test doctrine and guidance for the establishment, organization, administration and employment of Army Corps, numbered armies, and the theater army. The manual defines the roles, interrelationships, and functions of the various levels of command to include their combat, combat support, and combat service support requirements to conduct operations in all forms and levels of conflict.

FM 101-10-2. Organizational, Technical and Logistic Data Extracts of Nondivisional Tables of Organization and Equipment. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, July 1975. This manual provides TOE mission, allocation, mobility, and capabilities information to cross check TOEs.

PERIODICALS

Barclay, C. N. "Minor Tactics," Military Review (June, 1972). Emphasis western reliance on superior weapons and firepower as opposed to proficiency in small unit tactics which are critical in rear areas.

Battreall, Major Raymond R., Jr. "The Regimental Armored Cavalry Squadron in Area Security," Armor, LXXIV (January-February, 1965), pp. 42-46. A review of the employment of the 3e ACR, in Europe, in a primary mission of rear area security. A discussion of organization, missions and lessons learned during FTX's against the 10th SF.

Chrolak, Walter J. "Threat and Responsibility," Military Police Law Enforcement Journal (Winter, 1974), pp. 24-26. An excellent analysis of the development of the Soviet threat to the rear area.

Cooper, Major Matthew T. "Defending the Division Rear," Marine Corps Gazette, 54, No. 9 (September, 1970), pp. 27-30. A proposal to specifically design a force for rear area security and an outline for associated doctrine.

Department of Defense. "How DoD is Improving the Combat Proportions of U.S. Forces in Europe," Commanders Digest, XVIII (November 20, 1975), 2. A review of the implementation of the PL 95-365 (Nunn-Amendment) to date and the impact on NATO combat power in Europe.

Donnelly, C. L. "The Soviet Desant Concept," International Defense Review (July, 1971), pp. 544-546. A description of the desant concept and the current Soviet training to conduct desant operations in rear areas.

Erickson, John. "Soviet Military Capabilities in Europe," Military Review (January, 1976), p. 63. A review and analysis of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact threat as deployed and modernization of the deployed threat as published in the RUSI Journal.

Long, LTC Harold B., Jr. "Rear Area Protection," Military Police Journal, 17, No. 4 (November, 1967), pp. 5-7.

Sedorenko, A. A. "The Offensive (A Soviet View)," Military Review (February, 1974), pp. 16-18. An analysis of a translated Soviet military writing on offensive doctrine o include airborne operations in the rear area.

The International Institute for Strategic Studies. The Military Balance 1973-1974. London: IISS, 1973. A consolidation of military statistics by country. Comments added.

Turbiville, Graham H. "Soviet Airborne Troops," Military Review (April, 1973), pp. 61-63. A history, current organization and equipment, training and employment review of Soviet airborne troops. Includes a discussion of recent field exercises.

_____. "A Soviet View of Heliborne Assault Operations," Military Review (April, 1973), p. 61. The development of Soviet heliborne capability and current doctrine for employment.

Warmbrod, LTC Karlton. "Defense of Rear Areas," Infantry School Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2 (April, 1952), pp. 5-16. A review of rear area security problems in WWII and Korea. A discussion of the threat and the forces needed to counter that threat.

USACGSC REFERENCE BOOKS

RB 30-1. The Enemy Force. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975. This book provides organization and tactical concepts of a hypothetical enemy force. These concepts parallel the concepts of the Warsaw Pact countries. Good on Airborne Operations.

RB 30-2. Selected U.S. and Soviet Weapons and Equipment. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, July, 1975. This book provides the latest unclassified data available on U.S. and Soviet weapons and equipment, to include aircraft.

RB 54-1. The Corps Support Command. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, August, 1975. This book provides interim treatment of the newest concepts in organization and doctrine of the COSCOM until FM 54-9 is published.

RB 100-6. Antiarmor Operations. Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, September, 1975. Selected readings in antiarmor operations to include "Emerging Antiarmor Doctrine."

