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
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STUDENT  
ESSAY

THE ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD AND  
THE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY  
IN TIME OF NATURAL DISASTER

BY

COLONEL ERNEST W. COOK, JR.  
INFANTRY



CORRESPONDING COURSE

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



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USAWC ESSAY

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This essay is directed toward Natural Disasters and the working relationship between the Civil Preparedness Agency of a state and that National Guard in time of an emergency. It identifies the past and foreseeable future pitfalls that exist in time of a disaster. Failure to identify a clear chain of command, definitive areas of responsibility and a functional working relationship between Civil Preparedness and National Guard has resulted in chaos. Lack of preparedness and misunderstanding as to capabilities reduces valuable lead time which results in the unnecessary loss of life and property. There is a dire need to develop and continue to improve joint plans and programs. Emphasis should be on identifying lower echelon capabilities and planning for their effective use in time of disaster.

The statistics for this essay have been developed from personal interviews, reviewing state National Guard and Civil Preparedness plans and comments from the Military Support Plans and Operation officers throughout the country.

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## SECTION I

### INTRODUCTION

This essay has been prepared to appraise the reader of the working relationship between the National Guard and the State Civil Preparedness Agency in time of a Natural Disaster. It identifies how the National Guard provides support to the Civil Preparedness Agencies. It briefly discusses the history and organization of Civil Defense, provisions for National Guard support, and reviews problems and successes encountered over the years during National Guard and Civil Preparedness operations and provides recommendations to enhance future operations.

When we refer to Natural Disaster Emergencies it encompasses all domestic emergencies except those created as a result of an enemy attack or civil disturbance. To mention a few: hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, tidal waves, earthquakes, mudslides, snowstorms, droughts, fire, explosions, etc.

What is Civil Preparedness and how does it relate to military support with the National Guard?

"Civil preparedness", also called "civil defense", could be identified as a civil government acting in a period of extraordinary emergency.

It's true that Civil Preparedness and local government provide the core of the operation but the resources and capability to react in time of need is found among the non-governmental forces and volunteer groups of a community. When disaster threatens, the local authorities take immediate action to warn and evacuate citizens, alleviate suffering, and protect life and property. If additional help is required the Governor may direct the executive of the State's emergency plan, using law enforcing agencies or call the National Guard. The National Guard would provide the personnel, material, facilities, and other resources to supplement state and local capabilities and efforts. This support could also be in the form of technical assist-

ance, such as auditing, reviewing, and providing suggestions for upgrading local emergency plans.

This essay is not intended to identify all the problems that exist in a natural disaster but rather to shed light on the importance of cooperation between agencies, advance planning and a principle of self-help, through proper use of the capability of the lowest civilian echelon.

## SECTION II

### NATIONAL GUARD MILITARY SUPPORT PROCEDURES TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES IN A NATURAL DISASTER

The federal or state mission of the National Guard is to provide units trained and equipped which under competent order of federal or state authorities will provide protection of life and property, and preserve peace, order and public safety. As old as the nation itself is the tradition of Armed Forces support and assistance to civil authorities in time of disaster - whether from natural causes or the ultimate disaster of nuclear war. In case of natural disaster this assistance is normally provided at the request of civil government but it may be provided by an individual commander on his own initiative when immediate action is required.

Based upon sound judgment the military support will not be duplicated or committed to obstruct their primary capability to perform their military duty in defense of the United States National Security. The concept envisions that local requirements for military support will be identified, assessed and when all civil support and assets are exhausted request military support from the National Guard through the Governor of the respective state. When, in the opinion of the Governor, the situation warrants National Guard assistance the Governor will deploy National Guard military resources that have been planned for this purpose through the Adjutant General. It would be appropriate at this time to identify some of the agencies that would provide help before

the Governor activates the National Guard for the state mission. The state agencies would include local and State Police, Department of Natural Resources, Department of Public Welfare, State Transportation Commission, Department of Health, State Fire Marshal, etc. The Adjutant General is the Governor's Military Chief and is responsible for the development of statewide plans in conjunction with State Civil Preparedness.

As the Governor's authorized military representative the Adjutant General has the responsibility to maintain a constant state of readiness to provide without delay, troops, services and equipment required in a community or area within the state when directed.

Based upon a review of over thirty state military and civil preparedness plans, it can be stated that with minor modifications the states follow about the same emergency alert procedures and general coordination. An exception would be the State of Alaska. Prior to the Governor of Alaska declaring a "state of emergency" the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers is first called upon to react to the disaster or impending disaster. The National Guard may only be called when an actual emergency exists as opposed to a potential emergency. Provisions have been made, however, for direct federal support to Alaska in the event of developing potential situations involving threat to life or high property loss.

This exception by the Alaskan law has a direct impact on National Guard planning and effectiveness. Failure to call the National Guard until the actual emergency slows up reaction time. Experience has identified the need to activate National Guard troop units and get them into disaster areas before the actual emergency. Road blocks, traffic tie-ups and general chaos reduces or precludes the chances of personnel reporting to their duty stations. This delay is further compounded when personnel try to reach the disaster site and find roads and bridges out. Shortage of personnel to oper-

ate equipment and perform their assigned duties will reduce effectiveness at the onset. Logistical support becomes excessively difficult. A last minute commitment of the National Guard is ineffective anywhere but especially in Alaska, due to communication problems, bad weather, and distance between communities. It has a detrimental effect upon the morale of National Guard personnel and affects National Guard credibility among the citizens of Alaska.

There is an immediate need to review and possibly amend the Alaskan law to allow the National Guard to be called if in the opinion of the Governor a potential disaster exists.

### SECTION III

#### HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AGENCY (DCPA)

The Council of National Defense was created by Congress August 29, 1916. The Council was charged with coordinating industry and resources for the national security and welfare of the nation. In the interim years many changes and additions have taken place.

