THE ART AND SCIENCE OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS:
CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY
APPLICATION.

VOLUME ONE

Project Director
Daniel C. Pollock

Editors
Ronald DeMcLaurin
Carl F. Rosenthal
Sarah A. Skillings
and others

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Comments and questions on this report are invited and should be addressed to AIR.
FOREWORD

This collection of essays has been compiled by AIR using information in the open literature, unclassified government documents, and original contributions. In scope it covers the entire spectrum of military psychological operations (PSYOP). Appropriate consideration is given to related civilian activities as well as to relevant aspects of communication theory. Emphasis is placed on the entire operational field encompassed by such terms as “international communications,” “political warfare,” “cultural affairs,” “psychological operations” (PSYOP), and “psychological warfare.”

The editors have sought to illustrate the effective and non-effective uses of PSYOP and to describe the problems encountered and the solutions adopted by military and civilian personnel involved in PSYOP/Information activities during recent decades. Contrasting points of view were deliberately included in the casebook to provide a balanced as well as a general view of the state of the art. Some of the contributions may be considered controversial, depending on the reader’s point of view. Where copyrighted material has been quoted, permission has been obtained for its use.

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American Institutes for Research
3301 New Mexico Avenue N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20016
PREFACE

AIR, operating under a contract with the Department of the Army, has developed this two-volume anthology in the form of a PSYOP casebook. It has been prepared in response to a request from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE

This publication has been produced as a part of the overall research program undertaken by the Department of the Army to improve the capability of the United States Army to conduct PSYOP/information programs under a variety of circumstances in many different environments. The major focus of attention has been placed on psychological operations of military relevance, with special emphasis on the types of activities that may confront U.S. personnel in the two decades ahead.

In content, the editors have sought to cover the whole range of U.S. public international communications whether they be described as international information, cultural affairs, or psychological operations, and whether or not they be conducted by members of a military service or personnel of a civilian agency. The editors also have touched upon the ways in which PSYOP is employed elsewhere, with the hope that such material will serve to broaden the American understanding of how others around the world attempt to communicate effectively across cultural barriers and international borders.

COMMUNICATION THEORY AND PSYOP

The science of communication theory is relatively new; more than half of all research, most of the important books and articles in the field, and most of the great figures in the study of communications have become well known only in the last twenty years. Moreover, increasingly for the last decade and a half it is in the context of communication theory that psychological operations—PSYOP—has been studied. Therefore these volumes will include several timely essays on communication theory.

ORGANIZATION

The Art and Science of Psychological Operations is an anthology bringing together both original and previously published material. In effect, the essays comprise an analysis of the state of the PSYOP art. Some of them also provide conclusions and recommendations for the future. The individual essays, which are organized into chapters, deal with the nature and scope of PSYOP and communications; national policy and PSYOP; organizational and personnel matters; policy objectives and operational goals in Volume One; PSYOP intelligence requirements, sources, and methods; social science research (including communication theory) and PSYOP; media, methods, and techniques; evaluation of effectiveness; and foreign ideology and propaganda in Volume Two.

SOURCES

The types of selections that have been incorporated in this casebook
include professional and scholarly publications, original contributions, foreign and domestic PSYOP-related material, excerpts from official memoranda and directives, lecture notes, letters, and newspaper items. An attempt has been made to ensure a reasonable geographic coverage by providing examples from all areas of the world. For example, Algeria, Burma, Cameroon, New Zealand, Nigeria, Portuguese Guinea, Taiwan, and Rumania are among the more than 30 countries treated in the text.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

General

The casebook is designed to serve primarily as background information for training in the field of psychological operations and as an introduction to the more important elements and principles of PSYOP. It is intended to serve not only as a point of departure for the uninitiated but also as a useful reference. The use of overly sophisticated material requiring a substantial social science background has been avoided. On the other hand, articles dealing in overly simplistic terms with principles painfully obvious to the reader have been excluded.

The editors have, however, intentionally included several somewhat advanced papers in the section on research in Chapter VII and on PSYOP effectiveness in Chapter IX. In Chapter VII, the selections give an indication of how sophisticated social science research can contribute to PSYOP. Similarly, the content of Chapter IX would have been incomplete and anachronistic without reference to the methodological thinking current in the 1960s and early 1970s. It is believed that all the articles lend themselves to an understanding of the subject without an extensive background in communications research.

Secondly, most of the case studies have been purposefully selected to complement and supplement a standard reference in the field titled, *Psychological Warfare Casebook*, written in 1956 by William E. Daugherty and Morris Janowitz. Changing perspectives of the nature and scope of PSYOP since that time, as well as changes in the politico-military environment in which PSYOP is carried out, have played an important part in the updating process. In this respect, the editors have given due weight to relevant events occurring since the publication of the PSYWAR casebook and have tried also to portray the new conceptions, methodologies, and techniques that have been developed to improve the effectiveness of PSYOP.

Thus, this compilation of case studies represents PSYOP generally in the 1960s, the situations experienced and the lessons learned in that decade. It is noted that although most of the incidents described took place between 1960 and 1972, some of them happened earlier but are best analyzed in the literature of the 1960s.

Philosophically, the editors of this casebook have tried to indicate the new concerns in PSYOP, the changing conceptions of the field as a whole, and the trends in the use of new methodologies and techniques to improve
its effectiveness. It is with reference to the change in conceptualization of PSYOP over the last fifteen years and to the trend of thinking in the early seventies that PSYOP is viewed in this book as communication. When the question is asked, "What is PSYOP?", the answers of different generations and different experts vary. Yet, as noted earlier, increasingly over the last decade and a half, psychological operations is studied in the context of communication. Although "persuasive" and "purposive" communications are the focus of this study, many scholars in the communications field argue that all communication is "purposive" and hence "persuasive." There is no need, in the context of present purposes, for this anthology to align itself with one or the other of these schools of thought.

Editorial Method

The desire to cover the "open" literature as thoroughly as possible and to make this an essential source book for both military and civilian personnel interested in PSYOP and communications has made it necessary to be as concise as possible. It has therefore been necessary to excerpt many selections on the basis of relevance and concision. Except in the very few cases where the essays were "adapted," the excerpting is indicated by the use of ellipsis points in both copyrighted and non-copyrighted material. Only in the "original" and editors' essays were editorial changes, other than purely stylistic ones, made. Where necessary, the footnotes in each essay were renumbered, but not otherwise altered in form. The notes pertinent to a particular essay appear at the conclusion of that essay. Bibliographic citations for most sources used by the essay authors are found at the end of each chapter.

In as far as possible, the editors sought the consent of authors and organizations, even when their material was not copyrighted. The copyright holder, at least, was provided with a copy of the material in its proposed form. A particular note is made of the willingness with which publishers, editors, and authors responded to requests for permission to reprint material. In some cases, they even offered to update, substitute, or revise their articles, and when time permitted, the editors were able to take advantage of this. Some authors even suggested that they were flattered to be included. The undersigned, however, look at this the other way around: this book needed their contributions.

Inevitably in a work such as this—in which authors represent many nationalities, professions, and perspectives—the reader will find some material in spoken or translated English. For example, in those contributions illustrative of the day-to-day output of military units engaged in actual operations, a kind of clipped but useful military style is employed. Such a style was retained because it has a feel of immediacy and serves as an example of real PSYOP in action.

As in any anthology, one is advised to consider the article's original date of publication in one's reading. A further result of the use of the case study approach is the fact that articles do not have an inherent order and
flow. Although each selection has been placed in a chapter on the basis of its contributions to the topic covered in that chapter, an overly rigid linking of the several selections would be an arbitrary enterprise, misleading in some cases, since many contributions are illustrative rather than conclusive. The editors, therefore, have used the introductory comments at the head of each article to place the contribution in its situational context in many cases. However, this means, in some instances, that emphasis has been placed on aspects the contributing author did not necessarily consider to be preeminent, given his sometimes different purpose. Furthermore, because of the disclaimers carried in the mastheads of many of the original source publications, no implication should be drawn concerning the original source publishers' views on any articles published by them, without consulting the original source.

The chapters of this anthology, as well as the articles themselves, stand alone in large measure, even though references and cross-references reflect the interdependence of the various aspects of the PSYOP process as a whole. It is to be noted that because of the use of the casebook approach, style varies markedly from one article to another, providing a diversion from a single manner of expression.

Finally, a concerted effort has been made in the selection process for this compilation to stress the importance that the "PSYOP-related" fields have for effective psychological operations. Moreover, admittedly controversial analyses, conclusions, and recommendations are found in several of the articles. These have been included not only for the purposes of the casebook already discussed, but to stimulate thinking. Essays featuring contrasting points of view are presented to provide a general idea of the range of thought of the individuals working in the field.

At any rate, this study looks at psychological operations analytically and conceptually as well as descriptively. Above all, every action and all inaction communicate. The goal in PSYOP must be to ensure that, through the combination of action and words, the desired message is the one that is transmitted. This is as true for nations as it is for individuals and groups.

D. C. Pollock
R. De McLaurin
C. T. Rosenthal
S. A. Skillings
AUTHORS, CONTRIBUTORS, AND EDITORS

AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS

AARON, Harold R.  
(Major General, U.S. Army)  
Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, 1974; Graduate of the National War College; Special Warfare Division, Army General Staff, 1960–1961; Office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1965–1967; CO 1st Special Forces Group, 1967–1968; CO 5th Special Forces Group, 1968–1969.

ALLEN, George V.  

ASKENASY, Alexander R.  
Y3AIRDAIN, E. Frederick
Vice President and Senior Research Scientist, Applied Systems Science Technology, Inc.; has held senior management positions in domestic and foreign operations of several major transnational corporations specializing in organization and communications; Project Director of a task force to assess the status of PSYOP in Vietnam; Principal Scientist for conduct of basic and applied field research on measurement of effectiveness of PSYOP; and Principal Scientist for a project to create a history of PSYOP in Southeast Asia and develop recommendations on doctrine and guidance for the future; author of many classified publications and coauthor of Program Assessment: Vietnam Field Study, Psychological Operations—Vietnam.

BAIRDAN, Edith M.
President and Chief Scientist, Applied Systems Science Technology, Inc.; has held management positions in the aerospace and computer systems industry, including International Electric Corporation, Computer Sciences Corporation, and International Telephone and Telegraph; Project Director of a project to create a history of PSYOP in Southeast Asia and develop recommendations on doctrine and guidance for the future; Research Director of a task force advising U.S. agencies on conduct and evaluation of PSYOP in Vietnam; Research Director of a Field Team for Psychological Operations; coauthor of Program Assessment: Vietnam Field Study, Psychological Operations—Vietnam.

BARGHOORN, Frederick C.
Professor of Political Science, Yale University; Associate Division Assistant, Department of State, 1941-1942; Press Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Moscow, 1943-1947; author of The Soviet Image of the U.S., Soviet Russian Nationalism, Soviet Cultural Offensive, Soviet Foreign Propaganda.

BARR, John S.
Retired; represented London Missionary Society in China from 1924 to 1955; Professor and Counselor, Chung Chi College, Hong Kong, until 1966.
BARRETT, Raymond J.
Department of State Advisor at John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance, Fort Bragg, N.C.; as U.S. Foreign Service Officer, served in Madrid, Mexico City, Managua, Dublin, and Cairo overseas, and in the Office of International Conferences, the Office of East and Southern African Affairs, and at Air Force Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

BEELEY, Sir Harold

BELLOFF, Max
Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, Oxford University; has studied cultural and information work of Council of Europe and NATO; author of *The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1929-1941, Public Order and Popular Disturbances, The American Federal Government, The Future of British Foreign Policy, Imperial Sunset*.

BERGER, Carl

BOGART, Leo

BOHANNAN, Charles T. R.
Retired career military officer; Smithsonian Institution, before World War II;
(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)


BRANDON, James R.


BROMAN, Barry M.

U.S. Marine Corps, 1968-1971; no further information available.

BRZEZINSKI, Zbigniew


BULLARD, Monte R.

(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)

Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of California, Berkeley; formerly Department of Social Sciences, U.S. Military Academy (West Point); Foreign Area Specialist Training Program in Chinese; 1½ years at Foreign Service Institute of Chinese Area and Language Studies, Taiwan; Military Intelligence officer, Seoul, Korea; Political Warfare Staff Advisor, Headquarters, MACV, Vietnam.

CHOUKAS, Michael

Provost, Pierce College; previously on sociology and anthropology faculties, Dartmouth College, 1929-1953; Pierce College, 1968-1971; Office of Strategic Services, 1944-1945; author of Black Angels of Athos, Propaganda Comes of Age.

CLARKSON, Edward J.

Member, Mid-range Amphibious Warfare Study Panel, Headquarters, Marine Corps; in charge of III MAF Chieu Hoi Division, CORDS, 1967-1968.

DASBACH, Anita Adjunct Associate Professor to the Political Science Department, George Washington University.

DAVIS, Morris

Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; taught formerly at University of Wisconsin, Dalhousie University, and Tulane University; author of numerous articles on communications and other aspects of political science.

delANEY, Robert Finley


DONNELL, John Corwin

Professor of Political Science, Temple University; U.S. Army CIC, 1943–1946; SCAP, Tokyo, war crimes investigator, 1946–1947; Intelligence Analyst, Civil Intelligence Section, Tokyo, 1946–1947; Staff Officer, USIA, 1949–1953; State Department, 1953–1958 (Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaya); taught at Dartmouth College and University of California (Berkeley); staff member, RAND Corporation, Social Science Department, 1964–1965.

DUNN, S. Watson

Professor and Head, Department of Advertising, University of Illinois; has taught at universities of Wisconsin, Pittsburgh, and Western Ontario; author of Advertising: Its Role in Modern Marketing, International Handbook of Advertising, and Advertising Copy and Communications.
DURHAM,
F. Gayle
(See HOLANDER,
Gayle D.)
ELLUL,
Jacques
Professor of History of Law and Social
History, University of Bordeaux; author
of numerous works, including Autopsy of
Revolution, The Political Illusion, Propa-
ganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes,
and Technological Society.

ESWARA,
Harrogadde S.
FOOTE,
A. Edward
Reader in Psychology, University of My-
sore, India.
Editor, Educational Broadcasting Re-
view.

FREE,
Lloyd A.
President, Institute for International So-
cial Research, SAIS, The Johns Hopkins Un-
iversity; onetime Editor of the Public Opinion
Quarterly; Director, Foreign Broadcast Intel-
ligence Service, World War II; Assistant
Military Attache, Switzerland; Senior Coun-
selor, Mass Communications, UNESCO; Act-
ing Director, Office of International Infor-
mation, State Department; Counselor of Em-
bassy for Public Affairs, Rome; advisor to
presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson; advisor/consultant to Vice President
Nelson Rockefeller.

FRIEDRICH,
Carl Joachim
Eaton Professor Emeritus of the Science
of Government, Harvard University; taught
at Harvard, 1926-1971; Director, School for
Overseas Administration, 1946-1949; Con-
stitutional Advisor, U.S. Military Govern-
ment in Germany, 1946-1948; Constitutional
Advisor to Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands; Presi-
dent, International Political Science Associa-
tion, 1966-1970; American Society for Political
and Legal Philosophy, 1956-1965; author of
Man and His Government, The Philosophy of
Law in Historical Perspective, Totalitarian
Dictatorship and Autocracy (coauthor), Con-
stitutional Government and Democracy, The
Age of the Baroque, and many other works.

FULTON,
R. Barry
Career officer, USIA; currently assigned
to the Management Division, Office of the As-
sistant Director (Administration and Man-
agement), USIA; formerly Special Assistant
and Second Secretary, American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan; Director, American Center, Karachi Pakistan; Director of the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service, Turkey; taught at the University of Illinois, San Antonio College, the University of Maryland, and Pennsylvania State University.

Lieutenant, 9th Infantry, 1968; no further information available.

GARVER, Richard A.
Chairman, Department of Journalism, State University of South Dakota.

GERGEN, Kenneth Jay

GERGEN, Mary
Research Associate, Department of Psychology, Swarthmore College.

GESSNER, Peter
Free-lance film editor and camera assistant.

GIZA, Richard H.
Intelligence Research Specialist, Department of Defense, 1966-present; taught at Fordham University.

GLEASON, Robert L. (Colonel, USAF)
Former Special Warfare Operations Officer, Aerospace Studies Institute, Air University; graduate and former faculty member, Air War College.

GLICK, Nathan

GRINTER, Lawrence E.
Professor of East Asian Affairs, National War College; Visiting Professor of Political Science, Haverford College; Post-doctoral Fellow and Project Manager, Foreign Policy Research Institute; Senior Social Science Analyst, CINCPAC Headquarters, Honolulu; Research Associate, Center for Research in Social Systems; Field Researcher, Simulmatics
GUTHRIE, George M. Corporation, Saigon; Peace Corps volunteer teacher, Sierra Leone.
Professor of Psychology, Pennsylvania State University; coauthor of Child Rearing and Personality Development in the Philippines.

HARRIS, Elliot Communications consultant; member, Army reserve (in PSYWAR), late 1940s; attended Psychological Warfare School, Fort Bragg, N.C.; assigned to ACPW, U.S. Army, during Korean War; advertising writer and publishing executive since 1953; author of The "Un-American" Weapon: Psychological Warfare.

HAUSMAN, Conrad K. Defense Intelligence Agency; 1964–1966, Vietnam (Operations Research Analyst, MACJ3); Desk Officer, MACV Political Warfare; Senior Advisor, Vietnamese Armed Forces Psychological Warfare Directorate; Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st U.S. Infantry Division.


HENDERSON, John W. Retired career Foreign Service Officer; Washington bureau, Associated Press, after World War II; served with U.S. Army during World War II; served as FSO in Shanghai, Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Thailand, Indonesia; attended National War College; author of The United States Information Agency.

HERZ, Martin F. Career U.S. Foreign Service Officer (1946 to present); currently U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria; formerly Deputy and Acting Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs; officer, U.S. Army, 1941–1946 (member, Psychological Warfare Team, Fifth U.S. Army in Italy and chief leaflet writer, PWD/SHAEF, 1944–1945); translator, broadcasting company, 1939–1940; author of many articles on psychological warfare and
psychological operations; author of *Beginnings of the Cold War*.

HOLLANDER, Gayle D.

HOLT, Robert T. Professor of Political Science, University of Minnesota and Director, Center of Comparative Studies of Technological Development and Social Change; author, *Radio Free Europe*; coauthor, *The Political Basis of Economic Development, Political Parties in Action, Competing Paradigms in Comparative Politics, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy*; coeditor, *The Methodology of Comparative Research*.

HOSKINS, Marilyn W. Social anthropologist; no further information available.

HURLEY, Cornelius P., S.J. Founder and Director, Institute of Social Communications, Bellarmine Center, Santiago, Chile; author of *Theology in Film and Sociology in Film*.

JANIS, Irving L. Professor of Psychology, Yale University; Research Assistant, Study of Wartime Communications, Library of Congress, 1941; Senior Social Science Analyst, Special War Policies Unit, Department of Justice, 1941-1943; U.S. Army, 1943-1945; research, Social Science Research Council, 1945-1947; author, *Air War and Emotional Stress, Psychological Stress*; coauthor, *Communications and Persuasion, Personality and Persuasibility*.

JOHNS, John H. ODCSPER, DA, 1974; Instructor in Psychological Operations, Special Warfare School, 1960-1962; Senior Advisor/Instructor,
JOHNSTON, William F.  
(Colonel, U.S. Army)  
Member, staff and faculty, National Interdepartmental Seminar, Foreign Service Institute; assigned to Office, Chief of Psychological Warfare, 1953; several Special Warfare-type assignments, including command of PSYWAR battalion in USARPAC; Chief, JUSPAO Planning Office, Vietnam, in previous assignment.

KATAGIRI, Taro  
(Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)  
Career military officer; assignments included command of 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam.

KATZ, Phillip Paul  
(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)  
Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; Psychological Operations Instructor and Lecturer at Army Special Warfare Center, 1956-1963; Psychological Operations Officer at Department of Army and Senior PSYOP Officer for U.S. Army, Pacific, 1963-1967; Senior Program Manager for Development of Strategic Psychological Operations in Support of Field Activities, Vietnam, 1967-1968; developed a computerized PSYOP management information system for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Department of the Army; author of studies on PSYOP.

KELLY, George A.  

LANIGAN, John Dennis  
(Major, USMC, Ret.)  
Associate Director in the Policy Analysis Department, Operations Analysis Division, General Research Corporation; graduate of Counterinsurgency and Special
LANSDALE, Edward Geary (Major General, USAF, Ret.)
Retired career officer, USAF; served OSS during World War II; deeply involved in psychological operations and counterinsurgency planning for Southeast Asia throughout postwar period.

LERNER, Daniel

LESCAZE, Lee
Washington Post Foreign Service.

LE VINE, Victor T.
Professor of Political Science, Washington University (St. Louis); also taught at UCLA; author, *The Cameroon from Mandate to Independence, Political Leadership in Africa, The Cameroon Federal Republic*.

LINEBARGER, Paul M.A.

LITTLE, John M.
Infantry captain (1966); no further information available.

LONG, Chuong Dac
No information available.

LORIMOR, E. S.
Involved in communications research in Barcelona, Spain; formerly evaluator of teacher education project in Nigeria; Ph.D. in mass communications from the University of Wisconsin.
LOVETT, Colburn B. Foreign Service Information Officer, USIA, currently assigned to the Operations Center Staff, Office of the Director, USIA; formerly, PSYOP Planning Officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army; Senior Field Representative of JUSPAO in a previous assignment; also served in Korea and Thailand.


McAULAY, A.H.D. (Warrant Officer, Australian Army) Australian Army Intelligence Corps; linguist, attached to Australian forces in Vietnam.

McKAY, Vernon Professor of African Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University; foreign affairs officer, Department of State, 1948-1956; Research Associate, Foreign Policy Association, 1945-1948; also taught at Syracuse University; author, coauthor, and editor of over 100 publications on Africa.

No further information available.

MIDDLETON, Casilear (Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)

MILLER, Gerald Raymond Professor of Communication, Michigan State University; taught at the State University of Iowa and the University of Washington at Seattle; author of Speech Communication: A Behavioral Approach; coauthor of New Techniques of Persuasion.
MONROE,
James L.

President, Preston and Associates; Colonel, U.S. Air Force Reserve, on active duty during World War II and Korean War, heavily involved in leaflet drops (including development of Monroe Leaflet Bomb) and interrogation; contract research following Korean War.

MOON,
Gordon A., II
(Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)

Formerly Information Officer, Headquarters, Fifth Army, Fort Sheridan, Illinois (1967); no further information available.

MORRIS,
Michael A.

Fellow, Canadian Institute of International Affairs (1970); taught at Gallaudet College.

MORRIS,
Robert P.
(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)

Operations Research Analyst, Office of the Comptroller of the Army; taught at Florida State University and University of Maryland (Far East Division); Assistant Chief of Staff, G5, 1st Infantry Division, in Vietnam, 1967-1968, supervising U.S. Army tactical psychological operations in five provinces; graduate of U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

MOSKOS,
Charles C., Jr.

Professor and Chairman of the Sociology Department, Northwestern University; author of *The American Enlisted Man, Public Opinion and the Military Establishment*, and *Peace Soldiers*.

MOYNAHAN,
Brian

No information available.

MURTY,
R. S.

Head, Department of Law, Andhra University (India).

NATHAN,
Reuben S.


NIEHOFF,
Arthur H.

Professor and Chairman, Department of Anthropology, California State College at Los Angeles; also taught at University of Wisconsin; Assistant Curator, Milwaukee Public Museum, 1951-1959; Advisor in community...

**NORTON, John H.**

Director of International Operations, Keyser-Century Corporation and consultant on international operations for business; Lieutenant Commander U.S. Naval Reserve; naval aviator, 1960–1963; extensive overseas travel; degrees from Yale and Stanford; recently completed a year of advanced studies in economic and political development at Harvard and M.I.T.

**OKES, Imogene E.**


**ORTH, Richard H.**

Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; coauthor of a study on Community Relations Advisory Councils and a PSYOP Research Guide.

**OZAKI, John**

(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)

Career military officer; assigned to Department of Army (1969); served with ASA, headquarters 7th Army, MACV, and in the infantry in Korea; graduate, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College; no further information available.

**PAPPAS, Dino G.**

PIKE, Douglas Eugene

Communications in the Military Assistance Program (MAP).

POOL, Ithiel de Sola

Professor, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; also taught at Stanford University and Hobart College; member, USAF Scientific Advisory Board and the Defense Science Board; author of Symbols of Democracy, Symbols of Internationalism; coauthor of Candidates, Issues and Strategies, American Business and Public Policy; editor of Talking Back, Handbook of Communication.

PRESTON, Harley Oliver

Senior Staff Member, American Psychological Association; Psychological Assistant, U.S. Army Air Forces, 1942–1945; taught at Kent State University, 1941–1942, 1946–1947; Executive Scientist (1947–1960) and Director, International Division (1961–1964), American Institutes for Research; author of Operations of the Participant Training Program of AID.

PRICE, James Robert

QUANG, Phan Trong
RAFFA, Aldo L.
(Colonel, USAF, Ret.)
RAO, Y. V. Lakshmana

ROBINSON, David D.

ROLPH, Hammond
(Commander, USN, Ret.)
Executive Assistant to the Director, School of Politics and International Relations, University of Southern California, and Consulting Editor, Studies in Comparative Communism; retired career (21 years) naval intelligence officer; author of Vietnamese Communism and the Protracted War; coauthor of Communism in Vietnam.

RONALDS, Francis S., Jr.

RUBIN, Bernard
Professor of Governmental Affairs, School of Public Communication, Boston University; has also taught at Skidmore and Brooklyn colleges and Rutgers University; Chief, Research Design Unit, U.S I.A., 1968-1969; author of Political Television, Report to the Government of Massachusetts (on

SARAL, Tulsi Bhatia
Formerly Head, Department of Mass Communications, Literacy House, Lucknow, India; Editor and Information and Publications Officer, Government of Uttar Pradesh, India; Editor of Nava Yuvak for five years; author of twelve books in Hindi.

SCHRAMM, Wilbur
Currently with the East-West Center; formerly Professor, Director of Institute of Communications Research, Stanford University; also taught at universities of Illinois and Iowa; director, Education Division, Office of War Information, 1942–1943.

SIMPSON, Howard Russell

SMITH, Don D.
Professor of Sociology, Florida State University.

SPARKS, Kenneth

STONE, Vernon A.
Assistant Professor of Journalism, University of Wisconsin.

SUGDEN, G. Scott
Career officer, USIA; currently, Program Coordinator, North Africa, Near East, South Asia; previously assigned to India, Pakistan, Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. Senior Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; while Associate Professor in Research at The American University, developed the Associative Group Analysis method; taught also at George Washington University. Consultant to the Library of Congress; author and coauthor of numerous arti-

TANAKA, Yasumasa

Professor of Social Psychology and Communications, Gakushuin University, Tokyo, Japan; has also taught at universities of Pennsylvania and Saskatchewan; author of four books (in Japanese) on human communication and subjective culture; editor of Cross-Cultural Social Psychology Newsletter; Associate Editor of Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.

THEBAUD, Charles C.

(The Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)

Formerly Staff Officer, Deputy Chief of Staff, Fort Benning, Georgia; no further information available.

THOR:TON, Thomas Perry

Member, Policy and Coordination Staff, U.S. Department of State; Cultural Affairs Office, USIS, India, 1955-1958; Analyst, U.S. Navy Department, 1958-1963; Chief, Division of Research and Analysis for South Asia, U.S. State Department, 1963-1969; has taught at George Washington, American, and Johns Hopkins universities; coauthor of Grobianische tischzuchten; editor, The Third World in Soviet Perspective; coeditor, communism and Revolution.

TOO, C. C.

Head, Psychological Warfare Section, Malaysian Government.

TUCK, Robert L.

Director, Program Operations Division, Radio Liberty; Policy Director, Radio Liberty, 1961-1966; Foreign Affairs Analyst, Department of the Army and U.S. Air Force. Soviet analyst; no further information available.
VALERIANO, Napoleon
(Neilton, Armed Forces of the Philippines, Ret.)
Army of the United States; 1946-1957,

VAN DE VELDE, Robert Whitsett
(Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)
Professoral Lecturer, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University; career Army officer, 1935-1957; coauthor, Strategic Psychological Operations and American Foreign Policy.

WATSON, Francis M., Jr.
(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.)
Media researcher, writer, and lecturer, National Security Analysis, Inc.; Deputy Manager, Cultural Information Analysis Center and Chief, Fort Bragg Field Office, American Institutes for Research; author of Revolution in Executive Perspective, An Analytical Introduction to the Underground Press; editor TUPART monthly reports or the underground press, 1971.

WECHSLER, Irving Robert
Senior Analyst, Evaluation and Analysis Staff, Office of Research, USIA; taught at Harvard, 1935-1943; Office of War Information, 1944-1945; State Department, 1945-1953; career USIA officer from 1953, occupying several policy guidance positions.

WHelan, Joseph G.
Senior Specialist, International Affairs, Congressional Research Service, U.S. Library of Congress; Staff Member, Far Eastern Commission, State Department, 1946; author of numerous reports published by the U.S. Congress on Soviet affairs.

WONG, Paul
Research Sociologist, specializing in Chinese sociology.

YAMASHITA, K. Stanley
(Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army)
Instructor, Human Behavior Branch, Psychological Warfare Department, U.S. Army Special Warfare School; foreign assignments with U.S. Army in Thailand, Japan, and Okinawa.

YARBOROUGH, William Pelham
(Lieutenant General, U.S. Army, Ret.)
Airborne officer during World War II; Provost Marshal of U.S. Forces in Austria after the war, organizing Four Power International Patrol; Director, Department of Troop Information and Educa-
YOH, Bernard

Professor and Head of department of Political Science, New York University; also taught at University of North Carolina and Stanford University; Advisory Editor, Journal of Asian Studies; author, Party Politics in Republican China; coauthor, The Chinese Anarchist Movement.

ZORTHIAN, Barry R.

Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois; also taught at University of North Carolina and Stanford University; Advisory Editor, Journal of Asian Studies; author, Party Politics in Republican China; coauthor, The Chinese Anarchist Movement.

ZORHTHIAN, Barry R.

Vice President, Time Incorporated, President of Time-Life broadcast, Inc.; news reporter and editor, 1936-1942, 1946-1947;

PROJECT DIRECTOR
POILLOCK, Daniel Carroll
(Colonel, USMC, Ret.)

Former Principal Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; substantial experience in politico-military affairs during military career; Chief, Asia Branch, Cultural Information and Analysis Center, American Institutes for Research; Project Director for the Ethnographic Study Series and several other classified and unclassified research projects.

THE EDITORS
McLaurin, Ronald De


ROSENTHAL, Carl F.

Research Scientist, American Institutes for Research; while at American Institutes for Research, conducted studies on insurgency and collective violence, civic action and psychological operations; author of a number of classified or limited publications in these fields; author of Phases of Civil Disturbances: Problems and Characteristics, Social Conflict and Collective Violence in American Institutions of Higher Education.

SKILLINGS, Sarah Africa

Research Associate, American Institutes for Research; Research Analyst, U.S. Army Security Agency; General Assistant, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization; editor of a number of publications dealing with military assistance, intercultural communications, psycholinguistics, and psychological operations; coauthor of a technical report on foreign population groups.
**CONTENTS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FOREWORD</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VOLUME ONE</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter I. INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Psychological Operations in the 1970s: A Program in Search of a Doctrine, by Robert F. Delaney</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter II. THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PSYOP</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Origin of PSYOP Terminology, by William E. Daugherty</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What Is Communication? by Yasumasa Tanaka</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSYOP and Communication Theory, by Phillip P. Katz</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSYOP: What Is It? by Raymond J. Barrett</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is International Persuasion Sociologically Feasible? by Daniel Lerner</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSYOP and Related Activities, by Francis M. Watson, Jr.</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communication and Institution Building in Developing Countries, by John H. Johns</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Role of Psychological Operations Within the Military Mission, by Alexander R. Askenasy</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography, Chapter II</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chapter III. NATIONAL POLICY AND PSYOP</strong></td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National Policy and PSYOP: Framework for Policy</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PSYOP in Perspective, by William E. Daugherty</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The National PSYOP Community, by The Editors</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>USIA's Mission and Responsibilities, by Irving R. Wechsler</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Selling Uncle Sam in the Seventies, by Kenneth R. Sparks</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Planning</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Presidential Policy Parameters, by William E. Daugherty</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>When Are Political Objectives Clearly Defined? by Michael A. Morris</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Making Policy Is Not the Propagandist's Business—Or Is It? by Reuben S. Nathan</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xxix
Telling It Like It Really Is, by William T. Macy .................................................. 408
Operation Strike, by Elliot Harris ................................................................. 412
Effective Combat PSYOP in the Delta, by Colburn B. Lovett .................................................. 413
Defection Or Surrender, by Martin F. Herz .................................................. 416
Político-Military Affairs ................................................................. 419
The Good Guys and the Bad Guys, by Harold R. Aaron ........................................... 420
Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation, by Thomas Perry Thornton .................................................. 425
Target—The Civilian, by Napoleon D. Valeriano and Charles T. R. Bohannan .................................................. 440
Grace Under Pressure: The U.S. Soldier in the Dominican Republic, by Charles C. Moskos, Jr .. 454
Civil Assistance in Laos, by William P. Yarborough ........................................... 458
Expanding Political Participation—The Long Haul from Villagism to Nationalism, by John C. Donnell .................................................. 460
Political Warfare in Vietnam, by Monte R. Bullard ........................................... 461
Communication and Nation Building, by John H. Johns ........................................... 465
Bibliography, Chapter VI .................................................. 471

VOLUME TWO

Chapter VII. INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH .................................................. 477

PSYOP Intelligence .................................................. 478
A Survey of PSYOP Intelligence, by Phillip P. Katz (Introduction) .................................................. 478
PSYOP Intelligence Requirements .................................................. 494
PSYOP Essential Elements of Information, by 7th PSYOP Group .................................................. 495
The NVA Soldier in South Vietnam as a PSYOP Target, by JUSPAO Planning Office .................................................. 498
Translation Problems, by Richard H. Orth .................................................. 506
Tet in Viet-Nam, by Chuong Dac Long .................................................. 508
PSYOP Intelligence Sources .................................................. 510
Prisoners of War .................................................. 512
PW and Captured Document Doctrine, by John A. Hemphill .................................................. 512
Defectors .................................................. 518
A North Korean Defector, by 7th PSYOP Group .................................................. 518
Civilian Population (See Imogene E. Ekes “Effective Communication of Americans with Thai” in PSYOP Intelligence Methods section.) .................................................. 534
Broadcasts .................................................. 534
Radio Broadcast Monitoring, by 7th PSYOP Group .................................................. 534
Captured Documents .................................................. 536
Viet Cong Documents on the War (I) .................................................. 536
Propaganda .................................................. 545
Romania—A Chinese Toehold, by 7th PSYOP Group .................................................. 545
Voice of the People of Burma, by 7th PSYOP Group .................................................. 547
Intelligence Reports .................................................. 549
Views Held by North Koreans About Foreign Countries and Peoples, by 7th PSYOP Group .................................................. 549
Unpublished Studies .................................................. 553
Attitudes, Communications and Communist Propaganda: Factors in Insurgency in Southeast Asia .................................................. 553

xxxii
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PSYOP Intelligence Methods</th>
<th>571</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Methods for the Exploitation of Major PSYOP Information Sources, by Phillip P. Katz</td>
<td>572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intuition</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asiatic Guerrilla Motivation, by John M. Little</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct Observation</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unconventional Warfare—The Psychological Role of Special Forces, by William P. Yarborough</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewing</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effective Communication by Americans with Thai, by Imogene E. Okes</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sampling</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sampling Process for Psyoperaors, by Richard H. Orth</td>
<td>594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content Analysis</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factors Influencing North Vietnamese Morale, by 7th PSYOP Group</td>
<td>606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Science Research and PSYOP</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion, by Irving L. Janis (Introduction)</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anthologies, Syntheses, and Explorations: An Attitude Change Sampler, by Gerald R. Miller</td>
<td>624</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Model of Communication Effectiveness, by A. Edward Foote</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Measurement of Speaker Credibility, by R. Barry Fulton</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography, Chapter VII</td>
<td>649</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**CHAPTER VIII. MEDIA, METHODS, and TECHNIQUES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Audience Selection</th>
<th>655</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groups and Attitude Change, by Richard H. Orth</td>
<td>658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prestigious Persons and Key Communicators, by Richard H. Orth</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Problem of the Unintended Audience, by Paul M. A. Linebarger</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Decision to Defect, by Lawrence E. Gruner</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Message Composition</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selection of Themes, by Carl Berger</td>
<td>670</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One Pair of Shoes, by Reuben S. Nathan</td>
<td>673</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Soviet “Peace and Progress” Broadcasts, by 7th PSYOP Group</td>
<td>676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brief Observation on the Importance of Up to Date Language in “Black” or “Grey” Propaganda Leaflets, by Martin F. Herz</td>
<td>678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Films from the Vietcong, by Peter Gesner</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Viet Cong Slogan Slip, by JUSPAO Planning Staff</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaflets at a Glance, by The Editors</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Golden Bridges, by Reuben S. Nathan</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sihanouk’s Appeal to the Monks of Cambodia, by 7th PSYOP Group</td>
<td>687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Famous “MIG” Leaflet, by Carl Berger</td>
<td>689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretesting the Product, by Wilbur Schramm</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exploitation of Channels of Communication</td>
<td>693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication and the Use of Mass Media, by John Dennis Lanigar</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visual Communications in the Nigerian Civil War, by Morris Davis</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Media of Communication and Propaganda, by B. S. Murty 699
Nongovernmental Communications in the Nigerian Civil
War, by Morris Davis .......................... 702
News Broadcasting on Soviet Radio and Television, by
F. Gayle Durham .................................. 711
Strategic Leaflets, by Carl Berger .......................... 713
The NLF Leaflet, by Douglas Pike .......................... 716
USIA's "Little" Magazine, by Nathan Gluck ..................... 718
U.S.-Soviet Magazine Propaganda: America Illustrated
and USSR, by Anita Mallinckrodt Dasbach ................................ 720
TATZPAO: Medium of Conflict in China's "Cultural
Revolution," by Barry M. Broman .......................... 722
Earlyword, by The Editors .................................. 725
Postal Subversion, by Michael Choukas ..................... 726
Mainland Pounded by Balloons in Psychological Warfare ........ 727
Quemoy: Pop Goes the Propaganda, by Lee Lescaze .................. 728
Psychological Operations and Air Power: Its Hits and
Misses, by Robert L. Gleason .......................... 730
China's Use of Culture for Propaganda, by John S. Barr ................ 735
Plays as Propaganda: Theatre as a Communication Medium in Southeast Asia, by James R. Brandon ..................... 739
Organization and Operation of U.S-Supported Culture-
Drama Teams, by the JUSPAO Planning Office ................ 744
North Vietnamese and NFSLV Songs as Propaganda, by
7th PSYOP Group .................................. 749
Symbolic Acts as PSYOP, by Robert T. Holt and Robert
W. van de Velde .................................. 754
The Older Vietnamese as a Communicant, by the JUS-
PAO Planning Office .................................. 755
An Unknown Warrior, by Edward J. Clarkson ..................... 758
Unorthodox Techniques .................................. 759
Tactics of Deception in Psychological Operations by
Robert I. Holt and Robert W. van de Velde ................ 760
Special Operations Against the Vietminh, by Edward
Geary Lansdale .................................. 762
Our Poison Pen War Against the Nazis, by Brian Moynahan .. 763
Rumors and How to Counter Them, by Wilbur Schramm ................ 765
"Practical Jokes" by Edward Geary Lansdale ..................... 767
Intra-Group Communications and Induced Change, by
Arthur H. Niehoff .................................. 770
Bibliography, Chapter VIII .......................... 773

CHAPTER IX PSYOP EFFECTIVENESS .......................... 777
Introduction .................................. 778
A Brief Review Study of the Problems of Criteria in Psy-
chological Warfare, by David D. Robinson ................ 778
The Pueblo Film, by 7th PSYOP Group ..................... 784
Source Analysis .................................. 789
Source Factors in Persuasion, by Richard H. Orth ................ 790
The Likability and Self-interest of the Source in Attitude
Change, by Vernon A. Stone and Harrogadee S. Eswara .......... 796
The Hungarian Self-Image and the Hungarian Image of
Americans and Russians, by Radio Free Europe ................ 806

xxxiv
Ways and Means of U.S. Ideological Expansion, by A. Valyuuchenich ........................................ 823
Influencing Political Change by Broadcasting to the Soviet Union, by Robert L. Tuck ........................................ 830
Content Analysis ........................................ 835
Coding and Analysis of Documentary Materials from Communist China, by Paul Wong ........................................ 836
Polite Propaganda: “USSR” and “America Illustrated” by Richard A. Garver ........................................ 848
Puppet Regime Clings to Psychological Warfare, by 7th PSYOP Group ........................................ 864
U.S. Vulnerabilities as Portrayed in the East German Television Film, “Pilots in Pajamas”, by Harley O. Preston, James L. Monroe, and Aldo L. Raffa ........................................ 855
Audience Analysis ........................................ 862
Audience Analysis and Public Opinion Research—Radio Free Europe, by Lorand B. Szalay ........................................ 862
Audience Analysis at Radio Liberty, by Lorand B. Szalay ........................................ 878
Identification with North or South Vietnam in Eastern Europe, by Radio Free Europe ........................................ 883
Reference Groups, Congruity Theory and Cross-Cultural Persuasion, by E. S. Lorimor and S. Watson Dunn ........................................ 886
Media Analysis ........................................ 887
Effectiveness of PSYOP Messages: A Foundation Study, by Ernest F. and Edith M. Bairdain ........................................ 888
East European Attitudes to the Vietnam Conflict, by Radio Free Europe ........................................ 913
Using Motion Pictures to Aid Inter-Cultural Communication, by Neil P. Hurley, S.J. ........................................ 919
The Future of International Broadcasting, by Francis S. Ronalds, Jr. ........................................ 928
Propaganda Through the Printed Media in the Developing Countries, by Y. V. Lakshmana Rao ........................................ 939
Evaluating Films for Development, by Tulsi Bhatia Saral ........................................ 943
Effects Analysis ........................................ 946
Psychological Operations in Vietnam: Indicators of Effectiveness at the U.S. Army Division Level, by R. P. Morris ........................................ 946
Measuring the Effectiveness of an Overseas Information Campaign: A Case History, by Leo Bogart ........................................ 957
Radio Liberty’s Audience Impact and Effectiveness, by Joseph G. Whelan ........................................ 972
Some Effects of Radio Moscow’s North American Broadcasts, by Don D. Smith ........................................ 985
The Chieu Hoi Program Poses Threat of Special Dimensions, by Hammond Rolph ........................................ 996
On Analyzing PSYOP Campaigns Before Using Them, by Richard H. Orth ........................................ 1003
Conclusion ........................................ 1011
Effectiveness of International Propaganda, by L. John Martin ........................................ 1011
Bibliography, Chapter IX ........................................ 1021

CHAPTER X. FOREIGN IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA ........................................ 1027
Role of the Government System ........................................ 1027
Propaganda and the Monopoly of Mass Communications, by Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski ........................................ 1028

XXXV
THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

CASE STUDIES OF MILITARY APPLICATION
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN THE 1970s: A PROGRAM IN
SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE*

By ROBERT F. DELANFY

An overview of U.S. PSYOP in the past and its implications for the future.

I. BACKGROUND

Projection of American military strategy into the 1970s must be done with careful attention to the total national experience of the postwar era, which is seen by qualified observers as coming to an end. Not only does the United States face a considerably different geo-political situation in the 1970s, but for the first time in thirty years, the American economic resource base is admittedly limited. This exercising a restraining influence on continued sizeable economic and military assistance programs abroad and defense fiscal year budgets at home. Extension of military thinking into the decade ahead, however, involves considerably more than analysis of the shifting balance of great power relationships as measured against the present risk of nuclear warfare.

The entire sweep of American military experience since 1945 is now subject to review. Indeed, in the opinion of such scholars and observers as Samuel Huntington, Thomas Schelling, Morton Halperin, Adam Yarmolinsky and Lyman Kirkpatrick, the United States will have missed a greatly needed opportunity to prepare its national future in a sane, responsible manner if a review is not made. Yet, such a review will most likely be painful, for the parochial and bureaucratic interests of the foreign affairs community and the military establishment will be subject to scrutiny, at times unfavorably. Nonetheless, the need for a sweeping review is quite evident. It would seem that an American style Eisenhower Committee, paralleling its famous early 1900 British counterpart, should address the doctrinal, organizational, and operational makeup of the American strategic posture and its military force structure. The times call for nothing less.

This paper attempts to address one small segment of such an overall perspective: psychological warfare doctrine and psychological operations past and future. It should be clearly understood that a critical analysis of future American psywar doctrine and its implementation cannot be precise. Psychological operations are not yet fundamentally quantifiable. Beyond the field of public opinion research, social science has not yet developed reliable, accurate measuring techniques with direct applicability to field psychological operations.

But, it is the writer's view that psychological operations suffer less from imprecision and lack of measurement of effectiveness than from a

*Adapted from a paper presented at the Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces, Chicago, Ill., November 1971. Reprinted with the permission of the author.
basic lack of definition, acceptance, and understanding. As a result, its very position within the national security structure is questionable and, in consequence, the organizational influence and the role of psychological operations have never received their proper due. There is ample historical reason for this position: in general, and despite notable but singular American achievements in the field, especially during World War II and at the outset of the “Cold War,” American psychological doctrine and its implementation, both civil and military, have been deficient.

II. EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

American psychological doctrine is an outgrowth of three concepts: first, a felt national need for explaining America’s position in and to the world; second, a pragmatic conviction that advertising, née propaganda, American style, was an instrument peculiar to the American genius and deserving of national attention; and third, a reluctant acceptance of the proposition that psychological warfare, somehow or other, represented a tactical weapons system usable in war-time circumstances.

On the basis of this rather simplistic design the United States slowly evolved a doctrine of use variously termed and organized as propaganda in World War I, psywar in World War II, international information in the “Cold War” period (1947-60), and psychological operations in the Korea-Vietnam era. In retrospect, this pragmatic approach precluded the development of a single national doctrine and left the concept and programs to be fragmented among various agencies of government much as it stands today. The result for the policy makers and national leadership was a series of less than satisfactory half-triumphs and bureaucratic rivalries that by 1970 had caused a skeptical Congress to wonder about the cost effectiveness of American psychological initiatives.

In point of fact, however, the organizational impasse which so impeded the proper conceptualization of the psychological factor in national security planning and operations was only one reason for American myopia in this area. At root, a much more fundamental skepticism was at work, an anxiety deriving from the foundations of national character: in essence, Americans distrust political intrigue, propaganda and psychological manipulation. This, despite the impressive psychological victories of our history dating from the impact of the Declaration of Independence, to the offer of free land to the Hessians in the Revolutionary War period, down to the triumph of idealism in Wilson’s Fourteen Points.2 This suspicion is still with us and it is constantly reflected by Congressional refusal to permit the U.S. Information Agency to disseminate its output within the United States without specific per-case approval of Congress. While the American people have become quite accustomed to the manifold forms of commercial advertising, and while this same advertising industry and its expert practitioners have pioneered world acceptance of marketing and public relations, the political beliefs of the American people continue to resist the notion that psychological factoring has now become an instrument of modern statecraft. Americans tend to be long on
introspective idealism and short on patience; long on solutions and short on conceptualization. So too is it with the American overview to events psychologically considered or propaganda developed as a national motif. The American public believes rather than disbelieves that short tactical bursts of propaganda, wartime psychological coups cleverly arranged are acceptable, but deplorable in times of peace.

The psychological shortfalls in American policy and doctrine are due more to weaknesses in national world view than to technical deficiencies in operations. As Lippmann in his classic Public Opinion pointed out, "The world that we have to deal with politically is out of reach, out of sight, out of mind."3

This is a lesson still to be learned despite the Vietnam of this era, the communications revolution, and the intuitive American sense that something is wrong with our world view. It is precisely in our world view—a combination of innocence, idealism, and shrewdness that one finds the seeds reflecting national reluctance to enter fully into the international arena, though it scarcely can be doubted that in terms of treasure, commitment, and involvement the United States has done just that in the past quarter century. But as de Madariaga once pointed out, the world is full of foreigners, and Americans devoutly believe this as a psychological axiom of life. In short, America, as Max Lerner suggested, is a mixture of idealism and materialism based upon the "legendry of America as the land of freedom."4 From this belief there has evolved historically a peculiarly American world view: America's institutions are best suited for the pursuit of freedom; America is a force for peace in a cynical world; America fights its wars emotionally and totally with a view to return to normalcy as soon as possible.5

Against this background one can begin to sense the dilemma presented by the development of the psychological factor in national security affairs. For an idealistic, technologically oriented people, and its leadership to accept the premises of psychological warfare and its political constructs in peace and war as a normal permanent instrument of policy is a barrier that the nation has not yet breached. Fundamental to any long term pragmatic use of the psychological weapon is a determination as to whether America's world interests are subject to moral or realistic judgments as the bases of action programs. Strangely, if one studies the published observations of such diplomats as Dean Acheson, George Kennan, and John Foster Dulles, there is a constant tension or conflict between the moral and the realistic in foreign affairs, an outgrowth no doubt of the idealistic and the pragmatic strains in our national makeup.6 The fallout of this indecisiveness, amidst a history both strong in heroes and humanitarianism, as well as replete with villains and crassness, has resulted in the hobbling of a potentially vital aspect of modern military and diplomatic endeavor. Nonetheless, the United States has from time to time been enamored of the tool that is political warfare, psychological operations, international information, or propaganda,7 and it has been
through this manner of fretful advance rather than through a considered national policy that psychological doctrine and its operations have grown in toleration if not in total acceptance during this century.

The first World War provided the stage for the massive and widespread introduction of propaganda and psychological warfare as instruments of modern conflict. The worldwide effort was a curious mixture of success and failure based upon what Paul Linebarger perceptively identified as each belligerent’s “peacetime nonpolitical propaganda facilities.”

The German effort foundered largely on national arrogance, bureaucratic inflexibility, and a firm belief in the Clausewitzian precepts of military victory. In short, Imperial Germany failed to communicate. At the time, and during the interwar years, it was a critically overlooked lesson. Britain, on the other hand, performed brilliantly on the psychological and political warfare front, exploiting the “rape of Belgium,” German field terror, and the traditional bonds of Anglo-American language, commercial, and cultural ties. Yet British organizational efforts in the psychological area were compounded of four years of rivalry, agency jousting, and split commands. However, by 1918 the British had settled on an exportable Ministry of Information effort, a clever intelligence and communications security organization (monitoring and censorship), feeding both military and civilian channels, and a domestic National War Aims Committee which addressed the people of the United Kingdom.

The French effort, unlike the British, which featured its superb press communications and news facilities, was more modest and largely circumscribed by press control, image building, and astute diplomatic and cultural campaigning.

For the United States, the psychological warfare of World War I was a national departure from tradition, a giant step forward into the then-emerging world of international communications. It was both a temporary and a reluctant step, as seen by the structures which developed to harness and exploit the national motivational war effort and to “advertise” America as George Creel, presidential advisor and civilian director of the successful, free-flowing, and controversial U. S. Committee for Public Information, so proudly affirmed. The American effort as seen in the Creel Committee touched the civilian population, addressed neutrals, propagated the enemy, supported our Allies, and even coped with the delicate matter of censorship. Administratively, Creel’s bureau was supervised by a committee including the secretaries of Navy, War, and State. An intense rivalry, if not jealousy, arose between the State Department and the Creel Committee over jurisdiction abroad, a forerunner of behavior to be repeated in the immediate post-World-War-II period by the State Department and the Office of War Information (OWI) over the Voice of America. In contrast, the U. S. Army military intelligence quietly and effectively engaged in combat leaflet operations (at that time the only major available front line weapon) and pioneered enemy morale
studies, based upon a reading of German language press and indepth prisoner interrogations. The net effect of the army's program and Creel's innovative world advertising campaign was to lead to a German conviction that American propaganda was all-pervasive, and an American conviction that advertising was a unique native ability destined for greater things. It was out of this milieu that in the 1920s and 1930s America produced Walter Lippmann (who had served in the G-2 psywar effort) and his classic study of *Public Opinion* (1922); Edward L. Bernays (fresh from promoting the creation of the Czechoslovak Republic as a member of the Creel Committee), a leader in the public relations industry; and a George Creel, confident in his belief of *How We Advertised America* (1920), who could not switch to selling presidents. The organizational structure of World War I had passed into the society at large, and as Henry Stimson once remarked we had removed ourselves from the business of reading other people's mail.

And so the American republic lapsed into its disastrous period of normalcy which persisted largely unchallenged until the eve of World War II. Great strides were made domestically in advertising, public relations, and mass communications. Social science research began its first efforts into market research, audience measurement, content analysis, and communications feedback. Radio made its commercial entry into the American market place as a new, prosperous entertainment medium. The motion picture arrived as a determinant of middle class values, a form of propaganda in itself. The techniques of propaganda and psychological warfare in typical fashion were being put to efficient, pragmatic use in America's *Midletown* environment.

However, as America turned inward politically and psychologically, a new world struggle was in the making. The march of Nazi and Fascist totalitarianism had begun. The affairs of empire and aggression were met in political struggle. Psychologically, the tempo accelerated, and for the first time during the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), shortwave radio played a role in warfare. The stage for radio warfare had been carefully set; it was no accident. Beginning in 1927 Holland had started broadcasting to the Dutch East Indies. In 1932, the British Broadcasting Corporation commenced its Empire Service (later to evolve into the famous BBC External Services). Nazi Germany launched its *Auslandsdeutsche* programs in 1933; Fascist Italy followed in 1935 with broadcasts to Italians in Latin America; and that same year Japan initiated Japanese and English broadcasts to Hawaii. France joined the race in 1936. The United States did not follow the lead until war had set in. The Voice of America dates from 1942. In addition, British, French, Italian, and German informational and cultural activities were increased around the world. The arena was being prepared systematically for the terror of total warfare and the intensity of ideological conflict. In Russia, the Soviet experiment had survived and the Communists were busily perfecting techniques of subversive propaganda. Shortwave radio as a form of contact across vast
Siberian distances quickly became an instrument of news, indoctrination, and communications. Political warfare, psychological conditioning, and national propaganda became everyday tools in the hands of the totalitarian mandarins. In commenting on the situation, Whitton and Larson carefully summed up the state of psychological preparations in the interwar years:

Propaganda reflected with remarkable accuracy the foreign policies of the respective states. Aggressive states employed aggressive propaganda, revolutionary states subversive propaganda. The peaceful states either used no propaganda at all or entered the psychological conflict only when forced into it. However, as the powers were preparing for the great trial of arms they had commenced the struggle. . . . with all-out radio war.10

A somewhat bewildered yet confident civilian America entered the lists December 7, 1941. With the enthusiasm of near perfect morale and conviction bred of the rightness of the “great crusade,” America mobilized. With mobilization came the organization of a formidable, complex, and jurisdictionally divided psychological warfare machine. It was a study in American political fear, executive compromise, and bureaucratic rivalry involving Nelson Rockefeller’s cultural operations in Latin America, coordinated through the State Department; General William Donovan’s covert psywar responsibilities within the uniformed Office of Strategic Services (O.S.S); Elmer Davis’ civilian Office of War Information with duties in foreign and overt propaganda; and the individual armed services’ effort in special warfare. In 1942, O.S.S. was given authority to develop psywar plans in support of military programs; by 1943, O.W.I. was given responsibility for official domestic war information dissemination, foreign information, and overt propaganda with linkages to the military through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Theater Commanders. Psywar in the field was handled by a psychological warfare division in the European Theater and a psywar branch in the southwest Pacific area. In Europe, American psychological warfare liaison with the British was excellent; in the Pacific, cooperation with Admiral Louis Mountbatten’s command was minimal.11

It was largely on the bases of this multiple effort among often competing agencies that America’s great reservoir of human talent and communications expertise was sent to war psychologically. American psychological doctrine was based upon two concepts: unconditional surrender and total victory. Politically, history has shown that the Allies might have achieved peace sooner had total victory not been the goal. Technically, while U. S. doctrine whatever its shortcomings was implemented with ingenuity and professional proficiency, by war’s victorious end with military triumph at hand, the psychological weapon was once again largely dismantled. The reasoning paralleled the World War I experience: a democracy does not freely engage in political propaganda; psychological warfare is political trickery reluctantly used in all-out conflict.

Conspicuously absent from the early post-World-War-I-and-II arguments waged against the use of psychological warfare or propaganda
agencies in peacetime was the increasing role of ideology and systematic psychological manipulation of attitudes and events in the international arena. In this vein, the Congressional Record in 1918 could report such statements as:

A bureau of publicity to exploit the various acts and departments of the Government, . . . is a very dangerous thing in a Republic because . . . it has tremendous power, and in ordinary peace-time I do not think any party or any administration would justify or approve it.10

Yet, the highly democratic and parliament-conscious British consider psychological operations in a much more systematic and long term manner which might be summarized as (1) determining the opinion not only of an opposing government but of the public on whose support that government depends and then (2) influencing that opinion.11

Thus, while British realism expressed the Crown's modest but well-defined approach to psychological and political warfare, and while the Soviet Union was mounting a massive and aggressive postwar propaganda effort directed at the West, the United States was fast retiring its psychological and communications functions. No fundamental doctrinal evaluation or psywar critique flowed from the wartime experience. Few scholars or thinkers addressed the problem.12 The answer to America's postwar psychological posture came not from doctrine or from organization, for both were largely lacking, but from the fear generated by the worldwide propaganda, subversion, and espionage of the Soviet Bloc led by the USSR. In the name of anti-Communism, the U.S. government girded itself reluctantly once again, and, as part of the rearming, the Voice of America was saved from extinction, a residual information effort was maintained within the State Department, and cultural relations were, interestingly enough, upgraded in image and vitality. The military services, constrained by budgetary restrictions, inexperienced career personnel, and a World-War-II mentality, relegated psychological operations to contingency plans and reserve mobilization billets. The armed forces could not afford the luxury of the psychological weapon.13

It was on this thread of organizational chaos and doctrinal fear that the U.S. fought the Korean police action, a desperate, bloody exercise in political warfare which left Americans and their military leadership profoundly frustrated and disappointed because the American urge to victory, military decision, and decisiveness had been blunted. U.S. military professionals mindful of the administrative and personnel difficulties of World-War-II psywar were content to allow an unprepared, unequipped, and uncertain U.S. Information Agency 14 to carry the major burden under President Harry Truman's "Campaign of Truth."15

During this entire postwar period of intensifying "Cold War" (1948-60), the American emphasis was largely on organization and channels, a calculated effort to satisfy the various interested governmental agencies. However, individuals and government-sponsored research urged clearer assignments of responsibility, an acceptable priority for psychological doctrine, and a trained professional cadre capable of operating internationally across the spectrum of psychological and informational
activities. It was during this period that American psychological doctrine and operations first began to mature, if not to be fully accepted or implemented as modern instruments of statecraft. Pushed by the Army (especially the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare), supported by the Department of Defense’s Special Operations and Psychological Operations groupings, and encouraged at the White House level by such leading citizens (and practitioners) as C. D. Jackson, William Jackson, and Nelson Rockefeller, the movement, slow in operation, began. Although the State Department continued to view propaganda and psychological operations as a combination of gimmickry and conduct unbecoming a diplomat, the press of world reality pushed the United States inexorably toward an awareness of the new psychological dimension of international political communications. Without quite realizing it, the psychological factor was becoming the “new diplomacy.”

Throughout this era the central civilian agency in the drama—the U.S. Information Agency (U.S.I.A.)—moved with caution and uncertainty. Created in 1953 by executive order as an independent agency of government charged with “telling America’s story abroad,” the Agency was given responsibility for overt international information activities of the U.S. government, some responsibility for “gray” area propaganda and liaison in the darker arts with the contingency military offices concerned, and an even more nebulous relation with the Central Intelligence Agency and its parent National Security Council. In addition, U.S.I.A., by arrangement with the State Department, was responsible for the operation abroad of cultural relations. Thus, one agency, never really completely accepted by the Congress, was charged with U.S. overseas press relations, overt propaganda, cultural relations, and from time to time (as in Korea and later in Vietnam) psychological warfare activities. The Agency gradually developed an operational split, and no wonder, with a continuum of responsibilities, some almost contradictory (commented one officer: “waging psyops in Korea in one tour of duty and being cultural officer in Moscow the next tour is not exactly conducive to consistency and credibility”), little authority within the higher councils of government, and a career orientation among its officers toward the State Department’s foreign service officer corps. It was a time approximating what Bernard Rubin describes as the need for the emergence of “psychological peacefare.”

III. THE SOVIET PSYCHOLOGICAL CONCEPT

Against this extended background of administrative and policy uncertainty, the Soviet Union through its international Communist network and ideological control mechanism developed a worldwide “organizational weapon” emphasizing a Pavlovian-repetitive doctrine of propaganda, a highly developed sense of tactics based upon political and psychological goals, and a competence in informal transnational penetration approximating what Andrew Scott terms “the revolution in statecraft.”

While Americans argued about how to present the truth, and how to
organize for psychological operations, the Soviets raised ideology to an almost medieval level of zeal, and practiced indoctrination as a tried and true instrument of agitation and propaganda. Organizationally, there was no question but that the Soviets appreciated both the high risks and high rewards of aggressive political and psychological warfare. Starting with Lenin, who was a superb political organizer and propagandist, the Soviet state with its Communist ideology never lost sight of world opinion and psychological advantage. Their approach, contrary to the American technique, was not, as Wilbur Schramm has pointed out, "the word," but rather the hardened organizational cadre. "With the Communists," he observed, "there is no sharp separation between words and deeds, between political and military warfare."

One can attempt to sum up the basic postwar distinctions between the American and Soviet approaches. The Americans have traditionally failed to integrate the psychological principle at the highest levels of government. Psychological warfare has been considered an orphan both of military operations and foreign affairs programming. Operationally, American practitioners have tended to be media oriented, public relations inclined, suspicious of communications research, and firm believers in the spoken and written word. As suggested, the Soviets, for their part, have been organizationally zealous, doctrinally oriented, and inclined to integrate psychopolitical inputs into strategy and tactics, whether diplomatic or military, before implementing programs of operations.

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTOR

As pointed out in the conference report treating "American Public Diplomacy," whatever the pragmatic successes or shortfalls of American psychological operations may have been in the last half century, and despite intense Soviet interest in the psychological weapon, dramatic new inputs—involving technology, mass communications, private and public constituencies, and instant news—have arrived on the scene, changing forever the earlier political and military stance of psychological operations, and projecting a vastly different set of circumstances to be considered by Americans in the decade ahead.

There is little doubt that the communications revolution of the 1960s, involving the worldwide availability of transistor radios, television, and multichannels of communications, including satellites, has made its mark on doctrine and policy of democrat and totalitarian alike. Today, the psychological impact of rising expectations and rising frustrations converge at a point on the communications spectrum, making the psychological consideration of policy an absolute must. Political communication, as Murray Dyer long ago pointed out, must be organized and respected. This fact of psychological life is now generally accepted whether it be in the "selling of a president" or, as James Reston put it, in dealing with the "artillery of the press." Thus, the advent of a world communications grid has forced the acceptance of a new psychological dimension in international politics and war. A goodly measure of the distress, anger, and frustration over Vietnam stems from the operations of this psychocom-
munications network. Older precepts of privilege, sanctity of information, news censorship, primitive propaganda principles, hallowed military traditions, and standard tactical operating procedures have been literally torn asunder, and the task for the 1970s comprises a basic rebuilding and re-formation of concepts. In the modern idiom of audiovisual communications, it is increasingly difficult to separate domestic information from international political communications. It is likewise well nigh impossible to divide act from word, example from preachment. The spectacular rise of television as a worldwide political instrument has rendered largely ineffective American compartmentalized psychological and propaganda operations, whether they be military as in Vietnam, informational as practiced by U.S.I.A., or news promotional as increasingly urged by government public affairs specialists. What these developments suggest, of course, is that not only have our preoccupations and moderate successes in technique become outmoded, but the twenty-year search for a psychological doctrine has been overtaken by a revolution in technology, which as McLuhan has shown, led both to a “world tuned in” and yet sophisticated enough to differentiate between the hard images of radio and television and the frequently softer hues of official spokesmen and psychological warriors.

V. U.S. ORGANIZATION FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Following what might be historically described as phase I of the “Cold War” (1948–1960) in which the United States stood firm politically and ideologically in defense of its overseas commitments, the complexities of Cuba, the Dominican intervention, and the extended Vietnamese conflict descended upon us and America, again, unprepared psychologically, entered the era of wars of national liberation, a complex model of social, psycho-political, and military factors designed to exploit national vulnerabilities, erode social and economic institutions, and encourage eventual indigenous insurgent takeovers of developing countries. From a psychological point of view, the choice of weapons was and is superb. A modern, conventional high-technology military force is at a basic disadvantage in such a circumstance. The warfare is more political, terrorist, and unconventional than traditionally military. It is warfare fought politically with the help of guerrillas and military force rather than warfare fought militarily with the help of political force. At no point, as Sir Robert Thompson has warned again and again, was the United States prepared adequately to understand and cope with this style and concept of people’s war. By 1962, President John Kennedy had tried to retool for political warfare with emphasis on Special Forces operations, military advisors, psychological operations, and coordinated overseas mission activities. With the war escalating in 1965, President Johnson ordered creation of new forms to counter the threatening success of a Communist-directed people’s war. The effort was organizational rather than doctrinal. At the Washington level, interested agencies under State Department chairmanship were layered into the Senior Inte:departmental Group with Interdepartmental Regional Groups immediately below. Beyond that, a Washington-level Vietnam Working Group was established and at the
theater level psychological operations were coordinated and directed by the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) with direction for military political warfare and combat psychological operations flowing from this innovative, functional joint civil-military organization.

However, despite a determined bureaucratic effort at coordination, the intensity of the war, the backlash at home brought on by the psychological impact of the communications revolution, the growing frustration of the U.S. Army over its increasing difficulties, and the U.S.I.A. reluctance to practice psychological warfare on a limited resource base led to a splintering of the U.S. psychological effort in-country. Once more, doctrine, never strong, suffered, and technique became an end in itself. Today, with America firmly entered into the 1970s, the permanent organization of national PSYOP is still in large part philosophically ad hoc and administratively careerist oriented; the military, principally the U.S. Army, is still limited by manuals, inflexibility, and the system—although the Army has imaginatively established a career pattern for personnel interested in psychological operations, military assistance, and civil affairs. The time is opportune for a searching review of military-civil operations in the psychological-informational, counterinsurgency, and cultural areas.

VI. TOWARD A DOCTRINE OF THE 1970s

This paper has treated at considerable length the evolution of the American approach to psychological doctrine and operations. It has attempted to indicate where modern communications and Soviet Communist concepts enter the equation. It has done so because it is very nearly impossible to grasp the strengths and, above all, the weaknesses of the U.S. psychological effort without a fairly detailed review of where we are today and where we have come from, psychologically speaking. It seems apparent from what has gone before that America faces a serious task in pulling its psychological forces together for what promises to be the first full decade of instant world communications.

Let us briefly summarize the state of the art:
1. The United States lacks a coherent, government-wide doctrine of psychological operations.
2. The State Department still resists development of psychological initiatives in favor of traditional diplomatic method and leverage.
3. The U.S. military, for whom psychological operations remain tactically and politically important in a revolutionary era of change, has largely failed to adjust to the technical and professional standards required in today's communications environment.
4. The U.S. Information Agency stands in need of re-examination and reorganization. It has slowly lost its mission in the onrush of events and change, and it continues to maintain a structure based essentially on 1953 models.
5. Diplomacy secretly arrived at has given way to international politics psychologically arrived at. Both Moscow and Washington, not to mention Peking and Hanoi, are painfully aware of the open convenant of
public opinion and the growing participation of the masses in affairs of the earth.

Where does this situation leave the cause of the psychological dimension?

First, it demands that reality be faced. The United States has no alternative but to accept the necessity of a prudent psychological doctrine based upon legitimate and achievable foreign policy and national security needs and goals. A State Department that resents the loss of historic authority should no more prevent the updating of doctrine and technique than should a weakened Information Agency resist the implications of modern communications research or the military refuse to develop expertise in and sensitivity to psychological intelligence.

In the 1970s psychological operations of necessity will grow in importance and will encompass the entire foreign and military affairs community. The process has in fact already begun. Military planning and decision-making today risk failure if the psychological dimension is overlooked. A recent U.S. Navy-sponsored study went so far as to suggest that to be responsive to the strategic environment and support the limited objectives of U.S. policy, “military operations should be conceived, planned, conducted and evaluated in the light of what they may or do communicate to foes, allies, and neutrals among diverse populations.” This type of thought does not surprise the modern communicator or psychological planner, but it does represent a departure for the policy decisionmaker. Yet evidence is rapidly accumulating that the new communications environment is at last being accepted in the strategic planning process. As such, it would appear likely that the psychological factor in national security will be in the 1970s a fully accepted equal to military, political, and economic inputs.

If, as a result of reality, psychological doctrine does evolve as a headmaiden of necessity, it will surely not be confined to military PSYOP, but rather it will become an integral consideration in the development of national strategy and policies. It will cut across the government propaganda effort, across administration public affairs postures, information and cultural affairs. It will affect military training and deployments, tactics, and future operations. The 1970s will, in short, bring about a psychological environment made mandatory by communications technology and information flow.

This thesis is reinforced when one considers the array of security problems we face today without ready solution. For example, what permanent impact has the first televised war in history—Vietnam—had on domestic and foreign public opinion? Given the high discipline and strong psychological motivation of guerrillas and insurgents involved in “wars of national liberation,” how can conventional military strategies be expected to defeat mobilized resistance and public opinion? How is mass opinion to be analyzed and mobilized in insurgencies? How is national policy to be sustained by popular support in the face of mass involvement through instant communications? One could extend the list almost indefinitely, but it is sufficient to observe that in such a world the psychological factor
becomes a basic consideration, and a doctrinal approach must inevitably follow.

Another area of change in the 1970s will be the reorganization of the military and foreign affairs approach to psychological operations. The Department of Defense, the military services, the State Department, U.S.I.A., and the Central Intelligence Agency will be forced to reform agency structures to conform to national need. Indeed, the intelligence community itself will be called upon to accept the challenges of warfare and diplomacy psychologically waged in what will be a major step forward in providing facts and information fundamental to the operational soundness of such programs.

Finally, after a long period of intellectual hostility there will be a gradual reconciliation between the community of psychological operators and the research community. The 1970s should provide the impetus for pointed experimentation and research leading to development of techniques for the measurement of effectiveness, methodologies of analysis, and key psychological indicators. With the advent of communication theory, and its rapid advance, the professional calling and training of the psychological and information specialist will take on new meaning. The journalist turned propagandist, the teacher turned cultural ambassador, the military officer turned psy-warrior and advisor will move from the intuitive state (which will still be needed) to the professional level of communicator.

The 1970s will see a change in military environment, in professional training, in world cultural and psychological contact. Nation building will give way in our military assistance plans to the civic culture; military tactics will be leavened by increased attention to communications; and national strategy will find the psychological dimension as readily acceptable by the decade's end as the tank and machine gun were by November 1918.

NOTES

1 As deputy assistant director of field operations (Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office) in Vietnam, 1965-1966, and later as Assistant Director (research) of the U.S. Information Agency, the author found the effort to devise workable methodologies both urgent and futile.

2 The development of the Fourteen Points is in itself a fascinating insight into the potential of psychological operations. Edward L. Bernays in an interview with the author (7 June 1967) affirmed that the Creel Committee on Public Information, which functioned as a World War I temporary agency, was basically responsible for the development and initial dissemination of the 14 Points. The initiative came from Creel's representative in Russia who saw political advantage to be gained in Central and Eastern Europe by such an announcement.


5 While it is outside the scope of this paper, it is the widespread questioning of these beliefs, occasioned by the youth generation, the Vietnam War, and the challenge to governmental credibility that has brought serious ferment to American society and its institutions.

6 See Jane Van Hoogstrate, American Foreign Policy: Realists and Idealists (St. Louis, Mo.: Herder, 1960).

7 Typical of American ambivalence is the confusion engendered by the profusion of terminology carefully defined to explain and rationalize why America engages in psychological persuasion. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the U. S. Information Agency, and the
Central Intelligence Agency can and do agree to definitions but the agreement ends there, and individual agency practices vary widely.


The saga of our international information effort and the organizational ups and downs of the information agency is without the scope of this paper; nonetheless, the story is symptomatic of our national indecision regarding the role of psychological operations.

In fairness to the military, delimitation agreements and organizational arrangements bridging the Truman-Eisenhower administrations, ranging from JCS contingency planning (largely army oriented) to the Psychological Strategy Board and the Operations Coordinating Board, were efforts to place psychological policy control within the State Department control, and action programs within CIA and USIA purview, with the military services often cast as subsidiary role players.

Tribute must be given to the many able experts in the psychological vineyard ranging from Murray Dyer for his rethinking of doctrine, Lloyd Free and his pioneering work in international public opinion research, Paul Blackstock for his careful examination of Soviet and Nazi psychological techniques, Wilbur Schramm for his studies in mass communications, Joseph Klapper for his analyses of shortwave propaganda, and Robert Strausz-Hupe for his penetrating theory of Sino-Soviet protracted conflict based on the psycho-political dimension.

See A. S. Hoffman, *International Communication and the New Diplomacy* (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1968). Also W. P. Davisson, *International Political Communication* (New York: Praeger, 1965). During this period as operations and doctrine were being argued and advanced, government experts writing under pseudonyms often took their cases to the public. Typical of this category of period argument were John Amory's *Around the Edge of War* (New York: Potter, 1951); and Christopher Felix's *A Short Course in the Secret War* (New York: Dutton, 1963).

In time of declared war, USIA would fall under military field control. This is legally acceptable, but in point of experience rather useless since Korea, Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Vietnam were involvements short of declared war.

22 Taken from Wilbur Schramm's article "Soviet Concept of Psychological Warfare," in Daugherty and Janowitz, A Psychological Warfare Casebook, p. 779.


27 For a brilliant contrast between the real and the unreal in military psywar, compare Barry Zorthian's careful yet candid essay, "The Use of Psychological Operations in Combatting Wars of National Liberation," presented at a National Strategy Information Center Conference, March 11-14, 1971 and an article from Army Digest (pp. 8-10) of December 1970 titled "Psy-operators—They Use Words as Weapons" by Major M. L. Plassmeyer.

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31 The fascinating story of PSYOP in Vietnam has not yet been definitively told. It is a case study rich in experience and lessons. While such a study would reflect positively on many of the personnel involved, it would also reflect on America's outmoded psychological apparatus.

32 The 1970 U.S. incursion into Cambodia represented one of the last major military operations planned and executed without serious analysis of the psychological factor—at home and abroad.


CHAPTER II
THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF PSYOP

INTRODUCTION

During the 1960s, the use of psychological instruments for national political and military purposes expanded dramatically. As a result, by the early 1970s military employment of PSYOP was no longer limited to combat propaganda or psychological warfare, was no longer viewed, as in World War II and Korean conflict times, as a specialized and subordinate operation. Today the scope of PSYOP encompasses diverse activities—nonmilitary as well as military—in support of national objectives.

PSYOP is communication and therefore covers the entire field of human action. (See the essay by Phillip Katz in this chapter.) Giving rise to the greater scope attributed to the psychological factor in international political and military relations has been a fuller understanding of the field of communication. Communications research has grown so rapidly that many sociological and psychological concepts previously confined to the academic world have influenced or compete to influence revisions of PSYOP concepts and doctrine.

As long as PSYOP retained its constricted image as a minor and almost arcane support to military operations, such matters as rational training, thorough understanding, systematic evaluation, and resulting improvement were elusive. Recognition that PSYOP is essentially a form of communications has both clarified the wide range of potentially contributing fields (for example, psychology, sociology, communications, political science, economics, and anthropology) and, at the same time, obfuscated many of the previously accepted assumptions of PSYOP by subjecting it to the debates going on within these diverse fields.

Even the recognition in the early 1970s that communications are an important part of the political strategy of all countries did not result in a willingness to fully acknowledge psychological strategy and initiatives as acceptable in American political and military operations in peacetime. For years, reluctance to accept the use of persuasive communications precluded the development of basic conceptualization and systematic doctrine. Thus, it is understandable that confusion arose about several doctrinal concepts. Some contended that official Defense Department definitions were too broad and nebulous.

The situation might have continued indefinitely if the United States had not become intimately involved in the socioeconomic development of many foreign nations in the 1960s. The cruciality of communications was evident in carrying out this massive and multifaceted commitment to assist developing areas. Technical cooperation, security assistance, development of supporting national consciousness—each aspect of the American effort depended upon communication. In this context, a specific area of concern is how PSYOP relates to other overseas, nonmilitary missions and activities such as civil affairs, civic action, community relations, troop information, and public information.
Perhaps as a result of this experience, a large effort to integrate psychological operations with the other techniques of supporting national objectives was undertaken in the military. By the early 1970s this effort was still in its formative stages, often reflected more in training and long-range planning than in operations, but the recognition that PSYOP was closely related to other politico-military tools was clear. Indeed, the U.S. Army, in particular, attempted to develop career programs recognizing PSYOP as one of the key politico-military fields.

The essays in this chapter reflect the broad range of thought associated with the nature and scope of PSYOP: the reasons for its importance, its relationship to communication theory, the context of its employment, and the relationship of PSYOP to other Army activities as well as to broad policy objectives. Whatever fluidity of thinking is represented by these essays, PSYOP portends to become an even more essential activity in the years ahead.

ORIGIN OF PSYOP TERMINOLOGY*

By William E. Daugherty

An account of the origin of the terms PSYWAR and PSYOP

It has been amply demonstrated that American employment of propaganda, psychological warfare (PSYWAR), psychological operations (PSYOP), or whatever one chooses to call the activity that these terms are intended to describe is neither revolutionary nor un-American. In this essay the origins of the terms “PSYWAR” and “PSYOP” will be described.

PSYWAR AND PSYOP

The terms “psychological operations” and “psychological warfare” are often used interchangeably to identify an activity or function as old as human conflict or intercultural group relations. Both terms, however, are known to be of relatively recent origin. Psychological warfare was first used in 1920 and psychological operations in 1945.

The British military analyst and historian, J. F. C. Fuller, is believed to have been the one who coined the term “psychological warfare,” when in 1920, in a scholarly analysis of lessons learned during World War I, especially as these related to the employment of such new weapons as armor, he allowed his mind to wander imaginatively about the character of the future battlefield. In his treatise on tanks he prophesied that traditional means of warfare, as then known and understood, might in time be replaced by a purely psychological warfare, wherein weapons are not used or battlefields sought... but [rather]... the corruption of the human reason, the dimming of the human intellect, and the disintegration of the moral and spiritual life of one nation by the influence of the will of another is accomplished.

Although Fuller’s employment of the term is believed to have been the earliest recorded use of the phrase, there is not thought to be any direct connection between his use and the widespread adoption of it by Ameri-
cans on the eve of World War II. The British did not adopt the term to describe what both they and the Americans hesitated to describe as propaganda operations. Instead of employing the term “PSYWAR,” the British adopted the term “political warfare” to describe those activities that Americans came to identify in time as psychological warfare or PSYWAR. Since World War II the British have followed American practice and now use the term “SYWAR” to describe the activities they previously identified as political warfare. The earliest recorded use of the term “psychological warfare” in an American publication occurred in January 1940 when an article entitled “Psychological Warfare and How to Wage It” appeared in a popular American journal.  

The earliest recorded use of the term “psychological operations” occurred early in 1945 when Captain (later Rear Admiral) Ellis M. Zacharias, U.S. Navy, employed the term in an operation plan designed to hasten the surrender of Japan. Without any description or explanation, the term was used in the context “All psychological operations will be coordinated both as to times and trends in order to avoid reduction of effectiveness of this main operation.” The next use of the term was in 1951, when the Truman Administration renamed an interagency strategy committee giving it the title Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee. Neither in 1945 nor in 1951 did the use of the term “psychological operations” create so much as a ripple of interest.

Although the Department of the Army made the change in 1971, it was not until the 1960s that psychological operations came to supplant psychological warfare as the all-inclusive term in common use. Any explanation of this development must take into account the fact that Americans have become increasingly concerned about the continued use of a term that includes the word “warfare” to describe an activity that is directed to friends and neutrals as much or more than to hostile or potentially hostile people. Examples are the Lebanon crisis of 1958 and the Dominican Republic intervention of 1965.

In the late 1960s, with the widespread use of psychological operations in Indochina, emphasis was placed upon the need to integrate PSYOP with other training and operations and upon the reinforcement which other missions could lend to psychological operations. The psychological objective of military assistance and civic action, for example, was more fully stressed.

NOTES
WHAT IS COMMUNICATION?*

BY YASUMASA TANAKA

A discussion of the process of communication as it relates to persuasion.

From mentalists to behaviorists, over the last quarter century, an intensive effort has been made to construct a general model of human behavior. Models which can explain human behavior have recently been constructed by a number of behaviorists. Among these is a variety of "cybernetic models" that variably take into account the communication and control aspects of human behavior. In the simplest terms, these models presuppose a series of psychological processes in which one individual's or organization's behavior, in the form of explicit "output" information produced by him or it, is dependent upon the "input" information that an individual or organization may receive from other people or organizations and from the environment. In order to examine their validity and discover their relevance to our problems, let us look briefly at a few of them.

As a conceptual point of reference, it is useful to keep H. D. Lasswell's classic formula in mind. The scientific study of communication, he says, involves discovering "Who Says What, In Which Channel, To Whom, With What Effect."

There is another type of model, the "cybernetic" one, first introduced by C. E. Shannon for telephone communication and subsequently adjusted for human communication situations by C. E. Osgood.2,3

On the basis of the "theory" of these models, we now can make a more formal statement about the nature of human communication behavior. We can assume the existence of various processes of decoding and encoding between input and output events. Decoding here refers to the way in which the individual human (or organization) receives input information from his environment—namely, the internal reaction caused by the input on the subject. Encoding designates those processes whereby the individual human (or organization) chooses some response, in the form of output, to the environment surrounding and affecting him. That which psychologists call the "mediation process" is thus considered as the bridge between decoding and encoding. In the simplest terms, it is the process which "mediates" between the sensory nervous processes of decoding on the "input" side and the motor nervous processes of encoding on the "output" side. Even in comparatively simple acts, such as making a speech, an individual's communicating behavior is complex, susceptible to many factors, as suggested above, and it is a continuously renewing process whereby he is always adapting to his environment.

At this point the term feedback is also relevant. It has been stated thus:

The action is initiated by an "incongruity" between the state of the organism and the state that is being tested for, and the action persists until the incongruity is removed.4

According to this view, the fundamental building block of the social system is the feedback “loop.”

Dealing with the complex organization and mechanisms of government, Karl Deutsch defines feedback as “a communication network that produces action in response to an input of information, and includes the results of its own action in the new information by which it modifies its subsequent behavior.” In other words, by this feedback mechanism, individual humans (and organizations) can correct errors and adjust their behavior to the continuously renewing environment.

Furthermore, in view of the present state of communication technology, interpersonal interaction is not necessarily limited to a face-to-face situation. The whole or part of an encoded message may be quoted in a newspaper, or broadcast by radio and television, or even relayed via a communication satellite to local stations in foreign countries, for literally universal “mass consumption.” Then, as the feedback loops become more complex, the source will need some extended “scanning” devices or “monitors,” to gather feedback information. He will continuously need to keep an eye on local and national newspapers, radio or television newscasts, and even on the mass media in foreign countries!

PERSUASION AND THE EFFECTS OF COMMUNICATION

Persuasion may be defined as the art of “winning men’s minds by words.” The basic premise here is that persuasion is an act of communication. We must note, however, that it is a special kind of communication, and it is not involved in all communication situations in which behavior is influenced by a set of input stimuli. In order to be persuasive in nature, the communication situation must involve a conscious attempt by the communicator to influence the thought and behavior of the receiver through the transmission of some message.

Persuasive communication, therefore, implies a judgment of the situation in terms of the intentions of the communicator and the resultant thought or behavior change of the receiver. Persuasive communications can thus be judged with respect to their success in producing desired thought or behavior, or their failure to do so. Examples of success or failure of persuasive communications can be easily seen in election campaigns, advertising, or international diplomacy.

Research on persuasive communication embraces the study of persuasiveness, on the one hand, and persuadibility on the other. It also involves the study of attitudes—how they are formed and how they can be changed. The focus of recent research on persuasion is on interrelationships among these variables, and the studies have been increasingly empirical or “experimental,” oriented toward the theory of attitude organization and change. Comprehensive reviews and summaries of the relevant literature on the subject can be found in recent publications by E. P. Bettinghaus,7 R. L. Rosnow and E. J. Robinson,8 and W. J. McGuire.9
NOTES

PSYOP AND COMMUNICATION THEORY*

BY PHILLIP P. KATZ

Communication involves the total spectrum of human actions. In itself, communication is neither fact nor fiction; it is what the recipient believes it to be.

The purpose of this essay is to relate current communication theory to PSYOP. As noted in the introduction to this chapter, PSYOP is communication. To be precise, the function of PSYOP is to use communication to influence behavior. Therefore, a basic understanding of the nature of communication, the role of communication in a social environment, and the process of communication (how people communicate with each other) is necessary in order to develop meaningful and dynamic PSYOP programs.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION

Communication, in a very broad sense, includes the various processes by which one person influences another and involves the total spectrum of human actions, including speech, written matter, music, drama, the pictorial arts, and other forms of behavior. Charles Cooley defines communication as "...the mechanism through which human relations exist and develop—all the symbols of the mind, together with the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time...."

Melvin De Fleur notes that man is born into an ongoing and elaborate culture, and an important aspect of this culture is the "set of conventions which exist concerning the relationship between signs and their referents." Man as a social being develops various habit patterns that permit him to respond to particular gestures, verbal and other, having as their

* Original essay by Phillip P. Katz.
referents objects and events as they occur in their particular world of reality. A person's understanding of a particular symbol is the set of responses that the individual generates as a result of the stimulus of the symbol. The participation of the individual in the language process gives him the ability to communicate with himself (think) and with his social group. The entire process is structured around the social group. Human communication is the basis for group norms; it is the means by which social control is exerted, roles are allocated, coordination of effort is achieved, expectations are made manifest, and the social process is carried on.\(^3\)

Communication should also be considered as the sharing of information. Each individual or social group considers information or ideas based on his needs, comprehending and using the information in a manner that best suits his particular interests.

Human communication involves action; it is not mystical or magical; it is routine, daily, accepted, and normal. To understand communications one must understand, in a very real sense, people. Training in communication is deeper than language training. It requires the ability to understand and relate the content of communication (messages) to the aspirations of people, groups, organizations, and societies. The ability to understand how people relate to each other is crucial. For example, if a communicator develops a series of persuasive messages directed toward a guerrilla force, a very real understanding of interpersonal relationships at squad, platoon, and company levels is necessary for effective communication. In support of this point, Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld state that a key to understanding the content and dynamics of individual opinions and actions is accurate comprehension and knowledge of the content and dynamics of small groups.\(^4\)

Individuals living in society generally desire to adhere to the opinions, attitudes, and habits of those with whom they are motivated to interact. The social reality of group life makes it clear that individuals influence each other's perceptions, and the individual's way of seeing reality is based on the "real world" around him. On the whole, all social groups require a degree of conformity, and a revolutionary movement develops definitive methods and procedures to insure conformity to group norms and values.

A final but significant point is that groups, like individuals, have goals, and such goals often cannot be achieved without a degree of consensus. It is obvious that if a majority of the individuals cannot agree on the proper course of action, they cannot act collectively. It is only through meaningful communication that collective action and consensus can be attained.

THE ROLE OF COMMUNICATION

Communication then, can be considered as the great relating tool. It relates individuals to each other and individuals to historical perspective. This makes group functioning possible and allows societies to live in harmony.
However, very seldom does communication have a single function, nor is the manifest content of the message always the important content. Harold Lasswell lists the functions of communication as follows: first, the surveillance of the environment; second, the correlation of the parts of society in responding to the environment; and third, the transmission of social heritage from one generation to the next. With the understanding that an important function of communication is relating people to each other or to groups, or to history, and that the latent content of a message is significant, we can classify the vast majority of social communication under four major headings:

1. To inform
2. To instruct or teach
3. To entertain
4. To persuade

The above classification is from the viewpoint of the sender or the originator of the message. From the receiver's point of view we should list:

1. To understand
2. To learn
3. To enjoy
4. To dispose or decide

It is important that PSYOP program managers understand that communication content (messages) can be designed to perform all of the functions stated in the previous paragraph, any one of the four, or any mix.

David Berlo makes the point that the inform-persuade-entertain distinction has led to confusion in that there has been a tendency to interpret these purposes as exclusive entities; that is, one is not giving information when he is entertaining; one is not entertaining when he is persuading, and so forth. This is not so! Yet the distinction is frequently made. Berlo emphasizes this point as follows:

...it is popular today to distinguish between education (inform), propaganda (persuade), and entertainment (entertain). In the public media, we try to distinguish between educational programs and entertainment programs—without providing any reasonable basis for such distinction. Some professional communicators in the press and education state that they are not trying to persuade people, they are merely giving them information. Others view the entertainment industry as something independent of persuasion and ignore the effects their messages might have on the levels of knowledge, thought processes, and attitudes of their audiences. The theatre, for example, is a distinguished vehicle of communication with a considerable tradition and heritage. Many people would classify the theatre as an "entertainment" vehicle: Yet countless examples could be given of plays that were intended to have, and did have, significant effects on an audience, other than "entertainment."

The inform-instruct-entertain-persuade distinction causes difficulty if we assume that these are independent functions of communication.
indicated above, sometimes it is difficult to relate them directly to experience; that is, "knowing one when we see one." Too often the message (leaflet, speech, skit, newspaper article, or movie) is the only item examined in order to determine communicative purpose.

The inclination to consider the role of communication along rigid lines is often found in U.S. policy. Frequently, the role of PSYOP is viewed as a loudspeaker and leaflet operation with a persuasive function. Furthermore, even the United States Information Agency (USIA) separates its activities into "information" and "cultural" programs, with the tendency to consider information programs from the viewpoint of the American journalist; to associate cultural programs with the objectivity of the U.S. educator; and to view persuasive programs as a function of the propagandist or PSYOP. Of course, a PSYOP organization that follows a rigid distinction as to the functions of communication is at a distinct disadvantage competing with communication viewed as a political weapon and directed at the "whole person," skillfully combining the four functions of communication.

To the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Vietnam, for example, social institutions such as schools and membership associations are as important as the mass media in the total PSYOP effort. Especially at the tactical level the agitprop cadres of the NLF keenly understand the multipurpose function of communication.

Therefore, a single NLF cultural drama program provides the audience with information, instruction, and entertainment, all designed to persuade the target to adopt the political and social viewpoints of the NLF. Hence, it is again emphasized that PSYOP, especially in an insurgency environment, such as that in Vietnam in the 1960s, should integrate all functions of communication in an unmistakably coordinated PSYOP program.

THE COMMUNICATION PROCESS

All human communication must take place in the framework of social relations. The importance of understanding interpersonal relationships as an essential part of the communication process and the need for a clear vision of social pressures as part of the total communication process was emphasized previously. Joseph T. Klapper, Director of Social Research for the Columbia Broadcasting System, provides considerable evidence to support the thesis that effective persuasive communication must relate to the total social situation and that mass media are "not so terribly powerful" in persuasive communication. Specifically, Dr. Klapper writes:

More recent studies, both in the laboratory and the social world, documented the influence of a host of other variables [in persuasive communication] including various aspects of contextual organization; the audience's image of the sources, the simple passage of time; the group orientation of the audience member and the degree to which he values group membership; the activity of opinion leaders; the social aspects of the situation during and after exposure to the media, and the degree to which the audience member is forced to play a role, the personality pattern of the audience member, his social class, and the level of his frustrations; the nature of the media in a free enterprise system; and the availability of social
mechanisms for implementing action drives. The list, if not endless, is at least overwhelming and it continues to grow.* (emphasis added).

Communication Situation

The communication situation is one of the social factors that affects persuasive communication in that generally what people say and how they react to a PSYOP message depends on where they are, who is listening, and what communication channel is being used. P.J. Deutschmann has classified the communication situation as private communication and public (mass) communication. He lists face-to-face conversation as one type of private communication; another category would be what he has labeled "interposed" (private communications such as a letter or a telephone call).

It is apparent that in private communication one tends to be less formal and use different signs, words, and symbols. For example, members of the Armed Propaganda Teams (APT) (Viet Cong who have rallied to the GVN) frequently employ private communications to get the "Chieu Hoi message" to the families of known Viet Cong. The teams speak with the authority of experience; they are convincing; they have the personal answers to questions likely to be asked, and by their presence give proof that the Chieu Hoi Program delivers its promises. Furthermore, they can sincerely portray their inner feelings about their decision to defect from the ranks of the Viet Cong.

Mass media communication channels can be face-to-face and public (mass meetings, cultural drama performances, movies, or opera) or private (the individual as a radio or television viewer, or reading a magazine, book, or leaflet). The significant point is that the communication situation determines to some extent the kind of communication that goes on and the response that is likely to be made to it. For example, many techniques used to stimulate enthusiasm at a public rally would not be appropriately used in an individual, private environment. It is unlikely that a person listening to a radio in private would develop crowd excitement and its consequent behavior. Moreover, a person would not communicate with a stranger in the same manner as he would with a member of his immediate family group, nor would he communicate with a trusted friend in the same manner as with a government official.

A variety of communication techniques can be used to combine private and public communication. For example, a duplicate of a public poster can be prepared as a small handout or leaflet, thus permitting the individual to discuss the poster in public and at the same time carry the message home to discuss it with members of his family. The leaflet reinforces the government message and gives additional meaning to the public poster. Also, the handout or leaflet tends to set in motion a functional communication group to discuss the poster for the second time (after the PSYOP cadre departs) in public.

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Influence of the Group

Four intervening variables in the communication processes have been stated in the literature as: first, the exposure to the media; next, the differential character of the various media; third, the existing attitude or attitudes of the individuals; and finally, the content of the message. On the basis of many communication studies, Katz and Lazarsfeld have shown that a fifth variable should be added. They conclude that the response of the individual to communication cannot be accounted for without reference to his social environment and to the character of his interpersonal relationships.

The focus of this section is on the primary group to which an individual belongs—his family, friends, informal work teams, small military units—and the more formal groups such as farmers’ organizations, youth groups, defense groups, and so forth. Katz explains that within these groups the members are mutually attracted to each other as personalities. Such groups are usually characterized by their small size, relative durability, informality, and face-to-face contact.

The influence of the group on communication is profoundly important to PSYOP; yet, for the most part, there is a tendency in U.S.-sponsored PSYOP programs to direct communication to the individual as an isolated entity of society rather than to the individual as an integral part of an active social environment. That being the case, many PSYOP intelligence- and information-gathering programs tend to organize the collection of data as if each member of the target audience is isolated and in a sterile environment. Man’s social attachments are significant; consequently, the opinions and activities shared with a group influence his response to all communication. In other words, interpersonal relationships must be taken into account to understand properly the communication process, and to conduct effective PSYOP programs. Katz states that interpersonal relationships seem to be anchorage points for individual opinions, attitudes, habits, and values.

This concept (the influence of the group) suggests that when people are interacting in the communication process, they generate and maintain common ideas and behavior patterns which they are reluctant to give up or to modify by themselves. Also, it is apparent that when communication concerns sensitive roles and standards of the group, the communication is usually checked with other members of the group. In this respect, two important communication concepts for PSYOP are (1) the two-step flow of communication; and (2) the reinforcement function.

Two-Step Flow of Communication

Considerable research has shown that the image of the simple, direct effect of the mass media is an oversimplification. The closer one observes the workings of the mass media, the more one realizes that their effects depend on a complex network of specialized personal and social influences. It appears that the mass media as such have marginal effect in persuasive communication about political or social programs. For PSYOP
this means that: (1) interpersonal communication significantly counteracts or reinforces messages transmitted by a source, and that (2) influence spreads gradually in a group via various combinations of mass media and interpersonal networks. A series of studies has demonstrated that communication frequently flows from the various media, reaching first selected opinion leaders (or key communicators) and then, in turn, less active members of a group. Specifically, there could be and usually is a filter, or intervening factor, between the stimulus (the PSYOP message) and the resultant opinions, decisions, or actions of the group. This is what is meant by the two-step flow of communication. Some research has shown that even if there is direct communication, people will go to the key communicator for an interpretation or comment, which acts as a form of filter in the communication process. Katz has commented that it is a result of investigations dealing with the role of the opinion leader that communication research has joined those fields of social research which have rediscovered the primary group.

These studies, many of them products of the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia University, found: first, that the influence of other people on specific decisions tends to be more frequent (and certainly more effective) than the influence of the mass media; second, that people are influenced most by their close associates and those who are of the same socioeconomic status; third, that intimate associates tend to hold opinions and attitudes in common and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from the group consensus even when a mass media appeal seems attractive; and finally, that opinion leaders tend to be more exposed to mass media than other members of the group.

Reinforcement Function

It has been stressed that an individual's response to persuasive communication is based on and reinforced by his regular interpersonal relationships. In all societies a normal person usually consults a member of this primary group before taking decisive action in response to persuasive messages. In other words, the tendency is to have a close friend or a relative reinforce his attitude toward the subject contained in the PSYOP message. For example, a great number of the Viet Cong rally to the government of Vietnam's Chieu Hoi Program through an intermediary who is a relative or trusted friend. Many do not defect until they receive assurance from a relative or friend that the government of Vietnam will keep its promises concerning good treatment and other aspects of the amnesty program.

A form of reinforcement (in reverse) is this technique used by the Viet Cong cadre in their attempt to deter defection. To illustrate—a Viet Cong or North Vietnamese army soldier claims to his comrades that he was captured by the GVN or the U.S. forces and that he had subsequently escaped. He then testified that while a prisoner he was treated badly and that he had firsthand knowledge that the government of Vietnam did not abide by their good treatment policy.

The research findings on reinforcement substantiate the fact that in ti-
Remote associates tend to hold opinions and attitudes in common and are reluctant to depart unilaterally from their group consensus. The importance of face-to-face communication (as a reinforcement function) was stated by a district chief to his American advisor as follows: "Americans have much but no talk. VC no have much, but have talk, talk, talk. We must talk."

Society and the Communication Framework

The norms and constraints of the society as a whole also affect the communication framework. In any society there are things one usually does and things one simply does not do; things one generally believes without challenge and ideas one generally does not entertain because of the society that one has grown up in. Consequently, some ideas and traditions can be challenged, others not. Society determines how, why, to and from whom, and with what effects communication occurs.

For example, the central objective of communication for Communist China is to mobilize the entire Chinese population in support of Communist policy. For them, the appeal is all-embracing, addressing itself to the whole person. Every aspect of the society is concerned with the objective, including the social institutions, such as schools and membership associations.

The political regime relies on the radio-loudspeaker system to promulgate new directives, to encourage the study of Mao Tse-tung's works, and to stimulate revolutionary enthusiasm generally. In Peking, for instance, the day begins at 5:30 a.m. with neighborhood loudspeakers pouring forth the music, "The East is Red." This is usually followed by the reading of one of Mao's sayings. Various methods have been used to increase the size of radio-listening audiences. One method is an organized effort to promote collective listening; another method is the use of radio-diffusion exchanges or wired-radio speakers. With regard to wired radio, Franklin Houn writes:

The Chinese Communists feel, on the basis of their experience, that radio-diffusion exchanges are valuable instruments of agitation for higher labor productivity, and of socialist education among workers and peasants; including the news distribution on national and international affairs. They also see its great value in transmitting and explaining policies and decrees of the party and government, disseminating scientific knowledge and guidance on sanitation, giving weather reports, enriching the cultural life of the nation, and mobilizing the population to undertake emergency works.

In addition to radio, Communist China, in its efforts to reach the total society, has stressed the habit of reading. One effective method is to supplement printed newspapers with mimeographed newspapers, handwritten wall newspapers, and countless blackboard newspapers in small villages and settlements, factories, schools, public organizations, cooperative farms, and company-size units of the army.

Response of the Entire Personality

Schramm says that meaning comes not merely from a dictionary definition; it has factual, emotional, connotative, and denotative content. It is the response of the entire personality to a set of signs, and a person learns these responses in a social, not a sterile environment. Consequently, a
person's experience with the symbols and their referents is the only meaning that anyone can read into a message. As an example, the motion-picture cartoon showing Donald Duck as a soldier had a denotative meaning rather than the intended connotative meaning to the Africans who viewed this kind of presentation for the first time. In a similar way, any effort to explain the abstract principles of representative democracy to a politically unsophisticated target can be a frustrating experience. Certainly, the meaning that two people perceive in a message depends on finding an area in which the experience of the two individuals is sufficiently similar so that they can share the same signs efficiently.

Therefore, if PSYOP programs are to have meaning, the first requirement is to understand that the source and the receiver must find an area where their experiences are sufficiently similar so that they can communicate (share the same signs efficiently). Schramm uses the term "frames of reference" to explain the concept that two people can communicate efficiently only in those areas where they have a common fund of experience. He says:

The sources can encode, and the destination can decode, only in terms of the experience each has had. If we never learned any Russian, we can neither code nor decode in that language. If an African tribesman has never seen or heard of an airplane, he can only decode the sight of an airplane in terms of whatever experience he has had. The plane may seem to him to be a bird, and the aviator a god borne on wings.*

The concept of frames of reference can be visually portrayed by two circles. If circles around A and around B are considered as their frames of reference, then the areas wherein they can communicate efficiently with each other are represented by the overlap of the two circles. If the circles do not meet because they have no common experience, then communication is impossible. If the circles have only a small area in common, then it is going to be difficult to get the intended meaning across from one to the other. It is suggested that one difficulty experienced by sophisticated urban Vietnamese, in attempting to communicate with rural audiences, is that there is no overlap of their frames of reference. In other words, a significant problem in intercultural communication is finding the area where the experiences of the communicator and the receiver are similar.

Also it is important from a PSYOP viewpoint to understand that the VC soldier who picks up a leaflet or listens to a PSYOP radio broadcast not only brings to the message his language but certain beliefs and values, some lightly held and others he is prepared to defend stubbornly against change; and certain loyalties to persons and groups—these include a sense of the kind of behavior that is expected of him as a member of those groups, and a keen sense of the possible social consequences of going against the norms. If he decides that the PSYOP message is interesting and promising enough, he selects some or all of the cues it offers, interprets them according to his frame of reference, and disposes of them according to his needs, his values, and the social imperatives and

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the constraints he feels. To cite one obvious example, if a PSYOP leaflet (directed to a VC soldier) contains information about a GVN victory over an unknown VC unit in a distant province, it will be of little interest. On the other hand, if the leaflet presents facts and meaningful data about his own unit, if it provides names of people he knows, and if it has a picture of a friend that he recognizes, it is highly probable that the message will have meaning and the frames of reference will overlap.

Concept of Total Transmission

The decisive step in the communication process is to "transmit" or deliver the message to the intended audience by an appropriate channel. The use of the term "transmit" in this context involves more than the physical dissemination of leaflets or the delivery of audio messages. It is a four-step "total transmission" process in that: first, the message must attract attention; second, it has to be selected; third, it has to be interpreted; and fourth, it should be used at least in part as intended by the source. This "total" process generally applies to all communication, whether the purpose is to inform, to instruct, to entertain, or to persuade. The first three elements of the process will be discussed in this section and the fourth in a subsequent section on Relation to Purpose.

The critical step in the communication process is, of course, to attract attention, so that the message will be given consideration by the audience. All sorts of gimmicks and devices are used to attract attention with the hope that a particular item will be selected for consideration. The newspaper headline, the flashy photograph, the fancy cover on a novel, the display outside of an auditorium, the attractive young lady in a television commercial—all are intended to attract attention. In operations in Vietnam, messages are placed on attractive calendars, put on soap, kites, and numerous utility items such as plastic shopping bags and washbasins.

The next step is to get the audience to read or listen to the message. Reading or listening takes energy, and, generally, man operates to conserve his energy. The more energy required to make a response, the less likely it is that response will be made—other things being equal. David Berlo states that when the decision is made to perform or not perform a given communication behavior, it is based on the relationship between the amount of reward and the amount of energy required.

It is suggested that the reason the safe-conduct pass scores highly as a selected item among enemy soldiers is the expectation of much reward for little effort. For one thing, this PSYOP message is usually direct and brief. Moreover, the safe-conduct leaflet is usually interpreted by the enemy soldier as additional insurance (it could save his life), so the reward is high.

Schramm notes that many times people select things accidentally or on impulse. Much is the result of role patterns or habits learned from
obscure experiences. Yet over the years people tend to seek the kinds of communication that have rewarded them in the past. Furthermore, people tend to develop considerable loyalty to their favorite magazine, radio station, opera, Broadway show, television program, or trusted friend.

Berlo writes that Schramm’s concept can be expanded to include more than the selection of a message.3 Basically, he notes, we react to those things that are worth the effort and make decisions accordingly. He defines the fraction of decision as:

\[
\frac{\text{Expected reward}}{\text{Expected energy required}}
\]

After the selection of an item of communication, the next step is acceptance. This depends largely on what Schramm terms the “face validity” of the message, and on the reader’s judgment (interpretation) of the originator’s credibility. Carl Hovland, Irving Janis, and Harold Kelly note that the credibility of a message depends on two factors. In their words:

... a recipient may believe that a communicator is capable of transmitting valid statements, but still be inclined to reject the communication if he suspects the communicator is motivated to make nonvalid assertions. It seems necessary, therefore, to make a distinction between (1) the extent to which a communicator is perceived to be a source of valid assertions (his expertness) and (2) the degree of confidence in the communicator’s intent to communicate the assertions he considers most valid (his “trustworthiness”). In any given case the weight given a communicator’s assertions by his audience will depend upon both these factors, and this resultant value can be referred to as the “credibility” of the communicator.*

Many people regard the radio as more credible than the newspaper; others have the opposite opinion. A great number of studies confirm that attitudes toward the source to which information and news are credited are likely to affect the acceptance of a message. The very large number of studies which fall under the heading of “prestige suggestion” bear on this problem.25

As one example, an NVA sergeant stated that he was strongly influenced to defect by a GVN leaflet in the form of a testimonial from a former comrade. The PSYOP message contained three points: first, it related how this NVA soldier was wounded during a specific action and was left on the battlefield for three days; second, the message explained that the wounded soldier was “rescued” by the South Vietnamese army and immediately sent to a hospital; and third, the testimonial emphasized that as a prisoner of war the soldier was receiving good treatment. The NVA sergeant went on to explain that he was able to relate the information in the leaflet to the source (a former comrade) and with the actual


battle, and it was accurate. At this point he began to doubt the information given him by the VC cadre about the cruel treatment of prisoners.26

In a similar manner, statements from high-ranking or prestigious VC or NVA defectors (Hoi Chanh) attract attention and add credibility to messages. One rallier declared that a message from a former VC colonel cast doubt on the credibility of their cadres. The troops asked, "Why should such a high-ranking individual leave the Front and urge his comrades to defect?" A former member of the Viet Cong stated, "I believed the Colonel and I decided to rally." Many Hoi Chanh stated that messages from defectors who were senior party members upset their frame of reference and values.

A significant number of Hoi Chanh emphasized that they judged truth (credibility) in a variety of ways. They considered what they had been told by the cadres and other sources; or they would make a judgment as to how much of this information they actually believed; or, they could consider what information they received from interpersonal relationships (or what they heard); and, finally, what they actually had seen for themselves.27

The NLF understand that communication is likely to be rejected when the credibility of the source is questioned. Therefore, they make a determined effort to ensure that their agitprop cadres are expert and have the confidence of the people. In fact, the ideal cadre is a model of dedication, sobriety, and skillfulness.28 He is concerned with not only the techniques of communication but also with substance. Obviously, from the above discussion, any systems approach to audience analysis for PSYOP programs must consider the four elements of the "total transmission" process. First, Does the message attract attention? Second, Is it being accepted and does its source have credibility? Third, Is the message being understood as desired by the source? And finally, With what effect?

Relation to Purpose

The effect of communication is directly related to its purpose. If the purpose is to provide "pure" news or information and this is accepted by the reader, viewer, or listener, then the communication has had effect. Furthermore, if the purpose is to instruct or educate and the student does well, it is assumed the instructor communicated effectively. If an audience usually responds favorably to an entertainer, then his popularity and success are assured.

Persuasion

Persuasion, especially in support of military operations, requires a planned program of communication to fit the social environment. Furthermore, it is presumptuous and boastful to believe that persuasion can be accomplished with a single message; it requires, as already emphasized, maximum integration of communication media, both mass media and face-to-face communication. It needs one other vital element—an institution; that is, an organization and managers who understand the communication process and the role of media in programmed communication. Effective persuasive communication cannot be random in nature.
In order to persuade, the communication must activate certain psychological dynamics that are related to the individual's perception of his social environment, his needs, his social relationships, and his beliefs and attitudes. To accomplish any substantial change in attitude, persuasive communication must bring about a psychological process in the receiver. Both it and informative communication must get through, but for persuasion it is not enough to bring about a psychological process in the receiver; it is necessary to set in motion the particular dynamics by which the receiver will, in effect, change himself. This is the essential difference between persuading and informing.

In military PSYOP programs, the receiver in a hostile area looks at a hard persuasive message as "another piece of propaganda from the enemy." He comes to it with his defenses up and he is prepared to be skeptical; he asks, What is there for me in the message? He comes to the message with a set of personal relationships and loyalties, and he feels deeply dependent on many of them. He comes with a set of perceptions in regard to his future role in his environment, and he is not prepared to change without good reason. Thus, persuasion requires much skill, patience, and a great deal of current knowledge about the individual (target) and his social environment.

Techniques of Persuasion

Numerous studies and investigations deal with techniques used in persuasion communication. Arthur Cohen writes that the validity of many persuasive techniques has long been argued by propagandists, educators, and public speakers. He asks four cogent questions about such techniques. First, What role does the organization of the arguments play in the effectiveness of a persuasive appeal? Is it more effective to present one side of an issue or to present both sides? Second, Should the conclusion be stated conspicuously in a persuasive communication, or should the reader draw his own conclusion? Third, When a single side is presented, should the strongest argument be used first or at the end? When two sides of an issue are presented, which side should be presented first? Fourth, In a persuasive message, what type of appeal is most effective in stimulating an individual or group to accept a message? For example, What is the effect of fear-arousing propaganda? Of sentimental messages? Of using an ambiguous source? Of using rational appeals? We do not have the answers to many of these questions, especially as they are related to foreign cultures and societies. The above questions are important in a systematic framework for PSYOP, and the answers will be different for the various cultures and subcultures of a society.

An example of a persuasive leaflet message that did not have the desired effect is one disseminated to VC soldiers that stated, "If you do not rally immediately, we will kill you to the last man. We really don't care whether you rally or not; we are quite willing to accommodate your desire for death by killing you." Usually the reaction to such a message is one of anger and a stiffening of the soldiers' will to fight.
Many NVA and VC prisoners assert that messages emphasizing hardships, such as lack of food and medical treatment, are not effective because they always expected to face such hardships. In the words of one Communist soldier, "Hardships are the lot of the revolutionary soldier and the natural thing; only the weak and cowardly are influenced by such enemy propaganda." On the other hand, the less dedicated, and especially the younger soldiers, suggest that the truth be told them about the hardships, in particular the lack of medicine. One high-ranking VC defector is of the opinion that sentimental and nostalgic PSYOP messages are of no value, and he emphasizes that persuasive messages should be factual and to the point. Yet, numerous other VC soldiers repeatedly state that emotion-provoking poems and nostalgic letters are the most effective of the PSYOP messages. The transmission of emotionally persuasive messages to the civilian population "exploiting" VC atrocities is another example of the uncertainty concerning emotional appeals. For the most part, such messages proved to be counterproductive. From the viewpoint of the source, the purpose was to "persuade" the civilian population that the Viet Cong were evil and had no regard for the people or their property. Many such messages, however, only served to increase tension and fear, so that in some cases the PSYOP message tended to reinforce the NLF in its program to obtain cooperation from the people.

It should be noted that two diverse examples have been presented dealing with the use of fear-arousal or imminent threatening messages—one to a military and the other to a civilian audience. The use of the imminent threat or fear-arousal message to the military audience did not have the desired effect. It is suggested that the reasons are: first, the espirit of the primary military group; and second, the fact that military training and indoctrination tend to build resistance to fear-arousal messages. On the other hand, the VC use of terror and threat-arousal techniques on civilians has, in many instances, had the desired effect. This can be attributed to several circumstances: first is the fact that the average civilian group is less organized and disciplined than the military (It is interesting to note that in those areas of Vietnam dominated by militant religious organizations, the use of fear arousal by the Viet Cong has not, generally, been effective), and second, the use of fear-arousal techniques has been effective in those areas where the presence of the VC infrastructure is known and the use of the "carrot" and "stick" approach (by the Viet Cong) is prevalent.

It is obvious that additional research is needed concerning the use of persuasive appeals in support of PSYOP programs, especially in an insurgency environment. Therefore, determining valid persuasive communication techniques that are applicable to an insurgency environment is an important essential element of information (EEl) for PSYOP programs.

The Role of Interpersonal Persuasive Communication

Overwhelming evidence indicates that in persuasive communication, face-to-face contacts were among the most important influences stimulat-
The investigation by Paul Lazarsfeld et al. in *The People's Choice* disclosed that radio, newspapers, leaflets, and other mass media had only a slight influence on voting; what influenced people most was other people—friends, family, community contacts. As already noted, it was shown that ideas flow from television, radio, and newspaper first to opinion leaders, and from them to the less active elements of the group. Lazarsfeld emphasizes that this was a surprise to those who considered the mass media as omnipotent. 3

Joseph Klapper supports this viewpoint when he writes that "mass communication ordinarily does not serve as a necessary and sufficient cause of audience effects, but rather functions among and through a nexus of mediating factors and influences." He notes that on those occasions where the mass media influence change, one of two conditions is likely to exist. Either the mediating factors will be found to be direct; or the mediating factors, which normally favor reinforcement, will be found to be themselves impelling toward change. 33 As stated above, Katz and Lazarsfeld also conclude that personal influence is the most important in persuasive communication.

The Communist movement clearly stresses the importance of interpersonal persuasive communication when it urges the cadres to "mingle with the people as water is mixed with flour to bring about a consistent rising." Pike writes that the NLF clearly understood what all knowledgeable communicators know:

that the simple communication of facts is often ineffectual in changing men's opinions, that majority opinion reinforced by social pressure counts for much more than expert opinion or leadership assertions, and that people tend to misinterpret what they hear or read to suit their own preconceptions. 34 (Emphasis added.) Hence, the VC and NLF units emphasize that, if the revolution is to succeed, units everywhere must launch PSYOP programs and motivate the people to take part "in the revolutionary task and realize the Party's policy line." A political directive from an NVA division in II Corps stated that, "In civilian proselytizing, in addition to the task of helping the people to improve and stabilize their lives, we must attach importance to propaganda in order to create a revolutionary influence among the masses." Numerous VC documents stress the importance of interpersonal communication between the soldier, cadres, and civilian population; mass media, for the most part, are of secondary importance to the VC.

A COMMUNICATION MODEL

To recapitulate, every communication situation differs in some ways from every other one. An attempt will be made in closing to isolate certain elements that all communication systems have in common. In any case, one should constantly remember that this brief discussion is incomplete, in that this short section cannot possibly list all of the ingredients of the communication process nor adequately discuss how they affect each

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other. The purpose of this last part, then, is to provide the basic ingredients of a communication model and stress the dynamic nature of the process.

**Basic Elements**

Communication models contain three fundamental elements: the person who speaks or writes; the speech, illustration, or written material produced; and the person who listens or reads.

**Institutional Model**

All communication must have some source. This can be a person or group of persons (such as an institution) with a purpose. The fundamental purpose of a PSYOP organization, as an institution, is to: (a) code (write or design messages), (b) transmit messages, and (c) influence the audience as intended by the source. The communication encoders (writers, designers, and artists) are responsible for taking the ideas or the guidance from the institution and putting them in a code (language) expressing the source's purpose of PSYOP objectives. It is important to understand that the encoders are not separate entities of the model; they are extensions of the source. (See figure below.)

Since PSYOP programs are always conducted through an institutional base, it is obvious that the individual encoders (B1) through (B5) in the figure below are not free agents; the language of the messages, the illustrations, and the channels (D1) through (D5) are determined by the institution. This complicates the communication process and makes it vulnerable to error. There is likely to be filtering and distortion at any stage. Wilbur Schramm expresses the chances for error in this way:

> . . . if the source does not have adequate or clear information; if the message is not encoded fully, accurately, effectively in transmittable signs; if these are not transmitted fast enough and accurately enough, despite interference and competition, to the desired receiver; if the message is not decoded in a pattern that corresponds to the encoding; and finally, if the destination is unable to handle the decoded message so as to produce the desired response—then, obviously, the system is working at less than top efficiency. When we realize that all these steps must be accomplished with relatively high efficiency if any communication is to be successful, the everyday act of explaining something to a stranger, or writing a letter, seems a minor miracle.47

An important requirement of any communication system is that the receiver (E) of the message, and the encoder (B) must be in tune. This is easy to see when communication is considered from a mechanical viewpoint—obviously, if an audience is expected to hear a radio broadcast they must have radio receivers and be tuned to the proper frequency or channel. However, mechanical instruments and devices do not themselves really communicate. "Being in tune" with the audience requires people, and people who understand communication techniques, attitudes, and other people who may be different from themselves. Therefore, communication involves more than language skills; it requires a great deal of knowledge and insight. Most of the communication process occurs in what Schramm refers to as the "black box" of the central nervous

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SOURCE

ENCODER

MESSAGE

CHANNEL

DECODER/DESTINATION

A

B

C

D

E

U.S. ARMY PSYOP GROUP

B¹

RADIO SCRIPT WRITERS

C¹

D¹

E

PSYOP AUDIENCE

B²

NEWSPAPER COPY WRITERS

C²

D²

B³

LEAFLET WRITERS AND ILLUSTRATORS

C³

D³

B⁴

LOUDSPEAKER SCRIPT WRITERS

C⁴

D⁴

B⁵

CADRES, ARTISTS, AND PERFORMERS

C⁵

D⁵

*A Communication Model.*
system, the contents of which we understand only vaguely. Schramm emphasizes that "we are therefore dealing with analogies and gross functions, and the test of any model . . . is whether it enables us to make predictions—not whether it is a true copy of what happens in the 'black box'—a matter of which we cannot speak with any great confidence."38

In summary, clearly some PSYOP encompasses more than loudspeaker and leaflet operations. PSYOP and communication involve the entire population, and from a communication viewpoint, the environment is complex—targets are varied and seldom clear cut. Consequently, the scope of communication programs is extensive, many channels are used, and a variety of techniques, including the full spectrum of communication procedures, are programmed.

To gauge the effect of PSYOP programs, it is necessary to consider the objectives and performance of political, social, or economic programs being supported. If the primary programs are seriously deficient and these deficiencies are understood by the people, no amount of PSYOP will persuade the people that the programs are worth while. Therefore, the effect of persuasive communication is highly dependent on a variety of factors including PSYOP policy itself, credibility, the channel and techniques used, and the role of group dynamics.

NOTES
3 Ibid., p. 90.
7 Ibid.
8 Franklin W. Houn, To Change a Nation (New York: The Free Press, 1961), passim.
13 Katz and Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence.
14 Ibid., pp. 22-24.
Efforts to delineate the concept of psychological operations have been impeded by a reluctance to acknowledge PSYOP as an instrument of strategy. What is a psychological operation? Is there a psychological aspect to our national security policies and programs? Is there another dimension...


"The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the State or Defense Departments. Statement by Editor of Military Review."
to our efforts other than the direct impact of our diplomatic, military, and economic activities?

Clearly, the results we achieve do not depend simply on what we do. They also depend on how others perceive our actions. The views of others frequently determine whether they act in ways beneficial or detrimental to the U.S. national security goals we seek through our diplomatic, military, and economic activities.

Thus, there clearly is a psychological aspect to our national security policies and programs. Often, it is the critical element in whether we are successful or not. Psychological operations (PSYOP) respond to this aspect of our national security efforts; they are designed to get others to respond in ways beneficial to achieving our goals.

COLD WAR

The development of the cold war illustrates the reality and importance of psychological considerations. The confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union stemmed from many things. But clearly, a critical factor was how each side viewed the other's actions. The Soviets, having suffered two devastating attacks in 25 years, were intent on absolute security in Eastern Europe. They perceived Western attitudes toward Eastern Europe as being incompatible with this overriding Soviet concern. The United States and Western Europe saw Soviet statements and actions as implacably hostile, aggressively expansionistic, and a direct threat to their very existence.

These perceptions motivated the diplomatic, military, and economic actions of both the Soviets and the West. The pattern of action and reaction multiplied each side's perceptions of the other in ways that steadily deepened the confrontation.

Another salient feature of the cold war has been the role of ideology. The Communists brought to postwar prominence a way of thinking attuned to psychological considerations. The Communist sees the world in an ideological framework. The way the thought of Mao Tse-tung has dominated China's conduct is a salutary reminder of the absorbing concern of the Communist mind with ideology.

Communist China now distributes publications abroad in some 40 languages and broadcasts about 1,500 hours a week in 38 different languages. In the Soviet Union, Tass sends out 75,000 words a day, and foreign broadcasts total over 1,000 hours a week in 40 languages. The volume of these efforts indicates graphically the attention devoted by the Communists to psychological considerations.

A LIVING HERITAGE

Soviet and Chinese ideological and psychological activities often sound like massive polemics of questionable sincerity. However, ideology has real meaning for Communists. Marxist-Leninist ideology is a living heritage. It assures Communists they are right in trying to extend their sway over the rest of the world, and it tells them they will win. The latter conviction also endows their efforts with a patience that contrasts with US impatience for results.
The theoretical certainty of their ideological goals allows Communists to be flexible about means. They can play on the contradictions that bother others without regard to their own complete consistency. An ideological approach also highlights concern for "ideas." This is obviously a frame of mind adapted to identifying and exploiting the psychological aspects of international developments.

Americans, too, approach human behavior and international events from their own conceptual point of view. But the central and explicit Communist concern for ideology has so broadened and deepened the psychological aspect of international relations as to give it a new dimension. The Communist approach to the world incorporates a pervasive effort to foster social climates and public opinion that will affect domestic and international policies in the Communist interests. These Communist activities have often had a direct impact on our diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities. Hostile psychological operations can drive out good deeds.

U.S. REPUTATION

In this connection, it is instructive to examine candidly the deterioration of the reputation of the United States. Why has the Soviet Union maintained a relatively favorable image? Why have the rapes of Hungary, Tibet, and Czechoslovakia made little lasting impression? How could a society that must build a wall to retain its members be attractive to the peoples of the world seeking freedom? In contrast, why has worldwide obloquy attached to the US efforts in Vietnam?

It is no accident that words like "intervention," "imperialism," "exploitation," and "fallout" have become common currency and loaded with unfavorable connotations. Similarly, "peaceful coexistence" and "wars of national liberation" have become acceptable concepts with desirable aspects. In contrast, the words "capitalism" and "capitalist" have been all but universally tainted as involving social injustice and the "exploitation" of man by man.

"Socialism" has become a "good" word, and the Communist countries label themselves "the Socialist Camp" and dedicate their efforts to "Socialist fraternity." Simply labeling a relationship "colonialist" or "neocolonialist" creates a stigma and puts it on the defensive. Soldiers fighting for the government in the Congo became "mercenaries," a derogatory word. On the other hand, the revolutionaries in the Dominican Republic were labeled "constitutionalists," a "good" sounding word.

The United States had a highly favorable image at the end of World War II, and it has given others vast aid and made many sacrifices. Yet the United States is in disrepute in much of the world. In contrast, the Soviet Union has repressed dissent by force, proclaimed a dogmatic ideology, and given far less aid than the United States and several other countries. Yet the Soviet Union has a great deal of sympathy and support in many quarters of the world. How has this come about?

IMAGE OF POWER

Power—or, more exactly, the image of power—has been an important
element. Soviet nuclear power has obviously affected the views of others. The Soviets have adroitly projected an image of power. They have not hesitated, for instance, to dwell on the terrors of nuclear warfare. The Soviet threat is credible enough that they can utilize it to heighten fears of the USSR in many segments of world opinion.

These fears lead to worry about "provoking" the Soviets. "You cannot expect the Soviets to be reasonable if you keep provoking them" runs the plaint. The result is unremitting pressure on the United States to make concessions. We are placed constantly on the defensive, and the United States incurs opprobrium if it does not make repeated, unilateral concessions.

The Communists have shrewdly used their concepts to exploit the aspirations of the developing world. Those struggling to achieve or develop independence were not receptive to the idea of taking control of their destinies gradually. More important to them than advice and assistance are pride and sense of self-realization. In an atmosphere of both poverty and aspirations, the idea of pitting one person against another seems destructive. The concept of working together for the common good seems highly desirable—and translates readily to sympathy for things labeled Socialist.

These attitudes obviously offered a fertile field for Communist psychological exploitation. Admittedly, the Communist could be more freewheeling because they had few direct interests that might be damaged. But they were also astute in playing up to the concerns of the newly independent countries. Delegations from these lands were freely brought to Moscow and Peking, and key Chinese officials, in particular, paid them flattering attention. China diligently portrayed itself as the model for, and friend of, revolution in the Afro-Asian world. Through skillful activities and constant repetition, Communists tenets have been given vague but wide acceptance by many peoples and governments throughout the world.