TOEs

U.S. Department of the Army. TOE 5-127H. Engineer Company Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1975. Includes C-1.

_____. TOE 17-51H. Armored Cavalry Regiment. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970. Includes C-1.

_____. TOE 17-55H. Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970. Includes C-1 and C-2.

_____. TOE 17-56H. Headquarters and Headquarters Troop Armored Cavalry Squadron, Armored Cavalry Regiment. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970. Includes C-9 and C-11.

_____. TOE 19-47H. Military Police Escort Guard Company. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 September 1974. Includes C-3.

_____. TOE 19-76H. Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Military Police Battalion. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1 September 1974. Includes C-3.

_____. TOE 19-77H. Military Police Company. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 28 June 1974. Includes C-3.

_____. TOE 19-247H. Military Police Guard Company. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 January 1975. Includes C-2.

_____. TOE 19-500H. Military Police Command and Control Teams. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 29 August 1972. Includes C-6.

_____. TOE 29-75H. Support Battalion, Separate Armored Brigade or Support Battalion, Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970.

_____. TOE 37-100. Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970.

U.S. Department of the Army. TOE 37-102H. Headquarters and Headquarters Company Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized). Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 November 1970. Includes C-10 and C-12.

_____. TOE 19-262H. Headquarters and Headquarters Company, Military Police Brigade, TAACOM or Corps. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 September 1974. Includes C-1 and C-2.

ARMY TRAINING AND EVALUATION PROGRAMS

U.S. Department of the Army. ARTEP 7-45. Mechanized Infantry Battalion and Combined Arms Task Force. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 9 September 1975. Provides prescribed training for a Mechanized Infantry Battalion assigned to a Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized).

_____. ARTEP 17-35. Tank Battalion and Combined Arms Task Force. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, August 1975. Provides prescribed training for the tank battalions assigned to the Separate Infantry Brigade (Mechanized).

_____. ARTEP 19-77 (Test Edition). The Military Police Company. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, March 1975. Provides training proposed for the MP company (TOE 19-77).

OTHER REFERENCES

Armor Reference Data. ST 17-1-1, U.S. Army Armor School. Vol. II. Fort Knox, Kentucky, 1976. Data on organization, equipment and tables pertinent to the armored cavalry regiment and modified Seventh Army Cavalry units.

Armstrong, John A. (Ed). Soviet Partisans in World War II. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1964. A summation of research into the origins, operations and effectiveness of Soviet irregular warfare.

Daniels, Harry V. "A Military Police Role in Rear Area Security. Unpublished Student Research Report, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, April, 1974.

Daugherty, William F. The SHORAD Requirement of the Armored Cavalry Regiment. Published Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975.

Ferguson, W. N. III. "A Comparative Analysis Between ARTEP 19-27 and Institutional Training. Unpublished Research Report, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1976. Excellent analysis of skills required and institutional training conducted. Reflects lack of tactical training for MP soldiers.

Graham, Leonard T. "The West German Territorial Army in Support of NATO." Unpublished Research Paper for Course IR99, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1975. A history and analysis of the current organization, mission, and capability of the West German Territorial Army.

Lesson Plans on Rear Area Protection (RAP) Operations. U.S. Army Military Police School, Fort McClellan. Book 2 of Training Program, 1975. Current thinking and doctrine as relates to rear area protection operations and support center procedures.

Prause, Major Jens E. FRG Student. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Personal Interview, November 12, 1975.

"Territorial Heer," Truppen Proxis, September, 1973, pp. 653-657. A study of the wartime tactical missions of the TA.

Sheldon, J. D. U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Logistics. Personal Interview, March 17, 1976.

Wallace, Edwin L. An Army Command Briefing. 1975. An orientation briefing paper on RAP and the support center. Includes a briefing on SOCATS.

U.S. Army Ordnance Center and School. Combat Oriented General Support Information Briefing. Aberdeen Proving Ground: Office of the Deputy Commandant for Combat and Training Developments, Concepts and Studies Division, January 29, 1976. This is a complete command briefing with attached VGTs and a list of questions and answers on COGS.