On May 5, 1972, Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird abolished the Office of Civil Defense within the Department of the Army and established the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency (DCPA). This new agency is responsible for developing an effective national civil defense assistance and guidance program to help state and local governments achieve total disasterpreparedness.

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency works with the Office of Emergency Preparedness, other federal agencies, and state and local governments throughout the United States to achieve overall readiness to cope with major emergencies.

The Defense Civil Preparedness Agency works with the fifty states, Puerto Rico,

the Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the District of Columbia. Through the state Civil Preparedness Agency the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency reaches the counties, cities and towns to assist them in preparing to cope with the effects of man-made or natural disaster.

The State Civil Preparedness Agency has a number of critical functions to perform. Of primary importance to the State Civil Preparedness Director in establishing his organization and state planning for civil preparedness in time of natural disaster are:

[a] Coordinating relevant Federal and State programs with civil preparedness planning at all levels throughout the state.

[b] Supporting and strengthening lower echelon civil preparedness groups in planning and operations for reaction, preceeding, during and after disaster strikes.

Civil preparedness is by law a joint responsibility of the federal, state and local governments. Each has a distinctive and complementing role. The local community, however, is where the disaster has the greatest impact, and where prompt action is most essential to reduce loss of life and property. The local area Directors, assisted by the State Civil Preparedness Agency, have major roles to play in helping the local community and its residents achieve preparedness for the major emergencies which occur at any time.

The local area Director has the key role of identifying local capability and resources and creating interest, motivation and community involvement in planning to cope with emergencies. This lower echelon leader is the most directly involved in any disaster operation. He is responsible to insure that the community in his area can respond to all types of disasters.

The Governor of the State is the Chief Executive of the National Guard and all State agencies and therefore is responsible for policy-level decisions. The law enforcing agencies and heads of operating departments are in command of their own personnel and resources. When all necessary coordination has been accomplished there is a minimum of confusion, wasted effort and the resources of the community are applied to the emergency in a controlled and efficient manner.

#### SECTION IV

##### PROCEDURES FOR IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL GUARD ASSISTANCE

In order to expedite command and control of National Guard units within a state, a geographical subdivision is normally required. As a vehicle to illustrate the procedures of implementing "natural disaster" support this Section is directed to the  
4  
procedure utilized in Connecticut.

The object of subdivision is closer coordination and ability to render support as timely and as efficiently as possible. Subdivisions are based on the size of the state and the ability of the National Guard to support the missions. Connecticut has been divided into five areas as Sub-Area Commands. See Annex "A" attached. The Civil Preparedness Agency has established full time area Directors in each of these geographic areas.

Once the Governor alerts the National Guard, the Adjutant General exercises operational control over all National Guard units under his command. At no time is it, or has it been, the intent of the military to take over any civilian responsibility, and conversely, the civilian components have no jurisdiction over the military. Within each Sub-Area-Command the Civil Preparedness Director presents his mission request and receives his direction from the state Civil Preparedness Director.

As an emergency develops the state Civil Preparedness Director notifies the Governor and if deemed necessary the National Guard is activated and a Civil Preparedness/National Guard liaison is established.

To assist the Adjutant General prior to an emergency he has a Military Support Plans Office. See Annex "B" attached.

This office is composed of federally recognized personnel who are responsible for the development of detailed military support contingency plans, and for assessing the amount and location of all available military resources that could be used to support civil authorities. It is important to realize that prepared plans and procedures will require constant reviewing, and updating. There have been previous plans that looked good at the higher military echelon but lacked guidance at the state and local level.

With few exceptions each state participates in at least one Command Post Exercise a year. The Connecticut Military Department recently completed a table top exercise in which the Governor and her staff, along with key civilian agency chiefs, participated. This exercise laid the groundwork for a Command Post Exercise held in Connecticut in November 1975 in which the National Guard and state Civil Preparedness participated. It is mandatory that the civilian and military agencies have a detail working knowledge of the purpose and operational responsibility assigned to each agency. It is in this area that lack of knowledge by the local Civil Preparedness agencies of military plans, procedures and assets have caused the military much concern and has been partially responsible for the problems encountered integrating plans.

Presently each state has within its National Guard structure a State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment with a mission to advise and assist the Adjutant General in the administration, logistics and operation of the military

forces of the state. This includes the planning and employment of the National Guard units for state missions, to include state civil disturbance operations, and preparation for their mobilization assignment. The strength and grade authorization by the state is prescribed in the National Guard Regulations [NGR] 10-2 and letters of authority by the Chief, National Guard Bureau.<sup>5</sup> The statutes provide for the appointment of a State Adjutant General. He is appointed for a period of eight years but serves at the pleasure of the Governor. Conceivably an Adjutant General could serve under two different Governors, depending on the outcome of the election.

With few exceptions the Adjutant General has a dual status, state and federal. There are certain states whose Adjutant General does not have federal recognition. The Adjutant General is the authorized military representative of the Governor. When the Governor deems it appropriate to call the National Guard to state duty, the Adjutant General and his staff will make an estimate of the situation and render his recommendations to the Governor. Although the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment is the tool for implementing the Adjutant General's plans, there are times the degree of emergency would not warrant calling the State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment. At this time the Adjutant General's plans would be implemented by the Military Support Plans Office section or selected individuals from the Adjutant General's staff.

National Guard units when activated are issued mission type assignments with control by the National Guard and specific guidance to accomplish the mission as expeditiously as possible.

## SECTION V

### LIFE, DAMAGE, COST IMPACT

This portion of the essay will acquaint and set the stage for the reader to evaluate the horrendous impact a natural disaster has upon a nation. We will review several natural disasters that have taken place in the last fifteen years. The intent is to awaken or arouse a desire for each of us to become familiar with the need for more training to provide more expertise to reduce the extent of damage. It is the opinion of the writer that a more positive and timely reaction to the following disasters may have reduced the extent of destruction. This overview will give the reader a brief idea of the extent and cost of the damage and support provided by the National Guard in a natural disaster.