The United States also had tremendous assets that would seem to have offered it far greater opportunities than the Communists enjoyed for achieving identification with those seeking independence. The United States was the modern model of national independence from a colonial empire. It articulated the ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

UNITY AND DIGNITY

American history, for all its faults; centered around the pursuit of unity and dignity out of diversity. American society and economy, for all their serious defects, offered a quality of life well beyond that achieved previously. The United States accepted the principle of national traditions in a pluralistic world while the Communists, as the Brezhnev doctrine made blatantly clear, had one doctrinal concept for all the world. Yet, despite these seeming advantages, the climate of opinion has clearly changed against the United States and has imposed important practical constraints on what we can do in the world.
In the current era of insurgency and potential or actual instability, psychological considerations are the central element. Public attitudes toward government and violence are crucial. Vietnam has made clear that governmental legitimacy and security stem from a state of mind as much as a set of physical factors.

Psychology is similarly crucial to the success of the Nixon doctrine. The framework of U.S. security is our network of multilateral and bilateral defense treaties. Clearly, the viability of this arrangement depends on continued rapport and confidence. Successful partnership is in many ways, a frame of mind.

Under the Nixon doctrine, we are essentially engaged in developing the self-confidence of our allies. This effort involves our allies' perceptions of their problems and capabilities and of their 'neighbors and of us. The success of the Nixon doctrine also involves how our allies' neighbors, particularly those who might threaten them, view our capabilities and resolve, as well as those of our allies. All of these elements are heavily psychological.

ERA OF NEGOTIATION

The era of negotiation that the United States seeks has similarly important psychological aspects. The willingness to negotiate is also a frame of mind. President Richard M. Nixon has referred to the need for a spirit of negotiation in which each side defines its interest with concern for the legitimate interests of others. At the same time, a productive spirit of negotiation must stem from a position of confidence and not of weakness. Clearly, all of these actions are heavily underscored with psychological implications. Serious negotiation is more than atmospherics. It comes down to specific steps. A central factor in maintaining our troop levels in Europe was the destabilizing effect a cut might have on the Soviet evaluation of the American will and commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. An important element in proceeding with the Safeguard antiballistic missile system has been the belief that it would motivate the Soviets to negotiate more productively at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

Deterrence itself is, in the main, based on psychology. Deterrence relies on influencing the thoughts, perceptions, and actions of potential foes in ways that will discourage or prevent them from acting in a manner inimical to our security.

We can also point to examples in which the United States used psychological considerations adroitly and realized clear benefits. One was the "atoms for peace" program in 1953. This program offered a practical way to provide nuclear fuels to third countries for peaceful purposes. It also created a favorable impression for the United States among those countries eager to gain access to nuclear power as a key step toward self-development. And, at the same time, it embarrassed the Soviet Union by highlighting its reluctance to engage in a similar program.
OPEN SKY PROPOSAL

Another example was the "open sky" proposal that President Dwight D. Eisenhower made at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955. The concept was forthright and clear. Each country would allow complete freedom to inspect its territory from the air.

This approach offered a realistic way to put aside many of the worries and uncertainties that led to fear of a surprise nuclear attack. The move clearly illuminated the Soviet reluctance to accept any form of verification which would be essential to meaningful strategic arms agreement. The proposal offered dramatic evidence that the United States was willing to cooperate toward arms control despite its strategic dominance. It completely changed the atmosphere of the summit conference and of world public opinion in ways favorable to the United States.

A more recent example of psychological benefits for the United States arises from our landings on the moon. Obviously, these explorations have caught the interest of most of the world. The worldwide anxiety during Apollo 13's near tragedy underscored the tremendous empathy of the astronauts and our space program. This human concern and interest have comprised a singular asset for the United States that has helped counterbalance the opprobrium that Vietnam has produced.

KEY FOREIGN GROUPS

This review of the reality and importance of psychological considerations in international relations points the way toward defining psychological operations. The key point, clearly, is how pertinent foreign groups perceive actions that are important to US national security. What we want, therefore, are responses by key foreign groups that will further the achievement of important U.S. interests. We must, in short, influence these foreign groups.

Psychological operations, therefore, are those efforts designed primarily to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of key foreign groups in ways that assist in maintaining the national security of the United States. This statement sounds crass and self-centered, but our survey of recent international developments makes clear that the question is not whether psychological considerations will play a key role, but how.

A positive approach to psychological considerations generally is mutually beneficial to the foreign groups and the United States. What is involved is seldom a Machiavellian manipulation of the beliefs of others against their best interests. Generally, what is needed is an honest effort to understand and respond to the cultural conditioning and aspirations of others to achieve a result beneficial, in some degree, to all concerned.

The response that will most often benefit the United States—peaceful change, international cooperation, economic development, and improved communications—is also beneficial to the other country (or countries) concerned. Often, the US interest will be well served simply by the country avoiding coming heavily under the domination of the Soviet
Union or China. Efforts to influence others cannot be always open and above-board, but the goal, as these considerations make clear, is not an invidious one.

Psychological operations are not something apart from the diplomatic, military, and economic elements of our national security policies and programs. Nor are they a substitute for these other sources of power. They draw on and reinforce these activities and make them more effective. Psychological operations are ineffective without these other activities. The psychological success of the United States in the Cuban missile confrontation of 1962 was possible because the United States psychologically utilized effective military capabilities while the Soviet Union did not. Psychological operations are essential if the United States is to serve its best interests—the skillful nonuse of its great power.

One difficulty in defining more precisely the idea of psychological operations is that the concept has a certain vagueness about it. It is hard to visualize. We can see a diplomat, or a military weapon, or an economic development project, but it is hard to point to anything equally concrete and say, “that is a psychological operation.”

This difficulty stems from the intimate interdependence between psychological considerations and the other elements of our national security policies and programs. What is appropriate in psychological operations is closely interrelated with our other activities and to whom, where, and why we do them. We cannot separate and identify a single national PSYOP doctrine or strategy. By the same token, psychological operations involve more than simply information, communications, or even propaganda.

OPERATIONS DEFINED

Efforts have been made to develop adequate working definitions of psychological operations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have defined the operations, for military purposes, as those that:

- include psychological warfare and, in addition, encompass those political, military, economic and ideological actions planned and conducted to create in neutral or friendly foreign groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior to support the achievement of national objectives.

“. . . Another proposal develops the concept of ‘strategic psychological operations’ as aimed at influencing and shaping decision-makers’ power to govern or control their followers.”

These definitions tend to suffer from overstatement, overinclusiveness, or vagueness. It is hard to tell from these definitions what is, and what is not, a psychological operation. Greater precision seems necessary if we are to have a workable concept.

WARTIME SITUATION

We can clarify better what is involved by looking at an extreme case—the situation in wartime. Here, our goals are starker. It is easier to see whom we want to influence and the value to us of influencing them in certain ways. We want the enemy to stop fighting. The ability of our forces to move toward this goal is greatly improved if we can persuade
enemy troops to defect or impair their morale so as to lower their abilities as fighting forces. Leaflet and other operations are carried out to achieve these ends. In this instance, psychological operations become something clear and concrete.

The broader impact of psychological considerations is similarly clearer in wartime. It is not just our military forces, economic measures, and diplomatic efforts that induce an enemy to stop fighting—although they are essential. We improve our chances of getting an enemy to stop fighting if we increase his doubts and fears and the thought that he has more to lose than to win by continuing.

The German perception of the demand for "unconditional surrender" almost certainly lengthened the war in Europe, and strongly influenced the way it ended and the shape of the postwar world. Japanese attitudes toward the Emperor and U.S. awareness of this concern had a great deal to do with ending the war in the Pacific and the more favorable postwar events in that area.

We have trouble delimiting psychological operations because we live in an era that is neither peace nor war. Our goals are not as unambiguous as they are in wartime, and the usefulness of our efforts to influence others is correspondingly less clear-cut. We face a dilemma because we long for a world of peace and freedom. Unfortunately, conflict, however we label it, exists in the world in which we must live. We must acknowledge it clearly, both to endure it and to move from it to an era of negotiation. For both purposes, attention to psychological considerations is essential.

**IS INTERNATIONAL PERSUASION SOCIOLOGICALLY FEASIBLE?**

BY DANIEL LERNER

Persuasive communication usually has its greatest effect in reinforcement rather than conversion. However, some contemporary problems have been exacerbated, not ameliorated, by international communication.

The answer to the question of whether international persuasion is sociologically feasible, in general, is obviously Yes. International persuasion is sociologically feasible, on the face of it, because it has occurred in many different times, places, and circumstances. Our task here is to differentiate the circumstances under which international persuasion is more, or less, feasible.

The central point is that international persuasion is subject to the same conditions as any other form of persuasive communication. In general, international persuasion is more feasible when it operates upon existing predispositions in the foreign audience. That is, obtaining a "reinforcement effect" is far more feasible than obtaining a "conversion effect" for international, as for all, persuasive communication.

sion hinges directly upon the historical and existing state of relations between the sending and receiving nations. Where there is a long tradition of friendly relations between two or more nations, messages are likely to pass between those nations more freely and more effectively. Since the motives of the sender are not suspect, in such a friendly relationship his messages are more likely to be accepted at their face value. Such messages will, in this important sense, clearly be more persuasive. A case in point is the exchange of messages between Britain and America.

The situation is reversed when there is a tradition of hostility between the sending and receiving nations. Under these conditions all messages passing between the two hostile nations are likely to be carefully scrutinized and, in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary, treated with suspicion of motives and doubt of purposes. Clearly, such conditions greatly reduce the feasibility of international persuasion. The obvious case in point is communication between the United States of America and the USSR.

The state of the world political arena, at any given time, provides a third major set of conditions which affect the feasibility of international propaganda. When the world arena is relatively pacific, the flow of international traffic is likely to be larger, freer, and therefore more persuasive. In times of war and crisis—war being the most extreme form of international crisis—the world communication network contracts. Comparative studies in content analysis have shown that this contraction operates within as well as between nations. The vocabulary of crisis tends to become more limited and constrained as the crisis deepens and lengthens.

WARTIME PROPAGANDA

Fewer symbols are used to articulate national policies and defend national actions. A single symbol such as “national defense”—as was shown in the studies of Pool, Lasswell, and Lerner—is used to rationalize and justify a great variety of actions which, in times of peace, are justified in terms of other symbols. This internal contraction of communication is multiplied in the international arena. In times of war and crisis, nations appear to talk to each other through clenched teeth. As symbolism contracts, skepticism rises and persuasion is reduced. “Listening to the enemy,” in some countries, becomes a crime.

Yet it is essential to note that, even under the extreme hostility of total war, some measure of international persuasion remains feasible. The conspicuous examples are the great propaganda and psychological warfare “campaigns” of the two world wars. Harold D. Lasswell’s classic study of World War I established this point. My own study of the Allied campaign against Nazi Germany provides further documentation for World War II. People in Germany, both military and civilian, not only listened to the enemy but increasingly came to believe what he was saying as the war increasingly went his way.
International persuasion, under wartime conditions, has been feasible in the measure that the sender has met the two major conditions mentioned above: credibility and reinforcement. The outstanding example of successful building of credibility is, of course, the wartime British Broadcasting Corporation. The BBC established its reputation for truthfulness largely by being truthful. The core of this “strategy of truth,” as practiced by BBC, was never to tell lies—or, more precisely, never to tell lies that could be found out.

An illustration of the BBC technique was its practice of beginning each newscast—all day, every day—by giving first place to British setbacks, losses, defeats. Over the years this produced an image of BBC truthfulness that made it a model of credibility, in Germany as well as elsewhere. Ultimately, this asset of wide credibility became the basis for the high order of persuasiveness which BBC attained during the critical middle years of the war (1942-1943) and for the important role it played in persuading a large number of significant Germans that they had lost the war in its final years (1944-1945).

Reinforcement as a central condition of persuasion is vividly illustrated by the military propaganda campaign against the Wehrmacht. The specific case in point was the campaign to increase the surrender rate among German soldiers. During the years when Germany occupied most of Europe, and seemed likely to win the final victory, such propaganda was not feasible. As the tide began to turn, however, and German military units encountered severe dangers and increasing deaths, the predispositional machinery for surrender came into operation.

Central to the Anglo-American propaganda effort at this point, was its abstinence from direct attacks upon Hitler. All German soldiers had sworn an oath of loyalty to the Fuhrer and many of them, even under conditions of extreme peril in combat, felt themselves bound unto death by this oath. The Allied propaganda campaign avoided challenging this deep psychological commitment; that is, it did not seek a “conversion” effect. Rather, it moved steadily in the direction of “reinforcing” any predisposition to surrender among soldiers in losing combat. The most effective single message concerned a “safe conduct pass” promising them good treatment as prisoners of war. The psychological basis of its reinforcement impact has been described by Edward Shils:

Belief in the veracity of this appeal was no doubt based on the attitude that the British and the Americans were respectable, law-abiding soldiers who would treat their captives according to international law. As a result of this predisposition and the wide use of the safe-conduct leaflets, as well as our actual practices in treating prisoners well, the German soldier came to have no fear of capture by British or American Troops. In passing, it is interesting to note that the psychological warfare campaign against Japan in World War II followed the same strategy. The Emperor, as key symbol of Japanese identity and loyalty, was never directly attacked by Allied propaganda. Instead, as Japanese soldiers found themselves increasingly in painful and perilous situations, Allied
PROPAGANDA SINCE WORLD WAR II

These examples from the propaganda campaigns of World War II illustrate that international persuasion is feasible even under the most extreme conditions of international crisis. Other examples of more recent vintage can be supplied by most readers. A particularly interesting case to ponder is that of "nuclear blackmail." How are we to evaluate the "international persuasion" exercised by Khrushchev's atomic threats during the Suez crisis of 1956? How are we to evaluate the "international persuasion" exercised by the airlift during the Berlin crisis or by Kennedy's standfast language during the Cuban missile crisis? Although appraisals of these essentially propagandistic activities have varied, it is plain that they did in fact considerably influence the course of events. Further studies will help to clarify the underlying "code" that made these international communications persuasive.

Other topics in the relationship between international communication and "persuasibility" merit careful scholarly attention. Among these is the role assigned to the numerous and various organizations for international cooperation that have been created since World War II. Examples on the Western side are the European Community, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the general Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Also relevant is the transformation of the Pan-American Union into the Organization of American States. Of special interest, in terms of world communication, is the global network of alliances parallel to NATO that has been constructed by the United States: CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization), and ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States). Parallels on the Soviet side of the bipolarized world arena are the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance and the Warsaw Pact, which seek, largely through communication techniques, to guarantee the military and economic cohesion of the communist states under Soviet management.

A communication operation of explicit global purpose is the United Nations. The UN has been subject to the strictures affecting all "legislatures" that seek to govern units of unequal power on the basis of parity, that is, one vote per head. Successive governments of France, for example, have made it clear that they do not take seriously any "legislation" enacted by a body in which the vote of Gabon is equal to that of France. This view, stated less candidly and brutally, is shared by many other large member-states of the UN, including the USA and USSR. The long-term success of the UN, however, is less likely to be determined by its activities as a "legislature" than by its effectiveness as a "forum" of world communication. It is this aspect of the UN that most deserves study by communication specialists.

Perhaps the most complex problem of feasibility in "international persuasion" arises from the worldwide concern with development. Involved there is nothing less than the future of international relations between the rich and poor countries of the world. Sociologically, the disparities are...
enormous. Consider the single disparity of per capita income that separates the United States, which is moving toward $6,000 per annum, from India, which is just barely getting beyond $60 per annum. These simple figures represent what economists call "orders of magnitude." Between $60 and $6,000 per person per year stretches a money gulf that encompasses virtually everything we call the modern way of life. As Paul Samuelson has put it, most of what is distinctive in modern culture may be the common characteristics of any society that exceeds a per capital income distribution of $3,000 per year.

The relatively few rich countries of the world have nearly everything the numerous poor countries of the world do not have but are seeking to acquire. An urban, literate, technological, participant, and rich society like the United States can now feed itself by the labor of less than 7 percent of its population—and still have a lot of food left over to give, sell, or destroy. A rural, illiterate, overpopulated, underequipped, and poor country like India cannot feed itself adequately even with the labor of over 70 percent of its population. We are speaking here of economic disparities—in a sense which includes social, psychological, and political disparities—that cumulate to several large "orders of magnitude."

A WIDENING GAP

To return to our original question: "Is international persuasion sociologically feasible?"—under such conditions no easy, optimistic answer is possible. Indeed, the record of the past twenty years of effort in "development communication" is marked with failures and frustrations. When President Truman initiated the "bold new program" of development in 1949, most people concerned with development communication set out on their great enterprises on the premise that they would create a "revolution of rising expectations," and that this revolution would be a Good Thing. It would be good because rising expectations, according to the pattern established over five centuries of Western history, would stimulate the poor peoples of the world to revive the energies and acquire the skills needed to satisfy their new wants.

As it turned out, this was easier said than done. The poor peoples of the world have indeed lived through a "revolution of rising expectations" during the past twenty years, but their wants have not been satisfied. Far from it. On the contrary, the gap between the rich and the poor nations has continued to increase over these years. This is a major complication in international communication between rich and poor countries.

Another major complication is that the gap between what people want and what they get has widened within as well as outside most of the world's poor lands. This increasing imbalance in what I call the "Want/Get Ratio" (WGR) has led the poor peoples in the direction of a "revolution of rising frustrations." I have presented this view of our global future elsewhere.

It remains, in concluding this brief overview of feasibility, to indicate why international communication has been less "feasible" over the past two decades of development. The failure of development efforts has been, in large measure, a failure of development communication. We have
taught the poor people to want the "good things of life" available in the rich countries. We have not taught them how to get what they want.

Where we have failed in the past two decades we must now learn to succeed in the next two decades. The technology needed to do this job is available in the form of transistors, satellites, and the spinoff from these major technological advances of the past few years: video tapes, audio tapes, kinescopes, cassettes. This technology can be adapted to the needs of poor countries with relative ease. The harder communication task is to create "software"—that is, to integrate men, ideas, programs, and management in a "continuous feedback loop"—which can make productive use of the available hardware.

So grand a purpose will involve a massive and concerted effort of transnational experimentation, evaluation, and act performed by the rich nations for the poor nations. It must be done by the rich with the poor nations, acting in cooperative enterprises. The key word cannot be "transfer"; it must be "transformation." In the end, a true world communication network will become operative only when the poor nations of the world can demand, and deserve, "equal time" with the rich nations.

This is not now the case by a long shot. The current technology of global communication is mainly in the hands of the superpowers. As a result, traffic flows in the world communication network tend to be unilaterally from the rich to the poor, from the strong to the weak. In such a system, all "disparities"—economic, social, psychological, political—contaminate international communication. It is in the interest of all those who believe in "equal time" to help construct this indispensable condition for the just, and effective, operation of a truly global communication network.

Only then will international persuasion, on a world basis, become sociologically feasible—in the worthwhile sense proposed by the editors of this journal.

NOTES
5 Guidelines for further study of such international communications are provided by Hans Speier, Force and Folly (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, paperback, 1960).
9 My central thesis is that the poor countries do want what the rich countries have and, over the past two decades, have moved unilaterally in this direction. Several dozen replications of my model have confirmed it in every region of the world. The latest replication is G. R.

The most articulate exposition of this process and its consequences is in the voluminous writings of Gunnar Myrdal and Barbara Ward.


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**PSYOP AND RELATED ACTIVITIES**

By Francis M. Watson, Jr.

As communication involves the total spectrum of human actions, so all human interaction, irrespective of intent, communicates: PSYOP policies and actions should be considered in terms of this premise.

In any meaningful study of psychological operations, the PSYOP concept must be defined and its parameters identified against those military activities that support or are closely related to PSYOP and against the total psychological impact a military force has on its target audiences. This essay seeks to discuss the connection between PSYOP and its supporting and related military activities.

In this review, note will be taken of matters that can be considered as having psychological impact on the audiences which PSYOP is seeking to reach. That is, although no determination will be attempted about whether or not an action was planned or conducted, in contrast to being simply incidental to the military operation or presence in the area under study, PSYOP is here considered to include psychological warfare and propaganda and to encompass those political, military, economic, and ideological actions that are believed, in fact, to impact on the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of neutral or friendly foreign groups as they relate to the achievement of those U.S. objectives stated or implied in the literature studied.

Attention will therefore be given to each of the following activities, as being so closely related, or intricately involved, in audience impact as to be inseparable from PSYOP:

1. Civic Action
2. Civil Affairs
3. Community Relations
4. Public Information
5. Intelligence
6. Troop Behavior
7. Population and Resources Control

These activities and functions must be identified rather precisely at the outset. Some definitions of the terms used in this review must be made. Precise points of departure must be established from which appraisals can be made that may have some usefulness in the future development of doctrine or the design of training programs, for even a cursory review of

* Original essay by Francis M. Watson, Jr.
the reports and other literature dealing with these functions indicates
great similarities in the names of some of the activities undertaken, and
also great differences in objectives. For example, some of the same
activities may be undertaken as civic action and community relations, but
differences in goals, funding, and technique are great. Thus, each of these
functions will be defined and the doctrine and tactics intended for each
will be stated and briefly discussed.

CIVIC ACTION

Civic action is listed in the Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint
Usage, hereafter referred to as JCS Pub 1, as synonymous with military
civic action and was defined in the late 1960s as:

"...the use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to
the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works,
ariculture, transportation, communication, health, sanitation, and others
attributing to economic, and social development, which would also serve to improve
the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times
advise or engage in military civic action in overseas areas.)"

Conceived within the context of attitude-and-opinion-change efforts, civic
action has been repeatedly used in the field to influence civilian groups
toward various objectives sought by the military forces, as well as to
achieve environmental improvement.

Although many writers contend that the U.S. military has been con-
ducting civic-action-type activities throughout its history, the specific
program to which JCS Pub 1 addressed itself, and which has received so
much emphasis in the field, seems to have begun much more recently.

Virgil Ney attributes the origin of the present concept to

"...Ramon Magsaysay, a former World War II Filipino guerrilla captain, [who]
became Secretary of Defense of the Republic of the Philippines. His astute
appraisal of the Hukbalahap insurgency was that basically not all Hukas were
Communists. . . . There was a large group of good Filipinos within the Huk
insurgency movement who were there only because of political factors. Magsaysay
decided that it was possible to counter insurgency with other than military or violent
tactics. In reality, his new tactic was "civic action" and it was based upon subtle
but practical operations conducted by the troops in order "to make friends and
influence people" in favor of the de jure government."

Brought to the U.S. Armed Forces as a Cold War technique and
spurred by the Draper Report, civic action has received attention ever
since. For example, the early PSYOP and civil affairs field manuals do
not refer to the concept but it appeared in both in the early 1960s under
such headings as "cold war techniques" or "counter-insurgency opera-
tions." The 1962 civil affairs manual indicated that:

"Civic action, an aspect of civil affairs, is any function performed by military forces
in cooperation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups through the use of mili-
tary manpower and material resources for the socio-economic well-being and
improvement of the civil community with a goal of building or reinforcing mutual
respect and fellowship between the civil and military communities."

The Office of the Chief of Military History dates the origin of civic action
as follows:

There was one provision of the 1961 [Congressional] Act that had appeared first in
the Mutual Security Act of 1959. Although the concept of civic action had been used
previously in Iran and extensively in the Armed Forces Assistance to Korea
program following the Korean War, it did not become official until 1959. . . . Some
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C.A. [Civic Action] programs had been initiated under this provision in the 1959-1961 period, but the big impetus came in the 1961-1965 period. U.S. Army Colonel Robert Slover testified before Congress on civic action in June of 1961. He told the legislators, "civic action should be looked upon as both a preventive or countering measure to prevent deterioration in a country, and also as a technique of guerrilla warfare.

Slover was a civil affairs specialist and one of the Army's prime spokesmen on civic action at that time. The thesis of his testimony before Congress—and he quoted considerably from FM 41-5, the joint-service manual on civil affairs—was that action was a means for demonstrating brotherhood between the civilian and his own military forces in the improvement of political, economic, and social conditions in their country. Again, these are matters heavily laden with psychological subtleties well within the scope of PSYOP. PSYOP manuals themselves have very little to say about civic action, although they do allude to PSYOP exploitation of civic action successes and PSYOP officers' advisory assistance to their own commanders and indigenous military forces on civic action programs. In the field, however, civic action is effected under the aegis of G5/S5 officers, most of whom seem to be PSYOP-oriented.

Any consideration of contemporary civic action and PSYOP must also embrace community relations:

... in spite of interdepartmental agreement on the definition of the term, "military civic action" has come progressively closer and closer to meaning anything that any soldier or unit does for "the people" that appears at the time, and to the doer, to be good for them [the people].

Others have expressed similar concern for the mixing of military-civil relations programs involving psychological impact:

...the term "civic action" has been used to refer to a wide range of activities that have traditionally been known in the military by other labels, such as engineering, civil affairs or military government, public relations, civil defense, troop-community relations, and psychological operations.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS

Community relations has most often been undertaken in the military as a subfunction of public information, both because it is usually an "operating responsibility of the information officer," and because it has usually been conducted in conjunction with efforts to gain favorable coverage in the mass media and thus assist in "developing a good image of the Army...." In overseas areas, however, the community relations function has tended to drift toward the G5 staff section, especially with the advent of community relations advisory councils (CRACs) in such places as Korea. The 1971 PSYOP doctrinal manual envisaged coordination of the PSYOP staff officer with the civil affairs officer, for "PSYOP implications on proposed civic action and community relations programs, ... include the impact of these programs on local cultures and the likelihood of popular support for projects." (Emphasis supplied.) Perhaps the greatest difference between civic action and community relations is most clearly seen in the experience of these CRACs. The councils, as well as the programs involved, tend to be initiated because of some problem the
military perceives in its relations with the civilian community and not because of any apparent or expressed need within the civilian community. Both the public relations nature of community relations and its possible confusion with civic action can be seen in the following passage from the 1969 civil affairs manual:

Many of the individual projects undertaken in a military civic action program will have a superficial resemblance to community relations activities. While improved community relations of the military is an important byproduct of the military civic action effort these relations are not, at least during Phase I of its activity, the primary product. Military civic action should be designed to make real lasting improvements to the social, economic, and political environment. For example, if a military unit were to build, maintain, or staff a needed school task would be true military civic action whether or not it also produced a greater civilian respect for the military. On the other hand the activity of a military unit in sponsoring an occasional outing or meal for the children of that school would be primarily in the nature of a community relations project. As such, it would build up goodwill and a better relationship between the military forces and the people, but may be a misapplication of resources which should be devoted to true military civic action.

Appearing on the same page with a reprint of the JCS definition of military civic action quoted earlier, the above passage made no distinction—as the JCS definition did—between the roles of U.S. and indigenous military forces. This distinction can become a key issue. The same manual (FM 41-10), however, did distinguish those roles in connection with community relations:

Unless the U.S. forces (and their host country allies) understand the requirement for good community relations and proper conduct, the best planned civil affairs and PSYOP effort by CMO staff elements and units will be of little value. The rules of troop behavior required in a counterinsurgency situation are complicated. U.S. personnel must not only conduct themselves to the best advantage; but, by their example as well as by the advice encourage the indigenous military to improve its conduct. Mere generosity on the part of U.S. troops is not enough, particularly when that generosity is practiced with an unconscious show of wealth, a disregard for local custom, or is accompanied by loud or unusual behavior.

The Army Regulation on public information, although it did little to clear up the overlap with civic action, probably gave the purest indication of community relations, defining it as:

That command function which evaluates public interest, and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance.

PUBLIC INFORMATION

That there is a relationship between public information and PSYOP is evident, especially when there is an overlap in audiences, as suggested by the following paragraph from the civil affairs manual:

The impact on civilian-military relations of the information Office is not limited to his participation in community relations matters. The command information program for military personnel and for the civilian employees must be coordinated with the psychological operations program if one is being conducted. Information intended only for the education of U.S. military personnel often will reach civilian audiences and must be in consonance with U.S. released information directed at such civilian audiences or released to the world at large. In today's world the mobility of individuals and the profusion of mass communications is such that neither the information officer nor the psychological operations officer can hope to address an audience isolated unto itself. Further, news released abroad to U.S. and international news media and intended for audiences outside the theater of operations will also return to the locale of such operations and influence civilian audiences. Therefore, coordinated information programs must be scheduled if credibility is to be retained.

The first theater-level press officer appeared in World War I within the Press and Propaganda division of the G-2 section of General John J.
Pershing's headquarters. Referred to as "G-2," this office was in the company of three other G-2 subsections labeled: "Enemy Information," "Counterintelligence," and "Maps." Such an association with intelligence or PSYOP would be considered unthinkable now. Indeed, the Army came out of World War II facing a Congress that was suspicious even of the term "public relations"—thus the imposition of the term "public information" for the Army's contacts with the public press.

The function was pushed completely away from any suggestion of PSYOP. More recently as recognized by the passage just quoted from the civil affairs manual, the scope and speed of world news collection and dissemination have forced the PSYOP program to be aware of what is being said by the public information staff, because the two are often speaking to the same audiences, even if indirectly through the world press.

The complex interaction between PSYOP and public information was at least partially reinforced in the following two passages from the PSYOP doctrinal manual:

"The PSYOP staff officer provides advice on the effects of hostile PSYOP and recommends countermeasures for use in command information programs, [i.e. those directed to US troops], public information programs [information to the world mass media], and PSYOP."

"The information officer coordinates the command information program with community relations programs and the PSYOP program. The command information program for military and civilian personnel must be coordinated with the PSYOP program. Information intended only for U.S. military personnel often will reach civilian audiences and must be in consonance with U.S. released information."

INTELLIGENCE

In many ways the historical relationship of PSYOP and military intelligence is similar to that of PSYOP and public information in that both were very closely related at the outset, diverged, and are once again drawing close. The advent of an almost saturation level of mass communications in the world has apparently been the main influencing factor. In earlier days, military intelligence and PSYOP were both concerned almost exclusively with the same target, the enemy, and interested in essentially the same information about that target—its composition and the weather and terrain conditions under which that target would be encountered. Evolution of the concern of intelligence along lines manifestly related to PSYOP are evident in the following passage taken from the chapter on "Cold War and Stability Operations" in the 1971 PSYOP doctrinal manual:

"Intelligence Operations. In addition to enemy, weather, and terrain [traditional combat intelligence concerns], the population is included as the fourth major consideration of PSYOP intelligence. An important intelligence objective is to persuade the populace to provide information to government or allied forces. Timely and accurate intelligence is essential to successful stability operations. The amount of intelligence furnished by the population is an indication of PSYOP effectiveness. Prior to operations, the PSYOP officer assesses attitudes and behavior of the target audience toward the friendly and insurgent forces. PSYOP endeavors to convince the target audience[to report on the insurgents]."

Thus, there is a complex interrelationship between PSYOP and intelligence, as a result of which the PSYOP program is both a producer and consumer of intelligence—as well as an observer of intelligence as a
measure of its own success. The literature survey suggests that it is in its consumer role that PSYOP has its greatest problems, a fact demonstrated by the frequency with which the intelligence sections of the PSYOP manuals have been changed in recent years, changes usually expanding the "sources of PSYOP intelligence" portions of the manuals and reducing specificity about the types of information sought. Neither training literature nor field reports indicate that PSYOP and intelligence elements of the Army have come to agreement on such specifics.

TROOP BEHAVIOR

The term "troop behavior" does not convey the operational ramifications many see it as having on PSYOP. Dr. Paul M. A. Linebarger, whose career association with PSYOP included both active duty participation in the program as a military reservist and extensive research, said the behavior of individual soldiers was in itself...

... a major form of communication far more important than leaflets, radio broadcasts, or posters. The role of the soldier as he is seen by the people whom he passes is a real contributing element... in heavily settled areas such as Western Europe or much of East Asia, the soldier plays an indirect psychological warfare role which it is difficult to overestimate.

Even in the early 1970s the PSYOP manuals were almost completely silent on the role of an individual soldier as a PSYOP participant. They were even more so on the responsibility of the PSYOP staff officer as a source of advice or point of coordination, on the impact of troop behavior on the PSYOP situation, or on the training of the individual for his PSYOP role. For example, the latest doctrinal manual published in 1971 made no reference to these matters in its description of the duties and responsibilities of the PSYOP staff officer. Nor were they referred to as points of coordination with either G1 (personnel) or G3 who share responsibilities for troop morale, behavior, and training. The PSYOP operations manual published in 1966 did contain this paragraph:

[PSYOP planning will insure] Friendly Troop Orientation. In any military operation, specific plans must be made to orient friendly troops in psychological operations being conducted. This orientation must never be taken for granted, especially in tactical situations where troops might be unaware that enemy soldiers and civilians are actually endeavoring to rally for amnesty, defect, or surrender. The purpose of psychological operations should be explained to all personnel assisting in the mission. Their interest and cooperation will be more genuine if they are given an English translation of the message to be disseminated. If the mission is to promote defection, friendly troops must know how, when, and where the enemy may come over, so that they will recognize the defectors as such. Failure to orient troops beforehand could lead to the killing of enemy troops who actually wish to defect or surrender, thus destroying credibility and adversely affecting future psychological operations.

However, the above passage merely sought to preclude one small, negative PSYOP function. It was certainly an inadequate analysis of the potential negative effects of failure to emphasize the PSYOP consequences of troop behavior, and, apart from the very general injunction at the beginning of the passage, made no effort to elucidate the need for positive PSYOP-oriented troop behavior.

CIVIL AFFAIRS (CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS)

In considering troops as large groups rather than as individuals, civil affairs (or civil-military relations, as the newer manuals are beginning to
term it) now relates to PSYOP because it is now recognized to have a psychological impact on foreign target groups. The October 1969 edition of FM 41-10 contained what appear to be somewhat interlocking definitions for both:

Civil affairs includes those phases of the activities of a commander which embrace the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in a friendly country or area, or occupied country or area when military forces are present. Civil affairs includes, inter alia: (2) [sic] Matters concerning the relationship between military forces located in a country or area and the civil authorities and people of that country or area usually involving performance by the military forces of certain functions or the exercise of certain authority normally the responsibility of the local government. This relationship may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to military action in time of hostilities or other emergency and normally is covered by a treaty or other agreement, express or implied; (2) Military government: The form of administration by which an occupying power exercises executive, legislative, and judicial authority over occupied territory (AR 310-25).20

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS.... The ACof, G5, Civil-Military Operations (CMO) officer is the principal staff assistant to the commander in all matters pertaining to political, economic, social, and psychological aspects of military operations. He has primary staff responsibility for those actions embracing the relationship between the military forces and civil authorities and people in the area of operations to include internal assistance and development operations, and for those actions in which PSYOP techniques are used to support the achievement of command objectives by creating in target groups the emotions, attitudes, or behavior desired.21

The overlap between these two passages is easily seen. Also easily seen is the continued delicacy with which the Army handled the subject of military government within the overall civil affairs function. This was part of a trend underway for several years. In 1966–1961 Dyer, Higgins, and Hausrath wrote:

It is not clear at present whether the Army itself considers that its main activity in this area [civil affairs] is in the field of military government or in the field of civil relations. The Field Manual, FM 41-10, is written in terms of military government. There are signs that the Army nevertheless is becoming increasingly concerned with civil relations....22

These analysts were, of course, writing years ago and were referring to the 1957 edition of FM 41-10, which, indeed, was military government-oriented. In fact, its title was Civil Affairs/Military Government. The 1957 manual was superseded by a May 1962 version, title: Civil Affairs Operations, and by later editions in August 1967 and October 1969, with similar titles. Comparison of these publications confirms the Dyer-Higgins-Hausrath observation that the Army has been increasingly concerned about relations with civilians, but somewhat hazy on specifics and particularly hesitant in addressing the issue of military government—or such matters as occupied territory. This has definite significance for PSYOP, especially in such matters as consolidation PSYOP. For example, although the language has been tempered—much along the patterns detected by Dyer, Higgins, and Hausrath—consolidation PSYOP “are directed towards the population liberated or occupied areas to facilitate military operations and promote maximum cooperation with the occupying power.” 23 At least this has been the traditional context for consolidation PSYOP, and it was still so described in the 1966 version of the PSYOP operational manual, FM 33-5. The 1971 PSYOP doctrinal manual
and the 1969 civil affairs operations manual, FM 41–10, tended to relegate consolidation PSYOP to “limited or general war” or to blend its elements into the same type of subfunctions one finds in counterinsurgency operations—military civic action and populace and resources control, for example.

However Greenspan’s writings to the effect that “occupation” and “military government” are terms most appropriately assigned by de facto considerations seem the more accurate.

Military occupation is always a question of fact. The Hague Regulations state (Article 42): “Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” It follows that in an effective occupation the previous government in the territory has been rendered incapable of exercising there its governmental authority, and that the occupying force has substituted its own authority for it....

This point of departure is not offered contentiously, but with the idea that if it appears to apply to some of the actions the Army has taken within the scope of stability operations, the Army and the individual commanders involved would benefit by clarification of the applicable doctrine and precise definition of the operations involved. The erosive effects of equivocation on such terms as “occupied area” and “consolidation PSYOP” in successive manuals is to be avoided. It appears, for example, that the Army has been criticized severely in the world press at times because the commander in a local operation has not taken upon himself the full responsibility that his tactical decisions had thrust upon him as de facto military occupant. A clarification of the doctrine might at least present him with alternatives before he takes such decisions. Without further analysis, it would seem that the present situation is often loaded to give the PSYOP advantage to his opponent while making little if any change in the actual civil affairs situation.

POPULACE AND RESOURCES CONTROL

PSYOP support of populace and resources control is seen in some places in the literature as limited to counterinsurgency operations; in other places it is combined with civic action in a limited or general war context. Again, it is a matter with serious impacts on the civil population, curtailing “legitimate as well as subversive activities” and thus of specific concern in the appraisal of PSYOP.

CONCLUSION

In summary, this essay seeks to evaluate PSYOP in the context in which it operates, that is, not only as a source of propaganda directed toward intended target audiences, but as an activity inseparable from the accompanying impacts on these audiences created by the military forces of which the PSYOP effort is a part. This view is perhaps best illustrated by Hausrath’s description of the civil-military relationship:

*Note. A part of Hausrath’s study was incorporated into the 1967 edition of the Civil Affairs Manual.
and a myriad of other things for which it competes in the local economy. Its presence frequently congests the area, overtaxes the capacity of utilities, inflates prices, and crowds schools. Although it also creates business opportunities and expands the local economy, it draws new population to the area, and these newcomers are not always wanted by the earlier residents.

When the Army moves or maneuvers it may trespass, destroy or damage property, and cause injury to persons and livestock. Although the Army compensates for such damage, these occurrences are likely to irritate and alienate local people, or to invite exploitation by them.

The presence of a military force causes the social and cultural atmosphere of a community to change, and makes political and governmental problems more acute and numerous. The daily lives of the local people are affected, sometimes seriously disrupted. Local mores, respected customs, and valued traditions are infringed upon—often never to be restored. These changes are likely to be resented by many local people, and strong, negative attitudes and emotions may be generated. Although there are advantages as well as disadvantages to the local people in having a military unit in their area, benefits are quickly accepted and soon taken for granted, whereas irritations build up, rankle, and breed antagonisms. An accumulation of these irritations can result in acts of violence or persist as latent or expressed oppositions. 

Even though the above passages seem forceful in stating that the impact of a military organization on a civilian environment is very great before the first shot is fired, they do not mention what happens in a combat situation. Under these circumstances the total impact would be even greater.

The importance of the total impact concept in the appraisal of military PSYOP cannot be overestimated, for if purposeful communication is to be effective it must reflect reality, reality that is significantly shaped by the activities of and reactions to modern military forces. A PSYOP action plan that fails to take this into account will clearly be less effective than under optimum conditions and may even seriously prejudice the effectiveness of future psychological operations.

NOTES


3. U.S. President's Commission to Study the Military Assistance Program, Report of the President's Commission to Study the Military Assistance Program (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1959), known as the Draper Report. As a result of extensive Congressional debate on military assistance, President Eisenhower established a commission under William H. Draper to evaluate the entire program. Among other things, the committee recommended that emerging nations, not faced with an immediate threat of external aggression, should be given predominantly economic aid. The committee noted that the United States should encourage the military in underdeveloped countries to use their resources for economic objectives. From this recommendation came a spurt of interest in civic action programs.


COMMUNICATION AND INSTITUTION BUILDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

By John H. Johns

Communication can provide the major link required for institution building in developing countries.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this essay is to develop concepts of institutions and institution building that can be used as a frame of reference for U.S. programs, U.S. Army activities, and potential Army contributions to the overall U.S. effort to assist host countries to build strong institutions capable both of effecting social change with a minimum of violence and of resisting subversion.

As used here, a nation is viewed as a social system consisting of a large

* Original essay by John H. Johns
number of small, close-knit groups (that is, micro-groups), which are connected and linked in a pyramidal fashion by larger, more complex groups (that is, macro-institutions), which are in turn integrated into the overall national system. The small, intimate groups are the basic means of social control within a society, while the larger macro-institutions serve as coordinators, regulators, integrators, communication systems, and linkages for these smaller groups.

In order to function as a viable system, a nation must have a certain amount of unity. Unity of action in a social group is brought about by mutual behavioral adjustments of the individual members of the group, so that the action of the group as a whole has a common aim. Concerted action is the result of the integration or coordination of individual actions, feelings, and purposes of the group members. The behavior of a social group often becomes so highly unified that one speaks of the "solidarity" of the group. The development of this unity is called "group integration." Social or group unity is called "group integration." Social or group unity does not imply that all members of the group act in the same way or have the same thoughts and feelings. On the contrary, differences of behavior and of thought and feeling, when they favor coordination or adjustment, are necessary for the integration of a group. The unity of the group results from integration of the adaptive feelings and purposes of the group members. They unite in order to achieve some collective purpose desired by most of the members of the group. Group unity is due to the pressure of environment, but even more due to adaptive ideas, feelings, and purposes. This is at the heart of institution building.

The need for a certain degree of social cohesion does not mean that social conflict is necessarily bad. On the contrary, sociologists have long recognized that some social conflict is desirable and serves a useful function. Societies tend to "ossify" or become rigid and unresponsive to the needs of the people when there is no conflict to stimulate change. Unless change occurs with time, a society will become outdated and disintegrate, as almost all societies have done throughout history.

Stability operations seek to manage conflict so that it remains constructive and is not permitted to destroy the entire social fabric by developing into anarchy or by overthrowing legitimate authority.* There is a delicate balance here that man has not yet been able to find. Stability operations, a form of conflict management, will succeed only if that delicate balance is found.

Nationbuilding involves the development of unity in both micro- and macro-institutions. This paper discusses some relevant factors that must be understood if the subsequent discussion about the Army's role in institution building is to be placed in the proper context. The primary focus is on micro-institutions at the grass-roots level.

* As used here, "legitimate authority" is defined operationally by the president, that is, it is a government he has chosen to support. The U.S. Army does not become involved in the business of determining legitimacy.
THE NATURE OF INSTITUTIONS

By "institutions" is meant here any enduring, complex, integrated, organized behavior pattern through which social control is exerted and by means of which fundamental societal desires or needs are met. In short, institutions may be viewed as patterns of interaction among people. This concept is in contrast to the popular view of an institution as an organization of a public, or semipublic character involving a directive body, and usually a building or physical establishment of some sort, designated to serve some socially recognized and authorized end, for example, colleges, orphanages, hospitals, and governmental agencies.

Institutions are an essential element of any joint human endeavor. Humanity has progressed because men have been able to work together to achieve goals that could not be attained by working alone. As societies have become more complex and technological changes have dictated more interdependence among people, it has become necessary for men to develop more complex social relationships. These complex relationships require better communication systems in order that diverse sectors of the society will understand how they fit into the overall system, appreciate the benefits of cooperative endeavors, and have mutual respect for the contributions of other groups in the nationbuilding process. Complexity also brings more conflict of interest and hence the need for increased methods of conflict management.

Institutions may be developed through natural, spontaneous human intercourse, since interaction to meet needs tends to develop certain uniformities over time, some of which tend to persist. The basic need of survival dictates that certain institutions come into being. The "natural" development of institutions in this manner is more likely to happen in the case of small institutions characterized by relatively tangible, short-range goals, for example, the family, clan, local groups. Even when small groups do develop "naturally," there is likely to be a great deal of trial-and-error and the process may be inefficient.

The development of larger institutions, for example, states, nations, and international institutions oriented toward long-range, sometimes intangible, goals, is likely to be less spontaneous. This type of institution is likely to result from deliberate planning, that is, social engineering.

There are several important processes involved in institutional development and maintenance that must be understood if appropriate programs are to be designed to influence these processes. Most of these processes are intangible and subtle.

INSTITUTIONAL PROCESSES

The terms "group" and "institution" are closely related and sometimes used interchangeably. Most social scientists make a distinction between the two but for present purposes the group may be considered a special case of an institution.

There are two types of groups of concern to the social engineer: the micro/"primary group" and the macro/"secondary group." The "primary
group” is a group characterized by close emotional involvement of the members, which gives it primacy in the socialization process. It was first discussed in 1909 by sociologist Charles H. Cooley, who described the primary group as an “intimate association,” as a “mutual identification for which ‘we’ is the natural expression.” Cooley’s insights were largely impressionistic and gained through subjective observation. In the last few decades social scientists, using more refined and rigorous scientific methods, have confirmed Cooley’s observations and have gained a better insight into the nature of these building blocks of society.

The primary group is of critical importance to the social engineer concerned with institution building and the principal concern of the military in its programs of institution building.

The nature of the primary group is to be contrasted with the secondary group. In the latter, relationships are more casual, impersonal, and segmental or fragmentary. In the intimate primary group there is little need for elaborate social structure because its members are bound by a personal loyalty which is stimulated by their common interests and frequent contact.

As the size of a group increases and its membership becomes dispersed in space and heterogeneous in values and goals, however, the regulative power of personal attitudes is considerably diluted. For its own preservation, the group develops means of facilitating indirect contacts and of controlling the behavior of its members through standard patterns, in the form of rules, laws, and official customs.

It is these latter groups which require more elaborate “linkage” functions. A great deal of the resources of the group must be allocated to the function of connecting the “building blocks” to maintain solidarity and unity of effort. This function is performed through communication systems and becomes more elaborate as the size and heterogeneity of the group increase.

The nation as social system can thus be described in brief as follows: a large number of interdependent primary groups with overlapping membership, linked together to form larger, secondary groups. The larger groups are in turn linked to even larger groups in the same manner and so on until a hierarchical structure of interdependent groups and institutions is integrated into a complex system with more or less common goals, values, and interests. The catalyst that holds the building blocks together is communication, which permits shared ideas, values, and similar world perspectives. Cooley had this to say about communications:

By communication is here meant that mechanism through which human relations exist and develop—all the symbols of mind, together with the means of conveying them through space and preserving them in time...All these taken together, in the intricacy of their actual combination, make up an organic whole corresponding to the organic whole of human thought; and everything in the way of mental growth has an external existence therein.

Unquestionably, the vast network of social systems ranging from the two-person collectivity to the nation-state numbering in the millions is dependent upon the persistence of communication; without it the life-line

65
of interaction would be lost and the systems would quickly collapse. The communication process, then, is the key to institution building. Mass media alone, however, do not offer a solution. It is through the interpersonal communication process in the primary group that people are integrated into the social system, obtain a sense of belonging and involvement in the society, and are committed to the goals of the society.

The emphasis on communication as the key to achieving social cohesion should not be interpreted to mean that satisfaction of the material needs of the people is less important. Social cohesion is a product of improvement in the social, economic, and psychological environment. These cannot be meaningfully separated.

The integration of the national system is achieved in part by macro-institutions which may be called "linkage institutions." These are institutions which act as a framework or process whereby one or more of the elements of at least two social institutions are linked in such a manner that they function as interdependent parts of the larger system. Some institutions, for example, regulatory agencies such as the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), exist solely for the linkage purpose, while others, for example, the military institutions, may provide a valuable linkage service as a secondary function. Another example of a linkage institution of a very abstract sort is the national event such as the Fourth of July celebration.

INSTITUTION BUILDING

Simply put, the task facing many of the developing nations is to establish strong building blocks (that is, primary groups) and link them into an overall national system capable of meeting the needs of the people. They can do this piecemeal and haphazardly, as many have tended to do in the past, or they can use the vast body of scientific knowledge available and do it in a systematic manner. The question—whether to be systematic and scientific or haphazard and intuitive—does not necessarily involve the ethical issues of authoritarianism, thought control, or the myriad of other alleged evils sometimes associated with the use of science to control social forces. The question is whether or not we want to use the knowledge we have. The following discussion summarizes some of the principles pertinent to the U.S. task of assisting developing countries to use knowledge to build viable institutions.

Building a viable nation involves a number of interdependent tasks that must be conducted concurrently. First of all, it involves the establishment of new institutions where none exist to meet needs, the strengthening or modification of existing institutions, and/or elimination of certain dysfunctional (from the standpoint of national unity) institutions.

Of utmost importance is the development of primary groups oriented toward the nation's core goals and values. This task is accomplished by (1) identifying the needs of the people at the grass-roots level, (2) ensuring that primary groups and institutions exist to meet these needs, and (3) integrating the people into these groups.
There are many problems associated with the integration of people into primary groups. Social patterns in traditional societies are extremely resistant to change no matter how dysfunctional they may seem to an outsider. This can be overcome somewhat by “change agents” who understand social processes and the particular culture of the people concerned. There is a great deal of knowledge available that social engineers can use to overcome this problem. Voluntary membership and participation in groups is a psychosocial phenomenon that is generally the same in all societies.

At the same time that strong primary groups are being developed, it is necessary to develop the larger institutions and link the primary groups thereto. This task involves not only the development of technical skills required for specific jobs, but more importantly, the development of common goals, values, and mutual respect and understanding among the diverse elements of the institution. Only when these latter conditions exist can an institution possess the cohesion, espirit de corps, and unity of effort needed to function effectively under the adverse conditions characteristic of the developing areas of the world.

NOTES
2 Ibid.

ROLE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS WITHIN THE MILITARY MISSION*
BY ALEXANDER R. ASKENASY

Psychological strategy is a major tool for realizing national goals; it requires total integration with all other activities—economic, diplomatic, and military—and, accordingly, a coordinated effort by all agencies.

It is ironic that, whereas psychologists have shown only limited interest in psychological operations, to non-psychologists the term has often evoked sinister associations with the mystique of psychology.

Psychological operations, narrowly defined in terms of leaflets and broadcasts, have often been considered a minor appendage to conventional military operations. Some writers have called in general terms for a larger role for psychological operations, but only rarely have we implemented such a role. My thesis is that in contemporary warfare, psychological operations must be integrated with other actions and that a social-psychological approach can be helpful in conceptually unifying all the diverse actions.

Clausewitz saw war as a means of changing the enemy's will or, we might say, as a form of psychological operations. As he defined it: “War is... an act of force to compel our adversary to do our will;... force... is thus the means; to impose our will upon the enemy is the object.”

stated the classical formulation of the military role: "War is mere continuation of policy by other means," and "... politics is the womb in which war is developed, in which its outlines lie hidden in a rudimentary state, like the qualities of living creatures in their embryos." Clarkwitz was thus precociously aware of the psychological aspects of war. The point of war is not to destroy the enemy physically but rather to make him act in harmony with our will and to change his will to the extent that he no longer opposes our national interest. If we can influence the enemy's head, we will not have to strike his arm.

Burckhardt in his History of the Renaissance in Italy tells of the condottieri who moved their armies like chess figures without any fighting taking place, until one commander, perceiving he would lose the battle, conceded defeat. This example is not as anachronistic as it may appear. When we think of opponents in conflict or war, we should visualize not robots hacking at each other, but human beings with constantly changing perceptions, expectations, and alternatives.

BROADENING VIEWS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Linebarger reports that "World War I saw psychological warfare transformed from an incidental to a major military instrument..." In his opinion, this country's psychological warfare consists in "the supplementing of normal military operations by the use of mass communications"... Its place is a modest one and its methods are limited by our usages, morality, and law.

The outstanding example of psychological operations in World War I was Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points which appealed, with some success, directly to the people of Germany and Austria-Hungary. During World War I, the term "propaganda" was widely employed. Later on, the term became increasingly discredited—partly by Goebbels' use of it. The United States Army substituted the term "psychological warfare," and made extensive use of this "weapon" in World War II.

At the onset of both World War II and the Korean conflicts, many psychological warfare lessons had to be relearned—a fact that points up the absence of a continuous military policy for psychological operations. In 1957, the Department of the Army replaced the term "psychological warfare" with "psychological operations," indicating a recognition that such operations do not require a formal state of war and that they are not directed solely against enemies.

Finletter argued that "Psychological warfare is a bad term because the word 'warfare' implies that deceit is justifiable if it serves our purpose, and that such a concept is neither consistent with our principles nor is it good business."

In contemporary practice, psychological operations have tended to be conducted primarily on two levels: (1) as propaganda in the traditional sense, conducted by traditional means (leaflets, broadcasts, and so forth), and (2) more recently in specific actions (medical programs, school con-
struction, read-building) explicitly directed toward the change of attitudes and behavior of foreign populations in a direction considered desirable. On both levels, psychological operations have been viewed as subsidiary to conventional military activities.

We encounter too the not uncommon view that psychological warfare is somewhat disreputable or indecent. However that may be, the Communists are waging warfare psychologically today in places like Vietnam. As Dyer puts it, "When one looks at Soviet political communication and compares it with our own, what stands out is the completeness with which the instrument has been integrated into all forms of Soviet activity. . . . If we are to reply merely with counterpropaganda, or even propaganda, in the sense that the term carries today, we are at a disadvantage from the start."

A continuing dissatisfaction with the definitions used in this area has been reflected in the changing terms from "propaganda" to "psychological warfare" to "psychological operations." Other terms have been proposed. One source lists no less than 18 such expressions. In England, the term "political warfare" came into use, meaning "combined operations of diplomacy and propaganda." Lasswell says, "Political warfare adds the important idea that all instruments of policy need to be properly correlated in the conduct of war."

In practice, journalists, public relations men, and advertising specialists have often been called on to conduct psychological operations. Working from trial and error, they have often done skillful, sometimes ingenious work, even though their experience has usually been in the domestic communications industry. One British World War II expert concluded that "many of the techniques employed by journalists and advertisers are not applicable to propaganda operations."

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN CONTEMPORARY WARFARE

In contemporary warfare, the role of psychological operations increased in importance. There are two reasons:

1. As Morgenthau has pointed out, aristocratic internationalism has in the last 200 years been replaced by nationalisms with competing ideological claims, and increasingly wider groups have become involved in government.

2. More recently, nuclear weapons have reduced the feasibility of full-scale wars to settle policy issues. It is becoming increasingly clear that psychological operations are less costly than combat. While formerly the psychological aspects were a small part of an essentially military struggle, now, especially in a cold war, military aspects have become a relatively minor part of an essentially psychological struggle.

The so-called little wars and the insurgencies in developing countries have been recognized as crises which cannot be fought by force of arms only but which pose major political, economic, and psychological problems. It has become essential to win the allegiance of the civilian
population, preferably before an insurgency starts. Mao Tse-Tung has said that the masses must first be convinced and aroused before they can be organized. Guerrilla action can come only later.

General Giap of the Viet Minh has similarly maintained that propaganda is more important than fighting.

The revolution of rising expectations in developing nations cannot be contained by police action. Any long-range solution must take into account a people's national, economic, and social aspirations. The French found this to be true in Algeria. As Colonel Frequeulin has noted, the French Army started out to control the terrain and only later became concerned with the aspirations of the population.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF MILITARY OPERATIONS**

General Wheeler has pointed out that the Army's mission is to conduct combat operations on land which are well understood by ourselves, by our friends, and by our enemies. He further stressed the need for credibility and visibility of Army powers.

It may be argued that the military commander very often is not aware of the psychological implications of his conventional military operations. Yet all military actions can have psychological effects on perception and behavior whether or not the commander intended such effects. Indeed, such unintentional aspects of military operations may have a greater influence on the will to resist than do calculated schemes. Military, political, economic, and psychological actions may, then, be viewed as communications, as processes through which intentions are more or less conveyed. Psychological operations should be seen as a coordinated approach to influence the opponent's way of thinking and acting.

One shortcoming of psychological operations in developing countries is that communication is addressed primarily to the well-to-do upper or middle classes which represent the status quo, while far less attention is given to the majority of the population. As Osanka said, "the ruling powers (in underdeveloped countries) seldom view the peasants as an important or powerful political threat. Insurgents, and particularly Communist insurgents, take the opposite view." In the long run, it seems difficult to maintain the allegiance of a developing nation by relying only on the upper classes. Smith argues that, over time, the middle and upper classes have to work within the limits of the value constellation of the villagers whom they "govern," or be ousted.

What we need, then, is a clearer picture of the persons with whom we are communicating, the persons who play important roles in modern war and insurgency. They include not only the statesmen and military officers but also the common soldiers and the peasants, the students, and the frustrated intellectuals to whom the Communists seek to appeal.

**Changing Perceptions**

Cantril developed a theory which brings together perceptual research and the individual's relations to society and social movements. He holds that we must deal not only with the "objective" world surrounding a
person but also with his perceptual world—the world as he sees it. People have lived for centuries with poverty and accepted it as unchangeable; then, suddenly, they find it intolerable and act to change it. We must concern ourselves with what has brought about this change in a people's aspirations.

A man's perceptions have developed in a given cultural and social setting. It is the task of the commander and the planner to restructure not only the "real" situation of an opponent but also the situation as the opponent perceives it. This is done not only by propaganda leaflets but also by a wide range of other means. The military commander through actions at his disposal can change not only the opponent's will to fight but also his perceptions of us and our intentions. The commander should ask himself: What do the men opposing us expect us to do? What would they like to see us do?

All too often there is a tendency to project the standards and assumptions of our own nation into the minds of people of other nations. One example of this projection is concerned with so-called "legitimacy." A nation may communicate sympathy and support to another nation for its "legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace." In effect, such a nation sets itself up as a judge of right and wrong, forgetting the views of the people concerned, many of whom may oppose their established government and may even use illegitimate means because they feel their legitimate aspirations will not be fulfilled under the status quo. Too, the concept of treason is a relative one, as Boveri pointed out in her work, *Treason in the Twentieth Century*. A person may feel that in being loyal to the regime, he in effect betrays his nation or social group. Bauer, in an article on influence processes and resistance to communication, found need for two levels of analysis, one to account for "the intentions of the regime" and the other to explain the "intentions of the citizen."

In developing countries, where rapid technological change occurs while traditional customs persist, there is need for perceptual restructuring, for a new "definition of the situation." Communism tries to provide a ready-made doctrine which seems to explain all the disturbing changes. Communism tries to offer a common language as an aid to effective communication, to provide categories of thought, and to spread belief in the ultimate triumph of Communism as a historical necessity—a new version of "God's will."

The military commander must be concerned with what he communicates to the enemy leader. What should the enemy know? What should he not know? What impression should he get? As the enemy leader will base his plans and operations in part on his perception of our strength and of his own, what can we do to change this perception in a way favorable to us?

Perceiving the Enemy

In war, there has been traditionally a clear dichotomy between friend and foe, between the "goodies" and "baddies." Gray distinguished four
“images of the enemy”: first, as a professional colleague—a comrade in arms; second, as subhuman; third, as devil and enemy of God and the good; fourth, as essentially decent but misguided. Osgood has repeatedly questioned the implicit assumptions we make about our own motivations and about those of the enemy.

In a world war, it is relatively easy to create in a few years simple, endlessly repeated stereotypes. When we are trying to win over enemy soldiers or even leaders, however, it will not help to tell them that they are criminals. In guerrilla warfare, the identification of the enemy becomes increasingly difficult, and the problem of communicating with him the more complex. Who is the enemy in an insurgency in a developing nation—the guerrilla fighter, his military leader, his political leader, a foreign power, hunger, or social crisis? Our military have shown a growing awareness of this complexity by their increasing emphasis on civic actions either combined with regular military operations or as preventive measures.

In the long run, if we want to win people who are now in opposition to our national interests, neither conventional military nor narrow psychological operations will do the trick. To find a modus vivendi, we must identify “the common purposes, the common interests, the common values of the free world.” Smith suggested that the United States gradually redefine political freedom, economic security, and individual dignity in ways both we and non-industrial nations can agree on. Much of what was said about perceptions and expectations holds not only for foreigners but also for ourselves. Nor can one see communication as a one-way street for influence. Bauer advocated a “transactional model of communication, in which there is an exchange of values between two or more parties.”

Alternatives Open to the Adversary

What alternatives does the soldier or guerrilla perceive as open to him? What value priorities does he attach to these alternatives? Should he resist? What else can he do? These questions are closely related to his will to fight. Most guerrillas fight not for the sake of fighting but because they expect to reach certain goals which they feel cannot be reached by other means. Decision and game theories have not been too helpful in accounting for these processes. Values are subjective and choices are often made on emotional grounds. Nonetheless, it may be useful to think in terms of alternatives and of the probabilities and utility values attached to them.

Lerner in The Passing of Traditional Society concluded that mass media create the psychological capacity to imagine alternative ways of life and to perceive oneself in new situations and strange roles. Psychological operations in both the narrow and the broad sense can create and change alternatives. Consider some historical cases—over-simplified, of course. President Wilson’s Fourteen Points were widely accepted by people of the Central Powers as an attractive alternative to continued fighting in World War I. In World War II, the Allied insistence on unconditional
surrender is said to have stiffened German resistance. In the Philippines, Magsaysay offered amnesty and free land to Huk guerrillas who surrendered, giving them a most desirable alternative to fighting. In Malaya, the British made surrender more appealing by using such terms for it as “leaving the jungle” or “self-renewal.”

...In the broad sense, psychological operations should aim at changing the opponent's perceptions so that resistance no longer appears to serve his interests. From his point of view, he acts in his own interest, which others are resisting. Psychological operations, rather than destroying the enemy, can aim at converting him to see things differently. They can persuade him that it is in his long-range interest to work with us toward a future that satisfies his hopes and expectations. Thus, a common denominator must be found which takes into account the interests of both sides. If there is a one-sided preponderance of military or other power, the formula may neglect the interests of the other side. Such an equilibrium is likely to be short-lived. As soon as the weaker side gains strength—or perceives itself as having gained strength—it is likely to challenge the status quo. Therefore, long-range stability tends to require the acknowledgement of national interests as perceived by both nations involved.

COORDINATION OF MILITARY AND CIVIC ACTIVITIES

Just as the U. S. Army has shown its flexibility in developing new units, training methods, and doctrine for unconventional warfare, so it can adapt to the demands for extended psychological operations in contemporary warfare and insurgencies. The military commander in the field should be able to coordinate psychological and standard military operations, to plan and recommend military activities not only in terms of immediate military results, but also for psychological effect, both immediate and long-range. Magsaysay in the Philippines gave an impressive example of efficiently integrated military and psychological operations.

Although coordination of operations by the Army and other government agencies for psychological effectiveness has long been practiced, some specialists hold that such coordination has at times been incompletely achieved. Crossman for one has warned that “...psychological warfare may do more harm than good unless it is strictly coordinated with diplomatic and military activity.”

For efficient psychological operations, the military—and, for that matter, the political—decision makers must see their actions as a united whole. Even though different activities have been assigned to different government agencies, it would be dangerous to assume that the psychological processes involved fall into corresponding separate slots rather than being unitary and continuous. The Communists have been quite aware of this danger and have acted accordingly. We would neglect this unit at our own risk.

In order to conduct and maintain effective military and psychological operations, personnel must be sensitized to the psychological implications
of potential actions. Some such sensitizing training should be given not only to explicitly labeled psychological operations officers but also to commanders who make important decisions and to troops who are in contact with foreign populations.

NOTES

2 Ibid., p. 16.
4 Ibid., p. 40.
5 Ibid., p. 43.
7 In Korea, for example, the United Nations psychological warfare agencies dropped 14 million leaflets in one week, in contrast to 9 million distributed by American troops during all of World War I.
26 Ibid., p. 324.
25. Smith, "Communication Research."

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Draper Report. See U.S. President's Commission to Study the Military Assistance Program.


CHAPTER III
NATIONAL POLICY AND PSYOP

Who is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy? Who can claim credit—or should blame—for policies relating to PSYOP? How is policy formulated? How are competing policy recommendations forged into a single, coherent foreign policy for effective psychological operations? What are the interrelationships of the various departments and agencies, in the Washington PSYOP community and overseas—in policy formulation and in policy implementation (day-to-day operations)? Are there procedural conditions that policy should meet in order to facilitate implementation? What are the most important limitations on policy planning that public pressures create? These are some of the recurrent issues into which this chapter inquires.

The essays that follow seek to explain historical and contemporary aspects of the national policy process in PSYOP. From these essays, certain propositions regarding the framework within which national PSYOP policy is formulated, administered, and implemented emerge. The authors suggest that PSYOP can truly support national objectives only if it receives firm encouragement at the highest levels of government; the superordinate PSYOP apparatus must be specialized and linked in a direct relationship to the key national policymaking machinery if the psychological dimension is to be fully considered in international policy decisions; the PSYOP planning apparatus must wield firm power over all implementing agencies and departments if the information effort, long term as well as short term, is to be fully controlled and coordinated; and PSYOP planners as well as other policymaking leaders in a democracy must consider the role of the panoply of information media and the relationships between domestic attitudes and international policy.

NATIONAL POLICY AND PSYOP: THE FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY

Although the United States has undertaken psychological initiatives in foreign and military policy since the beginnings of the Republic, systematic planning for PSYOP policy was largely neglected until World War II. Since World War II, how—and even whether—the procedures and mechanisms required for overall PSYOP planning can be accommodated with the national policy framework have been debated. Nevertheless, it is clear that U.S. departments and agencies, as well as the U.S. Congress, are now more acutely aware of the psychological factor in national security planning than in the past, and this is reflected in the attention that psychological considerations have received beginning in the 1960s to the present time.

Much has been written about the national policy structure. In contrast, few writers have explored the national structure in the context of the framing of policy and doctrine for PSYOP. As in any dynamic system, full
comprehension of the framework involves the consideration of interac-
tions:
1. the formal organization for policy formulation and administration
2. the informal relationships between agencies and individuals that
determine how policy will be implemented
3. the structure of relations between institutions, and
4. the public environment which influences policy formation and articu-
lation.

The central forum for interagency coordination in the early 1970s was
the National Security Council (NSC). How adequately the NSC system
could and did execute its functions within the existing framework, how-
ever, remained a matter of current debate. Some asserted that informa-
tion agencies still did not interact in a fashion to insure a coordinated
communication effort.

Whatever the circumstances, even the most elaborate organizations
will not arrest the development of informal relationships, for they, too,
fill important needs. And these needs must likewise be considered within
the framework.

Any explanation of the development of informal processes must take
into account the general institutional slowness in adapting to new cir-
cumstances and in recognizing and utilizing special competence in unfore-
seen situations. Another part of the explanation involves consideration of
the power relations between departments and agencies as well as within
them. If used wisely, informal processes can lead to a more flexible
program; if used excessively, they can lead to a splintered, fragmented
communication effort.

**PSYOP IN PERSPECTIVE**

BY WILLIAM E. DAUGHERTY

The international information program of the United States requires a specialized
organization for both long-term and short-term objectives. This article provides an
historical evaluation of U.S. PSYOP.

BACKGROUND

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) as defined in recent doctrine is not
new, either to the armies of history or within the U.S. civilian or military
establishment. It has been well documented that leaders of all ages have
employed, often on a hit-and-miss basis, techniques which we describe as
PSYOP. To paraphrase a senior American Army colonel long experienced
in the employment of PSYOP, "In the past successful leaders have always
used it—albeit such actions were most often done by charismatic per-
sonalities or their inspired and viscerally attuned lieutenants who recognized
opportunities by some indefinable quality that they seldom under-
stood and rarely could explain to others. In the past the situations of
conflict were normally more clearly defined. The enemy was most fre-
quently identifiable. The slower reaction times that were allowed permit-

*Original essay by William E. Daugherty.
ted a higher degree of centralization of political/psychological tactics.” However, the situations and environments that U.S. strategic forces—civilian as well as military—have faced in the recent past are believed to be vastly different from those encountered earlier in our history. Yet, we do not know very accurately the scope and nature of the differences as they relate to PSYOP—when, where and how to employ it.

It has only been within the past two decades that the executive branch of the U.S. government and the military services have structured a PSYOP-international information effort on anything other than short-range plans and *ad hoc* improvisations. Although psychological warfare (PSYWAR), as it was called in World War II, was widely used, it was neither well understood nor universally accepted among the nation’s top civilian and military leaders. At the end of World War II there were no widespread demands for a written history of how it was employed, or what successes or failures could be attributed to its use. The several civilian information agencies active overseas during the war were greatly reduced in size in 1945 and merged into a small interim branch of the State Department. This activity, then labeled as international information, was not given statutory authority until 1948, and even then it was provided only limited personnel resources and a begrudging acceptance by the parent agency, the Department of State. The USIA, the civilian agency created especially to conduct the nation’s strategic international information programs, was not established until 1953.

Since it was established as an independent agency in 1953, the USIA has had a relatively uneven but steady growth and expansion as may be judged by the size of its personnel roster today, the nature and range of its activities, and the power that has been given to it on at least two occasions within the past decade to coordinate the joint civilian agency, military services PSYOP, and international information programs in overseas areas.

Within the military services, the development of a PSYOP capability since the end of World War II has been spectacular. Yet, this growth has not been consistent throughout the services. It is doubtful whether anyone has a very clear picture what the overall national capability is or how the PSYOP capability of any one of the several services can seriously affect the other services or missions of the nation.

**PSYWAR FOLLOWING WORLD WAR II**

At the end of World War II only the Navy of all the military services made an immediate attempt to assess the lessons it had learned from its employment of what was then called PSYWAR. The Army did not get around to a comparable effort until over five years later, when a contract research agency was asked to undertake aspects of this task. Of the several American civilian agencies that were engaged in the dissemination of the American story overseas during the war, only that agency headed by Nelson Rockefeller, The Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, ever succeeded in bringing out a history of the lessons
learned in disseminating information overseas. The Office of War Informa-
tion, the Coordinator of Information, the Office of Strategic Services,
the U.S. Army—none of these operations ever produced a history of
comparable scope. There were a few privately sponsored studies dealing
with specific aspects of PSYOP or foreign information activity but these
were limited in their coverage. Daniel Lerner's *Sykevar: Psychological
Warfare Against Germany D-Day to VE-Day* (1949), and Charles A. H.
Thomson's *Overseas Information Service of the U.S. Government* (1948)
were perhaps the most important of the earlier detailed accounts, along
with William E. Daugherty, “Psychological Warfare in American His-
tory,” *A Psychological Warfare Casebook*, ed. William E. Daugherty
and Morris Janowitz (Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1958),
pp. 59–118 and Paul M. A. Linebarger's *Psychological Warfare* (1948),
which was somewhat more general in character.

At the end of World War II all PSYWAR personnel in the military
services—staff officers as well as unit personnel—were either retired to
an inactive status in the nation's strategic reserve, or, if they remained on
active duty in the armed services, they were assigned to other military
responsibilities. When the U.S. military forces were ordered into Korea in
the summer of 1950 by President Truman, the Army at that time had no
existing plans, no accepted doctrine, nor even trained units to provide
U.S. troops PSYWAR support.

**PSYWAR AND KOREA**

To meet the challenges of the moment in Korea it was necessary for
personnel assigned occupation duties in Japan to improvise PSYWAR on a
day-to-day basis. Those individuals who were placed in charge of the
activity in the Far East Command (FEC) in Tokyo had very little prece-
dent to guide them. They received few directives from higher headquar-
ters and they possessed what is now believed to have been an all-too-
limited vision of how and for what purposes PSYOP might be effectively
employed. For the first seven months of the conflict, the FEC PSYOP
effort in Korea itself was confined largely to one man, a lieutenant colonel
operating in a liaison capacity for the FEC at Eighth Army Headquarters
(EUSAK). No operational PSYOP personnel were assigned anywhere
within the EUSAK until late January 1951, seven months after the war
began.

**EMERGENCE OF PSYWAR OFFICE**

At Army headquarters in Washington and throughout CONUS, de-
velopments were likewise late. Indeed, not until the end of the first year
of the Korean conflict did the Army, for the first time in its history,
create a special staff agency, the Office of the Chief of Psychological
Warfare (OCPW), to plan, supervise, and guide the development of
doctrine, organization, and training facilities in this heretofore unstruc-
tured ad hoc field of activity. The predecessors to the present-day Army
PSYOP units—companies, battalions, and groups—were first established
in 1951 and were created in response to crash planning. The present d:
JFK Center for Military Assistance, with its subordinate schools, can trace its beginning back to 1951 when a military PSYWAR course was first structured and given under the auspices of the Army General School, at Fort Riley, Kansas. In 1952, there was created at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, a PSYWAR Center, a PSYWAR School, and a PSYWAR Board, to train and equip personnel and to study Army needs and crystallize PSYWAR doctrine. To this center the personnel of the PSYWAR Department at the Army General School, Fort Riley, Kansas, were transferred in 1952.

During the 1950s a number of significant changes affecting PSYWAR took place both at Army headquarters in Washington and at Fort Bragg. In the course of time, other activities and functions were assigned to the OCPW. These included: first, the activities of special forces personnel and later, other cold war functions and activities variously described as unconventional warfare, special warfare, and counterinsurgency planning and operations. As additional functions and duties were transferred to the OCPW, there came an urge to label both the function and the offices responsible for their supervision by new names. Thus, in time, the term “Special Warfare” replaced the term “Psychological Warfare” in the title of the special staff section responsible for that function on the Army staff.

At Fort Bragg, in time, the PSYWAR Center and School became the Special Warfare Center and School. As a consequence of such Army thinking, the center broadened its mission to provide for the training of Special Forces personnel and units.

In the last years of the 1950s the term PSYOP came into American Army parlance, not to replace the term PSYWAR, but rather to provide Americans with a broader term that would more accurately characterize the changing concepts that Army personnel were gradually accepting. In the first years of the 1960s further changes were made at the Army headquarters and at the center at Fort Bragg.

FUNCTIONAL CHANGES OF PSYWAR BETWEEN WORLD WAR II AND VIETNAM

In World War II, in most Army commands and military theaters, PSYWAR was viewed as a specialized activity of military intelligence. The major exception to this was in General Eisenhower’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAPE) command. During the first seven months of Korean conflict, PSYWAR in the FEC Headquarters and within EUSA was administered by intelligence personnel. In the eighth month of that conflict the responsibility in EUSA was transferred from G-2 to G-3. The following June, a year after the American initial involvement in Korea, PSYWAR was divorced from G-2 and made a special staff section at FEC Headquarters, Tokyo.

In 1951, the establishment of OCPW at Army headquarters in Washington as a special staff section suggests that the activity encompassed by the term “PSYWAR” was viewed at that time as a special or subsidiary type of activity, not as an element of operational strategy.
However, as U.S. Army personnel gained more experience in PSYWAR and gave more thought to its use, the activity came to be viewed more and more as a G-3 function, not as a separate or subsidiary exercise of G-2.

To insure that PSYOP plans and operations were integrated more completely into overall military planning and operations, the functions of the Office of the Chief of Special Warfare (OCSW), as OCPW in time came to be called, were transferred approximately a decade ago to the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS). During most of the 1960s these functions were supervised by a director of either Special Warfare, or Special Operations as a part of ODCSOPS. As additional experience in its use was accumulated, and more and more officers came to view PSYOP as a specialized field of military operations, the responsibility for the supervision of PSYOP functions, on behalf of DCSOPS, was transferred from the chief of a directorate—to the chief of a component division of a directorate. Thus from 1967 on, ODCSOPS PSYOP functions were administered by the chief of the PSYOP Division in the International and Civil Affairs Directorate.

As a result of experience gained in South Vietnam, reports submitted by two ad hoc study groups in 1966 and 1967 and a recommendation of an Army board, established in 1966 to study Army training requirements (the Haines Board), PSYOP came to be viewed more and more in the context of a cluster of related activities that required personnel with similar specialized training, not heretofore provided in any depth, in formal courses of instruction in the Army school system. These evolving views with respect to PSYOP are reflected in a number of significant changes made between 1965 and 1969 in Army doctrine and organization at Army headquarters in Washington, at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and overseas in such operations at the military involvement in the Dominican Republic crisis and the escalation of operations in South Vietnam.

DEVELOPMENT OF CURRENT PSYOP ORGANIZATION

In the middle years of the 1960s, courses of instruction were established at Fort Bragg to provide training in such PSYOP-related functions as military assistance; counterinsurgency, later described as stability operations; and in techniques applicable to military advisory personnel assigned to work with host country counterparts. Overseas, in both South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, by presidential order, the supervision of joint international information-PSYOP activities were placed under the guidance of a senior officer of the United States Information Agency. Military PSYOP units and civilian personnel of the USIA were required to learn in an ad hoc-type of situation and organization how to work together in a common PSYOP-information program effort. In the course of time many of the hastily improvised arrangements became standard operating procedure not because they worked effectively, but because they provided the least friction. Thus, two different types of
agencies—one military, the other civilian—with disparate missions, organizational concepts, and operational facilities, forged through trial-and-error processes of learning through doing, have fashioned the PSYOP organization and arrangements that exist in South Vietnam today.

Recent changes and long term trends in American PSYOP doctrine and policy show clearly the growing breadth of the concept of psychological operations. In conjunction with those changes there has arisen a need for new organizational and management techniques to bring policy planning and implementation into line with the broader conceptual schema.

THE NATIONAL PSYOP COMMUNITY

BY THE EDITORS

A description of the current structure of the national security system as it relates to PSYOP in which a general trend toward a greater understanding and appreciation of PSYOP is noted.

INTRODUCTION

An increasing importance is being attached to the employment of psychological operations, or PSYOP, in the support of national policy abroad. In fact, the Department of Defense has defined national strategy as “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” This commentary, prepared by the editors, describes the framework of PSYOP at the national level as it exists as an element of U.S. national strategy in the current international environment of cooperation and conflict.

As a result of the separation of powers provided for in the Constitution of the United States, the formulation and administration of national security policy are responsibilities of the executive branch of the U.S. Government, and, ultimately, of the president. Each executive agency and department tends to define its mission and functions broadly in order to utilize all available resources and exercise control over as many variables as possible in supporting the achievement of departmental objectives. Thus, a major consideration for the president is the rationalization of decisionmaking—the organization and allocation of responsibilities among agencies to reduce overlaps and gaps and to systematize inter-agency coordination where it is necessary.

Although the structure of the national PSYOP community—as it is now constituted in the early 1970s—is largely an ad hoc one representing departments and agencies as their interests are affected, the constituent parts of the community may be divided into two groups—those with principal and continuing roles in PSYOP, and those with important, but occasional interests. The second group will not be discussed here, although those departments may have key roles in the decisionmaking on specific issues. The agencies and departments with continuing interest in PSYOP constitute the major part of the PSYOP framework at the national level and include the National Security Council and its supporting
structure, the Department of State, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)*, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Department of Defense (DOD).

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Established by the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended), the National Security Council (NSC) advises the president with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The president has designated the NSC as the principal forum for the consideration of national security policy issues requiring a presidential decision.2

Although the council itself is composed of the president, the vice president, the secretaries of state and defense, and the director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness (OEP), the NSC proper is in reality the highest level of a much larger decision-making system that operates at the direction of the council (and therefore of the president). The NSC staff, including the Office of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the secretariat, an operations staff, a planning group, and a program analysis staff, is supervised by a civilian executive secretary appointed by the president. Major organizational components of the NSC system are the Senior Review Group, the Under Secretaries Committee, NSC Interdepartmental Groups (IG) (and their subordinate working groups), the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), the Defense Program Review Committee, the Verification Panel, the NSC Intelligence Committee, and various other ad hoc committees appointed by the president to deal with specific problems.3

Other NSC members may propose the inclusion of items on the agenda, but the assistant to the president for national security affairs, at the president’s direction, and in consultation with the state and defense secretaries, has the primary responsibility for determining the NSC agenda and for supervising the preparation of the necessary papers.

When in January 1969, at the direction of the president, the NSC system was substantially reorganized along the lines described in this essay, two new memoranda series were established—the National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM) to report presidential decisions and the National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM) to direct the undertaking of studies for the NSC system.4

The NSC Senior Review Group examines papers coming out of the NSC groups and committees or from the departments prior to their submission to the NSC. Chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs, the review group includes representatives of the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

* Most overseas activities of the USIA, however, are conducted by overseas posts known collectively as the U.S. Information Service (USIS). (See section on USIA Overseas Operations.)
(JCS), and other agencies at the discretion of the chairman. It reviews the papers submitted to insure that: (1) the issue under consideration is worthy of NSC attention, (2) all realistic alternatives are presented, and (3) the facts (including the cost implications and views of all departments and agencies concerned) are fairly and adequately set forth. Action may then be assigned by the NSC Senior Review Group to the NSC Interdepartmental Groups, to the NSC ad hoc groups or committees, or to the Under Secretaries Committee.5

The NSC Under Secretaries Committee is a deliberative body in which issues are usually presented in a formal way. Chaired by the under secretary of state, assisted by the undersecretary for political affairs who acts as his alternate, the Under Secretaries Committee consists of the deputy secretary of defense, the assistant to the president for national security affairs, the director of the CIA, the chairman of the JCS, and, depending on the issues under consideration, and at the discretion of the chairman, ranking officers of other agencies. The NSC Under Secretaries Committee considers:
- issues referred to it by the NSC Senior Review Group;
- operational matters pertaining to interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas:
  — on which NSC Interdepartmental Groups have been unable to reach an agreement and which are of a broader nature than is suitable for any such group;
  — which do not require consideration at the NSC or presidential level, and which are refered to it by secretary of state; and
  — other operational matters referred to it jointly by the under secretary of state and the assistant to the president for national security affairs.6 In effect the Under Secretaries committee was intended to be the group that receives the truly significant problems from all the intermediate bodies and also an implementing body to carry out many presidential directives. However, the committee has lapsed in importance in large measure.7

The Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) are the basic elements of the NSC system. Organized on a geographical and functional basis and chaired by the appropriate assistant secretary of state, IGs include in their membership the appropriate assistant secretary of state, representatives of the assistant to the president for national security affairs, of the office of the secretary of defense, of the CIA, and of the JCS, as well as of other agencies at the discretion of the chairman. IG responsibilities include:
- discussion of and decision on interdepartmental issues that can be settled at the assistant secretary level, including those arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions;
- preparation of policy papers for consideration by the NSC; and
- preparation of contingency papers on potential crisis areas for NSC review.8
The Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) is chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs and includes as members the under secretary of state, deputy secretary of defense, the JCS chairman, the CIA director, director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA), Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) chairman, science advisor to the president, and chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). In its role as arbiter for the allocation of resources, the DPRC reviews and considers those major defense policy and program issues that have diplomatic, economic, political, and strategic implications in relation to overall priorities for the goals and use of national resources.

The Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG), another high-level group within the NSC system, endeavors to remain current on possible crises and to develop options for various stages of an international problem. It is essentially the White House operations center for crises. The WSAG, usually a small committee, is chaired by the assistant to the president for national security affairs and includes the deputy secretary of defense or assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs (ISA), director of the CIA, chairman of the JCS, and the under secretary of state. However, membership expands as circumstances require. WSAG is responsible also for anticipating future crises, for reviewing contingency plans prepared by the IGs, and for developing options for NSC consideration.

Also included in the NSC system are the Intelligence Committee, the Vietnam Special Studies Working Group, the Verification Panel (a policy and study group for arms control), and numerous other subgroups and ad hoc bodies.

In brief, almost all major issues of national security are now processed through the NSC mechanism. For example, the president, his assistant for national security affairs, the NSC staff, or an interested department or agency might raise a question or problem pertaining to U.S. PSYOP. The matter would be routed to the presidential assistant and the NSC staff to be formalized in a NSSM directing that a study of the matter be undertaken. Copies of the NSSM would be sent both to the NSC staff, which generates its own data and arguments, and to the departments or agencies involved. In turn, the NSSM would be assigned for action to and considered by, an appropriate NSC interdepartmental group or an ad hoc committee. In all likelihood, in this case it would be sent to an ad hoc PSYOP committee. The committee would then produce a "basic paper" that would go to the NSC Senior Review Group for finishing touches before being presented to the NSC by the assistant to the president. The president would personally make the decision in accordance with his constitutional responsibilities. The decision finally would be transmitted in writing in a NSDM, and the NSC Under Secretaries Committee would begin overseeing its implementation.
Although the president has the overall responsibility for the foreign policy of the United States, the secretary of state is his principal foreign policy advisor and has responsibility for the execution of foreign policy in accordance with approved policy. The secretary of state also has full authority and responsibility for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities of the U.S. Government overseas. This authority includes the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance and military assistance and sales programs as provided in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (as amended). The authority does not extend to:

- The activities of U.S. military forces operating in the field where such forces are under command of a U.S. area military commander,
- such other military activities as the president elects to conduct through military channels, or
- activities that are internal to the execution and administration of the approved programs of a single department or agency and that will not significantly affect the overall U.S. program in a foreign country or region.

The State Department also has previously established responsibilities, by virtue of law or executive order, with respect to such matters as: information activities, international educational and cultural affairs, foreign assistance, food for peace, arms control and disarmament, supervision of programs authorized by the Peace Corps Act, social science research, and immigration and refugee assistance.

In providing overall foreign policy guidance, the State Department also coordinates and supervises U.S. resources in the conduct of propaganda and political warfare. The U.S. Information Agency, as will be noted later, conducts overt mass communications and provides policy guidance on the conduct of PSYOP in accordance with the basic foreign policy guidance it receives from the State Department.

The secretary of state is also in charge of the day-to-day operations of the department, including the Foreign Service. A member of the cabinet and of the NSC, he uses the system of NSC Interdepartmental Groups and the Under Secretaries Committee in the implementation of his responsibilities for foreign policy and U.S. activities overseas. Within the purview of these responsibilities the secretary of state delegates executive authority to the chairmen of these committees.

The under secretary of state is the secretary’s full deputy and serves as acting secretary in his absence. As the principal advisor to the secretary, he (1) assists in formulating U.S. foreign policy and in providing overall direction to all the elements of the State Department, (2) participates in the NSC meetings, (3) serves as the chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, and (4) oversees the department’s participation in the NSC system. Assisting the secretary and the under secretary are the
under secretary for political affairs, the deputy secretaries for political affairs and for economic affairs, and the ambassadors at large. 

To improve the effectiveness of the department in supporting the role of the secretary of state as the president's principal foreign affairs advisor and as a NSC member and to strengthen the policy planning and coordination responsibilities of the senior levels of the department, a Planning and Coordination Staff responsible to the secretary was established in 1969. The staff furnishes policy support to the secretary and his principal associates, the Under Secretaries Committee, and other elements of the NSC system, including the NSC Senior Review Group and the IGs. It also performs the function of the former Policy Planning Council and relates long-range policy to current operations.

To provide improved management and policy guidance to the department in politico-military affairs, the department elevated its Office of Politico-Military Affairs to the status of a bureau in September 1969. The bureau is responsible for liaison with the Department of Defense (DOD) in the coordination of foreign and defense policies, as well as for support of senior State Department officers in relationships with the secretary of defense and the JCS.

Five assistant secretaries direct the activities of the geographic bureaus. For the countries within his geographical area, each assistant secretary has the primary responsibility to keep the secretary of state informed of important developments, to advise the secretary in the formulation of U.S. policies, to guide the operations of the U.S. diplomatic establishments, and to direct, coordinate, and supervise interdepartmental and interagency matters.

The regional assistant secretaries also serve as the chairmen of IGs in the NSC system, as previously outlined. These groups discuss and decide issues that can be settled at the assistant secretary level, including those arising out of the implementation of NSC decisions. They prepare policy papers for consideration by the council and contingency papers on potential crisis areas for NSC review.

Each assistant secretary is aided by country directors within his bureau who are responsible for the overall guidance and interdepartmental coordination with respect to their assigned countries. Country directors are the single focal point in Washington serving the needs of the U.S. ambassadors. They work closely with "country teams" in U.S. missions abroad to ensure that all elements of a mission in a given country jointly pursue U.S. foreign policy directives.

Within the department, at Washington level, no one specific office, bureau, or agency has a central responsibility for day-to-day PSYOP. PSYOP matters are handled between the regional or country directors or desk officers and the various embassies.

**Department of State Overseas Operations**

As representatives of the president and acting on his behalf, the chiefs of diplomatic missions in foreign countries exercise a positive authority for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government...
activities in their respective countries. In a letter to ambassadors in December 1969 concerning their responsibilities, the president reemphasized their roles as his personal representatives abroad and directed them to coordinate the work of all elements of the U.S. diplomatic missions. He said he expected that they would use this mandate not only to provide firm policy leadership but also to assure positive direction of all U.S. activities overseas. 

THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA)

USIA was established as one of the independent agencies of the executive branch of the government by the President's Reorganization Plan No. 8, as approved by Congress, on August 1, 1953. The U.S. Congress has taken a very active and decisive interest in the agency's activities from its inception and, in effect, has barred it from any domestic propagandizing.

In short, the role of the agency is to support the foreign policy of the United States by explaining it to the people in other countries; to build overseas understanding of U.S. institutions and culture; and to advise the U.S. Government on public opinion abroad and its implications for U.S. policy. The manner in which the USIA performs these functions has been the subject of continuing debate over the years.

The Washington Level of USIA

The agency receives guidance on U.S. policy from the president and the secretary of state. The director of USIA, appointed by the president with the advice and consent of the U.S. Senate, is responsible directly to the president.

Some of the past directors of the agency have participated directly in NSC meetings; others have only had seats in the background. Currently, although the director is not a member of the NSC, he does participate in the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, and the agency also is represented in the NSC Review Group and the regular staff meeting of the secretary of state.

USIA output must accurately reflect and persuasively support national policy. In this the director receives support from both the deputy director and the Office of Policy and Plans (IOP). IOP is also responsible for providing the director advice on the implications of foreign opinion for U.S. foreign policy.

This office also formulates basic information policies for the agency and assures that they are reflected in the agency's output. It prepares guidance on information policy for operating elements of the agency, based on briefings and background information received through liaison with the White House, the departments of state and defense, and other government agencies and private organizations. It issues guidelines for the preparation of planning documents by USIA elements and by overseas posts and reviews the plans to assure that overseas operations are consistent with established policy objectives and that resources are allocated in accordance with agency priorities.
Systematic evaluation of agency operations to insure that they serve program objectives with maximum efficiency is the responsibility of the Office of Research and Assessment (IOR). It provides the agency with a single element responsible for the assessment of products and operations, and it supervises and coordinates the work of the research service, the inspection and audit staff, the evaluation and analysis staff, the agency library, and the historian. Through sample surveys and other methods of empirical research, the research service provides information on foreign opinion relevant to U.S. foreign policy and to the agency's mandate; describes the channels of communication most likely to reach influential audiences abroad; and assesses the reach and impact of specific USIS programs (See section on USIA Overseas Operations for explanation of USIA-USIS relationship.) It keeps abreast of foreign press reactions to U.S. actions and policies and reports on the activities of foreign information services.

The assistant directors of the agency for the seven geographic areas (Africa, East Asia and Pacific, Soviet Union and East Europe, Latin America, Near East and North Africa, South Asia, and West Europe) are the director's principal advisors on all programs in or directed to countries in these areas. They help to formulate information policies and represent the director in interagency groups. They spend a large part of their time in the countries of their geographic region. These assistant directors are responsible for the direction, coordination, and management of information programs for the countries of their geographic areas. Moreover, they supply a knowledge of field problems and requirements to the agency's policy and planning processes; they arrange with media services to provide media products to their areas; and they consult with appropriate area and country officers in the State Department, AID, and with other agencies on operational matters of mutual concern.

The agency's media output must be of the highest professional standard. Thus, the assistant directors in charge of the four Washington media services are responsible to the director for the quality and persuasiveness of their output. They work with IOP and the area assistant directors to provide media products that will help advance U.S. foreign policies generally and specifically in each area. The four media services—Broadcasting (the Voice of America), the Information Center Service, Screen Service (Motion Picture and Television), and Press and Publications—provide materials to USIS posts abroad for use or adaptation by the posts. Other media products are acquired or produced locally by the posts.

Relationships with Other Agencies and Departments

The Washington agency's principal relationships are with the State Department, DOD, AID, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Labor, and the Smithsonian Institution.

*State Department.* As noted above, the agency director attends regular staff meetings of the secretary of state and participates in the Under
Secretaries Committee. This is not by any means the extent of inter-
departmental cooperation with the State Department, however. The
deputy director and the deputy director (Policy and Plans), for example,
respectively (1) represent the agency on the Government Advisory
Committee on International Book Programs, and (2) supervise continuing
liaison with the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Political Af-
fairs, the policy planning and coordinating staff, the Bureau of Public
Affairs, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, and the Office of
News. Both the deputy director and the deputy director (Policy and
Plans) represent the agency on the Board of the Foreign Service. The
assistant directors of the agency for the geographic regions are members
of the IG and maintain direct liaison with their counterpart geographic
bureaus in the State Department. The assistant director, USIA (Informa-
tion Centers), is a member of the Interagency Book Committee.

Department of Commerce. USIA allocates Special International
Exhibition funds to the department to operate a program under which
trade missions (with primarily commercial objectives) are sent abroad.

Department of Labor. Labor exhibits and missions are operated by
the department with USIA guidance and with Special International
Exhibition funds allocated by the agency. These exhibits and accompanying
missions are presented independently or in conjunction with some of
USIA’s national exhibitions at international fairs. The labor missions
work closely with USIS staffs in the field.

The president has also made USIA responsible for coordinating the
plans and programs of all other U.S. agencies engaged directly or indi-
rectly in overseas exhibits. This is done through the Interagency
Exhibits Committee, which is chaired by USIA. Representatives from
the Departments of State, Commerce, Labor, Agriculture, Defense, and
Health, Education and Welfare, and from the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion, NASA, the Federal Aviation Agency, and the Smithsonian Institu-
tion form the committee. Representatives of other agencies also are
invited to participate in the deliberations of this committee as might be
appropriate.

Smithsonian Institution. The Smithsonian Institution is responsible
except in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, for the conduct of a
program of International Exchange of Fine Arts Exhibits. This program
encompasses only exhibits in the fine and decorative arts—that is, painting,
sculpture, prints, folk arts, crafts, and related categories. Other
elements of the agency work closely on a continuing basis with their
counterparts in the State Department.

Responsibility for overseas administration of the Exchange of Persons
Program, the Cultural Presentation Program, the American Specialist
Program, and other educational and cultural activities of the State De-
partment lies with USIA. The State Department, however, performs
substantially all administrative housekeeping functions for USIA’s over-
seas installations.
Department of Defense. The agency works with DOD, particularly the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. USIA advises on foreign psychological aspects of public statements and actions in the defense field and works directly with the various services in Washington and commands abroad to increase psychological support for U.S. policies.

Agency for International Development. USIA advises AID on the implications of foreign public opinion for present and contemplated AID programs. The presidential statement of USIS's mission requires AID to consult with USIA when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated. Both in Washington and at posts abroad, the two agencies work together to assure USIA's effective support for U.S. assistance programs, and, conversely, to insure that AID programs effectively support U.S. psychological objectives. The statement also required USIA to service USIS field requests in these categories insofar as possible. The State Department and USIA provide policy guidance to the Smithsonian Institution on international relations and psychological factors, respectively, that influence the program.

USIA is responsible for all national exhibits, including those in the fine arts, that are presented in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European countries under cultural exchange agreements.

In addition to the major contacts described above, USIA briefs representatives of all government organizations operating overseas on U.S. Government informational policies and objectives by supplying policy documents and training programs and by individually briefing key personnel.

USIA Overseas Operations

USIA staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the chiefs of mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities—that is, those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opinion—for agencies of the U.S. Government other than DOD commands.

Overseas, USIA vests maximum practicable authority for the conduct of the information program in the public affairs officer (PAO) in charge of the program in each country. Certain overseas installations, such as the radio relay stations, programming centers and monitoring offices, press regional service centers in Manila, Beirut, and Mexico City, and the Regional Exhibits Center in Vienna are actually operating extensions of the Washington media services.

But the largest part of all USIA activities is the United States Information Service (USIS). The term "USIS" antedates the Smith-Mundt Act of 1953, which set up USIA, and is applied to the overseas operations of USIA that are not extensions of Washington media services. "USIS" refers to the overseas post that evolves the program suited to its particular problems, decides on use of specific material, and operates the country information and cultural programs. Posts are required to assess
annually their country plan objectives and their progress. USIA maintains USIS mission posts, branch posts, subposts, reading rooms, and binational centers.

The USIS mission carries out the agency's programs and administers the Exchange of Persons Program for the State Department in each country. USIS operates as an integral part of the U.S. diplomatic mission in each country. The public affairs officer receives general program direction from and reports to the assistant director of the appropriate area in Washington. He is a member of the U.S. country team that is coordinated in each country by the chief of the diplomatic mission (ambassador or minister). Thus, the PAO also reports his activities to, and clears new programs with, the chief of mission who supervises all U.S. Government activities in his country of assignment. USIS operations in some countries are conducted at consulates and at outposts in consular districts as well as at the principal post.

Each country PAO is assisted by a staff of American and foreign national employees (referred to as local employees). The supervisory staff, which varies with the size and scope of the country program, generally includes a cultural affairs officer and an information officer in addition to subordinate Americans. They plan, coordinate, and supervise programming and maintain active personal contact with government officials, media representatives, and academic and business figures important to USIS interests.

The USIA techniques of communication and persuasion are used selectively from country to country, under country plans devised to help achieve U.S. objectives in each country. Country plans are prepared by the PAO and approved by the chief of mission with the advice of his country team. Upon approval by USIA in Washington, they become binding statements of the USIS country programs.

Each country plan lists established U.S. objectives for the country. Those objectives that are susceptible or partially susceptible to furtherance by information and cultural programs are identified, and the USIS capability to help achieve each such objective is explained. From this analysis, each post determines its psychological objectives—that is, those attitudes to be created or strengthened to advance particular U.S. objectives. Also indicated in the country plan are the people or groups who should be influenced—the target audiences—as well as detailed programs by which USIS will undertake to create or strengthen within these specific groups the attitudes the United States seeks to inculcate—the psychological objectives. These country plans are revised often as necessary to serve as accurate, effective guides to USIS media support and field activities.

The relative emphasis on media to be used varies greatly from country to country. In one, films may be important; in another, not at all. Each program is tailored to the psychological objectives, audiences, and the
mean of communication best suited to delivering the right message to the right person at the right time.

USIA also plans and executes, in the field, the cultural and educational programs administered in Washington by the State Department. Such activities are an integral part of USIS programming in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

USIA has responsibility for the overall coordination of U.S. PSYOP in stability operations where the military has not yet been assigned command responsibility. For example, according to a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) memorandum, the responsibility for development of PSYOP policy and for substantive supervision and coordination of all psychological operations in Vietnam was delegated to the director, JUSPAO, who was the USIS chief there.

THE UNITED STATES ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INFORMATION

The United States Advisory Commission on Information, established under the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L.402), recommends to the USIA director the policies and programs for carrying out the act. In a semiannual report submitted directly to Congress, the commission gives its evaluation of USIA and recommends improvements in the information, education, and cultural programs. The agency maintains a secretariat for the commission with a full-time staff director.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Agency for International Development (AID) was established in 1961 within the State Department when the former International Cooperation Administration (ICA), the Development Loan Fund, and other foreign assistance activities were merged. AID's mission is to carry out U.S. overseas programs of economic and technical assistance to less developed countries, programs designed to bring the countries to a level of self-sufficiency.

For political, economic, and humanitarian reasons the United States has for over two decades been committed to helping the poorer nations of the world achieve their aspirations for social and economic growth. In this connection, the present administration has undertaken the following shifts of emphasis in the assistance effort:

* increased emphasis has been placed on multilateral aid programs with the administration moving toward greater coordination of U.S. aid with that of other donors;
* more emphasis is being given to applying U.S. knowledge to the problems of development through technical assistance, research, and social innovations;
* the highest priority is being placed on agricultural production and family planning;
* foreign procurement policies are being relaxed to assist the export potential of developing nations, and,
• opportunities are being increased for private enterprise to engage more directly in the development process.

In April 1971, the president sent proposals to Congress for the reorganization of U.S. foreign assistance programs. The changes proposed are not only in philosophy but also in the organizational framework and operating style.25

The Washington Level of AID

The AID administrator reports directly to the secretary of state. From 1961 to 1968 the secretary's authority had been delegated to the administrator of AID. In January 1968, in an effort to strengthen the State Department's supervision and control of these programs, this authority returned to the secretary who redelegated part of it to the under secretary of state and part to the then deputy under secretary for political affairs. The former was given general authority to supervise the effective integration of both the economic assistance and military assistance and sales programs within the context of U.S. foreign policy interests, while to the latter was delegated (later redelegated to the director of politico-military affairs) the day-to-day responsibility for the continuous supervision and general direction of the military assistance and sales programs.

In fact, the State Department does not and could not operate and manage the military assistance programs directly. The principal mechanisms for the formulation and application of policy on the presidential level are the annual budget preparation and the presidential decisions taken in the NSC system. At the departmental level there is a continuous dialogue between the State Department and DOD.26

The administrator of AID is supported currently by a headquarters staff, five regional bureaus (Africa, Latin America, Near East and South Asia, East Asia, and Vietnam), and the overseas missions. Among other things, the headquarters staff assists in the development of policy and procedure, while the regional bureaus, also located in Washington, are the principal line offices of the AID and are responsible, within overall agency policy, for planning and supervision of U.S. economic development assistance efforts in individual countries overseas.

Although AID operates mainly on the basis of bilateral programs, the agency encourages, supports, and participates in international organizations, consortia, and other coordinating groups designed to provide economic and technical assistance. Of these institutions, the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) is the major international body for general coordination of free world economic assistance policy, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) is the largest of the multilateral lending institutions.

AID Operations Overseas

Approved programs are executed by overseas U.S. AID missions (USAIDs) in cooperation with the officials of the countries being assisted. Several approaches to development assistance are employed:
• **Technical Assistance** is provided to developing nations through the assignment of technical experts as advisors to the public and private sectors of less developed countries and through participant training provided mainly in the United States for cooperating country nations.

• **Capital Assistance.** Capital loans, repayable in U.S. dollars on more favorable terms than private banks would offer, are conditioned on matching measures of self-help by the recipient country to further its own development.

• **Commodity Assistance.** U.S.-produced food and fiber needed for development (either general or in specified economic sectors) is made available through loans, and to a small extent grants, under the Food for Peace Program.

• **Private Investment Surveys.** Through a program of cost-shared investment feasibility surveys, private U.S. firms are encouraged to investigate specific investment opportunities that would contribute to the achievement of objectives in less developed countries.

• **Civil Security Assistance.** AID Public Safety assistance is produced to Free World countries to help them develop civil police institutions capable of maintaining the internal stability essential for economic, social, and political progress. The Public Safety Program serves to train civil police and paramilitary police forces to prevent the development of threats to internal order and to deal with them humanely in their earliest phases so that costly military solutions to civil problems will not have to be chosen later.  

AID's most important contribution to U.S. PSYOP is a result of its development activities. As an example, the provision of radios to villages remote from central government administration fulfills several objectives in the nation-building effort and supports PSYOP and public security objectives as well.  

**THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

The Department of Defense (DOD) was created as a part of a comprehensive program designed to provide for the future security of the United States through the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the U.S. Government relating to national security. Two of its functions prescribed by higher authority are directly relevant to PSYOP:

• to insure by timely and effective military action, the security of the United States, its possessions, and areas vital to its interests; and

• to uphold and advance the national policies and interest of the United States.

Since the early 1960s, DOD has been adjusting to new forces, circumstances, and aspirations in the national and international environments. As diplomatic, economic, and military resources have been integrated more closely than ever before into national security plans and programs, DOD has steadily established intricate relationships with
many of the other departments and agencies. Military-political contacts—both with the Department of State and with various foreign governments—have become routine, and defense strategy shares a principal objective with foreign policy: the preservation of U.S. national security.

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Secretary of Defense

The secretary of defense is the principal assistant to the president in all matters relating to DOD and exercises direction, authority, and control over the department. He serves as a member of the NSC. Among the several principal military and civilian advisors and staff assistants to the secretary, his assistant secretary for international security affairs (ASD/ISA), in particular, has major PSYOP-related responsibilities.

Office of the OSD/ISA

ASD/ISA is the principal staff assistant to the secretary in the functional field of international security and acts as a DOD liaison in the foreign policy field. He develops, coordinates, and recommends to the secretary of defense DOD positions on NSC affairs and foreign economic and politico-military matters (including disarmament) of DOD interest. Responsible for the planning, direction, and management of the Military Assistance Program (MAP) and the activities of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs) and military advisory and training missions to foreign nations, the assistant secretary also provides guidance to DOD representatives on U.S. missions and international organizations and conferences.

Within OASD/ISA, the specific responsibility for action on PSYOP is currently in the Long Range Planning Section of the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy and Plans, and NSC Affairs. Another deputy assistant secretary handles the military assistance and sales plans and programs.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisors to the president, the NSC, and the secretary of defense, the JCS are directly concerned with PSYOP. They serve as the immediate military staff of the secretary of defense. They are in the chain of command that runs from the president to the secretary of defense, through the JCS, to the commanders of unified and specified commands. The chain of command to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also runs from the secretary of defense through the JCS. The JCS are assisted in the performance of their duties and responsibilities by the joint staff and other agencies of the organization of the JCS.

The Joint Staff is organized into directorates concerned with:

- Personnel (J-1)
- Operations (J-3)
- Logistics (J-4)
- Plans and Policy (J-5)
- Communications-Electronics (J-6)

The intelligence function for the JCS is undertaken by the DIA. All of
these directorates have varying degrees of interest in PSYOP. In addition to the directorates, the activities of the various special assistants occasionally involve PSYOP. It is the director, J-3 (Operations), however, who has the responsibility in all matters pertaining to the psychological aspects of military operations. His principal staff assistant for PSYOP is the deputy director for operations (counterinsurgency and special activities) or DOCSA. DOCSA is supported by the PSYOP Division of J-3.

Military Assistance Advisory Groups

The Chief of a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) is the personal representative of the Secretary of Defense in the country to which he is accredited. The ASD (I&A) is responsible for planning, organizing, and monitoring activities of the MAAGs, which receive their military guidance from the JCS through the appropriate unified command. If a MAAG is located in the host country, it will often have access to information that may be important to the success of a PSYOP program. Representatives of the MAAG chief are therefore often included in the country team PSYOP agency, if one is formed.

Other DOD Groups with PSYOP Responsibilities

Within DOD, the work of the ASD (Public Affairs) often has potential PSYOP aspects. These include monitoring the release of all official DOD information for publication through any information media as well as responsibility for military participation in public exhibitions, demonstrations, and ceremonies of international significance.

The director of defense research and engineering (DDRE) directs and supervises the activities of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). ARPA is a separately organized (DOD) research and development agency that is responsible for selected basic and applied research. It has supported PSYOP-related tasks as directed by higher authority. ARPA utilizes the services of the military departments, other governmental agencies, private and industrial entities, individuals, and educational or research institutions to perform its projects.

Ongoing Operations

Responsibility for the training of personnel in PSYOP continues to be located in each of the separate military services. Each of the services continues on an individual basis, and with varying degrees of effort, to refine its own doctrine for PSYOP.

OTHER AGENCIES

Since effective PSYOP requires a wide array of resources, the PSYOP community involves the support of several other agencies and departments on either a full-time or intermittent basis. Many government and private agencies contribute intelligence, logistical cooperation, or other assistance: for example, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Justice, the Department of Labor, the Department of the Treasury, and...
organizations involved in education, health, disaster relief, arts and sciences, and missionary work.28

CONCLUSION

This is the structure of the national security system as it relates to PSYOP. Other writers have pointed to the need for closer cooperation, better coordination, less duplication of activities, more systematic planning and analysis among the various agencies, and the like. The current structure in which the centralizing role of the National Security Council has been re-emphasized represents an important attempt to address these problems—problems which plague many functions besides PSYOP—without reducing the responsiveness of the system to the president's needs in other areas.

In retrospect, there has been an overall trend since the early 1960s toward a greater understanding and appreciation within the executive branch of the U.S. Government of the use of psychological operations. However, the test of the current framework of U.S. PSYOP is in the answers to the questions: How well have the realities of present-day PSYOP been perceived? How well have the capabilities and potentialities of the various departments, agencies, and military services been recognized and employed?

NOTES

2 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, V, no. 6 (February 10, 1969).
5 Foreign Affairs Manual Circular 521 (February 6, 1969).
6 Ibid.
8 Foreign Affairs Manual Circular 521 (February 6, 1969).
9 See Halperin, "The President and the Military" (below).
13 Ibid.
15 U.S. Department of State, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 315-316.
USIA'S MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITIES*

By Irving R. Wechsler

Policies and missions for both strategic and tactical operations must be clearly defined, current, and capable of attainment.

During the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, the foreign information resources of the Government continued the development that began in 1945, when the United States for the first time established an official peacetime organization to inform foreign people about the United States and its policies. The United States Information Agency, the direct descendant of that organization, expanded in some directions, consolidated in others, shaping and defining its mission and role essentially as a response to the changing longterm nature of international relationships, and to the shifting urgencies and more immediate stresses of the time.

THE TRUMAN CONCEPT

The basic character and rationale of United States information activities abroad were in certain important aspects, implicit in the August 1945 announcement of President Truman's decision to maintain, as a peacetime service in the Department of State, some of the foreign information functions of the Office of War Information and the Office of Inter-American Affairs.

"The nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign affairs," President Truman stated in ordering the creation of the Interim International Information Service, a transitional organization, pending study of foreign informational needs by the Secretary of State, and the formulation of a program to be conducted on a continuing basis.

This first statement of mission and responsibilities, brief and general though it was, suggested certain principles that continue to influence the conduct and the concept of United States foreign information programs. The most important, of course, was the idea that foreign informational activities are an integral part of the conduct of foreign affairs, arising out of the contemporary nature of foreign affairs; a recognition that diplomacy was to have henceforth a new dimension, stemming from the increasing importance of world public opinion and attitudes and the burgeoning new technologies that were shaping and expressing them.

This "Government," the statement also announced, "will not attempt to outstrip the extensive and growing information programs of other nations. Rather, it will endeavor to see to it that other people receive a full and fair picture of American life and of the aims and policies of the United States Government." The primary means of informing other nations about the United States would continue, "as in the past" to be American private organizations and individuals; the Government's role would be to assist and supplement them.

Thus, certain limits and emphases were indicated: The United States Government would avoid competition with private American enterprises and activities in overseas information, and would not take its measure from other Governments' propaganda programs. At the same time, its programs would go beyond official Government action and policy, to present "American life," and to "endeavor to see to it that other people receive a full and fair picture."

Although what is full and fair has at various times been variously interpreted, there has been continued general acceptance of the view that the official American interpretation of America and its policies must rest its case on presenting actualities without deliberate distortion. And finally, the 1945 statement embodied a principle that has been rigorously maintained—both by Congressional insistence and Executive direction—the principle that the overseas information programs would have no responsibilities for explaining Government programs domestically.
THE SMITH-MUNDT REVISION

Early in 1948, the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act (PL 80-402, the Smith-Mundt Act) was passed, reflecting a Congressional realization that the postwar world demanded that the United States have a capacity in the field of foreign information considerably greater than the rudimentary organization that had uneasily and barely survived in the Department of State since 1945. Spurred by the descent of the Iron Curtain, the aggressive posture and programs of the Soviet Union and world Communism, and the clear need for the American story and American policies to penetrate through the perils and complexities that were besetting peoples overseas, the Act stated that its objectives were “to enable the Government of the United States to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries.” Among the means to be used in achieving these objectives were “an information service to disseminate abroad information about the United States, its people and policies” and “an educational exchange service.”

The passage of the Smith-Mundt Act gave to the information mission both a firm legislative base and a new scale, scope, and prominence. Less from the language of the Act than from the debate and discussion that accompanied it, an awareness of its role and more explicit development of ideas about it emerged—both within the Government and among the public. Two specifics were visible in the Act. One was the emphasis on mutual understanding—the idea that a two-way process was somehow involved, that more than simple declaration and amplification were to be part of the creation of “mutual understanding.” Secondly, the Act made explicit the separation of “information” and “educational exchange” as two distinct and different means of creating understanding—one allegedly “propagandistic” and the other “educational” or “cultural.”

THE EISENHOWER RESTATEMENT

On August 1, 1953, the United States Information Agency (USIA) was established by President Eisenhower’s Reorganization Plan No. 8, combining the separate overseas information functions of the Department of State’s International Information Administration, the Mutual Security Administration, and the Technical Cooperation Administration. The exchange of persons program, however, was left in State. The USIA was instructed to take its foreign policy guidance from the Department, while being responsible to the President through the National Security Council.

The new Information Agency was given a formal “Statement of Mission,” on October 22, 1953. This was the first effort to promulgate, in more than the most general terms, the task and methods of United States foreign information efforts. “In carrying out its responsibilities” the Eisenhower statement said, the Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. The purpose of the United States Information Agency shall be to submit evidence to people of other nations by means of communica-
tion techniques that: the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace.

2. The purpose in paragraph 1 above is to be carried out primarily:
   a. By explaining and interpreting to foreign peoples the objectives and policies of the United States Government.
   b. By depicting imaginatively the correlation between U.S. policies and the legitimate aspirations of other peoples of the world.
   c. By unmasking and countering hostile attempts to distort or to frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States.
   d. By delineating those important aspects of the life and culture of the people of the United States which facilitate understanding of the policies and objectives of the Government of the United States.

Two additional paragraphs, not made public at the time, regulated the Agency's use of "unattributed" materials.

Some significant emphases in the statement included the stress on "submitting evidence," by some considered to avoid the propaganda stigma of special pleading by "allowing the materials facts to speak for themselves;" the stress on demonstrating a harmony of interests, rather than an effort to convert, polemicize, or advocate; the stress on aspects of the United States "which facilitate understanding"—a sharper focus on the purposive and relevant "projection of America" than had sometimes obtained; and the clear and unmistakable mandate for counterpropaganda—to some minds, the primary (if not sole) justification for an information program.

This first formal statement of the Agency's information mission was a significant advance in sophistication and complexity. It served to supply clearer guidelines for action, and to crystallize out new and old doctrine and emerging ideas. As the first Director, Theodore C. Steibert, stated in a letter to the President:

Under this new mission, avoiding a propagandistic tone, the Agency will emphasize the community of interest that exists among freedom-loving peoples and show how American objectives and policies advance the legitimate interests of such peoples.

We shall, therefore, concentrate on objective, factual news reporting and appropriate commentaries, designed to present a full exposition of important United States actions and policies, especially as they affect individual countries and areas.

In presenting facts we shall see to it that they are not distorted...we shall avoid a strident or antagonistic note. This does not, of course, preclude us from making forcible, factual refutations of false accusations such as those that come from the Soviet communist portion of the world.

THE KENNEDY DEFINITION

During the Administration of President John F. Kennedy, a redefinition of the Agency's mission was formulated. Embodying concepts that had been "put into practice in early 1961" by USIA Director Edward R. Murrow, the new statement was drafted within the Agency and formally issued in January 1963 as a Presidential directive.

The Kennedy redefinition accepted and continued certain important elements in the Eisenhower statement—a counterpropaganda role, a
stressed on those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate understanding of United States policies, and a focus on demonstrating harmony between U.S. policies and the interests of other peoples. It introduced, however, some significant new emphases.

"The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives," the statement began, giving prominence and explicitness to a role and function that had sometimes been taken for granted, sometime asserted, sometimes denied or qualified—both within the Government and in public discussion. This support of U.S. foreign policy was to be accomplished in two ways. One was by "influencing public attitudes in other nations," the other by "advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs, and official statements." 6

The explicit public assertion that the Agency sought to influence public attitudes abroad was to some a note of welcome candor, while to others it seemed to make USIA too nakedly manipulative or self-serving. In a statement made before a House Subcommittee on March 28, 1963, Director Murrow indicated the limits and interpretation that the Agency sought to give the concept of influence: "Our Government tries to present its policies and programs in as understandable and palatable form as possible—understandable and palatable to those millions abroad, friend, foe, and neutral, whose lives and fortunes are affected by what we do." What was sought as effective communication, he emphasized, was "believability and persuasiveness." "To be persuasive we must be believable; to be believable we must be credible; to be credible we must be truthful. It is as simple as that.... Obviously...we emphasize those aspects of American life and policy which are of greatest significance in furthering our foreign policy objectives. We report events in context; we explain why things happen. But we do not lie, we do not cheat, we do not suppress."

An explicit acknowledgment that the Agency's mission was to be persuasive in support of U.S. policies appears less revolutionary in practice than the explicit injunction of the Kennedy statement providing that the Agency was to serve as an adviser to the Government on the foreign opinion implications of all its activities—and hence have an important advisory role in the formulation of the very policies that it would seek to publicize abroad. This new responsibility was doubly significant. For it is axiomatic that in a democracy the foreign information activities must take their policy direction from those charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. As Murrow put it succinctly, "We are, then, and properly so, prisoners of (U.S. foreign) policy." In the second instance, this explicit advisory role took on particular importance at this juncture because President Kennedy had just abolished the Operations Coordinating Board, established by Eisenhower in 1953 as a mechanism for concerting the Government's psychological activities—a device, cum-
bersome though it was, that had permitted USIA some voice in inter-agency consideration and planning. In essence, therefore, the new directive reflected both increased and more sophisticated awareness of the role of public opinion and attitudes in foreign affairs, and the view of Murrow (as one observer has put it) that USIA "should persuade, not just inform, and that it should aggressively and expertly advise the Executive Branch on the foreign opinion implications of policies and programs."

THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION'S NEW EMPHASES

During the earlier days of the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, USIA's role reflected the primary needs of a time of tragedy, transition, and the emergence of new directions and new emphases. The need to assure foreign publics that U.S. political processes, policies, and institutions would show steadiness, stability, and continuity appeared paramount. USIA's mission, however, remained essentially as it had been defined and redefined by earlier statements and existing doctrine. Nevertheless, the complex process of adapting the Agency's information resources to new times and new needs proceeded, but gradually and without high visibility—first under Carl T. Rowan (1964–65) and then under Leonard B. Marks (1965–69).

Although Rowan accepted the general statement of mission given the Agency by President Kennedy, and offered no formal redefinition or elaboration of its interpretation, the emergence of new national preoccupations brought new emphases. President Johnson's programs and the problems he faced gave an increased prominence to the U.S. domestic scene. The accelerated pace of efforts to end discrimination, to expand opportunity, and to make war on poverty, along with the resistance encountered and the violence generated, brought to the foreign audience an increased awareness of the U.S. internal situation with dramatic impact and sharpened detail. The prominence of domestic issues and events made for some change in the role of USIA. The persuasive emphasis diminished. Engaged in explicating and reporting developments of increasing complexity—and often of a kind that invited sharply critical condemnation—the Agency had a growing need to rest its case more on providing the background and perspective necessary to an objective understanding of the developments of the day.

Other forces, less dramatic, were also at work to give USIA's concept of its mission new nuances. One was a growing awareness of the limitations of official propaganda as an instrument for securing vital and durable changes in foreign attitudes. The accumulating evidence of academic research had begun to make clearer that the psychological processes of international communication were both more complicated and more difficult than had been assumed by many proponents and practitioners of the art. A more realistic judgment of the capabilities of persuasion and information as instruments of national purpose appeared in the making.

Another force was the burgeoning apparatus of international communication. The "communication revolution" immensely multiplied the reach and range of a nation's ability to transmit its messages, and this revolu-
tion in communication technology was augmented by the developments in transport technology. On the one hand new electronic mechanisms vastly expanded the speed and the amount of communication that was possible between nations and among people; on the other, new mobility brought multiplied and closer contacts. But there was no corresponding assurance of reception and attention—and, hence, of understanding.

Finally, in his remarks at the White House swearing-in of Director Marks, in September 1965, President Johnson stressed the central role of truth in USIA’s mission, and disavowed a propaganda aspect. The United States, he said, “has no propaganda to peddle” since “we are neither advocates nor defenders of any dogma so fragile or doctrine so frightened as to require it.”

THE MARKS STATEMENT OF MISSION

No doubt influenced by these various developments, Director Marks issued a restatement of the Agency’s mission on March 6, 1967. It reflected and elaborated upon many of the forces and preoccupations that were actively shaping the Agency’s task “in an increasingly complex world society.” He began by restating the basic assumption that President Truman had voiced more than two decades before, namely, “that our responsibility for direct communication with foreign audiences is essential to the conduct of foreign relations,” and stressing that this “reflects awareness that public opinion exerts increased influence on governments throughout the world and reaches beyond national barriers.” He reaffirmed the persuasive aspect of the Agency’s mission and its necessity to create understanding within the context of U.S. foreign policy objectives: “To achieve its foreign policy goals, the United States must break down barriers of misunderstanding; it must communicate effectively and persuasively on the many issues on which our security and welfare depend.”

Discussing “The Task of USIA,” Director Marks noted that “in carrying out the mission assigned us by law and presidential directive, USIA:

- Supports the foreign policy of the United States by direct communication with people of other nations.
- Builds understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture and policies among other people; and shares with them information, thought and experience that can contribute toward achieving mutual goals.
- Advises the U.S. government on public opinion abroad and its implications for the United States.”

Given new prominence was the concept that USIA “shares . . . information, thought and experience that can contribute toward achieving mutual goals.” The idea of harmonizing policies and interests and of demonstrating a consonance of goals was not new; neither was the idea of a sharing of experience and information. But they took on a new emphasis, significance, and explicitness in Marks’ discussion of how he viewed the Agency’s goals. “I find it helpful,” he declared, “to view USIA objectives in the following three broad categories: The United States as a Nation . . . International Issues and U.S. Policies . . . National Development.” It is in this last category that there is apparent a major new dimension of information tasks.

Since before World War II, the United States has had programs of
economic aid, rehabilitation, and technical assistance. But the emergence of new nations—many with only the beginnings of the political, economic, and social institutions, traditions, and skills that viability as a modern nation demanded—gave a new aspect and a new content to international relationships, particularly in the postwar context of U.S.-U.S.S.R. rivalry. The developing nations were both an audience and an arena of competition with new and special characteristics. To approach them exclusively within the framework of previous concepts and objectives would not do: the Agency could not, in the words of the Eisenhower statement of mission, simply “submit evidence . . . by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.” Nor could “influencing public attitudes in other nations” in support of U.S. foreign policies, as the Kennedy directive enjoined, be accomplished so directly as had sometimes been assumed. The new audiences had limited concerns and awareness outside the pressing urgencies of building their own nations and creating viable economies, workable political institutions, and the social structure and educational levels that would allow them to survive and participate fully in the modern world. Moreover, the techniques and apparatus of communication and public opinion formation that worked with the more established and the more industrialized nations—the chief audiences of earlier information programs—were less applicable to more rudimentary societies of the developing countries.

Expanding on the “National Development” objective, Director Marks stipulated tasks that were a considerable remove from the traditional concepts of changing attitudes about U.S. foreign policy.

The United States is today helping many developing countries to build the foundations of independent, modern states, responsive to the needs of their people. USIA has a role in this total U.S. effort. It may include: Explaining AID assistance and showing how cooperative programs can spur the nation’s growth; Helping build understanding of responsible citizenship and the democratic process; Focusing attention on critical issues such as the relation of population to agricultural production; Sharing relevant thought and experience that the developing countries can apply to their own problems; Acting as a catalyst in the circulation of ideas and helping build new attitudes that must underlie modernization.

These tasks reflect an increasingly sophisticated and flexible view of the kind of information and the kind of persuasion that would best serve the national interest and U.S. foreign relations—both viewed somewhat more broadly than has been traditional.

In “The United States as Nation” objective, Marks likewise stressed the criterion of relevance to other peoples’ interests and preoccupations, and the need to understand and acknowledge these concerns. The “USIA’s fundamental responsibility to build understanding of the United States, its institutions, culture, and ideals,” he declared “is a necessary basis for the respect, confidence, and support that the U.S. world role today requires.” However, he continued, “because the panorama of America is so broad, we must concentrate on significant aspects most
relevant for our audiences in their total judgment of the United States.

... The values that our audiences themselves prize, as well as the misconceptions they hold about the U.S. should determine the points of emphasis in each country program, 10

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OTHER RESPONSIBILITIES: NEW AND OLD

Under the Fulbright-Hayes Mutual Education and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (PL 87-256) the President was given authority to provide for "United States participation in international fairs and expositions abroad.

..." Although the President delegated this function to the Director of USIA, who in turn for several years redelegated this responsibility to the Secretary of Commerce, ... USIA resumed [this] responsibility [on July 1, 1966]. ... At the same time, the Agency transferred to the Department of Commerce responsibility for budgetary support of Commerce's trade mission programs. ... 9

[USIA,] which had been responsible for U.S. international art exhibits, 10 transferred responsibility for such programs (except in Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R.) to the Smithsonian Institution in 1965. 11

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[However,] policy guidance on international relations and psychological factors was to be provided by the Department of State and USIA, respectively. 12

If the persuasive function of USIA lost emphasis, the informative function generally gained, and the function of advising the rest of the Government on psychological implications received only minor attention during the Johnson Administration, one massive exception stands out. In Vietnam, and about Vietnam, the older concepts of official information programs were re-established and extended: this active war meant that USIA assumed tasks that had originally been performed by one of its progenitors, the Office of War Information, namely, psychological tactical and strategic political warfare. But more than a deflection into a former role for information was involved. A new and striking feature was the degree of integration of USIA with other elements of the Government, both abroad and in Washington, and the leading responsibility that USIA assumed in Saigon.