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Reserve Components Programmed Text. PT 135-1. March 1975. Includes Reserve Component Organizations, Missions, and Mobilization Planning Information.

_____. "Antiarmor Doctrine." Printed Instructional Material for Subcourse M3161-1.

_____. "X (US) Corps Operation Plan 1," Printed Instructional Material for Subcourse M3161-3. Employment of the ACR, Separate Brigade, and Reserve in the Defense.

_____. "Extract of X (US) Corps Operation Plan 9." Printed Instruction Material for Subcourse M3161-11. An OPLAN for employment of the ACR, separate brigade and reserve in a retrograde operation.

APPENDIX

STNAG 2079

STANAG No. 2079
(Edition No. 3)

March / mars 1971

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION
ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION
BUREAU MILITAIRE DE STANDARDISATION

STANDARDIZATION AGREEMENT
ACCORD DE STANDARDISATION

SUBJECT
OBJET

REAR AREA SECURITY AND REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

SECURITE ET PARADE AUX DESTRUCTIONS DANS LA ZONE DES ARRIERES

NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD

MILITARY AGENCY FOR STANDARDIZATION (MAS)
BUREAU MILITAIRE DE STANDARDISATION (BMS)

POSTAL ADDRESS
ADRESSE POSTALE
1110 NATO BRUSSELS

NATO UNCLASSIFIED

TEL.: BRUSSELS 350 100
Ext. 72

LOCATION/BUREAUX
1, RUE ARCHIMEDE
1040 - BRUSSELS

Each transmittal of this document outside the agencies of the U. S. Government must have prior approval of Department of the Army, DARD-PPI

ARMY BOARD

MAS(ARMY)(71)586

10 June 1971

NAVY/ARMY/AIR

Original English/French Translation

To : See Distribution below.

Subject : STANAG 2079 (EDITION NO. 3)(AMENDMENT NO. 1) REAR AREA SECURITY AND REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

Reference : a. MAS(ARMY)(71)161 dated 8 March 1971

Enclosure : I. Revised Annex A to the Terms of Agreement of STANAG 2079 (Edition No. 3)

1. The subject STANAG was promulgated under cover of reference a. Addressees are requested to detach and destroy the existing Annex A to the Terms of Agreement of the STANAG and substitute the enclosed revised Annex A.

2. AAP-4(N) should be amended to reflect the latest status of this STANAG

H.-H. WESCHE,
Rear Admiral, Danish Navy,
Chairman MAS.

DISTRIBUTION

Action : All Members of the Army Board MAS

Information : Remainder of Army Board List B:

SECGENNATO (DS DIV), MC, AGARD, SACEUR, SACLANT, CINCHAN, CINCNORTH, CINCENT, CINCSOUTH, COMNAVSOUTH, CINCEASTLANT, CINCWESTLANT, COMSTRIKFLTLANT, COMSUBACLANT, COMBALTAP, COMLANDSOUTH, COMLANDSOUTHEAST, COMAIRSOUTH, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH COMMAIRCHAN, COMLANDNORWAY, COMNORTHAG, COMCENTAG, COMTWOATAF COMFOURATAF, FINABEL, WEU, SECMAS, SECNAVBD, SECAIRBD, Terminology Coordinator MAS, MAS Library, File, Float, Extra Copies (30)

RF

RESERVATIONS

GREECE: The validity of this STANAG is applicable to the 'Combat Zone' only, since in the ambit of the Communications Zone, the security planning for the Rear Areas and Mass Destruction Control falls within the exclusive national competence.

ITALY: The validity of this STANAG is applicable to the 'Combat Zone' only, since in the ambit of the Communications Zone, the security planning for the Rear Areas and Mass Destruction Control falls within the exclusive national competence.