#### 1. Tornados 1962 [New England]

This particular series of tornados are mentioned to identify the need for a community to establish natural disaster plans for all contingencies, not only those storms germane to a particular area. The cyclonic change in atmospheric conditions has exposed communities to weather phenomena formerly unknown or in some cases not as prevalent. New England had a series of tornados on August 9, 1878. They cut a two-mile path 133-400 yards wide through Wallingford, killing 34 people and injuring 100, with \$202,002 damage to property. Eighty-four years later, May 24, 1962, a 12-mile long, 1/2-mile wide path cut through Middiebury, Wolcott and Sounington, Connecticut. This tornado caused 12.5 million property damage, razed 70 structures and damaged 600. There was one death and 50 injuries. The state was not prepared. These situations prompted Connecticut to include greater emphasis in disaster planning for tornados. It is this reaction after the fact that must be corrected and a dire need to develop viable plans for all contingencies that will reduce the degree of damage.

## 2. Flood 1967 [Alaska]

In August 1967 Fairbanks, Alaska was exposed to the worst flood ever recorded in that area with \$178 million in damage.<sup>6</sup> Fifteen billion gallons of water per day<sup>7</sup> passed through Fairbanks, enough to supply Washington, D. C. for two months. Before the Chena River receded on August 15th, 95% of the business community of Fairbanks sustained losses. Virtually every resident was touched in some degree. This flood was a greater disaster than the 1964 Alaska earthquake which took 115<sup>8</sup> lives and caused \$500 million damage.

## 3. Tropical Storm Agnes 1972 [Pennsylvania]

There were 117 Pennsylvania communities affected by this storm. A total of 50,000 homes, 126 bridges and hundreds of factories and businesses were destroyed.<sup>9</sup> A total of 35 million dollars worth of farm crops were ravished. The storm closed thousands of miles of roads, put 200,000 telephones out of service, and cut off<sup>10</sup> electricity, gas and water to thousands of citizens. Forty-nine deaths were attributed to this flood disaster.

A total of 12,680 Army and Air National Guard were called to active duty for a total of 152,117 man days over a period of 46 days. A total of 36 Army National aircraft<sup>11</sup> flew 893 missions, 2,010 sorties for a total of 1,715 flying hours. During this period the aircraft carried 1,999 personnel and transported 110,950 pounds of cargo without a single accident. Armories were used for mass care centers and a total of 2,146 individuals were evacuated to these centers. As for cost to the National Guard, there was 1 death, 16 injuries requiring hospitalization and 85 minor injuries or illnesses. Total pay for activated troops: \$2,713,414. subsistence \$503,909. Total cost of petroleum, oil and lubricants came to \$126,625. Miscel-

aneous costs came to \$30,000. The total estimated cost of the operation: \$3,173,978.

#### 4. Ice Storm "Felix" [Connecticut]

A total of 21 towns were affected. Approximately 250,000 homes were without power. The exact cost of the damage is unavailable at this time. Approximately 1000 National Guard troops were called for a five day period. Cost to the National Guard was ten minor injuries. Pay and allowances came to \$74,131., rations \$6,980, miscellaneous \$5,500. total cost to the state: \$86,511.00.

This cross section of disasters will give the reader a feeling for the need of adequate, timely, comprehensive planning and a distinct need for coordination between all civilian and military agencies.

### SECTION VI

#### SPECIFIC TYPES OF MILITARY SUPPORT AND EQUIPMENT AVAILABLE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES

The National Civil Preparedness Program of the Federal Government is an integral part of the National Security and the nation's deterrent posture. Conversely it is by law the responsibility of the National Guard to provide military support when deemed appropriate to civil authorities in time of an emergency. The National Guard has five objectives:

1. Protect life.
2. Save lives and protect property.
3. Sustain survivors and repair essential utilities.
4. Achieve emergency<sub>3</sub> operation capability.
5. Provide support.

The concept of military assistance to Civil Preparedness is an emergency support rendered to civil authorities and terminated as soon as possible. The reasoning is to conserve military resources and avoid infringement on the civil responsibility

and authority. Emergency National Guard support for natural disaster assistance include, but are not restricted, to:

1. Emergency clearance of debris and rubble from streets, highways, rail centers, dock facilities, airports, shelters, and other areas as necessary to permit rescue.
2. Emergency repair to or reconstruction of facilities, such as transportation, communication, and power systems, etc.
3. Rescue, evacuation and first aid treatment of casualties.
4. Maintenance of law and order to include law enforcement operations, emergency highway traffic control, security and protection of vital facilities and resources, and enforcement of economic stabilization measures.
5. Explosive disposal.
6. Medical treatment or hospitalization of casualties, recovery of critical medical supplies, and the safeguarding of public health. This may involve sorting and treating of casualties, preventive measures to control the incidence and spread of infectious diseases.
7. Recovery of deceased personnel.
8. Emergency provision of food, and facilities for food preparation.
9. Damage assessment of facilities, utilities and communications.
10. Provide mobile military communication equipment for command and control.
11. Provide and support mass care centers in armories.
12. Aviation support in supplying and evacuating personnel.
13. Information services to appraise the public and authorities of the situation.

Each National Guard unit has organic equipment available to assist in rescue operations. The types of equipment will vary depending on the organization of the unit in the emergency area. Identified below is a cross-section of National Guard assets available in time of a disaster:

1. Radiation and detection equipment.
2. Radio equipment (stationary and vehicle mounted) including telephone communications.
3. Photographic equipment.
4. Electronic test equipment.
5. Generators.
6. Meteorological equipment.
7. Vehicles [including ambulance, cargo trucks, utility trucks, etc.]
8. Demolition equipment.
9. Water purification and storage equipment.
10. Medical equipment.
11. Tool kits.
12. Field commissary outfits.
13. Fire extinguishers.
14. Heaters and stoves.
15. Helicopter.
16. Fixed wing aircraft.
17. Maintenance/repair tool kits.
18. Lighting equipment.
19. Communications equipment.
20. Tents, all sizes.
21. Heavy and light engineer equipment.