On the basis of earlier experience, it was decided in 1965 that U.S. psychological action in Vietnam required unified direction, encompassing both military and civilian. In April, the National Security Council delegated responsibility for policy direction and coordination of all U.S. psychological action programs in Vietnam to the Director of USIA. A new U.S. Mission organization, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was set up to carry out this responsibility within Vietnam. 13

But for a peacetime organization, with a wide range of continuing responsibilities in all quarters of the globe, so clearly a military-psychological operation as JUSPAO created some problems, anomalies, and disproportions.
In 1966, JUSPAO's field organization was merged, along with the field elements of other civilian agencies, into an Office of Civil Operations, and later, this organization was combined with noncombat military field activities into a Civil Operations and Revolutionary Support Office—steps that diluted JUSPAO's operational control and influence.

THE FUTURE

The successive definitions and redefinitions of USIA's mission and functions bid fair to continue. The changing emphases and directions, the experiments and extensions and retreats, appear an inevitable reflection of the fact that political communication—information activities, propaganda, public diplomacy, however, it is labeled—is a part of the international political process, and that is never static.

NOTES

3. By default, the actual administration of the program overseas remained a USIA responsibility.
4. Document 1-3 in Lawson et al., USIA, Vol. II.
7. Document 1-6 in Lawson et al., USIA, Vol. II.
10. PL 87-256 and Executive Order 11034.
13. Document 1-6 in Lawson et al., USIA, Vol. II.

SELLING UNCLE SAM IN THE SEVENTIES*

BY KENNETH R. SPARKS

Communication reflects society as well as influencing it. All communications channels are important in overseas communications efforts.

It is seven p.m. in Moscow and before a distinguished audience of Soviet dignitaries, dance enthusiasts, and bureaucrats in Estradniy Teatr, the curtain rises on a performance by America's Alvin Ailey Dance Company.

At that very moment in Munich, the Amerika Haus plays host to sixteen German college students discussing the future of the North At-

Atlantic Treaty Organization. Town Anders, a Fulbright Scholar and graduate student in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, leads the discussion.

In New Delhi, the American Ambassador is calling on Mrs. Gandhi to present a copy of a recent book about her father, former Prime Minister Nehru, by a University of Michigan professor.

Meanwhile, classes are changing at the binational center in Cali, Colombia. Seventeen-year-old Maria Angela Lopez wanders through the halls, gazing at an exhibit which features the Apollo XI moon mission and waiting for her third-year class in English to begin.

In a Bulgarian village just outside of Plovdiv, a retired army officer closes the door to his bedroom and turns on the radio to catch a news broadcast from Radio Free Europe.

In Bangkok, the theater lights dim on a full house of Thais who have come to watch John Wayne sock it to the bad guys once again. Following the feature, they will see an unattributed thirty-minute documentary depicting the Soviet Union's crushing of Czechoslovakia's moment of liberalization in 1968.

All of this represents America's propaganda machinery in action. Around the clock, around the globe, thousands of Americans and non-Americans alike are hard at work seeking to create or enhance public support overseas for United States foreign policy. All but a few of the many government agencies and departments play some part in this operation.

Ostensibly, our primary propaganda vehicle is the U.S. Information Agency (USIA). It is charged with "influencing public attitudes of other nations...by overt use of various techniques of communication..." To carry out this mission, USIA uses radio, television, motion pictures, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets, libraries, exhibits, concerts, English-teaching, and as much personal contact as possible. With a staff of just over ten thousand employees, about half of whom are "locals"—non-Americans—who do most of the non-policy work—the agency operates programs in over one hundred countries. In those countries where USIA activity is prohibited, the agency used its international radio arm, the Voice of America, in an attempt to reach the population with the American message.

But, though USIA was created in 1953 to serve as our chief propagandist, its role has always been limited. Other agencies within the governmental hierarchy share its responsibilities.

Any inventory of the American propaganda arsenal must begin with the White House press conference and the daily State Department press briefings. Covered by a host of foreign reporters and by the many news services circulated abroad, these two channels may well be the most important propaganda tools we have. But since these press conferences and briefings are also covered by domestic media, USIA does not partici-
pate. Congress, on numerous occasions, has indicated its intent that the American government not engage in domestic propaganda.

The State Department also has responsibility for cultural exchange. When USIA was organized, many felt that the exchange programs should be moved to the new agency together with the information or propaganda activities. An Assistant Secretary of State makes the policy decisions which direct the annual exchange of 6,000 students, teachers, research scholars, professionals, and government and business leaders. He also manages a limited program of cultural presentations ranging from the Philadelphia Orchestra to the late Louis Armstrong. USIA administers these programs overseas, an anomaly explained only by convenience.

Primarily known for its information-gathering or spying, the Central Intelligence Agency directs a number of sensitive operations that include propaganda. As with all CIA operations, only a select few government officials know the exact nature and dimensions of the propaganda effort. But it has become common knowledge that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, respectively, are creatures of the Intelligence Agency. Other transmitters in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia have also been traced to the CIA. In addition, the CIA supports local writers in many countries who produce favorable editorials or commentaries when the occasion demands.

The roster of cooks in the U.S. government's propaganda kitchen doesn't stop with the White House, the State Department, and the CIA. Virtually every major department conducts some international activity designed to win friends and influence people abroad. Defense, Commerce, Health, Education, and Welfare, Peace Corps, Nasa—even the Smithsonian—all have their propaganda role. The cost of these operations is close to $300 million annually. USIA's budget is roughly $185 million. The State Department's cultural exchange unit spends approximately $40 million annually.

**LACK OF MISSION**

Permeating USIA and the State Department is the conviction that American propaganda lacks direction and purpose, that our information and cultural efforts, and even our foreign policy, are lagging behind the changing world we are trying to influence. As relations thaw with the Soviet Union and Communist China, hard-hitting anti-Communist themes, long a staple of USIA's menu of activities, seem anachronistic.

Not only does policy appear to be out of date to many observers; it is sometimes non-existent. An example was given me by former Ambassador to France, Sargent Shriver. After his appointment by President Johnson, he searched in vain for an indication of what the State Department expected him to achieve. Preoccupation with Vietnam and a departmental belief that nothing of substance could be achieved while DeGaulle was in power had left a void in U.S. policy. When he turned to the long-range policy staff at the State Department and asked for guid-
ance, one official confessed that none existed, then asked, "Have you tried George Ball's latest book?"

"How can U.S. propaganda be effective until we have a clearly enunciated foreign policy?" mused Shriver. "It's like asking J. Walter Thompson to prepare a campaign for Procter and Gamble and finding out that P & G has no idea what it is trying to sell."

A second reason for the sense of uneasiness with U.S. propaganda within and without the government stems from frustration over Vietnam. Attempts over the past seven years to explain U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia as (1) fulfilling our commitment to defend a free people, or (2) meeting a Communist threat to the free world's security, have met with skepticism. Whether Vietnam proves the have been right or wrong in the long run, the short-term consequence has been a major psychological defeat for the United States. And a flop on such a global scale is enough to shake the foundations of any public relations firm, even the world's largest.

[USIA FUNCTIONS]

But it is important to step down from such macrolevel analysis and look for a moment at the functions U.S. propaganda is expected to perform. From time to time, the Information Agency has attempted to serve in at least five capacities: (1) information disseminator, (2) cultural programmer, (3) psychological warrior, (4) nation builder, and (5) public relations adviser. How well does it do each of these?

As a disseminator of information, USIA does about as well as can be expected. The agency has a competent staff of professional media personnel who, by and large, do a pretty good job of getting the message out through available channels. As mentioned earlier, however, many of our most successful operations are in countries where we have only the most limited national interests. Except for routine press contact, occasional special programming such as satellite hook-ups, and a few highly specialized publications, the agency has had little success in reaching Europeans. People in Europe are inundated with information from domestic sources, much as we are in America, and it is difficult for USIA to have much impact.

Those who measure success by counting the communists who have been converted to American-style democracy are bound to be disappointed with the U.S. informational effort. In line with what one would expect from communication theory, USIA is most successful in reinforcing existing attitudes. Relatively less effective are efforts to reach people for whom foreign affairs are less salient. And least successful are attempts to convert opinions from negative to positive. Since congressional attitudes toward the agency have traditionally been related to our "success in winning the Cold War," top officials at USIA have had to provide Congress with a variety of specious proofs of effectiveness at conversion. It is a phony game of piling anecdote upon anecdote which successive agency directors have felt obliged to play.
In cultural matters, USIA shares responsibility with the Department of State's cultural unit. The agency maintains libraries, reading rooms, and information centers, through which most cultural programming is done. In Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and sections of South Asia, programs of English instruction form part of the effort. The State Department expenditures in this area dropped from over $55 million to less than $36 million per year. As a result, there were fewer cultural exchanges and quality deteriorated. Recent increases in funding have barely matched inflation.

Because these activities serve primarily long-range interests, effectiveness is hard to measure and pressures develop to divert resources elsewhere. For instance, during the period of 1965 to 1969, State Department expenditures in this area dropped from over $55 million to less than $36 million per year. As a result, there were fewer cultural exchanges and quality deteriorated. Recent increases in funding have barely matched inflation.

For the most part, the Information Agency has eschewed any responsibility for conducting psychological warfare after a brief flirtation with it in Vietnam. As one agency official put it, "Once the bullets start to fly, we have failed and it is time to hand over the situation to the military." The Vietnam episode taught USIA two valuable lessons. First, psychological warfare requires huge expenditures which rob other programs of funds and talent. And, second, many information and cultural personnel are not suited by training or temperament to "psy-war" activities.

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

For years, USIA staff and interested observers have sought a role for the agency in policy formulation. The case, in its simplest terms, was that USIA with its special expertise in communications could make a valuable contribution by advising the government on the psychological implications of various policy decisions. In his 1963 memorandum to Edward R. Murrow, President Kennedy accepted this argument and directed the agency to begin advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs, and official statements.

Murrow was made a member of the National Security Council, and other mechanisms were created for psychological contributions by USIA. These contributions have consisted mainly of (1) roundups of press opinion, (2) a few public opinion polls conducted by the agency's research division, and (3) largely intuitive judgments about the conduct of public relations.

Today this "psychological adviser" role appears to be minimal. Shakespeare does not sit on the National Security Council. His views are generally not sought out by the State Department. His direct contacts with White House staff are of doubtful importance. Other departmental channels exist for USIA to give its views on policy matters, but these seem to have limited impact.

Overseas, the role of psychological adviser is played by the top USIA officer. How seriously he is taken depends on the personal rela-
tionship he establishes with the ambassador. He has few tools, however, not available to other officers within the embassy.

In summary, U.S. propaganda suffers from a variety of ailments. It will require a major overhaul in Washington and in the field to get the propaganda machine back on track.

FUTURE EFFORTS

What, then, should be the basis of our propaganda in the 1970's? The answer depends on one's view of the world, one's conception of what American foreign policy should be, and the amount of confidence one has in the performance of private and public sectors.

Our relations with other countries will certainly become more, rather than less, difficult. Our audiences will be more sophisticated. No longer can we divide the world into two hostile camps—one free and the other Communist—and ask people to choose. Our broad commitments to peace, prosperity, and individual freedom must be manifested with deeds as well as words. Propaganda can often support and enhance good policy, but it can do little to promote what others conceive as bad policy.

Our audiences will also be larger, as greater numbers of people everywhere will almost certainly seek to share political power. The member of communication channels will be increasing, which, as we have learned in Europe, can be a barrier rather than a boon to international propaganda.

With these few generalizations as a preamble, I would suggest the following guidelines as a framework for United States propaganda in the 1970's:

1. Nongovernmental media will be America's primary vehicles for informing people in other lands about our policies and culture. Even if Congress were to increase funds dramatically for informational activities, a course which is neither likely nor wise, the official effort would be submerged by nongovernmental communications. Instead of lamenting this fact, the chief preoccupation of government propagandists ought to be to facilitate and promote the best of these unofficial media whenever possible. Ways should be found, for example, to reinstate and expand the old International Media Guarantee (IMG) program, a revolving fund through which private publications, television programs and motion pictures were distributed in certain Communist and other countries. Occasionally, an article or program may embarrass, but the harm created is minute compared with the image which emerges of a truly free and self-confident society that sanctions such distributions.

We must realize that propaganda in its broadest and most important sense is a reflection of our total society. It consists of much more than official government pronouncements, overseas libraries, radio programs, cultural exchange, and a few clandestine operations. Marshall McLuhan, writing in a domestic context, summarized this point well:
... propaganda does not consist in the conveying of messages by press or other media, but consists in the action of the total culture (language, food, ads, entertainment, etc.) upon its participants. The idea that propaganda consists of packaged concepts peddled to unsuspecting citizens is no longer tenable.5

We must place our confidence in the nongovernmental media to tell America's story. Aside from promoting these media, the role for U.S. official propaganda is to fill in the cracks, to round out the picture, to provide perspective.

2. Efforts should be based on what we know about the effects of communication, rather than on the naive political judgment that people's opinions can be radically changed if confronted with "the facts." Two decades of communications research have demonstrated that the primary effect of mass communication is to reinforce existing beliefs.6 This makes the job of the propagandist one of seeking out those attitudes compatible with U.S. objectives and reinforcing them. This task may not be so glamorous as converting enemies into friends, but it is much more likely to be accomplished.

3. As much as possible, our programs should provide a service from the audience's viewpoint as well as our own. Programs which are so limited in appeal as to attract only the favor-seekers and hangers-on ought to be eliminated. In many countries we don't need a full-blown propaganda program, because other media are performing the job for us, or our target audience is so small that it can be reached adequately by routine personal contact.

4. Cultural affairs programming in support of long-range objectives ought generally to be expanded. Increased support for exchange programs should receive top priority. To know others better may not be to love them more, but it does increase understanding. This is the one area that seems to warrant large increases in funds. Cultural presentations need to be improved. America can't afford to send any second-rate talent overseas; our primary emphasis should be on ways to encourage top artists and entertainers to perform abroad, commercially sponsored, if possible, in major population centers. The emphasis on physical facilities—libraries and information centers—ought to be reduced. The cost is too great for the amount of return.

5. Primary responsibility for propaganda decision-making ought to rest at the national level, with the ambassador and his public affairs adviser, based on foreign-policy objectives for that country.

The innovative resource allocation system of the current Administration is a step in the right direction. Under this system, the local staff decides how the money allocated to each country for public affairs programming is spent. This places the funds and the responsibility close to the action. Washington's role should be largely supportive, providing funds, policy guidance, and administrative and production services.

6. Organizationally, USIA should be returned to an expanded State Department, which would become a Department of Foreign Affairs headed by secretaries for political, economic, and information and cul-
tural affairs. A study conducted by the Brookings Institution for the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee in 1959 pointed the way.\(^7\)

The arguments used in 1953 to separate information programs from the State Department have either been superseded or have proved less than persuasive. In sum, they were (1) that American propaganda was being outgunned by a monolithic Communist propaganda machine, and consolidation of efforts would produce better propaganda; (2) that old-line bureaucrats in the department did not understand or appreciate propaganda; and (3) that only by separation could field operations be consolidated and coordinated by Washington.\(^8\)

We now know that, except where special circumstances have existed, the Soviets have had no more success than we, and in many cases they have been patently less successful. Furthermore, the new generation of diplomats now assuming control of our foreign affairs is made up of people who are conscious of the merits of “public diplomacy.” Finally, field operations have been consolidated by giving ambassadors increased authority. Coordination of programs at home has not been measurably increased. In fact, USIA has become yet another policy-making center, together with the White House staff, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

A number of observers have called for cultural programs to be divorced from government control by establishing a quasi-public corporation such as the Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) to take over their management.\(^9\)

Considerable support for such a plan can be found and this general direction is one in which we should move. But the likelihood of adequate funding for the exportation of culture remains remote at this time in a country that failed to support the concept of government subsidies for the arts domestically until the late 1960's.

7. Personnel policies should encourage and reward special competence. Shifting staff members from one part of the world to another so that they may gain “fresh perspective” entails too great a loss in competence and personal happiness. Officers with special knowledge of underdeveloped countries and their problems should be shifted to the more developed countries only upon their request or for reasons of health.

Ways must be found to reward excellence in particular specialties. Today, the top pay goes only to the broadgauged generalist. A cultural affairs specialist finds himself bumping against the top pay bracket in a relatively few years. The Macomber Task Force has recommended such incentives, and the means should be found to implement them.\(^10\)

8. Our propaganda should be seen and evaluated as a total system. Scientific evaluation will no doubt continue to be limited to the effects of specific programs. Social science tools are not yet capable of isolating effects on a larger scale, except at great expense. But there is a need for macro-evaluation, based on political judgments augmented by whatever data can be produced. To give a specific example, Uncle Sam now oper-
ates or funds a number of radio stations: the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, Radio in the American Sector (Berlin), and American Forces Network (AFN). Each has a slightly different purpose, but each is part of our propaganda system. Ought RFE and Radio Liberty to receive almost as much money as the Voice of America? This type of evaluation needs to take place across the entire propaganda activity spectrum.

To facilitate such analyses, the research and evaluation operation at USIA should be shifted to the National Security Council staff at the White House. This staff would then develop and conduct the necessary public opinion polling for policy formulation, measure the effectiveness of specific propaganda activities, and assemble data to aid political judgments required for resource allocation among propaganda agencies. Full consolidation of U.S. propaganda programs may not be feasible, but if the White House has the means to evaluate them as a system, duplication can be minimized and the over-all effort strengthened.

We move into the seventies with an increased understanding of the limitations of official propaganda. No longer does it conjure up images of Lenin and Goebbels with their seemingly invincible and mysterious techniques. A world increasingly saturated with communications media operating independently of government has become hard to reach with artificial and polemic messages conceived by government bureaucrats. But governments still have a need to explain their policies and their actions, to participate in the international dialogue on goals for mankind and the means to achieve them. Various information and cultural programs can promote and supplement private media in this task, given redirection and proper leadership.

NOTES

2 USIA was established August 1, 1953, by President Eisenhower's Reorganization Plan 8. For a summary of earlier activities, see John H. Henderson, The United States Information Agency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 23-60.
4 The Agency in Brief, 1971, p. 4.
6 Although dated, a good review of this material can be found in Joseph T. Klapper, The Effects of Mass Communication (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1960).
11 In the case of AFN this is unintentional, but in many parts of the world this service for our armed forces attracts large audiences of foreign nationals.
POLICY PLANNING

Effective psychological operations requires detailed, coordinated policy planning and carefully controlled implementation. The national-level framework within which policy is formulated and administered was discussed in the first part of this chapter. In this section some of the ingredients in the planning process, the results of that process (that is, policy and guidelines for policy), and coordination and control over the implementation of policy are covered.

Before the determination of national policy on a specific issue can be made, the parameters within which policy is to be defined are usually established, whether explicitly or implicitly (in the presentation of options). Often only these parameters are publicly announced as policy; sometimes they are, in fact, the only components of policy.

Policies can be effectively implemented in accordance with their intent only when they are clear. Clarity is a first requirement of policy when operators are not directly involved in policy formulation and therefore might misinterpret their guidance. Although lucidity does not guarantee effectiveness, nor even implementation, a policy that is clear does have a greater chance of being carried out or supported as the policymakers intend.

Directives of a general nature require interpretation by the communicator so that he may effectively carry out his mission. His operational interpretation of broad policy goes a long way toward ultimate policymaking. Although decisionmakers at the national level usually try to make their guidelines clear enough so that the essentials of policy can be supported even in the face of often unforeseen circumstances, nonetheless some area of maneuver remains for the individual psyoperator. If planners wish to eliminate this flexibility in a specific situation, they can limit it by specifying to the field either detailed prescriptions or detailed proscriptions, the sine qua non of policy.

Perhaps the single most important PSYOP policy decision is that on priorities of resource allocation for short- and long-run objectives. In this connection, only the most important matters should be addressed so that resources will be expanded toward the realization of those objectives of overriding importance.

At the same time, planners in the pursuit of national objectives must consider local needs and issues. In the PSYOP/information field, this is a singularly important consideration: persuasion must come to grips with the attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behavior of the audiences, for these shape their perceptions and hence their reactions to persuasive communications. Since local events shape these attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behavior, considerable leeway should be left for local psyoperators wherever feasible.

Planners must not only be responsive to external needs (such as insuring that recent developments that affect audience attitudes, opinions, emotions, and behavior are taken into account), they must accommodate...
themselves to the needs of others in the planning process and to operators' needs as well. For example, the complexities of coordination in policy planning result in the placing of a high priority on quickness as well as on the understanding of and support for the needs of other participants in the process.

Coordination of the various roles in PSYOP and recognition of the unique role of the military in planning for PSYOP are the subjects of the concluding essays of this section of Chapter III. These two articles must be considered in terms of other requirements and limitations in planning. In that context, they indicate some of the planning goals which may be set for PSYOP—and the gap between planning objectives and current capabilities.

PRESIDENTIAL POLICY PARAMETERS*

By William E. Daugherty

The President often clarifies the political and psychological limits of policy with his words. It has been said that President John F. Kennedy "was acutely aware of the power of words," especially those of the president's own words that are "heard around the world." Numerous instances can be cited from his less than three-year term as president to illustrate this point. For the sake of brevity two must suffice.

PEACE IN LAOS

Two months after taking office, President Kennedy, on March 23, 1961, stood before television cameras at a news conference in Washington and warned his viewers and listeners of the imminent possibility of war over Laos. Supported by maps illustrating the situation in that country on three different occasions in its recent history, the president charged that "increasing support and direction from outside" provided by the Soviet Union and heavy weapons and combat specialists dispatched from North Vietnam had greatly changed the situation in Southeast Asia. He went on to say:

It is this new dimension of externally supported warfare that creates the present grave problem. ... I want to make it clear to the American people and to all the world that all that we want in Laos is peace, not war; a truly neutral government, not a cold war pawn; a settlement concluded at the conference table and not on the battlefield. . . .

"I AM A BERLINER"

Two years later, in the last months of his life, President Kennedy visited Western Europe and did "what no amount of USIA propaganda could ever do." In the words of a high official in the information agency this was the situation he encountered in Europe:

The President's reception was the warmest given any American . . . since Wilson in 1919. . . . In Berlin the President capped American efforts to make the [Berlin] Wall a Communist liability with one of his toughest speeches. . . . As the crowd roared its approval, Kennedy said free men everywhere identified themselves with

*Original essay by William E. Daugherty
Berlin and he too was proud to say, "Ich bin ein Berliner" ("I am a Berliner"). The Agency [i.e., USIA] commissioned a magnificent color film... which made the most of the Berlin speech.3

Both of the illustrations above are examples of presidential statements setting the tone for U.S. foreign policy and international communications.

NOTES


WHEN ARE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES CLEARLY DEFINED?*

By Michael A. Morris

National policy objectives should be clearly defined. Whether the goals are strategic or tactical, they should be clearly delineated and articulated to those responsible for implementing them.

The difference between clarity and vagueness of political objectives is only a matter of degree. Nevertheless, a rough distinction can be made between vague and clear political objectives after the nature of their relative difference is understood.

It is certainly a healthy sign that so much attention has been devoted to and that most observers clearly acknowledge that political objectives should determine the nature of military objectives and military strategy. Some note that military objectives and strategy cannot be precise unless political objectives are clearly defined.

Clarity of political objectives is the responsibility of the political leaders rather than military authorities and if political objectives are vague, the military services cannot be expected to impose limits on their operations.1 In turn, political objectives must not underestimate or overestimate the military capabilities at their disposal if military power is to be used efficiently and without risk of major war.

CORRECT GENERALIZATIONS

However, attempts by many authors to define clear political objectives are less perceptive than their analysis of the evils that result from objectives that are vague. Most envisage clear political objectives that are derived from an over-all objective that reflects our national purpose. In turn, limited objectives determine the nature and extent of US involvement in limited wars or interventions. Some authors add that clear political objectives also need to be flexible so that they can be adjusted to meet changing conditions.

These statements characterizing clear political objectives are correct generalizations. Clear political objectives should be limited and should not be achieved at the price of inflexibility. Changing circumstances will always make the task of the formulation of clear political objectives

* Adapted from "When Are Political Objectives Clearly Defined?" Military Review, Vol. XLIX, no. 10 (October 1969), pp. 3-8.
difficult. However, the attempts to go beyond these generalities belie an incomplete conception of vague political objectives. Since the difference between clarity and vagueness is only a matter of degree, an incomplete conception of vague political objectives obviously leads to an incomplete conception of clear political objectives.

* * * *

A PARADOX

Political objectives evince much superficial continuity, and hence an aura of decisiveness, although they may actually encompass and conceal considerable drift and indecision.

* * * *

Thus, while flexibility is necessary to adapt to changing circumstances, flexibility can also become largely synonymous with drift and indecision.

Nevertheless, political objectives still may remain constant in meaning over a period of time although different strategies may be required to implement them. The difficulty is in distinguishing between political objectives that only have superficial continuity of meaning and those that really are continuous in meaning.

This paradoxical nature of vague political objectives suggests a definition of clear political objectives. A political objective is clear when it continues to represent concern for the preservation of the same specific vital interest or for the same kind of postwar peace. If the objectives are clear in this sense, they can provide adequate political direction for the choice of military objectives and military strategy.

Drift occurs when political objectives are not continuous in meaning or when they are so vague as to permit several divergent strategies to appear to be adequate ways of attaining objectives. In either case, drift rather than political objectives largely determines the nature of strategy.

However, this definition only applies to those specific political objectives that guide military strategy in a specific limited war or intervention. General foreign policy objectives are, therefore, vague. For example, support of the United Nations and interest in a world free of aggression are general foreign policy objectives that attract popular support through their vagueness.

This suggested definition of clear political objectives needs to be elaborated further by examining its relation to the concept of vital interests. Since clear political objectives must represent concern for the preservation of the same specific vital interest, it is then necessary that vital interests also be clear and specific.

PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGES

Some propaganda advantages can be gained by grandiloquent political objectives such as the Truman doctrine's aspiration to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures. However, even at that early date in the cold war, the rhetorical exaggerations involved touched off a debate charging that the United States was overcommitting itself.
The US strategy of support to Greece and Turkey against aggression was a clear, limited commitment and refuted these criticisms. However, this clarity of strategy was due to the clarity of purpose of US policymakers and to their clear grasp of the US vital interests involved rather than to the clarity of publicly stated political objectives.

Occasionally, vital interests may be precisely formulated while political objectives are vague as in the case of the Truman doctrine. Nevertheless, it is extremely difficult for political objectives to be clear when vital interests are abstract and vague.

The stark clarity of a direct Soviet confrontation with the West in the late 1940's made the determination of US vital interests relatively simple. The calculation of what were these vital interests became more complex and ambiguous as the Communist threat became more diverse and subtle in the 1950's.

ABSTRACT VITAL INTERESTS

As the paradox of abstract vital interests begin to loom larger in US policy in the 1950's and 1960's, the need for clarity of political objectives continued and, perhaps, even increased as the nature of the threat changed and became more ambiguous. However, the precedent of vague political objectives set by the Truman doctrine's rhetoric continued to be the observed norm.

One of Robert E. Osgood's main themes in a 1968 paper illustrates the consequences of a heritage of vague political objectives and of increasingly vague and abstract vital interests. While the US postwar pursuit of policy objectives has shown much continuity, the US concept of its vital interests has been constantly expanding.

In Vietnam, in equating Communist aggression with a threat to US security, the general requirements of containment led to an increasing US response without questioning the precise relevance of the Vietnamese war to US security. Osgood considers that the growth of multipolarity and the increasing complexity of the Communist threat necessitate more precision in determining the extent to which our vital interests are involved in specific cases of Communist aggression.²

The paradox of abstract vital interests then reinforces the paradox of vague political objectives and vice versa. Both together—vagueness of vital interests and vagueness of political objectives—reinforce the indecision embedded in each vague paradox. This tends to result in drift in policy and in inadequately considered and expanding commitments.

This vicious circle of vagueness and drift can be broken by efforts to relate vital interests more specifically to contemporary conditions, and conflicts and can be weakened by increasing the clarity of political objectives—that is, clarification of vital interests leads to clarification of political objectives and vice versa. More precise vital interests make it harder for political objectives to equivocate in claiming they are preserving the same specific vital interest.

On the other hand, greater clarity of political objectives would increase
pressures on vital interests to be more precise. While political objectives determine the nature of military strategy, different military strategies represent different ways in which individual political objectives have been stressed.

Thus, greater clarity of political objectives would indicate roughly the respective advantages and costs of implementing different strategies and different combinations of political objectives. This would increase the chances that vague concepts of vital interests that required prohibitive strategic costs for their preservation would be exposed. This exposure would surely result in greater pressure for more precise vital interests.

GUIDELINES

The peculiar characteristics of vague political objectives suggest several guidelines for distinguishing clear political objectives from vague ones:

- Is the nature of the paradox of vague political objectives understood and consciously guarded against in political objectives?
- Do political objectives help undermine the paradox of abstract vital interests? By indicating roughly the respective advantages and costs of implementation of different strategies, do political objectives expose vague conceptions of vital interests that unwisely require prohibitive costs?
- In choosing our military strategy, have we carefully considered the costs and benefits of attaining objectives primarily demanding military action versus the costs and benefits of attaining objectives more closely related to nationbuilding and internal security?
- Are drift and indecision being reduced in our political objectives, our conception of our vital interests, and in our choice of military strategy?

Clarity of political objectives is being achieved when these questions can be answered in the affirmative.

NOTES


MAKING POLICY IS NOT THE PROPAGANDIST'S BUSINESS—OR IS IT?

By Reuben S. Nathan

In theory, the role of the propagandist is to execute the decisions of policymakers. In many practical situations, however, the line dividing the role of a policymaker and that of a propagandist becomes blurred, and sometimes, events force propagandists to make policy decisions.

Propaganda is an instrumentality of statecraft. Psychological operations, systematically employed, is a weapons system. It follows logically that propaganda is supposed to implement policy, not to make it, and that

*Original essay by Reuben S. Nathan
psychological operations must be designed to support the strategic and tactical objectives which the commander sets. Theoretically, in other words, propagandists and psychological operators are handmaidens of policy who take, interpret, and execute orders. Practically speaking, this is not always so. Circumstances often compel them to make policy. Sometimes circumstances make policy by themselves.

ANONYMOUS LITTLE MEN

To explain the realities of policymaking, which are seldom fully understood, let me relate what a Weimar Republic cabinet officer told me when I was a student in the Germany of the late nineteen twenties and had decided to prepare myself for a career in the Foreign Service:

I know you well enough to take it for granted that you want to go to the top, that you dream of making policy in order to advance your ideals. I am at the top. But I don't really make policy. Policy is made by anonymous little men who are experts in narrowly confined areas about which they know more than anybody else. They write the first working paper on any issue related to the area of their expertise. When that paper reaches their immediate superior, he is certain to edit it somewhat but he will rarely argue with its substance because he realizes that he cannot possibly match the writer's detailed knowledge. The same thing happens on every succeeding level until the draft comes to me. I may know a lot more about overall policy but I cannot conceivably know as much about every specific issue with which my department deals as do the men who write the working papers. I may revise the draft slightly. But when I sign the final version, it was not I who made policy. It was that anonymous little man. And don't forget that overall policy is, more often than not, just the sum of a hundred small policy decisions.

Twenty five years later I found myself in London attached to SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces) and in charge of the Joint Anglo-American Magazine Program. One of the magazines I had designed and for which I was responsible, was the monthly Neue Auslese, which enjoyed an unexpectedly large circulation in Germany and Austria. When I was debriefed by the Department of State in February 1946, I proudly recited the circulation figures of all our magazines and, coming to Neue Auslese, reported that it sold 300,000 copies in Germany's Soviet-occupied zone alone. This woke everybody up. "You did say, in the Soviet Zone," the presiding gentleman interrupted. "How did that come about?" I replied that we had asked the responsible Soviet officer in Berlin and that he had agreed. "Very interesting and even commendable," was the reaction. "There is only one thing wrong. You in fact concluded an international treaty. And you did not even bother to notify the Department of State."

I had turned into one of the anonymous little men of whom my father's friend had spoken. It had never occurred to me that I had been making foreign policy. It had all been in a routine day's work. In any event, our London organization had, in 1945, been changing so often that I would have been hard-pressed to consult with superiors. There were none left. For months I did not even know for which agency I was working.

COLD WAR RHETORIC AND INTERNATIONAL REALITY

Any propagandist who concludes that he needs only a triple-locked steel cabinet filled with contingency plans deludes himself. Sometimes there are no contingency plans because the contingency is completely unforeseen. Sometimes the operator is not of a high enough rank to be
taken into the policymaker's confidence. And, more serious, sometimes, though national policy is a matter of public record so clearly stated that drawing conclusions from it on the handling of a sudden emergency seems easy, that policy turns out never to have been meant too seriously or is suddenly and without notice reversed. That was the situation on June 17, 1953, when East German youth and labor rebled against Soviet oppression. Cold war rhetoric now confronted international reality.

I was at that time in charge of planning policy for Radio Free Europe (RFE). Radio Free Europe did not broadcast to East Germany but it did saturate the airwaves to other countries of Eastern Europe—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. We were on the air around the clock. According to fairly reliable information our audience numbered in the scores of millions. Obviously, these millions relied on us for accurate information, comment, and advice at a moment which could conceivably have spelled the beginning of the end of Soviet control over all of East Europe.

It could also have spelled the difference between peace and World War III.

There was no question that the Soviets had the military power to suppress the East German rebellion. But would they have been able to suppress simultaneous uprisings in East Germany and all of East Europe, risings which potentially might have involved at least indirectly, close to 100 million people? U.S. policy had been clearly proclaimed by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. He had during the election campaign in the fall of 1952 repeated time and again that, once in power, his party would start "rolling back the Iron Curtain." As we could not be certain whether this might not merely be one of those overstatements so typical of American election campaigns, we had cautioned our staff of exiles against emphasizing it. That had not been an easy task, because they had been hoping and waiting for a chance to tell their fellow countrymen that salvation might be just around the corner, and they tended to look at RFE policy as being too soft and ominously reminiscent of the policies of Yalta (which they consistently misinterpreted). Dulles, however, repeated his promise in his first speech as Secretary of State in February 1953. In fact, he went beyond it by suggesting that anybody rising against Communist tyranny could count on U.S. support.

This statement we could not disregard for he spoke officially for the United States. Further, the policy could not go unreported since every radio station in Western Europe commented on major American policy statements as a matter of course. No matter what we did, therefore, our listeners would learn of Dulles' proclamation. We had now been told publicly what U.S. policy toward our target areas was. Nevertheless, it was clear that blunt implementation of this policy at the time of the East German rebellion could mean war. Aggressive reports and comments touching on Dulles' promise could have lighted a fuse under Eastern Europe, especially since there had been indications of unrest in Poland.
and Czechoslovakia a very short time before. Our range of options thus narrowed. But there was one thing we could not do: stop broadcasting. We had to stay on the air or we would have risked losing the confidence of our listeners—confidence in us and in the United States. I had to issue a guidance statement within hours.

In view of the seriousness of the situation, we convoked RFE's highly placed and influential Board of Directors. Its most important members ordered me to produce a militant directive—they had no doubt that Dulles meant what he had said. As the first and fairly judicious draft of the guidance was teletyped to operational headquarters in Munich to solicit additional views, several of our formerly aggressive exiles revolted. They had suddenly gotten cold feet. They also saw an opportunity to overrule the American planning staff, one of their longtime ambitions. It now seemed in order to contact Washington for advice. A member of the board called two of the three most important members of the Administration. Washington had not yet made up its mind. There was nothing wrong in that, for much depended on the final decision and a few hours would not make much of a difference—for Washington, I, however, could not temporize. So RFE's Deputy Director (the Director happened to be in Munich) and I called C. D. Jackson in the White House. Jackson had been President of the Free Europe Committee until he became President Eisenhower's Advisor on Psychological Warfare. I have his advice scribbled on a piece of paper: "Reuben," he said, "don't make any mistakes now..."

As it turned out, I was prevented from issuing any meaningful directive at all. Our staff of exiles had gotten away with their revolt. This meant, in fact, that Poles and Czechs made U.S. policy in a critical hour. We might have made a major contribution to the collapse of the Soviet empire at a time when that was official U.S. policy. Alternatively, we might also have started a general war by trying to implement that policy. Yet was it not our job to follow policy? My diary shows that I might in the end have hedged—as Secretary Dulles did himself when rhetoric confronted reality. In any event, this was certainly a case where propagandists did not act as the handmaidens of policymakers.

How much Secretary Dulles had reversed himself became evident three years later when Hungary exploded. In view of the fact that Radio Free Europe had been organized to "roll back" the Iron Curtain, the attacks against us came as a surprise. They were also unfounded. Knowing that unrest was brewing in Budapest, we had started warning our Hungarian friends against premature action six months before they rebelled; we had, after all, learned the hard way that they were unlikely to receive U.S. support, and it certainly was not in the Western world's interest to give the Soviets a chance to slaughter their enemies. We wanted the dissidents to live. Contrary to some public notions, the Hungarians acted without any incitement from RFE. The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe were generally moderate in tone and cautious in statement. Indeed, the West German government examined the tapes of
every one of our broadcasts during the critical period and found, with the exception of three or four brief commentaries, little to criticize in the RFE programs. And yet, we were at least partially guilty—guilty of having done our job too well in past communications. Many Hungarians remembered Mr. Dulles’ promises, while forgetting the lessons of June 1956.

In terms of past communications, we had for six years, day in and day out, reminded the Hungarians of the values of democracy, of American values. That was the business specifically assigned to Radio Free Europe. U.S. policymakers had perhaps overlooked the dynamic power of these values. Americans tend to be rather cynical about some of the ideas to which we are committed. The number of people who look at the United States as the bearer of the flame of liberty continues to be very great indeed. Although U.S. policy had ceased aiming at rolling back the Iron Curtain, at helping to liberate the oppressed, at restoring the rights we hold to be unalienable, it retained Radio Free Europe and did not change its objective—to keep our values alive in the minds of the people under Soviet control. Fundamental American principles and pragmatic international politics had clashed. RFE, by adhering to American fundamentals as it was supposed to do, had in fact counteracted American policy which no longer wanted any trouble in East Europe. The result was tragedy and triumph at one and the same time: tragedy for the victims of the Soviets who had believed in America (their last radio transmission quoted the Gettysburg Address back to us); triumph because it proved the immense power of the American idea and because the Soviet empire after the Hungarian Revolution was never quite the same again.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

As in earlier years, we were, at least initially, unprepared to deal in a coordinated way with the psychological dimensions of the emerging Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Recalled to active duty with the Army during the Cuban Crisis, I served as Psychological Operations Officer on the staff of the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, Atlantic. The Task Force’s job was to organize and lead Cuban opposition forces behind enemy lines. When I reached Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to write the PSYOP Annex to the military operations plan, there was neither guidance nor relevant intelligence on which to base my plans. Aside from rumors, we did not even know whether there were any guerrillas to organize and lead, where they might be, or what they might think. As we prepared for H-hour, a number of high-ranking visitors called on us, but nobody talked with me. Although I was of relatively high rank, it was not high enough to be taken into Washington’s confidence, presuming Washington had formulated PSYOP directives. I discovered later that it had not. When the crisis was over, I was debriefed by several general officers, including a Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and told that my PSYOP Annex, good or bad, would not have mattered.
because the White House had reserved the right to guide all Psychological Operations as they proceeded. Whose guidance would have been followed, the White House’s or mine?

Visualize the practical circumstances: we would, had the order been given, have jumped into Cuba, presumably its mountains, and operated secretly with small, widely dispersed Special Forces Teams. The PSYOP Annex was part of the operations plan which told everybody what to do. The Annex dealt, of course, with how to motivate people to take up arms to fight Castro. Let us assume that the White House had developed tasks and themes different from mine. Let us assume, furthermore, that I could have been contacted. Even under these assumptions, was there any guarantee that I could have reached each team to provide and explain new directives? Would the teams, not trained as psychological operators, have been able to understand, digest, and employ new (possibly sophisticated) guidances? They would probably have adhered to the original, though by no means inflexible, plan—at least for a considerable period of time. In other words, my annex would probably have prevailed.

It was fortunate that the White House managed to resolve the crisis and that we, therefore, did not have to go.

BUREAUCRACY AND COMMUNICATIONS IN VIETNAM

Not quite five years later I was recalled for PSYOP duty once more. Top-level officers, with whom I had been acquainted for many years, had told me repeatedly of their dissatisfaction with psychological operations in Vietnam. One of them had come to the conclusion that the entire business was so ineffective that all emphasis should be shifted to civic action. (Civic action is, of course, part and parcel of PSYOP, designed to win “the hearts and minds of the people.”) Under these circumstances, it had been agreed that I be recalled to activate, organize, and direct the PSYOP staff of the new Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon, in the hopes of making a new beginning. I accepted; in fact, I went twice—the second time to write a National Psychological Operations Plan for Vietnam. My experiences would fill a (sad) book. Here, only the relationship of policy and PSYOP is germane.

Actually, I was provided with a single piece of guidance, and that proved unworkable. It was, in fact, so counterproductive that I was compelled to disregard it and to issue a directive to the opposite effect—which met with general approval. The initial guidance, given to me orally by a high-ranking State Department official, directed me to de-emphasize the American presence in Vietnam, especially the presence of U.S. combat forces just then in the process of being introduced. But it was the spring of 1965. The Viet Cong had been achieving notable successes. Indeed, they felt so certain of military victory in 1965 that, as General Giap later confessed, they neglected the first groundrule of revolutionary warfare: they de-emphasized the cultivation of popular allegiance. At the same time, Hanoi committed its first combat troops, at least one division and one regiment. The signs of defeat for the Saigon
government seemed to be clear. Persuaded that the Government of South Vietnam was likely to be beaten, the people, fearing for their safety, tended to side with the enemy. Since in revolutionary warfare the contest largely depends on the population without whose support—whether voluntary or brought about by terror—guerrillas cannot operate effectively, a directive that de-emphasized the American resolve to establish security was not realistic. My task was clear: I had to play the only trump card we had—the American presence. If we could convince the people that, in President Johnson's words, we would stay in Vietnam "with as much as it takes for as long as it takes," they might switch their allegiance back to Saigon: first, because people like to side with the winning party; second, because our determination to win meant that peace and security would not come unless and until we had won.

My first directive was the only one in which I violated guidance, because I never received further guidance, oral or otherwise. I pride myself on the directives I developed (some of which now serve as textbooks in major military colleges and schools) but I doubt they did much good for I soon discovered, as did my successors, that our propaganda machine was not working effectively. JUSPAO proved to be a messalliance; it was fractured by indifference, bureaucratic rivalry, and differing conceptions of propaganda and policy. The military establishment, committed to the conventional military wisdom, did not take PSYOP very seriously and at best considered PSYOP an occasionally useful supplementary weapon, not the primary weapons system it should and could be. And too many officers in the field felt that anybody, and especially they themselves, could write leaflets without reference to any guidance at all. Furthermore, realistically or not, military PSYOP aims at persuading people to accept what we consider our truth, to accept it passionately, so passionately as to fight for it.

The other principal component of JUSPAO is the United States Information Service (USIS), and USIS personnel have justiaciously clung to a different conception of PSYOP.

USIS personnel were, in the best USIA tradition, committed to the concept that "objective information" is propaganda. There is, of course, no such thing as an objective truth. Truth is a matter of perspective. The attempt to combine these two very different concepts led to serious policy conflicts.

In 1966, the Government of South Vietnam was trying to build a canal in the northern delta which the people of the area needed and wanted. Fearing that this canal would deepen popular loyalty to Saigon, the Viet Cong decided to stop its construction. The workers who were digging the canal spent their nights in a pagoda. One night, as they slept, the Viet Cong entered the pagoda and cut their throats; numbers died. Immediately upon hearing the news, USIS personnel raced to the scene to take color photos of the gory details, put together a luxurious booklet featuring the atrocities, and began distributing it. It was information
with a vengeance let the people see V.C. atrocities, “know the nature of the enemy.”

When I learned about this booklet, I succeeded in stopping its further distribution. Viet Cong atrocities are carefully considered; they do not aim at murdering a few people for the sake of killing them but at telling as many people as possible that it is dangerous to work for the GVN. The idea in this case had, of course, been to hamper the recruitment of labor and to prevent the completion of the canal. USIS's “information policy” had advanced the enemy's purpose. The essential thing from our point of view was to limit knowledge of the atrocity to the greatest possible extent, instead of publicizing it.

Military PSYOP, likewise, has been beset by counterproductive activities, many of which have been dramatically reported. Indeed, the burden of military PSYOP is formidable. The planner of military operations must consider the political and psychological implications of his plans. He must, especially in a revolutionary warfare situation, refrain from operations, which, for example, are likely to cause noncombatant casualties. One cannot retain or gain the allegiance of a man whose child has just been killed, and the outcome of any struggle against the techniques of revolutionary warfare depends on the attitudes of these ordinary people caught up in the struggle.

One cannot conduct effective PSYOP with a forked tongue, actions pointing one way and words another. What we had in Vietnam, however, was a clash of policies, interests, and actions, and this diminished the effectiveness of PSYOP as well as non-PSYOP objectives. Strategy must be integrated and encompass all weapons systems. There was not even coordination. A weapons system, to be effective, requires unity of command. There was no PSYOP commander. We were not even represented at command level. Nor were we consulted. Whatever successes we had, and there were a few, we had to plan and achieve almost in a vacuum, making our own policy as we went along.

POLICY AND PROPAGANDA: DEMOCRATIC AND TOTALITARIAN STYLES

In my experience it was never a matter of surreptitiously trying to circumvent directives but of often getting none or not getting any that fitted the circumstances of a critical hour. I am convinced that propagandists should not make policy. I also know that they often must make it.

How should propaganda and PSYOP policy ideally be made? This is the essential question. The answer is simple enough: in constant cooperation between the authorized makers of policy and the propagandist. The propagandist must become an integral part of the decisionmaking process. Since all political decisions have psychological implications, his views should be heard. The propagandist should, at the same time, have the opportunity to explain how he proposes to support national policy or the strategy of the commander.

Unfortunately, this ideal situation exists only in totalitarian regimes.
The propagandist, whether his name be Goebbels or Suslov, is the right-hand man of the decisionmaker. The propaganda line is determined as the decision is made and sometimes precedes it. Once the line is set, all actions are made to fit it, or at least to so appear. Propaganda, therefore, has a measure of credibility and a greater chance of effectiveness.

In democracies it is the other way around. The democratic propagandist is near the bottom of the totem pole. He is rarely consulted, often not even informed. Moreover, democratic decisions tend to be the results of compromises, as they should be. Some of these compromises are unpredictable. After they have been concluded, the propagandist is supposed to make the best of them. He will then try to prove that U.S. policy is in line with the highest aspirations, principles, ideas, and ideals of the nation and mankind.

In other words, the propagandist and the psyoperator in a democracy work under formidable constraints. They are so often forced to make policy decisions on their own that they must learn to define their nation’s objectives on their own—sometimes before the government defines them. That is a dangerous job for they cannot be wrong. They must be right both in their country’s, and in their own, interests. So, it follows that the two most important qualifications for the psyoperator are: astute political wisdom and uncompromising patriotism. They may not often be called upon to give their lives for their country, but they must always be willing to risk their careers.

CONCLUSION

What the experiences on which I have taught demonstrate is that propaganda and PSYOP policy, which can in fact force the hands of national policy, are not always made where they should be. Yes, there are “Country Plans.” Those I have seen tend to be vague and general. Moreover, none could be specific enough to consider all possible contingencies, for history and policies are not played by the book. Apart from that, propaganda is composed of myriads of items each one of which can conceivably motivate members of the target audience in ways the national leadership never dreamed of. However typical the incidents I have related, the fact remains that I, one of the anonymous little men, made policy day in and day out, and that, in a manner of speaking, I made it for the entire nation in whose name I published.

NOTES

1 At least one clandestine radio station operating with an expatriate staff in Frankfurt, did try to invite the Hungarian revolutionaries to fight. It is also true that the rebels monitored international broadcasts of the sometimes rather strong U.S. statements in the United Nations and may have misinterpreted them.

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PRIORITIES IN THE PSYOP EFFORT*

By JUSPAO Planning Office

Priorities on a national level must take into consideration what is realistically attainable as well as what is desired and must allow for local variations.


133
PSYOP policies currently in force cover a wide spectrum of activities and problems claiming the attention of U.S. Mission personnel engaged in psychological operations. Each of these policies places priority tasks on field personnel who have had to make a judgment on the relative emphasis to be accorded each of the program areas with which they deal. Their decision on priorities might be based on local requirements such as a tactical operation or a refugee problem, or it might reflect the emphasis given certain broad program areas by the Senior Province Advisor. For example in I CTZ the PSYOP emphasis would be on refugees, in IV CTZ, on RD [Revolutionary Development] support.

While it is recognized that special local conditions linked with the military situation or the ethnic makeup of a certain area will sometimes call for a different mix of priorities, this paper identifies national priority tasks in the order listed. This set of priorities has been agreed on by pertinent components of the US Mission and will serve as a general guide to national priorities in the PSYOP field until further notice. Progress in each of the priority areas listed will contribute in its own way to overall objectives of shortening the war and establishing a viable nation. While our effort should go forward simultaneously as much as possible in all these directions, it is realized that selective emphasis will have to be given on occasion because of resources limitations. The listing below is considered the proper national mix. Support to tactical PSYOP is not listed as a separate category because provincial PSYOP representatives are expected to cooperate with military commanders whenever required on tactical operations involving PSYOP, generally Chieu Hoi and population control measures.

Over the months ahead the most important nationwide PSYOP priority may be defined as helping the newly-elected GVN to improve two-way communications with the electorate. With elections over and a representative government now in office, PSYOP personnel throughout the country must help the government build a national consensus and project a positive image of activities and achievements to the mass audience. We must help improve this interaction between government at all levels and the people in the cities and villages. An understanding of democratic process must be fostered, citizenship rights and duties explained, reforms publicized and GVN mass media assisted technically in the development of a genuine Vietnamese style and the highest degree of professional competence. Evidence that social revolution is in progress and the elected GVN is beginning to deliver the kind of social justice the communists falsely promise must be seized on and exploited by all information media. The content of this PSYOP campaign will be provided by the sum total of the achievements attained by the GVN in the months ahead in its domestic programs. Social and administrative reforms, decisive moves against corruption at all levels, progress in the fields of civil service, taxation, public health and education among others will provide grist for the media effort. Success in the other PSYOP priority areas listed in this paper should also be exploited in output aimed at the general population as a
part of our assistance to the GVN in projecting to the Vietnamese people a positive image worthy of full allegiance.

JUSPAO and CORDS will be assisting the GVN in this area mainly in talking to and shoring up the confidence of the friendly population, that is the people in the cities and those in the countryside under relatively firm GVN control. Mass media aimed at the VC/NVA forces or the population in VC-controlled and contested areas will be largely a GVN/US/RWMAF military responsibility, exercised in the field through military PSYOP and RVNAF Political Warfare Department. This sharpened focus, resulting from recent policy discussions within the Mission, will permit a clearer division of labor among military and civilian PSYOP personnel in carrying out Mission PSYOP policy.

An essential part of the image-building program is to secure public support for GVN measures to marshal national resources in order to shorten the war.

Our PSYOP assistance to the GVN requires as a part of this task the buildup and maintenance of public confidence in the Vietnamese armed forces, their combat effectiveness, tradition and esprit de corps. To this end, US PSYOP must assist the GVN in exploiting ARVN victories, courage and civic responsibility.

As a sustained top priority, right next to image building for the GVN, is the Chieu Hoi/Dai Doan Ket Program. Success in this sector, expressed by a marked increase in the quantity and quality of the ralliers (Hoi Chanh), is directly related to shortening the war. The program, though running considerably above last year’s totals, has fallen somewhat behind expectations. PSYOP field personnel must not conceive their responsibilities in this area as limited to the distribution of standard products such as leaflets, posters, tapes and assisting tactical PSYOP in the development of quick reaction messages. They must seek out opportunities to publicize positive activities, achievements and career incentives made available to Hoi Chanh by the GVN. They should stress prompt and courteous processing of Hoi Chanh; vocational training; literacy and citizenship courses; medical attention; resettlement and job placement; in short, maximum GVN performance on promises made.

The major PSYOP support task in the area of Revolutionary Development (including Revolutionary Development Cadre and New Life Developments Activities) calls for the use of all available mass media to bring RD activities and successes to the attention of the rural people at whom the program is directed with particular emphasis on publicizing the rewards of self-help to hamlet and village dwellers. The country people must be motivated to engage in self-help projects leading to greater agricultural productivity and improved living standards. The ‘New Life’ activities, encouraged and supervised in hamlets by the RD group must be supported in the PSYOP field by the GVN mass media, VIS, direct persuasion by GVN village, district and province officials and such techniques as the cultural drama teams (Van Tac Vu) with their mix of entertainment and inspirational appeals.
PSYOP assistance continues to be required in building a positive police image of public service and in explaining the need for police control measures to protect the law-abiding population. When the National Identity Registration Program gets underway, PSYOP personnel in the field will need to assist in explaining how this three year program that will provide every citizen over 15 with a tamper-proof identity card serves the public interest. Finally, as the Police Field Forces (PFF) reach a level of effectiveness that permits them to take over from the RVNAF as law enforcement organization in the more secure areas, PSYOP personnel will have to assist in explaining that their tasks and functions benefit the public.

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PSYOP designed to build a positive U.S. image, provide information to American institutions and policies while tackling with word and deed any evidence of anti-Americanism, forms a large sector of essential activity. Negative side effects of the massive American presence in Viet Nam, such as competition for goods and services that drive up prices, and occasional problems with troop conduct or war-caused civilian casualties remain at a tolerable level but need continuing PSYOP attention. Field personnel have a major role to play in this effort by keeping senior province advisors and military commanders aware of problems and lending PSYOP support to moves designed to counter negative aspects of the US presence.

The massive effort to upgrade the GVN's internal communications capability and make the content of its mass media programs more persuasive and attractive, consumes a major share of JUSPAO resources. PSYOP personnel have to get involved in VIS training programs and the monitoring of VN media products and provide suggestions and assistance where required. The situation will vary from province to province depending on the proficiency and dedication of GVN counterparts, but it is a continuing responsibility.

Assisting US and foreign media correspondents in obtaining an accurate view of the Viet Nam conflict and of US/GVN/FWMAF actions to put down the insurgency and establish a viable nation is another major responsibility of field PSYOP personnel. PSYOP personnel at all levels must help in getting the Viet Nam story told abroad and in spotting and reporting up the line useful stories or story ideas for Saigon follow-up and third country placement.

To establish an orderly and consistent guide for field personnel in the apportionment of their efforts, the following index of PSYOP priorities is furnished as a national view. Nor should excessive weight be consistently given to only a few of the priorities listed. The relative order of national priorities remains in effect until further notice. A new policy will be published should the Mission's emphasis be changed in the PSYOP field.

**PSYOP PRIORITIES**

1. THE GVN IMAGE
2. CHIEU HOI/DAI DOAN KET

136
3. REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT
4. REFUGEE PROGRAM
5. PUBLIC SAFETY
6. US IMAGE
7. GVN MASS MEDIA ADVISORY EFFORT
8. TELLING THE VIETNAM STORY

A FORMER PSYOP GROUP COMMANDER IN VIETNAM LOOKS BACK*

By Taro Katagiri

The complex interrelationships involved in PSYOP planning require close coordination and each participant's thorough understanding of the exigencies of the other stages of the process.

During the period 1968–1970, it was a privilege for me to command the 4th PSYOP Group in Vietnam. In this article I intend to present thoughts on psychological operations based on my personal experiences rather than a definitive analysis of the subject.

In discussing key issues it is useful to use as a conceptual framework the standard elements of the propaganda cycle—that is, the steps involved in the development and dissemination of propaganda. In the cycle outlined below, all the components are interrelated; an error at any stage of the cycle can render ineffective the best planned work at the other stages:

- Step 1. Policy Guidance
- Step 2. Research and Intelligence
- Step 3. Propaganda Development
- Step 4. Pretesting and Evaluation
- Step 5. Production
- Step 6. Transportation
- Step 7. Targeting
- Step 8. Dissemination
- Step 9. Post-testing and Evaluation

POLICY GUIDANCE

The 4th PSYOP Group received its guidance from the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) through the Chief of the J3's PSYOP Division. The latter, in turn, received its guidance from the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office. Because of the many agency layers from Washington to Saigon, the policy guidance process was cumbersome. Indeed, policy guidance on key issues sometimes arrived too late for the proper psychological moment, and, on a few occasions, it did not arrive at all. When the U.S. President announced the bombing halt of November 1968, for example, guidance for PSYOP planners was absent. As another example, at the U.S. Pacific Command's PSYOP Conference of 1969, I urged immediate issuance of policy guidance and even the initiation of PSYOP programs in order to prepare the Vietnamese population—as well as to blunt the impact of enemy

*Original essay by Taro Katagiri
propaganda—concerning the well-known plan for U.S. troop withdrawal. As I argued at the conference, it was imperative to publicize immediately the ability of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) to afford security. Policy guidance did not come quickly. In its absence, I and my staff went ahead to seek means that would enhance the Vietnamese people’s confidence in their security forces. One means involved the publication of articles on Vietnamese accomplishments in the 4th PSYOP Group’s magazine, Thong Cam. When policy guidance was issued, the campaign to enhance the image of the RVNAF was intensified.

RESEARCH AND INTELLIGENCE

The problems of collecting and producing PSYOP intelligence were inextricably bound up with the complicated nature of the war. The people involved in PSYOP intelligence in situations like Vietnam must understand the basic political, social, economic, and military issues on a variety of levels and the interrelationships among those issues. I frequently heard complaints from members of the PSYOP community that intelligence people did not understand or were not sympathetic to our requirements. One problem I found, however, was that PSYOP planners could not specify their intelligence requirements except that they wanted information about audience vulnerabilities. Information on audiences is, of course, essential but it is only a part of the intelligence requirements. As we are learning, PSYOP intelligence must specify its needs along the entire continuum of the communication process. In this regard, criteria must be established for accuracy, appropriateness, timeliness, and reliability.

However, it should not be concluded that just because PSYOP planners recognized the importance of audience analysis that we had sufficient intelligence on major target groups. In many cases, the information was clearly inadequate. Indeed, the 4th PSYOP Group’s most challenging task during my command was to develop a solid analysis of the North Vietnamese soldier in order to appeal effectively to his instincts. Prior to October 1968 the PSYOP community did not recognize this need and considered the North Vietnamese soldier and the Viet Cong as falling into the same target category. In any event, after October, studies were undertaken to define the differences between, as well as the similarities of, the two adversary groups. Unfortunately, we did not come up with the right key.

PROPAGANDA DEVELOPMENT

The following points need to be emphasized in regard to development of propaganda materials. First, policy in Vietnam called for centralized guidance and decentralized execution. This was appropriate, especially in propaganda development, because the personnel serving in the area of operations are usually the most attuned to the attitudes and dispositions of the local audiences as well as to prevailing community situations. They are usually in a position, then, to tailor general messages to the local situation. The following example illustrates how unproductive a prop-
aganda message can be when the credence of the local population is not taken into account. In developing materials to exploit the theme "VC destroys, GVN builds" intended for the rural peasant, the propaganda development staff in Group Headquarters proposed to use two photographs—one showing civilians wounded by the Viet Cong and the second depicting the provision of medical treatment to the victims in a GVN hospital. To people in Saigon, the material would seem appealing; outside of Saigon, however, the material would seem incredulous. The hospital scene showed elaborate and modern medical equipment that could be found only in Saigon not in district or even provincial hospitals.

It takes a Vietnamese familiar with the local situation in an area to write messages for the local Vietnamese of that area. Occasions arose when the Vietnamese translators of the message were unfamiliar both with the local situation in the area in which the communication was to be directed and with the local Vietnamese dialect of the target group.

PRETESTING AND EVALUATION

Prior to dissemination, propaganda material should, of course, be evaluated for accuracy of style and tone and credibility of substantive content. In this respect, pretesting techniques involving expert panels and audience samples are highly useful. On occasion, however, psyoperators were careless in their use of pretesting techniques. A dramatic illustration was the pretesting of how a message would appeal to Vietnamese hiding in the jungles on Vietnamese subjects living in the comforts of Saigon and Nha Trang.

Even if the panel has a similar background to the target group, the PSYOP planner must still be wary of biases. In the desire to please their captors enemy captives have often portrayed the hardships of their former comrades still fighting in the jungles in exaggerated terms. Quite apparently, PSYOP planners must always consider in detail the extent to which the population sample is, and is not, representative of the target group.

PRODUCTION

Many logistical problems also hampered the PSYOP effort in Vietnam, despite outstanding support from Army logisticians. One of the major problems involved the servicing and maintenance of equipment. Organic to the 4th PSYOP Group was such nonstandard, low density equipment as 1250 multilith presses, Hess and Barker presses, paper cutters, platemakers, AN/VIH–6 public address systems, a 50,000-watt radio station, and the like. The equipment, however, was largely nonstandard, thereby hampering direct and general support capability. To complicate matters further, the 4th PSYOP Group had to maintain, without benefit of increased personnel, authorized stockage lists for the radio station and other nonstandard, low density equipment.

The 4th PSYOP Group's experiences with its 50,000-watt radio illustrates this problem. The AN/TRT–22, designed specifically for psychological operations, had little compatibility with U.S. Armed Forces Radio
and Television equipment in Vietnam. Although there were adequate numbers of personnel familiar with the standard equipment, few were trained in the mainenance of the AN/TRT-22. Hence, the principal in-country capability for maintenance and repair consisted of untrained but eager-to-learn personnel on the radio team. As backup, there were some periodic inspections by technicians from the Sacramentio Army Depot. Furthermore, the incompatibility of equipment led to the unavailability of spare parts at times. For example, the source of power for the radio station was 75 kilowatt nonstandard generators.

In terms of the larger logistical picture, the 4th PSYOP Group did try, with some success, to alleviate supply and mainenance problems. A Quick Reaction Procurement System was established, for example. This is a system for acquisition of nonstandard items for special warfare (unconventional warfare and psychological operations activities) through direct procurement on an expedited basis. Although this system did enhance capability, it was obviously based on expediency.

A number of measures should be considered to avoid future logistical problems of this nature. First, every attempt should be made to standardize equipment designed for PSYOP use. Indeed, most equipment adopted for PSYOP use should be compatible with other standard military equipment even at the expense of sacrificing any unique capabilities or desired characteristics.

There would still probably be nonstandard equipment in the PSYOP arsenal, however. Accordingly, there should be additional provision for supply and mainenance capability for nonstandard equipment, servicing, and parts.

Indeed, the organic mainenance capability needs to be expanded to care for all equipment. For this purpose, one technique might be to authorize a direct support platoon with personnel who have diverse technical skills and who can also qualify to operate direct supply support activities.

Another consideration involves supply, a subject that will be discussed in more detail in the following section. Suffice it to say here that the supply problem was formidable at all levels. On a very practical level, as an illustration, the question arose of how many days supply of paper should be maintained. After the experiences of almost running out of paper both at the battalion and Group Headquarter levels, we decided to establish as our goal maintaining a ninety-day supply of paper. This, of course, entailed the problem of securing adequate and satisfactory storage space.

TRANSPORTATION

Because of the many previously mentioned supply and repair problems, neither Group Headquarters nor the battalions had a sufficient organic capability to meet the needs of large-scale PSYOP offensives such as that needed during the Tet season. Consequently, much of the material had to be produced by the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa and then transported
by ship to Vietnam. At this point, various problems oftentimes arose. Difficulties on the docks delayed the unloading of the material. Another difficulty delaying unloading was the lack of storage space.

Once these problems were solved, other delays involving transportation occurred. The time consumed in printing and transporting material from Okinawa to Saigon was, in some cases, less than the time required to distribute the material from Saigon to local areas. Sometimes transportation was unavailable: vehicles were too scarce or ground transport was too hazardous. Aircraft could not always be depended upon either; other missions might take priority; cargo space was limited; or the weather was poor.

Production and transportation thus take time and, to our misfortune, much more time than PSYOP planners sometimes considered. There is room, accordingly, for improving scheduling criteria.

**TARGETING**

Misadventures about targeting are legendary: leaflets intended for the attention of one target group were sometimes disseminated in an area inhabited by another; two PSYOP units, operating in the same area without each other’s knowledge, disseminated contrary messages; the number of haphazard leaflet drops involving tons of bulk material were large. Suffice it to say, that targeting is a function that in most cases should be handled at the local level. Only at the local level is there likely to be accurate and timely information about who is where, what events are occurring, and the general mood of the population.

**DISSEMINATION**

The question of the most effective media for different audiences may be thoughtfully considered in a casual situation when organic resources are diverse and plentiful, but this was not the case in Vietnam where events occurred rapidly and human and material resources were severely limited. For example, psyoperators knew that face-to-face communications using Armed Propaganda Teams (APT’s composed of ex-Viet Cong) were the most effective media for supporting the Chieu Hoi Program. However, APT’s were too few and, furthermore, it was often unsatisfactory to use the teams in contested areas and, of course, infeasible to use them in areas firmly under enemy control. For these and other reasons, the Allies resorted extensively to the use of leaflets to support the Chieu Hoi Program.

The facilities of the audience must also be considered. Television and radio broadcasts have their place in the arsenal of PSYOP media as long as audiences have the appropriate receivers. JUSPAO did have a program of distributing television sets to villages but on too modest a scale to reach substantial segments of the population. The 4th PSYOP Group’s 50,000 watt radio station at Pleiku was powerful enough to be heard throughout the Central Highlands during ordinary weather conditions, but before 1968 most of the rural population in this region did not have radio receivers. Accordingly, a priority task of the 4th PSYOP group was
to distribute mini-radios to audiences in the Central Highlands. Whether we like it or not, in the final analysis, the key consideration in determining media use was often based on expediency not on effectiveness.

POST-TESTING AND EVALUATION

Post-testing and evaluation concern assessing the effectiveness of PSYOP programs. Indeed, authorities constantly raised the question of effectiveness, and, for this reason, the 4th PSYOP Group worked with representatives of research agencies to devise a means to "measure" the effectiveness of PSYOP. Despite this work, I left Vietnam with the impression that we were far from getting an adequate measuring device, especially for combat situations.

In evaluating effectiveness, a major stumbling block was the propensity to establish a "cause-effect" relationship between a program and the audience response. As a notable example, some statisticians attempted to establish such a relationship between the number of propaganda messages and the Hoi Chanh rate. Of course, this was only an exercise in self-delusion: analyses which establish a direct causative relationship between a message and a target response fail to take into account that PSYOP is only one variable among many that influence behavior.

Unfortunately, then, we could not realistically obtain data on PSYOP results independent of other factors in this environment. Instead of attempting to establish causative relationships to determine "effectiveness" we attempted to assess effects through using varied "indicators." One category of indicators involved the character of enemy counter-propaganda and of enemy countermeasures against Allied PSYOP efforts. For example, one captured document complained about the vulnerability of high and low cadre to Allied propaganda. In another document, issued in October 1969 to a North Vietnamese Army division, the commander warned his troops about "ideological sins" and blamed the Allies for "cunning plots and maneuver, especially... psychological warfare." Through indirect analyses, it was then possible to deduce in an informed way how the Allied PSYOP effort was influencing enemy morale.

Other, more direct indicators were also employed, and these indicators adequately showed that Allied authorities could hardly consider PSYOP to be a minor tool in their weapon arsenal. Analyses of target groups established conclusively that PSYOP messages positively enhanced the Allied effort. In the case of enemy soldiers, as a well-documented illustration, the large majority of captives contended that the decision to desert from their ranks was significantly influenced by Allied PSYOP messages informing them about alternatives to the struggle, good treatment by their captors, and the safe way to surrender. Another indicator was that a large percentage of captives carried Allied safe-conduct passes when apprehended.

CONCLUSION

From an operational PSYOP viewpoint, the Vietnamese experience
taught us many lessons. Prominent are two very important considerations transcending and cross-cutting each step of the PSYOP cycle: the first involves the use of PSYOP; the second involves planning and coordination. In spite of the JCS Dictionary, many, including those of us in the PSYOP community, tended to consider psychological operations as a separate and distinct activity unrelated to other functions, especially in nonmilitary situations. PSYOP, for example, was not amply exploited to support economic programs such as rural construction, political programs such as "GVN Cares" (in which GVN officials visited villages and hamlets to listen and respond to grievances); or humanitarian programs, such as the Medical Assistance Program.

Some of the problems associated with the use of PSYOP undoubtedly derived from perplexity, inside as well as outside of the information community, on what this "weapon" is. One of the most common misconceptions was that PSYOP involves just verbal communications. Of course, PSYOP involves nonverbal as well as verbal communications and both should support and reinforce each other. Despite this consideration, civilian and military officials were unintentionally insensitive to the critical impact of such nonverbal communications as gestures, posture, signs, physical appearance, and the like.

The second crucial consideration involves an integrated effort. Interagency coordination constituted a major problem in Vietnam, despite the concept behind JUSPAO. Complicating matters even further was maintaining coordination in the PSYOP effort between our forces and the host ones. On the basis of my experience, it seems that plans for commitment of U.S. PSYOP units in support of future stability operations should have provisions for coordinating and unifying the PSYOP effort not only among U.S. agencies but also with the host government as well. Moreover, the Vietnamese experience suggests that the systems for coordinating and unifying the effort should be established at all levels, ranging from the national to the local. Only in 1969, however, did combined PSYOP centers (CPOC) come into being in Vietnam and, even at this late date, their performances are in need of further reexamination.

Coordination problems hindered planning between the Allies and between U.S. Agencies within the general JUSPAO system. They also hindered planning within U.S. agencies. In terms of the military, Army PSYOP personnel did not always fully consider the entire PSYOP cycle. As a result, an error at one stage of the cycle sometimes negated the most careful planning at the other stages. During the 1969 Tet PSYOP campaign, for example, there was insufficient consideration given to the time required for production and transportation of the PSYOP material produced by the 7th PSYOP Group in Okinawa. When the Tet festival began, much of the material was still in Saigon instead of in the hands of elements operating locally. Even the best designed and most thoughtfully constructed messages are obviously useless unless they reach the target.

Accordingly, those in the PSYOP community need to acquire a better
appreciation of the propaganda cycle and apply the principle of backward planning in developing psychological operations programs. To determine the time required for the initiation of a large-scale campaign, it is thus necessary to work backwards in order to make proper allowances for the steps that involve targeting, transportation, production, and the like. PSYOP planners should be just as versed in all the steps of the PSYOP cycle as an infantry officer is expected to be in all the techniques involved in the handling and preparation of the rifle unit.

THE MILITARY IN INSTITUTION BUILDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES*

BY JOHN H. JOHNS

Planning for the socioeconomic and political advancement of developing countries should take into consideration the key role of the military in those societies as well as the communications potential in working with this sector.

SELECTION OF INSTITUTIONS TO BE DEVELOPED**

An important and crucial consideration in the modernization of Third World countries is the selection of institutions for development. The central factor concerns the needs of the people. The purpose of institutions is to meet needs of people. Consider first the most fundamental of needs, the economic needs of a society. One basic decision for policymakers is the relative emphasis to be placed on industrial development and agricultural development. This issue is especially pertinent for the reasons previously cited, that is, U.S. programs have been preoccupied with the economic institutions of developing nations. Even in this case, however, a great deal more is involved than just economics. There is, among other things, the psychological aspect of the problem. Many of the countries striving for development of their industrial base would probably benefit from placing priority on improving agricultural institutions. Obviously, the two must proceed in suitable balance, tailored to local needs.

The United States has attempted to encourage countries to participate in regional cooperatives so that specialization will gain maximum efficiency and make best use of natural resources. This makes good economic sense when viewed rationally. But as we know by now, man is not wholly a rational being motivated by options that will maximize his economic well-being. There is the question of national pride involved. The building of a highly visible, sophisticated transportation system, for example, an airline with jets, may not make a great deal of sense from our viewpoint, but it may be very important to the indigenous people, and may in fact be more important in the long run than sound economic development projects. The important point is that psychological factors are critical and must be given appropriate consideration in planning U.S. assistance programs.

*Original essay by John H. Johns.
**See "Communication and Institution Building" in Chapter II of this casebook.
Obviously, institutions established for the express purpose of satisfying economic needs will be expected to achieve economic goals. If they do not, people will lose confidence in these institutions and they will deteriorate and eventually disintegrate. If people believe economic institutions are performing their function, the institutions will have popular support.

The actual accomplishment of economic objectives within a country will not necessarily result in increased confidence in the government or its economic institutions, however. A necessary condition is that people believe progress has been made and that the progress is sufficient. What exists in the "real" world and what people believe to exist are two different things and may in some instances be widely at variance. Such inconsistencies occur frequently in developing nations.

Take for example the problem in a developing country of creating social acceptance of infrastructure-type economic projects. This sort of economic effort is essential if a developing country is to industrialize. Unfortunately, most of the projects in this category are expensive, have long term payoff, and have little direct relevance to the pressing needs perceived by the average citizen. A huge hydroelectric dam in the Vietnam highlands may be of critical importance to national development and may make the lives of coastal inhabitants much better—in the future. It is difficult to explain this to the average farmer in a way that will cause him to submit cheerfully to higher taxes to finance the undertaking. One need only study the sociopsychological problems encountered in the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) project to glimpse the problems to be expected in traditional societies. The TVA project encountered unbelievable resistance even though it was done in a modern nation where people were literate and communication media well developed.

The immensity of this problem is evident when one considers how long it takes to develop a country to the "take-off" stage of economic development. Under optimum conditions, several generations are usually required. Among other factors, how fast this development proceeds is dependent on how much the people are willing to sacrifice (or are made to sacrifice). The USSR reportedly put 35-40 percent of their national income into capital goods for some 30 years. This is exacting a heavy toll on the people. Mao Tse-tung is reported to have said that he would sacrifice four generations of Chinese to build China. He was not, of course, referring to the sacrifice of lives, but to the denial of improved standards of living so that resources can be put into capital development.

The point here is that psychological factors must be taken into consideration when designing economic programs, and the psychological factors are not to be left as a post hoc consideration that concerns selling something already in concrete, as is often the case. Rather, the psychological ramifications must be evaluated before a project is ever planned. For example, economic institutions are likely to develop more quickly when they establish tangible, realistic goals. Short term goals should be carefully
integrated with long term goals so that progress is evident. In this way, the people can realize a sense of accomplishment and pride.

Well-thought-out communication programs must be an integral component of every economic project to insure that the people understand what their institutions are doing for them. A common mistake is to assume that “good works” speak for themselves and the less said the better. Such an erroneous assumption is likely to lead at best to a failure to capitalize on the psychological value of economic projects and may even result in a psychological boomerang.

In regard to the psychological environment, appropriate resources should be allocated to the development of morale as an end in itself. More often than not, communication is looked on only as a means of accomplishing economic ends. To view it this way is a mistake that can lead to undesirable consequences.

People do have economic needs, but they also have psychological needs that are of equal or greater importance. The need to belong—to have a sense of participation and a feeling that one is accorded dignity—is powerful. Economic well-being will never compensate for a feeling of alienation among a race, class, or religious segment of a population.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to go into further detail about the choice of institutions to be developed or the extent of development desirable for any given institution. It is difficult to make generalizations on these issues in any case, for the decisions will depend on the situation in each country. Of particular concern, however, are military institutions, to which we turn next.

THE MILITARY INSTITUTIONS

The role of military institutions in developing countries is a highly controversial issue. Questions that immediately arise include: Should the military be restricted to performing a security function? Should resources be diverted to develop functions? If so, what should be the nature of these secondary functions? How strong should the military institution be? A whole host of other questions concern the benefits and dangers of strong military forces. ""Indeed, answers to these questions are fundamental to the determination of the role of the military in institution building, especially to the extent that they bear on the views of Congress toward such activities as 'civic action.'"

The military institutions of most developing countries are, like most other institutions, multifunctional. That is, they have a primary function (providing physical security), but in addition, have other secondary functions, for example, economic. Some of these secondary functions may be natural byproducts, for example, the economic impact of location of military bases. In other instances, the military resources may be used deliberately for a secondary function, for example, waterway development. Of critical concern in this study is the question of precisely what should be the priority "secondary functions" of the military. The relevance of this question will be shown in the discussion that follows.
First, consider the secondary functions performed by a military institution as a natural byproduct in the conduct of its primary mission of providing physical security. One of the most important byproducts is to broaden the "world views" of traditional societies. The military brings new ideas, values, and attitudes to parts of the developing world that otherwise have little or no contact with the larger universe. This happens as a result of bringing men into the military, exposing them to a new world, educating and training many of them, and returning them to their homes. The same process occurs to some extent where the military is operating or stationed. This cultural diffusion is ipso facto institution building in the strictest sense. It may build dysfunctional institutions or it may build functional institutions, depending on the nature of the military (or one's view of what is functional). The point is that this is a necessary function of a military institution. The only question, then is: will it contribute to national unity or will it promote disunity?

Next consider functions that the military performs deliberately as secondary functions. This includes the development of harbors, waterways, the building of dams, and the like. The U.S. Congress, as well as many military personnel tends to be concerned about the diversion of military resources for such activities. Elaborate civic action projects are often viewed as a wrongful use of military resources. This deserves some discussion.

One of the essential conditions for successful accomplishment of the primary function of providing internal security is for the security force to have the support of the people. A necessary task of the security force is to develop sufficient rapport with the people to insure that such support is obtained. Allocation of resources to accomplish this task is not only legitimate, but a requirement. The allocation of resources for this function is not a diversion of resources from the primary mission, rather it is an integral part of that primary function. Thus, if a military force assigns personnel and equipment to work in a slum, it should not be viewed as an illegal diversion of resources, but a necessary allocation of resources to accomplish a vital task.

Admittedly, the line between necessary secondary functions and functions of no military consequence is a fine one, because it is difficult to envisage military efforts in the latter category that would not result in improving the image of the military to some extent. Therefore, it is a matter of emphasis that separates the two. Indeed a real distinction actually can be made. The issue is important, however, as it relates to congressional legislation regarding the use of military assistance to support civic action projects or foreign military forces. If in fact the nation-building activities of indigenous military forces are viewed as a necessary part of an internal security mission, the objection to the extensive use of military forces in institution-building activities would be removed.

It can be assumed that the military of a country must engage in institution building to a large extent if it has an internal security mission.
The important question is, how much effort should be put into such secondary functions and what activities are most appropriate? A fundamental issue in answering this question relates to the purpose of the institution-building functions. If the primary purpose is to strengthen the capability of the military to accomplish its internal security mission, then certain types of activities might be designed. On the other hand, if the purpose is to meet the needs of the civilian population (other than their need for physical security), then the activities might be different. The two are obviously not mutually exclusive, rather they are complementary.

While economic institutions are expected to achieve economic results, the case is different with other institutions. The military, for example, has the primary function of establishing security for the nation, both from external and internal threats. It is not expected to be responsible for the economic development of a nation. The question is, then, what secondary functions should receive priority in the military of developing nations? Should the most important contribution, after security, be the improvement of the material environment? This question must be answered in a different way for specific nations, but several general factors are pertinent for discussion here.

The people of a country expect their military to be responsive to their own security needs and not be a tool of the vested interest groups. They expect the military to be sensitive to their legitimate plight. It seems, then, that a more appropriate principal goal for the military in nation-building would be the establishment of rapport with the people rather than attempting to conduct activities of economic benefit to the country. This is not to argue that the military can't do both. Actually, many projects can accomplish both. It is really a matter of emphasis and outlook, but that can have important consequences.

Rather than concentrating on the development of the material environment of the country, it is believed that a more useful function for the military of developing countries would be: (1) to build institutions, that is, patterns of cooperation among the people, at the local, grassroots level and (2) to act as a "linkage" institution to help relate the diverse elements of the society into a cohesive nation. The vast amount of civic action and other nation-building activities now being done by the various military forces provide a base for such missions, but they require a major reorientation.

In considering the development of the military institutions of developing countries, however, several factors must be taken into account. In many instances the military appears, on the surface at least, to represent the most stable institution around which a new nation can be built.

Indigenous military forces often have personnel trained in administration and have well-developed formal organizations with communication channels that reach into all sectors of the society. There are several instances where the military has been the primary institution of nation-building, for example, Israel, Iran, and Pakistan.
There are serious dangers, however, to overreliance on the military as the principal institution in nationbuilding. The most obvious, and perhaps most likely, is that the military oligarchy will not remain apolitical enough to avoid military dictatorship as has happened so often in Latin America.

Another danger inherent in the development of a strong military institution is the likelihood that resentment will be built up in the civilian population and the military will be seen as a privileged group and more than likely, become part of the “they-group.” When and if this occurs, the military will be unable to accomplish its internal security mission. This is more likely to happen in those countries not faced with a clear external threat (which tends to blind people to internal inequities of all sorts).

Resentment among civilians toward the military can be caused by several practices, some of which can be minimized. One of the most common problems is the ostentatious behavior of the military. Plush social clubs overlooking squalid slums are not likely to engender a sense of pride and national identification among “have-nots.” Likewise, the possession of sophisticated hardware costing millions of dollars, but of little apparent utility, can be expected to arouse resentment.

Even more important than the above practices, however, is the image held of most strong military forces. Once a military, police, or any other force acquires the image of a repressive force insensitive to the needs and welfare of the people, it becomes a they-group, ceases to be fully effective, and may in fact be counterproductive. Its use of power is considered illegitimate in such instances. There is a natural predisposition to view authority in this way. Purity of motive and honest intentions, good passive troop behavior, and good relations with the local power elite are not sufficient. To avoid the image of being an insensitive force, the military must take strong, positive measures to understand the world of the people and demonstrate empathy and compassion for their legitimate plight. The military forces in the majority of developing areas seem to have already acquired the image of insensitive, oppressive forces. Theirs will be a hard task to change this image, and appropriate resources must be allocated to effect the change.

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**SOME THOUGHTS ON PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS*  
BY WILLIAM F. JOHNSTON**

*Governments of countries threatened with insurgency should regard PSYOP, particularly face-to-face communications, as a first line of internal defense.

It is not the intent of this article to proclaim psychological operations as a panacea for “wars of liberation.” It is to focus attention on psychological operations as a vital instrument in Ho-Mao type wars of national liberation, especially in the early stages where revolutions are hatched from grievances of the masses by Communist incubation, kept at the right emotional temperature by thousands of native agitators. Without


149
this skillful and massive agit-prop and organizational effort, which has been characterized as "half the revolutionary task," there could be no successful "liberation wars."

Psychological operations needs more recognition as an important instrument of low-intensity conflict. It has the capability of competing with the Communist conflict doctrine which requires the integration of political, economic, psychological and military factors of power. Most especially psychological operations can be applied on a case-by-case basis in subversive, insurgency-threatened countries. Its use, however, must be carefully calculated in policy and operations to reach down to the grass-roots level.

In "Wars of Liberation" whoever gets to the people first with ideas that stimulate self-interest gains a decisive lead. . . . This is what happened in Vietnam.4

[USE OF MEDIA DISCOUNTED]

Looking at the war in Vietnam in retrospect shows that the Communists have used all available media to support their "liberation war" at all states, from instigation through armed propaganda and guerrilla warfare to conventional military operations. The more sophisticated mass media such as printed materials, leaflets, posters, pamphlets, and radio broadcasts were more obvious than the workhorse of the revolution: the agit-prop cadre who operated on a face-to-face personal basis at the rural village and hamlet levels. The use of sophisticated media in the early days was discounted because it did not seem to play an important role. What was not clearly understood at the time was that radio, for example, was communicating the Communist party line to the leadership and agit-prop cadres in the remote areas of South Vietnam who had the job of translating it into action among the masses. The actions were based on opportunities at the local level and generally consisted of study sessions, learning how to read and write Viet Cong propaganda, demonstrations, parades, rallies, and any activities which would get the people involved—ostensibly in furtherance of the peoples' interests but with the end objective of strengthening the Communist party and weakening the opposition. We did not appreciate the magnitude of the Communist agit-prop cadres—their numbers, effectiveness, or the extent to which they were able to get the people engaged in furthering Communist propaganda.

The noted expert on the Viet Cong, Douglas Pike, claims that the various social organizations created by the Viet Cong in South Vietnam and used by the agit-prop cadres were developed as "self-contained, self-supporting channels of communication" which were, in his view, the "secret weapon" and the "heart and power of the National Liberation Front (NLF)."5

Pike's study of the Viet Cong also revealed that Viet Cong "spent enormous amounts of time, energy, manpower, and money . . . explaining itself to itself, to the other side, and to the world at large;" that they
were "obsessed" with doing this. Pike found the more he studied the Viet Cong, the more "it became evident that everything the NLF did was an act of communication." Another way to say it is—that everything the Viet Cong did was calculated to gain the optimum psychological effect.

[POlicemaker and Propagandist]

In the Communist world, psychological operations/warfare experts are represented at the highest level of government and Communist party and help make policy. In the United States and most of the Free World governments, except for Nationalist China, they appear to have little status and not much influence. Several reasons for this are offered:

(1) Psychological operations/warfare, including propaganda, has a dis-tasteful image; it is thought to deal in lies and variations of the truth; it is looked upon in general as a dirty business with which few wish to be associated.

(2) Psychological operations cannot be scientifically evaluated as to effectiveness, and when an activity cannot produce fast results which can be seen, weighed, or counted, it is hard to sell. There are exceptions—when tactical psychological operations is used in situations where the beaten enemy is encouraged to surrender or in an amnesty campaign where the defectors can be counted.

(3) There are very few professionally qualified and experienced psychological operations experts who also have sufficient acquaintance with the people of a specific foreign country we are trying to help. A major reason for this is that little status, low prestige, few rewards, and/or no promotions to high level positions are based on professionalism in psychological operations. There is no special psychological operations career program. Yet, to be fully qualified professionally as a psychological operations expert on a specific foreign country is a lifetime job, not unlike the type of professionalism required of a psychoanalyst.

(4) Insurgency-threatened countries do not give enough attention or importance to psychological operations. First, they most often lack the know-how to get an effective psychological operations program started, and second, they tend to place the same sort of priority on psychological operations that the United States Armed Forces does in its support to the country. This is usually relatively low in proportion to the overall assistance given. While in the later stages of an insurgency the United States may help with the more sophisticated media such as printed leaflets, radio and/or TV, we more often than not lack real expertise in the language and ways of the people which is necessary to advise on the content of the message so as to insure that the desired effect is achieved.

The essential agitational aspect must be a completely indigenous effort based on native talkers recruited from the villages that they will operate in. This is one aspect of psywar where the United States can only give minimum advice and organizational assistance. The main burden of face-to-face education must be on the shoulders of the indigenous government and people. Another problem is how to convince an insurgency-threatened government that an uncomplicated but credible amnesty
program should be established early in the insurgency so that insurgents who have changed their minds or have doubts can find a way out of the box that the guerrilla is usually in: "Victory or Death."

[CHIEU HOI]

In South Vietnam the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) Amnesty Program is one of the GVN's most successful programs. Considerable time was required to build up credibility and to achieve the desired results. Initially, Viet Cong who wanted to defect were not sure that they would not be shot, as the Viet Cong indoctrination claimed.

The Chieu Hoi Program has shown a steady increase in the number of Viet Cong returnees since its low point at the end of 1964. In 1966 there were over 20,000 defectors, double the number of the preceding year. To date, the total defections of Viet Cong returning under this program total more than 75,000. If we take this figure in the commonly accepted ratio of ten government soldiers needed for each insurgent guerrilla, this program has saved the GVN-US a troop strength of over 750,000 soldiers. If we do a little arithmetic from the dollars-saved angle, the total cost of the program, using a cited-cost figure of $127 to bring in a Viet Cong defector, would be around nine and a half million dollars. But looking at the cost to kill a Viet Cong, which is estimated at $300,000 each, this number would have cost two and a quarter billion dollars. This is not all: currently thousands of former Viet Cong who defected are being used by the GVN as armed propaganda teams, RD [Rural development] cadres, and in other ways against the common enemy. The services of these selected Viet Cong are proving invaluable. For example, the U.S. Marines used them in their Kit Carson Scouting Program and saved many U.S. lives.

[INDIGENOUS ARMED FORCES]

The United States can and should give a higher priority to encouraging insurgency-threatened governments to develop a professional psychological operations capability. This must include personnel, American and indigenous, who can conduct face-to-face psychological operations. The latter must be able to overwhelm Communist-trained agitators in both quality and quantity of ideas related to peoples' desires and fears and get the people motivated and committed to the government.

The indigenous armed forces, paramilitary and/or police, would appear to be good organizations to undertake increased psychological operations responsibilities in the rural areas. Reasons include:

(1) These forces represent the best organized and most cohesive institutions in many developing countries, particularly in the rural areas; and

(2) In the remote rural areas better results will be achieved if the peasants know that an iron fist is underneath the velvet glove of friendly persuasion. Changing the ways of a peasant is a real challenge.

Every member of the armed forces and the police force in contact with the rural people should be trained and required to talk to them as part of their duties. This would include interpreting news and participating in
educational activities. They must also be prepared to discuss persuasively what the government is doing for the local people. But the main focus should be on specialized psychological operations units consisting of natives in the areas where face-to-face educational operations are conducted. Very important, also, is the establishment of a two-way communication system. (1) to insure that selected popular grievances and good ideas get to the psychological operations planners and decision-makers at the top level, and (2) to insure that governmental psychological operations policy guidance gets down to the lowest psychological operations level. This policy guidance must be centralized and controlled at the top, but implementation of the policy must be decentralized at the grassroots level to the maximum permitted by the skill of full-time psychological operations people. About half of the time of lower level psychological operations people should be spent in investigating and preparing so that they can tailor their talks and educational activities to fit the local needs. Once the real needs of the rural people are ascertained and transmitted to the top echelons, there is more reason to hope that the government will move to help the people help themselves. This would go a long way toward pre-empting the communist agitators from generating revolutions out of grievances, hatreds, and social injustices.

[CONCLUSIONS]

In conclusion, insurgency-threatened governments can be expected to heed U.S. advice if it is in the form of lessons learned at great cost to us in Vietnam. The most important lesson is that indigenous governments must put a high priority on psychological operations, particularly on face-to-face education and countering Communist agitators, as the first line of internal defense. They must recognize that a face-to-face psychological operations capability must be developed from the people, by the people, and for the people of each particular language group, tribe, clan, or area of the country. This takes time. Careful selection and training of candidates are required. This is not something that can be "made in the U.S.A." and exported.

The U.S. military can and should develop mature, fully qualified, professional psychological operations experts experienced in the language and the thinking of a foreign people in order to help them with psychological operations organization and management, as well as to back them up with our more sophisticated mass media. Psychological operations planners, both U.S. and indigenous, must be raised to the first team level. This is crucial for success. They must have ready access to top authorities. Top level interest and support must be translated into meaningful terms for the people at the grassroots level. Feedback from the people to the top level is equally important. This is essential to win and to maintain the support and loyalty of the people. Such a psychological operations program, in the opinion of the author, would be one of the cheapest and best security investments we could make in the developing world.

NOTES

1 It must, however, be kept in proper perspective and recognized that the Communist
Piywar instrument is simply a means to an end: Communist domination over everything that is not under Communist control. If the dominant Communist world leadership thought they could take over the rest of the world or any part of it by means of force or violence based on careful calculations that the gains would be greater than the losses, they would act accordingly. Hence, our nuclear and conventional military forces are our greatest deterrents. To circumvent the deterrent, "liberation wars" are part of their strategy to increase their power slowly and cheaply country by country, at the expense of the non-Communist world.

1 It is significant to note that General George Marshall, late in the China conflict, came to realize that the battle for the mind was waged with ideas and propagated by mass communications media could be decisive in countering the "liberation war" in China. In 1947, upon return from his unsuccessful mission to China, Marshall said, "China might have been saved by the massive use of radio and motion pictures, on a scale hitherto unheard of." William Benton, "How Strong is Russia? And How Weak?" New York Times Magazine, June 10, 1956, page 70.

2 See, Holt, Robert and Van de Velde, Robert: Strategic Psychological Operations, University of Chicago Press, 1960/64, who state that the U.S. has never fully understood the nature of the psychological instrument.

3 Stefan Possony in "Viet Cong Propaganda War," Los Angeles Times, July 11, 1967, gives a good analysis of internal propaganda based on captured documents. He concludes that although Americans are not conscious of it, the U.S. has, since 1961, been the target of a well-orchestrated and skillful propaganda offensive.

4 Radio Hanoi and Viet Cong clandestine transmitters have been an important medium for getting the Communist party line and other instructions in Communist jargon to the leadership and agit-prop cadres in remote areas-information which otherwise would have been delayed for weeks. Broadcasts were made in the five major languages used in Vietnam. Beginning in 1965 there was an increase in the use of all types of media in an accelerated propaganda offensive against the GVN.


6 Ibid., p. ix.

7 See Bjelajac, Slavko: "A Design for Psychological Operations in Vietnam," Orbis, Spring 1966, who concludes that "psychological operations are indispensable" and in a Vietnam-type war "should be accorded a priority, at least equal to any other weapon or technique in the Vietnamese protracted conflict."

8 The task of defecting a Viet Cong in the Chieu Hoi Program is primarily a psychological operations task. However, AID Vietnam plays a very important role, since AID furnishes the resources for most of the food, housing, and allowances given to the Chieu Hoi, and thus insures the credibility of the appeals which are propagated by every type of media.

9 Corsidine, Bob: "Pacification Cadres," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 19, 1967 quoting Robert W. Komer, man in charge of CORDS, (Pacification effort), it "costs us $127 per Ray-er" as opposed to Senator Richard B. Russell's estimate that the cost of killing one of them in combat works out to something like $300,000.


PUBLIC OPINION, THE PRESS, AND PSYOP

Decisionmaking and policy formulation in national governments
throughout the world are affected by domestic and international public opinion. The anticipation of public reaction, moreover, often plays a large part in major governmental policy decisions. Public opinion—in fact, a society as a whole—is reflected, directly or indirectly, in the media.

In the one hand, the wording as well as the substance of conclusions and recommendations, the logic used, the perceptions of events or ideas which have formed inputs to the logic—all reflect the social culture and recent or current developments or attitudes. The media, on the other hand, affect audience perceptions. In tone, relative emphasis, and timing, treatment of an issue may influence the audience.

Thus, public opinion on government policies is affected by the decision and by media treatment of the policy. As a result, communication with the public has become and will probably remain an integral part of military responsibilities.

THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION

BY LLOYD A. FREE

Public opinion cannot be slavishly followed, but psychological data should be collected and analyzed so that government can take this factor into account in planning.

I shall take as my text today excerpts from an exchange of letters which I am sure you read about at the time of the Vietnam moratorium in the fall of 1969 between a Georgetown University sophomore with the unknown name of Randy Dicks, who, believe it or not, characterizes himself as a monarchist, and a President of the United States with the well-known name of Richard Milhous Nixon.

As you may remember, Randy wrote the President:

I think that your statement at your recent press conference that "under no circumstances" will you be affected by the impending antwwar protests in connection with the Vietnam moratorium is ill-considered, to say the least. It has been my impression that it is not unwise for the President of the United States to take note of the will of the people. After all, these people elected you. You are their President.

The President replied in part:

There is a clear distinction between public opinion and public demonstration. To listen to public opinion is one thing; to be swayed by public demonstration is another. Whatever the issue, to allow government policy to be made in the streets would destroy the democratic process. It would give the decision not to the majority and not to those with the strongest arguments, but to those with the loudest voices.

There you have the issue joined.

[INTRODUCTION]

What is the role—the actual role and the proper role—of public opinion in international security affairs? And how, if public opinion does and should count, is majority opinion to be determined?

The assumption that public opinion, both at home and abroad, is somehow important is borne out by the efforts of political leaders to woo it and by the practices of governments. Every major government in the world today, and many of the minor ones, spend varying amounts of time,

*Excerpts from a lecture delivered at the National War College and published in Forum, Spring 1971. Reprinted with the concurrence of the National War College and the courtesy of the author.
money, and attention on attempting to influence the opinions of their own citizens and the citizens of other countries as if those opinions really counted. Yet, even in our recent history, when a sense of the importance of public opinion has become more self-conscious than it used to be, there have been unbelievers.

Harry Truman, whom I nevertheless admire as one of our great Presidents, was one of them. When Mr. Truman was presented with a problem, he would hunt around until he found what he thought to be a principle involved, often a moral principle, and then would make his decision accordingly and stick to it as you know, come hell or high water. With this as the basic approach, public opinion and opinion polls are obviously irrelevant; you simply do what you think is right.

The late, great John Foster Dulles tended to adopt this same approach. He once said in my presence:

If I so much as took into account what people are thinking or feeling abroad, I would be derelict in my duty as Secretary of State.

Not long ago another of our great Secretaries of State, Dean Acheson, claimed, disapprovingly, that Americans have a "Narcissus psychosis." "An American," he wrote, "is apt to stare like Narcissus at his image in the pool of what he believes to be world opinion." After making the point that the only honest answer people in the world generally could give to questions about the specifics of foreign policy would be a "Don't know," he concluded:

World opinion simply does not exist on matters that concern us. Not because people do not know the facts—facts are not necessary to form opinions—but because they do not know the issues exist.

Thus, we are faced with some very basic questions: Does such a thing as "world opinion" exist? Do people in the United States and other parts of the world really have meaningful opinions of any significant scope in regard to international issues? If so, are these opinions of importance to foreign relations and international security affairs? Your own instinctive answer to these questions may be an unqualified "Yes" or an unqualified "No," but after years of experience in the public opinion field, my own answer is very equivocal—namely, it all depends.

[DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS]

To start with, I must define in my one way (of course, every social scientist thinks he has to define something before he is through) some of the terms we will be talking about.

An opinion, in my terminology, is simply an expressed attitude, an attitude that is communicated.

An attitude, on the other hand, is really more of a perception—a way of looking at a given subject.

In the course of our lives, we build up all sorts of assumptions through experience, trying to accomplish our purposes; and these assumptions vitally condition what we perceive as the realities of the world in which we live. In other words, we participate in creating our own realities. Our attitudes spring from this "reality world" of ours. They are the result of
an interplay of our assumptions, shaped and modified by experience. Hence, in a very real sense, if an individual has no assumptions learned from experience concerning a given subject or capable of being related to that subject, he can have no attitudes—and hence no opinions. And any opinions an individual may express will be meaningful if, and only if, he in some way relates the subject at issue to his own purposes, no matter how narrowly individualistic or broad these may be. The range of his sense of purposes is again delimited by his “reality world.”

Every individual has his “blind spots” of greater or lesser scope—that is, subject matter areas in connection with which he has no assumptions to bring to bear, and hence about which he has no attitudes.

It is difficult for us to realize what a large proportion of the people of the United States, not to mention the underdeveloped areas of the world, have no such assumptions, attitudes, or information about international affairs.

Let me cite from a study I did in this country a few years ago. From some questions designed to test information and knowledge, it turned out that, for example, one-quarter of the American public had never heard or read of NATO; only 58 percent knew that the United States is a member of NATO; and only 38 percent knew that the Soviet Union is not a member—facts which obviously go to the very nature and fundamental purpose of our most important alliance! One-quarter of the adults in this country did not even know that the government of Mainland China is Communist!

In short, at least two-fifths of even the American people are far too ignorant about international affairs to play an intelligent role as citizens of a nation that is the world’s leader, and only about one-fourth are really adequately informed. The situation in most other countries of the world is, of course, far worse, particularly in the underdeveloped areas. For pollsters to ask these uninformed people about specifics of foreign policy is obviously an exercise in sheer futility.

Looked at in this perspective, one can begin to see the validity of certain aspects of Dean Acheson’s views and to question the common assumption that, if enough people at home and abroad are persuaded to adopt a given opinion, then the policy of their government will be affected, at least in democracies.

Before we write off the importance of public opinion in international security affairs, however, let us introduce some other aspects of the problem.

[OPINION LEADERS AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC]

First, we must recognize that when it comes to the “nitty-gritty” of day-to-day decisions on specifics, public opinion usually does not enter the case, either because the public has no opinions on the matter at issue or because the people just do not know that such decisions are being made. However, on a broad range of matters of greater importance which are publicly known, there is usually at least an educated elite which...
have meaningful opinions of varying degrees of intensity about international security matters.

This elite may be of greater or lesser size, depending upon which country is involved and what issue is in question. However, the fact that it may be small does not derogate from its power. We can meaningfully define "world opinion" abroad or "significant opinion" at home in terms of the opinion of the publics which count in the particular situation, whether limited or mass.

Beyond this, however, the broader public, or elements of the public, can and often do get into the act, not only in the United States but even in the underdeveloped areas. The people may be "ignorant," they may lack meaningful opinions on a wide range of specifics about international matters. But at certain times and places, their broader basic or implicit assumptions may come into play in such fashion as to make a given issue fraught with international consequences, a matter of public concern. Often this applies only to a minority of the greater public; frequently the people's concern is whipped up and organized for ulterior ends, whether by the Communists or by local leaders—but react they do, and often act they do.

This action may be as peaceable as signing a petition or writing a letter to the local newspaper (both of which are apt to be relatively ineffective); or to writing a letter, a personal, not a form letter to the President (as Randy Dicks did); or, better yet, to one's Congressman, which is much more likely to be of some influence. (In fact, the attention paid by members of Congress to their mail is out of all proportion to its significance as a barometer of public opinion.)

But, increasingly, more extreme manifestations of public action in the form of demonstrations, picketing and rioting—reflecting strongly held attitudes by at least segments of the public—have become a phenomenon of worldwide scope. For example, rioting in Japan and Korea made it exceedingly difficult for the two governments to normalize their relations. Demonstrations in Panama were unquestionably instrumental in causing the U.S.—after a decent interval, of course—to agree to revise the Panama Canal Treaty. Demonstrations and potential riots in the Middle East have made it difficult for the Arab governments to follow a policy of moderation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Anti-Communist violence in Indonesia strengthened the hand of the army against the Communist Party in a struggle whose outcome has had profound international implications. Anti-Vietnam protests in the United States have unquestionably affected the calculations of our enemy in Vietnam, not to mention those of our American leaders.

But the greater public also gets into the act in a more regular, generally more peaceable way, in the form of periodic elections in the democracies and even in some of the semidemocracies if not the "guided democracies." In such elections international matters can and often do enter as central issues of the campaign.
But then, one does not have to search very far back in our history for other examples: Woodrow Wilson's theme, "He kept us out of war," which helped him win the election in 1916; General Eisenhower's promise to go to Korea, which increased his landslide in 1952, et cetera. In fact, you can almost take it as axiomatic that whenever war or peace seems to be at issue, the public in almost every country will exhibit deep concern in ways that have political meanings.

GLOBAL PUBLIC OPINION

More broadly, a close study of the matter has convinced me that there are widely shared attitudes on international matters, amounting in many instances in consensuses which governments simply must take into account and can ignore only at their peril. Sometimes these are global. With apologies to Dean Acheson, there are on occasion worldwide or virtually worldwide reactions on matters that do concern us.

One occasion that comes to mind has to do with the Suez affair in 1956. I have little doubt that the well-nigh universal condemnation of the Israeli-British-French invasion of Egypt in the United Nations was supported by what can only be called a consensus of world opinion—a consensus shared even by many people in the United Kingdom and France themselves.

A similar consensus of condemnation seems to have existed over the Soviet Union's occupation of Czechoslovakia—a consensus apparently shared even by a good many people who were Communists themselves.

Another is the worldwide impact of Russia's launching the first two Sputniks in 1957, followed by its subsequent achievements in space. These developments led to reevaluations of the relative standings of the two superpowers, extending not only through official circles and elites but to general publics as well. In fact, recent data of ours show that people generally throughout the world these days rank the Soviet Union and the United States just about equally in terms of power and importance, an enormous contrast since the days before '57.

This has helped to contribute, along with other developments, to the idea that a stalemate now exists—a notion which has affected the foreign policies of most of the nations of the world.

REGIONAL AND NATIONAL ATTITUDES

Short of these global consensuses, there are basic attitudes so widely held in certain regions or areas that they must be taken into account, both by the governments which rule there and by others dealing with them. The phobia in Latin America against "American intervention" is one example. Similarly, in almost all of Africa and Asia, basic attitude patterns opposed to "imperialism" and "neo-colonialism" are deeply rooted. Another example is the anti-Israeli "set" of the Arab world; and, fortunately for us, the anti-Chinese bias in much of Southeast Asia.

In addition, there are many situations where there is a meaningful consensus of public opinion in particular countries. One is the almost universal aspiration of West Germans for the reunification of Germany.
Then there is the fear and hatred of the Germans among most Russians and Poles. Another example is the general opposition of the Japanese public to full-scale rearmament.

Finally, the American people, too, have certain fixed ideas. One is opposition to foreign aid. By now, six out of ten Americans favor either reducing economic aid to foreign countries or ending it altogether. Another is the very high degree of concern about keeping our military defense strong while at the same time, with characteristic inconsistency, more than half of the public thinks we are spending too much on defense and military purposes. In a related vein, almost six out of ten Americans think "The U.S. should take all necessary steps to prevent the spread of communism to any other parts of the free world, no matter where." Anti-communism, in fact, is clearly one of the strongest motivating factors in ideas about our international security policies.

In the face of such consensuses as these, whether global, regional, or merely national, it is evident that, in any particular country at any given point of time, there are programs and policies for which no government or leader, domestic or foreign, can engender public endorsement. In other words, the climate of opinion does impose limits, sometimes very broad, sometimes very narrow, on each government's area of maneuver. In the extreme, certain things are virtually taboo; in other cases, they are merely impolitic; in others, particularly where public opinion is either in agreement or is nonexistent, divided, or lacking in intensity, anything is possible.

Although policymakers sometimes appear blind to the fact, the achievement of many, if not most, of the international security objectives adopted by the United States presupposes certain perceptions, attitudes, beliefs, and behavior on the part of various persons in this and other countries.

Most of the time, on day-to-day matters, the individuals whose psychological and behavioral patterns are important for the accomplishment of particular U.S. objectives are confined to officials of our Government, including most definitely at least key members of Congress and/or officials of foreign governments in various parts of the world. On matters of more import, the list may include as well members of elite groups which have power or influence in our own or other societies. Often, still more broadly, at least the educated elements of the general public (the so-called "informed public") may also have a bearing on the success or failure of U.S. policies. And, with increasing frequency, our own or foreign peoples in the mass sense are proving of importance, either because popular support or cooperation is necessary for policies which contribute to our objectives, or because the people insist on making given issues matters of public concern and get into the act by way of protests, demonstrations, or periodic elections.

Thus, more often than not there are psychological requirements for the
success of U.S. policies. If these cannot be fulfilled in a given situation, then it is futile to adhere to a policy which presupposes them. Taking into account, for instance, the feelings of the majority of the Chinese people toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime in 1949, no amount of effort or determination on the part of the United States could have prevented a Communist takeover of Mainland China. As another example, for years the U.S. supported the maintenance of French rule in Algeria, despite the fact that the psychology of the Algerians—not to mention the French—made this goal impossible.

Speaking of another aspect of French international security affairs, it was public opinion, more than anything else, which forced the French military to fight the Indochinese war with one hand tied behind its back, thus making victory impossible. The French people would not condone the necessary national effort, so that the government found it impolitic even to send draftees to fight in Indochina.

The current malaise in the Atlantic community and the disarray in NATO are prime examples of the effects of psychological factors which put limits on what the U.S. can aim for.

Public opinion studies we conducted not long ago in Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany show that the economic growth of Western Europe has awakened aspirations for a role less dependent upon the United States. At the same time, from the military point of view, Europe's strength has not increased and Russia's has not diminished, to say the least; in fact, quite the contrary. Nevertheless, an assessment (psychological) has been made that Soviet intentions (psychological) do not involve major aggression against Western Europe. Only handfuls of Europeans believe any longer that there is a significant possibility of attack against them by Russia.

With the sense of common threat (psychological) largely gone, it is highly unlikely that the United States can persuade its allies to increase present NATO force levels. According to our surveys, only about one in ten Western Europeans favor increasing defense expenditures, whereas three and four in ten actually advocating reductions.

Finally, to prove what a valid prophet I can be on occasion—and, of course, I like to forget those instances where my judgment proved faulty—let me quote from a lecture I delivered in this very hall one year ago when the trends of American opinion about the war in Vietnam were still pretty obscure. I said in part:

Our own Government will undoubtedly now have to face up to the fact that the American people are sick and tired of the war. It is my considered judgment as a so-called “expert” that we are in the early stages of an inexorable tide in favor of pulling out of Vietnam. There may be riptides from time to time which will temporarily obscure the direction of the current, but it is my belief that however you and I may feel about the matter, the movement down below will continue ever more strongly in favor of disengagement.

Of course, as usual, when I stick my neck out, I had some data up my sleeve to rely on. These marked a turning point in the aftermath of the
Tet offensive. Studies of Institute conducted in this country showed that immediately after the offensive, in mid-February 1968, the majority of Americans remained "hawks." In fact, hawkish sentiment was increased in the immediate sense by the Tet offensive, favoring further escalation of the war. One-quarter advocated gradual escalation, and no less than 28 percent opted for "an all-ou crash effort in the hope of winning the war quickly, even at the risk of China or Russia entering the war."

By June of the same year—1968—the picture had changed very materially. By that time one-half of the public had shifted over to the "dove" side, with 7 percent favoring a cutback in the American military effort and 42 percent wanting us to discontinue the struggle and start pulling out of Vietnam—this latter figure being almost double what it had been just four months before.

By June of this year—1970—Gallup found that the proportion thinking we had "made a mistake in sending troops to fight in Vietnam" had risen from 25 percent in March of 1966 to 56 percent four years later. Correspondingly, by the latter date—that is, June of this year—about one-half of the people favored withdrawal, either immediately or at least by July 1971. And so it has gone.

POLICYMAKERS AND PUBLIC OPINION

The importance of such factors as I have been describing may seem self-evident, at least to some of you. But I can assure you that there is a real question about the sensitivity of our policymakers to psychological requirements having a bearing on the success or failure of our international security objectives—also a real question, more particularly, about their receptivity to the results of public opinion polls and other forms of policy-oriented psychological research. I can only speak on the basis of the direct experience of my late associate, Hadley Cantril, and myself, plus years of personal observation of the government process. However, from these points of view, I would say that the record is spotty, to say the least.

To my knowledge, for a good many years, during most of the time there has been no real problem at the White House level. ... Recent Presidents have tended to show an awareness of the importance of the psychological factors.

Oddly enough, the supreme example of sensitivity to public opinion and of consummate ability to influence it, came in the earliest days of scientifically conducted polling. I refer, of course, to Franklin D. Roosevelt. In a recent broadcast on presidential decisionmaking, Tommy Corcoran quoted Roosevelt as saying, in effect, that he was the captain of the ship all right, "but that events and public opinion...ut limits on his power, but at the same time provided instrumentalties for exerting power.

Particularly after the adverse reactions to his famous "quarantine" speech, Roosevelt was determined not to get too far out in front of public
opinion in connection with the war in Europe—nor to stay any farther behind than he thought he had to. In this connection, he followed the polls with great interest, and particularly charts of American public opinion specially prepared for him by my late associate, Hadley Cantril, showing the results of surveys he made all during this period.

[PRESIDENT EISENHOWER]

President Eisenhower was less consciously interested in domestic public opinion polls than Roosevelt. This was probably in part because he was so popular and his Administration so relatively non-controversial that he did not have to be. But I know from my own experience that he was deeply interested in the opinions of people in other countries. While working with Nelson Rockefeller in the White House as a consultant to the President in 1955, we started a series of periodic reports to him on the psychological situation abroad, based chiefly on data gathered by the research arm of USIA.

The President read these carefully and followed them with great interest. (The common notion that he did not read documents is ridiculous, in fact. Every single one of the reports I submitted to him through Rockefeller was read—and annotated—by the following morning. And this goes even for a 67 page document, single-spaced, which I know he read in full because he corrected a typographical error in his own hand on the next to the last page!)

On more than one occasion, after John Foster Dulles had given one of his masterful, lawyer-like briefings to the National Security Council (NSC) the President was heard to say, “But, Foster, you forget the human side,” pulling out one of my reports and reading from it. As a result of that, I was the second most hated man by Dulles in Washington, Rockefeller being the first!

At the time of the meeting at the Summit in 1955, my reports to President Eisenhower showed a sharp increase in skepticism abroad about America’s peaceful intentions. This helped created receptivity to an idea Rockefeller had advanced, which up to that time had been cold-shouldered—namely, the “Open Skies” inspection proposal, which, when finally propounded by Eisenhower, had as great a psychological impact as any one-shot propaganda move since World War II.

[PRESIDENT KENNEDY]

As to John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Jerome Wisener, who had an intimate relationship with him, says that Kennedy knew very clearly that his power could be exercised only if he had the consensus of the people and of the Congress behind him. As a result, Kennedy was a fervent believer in polling. He depended heavily on the findings of special surveys conducted for him by Lou Harris on domestic opinion, including international issues. He also followed closely the USIA data on opinion abroad, and on a number of occasions, to my knowledge, personally requested that certain surveys be made, especially in Latin America.

In the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs... USIA’s findings that Castro was
little known in Latin America and was generally viewed by the public
with considerable allergy, contributed to the Kennedy Administration
adopting a relatively low-keyed approach to the problems of Castro and
Castroism.

[PRESIDENT JOHNSON]

When it comes to that would-be practitioner of "consensus," Lyndon
Baines Johnson, the picture was much the same in the early days of his
administration. He regularly used Oliver Quayle to poll in the United
States, including on international issues, such as Vietnam, and kept
close at hand a thick, loose-leaf notebook, not only of the latest surveys
taken in the United States by Quayle, Gallup, Harris, et cetera, but also of
polls conducted abroad.

. . . . Following the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, I
immediately sent to the White House a report I had prepared in June of
1962, *Attitudes, Hopes and Fears of the Dominican People*. This showed
that the Dominicans, as of then at least, were the most pro-American,
anti-Communist, anti-Castro people we had found in any part of the
world. Not only did President Johnson read the report, but the White
House had it duplicated and distributed at the highest level and said that
it had proved "very helpful." I have little doubt that it was one of a good
many factors which influenced the Johnson Administration to shift from
the initial policy of exclusive support for the military junta to one of
working toward a coalition solution.

Against such "successes" as these, however, must be set some glaring
"failures," where our research findings were ignored in framing U.S.
policies. The most cataclysmic of these had to do with the Bay of Pigs
invasion. A year before this I had managed by the skin of my teeth to get
a public opinion study done in Cuba. This showed that Castro, at that
time, was overwhelmingly popular with the Cuban people. There was a
small opposition, but it was confined almost entirely to the city of Ha-
vana. Thus, whatever the expectations of those who planned the invasion,
it came as no surprise to us that there was no popular uprising to assist the
Bay of Pigs invaders. As with all of our reports, this study had been made
available to the Government as well as to the public and had actually been
sent up to the White House by the Bureaucracy. However, between the
time the report was issued and the attempted invasion, there had been a
change of administration when Kennedy came into the White House. And
our findings were not called to the attention of the new President nor
anyone on his staff when the question of invading or not invading was
being considered.

Although a "success" when submitted to President Johnson after the
Dominican intervention in 1965, our Dominican study, made after the fall
of Trujillo, was a "failure" when the results were originally made availa-
bile to the Government in 1962. On the basis of our data, we made the
following flat statement in our report:
An extremely serious situation of popular discontent and frustration, fraught with a dangerous potential for upheaval, exists in the Dominican Republic. Never have we seen the danger signal so unmistakably clear.

Yet, despite this urgent warning, the U.S. Government went ahead devising well-merited but long-range solutions to Dominican problems to the neglect of short-term emergency programs which might have helped to avoid the trouble that subsequently required intervention by the United States.

The neglect of such research findings as our Cuban and Dominican ones at crucial times in crucial situations demonstrates a fact which has become crystal clear to me from my years of experience within the State Department and of subsequent observation as a researcher and Government consultant. Unlike most of our recent Presidents, a considerable proportion of the bureaucracy of our Government, with particular reference to the State Department and Foreign Service tends by and large to be insensitive to the importance of psychological factors in international affairs. The fact of the matter is that within our Government there is no systematic collection of such data; and, despite the interest of the White House, no systematic marshalling of whatever material may be available when foreign policy decisions are under consideration.

It is not without significance that the special polling of American public opinion that was inaugurated by the State Department after World War II and was conducted under the very distinguished and able direction of Schuyler Foster, whom some of you probably know, was discontinued in the latter half of the 1950s.

As to psychological factors abroad, more than one Ambassador has echoed explicitly or implicitly the words of one of their colleagues: "To hell with public opinion! I'm here to deal with the Government, not with the public!" He said this, incidentally, while serving in a country which later went into an acute crisis because of the turbulence of its public.

It is against this multifaceted background that I said earlier that the record of our policymakers is spotty when it comes to paying attention to the psychological. Some (particularly at the highest level) have paid attention; some have not. As of today, some do; most don't.

In conclusion, let me put this whole matter into broader perspective. No responsible critic of current practices that I have ever come across has maintained that our Government should slavishly follow public opinion nor that U.S. foreign policy should be based exclusively or even primarily upon courting momentary popularity at home or abroad. Often, any government that deserves the adjective "responsible" will have to fly squarely in the face of domestic opinion while attempting to change it.

Bill Moyers, in a review of a book of mine that was published a couple of years ago, told a story that is very pertinent in this respect.

During a period of crisis, President Johnson and his advisers were meeting in the Cabinet Room to discuss alternative courses of action. At a particularly exasperating moment, when no option appeared likely to
succeed, one of the men present exclaimed wearily: "If we only knew what the people of this country really want us to do!"

The President studied his melancholy adviser for thirty seconds, then answered: "If we knew what they wanted us to do, how could we be sure that we should do it?"

Obviously, any government worthy of its name has to do what it thinks necessary for the good of the country, but its course can be greatly eased if it has public opinion on its side, which demands a knowledge of how the people are thinking and feeling and why.

Even more often, governments do and indeed must fly in the face of opinion abroad. This especially true of the United States as it pursues its role of world leadership. In particular cases, this simply cannot be helped; everybody cannot be pleased. If we aid India to rearm against the Chinese threat, we are bound to incur the wrath of the Pakistanis. We cannot assist Israel without provoking an anti-American outburst from the Arab world. We cannot fight the war in Vietnam without enraging the "doves" in many parts of the world. In every case, however, a certain price must be paid in at least psychological terms; and the point is that it should be incurred knowingly, after a careful assessment of the benefits and risks and a calculated attempt to devise ways to minimize unfavorable impacts and maximize favorable ones.

After the Tet offensive, General Westmoreland said that the effects of the offensive were psychological, not real. Well, he and his military and civilian colleagues had better learn that when it comes to accomplishing U.S. objectives, psychological factors can be just as "real" as guns or ships or planes or nuclear weapons. This is because man is always the ultimate mover and shaker, and man is a psychological animal. What he thinks is "real" is in fact real to him. It is his own particular "reality world" which provides the wellsprings for his action, his reactions, or his nonaction.

In short, my position is simply that psychological data need to be systematically collected and cranked into the overall intelligence appraisals of given situations and that at all levels of Government, these elements, both domestic and foreign, should be taken into account, among other factors, in framing foreign policies and enunciating international positions. The psychological requirements for the achievement of U.S. objectives need to be carefully calculated from the start, and every effort made, through leadership, persuasion, and public diplomacy, to secure their fulfillment.

This, it is my contention, is essential if the United States is to be effective in playing its role of leadership in today's world. And this, it is my certain belief, is imperative if the President of the United States is going to be able to lead a unified American people in the present, into the future.
EFFECTIVE PRESS RELATIONS*

By BARRY ZORTHIAN

Press relations is an art that rejects a precise formula, but consideration of certain ground rules can make the often difficult task more effective.

As a former Marine it's good to get back to Quantico. I am especially pleased to share the next hour with you talking about a subject of vital importance to Marines: The broad field of public communication—or, more precisely, press relations.

If there is a new dimension that you as commanders and staff officers must face up to in 1970, it is the dimension of communication—not as an additional duty or something to be done in spare moments, but as an integral part of your military duties. Whether you find it agreeable or not, the fact is with you and must be accepted as an area that must receive your attention.

The temptation is for us to have a nice bull session criticizing the character and nature of the press and then leave early for the club feeling that we've put in a good day's work. Let me resist that, not because I'm here as a defender of the press but simply because I think that there's not much mileage to be gained in this setting by dwelling on the shortcomings of the press. If you ask whether the press has many faults, the answer is yes, it does. But let's put the performance of the press aside for the moment and look instead at the government's performance. Under that broad heading, I want to focus in particular on the performance of the military services and the Foreign Service in the context of Vietnam.

Vietnam represents what may be the most intense point of confrontation in recent years, perhaps in all times, between the government and the press. Consider the role of each in filing reports to the home front, the impact of one on the other, the effects of this interaction on the American public and, consequently, on national policy. These phenomena are going to occupy the attention of sociologists, historians, politicians and, I hope, military career officers for a long, long time—as indeed they should, for the lessons and guidelines they can give us for the future. I want to contribute to that exercise, to distill a few of what I think are the lessons of Vietnam in dealing with the press and suggest them to you perhaps as a starting point for future dialogue and analysis on your own part.

I think it may be well when considering the role of the government in this field of communication to step back a bit in order to attain some perspective in constitutional terms. My purpose is not to give you a course in civics. But I do think that in all the heat and fury of today about

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the press, its role and its performance, the constitutional aspect (the constitutional concept, if you will) is often forgotten. Our concept of government is based in part on a free press. It is an essential, integral part of the system of government that we have chosen. The press has a role to play in that system in behalf of the public as a monitor, as a guardian, as an independent judge of the performance of the government. This is a constitutional rule, but too often, I'm afraid, it is not really understood or accepted.

The press' role in our society is one of independence. It is not a handmaiden of government, so to speak. The press does not have the duty to create or contribute support to an administration or to any of the administration's policies. Its role is one of the critic, one of passing judgment. It is perfectly within the responsibilities of the press to pass judgment on the facts—on whether the facts are accurate, on whether they're complete, on whether we in the government—military and civilian—have enough facts at hand.

Secondly, it is the press' responsibility—its constitutional responsibility—to judge also the evaluation of those facts and the decisions and policies reached by those in government.

At its best, the press performs its constitutional role in a responsible, intelligent, positive sense. At its worst, it does irresponsibly, with all the possible drawbacks and flaws that we're all too aware of. But I suggest that essential to any discussion of the problem is an acceptance of this concept of the role of the press in our society. It becomes particularly important in your case as career military officers and in my former role as a Foreign Service officer to be aware of this, because we do live a somewhat insulated life, a life detached from the normal mainstream of American society, especially when we serve overseas. And the press ends up becoming an inconvenience, an intrusion, a critic who isn't welcome.

An acceptance of the constitutional concept becomes doubly important when you consider that it's still possible today for an individual to become an ambassador or a general without ever having developed a sense for press relations, public affairs or communicating, and without ever really having had any training in it. This type of public relations course in a command and staff school is excellent, but it is also fairly new. One of the tasks facing Uncle Sam is the development of a press doctrine. It should be as much a part of the training of career officers as tactics in the military case and as political reporting in the case of foreign service.

The press media are going to be with us more, not less. We live in a world of instant communication. The flow of information to the public is just enormous. It's gone up several fold. I don't know how you'd measure it mathematically, but certainly what we and our children are getting is much, much more than even 10 years ago.
The average American today watches television for five hours a day, and of that a certain amount is news, public affairs, and so on. How long ago would you have accepted the thought that a man would walk on the moon and be watched simultaneously by 600 million people while he's doing it? Five short years ago, 10 years ago, if you'd made a statement like that, you would have been taken for a visionary. Such things could never happen!

Our capability in communicating is pervasive. It's become a much greater element in our lives. Our substantive ability has not improved equivalently; and yet, if we are to meet our present responsibilities, that ability must improve. Here, too, I suggest that we look beyond the immediate problems, frustrations and annoyances of the press and look at what is the ultimate target: the public—hopefully, an enlightened, informed public. Again, if we believe in our basic concepts of society, our government rests ultimately on public opinion. Our need, then, is for a more enlightened, better informed, more intelligent general public that will reach better judgments or at least as good judgments as possible. The channel to the public is the press. And in dealing with the questions that I'm raising, it would be well to remember that the press is only a channel, not an end in itself.

If we can start off on the basis of these few points, there are a few principles (or commandments, as I like to call them) that should be observed in dealing with the press and in becoming more effective in communicating. Number one is this basic point that I have tried to put across: respect for the role of the press; acceptance and understanding of the role of the press.

Secondly, in today's world a degree of sophistication, or candor, is necessary. The rhetoric of my generation, of World War II, is no longer good enough. In the mood of our society today, the “establishment,” the institution, is under question and is being analyzed, and in the proper spirit this is a healthy process. A gap between words, and fact—a reliance on rhetoric—is simply not adequate for this kind of a situation. I think that too often on the government side our approach to the press has been disingenuous; if not deceptive, at least misleading. This is not right in principle. You simply cannot get away with a gap between reality and your articulation of it. So the sophistication of the day—this irreverent, questioning, skeptical mood of the day—has to be taken into account and accepted as a fact of life. The issue is not really whether it's good or not, the issue is that it's there.

Let's try to put into perspective, also, the role of the public affairs officer. He is a staff officer; and, while I don't claim to present Marine Corps doctrine in this area, as a staff officer he should be used. I argue that the public affairs officer should participate in the policy-making process just as much as the G-3 or any other member of the staff.
The element of "public impact" is a factor to be taken into account in making a decision. It need not be a dominant factor, and there are many times when it will not be. But it is certainly not one that should be ignored. Very often, as many of you are aware, the ground rules under which we fought the war in Vietnam were affected by public opinion or the anticipation of public opinion.