NETHERLANDS: The implementation of paragraphs 5.b. and 7.d. by units of the Royal NL Air Force will be considered on a case by case basis.

UNITED STATES: The United States Navy (USMC) will use the term "Administrative and Logistics" as the heading for paragraph 4 in the Rear Area Security Operation Order and the Rear Area Damage Control Operation Order in lieu of the present heading of "Service Support".

5. AAP-4(N) should be amended to reflect the latest status of this STANAG.

H.-H. WESCHE,
Rear Admiral, Danish Navy,
Chairman, MAS

DISTRIBUTION:

Action : All Members of the Army Board, MAS

Information : Remainder of Army Board List B:

SECGENNATO (DS DIV), MC, AGARD, SACEUR, SACLANT, CINCHAN, CINCNORTH, CINCENT, CINCSOUTH, COMNAVSOUTH, CINCEASTLANT, CINCWESTLANT, COMSTRIKFLTLANT, COMSUBACLANT, COMBALTAP, COMLANDSOUTH, COMLANDSOUTHEAST, COMAIRSOUTH, COMSTRIKFORSOUTH, COMMAIRCHAN, COMLANDNORWAY, COMNORTHAG, COMCENTAG, COMTWOATAF, COMFOURATAF, FINABEL, WEU, SECMAS, SECNAVBD, SECAIRBD, Terminology Coordinator MAS, MAS Library, File, Float, Extra Copies (30)

AGREEMENT

4. a. The Details of Agreement in the following pages (pages 3 to 7) have been approved by all those nations shown as ratifying them in Annex A(TofA). No departure may be made from the Agreement without consultation with the Military Agency for Standardization.

b. Nations may propose alterations to the Details of Agreement at any time, should they consider them to have become obsolete or require improvement. Such proposals should be submitted at the earliest opportunity to the Military Agency for Standardization, where they are processed in the same manner as the original Agreement.

NATIONAL ORDERS, MANUALS AND INSTRUCTIONS

5. Ratifying nations agree that national orders, manuals and instructions implementing this STANAG will include a reference to the STANAG number for purposes of identification.

H.-H. WESCHE,
Rear Admiral, Danish Navy,
Chairman, MAS

Date of Promulgation: 8 March 1971

RESERVATIONS

GREECE: The validity of this STANAG is applicable to the 'Combat Zone' only, since in the ambit of the Communications Zone, the security planning for the Rear Areas and Mass Destruction Control falls within the exclusive national competence.

ITALY: The validity of this STANAG is applicable to the 'Combat Zone' only, since in the ambit of the Communications Zone, the security planning for the Rear Areas and Mass Destruction Control falls within the exclusive national competence.

NETHERLANDS: The implementation of paragraphs 5.b. and 7.d. by units of the Royal NL Air Force will be considered on a case by case basis.

NON-RATIFICATION OF AMENDMENTS

The following countries have not ratified amendments to this STANAG as shown below:

PORTUGAL) Amendment No. 1 to Edition No. 2

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

4. The following general principles concerning the preparation, use and format of plans and orders are applicable to both rear area security and to rear area damage control:

a. For the Field Army, Communications Zone, Sections of the Communications Zone and comparable commands, it is desirable that responsibility for rear area security and for rear area damage control be combined.

b. An effective system for rear area security, rear area damage control and administrative support must possess the following characteristics:

(1) A definite fixing of geographic responsibilities for these activities.

(2) A single commander responsible for all three functions in the same geographic area.

(3) An operations centre (and alternate operations centre) and the necessary communications.

(4) Provision for prompt integration of transit or lodger units into plans.

c. The commander's plan for rear area security and for rear area damage control should be included in appropriate paragraphs of an Operations Order and/or appropriate annexes. (See STANAG 2014).

d. Close co-ordination of plans for rear area security and rear area damage control is necessary at all levels.

e. Full use should be made of automatic data processing equipment and other electronic and communications equipment to receive, collate and disseminate intelligence, radiological data including fallout and other data, and to assist in the control of rear area security and rear area damage control operations.