More important than the ability to accomplish the support task and provide equipment listed above is the organizational ability inherent in the National Guard organization. National Guard units are trained to respond as members of a task force. Com-

pared to most civil organizations the National Guard units have a high degree of mobilization and at the same time have the ability to maintain good communication within a task force. An early commitment of the National Guard allows for the maximum benefit of its organizational and communication training by insuring its maximum integration and deployment in support of the civil operations. In this way the National Guard organization and communication systems fully complements, supports, and and strengthens the civil organization.

## SECTION VII

### NATIONAL GUARD PROBLEM AREAS

This section summarizes a few of the problem areas the National Guard has encountered over the last ten years. These problems have been identified in numerous US After Action Reports. The intent has been to appraise both National Guard and Civil Preparedness planners of the problems and to assist them in their contingency planning. The problems have been broken into seven critical areas and are identified below:

#### 1. Personnel:

- a. Inability of personnel to reach armories due to disaster, reduces unit operational capability.
- b. Improper identification delays guardsmen enroute to duty station.
- c. Failure to provide emergency information center for National Guard dependents.
- d. Lack of a policy for guardsmen holding civil occupations, such as firemen, policemen and doctors to either report to the National Guard or their civilian positions.

#### 2. Intelligence:

- a. Need to develop plans to reduce overtaxing communications systems.
- b. Failure to establish civilian rumor control centers.
- c. Civil Preparedness/National Guard system to receive, evaluate, and dispatch intelligence. Not adequate.
- d. Insufficient updating of intelligence from civil authorities on the condition of roads, to assure safe and timely routing of traffic.

3. Operations:

- a. Civil authorities lacked knowledge on proper procedures to acquire National Guard assistance.
- b. Political leverage to obtain support caused confusion and unnecessary delay.
- c. Failure in coordination between National Guard/Civil Preparedness or other civil agencies causing duplication and confusion in assigning missions.
- d. Failure to properly establish liaison between civilian and military Emergency Operations.
- e. Briefings required to appraise personnel of current situations. Grossly neglected during the operations.

4. Organization:

- a. Units assigned areas of responsibility too large for their unit strength.
- b. Units assigned missions beyond their capability.
- c. Difficulty in transferring missions from National Guard technicians to part time Guardsmen in fast moving situations.

5. Training:

- a. Lack of individual training in the use of and operation of multi-type vehicles and equipment.
- b. Combat and certain support type units assigned traffic duty without any prior training.
- c. Natural disaster support to civilian authorities must be integrated into required military training at lower unit levels.

6. Logistics:

- a. Certain civilian aviation facilities did not stock fuel for helicopters thus causing a logistic problem and time lag.
- b. Lack of lighting equipment grossly hindered night operations.
- c. Failure to estimate duration of the emergency led to confusion for National Guard dependents.
- d. Early dismissal of civil employees from support facilities during emergency created problems in procuring rations and fuel.
- e. Logistical support units not committed with operational units in the initial stage of the disaster.
- f. Lack of spare parts and expendables for vehicles and equipment.
- g. Loaning equipment to civilian agencies without operators and not providing maintenance support.

7. Communications:

- a. Lack of backup communications when telephones were inoperative.
- b. Inability of the military to communicate with civil authorities due to the fact radios were not compatible and could not net.
- c. Inadequate knowledge of radio/telephone procedures tied up National Guard with unnecessary traffic.

## SECTION VIII

### PLANNING AND OPERATION COORDINATION BETWEEN THE NATIONAL GUARD AND CIVIL PREPAREDNESS

It is not the intent of the National Guard to assume the responsibility of Civil authorities in planning for and operations during a natural disaster. However, National Guard assistance in planning is closely coordinated with supporting plans of Civil authorities to insure the attainment of common objectives. Non-military agencies in the government and private sector, in conjunction with Civil Preparedness, are expected to be pressed into service during the periods of natural disaster. As resources of these agencies and authorities become taxed beyond their capabilities, the Governor is authorized to order the National Guard to State duty to assist.

National Guard assistance will be on a minimum essential basis and will be terminated at the earliest practical time. This assistance will not be used as a substitute for participation by Civil authorities. This has been a gray area because of the misunderstanding of Civil authorities, politicians and other civilian groups. The primary role of a Military organization is to be trained, and have the necessary equipment to accomplish the military mission to protect this nation from external or internal enemy force. This is where in initial planning it must be made crystal clear what the mission of the National Guard is and what can be expected from the National Guard. Failure of civilian agencies to comprehend the National Guard mission has resulted, in some cases, in under-planning by Civilian Preparedness.

The chain of command for attaining National Guard support is from the State Civil Preparedness Director to the governor of a state. As previously mentioned, this is a last resort. An exception to this is in the case of an extreme emergency when local

civil authority cannot contact the governor through normal channels. The local civil authority would request support in writing to the local National Guard Commander. The National Guard Commander could only provide the necessary assistance to prevent death, relieve suffering, maintain law and order and protect property. Simultaneous with providing support the National Guard Commander will notify the Adjutant General of a state as expeditiously as possible. The mainstay to assuring an effective National Guard/Civil Preparedness natural disaster operation is the planning, updating of plans, and the implementing of plans in an emergency. The planning should start at the highest level with a clearcut understanding of who makes the final planning decision to "go" or "no-go". We realize that final decisions rest with the Governor but it is important that each participating group fully understands which agency is tasked with final planning and has the Governor's unequivocal support. This requirement is mandatory. The failure for an agency to understand or to adhere to the final decisions or the failure to take part in the planning stage has been and, unless corrected, will be the downfall of any emergency effort. The agency assigned the responsibility of overall coordination and final planning should be the State Civil Preparedness. Prior to calling a meeting of the State Civil Preparedness should prepare an itinerary to identify all types of contingencies the state could be exposed to. In addition to identifying the type disasters, broad recommendation should be included identifying proposed actions to reduce loss of life, property and to restore a community to normal.