The public affairs officer, then, should be taking part in the decision-making process and contributing his element—his dimension of the command function, to your over-all judgment. Furthermore, I suggest that he not be held to account, as is so often the case, for the failures—that is, for the negative stories. I've had a very, very knowledgeable ambassador tell me that the trouble with the Foreign Service is that it thinks it has to win all the press issues. It has to hit 100 per cent, and if it doesn't it's very disappointed. Again, it is the type of thing that's hard to measure. But if you do better than 50 per cent, you're doing well; and if you're getting 60 to 70 per cent on your side, just count your blessings and let it go at that.

The mood, the tone, the skepticism of the day almost ensures that you're going to lose a few. What a public affairs officer can do and what you do with his help and staff counsel is perhaps blunt the harm in a damaging story, making it less bad than it might be otherwise. I think that if you achieve that, you ought to be satisfied. A bad story is a bad story, and it's going to end up as such. The facts of life are not going to be changed. You can, perhaps, put it into perspective. You can, perhaps, blunt the negative impact by the way you handle it, the approach you take, and the attitude you show.

I said you can blunt and provide perspective; and I get to a next major point, which is education of the press. That sounds a bit patronizing, but it is not meant to be.

When the press is filling its role properly, it is anxious to have information and facts as the basis for a judgment. You can help considerably in that regard by ensuring that the judgment exercised by the representative of the press is as knowledgeable as possible, by giving him the information you can subject to considerations of national and military security. To provide the press with the information at hand together with your evaluation of the information is part of the necessary exercise on your part to educate and inform the press. This important principle is shown, obviously, in the various techniques used in dealing with the press—in backgrounding, in giving the press access to military expertise, and in providing all of the facts and information collected. The press is going to file its dispatches. Far better it does so, even if it ends up critically, based on accurate information than done in a vacuum or on only partial information.

Let me suggest, also, that a very sharp distinction be drawn between information and publicity. A post newspaper, an instrument of command, is essentially publicity. Information from the viewpoint of the press is quite different. The press is not there not only just not to be handmaiden,
but it is not there simply to accept releases and file them without question or without further examination. One of the headaches we used to face in Vietnam was that too many of our press officers, both military and civilian, had been plucked out of post PAO jobs where they had been involved really only in publicity (they knew the story they were writing was going to get into that post newspaper) and plunked down in the middle of the hottest, most controversial, most complex story in the world today and asked to do a real information job, a press job. The distinction is a real one. It is one I think you have to bear in mind; and it is one, certainly, that the press is aware of. When you hear the press criticizing the gap, the propaganda, the government releases, what they're really criticizing most often is the government's efforts at publicity. There are some incorrigibles who criticize even the information side. But I haven't heard any really responsible correspondents complain about the provision of information to them. Obviously, most of them would welcome it.

Finally, I'd suggest as part of press doctrine that we look at the press as an opportunity. I think there is a difference in approaching the press within a framework of positive, constructive thinking rather than as a chore, a frustration, or perhaps the last choice beyond jumping into a pit of vipers. Too often our senior commanders in Vietnam, both military and civilian, failed with the press. As a result they failed with the American public and failed to support U.S. policy by actively disliking the press and by approaching the press in terms of hostility, whatever the justification. (There was a good deal of justification. I assure you that some of these gray hairs I attribute to my friends of the press.) Nevertheless, if you put aside the individual behavior of certain correspondents and look at them as a channel, as the means to an end—and the end is an enlightened public affecting decisions on great issues in our society—if you look at the press along these lines despite the temporary annoyances and frustrations, their reaction to you might be a little more positive. Because while all of the things I say sound fine in theory, they do develop and take effect and are applied by human beings; and the element of human relations in press relations is very important. To be respected as a human being by the press is an important part of it. While you can't change your personality to fit a certain mold, you can help influence these human relations by your own attitude.

And let me suggest that in this spirit of going half way and achieving a better rapport, you learn something about the tribal customs and mores of the press; that you understand something about how and why a correspondent functions. Just as you want him to know something about your business, so he will respond better if you understand something about his.

Here is a list of a few ground rules that I referred to earlier as "commandments":

*No lying to the press.* While that isn't very often done, I do say
deception, deliberate or otherwise, has happened often enough. Being
disingenuous, not providing all the facts—there should be no deception
today. One of the aspects of Vietnam that will someday get a great deal of
examination is the “goldfish bowl” aspect, the fact that everything is
public. We not only had no censorship, I’m not sure we had much secu-

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ty. There were an awful lot of papers labeled “top secret” and so on, but
there was very little going on in the country that the press or even the
Vietnamese public didn’t catch up with eventually. It’s much better to get
out the full picture accurately as you know it rather than be cute and coy
and hold back part of it because you think it’s negative and will affect the
impression you want to leave.

Restrict security to an absolute minimum. Military security and na-
tional security have been used as a crutch too often for papering over just
distasteful, negative situations. Hold security to an absolute minimum. If
it’s not justified, it won’t last very long; it won’t be respected very long.
In terms of military security in Vietnam in the four years I was there, we
only had four correspondents who violated the self-imposed ground rules
on military censorship badly enough to have their credentials lifted. Out
of 2,000 correspondents with as wide a range as you can get in terms of
quality and attitude, that’s a pretty good record. Legitimate military
security is not going to be violated by any journalist worth his salt. But if
he thinks you are using that as an excuse for other purposes, your
so-called security just won’t last five minutes.

Establish ground rules in dealing with the press clearly and without
any misunderstandings. Be clear and then be firm on whatever the
ground rules are. Too often someone has talked indiscreetly, thinking he
was “background,” the correspondent thinking he was “on the record.”
Again, legitimate, responsible correspondents will accept ground rules.
These are tools of the trade. They should be learned and they should be
stated clearly without any embarrassment or hesitation. We just had
occasion to talk to the Commandant about something this morning. He
said, “This is a subject I cannot speak about.” Fine. Period. This is all you
need. What is not right is, “You cannot use this” or “You cannot use it but
you can’t attribute it to me” and then provide material and be surprised
when it appears in print. Just know where you stand, and how you’re
dealing with the press.

Parts of the government are interrelated. Neither the armed forces as a
whole nor a single military service nor the State Department itself nor
any other element of government exists independently today. Our world,
our society and our government are too sophisticated. There is an interre-
lationship between the press relations of one element of the government
and the others. Whether you are in a command position or a PAO position,
you cannot operate and execute your responsibilities without regard for
the impact on other elements of the government.

Your audience is a wide one. To fall back on a cliche, it is a small world.
There is no distinction between a domestic audience and a foreign audience
that means much any more. Why, our press conferences are covered almost as heavily by representatives of the foreign press as they are by the domestic press. One of the major problems you face in a place like Vietnam—and it is a problem that you've got to the conscious of—is, "Who are you talking to?" You talk to the whole world at once. Consider Gen. Westmoreland as COMUSMACV just about two years ago standing in front of the American Embassy after the TET attack. He's talking to the Marine guards who are surrounding him then after a vicious all-night battle. He's talking to his command. He's talking to the South Vietnamese people. He's talking to Hanoi, to Communist nations, to Allies, to neutrals. Finally, he's talking to the U.S. There are conflicting interests, certainly, and what is appropriate for one audience very often is not appropriate for another.

There aren't any easy answers to this. A four-star general, after a fight surrounded by a platoon of Marines who went through a hell of a night, saying, "You've won a great victory here," is understandable. Two years later you look at the statement in cold light with the perspective of two years and the effect of that TET offensive and U.S. public opinion and so on; and you say, "How can a man be so optimistic?" It leads to a Herblock cartoon which you may remember: "All is not lost; the mimeograph machines were saved!" As I say, I have no magic solution for this problem. But it is a problem that must be borne in mind. Sometimes there are ways out. Very often you've got a conflict and you've got to compromise. All I'm suggesting is that it not be forgotten that your audience is a wide one; and, depending on the issue, it can be a worldwide audience.

You must take the initiative. Finally, I'd list the need for initiative, for being concerned about getting out a study—even a negative one—in your terms, under conditions of your choosing, and in a setting that you've helped to set up. Again, this can be extremely important in the light and mood and tone of a difficult story. That first headline very often sets the tone. Provide the form—if you will, the framework—for the development and evolution of that story.

I have no firsthand knowledge of what went on behind the scenes in My Lai; but a "My Lai" would have been a negative story no matter what was done. It think it would have come out better—less negative, if you will—if the military had been in a position to take the initiative in surfacing it, to get it out under the best possible circumstances rather than having it leak out the way that it did. Bits and pieces came out, and the buildup was much longer than perhaps had to be the case. And the framework in which it came out was about as negative as it could be. So I don't say you could have gotten a good story out of My Lai no matter what happened. But it might not have been quite as bad if some initiative had been taken.

Too often in the past our philosophy has been reflected in the classic guidance to PAO's: "If asked, if you are questioned about this. . . ."
suggest that in many of these cases it's far preferable to take the initiative rather than wait for it to come to you, and that you'll end up with a better story.

Let me close with the point that I can't promise that application of all these principles I have listed will automatically bring you better press relations. For press relations is an art, not a science, and precise formulae cannot be applied. But I do promise that conscientious adherence to them will make your efforts with the press more effective; that it will make easier this critical task of communicating with the public which has become an integral part of your military responsibilities.

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CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZATION

All governments in the world today engage to some extent in psychological operations during peacetime as well as during periods of armed conflict. This chapter focuses on PSYOP organization and on the coordination of the different groups involved in international communication operations. (Chapter III deals with U.S. organization in the context of policy formulation and planning.)

Organization for these activities takes place at two levels: international and in-country. At both levels, propaganda becomes an ideological weapon of deeds and words employing various messages, media, and techniques of conveying appeals to international and national audiences.

By organization for "international communication" is meant organization within one state for communicating either with the world as a whole or with a specific audience in another country (or countries). In other words, this is the organization "at home" for communicating "abroad." For example, the American organization for international communication consists of the relationships of various agencies and departments in Washington. Similarly, the U.S. organization in Washington for international communications in Vietnam consisted of a somewhat different—because it was more specialized—series of relationships between many of the same agencies and departments.

The "in-country" organization means the communicating state organization within the country to the audience of which PSYOP appeals are targeted. This is the organization abroad for activities essentially in situ. For example, the American in-country organization in Vietnam consisted of the relationship of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) in Saigon with other U.S. activities in that country.

In all countries these psychological operations activities originate from and are conducted by agencies that vary in size and sophistication according to the priority given these activities. Some countries not only conduct internal propaganda activities, but also have wide networks of organizations reaching to all parts of the world. Centralization and coordination of tasks performed by these organizations depend on the strategic considerations and the national and international objectives and policies of the respective governments.

ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION

Coordinating all of a government's activities in international persuasion is a major problem. It requires internal and external consistency in policies formulated at the national level, and it requires a large measure of control over the institutional and informal arrangements of the PSYOP program. In highly authoritarian countries, those agencies having important roles in foreign propaganda usually fall directly under the control of the ruling organ (in the case of the People's Republic of China, for example, this function is the responsibility of the Party Central Committee), and their interrelationships are well defined. Citizens' participation
may be incorporated into massive propaganda, information, and cultural programs designed to support the state's foreign policies and its military and intelligence objectives.

In less regimented polities, especially in democratic countries, the government message may not be as dogmatic, reflecting the diversity of opinion current, or permitted, within the society. In such cases, governments may be pressed by the turn of international events into establishing a machinery for coordinating individual policies and actions. This is particularly true in crisis situations when there is need for conveying directly, lucidly, and unambiguously the nation's vital interests and capabilities in a single voice to avoid the appearance of internal schisms and indecisiveness.

Generally, however, political communications emanating from democratic countries originate from both official and unofficial agencies, organizations, and groups, and the nongovernmental communicators are free to treat issues according to their own judgments rather than those of the government. Organization for bringing issues to the attention of the world, when, is decentralized. Functional instrumentality of the government (for example, military and civilian agencies involved in the conduct of psychological operations), though their efforts are often relatively decentralized compared to their counterparts in totalitarian countries, are usually organized along sufficiently hierarchical lines that orchestration may be accomplished when needed.

**THE EXCOM AND PUBLIC DIPLOMACY**

**By G. Scott Sugden**

Public diplomacy, which can make a significant contribution to international crisis management and resolution, requires the identification, at high levels, of the country's objectives so that its vital interests, intentions, and capabilities can be conveyed directly, lucidly, and unambiguously to friend and foe in one voice.

* * * * *

During the first week after detection of the [Soviet] missile sites [in Cuba], there was no visible evidence of unusual activity in Washington. Selected members of the National Security Council and several other senior Government officials conducted an extended series of meetings in secrecy to determine the best way to meet the Soviet missile threat. By Friday, 19 October [1962], there was general agreement among the participants, who were convened as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom), that the first step should include the public declaration of a quarantine against the further introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba announced simultaneously with the demand that all similar weapons be removed from that island. Within 48 hours President Kennedy made a final decision in concurrence with that view, and arrangements were planned for its public release and implementation.

The President's address to the nation at 7 p.m., 22 October, was the first public indication that the United States and the world faced an unprecedented crisis. The domestic and foreign reaction was strong, immediate, and unequivocal. After achieving the support of its allies, particularly the Organization of American States, the President's address was followed by formal declaration of the quarantine to become effective on 24 October. While the quarantine remained unchallenged, the issue of Soviet intentions stayed in doubt until the denouement on Sunday, 28 October. That morning, Radio Moscow broadcast the text of Chairman Khrushchev's fifth letter to President Kennedy since the advent of the crisis. Through this means Khrushchev agreed with the conditions which had been set forth in President Kennedy's most recent letter calling for the removal of the offensive weapons and a "... halt to further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba."

In retrospect, it is no more possible to determine which factor contributed most effectively to the Soviet decision to withdraw its offensive weapons than it is to determine which factor was the most responsible for their introduction. However, the preponderant power of the U.S. strategic deterrent coupled with the inability of the Soviet Union to match U.S. military force in the Cuban area were, undoubtedly, principal considerations. After being triggered by the President's speech [to the nation] on 22 October in a preplanned response, the U.S. military effort involved about 300,000 men, 185 naval vessels, a 2,100 mile quarantine line, and the most massive airborne alert in world history. But military force would be effective as a deterrent only to the extent that potential adversaries were aware of its presence, its capabilities, and the intent behind its utilization. Consequently, one of the most important functions of U.S. public diplomacy during the crisis phase was to convey in a direct, lucid, and unambiguous manner to friend and foe the vital interests, intentions, and capabilities of the United States.

President Kennedy immediately recognized this need. As soon as he learned that the missile sites had been identified, he requested Special Assistant Theodore Sorensen to review all his public statements on the possible U.S. reaction to offensive missiles in Cuba. While these statements precommitted the administration to eliminating the offensive threat, the President was determined that the operation be performed without risking further misconceptions of U.S. intentions. For this purpose he made it clear that the U.S. Government was to speak with a single voice. Planning for the dissemination of public statements was charged directly to ExCom, with the President's press secretary Pierre Salinger responsible for coordination of the decisions. This determination by the President ranked many U.S. pressmen during the course of the crisis, and it eventually led to charges of news management against the administration. Nonetheless, with President Kennedy reviewing all public statements originating in the White House, the decision to coordi-
nate release of information materials was implemented faithfully and with telling effect throughout the crisis phase.

Members of ExCom frequently considered foreign public opinion when assessing plans and their possible effects or the outcome of the crisis. While the minutes of the ExCom meetings are not yet available for public record, it may be inferred from guidelines laid down for the implementation of decisions from this body that there were three principal objectives to be achieved in the field of public diplomacy during this period: first, to establish Soviet responsibility for the threat against the United States, the Western Hemisphere, and world peace; second, to convince all interested parties of the firm intention and capability of the United States to remove the threat; and third, to convince all interested parties that the measures to be used were limited to the threat, responsible in their inception and implementation, and peaceful of intent. Adjuncts to these objectives were to keep world opinion focused on the offensive weapons in Cuba, dissociated from similar U.S. weapons or commitments elsewhere, while countering critics of U.S. policy and operations.

The President's speech of 22 October provided the tone, direction, and basic source for the projection of U.S. public diplomacy during the crisis. Somber, deliberate, and firm, the speech stressed the unmistakable evidence and magnitude of the threat, the duplicity of Soviet policy in an area with a special relationship to the United States, and the resolve, but reasonableness, of the United States to eliminate the threat by whatever means were to be necessary, with a peaceful solution clearly preferred. By stressing these points, the President sought to emphasize the strongest facets of the U.S. position: the mutual threat to hemispheric security, proven Soviet guilt, and the inevitableness of the United States outbidding the U.S.S.R. in a nearby area of traditionally vital interest.

In his speech the President made the U.S. position clear. This country considered that the Soviet Union, rather than Cuba, was primarily responsible for the crisis, the resolution for which the United States was prepared to face the cost of worldwide nuclear war, including a full retaliatory response in the event of a missile launched against any nation in the Western Hemisphere. But concurrently, the peaceful intent of the limited quarantine—as an initial step toward achievement of hemispheric security—and the appeal to the regional and international organizations as well as to Khrushchev himself all indicated a balanced and temperate approach in favor of a peaceful solution. Each of these points was amplified through implementation of public diplomacy.

The importance of conveying these points abroad was reflected in the elaborate and finely timed arrangements made to gain maximum impact with the speech. In addition to the series of briefings scheduled for foreign ambassadors and the information media in Washington before and after the speech, special Presidential envoys were dispatched to inform key leaders and representatives abroad. At the same time the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) initiated a massive campaign to disseminate
the speech as the first step in its drive to ensure that explanation of the U.S. position was widely received and clearly understood overseas.

The senior official available from USIA... had been brought into ExCom during the weekend preceding the President’s quarantine speech. It was soon clear to him that the President was instinctively interested in foreign public opinion and in the vital need for everyone, especially the people in the Soviet Union and Cuba, to be aware of what was happening. With this insight and the benefit of the ExCom guidelines in mind, he organized his Agency’s efforts to promote the objectives of U.S. public diplomacy during the crisis.

NOTES

LEVELS OF COMMAND CONDUCTING PSYOP PLANNING*
BY C. K. HAUSMAN

Differences in the conduct of psychological warfare during internal defense operations, limited or general war will be in the tactical employment of the force, nature of mission assigned, and operational environment—not in the structure of the combat forces.

U.S. Army PSYOP is necessarily influenced by policy which originates with the President and flows down through the various levels of command. Within the Government there are many agencies and departments with which the Department of the Army has a special relationship in the conduct of military PSYOP. These include the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the other military services, the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), and the Agency for International Development (AID). In the case of the latter two agencies, the relationship is particularly noteworthy in the conduct of FYOP support for internal defense and internal development. The U.S. Information Agency's overseas offices are the official external informant of the United States. USIA is responsible for publicizing U.S. policy abroad, planning and conducting programs in support of other U.S. agencies, and conducting limited counterpropaganda. The USIA overseas agency, U.S. Information Service (USIS), assists military PSYOP by developing and maintaining effective local channels of communication in most countries throughout the world.

U.S. Army doctrine is very explicit concerning military/USIS overseas

PSYOP policy relationships within a host country. FM 33-1 points out this policy as:

With respect to cold war and counterinsurgency activities, USIS, guided by Department of State, possesses the overall coordination responsibility for overt U.S. PSYOP. U.S. Army PSYOP resources are often called upon to support, augment, or even substitute for USIS resources in cold war and counterinsurgency activities.¹

An example of this coordinating authority is an agreement concluded in Vietnam concerning the direction and supervision of U.S. PSYOP in that country. In a 10 August 1966 memorandum of agreement, Mr. Barry Zorthian, Director of the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), or USIS, and General Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, agreed:

1. . . . .

2. The responsibility for development of PSYOP policy and for substantive supervision and coordination of all psychological operations in Vietnam is delegated to the Director, JUSPAO. The responsibility is applicable to all U.S. Mission Agencies in Vietnam. The Director, JUSPAO, through his planning office develops physiological operations directives applicable, with Mission Council concurrence when appropriate, to all U.S. Mission Agencies in Vietnam.

3. JUSPAO serves a three-fold function of providing advice and assistance to the Ministry of Information and Chieu Hoi (Vietnamese Information Service), conducting psychological operations in support of U.S. objectives and of providing substantive (technical) supervision, direction and support of all Mission elements involved in psychological operations. Within this framework, the primary task of the JUSPAO field organization is support of Revolutionary Development.

4. . . . .

5. The Mission Psychological Operations Committee, chaired by Director, JUSPAO, consists of representatives of the Mission Agencies convened as necessary to review substantive psychological operations questions and coordinate the management of Mission, participation in and support of psychological operations programs. All Mission Agencies are represented on the Mission Psychological Operations Committee, with the ACofS, J-3 representing COMUSMACV.

6. Inter-agency support of approved psychological campaigns will be coordinated through the U.S. Mission Council, the Mission Psychological Operations Committee, or by other duly appointed representatives of the agencies concerned.

7. COMUSMACV conducts psychological operations in support of US/FWMAF/RVNAF military operations and in other areas as agreed to by COMUSMACV and Director, JUSPAO, within the context of JUSPAO guidance and directives. COMUSMACV provides advice and assistance to RVNAF psychological warfare activities, to include corps commanders for military matters.

8. . . . .

This agreement does not restrict the military psychological operator to the "parroting" of USIA phraseology. Paragraph 3 [above] notes that once broad guidelines to U.S. military forces have been established, representing the U.S. mission implementation of U.S. national policy, the only directive and supervisory authority retained by USIA is technical in nature. U.S. advisory assistance to host country PSYOP agencies has been divided into the two basic categories of civilian and military, with USIA advising the civilian agencies, and the military commander advising his counterpart.

The function of the coordinating committee described by paragraph 5 of the JUSPAO/COMUSMACV agreement is best outlined in FM 31-22
which notes that:

Coordinated planning and programming for mass communication support and advice to the indigenous government will normally be conducted through the establishment of a Country Team subcommittee for psychological operations. This subcommittee, usually chaired by the public affairs officer (PAO)—the USIS station director—in his role as primary coordinator of U.S. psychological operations activities, will be formed with representation from each of the other U.S. departments and agencies on the Country Team.

USAID, the overseas office of the Agency for International Development (AID), functions under the supervision and guidance of the Department of State and, as a member of the country team, administers economic aid abroad. While no formal memoranda exist detailing the military relationship vis-a-vis USAID, it generally follows that their primary area of overlap will be in the field of military civic action. The USAID representative at host country local levels will be engrossed in the civilian sector, centering on construction, agriculture, wage and price levels, public health, provoking safety, and other areas that generally fit into support rendered a host government in internal development.

While the responsibilities of the country team or mission members vary and are not always delineated in a formal agreement, as was the case in this example, U.S. PSYOP/CA [Civic Action] objectives, programs, and civilian/military relationships are normally established in writing for each country team. In many cases this is outlined in the country team internal defense plan. FM 31–22 points this out:

The country internal defense plan contains the objectives for U.S. psychological action, propaganda and information programs in the area, and the desired approach for advice, guidance, and coordination of the responsible indigenous military and civilian agencies.

This series of agreements then leaves the military commander—in the case of Vietnam, a subordinate Unified Commander—the PSYOP planning responsibility for both the advisory chain of command and for the units of the U.S. force structure engaged in support of the host country. Depending on the level of insurgency, size of the area of operation, and desired degree of U.S. involvement, the JCS can be expected to organize either a joint task force or a subordinate unified command to conduct internal defense operations in a particular host country. For the purpose of this thesis, the U.S. combat force so engaged is operating subordinate to a subordinate unified commander.

Shifting the scene to the lower levels in an internal defense environment, psychological operations conducted at lower levels in contested and threatened areas hold the key to success in an internal defense situation. Military and civilian psychological operations and plans must be integrated at these levels to be effective. Since the only personnel who normally can operate in hazardous areas are military, the host government forces will engage in necessary nation-building functions affecting the civilian population. U.S. Army advisors at all levels may be called upon to act for or assist other U.S. agencies having interests in the area. Actions taken by the military for the security, welfare, and betterment of the people must be exploited by propaganda and local publicity.
U.S. units and advisors planning psychological operations at local levels support specific military, civic action, security, and economic programs at given times and places. At lower levels, face-to-face persuasion and a more personalized approach are employed.

Except at higher levels of government, general or limited wars of greater levels of intensity will quite naturally alter the USIA/military PSYOP relationship in the war zone. However, since this area is beyond the scope of this thesis, the subject will not be pursued into a discussion of doctrine for this level of warfare. It is necessary, though, to consider the more conventional military PSYOP structure, as this structure will remain in all types of conflict.

The conduct of psychological operations by field army in a conventional or nuclear general war is an integral part of the field army military system, that is, it is one of the elements geared into the total combat effort. PSYOP relationships, at field army level, with the unified commander and theater army are not strictly a command relationship but merely a technical flow of policy guidance. The primary mission of PSYOP staffs at field army level is to plan tactical psychological operations. Consequently, at field army an adequate planning staff is provided to integrate psychological operations into current and projected army operations. In the planning phase of an operation this staff will have the capability to determine meaningful themes and symbols for messages for phased integration into specific field army operations.

Generally stated, the mission of corps and division psychological operation personnel is to insure the integration of PSYOP into current and projected combat operations. PSYOP personnel at these levels must be thoroughly qualified and competent to determine meaningful themes and symbols for tactical propaganda messages. Also, they must be qualified to recognize psychological opportunities and direct the immediate exploitation of these opportunities. In this regard, it should be noted that tactical PSYOP, to be effective, must be geared to a command level where the availability of intelligence provides for a rapid and detailed exploitation of a developed psychological vulnerability. PSYOP must be sensitive in response to the forward combat units and as pointed out in an ORO study, the tactical psywar effort should be oriented toward the level of micro-psywar; that is, it should be oriented to seize the favorable occasions that occur in a small scale, and for short times, in the course of combat whether or not the general situation is especially favorable for psywar methods.

Regardless of the intensity of the conflict being considered, force structures provide for introduction of U.S. PSYOP units into the area of operation and for augmentation of U.S. combat forces with PSYOP specialist teams as required and available. U.S. PSYOP units operate at higher levels, that is, at theater army and field army, and are described as:

The theater army and field army psychological operations units are area oriented and trained in the conduct of strategic or country level propaganda operations employing specialized assets for propaganda research and analysis, content development, radio and loudspeaker broadcasting, printing, and consolidation operations.
Specific PSYOP units and teams available for augmentation of a U.S. division generally are: "... authorized by a cellular TOE with inherent flexibility of tailoring the organization of teams with the skills and equipment needed for specific mission requirements." \(^{12}\)

Within the Department of the Army, and the CONUS training base, the Psychological Operations Division, International and Civil Affairs Directorate, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, directs and conducts the psychological operations training and related functions for Department of the Army. The psychological operations function at United States Continental Army Command (CONARC) is the responsibility of the Special Warfare/CA Branch, Unit Training Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. Training of PSYOP personnel is conducted at the J.F.K. [John F. Kennedy] Special Warfare Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. This center not only conducts considerable PSYOP research but also contributes to PSYOP contingency planning conducted by CONUS units.

With minor exceptions, the structure for the general conduct of psychological operations by U.S. combat forces engaged in internal defense activities will not vary from that described for general or limited war. The major changes will be in the chain of command. The division commander assigned an internal defense mission may be the senior military combat commander in the area of operations or he may be subordinate to a Unified Command, Specified Command, Joint Task Force, MAAG or Mission, a Corps Headquarters or Provision Corps Headquarters, or to a subordinate headquarters of one of these commanders. The basic differences are in the tactical employment of the force, the nature of the mission assigned, and the operational environment of the force, and not to whom it is subordinate.

NOTES
4. Ibid.
6. Ibid., p. 48.
7. Ibid., p. 49.
8. Ibid., pp. 51–52.
9. Ibid., p. 62.
11. FM 31–22, p. 78.
12. Ibid.
THE CHANGING ROLE OF BRITISH INTERNATIONAL PROPAGANDA*

BY SIR HAROLD BEELEY

Britain's international propaganda is conducted through three principal agencies whose activities are thought to be well-adapted to the requirements of a medium-sized power in the contemporary world.

In Britain as elsewhere, acceptance by the government of responsibility for the support of policy by publicity overseas and for cultural activity in foreign countries is a relatively recent development. The impetus was given by two world wars, and in the intervening years by the need to counter Nazi and Fascist propaganda. Under these pressures there were developed three organizations, each financed by the government but with varying degrees of independence in the conduct of their activities, and sometimes known collectively as the overseas information services.

The first of these is the official British Information Service, the members of which do not in fact constitute a separate service but are fully integrated in the Diplomatic Service and consequently subject to the same control. Their work is designed primarily to give direct support to current political and commercial objectives. Next come the External Services of the British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] which aim at ensuring that a British interpretation of international events, and knowledge of political and economic developments in Britain, are available in all parts of the world. While subject to directives concerning the languages in which it is to broadcast and the apportionment of its resources, the BBC is left entirely free to determine the content of its programs. Similarly with the British Council, the chosen instrument for the conduct of Britain's cultural relations: the government plays a part in determining in which countries it will operate, but it has full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of its work.

AIMS OF THE THREE AGENCIES

The most obvious contribution of these agencies to the conduct of national policy is that of the Information Officers and of the BBC in ensuring that the purposes and decisions of the British government are explained, and misunderstanding of them removed, as widely as possible. Secondly, the same two agencies play a valuable part in promoting exports, both by directing attention to specific commodities or processes and by advertising Britain as a country in the vanguard of technological progress. The Duncan Committee, reporting in 1969, recommended that in future this should be regarded as the primary task of Information Officers. The third principal purpose, in this case primarily of the British Council, is to further the knowledge and use of the English language. This is an asset, held in common with the United States and the nations of the old Commonwealth, of a kind which no other external publicity services

possess on a comparable scale. English is rapidly becoming a worldwide second language (taking over, for example, from Russian in China and from Dutch in Indonesia), and the demand for instruction in it is apparently limitless.

DIRECTION OF EFFORT

Many problems are faced, consciously or unconsciously, in determining how the limited resources of the three agencies are to be deployed. Are better results produced by a high degree of concentration on selected targets, or by a wider dispersion? Is the national interest better served by consolidating relations already friendly, or by developing channels of communication in a hostile environment? In fact, the direction of Britain's effort has been largely shaped by historical developments.

Thus, the Drogheda Committee, which in 1954 made the first comprehensive survey of British policy in this field, was deeply influenced by the immediate political context of its work.\(^1\) As the Duncan Report pointed out fifteen years later:

The Drogheda Committee saw a need for intensive political and propaganda effort during the period of decolonisation in order to establish good relations with new Commonwealth countries; to counteract the danger of communist penetration of newly independent countries; and to counter criticism in the United Nations and elsewhere of the United Kingdom as a colonial power.\(^2\) Consequently, the Drogheda Report recommended a reduction of effort in Europe and a greater concentration on the developing world. In its turn, the Duncan Committee was similarly impressed by the national preoccupations of its time. Foremost among these were the balance of payments and the movement toward entry into the Common Market. It was therefore not surprising that this committee advocated both a higher priority for commercial publicity and a shifting of effort toward Western Europe.

In fact, enquiries of this kind are seldom dramatic turning-points. As a general rule, they gather up and reflect tendencies already at work, contribute to the necessary adaptation of the structure of the services, and thereafter suffer a gradual decline of influence as new circumstances create new priorities. Thus, the explicitly negative attitude of the Drogheda Committee toward Europe has already been counteracted, and the more pervasively negative attitude of the Duncan Committee to the world beyond Western Europe and North America is unlikely to have any revolutionary effect.

The former dependencies in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean, now linked to Britain by the looser ties of the Commonwealth, form so substantial a part of the developing world that in much British thinking the two concepts have a tendency to overlap. In practice, moreover, the manifold surviving links—similarities of administrative and educational systems, customary exchanges of personnel and, above all, the English language—will ensure that a high proportion of available resources continues to be devoted to the new Commonwealth despite the loosening of political ties.
THE BRITISH COUNCIL

This concern for the new Commonwealth applies particularly to the British Council, in part because of the administrative arrangement under which approximately one-third of the public funds allocated to the council comes from the budget of the Overseas Development Administration. The reason for this is that much of the council's educational work is classified as technical assistance and is indeed fundamental to the technical assistance programs as a whole. And of these, the new Commonwealth has a major share.

Nevertheless, the council works on as broad a front as its financial resources permit, and is active in about eighty countries. One of its basic problems, the disproportion between the demand for the teaching of English and the limited personnel available, is being met by concentrating on the training of local teachers—or even the training of teacher-trainers—in cooperation with the Ministries of Education. Another economy in the use of scarce personnel is achieved by the provisions of educational television officers. Closely associated with this primary task, though broader in their appeal and their uses, are the libraries which the council maintains in more than fifty countries. These are also relevant to another principal function, the promotion of contacts between British representatives of the sciences, arts, and professions, and their overseas counterparts. To these exchanges must be added the award of scholarships and bursaries to British universities and other institutions of higher education. The council scholars form only a small fraction of the seventy thousand overseas students in the United Kingdom, though many of the others receive help of various kinds from the council's headquarters in London and its score of regional offices in university towns.

It would be misleading to concentrate on the British Council's function as a channel for the outward flow of educational aid at the expense of its instrumentalities in the promotion of cultural relations. An essential part of this is the arranging of both inward and outward visits by a great diversity of scholars and experts. It also includes the aspect of the council's work which is most widely known, and also most exposed to criticism on financial grounds—the presentation abroad of British drama, ballet, music, painting, and sculpture. These activities, which include events of spectacular impact like the performance of Sir Laurence Oliver with the National Theatre at Expo 67 in Canada, and of the Royal Ballet against the background of the Pyramids of Giza during the city of Cairo's millenary celebrations in 1969, accounted for only 8 percent of the council's budget in 1969/70. Critics of this expenditure include many who are impressed by the magnitude of the educational challenge to the council and deplore any diversion of its effort. Happily, a broader view of the British Council's responsibilities has usually prevailed. The latest enquiry, that of the Duncan Committee, led indeed to the conclusion that there should be a change in the balance of activities in favor of "cultural manifestations."
The staff of the council is entirely distinct from the diplomatic service, and most of its offices abroad are in premises separate from those of the embassy or High Commission. In a few cases, for reasons arising from local practice or conditions, the council's representative has the rank of cultural attache and operates from the embassy. But where this is necessary it is accepted with reluctance, for the council rightly attaches importance to being able to demonstrate its independence. In this way it has largely succeeded in avoiding the suspicion that its services have political strings attached to them, in establishing truly objective relationships on a basis of common intellectual interest, and in continuing its work without serious setbacks through periods of political tension. Undeniably, the British Council is an asset which weighs in the political balance, and indirectly it must make some contribution to commercial relations also, but these incidental benefits do not provide its motivation. It succeeds by the single-minded pursuit of its cultural objectives.

EXTERNAL SERVICES OF THE BBC

Independent control and concentration on specific professional objectives are similarly the characteristics and the strength of the External Services of the BBC. Their international standing depends above all on the reputation they have built up over the years for accuracy and detachment in the presentation of news. In seeking to maintain this standard of objectivity and high level of credibility, the BBC has sometimes caused inconvenience to the British government, but this is a price which has to be paid in the short run for a long-term asset of national importance.

Short-wave radio is often dismissed as a factor of diminishing importance in international communications. It is true that the spread of television is tending to reduce the popularity of radio listening, to say nothing of the prospect that television may acquire a new international significance in the next decade through the use of satellites. Nevertheless, it is estimated that the number of radio receivers in the world increased threefold between 1955 and 1969; a substantial audience still exists, and in certain areas or in certain conditions radio is the only feasible means of communication with a foreign audience. The BBC therefore continues to carry out a program of capital development designed to improve the audibility of its signals over the widest possible area and to extend the range of its medium-wave coverage.

In 1969, the BBC still ranked immediately behind the services of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China in the number of program hours of external broadcasting. Programs go out in some thirty-five languages, ranging downward in length from the ten hours a day of the Arabic Service. The Duncan Committee expressed an opinion which is receiving increasing support when it stated "that the long-term advantage lies with broadcasting in the English language, and that broadcasting in foreign languages is of lower priority." One reason for this is that English programs, which are evidently capable of being heard in more
than one country, are less exposed to the suspicion that they have a propagandist purpose than are programs obviously limited by language to a single target. Another is that a high proportion of those who wish to hear a British point of view are likely to understand English and prefer to hear it in that language. Certainly the BBC would still be performing a task of national importance if it transmitted its external services in English alone. But these arguments are not thought to have destroyed the case for foreign-language broadcasting except in a few marginal instances, and the Duncan Committee itself recognized that there were important exceptions to its general principle. Among these it mentioned Eastern Europe, and for similar reasons it might well have included China. Wherever there are obstacles to the free flow of information, the importance of radio—in the vernacular as well as in English—is obviously enhanced.

THE OFFICIAL INFORMATION SERVICES

In closer support of government policy, and under the direct control of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, are the Information Officers of British embassies and other diplomatic missions. Information staffs abroad, which had been built up to substantial numbers, particularly in the major Commonwealth posts, have been appreciably reduced in recent years, a process which seems likely to continue and which is assisted by a changing view of their functions. Less emphasis is being given to the distribution of printed material to more or less extensive audiences, and more to the establishment of personal relations with leading editors, journalists, and others concerned with relevant information media.

To a certain extent, this marks a return to the traditional concept of a press attache working closely with the political section of his embassy and concerned not with propaganda but with ensuring that the best possible relations are obtained with the press, a process in which he may receive as much information as he imparts. The Plowden Committee, writing in 1964, observed that:

The qualifications required in an Information Officer at policy level are not primarily technical. What an Information Officer needs first and foremost is close collaboration with political and commercial colleagues, an appreciation of what they are trying to achieve, and the personality and ability to put this over at this particular post. An Information Officer must be, and be seen to be, a full member of the Embassy or High Commission team. If he is seen to be in the confidence of the his colleagues and, above all, of the head of his post, his effectiveness is that much the greater.

Even functioning in this way, the Information Officers do still require an adequate supply of material and a variety of expert services. These are provided by the Central Office of Information in London. This office is not a policy-making institution but a professional organization supplying publicity material and services to government departments for use both at home and abroad.

CONCLUSIONS

There are thus three forms of officially supported activity which can be brought within a broad definition of propaganda. But even the one which serves government policy most directly and immediately does so within a
tradition of objectivity. The office of the British Information Service in New York, for instance, gives a wide distribution in the United States and Canada to a daily summary of British press comment—which is often, on balance, highly critical of the policies of the government of the day. The BBC, also concerned with immediate political and economic issues, jealously guards its right to treat them according to its own judgment and not that of its paymaster. The British Council is, by the nature of its work, exempt from these considerations. While the results of what it does may be far-reaching in terms of national prestige and in facilitating political objectives, its conscious aims are justified in purely cultural terms.

On these three instruments of national purpose, together with the external division of the Central Office of Information, the British taxpayers are spending about £37 million in the current financial year (1971). There are some who justify this on the ground that they provide a means of maintaining British influence in spite of military reductions and at a much smaller cost; they feel, in other words, that these should be regarded, not as an adjunct of power and consequently of diminishing importance, but as a substitute for power and therefore of greater importance now than ever before.

This view implies too simple a relationship between power and influence. On the other hand, it has the merit of recognizing that military strength is no longer so reliable a measure of influence as was the case before the rise of the superpowers had its leveling effect on other nations.

What now matters more to a medium-sized power is its economic productivity, its political skill, and its intellectual achievement. And the influence it wields must depend to an appreciable extent on the success with which it brings these qualities to the attention of the world at large.

NOTES


THE ORGANIZATION OF OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS ABOUT THE NIGERIA-BIAFRA WAR*

By Morris Davis

A description of government communications during a prolonged crisis, this article provides an example of the conflict and disorganization that is often unseen to those who witness only the final output.

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Whether the world-wide buzz of concern that accompanied the Nigerian-Biafran conflict constitutes an analytic system depends upon both the strictness of one's criteria and his interpretation of relevant facts. If characteristics like centralized planning, efficiency in overall

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maintenance and adaptation, and close mutuality of interaction are thought necessary, the cross-national conversations about the war obviously fall short. Yet what occurred was clearly not without headquarters and decision points, without some thematic continuity and situational flexibility, or without action in one place often affecting far distant communications sectors. The process might perhaps best be called a quasi-system. Sometimes intended messages got through to intended receivers. Often they did not; or else they were intercepted by others, who used (and misused) them in various ways. Groups tried to coordinate their separate efforts on occasion, though the results were usually more impressive in projection than performance. More frequently ostensible allies were really cobeelligerents, opposing the same enemy on different grounds and in differing ways. With the war cruelly protracted over two-and-a-half years, casts of discussants also changed considerably, their range fluctuating as the horror that succeeded indifference was succeeded in turn by boredom and by a final brief apprehensive surge. Nor were even the crucial communicators invariably allied or attentive.

Although individual messages conveyed abroad by the Nigerian and Biafran governments were often carefully preplanned and professionally constructed, their ensemble on both sides lacked programmatic coordination. The Nigerian government's low regard for externally oriented messages helps explain its shortcomings in this respect; so also do divided ministerial responsibility between Information for the printed word and Communications for broadcasting, struggles (of quite long standing) between Information and External Affairs for control of the propaganda function in embassies and high commissions, tendencies of field commanders to short off their mouths, and the junta's failure to adopt a consistent attitude toward the importunings of foreign reporters. Biafra... stressed its information services more, but the very enthusiasm and ubiquity of its efforts imposed difficulties. Radio broadcasts primarily designed to encourage the home audience were monitored by news agencies, and their relatively flamboyant content could be used to cast doubt on the more sober accounts Biafra distributed through its special representatives abroad or through printed press releases. The welcome Biafra accorded to a diversity of temporary foreign observers further increased the likelihood of inconsistencies; and so also did the potentially incompatible goals of military advantage and famine relief, of power politics and humanitarian appeal, that the leadership was simultaneously pursuing.

Nigeria and Biafra communicated directly with the outside world through their own offices abroad, Nigeria acting as a regular network of embassies, high commissions, and consulates, Biafra relying upon a far smaller number of special representatives. Even those observers friendly to the Federal side generally agree that its diplomatic corps was ineffective in articulating Nigeria's case. The criticism particularly applies to the
higher ranking officials, their appointment (Brigadier Ogundipe's in London, for example) usually reflecting complex political factors rather than any demonstrated expertise in communication. First Secretaries responsible for information tasks were more skilled in these matters, but their assistants were often woefully inadequate. As a consequence, Nigeria's information service often impeded the flow of ideas: it was even leery of distributing its own pamphlets to anyone who might not be a "friend." Its employees behaved lethargically under normal circumstances and tended to become catatonic under pressure. Biafra's special representatives abroad, by contrast, gave primacy to communications. They established fairly close ties with local pressure groups, friendly legislators, sympathetic newsmen, and various religious and eleemosynary leaders. Despite their spotty organization, they apparently provided greater amplification for Biafra's views than did Nigeria's diplomatic corps for those of its regime.

Nigeria and Biafra both purchased the assistance of foreign professional communicators in order to disseminate their views more effectively outside their homeland. Public relations consultants... were particularly [used]. Their work, however—that, for example, of Galitzine and Partners or Burson-Marsteller Associates for the Nigerians, of H. Wm. Bernhardt and Ruder & Finn for the Biafrans—involved them in pressure group behavior more often than in sophisticated communications masterminding. Output was limited almost entirely to general written materials (news releases, pamphlets, periodicals) and face-to-face conversations. No substantial media budgets were available. No centralized control over an entire long-term publicity effort was ever contemplated, let alone attained. Instead, the interplay between government (especially its Information Ministry) and external consultant was frequently laced with antagonism and mistrust. Officials in the (Biafran) Overseas Press Service habitually referred to Bernhardt's Geneva operation as "our post office," while a wish frequently expressed in Geneva was that Radio Biafra burn down. It was similarly an open secret in London that the consultancy retained by the Nigerians was usually strapped for both information and money, and that the telexed messages between "INPURECO" and "VERACITY," (as Galitzine's and the Lagos Information Ministry styled themselves) hardly crackled with good will.

Such tension was unfortunate, since the two governments had—rather luckily, given their haphazard search procedures—managed to employ skillful consultancies. The firms were severally capable of adept communication with general publics, the press (this was Bernhardt's specialty), business groups, legislators, executive assistants, and other relevant actors. Yet they were constantly hampered, in their view, by the erratic preferences of their client state, tenuous lines of access to policymakers, the imposition of impossible demands, and persistent shortages of funds. This last was especially serious; for, however much a public relations firm might believe in the rightness of a client's cause, it was not running a
charity show. Sometimes, expense statements seriously in arrears would cause operations virtually to close down. But equally debilitating over the long haul were niggardly budgets and inadequate fees that might lead a consultancy to terminate its contract, reduce important programs, or supplement its official retainer with money raised covertly from private sources. To avoid these breakdowns, public relations firms often labored hardest not to reach external targets but to convince their government employer about the worth of their activities and utility of funding them more amply.

* * * *

The quasi-system of communications about the Nigerian-Biafran War reflects, then, largely voluntaristic behavior. People and organizations on their own cooperated and listened to others, or failed to cooperate and listen. The networks were manned by converging and diverging allies, cobelligerents, enemies of the same enemy. Even rivals—the governments of Biafra and Nigeria, the hired public relations firms, the various championing friends, numerous reporters and essayists—kept looking over their shoulders at one another, so that the Nigerian and Biafran efforts were in fact both part of a single semi-structure. But the voluntarism so frequently in evidence also meant that activities would follow no unified master plans, that messages would get lost or newly interpreted, and that particular centers of influence would insist on doing their own thing in their own way. The result was shifting patterns of practice that may appear kaleidoscopic and chaotic, but that also reflected great effort, enthusiasm, and buoyance. In obvious humanitarian ways for Biafra and more subtle political ones for Nigeria, these activities managed, despite their malintegration, to . . . [cross the threshold to] induce a world-wide reaction of concern for the war and its consequences . . . So heightened and sustained a response is highly unusual. That people cared so greatly about the Nigeria-Biafran War seems largely due to the structuring of international communications about it, a structuring that no single power center could will into existence and for which a multitude of persons and groups deserve great credit.

AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR PEKING’S FOREIGN PROPAGANDA, INFORMATION, AND CULTURAL PROGRAMS*

BY THE 7TH PSYOP GROUP

In Communist countries, mass organizations, controlled by agencies of the state, act as communication vehicles engaging in a wide variety of propaganda activities, involving cultural as well as information programs, to advance national political, military, and intelligence objectives.

In Communist China, the Party, Government, and PLA, as well as the various “mass organizations,” such as “friendship societies” and “people’s associations,” are all actively engaged in massive international prop-

aganda, information, and cultural programs designed to support the
PRC's foreign political, military, and intelligence objectives.

Since the Cultural Revolution badly dislocated the Party apparatus and
virtually disrupted government operations, the outside world has expe-
cienced difficulty in getting reliable information on the existence and ac-
tivities of those Party offices, government departments, PLA units, and
“mass organizations” that previously were charged with planning and con-
ducting international propaganda, including political warfare. On the
basis of pre-Cultural Revolution organization charts, supplemented with
the latest, but incomplete, information, the following offices and organi-
izations seem to be directing Peking’s foreign propaganda, information,
and cultural programs.

Under the Party Central Committee, there are, at least in the organi-
zation chart, the following departments that have an important role in
foreign propaganda: the Propaganda Department, the Foreign Intelli-
gence Department, and the International Liaison Department.

Under the supervision of the Propaganda Department are the official
Party paper, the People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), and the Party theoreti-
cal organ, the Red Flag (Hongli). The two journals have appeared
regularly and carried articles and announcements of major importance

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The International Liaison Department has the overall responsibility of
maintaining liaison with Communist parties throughout the world.

The Social Affairs Department of the Central Committee, while out-
wardly not involved in foreign propaganda, is known to have had enorm-
ous power in conducting both overt and covert activities in the fields of
intelligence-gathering and propaganda-disseminating, as well as subver-
sion and infiltration; such activities necessarily would reach beyond na-
tional borders.

In the State Council, the following ministries and commissions, in
performing their respective functions, have directly or indirectly had an
important role in planning and directing foreign propaganda, information,
and cultural programs. They are the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
the Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries, the Commis-
sion for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, and the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Commission. In addition, there are a number of special
agencies of the State Council that deal with, on an operating level, foreign
propaganda, such as the New China News Agency (NCNA), [which
compiles information collected by its correspondents abroad and dissemi-
nates it through various media, including Radio Peking] the Broadcast-
ing Affairs Administrative Bureau; and Foreign Language Publications
and Distribution Bureau. The Culture Ministry has under its control the
Film Administration Bureau and the Bureau of Publications.

* * * * *

The several geographic and functional departments of the Foreign
Ministry undoubtedly are engaged in foreign propaganda, information,
and cultural programs in their respective areas of activity, but the one that is chiefly concerned with gathering foreign information and disseminating foreign propaganda is the Information Department.

In the Defense Ministry there is a Foreign Affairs Department, which is charged with supervising military missions abroad. While the General Political Department (GPD) of the Defense Ministry has as its main function the carrying out of political warfare at all levels in the PLA, the GPD undoubtedly also engages in foreign propaganda and psychological warfare programs. During the peak of the Cultural Revolution the PLA General Political Department appeared to have been abolished.

The Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries are also engaged in some sort of foreign propaganda because trade and economic assistance activities, in Communist countries, are inevitably designed to influence the policy of the target countries and to increase Peking's standing there. The Ministers of Foreign Trade and of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries are mainly to implement PRC international trade and economic assistance programs [whose director] usually represents the PRC in major trade and economic aid talks both at home and abroad.

The Commission for Cultural Relations, as its title indicates, is the principal Chinese Communist agency that plans and conducts cultural programs directed at improving foreign relations, Communist as well as non-Communist. Under the Commission is the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which is responsible for international people-to-people programs.

Another agency previously active in the PRC's "people-to-people diplomacy," the Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs, was reported to have resumed its activities which seemed to have been suspended since the Cultural Revolution. A news dispatch carried in the 12 May 1971 issue of the South China Morning Post, reported that the Institute cabled the leader of the Australian Labor Party, Gough Whitlam, welcoming the forthcoming visit of his party's delegation to China. The Institute was established to conduct relations with countries that do not have diplomatic relations with the PRC.

The Overseas Chinese Commission, established in October 1949 soon after the formation of the PRC, appeared to have suspended its activity during the Cultural Revolution.

The Broadcasting Affairs Administrative Bureau, which controls and operates the PRC's broadcasting and television system, was established in November 1954.

As said in the above, the government apparatus, as represented by the State Council (cabinet) on the national level, was badly disrupted during the Cultural Revolution; the outside world was only able to piece together the available information, fragmentary though it was in many aspects, to try to get a clearer view of the reconstructed State Council.
In mid-1971 there appeared several news reports from Peking which indicated that two new organizations, the Science and Education Group and the Culture Group, were formed in the State Council—presumably directly under Premier Chou En-lai. Each of the two groups seems to supervise and coordinate the work of a number of related ministries. The Culture Group apparently has under its purview: the Ministry of Culture, the New China News Agency, the Broadcasting Affairs Administrative Bureau, and the Foreign Language Publications and Distribution Bureau.

Before the Cultural Revolution, there were a number of General Offices that, acting as the eyes and ears of the Premier, supervised and coordinated the activities of related ministries. The General Offices were apparently abolished during the Cultural Revolution and have not been restored, and the above-mentioned Groups obviously were established to carry out the functions previously performed by the General Offices.

*RADIO FREE EUROPE*

**BY JAMES R. PRICE**

*A description of the organization, policy, and procedures of RFE.*

**ORIGINS**

Radio Free Europe [RFE] owes its birth to the reaction of a number of prominent Americans—in and out of government—in the face of the Soviet Union's rapid post-war moves to establish complete hegemony over Eastern Europe. Imposition of the Berlin Blockade and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia in 1948 were but two of the more sensational manifestations of Soviet policy which, in Eastern Europe, was characterized by a massive Soviet military presence and the shutting-off of the population (more than 100 million people) from outside contacts. The Iron Curtain was built of censorship, pervasive secret police systems, strictest border controls, and the monopoly of all means of public communication by Soviet-controlled Communist regimes. As a result, the population living behind the Iron Curtain at that time "heard only Communist ideas, listened only to Communist radios, read only Communist newspapers and books, saw only Communist movies, and learned about the outside world only from material slanted for them by the Communist propaganda operators."

* * * * *

By the end of 1951 RFE had in operation three powerful transmitters in Germany and one in Portugal. One of these transmitters was a 135 kilowatt medium wave unit broadcasting a full day’s schedule to Czechoslovakia. The others provided strong short wave signals into Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary. New headquarters facilities in Munich facilitated the preparation of more program material there instead of in New York, and total broadcast time increased considerably. By the mid


197
1950's, RFE operations reached a peak of some 18–20 hours per day of broadcasts through some 29 transmitters to Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, with about half that quantity of material beamed to Bulgaria and Rumania.\(^2\)

**CURRENT ACTIVITIES**

Today, Radio Free Europe broadcasts average 15 hours per day to the five Eastern European countries concerned. Czechoslovakia is the target of more than 20 hours daily; Poland and Hungary receive about 19 hours every day, while Rumania and Bulgaria receive smaller amounts of attention, respectively 12 and 7½ hours of RFE programming per day.\(^3\) This active broadcasting schedule is beamed over some 32 active and stand-by transmitters in West Germany and Portugal. According to RFE spokesmen, however, only four of these transmitters are modern, high-power (250 kilowatt) equipment, installed in Portugal in 1964. The remainder date from 1954 or earlier, and are said to be underpowered. While RFE has stood still in power transmission for the last 7 years, the proliferation of world-wide short-wave broadcasting operations by the USSR, governments in both East and West Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia has resulted in an increase in the number of higher-power (200 kilowatt or better) transmitters from a handful to nearly 250 in operation or on the way. Free Europe, Inc. President William P. Durkee has contended:

> Both the jamming and a growing interference from neighboring broadcast frequencies operated by other international broadcasters has led to a steady erosion in the technical quality of RFE’s signal...\(^4\)

**NON-BROADCAST OPERATIONS**

Although broadcast operations have always been the largest and most important activity carried out by Free Europe, Inc.,\(^5\) two other instrumentalities have also played a role in achievement of the broader purposes originally envisioned by ... the founders of the organization. These instrumentalities were (1) the Free Europe Press which, until the fall of 1956, engaged in balloon leaflet operations behind the Iron Curtain, and has also carried out various other publishing activities; and Free Europe Exile Relations, which was set up to maintain contact with and support of various exile political and professional organizations such as the Assembly of Captive European Nations and others. At the present time, however, Free Europe, Inc. has divested itself of all activities except the broadcasting and research programs of Radio Free Europe. Two staff members within the Free Europe, Inc. headquarters are responsible for tying up any loose ends remaining from the terminated exile relations program, and even these are being phased out.

**CORPORATE STRUCTURE**

Radio Free Europe is the major, and soon-to-be-sole, activity of its parent organization, Free Europe, Inc. Free Europe, Inc.—the corporate successor to the original National Committee for a Free Europe—is a private, non-profit membership corporation organized under the laws of the state of New York. Overall direction is exercised by a Board of
Directors of nineteen prominent U.S. citizens. Corporate headquar-
ers are at 2 Park Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016.

Fund-raising from the private sector is conducted through a sister
corporation, Radio Free Europe Fund, Inc. Directors of Free
Europe, Inc. and the RFE Fund, Inc. are the same persons, but the
general membership of the two corporations is not identical.6

The RFE Fund, Inc., is an outgrowth of the Crusade for Freedom,
organized in 1950... to conduct public relations and fundraising for the
Free Europe Committee. In 1953, the Crusade became a project of the
American Heritage Foundation, which it remained until July of 1955,
when it again became independent.

FACILITIES AND STAFF

Although the corporate headquarters is in New York, and the Presi-
dent and Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. exercise ultimate
control over the entire operation, most of the day-to-day activities of
Radio Free Europe are carried out in a largely autonomous manner at the
RFE headquarters in Munich. The Director of RFE, located in Munich, is
responsible to the President of Free Europe, Inc., for the overall direc-
tion and management of all broadcasting and related operations, includ-
ing the Munich headquarters and all field components. The latter include
not only news bureaus in 10 major European cities, but the New York
bureaus of each of the five Broadcasting Departments (Polish, Czechos-
lovak, Hungarian, Rumanian, Bulgarian) which make up the Radio Free
Europe network as well as the transmitting and monitoring sites in
Germany and Portugal. Organization charts, depicting the structure and
interrelationships of Free Europe, Inc., Radio Free Europe, and the
RFE Fund, Inc., follow.

NEW YORK

In New York, the President of Free Europe, Inc. and his supporting
management and fiscal control staff number some 29 persons, including 7
persons managing the affairs of the RFE Fund, Inc. In addition, five
security guards bring the New York corporate headquarters staff up to
34 full-time personnel; one part-time employee rounds out the overall
total to 35.

This staff performs the normal functions of a corporate headquarters,
i.e., various administrative and policy support functions. In addition,
another 98 persons in New York work directly for Radio Free Europe.

EUROPE

The operational headquarters of Radio Free Europe is located in
Munich, where approximately 970 persons operate five separate broad-
casting services to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, and Bul-
ORGANIZATION FREE EUROPE, INC.
RADIO FREE EUROPE FUND, INC.

Board of Directors

PRESIDENT
(1,654)

RADIO OPERATIONS

EXILE SUPPORT

PRESIDENT'S OFFICE
(28)* [sec]

RADIO FREE EUROPE
(1,611)

SEPARATE CORPORATION

Munich
New York
Portugal

(Phased out)

Management and Fiscal Control:
President's Office ............... 9
Reporting .................. 6
Fiscal Control ............... 7
Subtotal ................... 22
Security and Guards – NY Office .... 5
Permanent .................... 27
Part-time ..................... 1
Total ....................... 28
garia, and where a large research staff builds and maintains extensive political, economic, and biographical files on the East European countries concerned. Another 128 persons are employed at the RFE monitoring facility at Schleissheim and the two transmitting sites at Holzkirchen and Biblis. The transmitter at Gloria, near Lisbon, Portugal, is staffed by some 346 persons, while RFE news bureaus in Athens, Bonn, Berlin, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome, Stockholm, and Vienna employ another 69 persons. All of the Broadcast Department personnel are former nationals of the countries to which they broadcast.

Each of these Broadcasting Departments has a proportionate number of its own nationals in the New York Bureaus of the five Departments—a total of about 37 persons.

Except for the top engineering staff, most of the engineers at the Munich headquarters and at the transmitting and monitoring sites in Germany are German citizens. These number about 469 persons. Of the 346 employees at the Gloria transmitter, only five are U.S. citizens. Radio Free Europe, then, employs a total staff of about 1,611 persons, of whom only about 221 are Americans. This is in addition to the Free Europe, Inc., and RFE Fund, Inc. staff mentioned earlier.

In Germany, Free Europe, Inc. is registered as a foreign nonprofit corporation, holds long-term leases to the RFE headquarters in Munich, to two transmitter sites and two monitoring reception stations, and is licensed to operate transmitters by the German Federal Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.

The transmitter operation in Portugal was established in 1951 to provide a more distant base from which higher short-wave frequencies would be effective and jamming partially overcome. The license for the operation is held by a Portuguese corporation, S.A. de Radio-Retransmissao, S.S.R.L., or “RARET.” By Portuguese law, 60 percent of the RARET Board of Directors are Portuguese citizens and hold a majority of its voting stock. The remainder are connected with Free Europe, Inc., which supplies all the financing. Although the license permits either broadcasting or rebroadcasting, the sole function of RARET at the present time is to relay to Eastern Europe programs relayed from Munich to it by radio.

RFE POLICY MACHINERY AND PROCEDURES

Policy Objectives

. . . When Radio Free Europe went on the air in the early 1950's, its purposes were linked to U.S. Cold War strategy. RFE engaged in continuous psychological warfare against Eastern European regimes and with the aim of keeping alive in the people the hope of eventual “liberation” from the Communist governments. RFE executives acknowledge that programming fifteen or twenty years ago was polemical and “addressed to an audience assumed to be uncritically receptive to anti-Communism.” Relaxation of the strict Stalinist controls in the mid-
1950's, however, resulted in somewhat greater tendencies toward pluralism in Eastern European societies, less rigidity in the Communist systems, and subsequently a bit more give-and-take between the people and the respective regimes. Though they remained strictly controlled and censored, regime media became somewhat less dogmatic.

RFE's response—accelerated though not solely motivated by the 1956 Hungarian affair—has been a near-total modification of its earlier approach.

It has sought to stay ahead of its regime radio competition, to retain and expand its listenership. Above all, RFE has striven to (a) know its audiences and their preferences better and, (b) raise the level of professional expertise in all phases of RFE activity.

Polemics have been deemphasized in favor of more and better straight news coverage of world and local news events. The objective is to enhance audience appeal and to improve credibility by filling the "news gap" brought about by regime censorship policies.

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This standing general instruction has been restated in specific language for each of the five Broadcasting Departments. The following text, obtained from the Director of RFE in Munich, is typical of the "restraints" imposed by RFE upon these Departments. It has been abridged and edited by the author of this report in order to remove country-specific references and mention of specific groups and people.

**RESTRANTS**

The correct tone is as important in adhering to RFE policy as correct content of broadcasts. The following restraints are therefore emphasized:

1. Avoidance of vituperation, vindictiveness, and polemics.
2. Avoidance of broadcast materials, the content or tone of which is or could be legitimately construed as inflammatory or inconsistent with [local] or international political realities. Even straight news can be inflammatory if improperly handled.
3. Avoidance of bland, propagandistic argumentation.
4. Avoidance of sweeping generalizations and evaluations.
5. Avoidance of any action which would amount to or could be reasonably construed as incitement to open revolt or other violence.
6. Avoidance of tactical advice, by which is meant recommendations for specific action in particular cases, except in unusual circumstances, and then only by indirectness. The people provided they know the relevant facts, are usually better qualified to judge the efficacy and consequences of their action than anyone outside the country. Such advice is likely to be resented and, if acted upon, could cause regime reprisals and inflexibility.
7. Avoidance of patronizing or condescending positions or indulging in preaching.
8. Avoidance of narrow and parochial points of view.
9. Avoidance of tone or content which would give RFE the aura of a voice of emigre opinion... the term "we" should not be used to suggest that the speakers are representing the views of any emigre group, nor as spokesmen or as the purported voice of an opposition party... or of the... people as a whole.
10. Continued treatment of key themes is essential but monotony or needless repetition should be avoided.
11. No programs should be broadcast which are based upon or use rumors or unsubstantiated information. If, under unusual circumstances, a constructive purpose will be served by calling attention to a rumor, it should clearly be identified as such.
12. RFE should not jump to conclusions, either by attaching undue weight to government or other pronouncements which experience has shown the government may not carry out to the letter, or by unduly discounting them.
13. RFE should not encourage defections...
14. RFE should not lead the... people to believe that in the event of an uprising...
the West would intervene militarily. RFE must not ... speculate about an uprising ... nor contingencies arising therefrom.
15. Criticism of the ... government should be to the fact and to the issues involved. Insofar as possible it should be subtle and indirect.
16. RFE should not broadcast any material which could be characterized as petty gossip, slander, or attacks on the personal lives or families of government or party figures, or on individuals as such ...

**EMERGENCY CONDITIONS**

In the event of emergency conditions ... due to violent demonstrations, armed uprising and revolutions, or war, RFE will not assume any attitude toward such developments or participate in them in any way, except for straight and restrained news reporting, until it receives guidance from [Free Europe, Inc.] New York.

**Policy Formulation and Implementation**

The mechanisms through which RFE policies are formulated and implemented are based upon RFE's founding concept—"a cooperative effort of free East Europeans broadcasting to their countrymen at home, under American management and supported by the professional expertise necessary to the operation of a radio station." As previously noted, RFE's overall policies are under the direction and control of the President and Board of Directors of Free Europe, Inc. in New York. The Director of RFE in Munich is responsible to the President, and has primary responsibility, within the frame of reference of overall Free Europe, Inc., policy for all standing and ad hoc policies related to the management and operation of the radio stations. Thus there are two levels of policy: broad organizational and corporate policy, and the day-to-day considerations of running five radio stations which broadcast news, commentary, features, and music.

Free Europe, Inc.

... The Free Europe, Inc. Board of Directors is the highest legally-constituted governing body responsible for all activities of the organization. This Board of Directors is self-perpetuating, and has been from the outset.

* * * *

**Role of the President**

Under the By-Laws of Free Europe, Inc., the Board of Directors has "full power in the management and control of the policies, activities, funds, and affairs of the corporation." The Board accordingly appoints officers and interim directors, approves budgets and auditors' reports, reviews periodic operational reports submitted by the President, and takes other actions it considers necessary in guiding and directing the organization.

The chief executive officer of Free Europe, Inc. is the President, who is appointed by and responsible to the Board. With the New York headquarters staff previously described, he carries out the following functions:

* **Corporate:** Liaison with the Chairman and members of the Board of Directors, including the preparation of periodic meetings of the Board and Executive Committee, and consultation on major policy, organizational, and fiscal developments.
Governmental Relations: Consultation and liaison with the executive and legislative branches and whatever departments, committees, or other bodies may be appropriate under present or future arrangements. Recently this has included the Department of State, for exchanges of information; committees and individual members of Congress, as to legislation and individual requests for information; the Office of Budget and Management, as to current financing; and the General Accounting Office and Congressional Research Service as to their respective studies.

Policy and Program: The President supervises and consults with the Director of RFE in Munich on broad questions of policy and programming, on organizational problems and key personnel actions, on relations with European governments and with RFE's West European Advisory Committee. The handling of such matters is facilitated by a daily flow of teletypes and mail, and by occasional visits by the President and Director and other executives in both directions.

Fiscal and Budget: General supervision of expenditures and of accounting and auditing, as well as final review and presentation of budgets. The Accounting Department in New York maintains central accounts of all overseas and U.S.-based elements.

Public Information: The RFE research product, as noted elsewhere, has widespread byproduct use among scholars, journalists, and others in the U.S. and abroad. The President’s staff is responsible for meeting all requests in this country for information and documentation.

Fund-raising: . . . [The] President and Executive Vice President respectively of RFE Fund, Inc., are responsible for organizing the annual national fund drive and for the public-information advertising campaign conducted through the Advertising Council. The Fund’s activities include the organization of local volunteers; preparation and distribution of solicitation letters and printed materials, advertising copy, radio and television announcements; arrangement of speaking engagements; response to queries from the media and public; and the processing of contributions received.10

Radio Free Europe

Role of the Director
Within the broad framework of corporate policy established by the Board of Directors and the President in New York, Radio Free Europe in Munich enjoys a near-total autonomy in the conduct of its daily affairs. The Director . . . is responsible to and personally in close contact with President Durkee, but Mr. Walter and his staff make all the daily decisions which are essential to a rapidly responsive broadcast operation. Editorial policies are developed in daily meetings between the Director, key elements of the Director's staff, and executives of the five country Broadcasting Departments. Numerous administrative procedures have been developed to assure adequate follow-through on implementation of
approved policies, and it is the Director's responsibility to keep the President of Free Europe, Inc. promptly and fully informed. In the interest of speed and flexibility, RFE has ruled out any general policy of pre-broadcast review of programs or the use of centrally-prepared master scripts. Pre-broadcast reviews are, however, required in rare instances on certain designated sensitive topics. In emergency situations, such as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, the Director requires the pre-broadcast review of all commentaries as a double-check against the possibility of incitement or misunderstanding by the audience. In general, crisis situations call for a tightening-up of all review procedures. It should be emphasized that the review procedures under discussion are those required solely by the Director of RFE, in Munich, from his own staff in Munich. There are no established procedures which require RFE to clear any scripts in advance with Free Europe, Inc., or with any "sponsor" representatives.

Broadcasting Departments

The five Broadcasting Departments—the heart and soul of the entire operation—are each headed by a Director and deputy who are former nationals from their audience countries. These men are directly responsible to the Director of RFE. They direct both the preparation of broadcast materials and the production processes by which these materials are put on the air. Staffs of these departments range from 101 in the Polish Broadcasting Department to 41 in the Bulgarian Department, and are comprised of personnel of the variety of talents required to produce the broad spectrum of political, news, economic, cultural, and sports programming featured by the stations. All Broadcasting Departments are strongly supported by the Central News Room—linked to each Department by internal teletype circuits—and continuous post-broadcast checking of scripts for content and effectiveness is maintained for the Director by RF E's Broadcast Analysis Unit.

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RFE executives maintain that the system of placing the primary responsibility for program content with the individual Broadcast Directors has worked very well, taking full advantage of the special skills of the experienced East European staff and preserving their interest and morale in a manner which would be impossible under a system of implementing orders and translating centrally-prepared scripts.

RFE has had no Programming Department as such since 1967, and each Broadcasting Department has full responsibility for all program development. The Director of RFE is, in effect, the programming chief for the five-station combination. A description of these staff facilities and the daily use made of them in policy formulation and program implementation follows.

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The Central News Room (CNR)

The Central News Room edits and produces a news-and-features file of
about 100,000 words each day from a variety of sources. Standard western news agencies, received by teletype, are:

United Press International
Reuter
Agence France-Presse
Deutsch Presse Agentur

CNR also monitors the teletype output of the following eleven Communist news services:

Tass (Soviet)
Hsinhua (People's Republic of China)
CETEKA (Czechoslovakia)
PAP (Polish)
MTI (Hungarian)
Agerpres (Rumanian)
BTA (Bulgarian)
Tanjug (Yugoslav)
ADN (East German)
ATA (Albanian)
VNA (North Vietnamese)

Material from these sources, from the News Department's extensive radio monitoring services, and from RFE News Bureaus is edited and rewritten to produce the daily news-and-features file. News stories are transmitted via teletype to the newsrooms of the five Broadcasting Departments as they are written, for each Broadcast Department produces a ten-minute live newscast each hour. These hard-news stories, combined with additional feature material, are distributed in printed form, known as the "daily budget," to other key addresses within the Munich headquarters throughout the day. The overnight accumulation is picked up and distributed to the Chief of the News Department, the Director of RFE, Broadcasting Department chiefs, and selected members of the Director's staff at their homes at 0600 each morning. This not only provides these individuals with substantial breakfast reading material, it enables them to prepare themselves mentally for policy and programming decisions based on the news each morning.

Non-news feature materials produced by NCR include each items as information on the theater, music, books, art, science, medicine, travel, industry, education, fashion, cooking, and so forth. The Week in Review is a 3,000-word summary of each week's events, prepared in text-and-sound form but which is used as a model by individual Broadcasting Department editors in writing their own language adaptations of the material. Monitoring reports in English, consisting of about 60 pages of specialized East European news, are issued twice a day.

The Monitoring Section
The Monitoring Section regularly audits the output of some 40 Communist radio stations in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The result of approximately 300 hours of such
monitoring per day is the selection for editorial handling and transcription of some 100,000 words. Most transcribing is done in the original languages. In this fashion, the Broadcasting Departments are kept informed about the output of their competition—the regime radios. Other material is rewritten into English-language bulletins and moved into the regular Central News Room news circuit. Thus the monitoring operation is an important source for news developments within Eastern Europe—developments which are then “cross-reported” by RFE to each of its listening audiences.

The Audio Section

The role of the Audio Section is the provision of sound to accompany news and feature programming. The Information Services Department of RFE describes this role as follows:

These sounds, or “actualities,” are selected from hours of taped material and made available for broadcasts on master tapes containing tight excerpts. Transcripts also are provided to support the sound excerpts so that each RFE Broadcasting Department may prepare native-language “overlays” for its listeners or translate fully at the end of the actuality.

Feature material issued by the Audio Section includes interviews with pop stars, sports figures, intellectuals, etc. Almost any story issued by CNR either on its news circuit or in the Program Topics can be supported by sound.

Important sources of audio material are RFE’s bureaus and the Monitoring Section. The latter often provides taped excerpts from major East European announcements and speeches to reinforce or illustrate a major development.

In addition to the production of approximately 20 sound actualities a day, the Audio Section arranges program exchanges with other European radio stations and issues a monthly calendar of coming events in Europe.

RFE Bureaus


Although the news bureaus often supply items faster than the commercial wire services, their primary role is to focus upon events of special interest to Eastern European audiences—events which are often passed over by the wire services. The activities of Communist Parties outside the Soviet Bloc is but one example of the kind of news given detailed treatment by RFE bureaus. Press reviews, sound actualities, and the production of a number of regularly-scheduled programs are other major bureau activities.

The importance placed by the RFE News Department on journalistic professionalism is reflected in the background and experience of the editorial and reportorial staff of the Department.

Research and Analysis

Research and Analysis plays a dual role at RFE. It provides direct support to the Broadcasting Departments in terms of background information and analysis as well as contemporary factual material, and it
provides substantial staff assistance to the Director in the formulation of policy. . . . The Research and Analysis chiefs probably have quicker access to and bring more long-range influence to bear upon the RFE Director than do the Broadcasting Department chiefs. As the RFE organization chart indicates, the two Research and Analysis Departments are staff elements of the Office of the Director—totally separated from the Broadcast Departments and hence totally independent of them.

The East Europe Research and Analysis Department (EERA)

EERA is by far the larger of the two Departments, staffed by some 82 members, and dealing with the five countries to which RFE broadcasts—Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. . . . The basic components of EERA are the research and analysis sections corresponding to RFE's audience countries. These vary in size just as do the Broadcasting Departments they were originally designed to serve. The research and analysis sections are staffed by East Europeans, many of whom have been with RFE since its inception. Each section has its own information analysis center consisting of hundreds of thousands of 5 x 8 inch cards containing biographic, social, cultural, economic, political, and historical information organized according to a modified Library of Congress classification system.

In addition to the research staff, . . . the Policy Assistants work closely with the research and analysis sections, but have the main task of writing studies and memoranda of a broader, more policy-oriented type than the usual output of the country sections. The Policy Assistants also serve as a link between the American management team and the Broadcasting Departments, facilitating the smooth formulation and implementation of the Director's policy decisions. EERA also employs two economists who specialize in the economic problems of East Europe and whose contributions to broadcasting are considered quite valuable.

The Communist Area Analysis Department (CAA)

CAA is much smaller than EERA, consisting of only 13 staff members. It is not therefore able to provide the same kind of detailed analysis as is needed on the five audience countries. Since news of the rest of the Communist world, and of Communist Parties not in power, is of great interest to East European audiences, RFE makes an effort to maintain its expertise on these matters through the CAA staff. This staff includes three analysts on the Soviet Union, two on Yugoslavia, one on China, one on East Germany, one on Albania, and one on the nonruling Communist Parties. . . .

Sources and Methods

RFE considers the press, both printed and electronic, of the Communist countries themselves as by far the most important source of information. RFE analyzes every Communist newspaper, professional journal, periodical, and other publication of note produced in Eastern Europe. Most of the small or provincial newspapers are also examined, as
these contain much of the kind of detailed and topical information overlooked by the metropolitan press. Much of the cross-reporting material, and information on developments within-country come from this kind of source. The News Department's extensive radio monitoring activity of metropolitan and local stations in East Europe and elsewhere is also a valuable source of information for research and analytical activities, as is the input derived from the Communist news and wire services. Finally, another good source of information is to be found in Western publications—the press, scholarly journals, and commercial publications.

Information from these varied sources is analyzed, categorized, and filed in the information analysis centers within each of the five Research and Analysis Sections. The card files in these information centers are carefully maintained, and even some of the hard copies—the newspapers and publications themselves—are preserved within the Sections for several years before being microfilmed or assigned to warehouse storage.

The manually-operated file card system has worked well to date. The research analysts are thoroughly familiar with their files and are usually able to retrieve relevant information from the files very rapidly. The accumulation of twenty years has, however, caused storage problems, and there is no way by which to test scientifically the responsiveness of the information retrieval operations as they are presently constituted. In other words, there is no way to tell exactly how much relevant information on a given topic is contained in the information bank and which was not retrieved in a given case. The best that can be said is that both the research analysts and their Broadcasting Department users appear reasonably satisfied with the results.

RFE research personnel on both management and working levels are aware that their operations could benefit from a greater utilization of automation, and that today's state-of-the-art in information storage and retrieval could provide some significant improvements in utilization of the RFE files. They are equally aware, however, that present and foreseeable budgetary constraints relegate any serious discussion of automation to the academic.

Both the files of the information analysis centers and the supporting library operation are unique in their quantity, scope, and comprehensiveness in East European lore, and it would be impossible to put a realistic price on their value to the scholars, governments, journalists, and others who regularly subscribe to the RFE research output.

In Europe, for example, RFE had a list of some 694 regular subscribers to research papers. These include educational institutions, individual scholars, research institutions, governmental agencies and employees, persons in business and the communications industries, and others. More than 200 similar subscribers are in the United States, bringing the total distribution list of RFE research reports to 900.

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210
The Broadcast Analysis Unit

Originally organized primarily for the purpose of checking on the implementation of policy, the Broadcast Analysis Unit has evolved into a mechanism for quality control as well as policy control...

The Broadcast Analysis Unit has a formidable workload—possibly the heaviest per capita in RFE. Each day the major programs of each Broadcast Department are monitored, summarized, and analyzed for adherence to RFE policy and for comprehensiveness of coverage. The Daily Summaries comprise a key management tool for keeping up with the voluminous programming of the Broadcast Departments. All programs are analyzed to chart coverage of special policy guidances and news themes deemed important by management, and a report on the extent of such coverage is delivered to the Director each week. Also each week, there is a meeting between the B.A. Unit and the Director (and occasional informal meetings with Broadcast Directors) for the purpose of assessing style, content, and delivery techniques of programming. Program changes and the correction of flaws often result from these meetings.

A management tool of crucial importance to RFE is the series of statistical reports on RFE programming produced each month by the Broadcast Analysis Unit. These reports quantify the programming output for each Broadcasting Department in terms of program content, expressing the results in percentages of air time devoted to each type of programming. Statistical tabulations are accompanied by narratives which explain similarities and differences between the output of the different BD's and which enable management to remain well informed about trends in performance—strengths and weaknesses—in programming.

The Audience and Public Opinion Research Department

The Audience and Public Opinion Research Department (APOR) is another staff element of growing importance. Its basic purpose is as its name implies: to attempt to conduct market research which will provide scientifically usable information to enable RFE to (a) know better the likes and dislikes of its potential audiences, (b) know accurately the impact of specific programming on those audiences, and, (c) keep track of the size and composition of RFE audiences...

The West European Advisory Committee of Radio Free Europe

Although it is not an integral part of the RFE organizational structure, nor does it participate directly in the formulation of RFE policy, a group known as the West European Advisory Committee of Radio Free Europe does play an important indirect role in policymaking and deserves brief mention.

The West European Advisory Committee to Radio Free Europe is an informal group of eminent Europeans who meet about once a year with officers and directors of Free Europe, Inc. to discuss East-West relations, East European developments, and the work of RFE.
The group was established in 1959; its fourteenth session was held in Monte Carlo October 24-25, 1970. In recent years its meetings have been enlarged by invitations to non-members. An advance written report is submitted to participants by RFE, which also covers the costs and provides the necessary conference services.

Radio Free Europe's meetings with the members and guests of WEAC have served RFE beneficially in three ways: they give RFE a range of current West European opinion of East European policy and prospects; they elicit specific recommendations with respect to RFE's broadcasting and its relations in West Europe; and they acquaint a new group of distinguished Europeans each year with the policy, analytical capacity, and impact of Radio Free Europe.

How Policy is Made at RFE

Radio Free Europe's weekly broadcasting schedules call for 557 hours 42 minutes of broadcasting to the five audience countries. Of this total, some 292 hours and 27 minutes represent original programming, with the remainder being repeats at different times of day. Up to 15 percent of the original programming is prepared in New York; the remainder is prepared each day in Munich.

These figures graphically illustrate the speed and flexibility with which the individual policymaking components of RFE, described in the previous section, must work together every day. These figures, together with the disparate audiences of the five countries, also illustrate the impracticability of central scripting or the prebroadcast review of scripts except in limited quantity and unusual circumstances. The question of "policy control," or "policy supervision," by any group external to RFE's Munich headquarters—even by the Free Europe, Inc. Board of Directors—becomes largely one of trust and confidence in RFE's management and procedures based on evaluated performance. RFE's internal procedures are designed to deliver the kind of performance justifying confidence.

NOTES

4 Durkee, op. cit., p. 14, footnote (1).
5 Free Europe, Inc., is the corporate successor to the old National Committee for a Free Europe.
6 Annex B to the CR3 report lists the Officers, Directors, and Members of the two corporations.
7 Biographic information about key staff members of the Munich headquarters of RFE is included in Annex C of the CRS report.
10 Biographic sketches of eight key executives in the New York headquarters of Free Europe, Inc. are included in Annex C in the CRS report.
11 The descriptive material on RFE internal procedures has been drawn by the author from
RFE internal documents and from interviews conducted in Munich with RFE personnel during the period October 23–November 5, 1971. 

\[12\] The script of the Week in Review for the week ending October 28, 1971 is attached as Annex E to the CRS report.


\[14\] Biographical sketches of key members of the editorial staff are attached as Annex F to the CRS report.

\[15\] A sample statistical report for May, 1971, is attached as Annex H to the CRS report.

\[16\] Durkee, op. cit., Annex V., p. 1. A list of members and recent guest participants in WEAC is attached as Annex I to the CRS report.

RADIO LIBERTY*

BY JOSEPH G. WHELAN

This selection provides an overview of the background, organization, and operations of a nongovernmental radio engaged in communications with a closed society.

I. BASIC INFORMATION ON RADIO LIBERTY (RL)

The operations of Radio Liberty (RL) have remained almost completely unpublicized since its inception nearly two decades ago. Except for Soviet specialists, relatively few Americans know of RL's existence. The purpose of this study is to examine the history, organization, administration, and operations of RL.

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RL was formally conceived, at least organizationally, in the State of Delaware on January 18, 1951, with the incorporation of the “American Committee for Freedom of the Peoples of the USSR, Inc.” This organization was the forerunner of the present Radio Liberty Committee, Inc. One of the purposes of the committee was to sponsor shortwave broadcasts to the Soviet Union by former Soviet citizens. Broadcasts began on March 1, 1953, on a very small scale. Basic policy of the committee called for the “liberation” of Soviet Russia from the “tyranny of Bolshevism.” This policy reflected the theme of “liberation” in American foreign policy during the early years of the Eisenhower Administration. However, in the later years RL policy changed from “liberation” to “liberalization” as conditions within the Soviet Union improved under the impact of de-Stalinization. Ever since the later 1950's RL has been committed to a policy of peaceful liberalization of Soviet society, and its broadcasts have been structured accordingly.

Administrative headquarters for RL are in New York City. . . . In addition, RL maintains administrative offices, broadcast headquarters and research facilities in Munich, Germany. Offices, studios and other facilities are located in Barcelona, Lampertheim (Germany), London, Madrid, Paris, Playa del Pals (Spain), and Taipei. All of these facilities together with the U.S. Division in New York come under the administrative direction of . . . RL’s Executive Director in Munich. Operations at


213
Munich are broken down into four major subdivisions: the Program Policy Division, the Network Division, the Administrative Division and the Program Operations Division.

An important aspect to the organizational side of RL is the prevailing administrative style. This style encourages flexibility and informality, and fosters a type of fluidity that allows the widest permissible range of individual creativity and initiative, yet within a closely administered and carefully structured system of policy. Such flexibility, however, creates certain organizational risks.

What specific relations have existed between RL and the Executive Branch and the extent of RL's independence are matters that cannot be more fully explored. However, to an outsider viewing RL's current operations through documentation, extensive interviews, and actual on-site visits to facilities, certain aspects of RL's activities are apparent and it is possible to make the following generalizations: (1) that RL is clearly a United States Government operation and an integral part of this Nation's foreign policy apparatus; (2) that it seems to have a wide range of independence from the Executive Branch in its broadcasting operations; and (3) that its operating policies seem to be generated within the organization and not necessarily dictated by an outside authority.

Staff of RL has numbered around 1000 in recent years. As a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people, the staff, in keeping with the multinational character of the Soviet Union, is itself multinational. However, the major broadcasting effort of RL is directed at the Russian-speaking audience. The top administrative posts in policy making, policy control, and in key operations are held by Americans. The staff is regarded as being highly professional. It is multifunctional, and ideally, RL strives for a staff that represents the combined skills of a scholar, writer, journalist and radio performer. In-house training for RL is an organizational function created by necessity. Staff attrition due to advancing age and retirements, along with difficulties in recruiting newcomers from the Slavic areas of the Soviet Union, pose a potentially serious personnel problem for the future. The professionalism of staff is apparent in the quality of their research product, their multilingual facility, the unique combination of American and Western scholarship with the native talents of former Soviet citizens, and finally the existence of an organizational spirit that seems to arise from a conviction of participating in creating positive change within the Soviet Union. In addition, RL maintains close connections with the Western scholarly community as a complementing force to their research and broadcasting operations.

On the technical side of its operations, RL has transmitters at Lamperthein, Germany, Pals, Spain, and Taipei, Taiwan. A total of 1,350,000 watts of power enable RL to transmit its signal to the Soviet audience. Jamming is serious but by no means an insurmountable obstacle. Fre-
quencies are allocated according to regulations of the International Telecommunications Union, and transmitters are licensed by host countries upon whose territories RL's facilities are installed. Continuation of such licenses rests solely upon the will of the host country, thus injecting a precarious quality of dependency on others in RL's operations.

RL's broadcasting operations are supported by a research effort that is impressive in both quality and in quantity. To keep abreast of internal developments in the Soviet Union and to know what gaps to fill in their programming, RL staff in New York and Munich have at their disposal a vast collection of newspapers, journals, books, microfilms, along with monitored reports of Soviet radio, access to wire services of the world, and the daily output of Radio Free Europe's (RFE) news budget. The research effort is further backed up by RL's library facilities and the extensive resources of The Institute for the Study of the USSR, also in Munich. Owing to budgetary restrictions, the Institute was terminated at the end of 1971. RL's research facilities are open to scholars, and RL makes many of its research products available to specialists in academia, the government, and the mass media who are concerned with contemporary Soviet affairs. The quality of research done by RL, which has been highly commended by leading Western scholars, is vital to its broadcasting operations since it must fill the gaps of knowledge and information created within its Soviet audience by regime censorship.

II. RL'S GOALS, POLICIES, AND POLICY FORMULATIONS

The primary objective of RL is to encourage those forces of liberalization within Soviet society that will bring about an eventual peaceful evolution of the USSR from Communist totalitarianism to a genuine democratic form of government. The ultimate goal is democratization of Soviet society in the expectation that within such internal forces of liberalization lies the greatest hope for world peace.

RL's is a commitment to peaceful change from within. It rejects confrontation as an instrumentality in achieving its goals. RL encourages Soviet peoples to work together as a first step in instilling the habit of democracy. It broadcasts truthful information, to enable the Soviet peoples to make their own judgments on developments in the Soviet Union, to fill in the gaps of missing information caused by Soviet censorship, and to correct distortions of propaganda.

Within the larger framework of goals and purposes, RL pursues immediate objectives that focus on such practical themes as democratic political alternatives, economic reform, peaceful intentions of the democratic world, ideological irrelevance of Marxism-Leninism, and the virtue of cultural diversity and political pluralism.

To achieve its objectives, RL seeks to promote public opinion formation in the Soviet Union, and it does this principally through its radio broad-
casting operations. RL operates on the principle of the right of a free press; it "upholds the right of the whole Soviet public to know the whole truth about any question;" it is committed to the principle, affirmed in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, that the Soviet people, like all other peoples, have a universal right to be informed.

The general philosophical approach of RL is one that appeals to rationalism. It attempts to "substitute reason for emotion, and a calm voice for stridency." It begins from the premise that "the most convincing presentation is one that tells all sides of a story." In resorting to the rational approach, RL strives to break the monopoly over communications which the regime tries to impose in the expectation that the first step in the erosion of a totalitarian dictatorship is the development of individual thought.

In general, RL's policy guidelines are a reflection of a moderate, rational approach to the politics of the Soviet Union. These guidelines and the philosophy that produced them are contained in RL's Policy Manual. The Manual is RL's operating charter. It is "the mainspring for all other policy determinations, the central authority determining audience priorities, program content and the nature of Radio Liberty's approaches in program structure, style and tone."

In pursuing its objectives RL lays down a set of specific guiding principles. By and large the principles are commonsense: they appeal to reason, moderation and good judgment.

Other policy requirements are imposed upon RL that arise from the fact that its transmitters are located on territories of foreign governments. Material cannot be used in broadcasts, therefore, that would harm the interests of the host governments and embarrass RL's relations with them.

The Policy Manual is RL's charter for operations. In an effort to keep the Manual current, RL periodically reconsiders certain relevant questions and synthesizes its conclusions into more current formal policy statements and guidances, namely, Broadcast Position Statements, Broadcast Guidances, Monthly Guidelines and Daily Guidance Notes.

The primary function of RL policy is to make sure that programming provides the Soviet audience with objective, accurate and meaningful information; that it reflects the growth and plurality of views outside the Soviet Union; and that it corrects significant omissions and distortions in Soviet media. All members of RL staff contribute to policymaking and policy application, but the main role is played by President Sargeant and Executive Director Scott. They direct and review the formation of all policy and oversee policy operations at all levels.

The next level of responsibility lies within the Program Policy Division (PPD) and rests upon its Director in Munich. Through his policy staff, the Director exercises the chief operational responsibility for policy formulation and application. In New York, the Policy Coordinator actively participates in the formulation of current policy. Responsibility for carrying
out all policy by the U.S. Division rests upon him. A Special Advisor assists the President in the formulation and coordination of basic policy. A final organizational mechanism in the policy process is the Council of Editors in Munich. When a fully agreed policy draft is finally concurred in by the Council, it is passed on to the Executive Director for his approval and then to the President.

Policy formulations are divided into two major categories, those dealing with long-term [and those] with short-term guidances. The Policy Manual, and National Language Annexes, Broadcast Position Statements and Broadcast Guidances are long-term. These are supplemented by short-term Monthly Guidelines and Daily Guidance Notes which are intended to relate larger policy to specific current developments. On occasion an immediate policy guidance is given in the form of a Special Memorandum. All statements of policy, along with the Policy Manual and National Language Annexes, are inserted in a loose-leaf notebook called, the Policy Handbook.

RL is, therefore, a policy-oriented organization, and its staff is policy-minded. While questions may be raised whether there is a surfeit or sufficiency in policy, such questions are no doubt moderated by an awareness of risks of too loose a policy structure in dealing with a configuration of power of such awesomeness as the Soviet Union. Yet, the policy structure is there for achieving the proper balance if indeed this is a relevant question.

III. RL’s PROGRAMMING: PREPARATION AND OPERATIONS, POLICY AND QUALITY CONTROL

In program planning the Program Operations Division operates on the principle of an inverted pyramid where the first appeal is to universality of interest, and this is the news, with the expectation of a declining listener interest for the rest of the hour. News is the most important attraction for listeners, and it is programmed every hour on the hour for 24 hours. Thus, in RL’s four-part concept in programming, news takes first priority, news features second. Then, the remainder of the hour contains internal Soviet subject matter, for example, a review of samizdat, and finally a political or cultural show directed toward a more specialized audience. The key organizational elements in programming are the Central News Service, Russian Service, and the Nationalities Service. RL has extensive internal and external environmental aids to support programming.

Policy envelops RL’s operations, and its application begins with the writers; the next level of “screening” for policy is the editors. What enables RL to screen its programs carefully is the time sequence allowed in production. It takes approximately three to ten days for the production of a show. Tape makes it possible to have careful screening procedures. There are pre-broadcast editions, spot-checks by the Program Policy Division, review by the various services, and an “as broadcast” check made at the transmitters as the programs are being aired. What errors
and policy violations are caught in this screening (except at the transmitters) are corrected immediately by deletions and the actual "pulling" of shows. Policy violations and errors are compiled in a monthly report.

RL has many instrumentalities for policy control, but policy control cannot be total; policy violations are always possible; at best, control mechanisms can only reduce the probabilities. The heart of the matter is, therefore, trust and rationality: trust in the individual, for policy control must begin and end with the individual; and rationality in the wisdom of the policy constructed and of the people who are to carry it out.

* * * * *

Policy control and quality control overlap to a considerable extent. Pre-broadcast and post-broadcast auditioning provide in-house evaluations on both the quality of programming as well as judgments on policy matters. Beyond this, no other formal institutional mechanism for quality control seems to exist, except for the important tasks performed by the administrative assistant to the Executive Director. His main responsibility is to check programming in pre-broadcast auditioning for quality, effectiveness, policy, and overall excellence in production. As a means of maintaining quality, RL has a grading system on ratings of voices and ratings on shows. Speakers are taken off the air and shows ruled "dead" if ratings dip below 3.0 (A theoretically perfect score is 5.0)

RL's Audience Research Division plays an important role in quality control. On the basis of extensive testing of opinions through post-broadcast audition panels of substitute listeners and outside specialists in addition to direct interviews with Soviet citizens, it prepares reports evaluating programs. These reports are circulated throughout RL for the information and guidance of staff. Panel evaluations have shortcomings but they seem to have the virtue of at least providing some evidence of probable listener response and reaction without which there would be none. However narrow the sampling for evaluating programs, the panel approach, nevertheless, provides some basis upon which to maintain at least a measure of quality control.

**IV. SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON RL**

There seems little doubt that RL is what it claims to be, namely, a surrogate "Home Service" to the Soviet people, but its effectiveness in the Soviet environment can only be a matter of conjecture. To achieve its goal of liberalization of Soviet society it has established an impressive and, apparently, effective organization. Yet, it has organizational imperfections. It is caught in a scissors of an aging staff and an inability to recruit young, new blood in the Slavic areas. The non-Russian nationalities are allotted perhaps an unfair disproportion of the organization's resources, though the situation appears to be improving. It also appears that RL's Board of Trustees has failed in its organizational responsibilities by playing a passive role. If RL is to continue, particularly under proposals now being discussed, the Board will have to be strengthened and its role as an active participant more sharply defined.
The reality of RL conflicts with its popular image: it is neither a "Cold War operation" nor is its staff "a group of cold warriors" in the sense that the terms were used in the 1950's. On the contrary, as a matter of policy RL accepts all Soviet institutions, though not its ideology, and seeks to bring about peaceful democratic change from within. Nor does RL slander the Soviet Union, its people or its leaders. To do so would be to defeat its main purpose as a "Home Service" broadcaster.

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ORGANIZATION OF IN-COUNTRY COMMUNICATION

There are several types of organization and coordination that may be required in international communication activities carried on beyond the boundaries of a state. These include intragovernmental, intergovernmental, and governmental-nongovernmental coordination. Intragovernmental organization in-country often reflects the relationships of the participating agencies at home. If lines of responsibility and hierarchy are clear at home, they will usually be clear—or easily susceptible to clarification—in the field. However, a very large operation may prove an exception, because new organizational entities with unclear lines of authority are often born of such situations.

Sometimes intergovernmental coordination is elusive, for the sensitivities of sovereign nation-states must be considered. Indeed, intergovernmental organization for PSYOP activities may well embrace more than two governments, depending upon the number of those assisting in the communication effort. For example, Australia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea were involved in PSYOP in Vietnam, as well as the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States. Even apart from problems of coordination, different bureaucratic traditions and procedures, and linguistic or similar difficulties—divergent conceptions of political requirements and prohibitions may prove a major impediment to efficient and effective cooperation. Yet, intergovernmental coordination is necessary to prevent counteracting messages, overlapping responsibilities, and especially, serious transgressions of host country sensitivities.

Coordination of government and nongovernmental communication efforts is equally difficult. If the nongovernmental (or quasigovernmental) organization has a large degree of autonomy from government pressures, it may balk at policy decisions or implementation procedures after cooperation has begun, with adverse publicity as a possible result. Organizations more directly affiliated with the host country or other countries have some of the same problems as those involved in coordination with the government of such countries. Anxiety to pre-
serve organizational autonomy and less systematic security procedures and sanctions are additional problems sometimes associated with non-governmental organizations. On the other hand, enlisting the cooperation of such institutions may greatly increase the resources to which the communicator has access, significantly enhance the effectiveness of his media control and coordination, and broaden the responsibility for and national commitment to the effort.

THE 4th PSYOP GROUP: ORGANIZATION, OPERATIONS, AND OBSERVATIONS*

By Taro Katagiri

In an internal defense and development situation, U.S. Army PSYOP groups may have to play the principal role in advancing the communication effort for the indigenous government.

ORGANIZATION

The 4th PSYOP Group was the principal military PSYOP arm in Vietnam, operating from the Saigon level to the hamlet level. The Group came into being in December 1967, with headquarters located in Saigon and battalion field units operating in each of the four Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs): the 7th at Danang in the I-CTZ, the 8th at Nha Trang in the II-CTZ, the 10th at Can Tho in the IV-CTZ, and the 6th at Bien Hoa in the III-CTZ. (The 6th Battalion had actually preceded the establishment of the group and before December 1967 was the U.S. Army's primary support unit for PSYOP in Vietnam.) Figure 1 shows the location of the PSYOP battalions for the 1968-70 period.

The 4th PSYOP Group was under the command of the U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV). Operationally, however, it was under the control of the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), with the J3's Psychological Operations Division (MACJ3/11) exercising direct staff supervision. As it was supposed to work, the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office was the mission agency responsible for providing U.S. PSYOP policy guidance not only to the civilian agencies but also, through the Military Assistance Command, Psychological Operations Directorate, to all U.S. Army and other military PSYOP elements. Figure 2 depicts the organizational structure of the U.S. PSYOP apparatus in Vietnam.

Just as the group was under the control of the country U.S. military commander (COMUSMACV), so each battalion was under the operational control of the senior U.S. force commander in each CTZ: the 7th Battalion under the Commanding General of the III U.S. Marine Amphibious Force (IV Corps), the 8th under the Commanding General of the I U.S. Army Field Force (II Corps) the 6th under the Commanding General of the II U.S. Army Field Force (III Corps), and the 10th Battalion under the Commanding General of the Delta Military Assistance Command (IV Corps).

While operational control over the battalions was uniform from Corps to Corps, the pattern of staff supervision varied in the areas markedly. In

*Original essay by Taro Katagiri.
If, in the case of the III Marine Amphibious Force, a "special" PSYOP general staff officer exercised authority over the 7th PSYOP Battalion. Here, staff supervision generally involved only military PSYOP. A similar staff arrangement prevailed in the III Corps area of operation of II U.S. Army Field Force but with one significant difference. Just as in I Corps, the staff officer concerned himself almost exclusively with military PSYOP; unlike arrangements in I Corps, however, the G5 of the II Field Force exercised staff supervision over the 6th Battalion in the area of operations. In the other Corps, staff supervision involved civilian as well as military PSYOP. Staff supervision of the 8th Battalion was largely in the hands of the "Director for PSYOP and Chieu Hoi," who operated from the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development (CORDS) side. The
Director concerned himself with both military and civilian PSYOP. Likewise, in the Delta Military Assistance Command, where the 10th Battalion operated, the CORDS PSYOP officer had principal staff responsibilities for both the military and civilian PSYOP efforts.

OPERATIONS
To paraphrase a statement in U.S. Army Field Manual 33-5 (October 1966), Army psychological operations is a combat support weapon that the commander should use to assist in the accomplishment of his mission. In Vietnam, however, the activities of the 4th PSYOP Group went far beyond that limited role. In addition to providing tactical support to field
force commanders, the 4th FSYOF Group played a principal role in advancing the communication effort from the South Vietnamese Government (SVG) level down to the hamlet level. The Group supported such diverse programs in South Vietnam as encouraging defection and surrender in the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese ranks; informing the citizenry about the SVG programs; and, in general, taking other measures that fall within the framework of building national unity.

At this point, the question may arise of why the 4th PSYOP Group was so actively involved at the grassroots level. After all, in theory, at least, the task of enhancing the image of the SVG, particularly at the village and hamlet level, was properly a Vietnamese one. The facts about this are well known and widely published. A principal reason that the United States carried so much of the information responsibility, at least through 1968, was that indigenous PSYOP teams were scarce: well-equipped and trained Vietnamese field teams were not readily available, and even when available, there were problems of motivation. Only under exceptional circumstances should Americans become directly involved in the field: they should, instead, be as much as possible in the background, performing a support role to indigenous agencies.

Accordingly, because of limitations in the South Vietnamese effort, the resource needs, human and material, of the 4th PSYOP Group were perhaps larger than anticipated. In any event, the 4th PSYOP Group did manage to acquire a considerable organic PSYOP capability. Briefly put, Group Headquarters had: a 50,000-watt radio station, operating out of Pleiku in the Central Highlands; three high-speed, rotary printing presses; capability for researching and developing propaganda materials; and a staff to publish a magazine, called Thong Cam, for Vietnamese employees working for U.S. government military and civilian agencies. At the battalion level, the following was generally organic: six 1250 multilith printing presses; research and propaganda development capability; personnel to work with the U.S. Air Force Special Operations units for aerial leaflet and loudspeaker missions; and ground loudspeaker and audiovisual teams. Battalion assets were generally located at the CTZ headquarters level with one exception: loudspeaker and audiovisual teams operated with U.S. divisions and brigades or with province advisory teams.

Despite these organic assets, the varied missions of the 4th PSYOP Group could not have been performed on the needed scale had it not been for the support of many other U.S. agencies. JUSPAO provided invaluable production assistance, and assets of other U.S. civilian and military agencies in Vietnam were also made available. Further, outside of Vietnam, an essential support element was the 7thi. PSYOP Group. Headquartered in Okinawa, this group provided formidable support in back-up printing, high-altitude leaflet dissemination, as well as other essential support functions.

OBSERVATIONS
On the basis of the above, it seems appropriate at this time to offer my
reflections on some key PSYOP issues based upon personal experiences as a PSYOP unit commander in Vietnam. It should be remembered, of course, that I am thinking in terms of an internal defense and development context in which many of the problems encountered in Vietnam would have to be faced again.

1. Organization. The type, size, and needs of U.S. Army PSYOP organizations vary, of course, in terms of the conflict environment. This is also true in the case of the availability and quality of indigenous PSYOP assets. In the context of Vietnam during 1968 to 1970, it seems that the 4th PSYOP Group Headquarters was, in general, adequately organized (in significant measure owing to the support of the 7th PSYOP Group). At the levels of battalion and company, on the other hand, questions of organization often arose.

A major question has been whether PSYOP battalions should be placed under operational control (OPCON) or in direct support of force commanders. Some PSYOP battalion commanders have advocated direct support, principally basing their argument on the occasional conflicts emanating from command decisions on PSYOP material that are counterproductive or even contrary to prevailing U.S. policy. Without minimizing this problem, it still seems, if the Vietnam experience has a lesson, that PSYOP battalions can best serve their purpose in an OPCON role. And the grounds for this thinking is, concisely put, that PSYOP is not and should not be a function separate and distinct from the total effort. Because of the need for an integrated effort, particularly in an internal defense and development conflict environment, PSYOP should be a command function encompassing the political, economic, military, and ideological dimensions. Hence, the reasoning for advocating the placement of PSYOP battalions under the operational control of the supported commanders.

Questions also arise about command and control procedures in terms of PSYOP companies and other PSYOP units. My experience indicates that PSYOP companies and other units designed for support of divisions and brigades on an area basis should be assigned to a PSYOP group rather than to battalions (and attached to each battalion in accordance with the requirements prevailing in the area of operations). By having the PSYOP companies assigned to the group, it reduces the administrative problems that arise, such as accountability for equipment, when elements move from one area of operations to another. Furthermore, on the basis of the reasoning previously discussed, it is desirable to place (in situations such as those in Vietnam), companies under the operational control of the supported commander. Once the companies are attached to the battalions, it should then be the decision of the force commander exercising operational control over the battalion on how to place the companies and other subordinate elements.

2. Operational Capability. My experiences in Vietnam led me to the following conclusions. First, each PSYOP battalion supporting a Corps-
size force should be provided with the capability to support each of the U.S. combat divisions within the region with a PSYOP company rather than with just a few loudspeaker and audiovisual teams, as was the case in Vietnam. (In Vietnam, the basis for allocation of teams was one audiovisual team per division and one loudspeaker team per brigade.) Other assets essential to the company should include: capability for propaganda development; printing facilities for quick-reaction and other local requirements; and good supply and maintenance capability for PSYOP equipment.

Second, each PSYOP battalion should have the capability to provide, on an area basis, general support to pacification and development. Ideally, this support should be in the form of field detachments with the capabilities not only of audiovisual operations but also of liaison and support to pacification and development.

Finally, the equipment levels of battalion headquarters and headquarters companies should be enhanced significantly to include: organic aircraft for command and control and movement of personnel and light cargo to the field; messing capability; and superior assets for maintenance of low-density equipment such as printing presses, loudspeakers, motion picture projectors, and the like.

**PSYOP IN VIETNAM: A MANY SPLINTERED THING**

**By the Editors**

The size of the psychological operations effort, the speed with which American personnel were committed, and the lack of time for systematic planning of PSYOP coordination led to a superfluity of PSYOP involvement with overlapping objectives and responsibilities. Once this plethora of PSYOP programs had entered the field, attempts to impose a greater degree of order on the situation could achieve no better than partial success.

**INTRODUCTION**

Because the American presence in Vietnam increased slowly during the early 1960s, priority attention was not given to centralization of similar operations dispersed over several agencies. However, after 1964, when large numbers of U.S. personnel were involved in combat and support functions, as well as socioeconomic and political development, the need for greater coordination was evident. The U.S. PSYOP effort was splintered: the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), the United States Information Service (USIS), and the Agency for International Development (AID) were each responsible for one or more aspects of the foreign information/PSYOP effort conducted in South Vietnam and nearby areas.

These separate U.S. agencies operated in large measure independently of each other until May 1965. After a visit to Saigon in April 1965, USIA Director Carl Rowan and the Army Chief of Staff, General Harold K. Johnson, recommended to the president that U.S. foreign information/PSYOP activities in the Republic of Vietnam be integrated to increase the effectiveness of the effort. Following approval of the recommendation by the National Security Council, President Lyndon B. Johnson established the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO).
OBJECTIVES OF THE U.S. EFFORT
The breadth of American objectives had led to growth in the size of U.S. PSYOP elements. These objectives were:

- To undermine popular support for the insurgents;
- To enhance the image of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam;
- To increase Vietnamese understanding of, and elicit support for, U.S. policies in Vietnam;
- To engender international support for U.S. policy in Vietnam.

To accomplish these objectives, relatively few PSYOP-experienced personnel were available, and moreover, experienced personnel were spread among the many groups involved in PSYOP. Thus, the PSYOP responsibilities grew without the guidance and control necessary to maturation.

PSYOP RESPONSIBILITIES OF U.S. ELEMENTS IN VIETNAM
The U.S. PSYOP mission in Vietnam included the following elements:

1. The Embassy
   The Ambassador, personal representative of the U.S. president in the Republic of Vietnam, was responsible for implementing the foreign policy of the United States within South Vietnam. He was the senior member of the Mission Council, primary instrument for integration of the actions of the diplomatic mission.

2. The Mission PSYOP Committee
   The Mission PSYOP Committee was composed of senior officers from each agency of the mission and served in advisory functions.

3. Joint United States Public Affairs Office
   JUSPAO was responsible for U.S. PSYOP policy, supervision, coordination, and evaluation of all U.S. PSYOP in Vietnam, and for PSYOP support of RVN programs.

4. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
   PSYOP in support of (1) civil operations and revolutionary development and (2) military operations against the enemy was the responsibility of MACV, which exercised operational control of the 4th PSYOP Group. MACJ3-11 dealt with military PSYOP programs and advisory assistance to the Vietnamese General Political Warfare Department (GPWD).

5. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS)
   CORDS was responsible for the development of U.S. programs in support of pacification in Vietnam.

6. U.S. Army Vietnam (USARV)
   USARV provided logistical and administrative support to U.S. Army PSYOP units.

7. 4th and 7th PSYOP Group
   The 4th PSYOP Group, assigned to USARV but under the oper-

*PSYOP division of the Staff of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations, MACV.
national control of MACV, conducted PSYOP in support of joint and combined stability operations. Force commanders/senior advisors exercised operational control of battalions assigned to the group. The 7th PSYOP Group provided, backup printing and other PSYOP support and liaison with MACV.

(8) Force Commanders/Senior Advisors
Force commanders and senior advisors were responsible for PSYOP in their respective CTZs.

(9) U.S. Naval Forces, Vietnam (NAVFORV)
NAVFORV conducted offshore and inland waterway operations, through naval task forces for coastal surveillance and river patrol, combining PSYOP with normal activities.

(10) 7th U.S. Air Force
The 7th Air Force provided leaflet dissemination and aerial broadcast support.

COORDINATION
As a result of organizational and functional problems, the Army sought to determine the status of U.S. PSYOP in Vietnam. The Army Concept Team in Vietnam (ACTIV), on the basis of a 1968-1969 survey, reported how U.S. PSYOP structure in Vietnam operated in theory and practice and how the varied responsibilities described above complicated the coordination of the overall Allied effort. The report states:

(1) With the varied responsibilities of the agencies involved in PSYOP, it was extremely difficult to coordinate the overall PSYOP effort or establish centralized control and direction in RVN. All five PSYOP unit commanders, together with 40 percent of the respondents from supported commands, indicated there was duplication of effort between Army PSYOP units and other agencies in each CTZ due to lack of coordination and centralized control.

(2) Within MACV, the PSYOP responsibilities were divided. The 4th PSYOP Group, which operated under staff supervision of MACUS-11, conducted tactical and national PSYOP campaigns, while Assistant Chief of Staff (ACoS) for CORDS coordinated and supervised all PSYOP in support of civil operations and revolutionary development. Inasmuch as these agencies produced and disseminated PSYOP material to the same target audiences as JUSPAO, it was extremely difficult to avoid duplication of effort. Field operations in RVN proved that a division of PSYOP into tactical and pacification roles was impractical due to the combined and integrated political-military environment in RVN. By the very nature of their involvement and employment throughout RVN, Army PSYOP units were inextricably engaged in tactical, pacification, national, and strategic PSYOP campaigns.

(3) There were repeated examples of lack of coordination. On 16 February 1969, there was an airborne leaflet mission in III CTZ in which a total of 84,000 leaflets with a national theme were disseminated in the 1st Australian Task Force area of operation. The Task Force PSYOP officer complained about the drop since it was made in his area without prior coordination. There were examples of US PSYOP teams appearing at a hamlet on an audio-visual or loudspeaker mission, only to discover a province team conducting a similar mission.

(4) According to the five major PSYOP unit commanders there was a need for a combined PSYOP Operations Center at the corps and province levels to exercise overall direction to the PSYOP effort of all US/Vietnamese/FWMAF agencies and units. Although MACV has encouraged the creation of US/FWMAF PSYOP Operation Centers, such centers were not fully operational or effective in the past. Recent steps have been taken to remedy these problems. The II CTZ PSYOP Coordination Center officially opened at Nha Trang on 27 February 1969. Coordination centers are now operational on a daily basis in the four CTZs. Additionally, the 4th PSYOP Group of the Vietnamese Psychological Warfare (PSYWAR) Department took steps on 22 February 1969 to increase coordination.
and working relationships necessary at the national military level. For the first time, weekly meetings were held and arrangements were made for closer liaison to coordinate PSYOP activities and propaganda production.

(5) The organizational and personnel relationships between PSYOP units, and military and civilian agencies were confusing. It appeared that military personnel were assigned to civilian USPAO agency only to be later placed under military and civilian agencies were confusing. It appeared that military personnel were assigned to civilian JUSPAO agency only to be later placed under personnel as provincial PSYOP advisors under the operational control of CORDS. In some cases, CORDS PSYOP personnel received regulations and guidance from JUSPAO, CORDS, and MACV-3-11. In other cases, Army PSYOP units prepared directives and guidance which were authenticated and distributed by higher headquarters for implementation by field and province PSYOP advisors. It was stated by senior PSYOP officers that a single military manager for PSYOP was needed to be responsive to the force commander/senior advisor. These respondents speculated that the military personnel could be assigned directly to MACV-3-11 which would then have central PSYOP staff responsibility for military, revolutionary development, and political warfare.

Doctrinal guidance contained in FM 33-1 prescribed PSYOP functions as a staff responsibility of the G3 (J3). However, the prevailing practice in RVN placed PSYOP under the staff supervision of G5. Because of differences in organizational structures within each CTZ, different agencies exercised staff supervision over PSYOP units. At the MACV level, PSYOP was split between G3 and CORDS. In two CTZs, operational control of the PSYOP units was exercised through CORDS, while in other areas control was exercised through G3 and G5. There was not, and should not be, a standard employment of PSYOP units because the military situations were different in each area. However, there should be a continuous and uniform staff channel from the highest level down to the lowest unit to ensure an integrated and coordinated PSYOP effort and to avoid a confusing network of cross-channel communication.

The present system of operational control of PSYOP units in RVN, as opposed to an area or direct support role, was appropriate and adaptable to stability operations. The deployment of PSYOP battalions in each CTZ provided maximum support and responsiveness to force commanders in meeting PSYOP requirements. Moreover, it allowed commanders an opportunity to evaluate military operations in terms of their psychological impact. There have been occasional conflicts in the operational control system. These conflicts occurred when command decisions were made to produce PSYOP material which was considered by PSYOP unit commanders to be either counterproductive or in violation of US policy guidance. Other conflicts arose in the diversion of PSYOP resources or equipment from one CTZ to another. These conflicts were minor and the advantages of the existing operational control system outweighed the disadvantages.

From this report it would appear that the adoption of a joint civilian-military center for foreign information/PSYOP control alone will not adequately meet the need for coordination and control of PSYOP when large numbers of U.S. personnel are involved in overseas stability or other military operations.

NOTES
3 For a different point of view, see Taro Katagiri, “The CPOC,” in this chapter.
TEAMWORK IN SANTO DOMINGO*
BY BERT H. COOPER, JR.

One of the most significant organizational achievements of the Dominican operation in the area of communications was the combining of civilian and military talents by the USIA-Army team at the beginning of the American intervention in the Dominican Republic.

Despite the wide divergences of opinion that prevailed at higher levels of government in the United States concerning the American intervention in the Dominican Republic, there was close cooperation among the beleaguered U.S. representatives on the local scene in Santo Domingo, especially at the height of the crisis in May of 1965. The collaboration between the U.S. Information Service in Santo Domingo (USIS/Santo Domingo) and the Army's 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion during this period was a classic case of successful interagency cooperation in a crisis situation.

In accord with official U.S. policy, USIA was responsible for the entire in-country communications effort, with the Army and other military services providing direct support mainly in terms of hardware and equipment. This arrangement was not only consistent with military planning and national policy guidance but also met the practical demands of the situation. Although the USIA staff in the Dominican Republic was familiar with the country and had the necessary language ability and professional skills, it lacked the communications equipment and facilities to which the Army had access. Conversely, the military lacked area expertise and language capability.

The USIA Deputy Director was assigned the task of coordinating all psychological operations in the Dominican Republic. He had taken charge of USIA activities during the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 and was keenly aware of the need to develop capabilities for air delivery of leaflets, local radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker operations. To assist USIA in these efforts, the Army sent the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion to Santo Domingo. During the first week in May, the entire battalion was moved from its home base at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to the strife-torn capital of the Dominican Republic, taking along all unit equipment that was transportable.

The situation in Santo Domingo was such that the full resources of the Army 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion were clearly needed by USIA. The downtown offices of USIS/Santo Domingo were located in rebel territory, as were most newspapers and commercial printing facilities, the central telephone exchange, and the radio and television studios of Radio San Domingo. Under these circumstances, a temporary base of operations had to be set up in the home of the Public Affairs Officer, Chief of USIS/Santo Domingo, which was located five blocks west of the American Embassy on Avenida Cesar Nicolas Penson. The battalion set up camp first in a vacant lot next door and later moved into a nearby school building.

*Original essay by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.
In addition to providing physical protection for the civilian staff of about twenty U.S. and Dominican personnel at a time when sniper fire was a real hazard, the Army provided the bulk of the hardware and operating personnel that USIS/Santo Domingo badly needed: transportable radio transmitters, mobile presses, multilith machines, loudspeaker trucks, and aircraft for use in leaflet and loudspeaker operations. Army personnel also provided intelligence support by monitoring local radio broadcasts of both rebels and loyalists and translating and disseminating the transcripts of these broadcasts.

The Deputy Commander of the 1st Psychological Warfare Battalion served as liaison officer with the USIS staff. Coordination between Army psyoperators and USIA and State Department personnel was handled on a day-to-day basis through an ad hoc committee system that grew out of the crisis nature of the situation. An Associate Director of USIA sent from Washington to coordinate PSYOP and information activities in the Dominican Republic, met at the embassy with the U.S. Ambassador and other top-level U.S. representatives on the country team. Later he met with key members of the USIS-Army group to report back and to plan the next day's activities. Usually held in the evening in a summer house that had been turned into a conference room—and occasionally interrupted by sniper fire—these repasas, as the nightly staff conferences were nicknamed in Spanish, were informal gatherings in which information was freely exchanged and operational details and problems of the day could be worked out by those immediately involved.

Coordination between USIA and the Army during this period was greatly facilitated by the appointment of a military liaison officer who worked directly with the USIS/Santo Domingo staff. The selection for this assignment of the psychological warfare battalion's deputy commander seems to have been an excellent choice. By all accounts, there was remarkably good coordination and a high degree of personal rapport between the military and civilian elements of the PSYOP team. Their working relationship was particularly good during the crisis month, and some USIA participants in that operation have recalled that the main problem in coordinating civilian and military efforts stemmed from the fact that USIA personnel were often unaware of the resources to which the Army had access.

By June, the immediate crisis had passed and the withdrawal of U.S. forces had begun. During the summer of 1965, elements of the psychological warfare battalion returned to Ft. Bragg, taking along the radio transmitters, heavy presses, and much of the loudspeaker equipment which had been brought along. The residual psychological operations group no longer worked in direct support of USIS/Santo Domingo, which was now returning to its normal pace and style of informational activities and did not need military support at the previous level. The emphasis of Army psychological operations was now changed to more conventional propaganda activities, civil affairs support.
After the reduction in U.S. forces began in June, interactions between USIS/Santo Domingo and the psychological warfare detachment were handled on a more routine basis through the machinery of the country team headed by the Ambassador. Under the country-team concept, key persons representing the State Department, USIA, AID, the military services, and CIA met at least once a week at the U.S. Embassy to review the current situation and the latest developments in official policy and to coordinate on-going operations for which these officials had responsibility. In Washington, a Special Task Force for the Dominican Republic comprising representatives of State, USIA, JCS, and CIA was set up, with direct communication with the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo via a Pentagon "hot line." The interagency body played an important coordinating role throughout the Dominican operation, and its effect on the communications effort can be assessed as favorable in the sense that no serious coordination problems arose during the long phase-out period.

On balance, it would appear that the joint communications effort by USIS/Santo Domingo and the Army psychological warfare group was generally successful under particularly difficult circumstances. Although there have been complaints about delays in delivery and the type and quality of some Army equipment, most participants in the Dominican operation have concluded that the logistical support provided by the military played a significant role in the communications effort. Some criticism of military logistical support has emphasized the delay of a week or longer in getting material from bases in the United States. A more general complaint has been that the Army’s equipment was for the most part not up to date and indeed included some items which ranged from obsolete by a decade or so to antiques of pre-World War II vintage. Some observers have held that the Army’s printing facilities, for example, should have been more modern and lightweight.

According to many sources, the communications effort was severely hampered by the lack of up-to-date field intelligence and language capability on the part of U.S. forces. For example, while the addresses of the major radio studios and commercial printing offices were not unknown, the fact that most of these larger facilities were in unfriendly hands at the time made it necessary to locate others which were often in out-of-the-way places. Thus the lack of suitable maps and basic information about the city interfered seriously with PSYOP activities as well as with other aspects of the operation. Moreover, the psychological warfare battalion’s printing unit ran into a number of difficulties because the troops involved in printing leaflets did not know Spanish. In the course of the Dominican campaign these problems were eventually overcome, but at the height of the crisis such intelligence gaps and language difficulties seriously handicapped what was otherwise a remarkably successful exercise of civilian and military team work.
NOTES
1 The entire essay is based in large part on the following sources: Thomas C. Sorensen, The
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1965), pp. 1, 13; LTC Wallace J. Moules and MAJ Richard M. Brown, "Key to a Crisis,"
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JUSPAO ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION*
BY JOHN W. HENDERSON

Intertwined with the military war in Vietnam was a psychological war conducted at the
national and provincial levels by numerous organizations whose efforts were integrated
under the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). This selection provides
a useful overview of the organization of JUSPAO.

[OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR]
The Executive Office [of JUSPAO] coordinates administrative ele-
ments of the . . . [information] program—budget, personnel, equipment,
suppliers, transportation, housing, security, and the like. The Policy,
Planning, and Research Office prepares policy guidance for all psycholog-
cal operations and is responsible for the JUSPAO country plan, con-
tingency plans, research, evaluation, liaison, and reporting. Evaluation
includes attitude surveys, opinion sampling, and other polls, which are
used in part to assist the evaluation function. In addition to evaluation of
the U.S. program, JUSPAO analyzes Viet Cong propaganda and seeks
the psychological vulnerabilities of the enemy.

[FIELD DEVELOPMENT DIVISION]
The field development division coordinates JUSPAO support for
CORDS [Civilian Operations and Rural Development] field representa-
tives; it also maintains close liaison with Vietnamese Government ele-
ments engaged in psychological operations participating with the GVN in
the central planning and development of most GVN program themes and
psychological action for the provinces. The division produces such mate-
rials as leaflets, posters, newspapers, songs, skits, and tape-recorded
loud-speaker broadcasts.

[NORTH VIETNAMESE AFFAIRS DIVISION]
The North Vietnamese affairs division plans and directs psychological
warfare operations against North Vietnam and assists also JUSPAO
projects involving North Vietnam.

[INFORMATION DIVISION]
In Vietnam, the information functions performed by USIS in other
parts of the world are performed by the information division of JUSPAO.

*Excerpts from The United States Information Agency, Frederick A. Praeger, New York,
copyright holder.
This division has seven branches; press, radio, publications, exhibits, motion pictures-television, and the JUSPAO/AID and the JUSPAO/CORDS offices of information. The first three branches assign media experts to GVN in an advisory and training capacity. Other offices produce materials for the Vietnam press and public, for other USIS posts, for world-wide distribution through USIA in Washington, and for GVN use in the international information program carried on by its embassies abroad. A special function of the press branch is to form the point of contact between the U.S. mission and Vietnamese reporters, editors, and publishers. The radio branch, besides furnishing half of the material used by VOA in its five-and-one-half hours of broadcasts each day, produces broadcast tapes in twenty languages for use by VOA and other USIS posts. The motion picture-television branch performs the usual functions of USIS motion picture units and in addition is the largest producer of motion pictures of any U.S. overseas post. In cooperation with MACV [Military Assistance Command, Vietnam] and AID, this branch has assisted in the establishment of television in Vietnam, which began broadcasting on February 7, 1966, from U.S. Navy aircraft. The two offices of information perform public relations and press functions for the AID mission and for the CORDS program.

[CULTURAL AFFAIRS DIVISION]

The cultural affairs division carries on a program comparable to that of USIS cultural activities in other posts, including an exchange-of-persons program under Department of State auspices, American cultural centers, and assistance to binational centers.

[TECHNICAL SERVICE DIVISION]

The technical service division has facilities for printing, graphics reproduction, audio-visual communications, engineering service, radio installation and maintenance, photo laboratory service, and other services or technical advice for elements of JUSPAO and for the Vietnam Government. The division includes four branches: production, radio engineering, television engineering, and audio-visual facilities. As the war has expanded, in-country productions of printed materials has climbed since June, 1965, from 3.7 million units per month to more than 24 million by 1967.

The radio and television engineering branches supply their services chiefly to the Vietnam Government, helping improve the technical and maintenance capabilities of its radio and television systems. They assist also in developing studio techniques and in improving the design and construction of antennas. The radio branch has furnished to GVN extensive commodity aid and logistical support in the form of transmitters, towers, generators, studio equipment, tape recorders, and the like.

The audio-visual facilities branch furnishes advice and training to the Vietnam Government and also maintains the audio-visual equipment used in JUSPAO programs. Examples of important communications equipment and services for GVN installations in recent years include...
The activities of an assistant representative are concentrated mainly on providing advice and assistance to the Vietnamese Information Service. Among the activities he supports are:
1. "Revolutionary Development," including the amnesty program, indoctrination of refugees, and police and special campaigns
2. Content, theme, design, printing, and distribution of leaflets and posters
3. A community television receiver program— including the selection of sites and placement of sets
4. Building information boards and supplying them with material
5. Establishment, stocking, and maintenance of reading-information rooms
6. Films and equipment for film showings in hamlets throughout the provinces
7. Distribution of JUSPAO and Vietnam Information Service periodicals and books and the provincial newspaper.

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INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CAMEROON: PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS*

By Victor T. Le Vine

Prompt and determined psychological initiatives by the government to preempt insurgent objectives may deny revolutionary groups the mass support they seek.

BACKGROUND

This study of insurgency in the Cameroon between 1955 and 1962 and the measures taken to counter it necessarily focuses more on the political than on the military aspects of the situation. The insurgency never grew in scale to the point where large military units were engaged; rather, the conflict involved small, mobile units operating at sporadic intervals. The insurgency eventually ebbed, not so much in response to military or police counteraction, as to a changing political situation that brought about first a fragmentation of the rebel leadership and then a gradual reduction of the conflict when the insurgents became convinced of the futility of the rebellion.