REAR AREA SECURITY

5. In addition to the general principles outlined in paragraph 4, the following principles are applicable in the planning for rear area security:

a. The object of rear area security planning is to:

(1) Protect installations and activities located in the rear area against enemy actions, as defined in paragraph 3.b.

(2) Prevent or minimize enemy ground forces (both regular and irregular) interference with logistical and administrative operations.

(3) Destroy or neutralize the hostile forces involved.

7. c. (1) Prior to an Attack:

(a) Clear lines of authority and responsibility down to the lowest level.

(b) Communications and a warning system or warning systems for the reporting of nuclear detonations, radio-active fallout and biological and chemical attacks.

(c) Proper dispersion within and between installations, continuously planned and executed.

(d) Preparation of necessary plans and SOP, to include reporting of information required for post-strike analysis.

(e) Organization equipping and training of all personnel in rear area damage control operations.

(f) Appropriate use of cover and concealment.

(g) Allocation, organization and full utilization of available transportation net and equipment, to include alternate plans.

(h) Deception measures.

(2) During and After an Attack:

(a) Rapid assessment of the damage and its immediate effect on operations.

(b) Control of personnel and traffic either in co-ordination with the local civilian authorities or by the military when essential for continued military operations and the civilian police are inoperative.

(c) Fire prevention and fire fighting.

(d) First aid and evacuation of casualties.

(e) Warning and protection against chemical, biological and radiological hazards.

(f) Emergency supply of food, clothing and water.

(g) Explosive ordnance reconnaissance and disposal.

(h) Initiation of salvage operations.

(i) Decontamination of vital areas contaminated with radioactive material or chemical or biological agents.

ANNEX A(DofA) TO STANAG 2079 (Edition No. 3)

REAR AREA SECURITY OPERATION ORDER
(See STANAG 2014)

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
(Change from oral orders, if any)

Copy No.____ of _____ copies
Issuing Headquarters.
Place of Issue (may be in code).
Date-Time Group of Signature.
Message Reference Number.

REAR AREA SECURITY OPERATION ORDER NUMBER

References: Maps, charts and relevant documents (See STANAG 2029).

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order

Task Organization: See STANAG 2014.

1. SITUATION

Within the explanation given in STANAG 2014, the following points normally will be covered:

a. Enemy Forces. Enemy capabilities to:

(1) Use nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.

(2) Assault with airborne elements and other regular units.

(3) Mount an attack with irregular forces.

(4) Execute air or guided missile attacks.

(5) Employ psychological warfare.

b. Friendly Forces/Civilian Authorities

c. Attachments and Detachments

d. Commander's Evaluation

2. MISSION

See STANAG 2014.

ANNEX B(DofA) TO STANAG 2079 (Edition No. 3)

REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL OPERATION ORDER
(See STANAG 2014)

(SECURITY CLASSIFICATION)
(Change from oral orders, if any)

Copy No. _____ of _____ copies.
Issuing Headquarters.
Place of Issue (may be in code).
Date-Time Group of Signature.
Message Reference Number.

REAR AREA DAMAGE CONTROL OPERATION ORDER NUMBER

References: Maps, charts and relevant documents (See STANAG 2029).

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order

Task Organization: See STANAG 2014.

1. SITUATION

Within the explanation given in STANAG 2014, the following points normally are to be covered:

a. Enemy Forces. Enemy capabilities to execute nuclear, biological and chemical attacks and conventional air strikes without warning.

b. Friendly Forces. The assistance provided by the local, adjacent units and the civilian authorities.

c. Attachments and Detachments

d. Commander's Evaluation

2. MISSION

3. EXECUTION

Within the explanation given in STANAG 2014, the following points normally are to be covered:

a. Concept of operation.

b. Control responsibility in order of priority. (Responsibility, in order of priority, for the assumption of control of operations in the event one or more of the headquarters becomes inoperable).