Civil Preparedness must remember that with few exceptions these civilian participating agencies either have little knowledge of the subject or are experts in their own field and all must be cross trained in each others capability.

The initial meeting must have a cross representation of all State military, Governor's staff, representation from each section of civil government, and any civilian group or organization that can enhance the natural disaster recovery plan.

As these plans are developed the planners must keep in mind the requirements of updating and making sure changes are distributed to all agencies. The contingency planning should keep in mind both short and long range considerations. In developing plans the following guidelines are rendered and are not meant to be all inclusive:

1. All major emergencies constituting a threat to life and/or property will be covered under the plan.
2. Emergency groups normally committed to disasters will handle the routine problems they have been trained for.
3. Direction and control of emergency groups will remain with the chiefs and officers of the units as they are in day-to-day operations.
4. Coordination of state agencies and military forces will be handled through the State and Area Civil Preparedness offices.
5. Cities and Towns are encouraged to consider all resources within their boundaries and to plan for seasonal hazards.
6. Local Director/Coordinators are responsible for an emergency plan suitable to the size and population of their community. Their own plan will outline specific details and assignments identified in the annexes and Standing Operating Procedures.

It takes a series of meetings before a comprehensive constructive plan is developed. When the Civil Preparedness comes up with an approved plan it is to be reviewed and receives final approval by the Governor. When the plan has been approved and distributed to the respective agencies, it is mandatory at this stage that each agency is aware of who can do what and when.

This plan is only as effective as the capability of the users to apply it. The control of operations is in the Emergency Operation Center. The Emergency Operation Center is the nerve center. The direction, control, communications, intelligence, operations and resource management are carried on in this center which must be a secure centrally located building. The building's specifications must include emergency power, food and medical supplies, communication and warning systems. Within this building there should be the cross representation of

agencies identified above. It is essential to place a National Guard liaison officer in the Emergency Operations Center at the onset of a disaster. In addition to continuous updating of plans, these plans must be tested. This is where constant training, drills and exercises are mandatory. Connecticut has had unique success through emergency operation simulation exercises with CPA. Follow-up action on discrepancies noted in the Emergency Operation Center after each emergency is mandatory, to include revisions and updating of current plans. There has to be a continuous staff training program for key personnel of each agency. These Staff Training exercises may be conducted quarterly by the respective agency and at least once every year a combined staff exercise for all agencies. It has been noted that the sectors of the state that are continuously conducting refresher training and taking part in home study courses prepared by Civil Preparedness are more qualified in their response. The annual National Guard/Civil Preparedness exercise has been one of the greatest teaching vehicles to date. Connecticut rotates the context of the exercise, civil disturbance, natural disaster, or a nuclear disaster, or a nuclear strike; however, the basic operational policy and procedure apply.

## SECTION IX

### SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS BETWEEN CIVIL PREPAREDNESS AND NATIONAL GUARD

The problems that have existed in the past are gradually being resolved as the National Guard/Civil Preparedness through necessity work closer together. We have found the National Guard is better qualified to assist the Civil Preparedness and communities in a natural disaster caused by the weather such as floods, hurricanes, etc., as opposed to man-made disasters, such as plane crashes, fires, explosions, etc. The National Guard of Connecticut is in need of additional training to develop expertise in these man-made disasters and National Guard is receiving

greater exposure to disasters of this type by working with Civil Preparedness in their emergency simulation operations within the state. This training vehicle has also proved a success. Our National Guard liaison officer spends two to three days with Civil Preparedness at the site of the respective exercise. One problem that appears prevalent in most states is the civilian agency's attempt to utilize military in lieu of exercising and/or exhausting their local capabilities. Further, we find that the lowest level, particularly, do not understand or in some cases realize what their own capabilities are. The civilian agencies fail to understand the limits of National Guard capabilities, in time of disaster. Requests are made without adhering to plans or knowledge of our National Guard/Civil Preparedness plans. The military, on the other hand, tend to over-react to their anticipated leadership role. Projects in which both National Guard and Civil Preparedness both have a realistic viable working relationship have less problems. For example:

In rescue operations, the air arm of the Army Guard has coordinated with civilian emergency units, such as hospitals, to create operational plans providing individual roles and responsibilities for selected operations. If a remote hospital requires medical evacuation support, the unit rendering the assistance has complete details available of where to land, who and how to contact supported agency, routes back, pictures of the area, material and personnel support. The requesting agency would have similar data. Failure to preposition equipment, however, has created severe logistical problems and reduced reaction time.

In natural disasters, local pressures tend to try to force executive action, often prematurely, subverting maximum use of local resources. Politicians at all levels attempt to interfere with the normal execution of plans. An exerted effort is necessary to educate all phases of government to subdue their personal interest

which adversely affect emergency operations by the Civil Preparedness and National Guard. Operations would be enhanced if military liaison was available at all civil levels of emergency operations. This military liaison could be Reserve or National Guard, active duty personnel or even retired personnel, but part of a liaison pyramid. This pyramid could be developed, gradually downward, from the highest to the lowest level, to the community and neighborhood.

## SECTION X

### PITFALLS OF THE PAST

It is not the intent to blame any particular military or non-military agency for errors of the past. The mission of coping with an emergency is to do the right thing at the right time when the chips are down.