The conflict took place mainly in the former French areas of the present Federal Republic of Cameroon, an independent state on the west coast of Africa made up of West Cameroon and East Cameroon. The larger eastern region was first a League of Nations mandate and then a U.N. trust territory under French administration until 1960; simultaneously, as the state of Cameroun, it was an associated territory, first in the

French union from 1946 until 1958, then in the French community until January 1960, when it became the independent Republic of Cameroun. The western region was the former Southern Cameroons, which the British administered until October 1961 as a trust territory closely inked with the British colony of Nigeria. On October 1, 1961, pursuant to a plebiscite held in the British Cameroons, the British and French territories merged to form the Federal Republic of Cameroon.*

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It is significant that most of the insurgents were drawn from the heavily populated Bassa and Bamiléké areas in the southwest; to a high degree they were relatively unlettered peasants, usually animist by persuasion. On the other hand, the rebel leaders came principally from the Cameroun's "intelligentsia," men with at least a secondary school education and largely of Christian background. Surprisingly few rebel leaders—or followers, for that matter—were Muslims, an indication of the relatively low impact the rebellion had on the Muslim populations north of the tropical rain forest.

Economic and Social Problems Undergirding the Rebellion

Even though the cases of rebellion were largely political, a widely felt social and economic malaise contributed to its outbreak and continuation. In 1955 French Cameroun found itself with a relatively stagnant and essentially pre-industrial economy.

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A high level of urban unemployment—up to 30 percent of the males of working age in Douala, Yaoundé, and other southern towns—provided the leaders of the rebellion with a discontented and easily mobilized indigenous element. Most of the urban unemployed were rural immigrants from the Bassa, Bulu, and Bamiléké areas who had often fled unfavorable socioeconomic conditions at home or sought opportunities unavailable in the villages.

The Bamiléké, an energetic and aggressive people crowded within the narrow confines of the Bamiléké region, had for some time experienced mounting social tensions and challenges to traditional authorities. Land was becoming scarce, and overpopulation was becoming a critical problem. Large numbers—almost 100,000 by 1955—had been migrating elsewhere; and their presence in the towns and villages of the southern *régions* had begun to present vital economic and social problems for the resident local populations.

The influx of Bassa-Bakoko in the southern towns was also symptomatic of widespread discontent in the Sanaga-Maritime region, where most Bassa made their homes. The Bassa felt that they were treated as "poor relatives" by their more prosperous neighbors and claimed that the government had neglected the development of their area. Further, the

*Regarding spelling forms, the gallicized "Cameroun" and the anglicized "Cameroons" will generally be used as appropriate to the areas and time periods dealt with. "Cameroon" will refer to the Federal Republic of Cameroon establihed October 1, 1961, and in descriptions not related exclusively to any specific time period.

235
rebel leadership found ready recruits among young Camerounian "intellectuals" displeased with the pace of development, anxious to be rid of the French presence, and highly aware of the symbols of Camerounian nationalism that by 1955 had become common political currency.

Political Tensions; the Isolation of the UPC

The political situation in French Cameroun both reflected and contributed to the general tension felt throughout the territory at the beginning of 1955. Still administered at that time as a trust territory, with France responsible to the United Nations for the management of the trusteeship set up in 1946, the Cameroun's administrative structure was headed by a high commissioner responsible to the ministry of overseas territories.

The Camerounian deputies to the Territorial Assembly represented leading political parties, of which the most important was the Bloc Démocratique Camerounaise (BDC), a coalition of northern and southern politicians with a program that could be characterized as restrained nationalism.

One of the principal parties in the Cameroun in 1955 was not represented in the Assembly, and had failed to obtain seats in previous assemblies. This was the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC), founded in April 1948 by a group of trade unionists and by all odds the most dynamic and best organized party in the territory. The UPC was the first Camerounian party to espouse a coherent and vigorous nationalist program. By 1955 the UPC program contained four main points: (1) immediate withdrawal of the French, (2) immediate termination of the trusteeship, (3) reunification with the British Cameroons, and (4) immediate independence. The only important anti-government group in the Cameroun, the UPC controlled various subsidiaries.

By the beginning of 1955, the UPC found itself frustrated and alienated from the other political forces in the country. It had seen the nationalism issue, of which it was the first champion, preempted by the other parties; it had failed in successive elections; and it had been subjected to the increasingly hostile attention of the French administration because of its Communist ties. Especially opposed to the UPC was the moderate BDC, which, in the spring of 1955, persuaded the local Catholic hierarchy to launch a vigorous anti-UPC campaign. In April 1955, UPC extremists led by Dr. Félix Roland Moumié—a great admirer of Mao Tse-tung and revolutionary violence—gained control of the party and the stage was set for the outbreak of violence.

The political situation at the beginning of 1955 was thus explosive in the extreme. Although most of the 15,000 Fenchmen in the Cameroun supported the administration, most of the politically articulate Camerounians could be said to have ranged themselves along a continuum extending from minimal opposition to violent distaste for the colonial power. The UPC enjoyed widespread support throughout the southwest and had managed to recruit the most militant opponents of the regime.
INSURGENCY

Political tensions erupted into the violence that gripped southwest Cameroun in late May 1955. Between May 22 and 30 a series of disturbances took place in Douala, Yaoundé, Bafoussam, Meignanga, Nkongsamba, Mbanga, Loum, Penja, Dschang, and Ngambé. Attacking with almost wanton fury, the demonstrators killed or wounded any Africans or Europeans who happened to be in their path. Houses were burned, cars were demolished, and considerable other property was damaged. In Douala, some 3,000 rioters, armed with nail-studded clubs, machetes, axes, iron bars, and some firearms, stormed the central radio station and spread havoc throughout the New Bell section of town. In Yaoundé, the demonstrators stormed the police station, freeing a number of UPC prisoners, invaded the Territorial Assembly, and set up a roadblock. Elsewhere similar incidents were reported. By May 30, when the authorities had restored order, it was reported that 26 persons had lost their lives and 176 had been wounded. Other estimates ran as high as 125 killed and more than 300 wounded.

The series of riots and demonstrations begun on May 22 suggested well-laid plans; the rebels apparently believed that by creating widespread disturbances and the illusion of a general revolt, they could cause the Camerounian people to rise up and support the UPC in driving out the French. The UPC profited by the element of surprise in the May disturbances, but never again did the insurgents have sufficient organization or strength in the urban centers to launch another series of attacks on a similar scale. Thereafter, occasional urban violence, widespread guerrilla raids, and underground activity were the principal forms of rebel resistance. Underground resistance probably began soon after the UPC and its affiliate organizations were banned on July 13, 1955, and lasted until the ban was lifted in February 1960.

UPC Aims Eventually Stress Revolution

The UPC's political aims, echoed and reechoed by its various affiliates at home, at the United Nations, and through "friendly" presses and radios throughout the world, were always relatively simple. As noted earlier, the basic line included termination of the trusteeship, immediate independence, reunification of French Cameroun and British Cameroons, and complete elimination of the French presence. After the UPC and its affiliates were proscribed in 1955, the lifting of the ban and "national reconciliation"—that is, bringing the external UPC home to participate in the government—became part of the UPC program. "National reconciliation" became, in fact, quite a popular political theme in the Cameroun between 1956 and 1960; it was espoused by a variety of legal political groups, and even, to some extent, by the government itself.

In 1957, the status of French Cameroun changed, since the country, as an associated territory in the French Union, achieved local administrative and financial autonomy in that year. France allowed the Camerounian National Assembly to select a cabinet and prime minister—André-
Marie M'Bida—from May 1957 to February 1958 and, after that, Ahmadou Ahidjo, whose support came from a northern-based party, the Union Camerounaise (UC).3

As the insurgency dragged on, the external UPC added the aim of overthrowing the Ahidjo government; and, by the end of 1959, it was demanding the formation of a "revolutionary transitional government." This was to be brought about by holding general elections before independence and was obviously to be dominated by the UPC. Following . . . November 1960, the external UPC unequivocally stated its goal as the violent revolutionary overthrow of the Ahidjo government.4

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**Underground Operations**

The UPC's underground operations tended to fall into three main areas: (1) propaganda, (2) terrorism, and (3) destruction of property. The principal propaganda outlet for the insurgents was through the external leadership. These exile leaders published a monthly journal, La Voix du Cameroun, in French and English—the French version being printed in Cairo; the English, in London—and issued numerous pamphlets and newsletters. In Cairo, the UPC was permitted to use government radio facilities for weekly shortwave broadcasts in French and Arabic. Within the Cameroun, various UPC fronts published mimeographed newspapers and distributed UPC material printed outside the country.5

Terrorism, the most important weapon of the rebels, probably accounted for the lion's share of the civilian casualties incurred during the revolt. The insurgents employed both selective and random terrorism. Selective terrorism was directed against such key persons as native chiefs (notably in the Bamileke area), wealthy planters and businessmen, and candidates for public office. Its victims were in both the towns and the rural areas. Random terroristic attacks were directed against all the inhabitants of occasional villages or against small groups of individuals in the towns. Some Europeans, including businessmen, planters, and missionaries, were the objects of terrorist attacks, but most UPC terrorism was directed against Africans. Destruction of property generally accompanied terrorist acts, there are no records of the amount of property damage done during the insurgency, but innumerable houses, plantations and shops were burned, pillaged, or generally damaged.

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**COUNTERINSURGENCY**

The Camerounian rebellion was brought under control not so much by military as by political and psychological means. Credit for diminishing and almost ending the conflict goes primarily to the government of Ahmadou Ahidjo. Its reconciliation policies, its liberal amnesty laws, and its willingness to co-opt defectors from the rebellion into the political life of the country effectively isolated both the internal "irreconcilables" and the external Comité Directeur. The result was that the internal UPC lost its ablest leaders, and without them the insurgents had little chance of success.
In addition, both France and the United Nations played important contributory roles—France by providing the military means and logistical support to contain the insurrection, and the United Nations by refusing to sanction pre-independence elections which in the troubled year of 1959 might conceivably have brought the UPC into power.

There is little sense in attempting to draw a fine line between indigenous and external contributions to the counterinsurgency effort, since both France and the indigenous Camerounian authorities worked together closely. Military and police forces contained both Camerounian and French elements; planning was a joint Camerounian-French operation, particularly after 1958; and the execution of administrative and political counterinsurgency measures before 1960 was carried out by both French and Camerounian officials. Only over questions of political strategy did French and local authorities differ substantially, and these differences did not materially impair the counterinsurgent effort.

Nonmilitary Measures to End the Insurgency

Political measures, combined with such factors as the length of the insurrection and the war-weariness of those involved, had far more to do with the ending of the rebellion than did military operations. This is not to suggest that nonmilitary measures were all equally effective: Some were notably unsuccessful, and still others were talked about but never fully implemented or implemented too late. Had there been any attempt, for example, to attack the socioeconomic problems of the Bamiléké in a thoroughgoing manner or even to pursue a planned resettlement of the surplus Bamiléké population, some of the dynamism of the rebellion might well have been drained off months or even years earlier.

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Propaganda and Amnesties Win Over Many Former Rebels

By far the most effective nonmilitary measures stemmed from the Cameroun government’s determined psychological and propaganda effort to undermine the popular base of UPC support by extending fairly generous amnesty terms, fostering a policy of “reconciliation,” and overtly co-opting rallié rebel leaders into the country’s political life and the government. In the operational areas, pro-government literature was widely distributed, and both administration and rallié leaders made tours and addressed local groups. Promises of fair treatment, amnesty, and pardon were liberally given to induce defections. That this may have been done for less than altruistic reasons—many of the ralliés were subsequently imprisoned—in no way vitiated the effectiveness of the government’s policies.

During the Bassa phase (late 1955 to September 1958), there were no offers of amnesty or parole until the government of Ahmadou Ahidjo was invested in February 1958. On June 12 of that year, Ahidjo promised amnesty to UPC guerrillas who defected to the government; and, on June 19, he gave conditional releases to large numbers of political prisoners. Um Nyobé’s death in September 1958 and Mayi Matip’s defection soon afterwards undoubtedly contributed to the widespread ralliments (defec
tions), which, according to official figures, reached 2,070 persons by November 1958.6

The next important step was taken in early 1959 when Mayi Matip and several other ralliers presented themselves as candidates for the by-elections in the Senega-Maritime, Bamileke, and Nyong-Kellé districts. The government not only did nothing to prevent their candidacy, but in fact contributed to their victory. Their electoral success encouraged further defections during 1959, and in the spring of 1960 additional ralliers throughout the southwest contested and won seats in the new National Assembly. The widespread defections were made possible in part by the amnesty law of 1959 and its subsequent liberalization in 1960, as well as by the government's February 1960 action setting aside the 1955 laws outlawing the UPC and its affiliates. The re-enfranchised UPC lost no time in contesting seats for the National Assembly, and new waves of ralliments occurred throughout 1960 and 1961.

Between the end of 1959 and the beginning of 1961, probably more than 5,000 persons could be counted as ralliers, an estimate which included both active guerrillas and their passive supporters.7 Ahidjo even brought ex-ralliés into his cabinet; Pierre Kamden Ninyim, leader of the Bamileke rallié deputies, became a minister of state. Mayi Matip and Dr. Bebey Eyidi were also offered portfolios, but they refused the offers.

In its campaign to win over the rebels, the government relied not only on liberal amnesty offers, but also on such themes as the length of the insurrection, the loss of crops and economic well-being, and the high cost to life and property. Through its press and radio facilities and by way of its touring officials, the government sought to convince both the rebels and their sympathizers that the insurrection was not only futile but increasingly meaningless as well. With the coming of full independence in January 1960 and the reunification of the French Cameroun and British Cameroons in October 1961, the government's message looked even more convincing.

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2. Ibid., p. 252.


4. The UPC aims appear frequently in UPC publications.

5. For a partial list of UPC propaganda materials, see the author's bibliography in "Three Collections on the Cameroun," Africana Newsletter (Hoover Institution), Summer 1963, pp. 9-16.


7. The estimate is the author's; official figures are generally unreliable and usually fail to make any distinction between guerrillas and other persons.

Author's Note. Except for official—and mainly unavailable—reports, there are, to the best of my knowledge, no published articles, books, or reports dealing directly with this insurgency situation. I have therefore had to rely on an embarrassing degree on my own published materials, the documents, notes, and other ephemera gathered during my two

240
research tours in the Cameroun (September-November 1959 and September 1960 to May 1961).
I have also had the benefit of Prof. David Gardiner's excellent study of the Cameroun trusteeship—Cameroun, United Nations Challenge to French Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1963): some contact, by letter and in person, with various members of the UPC leadership; and extensive discussions on the general situation with French and Camerounian officials in Yaoundé, Paris, and New York.

THE UNDEMONSTRATED INTERVENTION*

By BERT H. COOPER, Jr.

STATED U.S. NATIONAL POLICY OBJECTIVES

The immediate objectives of the 1958 U.S. intervention in Lebanon, apart from protecting American lives and property, were to forestall military intervention by the United Arab Republic (UAR) and to prevent the overthrow of the incumbent government by revolutionary violence. Although not committed to keeping President Camille Chamoun in power indefinitely, the United States was determined that the Lebanese government would not be allowed to suffer the fate of the Iraqi government, which had just been destroyed in a violent coup d'état staged by elements believed to be in league with Nasser and the Communist bloc. In the wake of the sudden eruption of revolutionary violence in Baghdad and in the light of international tensions prevailing in the Middle East at the time, it appeared likely to many Western observers that a chain reaction might topple the fragile governmental structure of both Lebanon and Jordan. Accordingly, the regimes of both countries received military support from the United States and Britain at this time, although the Lebanese action was on a much larger scale.

The official policy position of the United States was set forth in several statements, including a White House press release, a message to Congress by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and an address by U.S.-U.N. representative Henry Cabot Lodge before the U.N. Security Council. Stating essentially the same points contained in each of these communications, President Eisenhower explained the Lebanon operation before Congress as follows:

U.S. forces are being sent to Lebanon to protect American lives, and by their presence to assist the government of Lebanon in the preservation of Lebanese territorial integrity and independence, which have been deemed vital to the United States national interests and world peace. . . . After the most detailed consideration, I have concluded that given the developments in Iraq, the measures thus far taken by the UN Security Council are not sufficient to preserve the independence and integrity of Lebanon. I have considered, furthermore, the question of our responsibility to protect and safeguard American citizens in Lebanon, of whom there are about 2,500.

In his radio and television address to the nation, the President emphasized the "pattern of conquest by indirect aggression" that had been employed by the Communists in Greece, Czechoslovakia, China, Korea, and Indochina, and he expressed the belief that a similar pattern of events was taking place in the Middle East.

Although the United Arab Republic was not specifically named in official U.S. policy statements, it was generally known that in the eyes of

*Original essay by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.
many Western officials Egypt and Syria were regarded as serving the interests of the Communist bloc in the Middle East. In the perception of most decisionmakers involved in the Lebanon operation, there was a tendency to equate the extreme manifestations of pan-Arab nationalism expounded by Nasser and the UAR with the aspirations of international communism for world domination. According to this view, Nasser was considered to be the primary agent of communism in the region, although to many Arab observers the issues did not appear to be that simple. Running through the conflict with Nasser's brand of pan-Arabism were strong crosscurrents of competing nationalism within individual Arab countries, communal and regional identifications, and personal rivalries among Arab leaders and heads of state. In the Lebanon crisis all of these crosscurrents were operative to some extent, and the question of the presidential succession was pivotal in view of the powers which were vested in this office under the Lebanese constitution.

The United States recognized early in the intervention that the Lebanese rebels were a disparate group whose primary point of agreement was opposition to President Chamoun. Accordingly, Under Secretary of State Robert Murphy sent to Beirut as President Eisenhower's special envoy to assist U.S. Ambassador Robert M. McClintock in working out a political compromise regarding the presidential succession. Although Prime Minister Sami al-Solh had announced on May 27th that the government would not seek Chamoun's re-election by the Chamber of Deputies, the matter was not actually settled until July 31st when the national legislature selected Gen. Fuad Chehab as the country's third president.

During the remaining period of the American presence in Lebanon, the United States pursued a policy of mediation between pro- and anti-Chamoun factions in the coalition government that President Chehab was then in the process of assembling. In attempting to explain this policy to the Lebanese public, American spokesmen had at first to overcome the widespread belief in the country that the United States had intervened in order to keep Chamoun in power. Later, this problem was reversed when pro-Chamoun "loyalists" began contending that the Americans were favoring the rebels by supporting the inclusion of anti-Chamoun politicians in the coalition government.

The withdrawal of American forces from Lebanon was a major policy objective of both the U.S. government and the Chehab administration. In his first public statement to the Lebanese people, President Chehab announced that an early withdrawal of U.S. forces would be one of his first objectives, although privately Chehab indicated his desire for the Americans to remain in the country until the security situation had improved. Thus, there was no basic disagreement between U.S. and Lebanese authorities on this point. It was deemed important to the United States, however, that the decision to withdraw American troops should appear to be made unilaterally and not in response to pressures from the UAR and
the Soviet bloc. Accordingly, President Eisenhower announced in early August that the security situation was such that there were more than enough U.S. troops in Lebanon and that a partial withdrawal could begin. One U.S. battalion left the country with maximum publicity before the UN General Assembly met in an emergency session on August 5th.5

Diplomatic action through the United Nations to effect the total withdrawal of American troops from Lebanon and the smaller British contingent from Jordan paralleled political maneuvers on the local scene to put together an acceptable compromise solution to the 1958 crisis. In arriving at this relatively favorable outcome, U.S. psyoperators played a critical role by explaining why the Americans had come to Lebanon in the first instance and the conditions under which they would leave.

ORGANIZATION AND COORDINATION OF THE COMMUNICATION EFFORT

As the civilian agency with primary responsibility for explaining American foreign policy to overseas audiences, USIA had detailed operational plans and evaluation procedures for information activities and political communication in Lebanon as well as throughout the Middle East. Beirut served as a regional center for USIA operations in the entire Middle East.

The total communication effort undertaken by the United States in connection with the 1958 Lebanon operation consisted of worldwide propaganda activity by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Voice of America and in-country activity by USIS/Lebanon and U.S. military forces participating in the intervention. The Department of State was responsible for overall coordination of all these activities.

USIA in-country activities were conducted from the American Embassy in Beirut and various facilities of United States Information Service (USIS) in Lebanon. U.S. military forces supported USIS operations upon request by the civilian authorities, but did not conduct independent PSYOP as such.

CHARACTER OF IN-COUNTRY COMMUNICATION EFFORT

Lebanon has the oldest and most prolific press in the Arab world, with numerous daily and weekly newspapers as well as many monthly periodicals and journals of opinion. Because of its high literacy rate of about 70 percent, the country's broad spectrum of political groups, and a relatively free press, Lebanese journalists played an active role in the 1958 crisis. Moreover, as a congenial and cosmopolitan urban center, Beirut served as home base for much of the international press community in the Middle East. Consequently, the events of 1958 were fully covered by the news media.

The United States generally concurred with the Lebanese government's position on the crisis, and USIA conducted a vigorous campaign to explain the reasons for the landing of American troops and the conditions under which they would be withdrawn. In this effort, USIS/Lebanon and American Lend Forces (AMLANFOR) cooperated closely with the international news media of the non-Communist world, arranging frequent
press conferences and tours by foreign journalists who were allowed to see for themselves that U.S. personnel were in the country by invitation and not as a permanent occupation force.

Since the Lebanon intervention was the subject of many hours of debate at the United Nations, the Voice of America (VOA) broadcast many of these sessions live from the U.N. General Assembly in New York. When Soviet jamming of these U.N. broadcasts became intense, VOA tape recorded and broadcast the jamming to show how the USSR was attempting to suppress information, even to the point of jamming the speeches of its own representatives.6

In sum, the relationship between U.S. and Lebanese governmental communications activities could be characterized as generally parallel if not closely coordinated. Thematic emphases were naturally different, although both governments were in basic agreement about the overall situation. Moreover, U.S. efforts were international in scope and regional in focus, since the Lebanese conflict was viewed by Washington primarily as an international crisis involving a regional contest between pro-Soviet and pro-Western forces in the Middle East. The Lebanese government's commitment to maintaining Lebanon's traditional borders and governmental system coincided nicely with U.S. foreign policy objectives in the area. Accordingly, both governments emphasized the values of national unity, speedy return to peaceful pursuits, and the early withdrawal of U.S. forces. These essentially positive themes were constantly emphasized in the VOA's worldwide propaganda campaign, and they significantly reinforced in-country information activities by the Beirut government and USIS/Lebanon.

ASSESSMENT OF COMMUNICATION EFFORT

As noted in the previous section, the political communication effort in Lebanon has been generally credited with successfully explaining U.S. policy to foreign audiences both in Lebanon and other parts of the world. The intensive propaganda campaign conducted by USIA and VOA was responsible in large measure for this success, but it should also be noted that the information side of the intervention only reflected what was in fact a highly successful military operation and diplomatic maneuver by the United States. The fact that U.S. forces were able to avoid active combat, although they came prepared for a fight, while political leaders and diplomatic representatives worked out a compromise that all sides of the Lebanese civil conflict could eventually accept meant that there were indeed positive results which could be heralded to the world.

The decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assign primary responsibility for political communication and ideological warfare to the American Embassy in Beirut and USIS/Lebanon proved to be fortuitous because of the greater professional skills and area expertise of these civilian in-country agencies. At the same time, close cooperation with U.S. military forces was achieved after some initial difficulties, and a harmonious relationship reportedly prevailed between Embassy personnel and the
AMLANFOR headquarters staff. Thus, military aircraft were made available when needed; for example, in connection with the well-known leaflet campaign in July and for the many press tours that enabled foreign journalists to see for themselves how well the operation was proceeding. Relations with the press were singularly successful, and the daily press conferences sponsored jointly by USIS/Lebanon and the military services have been cited as models of concise, clear-cut briefings that were invaluable to the press corps’ need to keep abreast of political developments and military conditions in country.

Relations with the indigenous population were generally good, and close cooperation between U.S. military forces and the Lebanese Army was instrumental in this regard. The Lebanese Army functioned as a buffer and intermediary between American troops and hostile elements of the local population in rebel districts of the capital, and the joint patrols by Lebanese and American troops and the system of liaison officers that were instituted soon after the landing greatly reduced tensions and cleared up misunderstandings. Later, the training exercises and practice firing conducted by AMLANFOR had important psychological implications by demonstrating U.S. military capabilities while at the same time involving many Lebanese in these activities as spectators. The intervention provided numerous opportunities for Americans to communicate with the people on a face-to-face and personal basis—U.S. troops on leave, Lebanese students in USIS/USOM English classes, and civil officials and military officers of both countries working together on common problems growing out of the crisis.

Although evaluative studies of the various dimensions of the massive communication effort surrounding the 1958 Lebanon operation were not available for this survey, it appears reasonable to conclude on the basis of discussions with knowledgeable persons and review of documents available in USIA files that this effort played a critical role in influencing foreign audiences. Without the professional skills of those responsible for ideological warfare and their serious commitment to the tasks of political communication, the success of American diplomats and military forces in this delicate undertaking would not have been able to have the positive effect that in fact it had around the world, and especially in the Middle East and Lebanon itself. On the role of psychological operations in Lebanon, Thomas C. Sorensen concluded that USIA efforts were at least partially responsible for making the Lebanon landing one of the relatively rare modern armed interventions not generally denounced.

NOTES
3 Robe Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co.,

245
BY TARO KATAGIRI

Multinational PSYOP efforts require multinational coordination. The CPOC, Combined PSYOP Center, was a partially realized attempt to meet this requirement.

A deficiency in the PSYOP effort in Vietnam was the lack of adequate systems for coordination and integration. Provisions to insure coordination are needed at every level from the national to the local. Prior to January 1, 1969, however, only a loose structure existed for efficient coordination and integration of the Government of Vietnam, the United States, The Republic of Korea, and other allied force PSYOP efforts. The magnitude of the problem of coordination and control can be inferred from Figure 1, showing the diverse units supported by the 4th PSYOP Group.

The year 1969 saw a first step toward the development of more efficient PSYOP coordination, at least for integrating the different military efforts. At each Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) level, there came into being a combined PSYOP center (CPOC). Each center differed somewhat in name, in function, and in team composition. One of the few Common denominators was that each CPOC was headed by a Vietnamese, with an American as his deputy.

In contrast to the favorable developments in the CTZs, a very different picture presented itself in Saigon. Events started auspiciously when it was decided in early 1969 that representatives of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), The ARVN Political Warfare Bureau, and the 4th PSYOP Group would meet on a regular basis to enhance coordination. Beginning in March of that year, weekly combined panel meetings were held to coordinate propaganda development. And in September 1969, the GPWD (General Political Warfare Department) MACV PSYWAR Policy Committee, comprised of representatives of the GPWD, MACV, ar. 4th PSYOP Group, began to meet monthly with the ambitious goals of assessing situations for PSYOP exploitation, establishing more compatible policies, and evaluating PSYOP programs. In the thinking of many, the time was close at hand when U.S. and South Vietnamese Military PSYOP resources would be combined. The integration never materialized. Indeed, the coordinating systems in Saigon did not meet the standards of the CPOCs in the Corps.

*Original essay by Taro Katagiri.
Without question, even the CPOCs were deficient as a coordinating tool in many respects. In concept, nevertheless, the CPOC represented a step in the proper direction. It provided a forum for the systematic exchange of knowledge and experience by the representatives of different PSYOP agencies. Further, it enhanced unity of effort between the allies. And, most importantly, the CPOC contributed to the realization of a major U.S. objective, improvement of ARVN PSYOP capabilities.

**Figure 1. Units Supported by the 4th P SyOP Group**

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structure. These problems are perhaps most pronounced in the attempt to coordinate activities abroad with headquarters "at home" (i.e., in the communicating country).

It is well known that persons stationed in foreign countries may begin to perceive events differently as a result of their exposure to the society in which they find themselves. This is a major consideration in coordinating policy and operations: personnel in-country often react differently from those at home to the same stimuli.

A similar problem is the structure of authority in headquarters-field coordination. Although lines of responsibility are usually reasonably clear in this situation, difficulties are sometimes created by the existence of (1) large in-country organizations for PSYOP and (2) crisis situations. A large number of diverse communicators in a single overseas country may represent somewhat divergent interests—more properly, sub-interests—of the communicator. That is, although each is attempting to serve the national interest, each perceives differently the best means to serve the national interest. When this discord must be carried on over thousands of miles, it is particularly troublesome. Clearly, a centralized control located in-country is advisable in most situations of this type.

Reuben S. Nathan discusses the hierarchical problem in headquarters-field coordination in "Cuba: Strategic Dilemma." He recognizes that "theirs is not to reason why" is still relevant to some crisis situations, but presents the problem of coordination in terms of communication up and down the lines of authority.

Bert H. Cooper, Jr., addresses the problems caused by perceptual differences of personnel stationed in-country and those at home.

REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ACTION*

By George A. Kelly

After 1956, the Psychological Action Service "had its own command channels, furnished an officer to all military staffs," and "developed considerable local license and autonomy..."  

While Anglo-Saxon observers are unquestionably more familiar with the intricacies of the discussion that has taken place since 1954 (the year of the "massive retaliation" doctrine) regarding the prospects and conditions of nuclear war, there has been a no less spirited debate in France over the nature of a very different kind of conflict.

To qualify this type of war which has so seized the imagination of French military analysts, the comprehensive title of la guerre révolutionnaire has been given.

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It is itself total war on a limited scale, because it utilizes propagandistic appeal to whole populations and all economic, social, and political over it can avail itself of.

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If it is exaggerated to claim that all instances of la guerre révolutionnaire...
ntaire are directly inspired by the Soviet Union or Communist China, it is, nevertheless, clear—according to Claude Delmas, one of the best-balanced writers on the subject—that “the principles of the achievement of a national struggle of revolutionary character for the conquest of power were codified in the Marxist doctrine.”

To the theorists of la guerre révolutionnaire, the Front de Liberation National (FLN) is equivalent to communism and the pacification of the territory is nothing less than the “defense of the Occident.” Internal political problems aside, it is by this very simple standard that the characteristic attitudes of the French Army must be measured. Algeria is, above all, a war of the flank whose object is Western Europe itself, cradle of the “traditional values” on which French military writers ceaselessly insist.

Jean Planchais, military correspondent for Le Monde, describes this attitude vividly:

General Callies, inspector general of the armed forces in North Africa, scarcely ever moves about without a world map where he has drawn a large black arrow, which, issuing from the depths of Rea Asia, pushes its point as far as the Maghreb. To him this is the best analysis of the Algerian situation.

GRAND STRATEGY

It would be dangerous to reject the capital importance which the French have attached to the concept of la guerre révolutionnaire, however extreme some of the interpretations seem to be. But we must recognize some very precise psychological conditions that make this analysis highly compatible with national needs of morale and prestige. A decade and a half of non-possession of nuclear armament in a world where its minatory power appeared omnipotent engendered in the French Army both a measure of chagrin and a requirement for formulating doctrines of grand strategy in which the emphasis would not be on the technical perfection of weapons or on statistical measurements of power.

The growing assumption of the “balance of terror” argued that as military potential approached the conceivable limits of destructiveness there was correspondingly less chance that the weapons of total cataclysm would ever be used, but rather that military activity would be carried on by less direct means. Whereas this likelihood led the nuclear powers to seek alternatives in the investigation of “limited wars” which would be essentially modifications of classical conflicts implying either the use or nonuse of nuclear arms, the French turned their attention to a much more restrictive, yet more total, phenomenon which their allies had sometimes mistakenly identified as “brush fire war” and furthermore given little concentrated study to.

La guerre révolutionnaire claimed its essence from the celebrated maxim of Clausewitz and opposed itself not to total nuclear war but to total peace. For peace in the generally accepted sense and la guerre révolutionnaire could be, and demonstrably were, simultaneous and by no means exclusive. The tactics revealed by the enemy in the writings of his theoreticians (Lenin, Trotsky, Mao) and in the two colonial wars the
French had fought in Indochina and Algeria enabled the planners to postulate theories for the novel kind of war they had perceived.

NO ULTIMATE WEAPON

The paradox of modern war so successfully posed by the theory of *la guerre révolutionnaire* was further abetted by French military sensitivities. If war was polyvalent (a favorite word of M. Bourgeois-Maunoury while he held the portfolio of national defense in the Guy Mollet cabinet), then there was no ultimate weapon: both the knife and the tactical nuclear bomb might have their uses. If nuclear war was massively impersonal, the conditions of *la guerre révolutionnaire* imposed the primacy of the individual in the conduct of operations.

The resourcefulness of small units became paramount, and this fact had the tendency to restore to war some of the glamor so essential to the morale of many who engage in combat. It became a compliment to the French soldier and his military organization to proclaim this function of initiative as a specific national aptitude. Thus, as a result of the Indochinese and Algerian conflicts, it was alleged—again far from falsely—that the French among Western armies had the greatest experience and most adequate indoctrination for the new type of combat. As Colonel Némo wrote in the *Revue de Défense Nationale*:

The French Army is practically the only one to have encountered communism in action in a vast land war of style and amplitude previously unknown. It can, therefore, open broadly the debate on the form of future war.

The doctrine of *la guerre révolutionnaire* was, it would appear, the result both of objective analysis of combat experience and of institutional self-appeasement. It would be incorrect, however, to suppose that the subjective arguments were of a nature to destroy the thesis as a whole. Again, it seems just to say that only the limits of the thesis are in question.

MILITARY CONQUEST

*La guerre révolutionnaire* recognizes that military conquest of the enemy will be difficult and indeed prohibitive. If the adversary is bold enough to undertake a battle with regularly constituted fighting units and is beaten by the “forces of order,” he still has the possibility of retiring to the maquis and reverting to continuous guerrilla activity, provided that his conviction in the war remains staunch. This was the precise case of General Giap of the Vietminh, beaten in Tonkin in 1951 in a regular engagement by the army of De Lattre. Customarily, a revolutionary army seeks a major military encounter only when it is sure of its numerical, technical, and strategic superiority in a given circumstance (for example, Dien Bien Phu). Until this time arrives the objective will be to drain the morale of the “pacification forces” through interminable raids, ambushes, skirmishes, reprisals, and a steady stream of carefully controlled propaganda.

CIVILIAN SUPPORT

One particular condition is absolutely essential for the waging of revolutionary war: the support of the surrounding civilian masses. The
revolutionary soldier must be able to disguise himself—sometimes in
groups of regimental strength—among the population and reemerge
when the time is ripe. He must be, as Mao Tse-tung puts it, like “the fish
in water.” Mao also writes that “revolutionary war is the war of the
popular masses; it cannot be waged except . . . by enlisting their sup-
port.” Therefore, it is to this “mass” that the counter-revolutionary army
must likewise address itself: first, by the interdiction of the enemy’s
grasp over the indigenous population through both force and persuasion;
second, by rallying the sentiments of the people to the cause of the “forces
of order.”

The mass, according to the most systematic theorists, is inert; it blows
as the wind blows. Consequently, it becomes a question of employing a
spectrum of means in the most advantageous manner if the allegiance of
the mass is to be obtained. “Cette masse est à prendre,” declares Colonel
Charles Lacheroy, former chief of the Psychological Action Service of the
Ministry of Defense. “Comment la prendre?” For it is elementary and
undisputed in la guerre révolutionnaire that the first step is that of
forming a base for revolutionary activity.

The axiom cuts both ways, because it is equally essential to the “forces
of order” that their base of operations should be protected and a core of
sympathy created among the surrounding inhabitants. With absolute
military decision unavailable, the struggle becomes one for the allegiance
and control of the population. This lesson has been analyzed frequently in
the light of modern experience: where Ho Chi Minh succeeded brilliantly
in extending his sway through the creation of popular support, Markos,
the Greek Communist, failed in 1947 because of casual and ineffective
methods of political indoctrination among the masses.

It becomes evident that if la guerre révolutionnaire is sometimes a war
of terror and torture (as the experiences of Algeria have abundantly
shown), it is also a conflict of persuasion, manipulation, and compulsion.
If there is nothing strikingly novel about this circumstance—for history is
studded with the effects of illustrious persuasion—the scientification of
the techniques employed is at least a significant innovation. This is,
perhaps, the most confused and interesting aspect of la guerre révo-
lationnaire and the one which we shall proceed to examine.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAPONS

The psychological weapon has been used in warfare since time immem-
orial, but never have its manipulators been so conscious of their
activity as such as in this present “century of total war.” The role of
Communist “agitprop” and the function of the Hitlerian mass spectacles,
hate campaigns, and “blood and soil” motifs are too well-known to require
comment here. Today, propaganda technique and subsidiary uses of mass
psychology may be at the total service of an aggressive ideology, one
which either holds the formal levers of command in a nation-state or
aspires to do so through subversion.

The French, more than any other Western nation, have experienced
this pertinent factor in combat. The incessant psychological warfare of intense ideological character waged by the Vietminh against their own troops, the population of the country, the French Expeditionary Force, and the people of neighboring states easily convinced certain French officers that the Communist contagion could not be checked unless determined steps were taken to adopt some of these same methods in the West. The shattering experiences suffered in the prisoner of war camps of Ho Chi Minh furnished a final complement to the more indirect techniques of visual and audial propaganda.

An essential ingredient of la guerre révolutionnaire was the unprincipled use of psychological warfare. Increasingly, influential spokesmen in the French services, humiliated and smarting from the defeat of 1954, began to demand immediate action through improved methods of troop education and the establishment of psychological warfare services that could enable French forces to meet the revolutionary challenge on its own terms wherever it might break out in the future.

With regard to the psychological aspects of modern war, French military theorists divide the range of action into two components which they label respectively la guerre psychologique and l'action psychologique. Normally, the two terms would convey the dichotomy of "propaganda" as opposed to "information," but it is quite evident that these have become confused and that propaganda is paramount in both instances. La guerre psychologique comprises those elements of propaganda, psychological riposte, and demonstration which are specifically directed toward the forces of the enemy and designed to undermine his will to resist. In this sense it corresponds roughly with what the US Army terms "tactical" or "strategic" operation in its Psywar doctrine.

L'action psychologique, on the other hand, embraces those efforts which either contribute to the morale and allegiance of the indigenous populations or to the fighting will of the "forces of order" themselves. This would recall a blend, in American military terms, of troop information and education and the aspect of Psywar known as "consolidation operations."

It is not difficult to see that in a fluid campaign such as the Algerian, where small forces are individually engaged in combat and where the enemy fighter and the civilian, in conformity with the "fish in water" principle of la guerre révolutionnaire, are frequently indistinguishable, the two jurisdictions have a tendency and a temptation to overlap. Nevertheless, the distinction is clearly drawn in the significant instruction to the armed forces signed by the (then) Minister of the Armies, M. Pierre Guillaumat, on 28 July 1959, the ostensible purpose of which was to curb many of the independent and deep-rooted abuses of the psychological arm that the Algerian war and its surrounding political milieu had produced.

Inasmuch as the province of la guerre psychologique is, at least in theory, fairly closely confined to those techniques familiar to the Ameri-
can military services (loudspeaker and leaflet operations, radio broadcasting operations, and special interrogation of prisoners), attention shall be devoted more exclusively to those elements comprehended in the term *l'action psychologique*, the direction of information and propaganda toward friendly or at least neutral targets.

**POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION**

The origins of the pressure for a doctrine of psychological action in the French services were assuredly both theoretical and visceral. We have already spoken at some length of the theoretical in connection with la *guerre révolutionnaire*. Now we must briefly evoke the experience of Indochina on the human and emotional scale. In the compounds of the Vietminh the prisoners experienced constant political indoctrination, including compulsory study groups, lectures, and classes on Marxist texts. "Political progress" was encouraged through systems of rewards and punishments, creation of fear, doubt, and apprehension among the subjects, enforced autocriticism, and the whole battery of psychological manipulation which we collectively call "brain-washing."

This novel and debilitating process left deep scars on the returning officers. If it did not make many Communists, it did make a group of embittered professional soldiers who reserved whatever anger they could not muster for the Vietminh to the system, the politicians, and the insouciant civilian population of France in general—in short, the whole complex of democratic organization that had defended them and itself so badly against a little-understood menace. Liberal democracy stood, in a sense, condemned as ineffectual. "One will never insist enough on this point: propaganda directed from the base of a mild-mannered democracy loses nine-tenths of its chances, while on the contrary it achieves its maximum efficiency from the base of a clean, hard organization of parallel hierarchies," fumed Colonel Lacheroy, himself a former inmate of the Vietminh. Although this article does not touch upon the intense political ramifications of the *action psychologique* movement, it is appropriate to point out that variations of Lacheroy's attitude were instrumental in the unwillingness of the French services to defend the waning prerogatives of the Fourth Republic in May 1958.

Generally speaking, the mode of thinking in 1954-56, when *l'action psychologique* was germinating, was the following: when the adversary is unscrupulous, what is fair is what works. And what works can be admired, even if the one who has delivered the hard lesson inspires nothing but hate. This was to lead a number of French officers to the detailed examination of the methods employed by the Vietminh in the Indochina War as well as to the study of a number of central Communist and psychological texts which provided both a justification and a methodology of the type of warfare they were proposing. The anguish of the Indochina defeat gave rise to serious questioning of democratic military doctrine. In a lecture given at Nice on 20 July 1957, Lacheroy exclaimed:
In Indochina, as in China, as in Korea, as elsewhere, we observe that the strongest seems to be beaten by the weakest. Why? Because the norms we used for weighing our opposing forces, those traditional norms, are dead. We have to face up to a novel form of warfare, novel in its accomplishments and novel in its achievements.

Many of the officers who came back from Vietminh prison camps found themselves posted to the faculties of the war colleges and to the higher staffs in their quality as participants in the most recent war. Others "prepared certificates in psychology and sociology." They shared and compared experiences. A clarion article by the brilliant and dogmatic General Lionel Chassin, who had been De Lattre's air deputy in Indochina, served as a rallying point for the discontented. He wrote:

It is time for the army to cease being the grande muette. The time has come for the Free World, unless it wishes to die a violent death, to apply certain of its adv.

dacy's methods. And one of these methods—probably the most important resides in the ideological role which, behind the Iron Curtain, has been assigned to the military forces.

In March and April 1955 the review Hommes et Mondes furnished an operational sketch of proposals related to the Chassin criticism. Written under the collective nom de plume of "Milites," the article began with a section entitled "L'Armée en Marge de la Nation." Positive means for encouraging a common understanding of aims between the army and the French metropolitan population were urged. A later section called for the revitalization of the traditional values of the nation through educational reform, with a particular target being the younger citizens. The army, said the article, would be prepared to "give the citizens a 'moral armature' against an aggression which would be not only material but psychological...show him how to fight effectively on both the material and psychological planes."

ARMY-YOUTH COMMITTEE

Partly as a result of the "Milites" study, an Army-Youth committee, established by the government in 1953, was revitalized under the presidency of General Jacques Faure. At a meeting of representatives of this group held at Chamonix in February 1956, Faure urged his young listeners to seek a "precise inventory" of national myths and to weigh "their emotional density." At the same time an ambitious troop information program was instituted at all echelons, making use of much psychological material in its presentation and particularly directed toward anti-Communist indoctrination. Thus the primary steps were taken in accordance with the doctrine of la guerre révolutionaire to protect the base, "protéger les arrières."

In the meantime the military analysts addressed themselves to the matter of technique itself. Some of the extremists unquestionably would have preferred to see a more authoritarian line of political command proceeding from the highest government sources in Paris. This would have inhibited daily vacillations of policy and eased the task of imposing the new methods which had had such a startling fund of potency in the hands of Ho Chi Minh. Others, while endorsing the reorientation of psychological warfare to meet the needs of combating the enemy in
Algeria, were more content to work within the traditional structures provided by modern democratic convention.

In any case, from 1956 on the fledgling Psychological Action Service (SAPI), which now had its own command channels and which furnished an officer to all military staffs (7ème bureau), found itself—owing to the exigencies of the Algerian conflict—with considerable local license and autonomy, ample funds, and constant ability to multiply its activities in what normally would be construed as the civilian sphere. A directive on the subject of the aims of the war by the Resident Minister for Algeria, M. Robert Lacoste, published in June 1956, did much to regularize and legitimize the new concept of warfare which was increasingly thrown into the breach as the volume of the rebellion mounted.

NATURAL LAWS

An intellectual substratum, sometimes misused or misconstrued, governed the French practice of psychological action, or at least was often used to justify it scientifically. It was believed—and indeed the belief is shared by many psychologists—that there were rules, almost amounting to natural laws, which could be discovered pertaining to the imposition of obedience on amorphous crowds such as the Islamic peoples of North Africa. The works of Lenin and Trotsky were combed for all points relating to crowd behavior, and the unsystematic science behind the nefarious art of Hitler and Goebbels was studied. Other pioneer, and often native, crowd sociologists, such as Gustave Le Bon, hinted at laws and techniques that were introduced helter-skelter into the arsenal.

Probably the most influential maître de pensée was the Russian émigré psychologist Serge Tchakhotine, a disciple of Pavlov, who maintained in his book, The Rape of Crowds by Political Propaganda, that crowds could indeed be manipulated by clever oratory and skillful demonstrations through the induction of “conditioned reflexes.” Tchakhotine, who, although himself a Marxist, had absorbed much of the Hitlerian method from residence in late-Weimar Germany, set great store in the mounting of mass demonstrations, use of symbols (Swastika, goosestep, and Roman salute), military music, crowd-leader dialogue, and other rhetorical and psychological tricks. More than a little of the Tchakhotinian style can be detected in some of the performances at the Algiers Forum in the days following the 13 May 1958 coup d'état, and directives of the psychological action services from this period clearly reveal the debt.

Although tentative efforts had been made in Indochina from 1952 on (under the auspices of a joint Franco-Vietnamese Psychological Warfare Branch headed by a Vietnamese official Nguyen Huu Long) to riposte against the Vietminh with their own methods, the first systematic use of the new techniques by a Western army was in the Algerian fighting. Three of four newly organized loudspeaker and leaflet companies (Compagnies de Haut-Parleurs et Tracts), formed on the American model, carried anti-FLN propaganda, entertainment, and educational material throughout the ravaged countryside in massive “consolidation opera-
At the same time, the SAPI itself, through command directives and through the army’s regular weekly publication *Le Bled* (which attained a circulation of 350,000), concentrated its efforts on keeping morale and will to fight at a high pitch, counterattacking against “defeatist” propaganda from the *métropole*, and launching concerted campaigns aiming particularly at the conversion of the urban Moslem populations of the large centers.

A third, and most effective, type of *action psychologique* was performed by the SAS (Section Administrative Spécialisée) and SAU (Section Administrative Urbaine) officers, numbering more than 500, who had been given their missions in 1955 and 1957, respectively. The former in the countryside, the latter in the cities, these men had no direct hierarchical connection with the *cinquèmes bureaux*, but it often happened in the smaller units that a single officer received both staff designations. The task was to work directly with the indigenous populations in the immediate zone of operations, helping to establish schools, giving sanitary and agricultural advice, distributing food, assisting resettlement, and, of course, winning native allegiances both actively and passively for *l’Algérie française*.

The terrorist campaigns of the FLN waged in 1955-56 had been extremely effective in depriving the “forces of order” of indigenous support, and it fell upon the shoulders of the SAS and SAU to deny this support to the enemy both through a variety of humane acts and the exercise of positive military control in the “spoiled” areas. A day-by-day account of these operations is furnished in the well-known *Nous Avons Pacifié Tazalt*, by Jean-Yves Alquier, a reserve lieutenant of the SAS.

Unquestionably, this experiment in civil-military relations bore much good fruit and some bad. It is, perhaps, the most extensive example of “consolidation operations” in the history of Western armies. It would, however, be mistaken to assign its entire origin to the new doctrine of *l’action psychologique*, for in many respects it resembles and conforms with the pattern of colonial relationship recommended by Marshal Lyautey, especially in his essay “Du Rôle Colonial de l’Armée,” written over 50 years ago.

**NEW TECHNIQUES**

Two aspects of the new doctrine which, however, owe little or nothing to French colonial tradition and have been of paramount importance in the conduct of the Algerian campaign are the techniques of relocation of populations and political reeducation. Usually, especially in the case of rural populations, the two operations are combined. It had been noticed that the relatively static role of village populations in Vietnam had worked to the advantage of the enemy. It had given him the opportunity to choose his targets like sitting ducks, unlimited means for subversion and infiltration (*pourrissement*), and a possibility of establishing his bases far to the rear of the outposts of the French Expeditionary Force.

In Cambodia, however, a mass resettlement of rural populations (about...
600,000) made possible by the greater availability or arable land and the less emphatic association of the Khmers with their village community. had had the effect of snatching a malleable and easily terrorized population out of the enemy grasp, while the pacification could be pursued in earnest in the vacated territory. The enemy, no longer able to rely on levies and extortions from the intimidated villagers, was forced to fall back on his regular bases. In the meantime, the uprooted people were resettle in stockaded villages suited for autodefense, erected by military labor, and kept under close surveillance by the "forces of order." Often the facilities of the new habitations were much improved.

Because of the regular rectangular layout imposed in the reconstruction for reasons of internal security, the technique became known as quadrillage ("gridding"). Quadrillage also implied that spheres of authority in the area could be well-delineated. This produced, we may say guardedly, a measure of military control and guidance previously unexperienced in both city and country; at the same time it notably improved conditions of hygiene, diet, medication, and the general standard of living. The dislocated natives often became, in effect, wards of the army.

POLITICAL INDOCTRINATION

The program of resettling the population has been carried out at high speed in Algeria, a country topographically favorable for the operation. It is estimated that between a million and a half and two million Moslem Algerians have changed their residence under these conditions. As soon as they are regrouped in the new villages, it is current practice to grant them a liberal amount of political indoctrination according to the precepts of l'action psychologique. The themes of intégration and social evolution are steadily applied, confidence in General de Gaulle as a kind of totemistic figure is reinforced, and the lies and treachery of the FLN are exposed and condemned. What the effects of this massive undertaking will finally be is difficult to predict, but we may say that it has promoted the "pacification" of numerous sectors of the country despite the opposition of a stubborn and resourceful enemy, himself highly skilled in the practice of la guerre révolutionnaire.

Another undoubted success of l'action psychologique was the pacification of the Casbah of Algiers by Colonels Godard and Trinqueter at the end of 1957 and beginning of 1958. Here, there was no question of relocating populations in an area honeycombed with FLN agents thr. were able to control the section through threats of terror and exemplary reprisals. Colonel Godinard himself broke the enemy network by penetrating it in disguise and uncovering its operations. The ratissage that followed was neither lovely nor particularly humane, but the show of force had the effect of liberating the bulk of the people from silent terror. Thereupon, the troops of the SAU proceeded to carry out the same kind of "consolidation operations" commented on elsewhere.

The events of the forum and the referendum of 1958, on the other hand, even if they do, in part, suggest the atmosphere of Tchakhotine, owe
their success to much more “traditional” methods and to the personal prestige of General de Gaulle. It is appropriate also to remark that the General, himself a master of psychological action, has never taken a very kindly view of the new techniques, feeling them to be an abuse of the normal activities of the armed services. Consequently, it is not surprising that a more serious check has been placed on l’action psychologique in Algeria since 1958 than ever existed under the last four governments of the Fourth Republic. In the meantime, the controlled use of psychological methods for achieving military and political aims has become an approved part of French military doctrine, as has the concept of la guerre révolutionnaire.

CONCLUSIONS

It should be noted that these phenomena have attracted a great deal of attention in the French press, most of it unfavorable. I do not propose to judge this point. The excesses which the exponents of l’action psychologique on occasion permit themselves are quite obvious and need not be spelled out in an article which strives to avoid the polemical. The outstanding question appears to be this: How is it practical and morally defensible that “Western, Christian, and Mediterranean values” can be defended through recourse to the methods of the very enemy that is seeking to destroy these values? Is there a judicious balance? Where precisely can the line be drawn? Maurice Mégret, a distinguished writer on military topics, construes l’action psychologique as an “infantile malady of information.” But perhaps the case is not so simple. Certain psychological warfare officers have unquestionably been carried away by the possibilities of the new role they have staked out for themselves. “Call me a Fascist if you like,” said Colonel Trinquère in an interview in 1958, “but we must make the people easy to manage; everyone’s acts must be controlled.”

The association of certain 5ème bureau officers with the leaders of the Algiers rebellion of January 1960 has been widely noted, leading to the suppression of the SAPI in Algeria and to the indictment of its zonal chief. “Intoxication” is the word the political scientist Maurice Duverger uses to describe this attitude. “What good does it do to fight in the name of a cause if one denies and destroys that which he justifies? . . . It is not a matter of replacing one ‘intoxication’ (the Communist) with another but simply of putting an end to all intoxication.”

No other Western army has reached the point of crisis implicit in the French hesitation about psychological action. Perhaps this is due to the fact that our formal and political institutions are sounder and less subject to crisis. But it is also because we have not experienced the same bitter lessons, in length and intensity, of la guerre révolutionnaire. There may assuredly come a time when it will be necessary to fight such a war, not simply on our own territory or on that of a “modern” nation. Therefore, the French experience and its contingent problems are worth the most carefully detailed scrutiny by our qualified military experts.
CUBA: STRATEGIC DILEMMA*

BY REUBEN S. NATHAN

Effective PSYOP planning requires clear policy directives and guidance and a solid research and intelligence capability. JUWTFA had neither.

President John F. Kennedy was confronted with incontestable evidence that the Soviets were installing nuclear missile sites in Cuba. Soviet missiles that close to the United States represented a clear threat to U.S. security. The President acted decisively and dramatically on many fronts. In order to prepare for the possibility that Chairman Nikita Khrushchev could not be persuaded to dismantle the sites and remove the missiles, the continental U.S. Army was readied to invade Cuba and take the missiles out.

Conventional military planning was complemented by the creation of a Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic (JUWTFA). JUWTFA was a small unit—a Special Forces Group supported by some naval forces and aircraft—assigned to organize and lead Cuban anti-Castro forces behind enemy lines. Obviously, strong propaganda appeals would be needed to achieve this objective. This essay concerns the considerations involved in designing them and in writing the PSYOP Annex to JUWTFA’s Operations Plan.

The soundness of a PSYOP Annex depends, of course, on a reasonably correct Estimate of the Psychological Situation in the theater of operations. Little was known about the climate of public opinion in Cuba, and the precise nature of the plans for the conventional invasion was not revealed. It was clear, however, that these plans and their execution would have decisive bearing on our chances to persuade anti-Castro Cubans to join us.

Analysis of the demands of the international political situation and the

*Original essay by Reuben S. Nathan.
immediate military conditions was the only alternative open.

The President had to consider the probability that the Soviets, unable to reinforce Castro effectively, might initiate a diversionary maneuver somewhere else in the world. As he might need military power to handle that diversion, he could not possibly afford to think in terms of a long, drawn-out conventional engagement in Cuba proper. He would have to restrict the time for the conventional operations so that he could employ forces elsewhere if necessary. Therefore, our conventional troops would have to get into and out of Cuba very fast indeed.

It appeared to follow that the United States would attempt massed landings on open beaches. Landings on open beaches are costly. Castro’s regular army and militia numbered somewhere between 200,000 and 300,000 men who would occupy strong defensive positions. We might have to take unacceptable casualties—unless we prepared the landings by saturation bombing, which kills noncombatants. Question: How does one persuade people whose loved ones have just been maimed to join the forces which maimed them—no matter how much they might hate Castro’s regime?

If President Kennedy had to withdraw all or most of his conventional forces from Cuba after they had taken Havana and other key points, the job of securing the island would largely fall on JUWTFA’s shoulders. Consolidation might take a long time unless Castro’s regime collapsed in the wake of military defeat, and it might not collapse at all. Castro would probably again try to conduct a protracted struggle in the mountains. Certainly, we would not be able to reestablish security if we could not recruit a substantial number of Cuban guerrillas and create a dynamic popular movement that would ultimately sweep the country.

These speculations may have been quite inaccurate, involving as they did, scores of political imponderables. However, in the absence of information and in view of the contingency thinking of the highest levels of the U.S. Government, PSYOP planning had to proceed on such speculation. That speculation, unhappily, told me that JUWTFA’s chances were slim.

What does a PSYOP officer do in a situation like that?

There is very little he can do—except his best. Assuming the analysis to be correct, even if JUWTFA’s PSYOP problem had been placed before him, the President might have admitted that saturation bombing and an effective PSYOP campaign designed to enlist the support of the Cuban people were contradictions. Then, however, the President would probably have decided there was no real alternative, expressed understanding, and regretted our dilemma. Ours would have been the soldier’s response: to salute and say that we would try to do our damnedest. Fortunately, the U.S. objective was secured through diplomatic means.

The problem, though, goes very deep. Someone must decide whether the national interest is better served by (1) operations which make PSYOP difficult or impossible, or (2) by giving priority to psychological considerations in the hope that PSYOP can achieve the national objective
more expeditiously. In the case of the Cuban missile crisis, the President achieved his purpose by his own brand of PSYOP. Leaving no doubt that the United States would eliminate the Soviet missiles from Cuba regardless of the consequences, he forced the Soviets to retreat. On a lower level, however, PSYOP lost out. In the particular circumstances (assuming the above analysis to be correct), the outcome was inevitable. There are situations which leave no choice: JUWTFA was expendable.

The remaining question: Was the President ever advised of the problem JUWTFA faced—and of the possible consequences? It seems not. Apparently, no PSYOP specialist had a part in the highest level decisionmaking. Perhaps there was no time to think of anything below the level of high policy; perhaps the President's advisors felt, as do so many Americans, that propaganda, unlike plumbing, does not need to be learned. In any event, VOA's broadcasts to Cuba, Central, and South America continued to follow the usual information policy and remained routine throughout the crisis.

As a matter of fact, it is reasonably certain that the psychological problem which confronted JUWTFA so directly simply had not met with much attention. A review of the leaflets the Fort Bragg PSYOP Battalion had been ordered to produce disclosed obviously counterproductive materials—cartoons showing red-faced Castro leaving a sinking ship with bags of gold in his hand (incredible), leaflets showing women and children in the midst of a holocaust of exploding projectiles (suggesting no escape). The officers in charge indicated that their original drafts had been entirely different but had been disapproved by a high-ranking troop commander who had then ordered them to execute his own ideas of what constituted effective psychological warfare. It is less relevant that the general officer in question had not been trained in PSYWAR than that he had quite obviously not been furnished with directives from more knowledgeable echelons. We acted to develop better materials.

Thus, in a confrontation the outcome of which hinged on psychological factors, very little coordination was effected between the various levels to insure optimum effectiveness at each stage. Even in this case, where a national policy/PSYOP requirements dilemma could not be satisfactorily resolved, the possible contingencies seemed to demand a much greater degree of coordination than was carried out. The Cuban case illustrates that crises are sometimes not amenable to the most systematic planning and control.
DIVIDED COUNSEL*

BY BERT H. COOPER, JR.

The success of a well-planned and coordinated PSYOP exercise can be at least partially reduced by diverging perception of headquarters and field personnel. Stable organizational and hierarchical lines of authority can assist in minimizing the impact of such a divergence.

Although the various communications efforts of U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic in 1965 may be considered generally successful in the face of a plethora of complex political problems that persisted throughout the period, some elements of the Dominican operation illustrate remediable deficiencies. Apart from the complexities of the Dominican political scene, which was characterized by rapidly shifting personal alignments and extreme polarization of political forces, there was the matter of the divided counsels and ambivalent attitudes of those responsible for national policy. There was basic agreement among U.S. policymakers that the Dominican Republic should not be permitted to become “a second Cuba.” However, beyond that point, there was a wide divergence of opinion as to the steps which should be taken by the U.S. government and about the nature and extent of Communist influence in the Dominican situation.

The immediate aim of the U.S. forces landed in the Dominican Republic was to protect the American Embassy and evacuate American citizens and other foreign nationals from the country.

The case for such a rescue mission was plainly stated by President Johnson in a television address to the nation on the evening of April 28th:

The United States Government has been informed by the military authorities in the Dominican Republic that American lives are in danger. These authorities are no longer able to guarantee their safety and they reported that the assistance of military personnel is now needed for that purpose. I have ordered the Secretary of Defense to put the necessary American troops ashore in order to give protection to hundreds of Americans who are still in the Dominican Republic and to escort them safely back to this country. This same assistance will be available for the nationals of other countries, some of whom have already asked for our help.

At this point, it was hoped that the landing of a limited force of U.S. Marines would be sufficient to ward off attacks on the diplomatic community and persons being evacuated and that such action by the United States would encourage antirebel forces in the suburbs of Santo Domingo to regain control of downtown areas of the capital. It was the opinion of the American Ambassador and most U.S. representatives in the country that a rebel victory would open the way for a Communist seizure of the government in the immediate or near future. These representatives viewed the “loyalist” antirebel forces as the surest defense against what was termed “a second Cuba.” It was this view which led to the decision on April 29th to commit units of the 82nd Army Airborne Division, transforming what had originally begun as an emergency relief operation for

*Original essay by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.
humanitarian ends into a military operation for political ends, when "loyalist" forces appeared to be unable to cope with the rebel threat in the city.

The first public reference to the political aspects of the Dominican operation came on Friday evening, April 30th, when President Johnson again addressed the nation on the crisis, noting that the cease-fire call by the Organization of American States (OAS) was not being fully observed, warning that "people trained outside the Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control." During the weekend as the troop build-up continued, reliable but unofficial sources, including the military spokesmen, stated unequivocally that the United States had come to the Dominican Republic not only to save lives but to prevent a Communist takeover of that country. On Sunday, May 2nd, President Johnson acknowledged that the original rescue mission of U.S. forces had been altered in the light of political circumstances found to exist in the Dominican Republic. Militarily neutral, the United States was nevertheless now clearly committed to keeping the Communists from gaining political control of the country.

Apart from the Communists, other Dominican factions were to be treated equally by the United States in the competition for political control of the government in Santo Domingo. Considerable difficulty arose in communicating this U.S. posture to the rest of the world, however. For one thing, U.S. representatives often differed in their assessment of the degree of Communist influence and control over Dominican political groups and key personalities. Moreover, there was certainly no consensus among the Dominicans over the nature and extent of Communist involvement in their civil war. For another, the practical implications of intervention favored the antirebel group, at least at the beginning, by dividing rebel-held areas of the city along the lines of communication (LOC) linking the International Security Zone (ISZ) with San Isidro Air Base, which was in antirebel control and through which U.S. airborne forces were supplied. Later, when antirebel forces had destroyed the rebel positions north of the LOC and were threatening rebel headquarters south of the demilitarized zone, the presence of U.S. forces worked to the advantage of the rebels. Moreover, medical aid and food were always made available to both sides of the conflict. Thus, the United States pursued a difficult and delicate course of qualified neutrality which frequently left those of the local scene open to charges of violating the neutral stance to which Washington was publicly committed.

Debate in the international press over contradictions between stated U.S. policy and day-to-day military operations and backstage political negotiations with Dominican factions continued throughout the 1965-1966 period. Much of this controversy stemmed from the fact that U.S. leaders were not in complete agreement on the implications of the Dominican revolution for the United States—disagreeing particularly on the extent of Communist influence among the rebel forces—and consequently pur-
sued apparently contradictory and vacillating policies. Moreover, official explanations of the American presence in the Dominican Republic generally lagged behind unofficial disclosures and speculations in the news media, which sometimes accurately predicted what was later affirmed by government sources. For example, as subsequent developments were to bear out, the initial landing of U.S. Marines to protect American lives in Santo Domingo proved to be the opening gambit in a large-scale military intervention that had considerable political significance. Some critics of the Dominican operation have argued that the United States should have been more candid—or at least more prompt—in explaining its action in the crisis. On the other hand, it can be argued that the course of events was in fact so swift and unpredictable that persons in responsible positions were unable to keep the public any better informed than they did.7

The views expressed through the news media were largely critical of the U.S. intervention and highly skeptical of official perceptions of the Communist role in the Dominican crisis as a threat to the national security of the United States.

The hostility of the press was undoubtedly related to contemporary attitudes toward the Vietnam involvement and the recent conduct of foreign policy in general. The presence of North American journalists and newsmen in Santo Domingo immediately after the landing and at the height of the crisis certainly posed a number of problems for U.S. representatives there. Despite regular briefings by State and Defense Department public information officers at a Joint Information Bureau set up in the Hotel Embajador, the attitudes of most of those working in the international news media remained basically hostile. On the other hand, the reporting on the Dominican operation might have had a more negative tone without these efforts by the public information team. In any event, it is not clear to what extent the international press directly influenced the effectiveness of U.S. communication efforts oriented toward the Dominican population.8

There were, however, some operational implications in that criticism by the news media helped to bring about certain changes in U.S. political strategy, and these developments in turn had an impact on the style and conduct of psychological operations. Since psychological operations in the country were basically in line with national policy objectives and strategies and since these in turn were highly responsive to the pressure of world public opinion, the communications effort had to accommodate itself to the shifts and turns which the volatile Dominican situation dictated. In the course of the crisis, there were at least two major policy developments: (1) the initial unilateral military action by the United States was followed by an emphasis on multilateral political and diplomatic activity through the OAS, with U.S. forces playing a supporting role in the background as much as possible; and (2) the original assessment of the Communist role in the rebellion was later modified and the earlier de
facto support of the “loyalist” junta replaced by a policy of strict neutrality toward both rebels and loyalists.

The Department of State, which had responsibility for determining national policy objectives and strategies in the Dominican Republic, exercised overall supervision of all U.S. activity in the country. In several instances the State Department differed with U.S. representatives in Santo Domingo over certain operations. For example, when a visiting delegation of OAS representatives complained that the leaflets being dropped from U.S. planes contained propaganda material in support of the “loyalist” military junta, the State Department asked that leaflet drops by military aircraft be halted. State also objected to the Army’s interrogation of Dominicans held by U.S. forces for investigation and intelligence purposes.

There was some disagreement between the State Department and the USIA over the Agency’s sponsorship and use of a book on the Dominican situation by Jay Mallin. According to the State Department, the Mallin book was not consistent with U.S. political strategy by the time it was published. Similarly, from the Department’s point of view, the analysis of the Dominican situation presented by former U.S. Ambassador John Bartlow Martin in an article in Life (May 28, 1965), which the USIA used in its information program, was also outrun by events. These instances, which appear to be illustrative of some of the differences which arose between the Department of State and those at the operational level of the communication effort, were perhaps the natural consequences of such a rapidly changing and highly complex political situation.

In this connection, it should be noted that the CIA’s assessment of predominant Communist influence among the rebels was not accepted uncritically within the State Department. Indeed, a basic schism on this point ran through every agency and branch of the U.S. government, with obvious implications for those involved in communication activities in the Dominican Republic. U.S. in-country representatives, both civilian and military, who were present during the initial crisis tended generally to accept the CIA view, while Washington was more skeptical of the intelligence community’s hard-line assessment of the Dominican situation. Consequently, there existed some element of intra-agency conflict between headquarters and field personnel in this respect as well in both the State Department and USIA.

Although it cannot be proved conclusively, the divergence of perception between Washington and the field on several matters probably contributed to the ambiguity and fluctuation in the rationale for the Dominican Republic operation and hence to the skepticism which that rationale was accorded in public opinion. This operation underlines the importance of careful orchestration of headquarters and field personnel and policy.

NOTES

1 Abraham F. Lowenthal, “The Dominican Crisis of 1965: A Study of United States Policy,” paper presented to Seminar on the Dominican Republic, Center for International Affairs,
3 Center for Strategic Studies, Dominican Action—1965, p. 49.  
4 Martin, Overtaken by Events, p. 678.  
5 Ibid., pp. 660-703; Szulc, Dominican Diary, pp. 50-75.  
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CHAPTER V
PERSONNEL

Much has been written about the varied types of activities in which the communications specialist may become involved and the qualifications, both positive and negative, that the communicator should possess to perform the many duties associated with those tasks. Sometimes ignored by these writings is the fact that the communications mission of U.S. military forces is by no means limited to PSYOP. On the contrary, a number of PSYOP-related functions have already been identified and, as pointed out in an earlier chapter, communications “involves the total spectrum of human relations.” To a great extent, then, the ideal prerequisites for selection of personnel for assignment in PSYOP are reflected also in the desirable qualifications for individuals assigned to PSYOP-related tasks.

While communications—that is, the basic act of communicating—is ostensibly a simple process, the diversity of situations (values, language, culture ...) in which the communication takes place is extensive and, more often than not, complex. As a result, any conceptualization of the mix of qualities a psyoperator should possess for the varying circumstances can be attempted in general terms. This is particularly true in view of the probability that there remain many types of communications opportunities in the future in which the role of the communicator will diverge from past experience.

The growing importance of communications in socioeconomic and political development, as well as in stability operations and international regional activities, is largely responsible for the greater need for effective international communications. American military services, for example, have become increasingly involved with host country military personnel and civilians in matters not traditionally within the scope of military operations. Consequently, their new quasi-political role places additional requirements on training programs that must, above all, prepare them for intercultural communications.

This chapter, in focusing attention on areas of specific interest to military personnel, typifies much of the existing, collected data.

NOTES

2 Francis M. Watson, Jr., discusses the relationship of several of these functions to PSYOP in “PSYOP and Related Activities” in Chapter II of this casebook.
3 Phillip P. Katz, “PSYOP and Communication Theory” in Chapter II of this casebook.
4 See Harold R. Aaron, “The Good Guys and the the Bad Guys,” in Chapter VI of this casebook.

PSYOP PERSONNEL

The growth of the role of the psyoperator and the changing nature of
the American involvement in world affairs since the end of World War II have resulted in the need not only for more highly qualified but also more specialized personnel in the PSYOP field. Training, especially that programmed for the armed forces, must take into account the many factors that influence the cultural milieu in which many of the communicator's relationships occur.

Among the most obvious considerations are language problems. But even when a language is shared by individuals from different cultures, both good relationships and effective cooperation can be complicated by either a misunderstanding or misinterpretation by one of the others' role behaviors. In the past, for example, this has resulted in the limitation or distortion of communication in efforts to sway attitudes and opinions. Moreover, variations in value judgments stemming from differences in cultural backgrounds may lead, inter alia, to the stereotyping of individuals and to a misreading of the processes involved in the formation of attitudes and opinions under particular circumstances.

The conclusions of the authors in this section indicate that job and language skills are not enough. It would appear that what a psyoperator needs is a solid grounding in the customs, habits, proscriptions, mannerisms, and gestures of the indigenous population so that all become second nature in operational situations. He should experience formal cross-cultural training, ideally, tailored to the country in which he will serve. If this training does nothing else, then, it should sensitize the psyoperator to his own shortcomings in cross-cultural relations and to the wide range of cultural ramifications in the art and science of communications.

The writers of the selections in this chapter suggest that effective PSYOP requires:
* Imagination
* Perseverance
* Aggressive leadership
* "A volunteer spirit" (since of mission)
* Linguistic and cross-cultural communication skills
* Tact
* Patience
* Flexibility
* Military experience, and
* Area orientation and world knowledge.

In addition, they write that he should have some knowledge of PSYOP media usage, an understanding of staff techniques (especially in intelligence), and an interest in developing personal relationships with people from other cultures on an individual basis. He should "think, talk, and act" with exemplary military demeanor, exhibit poise and confidence in interpersonal relations, and demonstrate ingenuity in preparation and equipment maintenance. As his like of and respect for those foreign
personnel with whom he works will to some extent be perceived by them, it is important, therefore, that they feel that he supports both their personal independence and their self-esteem.

This is a truly intimidating set of requirements, which no single individual reasonably can be expected to fill completely. It is probably the relative weight of the various traits in specific situations that is most significant from a practical point of view. However, relative importance remains debatable and, in any case, varies by virtue of the nature of the specific task to which an individual is assigned.

PROFESSIONAL CAPABILITIES OF PSYOP PERSONNEL*
BY C. K. HAUSMAN

One of the most important requirements of personnel operating in the PSYOP field is the development of professionalism.

The selection of PSYOP personnel has a definite impact on the amount and quality of the combat unit PSYOP effort. . . . Considering . . . the division level requirement, the officer charged with this responsibility will be one of the primary general staff officers, probably selected by the division commander for this position on the capabilities basis of other than those of a good propagandist.

Regardless of staff responsibility, G3 or G5, for the program, it follows that the officer and his assistants charged with planning, and in many cases executing, must possess keen imagination, ability to persevere, and eagerness to convey ideas. Among the more tangible attributes are: the PSYOP planner should be a volunteer; possess, as a minimum, rudimentary knowledge of PSYOP media usage; have combat experience at company level; possess some skill in the enemy's language; and have some knowledge of staff techniques with special emphasis on combat intelligence. In most cases these qualities also apply at brigade level.

The volunteer qualities deemed most important are his enthusiasm, belief in the PSYOP mission, and desire to expend considerable effort, for in many cases little reward will be the heart of the division program. The PSYOP officer or one of his principal assistants should have sufficient knowledge of the language to listen to interrogations or review a leaflet and gather the theme intended.

[Concerning media techniques], PSYOP augmentation teams are designed to provide the required expertise. This does not excuse the division PSYOP planner, for he should also know media capabilities and limitations. This particular factor [is] discussed in a separate analysis of the technique problem.

The personnel of the division must think, talk, and act like military men. Unless the PSYOP personnel enjoy a certain level of rapport or

share common experiences with personnel of the maneuver battalions, their attempts at gaining support of those forces in contact with the enemy will be futile. A good knowledge of staff procedures can be learned from a book, but is usually takes experience to learn an appreciation for intelligence. Effective PSYOP, given the proper approach and timing, can produce defectors and POW's for interrogation by the intelligence officer. On the other hand, the response time to a newly developed enemy vulnerability and the quality of the PSYOP product vary directly with the response of the intelligence community to the PSYOP intelligence requirements. Problems that developed in this interchange of information and requirements were recognized by Department of the Army. The experience in Vietnam indicated that the PSYOP-Intelligence relationship needed improvement. Some of the weaknesses were: lack of (1) clearly spelled out guidelines for the intelligence support of PSYOP (adequate EED were not developed); (2) PSYOP personnel's recognition of what intelligence was available; (3) ignorance on the part of PSYOP personnel about how to exploit PSYOP information sources with maximum benefit; and (4) understanding by intelligence personnel of the psychological effects of adequate intelligence collection and processing.

The consequences of this lack of exchange of information and requirements were: the overlooking of opportunities for psychological exploitation; the failure to fully apply the PSYOP weapons system; and the lack of optimum program planning for PSYOP.

The problem of acquiring competent personnel, as in all military fields, is accentuated in the case of PSYOP by what appears to be a future trend toward a strong increase in international pressures to limit [military] conflicts with respect to scope, duration, military and civilian casualties, property destruction, and economic disruption. Several PSYOP missions can be developed from this trend, not the least of which is limiting civilian or noncombatant casualties.

* * * * *

PSYOP STAFF AND UNIT OFFICER PREREQUISITES*

By Dino G. Pappas

A study of the characteristics an effective PSYOP officer should and should not possess.
The combination of traits specified is not likely to be found in any one individual, especially in view of the recruitment pattern of PSYOP officers.

GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS

Introduction

Although the duties and responsibilities of the PSYOP staff officer are spelled out in detail in FM 33-5, Psychological Operations, Techniques and Procedures, there is no similar treatment provided for the PSYOP unit officer. In most cases this is not necessary, for in essence both the PSYOP staff and unit officers are concerned with the same responsibilities and functions, but at differing levels. The PSYOP staff officer advises, coordinates, supervises, and assists in PSYOP at the highest levels—from brigade through joint command and combined command to

* Original essay by Dino G. Pappas.
the interagency activities with the Department of the Army (DA), Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the Department of Defense (DOD). On the other hand, the PSYOP unit officer performs in a similar capacity as the PSYOP staff officer but at the lower echelons—from the PSYOP Team to the PSYOP Group and the Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and Special Army Forces (SAF).

Personal Traits

Both these PSYOP-type officers should possess certain personal traits in order to carry out their specific missions. Foremost among these attributes are the possession of a keen imagination, the ability to persevere, and the eagerness to convey ideas. In addition, the critical comments of several U.S. PSYOP officers who evaluated the performances of host country PSYOP team officers in Thailand are noteworthy. This critique included the following personal traits: (1) aggressive and imaginative leadership; (2) the need to seek out and cultivate personal relationships with people on an individual basis; (3) poise and confidence in person-to-person relations; and (4) improvisation and ingenuity in preparing programs and propaganda themes as well as maintaining operational equipment. The above traits relate more readily to those of a PSYOP unit officer commanding an operational team or a PSYOP unit; however, they have application also to the role of a PSYOP staff officer in conducting his functions among the higher administrative levels.

These listed criteria suggest some of the more important personal traits that are considered essential for PSYOP staff and unit officers to carry out their duties. Undoubtedly there are several others such as tact and patience, as well as the capability to communicate effectively across cultural barriers. These latter traits apply, as do the others, to any and all situations in which American military personnel are working among people of the developed and the developing world. Whether the PSYOP officer is an advisor to host country counterparts or in command of a U.S. unit he must deal with the various personnel he encounters in a patient, persuasive, and diplomatic fashion, exercising tact and perseverance in accomplishing his mission. Likewise, the PSYOP officer must have more than language skills to get across his message. He must have a willingness to use a variety of communication means, an ability to reduce abstract ideas to concrete terms, and the ability to determine when counterparts or other indigenous persons do or do not understand what the American is trying to convey.

It is highly unlikely that any PSYOP staff or unit officer would possess all or a majority of the desired personal traits and qualities. More likely the individual will excel in a few cross-cultural attributes. If one were to focus on the one or two personal traits that are of the utmost importance, they would be a sense of mission and the quality of flexibility. These two aspects should be considered the keystone for supporting the PSYOP officer in his numerous and varied assignments.

This dedication to the mission and realization of the importance of the
The role played by PSYOP activities in politico-military operations is vital in motivating the PSYOP officer to perform well. In most cases there will be little reward for his considerable efforts. Thus he should possess a volunteer quality as well as enthusiasm and belief in the PSYOP mission as a good foundation for such assignments.

The flexibility required of the PSYOP staff and unit officer cannot be overstated. He must constantly adjust to new environments, conditions, and associations as well as altered directions in policy guidance and changes in work demands and techniques. He will serve in numerous slots and geographical areas, many of which fall outside his fields of specialization and preference. The PSYOP officer will have to function with or without rigid or routine procedures that will require a high degree of improvisation and innovation on his part. Lastly, he must be adaptable to the ever-changing conditions of his mission, the environment, and the human elements that are to be encountered.

SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS

Categories

Although the personal traits of a PSYOP unit and staff officer are basic to his performance and in a sense form the foundation for the PSYOP professional prerequisites, there are several other important characteristics. Among these professional aspects are the categories of military experience, area orientation and world knowledge, and familiarity with PSYOP media usage. The model PSYOP officer should have some experience, skill, and knowledge in all of these categories plus several of the personal traits that have been previously listed. It should be pointed out that all three categories are of equal importance and that the PSYOP officer should have some strengths in each of these areas. High marks in military experience and PSYOP media usage without world knowledge and area orientation or some of the other important personal traits may not result in an effective performance by a PSYOP officer. Among the numerous prerequisites for PSYOP achievement, the key aspect is the total makeup of the officer personnel, which requires that there be some competence in all the major categories—military operations, world knowledge and area orientation, and familiarity with PSYOP media usage.

Military Experience

Foremost among the three categories is concern with a PSYOP officer's military experience and professionalism. Although most unit and staff officers will not have had identical training and experience, they will have come from related branches of the U.S. Army, having attended basic and specialized schools and undergone extensive training and experience in the field. It is hoped that in their climb upward through the ranks, such PSYOP officers will have experienced an assignment on a PSYOP operational team where they will have gained firsthand knowledge and experience with PSYOP media usage. This is not the situation in most cases, but the majority of officers at the junior levels of their career will
probably be exposed to or come into contact with some aspect of PSYOP through either the intelligence (G-2) or operations (G-3) functions.

One of the more important military criteria for personnel who become unit and staff PSYOP officers should be to have had combat experience at the company level. Without such direct participation experience they will be unable to relate PSYOP needs at the higher battalion and brigade levels. Military experiences at various command levels from company to brigade provide PSYOP officers with the opportunity to develop the leadership, resourcefulness, and ingenuity necessary to accomplish the assigned missions.

Once the PSYOP unit officer has completed the lower levels of training, operations, and command functions, he should be well prepared for serving in the higher echelons. As a PSYOP staff officer he will be responsible for PSYOP planning, coordination, and implementation of administrative and operational directives. He will perform staff work in the PSYOP field, be responsible for making the PSYOP staff estimates, and provide advice to commanders on PSYOP courses of action. On occasion the PSYOP staff officer will have to execute PSYOP plans and special campaigns that he has developed for others to implement. As military professionalism and experience increase his capabilities and provide him with maturity and seasoned judgements, the PSYOP staff officer will finally reach the pinnacle of his career. He will advise and plan PSYOP functions at the unified and joint command levels as well as serve in a PSYOP capacity on the JCS and DOD staffs.

Thus, direct experiences leading to military professionalism are an important facet of the PSYOP officer's career. It is, in fact, central to the success of his role as a psyoperator. The PSYOP unit and staff officers must have an affinity and close relationship with other military groups, for otherwise they will be unable to carry out the PSYOP mission and goals. They are dependent upon the support of military forces, for this group generally has first contact with the enemy, whether it be military or civilian. Therefore, the need for a PSYOP officer to think, talk, and act like a military man is a key ingredient in insuring that the PSYOP missions and goals are integrated into the overall military objectives.

World Knowledge and Area Orientation

Overall the PSYOP officer should have a general knowledge about the whole world, particularly the developing world. These latter areas are significant, for they are the geographical regions and subregions where the PSYOP officers of the 1970s and 1980s are most likely to be called upon to serve. Thus the general prerequisites should include at least a superficial knowledge of the languages spoken and the political, military, economic, and social aspects of these developing regions. A familiarity with the types of government, dominant and minority ethnic groups, religious organizations, economic system, and the role of the military should be subjects in which a PSYOP officer has an awareness and some general knowledge. Armed with such information he should be able to
conduct intelligent discussions and write and deliver meaningful presentations on social processes and systems.

Beyond this general knowledge of the world, the PSYOP unit and staff officer should have expertise in a specific area or series of selected contiguous countries. This prerequisite would include detailed basic knowledge of the history, geography, economy, international relations, internal difficulties, culture, social problems, and institutional roles of such area.

In addition to this world knowledge and area orientation, the PSYOP officer should have some skill in the language of the region or country in which he will be assigned. Although the United States cannot train PSYOP officers to speak all the languages and dialects of the 100 and more nations of the world, it can train a number of PSYOP officers to specialize in the lingua francas of selected developing and developed regions and subregions. For example, among the languages that should be considered essential for these tasks are Spanish (for all of Latin America except Brazil and a few continental and island nations) and Arabic (for the major areas of North Africa and the Middle East). In other developing areas such as Africa south of the Sahara and the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia, the problem is not as readily solved. No one language is yet established as a common vehicle for communication, and a number of PSYOP officers will have to be trained in the several languages that are spoken by the larger ethnic groups.

It is not required that the PSYOP officer be totally knowledgeable in the foreign language, but that he possess some skill in using the language to prepare propaganda materials, programs, plans, and themes. This limited language skill is necessary in dealing with the host country writers and interpreters whose job it is to bridge the cultural differences and give the propaganda credibility. An example from experience in South Vietnam highlights this specific point about language and the problems encountered by U.S. PSYOP units in preparing leaflets.

The RVN Chieu Hoi program, patterned after that of Magsaysay's successful program against the Huk, was heavily supported by U.S. forces PSYOP campaigns. One U.S. produced leaflet was a letter to friends from a Chieu Hoi returnee, but written in such high-flown, excessively literate language that the recipients probably did not believe it was written by the returnee. The defector himself should write the leaflet. So long as the letter communicates, one should not worry about grammatical errors.

One concludes that world knowledge, area orientation, and language skills play an important part in PSYOP activities and programs. All of these factors are essential in helping the PSYOP officer analyze and evaluate the social systems and processes in the specific area in which he will serve. These talents will allow him to apply his special skills in communicating with the host people or enemy in order to bring about changes in mind and heart. The PSYOP officer who has no cultural awareness of his adversary and who has no language skill or knowledge of the make-up of the enemy would have a most difficult time in bringing about any modification of attitudes and beliefs in the target audiences.
Familiarity with PSYOP Media Usage

A model PSYOP officer, whether he serves at the unit or staff level, should have knowledge of PSYOP media usage. Even though at the higher staff levels the PSYOP officer is supplied with personnel who possess the required expertise in media techniques, the PSYOP planner and programmer should also know media capabilities and limitations. In preparing PSYOP, the planner must consider the rapid changes that occur in internal defense and development (IDAD), limited war (LW), and general war situations and be ready to exploit the psychological advantages as they occur. Along with the previously discussed attributes and categories, one cannot overlook the important role played by the PSYOP media and their usage.

There are numerous accounts from South Vietnam that describe the failure of either the PSYOP planner or the PSYOP operational team leaders to utilize their media effectively. These episodes indicate dramatically that unit and staff officers should be familiar with the PSYOP media and the themes conveyed. One example of such poor media techniques relates to a poster

featuring members of a rural development (RD) team improving a road with shovels and other tools. No villager is in sight, i.e., the RD team is working all alone. It would be better to show these teams working with the people, not doing chores for the people.

Other aspects of poor PSYOP media techniques include the following:

- Chieu Hoi leaflets not containing assurances of good treatment;
- Leaflets presenting Viet Cong (VC) soldiers as offensive in appearance in an attempt to attract the reader, who is himself a VC soldier, to defect;
- Showing the VC resorting to physical force to recruit or conscript people in areas where it has been established that physical force has not been used;
- Indiscriminate use of the host country flag in propaganda; and development of a leaflet with a Vietnamese Pledge of Allegiance.

Three more short anecdotes on the ineffectiveness of the GVN propaganda are presented to indicate the failure of the PSYOP media used, and even more important, the factor that the GVN themes lacked credibility. These interviews are among those taken from a group of 22 enemy soldiers, both private and low-level cadre of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army (NVA), who were captured between late 1968 and January 1969 at the latest.

One NVA cadre, when asked whether he had seen GVN propaganda during the past six months, said: “Many, many times. I could see it all the time.” As to his reaction, “Broadcast and propaganda leaflets usually said that if we rallied we would be welcomed by the GVN, issued clothing and money. I doubted that. Frankly, I did not believe this because I have never seen it and I thought that it was only a decoy to demoralize the men. The only type of propaganda that I believe was about the B-52 bombers. This leaflet said that if we did not rally to the GVN we would certainly be killed by B-52s. I already knew of the effectiveness of the B-52s, and thus I believed that I might possibly be killed by them. I noticed that this propaganda was effective.”

Another NVA cadre, asked to assess GVN propaganda, replied: “I did not believe
I noticed that the GVN review said that the people in South Vietnam were enjoying a prosperous free life. Even without being told anything about it by the cadres, the troops all realized that this was completely untrue. There was no such a regime as the propaganda claimed. In reality, the people were living a miserable life, and their homes destroyed by bombs, their rice fields and gardens left uncultivated. The people did not have enough food to eat and had to live in huts. Second, the propaganda said that the people in South Vietnam were given economic aid by the allied nations, had nice homes, motorcycles, television sets, bicycles, etc. However, the Vietnamese people were being killed by bombs and shells and had to earn money for each meal. Due to these things, we did not believe any propaganda made by the GVN. The more we saw the realities, the more logical would be our struggle, and the more encouraged we were."

An NVA private, however, seems to have been somewhat more strongly affected. Telling the interviewer that he had heard two GVN broadcasts and seen some GVN leaflets that had urged him to rally, he answered, after a long pause, when asked why he did not comply: "I did not know the way."

The majority of the above accounts indicate not only the basic failure of the PSYOP media utilized but also that the propaganda messages failed to convey credible themes and thus the PSYOP goals were not achieved. In most of the South Vietnamese episodes, the GVN and U.S. propaganda planners did not have adequate knowledge about the target audience (V.C. and NVA forces) and their cultural background. The credibility gap relates to a failure in understanding and appreciating the importance of intelligence and other information concerning the enemy. This lack of background knowledge and the omission of adequate information is obvious in the GVN and U.S.-assisted broadcasts and propaganda leaflets. The leaflets particularly failed to portray essential elements of credibility, for example: no assurances of good treatment if one surrendered, portraying the enemy in a poor light, imposing foreign cultural values on a local population such as a non-existent pledge of allegiance, and failure to provide information and procedures on how and where an enemy could surrender.

Such incidents highlight failure on the part of some PSYOP personnel to have an awareness of cultural differences and to make greater use of the intelligence information that is available from the various host country and U.S. collection agencies. The use of intelligence that has psychological implications can lead to defectors as well as to prisoners of war (POWs). PSYOP officers when armed with adequate intelligence indicating areas of enemy vulnerability can utilize their various weapon systems (the PSYOP media) to exploit these situations and bring about a response from the enemy that could result in political and military gains.

On the other hand, some innovative ideas demonstrating an understanding of effective PSYOP media usage have also come to light in Vietnam. The following anecdotes illustrate two such incidents.

**Situation:** In conversation with the Kien Phong Province Chieu Hoi Chief, the American JUSPAO Field Representative for the province found a need for some type of explanatory document that Chieu Hoi cadre could leave with a family that had a member in the VC ranks. The circumstances required something small, with a simple text easily understood by the peasant. Pictures were a necessity, as they are more credible to the peasant than words.

**Psyop:** The Chieu Hoi Chief and the local JUSPAO Rep put together a "returnee dairy" in pictures and short text. The booklet shows the returnee escaping, being welcomed by a GVN outpost, receiving a reward for his weapon from the province chief, living in the Chieu Hoi Center. The booklet also contains a list of Chieu Hoi benefits, weapons rewards and a safe conduct pass.
Effectiveness: In its first weeks of use in Kien Phong, the booklet was responsible for the return of three VC, one of whom read the booklet, then threw it away because of the danger of carrying it, but came in clutching the page containing the safe conduct pass.\footnote{14}

* * * * *

Situation: To document the effectiveness of quick reaction tapes produced and utilized during a military operation.

Psyops: In a 1st Infantry Division operation during September 1966, one Hoi Chanh rallied with his weapon. The G-5 staff immediately interrogated him and produced a loudspeaker tape appeal. The unique feature of this tape was that the rallier called to his former co-members by name.\footnote{15}

Effectiveness: Within 24 hours, 33 or more members of the unit defected to the GVN.\footnote{16}

NEGATIVE CHARACTERISTICS

In discussing the general and special characteristics of PSYOP unit and staff officers, all the attributes under consideration until now have been of a positive nature. The focus has been on traits, qualities, and background that the ideal PSYOP officers should have to carry out his numerous and varied assignments. It is not difficult to ascertain what negative or disagreeable aspects a PSYOP officer could have that would make him ineffective in such tasks. An immediate reaction is to suggest that if the military personnel lack the major positive characteristics that have been discussed, then they would be totally unsuited in such a specialized military field. These "mirror images" or negative qualities of PSYOP personnel would include the failure to acquire a certain degree of military professionalism, the lack of general world knowledge and specific area orientation, no familiarity or any functional expertise with PSYOP media usage, the absence of language skills, the inability to utilize intelligence information, and the lack of particular personal traits.

Aside from these major negative characteristics there are a number of other qualities which, if possessed by PSYOP officers, would make them ineffective in achieving their goals and missions. Because future trends indicate a largely advisory role for many PSYOP personnel and the continuing need to work with the military and numerous civilian agencies and personnel, the following traits are particularly undesirable in a PSYOP officer. In any advisory capacity, a PSYOP officer should not be the headstrong, inflexible, demanding, and stubborn type who is unwilling to relinquish control and command to his PSYOP counterparts. His goal is to advise and assist the developing nations in achieving PSYOP competency, not to acquire a permanent position for himself or to impose a U.S. way of life upon the indigenous population. If he is unable to utilize suggestions, friendly persuasion, and other assets in dealing with host people then he will undoubtedly fail in his PSYOP mission. This "bull in the china shop" attitude on the part of PSYOP officers is a serious failing not only in an advisory capacity with host governments, but also in relations with the U.S. military and civilian government agencies and personnel.

Additional negative aspects one should consider are the PSYOP officers who dislike and distrust civilians and those officers who forget their military role and "go native" in an overseas environment. The former type
can create serious problems with such attitudes because much of the time, they will be working with civilians and be relying upon indigenous translators, artists, and mass media technicians to get a job done. If they harbor hostility and resentment against such personnel because they are not of the military caste, they will only bring about a failure of the mission. Similarly, the PSYOP officer who forgets his own culture and takes on the superficial aspects of the immediate environment could undermine both his military role and that of his counterpart. PSYOP personnel who fail to understand, appreciate, and respect the values, attitudes, and convictions of a host population, and even worse to mimic these values, are doing a great disservice to all concerned. Furthermore, PSYOP officers with personalities of an extreme nature would be unable to cope with the complexities of the job. Military personnel who are "do gooders," lack empathy for foreign cultures, and have inabilities in communicating ideas are all poor candidates for PSYOP assignments.

The negative characteristics that have been surfaced are those of a human relations nature. Those military personnel who fail to have a sense of balance and taste in conducting military-political activities and who lack rapport with both military and civilian personnel in an operational environment will be relatively unsuccessful in the conduct and achievement of PSYOP goals and missions.

CONCLUSIONS

PSYOP unit and staff personnel should be first and foremost good Army officers. They must be able to think, talk, and act like military men. Such personnel should be knowledgeable about unit and staff procedures and have rapport with the other service officers they will encounter in efforts to carry out the PSYOP mission. Their military assignments should include some command and staff experiences both at the combat and noncombat levels. Service in the latter groups includes assignments to support and specialized military organizations. During these tours of duty such personnel will have developed characteristics of leadership, resourcefulness, flexibility, tact, patience, and above all, an enthusiasm for the PSYOP mission. The latter is a most important quality, for if the PSYOP officer fails to have this volunteer attribute he will find few others in his military contacts to sustain him in PSYOP endeavors. The unit and staff officers must be dedicated to the PSYOP mission, for they will find little help and few rewards forthcoming from those upon whom they are dependent for assistance and support.

Other minimal qualifications certainly include some knowledge of PSYOP media usage, language capabilities, and the use of intelligence and area orientation. All of these capabilities can be acquired in training courses of limited duration so that the unit and staff officers have a familiarity with these essential elements in conducting the various aspects of PSYOP. In several cases, particularly at staff levels, the PSYOP officers will be able to depend on unit officers and enlisted specialists who have sufficient knowledge of a language to listen to interrogations or to
review leaflets and develop propaganda themes for intended target audiences. Likewise in the areas of PSYOP media usage, the unit and staff officers can rely on PSYOP operational teams to provide the expertise and implementation for various propaganda programs that should be undertaken. In both instances, however, the PSYOP officer, who either has familiarity or depth in both the language of the area and PSYOP media usage, will undoubtedly be more successful in carrying out the PSYOP mission and implementing PSYOP programs among the target audiences.

A skill in the use of intelligence, and its special application as PSYOP intelligence, is one of the most important abilities that a PSYOP officer should possess. When properly utilized by PSYOP officers, information on the enemy indicating vulnerable areas as well as knowledge of the local population can lead to defectors and POWs. These persons in turn can supply additional information that gives the military alternative courses of action to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat.

Last, but not least, the characteristic of area orientation and world knowledge is of basic importance to PSYOP personnel. This familiarity, and in some cases, knowledge in depth on the environmental aspects of a developing country and the enemy or the potential enemy within that area provides the PSYOP unit and staff officer with a firm foundation from which to launch PSYOP campaigns. This understanding of the history, geography, sociology, politics, psychology, and anthropology of a nation or region can be obtained either in the classroom or in the field through experience. What is important is that familiarity with background information helps PSYOP personnel to create propaganda materials that can be effective and credible in accomplishing PSYOP goals and missions in a specific environment. The recounted incidents in South Vietnam in which both GVN and U.S. PSYOP efforts lacked the proper background information resulted in propaganda broadcasts and pamphlets that were ineffectual because they were not credible. A good example of this was the incident dealing with the need for a pledge of allegiance by the South Vietnamese, a concept totally alien to that society. Again, as in the case of language knowledge or familiarity, these categories are essential for they often mean the difference between a successful accomplishment of PSYOP mission and goals—or failure.

A positive example of the importance of knowing the enemy and having an awareness and knowledge of what composes his psychological makeup is evident from one of the most effective leaflets in World War II, titled "Human Hands vs. Steel." This leaflet told the Nazi soldiers that men could not be expected to fight with their bare hands against steel; that their air force, equipment, and supplies were inferior to ours; and that it was, therefore, not dishonorable but logical for them to give up the fight and surrender. In this instance the makeup of the German mind was understood by the PSYOP personnel. In Vietnam the enemy thinks
differently and we still have not entirely been able to grasp what is needed to break his morale and motivation.

In summary, if one were to characterize PSYOP unit and staff officers destined for duty in one of the developing nations, such officers would be military professionals, who know and respect technical competence and professional status. They understand, appreciate, and respect their hosts, their values, attitudes, and convictions, and what place they and their army hold in their own political process, economy, and social dynamics. Such understanding may in many instances necessitate a command of the language, and thorough study of the history, culture, and politics of the particular country.

NOTES


5. Ibid., p. 82.

6. Ibid., p. 83.


9. Ibid., p. 74.

10. Ibid., p. 103.


RESPONSE OF U.S. PERSONNEL TO LOCAL CUSTOMS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS*

BY K. STANLEY YAMASHITA

Those who are least effective in their relationships with national counterparts and who demonstrate little insight into their overseas experience are those who claim no difficulties in their personal relationships and who tend to minimize the importance of cross-cultural dimensions.

* * * * *

Historically, the role of the U.S. Army was in military operations, fighting in an enemy area or functioning as an occupation force. Little or no interest was manifested in the interpersonal relationships between the indigenous people and members of the Armed Forces. Within the context of the Armed Forces language training, a modicum of attention was paid to cultural values, attitudes and behavior, but never in terms of efficiently and effectively functioning within a foreign culture.

Today, this disdain and lack of interest in the functioning of an individual in a foreign culture is not only intellectually stupid, but may jeopardize the successful completion of a mission. Increasingly, as a result of the Cold War, the military forces of the United States, and particularly the U.S. Army, have been and will continue to be committed in stabilization operations throughout the world in areas which have little or no semblance to the familiar Western culture. Furthermore, the role of the U.S. Army is no longer that of a purely military force, but increasing emphasis is on training and advising of foreign counterparts. Thus, the problem of cross-cultural communication becomes paramount since it is patent that unless one can communicate with his counterpart, there can be no training or advising. Yet, such a patent point seems to be overlooked at all levels of the U.S. Army.

Moreover, despite the overt awareness of the criticality of this problem as manifested by the various research projects currently being undertaken..., there seems to be a lack of interest [in these ideas] and the rejection of [them] as being "Cloud Nine stuff" and hardly applicable in the training of individuals going overseas as members of Mobile Training Teams, Special Forces Groups, and others. A survey of current Programs of Instruction, Field Manuals, and other basic training literature in the U.S. Army reflects very little of the problems of cross-cultural interaction and further, what is reflected violates the findings of social scientists who have extensively researched this field.

* * * * *

As summarized by Kraemer and Stewart, current language training and foreign area training consist of providing the student with what is believed to be relevant facts, consisting of historical, sociological, economic, geographic, political and military background. [It is assumed, somehow, that the accumulation of knowledge about foreign people is equivalent to understanding them and becomes a major factor in effective performance overseas.]

* * * * *

Not only is there a lack of awareness as to what can be done to facilitate intercultural interaction, but we are also faced with a problem which Haines points out:

...the American does not recognize his needs for cross-cultural skills. He assumes that his high motivation and his job-proficiency are enough. He feels competent at instructing and socializing here in the U.S., consequently, he sees no reason why he should not be equally successful with his indigenous counterparts. By the time he learns through bitter experience, his tour of duty is usually finished.

Concomitant with the problem of cross-cultural communication is another problem which again is too often overlooked—that of culture shock. [Very briefly, culture shock is generated by anxiety stemming from the loss of familiar signs or clues which orient individuals to situations of daily life; when and how to get people, give tips, make purchases, accept and refuse invitations, and the like. These signs and cues are acquired while growing up and become second nature. In a foreign cul-

283
ture where these familiar signs and cues are removed, the individual is at a loss, becomes uncomfortable, and rejects the foreign environment.

Both of these problem areas currently confronting the military (and the non-military organizations such as AID, USIS, etc.), that of cross-cultural communication and culture shock, are intimately related and can be summarized as the problem area of "cross-cultural interaction." Within this context, then, the answers to the following must be obtained, . . .:

a. What are the critical factors involved in cross-cultural communication?
b. What are the communication tools, if any, which can assist the U.S. Army representatives in crossing these barriers?
c. To what extent can understanding of our own value system, our attitudes, our norms, contribute to an understanding of foreign values, attitudes, etc?
d. What are the essential facets of knowledge and understanding of a foreign culture which the individual must possess in order to effectively communicate? What forms must these take? (Obviously, as pointed out earlier, a mere recital of facts does not assist in effectively interacting in a foreign culture).
e. How best can the Army prepare the individual to cope with the inevitable culture shock when faced with a foreign culture?
f. What steps can be taken to overcome the initial shock and how best can the individual be aided to operate effectively in spite of this?
g. What are the most effective methods of internalizing concepts which may aid the individual in functioning most effectively in a foreign culture?

Having delineated somewhat superficially, the major problem areas, let us discuss these individually. First of all, in regard to points "a" and "b" above, . . . language skill, by itself, is not sufficient. Language training, as currently taught in the U.S. Army, places an emphasis in the rote memorizing of words and phrases. Thus, at the end of the course, the student possesses a limited vocabulary, but has no idea of how the language is used in a given country—the denotational meaning of words may have been learned, but the connotational meanings have not been covered at all.

If sufficient time does not permit a comprehensive grasp of a foreign language, perhaps some consideration should be given to instruction in the effective use of interpreters. But this brings up another problem area in that in our culture, we use interpreters as a transmitter-coder-decoder; yet, in many Southeastern and Eastern cultures, the third person has another function—of laying the foundations for a smooth interpersonal relationship—and this must also be considered in any instruction in this field.

In regard to point "c", . . . one of the contributory factors to difficulty in cross-cultural communication is a lack of awareness of our own values,
attitudes, expectations, etc., when confronted with an individual from a foreign culture. It may be redundant to repeat that successful communication occurs only because of the existence of common knowledge, experience, etc. Yet, with the naive assumption that despite the foreignness of an individual, since he is another human being, he must perceive the world around him in the same way, must have the same needs, desires, aspirations, etc., have hampered any attempts to communicate effectively. Yet, ... we do not recognize the need for cross-cultural skills. Because our value systems have been so deeply internalized, we are too often unaware of the basic assumptions we make in our interpersonal relationships. How can we then, within the context of our various training programs, make the student aware of basic American values, norms of behavior, etc., and overcome the usual resistance of the American who feels he “knows” why he acts in a given way, “knows” what his basic values are, “knows” how to communicate?

Points “d” above must be considered in terms of the often minimal time available in preparing, say, a MTT going to a foreign culture. Numerous incidents can be cited of MTT’s going to a new area with an absolute minimum of preparation; i.e., without any language capability and a three hour “orientation” on the culture and customs of that area. Some consideration must be given to adequate preparation of individuals being sent to a foreign culture—if the expense of sending a MTT, to say, Nepal, is considered justifiable and in consonance with the given mission of the U.S. Army, then cursory and superficial preparation can only detract from the ultimate mission. As clearly detailed in Kraemer and Stewart, unless properly trained, the effectiveness of such missions is open to question. Within this context, then, should be considered the makeup of “pre-mission training programs.” What are “nice to know facts,” what are critical; what form should this presentation take; what is the minimum period of time which must be devoted to this training, etc. In this context, and patent in any discussion of training for cross-cultural interaction, is a question as to the validity of the basic U.S. Army assumption that any officer, by virtue of his being an officer, can be an instructor. Further, the assumption that because an officer can be an instructor. Further, the assumption that because an individual has served in an overseas area, he is knowledgeable about that area is also open to question. Unless the instructor has some educational background in the social sciences, preferably in communication, linguistics, anthropology, social psychology, etc., we compound the difficulties by contributing to a situation of the “blind leading the blind.” ... There are, for example, instructors teaching human behavior with no educational background in psychology; instructors teaching history with no background in political science or history; and, of course, instructors teaching “background on Vietnam” based solely on the basis that they have had one tour in Vietnam.

In discussing points “e” and “f” relative to culture shock, one of the
primary difficulties is to convince the "powers that be" that such a situation exists. There is a very limited awareness at all levels of the military, and not only the military but the non-military also, that some of the common reactions of Americans when initially confronted with another culture is what is technically called culture shock. Particularly, because of our ethnocentric feelings, it is almost axiomatic that the inevitable reaction is in terms of "dirty villagers," "backward natives" and the use of such terms as "gooks." Rejection and regression are almost inevitable—yet, surely, there must be some method of preparing the individual for the initial shock. Surely, as long as we continue to live in "American compounds," as long as we limit our contacts with the indigenous personnel to the Westernized counterpart who speaks English, the native culture will continue to be foreign and strange. Yet, the idea that one can "go native" and thus closely align himself with the indigenous population is hardly the solution. How, then, can we prepare the individual to cope with the inevitable culture shock? Can "facts" about the viability of the particular culture, the contributions in terms of philosophy, the arts, etc., of a culture help to diminish ethnocentric ideas on part of the American?

Finally, point "g" brings out the most critical aspect of this entire problem area—what can be done to help the officer or the soldier going to a foreign culture to internalize some of the basic concepts which will assist him in functioning effectively and lower the inevitable barriers confronting a stranger in a foreign culture? Studies . . . indicate some awareness of the problems—but to what extent are the results being incorporated into Army training programs—and more important still, what form does this training take—or should it take? . . . "Lip service" is given to the importance of cross-cultural communication—of the need to understand foreign cultures—their basic values, attitudes, frame of reference, etc., but what is being done to implement this aside from "shopping lists" of "do's and don'ts" in various lesson plans? And further, as has been pointed out earlier, assuming the validity of the statement that mere knowledge does not suffice for effective interpersonal relationships in a foreign culture, what form should the training and/or instruction take? How do we get the student to internalize these concepts?

In this context, some preliminary research is presently being conducted . . . in role-playing by prospective advisors in an effort to delineate between Western and non-Western values. At the U.S. Army Intelligence School at Fort Holabird, Maryland, for a number of years, in order to provide a "realistic" environment for practicing interrogation, students in the Interrogation of Prisoners of War classes have been confronted with a "prisoner" from the Demonstration Group and behind a one-way mirror, have been made to conduct an interrogation, with the "prisoner" playing various roles as a reluctant prisoner, overwhelmingly cooperative, etc. Thus, the student, in conducting his own interrogation and in watching his fellow students conduct an interrogation, becomes aware of some of the basic teaching points in interrogation. The feasibility of such a
practical exercise should be examined closely by the various research organizations. Can a situation be so structured that it will reveal to the student what is involved in a cross-cultural interaction? Will it afford the student an insight into what he might face in a foreign culture? And more important still, will such a situation provide the student the opportunity to internalize concepts which were merely on a verbal level initially? Of course, basic to such a presentation will be an examination as to what specific needs this will satisfy within the individual. Since we are initially confronted with the problem of almost complete unawareness or even indifference as to what is involved in cross-cultural interaction, how can we make the individual aware of this? What needs must we arouse within the individual so that he will strive to attain some degree of understanding?

Such, then, are the problem areas in what we call cross-cultural interaction. What are the facilities presently available in the U.S. Army Service Schools which can be utilized to cope with these problems? What is required before these problems can be effectively dealt with in the very near future?

The crux of the problem seems to be that in a space program, in electronics, in a guided missile program, the military turns to and accepts the pronouncements of the experts in the field. But in the field of human behavior, the words of the expert cultural anthropologists, the social psychologists, the linguistics man, go unheeded or at the very most, are incorporated into studies which are superficially scanned and promptly discarded in a search for “concrete,” “down to earth” facts which can be applied today and now.

* * * *

NOTES

1 Donald B. Haines, Training for Culture Contact and Interaction Skills (USAF, Wright Field: Behavioral Science Laboratory, December 1964).
3 Haines, Training for Culture Contact.
4 Kraemer and Stewart, Cross-Cultural Problems.

BUILDING RAPPORT WITH THE VIETNAMESE*

BY MARILYN W. HOSKINS

A trained observer can identify, describe, and explain numerous cultural traits in a target group which will assist the development of effective communications to that group.

During the several years I was engaged in social anthropological research in Viet Nam, I met many newcomers to Viet Nam who were puzzled as to how to begin their work with the Vietnamese. Some asked for advice on establishing rapport. Rapport is, however, a thing of spirit, not of logic and rules. I have seen Americans of good will break many “rules of good conduct” in Viet Nam and still become trusted friends of Vietnamese. I have seen others earnestly try to cultivate friends and

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never break down the barriers of suspicion. However, there are some observations, experiences, and ideas which I found useful in establishing friendly relations and interpreting information from Vietnamese. These I would like to share.

PERSONAL BASIS OF SOCIETY

(Truth)

Perhaps the most important adjustment a Westerner has to make in dealing with Vietnamese is the completely personal basis of the society. “Truth,” for instance, is not the fact statement for which many a Westerner has fought as a matter of honor, but is the “truth” of pleasant personal relationships. A Vietnamese’s honor lies in not giving or receiving embarrassment or shame. For instance, it would not be culturally correct for a Vietnamese to shout at and disconcert a waiter over bringing the wrong order. He should quietly request a change or decide the change of order less important than the embarrassment of pointing out the mistake and simply eat the other food item. This does not mean no one ever creates a scene, but it is not considered correct even if the other person has done something outrageously wrong. Vietnamese respect people who “keep their cool” in time of stress.

When someone does break the taboo, the other party may be deeply hurt. I know a small water boy who was harshly scolded by a Vietnamese lady in front of his friends for something he did not do. It was not the fact that he was unjustly accused which angered him as much as the fact he was scolded in front of his friends. He retained his polite and smiling attitude toward the scolding lady (so he could retain his job), but he quietly spit in each bucket of water he carried to that house from that day forth. His friends enjoyed the joke with him and Vietnamese tradition would hold that he had handled the situation in the best possible way.

(Questions and Answers)

This personal approach applies to both the questions and answers of a Westerner. If you ask a man in a straightforward manner for directions, you may be given fictitious ones for the sake of good will rather than be told he does not know the way or he does not understand your question. It is very common to see a Westerner quite sure he has been “gypped” when in actuality the desire to agree on the part of the Vietnamese caused a misunderstanding. It cannot be stressed too much that a Vietnamese may think he will be insulting you if he admits he does not understand your Vietnamese or will be embarrassing you or himself if he does not understand your English or French. In any event, he may feel the understanding is less important than a pleasant conversation. Conversations must be simple, taken step by step with one idea at a time, and information must be checked and rechecked for accuracy.

(Time)

Certain other “factual” concepts are seen by the Vietnamese only in their relation to people. Time, for instance is quite relative to most Vietnamese. The lack of reliable electricity makes electric clocks unusable. Many Vietnamese do not have working clocks or watches and they have just not become the slaves to clocks that Americans are apt to be. If
they are bored they may arrive someplace early; since it is impolite for
them to tell a visitor to leave or hurry past a friend without a visit, they
may arrive late even when intending to be there sooner. Distances and
numbers even take on a personal meaning.

* * * * *

[Humor]

Vietnamese laugh and giggle not only when they think some joke is
funny but when happy, when embarrassed, or when covering up emotions
dey do not wish to show. A Vietnamese enjoying himself, excited over
good news, being corrected, describing a horrible accident, or being
treated for a painful wound may emit the same laugh. They also may laugh
to keep someone else from being embarrassed.

* * * * *

Vietnamese have a delightful, light-hearted sense of humor, but it
takes some time to be able to use humor with a people of such a different
culture. Things that are humorous in one culture are pathetic or not
understood to be funny in the other. They do, however, admire a person
who can laugh over his own mistakes.

[Personal Conversations]

Personal conversations must all be quotable. If a Vietnamese does not
like a neighbor he or she may bring up gossip which may or may not be
accurate. It may be widely quoted as will your opinion if he can get you to
agree with any part of it. If you should remark that one store has a better
stock than another or the Catholic group are better organized than the
local Buddhists, etc., it would be taken personally rather than treated as
an observation of fact. Upon coming back to a community in which such a
statement has been made, one is apt to find everyone informed of your
comment and on one side or another of this “personal fight.”

[Favors and Gifts]

Answering things in the negative is also a very touchy process. When I
first arrived in Viet Nam a young girl befriended me and I assumed she
was particularly interested in practicing her English. Later she intro-
duced me to her high school-aged brother and asked if I could help him
select a university to attend in America. I answered I would be glad to go
over the library copies of college catalogues with him and help in any way
I could. All was well. She asked if I could help him get a scholarship and I
said I would find out when and where the tests were given, but he would
have to finish high school before he could take them. All was well. Then
she asked if I could get him excused from serving in the military. I said
that I knew nothing of Vietnamese military regulations and would not be
able to help at all in that matter. She never spoke to me again. The taboo
I had broken was not that I did not help, but that I gave such an abrupt
and negative response. This child, who had never spoken to a Westerner
before, was embarrassed by not having our relationship run more
smoothly and insulted by the directness of my answer. A Vietnamese
would have answered that he would do what he could and with some such
evasion would have let the subject drop, yet allowing the relationship to
continue.
It is also delicate to refuse a favor a Vietnamese may wish to extend to you. If he announces he plans to do something for you, you may say he is too kind and you do not want to trouble him in this way. If his offer is dropped it may be assumed he was offering as a matter of form (such as an American may say, "You must drop by sometime," as a polite but meaningless invitation). If however, he still insists and you can possibly accept, it may be best to do so. In one particularly poor home I was told they were sending their daughter to buy orange drink and I insisted several times I would rather have tea (which they were drinking and which Vietnamese drink instead of water during the day). When the daughter started to leave I stated again that I really preferred tea. The hostess quit politely insisting and burst forth with a flood of words about that fact I drank orange at some people's homes and must think she was very poor that she could not afford to entertain guests properly. Many neighbors regularly entertained me with tea, but this woman never again extended an invitation to her home.

When a Vietnamese receives a present, he feels it is proper to thank you before opening it. It is the act of remembering him for which he thanks you. Most generally he will take it home to open and will make no mention of the present again. It is almost as though he would show less gratitude for your act of giving if he later referred to the item directly. Some Westerners feel this shows ingratitude, but on the contrary it shows the personal relationship is treasured above the material gift.

Sometimes this same emphasis on personal relationships causes Vietnamese to want to avoid being personally associated with bad news. If something is not going to work out, they may wait for the situation itself to make known the bad news.

But do not despair—communication does go on. It is simply a matter of sensitivity and learning the rules. A very perceptive Belgian who headed the United Nations Educational, Cultural, and Scientific Organization (UNESCO) in Saigon gave me my first lesson in hearing what was said. He had worked with a certain village for years and, even though it was off-limits or "safe travel," he continued to go. One day when we had just arrived at the village, we were asked to have tea with a friendly gentleman. He kept urging us to drink more tea, though we had only had a sip from our cups. This I remembered was a well-known cue to hurry. Perhaps, I thought, the man had someplace to go and could, of course, not say this directly for fear of being rude. As we started to take our leave, he remarked that it was very hot in his village today and he hoped we would not find the heat too much. I might have answered that we enjoyed the visit despite the heat or some such thing but it did seem a strange topic, since weather is very predictable by season and is not usually a topic for conversation. The Belgian, however, answered, "Do you feel it is as hot at the school?" (a few miles away on a main road). "Yes," said the
man, "Today it is very warm all around here." The Belgian then asked. "How do you think the weather will be next week?" "Oh! Better I should hope." We then excused ourselves and I left very much bewildered. The Viet Cong came into the village soon after we left and only the Belgian's sensitivity to the real warning inherent in the conversation had us out in time. In time of war this desire not to tell us to leave directly not only guarded the conversant from a direct confrontation and kept him from appearing to presume to tell a respected advisor what to do, but also protected the elderly villager from being accused of warning the foreigners or conversely of having inside information about the movements of the Viet Cong. This subtlety in personal relationships makes the Vietnamese considerate, responsive, and gentle people. They are keen observers of attitudes and sensitive to disapproval.

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INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

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[Family Ties]

The belief that each person is a unit unto himself leaves parents feeling less responsible for the acts of their children and less apt to control their actions. However, it also leaves both of the parents more relaxed about the development of their children and more apt simply to enjoy being with, fondling, carrying for, and carrying the baby than is apparent with most Westerners. They do not have the constant worry Westerners frequently exhibit that young children make a good impression.

The folk tradition of very close ties and gladly shared responsibilities among members of the moderately extended family has undoubtedly been disrupted by unsettled conditions and urbanization, but it would appear always to have been more a folk ideal than complete reality and not as strong as in the traditional Chinese family.

[Outsiders]

Distrust of strangers is a part of Vietnamese cultural training.

* * * *

The traditional Vietnamese attitude of distrust of outsiders has been heightened during the many decades of war. It is the outsider who comes to their little communities to collect taxes, spray DDT on the ancestral alters which may anger the spirits, draft their sons or make families leave their ancestral homes. The "proper" behavior toward these outsiders is politely to keep one's distance, unless there might be something to gain from making contact (a job for a relative, and the like). Answers to questions should reflect what the questioner may want to hear, answers which will be profitable or will protect them from taxes, the draft, or the spirit world, or just humorous answers given credibly, but which, if believed, will provide entertainment for the "insiders" for weeks to come.

* * * *

[SOUTH VIETNAMESE-U.S. RELATIONS]

[Expectations and Stereotyping]

Many Vietnamese have a stereotyped picture of Americans as very
rich, influential, and quite naive. This influences how they react to Americans. The fact that you are rich means you are not as apt to cheat them of money and probably have lived a good life in this and previous lives. They expect you to contribute to the repair of a bicycle of a poor man who ran into and scratched your car, though they may readily admit he was to blame. They consider you cheap if you complain much if a poor Vietnamese thief takes some money from you. They will consider you foolish if you pay an exorbitant price for an item but will resent too much quibbling over a reasonable price, offering to pay much less than an item is worth, or talking down the quality of their merchandise in an effort to make a better bargain. They may actually expect you to pay a small amount more, on some items, but they expect the same from well-to-do Vietnamese. Respected wealthy Vietnamese usually do contribute more than the minimum amount to community projects or to a poor family’s wedding or funeral (a sort of voluntary graduated tax to make up for the lack of social security).

Vietnamese usually assume an American who comes to their community has unlimited funds and power and may become particularly resentful about a project that Americans start but do not complete. Once an American “takes on” a relationship with a Vietnamese it is ordinarily expected to continue.

Americans frequently accept people at face value and feel a person would not say he believes in something if he does not. Such an attitude may lead to naive reactions in a country where personal relations, not facts, dictate truth and gaining personal power is the end for which many contacts are established.

Vietnamese do, however, sometimes mention they feel most Americans have “good hearts” and are more sincerely concerned about their well-being than their own more polite neighbors and relatives. Americans are often amazed at the appreciation Vietnamese show when an outsider remembers their previous conversation and asks if their daughter is feeling better or some other non-threatening personal question.

Making Contact

Now we come to the techniques of making contact, establishing rapport and starting to work with people who have a different basis for “truth,” different rules for conversing, distrust and fear of strangers, deep and complex traditional beliefs very different from ours and preconceived ideas of Americans. Given these complexities, a certain amount of preparation is necessary before meeting any particular group with which continued contact is crucial. Defining your role and relationship with them in a simple, non-threatening way, using the same words when explaining your presence to different people can help avoid giving the feeling of hidden motives and make clear the limitations of your role. It is not difficult to learn a few Vietnamese words and the ordinary Vietnamese people are delighted that someone wants to get to know them.
enough to attempt to greet them in their language. (This is not always the case with Vietnamese higher government officials who may speak French even in their own homes and consider this a sign of education.)

[Use of Interpreter]

My job required the use of an interpreter for understanding subtleties of conversations and feelings, but I found it helpful to become acquainted in the area I was working by myself first. This helped give the feeling it was me, not the interpreter, with whom they were communicating. The difficulties in choosing an interpreter cannot be overstressed. Vietnamese may quite probably suspect an interpreter of being a spy or government agent unless he has good rapport himself. An educated Vietnamese interpreter might try to assert his position with less highly educated strangers by speaking less respectfully to them. Interpreters should understand the job and be "attuned" to desired methods and goals, dress inconspicuously and speak in terms of respect, especially to elders. Upper class Vietnamese usually lack understanding and often lack sympathy for the ideas and problems of the lower class Vietnamese.

[Establishing Rapport]

One simple way to start establishing acquaintances in a new area is to use the services there: the soup and tea shops, tailors, barbers, retail shops, etc., ....

Vietnamese have several types of traditional theater; they have an epic poem entitled "Kim Van Kieu" written by Nguyen Du and from which almost any Vietnamese can quote bits and pieces; and they have traditional games such as the Chinese forms of chess and cards and cricket fights. Any of these things make good conversation, as do food, cost of living, and health....

You may be asked your age, as this is not an offensive question in their culture. You may be asked about the cost of something, what you pay for your house, or your salary, for, unlike the U.S., money is not a taboo topic, though it is acceptable to give evasive answers. Their answers to such questions may not be accurate especially if it seems to relate to taxes, and they truly may not know the answer if it includes long range profits or value of inventory. Safe topics are always how beautiful is the family alter, how skillful is their work, or how clever is their child. It is very difficult to cross sex boundaries and still retain good rapport; men find it difficult to take women seriously and women are too shy to talk about personal problems with men.

A fine ice breaker is the taking of pictures and giving the subject a copy. This must be done with a little restraint at first and with permission lest you appear to be spying or trying to take embarrassing pictures. Parents with babies are almost always pleased if you ask to take their children's pictures. Polaroid cameras get sensational response, though I found I preferred using the other type so I could keep any copies I wanted and have an excuse to visit the family another day bringing them a copy. Sometimes, however, I had to put all signs of the camera away in order to get rid of mobs of youths all wanting pictures and following me right into
a villager's home. Even if these youngsters are destructive, the home owner is apt to feel it impolite to ask them to leave.

There are a few rules in taking pictures considered important by some Vietnamese. Some women feel a baby will be born ugly if the mother's picture is taken while she is pregnant. Some believe that if there are three people in a group photo one of the three will become ill or die and will ask to have some friend or stranger included or will break up the group for two pictures in order to change the number. Many Vietnamese are angry if their picture is taken while they are working or are in dirty clothes. Some young men do not want their pictures taken for fear you might report them for the draft. If you faithfully return prints, residents will soon ask you to their homes to take pictures of them in front of their family alters or in posed family portraits. Buddhists, unlike Muslims, believe photos are good and will serve the purpose of reminding the living of a person after he dies.

If a Westerner is closely identified with any one person or group of persons, it is difficult to enlarge his group of contacts. A person who goes to the Buddhist pagoda and not to the Catholic or other churches of the area will get the reputation of “favoring” the Buddhists. This is also true of rich vs. poor, newly arrived vs. old timers, and Northerners vs. Southerners. Those seen exclusively with officials of the area may miss the real leaders entirely. Anyone identified with any aid program or official too closely will receive not only contacts with those being helped but also the enmity of those who have been turned away or feel they should have been helped. A person working for such an organization can only define his role, describe his limitations as clearly and impersonally as possible, and try to develop friendships on as broad a basis as possible.

Because the society is so personal, Vietnamese may become jealous of attention paid to others and will notice such things as a neighbor getting a larger picture. A measuring stick for giving gifts is to be sure they relate to a service rendered, or are for a special occasion, such as a bouillon cube to an elderly sick lady or a small amount of fruit to a family with a wedding or funeral, but it should be something that can be given to anyone in the same situation. It is interesting to note that a Vietnamese saying is, “Help your friends with good advice but never with money.”

Vietnamese appreciate someone who cares enough to follow through in finding information for them, but do not be offended if they do not follow what seems to you to be excellent advice. If they are worried about a child with a cough and you can locate a hospital where he can get an X-ray, they will appreciate your effort. Local residents are often unaware of available services. However, the services described in the books, as in any country, may not turn out to be as “rosy” as described. When they find the hospital, it may have long lines requiring a person to miss a day's work to see a technician who then prescribes medicines the patient cannot afford to buy. If you can give your information in a tentative way, “I heard there is a hospital over by the market. Could the doctors there help
your son? "etc., they will appreciate your interest and should there be any
difficulty they will feel free to discuss it with you and not be emba-ressed
to see you again if they cannot or do not follow through.

Also, some requests are made for effect. One time during a bad flood in
central Viet Nam, the monks of a local pagoda complained that the
government would not take to the flooded area the relief supplies local
residents had brought to the pagoda. I found this was true, as the
government at that time was troubled by a Buddhist anti-government
movement and feared a bomb being put in the plane. I then found a man
with a boat who volunteered to take the goods for them. I passed on the
news which was received with enthusiasm by the younger monks. I was
surprised when no one contacted the man with the boat and only later
found that the older, more politically active monks who had originally
discussed the topic were more anxious to discredit the government than
to get the supplies to the flooded area.

[Eliciting Information]

Finding out information takes a special technique in question phrasing
which sometimes seems slow and indirect to the Westerner. A very direct
question to a Vietnamese will make him feel a little embarrassed and a
little ill at ease as when a Westerner notices some stranger staring at him.
Direct questions on political or other threatening topics or which would
embarrass the Vietnamese should he not know the answer are especially
taoo. "I heard someone say that something happened at the pagoda
last night," with a pause for their reaction is preferable to, "What hap-
pended at the pagoda last night?" or "Is it true that there was a fight at the
pagoda last night?"—the second being too direct and pushy and the third
too leading for a trustworthy answer.

Westerners who "oh!" and "ah!" loudly will often be entertained with
much of interest but little of truth. It takes a little time to establish the
climate before quietly accepting whatever they have to say. . . . It is
important not to overreact to stories. You may misunderstand the point
they are making through cultural or translation difficulties, they may joke
about something they are serious about in order to test your opinion, or
they may be trying to find out how gullible you are.

If you really must refuse an invitation to attend a ceremony or to have
tea, etc., a Vietnamese may believe you are not interested in becoming
friends and the next move will be up to you. It is polite to go to a home at
any time during the day except meal and afternoon nap time (between
12:00 p.m. and 3:00 p.m.). It is polite to arrive unannounced, partly
because so few people have phones but also because it indicates you do not
expect them to go to extra trouble preparing for your visit. You may also
expect unannounced visits from Vietnamese friends at any hour of the
day or late evening. Vietnamese do not always keep social appointments,
but it is best where possible to be a "good sport" and let it pass.

* * * *

Starting to Work

Many Westerners who have worked closely with Vietnamese would
like to tell newcomers to move slowly in forming conclusions, especially about changes that should be made: opinions, standards, and "eyes" will change. One well-meaning, newly arrived American suggested tearing down large areas of workers' houses and replacing them with modern dwellings of four story brick buildings. This was to be a method of improving the life of the worker and raising morale. These workers' houses were mostly squatter houses, some with rickety boards and dirt floors, but the majority somewhat improved, especially if occupied by the owners. When the residents of one of these areas were asked if they thought this would be a good idea, some were startled and others offended. To the American outsider none of these houses was anything anyone would want to live in, but had he remained in the area to judge with eyes more attuned to the environment he would have seen how much those who lived in their own houses prided themselves on improvements they had made. The residents mentioned that they would rather be able to get small home improvement loans, having building materials available and have some community improvements in the way of drainage, sidewalks and water supply. Several renting residents mentioned they would prefer a loan to buy one of the local houses. Only a very few of the poorest seemed at all interested in living in a high rise building and it is doubtful if they could have paid the rent for such apartments.

* * * * *

Defining a project by the stated goals of local residents is also sometimes misleading. As is true in most societies, Vietnamese may verbalize one goal and really pursue another. One woman who said she valued education and desperately needed money, lost financial support from the Foster Parents' Plan when she took her very bright child out of school. She claimed that she needed the child to baby sit her tiny ones at home; but she actually took the child to the market to keep her company while she sold produce, leaving the tiny tots unattended. It took some time to identify sociability as one of her highest goals.

Teachers find they must take time to consider whom and how as well as what to teach, especially when they must cross cultural barriers (which is true of Vietnamese of different classes or coming from different areas as well as foreigners). In the early days of maternity centers, public health officials were teaching young women about diet during nursing. The women responded that they recognized the signs of pellagra and scanty milk supply described as resulting from the customary post natal diet excluding all vegetables and fruits. Much later the technicians found that they had been teaching the wrong people, for when the girls went back to their homes, they ate only what their mothers-in-law dictated. Also, one could not interest most mothers-in-law in a better diet for the sake of the daughter-in-law as easily as one could interest her in a diet what would provide more and better milk for her grandchild. Similarly, in teaching about boiling water in villages with an unsafe source, it was discovered that Vietnamese folk medicine stresses adding of heat to take away sickness and the need for boiling water could be accepted when proposed
in that way. If technicians discussed the illness as unseen microbes, an elderly mother-in-law might nod politely but later laugh herself to sleep over such an idea. The proper understanding of Vietnamese customs and traditions can save endless hours spent talking to people too polite to disagree openly and who seem to respond to any suggestion one makes. Young boys who are taught about fertilizer in school, when the fathers are not also given the same information, may be severely disciplined if they bring home these new thoughts and try to tell their fathers how to change their farming. This kind of approach can also discredit the school in the eyes of parents who traditionally believe the school should reinforce the respect pattern in the family.

Vietnamese are much more willing than many other Asians to try new things if they see that they will work. But they have too much at stake to risk putting their family savings in a cooperative if the money holder may abscond with the funds, or try a new type of crop without some evidence of it being an improvement. New types of rice with high yields may look good in a laboratory or in another situation but they may not leave good straw essential for the buffalo, etc. A number of Vietnamese have mentioned that the new American-sponsored "miracle rice" gives good yields but tastes different enough that it will not sell in the local market if there is any other choice.

[Authority, Leadership, and Key Communicator]

Vietnamese greatly enjoy watching an outsider come to the community, plan improvements, do all the work, take all the blame for failure, and they will characterize this work as something he does for the sake of his own soul, thereby not putting themselves in the outsider's debt for any success. Though they may participate in a project for some sort of recognition such as uniforms, medals or certificates of merit (which they prize more than Westerners may realize), real leaders from the community are usually available only when actual power is theirs. Yielding of authority to the local Vietnamese sometimes constitutes a problem for the American advisor, however. Not only are technically trained Americans eager to get projects done more quickly than the local pace and talent may be able to do them, but the Vietnamese concept of power includes ability to give jobs to relatives and friends, to give extra supplies or services rendered to those below. Americans, observing, call this nepotism, embezzling, and graft. Those Vietnamese who end up on the paying instead of the receiving end are quick to point out the inequality of the system, frequently hoping to change not the system but their position in the give and take arrangements. This cultural difference is not easily resolved.

Identifying the actual leaders in a community (not necessarily the official ones) can ease the problem of presenting new ideas or projects. In Catholic communities the priest is frequently a trusted leader (among the Catholics). Some Buddhist monks also have a reputation for wisdom, if not leadership, but this is less common as that religion in Viet Nam does not stress educational or service goals for its monks. In Cambodia and Thailand one can gain merit for helping work on a project initiated by the
monks, but this is not a common concept in Viet Nam. In rural areas you
may find men considered village leaders by the majority of the residents.
If there is a meeting in such a community where a project is to be
considered, the men may mill around, talking apparently about other
subjects. In the end a consensus emerges, mostly, it appears, from the
men having sensed what the most knowledgeable or powerful man would
like to see take place. After such a meeting there seems to be little
undercurrent of disagreement.

In newer urban communities or those made of people of varying
backgrounds, such meetings take on a more informal air but due to lack of
general acceptance of one or several men as leaders there may be much
more resentment with what is and what is not being done. In these
communities there are elected officials in precinct-size areas, but frustra-
tion with red tape, lack of real power, and lack of community continuity
keep some of the most respected and talented men from taking these
jobs.

In most rural communities there are also elderly women who play the
part of an Emily Post, Dear Abby and Dr. Spock, passing on customs,
recipes for potions and cures. They may tell of curing diseases such as
tetanus with such things as the power of burnt spiders’ web, and eggs.
They supervise the building of the fire over which new mothers lie to put
back in their bodies the heat lost in childbirth; give advice to pregnant
women on how to have beautiful, intelligent, energetic babies; and know
who makes the best love potions, reads the best fortunes and who takes
away curses on sick children. When young families move to the city, they
often feel a void in their knowledge and advisors in these areas could be
especially effective. Some young families keep going back to the rural
area for advice, some follow the advice of neighbors, and some adopt
Western medicine and methods at least while in the city. However, when
these knowledgeable women are present and can be identified, they
should be treated with great courtesy, as they have collected a great
many culturally important traditions, have the respect and admiration of
numerous women and men, and are a storehouse of experience and
information. They are usually delighted to give advice, have useful in-
sights and are often the key to whether something such as a maternity
center will be used. If approached with tact, they may be a most impor-
tant “seller” of new ideas.

CONCLUSION

Most Americans who have made an effort to bridge the gap between
the two cultures (though they probably never feel they fully understand
the Vietnamese) develop a deep respect and love for the Vietnamese and
feel themselves the wiser and better for the opportunity of knowing
Vietnamese people and learning of their way of life. They also end up
being less frustrated with the results of their labors and contacts with the
local people than those with rigid preconceived ideas.

I believe the most important thing I have learned about working with
the Vietnamese is to keep an open ear, an open eye, and an open mind,
and to move gently in making suggestions or trying to change anything in this very old culture. As I worked with the Vietnamese I found problems and situations my knowledge did not cover but with patience my understanding and values broadened. I found Vietnamese prize politeness before progress and this was the only way to proceed, despite temporary frustrations. I found I enjoyed their allowance for individuality, enjoyment of children, relaxed manner of approaching life, politeness, respect for elders, restraint from resolving problems (especially family problems) in public, and the genuine friendships which I eventually developed. Americans who have the opportunity to go to aid Viet Nam with technical skills, medical and educational contributions may find they too have gained from this experience of the mixing of the East and West.

SOURCES OF THE ABILITY TO ESTIMATE FOREIGN ATTITUDES*

By Alexander R. Askenasy

A study to identify persons best able to estimate the attitudes of a foreign population found that post-graduate degree officers were most competent in this regard, but that an officer's experience and maturity can make up for a lack in formal education. Apart from expertise, the study found other significant relationships between some of the officers' characteristics.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY

United States military planners and decisionmakers at home and commanders on overseas assignments often are confronted with a requirement to obtain accurate and unbiased information on a foreign country or population. In cases where no written up-to-date information on certain aspects of a foreign area exists, frequent use has been made of individuals who possess expert knowledge of a foreign population. The question then is, which persons can provide the best information? Must one follow a course of trial and error by asking any persons who happen to have been in a foreign country and to be available at the moment? Or is it possible to identify personal qualities and background characteristics of individuals who are able to estimate foreign views most accurately?

It is generally assumed that living in a foreign country for a time leads to some more or less accurate knowledge about the local population and its attitudes. This raises the problem of who, among a number of persons who have lived in an overseas locale, would be most expert on the local people's views. This problem becomes particularly pressing when different "experts" make contradictory statements. Whose judgment should be accepted? Whose advice should be followed?

This study seeks to shed some light on the characteristics of Army officers that are related to their expertise in estimating attitudes of a foreign population. To determine these characteristics, it first is necessary to establish a criterion or standard of expertise. It is difficult to find any good criterion for expertise on the attitudes of a population in an unfamiliar country. For this study, the criterion used was Korean re-

sponses to an opinion survey. The objectively collected data of a public opinion poll conducted for the U.S. Information Agency were used as the standard to gauge "expertise." The use of survey data seemed to be more practical and to permit coverage of more Koreans representing a larger segment of the population than could be covered by the more time-consuming in-depth approach of the anthropologist. 3

Expertise thus was to be measured by the officers' ability to estimate Korean responses to public opinion survey questions. By comparing the criterion, that is, the actual Korean opinion data, with the officers' estimates of these data, the amount of expertise of officers could be expressed in quantitative terms, and its significance could be tested statistically. (Statistical tests of significance are used to determine the probability of whether findings are due to mere chance and thus how much confidence can be placed in them.)

HYPOTHESES

The first step was to determine what background characteristics of the U.S. Army officers one would expect or hypothesize to be related to the ability to assess Korean views accurately. A review of relevant scientific literature suggests a number of hypotheses that could be tested in this study.

First, it was hypothesized that the ability to assess Korean views accurately would be positively related to the amount of relevant experience such as the length of time in the country.

Another hypothesis was that expertise would increase with education, and social science and humanities majors would be better estimators than officers who had majored in other fields.

Next, it was expected that certain biographic characteristics like age and marital status would be correlated with the ability to estimate Korean opinions.

It was also hypothesized that frequency of interaction with certain types of Korean nationals would be positively correlated with the ability to estimate Korean attitudes. The relevance of certain types of interaction was stressed by Ralph White, 4 who pointed out that Americans tend to have contacts with precisely those foreign nationals most likely to support a pro-American government.

In the present study it was hypothesized that the ability to estimate foreign views would be related to the personality characteristics of the perceiver as well as to his experience with and knowledge of the culture and its people. More specifically, it was expected that the more dogmatic respondents, that is, those with relatively close-mindedness, would be less accurate in estimating Korean opinions.

It has been reported that American reactions to overseas assignment vary enormously. In this study, it was hypothesized that the officers most satisfied with their Korean assignments would be most accurate in estimating Korean views. A question on satisfaction with their assignment was included in the biographic data form given to the officers.
INSTRUMENTS

Three instruments were used in the study.

1. Biographic data form. Its purpose was to obtain information on the officers' biographical background, experiences in Korea, and reactions to their assignment.

2. Korean opinion questionnaire. This instrument was labeled the “Social Perception Questionnaire.” It contained 23 questions given to 500 Koreans in a public opinion survey. The U.S. Army officers were asked to estimate how the Koreans answered the 23 questions.

3. Dogmatism scale. This form was labeled the “Social Attitudes Scale.” It consisted of 40 brief statements, the responses to which measure dogmatism or closedmindedness.

SAMPLE

The sample consisted of 161 U. S. Army officers stationed in Korea, ranging in rank from warrant officers and second lieutenants to lieutenant colonels.

ANALYSIS

The data collected were punched into IBM cards and computer-analyzed. Two measures of the officers' ability to estimate Korean views were developed: an “accuracy score” and a “directionality score.” The accuracy score measures how accurately the officers estimated Korean views. The accuracy score deals with the closeness of an officer's estimates to the Korean data regardless of whether he over- or underestimated Korean responses. The directionality score, on the other hand, takes into account the direction of a respondent's inaccuracy, that is, whether he tends to over- or underestimate the pro-American character of the responses of the Korean sample.

A number of statistical tests were conducted to determine which background characteristics were significantly related to the officers' expertise. Included in these characteristics were certain biographical factors, contacts with various types of Koreans, and some attitudes of the officers.

FINDINGS

Measures of Expertise in Ability to Estimate Korean Opinions

As has been indicated, two measures were developed to indicate the U.S. Army officers' expertise: the accuracy score and the directionality score. Accuracy scores measured how closely the officers could estimate Korean views. The accuracy score of a perfect estimate would be zero, because there would be no difference between the original Korean views and the officers' estimates. The higher the score, the greater the difference between the Korean data and an officer's estimates. The most inaccurate score possible would be 18.1 The mean (average) of all officers' accuracy
scores was 4.88. Accuracy scores of individual officers ranged from 3.30 to 7.50.* Statistically, the results suggest that the task of estimating Korean opinion data was a difficult one for the officer group. Still, there were significant differences among the officers in ability to estimate attitudes of a foreign population, depending on background characteristics.

Directionality scores measured the direction of a respondent’s inaccuracy, indicating whether he tended to over- or underestimate pro-American (or anti-Communist) opinions of the Koreans. The mean (average) of all respondents’ directionality scores was .02; this indicates that the officers’ group as a whole was not biased in one direction—that over- and underestimates nearly balanced. A negative (−) score indicates underestimation of pro-American views; a positive (+) score means overestimation of Korean pro-U.S. views. Individual officers’ directionality scores ranged from −3.28 to +4.98.**

Relationships Between the Officers’ Expertise and Other Characteristics

The following discussion of results will cover relationships found between expertise and the officers’ biographical characteristics, dogmatism scores, social interaction with Koreans, and satisfaction with being assigned to Korea.

Biographical Characteristics of the Officers

Length of Time in Korea. The group that had been longer in Korea made more accurate estimates. Length of stay in Korea was the strongest single predictor of accuracy level in estimating the Korean survey data.

*The most accurate score was that of a major with a B.A. in political science. He “rarely or never” had contact with close personal Korean friends, but he had been in Korea twelve months, had visited Korea previously on several TDY trips, and, as Allied Liaison Officer at the Signal School, had had many contacts with Korean military personnel studying there. The least accurate score was that of a captain with a B.A. in speech. He reported daily contact with close personal Korean friends and had spent ten months in Korea without previously having been there.

**The officer with the highest negative score, that is, the greatest underestimation of pro-U.S. views, was a captain with a high school diploma, seven years in the service, and 12 months of experience in Korea. He wrote in the biographical data sheet that he had had “very little” special knowledge about Korea before his arrival, “and what knowledge I did have was wrong in general.” One may opine that his score reflects a leaning over backward from the pro-U.S. responses he may have expected before his Korean assignment. The respondent with the highest positive score, that is, the greatest overestimation of pro-U.S. views, was a captain with two years of college and 18 and one-half years in the service. He had spent 12 months in Korea on his present tour and 13 months on a previous tour. He reported daily contact with close personal Korean friends.
Two groups of officers were compared. One consisted of those who had been in Korea for no more than five months, and the average was 2.3 months. The other group (which gave better estimates) had been in Korea eight months or more, and its average was 11 months. Incidentally, cross-correlations found that officers who had been longer in Korea reported closer interactions with Koreans and also tended to be more satisfied with being assigned to Korea.

Education. The officers were divided into three groups according to their education. Officers with postgraduate degrees (M.A.'s, M.D.'s, LL.B.'s, and the like) tended to be most accurate; officers without any college degree were next; officers who held only a bachelor's degree were least accurate. This result may indicate that the nongraduates make up in experience and maturity what they lack in formal education. Compared to the rest of the sample group, the average nongraduate had been more years in the service and more months in Korea, and he was senior in terms of rank and age. Officers with postgraduate degrees also showed more general closeness of interaction with Koreans than either college-only graduates or nongraduates. There was little difference in closeness of interaction between the college-only graduate and nongraduate groups. Major field of study was not shown to have a significant bearing on expertise.

Age. Year of birth was correlated with the directionality score. Older officers overestimated pro-U.S. responses less.

Frequency of Interaction with Koreans

The American officers were asked to indicate the frequency of their contacts with different types of Koreans, namely, with Korean military personnel, government officials, white-collar workers and professionals, students, and shopkeepers and peddlers, and their closeness of interaction with Koreans in general.

Interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals was the best single predictor of ability to estimate Korean public opinions, not only among the measure of interaction but among all the measures used in this study. It appears that the white-collar workers and professionals with whom the officers had contact were in general highly educated and articulate English-speaking Koreans and were usually employed by the U.S. Army. The group included many translators, bookkeepers, and other office personnel.

Accuracy of U.S. officers' estimates increased with interaction with Korean shopkeepers and peddlers with whom the officers made contacts off U.S. Army bases.

Officers who had more frequent contact with students tended to overestimate pro-U.S. responses. A number of these contacts occurred when officers taught English or advised Korean students. This finding may be explained by the type of students and the nature of the interaction; presumably these students were pro-American in their feelings. The
more anti-American students probably do not seek out contacts with U.S. Army officers.

Officers who had more contact with students also tended to be more satisfied with their assignment to Korea. The causality of this finding does not appear to be clear cut. Officers who were happier with their Korean assignment to start with may have been more ready to volunteer for work with Korean students, and respondents involved in teaching or advising friendly students may have found this made their stay in Korea more satisfying.

On the other hand, hardly any relationship was found between expertise and interaction with Korean military personnel and government officials.

**Officers' Satisfaction with Being Assigned to Korea**

Another significant indicator of expertise was that estimates by officers who were "extremely satisfied" with their tour of duty in Korea were more accurate than those by less satisfied officers.

As was stated, it was also found that officers who were more satisfied with their assignment to Korea tended to be less dogmatic, to have spent more time in Korea, and to interact more frequently with Korean students.

**Dogmatism Scale**

The more dogmatic respondents were less accurate, and they overestimated the Koreans' anti-U.S. views. The more dogmatic respondents also were less satisfied with their assignment to Korea.

**Relative Contributions of Different Factors to Expertise**

Up to this point, expertise was studied in relation to single characteristics of the officers, one factor at a time; for example, in relation to months in Korea or to education. In additional analyses, expertise was studied in relation to a number of factors at once. The analyses made it possible to identify the relative contributions of various factors to expertise.

In the analyses, the measures of expertise (directionality scores and accuracy scores) were correlated with the following factors: Age; months in Korea; marital status; interaction with Korean military, government officials, white-collar workers and professionals, students, shopkeepers and peddlers; general closeness of interaction; major source of information about Korea; dogmatism; and satisfaction with being assigned to Korea.

When the accuracy scores were correlated with the combination of factors, the best predictor of expertise was found to be length of stay in Korea. The group that had been longer in Korea made more accurate estimates. The next two strongest predictors were interaction with shopkeepers—the more interaction, the higher the accuracy—and dogmatism—the less dogmatic respondents were more accurate. In other words, the ability to estimate Korean views accurately can be best predicted by ascertaining the officer's length of stay in Korea, his contacts with certain parts of the Korean civilian population, and the pre-
sence or absence in his personality of a characteristic that may be called closedmindedness or dogmatism.

It was found that if one correlates the combined factors with the directionality score, the best predictor of expertise is interaction with Korean white-collar workers and professionals. Officers who interacted less underestimated Korean pro-U.S. views. The next strongest factors, in order of decreasing strength, were (a) interaction with Korean students, (b) satisfaction—the more satisfied officers made less biased estimates—and (c) dogmatism—the more dogmatic respondents overestimated Korean anti-U.S. views.

NOTES


2 A number of studies on the evaluation and utilization of expert opinions have been conducted at The RAND Corporation. Some of these studies use as criteria facts of the type found in the World Almanac. See, for instance, the following: Bernice Brown and Olaf Helmer, Improving the Reliability of Estimates Obtained From a Consensus of Experts, P-2986 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, September 1964); Norman Kaldrey and Olaf Helmer, An Experimental Application of the DELPHI Method to the Use of Experts, RM-27-PB (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, July 1962); Olaf Helmer, Social Technology, P-3063 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, February 1965); Olaf Helmer, The Systematic Use of Expert Judgement in Operations Research, P-2795 (Santa Monica, Calif.: The RAND Corporation, September 1963); Olaf Helmer and Nicholas Rescher, "On the Epistemology of the Inexact Sciences," Management Science, V. (1960), pp. 25–52.


PSYOP-RELATED PERSONNEL

Part of the success of any military operation, including PSYOP, is clear definition of task performed so that the special skills, knowledge, and experience of individuals can be maximally utilized. This is rarely a simple undertaking. In an internal defense environment, for instance, there is a wide range of military and civilian activities requiring utilization of U.S. and host country personnel in which coordination and control of effort are difficult. Moreover, the rapidly changing character of the political and military situations makes it difficult to forecast precise personnel requirements.

There are many communications specialists whose talents are utilized in PSYOP and PSYOP-related activities. Aside from the personnel who produce and disseminate PSYOP material to influence civilian, as well as military, target groups, there are: military advisors; information officers who perform military public-relations functions for both foreign and domestic audiences; radio programming officers; Special Forces; interpreters who are assigned to combat units to smooth out communication with the local population; political officers who direct their efforts toward the indoctrination of friendly or hostile troops; carefully selected mem-
bers of the local population mobilized into PSYOP units and sent out to make contact with inhabitants of semi-isolated hamlets and villages; and former enemy soldiers who surrender and volunteer to take part in operations against their fellow comrades.

Military Advisor

A MILITARY ADVISOR IN THE PHILIPPINES

By George M. Guthrie

Advisors overseas must not allow their wishes to shape their perception of the degree to which host nationals will support commonly agreed objectives.

Captain Wilson was assigned to the Joint U.S. Military Assistance Group, JUSMAG, in the Philippines in 1965. He moved his wife and two children to Manila and went to work at the JUSMAG compound with Captain Ramos of the Third Military District, a region of former Huk activity north of Manila in the populous rice plain. In the tradition of Magsaysay, the Philippine Army had been attempting to maintain good relationships with the tenant farmers. Most of the personnel spoke Tagalog, a few Pampango, another dialect of the area. All officers spoke "Filipino English" which an American could understand after a few weeks. Most of the enlisted men understood English but few appeared fluent even though all insisted they understood instructions.

This was Captain Wilson's first experience in the Far East; his previous overseas duty had been in Europe. His orientation had included some reading on the Philippines, conversations with fellow officers who had returned and two weeks in a special program at the Foreign Service Institute. His duties were rather general. The Philippine Army had been encouraged by his predecessors to develop a civic action program to ensure the continued peace and to further economic development of the district. Conferences with provincial governors and with community development officials had led to a program of road building, particularly feeder roads to villages which had previously been connected to highways only by trails along which water buffalo pulled wooden sleds. At the same time the president of the Philippines was promoting a land reform program in selected communities in which the tenants could choose to buy their land at prices fixed by the courts.

Captain Ramos explained the program, described the steps which had been taken and suggested the next moves. He felt they needed additional road building equipment and some additional transport for their men who had been obliged to use rural buses when their troop carriers had broken down. The next day the two men were driven to the provinces for a couple of days to see the work at first hand.

This was a new experience for Captain Wilson. Each community leader, major or barrio captain, prepared a special meal which included roast pig, local fruits, rice, tropical temperature Coca Cola and San Miguel beer, and out of deference to the American, bread and canned pineapple.

Adults and children gathered four deep to stare at the Americano who towered at least a foot above almost everyone except Ramos. They smiled uncomfortably when he returned their glance and children covered their faces and hid behind their mothers. The officials made long and enthusiastic speeches about the great things which the program would do for their barrio (village). They also made Wilson feel good by praising their American friends for help in the past, present activities, and better things to come.

In the months which followed, the American found that there were problems in the program. Ramos had relatives who were landowners and who pressed him to withhold reform programs from their area. A provincial governor claimed responsibility for many accomplishments with which he had nothing to do and had billboards erected announcing that Governor Sanchez had given the roads to the village as part of his program of improvement. In addition, there were thefts of equipment, preventative maintenance had been indicated but had not been carried out, and several good officers got involved in a feud with a governor who in turn brought pressure to have them assigned to remote islands. Finally, the people of several barrios did not seem willing to maintain the roads nor to spend the few hours necessary to make repairs after a hurricane.

This example is presented to illustrate the degree to which an American advisor can be misled into believing that local nationals share his commitments when they seem to agree with his suggestions and express goals with which he concurs. In this case a number of Filipinos were saying what Wilson wanted to hear in order to make him feel good but they did not share his conviction that equipment and roads must be maintained and protected regardless of other considerations. Similarly, he failed to recognize the importance of family obligations in the Philippines and the intensity of political competition. Because they talked in a way he could understand, he assumed that they were reasoning from the same premises and would judge situations in much the same way he would. He used the only frame of reference he had, his own. When his counterparts failed to meet his expectations he was tempted to make very negative evaluations of their character, especially when equipment disappeared and when favors were done for relatives. Of course, there can be incompetence, theft and nepotism anywhere. The problem Wilson faced was to try to respond to what he saw, or thought he saw, without losing his relationship with his counterparts or his own principles.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AMERICAN ADVISORS AND VIETNAMESE OFFICERS*

BY AN ARVN CAPTAIN

A commentary by an ARVN Captain on the personal qualities and characteristics requisite to an advisory role. Basically, an advisor should be patient, understanding, and objective.

It is my opinion that the assignment of an American advisor to a Vietnamese military or naval counterpart is a difficult one requiring not

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only thorough technical competence but a skillful, tactful, helpful character of a man. He must know himself, know others, and be a true philosopher. He must be willing to walk in the shoes of others. This is because he will not be working in an American atmosphere. He will not be giving orders or carrying them out as he is used to doing in the Armed Forces of the United States.

Most American advisors have found their job in Vietnam a perplexing one at first. It is a job very different from the regular duties one performs in the American Armed Forces. These advisors are more or less handicapped by a lack of experience and understanding in relation to this new environment. Even instruction in the United States does not adequately prepare the advisor for the task in Vietnam.

Too many advisors demand more of their counterpart and his unit than they would demand of themselves and their unit in a similar situation. Many American advisors demand the ideal solution to a problem. Ideal things are easy to accept, even when one does not fully understand all of the implications. Implementation, however, is something else again.

Now, let us consider what I call the "unknown factors":

YOUR COUNTERPART'S POSITION

This factor involves knowing your Vietnamese counterpart's social, moral and military obligations. This helps build your mutual understanding of one another and your friendship. Vietnamese Officers and NCOs require social and military respect in all situations. Though I must work with my advisor (considered as my "lateral superior"), my pride dictates that respect be evinced by my counterpart. Little things: salutations, greetings, courtesies, and the like, provide me that important prestige which elevates me above my subordinates and shows them that I am indeed a worthy officer, able to walk on my own two feet, and a man in whom they may place their confidence during training or on the battlefield. By that, I mean that I consider myself as the host and my American counterpart as my guest. I will be courteous and expect to be treated the same way.

Another consideration rests with language. Many American advisors make no attempt to learn the most rudimentary Vietnamese. Some only go through the motions in American service schools. We do not demand that Americans be fluent, and, in return, we do not believe that Americans should demand fluency in English from us. One of the worst American habits is to speak English to a Vietnamese in a manner similar to a teacher speaking to a small child. This is very upsetting and tends to destroy rapport.

Every culture has its own peculiarities and similarities. Generally, we have noticed that Americans are very sociable. Cocktails, dinner parties, and the like, are your ways of broadening your social relationships. By this I mean, you have your own way of living, which, in most cases, is of a higher standard than most Vietnamese. As an Oriental, immersed in the doctrines of Confucianism and Buddhism, where the family is the main
constructive and most fundamental unit of society, your Vietnamese counterpart will do everything possible for his family. He reduces his social circle and avoids hobbies in order to be able to provide his parents the comforts of life. This must be considered when Americans invite their counterparts to expensive parties in luxurious places. As any man would not lose face, he will attempt to repay in kind. Many Vietnamese frequently have to borrow money, at interest, to repay the obligations they feel they have incurred. After experience like this many of us try to avoid meeting socially with Americans. Why Americans desire such, by our standards, grandiose entertainment is perfectly understandable, but when Vietnamese counterparts are involved, good taste should dictate more humble amenities in less affluent surroundings.

KNOW YOUR COUNTERPART'S OUTLOOK AND GOALS

This factor involves knowing your counterpart in relationship to his past. This involves knowledge not only of present social conditions but historical ones as well. Because of the history of French rule, many Vietnamese officers and men still retain varying degrees of inferiority before a white man. This complex relates to almost a century of French rule and a lack of linguistic knowledge. An almost built-in element of low morale tends to affect many Vietnamese when confronted with a Caucasian man on close terms. You can detect this feeling in their eyes and their manner. Only a high degree of tact and understanding can break down the barriers which unconsciously exist among so many Vietnamese military personnel. The counterpart's present career situation may have a lot to do with his attitude toward his advisor. It is human nature for a professional officer or NCO to want to get ahead, to move forward, to have a bright future for himself and his family. Knowing how long your counterpart has been in his present rank is important, for this factor almost always has a strong effect upon his morale and his receptiveness to new ideas.

As his advisor, you should learn to better appreciate your counterpart's situation and not become abusive when your advice is not followed. You must analyze the situation with empathy. By doing so, you will be better able to accomplish mutual goals and objectives.

HOW TO MAKE YOUR ADVICE UNDERSTOOD BY YOUR COUNTERPART

To improve the combat capability and the operational efficiency of your counterpart's unit, you must from the beginning understand that the South Vietnamese Armed Forces are very different from those of the United States. This is due, not only to fiscal poverty, but also to administrative and organizational structures and procedures. These differences must be taken into consideration whenever you advise your counterpart.

To make sure your advice and recommendations are understood, you should ease into your work, initiate your counterpart slowly and by being suggestive, rather than directive in your approach. While no one is
perfect, few people want to be told what to do by a foreigner on the person's own soil. As far as Vietnamese Officers and NCOs are concerned, especially unit commanders, they like to be judged qualified to assume their commands. Besides their military experience, most have had service schooling under the French, the Vietnamese Government, and in the United States. In some cases, these soldiers have a great deal more combat experience than their advisors! Besides, each has his own pride in serving his country and being chosen to be raised above his subordinate countrymen.

The value of advice is not based on how good it sounds, but on how well it works. Advice should be geared to the unit's true strength, its combat capability and the overall mission of the unit. In addition, the advice should be practical and understandable. The total morale of the unit and its commanders is a matter of great consideration. This is a vital area pertaining to counterpart relationships as a whole. Somehow, the successful advisor must shape his advice, his recommendations and his suggestions in such a manner that the counterpart is made to believe that the original thought was his and the concepts derived therefrom were attributable to him and his staff.

YOUR ADVICE: ITS APPLICATION AND SUPERVISION

Your counterpart has many pressures being applied from many directions. Even if your counterpart were to agree with you 100 percent about your ideas, he must carry out his superior's directives as and when they are received. Remember that your direct commander has a great influence over your military career. This precludes 100 percent responsiveness to one's counterpart, even though the suggestions or advice may appear better under the circumstances. Here is where your patience and tolerance are put to the test; here is where your better judgement may be sorely tried and where your psychological application of diplomacy, or tact, will be the balance between success and failure. Your counterpart is aware of the pressures placed upon you by senior advisors. If you are aware of the pressures placed upon him by his seniors, both of you will be better able to cope and achieve your mutual objectives.

Be sure to allow your counterpart the luxury of undivided command. His subordinates should have no misunderstandings regarding his freedom of action. Let your Vietnamese counterpart do the work himself. Your comments will only be appreciated in a private face-to-face “after action” critique. Be sincere, and yet, be friendly. Never take over prerogatives that are not yours by right. In either combat or garrison situations, your assumption of prerogatives which are not legally your's could cause a real problem between you, your counterpart, and his unit. This has happened many times. It is hard to blame the American advisors as being responsible. Your desire to achieve often results from attempts to impress senior advisors with drive and professionalism “à l'Ameriçaine.” All I can recommend is that advisors be selected from men
of patience, understanding, and objectivity. Nowhere is tolerance a more valuable quality.

Every Vietnamese Officer and NCO understands that each American Advisor has various assigned missions to perform. We understand, also, that these missions are often performed under considerable diplomatic and military pressures from above. We understand, that various American advisory groups, teams, and individuals are taxed with administrative duties which bear no relationship to the mission of advising Vietnamese units. We also understand that American careers are often made or destroyed through efficiency reporting channels where even the performance of a Vietnamese commander or unit bears on the rating of an American advisor in the eyes of his own superiors. All this is, of course, very frustrating to all concerned. It has made for deep-seated misunderstandings, unfortunate rumors, and personal cross-cultural animosities. It takes a strong man to fight a hard war. It takes an even stronger one to properly advise the ones who must fight such a war.

In this area, we all understand the necessity for unit evaluations, both by the Vietnamese Armed Forces and by the American Military Assistance Command. The reporting system is, by and large, unilateral on both parts. This system has created untold numbers of misunderstandings between Vietnamese and American Officers and NCOs. I don't know what the psychological implications are, but there is a tendency for advisors to report things through American channels that they never take up with their Vietnamese counterparts. Courtesy may be a consideration in this, but I would say that it seems mostly an evasion of frankness and honesty. Perhaps it is easier to report than it is to advise? Who knows. In any case, the results of these reports come down through Vietnamese channels and are in some cases, a complete surprise to the rated unit and its commander. In my case, and I have been a member of the French Union Armed Forces and the Viet Minh, I want to know, point blank, the things that should and can be improved in my unit. I want to be told by my advisor where I have failed (or where my strengths are) and I want to know what I must do to improve the overall combat readiness of my unit.

My advisor and I (and I have had fourteen in the last six years) must work these things out together, before his report goes up through his command channels. We can never be honest with one another when the first clear indication of problems comes back through Vietnamese channels! It is, therefore, imperative that advisors and those advised have opportunities to discuss all things that took place before an evaluation of a unit is determined and the advisory reports submitted. What I am saying to advisors (as well as to counterparts) is, “Do not be two-faced!!” It is wrong to courteously compliment your counterpart when there is something wrong in his unit, and then furnish reports through your own channels which tell the reverse. Only through a direct give and take, at
the advisor/counterpart level, can mutual trust, understanding, and better collaboration toward full effectiveness be achieved.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I feel that what I have written here is incomplete. But, I hope it will reflect my feelings correctly and impart the views of hundreds of my peers. I hope it will be of help to future advisors to the Vietnamese Armed Forces and the forces of other Southeast Asian countries as well. Let your counterpart operate in accordance with the evolution of his training, experience, and new freedom of action. Even if he is lacking in military experience, allow him to appear as though he were his own man. Only in this way will he learn to comport himself in a manner that will win the inspiration of his men and the people.

As we all know by now, in order to defeat a Communist-inspired subversive insurgency, the most successful weapons are not arms and money, but the good will and support of the common people. This good will and support will only be provided willingly when the people finally realize that the individual Vietnamese soldier, airman, sailor, marine, and militiaman will fight independently for his total freedom from Communism and Colonialism.

MAAG Advisor

LANGUAGE AND THE ADVISER*

BY CHARLES C. THEBAUD

The success of the American adviser in influencing his counterpart will depend in large part on his ability to communicate effectively in the indigenous language.

To advise requires that the thoughts and recommendations of one, in some manner, be transmitted to the other. This particular area, communication, is one of the greatest causes of frustration or challenge for all advisers serving in countries where other than English is spoken. It is an area where the adversary in Southeast Asia holds the advantage, since he invariably speaks the native tongue.

A national lack of desire and even an antagonism toward studying foreign languages has long been a prominent feature of American culture. However, today there is a new awareness of our need for linguistic proficiency. This awareness stems from the requirements of our overseas personnel who are filling United States commitments throughout the world. Within the military establishment, our language gap can be traced, in part, to the long period in American history when our military forces were small and deployed primarily in the continental United States. For those US troops that did serve abroad, the local populace usually obliged by learning sufficient English.

Today, the average military adviser must fall back on a knowledge of another language or resort to the use of an interpreter. In Southeast Asia, the ability to speak French is a tremendous advantage; it estab-

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lishes an important common bond between the adviser and his counterpart as well as other civilian and military contacts. Also, because of the absence of military expressions and terms in the native languages of this part of Asia, French, or even English, is often used by native commanders in issuing both oral and written orders to their troops.

Major General C. J. Timmes, then Deputy Chief, MAAG, Vietnam, at a briefing in Saigon in February, 1962, indicated that one of the biggest problems that the MAAGs of Southeast Asia have is providing sufficient, qualified, reliable interpreters to work with the advisers. Even when available and qualified, the use of interpreters often results in lost motion and wasted time. Injecting a third party between the adviser and the advisee does not contribute to the rapport so necessary in adviser activities. In many instances, interpreters are completely lacking in military background and consequently, through inadvertent error, many misinterpret. Further, Lt. General Samuel T. Williams, USA Retired, warns, "Conceivably, he might be a Communist agent; they infiltrate all activities."

Too, the interpreter has his problem. He is, in a sense, trying to serve two masters. It must be remembered that the interpreter, too, is Oriental and will often purposely misinterpret to save "the face" or cover for the advisee. From strictly a long-range job security standpoint, the interpreter realizes that the American will leave in a matter of months, but the local native commander will be there indefinitely. Under such circumstances, it is not too difficult to understand why most interpreters so scrupulously avoid offending the advisees.

The language barrier on MAAG duty is a problem recognized at all levels, from the lowest ranking adviser to presidential committees. The ability to use and understand the local language is of unquestionable value; but, like other skills, its value is not absolute. It is relative to the other types of skill and understanding identified later as also being required for the particular assignment.

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NOTES

2 Ibid.
4 John H. Heintges, Interview with author, Nov. 1962 (referred to hereafter as "Heintges, Interview")
5 Ibid
9 Heintges, Interview.
10 Cleveland, Mangone, and Adams, *Overseas Americans*, p. 293.
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE*

BY KENNETH AND MARY GERGEN

The authors document the effects of those factors felt by officials in international assistance to be of primary importance in affecting reactions to aid. Aid takes place on the inter-personal level and success depends heavily at every echelon, on the psychology of the recipient. A mutual "liking and respect," "warmth," and "honesty" are essential in transactions. However, political and religious differences are potential sources of resentment or outright hostility.

International assistance programmes are traditionally cast in either physical or political terms.¹ In the former case, the problems of recipient States are conceived as primarily economic in nature, and the solutions to such problems flow naturally from a technological perspective. From this perspective, the success of assistance programmes is typically gauged in terms of the industrial capability of the recipient State, the number of jobs available, the number of housing units constructed, the miles of new highway, the yield of wheat or rice, and so on. The major contrasting perspective, more often encountered in private than in public, is the political. Donor States have long been aware that technical assistance can be employed as an instrument of statecraft, and that political outcomes can be secured with what are ostensibly economic gifts.

THE INTER-PERSONAL ASPECT

Rarely is international assistance conceived as an inter-personal transaction with its outcomes depending on the psychological engagement of the participants. And yet, it seems abundantly clear that if international aid is to succeed, either in improving the well-being of recipients or in building international alliances, the psychology of aid-transactions must be fathomed. Daily life furnishes us with numerous examples of the part played by psychological factors within those transactions in which one party proffers aid to another. Many people are loth to accept help from someone they feel inferior to them in status; great suspicion often results when we are offered "something for nothing"; gifts on "inappropriate" occasions may cause us subsequently to avoid the giver; when much needed help proves to be ineffective we may vent our frustration on the helper; affections wane when gifts are "too small", and we may experience shame when they are "too large"; many feel it an insult to their capabilities when others offer them help. Why should we be less sensitive to such factors in the international arena than we are in the context of daily life?

From this perspective it might be ventured that international assistance does not take place primarily on balance sheets or written contracts, nor is it only to be found in the holds of ships or in new constructions. Aid also takes place on the inter-personal level, where donor hammers out ideas with the recipient, where a technical assistant de-

monstrates a farming technique to rural inhabitants and where the starving queue up to receive their daily sustenance from the hands of a foreigner. Matters of deference, custom, self-esteem, autonomy, attraction and loyalty play no less a part in such situations than they do in the daily lives of all of us. Assistance programmes do not exist apart from the relationships among the participants.

A central assumption in the present discussion is that the success of any international assistance programme depends in large measure on the psychology of the recipient. Whether the recipient accepts overtures from a potential donor, initiates negotiations, agrees to terms, accepts the donor’s specific plan of operation, co-operates in the programme’s implementation, allies himself with the donor on subsequent political matters, or grants other political or economic favours to the donor: these are all vitally influenced by the attitudes, aspirations and perceptions of the recipient.

Although the need for a psychological approach to aid seems vital, there is little in the first instance to suggest which psychological aspects are most important. The present paper will document our initial efforts to deal with this problem. It attempts to isolate the major determinants of recipients’ reactions to aid: which factors are important in creating a relationship in which a programme is likely to flourish? And under what conditions is the recipient likely to be unco-operative, unmotivated or resentful?

**FACTORS AFFECTING REACTIONS TO AID**

From the standpoint of officials engaged in international assistance programmes the following factors appear to be most important in affecting recipient reactions to aid:

1. **Liking and Respect of the Donor**

The most important factor to emerge in our interview was the extent to which the people of the donor country, or their representatives, were perceived to like and/or respect the recipient State and its people. Over 90 per cent of the sample felt this factor to be moderately to very important. So important was the factor that it appeared to influence almost every level of the aid transaction. Many officials noted, for example, that most States will not even accept initial overtures for aid from a country that does not otherwise maintain friendly relations. Recipient officials noted the importance of positive rapport during aid negotiations, and how the lack of such rapport can threaten the existence of a programme. One North African official spoke of the fury with which he responded to requests from United States AID officials to submit reports that indicated their lack of respect for his abilities. Others felt the need for liking and respect was most apparent in the very delicate counterpart relationship, where the representative of a donor State works side by side with a recipient in order to increase the latter’s skills or knowledge. If the donor representative appears cool or indifferent to his counterpart, or if he demonstrates lack of respect for the counterpart’s capabilities, the relationship is jeopardised and little transmission of information occurs.
The dissemination of information, goods or services in the field is also influenced by recipients' perception of the feelings of the donor State or its representatives.

Although there is widespread accord concerning the critical function of liking and respect in the aid transaction, it is less clear precisely why this is so. Basic research suggests that people develop strong needs for positive regard at an early age, and that under certain conditions such needs may exceed in strength the individual's strivings for material welfare. However, positive regard may also serve as a symbolic promissory note, indicating to the recipient that he may expect continued favours in the future. Also, when positive regard is present, the recipient need be less fearful of the possibility that he is being secretly manipulated. At present it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which each of these various underlying processes contribute to on-going aid transactions.

2. Autonomy of the Recipient

The aid officials placed second greatest importance on the extent to which the recipient perceives his autonomy to be threatened. Again, over 90 per cent of the sample placed great importance on this factor. While it is frequently unclear to what extent the recipient actually has the freedom to act on his own behalf within the aid framework, certain procedures are especially damaging to this sense of freedom. One United States official of Palestinian ancestry dramatised the feeling of the man given aid by saying, "If you give a piece of bread when he knocks at your door, do not tell him to eat one-third of it, give a quarter to his eldest son and put the rest in the ice box.” In the case of United States AID, projects are rigidly enforced once they have been designed and funded. If conditions within the recipient country are altered after agreement is reached, the sanction of the United States Congress may be required. The construction of an airport in Tunis has been delayed for over ten years as a result of changes in the prevailing mood in Washington. Recipients are also handicapped by stringent criteria often applied to proposed projects. An Arab cabinet minister resentfully remarked that Marshall Plan requirements would be more realistic for a country just emerging from Biblical times. Recipients are also goaded by restrictions that manufactured goods be bought from donor's markets regardless of cost.

Many donor agencies have implicitly recognised the jeopardising effects of delimiting the recipient's freedom of action, and have attempted to compensate. Several aid personnel mentioned modes of deception which enabled their agencies to retain control while appearing to give it away at the same time. As one donor official noted, “their officials must feel they are responsible for their projects Thus, when I want to get a project started, I talk with one of them and just suggest the idea in passing. Then he takes it to his senior and presents it as his own idea. The senior does the same, and in the end I am informed by the minister of a
new project which his country has designed. Of course I recognise it, but I feign naivety and, after some deliberation, usually accept it. If I had presented my idea to the minister in the first place it would never have gone through. Another subtle and more common form of retaining control is the "examining committee." Its task is to oversee a project and ensure that it develops according to specification. To create the impression that the project is under the control of the recipients, all members of the committee are representatives of the recipient country—save at least one. All that is required is a single member from the donor agency in order for complete control to be effectively retained by that agency.

The precise reasons for the importance of personal autonomy are again unclear. Systematic research suggests that the need for perceiving control over one's own actions is highly general and may be learned at an early age. However, threats to autonomy also have implications for the self-esteem of the recipient. When another usurps control it often results from a belief in the incompetence of the actor in question. Even if one believes him to be competent, he may, nevertheless, be insulted by the usurpation and react accordingly. On other occasions, giving over the reins of internal development is tantamount to surrendering the national destiny to a foreign Power, and thus highly threatening. Further work will be required to disentangle the effects of these various processes.

3. Characteristics of the Donor

The third most influential factor calls attention to the traits and stereotypes used by people in judging each other. As Peabody's research on national stereotypes suggests, widespread views exist within any society concerning the personal dispositions of those from various other nations. The aid officials interviewed in the present study manifested strong agreement (74 per cent) that such views or perceptions vitally affect the aid transaction. "What is the character of the people who offer their assistance?" is a common question among recipient peoples, and the way in which the question is answered influences their reactions to the assistance. If a State is stereotyped as "aggressive" or "domineering," resistance may well be encountered when its representatives attempt to establish aid programmes abroad. We found that United States Peace Corps workers, for example, have experienced particularly great difficulties in the field since the "racist" and "imperialist" labels became widely popular in describing Americans. Soviet aid workers were felt to be much less effective than they could be because they were perceived as "cold" and "clannish." On the other hand the characteristics of "warmth" and "honesty" seemed to be prized, and aid representatives thus characterised appeared to meet with considerable success.

Donor characteristics are no less important in the higher echelons of assistance than in the field. Recipient officials were often very pointed in their descriptions of donor officials with whom they worked, and these descriptions were intimately linked with their behaviour. Although we did not specifically ask about the issue, it also became apparent that
perceptions held by donor officials of the recipients played an important role. If the recipients were seen by donors as “not very intelligent,” “lazy,” or “untrustworthy,” for instance, these views were likely to be manifested in the donor’s actions, and with detrimental consequences.

4. Self-Gain as a Motive

The extent to which aid is perceived to result from selfish motives on the donor’s part was singled out by 70 per cent of the sample as important in influencing the aid process. If aid is perceived as a calculated effort to manipulate conditions for selfish ends, it is likely to be resented or rejected. A crude example is furnished by China’s offer to Nepal to build a highway from the capital of Nepal to the border of the People’s Republic of China. The Nepalese feared this munificent gift, understandably suspicious that the highway might one day facilitate a Chinese invasion. An Indian official was piqued that the Soviets had built a cigarette factory in India, ostensibly to aid in the industrialisation of the country. In reality the factory was being used as a medium through which to convert the workers to Communism. In one North African country the Chinese aid mission was ejected when it was found that the Chinese table tennis team was being used to spread Maoist propaganda.

For the majority of the factors mentioned by the respondents, little distinction was made between the reactions of the government and the man of the street. Liking and respect appear to be no less important on one level than another; a general desire exists, at both levels, to maintain autonomy, and so on. In the case of the donor’s motives, however, a distinction was frequently drawn. Government officials appear to be acutely sensitive to the motives of the potential donor. This condition undoubtedly stems from the enhanced sense of political responsibility within the ranks of government and to the increased awareness of the hidden motives of potential “helpers.” Recipient officials continuously stressed their hopes for an affinity of aims between themselves and donor States and agencies.

In spite of the general desirability of altruistic assistance, some allowances appear to be made for purely selfish motives. As one Indian official put it, “when the United States officials once told us they had nothing to gain by assisting us, we laughed behind their backs. Only a fool would give away something for nothing.” It is also clear that there are very few aid agencies that are primarily humanitarian in their aims, and if foreign assistance is desired, selfish motives must be taken into account by the potential recipients. Under such conditions, the desideratum appears to be honesty. Recipients wish to know precisely what the potential donor expects to gain through his activities. To learn that European countries desire to give dairy products in order to maintain the price structure at home, or that a religious organisation will feed several thousand school children in order to be available to those of their own faith, should they be endangered, is not likely to threaten aid negotiations. The costs are low for the recipient and the donor’s motives appa-
rent. Much feared and resented are offers of aid that mask the true motives of the donor, and for which the costs are likely to be heavy at some unspecified date in future.

5. Obligation

A majority of aid officials agree that obligating the recipient has important consequences for the success of an aid project. However, considerable controversy surrounds the exact way in which obligation affects the aid process. On the one hand, many officials feel that recipients prefer aid without obligation. From this standpoint, obligations operate as restrictions on the autonomy of the recipient, and are thus odious. Obligations may also be viewed as costs to the recipient and are thus subtracted from the value of that which is received. On certain occasions aid may even cost the recipient more than it does the donor. This position was taken by a large number of recipient officials, who felt that the most valuable aid their States could receive would be financial aid without repayment clauses. Others were vehement in their criticisms of international loans, even those with low, or no, interest. Too often, one set of government officials incurred large debts, little new capital resulted from the project thus supported, and later administrations found themselves immersed in debts which they had no part in making and which thwarted their plans for domestic progress.

In contrast to this antipathy for obligation, other officials feel that it is essential for the success of a project that the recipient be allowed to reciprocate. From this viewpoint, receiving aid reduces one's sense of dignity, implying the role of beggar. Only by repaying the aid in some form can this stigma be avoided. Moreover, the receiver of a gift is thought to lose power because he continues to be psychologically obligated to the donor. In addition, one who offers "something for nothing" may be suspect. Even when the donor asks for nothing in return, he can later remind the recipient of the favours he has bestowed upon him and cause him to feel guilty unless such favours are returned. By making formal obligations prior to receiving aid one is released from the possibility of some future tension of obligation. One of the foremost proponents of obligation is an expatriated Frenchman, under whose leadership thousands of barren acres in eastern Algeria have been afforested, with labour provided by the local poor. So massive is the project, with all its many subsidiary enterprises, that it is said to constitute the largest corporation in North Africa. At times, as many as 40,000 men compose the work force, and they are paid almost altogether in food supplied by the World Food Programme. According to the leader of this project, success is largely due to the exchange of food for productive labour. "Under such an arrangement the men see their work as valuable, and the food is not considered some form of charity. The workers return to their homes at night proud to hold their heads up among family and friends."

It is too early to draw conclusions about the general desirability of obligation, but it is clear that the concept of man's dignity being eroded
by charity—a concept that is basic to United States and European bilateral aid, the World Food Programme, the Catholic Relief Service, and many other agencies—requires serious examination. It would seem most probable that the effects of obligation are dependent on other conditions pertaining at the time. For example, if the recipient is obligated it seems better that it be on a short-term basis than over a long duration. National sentiment may also serve as a modifier: when the spirit of nationalism is strong, aid without obligation may imply that the recipients are inferior or dependent. Finally, the degree of recipient need may also play a role. When people are severely destitute, or ravaged by disaster, obligations may appear unwarranted from the recipient's viewpoint.

6. Cultural Factors

Ranking sixth in assigned importance were cultural factors, that is, pervasive behavioural dispositions of the people in a given culture. With great frequency aid officials who had laboured in more than one cultural setting described some peoples as more basically resistant to the concept of aid than others. Various peoples were described as “too proud” to accept aid; others were said to be “prone to dependency and thus highly desirous of international assistance.” The Moslems were described as generally ungrateful for aid because in their religious orientation the giver of a gift is rewarded by the deity and the receiver of the gift is not. A Catholic monseigneur described differences in receiving aid between Western and non-Western peoples; he surmised that the Western peoples are more ready to accept the concept of charity because of their ties with the Judaeo-Christian tradition; in Asia and Africa charity is not viewed in such a positive light, and is, thus, more problematic. Other aid officials were much less reasoned in their replies in describing various recipient peoples as too “lazy,” “superstitious,” “corrupt,” “immoral,” or “closed-minded” to be promising participants in programmes of economic development. When such descriptions are placed alongside the views of many recipients, to the effect that donors are insensitive and unsophisticated imperialists, it appears miraculous that aid transactions ever meet with success.

7. Political and Religious Differences

Donors and recipients typically differ from each other in political and religious orientation, and our respondents generally agreed that such differences could often affect the aid transaction. However, the effect of such differences was felt to be slight except when the donor uses his aid to proselytise, or when, in the recipient State, chauvinistic political or religious sentiments are prevalent. We have already dealt with the first of these conditions in our earlier discussion of self-gain. The latter deserves further attention.

It appears that recipients are generally tolerant of political and religious differences separating themselves from donor groups. In the public sector, many are unfamiliar with the central political and religious
ideologies of other societies. Also, many political and religious systems do not rule out co-existence. However, such differences do cause recipients to distinguish between "we" and "they," and to consider donor representatives somewhat strange or alien. As a result, political and religious differences are latent instigators of animosity. If a political group wishes to gain power, it may do so by pointing to the threat of "they"; religious leaders are also likely to increase the cohesiveness of their followers by railing against the false gods of the intruders. Such events are not infrequent. The United States' aid mission to Algeria was terminated in the upsurge of nationalistic fervour following the Six Day War; until that point the Algerians had been quite willing to accept the political differences dividing the two States. In India a Jesuit priest was recently ejected by a raucous and fanatic religious group which looked upon the man's work as contrary to the religious interests of the people. The priest had spent many years in the country, devoting all his personal and economic resources to establishing co-operative economic opportunities for the people in his area. National officials did not stand in the way of his ejection for fear of the political consequences. In brief, political and religious differences separating donor and recipient may not always play an active role in determining aid activities, but they do constitute a continuous, potential threat to any international endeavour.

8. Need and Educational Levels of the Recipient

The eighth and tenth ranking factors are so closely linked that it is convenient to discuss them together. Many aid officials voiced the opinion that certain subgroups within any society are more accepting than others of the idea of aid and more open to the foreign presence often entailed. Two relevant factors were singled out by a majority of the officials: educational level, and the existing state of need. Persons with higher levels of education are felt to be more negatively disposed toward aid, as are those whose physical needs are less severe. On the level of daily observation it is extremely difficult to separate these factors, as the more educated are generally more prosperous. However, in light of the comments of these many officials it appears that the underlying processes may be different in each case. Education may increase the sophistication of the recipient in matters of international politics. As a result, the myth of humanitarianism may be penetrated and the function of aid as an instrument of statecraft realised. The more educated may also be more optimistic about the fruits of self-reliance. Governance is likely to fall to them, and to admit dependency on a national level might be tantamount to admitting personal incompetence.

Although the needy are less educated, their lack of education may only play a partial role in disposing them positively toward aid. A condition in which needs are at their most acute, may itself increase the desire for assistance. When one is hungry, homeless, or diseased, assistance of any kind may be welcomed. In fact, judging from the reactions of our sample, when need state is high, the effects of all other factors may be diminished.
If the physical discomfort is great enough, the recipient may be oblivious to the donor's liking or respect for him, the extent to which he is being manipulated, autonomy and so on. Behaviour in disasters supports such contentions. Most recently, when the Peruvian government was faced with an earthquake, United States aid was welcomed. Some months before, United States enterprises had been seized in a spurt of national sentiment, and the United States aid mission all but forced out of existence.

9. Recipient Self-Esteem

In one form or another many of the interviewees described the self-esteem of the recipient as highly important in determining the course of aid relationships. Some spoke of the "loss of face" often suffered by those who accept aid; others described the humiliation of those who must stand waiting for hand-outs; others described the sense of inferiority often attendant upon asking for help. These observations may be unified by the concept of self-esteem. In each case the recipient's esteem for himself is being reduced, and the concomitant emotional state is negative. The self-esteem factor was featured in our earlier discussions of donor liking and respect and recipient autonomy. However, so often was self-esteem discussed independent of these factors, that it deserves attention in its own right.

The essential problem is that built into the basic components of the aid transaction itself are implicit definitions of superiority and inferiority. The benefactor is one, who by definition, has superior resources. In accepting these resources the recipient acknowledges his inferiority in a given realm. We also know that there is a general tendency for persons to generalise their feelings about self and others; if inferior in one respect, why not in others? This tendency is exacerbated when one asks why a State has inferior resources. The general reaction to such a question is to think in effectively consistent terms, that is in terms of other inadequacies within the country, such as mistakes in policy, cultural rigidities, genetic inferiority, and the like. Seldom do we consider the possibility that a deficit in resources might result from some positive aspect of the culture. Yet, an emphasis on close-knit family life, a loathing for frenetic activity, or reverence for community tradition may all impede economic advancement. As a result of these various processes, aid recipients are put at a psychological disadvantage at the very outset of a transaction.

Research has also made it clear that persons generally find a state of lowered self-esteem unacceptable, and adopt several different modes of compensation for it, a number of which may hinder the success of assistance programmes. In the first instance, the recipient may seek to find fault in the character of the donor or his resources. He may be highly sensitive to mistakes in the donor's actions, or may be critical of his policies. In extreme cases, the recipient may ensure that foreign aid projects do not succeed. In all cases, the donor's definitional superiority is
reduced and the recipient's self-esteem thus restored. Another reaction to lowered self-esteem is direct hostility toward the donor. Relations may be cooled, communication broken, and alliances may be sought with enemies of the donor. In its extreme form, such hostility may be manifested in direct aggression.

A keenly sensitive United Nations official phrased the appropriate question: "Nobody wants to receive. Yet the world cannot do without knowledge transfer. What is the best way to convey technology without someone losing face?" There are no simple solutions to this problem. However, we shall suggest one important possibility later in this paper.

EXTENDING THE RANGE OF DETERMINANTS

Hitherto, we have documented the effects of ten factors felt by officials in international assistance to be of primary importance in affecting reactions to aid. Over fifteen additional factors were mentioned by the officials. Many of these were described by only one or two officials or were rated as having minimal effects by others. However, several of these factors were mentioned with sufficient frequency to deserve brief mention.

Within these factors of lesser magnitude, a certain cluster can be identified as relating to the characteristics of the aid itself. The amount of aid, for instance, was seen as moderately important in determining recipient reactions. The greater the donations, the more amicable the relations which are felt to result. The type of aid was also seen as important. However, no particular type (e.g., military, food, loans) of aid was viewed as intrinsically more desirable than any other. The type of aid preferred depends on the specific needs of the potential recipient. Although this point seems obvious, its converse is not always heeded: the type of aid provided by aid agencies is not always well articulated with the specific needs of the recipient. Under such circumstances, a small amount of aid may be worse than none at all. The quality of the aid may also play a significant role. Recipients are often sensitive to the quality of the products they receive, and when the quality is inferior to standards or expectations, the aid may create animosity. Even when hungry, people will not eat food to which they are unaccustomed. The success of the aid project must also be added to this list of factors. When a programme is successful in meeting its aims, the recipient State is much more likely to facilitate additional programmes.

Several additional factors are also worthy of note. The phase-out of long-continuing projects was viewed as particularly problematic by a number of officials. When aid is received for long periods of time, it ceases to be viewed as a gift by the recipient. Rather, the recipient comes to view it as a right, a benefit that is deserved. Thus, when a programme is terminated, it is equivalent to taking from a man that which he feels is rightfully his, and animosity results. The allies of the donor may also be taken into account by the recipient. Greek and Indian officials both described the ire with which they had reacted when the United States
provided aid to their traditional adversaries, Turkey and Pakistan. Finally, the wealth of the donor also appears to influence recipient reactions. When a State appears highly affluent, its aid is less impressive to the recipient. When a State has little but, nonetheless, attempts to give, its aid signifies to many recipients that the donor harbours highly positive feelings towards them.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE POLICY**

The results of this research leave little doubt that the relationship dependent on the psychological impact of the aid plays a critical role in determining the efficacy of international assistance programmes. Viewing the entire spectrum of factors mentioned by these many officials, we find only limited emphasis on the physical properties of the aid transaction. Factors such as the amount of aid, its quality and its type, were ranked of secondary importance. In contrast, the feelings of the donor towards the recipient, his motives in giving aid, the degree of autonomy allowed the recipient, and the impact of the aid on the recipient's self-esteem, were prominent in the minds of the officials. It is possible that the importance assigned to these various factors may have been affected by our presence as psychologists, which may have prompted officials to "speak our language." However, we specifically asked about the various physical aspects of aid during the interviews, and in no way discouraged discussion of such factors. To be sure, our rankings can only be considered rough approximations, but, even in their crudity, we cannot escape the pervading importance assigned to the psychology of the aid relationship.

Over twenty-five States are now engaged in international assistance programmes, and in light of the present findings, current practices are much in need of examination. At the outset, there is ample reason to call into question the entire concept of bilateral aid. Bilateral aid is basically aimed at increasing the power or welfare of the donor State, and as such, the donors' motives are always suspect. Self-sacrifice does not now, nor may never, play a significant role in international relations. It is also difficult for donor States to forego control of their resources, and to allow the recipient true autonomy. Implied in the fact of a State's underdeveloped condition is its incapacity to effect productive change on its own. As a result, the recipient is seldom trusted by the donor State. Furthermore, inasmuch as the donor's self-gain often depends on the success of a given project, he hesitates to relinquish control. The bilateral aid relationship also poses the greatest potential threat to the self-esteem of the recipient. The very act of giving in this way implies the inferiority of the recipient. Political and religious differences between donor and recipient are also likely to separate the donor from the recipient of bilateral aid. Actually, bilateral aid may never be a fully effective mode of transferring resources or knowledge from the "haves" to the "have nots."

Although we cannot be sanguine about the future of bilateral aid, multilateral assistance has much in principle to recommend it. There is little room for invidious motives of self-gain to manifest themselves in
programmes under international control. If representatives of the recipient State also participate in decision-making within the multilateral organization, recipients can achieve a high degree of security and autonomy. Loss of self-esteem is also minimised when the distinction between donor and recipient is blurred by their joint membership in the organization providing aid. Political and religious differences may also play a lesser role, as distinctions in ideologies are blunted by the multifarious membership of such organizations.

Whether international assistance can ever be directed from the bilateral to the multilateral mode remains a complex question. At present, the United States plays too dominant a role in the existing multilateral organizations (e.g., the World Food Programme, UNESCO, the Catholic Relief Service, the World Bank), to invite widespread participation by other States. The United States provides over half the budget for the World Food Programme, for example, and as a result has a strong influence on the policies adopted by the organization. American food cannot be sent by this multilateral organization to countries not approved by the United States. Under such circumstances it is unlikely that the Soviet Union would redirect its resources to such a programme. Additional problems for multilateral programmes are created by existing world tensions. Hostile relations between States do not make for strong multilateral programmes.

While the extent and efficacy of multilateral aid itself depend to a considerable extent on the level of world tension, it is also possible that multilateral investments could themselves serve to reduce such tensions. It is unnecessary for a State's foreign policy to be completely consistent, such that all its actions may be derived from each other. Consistent policies fail to represent accurately the full complexity of a State's motives, feelings and ideologies. Thus, a State's participation in a multi-State co-operative venture, even when its general policy towards one of the member States is hostile, seems warranted. Such merits would be enhanced should the co-operation on this level be successful. If member States found their resources being treated with reason and discernment, greater trust might be developed. Increased trust in this realm could carry over into other sectors as well. Multilateral assistance may not only represent the optimal mode of providing aid, but may foster positive relations within the world community at large.

NOTES

1 Financial support for the research described in this paper was provided by the John Solomon Guggenheim Foundation and the Barra Foundation.
3 The economist, F. Pryor, has pointed out that the sentiments expressed in this instance are nicely reflected by the poet, E. L. Masters, in the American classic Spoon River Anthology:

    You praise my self-sacrifice, Spoon River,
    In rearing Irene and Mary,
    Orphans of my older sister!
And you censure Irene and Mary
For their contempt for me!
But praise not my self-sacrifice,
And censure not their contempt;
I reared them, I cared for them, true enough!—
But I poisoned my benefactions
With constant reminders of their dependence.

* See J. W. Brehm, A Theory of Psychological Reactance (66).
* See P. F. Secord and C. W. Backman, "Interpersonal congruency, perceived similarity, and friendship," in 27 Sociometry, pp. 115-127.
* Basic research strongly suggests a generalised desire for reciprocity in human relations, such that persons generally desire to reciprocate for that which they receive. See A. W. Gouldner, "The norm of reciprocity: a preliminary statement," in 21 American Sociological Review (1960), pp. 117-112.
* The interesting question may also be posed as to differences among aid officials in their perception of the important factors at all in the aid process. A systematic analysis of the relationship between various respondent characteristics (e.g., recipients versus donors, number of years in aid, cultural background) did reveal differences. However, no significant differences emerged when donors' perceptions were compared against recipients. Differences in perceptions between these two groups would have important implications for aid policy.

Information Officer

INFORMATION OFFICER OR PROPAGANDIST? *

By Gordon A. Moon

There are many shades of propagandists ranging from teachers, clergymen, and public relations people at one end of the spectrum to agents, publicists, and promoters at the other. Suggestions are offered by the author to help information officers keep their "propaganda" within acceptable limits.

To the conscientious, well-motivated military information officer, propaganda is something that belongs on the other side of the tracks. He doesn't even like to talk about it. But how close to propaganda is our information function?

After considerable thought and soul-searching, I am convinced the information function and propaganda look so much alike it would take a very sharp eye to separate them, if indeed that can be done.

Let's look at the title "information officer." It is the official term, having replaced the World War II "public information officer" or PIO.

* Excerpts from "Information Officer or Propagandist?" Army, 17, no. 12 (December 1967), pp. 58-63. Reprinted with the permission of the Association of the U.S. Army, copyright holder.
which was more restrictive and not truly descriptive of the function. However, the title "information officer" isn't entirely descriptive either. For some it conjures up something akin to the encyclopedic-minded expert in a railroad station or air terminal. The Army doesn't use the term "public relations" when referring to the military function, although in the business and professional world this is the accepted terminology for similar activities. Our military services probably avoid this wording because some believe that public relations practitioners are pressure artists and press agents, in the unfavorable sense of the latter term which pictures the PR man as an offensive, checkered-suited, cigar-smoking, back-slapping, high-pressure salesman with a lavish expense account. The civilian public relations profession is aware of certain inclinations toward this false image, and is trying to change it.

There is a trend among our services to rename information divisions in certain headquarters "public affairs division." For example, that is the name of the information officers at the headquarters of United States Army Europe and of United States European Command.

But names and titles can become curiously conflicting and ambiguous. An organization in Saigon is called Joint United States Public Affairs Office. It is a U.S. Information Agency (USIA) office which is openly engaged in psychological operations.

Thus, while carefully avoiding being tagged with terms such as public relations, we now find ourselves using exactly that terminology for what is admittedly a psychological warfare or propaganda operation, and for a public information function supposedly based on truth and fair play with U.S. newsmen and broadcasters. Credibility isn't exactly improved when, in the minds of newsmen who know their way around, information officers are associated with the other function.

But it isn't merely a matter of identical terminology—which, so far as I know, is restricted to this one case. Psychological operations encompass far more than propaganda, of course. Improving POW camps to encourage enemy desertions is an old trick in psychological warfare. ... Nevertheless, propaganda is an important tool in psychological operations. People who have had good journalistic training—facile writers and able speakers, experts in the broadcasting fields—are well suited to perform the information function—or for that matter, the psywar function. Many of the basic skills are the same.

[PROPAGANDA]

How can we define propaganda? Most writers would probably agree it is the deliberate and conscious effort to fix an attitude or to modify an opinion as it relates to a doctrine or program. Dr. Daniel Lerner has studied propaganda deeply. In this chapter, "Effective Propaganda: Conditions and Evaluation," in The Process and Effects of Mass Communication (edited by Wilbur Schramm, 1960), he says this attempt to change attitudes is only an intermediate step toward the real goal of influencing behavior. He lists four essential conditions for effective propaganda:
• The attention of the audience must be gained.
• The credence of the audience must be won.
• The predispositions of the audience must include the modifications sought by propaganda as plausible alternatives to present expectations.
• The environment of the audience must permit the courses of action prescribed by the modified structure of expectations.

In less technical language: first, you must get your hearer to listen to you if you want him to do what you wish; then, when you have his attention, you must get him to believe what you say if he is to take your message seriously. Your message will postulate what is desirable but it will be wasted unless it falls within the limits of what is also possible.

The third condition says there is little use in trying to persuade a loyal communist in the Soviet Union, for example, that he would rather see NATO over the Soviets in the cold war. A loyal communist simply doesn't carry this as an acceptable alternate within his mental framework. It might be possible, however—at least theoretically—after you have this same person's attention and credence, to persuade him that NATO is a defensive alliance which does not intend to attack the Soviet Union.

The final condition says the actions required of the audience must be possible. For example, it would be useless—at least today—to try to persuade a Bulgarian—even if he could be convinced it was desirable—that his country should withdraw from the Soviet bloc and join NATO.

I cannot deny to my own satisfaction that the conditions listed by Dr. Lerner do not also apply, at least in some degree, to my own job as an information officer. If I substitute “message” for the nasty word “propaganda” and visualize the audience as being my fellow-citizens of allies instead of my enemies, the shoe begins to fit. It also begins to pinch, because my own predispositional set—to use Lerner's psychological terms—is that I am not a propagandist!

Perhaps many information officers would protest that they do not go so far as to try to influence behavior. For certain functions, such as responding to press queries, this is generally true. But one of the best examples of a military public relations campaign that certainly influenced behavior is the U.S. Army Air Defense Command's Operation Understanding. Since its beginnings more than ten years ago, this well-conceived and carefully handled program has changed active resistance by citizens of some of our larger cities against imagined hazards of nearby nuclear-armed missiles to a feeling of active support and of confidence and security.

When information officers assigned to NATO staffs seek support for the NATO concept, wouldn't the most effective kind of reproach or support in the various countries be the behavior of citizens at the polls? Commonly heard information themes are that NATO is successful, or
NATO is essential, or NATO must be kept strong and vigilant. We don't have to go much farther—in fact, it can be inferred—to add, "If you believe in NATO, vote for X instead of Y." Is this propaganda?

Professor Ralph D. Casey, for many years director of the School of Journalism at the University of Minnesota, says it is the job of communications fields to disseminate facts objectively and honestly. In his chapter, "The Press, Propaganda, and Pressure Groups," in Mass Communications (also edited by Wilbur Schramm, 1960), he points out that press agents, publicity men, and propagandists are interested informers, whereas reporters and editors are disinterested informers. (This seems to need further qualification, and we shall return to it.) Propaganda gets into the news, Casey says, but it is the job of editors to keep it out or hold it to a minimum. He recognizes, also, that sometimes it is almost impossible to distinguish propaganda from genuine news.

Where do information officers fit in? Are we being thrown willy-nilly into bed with the propagandists, whether we like it or not?

Perhaps both yes and no. Professor Casey continues:

It is difficult to generalize on the social usefulness of... independent news bureaus. Those associated with education, science, social work, government, and many forms of business generally play fair with the press and widen the scope of the news. Others are either parasitic growths or outright obstacles to complete coverage of the news. The highest type of information specialist thinks of himself as an extension of the arm of the press, and the keen-witted news bureau man realizes that to cooperate with the press is to get the best results for his client.

It seems, then, that there may be many shades of propagandists: from parasitic growths or worse to those who at least try to play fair. Teachers, for example, might be pictured as propagandists for certain cultural concepts as they see them. Clergymen are propagandists for the doctrine or dogma of whatever religion they represent. But in the popular use of the term, propaganda implies something evil, sinister, and dishonest.

Truthfulness is not an effective criterion by which we can separate benign propaganda from the malignant. One of Joseph Goebbels' principles of propaganda, as determined by psychology professor Leonard Doob in "Goebbels' Principles of Propaganda" (The Process and Effects of Mass Communication), was that he used truth as frequently as possible; otherwise the enemy or the facts themselves might expose falsehood, and the credibility of his own input would suffer. Lies, consequently, were useful when they could not be disproved. A clever propagandist might conceivably go on for years without ever telling an outright lie.

* * * * *

[COMMAND INFORMATION]

Most command information efforts must by their very nature speak from a position of considerable bias. The clear objective of such effort is to inform the serviceman; to explain why it is essential that he must be prepared to give his life, if necessary, for his country; and to motivate him to be an efficient and dedicated soldier, sailor, marine, or airman. Call it propaganda if you will, but it is one of the overt and basic necessities of a
modern fighting force. If its troops were not motivated, at all, an army would never get into a battle; if they were inadequately impelled, disproportionate casualties would result from our half-hearted effort.

Thus, it would seem that motivation of troops is not only a necessary act of self-preservation, but morally right and legally defensible from any reasonable point of view. Once our competent civilian authority orders our military forces into combat operations, we must use every proper, legal, and humane means to win at the lowest possible cost. One of these means—it is also an obligation—is informing and motivating our troops through the command information program.

However, it is equally proper that the military avoid politics or issues which may take on political overtones. Thus, we must clearly distinguish public information from command information. We must respect the public's right to know what goes on in military operations just as citizens must be told the details of any operation at all levels of government. Although we must "editorialize" in motivating our troops, in dealing with newsmen all such expressions of opinion or bias should be forbidden.

* * * * *

But we must also realize that no matter how hard the soldier tries, he cannot completely divorce himself from positions or arguments that include some political tinge. One of the best illustrations of this is the rather special experience of being assigned to one of NATO's interallied staffs. In such an assignment you soon learn that almost everything you do has political connotations. In a multi-nation organization, there are national positions—or political bias—on tactics (shall a Dutch or Belgian unit do this task?), standardization efforts (will NATO adopt your tanks or ours?), strategy (should it be forward or farther to the rear?), funding, infrastructure, and almost everything imaginable—including policies on leave, hospital facilities, and whether and how many tax-free commodities should be in exchanges and the SHAPE shop. So the military's freedom from political bias is relative. While generally the soldier avoids upending himself completely in the political mud puddle, he can never completely avoid being splattered once in a while.

Whence, then, does this lead in relating information officers to propaganda?

Perhaps we can formulate a continuum—a scale whose divisions cannot be separated or separately discerned—and label it intensity of propaganda. At one end we will place pure research. The published results of research should be about as close as we can get to zero. The other end of our continuum might be tagged Goebbels'-type wartime propaganda.

The relative positions of various groups may be postulated along our graph. Because of wide variations inside the groups they appear not as points along the continuum but as parts of the line, some being considerably longer than others. For example, undoubtedly there is far greater variation in the intensity of propaganda in the advertising world than among straight news reporters. They are also placed at opposite ends of the continuum. News editors try to be unbiased and fair, but there is
slightly greater pressure on them by some publishers than on reporters, for example. The writers and editors of editorial pages are still higher on the scale in terms of interest or bias as informers. The editorial pages of the Chicago Tribune under Robert McCormick are a striking example. In the Hearst papers, during William Randolph Hearst’s lifetime, this bias was obvious in the news columns as well. Thus, I cannot agree with Professor Casey on an unqualified statement (and I am sure he did not intend it so) that editors are disinterested informers. They, too, are subjected to various pressures and are affected by their own bias.

There are wide variations among responsible public relations people. Military information officers fit somewhere into this broad class. However, we must separate them into those performing the public information function—hopefully in a relatively unbiased manner—and those engaged in command information. The latter, as we have pointed out, are editorializers, and their degree of bias is considerable. Far closer to Dr. Goebbels’ end of the continuum, lie (in both senses of the word) press agents, ballyhoo artists, or Hollywood-type promoters.

It might also be worthwhile to consider which of our groups are inclined to address their message to the audience as a whole and which seek to focus on particular sections of a potential audience. Depending on their degree of bias, editorial writers, columnists, and editors probably address themselves to those of their own political or ideological leanings. However, a good editorial page would show a balanced point of view overall (it would balance Walter Lippmann, say, against Joseph Alsop). News editors and reporters generally do not aim at parts of the population, although even here there may be exceptions. Some papers carry a far higher percentage of soft news (blood, sex, and scandal) than more sober journals, and—presumably—they have a greater appeal to the less educated members of the audience.

Even though there is some focusing by these groups, it would appear to be fairly broad-beamed. I doubt that public relations groups and press agents mean to focus at all, unless we reflect that often their material is aimed at opinion leaders or influential people. However, influential persons are apt to be a cross-section of the people, not necessarily the rich or politically powerful. In advertising we really get into addressing particular parts of the audience. Smokers, drinkers, stamp collectors, boating enthusiasts, gardeners, teenagers, certain racial elements, the rich, the poor, and all the other groups are singled out and addressed personally.

One might hypothesize, also, that there should be less aiming at parts of the audience as we move down the continuum away from highest intensity of propaganda. As we have said, good, responsible editorial page editors balance opinions and points of view. Also, the trend toward consolidation and monopoly of newspapers works, in a way, to eliminate bias. A monopoly newspaper, if it is able to maintain its position, must have something for all—it cannot afford the luxury of appealing to special groups or to a limited part of its audience. Even so, there will always
remain some newspapers which ignore the theory of social responsibility in journalism and continue to make their pitch—and fatten their bank balances—by appealing to that very large part of their readers which is attracted by the morbid and the sensational.

Is it possible to clearly separate the functions of the information officer from propaganda? I doubt it. We are certainly interested informers, and we are clearly recognized as such.

Possibly the only definition or delineation we can arrive at is a circuitous one: we engage in propaganda in the popular or bad sense when we begin to acquire a reputation among intelligent and responsible people as being a propagandist. In other words, in less circuitous terms, to be tagged with this label brings a lack of respect or a loss of faith and confidence, particularly from a professional body such as responsible newsmen. It goes beyond the point of being an interested informer—there is a connotation that our message is not sincere (it may even be a lie) and that you don't necessarily believe what you claim.

Also, there seems to be an element of pressure in the popular conception of propaganda which is not in the news function. Information is not offered take-it-or-leave-it-and-judge-for-yourself. There is a degree of positive pressure to impose the writer's conclusions—a definite effort to convince. This squares with the definition, of course, in seeking to change attitudes and behavior. However, the element of pressure is not in itself invidious or covert. It is simply an element to be noted, for example, in legitimate command information efforts—as distinct from military public information activities.

[GUIDELINES]

Is it possible to come up with any guidelines which might help information officers keep their “propaganda” within acceptable limits?

I offer these tentative suggestions pertaining to the information officer's public information function:

* Seek to gain a newsmen's respect by understanding his needs and meeting them with professional competence.

* Dr. Goebbels to the contrary, there is no acceptable substitute for the truth. When asked about a disagreeable matter, never depart from truth, and tell as much of the full story as you can—within the restrictions in which you must work.

* Avoid taking a position on political issues or becoming involved with them in any way. This is particularly important among inter-allied staffs, which abound with political situations and problems.

* Be careful about aiming at a particular group. This might be recognized for what it is: undue pressure. The influence and the pressure you are trying to exert may boomerang. Ill-advised publicity campaigns and pressure tactics can themselves become newsworthy. (Example: The Dominican Republic, under Trujillo, mounted a large, well-funded publicity campaign in the United States through paid lobbyists in Washington.)
This activity drew adverse comment in the press and the overall effect was highly unfavorable to the Dominican Republic.

- Are your releases really newsworthy? If not, skip them. Otherwise, the editor may move you a notch up the continuum in his own mind as he throws your material into the waste basket.
- Maintain a sense of responsibility toward the public whom you serve as well as for the service which you represent. In other words, move as far away on the continuum from Dr. Goebbels as you can, without becoming absurd and ineffective.
- So far as command information is concerned, we reserve the right to editorialize. This position of admitted bias does not connote dishonesty. It is overt, and dedicated to the national interest. Except that opinions are introduced, along with fact, the same general rules for public information activities apply. The ultimate test is credibility. Unless our command information "editorial page" makes sense, unless it is honest, reasonable and proper, we will lose our audience. The message—no matter how impassioned—will be neither read nor heard, and the effort will be wasted. Not many of our present-day intelligent, well-traveled, relatively sophisticated fighting men will be misled by a phony message. Nor are they apt to be taken in by Goebbels-type propaganda. The nature of our audience itself is the best guarantee of honesty and quality in command information.

Perhaps the best guidelines of all are the words of Maj. Gen. George V. Underwood, Jr., former Army Chief of Information. "Good deeds do not produce good public relations unless they are publicly appreciated. Also, unfortunate developments require quick and frank explanation if exaggeration and misinterpretation are to be avoided. Our task, simply stated, is to get the Army credit for being as good as it really is. No more is desired. Nothing less is acceptable."

Radio Programming Officer

STAFFING AT RADIO LIBERTY*

By Joseph G. Whelan

A description of the characteristics of the staff personnel of a nongovernmental organization involved in international political communication.

SIZE OF STAFF

In recent years RL's staff has numbered around 1,000. According to figures published in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on RFE/RL, there were 953 employees in 1970, 962 in 1971 and 967 projected for 1972. According to information provided from the General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1971, RL has a total of 1,067 employees. In its T/O, RL numbers its employees at 1,064, but the actual number on board, is 932. Personnel within RL are allocated in accordance with the Strength Report of June 1971 reproduced as Figure 1.

NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF STAFF

The unique purposes of RL as a surrogate "Home Service" for the Soviet people require staffing that is multi-national, for if RL is to communicate effectively it must do so in the many languages of the Soviet peoples. The Soviet Union is a multi-national state, having in its population of 241,784,000 ethnic groups numbering more than 170, speaking some 125 different languages and dialects, and practicing 40 different religions that embrace in substantial numbers the major faiths of the world.

Within RL (as within the Soviet Union), Russian is the lingua franca, but broadcasts are made in as many as 20 languages. In the Slavic languages there are broadcasts in Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian. And in the non-Slavic languages there are broadcasts in Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Georgian; in the North Caucasian languages, that is, Adige, Avar, Chechen, Karachai, Ossetian, and Tatar-Bashkir; and in the Turkic languages, Crimean-Tatar, Karakalpak, Kazakh, Kirghiz, Tajik, Turkmen, Uighur, and Uzbek. Staff requirements are high in matters of linguistic skills, for the broadcaster, speaking as a friend and fellow countryman from abroad, must do so in the language. the accent, and the style of his audience.

Thus, the overwhelming majority of RL's programmers are former Soviet citizens. Most of the remainder have common roots and native identity with RL's audience because either they or their parents were born on the territories that now comprise the USSR. Of the 182 writers, editors, producers and broadcasters, 1.1 percent are from the pre-revolutionary emigration; 13.2 percent are second generation; 4.4 percent fall in other categories; while 81.3 percent are former Soviet citizens. Newcomers from the Soviet Union do augment RL's staff, infusing it with new blood and providing a fresh Soviet perspective. But their number, especially from among the Slavic peoples of European Russia, is nowhere sufficient to insure stable staff conditions in the future.

Owing to the uniqueness of RL's role in broadcasting, native Soviet peoples by and large hold many of the operational posts in the organization, such as area desks for broadcasting and script writing. However, top administrative posts in RL in policymaking, policy control, and in key operations are held by Americans.

PROFESSIONALISM OF STAFF

When in the spring of 1971 David Binder of The New York Times visited both RL and RFE headquarters in Munich, he found that both organizations "are staffed by specialists who take pride in their professionalism." Analysts like Keith Bush of RL and James Brown of RFE, he continued, "are well regarded among historians and other professional students of Soviet-bloc affairs." Leading Western scholars on Soviet affairs have commented favorably on the high quality of work produced by RL's staff.

A review of . . . biographic sketches . . . provides some indication of the professionalism of RL's staff. A total of 19 RL staffers hold doctoral
## Figure 1. Radio Liberty Committee Strength Report, July 1, 1971

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*ARD
1 - London
3 - Paris
9 Munich
degrees, 41 have other advanced degrees, while many others are currently working for post-graduate degrees.5 Years of research experience in the Soviet field and experience in the practical world of journalism and network broadcasting have further strengthened RL staff capabilities.

Ideally, an RL staffer must have a combination of expertise: he must have substantive knowledge in Soviet affairs; he must be knowledgeable in communications technique; he must have complete competence in Russian and in the case of other nationalities, their particular languages; he must be trained in the American requirements of scholarly research; he must have, in brief, the combined skills of a scholar, writer, journalist and radio performer. When any of these requirements are lacking, RL seeks to correct the deficiency through training.

An asset in RL is the multi-functional roles that staff often plays. It is not exceptional that one staffman will do the research for a program, prepare the script for broadcast, produce the program, and finally participate in the actual broadcasting. Every effort is made in the Program Operations Division to have staff deliver their own scripts. As one RL staffer said, RL tries to overcome the "one man for one job approach" and attempts to develop a staff that has multiple-functional capabilities.

To enhance the professionalism of staff, RL maintains an inhouse training program. A staffman schooled in the American legitimate theater will work with raw newcomers from the Soviet Union training their voices and preparing them to be effective announcers. The Production Department is constantly engaged in developing and training new talent—persons, for example, who have excellent Russian but have no knowledge of radio techniques. The Central News Department trains personnel from the inside. "Where do you find a Russian journalist?" one staffman said. In some instances RL will finance further study for personnel.

* * * * *

ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT AND GENERAL ATTITUDE

A final point to be made in the matter of staff concerns the rather intangible, yet important, idea of organizational commitment and general attitude towards the goals and purposes of RL.

The positive assessment of David Binder on the sense of professionalism pervading RL's staff appears justified. Adherence to the general rubrics of scholarly research and writing are reflected not only in published works and in other research efforts but also in staff papers and memoranda intended for strictly internal use... Even to the casual observer the care taken in policy formulation, programming, production, policy control, and program evaluation indicates a high sense of professional concern. The multilingual facility of staff reveals, moreover, a level of linguistic professionalism that is impressive to the outsider.

Evident also in RL's staff, especially in research, is the unique combination of American and Western scholarship with that of the native talents of former Soviet citizens who are deeply immersed in their own native Soviet environment both through the written word and their own
experience. In the view of one senior American analyst in RL this combination has resulted in a good research product; while to a senior commentator, a Russian by birth, the combination provided the possibility in broadcasting of bridging the gap of misunderstanding between the Soviet peoples and those of the West and imparting the values and traditions of the West into the Soviet environment.

What seems most significant, however, is the apparent spirit of the organization. It is a spirit that seems to arise from an inner conviction of participating in some form of positive change within the Soviet Union. One senior programming official, Morris Diakowski, an American of Ukrainian-Canadian extraction, described the feeling of staff as one of being caught up in an important activity and being deeply involved individually as an active participant. "An attitude of total commitment in what is being done exists within the organization," he said—"not in an extreme sense, but rather in the sense of doing something positive by participating in bringing about changes for moderation in the Soviet Union." The accent, he said, is on the positive in this work, and the prevailing spirit is one of idealistic expectation of a hopefully better world. "If not," he declared, "one would be lost as an individual"; for, "without an inner belief in the regenerative qualities of Soviet society, one would lose his mental balance."

NOTES

1 U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, RFE/RL Report, p. 2.

SPECIAL FORCES PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA*

BY WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH

Special Forces service in the unconventional warfare environment "surfaced the need for individuals who had more political sensitivity, tact, diplomacy, inner discipline, and initiative than had ever appeared as a stated end product of the Army personnel production process."

In July 1964 a booklet entitled "Montagnard Tribal Groups of the Republic of Vietnam" was prepared and published by the United States Army's Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The work was the product of many contributors. Among these were Special Forces soldiers who had lived among the tribesmen and had studied their mores sympathetically and in a remarkably scholarly way. Included was a map showing general areas where some 28 tribal groups were believed to be

*Original essay by LTG (Ret.) William P. Yarborough.
located. With suitable words of caution to the reader in the light of the admitted informational gaps, the booklet then described languages, relative tribal development, settlements, agriculture, the natural environments of various tribes, industrial arts, trade, division of labor, kin groups, marriage customs, family relationships, sociopolitical factors, religion, and other items including psychological considerations.

Old soldiers might have wondered what bearing a book about the details of the water buffalo sacrifice ritual, the ceremonial drinking of rice wine, and the customs and taboos relating to hill tribe marriages had to do with soldiering in Montagnard country. The Special Forces soldier was taught why he needed to know these things. Perhaps not since the earliest days in the development of the United States had American soldiers been assigned missions that involved bridging such significant cultural gaps. George Washington, Lewis and Clark, Daniel Boone and other American pioneers knew a great deal about Indian customs and dialects. The essentially rugged way of life of the American frontiersman, however, fitted him much better to live among and work with the American Indians than modern America has equipped her sons for life among the hill people of Southeast Asia.

It was mainly through extremely careful selection of the volunteers for Special Forces that the U.S. Army was able to field detachments of soldiers whose personal qualities were extraordinary to a degree almost without historical parallel. Physical fitness, technical skill in the art of the individual soldier, courage, and initiative were expected without question or equivocation. These were qualities the U.S. Army had always sought in its fighting men. The new unconventional warfare environment, which had developed on the Asian mainland as a result of Mao Tse-tung's military genius, had given rise to the requirement for a mutation of the classical soldier format.

Service in a psychologically and politically charged conflict arena surfaced the need for individuals who had more political sensitivity, tact, diplomacy, inner discipline, and initiative than had ever appeared as a stated end product of the Army personnel production process.

The psychological impact of Special Forces among the tribal peoples of Indochina was strong and lasting. Because Special Forces personnel were hand picked, they often did the right thing by instinct in the absence of specific training. Judgement and sensitivity to people was translated into rapport. Empathy developed from respect, which had stemmed from keen and patient observation.

Special Forces medics seldom questioned the rationale that led to their delivery of babies for mountain women and even to living among the human derelicts of nameless leper camps, easing the pain and misery as best they could. Sometimes no direct military return came from these activities, but there was an even more valuable premium which lay almost completely in the psychological sphere.

Special Forces' particular sensitivity to the psychological climate high-
lighted their use in Vietnam. The following are two examples of this sensitivity.

**COMBINED EFFORTS AT DUC CO**

A PSYOP project initiated by Special Forces in conjunction with a detachment of the 245th PSYOP Company, JUSPAO, and the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) had as its objective bringing Vietnamese Government presence back to the area around Duc Co in Pleiku Province. The area had slipped into the "contested" category. Using the Duc Co Special Forces Camp as its base, the PSYOP effort was aimed at all of the villages and hamlets within a ten kilometer radius.

Special Forces medics held sick calls over a four-day period in order to attract the sympathetic attention of the villagers. Over 800 villagers were treated during this four-day period. Face-to-face contact with village officials allowed the representatives of the Vietnamese Information Service to stress the theme that the Viet Cong were preventing peace while the Government of Vietnam was working for peace.

While the composite team was working, distributing school supplies and free world publications and posters showing ARVN victories, its members were also recording needs of the people which were then transmitted to USAID, CARE and other organizations.

Valuable information concerning the popular resentment toward Viet Cong methods began to come to light, and the team members were careful not to make any of the same mistakes, particularly with regard to pressures exerted to bring villagers to propaganda sessions.

At the end of four days the operation was judged to be a distinct success, so much so that wives of eight Viet Cong persuaded their husbands to seek amnesty as Chieu Hoi returnees.

**CIVILIAN IRREGULAR DEFENSE GROUPS**

A combined directive issued by the commanders of the Vietnamese and U.S. Special Forces resulted in the formation of Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Civil Affairs/PSYOPS Teams. The concept was originated at the Plei Do Lim Special Forces Camp in the I Corps Tactical Zone in October 1965. The outstanding accomplishment of the pilot team at Plei Do Lim prompted instructions for all Special Forces CIDG Camps to establish CA/PSYOP Teams. The CIDG CA/PSYOP Teams operate[d] within the Tactical Area of Responsibilities (TAOR) of the Special Forces Camps. The teams conduct[ed] CA/PSYOP patrols into the hamlets within the camp's TAGR. Among the many activities of the teams were: face-to-face meetings with the populace, conducting sick calls, distributing school kits and health kits, and organizing athletic contests. The teams also provide[d] construction materials and basic relief items for refugees and needy families in the hamlets they visit[ed]. They supplement[ed] airborne leaflet and loudspeaker missions by passing out propaganda materials and conducting loudspeaker appeals on the ground.

Team members went through an intensive training period...advised by U.S. Special Forces personnel. The PSYOP instruction follow[ed] national psychological objectives.

Special Forces operations which frequently led them into remote areas, became a valuable source of intelligence concerning effectiveness of friendly PSYOP.

For months millions of safe-conduct passes and surrender leaflets have been dropped on the Ho Chi Minh Trail to undermine the effectiveness of replacements infiltrating into South Vietnam.
A Special Forces unit operating near the trail in Quang Duc Province discovered that the trail was well covered with leaflets, even in the dense jungle. During an engagement with infiltrating VC forces, the Special Forces captured a VC soldier with a safe-conduct pass concealed in his shirt. Two other VC soldiers were killed in the same encounter. They also had safe-conduct passes on their persons. General William C. Westmoreland writing in the CINCPAC-COMUSMACV "Report on the War in Vietnam" records his belief that the influence of U.S. Special Forces among the Montagnard tribes constituted one major reason that there was not massive defection from the Government of Vietnam by the hill people in September 1964. Indeed, it was the calm sympathetic and knowledgeable presence of Green Berets, wise in the ways of the Montagnard that permitted the rescue on September 27, 1964 of the Vietnamese district chief and some 60 other Vietnamese hostages from the Special Forces Camp at Bon Sar Pa where they had been held by troops of FULRO (United Front for the Struggle of Oppressed Races). In setting down his observations for the Year 1966, General Westmoreland notes:

Our Special Forces continued their valuable contribution in Civic Action and psychological operations. In remote areas of Vietnam they were frequently the only contact the local inhabitants had with the central government or the outside world. Their contributions to education and medicine in those areas were extensive; they built or sponsored over 300 schools and provided medical care for innumerable isolated small communities.

The overall value of our Special Forces and the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups can scarcely be overstated. The intelligence they furnished on enemy infiltration and operations in remote areas was vital. With minimum strength they maintained a measure of control in vast areas that otherwise might have gone to the enemy by default.

They brought some 45,000 fighting men and a proportionate population under government control or influence, all of whom might otherwise have been recruited or dominated by the enemy.

The principal ingredient in the Special Forces success formula was psychological.

NOTES

2 Ibid., Anecdote #28.
3 Ibid., Anecdote #34.

INTERPRETERS ON OPERATIONS WITH INFANTRY*

By A. H. D. McAulay

*Excerpts from "Interpreters on Operations with Infantry," Australian Army Journal, no. 226 (March 1968), pp. 48-52. Reprinted with the permission of Army Journal, Department of the Army (Australia), copyright holder.

340
morale of both friendly and enemy forces; he can be active in the "Hearts and Minds" role and help to avoid misunderstandings and ill feeling between our own forces and local citizens by explaining the actions and customs of both. When indigenous forces are employed on an Allied operation, interpreters are necessary not only at headquarters but with sub-units likely to encounter these forces in order to keep indigenous forces informed of Allied activities and Allied commanders fully informed of theirs.

ENGLISH-SPEAKING VIETNAMESE

English-speaking Vietnamese are available for operations but, in general, lack the stamina and aggressiveness of Europeans. However, some very good Vietnamese are available, and if these are chosen for attachment to a unit on a permanent basis, thus becoming "one of the family," they can be of great value to a commander.

AUSTRALIANS EMPLOYED AS INTERPRETERS

The Australian interpreter who regards himself as too highly trained to have his talents wasted in an infantry unit, or who became an interpreter only to get away from footslogging, is a liability to the unit. He must "think infantry." If recruited from outside the corps, he must raise himself to the infantry level. He must take part in all unit activities and duties so that he is accepted by all members of the unit. In a battalion he must be known to all members who go on operations, not as an Acorn representative who comes down from battalion headquarters when necessary, but as an infantryman who has received special training and can speak the local tongue. He must patrol with the infantry, eat with them, get wet with them, ambush with them, take his turn on machine-gun or radio, go in with the first elements, act as forward scout, or if necessary act as a carrier of extra water and rations. He must in fact be able to tackle any of the many tasks likely to fall to the lot of the infantry soldier on operations.

He should also have as wide a knowledge of the area as possible, including the names of the District and Village elders, leaders and personalities (teachers, barbers, cafe proprietors and suchlike), of tracks and paths as known to the locals (Black Dog Creek track, Three Bamboos Spring, etc.), and of local customs and religions. He thus becomes a fount of information, available for tapping by commanders at all levels. To help the interpreter acquire this knowledge, he should be given freedom to contact the local people as much as possible. Civic action provides opportunities for this, but even then the range of people encountered is not wide enough. Continued close contact with the people was not possible at Bien Hoa as 1 RAR [First Royal Australian Regiment] conducted most operations some distance from the base, but interpreters with the Task Force should be much better off in this respect.

No matter how brilliant the interpreter may be, he cannot be expected to retain his fluency if he is not permitted to maintain close contact with the people, constantly striving to absorb their idiom and attitudes. An
interpreter sitting in a base camp is virtually useless. Though the fluent speaker almost automatically becomes a fluent reader, the reverse rarely applies. A limiting factor also is the in-bred reluctance of the transport people to release a vehicle for any purpose, let alone to someone who apparently merely wants to go about talking to people.

ALLOCATING AND EMPLOYMENT

For the greater part of 1 RAR's tour in Vietnam, only two interpreters were available. Consequently the two companies deemed most likely to need the services of interpreters were all allotted them, battalion headquarters often going without. The company commander then allocated the interpreter to a platoon or kept him at company headquarters until needed.

Ideally each patrol should have the services of an interpreter. However, since as many as six patrols might be out simultaneously, this at present is little more than a pipe-dream. Patrols operating near houses or cultivated land obviously have more need of an interpreter than those going into uninhabited places. And since people encountered in the jungle usually shoot first and talk later, the task of the interpreter with a patrol is generally limited to the translation of any documents acquired from bodies or equipment found after contact.

At platoon, company or battalion level, the interpreter rarely has time to interrogate a Viet Cong prisoner in order to extract information of value to his commander. The highly organized helicopter system will whisk away a PW within minutes.

At this level most of the early information is derived from official and personal documents the Viet Cong habitually carry. The reorganizing, clearing or follow-up activities after contact do not allow sufficient time for the interpreter to extract much information from any prisoners captured. Thus, in order to "work his passage" on an operation and not become merely a burden, the interpreter must be able not only to perform the normal infantry tasks but be able to identify and operate captured enemy weapons and equipment. The interpreter must not only be able to speak, read and write the language; . . . he must learn the colloquialisms, be able to read ARVN and VC documents and maps.

The interpreter should be included in any sub-unit Orders Group, even when another Intelligence representative is present, so that he will be kept as fully informed as possible and at the same time be able to offer information himself. At battalion level any information gathered by the interpreter is passed to the Intelligence Officer, who collates it with what he has already obtained from other sources.

As can be seen, a posting to an infantry unit actively engaged in operations is a rewarding and enlightening experience for an interpreter. An enthusiastic infantry-intelligence minded one can be of great assistance to a unit on operations in South-East Asia provided he is properly employed. He can be the commander's own window on the people, the fish in the Asian Sea.
GUERRILLA METHODS AND THE MIND: THE POLITICAL OFFICER*

BY HOWARD R. SIMPSON

The role of the political officer in Communist guerrilla organizations has been one of the most important devices for keeping firm control over the soldiers' psychological reactions to political and military situations and events.

Historically, the role of the political officer in normal military organizations has been ill defined and tenuous. Military leaders have often resented the presence of such official envoys and done their utmost to ignore them. This is understandable considering that many noblemen performing such a function in the 15th and 16th centuries were merely spies for their sovereign sent to report on the performance of his generals and see that the spoils of battle found their way to the Royal Treasury.

During the Napoleonic wars the equivalent of political officers was used to keep track of the non-French regiments fighting for the Empire, reporting on their morale, fighting spirit, and the loyalty of their commanders.

Political officers were attached to British and French colonial expeditions in Africa, the Near East, and Asia. They were to assist commanders in dealing with local rulers and populations and to see that the goal of the expedition was not lost in an excess of military glory hunting. Many a general breathed a sigh of relief when he could leave his political officer behind to administer a newly pacified territory.

These forerunners of the modern political officer were seldom concerned with the individual soldier and his indoctrination. Napoleon felt that an army is a crowd which obeys. Morale problems could usually be dealt with by an appeal to the emotions: a horseback exhortation by a revered general; rewards in the form of decorations, citations, or an additional ration of brandy. If these failed there was always punishment.

Political evolution and revolution have changed this. Political theory has seeped down to the individual soldier. The revolt of entire front line units during World War I sent a shock through the French Army. Firing squads crushed the revolt, but the romantic picture of the self-effacing, patriotic “poilu” asking only to be sent into the mouths of enemy guns was smashed forever, and the High Command was forced to insert political factors into its evaluation of troop morale.

The Chinese Nationalist soldier who deserted to the Communists in 1948 to save his own skin was, for the first time in his life, lectured on what he was fighting for and why.

He also found that his new officers actually explained their planned tactical moves. This was heady wine for a peasant soldier whose previous experience with officers had been limited to moving their luggage and receiving punishment.

Today, if the political officer or his equivalent is a constant recognized factor in many military organizations, it is largely due to his coming of age in guerrilla movements where his function has proved indispensable to success.

From the caves of Yenan to the hills of North Korea the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of Communist China has depended on the political officer or cadre as a yeast in their leavening of purpose.

The footsore intellectual trying to lecture guerrilla bands on the complicated theory of politics has been replaced by the hardened, professional propaganda expert whose role in the PLA has grown to the point where he is burdened with specific tasks.

He is responsible not only for morale, political indoctrination, and propaganda but he must also arrange for assistance to soldiers' families; process leave, furlough, and marriage applications; allocate blame, praise, reward, or punishment; regulate relations between unit members and the civilian population; observe closely the behavior of military leaders toward their men and even their conduct of military affairs.¹

This is a complex assignment for one officer no matter how dedicated or fanatic he may be. To make their task easier, the PLA political officers have evolved a system that automatically enlists the common soldier as an assistant.

Under the “morale informants system,” appointed leaders within the squad—usually party members—are made responsible for daily reports on bad morale or any stubborn attitude shown by their comrades. This spiderweb network of informants facilitates the political officer's work. It also provides him with the mechanics to evaluate the soldier's psychological reaction to political and military situations and events.

A Westerner would consider this spying or informing. Care should be taken, however, not to expect such a negative reaction on the part of the Chinese soldier. Political indoctrination emphasizing the constant threat to the unit and the nation from "reactionary elements" and the atmosphere of mutual political responsibility in the PLA facilitates the acceptability of such a system.

Despite this constant indoctrination the individual still reflects a certain amount of human independence, and the PLA political officer divides his wards into beets—red through and through, the true party members—and radishes—red on the outside only, those who lack party commitment.²

Although the PLA's political methods were developed in a time of guerrilla operations, it is now a well-established regular army and should not be taken as representative of a normal guerrilla fighting force.

In Malaya the Communist-supported guerillas of the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) recognized the importance of political indoctrination from the very beginning of their revolt. Forced to fight in small units and under constant danger of infiltration by agents of the Colonial Police of British Intelligence, the MRLA saw to it that its political
officers were equal or, in some cases, senior to their military command-
ners.

In Vietnam the political officer or cadre has been the backbone of the
revolution. During the period prior to World War II, anti-French political
groups with varying loyalties carried on a clandestine fight for leadership
in the struggle for eventual independence.

Western political doctrines blended with traditional Asian intrigue to
make French Indochina a perfect operating terrain for the professional
paramilitary cadre. Violence, corruption, sellouts, double and triple
agents, official and unofficial "special" operations built an atmosphere
within which only the hard, clever professional survived.

Ho Chi Minh's agents and the French intelligence services recruited
their own cadres from these professionals. A mutual appreciation of the
political cadre's importance instigated a war in the shadows as important
and crucial as the field operations of the Indochina war.

Following the Geneva Accords the well-trained, covert political cadre
left behind in South Vietnam became the artisans of the National Libera-
tion Front's control apparatus. Today they, and their assistants, continue
their training and indoctrination work throughout the South. At the
district level approximately 50 percent of their study program is devoted
to political subjects. At the village level political subjects take approxi-
mately 70 percent of the total training time, leaving only 30 percent for
military instruction.

An important aspect of the Viet Cong political officer's work is the
maintenance of fighting spirit among guerrilla units, particularly those
isolated from base areas or under continual harassment by the enemy.

The political officer's harangue prior to an action has become a standard
procedure both with the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong. Generally,
this preaction warmup is modeled on the Chinese Communist method,
going so far as to require signed pledges promising death to the enemy,
continued faith in the party, and requesting punishment in the event of
failure.

The most effective political officers weave references to international
events, local developments, and the enemy's alleged cowardice or brutal-
ity into their exhortations. The message is often presented in a traditional
style or as a modern-day version of some ancient Vietnamese legend.

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NOTES

1 Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action (New York: Columbia
2 Ibid., p. 89.
Ideological work in the Armed Forces guarantees putting into practice the requirements of the party concerning further strengthening of the might of the Soviet Army and Navy and raising their readiness to destroy any aggressor. The basic efforts in ideological work are aimed at a more active formation in the fighting men of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, communist conscientiousness, and high moral-political and combat qualities, and the greatest possible strengthening of military discipline.

The forms of ideological work are varied. One of the most important forms is the political training of the personnel. It is based on a deep study of the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions of the 23rd Party Congress and the Plena of the Central Committee of the party, the materials of the CC CPSU commemorating the 50th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, and documents of the international communist movement. In classes, seminars, reports, lectures and discussions, commander, political workers and party organizations are obligated to clearly and convincingly popularize the successes of our country in constructing communism; the revolutionary traditions of the Communist Party and the Soviet people; the glorious 50-year history of the Soviet state and its Armed Forces; to instill in fighting men the spirit of boundless devotion to the socialist Homeland; the friendship of the people of the USSR; and proletarian internationalism. Each serviceman must achieve a deep understanding of his personal responsibility for the security of the country, for fulfilling the tasks facing the Armed Forces under contemporary conditions.

The mission of ideological work is to actively unmask bourgeois ideology, the aggressive essence of the policy of the imperialist powers, and the reactionary anti-popular character of their armies, and to instill in Soviet fighting men the spirit of implacable class hatred for imperialism, especially American imperialism, the worst enemy of the socialist Homeland and all workers.

The continuing aggravation of the international situation and the growth of the danger of a new world war demand an intensification of the indoctrination of servicemen in the spirit of high revolutionary vigilance, constant combat readiness, and resolute elimination of the slightest manifestations of carelessness and complacency. It is necessary to purposefully and effectively carry out work in regard to the moral and psychological training of fighting men, instilling in them bravery, staunchness,
fearlessness and a strong will for victory over the powerful, perfidious enemy, and readiness to carry out combat orders at any price including self-sacrifice. All ideological work is aimed at instilling in fighting men a conscientious attitude toward mastering weapons, combat equipment, and high discipline, a striving to become outstanding men in combat and political training, and to give every effort to fulfill their duty to the Homeland.

Ideological work in the army is called upon to give a deep explanation to personnel of the requirements of the Communist Party and the Soviet government concerning the observance of the laws of our state, the norms of communist morality, and the military oath and regulations, achieving absolute fulfillment of them by all servicemen.

Ideological-educational work in the Armed Forces is conducted in an adaptable manner, taking into consideration the service status of the fighting men, their needs and other peculiarities.

MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING OF OFFICERS

High ideological-theoretic indoctrination of officer cadres is the most important condition for successful solution of the tasks facing the troops. The Communist Party considers it necessary, it states in the Program of the CPSU, that command personnel steadfastly master Marxist-Leninist theory.

The basic method of the political training of officers is independent study by them of the classic works of Marxism-Leninism, the decisions of the party and other political and military-theoretical literature. The principle of deep and consistent mastery by officers of the history of the CPSU, all the integral parts of revolutionary theory, and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army is being put into practice. Groups for Marxist-Leninist training are formed in order to conduct seminars. Participation in them is mandatory.

The training plans for Marxist-Leninist training make provisions for studying the history and military activity of the CPSU, philosophy, political economics, the bases of scientific communism, the Marxist-Leninist doctrine on war and the army, pressing problems of the theory and policies of the CPSU, Soviet military construction, and philosophical problems of military theory and practice.

A specific number or hours of duty time is allotted for lectures and seminars.

To aid commanders and political workers in division-level units, units and on ships theoretical conferences and discussions, lectures and reports are organized on matters of Marxist-Leninist theory, Soviet military science, pedagogy, psychology and the practice of training and education.

At evaluation sessions and also in checks, the officers are given a rating of “mastered” or “did not master.”

Many officers increase their political knowledge in evening universities of Marxism-Leninism, party and general education schools, and in correspondence courses from higher educational institutions. Officers who
are leaders of political study groups of soldiers and sergeants study in seminars which have been especially created for them.

An important integral part of Marxist-Leninist training, especially for officer leaders, is their personal active participation in agitational-propaganda work among the troops.

POLITICAL CLASSES FOR FIGHTING MEN

All Soviet fighting men should be instilled with the spirit of unlimited faith in their people and the cause of communism, be ready to expend every effort and even life itself if necessary to defend the Socialist Homeland.

The Program of the CPSU

Political classes for soldiers, sailors, sergeants and master sergeants is one of the basic forms of political indoctrination of fighting men. The classes are conducted in accordance with the training plan of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy during the course of the entire training year on the days and at times established by commanders of units and ships, as a rule, for two hours twice a week.

Political classes are conducted by the lecture-seminar method, and for those groups where the personnel do not have sufficient training, political classes are conducted by means of talks and lively, free discussion.

As leaders of the groups are assigned well trained, politically skilled officers—commanders of platoons, companies and equivalent sub-units, as well as staff officers, political workers and officers of military construction detachments. From among the best fighting men communists and Komsomol members, are assigned the assistants to the leaders of political classes. The assistants conduct supplementary classes, work with those who are lagging behind, and organize independent reading of recommended literature in non-class time.

The knowledge of students is evaluated by a four-grade system: excellent, good, satisfactory and unsatisfactory. A general rating of the group is determined taking into consideration the status of the combat training and military discipline of the personnel.

POLITICAL INFORMATION SESSIONS

A political information session is one of the most flexible traditional forms of mass political work. Such sessions were conducted in combat situations in the years of the Great Patriotic War.

The directive of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Main Political Administration about mass agitational work in the Soviet Army and Navy requires an upgrading of the role of political information sessions in the political and military education of personnel.

At political information sessions the fighting men receive explanations of current events occurring in our country and abroad, as well as the tasks of the personnel ensuing from the decisions of the party and government, and orders of the Minister of Defense USSR.

The theme of political information sessions is determined by the deputy
commander for political matters. He also instructs the officers who are entrusted with conducting the political sessions.

By established practice political information sessions are conducted twice a week in the morning hours and last 30 minutes. All the enlisted and noncommissioned personnel attend the sessions. With students of military educational institutions political information sessions are conducted once a week for 50 minutes.

LENINIST READINGS

Leninist Readings have won great popularity in the army and navy. This form of mass agitational work helps the personnel to study Lenin's heritage, to see the ideas of the great leader of workers embodied in life, and to see their mobilizing inspiring power.

For Leninist readings propagandists as a rule select articles, letters and speeches of V. I. Lenin which are available to a broad readership and which have great significance for the correct understanding of the essence of contemporary events of internal and international life, and of specific tasks facing the army, navy and all fighting men. In units and on ships they often conduct readings of the speeches of Vladimir Il'ich at the Third Congress of the Komsomol, “The Missions of the Youth League,” and his works—“A Letter to the Workers and Peasants Concerning the Victory Over Kolchak,” “A Letter to American Workers,” “Everyone to Fight Against Denikin!”. Reading of these works of Lenin presents an opportunity to become more deeply imbued with a consciousness of the importance of strengthening the defensive capability of the country, tightening military discipline and increasing vigilance and combat readiness.

They often conduct so-called thematic Leninist readings dedicated to individual problems—“V. I. Lenin—the Creator of the Communist Party and the Soviet State,” “V. I. Lenin on the Moral Aspect of the Soviet Fighting Man,” “The Military Legacy of V. I. Lenin,” “V. I. Lenin—the Creator of the Soviet Armed Forces,” and others.

Readings are primarily conducted on a subunit scale. Before beginning the reading, its leader—the commander, political worker, propagandist or agitator—tells in connection with what events or in what situation the given work of Lenin was written. Then he reads the work—loudly, distinctly, explaining certain theses—and draws from the instructions of the leader practical conclusions for the fighting men of the subunit. In the course of the reading the fighting men ask questions and share their ideas. The reading becomes a lively discussion.

For participating in such readings invitations are extended to old communists, veterans of the revolution, and people who had met Lenin and had worked under his leadership. Fighting men listen to a phonograph record of a speech of Lenin's with great interest. The educational effect of the Leninist readings is great.

During the days of preparation for the celebration of the 50th anniver-
sary of Soviet power, broad dissemination was made of Octobrist read-

AGITATOR-PROPAGANDIST COLLECTIVES

In the Armed Forces there is an entire network of supernumerary
establishments which help commanders and political workers in educat-
ing the personnel. These are the supernumerary lecturing groups at-
tached to the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy
and the political administrations of the arms of the Armed Forces, military
districts, groups of forces and fleets; methods councils, schools for
propagandist skills, agitation-propagandist collectives attached to political
divisions of division-level units; and groups of speakers attached to
party committees and party bureaus of units and ships.

Along with generals and officers, agitation-propagandist collectives
and groups of speakers also include soldiers, sailors, sergeants and mas-
ter sergeants who have high general educational and special training and
who serve as examples in training and in service.

The assignment by party organizations of supernumerary propagandists
for companies and batteries from among officer communists has also come
into practice.

THE REGIMENTAL PROPAGANDIST

The regimental propagandist is an official assigned in the tables of
organization and appointed from among the officers. He is directly subor-
dinate to the deputy commander for political matters and is responsible
for the organization and status of agitation-propagandist work in the
regiment.

The propagandist is guided by the decisions of the Communist Party,
the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense USSR and the Main
Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and the instruc-
tions of superior political organs, the regimental commander and his
deputy for political matters.

Propagandist activity is a specialty of the communist who is assigned to
this post, his profession, and his party and state duty. Of course, as
underlined at the 23d Party Congress, ideological work cannot be the
work of specialists alone. It is a most important integral part of all the
multi-faceted activity of the CPSU. Ideological work, party propaganda
and agitation are matters for the entire party and all communists.

In the regiment and its subunits a large circle of party and Komsomol
activists is involved in propaganda and agitation. The assigned propaga-
dist acts as one of the organizers of all the propagandist and mass
agitation work in the unit. This work is always coordinated with the
general plan for combat and political training. Maintaining close contact
with the party committee, party and Komsomol organizations, and com-
manders and political workers of subunits, the propagandist actively
participates in planning and conducting measures for party-political
work.

In propagandist and mass agitation work use is made of such powerful
means of ideological influence on the masses as the press, radio, television and motion pictures. With all of this, of primary significance is the direct contact of the propagandist with the fighting men, his talks, reports and lectures on military-political subjects. The propagandist, tirelessly explaining to the fighting men the policy of the party and carrying the ideas of Marxism-Leninism to the masses, is an active champion of everything new and advanced in military matters.

The propagandist combines high personal theoretic preparation with methods know-how, and the ability to express ideas correctly and effectively and influence the consciousness and feelings of people. Only then can he be a skilled organizer of agitation-propagandist work and a leader and guide for supernumerary propagandists and agitators and subunits.

The propagandist actively participates in the ideological-political education of officers: in arranging for Marxist-Leninist training, selecting subjects for study by the officers, compiling class schedules, and developing plans for seminars. As a rule, the propagandist himself is the leader of one of the groups. With the help of the propagandist arrangements are made for lectures for officers, discussions on political and military-theoretical problems, consultations and other measures.

The basic method of improving theoretic knowledge is independent study by officers of the works of K. Marx, F. Engels, V. I. Lenin, the decisions of the party, the documents of congresses and plena of the CC, and political and military literature. The regimental propagandist regularly conducts individual and group discussions with officers on the essence of material studied, monitors the preparation for forthcoming seminars and discussions, participates in organizing such monitoring in the subunits. Monitoring is always combined with consultations, help to officers, and enlisting the best prepared comrades in propaganda work.

The regimental propagandist is one of the organizers of political classes with soldiers and sergeants. He concerns himself with the correct make-up of the group, the selection of lecturers, group leaders and their assistants, conducting seminars with them, the state of preparation and high quality of classes, providing the fighting men with aids, and organizing independent work with literature.

The propagandist deeply and thoroughly studies the state of political training of the fighting men of subunits, reports his conclusions to the deputy commander for political matters, and participates directly in generalizing and disseminating the best know-how of training and in eliminating the shortcomings in the ideological content and methods of conducting classes. Most seminars of lecturers and group leaders of political classes are conducted under the leadership of the propagandist. On individual, most complicated subjects the propagandist himself gives lectures at classes for soldiers and sergeants. In addition, the propagandist instructs certain group leaders and devotes special attention to the less experienced comrades and those who for some reason could not attend a seminar. To assist the students of political classes arrangements
are made for meetings with veterans of the revolution and the Armed Forces, trips to enterprises, construction projects, kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and museums, the showing of motion pictures, artistic exhibitions, local radio broadcasts, and photographic exhibitions.

The regimental propagandist actively participates in organizing mass agitation work among the fighting men, workers, officer employees, and members of the families of officers and extended-service men, and strives for the effectiveness and purposefulness of this work. Political propaganda and agitation mobilizes the fighting men to achieve new successes in combat training, further strengthening of discipline, and increasing vigilance and combat readiness.

The regimental propagandist probes deeply into the varied mass political work which is conducted in the subunits by commanders, political workers, and party and Komsomol organizations, and prepares suggestions on matters of propaganda and agitation in their monthly and long range plans. Together with the party committee (bureau) the propagandist organizes the activity of groups of speakers and helps commanders and political workers of subunits in selecting platoon agitators. Guiding the school for agitators, Leninist readings, question-and-answer evenings, debates, the work of the council for Leninist reading rooms and the editors of wall newspapers and radio news, subscriptions to newspapers and magazines, and decorating visual displays for agitation—all this and much more also occupies the time of the propagandist who enlists the cooperation of a broad group of activists. He consults with supernumerary propagandists and members of speaking groups, and helps them to prepare lectures, speeches and discussions. This help is especially active during times when the regiment goes into the field and on tactical exercises. The propagandist probes deeply into the ideological content of motion picture festivals, radio and television broadcasts, and the repertoire of amateur theatrical groups.

In order to be a good propagandist, taught V. I. Lenin, it is necessary to study considerably and gain experience. The varied labor of a propagandist demands of him organizational ability, skill in conducting meetings, constant improvement of his knowledge and a high general cultural level.

AGITATORS OF SUBUNITS

This is the most numerous detachment of propagandist cadre of the army and navy. They are assigned in all platoons and equivalent subunits, and, if necessary, to separate teams, crews, details and combat posts from among the leading politically trained soldiers, sailors, sergeants, master sergeants and officers.

The agitator conducts discussions on political and military subjects, expertly comments on current events, answers topical questions, and mobilizes public opinion against obsolete, narrow attitudes which sometimes penetrate into our environment.

The mission of the agitator is to reach the heart and mind of the Soviet
fighting man with sincere words, to arouse in him bright and noble feelings and thoughts, and by word and personal example to inspire him to exemplary fulfillment of his duties.

Agitators are directly guided by commanders and political workers of subunits and secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations. In companies, batteries, squadrons and equivalent subunits agitators are guided by the deputy commanders for political matters. At the unit and division level there are periodic meetings of agitators. At these meetings speeches are made by commanders, political workers, and leaders of local party, representative and economic organizations. Problems of the practice of the agitational work are reviewed.

In many units and division-level units there are schools for agitators. The Communist Party devotes constant attention to the further improvement of mass agitational work. The Directive Concerning Mass Agitational Work in the Soviet Army and Navy requires that each communist be in fact an active agitator and a staunch and confirmed fighter for carrying out the ideas and policies of the party, and know how to lead the masses.

PROPAGANDIST AND AGITATOR

SOME ADVICE TO THE AGITATOR*

BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, U.S.S.R.

This excerpt in listing some general rules to be followed by political propagandists in the Soviet armed forces stresses that modestly is becoming, that there are very few morally staunch and capable propagandists, that the propagandist must know how to speak simply and clearly, and that he must master political knowledge and his military specialty.

THERE IS MUCH TO KNOW AND TO LEARN

Follow the press. Be able to comment on the most essential materials—the articles, essays and correspondence on the most important events of the life of our Homeland and the Armed Forces, and international life. You will always read about the most topical events in the editorials of the newspapers Pravda, Krasnaya Zvezda and others. They illuminate the most important problems of politics, economics, culture and party-political work. Newspapers and magazines (Kommunist Vooruzennykh Sil, Bloknot Agitatora and others) present the decisions of the party on military problems and the requirements of the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense USSR and the Chief of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, and illuminate pressing problems of army and navy life. Organize discussions of magazine and newspaper articles.

It is clear that he who himself presents a model of conscientious fulfillment of military duty, the military oath, and regulations, rules and instructions, and assiduously masters political knowledge and his military

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specialty has the moral right to speak before his comrades in arms.  

MAKE DISCUSSIONS FORCIBLE AND INTERESTING

The forms of agitation are varied, but the main one is a lively, sincere discussion with the troops. The theme of the discussion will always be suggested by the commander, political worker, or the secretaries of party and Komsomol organizations. But the agitator himself must also display initiative. After all you are closest to the fighting men and you know what interests them most.

After selecting a subject, think about the plan of the discussion—what problems to illuminate, what preliminary reading to do. Articles, books and magazines read in connection with a subject provide authoritative advice, examples and artistic models, lead to new ideas, and help to learn more deeply the examples and facts of military life. No matter what kind of a discussion is conducted, it must be connected with the lives of the fighting men. Remember that the Armed Forces and our entire people are one friendly family. A defender of the Homeland protects the peaceful labor of the builders of communism. Try to arrange every discussion so that it is interesting and lively, and instills the desire in the soldier and sailor to better serve his Fatherland. Tell an interesting story, of course, directly related to the subject of the discussion, refer to a significant placard, map or diagram, cite a typical comparison, if necessary, use a tongue twister, a proverb or a joke and you will feel that your words are easy to understand and make the necessary impression. Try not to do all the talking yourself, but also draw the listeners into the discussion. Often put questions to them and ask their opinions.

REACH THE HEART AND MIND OF EACH FIGHTING MAN

Do strive each time for a “broad” audience. Try to discuss political, military and other pressing subject with one, two or three comrades. Individual work, if conducted wisely, is especially effective. Only one must really know his comrade in arms, his capabilities and morale, win his faith and favor by sincerity, directness and attention to his needs and interests. In a sincere, comradely conversation with a soldier or sailor when he believes in the agitator and considers him an authoritative person, any doubts are dissipated and solid and correct convictions and views on life are formed. The subject of such interesting conversations can be any question which comes to a fighting man, an important event, or even an immoral act or violation of discipline. It would be a poor agitator who would regard offenses complacently. Of course, the individual discussion will achieve its goal if the offense receives the proper evaluation from the point of view of the interests of the party and the requirements of communist morality and military service.

Remember, you are a political soldier. When necessary, help a comrade with a warm word, deed or good advice. If the soldier committed an offense or violated discipline do not be ashamed to tell him the truth to his face, openly condemn the poor conduct and, if necessary, take the facts before the court of public opinion.
In talks with comrades always be tactful, do not emphasize your superiority even if you feel it. Modesty is becoming.

**USE TECHNICAL MEANS OF PROPAGANDA**

Technical means of propaganda refer to radio receivers, television sets, record players, cameras, film viewers, etc. Movies, radio and television and other means of propaganda which are possessed by the clubs of units and ships can be widely used in agitational work.

In the course of discussions make frequent arrangements to listen to records of the speeches of V. I. Lenin and make use of the film strips "In the Halls of the Central Museum of V. I. Lenin," "How V. I. Lenin Worked on the Program of the Party," "Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels" and others. Discussions can be illustrated with film strips on the subjects of combat training, political and military education, the combat history of the Armed Forces, the military oath and regulations, discipline and vigilance, commanders, etc. Some agitators prepare film strips themselves. The apparatus for showing them, the FGK-49 or the F-64 film viewer, is not complicated and can be operated in any dark room.