If we can accept the premise all agencies are working for a common cause and the welfare of society then there must be another reason when emergency operations are slow in getting off the ground. It is the belief of the writer that a lot of the problems are caused by possible misunderstanding and/or lack of coordination. An example of this recently took place during a large-scale fire emergency. The water department issued a call to the citizens to hold the use of water to an absolute minimum so that water pressure could be kept up for fire departments; at the same time, however, fire officials were on television instructing citizens to wet down their roofs with garden hoses. What was lacking was coordination, the "left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing." The various departments, each with their expertise, went their own way with no one pulling together. These poorly coordinated operations can lead to the loss of lives<sup>that</sup> may have been saved or the destruction of property that could have been preserved. It is through each such disaster we learn and implement into our contingency plans for the future.

An area of concern in the past and becoming more prevalent are mobile homes. Statistics tell us in the next ten years one out of every five new homes built in the US will be a mobile home. During Hurricane "Celia" in Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1970, 3500 mobile homes were destroyed. Failure to properly secure the mobile homes and in conjunction with poor or no warning system of approaching storms has taken its toll in lives and property loss. Local governments and our lawmakers must take action to institute laws to protect such dwellings and their occupants.

It is said we learn from experience. Based upon my research and my actual experience, this is not so in all cases. In the last ten years Connecticut has been harassed with floods and hurricanes. With but few exceptions we have found many cases where people refuse to leave their homes knowing they were in the path of destruction. We of the National Guard are told we cannot force people to leave their homes. We have had to wait until the disaster was upon them and then risk the lives of our men to evacuate these people. This is an area that will require strong legislation and when approved must be enforced. Additional effort is required by all agencies to educate the citizens of each community of the need for fast, timely reaction to alert warnings and to adhere to instructions.

During the Connecticut 1973 ice storm many areas of the state were exposed to power failures as well as gas and telephone service for several days. Because of the excessive work load the utilities requested National Guard support. National Guard personnel reported to the disaster sites prepared to assist the utility crews. Due to the Guardsmen's lack of timing and know-how they failed, with one exception, to serve a useful purpose. Several were assigned to climb telephone poles and sustained injuries in the attempt. In areas where live power lines had fallen, the untrained Guardsmen were a hazard to themselves.

Failure to establish early coordination with local industries and to obtain plant layouts made it difficult for the Civil Preparedness Agency and National Guard to obtain realistic damage assessment and thus slowed up providing necessary assistance. Rescue workers had no idea of the factory floor plans, entrances and exits, type power, construction of the building, how many employees in the building, etc.

With few exceptions most states have not prepared a "hazard analysis" on the effects of a major threat to their state. Failure to evaluate and then prepare for emergency repair and restoration lead to lost time, mass confusion and contributed to the unnecessary loss of lives and property.

## SECTION XI

### OUTSTANDING SUCCESSES

It is difficult to categorically break out the successes from the non-successes in a National Guard/Civil Preparedness coordinated effort in a natural disaster. Sometimes it is just the degree of success that makes the difference. Although we come through the disaster it is difficult to objectively appraise what could have been done to further reduce death and damages or to what extent the operation was successful in saving lives and property.

We will take a few minutes to highlight several incidents that met with outstanding success in the field of cooperation between the National Guard and Civil Preparedness.

1. Two incidents in Montana met with marked success and it was felt it was due to the National Guard attending Civil Preparedness Disaster Committee Meetings that were held from time to time. The first was to assist in a hay lift in which National Guard air lifted hay and grain to cattle and sheep that were marooned and separated

from their feed areas due to heavy and drifting snow. The only access was via air. This became a three way coordinated effort. The feed had to be procured and delivered to the aircraft site. National Guard personnel had to prepare aircraft for the type mission, and owners of stock had to work with the National Guard to identify the location of the animals. The operation was completed timely and with no problems. The second incident occurred in the spring when 120 people and their belongings had to be moved from flooded areas. Both incidents were resolved in a professional manner through a joint effort of Civil Preparedness, National Guard and the citizens.

2. Pennsylvania has been exposed to many natural disasters of one type or another but the current ones that met with outstanding successes were: Hurricane Agnes' floods of 1972, truckers' strike Civil Disturbance of February 1974 and the heavy snowstorms of southwestern Pennsylvania of January 1975. A unique situation in Pennsylvania may have merit for other states in that the Adjutant General of Pennsylvania is also a member of the State Council of Civil Preparedness. In this role the Adjutant General determined troop requirements and directed operations from his military headquarters and also kept abreast of non-military disaster activities through his military liaison team maintained in the State Emergency Operations Center. The Adjutant General being personally involved in military and non-military operations was instrumental in cutting the red tape. There were no significant problems. A noteworthy observation is that the Pennsylvania emergency plans and concepts have undergone very few changes in the last ten years. Probably this is credited to the military and Civil Preparedness Agency being so close.

3. In 1973 South Carolina was struck with a snowstorm that literally paralyzed the state for three days. Without downgrading the efforts of other agencies, it was

the National Guard that turned the trick. Other agencies worked ceaselessly during the emergency and each contributed immensely to the work that saved many lives but as the storm intensified they required additional help. The National Guard pressed into service their 10-wheel, two and one-half ton transports, armored personnel carriers and helicopters. They evacuated families, rescued stranded motorists, transported expectant mothers to the hospitals, and traversed dangerously iced roads carrying essential personnel to their civilian jobs. A partial success to South Carolina's emergency operations could be credited to the Director of Civil Preparedness. With a staff of only 40 he knew it would be impossible to cope with all problems. His course of action, which proved a success, was to take advantage of the expertise and skills in the National Guard and Civil Affairs Reserve units. The foresight of the Director to visualize these problems and to work with the military gave South Carolina two years of advance planning prior to this horrendous snowstorm. This coordinated effort and planning assisted in the 23 tornados that followed -- claiming 10 lives.

Although we have only touched upon a few of the natural disasters that take place in the US annually, it should be clear from the above successes that proper planning, in sufficient time, and an interrelation between military and non-military will provide a viable organization capable of coping with disaster relief.