Wide use is also made of slides in agitational work. They are prepared on glass. Picture slides are shown by means of viewers and universal projectors—also simple devices to operate. The universal projector can also be used to show film strips and picture newspapers.

A great help in the hands of an agitator can be the FED, the Zorkiy or any other photo camera. By means of them it is possible to take photographs which clearly show the life and training of personnel, the achievements of the leaders in combat and political training, issue a photographic newspaper and prepare photographs for wall newspapers and combat leaflets.

Film newspapers are also excellent in mass agitational work. Such a newspaper consists of photographs, cartoons, caricatures and other materials on motion picture film united in a definite order by textual material. In a visual and easy to understand form they tell of the life of the subunit, the know-how of the best students and criticize shortcomings in the service and conduct of individual soldiers.

The agitator performs a useful service if he organizes cultural trips to see new movies, discussions of radio and television broadcasts, spectacles, and speeches by the best fighting men of the subunit on local radio broadcasts.

**A LIBRARY ON THE MARCH**

The agitator's file is a special, small library which are concentrated materials on pressing political and military subjects—the decisions of the 23d Congress of the CPSU, the party Program, the decisions of the plena of the CC CPSU, the text of the military oath, extracts from the rules and regulations.

Before going into the field it is useful to provide oneself with booklets and leaflets for the soldier on operations on the attack, on the defensive and under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons. It is good if the file
contains material with data on the dimension of a fox hole, the effect of radioactive materials on men and combat equipment, etc.

Of course, everything does not go into the file. It is important to select the most necessary materials, taking into consideration the situation and tasks which have been assigned to the subunit on the field trip. And it goes without saying that whatever is taken must be used in work.

V. I. LENIN ON PROPAGANDA AND AGITATION

Clarity of propaganda and agitation is a basic condition. If our enemies said and admitted that we performed miracles in developing agitation and propaganda, then this must be understood not in the foreign manner, that we had many agitators and used much paper, but it must be understood in the internal manner, that the truth which was contained in that agitation entered the minds of all. And one must not deviate from that truth.


... One must learn to approach the masses with special patience and care in order to be able to understand the peculiarities and special features of the psychology of each layer, profession, etc. of this mass.


... In regard to propagandists I would also like to say a few words against the usual overmanning of this profession with persons of lesser capabilities thereby lowering the level of propaganda. Sometimes we consider any student indiscriminately to be a propagandist... Actually there are very few morally stanch and capable propagandists (and in order to become one it is necessary to study long and acquire know-how), and such persons must specialize and devote themselves completely and be specially cared for.


... The propagandist, if he takes, for example, the same question about unemployment, must explain the capitalistic nature of crises, show the reason for their inevitability in contemporary society, describe the necessity of transforming it into a socialist society, etc. In a word he must give "many ideas." The agitator, talking about the very same matter, takes the best known to all of his listeners and the most outstanding example—let us say, the death from hunger of a jobless family, the intensification of begging, etc.—and directs all his efforts, by means of this incident which is known to one and all toward giving "the mass" one idea—the idea of the senselessness of the contradiction between the growth of wealth and the growth of poverty, he tried to arouse in the mass dissatisfaction with and indignation over this crying injustice...


We do not have enough indoctrination of the masses on the basis of five, specific examples and models from all areas of life, and this is the main task. Less political chirping. Fewer intelligent discussions. Closer to life. More attention to what the worker and peasant mass is in fact building, something new in his everyday work.


... Know how to speak simply and clearly in the language of the masses, resolutely discarding the heavy artillery of clever terms and foreign words which are studied and contrived, but still not understood by the mass, and discarding slogans, definitions and conclusions which are not familiar to the mass. It is necessary to know how to interpret the matters of socialism without phrases and without exclamations, but with the facts and figures in hard...
Indigenous Scout

KIT CARSONS STRIKE BACK*

By Dave Furse

Special volunteer teams of former insurgents, such as the Kit Carson Scouts, should be used to the maximum extent possible to take full advantage of their knowledge of the enemy's operational techniques in the field.

A century ago Major General H. W. Halleck wrote during the Indian Wars, "I respectfully call attention to the use of Indian Scouts... Their services have proved of the greatest value."

Just recently a 9th Infantry Division captain fighting in the Republic of Vietnam said: "The value of these scouts is becoming increasingly apparent. We could hardly be more pleased with the results of the program..."

The captain was speaking of the Kit Carson Scouts now employed in the 9th Infantry Division—scouts serving in the same tradition as their Indian counterparts in the American West of a century ago.

Several years ago, all were Viet Cong soldiers, many of them officers. Yet they are making a distinguished record today as guides, interrogators and fighters with 9th Division units in action against their former VC comrades.

Their aggressiveness in searching out the VC and their loyalty to their American unit is another of the many paradoxes of the Vietnam War. All of the Scouts rallied voluntarily to the South Vietnamese government under the Cheu Hoi (Open Arms) amnesty program and then further volunteered for duty as scouts with United States forces.

[Early in 1968] the Division had only 32 such Scouts. Toward the end of that year there were over 150, and the Division planned to add another 50 in the near future. They are well paid by Vietnamese standards, roughly the same as an unmarried staff sergeant in the South Vietnamese Army....

Although the scouts have been a success, there have been a few minor problems, such as clothing for the small Vietnamese. Another is language, since most speak [little or] no English....

The scouts have proved of great value to U.S. fighting units because of their first-hand knowledge of VC tactics and methods. During one month the 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry credited its alert scouts with locating numerous booby traps and mines. On one occasion another scout under fire pointed out enemy bunkers which were later knocked out by friendly troops. Seven times the Scouts were able to locate the VC by their ability to communicate with Vietnamese nationals.

Battalion intelligence officers in the 9th Division recruit and hire their prospective scouts from Chieu Hoi repatriation centers in their areas of operation. As one officer put it, "I first look for a man with jungle

experience. Does he know VC tactics and booby traps? Did he have a leadership position with the VC? "At the Chieu Hoi center I talk first with the Chieu Hoi Chief, explaining the program and its benefits. He then asks if any of his people are interested. From then on it's like an interview for any other job."

When a Kit Carson scout enters his U.S. unit, he is assigned an American buddy who explains the unit's policies and shows him how to maintain his new weapon. When the new scout walks point on a patrol, his buddy walks with him.

Kit Carson scouts with 9th Division range in age from late teens to 40 years of age. Some were VC riflemen or ammunition bearers. Many were officers or aspirants (warrant officers) who commanded VC units as tactical leaders or members of the Communist political cadre. All of the scouts share a common disenchantment with the VC tactics of deceit and cruelty, and they are convinced that their only chance for survival is to defeat the Viet Cong.

Most scouts are indigenous South Vietnamese who were recruited by the VC. One of these men, however, was drafted from his home in North Vietnam and infiltrated south where he served for a year as a sniper with the Viet Cong Dong Nai Regiment. He spent seven months in the Chieu Hoi repatriation center in Saigon, but his family and his roots are still in the north.

The former VC become scouts for a wide variety of reasons. As one put it, "I think the VC are trying to deceive the people. Also, I disagree with their tactics of cruelty to civilians and military." When asked how he would feel about having to fight North Vietnamese regulars, he responded, "If I don't kill them, they will surely kill me."

"I became a Hoi Chanh because I was tired of fighting," explained still another scout. A native of South Vietnam's Bien Hoa Province, he had been a VC squad leader for two years. "The VC say victory is soon," he continued, "but that is a lie. I am fighting again now because to defeat the VC is the only way I can live."

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CHAPTER VI
POLICY OBJECTIVES AND OPERATIONAL GOALS

PSYOP supports the attainment of national objectives abroad. In order to contribute most effectively to the realization of national foreign policy objectives, policy and operational goals must be established for PSYOP. This chapter deals with the objectives of strategic, tactical, and other PSYOP. Strategic and tactical psychological operations are not mutually exclusive: rather, there is some overlap of the two. This is recognized explicitly by the existence of other forms of PSYOF that are not easily subsummed under either “strategic” or “tactical.”

In all forms of PSYOP, it is important to subordinate PSYOP objectives to national interest. PSYOP that does not support national objectives inadvertently may be in support of the objectives of another country or work against the realization of U.S. goals, and, in any event, has no legitimate claim to the use of national resources. Any inclination or immediate pressures to identify goals, establish techniques, and pursue themes without reference to national objectives must be firmly resisted.

Credibility is the immediate operational goal of PSYOP. All PSYOP seeks to establish credibility of the message, of the communicator, or, usually and implicitly, both. Credibility is the key factor in PSYOP and has both long and short term significance to support a specified operation. The problem is to distinguish these individual critical occasions from the many less critical situations—but ones that often seem critical at the time—in which communicators find themselves. American wartime PSYOP provides countless illustrations of the principle that hostilities in progress do not in and of themselves detract from the importance of maintaining credibility. Indeed, conflict situations provide both a problem and an opportunity: the problem is to maintain sufficient perspective to refrain from sacrificing long term interests to short term pressures; the opportunity is to enhance credibility precisely by overcoming that problem. The objective is to influence “those whose attitudes and behavior, particularly when the crunch comes, actually do or may make a difference . . . .” (emphasis added) But the persistent problem is determining which is the real “crunch,” for in many cases the communicator will have but one opportunity to take delivery on the effect of built-up credibility.

These problems of national policy and communications policy are largely questions of strategic PSYOP. Tactical psychological operations and other, specialized forms of PSYOP deal more with the direct support of military operations and objectives. The problems they must overcome are often based on resource limitations—equipment, manpower, and, especially in combat situations, time. However, tactical PSYOP also encounters contradictions with policy. For example, the effect of combat operations on the lives of noncombatants often undermines the most important messages PSYOP tries to communicate to the civilian populace.
Similarly, other forms of PSYOP have policy problems of their own. For example, "policy" in stabilization operations is seldom as clear cut in the field as it sounds in general statements made by political leaders. (See Bert H. Cooper, Jr., "Divided Counsels," Chapter IV; and Charles Moskos, "Grace Under Pressure," in this chapter.) Marshalling resources in support of even the most obvious objectives may be impossible in view of coordination problems, the logistical constraints in developing societies, or personal misunderstandings—and most goals are far from obvious.

In spite of these complicating considerations, PSYOP must set and attempt to meet certain objectives. Whether these objectives are long term or short term, whether they are contentious or consensual, the goals should always be in support of national policy. At times, communications may be forced to cultivate the appearance of conflict with national policy in order to serve it, but the purpose of psychological operations is to support national policy, and this essential reality should not be obscured by short run needs.

NOTES
1. Lloyd A. Free, "General Premises for VOA," in this chapter.
2. See Casilear Middleton, "The Little Red Schoolhouse" (in this casebook) for examples of each.

STRATEGIC PSYOP

Effective PSYOP has several requirements only some of which are under the control of the communicator. These manageable prerequisites are addressed in the various chapters of this casebook. The objectives of PSYOP constitute another element of the communications process over which the psyoperator and his team exercise some control. Objectives may be of either a policy or an operational nature. For example, establishing realistic goals is important to effective PSYOP and has implications for operations as well as policy. A firm awareness of PSYOP resources and the constraints within which PSYOP must function is fundamental. Lloyd A. Free and George V. Allen discuss these considerations and realism in objectives in their contributions to this chapter.

On the other hand, being realistic is too frequently used as an excuse for a lack of innovation. In a situation where realistic objectives would have been exceedingly limited and almost surely ineffective, Ramón Magsaysay used sound advice from a military assistance team, a charismatic personal style, and a flair for innovation to plan a comprehensive national PSYOP program.  

The thread running through the first two articles in this section is: it is difficult in the short run to change basic attitudes. However, decisive measures must often be taken to alter the shortrun military trend of a situation, and these measures will almost always entail psychological consequences. An example of such a case is the Malayan emergency, where early actions were largely uncoordinated but had significant re-
wards. Magsaysay, moreover, succeeded in effecting change in firmly held attitudes in the Philippines over the long term. Magsaysay did not, however, merely replace basic attitudes with new ones. Instead, he appealed to the even more fundamental values of the national audience and stressed these values in communications to the populace. Similarly, in a more limited operation, much of the success of U.S. PSYOP in Lebanon in 1958 may be attributed to the emphasis placed upon the basic agreement of the Lebanese and American governments.²

To emphasize the congruence of two governments' objectives or of U.S. objectives and the basic attitudes and values of a foreign audience, requires that American interests in fact permit of such concordance, for persuasive communications must serve national policy. If foreign policy is unclear, or is clear but abstract, major policy problems in communicating with foreign audiences may result. The role of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe in the Hungarian situation of 1956 is an example of the effects of communication based on unclear policy. When foreign policy refrains from grappling with the difficult, concrete problems likely to be encountered as a direct result of policy, then too often the pressures of time force operators to make policy decisions.³

An unstated premise in international political communication is that choice between options exists on most issues. This can be singularly important in strategic PSYOP, where communication is always based on the existence of choice. The sender, in effect, attempts to convey to his audience the awareness of a choice and the impression that the audience's interests are best served by the government's taking (or avoiding) a particular path. Similarly, PSYOP should explicitly recognize the dispositional nature of the situation being addressed. Bert H. Cooper, Jr., has shown the cruciality of providing a hostile target some room for maneuver in "Effective Diplomacy: An Exit from Armageddon."

The essays that follow in this section, then, all illustrate the important role—and sometimes the negative role—that international communications can play in support of national strategy.

NOTES


2 See Daniel Lerner, "Is International Persuasion Sociologically Feasible?" in Chapter II of this casebook.

3 See Reuben Nathan, "Making Policy Is Not the Propagandist's Business—Or Is It?" in Chapter III of this casebook.
GENERAL PREMISES FOR VOA*

By Lloyd A. Free

International communications should not restrict its audience to elites any more than it should aim at the masses. It should increasingly try to affect the attitudes of opinion molders, of "activists" throughout the general populace.

At the risk of being tedious, I would like, first (and probably at far too great length), to spell out some of the general premises upon which I think the entire VOA operation should be based, including the question of language priorities.

1. Apart from such exotic devices as airdrops of leaflets or messages by balloons, which are normally ineffective as means of sustained communication and present serious international problems, direct broadcasting by the VOA is the only regular medium available to the U.S. Government, which, for its effective functioning, does not require the cooperation or at least acquiescence of foreign governments or key foreign nationals (such as newspaper editors, radio and television personnel, and the like). The activities of almost every other medium can be, and sometimes are, choked off at will or whim.

This vulnerability is not confined to the Communist world. Even in a country as friendly toward the United States as Italy, for example, during my term as PAO [Public Affairs Officer], the Italian Government forced us to curtail an aggressive film program involving the use of mobile units. Most of the editors of important publications in Western Europe these days disdain the use of USIS press materials. In many countries, censorship (or necessary self-censorship) curtails what can be disseminated internally (for example, Spain, Yugoslavia, and places where the prohibition against criticism of third countries applies).

At present, meaningful USIS internal activities are impossible in Portuguese Africa because of political reasons, and in China, Zaire, and Albania because there are no Americans there, while operations are prohibited entirely in a considerable part of the Arab world (the UAR, Syria, Iraq, and the two Yemens). Short of this, the USIS presence has been subject to severe ebbs and flows in recent years in such critical countries as Burma, Pakistan, Cambodia, and Indonesia.

Looking to the future, limitations on what USIA can do "on the ground", so to speak, are likely to become more, rather than less stringent because of growing nationalism throughout most of the world and an increasing desire for greater independence from the American colossus—both of which are already fueling feelings of anti-Americanism. Just as we are going to have to learn how to get along without many of the military bases we now employ in various parts of the globe, we are probably going to have to learn how to defend the psychological interests of the United States without resort to the considerable panoply of USIS activities which still remain possible at the present time. If this predic-

tion proves correct, over the long haul the direct broadcasting of the VOA will become even more indispensable than it is today.

2. It is true, of course, that in crisis situations, when other channels of communication are denied to us or curtailed, the VOA can attract a certain number of listeners to broadcasts inaugurated on an emergency basis. However, this is a poor and unreliable substitute for audiences already in being, built up and sustained over the years, habituated to listening to the VOA and having faith in its credibility. But what kinds of audiences and what kinds of programming does this consideration entail?

3. The sole legitimate purpose of the VOA (as, indeed, of all other branches of USIA) is to further the substantive international objectives of the U.S. Government. Nothing else should be allowed to count. There should be no concern about audience building for its own sake. To the greatest extent possible, the people reached should be those whose attitudes and behavior, particularly when the crunch comes, actually do or may make a difference in the success or failure of U.S. objectives.

Almost every U.S. substantive objective posits certain psychological requirements which are essential for its success. Usually these psychological requirements involve the attitudes and behavior of a limited number of key individuals and elitist groups in a position to influence, more or less directly, the decisions of governments. Hence the importance of the highly selective target group approach now practiced by USIA.

However, increasingly in today's world, the broader public, or elements of the public, can and often do get into the act, either by way of extreme manifestations or public action in the form of demonstrations, picketing and rioting, or through the more peaceable process of periodic elections, in which international questions may become key issues, helping to elect or defeat governments either friendly or hostile to the U.S. interests.

Thus, in varying degrees public opinion abroad, as well as elite opinion, can be of great importance to the United States. In addition to the direct impact of public opinion on governments through the overt manifestations and elections mentioned above, congenial national climates of opinion can also have important indirect effects by way of encouraging and reinforcing attitudes and actions favorable to the U.S. on the part of the elitist elements which run the country—or, conversely, and perhaps even more importantly, by inhibiting unfavorable actions which, being unpopular, might be considered impolitic.

4. As stated in an earlier memo of mine on PPBS [Programming, Planning, and Budgeting System], even though I pioneered the selective target group idea while PAO in Italy, I have come to the conclusion, after going over the PPBS manual and a great many of the CPPMs [Country Program Plan Management Budgets], that by now USIA has become so super-sophisticated in its highly selective approach that it has lost sight of (1) the nature of the mass media (that is, their capacity for reaching large audiences), and (2), relatedly, its responsibility under the law for in-
fluencing public opinion abroad. One gets the impression that in most countries, at least on paper, the stated goal has been narrowed down to appealing well-nigh exclusively to (1) decision-makers, and (2) upper-crust public opinion moulders, relying on them to influence the broader public. The result is to hand USIA's responsibilities in regard to public opinion over the extremely small elitist elements which may not be inclined to do, or capable of doing the job required; and, in a larger sense, to put the reputation and fortunes of the United States into the hands of such elements as a kind of hostage. As explained below, this reliance also ignores some of the central findings of communications research on how public opinion can best be influenced.

5. Despite the foregoing considerations, I am not suggesting that the VOA try to reach mass audiences of general publics. To start with, as a great deal of psychological, communication, and sociological research makes abundantly clear, “the masses” in most countries have very little influence on most issues of concern to the United States; they are far too ignorant, unconcerned, apathetic, and politically impotent.

More importantly, the greater part of the public, in terms of education and interests, is not a likely audience for materials of the serious type the VOA wants—or should want—to dispense. In this sense, most of them are not a “reachable” audience. If exposed to such content, they will simply switch it off—either physically, by turning the radio dial to another station; or psychologically, by “blacking out” in such fashion as to pay little or no attention to the material to which they are physically being “exposed.” (Pertinent in this respect is a recent story in the Washington Post quoting missionaries to the effect that Brazilian Indians listen frequently to the VOA—not for the content of its broadcasts, to which they pay no attention, but just because they like the noise it makes.) The ability of the human animal to protect himself from exposures he does not find congenial or interesting is, in fact, truly staggering—by far the most serious limitation of all on the potential effects of any propaganda, or for that matter educational materials.

6. Communications research (as summarized, for example, in “Communications and Political Development”, edited by Lucian Pye) shows that really effective communication involves two stages or levels. First, there are the mass media; but, by themselves, unaided, their effects on the broader public are minimal. A second step is required: the intervention of informal opinion leaders or moulders, whom I shall call “activists,” who, having exposed themselves to what is disseminated by the mass media, then pass on information or ideas they have acquired to their own coterie of followers on a face-to-face basis. They are “concerned citizens” who are sufficiently knowledgeable about public affairs that others (friends, colleagues, neighbors) look upon them as “experts” and turn to them for advice on what to think about particular situations or problems.

7. Insofar as moulding public opinion is concerned, USIA, in setting up its present highly selective system of target groups, has failed to take
into account the fact that these "activists" are scattered throughout every society: they are not clustered exclusively at the very top of the socio-economic pyramid. The government officials, the bankers, the professors, the intellectuals, and the like may have great influence on government decisions and for this reason are important targets. But, when it comes to public opinion moulding, they have only limited clienteles (restricted normally to their own friends, colleagues, and people of their own class). They have very limited personal contacts with "the masses" and little or no role as activists vis-à-vis the "regular folk," who are much more apt to turn to a foreman in the factory where they work, a doctor or barber or storekeeper in their neighborhood, a friend or relative whom they think has superior knowledge. Generally, the person they turn to is above them in terms of education and knowledge; but not so far above as to make personal contact impossible or uncomfortable, and certainly not someone at the very top of the socio-economic ladder. (This again demonstrates how fanciful it is to rely on the highly selective elements USIA has chosen for its target groups to mould public opinion, as potent and important as they may be in influencing governmental and elite attitudes and behavior.)

8. In addition to reaching the present highly selective target groups because of their influence on governments, the goal of the VOA should be to reach these informal public opinion moulders or "activists" because of their potential impact on public opinion, leaving it to them to "spread the word" to "the regular folk" through face-to-face communication on an interpersonal basis. (Highly important in this respect are arrangements for obtaining continuing "feed back" from these activists, through such things as personal contact and research, to insure that the mass media are keeping in tune and in step with the thought processes of these activists.)

9. The identity of these informal leaders cannot be defined in occupational terms; they belong to many callings and many walks of life. The essence of the matter is that they are people whom others consider "experts" in one field or another. The influence of one may be confined to, let us say, farming methods; or another to village politics or problems—fields in which the U.S. normally has little interest. For the most part, it is those who are consulted about international matters who are of concern to us.

The characteristic that sets these leaders apart from their followers is that they are people with sufficiently broad horizons (or "reality worlds") to maintain a keen interest in foreign affairs; in short, they are "concerned citizens"—concerned about the world around them. In most cases, such breadth of interests connotes a certain degree of education—say at least at the high school level. Very few individuals with less than this amount of education can meet the necessary qualifications for attaining influence; thus the masses of the uneducated or semi-educated can safely be ignored by the VOA and other mass media.

These activists in international matters may be considered experts by
others because they have travelled abroad, or because they are known to follow international news in the newspapers or over the television or radio (even, perhaps, via the VOA!). Their status and prestige derive from the assumption that they have knowledge superior to that of those who seek their advice. Hence, they are strongly motivated to follow international matters closely, lest they lose their reputation as wise men, and hence their influence. Because of their motivation and interests they are a "reachable" audience insofar as the VOA and other mass media are concerned, so long as—but only so long as—they feel that, by exposing themselves to such sources, they can get information their followers do not have.

The programming implications of this fact are of the utmost importance: the content disseminated by the VOA must be pitched at a relatively high level of sophistication or these informal leaders will "drop out" because they won't feel they are getting the esoteric information which is their currency and stock in trade. To popularize program content unduly, to seek the common denominator, to reach out for mass audiences are sure-fire ways of alienating the activists, whose whole frame of reference and motivation are exclusivist, elitist and monopolistic.

* * * * *

WHAT THE U.S. INFORMATION PROGRAM CANNOT DO*

BY GEORGE V. ALLEN

An international information program cannot change the basic attitudes and opinions in foreign countries.

One of the great American fallacies is the notion, prevalent among people in all walks of life, that all we need to do is to explain ourselves, our policies, and our way of life to foreign peoples and they will love us—or at least will understand and sympathize with our point of view. I submit, however, that this point of view is not realistic, and those in the academic world and other professionals in communications should be tough-minded enough to face certain facts squarely and realistically.

While I was director of the United States Information Agency, I was often asked, usually by Congressmen, to explain why the Voice of America seemed to have difficulty in getting the American story across to the people of foreign countries. "It should be very simple," I was told. "All you have to do is to explain that our American way of life, including our democratic principles, our respect for human rights, and our private enterprise has developed in America the highest standard of living in the world. Everybody admits that not only the upper strata but the common man in the United States has more of the good things of life—more shoes and clothes and leisure time and music and vacations and opportunity for advancement than the people of other countries. Why can't you just keep pointing that out to them on [the Voice of America] VOA? The job should be easy."

However, ... Uncle Sam is regarded as Mr. Rich. We are presumed, with some justification, to want things to remain more or less as they are. We talk a good deal about evolution instead of revolution, and we make it clear that we do not want the government of Cuba to seize American-owned sugar refineries or other American property without adequate and prompt compensation. We insist on reforms--Latin America under the Alliance for Progress—but we want them to be instituted by orderly legal process, of course. This is all as it should be, but the miserably poor want to turn the world upside down—today. They regard the United States as basically in favor of the status quo. All rich people are supposed to be that way.

More significant, perhaps, is the fact that Moscow is regarded by most of the poor people around the world as the friend of the poor and of the rebel (outside the Moscow bloc!). So, when one asks how it is possible that so many Cubans seem to be attracted towards Moscow rather than the United States, the painful but realistic answer is because they think Moscow is more likely to support them than we are. Demagogues such as Castro or Peron, who depend for their chief support on the rabble, the shirtless, are likely to shout defiance at Uncle Sam, and their followers are likely to cheer them for it.

I repeat that the Voice of America cannot change the basic fact that we are rich, while most people in the world are poor. The more we talk about our high standard of living, the fewer friends we are likely to have.

* * * * *

Let us turn now from economic to ... [political] matters.

One of the principal foreign policies of the United States today is the decision to participate in and foster collective security for the nations of the free world. The purpose of the United States Information Agency, in the words of President Eisenhower shortly after the Agency was established in 1953, “shall be to submit evidence to peoples of other nations, by means of communication techniques, that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress, and peace.” In other words, we are to make our policies as convincing and acceptable to foreigners as we can, on the presumption that our policies are in harmony with their proper aspirations.

I was in India when the United States gave military aid to Pakistan under our collective security policy. The Angel Gabriel himself could not have made this palatable to the Indians or have convinced them that it was compatible with their aspirations—legitimate or otherwise. No matter what policy we adopt in the Kashmir dispute, we shall not convince
both sides that we are their friends. The same goes for the Arab-Israeli
dispute and a dozen others.

The heavy responsibilities of the United States in the world today
require us to take positions which frequently please nobody. Communi-
tcations techniques are important, but there is danger in expecting too much
of them. I was once told in the State Department that only the Voice of
American could win the Berlin dispute!

There is a tendency for college professors to claim too much in their
courses in the growing field of communications, or psychological warfare
as it is sometimes improperly called. Many universities are rapidly de-
veloping studies, and even faculties, in this specialized field. Its impor-
tance is undoubted, but if those in the academic world and we in govern-
ment overstate our case for communications, we are likely to make
trouble for ourselves. Propaganda itself can do little to remove the basic
problems of the have-nots, or the national rivalries of Pakistan and India,
or the racial animosities of Africa. Whatever it can do is a long process,
like education, and is not likely to avoid a takeover by a Castro in Cuba.

What we can do is to put forward as honest, objective, and truthful an
information program as God gives us to see the truth, make it available
to as many people as possible in comprehensible terms and by the most
effective media, and rest our case with the common sense of mankind. I
suppose one must have a mystic faith, as Jefferson did, in the ability of
the common man to make a right decision if given adequate information
and freedom of choice. If one does not have this faith, I doubt that he
should be in the communications field.

Let me repeat once more, however, that we must be realists. Berlin
will be saved from Soviet aggression by a combination of forces, including
political, economic, psychological, and military—the latter being possibly
the most significant in our present sad state of international chaos.

DEFEATING COMMUNISM IN MALAYA*

By C. C. Too

The first goal PSYOP should support in counterinsurgency is the separation of the
insurgents from the rest of the population. Once they are thus segregated, affirmative
military and political action can be directed at each.

A major characteristic of the Communist “national liberation struggle”
in mounting insurgency in the developing countries is the extensive
exploitation of the local civil population, particularly those in the rural
areas, to support and sustain the Communist organization. This was no
exception with the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) when it broke out
into its militant campaign of violence and terrorism making it necessary
for the government to promulgate a state of emergency during the period
of June 1948 to July 1960.

When the Japanese Army occupied Malaya in early 1942, the social-
economic conditions of the country suffered a total collapse. This was

*Excerpts from “Defeating Communism in Malaya,” Military Review, XLVII, no. 8 (Au-
gust 1967), pp. 82-92.

370
especially true in the urban areas where trade and industry were obliterated by Japanese occupation, and unemployment became rampant. Trade with the surrounding countries—particularly Thailand and Burma which supplied a high proportion of Malaya's staple food, rice—was practically nonexistent. Under the circumstances of a food crisis, there was a natural tendency for the people living in urban areas to migrate to the rural areas to engage in food production, mainly by “squatting” upon any suitable land and setting up their small vegetable gardens there.

SQUATTER AREA

Faced with the food crisis, the Japanese occupation authorities also took active and even drastic measures to drive the people out of towns and cities to the suburbs to engage in food production. The number of “squatters” increased enormously. The net result was to turn the entire countryside into an extensive “squatter area” mostly beyond the control of the Japanese occupation authorities.

The majority of the urban population in the Malay Peninsula was, and still is, of Chinese origin. While most of this Chinese population were not politically minded, nevertheless, the MCP, composed mainly of Chinese membership, existed in the country. Clandestine cells were active in exploiting the anti-Japanese sentiments of the local Chinese population in furtherance of Communist purposes. Communist activities were, therefore, hidden under the cloak of anti-Japanese activities.

When the Malay Peninsula fell under the Japanese invasion army in early 1942, the MCP took over the resistance movement, and the vast squatter areas of the country became their operational bases. Communism became synonymous with the desire to fight against the Japanese invaders.

Hand in hand with the so-called Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA), the MCP organized an ancillary supply, intelligence, and recruiting organization under the name of the MALAYAN People's Anti-Japanese Union as part and parcel of its Popular Movement (Min Yuen). These organizations had their members in the squatter areas which they used as their bases.

MASS TRIALS

During the period of the Japanese surrender, the Communists carried out “mass trials” before the return of the Allied forces to the Malay Peninsula. Many alleged collaborators were executed during the mass trials which the local population was forced to attend. During a period of three to six months, the Communists were in complete control of the smaller towns and remote villages before the Allied forces completed the process of taking over.

The MPAJA officially disbanded on 1 December 1945, but its cadres were retained as functionaries of the MPAJA Ex-Comrades Association and they were soon active in organizing various labor unions and popular organizations to carry on the Communist struggle.

With the rapid progress of rehabilitation, government machinery was soon restored in the major towns in the country. It took much longer,
however, for the civil administration to return to the smaller towns and villages. Furthermore, the large number of squatter areas which did not exist before the war were provided no administrative machinery whatever.

Malaysia, like the majority of Asian nations, is basically an agricultural country. To the landless squatters, the greatest and most pressing need is land. The gradual return of civil administration to the villages brought in a new concern: the government might eject them from the land upon which they were illegally squatting.

One of the most attractive propaganda lines of the Communist was land reform which had already proved extremely effective to the landless peasants in China, and the MCP was not slow in exploiting this line. In the various political programs issued by the MCP from time to time, there has always been the policy of giving land to the landless. No new land policy was forthcoming from the government and the MCP made capital of this to rally the squatters. In addition, it exerted an effective atmosphere of intimidation and extensive propaganda among the rural population.

POLITICAL FACTORS

To the hitherto nonpolitical rural population, the MCP carried out an extensive propaganda campaign explaining that the difficult social-economic conditions encountered by the squatters were attributable to their lack of political enfranchisement under a colonial regime. The MCP program called for the establishment of a “People's Republic of Malaya” with universal enfranchisement and all the democratic rights. It particularly emphasized safeguarding and improving the living standards of the peasants and workers. The MCP, with its numerous front organizations, was the only body in the entire country which was putting forth what appeared to be a positive and dynamic program. This was being done during a time when the colonial government was trying to reestablish its prewar organization and functions.

While the MCP was already in the process of going underground to launch the “highest form of struggles—the Armed Struggle,” government action took them by surprise in a series of raids in late June 1948. As a result, several of their leaders were arrested and later deported to China. Sporadic Communist attacks took place in rural areas, but it was not until December 1948 that the MCP issued its first campaign directive. This directive, entitled “Strategic Problems of the Malayan Revolutionary War,” was an adaptation of Mao Tse-tung's thesis entitled “Strategic Problems of the Chinese Revolutionary War” written in 1936.

MCP STRATEGY

The contents of this MCP directive followed closely Mao Tse-tung's thesis in an attempt to ascribe an identification of Malayan conditions in late 1948 with conditions in China in 1936.

Two major phases were envisaged by this directive. The first phase had the “enemy” on the offensive and the MCP on the defensive during
the early stages when "the enemy is strong and we are weak." During this phase, guerrilla warfare of attrition would be carried out by the MCP in order to wear down the enemy and, at the same time, to build up its own forces.

The main tactics were to be a series of sudden attacks upon enemy weak points with a maximum concentration of local MCP forces which would retreat upon encountering superior enemy strength. The capture of weapons and ammunition from the enemy was of great importance. MCP armed units would normally remain small in size to ensure maximum mobility. Only temporary bases would be set up, usually within the squatter areas, with the squatters themselves providing a protective screen.

Phase two would be reached when the MCP's armed units reached a sufficient size and strength to mount a "strategic counteroffensive." At this early date, the MCP did not talk about the third and final phase of Mao Tse-tung's strategy of positional warfare with permanent bases in the form of liberated areas.

The complete emphasis upon militant action which characterized this 1948 directive sowed the seed for the MCP's future defeat. It was a departure from Mao Tse-tung's later more balanced strategy of waging a double-pronged struggle simultaneously: the "armed struggle" in remote areas outside the sphere of government influence and control, hand in hand with a "peaceful legal struggle" largely by means of the Communist united front in urban areas under government control.

In actual fact, even during the first phase, the MCP was upset by unplanned, haphazard, government defensive military action which soon caused considerable demoralization and casualties among the ranks of the MCP's armed units.

GOVERNMENT REACTION

The government reacted by making great efforts to increase its military and police strength. On the whole, it was thrown on the defensive, rushing troops to reinforce remote places when these came under Communist attack and being ambushed by the Communists while on the way. When on rare occasions the government managed to go on the offensive, the Communists disappeared melting into the nearby squatter population.

The civil population was under complete influence of the Communists, either in sympathy or in fear of being intimidated. Many had relatives or friends among the Communists as a result of the MCP policy of incriminating all former members of the underground resistance movement, the MPaja, whether or not they were sympathetic to the Communists.

The colonial government, in a moment of panic, fell into the Communist trap. They treated practically all former resistance members as Communists and suspected almost every member of the local Chinese population as a Communist on the argument that the absolute majority of the
membership of the MCP and its front organizations were Chinese. The squatters came in for particular suspicion on this score and were treated by the colonial government accordingly.

The squatters saw the MCP fighting against the British Colonial Government for the power to rule over them, and they realized that during this process they would be drawn between the two fires. Even those who were initially attracted by the MCP's program of "land for the landless" and political enfranchisement for their own "people's government" had now to be intimidated and terrorized into actively helping the Communist in this crossfire. Rampant terrorism with brutal atrocities was committed by the Communists during this period to subjugate the rural Chinese population which consequently suffered the highest casualties during the entire campaign.

On the whole, the squatters reverted to the traditional attitude of the peasants in China who were drawn between the government forces on one side and the Communist forces or the bandits on the other. Both sides represented oppressive authority which tried to subjugate them and extort taxes and other payments from them. They would rather stay as far away as possible from the crossfire and hope each side would eliminate the other thus leaving them free from bother by government and antigovernment forces alike.

IMPORTANCE OF PROTECTION

It took the British authorities a period of time to realize the futility of blaming the defenseless rural population for noncooperation and fence sitting. It required a drastic reorientation of official thinking to wake up to the fact that such a policy had the effect of playing into the hands of the Communists by driving the people to the Communist side.

The obvious answer to this problem was to give the squatters reasonable protection from Communist intimidation and terrorism. This was physically impossible since most of the rural population were scattered over a wide area and a high proportion of them had their farms in remote places. Also, tens of thousands of rubber-tappers—who supported the major industry of the country—worked, and still work, in the extensive rubber estates stretching miles away from civilization.

One of the principal aims of the Communist terrorists was to destroy the major industries in order to plunge the entire country into an economic crisis, thus making it impossible for the government to pursue the anti-Communist campaign. Since rubber was, and still is, the major industry in Malaya, every effort had to be made to keep this industry going.

Because it was impossible to bring protection to individual rubber-tappers, squatters, and other members of the civil population, and since without protection the public could not be expected to resist the Communist terrorists even with the best of will, the idea was soon conceived by the British planning experts that individual members of the rural population could be brought to places where protection could be given. By
doing so, the Communist terrorists could be isolated from the rural population from whom they drew their sustenance. The result of this came out in the form of compulsory resettlement of squatters into new villages. NATIONAL REGISTRATION

On 1 March 1949, the government introduced the strict enforcement of national registration throughout Malaya. Under this measure, every adult had to register with the authorities and was issued an identity card bearing his photograph, finger prints, and his personal particulars, including the address of his residence. On the whole, the Communists and their supporters dared not present themselves for registration. This, therefore, had the effect of separating the goats from the sheep. In addition, useful information on the distribution of the squatters was provided by this measure as a basis for planning their resettlement.

On 28 May 1949, a regulation was promulgated providing the authorities the power to resettle the squatters and to clean up the squatter areas. This was quickly followed by the resettlement of squatters in sensitive areas as a purely military necessity. Owing to lack of experience and an inadequate staff, considerable difficulty was encountered in these early efforts at resettlement.

Meanwhile, the MCP saw the writing on the wall when the newspaper carried reports of the resettlement, and it lost no time in mounting an extensive propaganda campaign among the squatters encouraging them to resist resettlement. The squatters were told that they were being sent to concentration camps with resultant dire consequences, that they should not budge, and that the authorities could not move them.

Actually, those squatters who believed this propaganda and refused to move were removed physically from their huts, placed in military trucks, and taken to the new resettlement areas. There, because of their late arrival, they had to be satisfied with the last choice of sites for their houses. This had a salutary effect upon the squatters who now began to blame the MCP for the wrong advice given them.

As a result of experiences gained during the balance of 1949, it became obvious that haphazard, short-term planning, while essential in coping with the immediate military situation, was not enough. More comprehensive and long-term planning was, therefore, introduced. This new planning was launched by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs when he arrived in Malaya to take over the post of director of operations in April 1950. As a result, the plan is commonly known as the Briggs plan.

This plan called for a general review of the current operational situation in conjunction with the squatter areas. Suitable sites were studied and investigated for the resettlement areas. These were intended to grow into normal villages and townships upon the conclusion of the campaign, in addition to serving the immediate operational requirement of cutting the Communist terrorists off from the local population. Priorities were allocated, staff were recruited, and buildings and other material procured.
The resettlements were renamed “new villages” carrying the implication of a new and better life for the squatters. In these new villages, the squatters were given, among other things, these facilities for the first time in their life:

- Adequate protection from Communist terrorism.
- Land on which to build their houses.
- Free material and assistance in building their houses.
- Government subsidy for the initial period of resettlement for approximately three to six months until they could find employment in the new area or reap the first harvest of their short-term food crop.
- Free medical and health services.
- Free schooling for their children.
- Standpipes for their water supply.
- Good roads inside the new villages and to the nearest township.

POPULATION CONTROL

On the other hand, each person in every family was carefully registered by the resettlement officer who kept a complete roll of the population in the new village with a photograph of each person. Each visitor to the new village was registered as was any member of the new village going out to visit relatives or friends elsewhere. In short, complete control of the population was achieved.

The amenities provided in the new villages contributed greatly toward refutation of Communist propaganda against resettlement. While an appreciable amount of hardship and worry were no doubt encountered when the squatters were forced into leaving their old homes in the squatter areas, they soon realized the advantages provided in the new villages.

In August 1950, the MCP felt the effect so badly that it issued a directive entitled “Guide to the Anti-Resettlement Struggle” ordering that the squatters should be forced to resist resettlement to the bitter end. However, this failed to check the mounting momentum of the campaign.

VILLAGE DEFENSE

The new villages were sited in such a way that, apart from the availability of suitable land and all the normal considerations of maintaining a viable economy for the villagers under the circumstances, they were within easy distance of quick reinforcements should their military or police garrisons need help to defend the new villages against Communist attack. This was of utmost importance not only from the military point of view, but also from the viewpoint of the morale of the villagers which could affect the success of the entire campaign.

Each new village was surrounded by a double barbed wire fence approximately seven to eight feet high which was lighted at night. Gates were manned and everyone was searched when going through the gates.

Hence, the functions of the new villages were almost entirely on the tactical level in terms of local military operations, although the underlying principle of cutting the Communists off from the local population upon
whom they drew the sustenance may be given strategic connotations. Since the defense of the new villages depended on their proximity to nearby military centers, this made them potential linkages of expanding government control radiating from the military centers.

Constant perimeter patrolling and patrolling in depth in the nearby jungles also turned the new villages into satellite operational bases. This was coordinated with similar patrolling from the nearby military centers, thus making it difficult and eventually impossible for the Communists to make use of the terrain in between. The net effect was that government control expanded from such bases to link up with similarly expanding bases nearby. The Communists were either driven away or cut off into small isolated groups to be eventually eliminated piecemeal. In a sense, it was Mao Tse-tung's basic tactics of mobile warfare operating from permanent bases in rural areas being adopted by the government which was defeating the Communists.

The Malayan jungle is so neutral that even experienced Communist terrorists could not exist in groups larger than four or five persons. Even so, there was practically a full-time need to forage food in the form of scanty jungle vegetables and fruits and small animals such as rats and frogs. This left hardly any time to engage in Communist activities. Thus, even after resettlement, the Communist terrorists in the area had to remain near the new villages to obtain food and medical supplies from the residents when they came out to work in the rubber estates or tin mines.

INFILTRATION

Although the majority of the Communist terrorists and supporters took to the jungle upon the implementation of national registration and the resettlement scheme, nevertheless, a few of them were bold enough, or were surprised into being resettled. These Communist elements lost no time in organizing themselves and making contact with the Communist terrorists in the nearby jungle. They became 'masses organizations' inside the new villages under the direction of the Communist branch committee or armed work cell hiding in the nearby jungle, and were charged with the task of smuggling food, medicine, and other essential supplies to the Communist terrorist groups.

In June 1951, the government countered by imposing strict food control measures and stringent gate checks in the new villages, with the purpose of stopping food, medicine, and other commodities essential to the Communist groups in the Jungle. Searching booths were erected at the gates, and communal cooking of rice was introduced in some areas to prevent any private ownership of uncooked rice inside the new villages. Cooked rice, being bulky and perishable, could not be kept and smuggled out to the Communists.

Curfews were imposed on a 24-hour basis outside the new villages and during the hours of darkness within most new villages. All travel on the public roads had to be made under convoy and no stop was allowed between controlled areas.
By the end of 1952, there were 509 new villages set up with a total population of 461,822, mostly Chinese.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

The inability of the Communist Terrorist Organization (CTO) to stop the resettlement plan and the subsequent food control measures presented a telling setback upon the prestige of the CTO among the rural population. With protection and administration, public confidence in government was rapidly restored. There was a corresponding deterioration in Communist morale, especially when government military pressure was mounting at the same time.

A surrender policy was offered to the Communists by the government under which an increasing number of Communist terrorists gave themselves up for the hope of a new life. The surrendered Communists provided invaluable intelligence on their ex-comrades in the jungle and on the “masses organizations” within the new villages. Suitable surrendered Communists were selected to tour the new villages to tell the people of the unhappy conditions in the jungle and of rapidly dwindling Communist strength and morale. With success begetting more success, the entire process snowballed toward eventual defeat of the Communist terrorist campaign of violence in the “armed struggle.” The collapse had begun, and even the Communists recognized it.

Although the number of terrorist attacks and military and civilian casualties actually mounted in 1950 and continued to increase until 1952, three major disagreements took place in 1950 within the ranks of the CTO. These disagreements led to the execution of one senior leader and the surrender of two other senior leaders. If government intelligence at that time had been as good as it became later, the entire antiterrorist campaign could have been successfully concluded in 1953.

In April 1954, the second conference of Communist and Workers' Parties within the British Commonwealth was held in London. A representative of the MCP submitted a report to this conference which resulted in a resolution calling for peace negotiations with the government. On 1 May 1955, an announcement from the Malayan National Liberation Army General Headquarters called for peace negotiations and offered to send representatives to Kuala Lumpur to make arrangements for peace talks between MCP leaders and the government.

Meanwhile, development and progress in the new villages continued. In August 1950, announcement was made of the formation of the Home Guard on a voluntary and part-time basis. This group was to take over static defense and free highly trained troops and the paramilitary Police Field Forces to pursue the Communist terrorists deeper into the jungle. The result of this policy was that, for the first time, the suspected Chinese ex-squatters were soon given training and arms to take part in their own defense.

In June 1951, elections for village committees, to be known as local councils later, were first held in the southern state of Johore. This had
been a difficult area before and was, consequently, one of the four priority areas for resettlement. This was followed by similar elections in the states of Selangor, Negri Sambilan, and Perak.

In view of the frequent Communist propaganda calling for democracy, and the fact that there had not been any election within the Malayan Communist Party since World War II, this move was of particular significance. Although initially advisory in nature, the freely elected village committees were soon given increasing responsibilities.

Citizenship, and, therefore, political rights, became available to the Chinese in Malaya, and many Malayan citizens of Chinese origin voted in the first general elections in August 1955. This returned the Alliance Party to power to form a government under the principle of internal self-government promised by the British Government. Two years later, on 31 August 1957, the independent and sovereign Federation of Malaya came into being.

The tempo of the mopping up operation increased in consequence even after several attempts by the MCP to offer to talk peace. The state of emergency was officially ended on 31 July 1960, thus putting an end to the 12-year campaign.

At present, practically all the new villages set up during the Malayan anti-Communist campaign of June 1948 to July 1960 have become thriving villages or townships. All of the villagers have their own houses on land for which they are issued titles or leases by the government. Most villages have piped in water, electric lights, schools, and clinics.

The new villages have proved to be more important as a long-term silent social rural revolution in Malaya than merely a temporary measure to fight Communist insurgency.

The most important lesson learned during the 12-year anti-Communist campaign in Malaya was that of winning the civil population, particularly the rural population and the underprivileged, to the side of the government. This involves increasing government activities, coverage, and administrative facilities, and eventually changing the government itself when this became necessary. Military measures were essential, but had to be coordinated with civil government measures and took second place to administrative measures without which the military could not operate effectively in the long campaign.

More than anything else is the need for reasonably effective local government administration. This calls for the rapid recruitment and training of junior administrative officers. The importance of this in the developing countries anywhere in the world cannot be overemphasized.

AFTERWORD:
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMPLEMENTS MILITARY OPERATIONS

By Bert H. Cooper, Jr.

British psychological warfare operations in Malaya were insightful and provocative and brought some particularly effective results. An early
example was the creation of resentment against the insurgents’ tactic of slashing rubber trees. Propaganda leaflets in Chinese and Tamil told the workers on rubber plantations that the Communists, by destroying rubber trees, were “breaking our fellow-workers’ rice-bowls.” This campaign was so successful that the Communists finally ordered their guerrillas to desist from this type of sabotage.

After this campaign, the emphasis of the government’s psychological warfare program shifted to fomenting unrest within the Communist camp itself. One of the most imaginative psychological warfare tactics was the voice aircraft, a plane which flew low over the jungle and broadcast messages to individual guerrillas and units. On occasion, General Templer addressed the guerrillas in Chinese via voice aircraft and gave his personal pledge that none who surrendered would be ill-treated. Voice aircraft broadcasts and propaganda leaflets were both designed to create dissension between lower echelon guerrillas and their leaders. In October 1953, some 20 million surrender leaflets were dropped over guerrilla-held areas. Often prepared by ex-guerrillas who could speak from personal experience, these leaflets urged lower echelon guerrillas to desert, bring in their leaders, and collect liberal rewards, ranging from M$4,000 (US $1,333) to M$50,000 (US $16,666).

Propaganda was invariably aimed at the weak, the disgruntled and the weary who, as chances of a Communist victory appeared more and more remote, came out of the jungle in growing numbers. Hard-core leaders were usually impervious to this type of propaganda, and the government was the first to admit that psychological warfare alone would never have proved decisive. In fact, psychological warfare was only successful in tipping the scales when the guerrillas were already under intense pressure from food-denial operations and from military patrols operating with good intelligence.

NOTES
3 Hanrahan, Communist Struggle, pp. 75–77.

ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE*

BY BERT H. COOPER, JR.

Emphasis on the parallels between the interests of the audience and those of the communicator is an effective tool for winning public sympathy.

There was a high degree of consensus and consistency in official U.S. policy in regard to the Lebanon intervention of 1958 and general agreement among policymakers on the terms of American involvement in the crisis. The purpose of the military intervention was to prevent the overthrow of the Lebanese government by revolutionary violence sponsored by foreign governments regarded as unfriendly to American interests in the Middle East. However, it was never U.S. policy to maintain the

* Original essay by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.
incumbent government in power indefinitely, but only until an orderly transition could be effected. Nor did the United States intend to keep troops in the country for an extended period, but only until the governmental crisis was resolved and public security restored.

Despite the apparent simplicity and straightforwardness of this policy as viewed in retrospect, there was considerable misunderstanding of U.S. intervention at the time of the Lebanon crisis, and a major communication effort had to be made to explain why American troops had gone to Lebanon and the conditions under which they would be withdrawn. This theme was enunciated in the various statements by President Eisenhower addressed to the American people and Congress and was repeated in VOA broadcasts and USIA press releases around the world.

The leaflets produced by USIS/Lebanon in July carried this message to the Lebanese people. Entitled "U.S. Troops in Lebanon" and containing a 3" by 3" picture of President Eisenhower, the four-page leaflets began:

In response to an urgent plea from the Lebanese government, U.S. forces landed in Lebanon on July 15. The U.S. troops were sent to help preserve Lebanon's territorial integrity and political independence.

U.S. forces will be withdrawn as soon as the United Nations can take the necessary steps to guarantee the independence of Lebanon.

The rest of the leaflet text noted recent events in Iraq and Jordan, pledged American support of Lebanon's independence, stressed the need for U.N. action to resolve the Middle East crisis, criticized Soviet obstruction tactics at the United Nations, and promised prompt withdrawal of American troops once Lebanon's security had been established.

The leaflets distributed on July 21st set the basic thematic tone of the PSYOP effort for the entire period. VOA broadcasts and USIA materials constantly stressed the point that the Lebanese government had requested American troops to preserve Lebanon's territorial integrity and political independence.

Support of the U.S. intervention by the governments of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan and favorable press reactions around the world were also given prominent coverage in USIA media. The eventual withdrawal of American troops was presented as one of the incentives for achieving a political settlement that would guarantee Lebanon's independence and end the civil turmoil, but there was no suggestion that U.S. forces would leave before this condition had been met.

VOA broadcasts to Lebanon frequently emphasized Lebanese-American ties and the good relations that traditionally prevailed between the two countries, noting on July 25th that there were "some four hundred thousand Americans of Lebanese birth or descent living in the United States." This broadcast observed that "Lebanese-Americans—both Muslim and Christian—have taken root in diverse communities from coast to coast....Many of them have turned to farming, others to business and entertainment—especially radio and television—with marked success." The VOA announcer also reviewed U.S. diplomatic support and economic assistance to Lebanon since it achieved indepen-
dence at the end of World War II and hailed the American University of Beirut as a "living monument to American cultural and intellectual fellowship with this distant land."  

In September, VOA programs began stressing U.S. support for the new government then being formed by President Fuad Chehab and on October 8th a VOA news analyst reported that "barring unforeseen developments U.S. forces will all be withdrawn by the end of October." On October 25, VOA could announce that "the last of the United States combat troops in Lebanon left that Middle East country today, having fulfilled the American commitment to aid a friendly people."  

Throughout the intervention period the U.S. government emphasized that the action taken in Lebanon was a temporary expedient taken in the interests of that country and the preservation of world peace. President Chehab's pledge to achieve a political solution in which there would be "neither victors nor vanquished" provided a formula which neatly fitted U.S. foreign policy objectives in the country. Consequently, the two governments were able to agree on a positive propaganda campaign which appealed to Lebanese nationalism and self-interest.

NOTES

FOREIGN POLICY AND COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE HUNGARIAN UPRISING
By The Editors

If policy is unclear, the audience may misperceive it even when operators do not. Reactions may be harmful to the interests of both the communicator and the receiver.

In the fall of 1956 three major events dominated the international news: the Suez intervention, the political convulsion in Poland, and the more violent turmoil in Hungary. Although they might have remained predominantly localized problems, each was to have major ramifications in the Cold War atmosphere prevailing at the time. Certainly, in terms of international communications, the most important was the Hungarian uprising.
BACKGROUND

The Western countries had tried to break the isolation in which Hungary's Communist regime attempted to keep its people. Stringent limitations on the activities of the non-Communist foreign community in Hungary had the effect of restricting initiatives in the country to largely cultural efforts such as libraries, lectures, films, and language classes. Direct political communication consisted primarily of radio broadcasts (especially, BBC, RFE, and VOA, though other broadcasts originated from France, Germany, Israel, the Vatican, and elsewhere in Europe), and balloon leaflets. As limitations on foreigners sought to reduce the effectiveness of non-Communist activities in the country, so the Hungarian government attempted to undermine balloon-borne leaflets and radio propaganda by protesting the former and jamming the latter.

Since the 1952 elections in the United States, no clearcut U.S. policy had emerged with respect to the East European nations. The victorious party in that political campaign had established a platform in opposition to the "containment" policy of the incumbent administration and, instead, supported "rolling back the iron curtain" (a policy of "liberation"). Indeed, even after its installation in 1953, the new administration made reference to such objectives. However, it took no military action in the face of discontent in East Berlin (1953) and Poland (1956). Thus, it was not altogether clear whether liberation (1) had given way to a de facto containment policy, (2) awaited a situation more appropriate for military action, or (3) held more nuances than had originally been attributed to it.

RFE AND VOA AT THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLUTION

When the Hungarian revolution developed through protest demonstrations and political shakeups, RFE and VOA were caught in something of a policy vacuum. The reactions differed only slightly. The Voice, a part of USIA, responded by markedly increasing its output. The policy question, however, was more elusive. VOA relied primarily upon "straight news" coverage of the events taking place in Hungary with little analysis that could be called provocative. Although its Munich-originated programs may have used more editorial commentary, the predominant tone was straight and reportorial.

RFE made the decision in New York to proceed with a similarly restrained cast to its programming. However, this policy was not immediately effective at the RFE Munich branch where Hungarian emigres, staging something of a minor revolt themselves, viewed the situation as propitious for the beginning of a drive to push the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe. European-originated RFE criticism of the Nagy government was therefore rather harsh at times.

While the Hungarian insurgents were in control, communication between rebel groups was often carried out by the now free press. Insurgent newspapers and radio stations blossomed, many spreading information received from USIA or RFE. At the same time, RFE broadcasts in particular discussed many of the common demands of the various rebel
groups. Both RFE and VOA reported the proceedings of the U.N. debates on the Hungarian question and the comments of U.S. leaders.

THE QUESTION OF RESPONSIBILITY

The question that arose after the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian liberalization was the Western responsibility for the violence. Had Western communications, especially RFE and VOA, incited the revolution? Had they given false promises of American military support? Had they implied in their reports that such support was forthcoming? Or had they by their very presence implied such support might be forthcoming?

INCITEMENT

There have been numerous charges that VOA and RFE incited the Hungarians to revolt against their Communist government, but the several studies of the broadcasts have all refuted this charge. Indeed, the German Federal Republic and the Council of Europe both conducted critical studies of RFE soon after the Hungarian episode, and both reached the same conclusion.

PROMISES OF SUPPORT

Review of VOA broadcasts establishes irrefutably that no explicit or implicit promise was made by this official radio arm of the USIA. Similarly, even though the Munich programs continued to attack Prime Minister Imre Nagy after RFE had decided to support his reform movement, promises explicit or implicit of U.S. military assistance were not made by RFE.

More fundamentally, the operation and messages of VOA and RFE over a long period of time may be seen, and may have been seen by Hungarians, as a form of continuing U.S. commitment to the liberation of Eastern Europe, especially when taken in conjunction with the promises made in and repeated after the 1952 U.S. political campaign. In this view, what was needed to operationalize the perceived commitment was merely an internal revolt against Communist rule.

It is impossible to separate the charge that specific broadcasts of RFE during the uprising were interpreted by the listeners as indicating that the West would come to their aid, from the more general charge that the very fact that the West was broadcasting to the captive peoples would be interpreted to mean military support when a revolution broke out. But there is no doubt that the very existence of the American stations gave many Hungarians the impression that the United States would be willing to fight to save Hungary.

It is clear that Hungarians believed promises of U.S. assistance had been made to them, implicitly or explicitly, in radio broadcasts. It is clear that the promises had not been made. It is not clear to what extent the knowledge that such a promise would be necessary if the USSR chose to oppose the reform movement shaped the perceptions of the Hungarian audience, what role rumor and the unconscious mixing of sources of statements may have had, or how much the awareness of the liberation or rollback philosophy influenced those perceptions. The conclusions of the United Nations Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary are germane in these contexts:

In a tense atmosphere such as that prevailing in Hungary during these critical weeks, optimistic and encouraging broadcasts, which paid tribute to the aims of
the uprising, were welcomed. The generally hopeful tone of such broadcasts may well have been overemphasized in the process of passing from mouth to mouth what various speakers were alleged to have said. The attitude of the Hungarian people towards foreign broadcasting was perhaps best summed up by the student . . . who said: "It was our only hope, and we tried to console ourselves with it."

. . . The Committee feels that in such circumstances the greatest restraint and circumspection are called for in international broadcasting.10

CONCLUSION

Even after a review of the broadcasts of RFE and VOA had established the lack of grounds for charges of implied or explicit promises of Western military assistance, the ambiguity of official American policy in this regard—the campaign rhetoric and the fact that disavowal of force came only after the violence in Hungary—was such that the audience believed it received such promises.

It is commonly felt— at times even expressed—that ambiguity of commitment is advantageous, that the United States benefits from letting foreign officials believe there is an American commitment to them when the U.S. government does not in fact recognize the validity of such a commitment. However, the disadvantages of such a policy become clear when the United States is called upon to live up to the commitment that others have knowingly been allowed to perceive. Failure to "deliver" on such a commitment erodes the credibility of the communicator.

"Hungary was a classic example of the confusion between aspiration and action." The nonmilitary nature of the American commitment should surely have been made clear. The losers were not only unfortunate Hungarians who died thinking U.S. assistance was forthcoming but American political credibility as well.

NOTES


3 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1967), p. 76. For statements on this issue see the New York Times, June 2, 1952; August 9, 1952; August 14, 1952.

4 See the press conference remarks of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Press Release 83 (February 18, 1953).


7 Constance Udean Greaser, "The Role of the Voice of America in the Hungarian Revolt of 1956" (M. A. thesis, University of Southern California, 1966), pp.41ff; See also Stephens, USIA Meets the Test, passim.

8 Leroy Robert Rubright, "Voice of America Themes in International Crises: A Case
Study" (M. S. thesis, University of Wisconsin, 1958), points out in several cases the different tone Munich often took. See also Greaser, "The Role;" passim.

9 Robert T. Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1958), pp. 188-189; Reuben S. Nathan, "Making Policy is not the Propagandist's Business—Or is it?" in Chapter III of this casebook.


12 Ibid., pp. 190-191.


15 See sources listed in notes 7, 8, 9, and 10.


17 Holt, Radio Free Europe, Chapter 10

18 Ibid., p. 199.


20 See notes 16 and 17. Such promises were, however, made by at least one other radio station. An emigre-run station in Frankfurt made broadcasts of this type and was apparently often confused with RFE. Rubright, "Voice of America," p. 38; Holt, Radio Free Europe, p. 198. On the phenomenon of perception, compare the comments of John Johns, "Communication and Nation Building" in this chapter of the casebook.


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EFFECTIVE DIPLOMACY: AN EXIT FROM ARMAGEDDON*

By BERT H. COOPER, JR.

Effective PSYOP should leave a "way out"—a path from the brink of conflict.

Between January 1959 when the revolutionary government of Fidel Castro replaced the Batista regime in Cuba and the October 1962 "missile crisis," relations between the United States and Cuba deteriorated steadily as the Caribbean island moved away from its traditional economic dependence on North America. Following the termination of U.S. diplomatic relations with Cuba on January 3, 1961, the Kennedy administration eliminated the Cuban sugar quota, and on April 3, 1961 the U.S. government issued a pamphlet that expressed its determination to support future democratic governments in Cuba and to help the Cuban people achieve freedom and social justice. At the same time, President Kennedy pledged that U.S. armed forces would not intervene in Cuba under any circumstances to overthrow Castro.1

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*Original essay by Bert H. Cooper, Jr.
THE MISSILE CRISIS

Before dawn on the morning of April 17, 1961, an invasion force of some 1,300 men landed on the beach of Giron in the *Bahia de Cochinos* (Bay of Pigs) in south central Cuba. Opposed by some 20,000 government forces, the anti-Castro landing party met defeat in a matter of days, leaving over a thousand captives in the hands of the Castro government. The effect of the abortive invasion was catastrophic for U.S.-Cuban relations, and the episode set the stage for the developments which culminated in the October 1962 missile crisis. The Bay of Pigs incident confirmed Cuban charges of U.S. complicity in the anti-Castro movement. One immediate result of the Bay of Pigs was Castro’s public espousal of communism. He declared on May 1, 1961, that Cuba was a “Socialist” country and on December 2, 1961, that he was a “Marxist-Leninist.”

On October 15, 1962, U.S. reconnaissance photographs revealed for the first time the existence of medium-range and intercontinental-range ballistic missile bases in Cuba. Although knowledge of this development was restricted to a small group of the highest U.S. officials for a week, the Cuban missile crisis really began with this disclosure on October 15th. Between the 15th and President Kennedy's historic nationwide radio and TV address one week later on October 22nd, an *ad hoc* “executive committee” of the U.S. National Security Council worked under maximum security and with great haste to devise strategy and contingency plans to meet the Soviet challenge. Subsequent photographs indicated that other missile sites were in various stages of construction, underlining the necessity for a prompt reaction to what was clearly a very serious military threat to the United States.

Although it was estimated that the earliest completion date for the first missile bases was still about ten days away—allowing U.S. planners a margin of valuable time—the effect of the Soviet move was to place approximately half of the U.S. nuclear deterrent force (some 42 SAC [Strategic Air Command] and ICBM bases) and every major continental American city except Seattle within range of a no-warning nuclear missile attack. Altogether, 24 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) launching pads and 15 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) pads still under construction were identified. A total of 42 MRBMs were believed to be already in Cuba, with 6 more on the way, but there was never any evidence of any IRBMs in Cuba. It has been concluded that the Soviets intended eventually to bring at least 64 nuclear missiles to Cuba. There were also some 42 Soviet Ilyushin-28 jet bombers and 39 MIG-21 jet fighter planes in Cuba during the October-November period, as well as about 500 surface-to-air missiles regarded by the U.S. government as defensive weapons. The number of Soviet “technicians” and military personnel in Cuba during the crisis may have been as many as 22,000.
On the night of October 18-19, after careful consideration of several alternative strategies, the President and his advisors reached the decision to employ a naval blockade of Cuba as an initial measure. The use of a naval blockade, to be termed a "quarantine" for psychological reasons, would leave the President with the option of further military action later if necessary, including such possibilities as an air strike against the missile sites or even the landing of American troops in Cuba. It was felt that this approach by avoiding war while preserving the President's flexibility, would allow the Soviets time to reconsider their Cuban action and permit Khrushchev to retreat from his position with some dignity, a factor which Kennedy considered particularly important.\(^5\)

Once taken, this decision remained a tight secret until the President addressed the nation on the evening of October 22nd. Meanwhile, an intensive and elaborate process of military and diplomatic preparations was under way to bring U.S. forces around the world to alert status and to gain the support of friendly nations for the impending action against the Cuban missile threat. Within a few hours of President Kennedy's announcement, American diplomats abroad had briefed the heads of friendly foreign governments on U.S. plans. American communications media also had to be alerted to stand by for an important Presidential announcement on Cuba without compromising the security of the operation.\(^6\)

As a result of the previous week's careful preparation and the tight security that surrounded these efforts, the Soviets were apparently taken by surprise when the President announced to the world on Monday evening:

"...within the past week unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear capability against the Western Hemisphere.\(^\text{\ldots}\)"

This secret, swift, and extraordinary buildup of Communist missiles—in an area well known to have a special and historical relationship to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere, in violation of Soviet assurances, and in defiance of American and hemispheric policy—this sudden, clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil—is a deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever to be trusted again by either friend or foe.\(^\text{\ldots}\)"

Kennedy then stated that the U.S. objectives were "to prevent the use of these missiles against this or any other country and to secure their withdrawal or elimination from the Western Hemisphere." To implement these objectives, the President announced "a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba," pledged to continue close surveillance of Cuba while preparing U.S. armed forces "for any eventuality," warned that "any nuclear missile launched from Cuba" would be regarded as a Soviet attack on the United States "requiring a full retaliatory response," called for the removal of all offensive weapons..."
in Cuba under U.N. supervision, and appealed to Krushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace."

During the next few days, as some 180 U.S. naval vessels in the Caribbean moved into position to enforce the embargo on Soviet shipping to Cuba, the world waited anxiously for what many believed might be the beginning of a nuclear exchange between the two superpowers. When the United States released photographs of Soviet missile installations in Cuba, the Soviet U.N. delegation tried to deny the validity of this evidence, and Krushchev began circulating thinly veiled threats of nuclear warfare. Meanwhile, U.S. armed forces were mobilized for a possible attack on Cuba and defense of the United States and Western Europe in the event of a Soviet attack.

By the end of that fateful week, the first signs that the crisis might be settled short of war began to appear, and on Sunday, October 28th, Radio Moscow broadcast Krushchev's letter to Kennedy in which he stated that he has "given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The official Soviet explanation for this complete about-face was that since the U.S. government had now pledged not to invade Cuba their missiles served no further purpose in Cuba as they had been placed there solely for the defense of the island. The Administration was content to let Krushchev save face by this exercise in semantics, although in fact the so-called "no invasion" agreement was only a restatement of nonhostile intentions toward Cuba, which was not essentially different from earlier U.S. policy statements before the crisis began.

RESOLUTION OF THE MISSILE CRISIS

With the two major powers in substantial agreement on a settlement of the crisis, there still remained some difficulty with the Cuban government, which had not been included in the dialogue between Washington and Moscow. Castro maintained that since he had not been a party to the U.S.-Soviet agreement he would not permit on-site inspection by U.N. or Red Cross observers to verify the removal of the missiles. Furthermore, Castro claimed that the IL-28 aircraft had been given to Cuba by the Soviets and therefore could not be taken back, as Krushchev was now proposing to do. To resolve these differences with its Latin American ally, the Soviet government sent Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan, an able and shrewd high-level Soviet official, to Havana to explain the shift in Moscow's Cuba policy.

Under the compromise arrangements finally worked out, instead of the on-site inspection in Cuba that Castro steadfastly refused to allow, U.S. naval personnel observed and photographed the dismantled missile equipment exposed on the decks of Soviet vessels at sea, counting in this
way 42 MRBMs in all. U.S. air surveillance confirmed the removal of the Soviet missiles during November. Finally, in mid-November after the Soviet government persuaded Castro to agree to the removal of the disputed IL-28s within 30 days, the U.S. government officially ended the naval blockade around Cuba on November 21, 1962.11

By the end of the year, the crisis situation had ended in what most Western observers regarded as a highly successful exercise of international diplomacy. War between the United States and the Soviet Union had been averted at the very brink of a nuclear showdown that demonstrated American willingness to risk war over an area regarded as vital to its national interest, and the Soviets had been forced to make a significant retreat from the Western Hemisphere.

Cuban-Soviet relations were less congenial after the 1962 crisis, and Castro became even more of a maverick in the Communist camp after this experience with great power diplomacy.

United States-Cuban relations remained in a state of suspended hostility following the resolution of the missile crisis, and throughout 1963 there were recurrent reports of renewed Soviet military activity on the island, although the U.S. government denied that such activity posed an immediate threat to the security of the United States. Finally, there remained a running controversy over the so-called "no invasion" pledge which Khrushchev claimed President Kennedy had given but which the Administration steadfastly refused to acknowledge formally in the absence of any provision for on-site inspection to verify the removal of Soviet missiles and offensive weapons from the island. In retrospect, it appears that with all its ambiguities, the understanding between Washington and Moscow that led to the withdrawal of the missiles and planes may be credited with meeting "J.S. strategic objectives in the situation, while at the same time permitting the Soviets to do so with a minimum loss of face.12

NOTES
DEFCCTOR OPERATIONS*

BY JOHN OZAKI

Defector operations must be carefully planned and coordinated at all levels.

Because of the economic and political instability that prevails during internal defense operations, many insurgents can be persuaded to return to their government's cause if a sound defector plan is instituted.

From the experiences of the successful campaign against the Huks in the Philippine Islands, and the more recent Chieu Hoi (open arms) defector program in Vietnam, it is now possible to formulate a defector program for internal defense and development. Success, of course, will depend upon proper implementation.

The successful defector program requires national coordination and should have the objective of supporting the existing government by:

- Inducing the maximum number of insurgents to discontinue voluntary support of the insurgent program and to support the legally constituted government.
- Exploiting for intelligence and psychological operations (PSYOP) those individuals who have returned to the side of the government.
- Fulfilling promises to defectors by providing them and their families security and economic support, to include vocational and job opportunities to help them become self-supporting.
- Enlisting the defectors for specialized jobs and units where their knowledge of the enemy's techniques can be utilized.

In cases where the United States is advising a host country on military matters, to increase the chances of a successful defector program, US representatives to the host country at the national level should seek approval of the following policies:

- The host country should establish an agency to be responsible for execution of all aspects of the defector program. This agency should be equal in status to major components of the government such as the military departments and the national police. This agency's organization

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should function on the principle of centralized direction and decentralized execution from the national to the lowest level.

- US agency responsibilities and policies for defector operations must be clearly established from the national level down to receipt of a defector by a combat unit.
- Combined agreements should be made whereby a review of performance can be accomplished for the purpose of replacing ineffective administrators.
- The responsible US agency should have control of funds provided by the United States that are used in direct support of the defector program.
- Combined civilian and military counterparts should be established at each level where major defector operations take place. These would include district, sector, regional, and national levels as appropriate to the territorial organization of the country.

The objective of the inducement program should be to cause the members of the insurgent forces to quit their cause and join the legitimate government. The over-all effect should be to let the insurgents know that the government is aware of their plight and wants to forgive and welcome them back. Also closely associated with this program is the requirement of informing loyal citizens and military organizations about the program. These are the groups which play an important role in the rehabilitation of the defectors. The loyal citizens must accept the defectors back into the society or the defectors will probably return to the insurgent side.

Inducement operations should be the responsibility of PSYOP personnel although intelligence organizations also play a major role in this part of the program. The intelligence community can provide the PSYOP personnel information gained from interrogations determining why insurgents have quit their cause. If feedback provided by intelligence is timely and valid, this information can be used to induce more insurgents to quit their cause. Intelligence organizations will benefit from this type of mutual support because, with more insurgents defecting, there is the probability of increased intelligence.

THEMES

Before a PSYOP program can be effective, a careful analysis must be made to determine the vulnerabilities of the insurgents. Common vulnerabilities of insurgent forces are hardships, disillusionment because of the slow progress toward objectives stated by the insurgent leaders, and fear of getting killed. To be effective, the term “hardship” must be translated into meaningful facts such as insufficient medical services, low pay, and long family separations. The success of any PSYOP effort will depend on close coordination with intelligence agencies.

Maximum use of radio, loudspeakers, newspapers, leaflets, and other publications will be the mainstay in the dissemination link. The PSYOP operator, however, must constantly seek new and unusual techniques to spread the word of the government concerning the promises of the
defector program. Innovations such as badges, postage stamps, and imprinted balloons will help publicize the defector program. Encouraging local government officials to speak about the program may also help.

PSYOP UTILIZATION

Former insurgents should be used to the maximum extent possible in inducement operations. They can be extremely effective in developing PSYOP material because they know the environment and the modus operandi of the insurgent. If defectors are integrated into the PSYOP effort, their knowledge of the habits, customs, and idiom of the insurgents will make the PSYOP effort more effective. Additionally, these individuals can be used to evaluate PSYOP material before it is disseminated.

Small units of armed defectors should be organized to perform propaganda missions in locally contested areas. Such units can be effective since they speak with firsthand knowledge. For security, however, selected individuals of known loyalty should be incorporated in these special units.

An effective system of rewards is one of the most important aspects of a defector program. Rewards should be coordinated to insure that each man is paid for his actions which are helpful to the government and that the amounts are equitable. A central office monitoring all rewards can establish a well-publicized standard scale to insure that rewards are in line with those previously paid. Defectors should be questioned to determine if they have received all rewards due them.

Speed in making rewards is necessary so that the impact of the deed is not lost; consequently, funds should be made available to local officials so that rewards can be paid immediately. When security permits, rewards should receive wide publicity to show the insurgents that the government lives up to its word. This added emphasis may induce other defections, particularly when large sums of money are involved.

Exploitation of the returnees involves obtaining information, disseminating the intelligence derived from this information, and using the intelligence to defeat the enemy. Some major considerations concerning the exploitation of defectors are:

- Treatment promised returnees must be fulfilled. Initial reception is particularly important because the treatment an individual receives will have an important bearing on how much he will contribute to the government. A returnee who is properly treated may even volunteer for exploitation for intelligence and PSYOP roles. On the other hand, an individual improperly treated becomes an easy target for reindoctrination by antigovernment forces.

- Qualified interrogators should be available at the lowest level possible. This is important because of the insurgents' characteristic of frequently moving. It is imperative that defectors be interviewed within the first few hours after defection to determine their knowledgeable. Interviewers also need the necessary communications to disseminate information to responsive units. When the number of qualified interrogators
is limited, consideration should be given to pooling and dispatching
them by air as the situation requires.

- Security must be provided the defector and his family. Insurgent
forces are likely to place maximum effort on retaliating against a defector
or his family to discourage other defections.

- Clearly defined policies on exploitation must be established.

One of the major problems confronting a commander concerning returnee
exploitation is that many of his officers and men will not trust the
defectors. To counter this logical distrust, the commander must imple-
ment a massive command information program which includes handling,
treatment, and use of defectors. Experience has proved that one of the
best ways to reverse the feeling of distrust is to publicize the help that
defectors give to the friendly forces. The returnee's knowledge of the
insurgent tactics, terrain, and current situation is invaluable to the coun-
tering forces.

One of the most difficult problems facing the friendly forces is to
identify the enemy. The defector will often be the only person who knows
who the enemy is; consequently, a major task of friendly military person-
el is to exploit this knowledge. Former insurgents may be used as
scouts, guides, members of collection and reconnaissance units, monitors
for interpreters, and in psychological operations.

When working with a defector, special interrogation procedures are
necessary. Experience has shown that most defectors will talk freely
without the use of pressure. Generally, the best technique is to employ
the interview method of interrogation. The interviewer first must gain
the confidence of the defector, and interviews should not be continued
unless the interviewer believes that good rapport and communication
have been established.

Normally, defectors are highly apprehensive immediately after their
escape. As a result, it will often require several interviews before com-
munication can be established. It may be useful to have earlier defectors
talk to all new returnees to convince them that they have made the right
decision by defecting.

The interview environment is extremely important. Although a private
room is desirable, elaborate equipment is not necessary. With new defec-
tors, it is helpful to have intelligence requirements mentally fixed so that
resort to paper and pencil is not necessary. The defector should be
convinced that he is important and has valuable information that can be
used to help defeat the enemy.

Rapid and accurate interrogation of knowledgeable returnees is neces-
sary if effective exploitation is to be accomplished. Generally, the best
procedure is to use the normal military communications to report inform-
station gained from interrogations. Communications available to police,
government officials, and other sources, however, must be coordinated
because many of the insurgents will defect to other governmental agen-
cies rather than military units.

Reporting by headquarters parallel to those of the existing government
will speed information to the user. If the country is so organized, there would be a military reporting headquarters at district, province, and region. Forms used for reporting must be simple, and some basic information should be reduced to blocks designed for checking. It often will be beneficial if the forms are bilingual.

Intelligence agencies must keep the lower echelons informed of their special requirements so that special reports can be forwarded. Each echelon in the reporting channel must keep a reference file on all defectors with basic information such as date of rally, area of operations, former job with insurgents, special knowledge, and disposition. This information should be readily available so that an individual can be quickly located for exploitation at any time.

SECURITY

Security for defectors is essential to the success of the program. If the exploitation program is working well, the insurgents will counter it by attacks against individuals and compounds where returnees are kept. Normal active and passive security measures can be improved by organizing the defectors into self-defense units. Special protection must be given to high-level defectors—perhaps evacuating them from the immediate battle area even though they may be able to provide exploitable tactical information.

Special consideration must also be given to a defector’s family. Immediately after a person defects, the location of his family should be determined. If they are in an enemy controlled area, the defector’s identity may have to be concealed before he can be exploited. When defectors cannot be exploited because of the family’s location, plans should be made to evacuate the family to a secure area to prevent reprisal.

A successful defector program must include effective means for rehabilitation of returnees. This phase of the program must receive national support if it is to succeed. Planning and coordination of national resources are required to provide jobs, arable land, and educational facilities.

RECEPTION CENTERS

Rehabilitation begins at the reception center as soon as a returnee has been exploited for intelligence and PSYOP. Centers should be established in secure areas near the defectors’ homes if possible. It is of the utmost importance that all promises disseminated by the PSYOP program be fulfilled as soon as possible.

A new returnee must be made to feel welcome. Experience has shown that an effective way to help a new returnee overcome initial shock is to assign him a sponsor—a returnee who has been at the center for some time. Additionally, a special ceremony, such as a retreat formation, should be held to introduce this individual to the rest of the group. In addition to temporary jobs, such as sponsoring members, returnees should be hired to fill as many of the permanent administrative jobs at the
center as possible. They know the problems of the returnee; therefore, they can be very effective in rehabilitating the former enemy.

While at the centers, individuals should be given reindoctrination courses on government objectives and the responsibilities of individual citizens. Detailed programs of instruction can be centrally prepared, and supporting reference materials should be provided the rehabilitation administrators.

Vocational training may have to be centralized because of limited facilities and qualified instructors. This training should be on a voluntary basis, and national coordination is required to insure that those individuals who successfully complete vocational training can be gainfully employed.

To assist in their own protection, defectors should be organized into self-defense groups. The rehabilitation complex should be tied into the defense plan of the area, with some government forces placed in support of the center or located close by. Within the center, a system of planted returnees should be used to determine if the enemy is trying to infiltrate the program. These specially trained individuals should also evaluate the centers' effectiveness, to include determining if the centers are providing the defectors all benefits due them.

The defector program must include a followup phase to determine if the defectors are remaining loyal to the government and if they are becoming self-supporting.

Field representatives working with the police should receive information from the defector administrators when defectors have moved into their areas. They should determine what problems, if any, the defectors are having in being accepted by the general population. As a minimum, a system must be established whereby an ex-insurgent is required to register with the police in the area where he resides. The police would then be responsible for the security and surveillance of these individuals.

Returnees whose home areas may be under insurgent control may have to be provided temporary homes. It is not advisable to place them in defector villages because they then become easy targets for the insurgents, and this positive identification may make it harder for them to be accepted by the general public. Defectors should be resettled where they can find employment in the trade learned during the rehabilitation portion of the program.

History has provided many examples to demonstrate that a sound defector program can be a valuable aid in defeating an insurgent movement. A good defector program supports the existing government by reducing the number of active insurgents, gaining support from the general population, and providing information which can be exploited to defeat the enemy. A good defector program is another form of combat power. To neglect it invites a longer conflict and unnecessary casualties. When the insurgent's voluntary support from the mass base is served, his movement will end.
NEGLECTED DETERRENT: PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATION.

By WILLIAM F. JOHNSTON

Some insurgents are able to translate widely held grievances into affirmative action. Through effective communication they crystallize popular emotions into personal commitment.

The struggle in Vietnam is not a new type of conflict. Almost every facet of it is simply an adaptation of the strategy, tactics, and psychological techniques which Mao Tse-tung evolved in China. Both Ho Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung understood and made extensive use of psychological means to generate power and to wage and win conflicts.

Ho’s methods might be characterized as more subtle and less violent than Mao’s. Every Viet Cong action—from use of agit-prop for stirring up hatred in the neglected farmer, to killing the corrupt landlord, to forays into the countryside by armed propaganda teams, to outright guerrilla warfare against GVN forces—was planned and calculated to get the great masses of peasant workers organized into a totally mobilized force (every man, woman, and child) under the iron control of the Communist party. A basic rule of thumb appears to be that every action undertaken by the Viet Cong leadership was aimed at strengthening the Vietnamese Communist Party and at weakening their opposition.

The basic source of Viet Cong power did not lie in their Communist ideology, but rather in the slumbering needs, grievances, emotions, and hatreds of the people, individually and collectively. This power was generated by clever Communist agit-prop on a huge scale. Through many Communist-inspired local social organizations, originally established to help right some wrongs, the people got a taste of power, were corrupted, and became caught in the Communist web, unwittingly used and later sacrificed for the benefit of the Communist party in South Vietnam.

[HISTORICAL BACKGROUND]

How did they, the Communists, accomplish this task? Captured Viet Cong documents credit agit-prop action, to educate and change the thinking of the masses, as being “half the resistance work.” To appreciate this and to understand the long term psychological complexity of the Vietnamese War, it is necessary to go back 37 years when the Indochinese Communist Party was founded by Ho Chi Minh. General Giap tells us: “After ten years of heroic, political struggle [propaganda and education of the masses] at the dawn of World War II, the Party advocated preparation for armed struggle and the launching of a guerrilla war.” For students of psychological operations, this is of significance along with the facts that: (a) the second military unit created (December 22, 1944) in the Vietnamese Communist Party was the “Propaganda Unit of the Viet


397
Nam Liberation Army;  
(b) during the World War II period, the "Party continued to do its utmost to step up propaganda and agitation among the people, to gather all patriotic forces into the Viet Minh, to build guerrilla bases, and to make preparation for armed insurrection;"  
and, (c) to do this "The most essential and important task was to make propaganda among the masses and organize them."  

In the early stages of the Viet Minh-French conflict, Ho Chi Minh's guiding principles were (1) armed propaganda which would insure that "political activities were more important than military activities," and "fighting less important than propaganda," and (2) "not to attempt to overthrow the enemy, but try to win over and make use of him."  

These guiding principles were applied more vigorously against the urban-oriented Diem regime than against the French and are of great significance to the student of psychological operations because they combine agitation and propaganda with armed struggle—the kind of power Mao Tse-tung said "grows out of the barrel of a gun." Ho Chi Minh used this, not in the sense of conventional armed force, which is military power, but in small squads or platoons of agit-prop cadres armed for their own protection, as a threat and for the psychological effect the presence of guns induced in the unlucky rural audience. It took the power of the gun to make it safe for Ho Chi Minh's Viet Cong agitators to enter unfriendly villages and hamlets and it took the power of the gun to persuade people to assemble and listen to what the agitators had to say.  

[PRICR INVESTIGATIONS]

What the agit-prop cadre said was usually based on a detailed prior investigation  by a secret Communist agent in the village. In this way what they had to say made good sense to the villagers. Action to get land for the workers and lowering the taxes were favorite subjects. In the absence of help from the government's side, the agitators pressured the villagers to attend more and more such meetings where agit-prop cadre incited disrespect for the GVN and fanned the sparks of popular discontent. The Communist power of the gun was there if a bully or some corrupt or hated person presented an opportunity for the Viet Cong to gain influence by eliminating him. This often was done in a way that would get the people involved and engender guilt feelings.  

The combining of agit-prop with the "barrel of a gun" into what Ho Chi Minh called "armed propaganda" followed (1) Mao Tse-tung's principles of "treat the illness in order to save the man," "apply persuasive reasoning,"  and "striking and stroking alternately;"  (2) his strategy of pitting one Communist against ten of the enemy; and (3) his tactic  of pitting ten Communists against one of the enemy in order to subdue them one at a time and persuade them to join the Communist side. In essence, the Viet Cong armed propaganda cadres were used in a form of low key guerrilla warfare against the people to gain control over the rural population as a base of operations in preparation for the time when guerrilla warfare would be initiated against GVN armed forces.
Another significant aspect of Viet Cong psychological techniques is the principle of getting everybody with whom they come in contact actively involved, wittingly or unwittingly, in psychological work, e.g., passing on the party line, agitating and propagandizing, devising slogans, writing these slogans on every conceivable thing available including the bark of trees, preparing and distributing slogan slips, writing letters, proselyting military personnel to defect or act as agents, and/or in general being a nuisance and applying political pressure against the legitimate government.

[CONCLUSION]

The extent to which the Viet Cong agitation/propaganda cadres and three-man cells were able to involve village and hamlet people in mass activities which benefitted the people in a short-term, small way, and the Viet Cong in the long-term, large way, is not fully appreciated by those unacquainted with the comprehensiveness of Viet Cong psychological activity. One Vietnamese official educated in America has characterized the Viet Cong agit-prop cadre as performing a "cheerleader" function. Such a description disguises the real purpose of the Viet Cong to condition people to their commands and to use them to further Viet Cong ends.

The masses of people were encouraged, for example, to participate in demonstrations against GVN authorities and to demand compensation for damages—damages for acts which the Viet Cong leadership had tricked the GVN police and army units into taking against the people.

NOTES

1 "Agit-prop" is communist jargon for agitation and propaganda. It has the objective of inciting rebellion and gaining support of the people for Communist objectives. Agitation is the person-to-person propagating of a few ideas to many people. Propaganda, in communist terms, is the propagating of many ideas, or a sort of one-sided education, to a few people, usually the cadre (Communist Party leadership element organized into three-man cells).


3 Pike, Douglas. Viet Cong: The Organization and Techniques of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, p. 132. Pike states that 6,000 agit-prop cadres worked out of district levels. When this number is multiplied by more than 240 districts in South Vietnam, the magnitude of the effort is apparent. The job of these cadres was to get the people involved in convincing themselves, a "form of self-agitation."


5 Ibid., p. 50.

6 Ibid., p. 51.

7 Ibid., p. 78. (author's italics).


9 Giap, Vo Nguyen. People's War: People's Army, p. 79.

10 The "Five Steps in Operation of a Revolution" set forth in a captured Viet Cong document are: Investigation, Propaganda, Organization, Training, and Struggle. "Every cadre of the Party is a propagandist." For the translation see CRESS, American Univers-

11 Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works, Volume IV, states, “In treating a case of ideological or political illness, we should never resort to violence, but adopt the attitude of ‘treating the illness to save the man,’” p. 44. On persuasive reasoning he states, “If our reasoning is persuasive and to the point, it will be effective. In reasoning we must begin by administering a shock and shouting at the patient, ‘You are ill,’ so that he is frightened into a sweat, and then we tell him gently that he needs treatment,” p. 49.


13 Mao Tse-tung, op cit, I, p. 239.

TACTICAL PSYOP

The distinction between strategic and tactical PSYOP is sometimes an arbitrary one. Certainly, tactical PSYOP should support the achievement of strategic objectives. Identification of PSYOP initiatives that are closely tied in with combat operations but are developed to achieve longer term goals as “tactical” or “strategic” seems misleading. In several of the essays in this chapter the interrelationship of long and short term objectives illustrates this ambiguity. “Tactical PSYOP and Strategic Objectives” demonstrates the PSYOP efforts used by one government at the combat operations level to support longrun national objectives.

Blindness to the validity of a strategic-tactical dichotomy in certain contexts may be a major problem, however. If, for example, tactical objectives are enemy desertion or refusal to fight, it is unproductive and may be counterproductive to labor “strategic” arguments such as the immorality of the opponent’s goals or techniques. This confusion of strategic and tactical (in the context of political appeals to American soldiers) has been a recurring problem in Viet Cong/North Vietnamese propaganda. Similarly, communications that will be understood as “boasting” or deprecating the audience’s military abilities are generally ineffective. Both of these characteristics are also erroneous in being remote from the immediate needs of fighting men.

However, VC/NVA propaganda has shown sophistication in detailing the modalities of surrender. This is a matter of immediate concern to many troops in combat situations. Even the contemplation of surrender is likely to cause anxiety because barriers of language and culture are present. This is clearly a concrete problem. “Operation Strike” during the Korean conflict used messages of immediate pertinence to the audience, suggested concrete and realistic action, and established credibility by observable fact: uncontested control of the skies during the leaflet drops.

Individually directed surrender appeals constitute another method of approaching concreteness. The two programs described here by Colburn B. Lovett employed highly effective technical and logistic support, but it was the combination of military pressure and PSYOP that brought results. PSYOP cannot work effectively toward the realization of identified objectives without full support and the integration of PSYOP into the larger government program.
The last essay in this section has relevance for the casebook as a whole. Martin F. Herz, in describing the weakness of U.S. and South Vietnamese appeals to North Vietnamese soldiers to defect, has provided a classic example of "overlearning." It is imperative that although refinement of PSYOP is sought on the basis of evaluations of past effectiveness, effectiveness of a technique in one situational context is not presumed to be the panacea in other dissimilar environments. This stricture is not an easy one to work with, because the key factors that differentiate one situation from another are usually undefined and often elusive.

Although strategic and tactical PSYOP overlap in many specific instances, a basic conceptual difference between communications developed to support long-range state interests and those used to support immediate, combat missions is essential. This section gives examples of the relationship of tactical to strategic objectives in PSYOP, the importance of the concrete appeal in tactical PSYOP, the cruciality of learning from experience, and the danger of "overlearning."

TACTICAL PSYOP AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES

By THE EDITORS

Exploitation of tactical opportunities for strategic PSYOP can be crucial to achievement of long term goals.

One of the major causes of popular disaffection from the government during the early years of the Hukbalahap insurgency (1946–1964) in the Philippines was the mistreatment the populace endured at the hands of the security forces. Accounts of individual abuses of police powers in the Philippines are legion. From independence until 1950, the security forces were poorly trained and suffered from bad morale and worse discipline. In the field, troops typically foraged for supplies at the expense of poor peasants whose food and equipment were seized. Indiscriminate firing of weapons resulted in unnecessarily high noncombatant casualties. Worse, the Philippine Constabulary sometimes shelled whole villages when some residents were suspected of harboring or abetting Huk. Suspects were seized without due process of law and often beaten or treated in otherwise inhumane fashion. Police corruption was widespread and resulted in such bitter, frustrating experiences for the peasants that many of them supported or joined the Huk.1

After Ramón Magsaysay became secretary of national defense in September 1950, however, a number of important and effective steps were taken to protect noncombatants during tactical operations and to build their confidence in their military forces.

An innovation in tactical organization helped to reduce the inadequate supply situation in the armed forces which had led to foraging by troops in the field. Institution of self-sufficient battalion combat teams (BCTs) reduced the interdependence, which, because of inadequate support had slowed army responsiveness until 1950. The BCTs displayed initiative, flexibility and resistance to Huk intelligence-gathering. BCTs were "autonomous in almost every sense except for strategic command, which was
placed under the commander of each of the four military areas in the country."

Second, in those cases where security forces abused their authority or did not treat civilians with the respect to which they were entitled, an effort was made to insure that prompt and appropriate punishment was meted out. Because the objective was popular sympathy, not merely appropriate punishment, a certain degree of publicity attended these self-administered acts of justice on the part of the military.3

Third, civil affairs officers were attached to each unit to contact and work with the people—to inform them of the government's objectives and to make the military aware of the needs, interests, and problems of the local citizenry. This activity was also one of a series designed to overcome the troops' previous lack of positive contact with the Filipino masses. It resulted in close relationships, more effective civic action programs, and better tactical intelligence. Civil affairs officers were also responsible in large measure for the implementation of the population protection program.4

A further instrument to insure that the armed forces acted with self-restraint toward the civilian population consisted of an arrangement with the Philippines telecommunications facilities whereby any citizen, for the equivalent of five cents, could send a telegram of complaint about troop behavior directly to Secretary Magsaysay's office. In turn, the Secretary maintained a pledge to respond to each complaint and initiate an investigation into the circumstances that gave rise to it within 24 hours of the receipt of the telegram. The availability of this means to redress grievances and the determination of the government to follow through on resulting telegrams in order to build popular support were impressed upon the armed forces for maximum deterrent effect.5

Yet another change involved the dispatch of military doctors with individual units while the units were assigned operations in the field. The function of the doctors was to serve the noncombatants as well as the military. They provided medical aid to civilians who were injured through combat operations or accidents to such operations, but also provided general medical attention to people who in many cases had never seen a doctor before.6

As progress in the program to protect and work with the indigenous population became marked, even more flexible approaches to insure the protection of civilians from abuse, loss, or casualty during tactical operations were essayed. By May 1954, in the words of one writer, "the patrols were firing at the Huks only as a last resort." Through these and other initiatives, PSYOP at the tactical level contributed to the major strategic objective of the government—reacquisition of the loyalty and support of the population.

NOTES

1 See, for example, Richard M. Leighton, Ralph Sanders, and José N. Tinio, The Huk Rebellion: A Case Study in the Social Dynamics of Insurrection (Washington, D.C.: 402
LESSONS FROM VC/NVA PROPAGANDA*

BY MARTIN F. HERZ

Study of enemy propaganda can improve friendly PSYOP and counterpropaganda.

The lessons to be learned from mistakes of enemy propaganda are sometimes more accessible to us than lessons from the mistakes of our own propaganda, simply because the enemy's propaganda addressed to our troops is in English. Viet Cong (VC) and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) leaflets addressed to American troops showed a good deal of sophistication but also some blind spots. (As discussed elsewhere, our own propaganda addressed to VC/NVA personnel also showed some blind spots.)

LACKING METHOD

If a systematic effort had been made to refine appeals in the light of intelligence about their effectiveness, one would have expected a gradual concentration on the most effective appeals and thus a decreasing variety. Instead, there was a continuing variety of appeals (on both sides). The

*Original essay by Martin F. Herz.
great variety is presumptive evidence of the lack of a methodical approach.

The VC/NVA used the following appeals in their leaflets: (1) testimony of American deserters; (2) testimony of released POWs; (3) divisive appeals addressed to Negroes and Puerto Ricans; (4) appeals for mutiny and reports about alleged antiwar demonstrations of U.S. soldiers in Vietnam; (5) appeals addressed to specific U.S. units; (6) instructions on how to surrender and assurance of good treatment; (7) general purpose (strategic) morale lowering; (8) cross reporting of antiwar protests in the United States; (9) very rarely, sex themes; (10) more often, calls for negotiation with NLF; (11) anticapitalist propaganda; (12) very frequently, dissemination of complete partly declarations. There were others as well.

"DIRECTIVE" LANGUAGE

Running through the Communist output was something that may also have been present in RVN propaganda and which only the most stringent self-examination will avoid: "directive" language, that is, formulations that seem normal and everyday usage to one's own side, and even seem necessary for an adequate rendition of what is meant, but which strike the recipient on the other side as foreign. I refer not only to the frequent lack of cooperative prisoners (or suspicion of noncooperation) which led to a poor quality of English, but also to the phenomenon of "enemy language." This exists in any war because propagandists are so caught up in their own idiom that they believe they are speaking the language of the other side just because they spoke that language before the war began.

VC/NVA leaflets about prisoner treatment (for instance in statements by American deserters or released POWs) consistently referred to it as "lenient and humane." This politically inspired awkwardness, and others like it, must have been caused by insistence of political officers that "directive" language be used. It surely must have detracted from the effectiveness of the message. Thus we find an Air Cavalry Warrant Officer saying, "I received a very lenient and humane treatment throughout my captivity."

Similarly a sergeant, frequently referred to in VC/NVA leaflets, says, "I would like to take this occasion to thank the Vietnamese people and the SVN-NLF for returning my freedom, once again. I also thank all the cadres and soldiers of the camp for what they have done for me while I was a POW. I thank you for the Front's lenient and humane policy towards foreign ralliedmen and POWs."

The oddity here is not only in the term "ralliedmen," which is to describe American defectors without using that pejorative term; it is even more in the word "lenient," which implied something very important to the other side—that the Americans, being "bandits" and aggressors, were really criminals subject to "punishment" at the hands of the Communists and that, in foregoing such punishment, their captors were therefore exercising leniency. This is hardly a reassuring thought about
captivity, since it implies that the POW has no right to decent treatment.

UNITED UTILITY OF POLITICAL APPEALS

A second weakness of VC/NVA tactical propaganda was its emphasis on political themes in trying to reference the behavior of American soldiers. (As discussed elsewhere, there was a certain symmetry in that Allied tactical appeals to North Vietnamese soldiers also put a misplaced emphasis on political, as against prisoner-treatment appeals.) There was a tremendous, joyous exploitation by the VC/NVA of antiwar statements by American politicians.

The American GI, unless I am badly mistaken, did not see his personal problems in Vietnam primarily in political terms. He, like every soldier, was intensely interested in anything that affected his chances of survival, and thus probably would not turn a blind eye to an enemy message about, for instance, the treatment of prisoners. The Vietnamese Communists addressing him, however, saw his presence in Vietnam as primarily a political fact, to be countered by political means, and to be ended by political means. Thus, the confusion of tactical and strategic appeals follows easily.

"The U.S. Must Directly Negotiate with the NLF for an End to the War" is hardly a message about which the U.S. soldier is able to do very much. "Up men! Struggle for Yourselves!" proclaimed another leaflet, which informed the American soldier of "numerous anti-war acts staged by US troops at Danang, Trangnhat, Dongdu (Cuchi)," followed by a new outbreak on July 31, 1969 at Quinhon: "Despite threat and repression," the leaflet reported, more than 100 GIs "staged a rally and shouted 'Stop the war, bring all US troops home now.' They came to the airfield destroying houses, cars. The conflict was took place [sic], 3 U. S. officers were killed or wounded." Clearly, this is how the VC/NVA would have liked to see the war end, by a mutiny of American troops—and indeed such mutinies were frequently alleged to have taken place, giving rise to enthusiastic calls for emulation.

SEX INEFFECTIVE AS THEME

Sex as a theme addressed to American troops suggested itself to the NVA/VC just as it suggested itself to the Germans and Japanese in World War II. It did not work and must have been quickly abandoned, for I have seen only one example in an extensive collection of enemy leaflets. (We, on our side, learned the same lesson—but had to learn it again and again, since some of our commanders seemed reluctant to believe that the prudish VC/NVA couldn't be influenced by such appeals.)

SURRENDER PROPAGANDA

The VC/NVA showed a sophisticated awareness of the problem of how to give up, which is usually a very difficult thing in battle. An article entitled, "Various Ways U. S. Troops Surrender," broadcast by Liberation Radio in Vietnamese in July 1969, said for instance:

We must also understand the English words "I surrender" uttered by U.S. troops. During a battle on A Bia mountain, our troops, although urging U. S. troops to surrender, furiously assaulted them. Dozens shouted "I surrender" which our com-
batants did not understand. For this reason, in combat it is necessary to thoroughly
understand tactics, ways to capture U. S. POWs, and a number of English verbal
orders, such as "drop your gun," "hands up," and "move quickly." It is not very
difficult to learn by heart all these English orders . . . . A victorious battle would be
more meaningful if enemy troops are taken prisoners . . . .

Thus in a leaflet addressed "To Anti-War American Servicemen," we
find the instruction: "When the liberation armymen come near you, lie
still and say, 'Hong.' You will be safe and treated with leniency if you
follow strictly those instructions." Other leaflets—very much along the
lines of leaflets we developed in World War II in Europe—gave U. S.
troops more detailed instructions on behavior to minimize the danger that
VC/NVA troops might fail to understand the intention of giving up.
(Oddly enough, our own output was not influenced much by this
common-sense approach of the enemy's tactical propaganda.)

SELF-PRAISE—COUNTERPRODUCTIVE

Vaingloriousness, self-congratulation and deprecation of the enemy's
soldierly qualities are clearly not effective themes addressed to the other
side, but again the VC/NVA were so immersed in their own (internal)
propaganda that such themes made their appearance in a number of their
leaflets addressed to Americans. Thus in a leaflet addressed to the 1st Air
Cavalry Division, the enemy said it had "completely failed not only in its
attempt to block the Liberation Armed Forces from afar, resulting in
abandonment of a number of positions in order to shrink back, but also in
escaping heavy losses." (Emphasis added.)

Also, the headline "U. S. troops' shameful withdrawal from Khe Sanh
base" could hardly sit as well with American target audiences as with the
enemy's own audience. In another leaflet, in addition to the ritual refer-
ence to non-U. S., non-Vietnamese troops (that is, the Australians, New
Zealanders, Thai, and Koreans) as "satellites," there was this announce-
ment: "In their stormy general offensive and uprising, the S. V. N. people
and army will continue dealing thunderbolt blows at U. S. imperialists
and the Thi-ky clique in the time to come." Brave talk when addressed
to the enemy's own troops, but not likely to be effective when addressed
to Americans.

SECURING POW OPERATION

We have mentioned earlier the efforts made by the VC/NVA to obtain
American defectors and to propagandize our troops with leaflets incor-
porating statements by deserters, released POWs and POWS still in
captivity. An item of intelligence came to hand while I was in Saigon
which showed the great and methodical care taken by the enemy prop-
agandists in conditioning American prisoners to make them receptive to
demands for cooperation. Thus, captured American personnel were taken
to well-prepared sites where they viewed damage done by American
bombing and defoliation. The scenario was carefully prepared, with
people ready to shout and gesticulate in anger and defiance at the cap-
tured Americans, and some of them threatening physical violence against
them for the "crimes" committed by our side. Then the propagandists,
having “protected” the American prisoners against the pent-up ire of the people whom we had victimized, would take the occasion to explain all the misdeeds for which our side is supposed to be responsible, finally inviting the prisoners to “comment” on what they had heard and seen. In this manner, and in others, personnel who might be willing to cooperate were identified and screened out and then further worked upon and finally exploited.

In summary, we can learn a great deal from enemy propaganda, both from its faults and from its strong points. In his propaganda addressed to U.S. troops, the enemy was handicapped by use of his internal propaganda language, found it difficult to differentiate between strategic and tactical propaganda in tactical situations, and like ourselves did not manage to bring his efforts to a point by concentrating on what was most effective. He did, on the other hand, give more thoughtful attention than we to the mechanics of making and using prisoners of war.

THE KOREAN SAFE-CONDUCTS*

BY CARL BERGER

Tactcal PSYOP appeals to the immediate fears and needs of the audience.

In Korea, leaflet writers met a sophisticated and adroit enemy. When American propagandists in Korea used touched-up photos of Communist prisoners to protect their identity, the Red political officers told their men that the prisoners’ eyes had been blacked out to hide the horrible scars left after U.N. torturers had gouged the eyeballs out. News of this Communist charge brought a quick end to U.N. retouching activities.

During the Korean conflict a half-dozen different versions of a U.N. and Eighth Army Safe Conduct Pass made their appearance, producing in at least one case a distressing situation for a Chinese Communist soldier who finally surrendered. When this man finally got up his courage and slipped over to U.N. lines, he had several copies of the various passes on his person. He told U.N. interrogators that he had postponed surrendering for fear that the latest edition would be required—an item he thought might not be in his collection.1

The typical U.N. Safe Conduct was written in two languages—Korean and English, or Chinese and English, and usually carried the signature of the United Nations Commander, General Douglas MacArthur or his successor, General Matthew Ridgway. The Eighth Army also issued its own distinctive “Official Safe Conduct Pass,” signed by General James Van Fleet. The typical U.N. “how to surrender” instructions, given in the Safe Conducts, read as follows:


407
WHEN YOU COME OVER TO THE U.N. FORCES, IT IS IMPORTANT TO FOLLOW THESE STEPS:
1. Wait for a favorable time to escape secretly from your unit.
2. Destroy or bury your weapons.
3. Make your way to the nearest UN Forces during daylight hours only.
4. Come down an open road in single file, with both hands raised above your head.
5. Bring your wounded brothers with you.

The Communist forces also dropped Safe Conducts during the war. Although their early efforts were crude, the Red leaflets improved as the war progressed. In October 1951 one of the Communist surrender appeals—which reproduced a photo of some Allied prisoners—read as follows:

YOUR BUDDIES ARE DOING FINE HERE IN A POW CAMP COME OVER!
Join your buddies here. You will go to the rear in safety and get home in one piece.

—USE THIS AS A SAFE CONDUCT PASS—
When you see a Korean People's Army soldier or a Chinese Volunteer soldier, lay down your gun and shout:

"TOW SHONG"
(Surrender)

We guarantee you safe conduct and good treatment.

THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S VOLUNTEER FORCES.

Except for a spelling error, this leaflet has all the attributes of a good surrender leaflet and makes the useful contribution of the Chinese word for surrender.

NOTES
3 Chinese Communist Leaflet No. CCF-UN63, "Your Buddies Are Doing Fine Here in a POW Camp" (1951?).

TELLING IT LIKE IT REALLY IS*

BY WILLIAM T. MACY

Persuasion is usually most effective when it comes from credible, indigenous sources.

Thi Van Dinh, a wiry, 35-year old woman, has lived in a hamlet south of Danang all her life, tending the rice paddies and growing a small plot of Chinese cabbage. Her husband has not been around the hamlet for the past year, and Government of Vietnam officials at the district level believe he is now a Viet Cong, either impressed or voluntary. In either case, the husband of Mrs. Dinh is probably growing tired and disillusioned of life with the VC by now. He is more than likely hungry, frightened of the bombings and artillery fire and he probably has malaria. On four occasions in the last few months he has seen Allied leaflets urging VC to Chieu Hoi and to rally to the government. Sometimes he wonders if

this wouldn't be a good idea, but he also wonders if what the leaflets say is true.

In the village his wife wonders the same thing. She, too, has seen the leaflets, and an Armed Propaganda Team (APT) made up of former VC who rallied to the government has been in her hamlet twice telling of the terrorism of the VC and the good treatment of the Hoi Chanh (ralliers) by the GVN. But Mrs. Dihn has seen many troops and heard many stories in the last twenty years. She wonders if this one is true. If her husband became a Hoi Chanh would he be well treated or are these promises just a way to get VC to surrender? She thinks about this many days while working in the fields under an unrelenting sun. If only she knew for sure; if only she could believe.

At a joint meeting of all III MAF/I CORPS psyop officers in November 1968, the same question was being asked. How could we convince the wives, mothers, fathers and relatives of VC that the Chieu Hoi program is worthwhile for them; that it will start them on a new life; that it is not a propaganda stunt but a way to escape a life of bombings and sickness and to receive training and assistance from the GVN?

A suggestion was made at the meeting that tours of the Chieu Hoi Center in Danang should be set up with emphasis on "telling it like it is" to villagers, including (deliberately) families of suspected VC. It was proposed that each tour would bring a representative number (say 20) of people from a hamlet for a one day trip to see and talk with the ralliers (Hoi Chanh) and to get the "straight scoop." The idea met with immediate enthusiasm from the Vietnamese officers at the meeting. They quickly volunteered to set up a pilot tour which was run in early December 1968.

The hamlet picked was just north of Danang. With the cooperation of Vietnamese officials from i Corps, from Hoa Vang district of Quang Nam province and from the Chieu Hoi Service, arrangements began. First, contact was made with village and hamlet officials to explain the nature of the operation and to request volunteers for the tour. The desire was to have a group of people—men and women, young and old—who would form a cross section of the village. Particular emphasis was placed on getting people who were suspected of having relatives in the VC because they would be the natural avenue of information to their relatives. Another likely prospect was the gossipy old woman, or man, in the hamlet. This type of person is present in every group in every nation and culture, and a Vietnamese hamlet is no exception. Relishing a savory story of a day in Danang, they would spread it far and wide in the village—which was exactly the intent. Marine transportation was set up, covered to protect the Vietnamese guests from sun and rain and with a ladder over the tailgate of the truck to assist the less spry.

One problem that arose was the skepticism of the villagers. They weren't too sure they wanted to be part of the scheme: it might invite retaliation by the VC or by VCI (Viet Cong Infrastructure) in the hamlet itself. Also a day away from the fields means a one day's loss of produc-
tive work. And some, particularly those with relatives in the VC, felt it must be some sort of trick. How to overcome these problems?

The loss of a day's work was compensated to some extent by a free and very hearty lunch plus a small gift packet. The skepticism was partly overcome by explanation of the intent of the tour and what would happen on it. This information was passed on to the hamlet officials a few days before the tour when participants were recruited. The fear of retaliation was ameliorated by the information that anyone in the hamlet could go on the tour and was in fact urged to go, whether he be pro or anti-VVN.

The tour itself as set up almost entirely by the Vietnamese started with the pickup of the people in the village in the early morning. They were brought to a small Chieu Hoi Center in Danang and greeted by GVN and Chieu Hoi Service officials. There were welcoming speeches followed by an informal tour of the living area for the Hoi Chanh. The tourists were then left to their own devices and once the ice of shyness was broken they talked with the ralliers. On the first tour, one woman discovered a young ex-VC she knew at the Center. The information she brought back to the hamlet surely filtered through a hundred different mouths to many VC and their families.

Following the visit with the Hoi Chanh, which lasted one-half hour, the tourists were presented gift packets by the officials of the Chieu Hoi Service. These packets consisted of a small towel, a large quantity of soap and information pamphlets and leaflets telling about the Chieu Hoi program and the GVN. The tour then moved to a compound in Danang where members of Armed Propaganda Teams and their families live. APTs, which are composed of Hoi Chanh volunteers, move into hamlets or tactical areas to broadcast information to assist in pacification, to encourage defections from the enemy and to assist military operations. A number of these APTs are headquartered in Danang. The people were greeted and then conducted on a walk-through. They saw the area where the APTs live and train and noted that the ex-VC who chose to join an APT had his family living with him in a protected compound in individual row houses—a rare luxury in any hamlet. After the walk-through a lunch of four Vietnamese dishes including fish, meat, shellfish, noodles, rice and soft drinks was served. The food was plentiful and tasty by any standards. During the meal the villagers sat with the Hoi Chanh of the APTs and had a chance to visit them and question them at length.

The final stage of the tour was a refugee village on the northern outskirts of Danang. Hoi Chanh have a choice of joining an APT or becoming a Kit Carson Scout (KCS) or returning to their native hamlet after receiving certain compensation, training and assistance from the GVN or moving into a refugee hamlet. In this hamlet the tourists were met with a soft drink, which was a welcome respite from the heat of the day. The tour was then shown the individual homes, the community TV, the school and the small vegetable plots available to each family. Again
there was a chance for the tourists to visit informally with those who had rallied to the GVN, to ask questions about how the Chieu Hoi and about how Hoi Chanh are treated and whether the program is “for real.” Following the visit to the refugee hamlet, the visitors were returned to their homes. The tour had lasted until 1430.

Since the initial one, the tours in the Danang area have been held at the rate of one a month. As a result of that original tour certain lessons were learned and considerable refinements made. First, the tour was cut from three sites to one, the refugee village. The tours of three different areas, while worthwhile in themselves, took considerable travel time which was unproductive. The change to one refugee hamlet allowed time for a greeting and indoctrination, followed by lunch and a walking tour of the area with a chance for the tourists to talk to and question the inhabitants. Keeping the tour at one spot allowed a half day schedule, returning the people to their hamlet in the early afternoon so that an entire day was not lost for them. Secondly, the length of the “official” greeting was cut since it detracted from the time available and from the informality and rapport desired between the villagers and the Hoi Chanh who could sell the program. Thirdly, the Chieu Hoi Service arranged transportation, usually by the ubiquitous Lambro micro-mini bus, thus relieving the Marine Corps of the necessity of providing trucks and giving the program a stronger GVN flavor. Indeed, the most encouraging aspect of the program was the way the GVN moved in to set up the tours and handle the arrangements. They recognized the potential for encouraging defections by selling the idea of Chieu Hoi to people who could—and do—talk directly to Viet Cong.

Obviously the ultimate and only completely satisfactory proof of the usefulness of the tour program is in the number of ralliers it produces. But this is a hard statistic to come by. How many Hoi Chanh rally because of what they have heard from relatives about the Chieu Hoi program, how many rally because of hunger, malaria or high casualties in their unit and how many rally because each of these elements contributes something to the final decision, that the tours are a contributing factor and that the number of ralliers in the Danang area has increased considerably in 1969 over 1968. Since the tour program has contributed a share to this by giving people who have direct access to VC a chance to see for themselves what the Chieu Hoi program is about, then it has served its purpose.
OPERATION STRIKE*

BY ELLIOT HARRIS

"Delivery" on promises made in propaganda supports credibility and undermines enemy confidence

"Operation Strike," perhaps the most successful aerial PsyWar effort against the North Korean civilian populace (during the Korean conflict) was aimed at the most vulnerable of all enemy sore-spots—the deep rooted fear of UN bombing power. Weeks before a city was to be hit by a major raid, PsyWar planes dropped general warning leaflets all over the target area. Civilians were warned that they were going to be bombed heavily because their homes were being used to house military personnel and equipment. The Reds often pressed private homes into service as supply depots on the theory that they would be immune from air attack. The people were advised to flee using main roads which would be spared from attack for a given interval (thus inviting the clogging of vital enemy supply arteries). The day before the bombing, a last local warning message was disseminated with Radio Seoul repeating the warnings and the time left right up to “B hour.” After the UN planes had completed the strike, a third leaflet was dropped, reminding the populace that they had been given plenty of time to have made good their escape. The military necessity for bombing was then emphasized and reiterated.

The remarkable effectiveness of “Operation Strike” lay in the fact that it adhered strictly to the information printed in the leaflets dropped, and that it executed the bombing at the exact time publicized, playing up in the most dramatic terms the complete UN command of the air over North Korea. In addition: Communist soldiers were side-tracked from the front to prevent civilians from deserting; civilian animosity was generated against their own army; decreased production was caused by the departure of workers who were able to make good their escapes; all these plusses added to the sweeping effectiveness of “Operation Strike.”

This was the text of the broadcast beamed to the peoples of North Korea (three times daily) during “Operation Strike”:

PEOPLE OF NORTH KOREA—ATTENTION—THIS MAY SAVE YOUR LIFE...

Today the UN Air Force bombed fifty villages, towns and cities that were military targets... These were military targets along highways and railroads. You may be next... Save your life... Flee to the hills.

Obey this warning and you will live.

LEAVE YOUR VILLAGE IMMEDIATELY. TAKE YOUR FAMILIES WITH YOU. IF THE COMMUNISTS FORCE YOU TO REMAIN IN THE DANGER AREA, SEND YOUR WOMEN AND CHILDREN TO SAFETY.

The United Nations Command wants to protect Korean civilians; you must obey these instructions to leave.

LEAVE THE DOOMED AREA AT ONCE.

REMEMBER... YOU MAY BE NEXT TO DIE!


412
The fact that warnings of an impending raid were delivered without difficulty—and that few if any Red planes were there to defend the city, also acted to tear down morale.

If air attacks like "Operation Strike" are ever unleashed against the factory cities of North Viet Nam, however, PsyWar would have to insure against an over amount of warning time, which would add to the already formidable flack and missile danger for our bomber pilots.

EFFECTIVE COMBAT PSYOP IN THE DELTA*

BY COLBURN B. LOVETT

PSYOP is usually based on outside pressure, but individual PSYOP appeals are particularly successful in combat.

Vietnam was not the first war in which the United States conducted psychological operations as a part of combat operations. It was done in Europe in World War II and on a lesser scale in the Pacific Theater as well. PSYOP was used in Korea. In both cases, however, the use was limited when compared to what was done in Vietnam.

PSYOP came of age in Vietnam. Here there was mass use of the instrument to support tactical operations of the Army and Marine Corps; to provide personnel, equipment, and logistical support to civilian agencies working in the area of pacification; to provide advisors to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and Vietnamese civil government; and to provide the needed backup support to the Joint United States Public Affairs Office, an agency of the U.S. Embassy. The 4th PSYOP Group, with four PSYOP battalions, the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 10th, provided the base upon which U.S. military PSYOP activities were built. All of the units provided direct support for U.S. combat divisions, brigades, and individual regiments in the field as well as training ARVN personnel to take over operations after the return to the United States of the "psy-warriors".

PSYOP support came in many guises during the years after 1966 but perhaps the greatest effort was directed toward support of the Chieu Hoi rallier program. Much of the gain that was accomplished under this program can be attributed to effective combinations of military pressure and PSYOP.

In two operations carried out in IV Military Region, the Delta, during the fall of 1970 and the spring of 1971, it was very clearly shown that the two forces, combat pressure and PSYOP, working together could produce spectacular results. These two operations were "Operation Roundup" conducted in Kien Hoa Province and "Project Falling Leaves" in Kien Giang Province. In Kien Hoa Province the military pressure was furnished by troops of the provincial RF/PF and units of the 7th ARVN Division. In Kien Giang Province, Project Falling Leaves was in support of the RF/PF and the 33rd ARVN Regiment in the clearing of the northern part of the U-Minh Forest. In both provinces, enemy strength

*Original essay by Colburn B. Lovett.
was high, morale was good, and both areas had been held by the Viet Cong since 1954. Indeed, Kien Hoa Province is said to be the “home” of the Viet Cong movement while the U-Minh Forest has been terra incognite to government troops since before World War II; even the Japanese occupation forces could not penetrate it.

OPERATION ROUNDUP

Operation Roundup was carried out over a three-month period in the fall of 1970. The original plan was to saturate enemy controlled towns, villages, and hamlets with a continuous stream of PSYOP materials. It was expected that as the military pressure was applied, large numbers of enemy troops would respond to the PSYOP messages and take any opportunity to rally to the government forces. This proved to be true. Daily operations were planned and conducted using the assets of the 9th Special Operations Squadron, the U.S. Air Force (USAF), the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF), the 10th PSYOP Battalion from Can Tho, the 40th POLWAR (ARVN—Political Warfare) Battalion, the 4th PSYOP Group, and CORDS PSYOP from IV Military Region. As enemy forces began to rally to the friendly outposts and units, many of the Viet Cong agreed to make special surrender leaflets directed at their comrades. The rallier’s picture was taken, close-up, with a Polaroid camera; then the rallier wrote and signed a simple message on a blank leaflet form. After a photoplate was made of this layout, it was flown to Can Tho and rush-printed on the presses of the Combined PSYOP Operations Center (U.S. 10th PSYOP and ARVN 40th POLWAR Battalions). In a matter of a few hours, the leaflets were then air dropped on the map coordinates of the enemy unit as gained from the rallier’s interview statement. The system is self-multiplying. As more rally, more leaflets are made, and as more leaflets are directed to specific targets, there are more ralliers.

Leaflets were not the only medium used. Loudspeaker teams of former Viet Cong soldiers were sent back into the areas of their units to speak to their comrades in the bush. Radio broadcasts were made over Can Tho Radio (the enemy likes the station) urging them to rally, by name and unit. Ex-Viet Cong, enlisted in the Armed Propaganda Teams, returned to the enemy areas to meet clandestinely with their former comrades and urge them, face to face, to rally.

Operation Roundup was a major success and produced the largest number of ralliers in the seven-year history of the Chieu Hoi Program. More than 1,400 enemy soldiers and political cadres came over to the government side. The twelve weeks gained more neutralization of enemy units and cadre structures than had previous months and years of purely combat attacks.

PROJECT FALLING LEAVES

Project Falling Leaves made maximum use of local assets and personnel. The resources of the Province PSYOP Advisory Team consisted of Province PSYOP Advisor Colburn B. Lovett, a Foreign Service Information Officer from the USIS; Capt. James Cravens (the Sector S-5 Ad-
visor); two U.S. Navy members of Team 13, Beach Jumper Unit One; Petty Officers Brincefield and Stanton; and "on call" aircraft of the 221st Aviation Company. These sources were supplemented by Vietnamese personnel of the Kien Giang Sector POLWAR Company, Companies 44A and 44B of the Armed Propaganda Teams (100 percent ex-Viet Cong soldiers), aircraft from the VNAF, and loudspeaker teams from the 40th POLWAR Battalion in Can Tho. Printing support came from the Combined PSYOP Operations Center (Vietnamese and U.S. personnel working in a joint headquarters) in Can Tho. Coordination of out-of-province assistance was handled through the office of the Director, PSYOP CORDS IV Military Region.

All possible variations in the use of media were used. Loudspeaker teams accompanied RF ground operations and deep penetration by the Armed Propaganda Teams. Special boat-carried loudspeaker units were established using the assets of the National Marine Police. Extensive face-to-face communication was conducted by the Armed Propaganda Teams, Sector POLWAR Company, and the Vietnamese Information Service. Leaflets were dropped on 27 identified Viet Cong unit locations on a daily basis by fixed wing aircraft and helicopters of the U.S. Army, the VNAF, and the ARVN. Radio tapes made by "Hoi Chanh"s were played back within minutes to members of their former units while many such tapes were broadcast over Radio Can Tho. TV appearances were broadcast of surrendered Viet Congs so that the relatives of enemy soldiers still in the bush would see the broadcast and urge their men to join in the surrenders.

In mid-December 1970, the 21st ARVN Division began to clear the U-Minh Forest, the last major enemy stronghold in the Delta. An area of small, isolated villages and hamlets, covered with small canals and mangrove swamps, it has been characterized as the "Everglades with VC." It has been under Viet Minh control between 1942 and 1954 and then under Viet Cong control between 1954 and 1970. No friendly forces had been able to penetrate the area and remain since 1964, and the Viet Cong had complete control of it after that date. The population was estimated at between 10,000 to 15,000 people, and enemy forces were estimated to be about 3,500 men with many units having as high as 90 percent North Vietnamese.

In the period December 15, 1970 to January 25, 1971, there was little PSYOP support provided to the operations of the 21st ARVN Division or to the RF companies that were attacking in the area. During the month of December 1970, there were 44 ralliers from the area; during the month of January 1971, 74 ralliers came in. During the month of February and the last five days of January, the first half of Project Falling Leaves was carried out and 554 enemy troops rallied. During the month of March, through the 25th, 596 enemy troops came in and voluntarily surrendered. Project Falling Leaves terminated on March 25th. In the month of April, the number of ralliers was only 93. The initial significance is that during a
two-month period when PSYOP supplemented military action, there were 1150 ralliers, while in the six weeks before and the four weeks after the intensive PSYOP campaign was conducted, there were only a total of 211 ralliers. Further significance was developed during the campaign period of 25 January to 25 March through the use of intensive post rally interviews. On a week-to-week basis, ralliers stated that they were directly induced by PSYOP to rally with a low percentile of 27 percent one week and a high of 48 percent another week. During the eight-week period, 41 percent of the ralliers stated that they had been induced to surrender by PSYOP.

However, experience has shown that PSYOP has limited results in inducement when it is applied without the additional stimulus of military pressure. As stated, a detailed study of “before,” “during,” and “after” statistics was made during Project Falling Leaves. Widespread discussions among Province PSYOP advisors in the delta in the fall of 1970 led to general agreement that military action and PSYOP complement each other and that neither will accomplish the desired results with maximum efficiency without the other.

CONCLUSIONS

There are several lessons to be learned from Operation Roundup and Project Falling Leaves, lessons which are applicable to all commanders and not just to the PSYOP community.

PSYOP, if applied on an intense scale, can be of significant value to commanders in securing the surrender of enemy forces. The application of these PSYOP measures takes experienced and qualified PSYOP officers. PSYOP leaflets are of the greatest value when they are individually tailored to enemy units and to specific enemy personnel. Reaction time is highly important. Military operations conducted without PSYOP support will not be as successful as those conducted with it.

In these two special PSYOP projects—Operation Roundup and Project Falling Leaves—firm evidence was developed to show that PSYOP can be one of the commander’s most positive assets.

DEFECTION OR SURRENDER

By Martin F. Herz

Success in a specific appeal to a specific audience should be tailored before application to another audience.

A political act on the part of an enemy soldier is generally more difficult for him to perform than the soldierly act of yielding to superior force and becoming a prisoner. The single exception to this rule would seem to be a civil war; and because the war in Vietnam was both a civil war and a war of aggression, a certain amount of confusion necessarily arose among the propagandists. The VC/NVA insistence that the Americans take political actions was matched by the U.S./RVN insistence that even the NVA soldier must give up as a political act.

* Original essay by Martin F. Herz.
* See Martin F. Herz, “Lessons from VC/NVA Propaganda,” in Chapter VI of this casebook.
This demand is a weakness of one sector of our own output, not detracting from—indeed, attributable to—the outstanding successes that were achieved with Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) appeals addressed to Viet Cong, that is, to South Vietnamese Communist soldiers. The very success of the Chieu Hoi Program, which made Viet Cong personnel defect to the RVN side in large numbers, led to the same appeal for defections being addressed to North Vietnamese troops; and the error was continued for a long time because of the very momentum of the Chieu Hoi campaign.

The difference in the target audience is, of course, enormous, for a Viet Cong, being a South Vietnamese, was going home when he defected from his side and rallied to the Republic of South Vietnam; whereas a North Vietnamese soldier who defected to the RVN was taking an action that might prevent him from ever going home. Given a choice of rallying to the RVN or becoming prisoners, most NVA soldiers would no doubt have much preferred becoming prisoners; yet, hard to believe as it may be, for years they were not offered such a choice; they were told that in order to escape the war they had to “rally to the just cause of South Vietnam.”