## SECTION XII

### LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Lessons are learned through actual exposure to natural disaster or through training exercises when both the Civil Preparedness agencies and the National Guard personnel participate. It is the experience factor that will improve our disaster expertise and our ability to act as professionals in time of a crisis.

The nation has come a long way in being able to cope with natural disasters. History, experience, modern weather predicting technology along with our effective news media has assisted states to react timely and effectively before the arrival of the storm.

Identified below are recommendations to be considered in natural disaster planning.

1. A "hazard analysis" must be prepared by each state. Failure to conduct the analysis timely, accurately and to keep current, exposes the citizens to last minute chaos and possible destruction. The analysis must be prepared for all natural disaster contingencies and conducted at the highest state level, preferably the Civil Preparedness Agency. The analysis should include the extent and types of threats, divide the state into geographical sections in consonance with where a potential threat may strike, and the when, where and what actions to be taken for each type disaster. A final step of the analysis is to define priorities for employing natural disaster support.
2. The Adjutant General should be a member of the state Civil Preparedness Agency committee. This will assure maximum cooperation and minimum misunderstanding. This arrangement precludes the loss of time in decision-making, identifying available resources, and assures timely reaction to disaster support. There are states in which the Adjutant General is also the state Civil Preparedness Director. I feel this is not a healthy situation. This arrangement would deprive the civilian agencies of their rightful responsibility.
3. National Guard and Civil Preparedness agencies should develop damage assessment teams. Damage assessment information is required for all levels of government to develop priorities and allocate the proper type and amount of aid to a disaster area. Eventually the data would be used to substantiate all contracts and expendi-

tures and provide the data for auditors after the disaster. These damage assessment teams must consist of qualified personnel with the expertise to render valid information. Personnel assigned to the assessment team could be: Engineers, Community Planners, Building Inspectors, Tax Assessors, Building Contractors, Zoning Board personnel, Fire Marshalls, etc. The damage assessment teams would collect the following type statistics: number of casualties, number of evacuees and their location, type and extent of property damage, damage to utilities, communication facilities, transportation facilities such as highways, bridges, airports, seaports, etc.

4. Assign a National Guard officer to attend the Community Civil Preparedness committee meetings thereby making the personal contact that is so important in time of a disaster. Due to personnel changes in local government it is necessary to meet with them immediately upon their taking office. Failure of the incumbent to inform his successor of the National Guard relationship leads to a duplication of National Guard effort.

A positive approach is to establish close liaison with each agency head when plans are being formulated. It is imperative the liaison officer does not infringe upon using the Emergency Operations Center communication unless absolutely necessary. An FM, AM and single side band-radio should be prepositioned in the liaison officer's assigned area of operation. The liaison officer should be relieved of duty every four hours by an individual equally qualified. Prior experience indicates the liaison officer should have two assistants. Personnel should remain in their working area within the Emergency Operations Center to insure their Civil Preparedness personnel availability in a crisis. A field telephone should be installed in advance between the Civil Preparedness Director and the National Guard liaison officer. If

available, a tape recorder has proven valuable in identifying problems and errors to be <sup>CORRECTED</sup> ~~revised~~ in future operations. The liaison officer will be provided a vehicle to be used as a courier service for backup communication.

5. An area that requires additional National Guard training and coordination with the Civil Preparedness agencies is the disaster other than that caused by weather. I refer to fires, oil pollution, aircraft accidents, highway incidents, building collapses, gas leaks, bomb threats, etc. These accidents are becoming more prevalent, in addition to becoming more complex and requiring more expertise. These threats are handled in a routine manner by government or civilian agencies. The problem exists when the disaster cannot be contained by these specialists. This recommendation is geared to aircraft accidents but may be expanded or geared to similar type accidents in this category. With the increased size and number of aircraft along with a nation more prone to travel we must be prepared to cope with mass casualties and injuries which may result in aircraft accidents. The Procedural Regulations of the US National Transportation Safety Board, Title 14, Chapter III, Part 430 and 431 identifies each agency's responsibility at the time of an aircraft accident and will prove a valuable reference in preparing plans.

This disaster recovery plan, as with all plans, must be a coordinated joint effort with each agency working with the same contingency plans. Individual plans tend to confuse and reduce timely recovery action. The basic plan should be prepared by the Civil Preparedness agencies in conjunction with the airfield facility management. Upon approval of the basic Civil Preparedness plan the civilian agencies and National Guard planning should consider or include as a minimum the following:

- a] Detail knowledge of the terrain, environment, access to the site in order to provide necessary rescue support. Routes to hospitals must be clearly identified and understood by all rescue workers. Analysis training exercises should be developed to list the effectiveness of getting to and from the vulnerable areas depicted.
- b] Provide illumination with a backup for night rescue operations. Locating bodies and trying to find unconscious and dazed survivors with poor or no lighting has accounted for unnecessary loss of life.
- c] Civilian and military radio frequencies must be compatible. The coordination must be accomplished during the planning stages. If it is not possible to tie in all radio communication it is essential the communication between rescue crews, ambulances and hospitals are direct with no interference.
- d] Centralized control is mandatory and must be determined in advance and understood by all agencies. An emergency operation center must be set up at the scene that will control and direct the operation. National Guard liaison personnel must be assigned to the Emergency Operations Center.
- e] An evacuation control system must be established at the Emergency Operations Center to preclude overloading hospital and/or to assure victims prompt treatment upon arrival.
- f] Medical teams must be organized and located at the disaster site. These teams will prove of great value in saving lives that may otherwise have died of shock or loss of blood.
- g] Coordination with adjacent states to obtaining maximum support. Lack of inter-state planning hampers equipment operators in locating state equipment sites and drivers should be cross-trained on equipment they may be assigned to operate. Equipment responsibility at the onset is a problem and is compounded when damaged equipment is returned to home station.

- h] Lack of coordination with local utilities led to confusion. When the National Guard was called to assist utility crews National Guard personnel were not qualified. However, each utility company has a training program and expertise that could be utilized to instruct National Guard and Civil Preparedness groups.
- i] Duplicating and contradictory public information over the various medias tend to confuse and cause panic. There is a need for one news release agency. Greater use of radio and TV is required to suppress rumors immediately upon their release. Wherever possible, use your own aerial reconnaissance as opposed to secondhand intelligence. Local reports to the Emergency Operations Center were at times 100% wrong. This was noted when bridges and roads were reported impassable and later found to be intact. Reliable intelligence is imperative.
- j] Certain disaster areas have a tendency to breed flies and mosquitoes when inundated. This leads to the spread of unnecessary disease. Prior arrangements should be made to have areas sprayed as soon as the weather permits.
- k] Unrequested perishable food and unusable clothing being shipped into the area causes storage and health problems. One agency should be assigned this responsibility in advance. Possibly the Red Cross or Salvation Army.
- l] Although detailed plans are prepared and implemented, provision for young children, pets and the elderly in the respective armories and shelters should not be overlooked.
- m] Warning systems are mandatory but they are only effective if people heed them. Constant false alarms and premature warnings that never develop have a harrasing effect on people and they become immune to the alarms. Education programs are necessary to explain the reasons for the alarm or there should be degrees of alert signals.

n] If passes are issued to authorize personnel into the disaster area it is necessary for firm supervision and security in the issuance. Passes falling into the wrong hands can compromise the pass system.

o] As in the passes, food stamps for disaster victims must be controlled. Once stamps are issued their use or misuse must be closely observed.

p] Body recovery and identification requires a lot of detail coordination. Body identification must be more than just by visual means and identifying objects on the bodies retained. Body bags should be available. The pre-locating and planned use of refrigerated vans would prove very valuable in storing bodies before removal to the morgue. A lot of anguish and sorrow could be prevented if bodies are segregated by sex and possible age. The most difficult sorrow is identifying children, so they should be separated also.

The following recommendations are based upon lessons learned by the Connecticut National Guard during the last 10 years. Although these recommendations pertain to the National Guard they will serve to appraise civil agencies of National Guard problems and assist in their civil preparedness planning.

- 1] At the first notification of an impending disaster, establish and make operational an Emergency Operations Center and dispatch liaison personnel to the Governor's office or place of operation.
- 2] Expedite procuring and issuing radios with installation kits to all units regardless of authorization.
- 3] Develop a reliable radio communication system with special effort to integrate military and civil radio communications, particularly down to the lowest echelon.
- 4] VIP flights to be kept to a minimum until the crisis has diminished.
- 5] Provisions be made to release from duty, at earliest opportunity, those National Guard individuals who suffer from personal loss.
- 6] National Guardsmen assigned security missions will be accompanied by local law enforcing officers. Failure to do so leads to serious civil actions after the disaster.
- 7] All requests for National Guard support must be submitted through Civil Preparedness channels.

- 8] A judge advocate be attached at the onset of the disaster to the staff of the National Guard Task Force.
- 9] Aircraft rescue hoists be made available for air rescue by helicopters.
- 10] Industry and local business take maximum advantage of local law enforcing agencies before requesting National Guard support.
- 11] Keep all personnel not directly involved in the operation out of the Emergency Operations Center.
- 12] When it is evident there is an impending natural disaster emergency activate all the Adjutant General's staff.
- 13] Assure strength reporting is simple, accurate and timely.
- 14] Make sure housing accommodations are available and adequate for personnel on duty.
- 15] Assign one qualified individual to handle all legislative and congressional inquiries making sure all intelligence is cleared by the Adjutant General.
- 16] Central control of all aviation assets.
- 17] When Task Force Commander authorizes direct contact with Civil Preparedness Sub-Area Command appraise military Emergency Operations Center of action.
- 18] Periodic briefings are mandatory, down to lowest echelon.
- 19] Establish a visitor bureau and prepare itineraries for official visitors.
- 20] Task Force Commanders should be authorized maximum latitude in the determination of priorities of missions in consonance with guidance from higher headquarters.
- 21] Establish liaison with local Red Cross and similar agencies.
- 22] Armories should have shelter Standing Operation Procedure identifying what is available and identify safety restrictions.
- 23] Armories should be equipped with an emergency generator to assure power to necessary utilities.

This essay has been written to appraise the reader of the crippling impact a national disaster has upon a nation. It has identified the need for cooperation and a uniform mode of operation between the National Guard and the Civil Preparedness agencies. It has pointed out the need for each agency to understand each others capability and how and when National Guard support is provided. Above all is the need to assure disaster plans are workable, properly coordinated and understood at the lowest echelon of Civil Preparedness Agencies and National Guard Programs will require vigorous leadership at the national and state level but the most effective actions must be implemented at the local echelon of government and in the private sectors of our society.

*Ernest W. Cook Jr.*  
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COL. IN CT ARNG

## FOOTNOTES


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
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| 20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)<br>This essay is directed toward Natural Disasters and the working relationship between the Civil Preparedness Agency of a state and that National Guard in time of an emergency. It identifies the past and foreseeable future pitfalls that exist in time of a disaster. Failure to identify a clear chain of command, definitive areas of responsibility and a functional working relationship between Civil Preparedness and National Guard has resulted in chaos. Lack of preparedness and |                       |  |

Item 20 continued.

misunderstanding as to capabilities, reduces valuable lead time which results in the unnecessary loss of life and property. There is a dire need to develop and continue to improve joint plans and programs. Emphasis should be on identifying lower echelon capabilities and planning for their effective use in time of disaster.

The statistics for this essay have been developed from personal interviews, reviewing state National Guard and Civil Preparedness plans and comments from the Military Support Plans and Operation officers throughout the country.