The reasons for this approach are complicated and cannot all be analyzed here. One factor certainly was that the RVN felt that by offering a change of loyalty, they were offering the NVA soldier something more, rather than less, honorable than captivity as a POW. A concomitant of this belief is that a South Vietnamese PSYOP officer needed unusual courage to persuade his superiors that, seen from the North Vietnamese perspective, the government of South Vietnam was perhaps not an attractive entity to which to rally; whereas a status of POW might be accepted even at the hands of a despised enemy, provided the treatment was decent.

Be that as it may, South Vietnamese leaflets addressed to North Vietnamese troops for years rang all the changes on the theme of rallying. A large number of leaflets, despite being specifically addressed to the NVA, used such terms as “Return to the people in the South”; “Come back in the friendship of the Southern people and rebuild your Motherland”; “Return to the welcome of the people and Army of South Vietnam”; “Your future will be assured if you stand on the side of the South Vietnamese people to fight against Communism”; “Return to the national community”; “Rally to the Government of the Republic of Vietnam.”

It may also be that, faced with an eminently political campaign by the VC/NVA, the South Vietnamese (and Americans whom they either persuaded or who shared their prejudice) felt that it was a sign of ideological strength to go the enemy tit for tat, showing faith in one’s own cause and creating a kind of symmetry in the ideological battle. But ideology is not a sound guide to effective combat propaganda, which is better based on an objective analysis of the target audience and scientific testing of a variety
of appeals. It was almost as if the RVN and its American advisors preferred to get one North Vietnamese defector rather than ten or more North Vietnamese prisoners.

There is, indeed, some evidence that this was so, for a great deal was made of the occasional high-ranking North Vietnamese defector—as if his frame of mind permitted far-reaching conclusions about those whom he had left behind. Such defectors were extensively debriefed, almost psychoanalyzed, and their accounts disseminated as prime psychological intelligence about the enemy. The fact that such defectors were in virtually every case unusual specimens—men who were in trouble with their superiors and peers, who came from middle-class backgrounds, or needed urgent medical attention, or had relatives in the South—was brushed aside as not significant.

Take, as an example, the interrogation report on Lt. Col. Phan Viet Dung, who rallied in 1968. He went to great lengths to explain his defection on ideological grounds, but it also came out that he had doubts and hesitations about the treatment that he would encounter. "I thought of my wife and children," he said. "What would happen to them in North Vietnam? I also thought of my friends there. If I defected to this side, I would be fighting against them, whose hands I shook and whose hardships I shared in the past... But I was sure of one thing, that I would not be killed or mistreated by this side, since I was reassured by the Chieu Hoi program over here."

There was no evidence that he has ever considered giving up by becoming a POW. This is not surprising since that alternative wasn't even suggested in the U.S./RVN propaganda output at that time but the statement about good treatment as a Hoi Chanh (rallier) carried the devastating implication that he must have had doubts that he would be well treated if he did not change sides as well as give up. Yet the rallying of Phan Viet Dung was taken as confirmation that the U.S./RVN propaganda addressed to the NVA was on the right track.

So we have here a case of symmetry, with the NVA calling on Americans as well as South Vietnamese to give up as a political act, and the Americans and South Vietnamese addressing both the South Vietnamese and the North Vietnamese Communists in the same terms, even though the Chieu Hoi Program—a tremendous success with the Viet Cong, that is, with the South Vietnamese target audience—was a patent failure with the North Vietnamese. Later this mistake was partially rectified by combining Chieu Hoi and POW appeals, offering the NVA target a choice between those two alternatives.

Unhappily, even the Allied safe conduct, different from safe conducts in World War II—and even different from the enemy’s safe conduct—clearly implied that the bearer would be granted fair treatment as a defector. Bearing the RVN flag on one side and South Vietnamese President Thieu’s picture and signature on the other, it said: "Bring this Safe Conduct Pass and return to cooperate with the national government and
you will be kindly received, your security will be assured, and you will be treated properly." Again the devastating implication was, and is, that if the enemy soldier does not "return" and does not "cooperate," his security and proper treatment might not be assured. The safe conduct, in other words, is a Chieu Hoi appeal rather than a document capable of encouraging NVA personnel to become POW's.

POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS

The previous sections have discussed strategic and tactical PSYOP. The essays in this section could perhaps be subsumed under "strategic" or "tactical." The essence of these cases, however, lies in the nonwar or limited war backgrounds to which "strategic" and "tactical" are unevenly pertinent.

It is a commonplace of the current era to observe that the Department of Defense has been given many new responsibilities that do not involve the use of force. Such responsibilities devolve from the new conceptions of the U.S. national interest. Today, in stability operations, complexities of international politics are telescoped into new environments composed of nonmilitary tasks for U.S. military forces. Although the assignments are not new, the environments are, and the political contexts in which stability operations are to be carried out have shifted dramatically. In some respects, developing societies are the new front, but this is often a front without an enemy. New guidance, flexible but supportive, is needed for this changed situation.

Ramon Magsaysay's success in the Philippines may be attributed in large measure to the fact that he refused to consider the Huks to be "the enemy." Rather, they were Filipinos first and foremost. The Philippines case clearly illustrates the importance of the situational variable in strategic PSYOP objectives. PSYOP and PSYOP objectives must be tailored as much to the specific situation as possible. Magsaysay and his advisors' ingenuity in grasping the breadth of resources available to the new effort after 1950 and in finding new ways to marshal those resources is discussed in this chapter by two veterans of the campaign in "Target—the Civilian."

Overseas duty in such conditions may be singularly frustrating, however. The reactions of the soldier to the change in the conditions of his employment in foreign lands may impose a severe limitation upon his usefulness, since most stability operations and development missions tread close to political sensitivity. American soldiers' reactions to, and behavior in, such situations as those in the Dominican Republic and Laos illustrate the new and complex considerations involved. In the supporting role U.S. forces are asked to play in developing countries, the American focus is often on what the United States can do. However, the real action must be taken by the host country, for it is to the latter that indigenous loyalty must evolve. And it must be action, not merely words, for pledges and apparent sincerity are not adequate to the development effort.

The very essence of the U.S. role in developing societies is communica-
tion. This includes communication with the government (as in the traditional relationship between sovereign states). It also embraces communication in conjunction with, and in support of, the host government, with the government’s supporters, with those whose feelings toward their government are best described as neutral, and with actual and potential disaffected elements of the population.

**THE GOOD GUYS AND THE BAD GUYS**

**BY HAROLD R. AARON**

The new international situation is difficult for soldiers, since an enemy is often unidentifiable.

In September 1962, a United Nations military force in the Congo, consisting of an Indian brigade and Ethiopian, Irish, and Tunisian battalions, was deployed along a perimeter around the Elisabethville airfield and outposts within the city. Their mission was defensive: to forestall any attack by Congolese rebels against the UN airhead through which supplies and men arrived from Leopoldville more than a thousand road miles away.

On the 24th, members of a patrol from a Gurkha battalion unknowingly entered an unmarked rebel minefield. One Gurkha was killed and two were wounded by the detonation of a mine.

The next day, as final preparations were made for burying the soldier, I visited the Gurkha battalion command post and met the slightly built, neat, and impressive looking commander. After exchanging pleasantries, he told me about the problems his soldiers faced in adjusting to their tactical mission and orders on a continent thousands of miles from home.

When my battalion is employed in India, it is usually because of war. Or, in the event of a disturbance, we know that the force used by the police has been unsuccessful. My men know that greater force must be applied against an unruly and destructive mob. There is no doubt in their minds regarding their mission. These are simple men. We give them simple orders. Yet, here in the Congo, my men are fired upon by rebels, but they cannot fire back unless they are in immediate danger of being killed. As they occupy their posts at night, it is not unusual for them to be fired upon by rebels that have drunk too much sabra beer. My men are under orders not to fire back at this harassing fire. They obey but they do not understand why.

During the Dominican affair in May 1965, an American correspondent reported his encounter with a U.S. soldier. The soldier was crouched behind the corner of a building as he and his comrades searched the windows and roofs of the buildings ahead for a sniper who had been firing in their direction. The soldier told the correspondent: “This is a hell of a war! I don’t know the good guys from the bad guys.”

These examples indicate the dilemma that faces commanders and soldiers in “stability operations.” The predicament is not confined to the American soldier alone, for those in other armies and many places of the world today also find themselves encountering what appears to be a confusing situation, and to many a new one.

For the most part, professional soldiers are trained to fight a war and to win or settle conflicts by force of arms. The older professionals of our own Army retain vivid recollections of campaigns in France or Italy, New Guinea or another Pacific island. In reading our history and watching television the younger ones have seen professionals of another generation storm ashore on enemy-held beaches or assault the snowy crests of Korean hills. This was their view of the nature of combat and war.

But to the Gurkha soldier in the Congo and the American soldier in the Dominican Republic, there was no such war. It was neither the black nor the white as he had known it or as he had read about it. The situation was colored a shade of gray. Yet, he could see friends being wounded and some killed. His unit had been given a mission and they had used tactical formations to accomplish that mission. Orders were given, ammunition issued, and other details were attended to as had been done on training grounds and battlefields before. But the picture was fuzzy and incomplete.

The soldier found that he had to exercise judgment and restraint. He found that he could be fired upon, yet he could not fire back. If firing was permitted, only selected marksmen were used—with squad leader, platoon leader, company commander, and other leaders looking on and adjusting and controlling the fire. Those who appeared to be bad guys in any script were for political reasons the maybe-bad guys. They were not the same as North Koreans or Viet Cong. Thus, the simple but terse conclusion from a warrior who wasn’t allowed to fight: “It’s a hell of a war!”

While these two soldiers—the Gurkha and the American—perhaps typify their profession, the correspondent typified the confusion of many of his colleagues and other Americans. When the soldier and his junior leaders could not explain or clarify what was a fluid situation, the correspondent—probably a young one aspiring to emulate Ernie Pyle—thought the confusion newsworthy, as indeed it was. But he did not understand his encounter with the muted conflict and thus could not clarify the gray situation. Consequently his readers obtained little enlightenment.

Was this a civil war? A revolution? A low-intensity conflict. More explicitly, had a desirable revolution, aiming at progress and reform become endangered by the threat of communist control?

One of the reasons why all of us—military and civilian—find it difficult to accept the need for stability operations in conflict situations that are neither black nor white, is that we are prisoners of our own history. We are inclined to use the experiences of the past as a guide to action in the present and the future. We try unsuccessfully to make those past experiences coincide with those of the present. But they do not seem to coincide. Over the 20 years of the Cold War, we have failed to learn that many of the conflicts of the recent past—and probably many more in the immediate future—will be of low intensity and confused in cause and purpose. No neat nor simple resolution will be apparent or even contriva-
ble. The key objectives of the stabilizers will not be communications centers or key terrain, or villages or capitals.

As General Harold K. Johnson, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army has observed: "... the armed forces of the United States have been committed to operations which have military overtones, which at times may involve combat, and yet which are not war in the context that war has been understood in the past."

In South Vietnam, we do not fight to gain territory but to win over the people. Simply put, it is to win their hearts and minds, but this provides little clarity to the winners or the won. In many areas in South Vietnam many of the won know little or nothing about what Americans believe in. Many are unaware of such concepts as nationalism, freedom, and democratic government.

The task of the stabilizers is clearly an attempt to influence the actions of people rather than trying to gain the long-term objectives of developing favorable attitudes. By influencing them, we and their government are endeavoring to have them deny aid and comfort to the dissidents and to transfer loyalty to us. The problem of influencing their behavior must be solved while they are the victims of terror or while they are being intimidated by only the threat of it.

The soldier of the future, then, must be trained to have a new outlook and to practice new skills. He must be trained to respond to and accept the new role thrust upon him. A wonderful example of this was described by Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer Jr., who commanded our forces in the Dominican Republic: "It was not uncommon to see a U.S. trooper, shot at the night before, working long hours during the day distributing surplus food provided by the Agency for International Development. This food was given to hungry people of both sides."

The soldier must be trained to distinguish among the various degrees of force and when each may be applied. He must recognize the use of too much force and need to measure it. To the soldier and his commander, the words of President Kennedy at the West Point graduation in 1962 remain pertinent: "You will need to understand the importance of military power and also the limits of military power, to decide what arms should be used to fight and when they should be used to prevent a fight. . . ."

Our future commanders must also be made to study similar situations involving muted conflict. They must learn not only the military consequences of the use of force, but also the political and psychological ramifications of such use. A strong attack against a village controlled by the Viet Cong may be successful. Yet an assault during which civilians may be killed and injured may cause such a psychological reaction that all the good will of the United States forces in the area may have little effect for the next five years.

Present as well as future commanders must think about the possibility of leading units in an international military force with all the political nuances inherent in such a command. What would be the reaction of
inexperienced officers to this order sent by the Secretary General to the UN Cyprus Force Commander: “When acting in self-defense, the principle of minimum force shall always be applied, and armed force will be used only when all peaceful means of persuasion have failed.”

What action would this commander take if he and his forces were not allowed freedom of movement and were unable to maintain a secure line of communication over which combat units, transportation, and supplies for their forces could move? Before resorting to force of arms, he may be required to employ a “peaceful means of persuasion” to attain this necessary military objective, so as to facilitate rather than hinder the accomplishment of overriding political objectives. But what about security—a cardinal principle of war? Certainly the commander must be able to ensure the security of his force. While this may be true, we could also argue that the use of too much force to attain military security could well jeopardize the interests of national security. Force, within the last two decades, has been increasingly limited and ordered, applied not to win wars but to prevent them.

In the Lees Knowles lectures of 1962 at Cambridge, England, Lieutenant General Sir J.W. Hackett, then Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff, succinctly expressed his view of the profession of arms today: “The essential basis of the military life is the ordered application of force under an unlimited liability. It is the unlimited liability which sets the man at arms apart.” [Emphasis supplied.]

The ordered application is as essential to the officer who works at the level of national policy and planning as it might be to the rifleman in the squad or the officer of a division staff. Those occupying lofty positions have tremendous military power as well as unlimited liabilities. Only a small part of this power can be used to win conflicts in our day, while a greater portion is reserved to deter a potential, much larger conflict. The profession of arms is becoming one that spends more time making a show of force than in using it. And it uses force on limited missions and limited deployments.

We find also that there are agonizing appraisals or military estimates that can no longer be devoid of political and psychological considerations, and that these estimates cannot always lead to concise and pure military command decisions. We find that there are restraints to action—largely political—that overshadow the age-old restraints of logistics and communications. And, the most efficient and effective military option may appear to be the least desirable and feasible in terms of the national interest.

These frustrations—whether in the squad or on the joint staff—over the inability to fire back or to employ large military units swiftly, effectively, and decisively arise from several factors. For some, the frustrations arise from ingrained military conservatism—the living in the past—and from a lack of recognition of the full scope of the problem and the developing world in which we live. Looking back, how many of us would have agreed with President Kennedy in March 1961 when he
assessed the threat to the Free World in the sixties: "The Free World’s security can be endangered not only by nuclear attack, but also by being slowly nibbled away at the periphery...by forms of subversion, infiltration...guerrilla warfare...."

I think that many of us must admit that our military lexicon and our vital military concerns at that time included terms such as megaton yield, pentomic divisions, and limited wars. Counterinsurgency, psychological operations, civic action, and air mobility on the future battlefield as realistic concepts or techniques were gleams in the eyes of only a few.

These frustrations have resulted also from the inability to apply classical solutions to non-classical situations. We now admit, for example, that counterinsurgency is no longer a special type of warfare, but warfare in which all tactical forces can and must participate. Major General W.R. Peers...[has written] "We have seen that subversive insurgency can require, as a continuation of our response, the commitment of large land combat elements." That is a lesson of Vietnam that is rarely mentioned.

Within the past five years, there has been a growing realization that a new breed, a new platonic guardian, is being trained and developed in the backward areas of the world. Today’s military professional must be not only a military animal; he must be a social and political animal as well. He must be ready to discuss and help village chiefs with their local problems, assist in establishing the basic means for rural education, and gain the confidence and good will of peoples with strange customs, who still live under a feudal system. He is also learning that from these new talents, acquired in many instances through trial and error, new and necessary forms of assistance are accruing to him and his comrades: intelligence for action that is gained more from noncombatants than from aerial photos and patrols and from popular forces that are necessary auxiliaries for coordinated counterinsurgency actions.

Only occasionally in the past has the soldier been forced to realize the importance of solving problems in civil affairs. In our time he is required not only to discuss daily mutual problems with the civil affairs specialists; he must also collaborate with others: an official from the United States Operations Mission, a member of a civil relief organization, a junior officer from a ministry of the local government. Thus, the shadowy battlefield of today becomes an example of not mere military teamwork, but civil-military teamwork. This new team must apply military, economic, social, and political techniques aimed at winning the support of a people.

For the soldier, muted conflict in the coming decade will not be simple. It will be hard to distinguish the good guys from the bad guys. During this period of continuing and difficult adjustment, we are building a tremendous reservoir of experience and experienced people. While the solutions will be difficult and the situations hard to understand, we should find the going a little easier. If it becomes easier for us, certainly it will be more beneficial to those we assist.
TERROR AS A WEAPON OF POLITICAL AGITATION*

BY THOMAS PERRY THORNTON

Terrorism, far from being irrational, can constitute a potent weapon in the hands of a determined and competent group.

* * * * *

A DEFINITION OF “TERROR”

It seems advisable to begin our consideration with a definition of the concept of terror as we shall use it, within the framework of the internal war situation. Terror is a symbolic act designed to influence political behavior by extranormal means, entailing the use or threat of violence. We shall discuss the terms individually.

“DESIGNED TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL BEHAVIOR.” Under certain circumstances, the use of terror for other than political objectives is possible, but by terms of our preoccupation with internal war, such nonpolitical events are excluded by definition. Terrorism may gain political ends in one of two ways—either by mobilizing forces and reserves sympathetic to the cause of the insurgents or by immobilizing forces and reserves that would normally be available to the incumbents. A point of which insurgents are acutely aware—but which incumbents frequently overlook—is that, in the initial stages of internal war situations, the incumbents usually have an immense advantage with regard to the great uncommitted mass of citizens. For although this mass may be uncommitted in terms of the particular issue at stake, it is less likely to be uncommitted with regard to the incumbents as such.

The incumbents and the mass they dominate are part of a single social structure. The incumbents benefit from the natural state of inertia that prevails in the political relationship; the insurgents, on the other hand, represent an alienated factor, which the organism of the society will normally be predisposed to cast out. Among the various tasks of an insurgent group, the one that will interest us primarily is its need to disrupt the inertial relationship between incumbents and mass. In order to do this, the insurgents must break the tie that binds the mass to the incumbents within the society, and they must remove the structural supports that give the society its strength—or at least to make those supports seem irrelevant to the critical problems that the mass must face. This process is one of disorientation, the most characteristic use of terror, which will be discussed below in some detail.

Since terror is a weapon with political implications, it should be considered in its relationship to the entire spectrum of political agitation. Although we shall compare it with certain other political acts later, it may be noted here that the appropriateness of terror varies according to the degree of political support enjoyed by the insurgents. In view of its disorientation function, terror is only appropriate if the insurgents enjoy

a low level of actual political support but have a high potential for such support. If their potential is low, terrorism is likely to be counterproductive. Even if the disorientation effect is achieved, the mass will look for other support structures than those offered by the terrorists. More likely than not their opposition to the terrorists will cause them to cling more closely to the already existing state structures. If the terrorists already enjoy a high level of active support, terror will not only be wasteful of energy and moral authority but may have a negative effect by endangering the orientation of those already included within the insurgents’ structures.

The political function of terror must also be emphasized, in contrast to the military role that is often ascribed to it. The military function of terror is negligible. It is a small-scale weapon and cannot in itself have any appreciable influence on the outcome of military action. Various sources suggest that it has been used as a means of recruiting troops, but this suggestion seems incredible and has never been documented. A man who is coerced into fighting will hardly make a very effective soldier and is likely to desert to the enemy at the first opportunity. That is not to deny the importance that a well-planned terrorist campaign may have as a method of gaining short-term logistical support and, insofar as it contributes to the political strength of the insurgents, of lending valuable support to subsequent military action.

“ENTAILING THE USE OR THREAT OF VIOLENCE.” In view of the high levels of alienation inherent in any insurgent group that feels impelled toward terrorism, it is inevitable that violence will play a characteristic role in terrorist activities. A nonviolent program could hardly qualify as terrorism. (If we seek an insurgent tactic that fulfills all the other criteria we shall postulate for terrorism, the Gandhian nonviolent movement against the British in India presents a model that shows almost identical structural features. Very few, however, would care to label Gandhi a terrorist.) Violence also is the ground for distinction between terror and propaganda, for both are tools for creating public support in the pursuit of political ends; indeed, an important function of terror is that of propagandizing for the insurgent movement.

There are, of course, as Hitler stated, spiritual (nonviolent) as well as physical (violent) attributes of terror; in fact, terror operating solely on the physical plane would be obviously illogical. It is even theoretically conceivable that a victim could be terrorized without the threat of physical violence, but in the internal war context the possibility is so remote as to be nonexistent. Such an effect could at most be achieved on a few individuals at the hands of an exceptionally perceptive psychological manipulator with a thorough knowledge of the subconscious vulnerabilities of the victim.

“BY EXTRANORMAL MEANS.” Terror occupies the upper reaches of the spectrum of political agitation, immediately above other types of political violence. Terror may be distinguished from these other types by
its extranormal quality; that is, terror lies beyond the norms of violent political agitation that are accepted by a given society. If an agitator wishes to assault the structures of his society, he can best do so by engaging in extranormal (and therefore disorienting) actions. The level of extranormality varies, of course, from society to society and from time to time.

The extranormality of terror can also be expressed as a function of the internal war situation. Internal war will not come about in a situation that permits the conflicting vital aspirations of the incumbents and the insurgents to be met by constitutional means—i.e., by "normal" means. If the contending sides can agree on formulae that permit the peaceful transfer of political power, any form of violence is anachronistic.

While in some cases the refusal of the incumbents to make constitutional provision for the transfer of power compels the insurgents to resort to extranormal means, at least equally often the insurgents utilize terror because they lack the political strength to make use of constitutional procedures that may be objectively adequate and just. They attempt to provoke the incumbents into repressive measures, in order then to claim that the incumbents have made the constitutional machinery unavailable. It therefore seems probable that, the longer the incumbents can delay opposing insurgent terror with extranormal means of repression, the more advantage they will have in laying insurgent propaganda.

In any case, the insurgent must attempt to communicate effectively to his audience the idea that terror is the only weapon appropriate to the situation. A basic requirement is formulation of the issues at stake in simple terms of black and white. Shades of grey are not conducive to terrorism, for the level of urgency falls off as the admixture of white increases. This black/white relationship is often established by pressing a serviceable ideology into use. As Hannah Arendt has pointed out, ideology is the precurser of totalitarianism, and totalitarianism breeds terror.

Whatever justification the insurgents may attempt to create, the dysfunctional use of terror in terms of the political system must be considered immoral—and a sign of great political weakness and a dangerous extremist mentality on the part of those using it. The Russian Narodnik terrorists recognized this point in a comment upon the assassination of President Garfield: "In a country where freedom gives the people the possibility of an honorable contending of ideas; were a free peoples' will decides not only the laws but also the personnel of the government; in such a country, political murder as a means of struggle is a manifestation of the same spirit of despotism which we consider our task to eliminate in Russia."

"A SYMBOLIC ACT." Definition of terror as a symbolic act does not mean that a person, say, is assassinated only symbolically and not in fact; rather, it means that the terroristic act is intended and perceived as a
symbol. The observer realizes that the act implies a meaning broader than its own component parts.

The relatively high efficiency of terrorism derives from its symbolic nature. If the terrorist comprehends that he is seeking a demonstration effect, he will attack targets with a maximum symbolic value. The symbols of the state are particularly important, but perhaps even more so are those referring to the normative structures and relationships that constitute the supporting framework of the society. By showing the weakness of this framework, the insurgents demonstrate, not only their own strength and the weakness of the incumbents but also the inability of the society to provide support for its members in a time of crisis. The individuals and subgroups that comprise the structures tend to become atomized. If we envision each of these structures as dominated by a single symbol, in the sense that an arch is dominated by a keystone, destruction of the symbol results in fracture of the structure into its component parts in a most economical manner. It would obviously be impossible to terrorize a nation on an individual basis; furthermore, to the extent that terror destroys only the keystone-symbol, the individual components of the structure remain intact and available for restructuring along lines desired by the insurgents.

The symbolic concept of the terrorist act enables us to make two crucial distinctions: between terror and sabotage and between terror and assassination. Although sabotage is virtually always directed against objects rather than against people, while terrorism is generally directed against people, a distinction cannot be made solely along these lines—for terrorism is occasionally used against objects. The proper distinction—which coincides with the persons vs. objects distinction in most cases—is to be found in the psychological, rather than the physical objective of the act. If the objective is primarily the removal of a specific thing (or person) with a view towards depriving the enemy of its usefulness, then the act is one of sabotage. If, on the other hand, the objective is symbolic, we are dealing with terror.

In distinguishing between terror and assassination, the criterion again is the symbolic nature of the act. An assassination (or murder) may or may not be carried out publicly. If it is considered desirable merely to remove a certain public figure, a discreet poisoning will fulfill the requirement adequately, but it would not be terrorist. The elimination of a public figure may also be accomplished quite openly, with responsibility clearly fixed. If the cause is a personal grudge—as in the assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed office-seeker, for example—we are not dealing with terrorism. President Garfield's assassin was not interested in overthrowing the existing order—quite unlike Leon Czolgosz, the assassin of President McKinley, who was an anarchist and very interested in upsetting the established order. Czolgosz's was one of the rash of terroristic acts perpetrated by anarchists around the turn of the century, with the objective of attracting attention to the anarchist cause.
McKinley's death was symbolic, thus an act of terrorism, especially when taken in context of anarchist doctrine and related to other assassinations of the time.\footnote{7}

As a general rule, assassination and sabotage are nonsymbolic acts directed against persons and things, respectively. Terror is a symbolic act that may be directed against things or people.

**TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS**

**THE TARGETS OF TERRORISM.** Who is the object of terrorism, and who are the actors in the terrorist drama? First, of course, in any act of terrorism, there is the person who commits the terrorist act—let us say the bomb thrower. Next, we have the person or object at which the bomb is aimed. The person who is struck by the bomb is clearly the victim of the act, and certain things happen to him. If not killed or incapacitated, he is at least frightened—perhaps to the extent of being neutralized for future action. This victim himself probably belongs to some group that identifies with him and will automatically feel itself exposed to danger—he is typically a policeman, perhaps a member of the governing elite, or a member of a rival insurgent organization. This group will probably be both “terrorized” and subjected to disorientation effects, but the former is likely to be the most important component. Finally, the terrorist act takes place in a social environment, all members of which will potentially take notice of it. For this resonant mass, the disorientation content is of vastly greater importance.\footnote{8}

The identification group and the resonant mass may in some instances be identical. In any case, a large-scale terror campaign is likely to involve a large number of subgroups of the society, so that the whole resonant mass will feel increasingly engaged.\footnote{9}

A terrorist act will usually also have a stimulating effect on the members of the terrorist organization and its immediate supporters. This function of terrorism is of a different nature and must be kept analytically separate, even though acts aimed at the hostiles and the neutrals will usually have this secondary effect.

Internal war situations involving colonial insurgency against the occupying power show radical differences when compared to the customary type of internal war, especially with regard to the resonant mass or target of intent of terrorist acts. Brian Crozier's study, *The Rebels,* deals almost exclusively with colonial “internal” wars and presents an excellent analysis of terrorism in these situations. Although the terrorists would probably like to terrorize the occupying forces and reduce their efficiency, Crozier points out that their principal task is to make repression so costly that the colonial government will prefer to withdraw rather than continue the struggle. The resonant mass is thus the government and population of the home country, completely removed from personal and direct involvement in the war.\footnote{10}

The principal lesson to be drawn from differentiation of victims and targets is that, in appraising a terroristic act, one must ask, not only "Who got hit by the bomb?" but also "What effects is this particular act..."
likely to entail? Since a terroristic act is public and thus meant to have a propaganda effect and since the victim is usually physically eliminated and therefore not in need of being propagandized, there is a\textit{primo facie} requirement that the analyst of terrorism look for the real target of intent. When he locates this target, he will not only be better able to counter the propaganda effect of the act, but he also may be able to take measures to reduce the incident of terrorism by protecting targets that have high symbolic contents, rather than those that may be of purely utilitarian value. Lacking a knowledge of the target of intent, his chances for taking purposeful counteraction are extremely small.

RESPONSES INDUCED BY TERROR. Having discussed the various levels of target that may be affected by terror, we shall now summarize the responses that the terrorist may seek by his act. These responses can be classified for analytical purposes under three headings. The labels I shall give these groupings are to a considerable extent arbitrary. I have chosen to assign names to them—rather than to use X, Y, and Z—but no more should be read into the names than is specified in the following definitions.

The one positive response to be achieved is enthusiasm among the adherents of the insurgent movement. This response involves the purely morale-building function alluded to above and need not concern us further.

The lowest level of negative reaction is fright. The frightened person perceives a specific danger, which is not qualitatively different from other dangers with which he is personally or vicariously familiar. Since the perceived danger fits into the pattern of his previous experience, his response will be meaningful in terms of familiar norms of action; it will be both subjectively and objectively logical and reasonably predictable.

The middle level of response is anxiety, which is called forth by fear of the unknown and the unknowable. Traditional norms of behavior show no relevance to the new situation, and the victim becomes disoriented, casting about for guidance. The exact nature of response is unpredictable, but it is likely to lead to activity that is logical in terms of the new situation as perceived by the target.

The most extreme level of response is despair, an intensified form of anxiety. The victim perceives the threat to be so great and unavoidable that there is no course of action open to him that is likely to bring relief. As a result, the victim withdraws from the situation to the maximum possible extent.

DISCRIMINATION IN THE USE OF TERROR. Differentiations among targets and according to desired effects govern the degree of discrimination to be used in terrorism. Indiscrimination is often thought of as a necessary attribute of a terrorist campaign, and certain types of terror do give the appearance of being completely indiscriminate. Terror must always have at least some element of indiscrimination, else it becomes predictable, loses its broad character, and can no longer be
legitimately designated as terror. Also, it becomes relatively easy to combat. Total indiscrimination, however, is not reasonable, unless one is a complete nihilist. Indiscrimination to the extent of a nihilist's bombing the nihilist party headquarters, for example, is an engaging but unlikely possibility, and short of this extreme, some discrimination must be practiced.

Discrimination plays an extremely important role in the creation of anxiety responses. Any element that tends to make terror more unknowable and therefore more disorienting contributes to the creation of anxiety. The resonant mass and the identification group do not become anxious in the face of highly discriminate terrorism, but if they believe they are confronted with seemingly indiscriminate terror, they will experience the required sense of personal involvement. Again, however, total indiscrimination is not desirable, for the insurgents will wish to concentrate their attacks on specific targets of intent, social structures, and symbols, to achieve economy of effort and ensure the maintenance of those structures that are of potential value to them. They must therefore determine which structures are to be preserved, which structures are the most vulnerable to attack, and which are the most crucial in holding together the fabric of the society they wish to split. Certain compromises will inevitably have to be made, but the optimum targets are clearly those that show the highest symbolic value and are dominated by symbols that are most vulnerable to attack.

The terrorist must always have the distinction between apparent indiscrimination and actual indiscrimination clearly in mind, if he is to succeed. As a general rule, it may then be said that terror is most effective when it is indiscriminate in appearance but highly discriminate in fact.

THE PROXIMATE OBJECTIVES OF TERRORISM

We have established that the ultimate objective of terror is the influencing of political behavior, and we have discussed three tactical considerations with which insurgent terrorists must contend. It is now in order to list the proximate objectives of terrorism in this context. Our inventory will perhaps not be exhaustive, although it claims to present all of the major categories of objectives to which insurgent terror may aspire. An economically-minded insurgent group will attempt to make each act affect as many objectives as possible, and, conversely, the analyst of an act of terrorism should not be misled into thinking that each act can have only one objective. We shall leave out of consideration the bonus-effects (like sabotage) that a terrorist act may have.

The first objective is morale-building within the terrorist movement itself, as well as in that element of the population that is already sympathetic to the insurgents. This objective is usually a side-effect of acts that have other primary purposes.

In terms of our tactical criteria, this objective would have the move-
ment's sympathizers as its target, it would seek to call forth a response of enthusiasm, and discrimination would be irrelevant, except that the act should not adversely affect any of the target group.

Closely related, but of much more significance, is the objective of advertising the movement. Although not the most important objective of the terrorist, advertising is in some ways the most characteristic, for it is of the very essence of terror that it be noticed. Advertising not only calls attention to the existence of the insurgents but also serves as a reminder of their program and ideals. This thought is foremost in Kropotkin's mind in his description of terrorism—"the propaganda of the deed":

Indifference (following terrorist acts) is impossible. Those who originally did not even ask themselves what "those lunatics" were after, are forced to take notice of them, to discuss their ideas, and to take a stand for or against. Through the deeds which attract general attention, the new idea insinuates itself into peoples' heads and makes converts. Such an act does more propagandizing in a few days than do thousands of pamphlets.4

The advertising function differs from morale-building primarily in that it is directed toward a mass audience. The desired response can best be described as one of curiosity, and the level of discrimination indicated is extremely high, since the act must not only spare the insurgents and their sympathizers but also the mass audience they wish to captivate.15

Disorientation is the objective par excellence of the terrorist, removing the underpinnings of the order in which his targets live out their daily lives. The primary responsibility of any incumbent group is to guarantee order to its population, and the terrorist will attempt to disorient the population by demonstrating that the incumbents' structure cannot give adequate support.

This demonstration is, however, but one aspect of the disorientation process. On a much deeper level, the objective is the isolation of the individual from his social context. Edmond Taylor 16 described the German technique as aimed chiefly at the disruption of the sociopsychological ties among individuals that make them act as part of a group. The ultimate of the terrorization process, as Hannah Arendt conceives it, is the isolation of the individual, whereby he has only himself upon whom to rely and cannot draw strength from his customary social supports.17 While this end can most readily be achieved by physically withdrawing the individual from his environment and isolating him (as in "brainwashing" techniques), the terrorist's most readily available substitute on a mass basis is the destruction of the social framework, so that the individual perceives himself to be alone in his anguish even though he may be physically undisturbed.

Disorientation occurs when the victim does not know what he fears, when the source of his fear lies outside his field of experience. Knowledge and understanding of the source of danger provide the victim with a framework within which he can classify it, relate it to his previous experience, and therefore take measures to counter it. If he is unable to do this on his own, he can draw strength by attaching himself to a leader.
who at least gives the appearance of wisdom. If, however, the leader has been physically removed or has been demonstrated to be incapable of dealing with the rapidly shifting patterns of order, if existing organizational groups lose their apparent relevance, then the individual can look only within himself for strength and guidance.

Disorientation itself represents only a partial victory for the terrorist, albeit a very useful one. By dissociating his victims from structures associated with the incumbents, the insurgent has removed the target from the ranks of the opposition. He has little to fear, for terrorized victims are in a condition associated with anxiety neurosis and are thus unlikely to do much except look to their own security. In searching for safety and reassurance, however, most will attempt to locate new structures of authority that can alleviate their aloneness and give promise of being capable of dealing with the changed situation. The role of agitational terror is now over; it now remains for the insurgents to demonstrate that they are capable of infusing meaning into the unstructured environment.

Thus the target of the disorientation process is the mass, and the desired response is anxiety. The level of discrimination should appear to be low, almost nonexistent. Greatest anxiety will be caused if terrorist attacks fall in an apparently random pattern, are intense and unpredictable. The analogy to the Pavlov experiments is clear.

In view of the importance of disorientation effects, it is worthwhile to consider briefly what types of society are most likely to be vulnerable. It would be extremely difficult to induce mass-disorientation in a society whose members feel a high degree of positive identification with the society and are firmly committed to its values. The terrorist is probably always well advised to inject himself into a situation that already shows a high degree of disorientation. In a way, however, this consideration is minor, since it is precisely this sort of social situation that evokes terror and internal war in the first place.

There are theoretical grounds for believing that a society may be better equipped to withstand terrorist pressures when it has passed the transitional phase from adherence to rigid traditional structures of long standing and has achieved a new resolution, in which the individual draws support less from family, clan, and small occupational units than from more diffused structures and, above all, from resources within himself. The allegiance of man in a modern pluralistic society is generally distributed over a much larger number of structures. To achieve complete disorientation, the terrorizer would have therefore to spread his attack much more widely. Above all, the individual is supposed to gain strength by cutting himself loose from tradition, facing the existential problem, and establishing his source of strength within himself, rather than seeking it outside himself. David Riesman's analysis tends to belie this concept, however, and the course of contemporary history gives it still less support. The strengths man finds within himself vary greatly from
individual to individual, and the contemporary pattern seems to be much more one of "other-direction" than of "autonomy" or "inner-direction." It is precisely the "other-directed" man who leans heavily upon the support of society, as did his "tradition-directed" forefather. But even in the most advanced of societies, he may not find adequate support, and thus prove a more vulnerable target than tradition-bound groups that have not yet begun the transition to modernity.

Insofar as inner-direction is a transitional form between tradition-direction and other-direction, this period of transition would appear paradoxically to be the most difficult for the terrorist to crack. There is no law that postulates this progression of development, however, and it may be that, in our era at least, inner-direction was a historical phenomenon peculiar to the industrializing ages of a few West European and North American countries. The developing countries seem rather to be following a path from tradition-direction to other-direction, or simple non-direction looking for a direction to take. Here we return to our concept of disorientation, for non-direction is no more than disorientation, whether developed historically or caused by destruction of the structures that give direction.

If simple other-direction provides a highly vulnerable target for terrorism, then one might assume that a totalitarian society—which is founded upon extremes of other-direction—would be highly vulnerable to terroristic action. If the totalitarian structure is shown to be incapable of fulfilling its self-proclaimed role, the resultant shock is tremendous and the pliability of the masses extreme—witness the psychological state of Germany and Japan after 1945. Parenthetically, it may also be noted that in a totalitarian state the symbols of authority are intimately connected with the actual locus of power and are thus especially tempting targets for terrorist action.24

The next general objective of agitational terror is the elimination of opposing forces, either physically or by neutralizing their effectiveness. In one sense, this is a by-product of terror, for the aim in itself is not symbolic; it could be accomplished by murder. Yet it is not feasible to remove, for example, the entire British police force on Cyprus, one by one. Nechayev's rather simplistic statement that "assassination will put fear in the hearts of the government" is valid only in a qualified sense. Like terrorism aimed at disorienting the social fabric, this more specific type also aims at achieving a demonstration effect. In fact, a considerable economy of effort may be achieved if acts aimed at disorientation utilize as their means the elimination of individuals who are in themselves harmful to the insurgent cause. From elimination of a harmful individual, not only will general disorientation be promoted, but a more specific fear will be instilled into the group to which the victim belongs ("Will I be next?" each will ask). This type of terrorism, directed as it is against an organized enemy who is a "legitimate" target of attack is quite similar to
military operations. It represents the limiting case of terrorism in the
direction of conventional military action.

The specific target in this case is the victim who is to be immobilized
and his identification group; the level of discrimination, must of course be
very high so that the line is clearly drawn between those who are
threatened and those who are not. The desired response is despair, total
immobility that denies the incumbents the support of some of their most
valuable forces and reserves.22

Another major use of agitational terror is the provocation of coun-
termeasures by the incumbents. Faced with terrorist acts, the incum-
bents will find it necessary to suppress the terrorists. Ideally, suppres-
sion should be accomplished by routine methods of law enforcement, but if the
terrorists are effective—and especially if the incumbents perceive them-
selves to be in a crisis situation—it is almost inevitable that extraordinary
repressive measures will be taken. In combating an elusive terrorist, the
incumbents will be forced to take measures that affect not only the
terrorist but also his environment, the society as a whole. Although this
result may be incidental to the aims of some terrorists, terrorist acts
often are committed with the express purpose of provoking reprisals.

A much greater problem is whether or not repressive measures will
actually have the desired effect. There is always the danger that the
uncommitted will blame the terrorist for starting the whole chain of
repression in the first place. Certainly a basic requirement of this sort of
tactic is that the population not be actively committed against the ter-
rorists. If the terrorists are opposed by the populace, provocation is
very likely to be counterproductive. Even in the case of a populace that is
sympathetic to the goals of the terrorists, much depends on the state of
the popular mind.

Kropotkin believed that, while the government can normally stifle the
opposition by repression, in times of popular upsurge (époques d'éffer-
vescence) the effect of repression will be to stimulate the insurgent
movement, with corresponding divisions in the attitudes of the incum-
bents about the appropriate nature and degree of repression.23 Che Guev-
ara, on the other hand appears most chary of utilizing terrorism, for fear
that government repression will cost the insurgents more that they
gain.24 It is most difficult to find guidelines to specify when a population
would react one way and when the other, and historical examples abound
on both sides. A bonus effect of terror used successfully to provoke
countermeasures is that these countermeasures themselves tend to be ex-
traordinary and contribute to the general sense of insecurity and un-
rest that is the very objective of the terrorist, as well as to reduce the
population's confidence in the incumbents.

In terms of tactical considerations, provocative terror must be highly
discriminate in order to provoke the type of response desired. The target
is not so much the victim, (who will probably be killed and thus no longer
be involved in the action) as his identification group—the incumbent
elite—who will take the desired retaliatory action. The response to be achieved must be one of war, so that the target will react and react specifically in a logical and predictable manner.\textsuperscript{25}

THE PLACE OF TERROR IN INTERNAL WAR

As a weapon in the insurgent arsenal, terrorism has definite advantages and limitations that must be weighed against each other if terror is to be used effectively. Among its most prominent virtues is economy. It is a weapon that promises returns far out of proportion to the amount of time, energy, and materiel the insurgents invest in it, enabling them to project an image many times larger than their actual strength. Terrorists also frequently argue that the economies of terror are very real in terms of human life. Trotsky proclaimed that simple reasoning showed terror to be essential for the saving of life, but only a few pages later he struck on the true economic value of terror by noting that “the revolution...kills individuals and intimidates thousands.”\textsuperscript{26}

The return on terror expenditures increases in direct but somewhat scaled-down proportion to the apparent indiscrimination of the terror employed. The psychological effect of indiscriminate terror is much greater, and it is extremely difficult for the incumbents to predict what the terrorist’s target will be. Although no government would attempt to protect all potential targets, failure to protect any symbolically significant target can be used as a demonstration of incumbent weakness.

Most people would be willing to grant that terrorism, despite its economy, is not a desirable weapon to use. It is certainly undesirable from a moral point of view, and it is also generally recognized that terror by itself cannot be the final determinant of the outcome of an internal war. It can only be regarded as a means to an end, specifically, in our context, the end of political control. Its only effect upon the mass is to elicit an emotional response that results in no constructive activity. Having terrorized, the insurgents must then begin with the task of reforming the target into the desired patterns of activity.

The significance of this must be emphasized. If the insurgents are in a position of political strength to begin with, it is unnecessary—and even wasteful—for them to initiate terrorism. They lack, however, any less undesirable means of rendering the mass mobilizable to their own symbols, and, by resorting to terrorism, they tacitly admit their own political weakness. It is in this sense that we must understand Brian Crozier’s oft-repeated dictum that terrorism is the weapon of the weak.\textsuperscript{27} Both Crozier and Lucian Pye,\textsuperscript{48} seem to envision this weakness in military terms, but this reservation would only be valid in situations where insurgents are operating against a foreign colonial power without the strength to engage in open warfare—or in any situation where almost the entire population is actively opposed to the government.

By presupposing a high degree of unanimity among the population, however, we exclude the most interesting cases of internal war—in which the population is split. Even in such “colonial” wars as those in Malaya or
parts of Indochina, the real object of the battle was control of the population. Only after the insurgents had won this control could they move on to the stage of directing their fire directly against the occupying power and reach the position posited by Crozier. In fact, the Malayans never reached this point. (Crozier, of course, recognizes this fact and goes on to note that, if the support of the population is lacking, terrorism may show great initial results but will ultimately become counterproductive.)

A crucial problem for all terrorists is that of timing. The initial stage is the most important. If the terrorists can launch a sudden massive campaign, they have the opportunity both to create highly desirable psychological response and perhaps even temporarily to neutralize the incumbent forces. A movement that could achieve such results, however, would probably be politically so strong that it would not have to resort to terror.

For a number of reasons, agitational terror is not the sort of activity that can be utilized effectively over a protracted period of time. It tends to lose its effectiveness with familiarity; it is perceived as an emergency weapon by most people; and it is not appropriate to the legitimacy that an insurgent group must at least claim to have. There are a number of interesting and significant historical examples illustrating failure to realize weakness—particularly those of the right-wing Indonesians, the Burmese Communists, and the Malayan Communists.

The reason for the importance of using extensive terror only in the initial stages of an insurgent movement, especially of not resorting to it after other means have failed, is obvious. The disorientation purpose of terror is followed by an attempt to supplant the demolished structures of authority by structures desired by the insurgent. To exploit the anguish of the disoriented mass, the insurgents must appear to be a pillar of strength, an infallible guide in a confusing world. This image will be somewhat tarnished, to say the least, if the insurgents have been proved incapable of overcoming the incumbents. Specific acts of terror, aimed primarily at intimidation, will be accepted by the population even in late stages of insurgency, especially if they are perceived as enforcement terror. The nature of these acts must be clear, however, for terror in late stages of an insurrectionary movement can look very much like (and frequently is) the irrational death throes of the movement. An attempt to begin a disorientation process after more direct methods have failed seems doomed to failure.

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NOTES
1 This definition is valid for both agitational and enforcement terror.
2 This danger could be reduced by increasing discrimination.
Under such circumstances, however, one could hardly expect them to perform at the level the Viet Cong appears to be achieving.

4 *Mein Kampf*, pp. 45-46.

5 “Ideologie und Terror,” p. 242. The ideology need not by any means be limited to Communism or Fascism.


7 What if President Garfield’s assassin had been advocating, not a more egocentric orientation of the spoils system, but the enactment of civil service legislation? It would be a limiting case certainly, and, although closely related to terrorism, would probably best be called something else. If, however, civil service enthusiasts throughout the country had at that time been urging the assassination of presidents to bring attention to their cause, we would have a clear case of terrorism and even a very effective one, since Garfield’s death did promote civil service reform. On the other hand, if civil service reform had been the objective of the killing, his death would probably have retarded the reforms. Such is the dilemma of terrorism.

8 The term “resonant mass” is taken from the “Document on Terror,” printed in *News from behind the Iron Curtain*, I (No. 3, March, 1952), 53.

9 Friedrich and Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship*, p. 131, argue that in view of the manifold interrelationships among groups in society, the entire population will inevitably become affected by the terror.

10 Given this situation, it is highly questionable whether any such colonial war can be correctly classified as an internal war. Certainly the psychological relationships among the actors are very different from those in a regular internal war situation, and the problems faced by both sides are of a different nature. Although we shall make certain observations about terrorist occurrences in colonial war situations, we shall exclude the colonial war as an analytical category of internal war in dealing with terrorism. Probably it should be completely excluded from the internal war inventory.

11 In fact, they are loosely derived from the terminology of scholastic philosophy, but no attempt has been made at exact accommodation to the scholastic framework.

12 It is not our purpose here to work out any detailed psychological background for the use of “terror. Much work clearly needs to be done on the subject. There is interesting material in the volume *Identity and Anxiety*, Maurice R. Stein, et al., eds. (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1969), especially Kurt Riezeler’s article “The Social Psychology of Fear,” reprinted from *American Journal of Sociology*, XLIX (1944), pp. 489-498. Also important are the articles by Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Franz L. Neumann, and Joost A. M. Meerloo. Reference should also be made to Bruno Bettelheim’s *The Informed Heart* and to the experiments of John T. Lanzetta, et al., reported in the *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, XLIX (1954), pp. 445-453, and in *Human Relations*, VII (No. 1, February, 1955), pp. 29-52. Lanzetta’s work with small groups is probably not directly applicable to genuine terror, since it is hardly possible to create artificially the conditions that would simulate the high levels of fear associated with terror. It does, however, raise the interesting question concerning the point at which external pressure begins to atomize individuals within a group rather than stimulating group cohesiveness.

13 Moore, *Terror and Progress*, pp. 169-170, considers that the Soviet terror appears capricious to the Russian people and thus undermines their “essential bases of social organization.”


15 A subcase of this objective is the attempt to polarize public opinion by means of terrorist acts. The insurgents’ opponents (either incumbents or other insurgents) will respond strongly, perhaps with terror of their own, and neutrals will feel compelled to take sides. For a discussion of the activities of the French Secret Army in this context see Edmond Taylor, “The Ugly Trend,” *The Reporter* (December 7, 1961), p. 26.

16 *The Strategy of Terror*, p. 183.
i. The Communists interviewed by Gabriel Almond for *The Appeals of Communism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1954), showed, in many instances, a severe sense of isolation and rejection of stabilizing norms. Reminiscences of ex-Communists reinforce this impression to the extent that it becomes almost a stereotype.

ii. Norman Cohn's description of the followers of mediaeval chiliastic movements bears striking similarities to the state of disorientation that we have assumed to be the objective of terror. Cohn conceives of this state as mass paranoia, which in more modern times has channeled itself into totalitarian movements. (*The Pursuit of the Millennium*, passim, especially the Conclusion.)


21. The totalitarian state has, of course, a great advantage in the efficiency of its repressive apparatus. In both Germany and the Soviet Union, this efficiency more than offset the vulnerabilities of the system.

22. In theory, the entire population, excluding the insurgents, could be the target. Once everybody else was immobilized, the insurgents would stand alone on the field. This effect may be possible in small-group situations, but it is rather unlikely in normal practice. In military terms, it is analogous to the physical elimination of the entire enemy population.

23. There is an extensive and illuminating discussion of this technique in the "Document on Terror" (Note 8). The "Document" is worthy of intensive study, even though its source is at best questionable. Although no claims are made about its provenance, it is obviously intended to appear to be of Communist origin. This origin is highly doubtful on internal grounds, but no matter where or by whom it was written, the "Document" is of exceptional theoretical and operational interest. The German "original"—generously made available to me by the Free Europe Committee—contains important material not printed in the English-language version.


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31. This the proposition holds true only if there is little or no time lapse between the two phases. There is no theoretical reason why a movement cannot fail, withdraw for a few years to regroup, and then begin a disorientation campaign as a fresh start.

439
TARGET—THE CIVILIAN*

BY NAPOLEON D. VALERIANO

AND

CHARLES T. R. BOHANNAN

Success in counterinsurgency PSYOP depends upon strong leadership, command support, direct organizational responsibility, and a well-conceived program.

* * * * *

Possibly an appropriate definition of psychological operations in a counterinsurgency situation would be: "actions planned and conducted primarily to create emotions, attitudes, and behavior favorable to the accomplishment of the national objectives, including elimination of the guerrilla." Now change the term defined to "national revival operations" (instead of "psychological operations"), and the whole becomes as easy to defend as a campaign platform based on home, mother, and opposition to sin. Perhaps more important, if the national objectives are clearly defined and agreed upon, improper use of the mechanism can be detected and exposed.

Such a definition was in effect applicable to the psychological operations undertaken in the Philippines under the direction of [Ramón] Magsaysay. A mission directive formulated on the basis of this definition will give great freedom in the choice of means. It permits actions of countless sorts, as long as their purpose is influencing attitudes or behavior on behalf of the government. In practice, such actions will range from those undertaken to inform the target to those intended to terrify it. They will range from press handouts to using a “Voice of God” loudspeaker to tell guerrilla Taclac Tommy and his friends that intelligence he supplied (in fact, he has not supplied it) has led to the death of Huk Commander Keling. On-the-spot promotions for soldiers who have killed guerrillas and the provision of an army band for a village celebration may both be useful psychological operations.

Most important, this definition and the mission based on it neither describe nor delimit the target of these operations. The reason and the necessity for this are obvious, in light of popular distrust of any activities designed to influence attitudes and behavior. In guerrilla and counter-guerrilla operations alike, the target is, and must be, everyone—friends, enemies, innocent bystanders, foreign diplomats, international correspondents. The target is the sea, and the fish who swim in it, the birds who fly overhead, the pseudo-gang shark, and the porpoise who may be grist to the enemies’ propaganda mill.

* * * * *

Magsaysay, when he took office as Secretary of National Defense, was little concerned about definitions, organizations, or theories. He had, in fact, a strong aversion to all of them, and would have insisted that he had

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no theories. He would have said only that he "knew" some things. He did.

He "knew" that the government must win the support of the civilians if the soldiers were to defeat the guerrilla. He "knew" that in the operational area the soldier is by far the most significant element of government in contact with the civilians. He "knew" how every action of the soldier reflected on government.

Accordingly, he set out on a high run to make the actions of the soldiers reflect and emphasize their mission as friends and protectors of the people. One of the first things he changed was the manner in which troops entered a town or village.

In 1947, after President Manuel Roxas had proclaimed his "mailed fist" policy, the troops went on combat-alert status. By late 1950, under the prodding of the high command to be "truly military," they adopted the practice of entering every inhabited area in Huklandia in an exaggerated combat posture. Troops would move in by truck, obviously battle-ready, weapons pointing out in all directions as though they expected immediate assault. From their demeanor, it was to be assumed that they felt they were among enemies, that they anticipated momentary attack.

The psychological effect of this was deplorable. The people saw that these representatives of their government regarded them as enemies. The obvious effect on the troops themselves was to feel that the people were indeed their enemies. Soon, in small villages, the people simply disappeared when the troops came in. In larger towns and cities, soldiers were ignored or treated as a bad smell. The very insecurity that the guerrilla feeds on was heightened both in the protector and the protected.

Magsaysay issued orders that troops entering towns and barrios were to make no threatening display of weapons, adopt no threatening attitude unless there was clear and present danger. He instructed troops entering an inhabited area to conduct themselves as though they were coming among friends who, like themselves, might be subject to surprise attack by a common enemy. These orders he enforced by most thorough checking of troop behavior himself and by reports from trusted members of his staff.

Magsaysay's next action was based on his recollections of the reactions of civilians, particularly children, to American troops who seemed always to have candy for children. He begged, he borrowed, he scrounged, perhaps he even stole, but he procured candy and chewing gum to issue to troops on the move; candy they, in turn, were to distribute to children wherever they halted in a village.

The results were prompt and far-reaching. As soon as soldiers came in friendliness, the barrio people at least stayed to see the next move. As soon as it became known among children that these soldiers, their own soldiers, gave candy to the kids, a patrol or a truckload could not enter the village without being surrounded by children coming to greet "Santa Claus."

This meant many things. First of all, the children quickly began to
regard soldiers as their friends no matter how much the elders in the family disapproved of soldiers in general or sympathized with the Huk. It was hard to persuade the children that the Santa Claus with the candy was an enemy. Eventually, this rubbed off on the older folks; it is hard to dislike those who respond to children. Troops surrounded by children are not likely to be attacked by a guerrilla whose support depends on people to whom the children belong. Thus, the children formed the best possible shield for troops while they were in the village. And if the children did not appear when soldiers came in, it was reasonable to assume that the enemy might be nearby. The effect of the friendship-candy approach went even deeper, since friendships started by the children could lead to information for the soldiers.

About the same time that the wholesome effects of the "candy for kids" program became apparent, Magsaysay issued a statement to the armed forces declaring that every soldier had two duties: first, to act as an ambassador of good will from the government to the people; second, to kill or capture Huk. Nothing else, he said, really counted as far as he was concerned. Certainly nothing would qualify a man for promotion except to be an effective ambassador and an effective fighter. This policy would govern all actions, and he and his staff would be checking on it. He went further. He proclaimed it the duty and responsibility of everyone—civilian and soldier alike—to submit suggestions as to how these two objectives could better be accomplished.

Needless to say, his statements were received with considerable skepticism. But skeptics soon found out that Magsaysay and his staff were checking constantly and by every conceivable means to ensure compliance with his policies.

No commander, even in the most isolated outpost, could go to bed at night sure that he would not be awakened before dawn by an irate Secretary of National Defense. . . . He would want to know how much the commander, be he sergeant or colonel, knew about the situation in his area; about the state of his command; when the troops had last been paid; what they ate for supper last night; how many Huk they had killed in the last week; why they hadn't killed more; what was the state of motor transport; what were the needs of the civilians in the area, what was the attitude of the civilians.

* * * * *

Another source of irritation between soldier and civilian—and one of the most common difficulties in counterguerrilla operations—was the inadequacy of ration supplies for troops in the field. The problem of getting supplies, and of getting them distributed, frequently left troops with no alternative but the age-old one of foraging. And troops forced to appropriate rations are not inclined to be gracious to the farmer who supplies them. The Armed Forces of the Philippines were no exception. Troops often ate only what they could forage—and had no money to pay for it. Secretary Magsaysay recognized that by this practice alone the
troops were placing themselves in an unfavorable position in comparison to the Huk. True, the guerrillas depended almost entirely for their sustenance on what they could extract from the farmers, but they always sought to make their extractions as painless as possible. The actual pickup of the food was often done for them by the Huk 'tax collectors' on behalf of the cause. If the food was procured by the guerrillas themselves, it was customarily begged. The farmer was asked, politely and humbly, if he could spare some food for the men who were fighting "for his cause, on his behalf, and to establish the new people's democracy." Thus guerrilla foraging was actually made to contribute to their propaganda campaign.

Magsaysay took several steps to rectify this situation. The procurement and distribution of field rations was given emergency status. A new policy was established: Troops, especially patrols to remote areas, were required to carry more food than they needed for themselves. If this was not possible, emergency resupply was effected, often by air drop. When this was impractical, troops were supplied with cash with which to pay for food purchased from civilians. The fact that the troops were able to depend on military resources, were self-sufficient, heightened their own morale and increased the respect of the civilians for the army.

There was another effect, a psychological reaction of perhaps greater importance than that induced by the self-sufficiency of the troops, by the demonstration that they were law-abiding citizens whose presence was not a burden on civilians. This resulted from the extra food carried by the patrols, food they could give to those in need, especially those in need because of the depredations of the Huk, the common enemy. In the past, the farmer who gave food to the Huk, however unwillingly, had been treated as clearly a sympathizer and supporter of the enemy. Now the assumption was that if he was actually in need because of taxes levied on him by the Huk, he was clearly a person entitled to help from his government. The troops made common cause with him against the common enemy, they said, thus tacitly imposing on him an obligation. It was clear that if the soldier gave a man food to replace what the Huk had taken, the man had an obligation to help the soldier find and eliminate the Huk.

Magsaysay realized that he could not singlehandedly implement his "Attraction Program," as he called his campaign to win acceptance of the soldier as 'worthy supporter of a government that deserved the support of the governed. At first, he may have thought that the program was so obviously necessary and useful that, once started, it would be carried forward automatically. He did not make the mistake of thinking that simply issuing an order would be enough.

* * * *

The Attraction Program was, in practice, an enlargement of the mission of the armed forces—although certainly the principle was inherent in their basic mission. Effective accomplishment of this enlarged mission required officers especially trained and motivated to assist, advise, and,
not infrequently, do the work, in the accomplishment of this new mission
given to commanders.

An organization was created that became known as the Civil Affairs
Office of the Secretary of National Defense. Although under the direct
control of, and personally responsible to, the Secretary of National De-
defense, this organization functioned in much the same way as any technical
service, such as the Chemical Corps, functions in conventional (pre-1962)
U.S. military organization. Civil Affairs Officers were assigned to each
echelon of command down to battalion level, and at each echelon
functioned both as special staff officers (advisers to the commander) and
as operational officers, responsible for duties in their specialty. In addi-
tion, there were special operational units directly under the Civil Affairs
Office, which could be attached to tactical or administrative commands,
and special sections (press, radio, etc.), which served the entire Armed
Forces.

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The mission of the Civil Affairs Office was never set forth fully and
explicitly. Various written directives made the CAO responsible for
advising and assisting commanders in establishing the best possible rela-
tions with civilians, a mission somewhat broader than that ordinarily
given a public-relations officer. It was generally understood that any
matter that might be expected to come within the purview of troop
information and education, psychological operations, or military govern-
ment came within the cognizance of the CAO. Finally, the CAO at higher
echelons functioned as something similar to a publicity-minded Inspector
General. The lack of clarity in the statement of mission of the CAO
aroused much criticism from organization-minded members of the milit-
ary, who could not see why these missions should not be spelled out, or
why they should not be given the more commonly used military designa-
tions.

The reasons were very simple. Magsaysay realized the public criticism
that any accurate statement of mission would arouse; he also realized the
necessity for not imposing arbitrary or formal limitations on activities
designed to win popular support for the armed forces. To his way of
thinking, the duties of a Civil Affairs Office should be sufficiently implic-
it in the name, and anyone who could not understand the meaning of the
words should go away and figure it out, not take up the valuable time of
people trying to win a war. As for its position in his office rather than in
GHQ, he felt, with justification, that without maximum command back-
ing, his backing, the CAO could never accomplish its mission.

As its greatest strength, the CAO never totaled more than 200 officers,
enlisted ..., ... civilians. This is comparable to one company of
psychological-warfare troops in the U.S. Army. With little actual equip-
ment of their own, they had to rely heavily on their own good judgment,
the cooperation of their commanders, and a sensitive knowledge and
understanding of their people and of the enemy.
Since the CAO headquarters was in the office of the Secretary of National Defense, and was responsible for advising and assisting the Secretary in maintaining the best possible relations with the civilians, it functioned as his public-relations office. Reporters scouting for news about the armed forces came to the Civil Affairs Officers for information. If it were for a follow-up on a report casting discredit upon the armed forces, they were coming to the officer who was not only authorized to give information about the incident, but also responsible for seeing that if such an incident had occurred, it was made to redound to the credit of the armed forces, if possible.

Suppose, for example, that a reporter came to the CAO asking information about a reported chicken theft by soldiers of the Second Squad, Third Platoon, Company B, Umpteenth Battalion Combat Team. The CAO was authorized to require, on behalf of the Secretary of National Defense, an immediate investigation of the incident and appropriate corrective action. It was further charged with following up the report to ensure that the appropriate action taken was so reported to the press as to convey the idea that an unfortunate and exceptional incident had received sudden and condign punishment.

A major mission of the CAO was to secure the widest publicity for all laudable accomplishments of the armed forces. Information was constantly fed to eager newspaper reporters and radio commentators. However, they were never forced to use any items nor to withhold any. The achievements of the armed forces and the developments on all fronts made headline news regularly and deservedly on their own merits. The few newshounds who remained hostile searched freely for subjects on which to base scathing remarks, while CAO Officers scurried to make these remarks boomerang on their makers. Public opinion about the actions of the government and of the armed forces was constantly monitored. Every effort was made to keep abreast of the attitudes of the Huk toward new developments. This monitoring kept the Civil Affairs Office constantly in touch with the impact of the various approaches tried, and gave excellent leads for further propaganda campaigns.

Wide publicity meant more than handing out news releases. It meant spreading the information to the people in the country, people who did not see the newspapers or hear the radio. One of the better devices for widespread dissemination of information about the helpful actions and good intentions of the troops was the publication of journals and newspapers ostensibly for the troops. These papers included general news, gave instructions on troop behavior with civilians, and reported commendable military activities, citing them as actions to be emulated. These publications were issued to the troops in large quantities, so that they might see in print what they were supposed to be doing, and what their rewards might be. More important, the soldiers were encouraged to give copies to the civilians, especially in the area of operations against the guerrilla. What form of propaganda could better carry conviction on the desires of government for proper troop behavior than official publications?
intended for consumption within the armed forces, and directed to the attention of every member of those forces?

In the Philippines, as in most countries where literacy is not (or has not long been) virtually universal, plays, skits, and recitations are traditional entertainment, and are exceptionally useful vehicles for transmitting information. This national practice was utilized in a number of ways. Movies were made, contrasting the laudable accomplishments of the armed forces with the deplorable actions of the enemy, who was shown acting in ways contrary to the customs and culture values of the country. Mobile projection units showed these movies widely in the remote areas. The Civil Affairs Officer of each BCT had a jeep, a projector, and a projectionist for just this purpose. Audiences came from far and wide to enjoy the entertainment.

Radio and movies were occasionally used ostensibly, sometimes actually, for tactical psychological operations. The mother of Luis Taruc, the most respected of the Huk field commanders, made a tape-recorded appeal for him to surrender. This was broadcast over the radio repeatedly, primarily to show that this “hero” was actually a person who would not heed his mother. Taruc did surrender shortly afterward, and claimed that this appeal, which he had heard repeatedly, did have an effect on his actions.

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“Live” shows obviously offered more effective personal appeal than movies, so a number of traveling road shows were organized. Designed to improve relations between the military and the civilians by demonstrating the interest taken by the armed forces in the welfare of the people, they were good entertainment and extremely effective propaganda vehicles. In one area of Huklandia where transportation was largely by water, a “Show Boat” was rigged up and proved a tremendous success. Its programs, in the local language, featured news, songs, skits, and true-life stories. Ex-Huk, often former recruiters in the same area, were featured performers. When these men revisited the community to explain why they were no longer rebels, and made eloquent and obviously sincere pleas for support of the government as the protector of the people, the means by which the aspirations of the people could best be achieved, the effect was that of an old-fashioned revival preacher. There were few occasions when one or more Huk or Huk supporters in the audience failed to come forward to the “mourners’ bench.”

No effort was spared to get the word to the people. The army distributed pamphlets on topics from rice-growing to baby care. Comic books showing Huk crimes and army punishment of them (and army punishment of erring soldiers, as well) were passed out by patrols. Posters spread the word of the new policies. They showed Magsaysay offering “my left hand in friendship, my right hand in force,” which was soon shortened to an offer of “All-Out Friendship or All-Out Force.” Surren-
ders became more frequent as more opportunities and more persuasion were provided.

The Civil Affairs Office, by informing civilians and military of the actions and intentions of both the government and the armed forces, was actually conducting the most effective kind of strategic psychological operations against the guerrilla. Civilians, in contact with the Huk, either directly or indirectly, naturally passed along to them what they knew, or thought they knew, about the activities and intentions of the government. Inevitably, this carried greater credibility, greater conviction, than the same statements made directly by government officials.

Further, if what a civilian saw and heard about the government was good, was contrary to the Huk charges that the government was tyrannical, abusive, corrupt, it aroused in the mind of the civilian some doubt about the justification of further depriving himself in order to support the Huk. This doubt was transmitted to the Huk, at least by indirectness, and a gulf began to open between him and his civilian friend. The loss of mutual confidence inevitably presaged a loss of voluntary support for the guerrilla.

Publicity, entertainment, and direct propaganda were only part of the mission of the CAO. The basic mission was the implementation, at all echelons, of the Attraction Program. Partly this was a matter of troop indoctrination, and of checking on the effectiveness of the indoctrination. Partly it was a matter of developing and securing implementation of programs by which the army could actively and concretely demonstrate its helpfulness to the people.

Magsaysay insisted on direct action by the troops to help the little people. Protecting them, pursuing their enemy—the guerrilla—came first, but whenever possible, the soldiers were to do more. They should actually improve the conditions of life. Out of this belief grew the activities called “civic action,”... the real purpose [of] which is to influence the thinking and behavior of all concerned, from the troops who build the schoolhouse to the guerrilla whose son is given a chance to go to school—by courtesy of the army. As a means for proving to all participants and observers the desire of government to be of service to the governed, an effective civic-action program cannot be excelled. It is also an effective way of accomplishing worthwhile projects with available labor. Practically speaking, however, it is doubtful if any civic-action projects can be afforded, in a counterguerrilla situation, which do not clearly contribute to the operational purpose of influencing the emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the people toward support of the government.

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In practice, effective counterguerrilla action—especially that of troops—so intermingles concrete useful actions, protective actions (combat against guerrilla), and psychological operations that it is difficult to tell where one action leaves off and the other begins. Properly performed,
they blend in a spiral, moving more and more rapidly from one success to another, from one field to another, until the desired objective is achieved, until the fish is driven out of the sea in which he can no longer live.

This was especially effective in the Philippines, where many ways were devised for the soldier to demonstrate his helpfulness and his good will to civilians. Medical-aid men were trained to accompany patrols and were provided with medicines and instructions for treating simple sicknesses and injuries of the civilians. Troop units were encouraged to assist in solving local problems—to evacuate persons seriously injured or threatened by Huk activities, to repair roads and bridges. This was civic action of the most basic sort. These were also psychological operations of the most effective type.

Developing national programs, like furnishing material to the national mass-communications media, was largely accomplished by the CAO in the office of the Secretary of National Defense. Actual accomplishments in the Attraction Program came primarily from the lower echelons.

The next command echelon under the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines was formed by the four military area headquarters, each with its Civil Affairs Officer and his teams. These military area headquarters conducted civic-action programs within their own resources. They repaired and built roads and schools, dug wells, moved houses, did all the thousand and one useful things that can be accomplished by troops not urgently required to be deployed to the field.

Under the area headquarters were sometimes sector headquarters which had much the same functions in smaller areas, and then the battalion combat teams, the basic building blocks of the Philippine Army. In each BCT headquarters there was a Civil Affairs Officer with a small group of enlisted men to assist him.

One of the most successful BCT commanders started the practice of calling the CAO the civilian representative on his staff. The CAO was required to know, and to maintain constant liaison with, all civilian officials in the BCT area of responsibility. All officers were, as a matter of course, supposed to know as many as possible of these civilian officials, but maintenance of continuing liaison with them was the primary responsibility of the CAO.

The CAO was made an integral and essential part of the battalion staff. He suggested operations based on information received from civilians. More important, proposed operations were coordinated with him in order to minimize their possible adverse effects on civilian activities. To the civilians, he was their representative, not the government's. He did conduct propaganda activities, but with his left hand, so to speak. Operations of an obvious propaganda nature were usually made to seem the responsibility of someone else, so that the role of the CAO as the "honest broker" between civilians and soldiers was not compromised.

One of the most important duties of the CAO on the BCT level was to ensure the creation and maintenance of the "image" of the troops as
friends and benefactors of the people. This was not easy. It meant first of all indoctrinating the troops themselves with the concept, making them realize what it implied in terms of their actions and behavior, and making them understand the consequences of actions that harmed this “image.” Part of his staff duty was checking on implementation of the policy that enlisted men or officers who committed offenses against civilians were to be tried on the spot, if possible, by a military court-martial or by civilian courts. He was further responsible for making certain that the results of such trials were immediately publicized in terms which made clear that crimes against the people were also crimes against the army and against the government. The CAO who could accomplish all this, without being tagged as a “spy” of higher headquarters or a tattletale, was a diplomat, teacher, and disciplinarian of high order.

In addition to seeking to indoctrinate the troops (and their leaders, and the civilians), the CAO suggested ways in which to implement the Attraction Program, and where appropriate and possible made the means available. It was his duty to secure leaflets, magazines, newspapers, extra supplies of medicine—all the things the patrols could take out with them and distribute to civilians in need either of help or of education about the purposes of government. The real payoff came in getting the soldiers, the patrols, to understand the importance and value to them of establishing good relations with the civilians in their areas of operations. How well this was eventually understood and how thoroughly this goal was pursued is aptly described in the following anonymous article in the *Philippine Armed Forces Journal* for October, 1953:

**Every Soldier a Psy-War Man**

To the successful prosecution of psychological warfare, it is essential for unit, down to the squad to win the people in their areas psychologically. Since, under the “Three-in-One Plan,” each unit has a more or less permanent sector, the first step is for members of the outfit in any area to get acquainted with the people in their sector.

The approach should be friendly and informal. Every member of the team should maintain an attitude of cordiality. He should not pretend that he is more intelligent or more prosperous than the civilians; he should not assume an air of superiority; he must refrain from making the civilians give information by constraint. On the contrary, he should treat the civilians as his equals and friends, thereby adroitly making the civilian both an ally and an active, willing helper.

Never forgetting that he is a psy-war man, every member of the unit should perceive the manner in which the patrol is received by the people it comes in contact with. He should note whether the soldiers are welcomed spontaneously or received with cold indifference. Are the people reluctant to talk? Are they afraid of the man in uniform? Are they helpful or sympathetic to the army? Are they antagonistic? What is their general feeling toward the conflict between Communism and democracy? Are the people pessimistic of the country’s future?

The attitude of the people toward the Armed Forces as well as toward the Huk is gauged in the process. The patrol, however, should be careful to make his observations without arousing suspicion among the civilians that they (the civilians) are

[*A coordinated intelligence, psychological warfare and combat operations program developed by Lightning Sector, II MA.*)
under observation. He should record in his mind what he sees and hears and put them down on paper later. He should not start any argument.

As a psy-war agent, the patrol should distribute psy-war materials in its sector. Since it is not possible to furnish every inhabitant with psy-war materials, it is important for the patrol to make a wise distribution. The Huk allies and the fence-sitters (those who are indifferent) should get the patrol's first attention. Issuing the leaflets or posters or mime books he has at his disposal, the patrol observes the reaction of the people to such material. Are they eager to receive the leaflets, posters, etc.? Do they read these? What do they say? What is their reaction? Do facial expressions tally with what they say?

With the knowledge he has acquired of the people and the circumstances obtaining in his sector as his guide, the patrol should proceed, on its second or third visit, to take positive measures to correct the attitudes of the people toward Democracy, and toward the AFP and its efforts to bring the peace and order campaign to an early conclusion. The BCT public-relations officer, who is also the BCT's psy-war officer, may be consulted on the measures to be taken and how they should be implemented. It is essential, however, for the commanding officers, as well as the platoon, squad, and patrol leaders, to make every member of their unit acknowledge the fact that the present campaign can't be won by bullets alone and at the same time make every man in the outfit realize that he cannot be an effective psy-war agent unless he enjoys the confidence of the people of his sector. To win that confidence, the soldier has to conduct himself properly and must take sincere interest in the people and their problems.

Under the "Three in-One Plan" the soldier has these missions: operations, intelligence, and psy-war and public relations. It is a big job. It is important that the soldiers are thoroughly briefed by their leaders. The briefing should be done not once but as frequently as possible and before any patrol is sent out.

This was a radical departure from contemporary doctrine on patrol missions, but had ample (and almost forgotten) precedent in Philippine history. Routine patrols of the Philippine Constabulary in the first thirty years of this century had virtually identical missions, differently stated. If led by an officer into remote areas, they often served as mobile Justice of the Peace courts, sanitary inspectors, first-aid teams, educational inspectors, registrars of marriages, births, and deaths, tax collectors—were, in other words, an embodiment of the services of government, of good and concerned government.

So must it be in areas of counterguerrilla operations. Whether his commanders like it or not, the soldier symbolizes government to many of the governed. He must be made the best and most useful symbol possible. He must clearly demonstrate the moral justification for the existence of the government, and thus he will impose an obligation for the support of that government. This is a command responsibility. Civil Affairs Officers, military-government officers, psychological warriors, and a host of others may assist the commander in the execution of his duties, but the responsibility is his. This was recognized in the Philippines as it must be everywhere.

* * * * *

The most significant and the best known of the major psychological operations was that known as EDCOR. This was executed by the Corps of Engineers, under the guidance of the CAO and in the glare of publicity the CAO provided at the national level.
EDCOR (the term is an acronym for Economic Development Corps) was originally intended to be a program for ensuring food for the armed forces by providing homesteads for drafted and discharged soldiers. Magsaysay saw in this program, which had been approved by the Philippine Congress, an opportunity to demolish a major Huk campaign slogan: "Land for the Landless." Magsaysay proclaimed that if they really wanted land for the landless, if they were sincere in their claims, the way for them to achieve this objective was to surrender to the armed forces. If they did this, if they demonstrated a sincere desire to be loyal citizens working their own farms, they would be given farms of their own, and helped to get a start on them.

Captured or surrendered Huk who gave evidence of their sincerity were placed in specially established EDCOR resettlement projects, leavened with a number of settlers who were retired soldiers or ex-USAFTE guerrillas. Personnel selected for these projects were transported to the site, with their families, and given assistance in building houses and clearing land. Each was assigned about fifteen acres of land, to which he received title after he had done a certain amount of work on it. Until his own crops were harvested, each received a ration allowance and, if needed, clothing, medicine, seed, and tools. All was to be paid for when the harvest made payment possible. The effect of the two initial projects was extraordinary and far-reaching.

Huk commanders were invited to come in, under safe-conduct passes, to visit these projects and see for themselves the conditions under which their former comrades were now living.

The direct effect on the Huk movement, in terms of government propaganda directly causing surrenders, was strong. The indirect effects were much stronger. The publicity given the EDCOR program, and the credibility it achieved, make a tremendous impression on people who had been supporting, or tolerating, the Huk. As long as the guerrilla could say that he was fighting for something worthwhile, something that could not be achieved without fighting, he had a moral claim to support, especially if he were a relative or a friend. When it became apparent that he could achieve this objective without fighting, that his avowed purpose for fighting had disappeared, any moral obligation to support him disappeared also. More, if he continued to fight, his motivation became suspect.

In addition to the resettlement projects, EDCOR undertook two other major operations. One of these was a rehabilitation center right in army headquarters outside Manila. In a warehouse, a vocational school and carpentry shop were set up where captured or surrendered Huk who had given material assistance to the armed forces could learn and practice a trade. Not only did they learn, they produced, and they earned money. Several of them were able to set up profitable businesses after their release from custody, businesses built on the knowledge and funds garnered while they were prisoners.
Perhaps the most spectacular operation of EDCOR was one in which a whole village was transplanted. A barrio of the municipality of San Luis, in Pampanga Province, the home town of the Huk leader, was in dire straits. The land the residents were supposed to farm was not their own; worse, cultivation of much of this had been impossible for several years because of the activities of Huk and government forces in the area. The future seemed hopeless. A battalion of army engineers moved in to a piece of public domain not far from the barrio and cleared it of the tough cogon grass, which forms a root mat almost impenetrable to the plow. They cleaned it, they ditched and drained it; they built paddy-field dikes and elevated roadways. They finished by picking up the houses of the barrio dwellers and transferring them intact to a new location near the fields, to which the residents received title after a short period of work on them.

This project was expensive. It was a project that could not be justified in terms of its helpfulness to the nation, for it could not be repeated in the hundreds, perhaps thousands, of areas where similar help was needed. As a psychological operation, it was a tremendous success. Every member of that barrio had many relatives in the field with the Huk, men who now, by Philippine custom, were made to feel a sense of obligation to the government which had so dramatically helped their relatives. Magaysay estimated the value of this operation as greater than that of another battalion combat team in the field.

The large EDCOR projects did not in themselves make a significant contribution to the economic or social welfare of the country....

Their real value—and it was tremendous—was as dramatic proof of the intentions and desires of government, proof that lent itself to publicity, to propaganda. They could be called advertising stunts but their value in selling the good intentions of government to the governed was tremendous.

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The strategic psychological warfare quite properly placed major emphasis on the Attraction Program, on offering and demonstrating justification for supporting the government rather than its enemies. Other approaches were not neglected. These ranged from “one-shotters” designed to destroy the credibility of a notorious opponent (such as the politician who received a commendatory cable ostensibly from a foreign Communist source, which would have been publicized had it not scared him into cooperation) to sustained operations designed to create distrust or enmity between the Huk and the mass base.

Often these operations served several purposes, as did the program of rewards for capturing or killing Huk leaders. Tens of thousands of posters were distributed, listing individuals wanted for crimes of murder, kidnaping, banditry, rape and offering rewards for these criminals. Emphasis was placed on the crimes, but the fact that they were committed by Huk, and were a part of their rebellious activity, was also mentioned. These posters deliberately sought to tear away the glamour of political
motivation, of heroic guerrilla action, and to expose the Huk leaders as common criminals. This was most effective in reducing sympathy for them.

The liberal rewards offered brought the death, capture, or surrender of many Huk leaders. Sometimes these were effected by civilians, sometimes by other Huk. Whenever possible, these incidents were publicized, always in such a way as to protect the individual responsible while conveying the impression that it was someone the Huk had trusted. Rumors of Huk being killed or betrayed by their comrades were assiduously propagated, always with care lest government credibility be impaired if the rumors were proved false. (Surrenders to claim the rewards were not officially countenanced, since the government could not be a party to bribing criminals to surrender, but in practice “arranged” surrenders were not discouraged.)

The principal value of the reward program was in widening the gulf between civilians and guerrillas, and increasing the suspicion and hostility of the guerrilla toward civilians and toward his own comrades. The effect of the program was to commit an ever-increasing number of civilians to the fight against the Huk, and to make eventual success seem less likely to the Huk.

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In his efforts to convince the people of the sincere concern of government for their welfare, Magsaysay did not neglect the possibilities offered by agencies of government other than the armed forces. He was able to secure control of the “Peace Fund,” a partially governmental, partially civilian, fund originated to help the victims of the fighting, but generally considered a political “slush” fund. This he used for on-the-spot relief, as well as for rewards to civilians who had made significant contributions to restoring peace, such as causing the surrender or death of notorious Huk “bandits.”

The Social Welfare Administration... was swept into the action. When Magsaysay saw a chance for it to make a contribution, he called the matter forcefully to the attention of Social Welfare personnel, usually by sending transportation and an officer who obviously expected immediate acceptance of the invitation. The SWA became a familiar concomitant of operations designed to lessen suffering caused by Huk actions and a useful exponent of government concern for the general welfare.

The success of the campaign to win popular support for the government through the actions of the military derived essentially from three sources: leadership and command emphasis; a military organization, that is, an element within the military establishment to plan and supervise implementation; and, finally, an effective program tailored to the attitudes and needs of the people at whom it was targeted. All three elements are necessary to the success of such a campaign.

Success, it must be understood, is not to be measured in terms of actual concrete accomplishments, of numbers of people resettled, or wells dug, or schoolhouses built. Success... is manifested by actions of the people...
which show that to them the government and the armed forces seem to be their friends and benefactors, to whom they owe allegiance and support.

In retrospect, it is clear that the most effective psychological operations were those targeted against everybody, for those were the operations that tended to bring everybody into the fight, consciously or unconsciously. They built a political base on which the government could rest with stability; a base with an inherent capacity for resisting attack. The smaller psychological operations were useful, and often entertaining to the operators; but the development of confidence in government was the cement that bound the elements of the community together, and rendered the Huk effort futile. Effective action to win the civilian guaranteed, as it facilitated, success against the guerrilla.

GRACE UNDER PRESSURE
THE U.S. SOLDIER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC*
BY CHARLES C. MOSKOS, JR.

The psychological effects on soldier and civilian of neutral stability operations are strenuous and demanding. Intensive preparation should be provided.

[BACKGROUND]
it was on 26 April 1965 that the 82nd Airborne Division at Fort Bragg, N.C., received a formal alert to prepare for deployment to the Dominican Republic. Two days earlier, a revolution had erupted in the Caribbean nation and a growing crisis posed a threat to the safety of American civilians. President Johnson met the crisis by ordering the landing of U.S. troops in the Dominican Republic to safeguard American citizens and other foreign nationals. On 7 May 1965, under the command of Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, Jr., all U.S. forces in the Dominican Republic were formally designated USFORDOMREP. Later, USFORDOMREP became the major component of the Inter-American Peace Force set up by the Organization of American States. At its maximum strength in early June 1965, the U.S. command included 13,700 Army, 8,200 Marine Corps, 1,100 Air Force, and 11,500 Navy on ships offshore. On 13 January 1966, Brigadier General Robert R. Linvill assumed command of USFORDOMREP as General Palmer returned to Fort Bragg to resume command of the XVIII Airborne Corps. Complementing the American personnel, other O.A.S. forces total 1,800 men: 1,200 Brazilians, and smaller numbers from Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay, and Costa Rica.

Although its history is brief, USFORDOMREP...set a distinguished record...Its first task was to insure the safety of American civilians caught in the violence of a civil war. In a well organized operation completed within five days after the arrival of the first U.S. forces, 2,694

Americans had been evacuated without injury along with 1,373 civilians from other countries. This necessitated establishing an International Safety Zone on the western side of Santo Domingo and linking this zone with the airfield to the east of the city. A supply corridor—variously called “Battle Alley” and “All American Expressway”—was secured through the densely populated center of the city. To avoid injuring Dominican noncombatants—a consideration not conspicuously evident within the opposing “rebel” and “junta” forces—the American forces improvised new tactics and operated under the handicap of “hold fire” orders. It was in securing the corridor that the 82nd suffered its first losses. USFORDOMREP casualties would eventually reach 26 dead in combat and over 150 wounded.

After successfully completing its first mission of evacuating civilians, however, USFORDOMREP was faced with a new and much more complex task. This was to make possible the establishment of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic in accordance with the desires of its people. Although known as “the land Columbus loved best,” this strife-torn Caribbean nation had received little affection since. USFORDOMREP was to carry out a peace-keeping role in the context of a political convulsion that would have challenged the wisdom of Solomon. This meant creating a climate that would eventually allow holding free elections in the beleaguered country.

[SCAPEGOAT]

Sadly, but predictably, a logical scapegoat in the breakdown of order in the Dominican Republic would be the U.S. soldier. Portrayed as a symbol of Yanqui imperialism, the American trooper received much of the brunt of the Dominicans’ own internecine hostility. That anti-Americanism was an honestly felt mood on the part of many Dominicans cannot be denied. And this was to be expected in the presence of a foreign army. More insidious, however, an anti-American campaign was being cynically maneuvered by extremists to provoke U.S. soldiers into creating incidents that could be used for propaganda purposes. That such incidents were rare is to the credit of the personal discipline of the men of USFORDOMREP. The vindication of the force came with elections of June 1. Not only was the election honest and calm, but it reflected a mandate that can only be interpreted as a strong desire by the Dominican citizenry for peace and orderly change.

It was the behavior of men like those in Charlie Company (504th Infantry) that typified the grace under pressure that became the hallmark of USFORDOMREP. Charlie Company was responsible for twelve observation posts. Those OPs were located on roofs of tall buildings located in the heart of the city, the area where anti-Americanism was most vocal. Seated in a “three-quarter” truck, we drove through the city making periodic stops while the sergeant of the guard posted the relief. As the men coming off duty climbed on the truck they sounded the
invariable complaint of guards everywhere: "What kept you?" The answer was always a chorus of "at ease."

[PROVOCATION]

On street corners groups of men would glare menacingly. Here and there, pretty girls on balconies which overhung the narrow streets would cry, "Go home." One wondered if he was only imagining an undertone of flirtation in their appeals.

"That's nothing," said the man next to me, "Wait till they start throwing things." "Yeah," said another, "and we got to police it up."

Young boys would occasionally run up to the vehicle with their fists cocked in a boxing stance and shout, "trumpy-trumpy"—loosely translated as "fight-fight." Once a trooper began to talk back at a heckler. The others quickly calmed him. "Cool it." "Don't play into their hands." "That's what they want you to do." "Grin and bear it, man."

"You know," one solider said talking to no one in particular, "They're not so bad when they aren't in a crowd. Maybe they're more afraid of each other than anything else." I noticed too that some of the \textit{Puerta Yanqui} ("Go Yankee") scrawlings on the walls were followed by an inscribed \textit{y llevame contigo} ("and take me with you"). While only a blind or deaf man could miss the anti-Americanism, much of it appeared a facade—uttered for the benefit of other Dominicans rather than as an expression of conviction.

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[ISOLATION]

Back at the compound most of the soldiers were trying to sleep or watching the movies.

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Along with the "flicks," bull sessions, cards, and PX beer, the major relief from boredom was the transistor radio. Armed Forces Radio in the Dominican Republic has a devoted audience. (AFRDR broadcasts in four languages: English, Portuguese, Spanish, and Guarani, an Indian tongue spoken in Paraguay.)

On the sidewalk outside the buildings were the ever-present shoeshine boys; junior entrepreneurs who are a combination of nuisance, utility, and entertainment. The only other Dominicans with regular contact with the troopers were the KP's and the "ropa (clothes) women" who did most of the company's laundry. A unique feature of USFOR DOMREP was the presence of many American soldiers who served as interpreters with the local population. The Puerto Rican and Mexican-American soldier and marine were an invaluable asset in this Spanish-speaking country at both formal and informal levels.

Although morale was good, the troopers were feeling the strain of their confinement. There were no passes. It was a hardship but the policy paid off in the absence of embroilments between off-duty troopers and Dominicans. Although there were a few of the inevitable camp followers around some of the tent-compounds outside the city, the life of the USFOR DOMREP soldier was one of isolation from the Dominican scene.
The usual community pandering to American servicemen found in other overseas stations was absent in the Dominican Republic. That the men, many for almost a year, bore up to these restrictions speaks highly of their infectious good humor. There is something about the comradeship of line soldiers that is hard to communicate.

[CONCLUSION]

The day before I left the Dominican Republic, I made a purchase from a street vendor in downtown Santo Domingo. Not too far away on top of a building was an OP, but now I was outside. The vendor noticing my accented Spanish asked where I was from. Somewhat apprehensively I told him I was a Norteamericano. He glanced furtively around and then said in a low voice, "We're glad you're here. My countrymen know that it is FIP [as the Inter-American Peace Force is locally known] that has stopped the killing." Before I could say anything he stepped away and hurried down the street. Somehow I felt he too represented an important extract of Dominican opinion. Few Dominicans had the courage to say it out loud—and it wouldn't have been prudent to have done so much of the time. Still the sentiment existed and could have been more widespread than most of us thought it was.

As the vendor disappeared into the crowd, I thought about something that happened on my last day with Charlie Company. To break the monotony I had decided to go along on the water run: a two-hour trip from the compound into the countryside.

As we drove through the villages, I was surprised to see children running to the side of the road and cheer the truck as it went by. Every so often the driver would reach into a bag on the seat next to him and toss candy to the children. I asked him where the candy came from.

“Bought it on my own. When I first started making this run, the kids were always waving at me. Decided they might like a little candy. I'm no Santa Claus, but it's not their fault we're here. Here,” he grinned, “have some yourself.”

On 2 May 1965, as he informed the American public of the sending of U.S. forces to the Dominican Republic, President Johnson said: "In the dark mist of conflict and violence, revolution, and confusion, it is not easy to find clear and unclouded truths. But certain things are clear. And they require equally clear action." That the men of USFORDOMREP have brought honor to themselves and to their country is now also clear. Coming into a situation fraught with ambiguity and provocation, their self-discipline under tremendous handicaps has been responsible for the successful accomplishment of their mission. It is to the personal character as well as the military effectiveness of the men of USFORDOMREP that we all owe a salute.

They exhibited grace under pressure.
CIVIL ASSISTANCE IN LAOS*

BY WILLIAM P. YARBOROUGH

The American military advisors overseas can assist the nation-building effort in numerous ways. The personal qualifications for effective service are increased by virtue of the broadened functions, however.

It was perhaps in the hills of Laos in 1960 that United States Army Special Forces who constituted the White Star Mobile Training Teams first became most intimately aware that the humble and inarticulate minority peoples of Indochina were, in actuality, very important pawns in the strategic game being played by giants in and around their homelands. They were most fortunate to have had as their commander Special Forces Lt. Col. John T. Little, an outstanding professional Army officer with the highest moral qualities. John Little was a disciplinarian, a perfectionist, and at the same time a realist.

In recognition that only part of the Special Forces’ mission in Laos was to show indigenous soldiers how to march, shoot, and communicate, he set about the task of developing the policies and doctrine that would eventually bring rich psychological returns to the United States.

In a letter titled “Civil Assistance” dated 22 September 1961, Colonel Little laid down the parameters which were to guide the White Star Mobile Training Teams in Laos and which were to impact in a most positive way upon Special Forces doctrine for years to come. The following are extracts from this important document.

In an insurgency situation, the guerrilla is dependent on a sympathetic population. Counter-guerrilla operations must, therefore, have as one objective winning the population’s cooperation and denying the enemy their sympathy.

An imaginative program of village assistance properly backed by the military and civil authorities is one form of psychological operation which will contribute significantly toward this objective and achievement of U.S. goals in Laos.

You are not in competition with other U.S. agencies; USIS and USOM; you are the spearhead and a focal point for the injection of these activities until Laos civil assistance teams are trained and in use.

Upon arrival in the village pay a courtesy call on the Chao Muong (political boss of the district). Do not talk shop on the first meeting, just make friends.

Deal directly with the Chao Muong. Do not work through his subordinate. Always work through one man—the chief.

Make a statement on graft. Let the Chao Muong know that under no circumstances will you tolerate graft and if you detect it your aid will stop. If corruption starts the villagers will tell you. You do not need to search for it.

Always make the villagers share the work load. Let them know that all these projects are village projects not U.S. help for the helpless. Once you do one project all by yourself the villagers will forever after expect this from your team. Do not give them something for nothing. For example, a good approach could be “I will try to get a tin roof for this school house if you will build the school and furnish all other materials and labor.”

Try to present your ideas to the Chao Muong in such a fashion as to make him think it was his idea in the first place. Let him win full credit for the completion of any project. Do not issue orders to him or demand an instant decision. When you

*Original essay by LTG. (Ret.) William P. Yarborough.
approach him with an idea let him have a night to think about it. But the next day
be sure to gently push him toward a decision.

Initially your weapon is talk. It must be interesting, arousing, intelligent. You are
a master salesman for the United States. Some pitfalls for newcomers; drinking too
much at social functions (keep your mind clear for business); getting involved with
native women (creates jealousy and hate and makes you a set-up for anti-U.S.
propaganda); being arrogant, sarcastic or belittling in your conversation (these
people are hypersensitive and proud and you will come to dead end if they dislike
you). Maintain the proper team attitude of good natured willingness and endless
patience in the face of resentment to change and complete apathy. Be tactful, be
tolerant. Show exceptional kindness to the children and the very old. Be courteous,
be relaxed and do not be in a hurry.

For success in this mission observe the native customs. For example, when your
are visiting a different village inform the villagers that you are coming so that the
people can assemble. The district head man (Chao Muong) always makes a political
speech on these occasions. Never force your way into a village where broken
branches across the trail indicate a closed celebration. Follow the native custom of
removing your footgear when going into a village house. Learn the customs of
your region.

Make sure the United States gets credit for all U.S. items distributed. When the
Chao Muong makes a speech to the citizenry about the tools and supplies they are
to receive make sure he tells them that the equipment comes from America.

The sky is the limit in what you can achieve. You cannot make a new Laos in one
day but it only takes one day to start. Now is the time to start beating the enemy at
his own game—the winning of men’s minds, emotions and loyalty to the concept of
freedom, justice, individual human rights, equality of opportunity and a higher
living standard.

Colonel Little’s letter also went into some detail concerning practical
programs for medical support, aid to education, sanitation, aid to agriculture,
transportation improvement, children’s playgrounds, provision of special tools, market place improvement, showing of American moving
copies, provision of electric lights, and cleaning up local restaurants. He
noted that all of the above projects were in addition to the primary task of
helping to train the Forces Armeés Royales and that they will take many
hours. He concluded with the conviction that the hours would be “well
spent in the achievement of the United States objectives of building a
greater and stronger free Laos.”

Some ten years after the withdrawal of the last of the Green Berets
(U.S. Army Special Forces) from Laos, a high-ranking U.S. Army officer
landed by helicopter at a tiny remote village on the Plateau de Bolovens.
He was greeted by an ancient Kha tribesman who wanted the officer to
know that a rice mill procured and placed into operation by Special Forces
working shoulder to shoulder with the villagers, was still in operation.
The venerable old chief would have it no other way but that the Ameri-
can join him around the sacred jar for a wine ceremony. This was his
expression of nostalgic thanks to the Green Berets who had long since
departed but whose psychological presence had lingered.
EXPANDING POLITICAL PARTICIPATION—THE LONG HAUL FROM VILLAGISM TO NATIONALISM*

BY JOHN C. DONNELL

Abstract appeals and verbal exhortation alone, no matter how intense, are insufficient to change attitudes. Actions must support the words.

Binh Duong, 1962: A peasant family in an elaborate new strategic hamlet complex is subject to the new restrictions on movement. It is told that henceforth, one may move in and out of the hamlet only between dawn and dusk, which means that each week the family must give up several hours of labor it customarily has performed on its outlying farm plot. Furthermore, during the first week of the new hamlet gate watch, a son is roughed up by the militia for returning late and not showing what the guards consider the proper contrition. The peasant is angered by this incident and is somewhat skeptical anyhow as to whether the strategic hamlet's vaunted security benefits are worth all the restrictions, the two weeks of construction labor required from his family members and the material outlay, including bamboo for fencing. He also considers that the district chief, an Army captain and something of a martinet, has pushed the village and hamlet authorities hard for full labor mobilization of the villagers on the hamlet perimeter defense earthworks and rigid compliance with the controls on population movement. Furthermore, the newly-appointed village chief is a man he never has liked, known for his aggressiveness and shrewd self-seeking; and now this chief not only seems to enjoy the backing of the district chief in pushing people around but rumor holds that he is in cahoots with the district chief to hold back some of the government funds supposed to be paid in travel and luncheon allowances to peasants assigned to perform additional labor on other strategic hamlets some kilometers away.

Now, holding such negative perceptions of the local officials who represent government authority most directly in his village, this peasant nevertheless is exhorted by slogans on a crop of small signboards in the areas as well as by the lectures of government cadres to respect the "Clearsighted Leadership of President Ngo-Dinh Diem," the "Personalist Republic" and the "Collective Advance" (mass improvement presumably being enjoyed by all classes and ethnic groups). He also is exposed by these and other propaganda media to a considerable amount of anti-Communist propaganda, much of it also having an abstract, remote quality due to its being produced in Saigon for dissemination throughout the country.

Thus, the Ngo Dinh Diem government understood that it was necessary to extend political loyalties beyond the traditionally narrow bounds to a truly national scope, but its approach featured mainly verbal exhor-

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tation. The peasant over the years has read and heard a great many abstract appeals by the GVN to a wider national loyalty, but the implicit assurances of good national government were not necessarily consonant with his own direct experience of village politics. He often, therefore, tended to react with indifference or cynicism. Moreover, while the Ngos' rural programs achieved mixed results (some of them churned up the countryside and created new antagonisms to the government, outweighing their advantages to other segments of the society), to the extent that they did generate any political loyalty, it generally went no further than to the hamlet and village.

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POLITICAL WARFARE IN VIETNAM*

BY MONTE R. BULLARD

The company POLWAR system attempts to eliminate conditions causing low morale and desertions, build esprit, provide troops with ideological direction, and detect and neutralize individuals prejudicial to the unit.

One of the least understood yet most important functions in the Vietnamese armed forces is the political warfare (POLWAR) system. It is so extensive that, sooner or later, every US advisor will come into contact with at least a part of it.

The POLWAR system is an organizational attempt to solve deep-rooted, noncombat military problems involving loyalty and civil-military relations. It also includes the traditional problems of corruption, mutiny, motivation, desertion, and troop and dependent welfare.

The POLWAR concept as it exists today is new to the Vietnamese armed forces. The key functions of POLWAR are:

- Troop and dependent welfare.
- Indoctrination and motivation.
- Civil Affairs.
- Psychological warfare (PSYWAR) activities.
- Security investigations.

These functions are designed either to create and maintain an allegiance to the Republic of Vietnam or destroy the allegiance to North Vietnam. The target audiences are the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF), civilians in enemy and friendly areas, and the enemy troops.

DEVELOP THE SOLDIER

These functions are carried out by means of a phased procedure known as the "political warfare process." The first step of phase I seeks to create the conditions under which a soldier can be loyal. A sincere and obvious concern for the well-being of the troops must be developed. If a soldier is disaffected because of his food, pay, or living conditions, or is worried about his family, motivation and indoctrination programs cannot succeed. Moreover, if the soldier is illiterate, these programs cannot get through


461
to him. Thus, the POLWAR cadres must first initiate programs to develop a happy, healthy soldier. They must make every aspect of the soldier’s life better and keep him entertained.

The second step is to provide him with a basic education. At this point, he should be receptive to the third step—the motivation and indoctrination programs. If, after completing these steps, the soldier still wavers in his loyalty, the fourth step must be taken. This consists of detecting soldiers not loyal to the government and providing them with a special motivation and indoctrination effort on an individual basis.

The program uses both group and individual contacts as means to influence the attitudes of military personnel. This includes unit-wide or even army-wide programs which are designed to better the living conditions of the soldiers such as dependent welfare programs; lectures; movies, radio, and television; magazines and newspapers; and sports or entertainment programs.

The second approach includes personal contact with individual soldiers. It is a refined investigation, counseling, and persuasion system carried out by the POLWAR organization within the units. This approach is the essence of political warfare and the primary characteristic which sets political warfare apart as a unique system.

Phase II of the POLWAR process concerns the civilian populace. This phase must be divided into three steps which must be in sequence. The first step is to identify the progovernment elements within the target civilian group. These are usually a small minority. After they have been identified, they must be organized and tested for loyalty. In the second step, the small, organized progovernment elements solicit the support of the noncommitted or apathetic segment of the target civilian group—usually the majority. PSYWAR media and civic action projects are also used to accomplish this task. Once the majority of the group can be considered in support of the government, the third step can be taken. This step identifies and expels the proenemy elements of the target civilian group.

ENEMY LOYALTY

The third phase of the POLWAR process in psychological warfare operations is to break down the loyalty of the enemy to his leaders and cause him to desert or rally to the government side.

The one area which is alien to most US advisors is the mission of creating and maintaining loyalty of the RVNAF to their leaders and nation. This is also the most important function of the POLWAR system. It includes placing a POLWAR officer or staff in every military unit, school, training center, and other military organization. It is similar to the Soviet commissar system, but there are some important differences.

The original concept does, in fact, come from the Soviet political commissar system. In 1924, it was introduced into China in the form of USSR advisors to the Chinese Military Academy. The Soviets were responsible for the organizational format of POLWAR, but the Chinese have de-
veloped the basic doctrines which exist today. In 1927, when the Chinese Communists and Nationalists split, the POLWAR system took separate and distinct roads. Both the Communists and Nationalists adapted the system to the Asian scene within their respective ideologies.

Under the Communist system, the POLWAR cadre, with a separate chain of command, exercises control over the armed forces. The Nationalists have greatly reduced the influence of the cadre over the armed forces by subordinating the POLWAR officer to the unit commander.

NATIONALIST PATTERN

The Vietnamese POLWAR system is copied directly from the Chinese Nationalists. In 1960, a team of Chinese POLWAR officers traveled to Vietnam to hold some courses in POLWAR for selected Vietnamese officers. Then, in 1964, several Vietnamese officers with US advisors visited Taiwan and studied the feasibility of establishing a formal POLWAR system in Vietnam. On 24 October 1964, as a result of this study, the POLWAR system was officially established by Prime Ministerial decree. A Chinese delegation was dispatched to advise on the development. In May 1965, the POLWAR Division, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, was assigned the task of providing the US advisory effort.

The top echelon of the political warfare system is the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) which is a major subdivision of the Vietnamese Joint General Staff. It is a joint services organization headed by an army major general, and most of the staff is made up of army personnel at the present time.

The POLWAR system includes two types of POLWAR cadres: those under the direct command of GPWD and those located in military units, schools, or support organizations. The latter POLWAR cadre is under the command of the commanding officer of the unit to which it is assigned.

GPWD is divided into two types of staff, five divisions, a POLWAR College, and several operational units. The special staff which reports directly to the chief, GPWD, includes: the Deputy Chief for Troops Action who is responsible for developing long-range programs of troop motivation and indoctrination; the Deputy Chief for Civic Action and Enemy Action who is responsible for developing long-range civic and PSYWAR programs; and the Deputy Chief for Regional Forces-Popular Forces who is responsible for developing POLWAR activities within the Regional and Popular Forces.

The so-called “upper staff” includes: the Organization Branch which is responsible for tables of organization and equipment, training, and general organization of the POLWAR system; the Plans Branch responsible for preparing long-range POLWAR and PSYWAR plans; the Inspection Branch responsible for monitoring the activities of the entire GPWD organization for indications of misuse of office, corruption, or negligence of duties; the Information and Civilian Relationship Branch responsible
for the release of military information to the civilian press; the Sports and Gymnastic Branch which administers unit sports programs and manages military teams which enter international competition; Budget Branch; and the Administrative Branch.

The five divisions include the Motivation and Indoctrination, PSYWAR, Security, Social Service, and Chaplain Divisions. These divisions are the elements which prepare national-level plans and support the POLWAR system in the field with materials, technical guidance, and general support.

The POLWAR College provides education and specialized training for active duty RVNAF political warfare officers.

The operations elements of GPWD include five POLWAR battalions and an information section. The battalions of 590 men each are located in each corps tactical zone and one in general reserve. Each battalion has five companies which consist of eight teams each. Each team has a PSYWAR and civil affairs capability. There is also a culture and entertainment team in each battalion. These battalions are under the operational control of the corps tactical zone commanders. GPWD exercises staff supervision and provides technical support.

The information section includes radio, television, motion picture, and press activities which present national-level information programs primarily to further the image of the RVNAF in the eyes of the RVNAF, as well as the civilian populace.

The size of the POLWAR organization within military units varies with the level of the unit. At corps headquarters, there are a Deputy Chief of Staff for Political Warfare, three Chaplains, a Military Security Division, a Political Indoctrination Division, a PSYWAR Division, a Social Welfare Division, and a Press and Information Section. Each division, regiment, and battalion has a smaller POLWAR staff.

The POLWAR organization at company level is the most important facet of the entire political warfare system.

The primary mission, then, of the company POLWAR officer, who is also the company executive officer, is to support the commander by eliminating the conditions which cause low morale and desertions; by building esprit; providing the troops with a political or ideological direction through motivation and indoctrination programs; and by detecting and neutralizing individuals whose activities are prejudicial to the best interests of the unit. He has the additional duty of assuring proper relationships between his unit and the civilian populace in the area of operation. He is also responsible for PSYWAR activities against the enemy.

The POLWAR officer is assisted by a noncommissioned officer and the POLWAR Fighter Organization. This organization is made up of one soldier from each squad in the unit, and formed into teams, one in each platoon. Their mission is to detect and report the ideologically weak soldiers and general grievances of the soldiers to the POLWAR officer.
Each company also has a Welfare Committee responsible for organizing sports, educational, and cultural activities, and for improving the unit's food and general living conditions.

Security maintenance cells of individual soldiers are appointed by the POLWAR officer to detect variations in the behavior of fellow soldiers and to report anything which might indicate a soldier is preparing to desert. This early detection of a potential desertion allows the POLWAR officer to attempt to resolve problems likely to lead to desertion.

The importance of the company-level POLWAR organization is evident in the variety of functions it performs and the number of troops it contacts. The company POLWAR officer is the key to the POLWAR system.

COMMUNICATION AND NATION BUILDING*

By John H. Johns

Social communication is the glue in the nationbuilding effort, for it is through communications that national loyalties are developed.

INTRODUCTION

With the exception of "consolidation operations" during the aftermath of World War II, U.S. Army psychological operations activities had, until Vietnam, been limited to strategic and tactical psychological warfare. Vietnam introduced a new dimension to our psychological operations. For the first time on a large scale, the Army was faced with the problem of combating insurgency. Early in the conflict we began to recognize, in a general sense, that the Vietnam war was a "political" war and more than military muscle would be required to handle it. Most observers would probably agree that we were unprepared for this new dimension of warfare.

While our decisionmakers continually spoke of the "political" nature of the war, there is evidence that they did not fully comprehend the nature of the conflict. This inference seems warranted if, for no other reason, we consider the small amount of resources expended on certain activities related to the "political" aspect of the conflict, specifically PSYOP. We failed to understand the psychological component of the political process and, furthermore, failed to recognize the role of communications in influencing that psychological component.

The misunderstanding of the political nature of insurgencies is probably best evidenced by the way the U.S. governmental agencies use the term "political development" when referring to foreign assistance and by the actual programs conducted in developing areas. Unfortunately, the term "political development" is most often used in the narrow sense to refer to development of formal governmental structures, for example, administrative, legislative, judicial, and the like. The result has been that programs designed to develop the "political base" have been focused on technical skills associated with formal governmental institutions. (This

*Original essay by John H. Johns.
A narrow concept of "political" development also has the effect of generating strong objection to military involvement in such activities.

The purpose of this essay is not to do a post mortem on Vietnam; rather, it is to extrapolate lessons learned there to other areas of the world in which the United States may be called on for assistance in dealing with problems of the same type. Therefore, the discussion that follows does not focus on any concrete situation. Moreover, the goals of the essay are necessarily limited by space to a general discussion of the role of PSYOP in nationbuilding. Basically, the intent is simply to describe one aspect of the "political" problem of nationbuilding—and hopefully, to broaden the concept of "political" warfare.

**SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL BASIS OF INSURGENCY**

In the most general sense, the cause of insurgency stems from dissatisfaction of some portion of the population with the existing political, social, and/or economic conditions and a lack of confidence in the ability or willingness of the incumbent government to correct the conditions. It should be noted, however, that dissatisfaction and confidence are states of mind and may be irrational in the sense that they have little basis with respect to material conditions. "Perceived reality" is the only true social reality for the individual, and it is his subjective definition of reality that governs behavior. This fact, which is often forgotten or ignored, has an important bearing on every aspect of nation-building activities. Many well-conceived programs fail, or, are at best marginally successful, simply because they are misunderstood by the people.

Social scientists have long been aware of the fact that events occur in the midst of what has been called a psychological or "symbolic" environment, that is, the customs, beliefs, prejudices, and cultural climate that have been developed over generations. How an event is perceived is as dependent on this psychological environment as on the physical event itself. Governmental programs that do not take this phenomenon into consideration have little likelihood of success. As a noted sociologist, Robert E. Park, said in the early 1930s in an article about the social planning that was taking place in Russia and the United States: "Social problems are not wholly solved by changing the form or structure of society. It is necessary that the new social order should be understood, accepted, and eventually incorporated into the habits, traditions, and mores of the community."

Although all social systems have internal conflict, most systems can manage conflict short of a restructuring of society itself. When the United States is called on for assistance in stability operations, a host government has usually demonstrated an inability to manage conflict within its society. In essence, where insurgency is latent, stability operations consist of actions to maintain social order by developing social cohesion to the point where dissident elements of the society can be effectively managed. When insurgency has developed to the point where large-scale violence has erupted, the requirement is to reestablish social order. In the case of
creating a new nation, this may involve the establishment of a new social order superimposed on existing local and provincial social systems. In any event, the goal is to create social solidarity on a national level, that is, nationbuilding—usually under the most adverse conditions. Typically, the countries in which insurgencies are occurring are characterized by: widespread poverty; inequitable distribution of benefits; deep rifts between classes; racial and religious cleavages; lack of social mobility; lack of communication between the government and people; poorly developed national institutions; lack of national identity among masses; and traditions of corruption, nepotism, and exploitation by authorities.

These conditions have existed for many generations in most of the developing countries and have resulted in deep-seated attitudes. It is unreasonable to assume that changes in the material environment, if and when they are made, will result in a rapid change in attitudes among the people.

BUILDING A NATION

Nationbuilding is a whole complex of interdependent changes in the physical environment; in the forms of social organization; in the habits, loyalties, and thought processes of the people involved. To pick out any one aspect of this complex phenomenon and center attention on it involves a considerable danger of wrong analysis, out of which ineffective or even harmful policies may spring. Economic development, which the United States has focused on, is important, but the real core of nationbuilding is what happens in men's minds, especially as it affects their habits and organizations for working together. Among other things, national development includes creating a state of mind involving changes in relations between people. Habits of thought and of conduct are the most stubborn obstacles to development.

The Communists seem to have been more aware than the United States that to modernize, the relations of people in society must be altered. This understanding has been one of the sources of their strengths. They apply this knowledge in their own ruthless way to sweep away a great many social relations in regions that fall under their control—what some term "the social debris of centuries." Their ruthlessness appeals to some impatient people who have been frustrated by the social obstacles to development and who want to telescope the development.

We must be equally aware of the necessity for social changes as a part of modernization, but the democratic approach is to find means of stimulating and guiding those changes without sacrificing human dignity. We have the knowledge to do this, but have as yet, failed to use this knowledge to the full extent. This failure seems to stem, at least in part, from our philosophical view of the individual in society. There is a widespread abhorrence of any hint at manipulation of people. The term "social control" alone is sufficient to create antagonism in many minds. Such a philosophical view logically leads to resistance to talk about social engineering of any sort.
In regard to social engineering, U.S. policy has, with the exception of South Vietnam, tended toward the nonintervention end of the spectrum. This approach seems to be due in part to our desire to let people "determine their own destiny." More importantly, it reflects a philosophical view of man as a rational being who objectively weighs the rewards and costs of a given course of action and responds in a way that will maximize economic gain. Such a philosophical stance has led to a preoccupation with the development of the material world and conversely, the neglect of the psychological world.

Psychologists have recognized for many years that man does not respond to the "real world" as it may be seen by outsiders. Rather, people behave on the basis of the way they perceive the world. This process of perception brings into play factors that have been little understood by U.S. "nationbuilders." The "world of reality" of the individual is shaped by the customs, beliefs, prejudices, and "weltanschaung" of the group to which he belongs. Events are viewed, evaluated, and responded to from the standpoint of that world of reality. Behavior that appears irrational to an outsider may be quite sensible from the standpoint of the actor.

Emphasis on "psychological worlds" and "symbolic environments" is viewed with disdain by many tough-minded pragmatists who like to get a firm fix, preferably quantified, on the world with which they are dealing. Such an attitude is understandable, but is fatal to a nationbuilding effort. One essential task of nationbuilding, building a "sense of nationhood," illustrates this point.

**SENSE OF NATIONHOOD**

The striving of men in developing countries to reestablish national self-esteem, after being in an inferior position in relation to the West, is one of the most powerful forces operating in the psychological world where nationbuilding is taking place. Inadequate understanding and appreciation of this and other such psychological forces have led to serious miscalculations in many U.S.-backed programs.

In this respect, the emotional element in nationalism must be looked at more carefully. It often leads to behavior, which in the coldly rational view—especially the view that looks primarily to economic advancement—may be foolish and harmful. To understand the politics of economic development in the developing world today, we must keep reminding ourselves that men seek not merely material well-being but also the well-being connoted by such socialpsychological terms as respect, status, and self-esteem. These intangibles, now bound up with sentiment of nationality, have often led man to sacrifice material advantages and even life itself.

Nationalism, a state of mind in which the loyalty of the individual is felt to be to the state, is a relatively new concept. While a deep attachment to one's native soil, to local institutions, and to territorial authorities has existed throughout history, nationalism in the modern sense came into being at the end of the eighteenth century. Whereas man's loyalty had
been to local forms of social authority such as the tribe or clan, landlord, or the church or religious group, the nation-state now claimed a share of the loyalty.

Although there are varying degrees of loyalty to nation-states, each nation, if it is to function as a viable system, must have a certain amount of unity. Unity of action in a nation is achieved by some sort of consensus about basic values, goals, sentiments, and the like. This does not imply that all members of the group act in the same way or have the same thoughts and feelings. On the contrary, differences of behavior and of thought and feeling, when they cause adjustment, promote group unity. Where deep cleavages run strong among the diverse sectors of a society, the creation of national unity is one of the most difficult, and yet essential, tasks to be performed. Without national unity, all other efforts come to naught. With strong unity, there is little that cannot be achieved. Building national unity must be done systematically with integration of economic, social, political, and psychological factors in a national effort.

CHARISMA, IDEOLOGY, AND NATIONAL UNITY

The U.S. response to the requirement for national unity has often been to search for attractive ideologies and charismatic leaders as rallying points and to link the people with these national symbols by means of mass media. A good “national purpose” and a charismatic leader are useful (and perhaps essential) — and mass media is a valuable tool. But these alone are ineffective unless other steps are taken!

Historically, charisma and the spirit of revolution have been the two most potent ways in which societies have been able to rapidly establish a new sense of authority and social order, once the old authorities have lost their claim to power. On the other hand, the mere presence of the charismatic leader of revolutionary enthusiasm is not enough to promise the establishment of a new and effective system of authority. Once the spark has gone out of either one of these forms of control, there can be a deep sense of letdown, widespread resentment and cynicism, and the task of ruling can become profoundly difficult.

Charisma at best is only an aid, and never a sufficient condition, to insure unity. It can inspire collective self-confidence and awaken exciting visions of a new future for the country. At the same time, however, the very magic of charisma may suggest to all that it is entirely up to the leadership to solve all problems.

The value of charismatic leadership and ideology is temporary and may be detrimental in the long term if it is not institutionalized and routinized. Unfortunately, in the case of most of the new states we can find few examples of personal charisma or ideology becoming so institutionalized as to transform the system into legitimized authority. Instead, we tend to find that wherever either has worn thin, the result is a near vacuum of authority. The rise and fall of Sukarno in Indonesia is perhaps the most clear-cut example. One of the major roles of PSYOP, a special type of
social communication, can be to assist institutionalization of charisma and ideology.

COMMUNICATION AND NATIONHOOD

Although common descent, language, territory, political entity, and religion are often characteristic of nations, the most essential element for a sense of nationhood is the community of values, interests, and purposes that results from mutual respect and understanding. This community is possible only if there is effective communication among and between significant segments of the population. How then, is this community achieved?

A central premise of this essay is that a sense of community, or nationhood, can best be achieved when: (1) people are organized into small groups that provide a sense of belonging, (2) interpersonal communication networks among the groups are significantly influenced to teach the nation’s values, and (3) the people have a sense of involvement in the nation-building process. One of the most important uses of PSYOP in nationbuilding is to achieve these objectives and to develop loyalty to the nation.

The functioning of small groups is relatively easy to understand. Their goals (or purposes) are usually concrete, short-range, and closely related to their everyday life needs. The roles of members and the rules and regulations regarding their duties and rights are well defined and understood. In traditional societies, membership in these small groups is usually homogenous with respect to ethnic and religious background. The groups have a long tradition; there is daily contact among the members; and, there is a general consensus about the nature of reality. Social control in such groups tends to be very effective. Physical, economic, and psychological sanctions insure conformity to the group norms, the latter being most powerful. Cultural heritages of generations determine how the individual perceives the world throughout his life.

Creating social cohesion of these small groups on a national level (“sense of nationhood”) involves several new dimensions. Goals, or the “national purpose,” must of necessity be highly abstract, vague, ambiguous, and of sufficient complexity to embrace the diverse interests of the heterogeneous sectors of the country. (The immensity of this effort is readily apparent if one considers the case of India.) Activities of the national government are complex and, for the most part, outside the immediate experience of the people. Any one citizen is likely to be exposed to a very small portion of the government, but his image of the government may be formed by this small part unless some way is developed to extend his psychological world to the larger universe of the nation. This extension is symbolic and is achieved by communication.

Effective communication, of which PSYOP is one kind, is indispensable to nationhood. The values, folkways, shared feelings of the people are embedded in the language and symbols of the society. Communication creates, or at least makes possible, that consensus and understanding
among the individual components of a nation that eventually give the
country the character not merely of a geographical grouping of people,
but a cultural unit. They are the means of extending the loyalties and
identification of the citizen beyond his own immediate, concrete experience by making institutions, nations, and ideologies real for him. The
process by which this extension is accomplished is one of the most complex of social phenomena and requires special expertise to execute properly.

The degree to which a given government controls communication involves philosophical as well as operational problems. The range of governmental control varies from the closed society (for example, Mainland China) to the open society (for example, United States). However, all governments exercise some control over communication processes, both public and private.

The fact of the matter is that social communication systems that can promote national unity are inadequate in most developing countries. To compound the problem, the leaders in most countries are not aware of the seriousness of this deficiency. Governments cannot afford to leave the building of effective systems to a hit-or-miss approach. The techniques of organizing and involving the masses through face-to-face persuasion are among the Communists' greatest strengths. We cannot win the battle for loyalties unless we compete at the grassroots level with similarly effective techniques.

As yet, the United States has not provided the kind of advice and assistance to friendly countries to achieve the psychological conditions necessary for effective social control. This deficiency has persisted in spite of the wealth of scientific knowledge available on social control processes. If we are really serious about assisting friendly countries to build cohesive societies, we must translate that scientific knowledge into operational principles and train friendly governments in the use of these principles. To argue that there is something sinister about using scientific knowledge in a systematic way to develop unity among a people, ignores certain realities. Nations are not formed by spontaneous convergence of individual wills and goals; rather, consensus is developed through a systematic effort. The alternative is social control by coercion. We will have to make the choice.

NOTES
1 See "Foreign Policy and Communications During the Hungarian Uprising," in this chapter of the casebook.

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FRED C. WEYAND
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Official:
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**AUTHOR INDEX**

(Page numbers denote the first page of authors' essays. The two volumes of this book are numbered sequentially; Volume Two begins on page 477.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aaron, H. R.</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African National Congress</td>
<td>1149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algerian Delegation in Cairo</td>
<td>1146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allen, G. V.</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARVIN Captain,</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askenazy, A. R.</td>
<td>61, 299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bairdain, E. F.</td>
<td>893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bairdain, E. M.</td>
<td>898</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barghoom, F. C.</td>
<td>1030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barr, J. S.</td>
<td>735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barrett, R. J.</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beeley, H.</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beloff, M.</td>
<td>1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berger, C.</td>
<td>407, 670, 689, 713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bogart, L.</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bohannan, C. T. R.</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brandon, J. R.</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bromann, B. M.</td>
<td>722</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski, Z.</td>
<td>1028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bullard, M. R.</td>
<td>461, 1105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Choukas, M.</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarkson, E. J.</td>
<td>758</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooper, B. H.</td>
<td>229, 241, 262, 279, 380, 386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dasbach, A. M.</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daugherty, W. E.</td>
<td>18, 80, 121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Davis, M.</td>
<td>191, 698, 702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaney, R. F.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>de Sola Pool, L.</td>
<td>1043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donnell, J. C.</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dunn, S. W.</td>
<td>866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Durham, F. G.</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Editors, The</td>
<td>85, 235, 382, 401, 684, 725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellul, J.</td>
<td>1050, 1065</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eswarda, H. S.</td>
<td>796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foote, A. E.</td>
<td>636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free, L. A.</td>
<td>155, 364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friedrich, C. J.</td>
<td>1043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulton, R. B.</td>
<td>642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furse, D.</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garver, R. A.</td>
<td>848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gergen, K.</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gergen, M.</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gessner, P.</td>
<td>680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Giza, R. H.</td>
<td>1100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gleason, R. L.</td>
<td>730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glick, N.</td>
<td>718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grinster, L. E.</td>
<td>668</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guthrie, G. M.</td>
<td>306</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harris, E.</td>
<td>412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hausman, C. K.</td>
<td>181, 271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hemphill, J. A.</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson, J. W.</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herr, M. F.</td>
<td>403, 416, 678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hollander, F. G.</td>
<td>See Durham, F. G.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holt, R. T.</td>
<td>754, 760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoskins, M. W.</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hurley, N. P.</td>
<td>919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Janis, I. L.</td>
<td>609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johns, J. H.</td>
<td>62, 144, 465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Johnston, W. F.</td>
<td>149, 397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSPAO Planning Office</td>
<td>133, 498, 744, 755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUSPAO Planning Staff</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katagiri, T.</td>
<td>137, 226, 246</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katz, P. P.</td>
<td>22, 476, 572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kelly, G. A.</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lanigan, J. D.</td>
<td>694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lansdale, E. G.</td>
<td>762, 767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin American Solidarity Organization</td>
<td>1142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lerner, D.</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lescaze, L.</td>
<td>728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Le Vine, V. T.</td>
<td>234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Linebarger, P. M. A.</td>
<td>666</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little, J. M.</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long Chuong Dac</td>
<td>508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lorimor, E. S.</td>
<td>886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lovett, C. B.</td>
<td>413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McAulay, A. H. D.</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>McKay, V.</td>
<td>1122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macy, W. T.</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Martin, L. J.</td>
<td>1011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miller, G. R.</td>
<td>634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense, USSR</td>
<td>346, 353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monroe, J. L.</td>
<td>855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moon, G. A.</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris, M. A.</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morris, R. P.</td>
<td>946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moskos, C. C.</td>
<td>454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moynahan, B.</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murty, B. S.</td>
<td>699</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nathan, R. S.</td>
<td>125, 269, 673, 684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand Department of External Affairs</td>
<td>1120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niehoff, A. H.</td>
<td>770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norton, J. H.</td>
<td>1039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okes, I. E.</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Index 1
Orth, R. H., 606, 594, 658, 662, 790, 1003
Ozaki, J., 391
Pappas, D. G., 272
Pike, D., 716, 1152
Preston, H. O., 555
Price, J. R., 197
Quang, Phan Trong, 1115
Radio Free Europe, 806, 883, 913
Raffa, A. L., 855
Rao, Y. V. L., 989
Robinson, D. D., 778
Rolph, H., 986
Ronalds, F. S., 928
Rubin, R., 1084
Saral, T. B., 943
Schramm, W., 690, 765
7th PSYOP Group, 194, 495, 518, 534, 545, 547, 549, 606, 676, 687, 749, 784, 854, 1119
Simpson, H. R., 343
Smith, D. D., 985
Sparks, K. R., 111
Stone, V. A., 796
Sugden, G. S., 178
Szalay, L. B., 862, 878
Tanaka, Y., 20
Thebaud, C. C., 312
Thornton, T. P., 425
Too, C. C., 370
Tuck, R. L., 830
U. S. Information Agency, 589
Valeriano, N. D., 440
Valyuzhenich, A., 823
van de Velde, R. W., 754, 760
Watson, F. M., 53
Wechsler, I. R., 102
Whelan, J. G., 213, 333, 972
Wong, P., 836
Yamashita, K. S., 282
Yarborough, W. P., 337, 458, 587
Yoh, B., 1072
Yu, G. T., 1110
Zartman, I. W., 1130
Zortman, B., 167
SUBJECT INDEX
(The two volumes of this book are numbered sequentially; Volume Two begins on page 477)

Acheson, D.: 3, 156-157
Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA): 100
advertising: 2, 5
African National Congress: 1149-1152
age as prestige factor in communication: 755-758
aged persons as communicators: 755-758
agit-prop: 356, 399n(1), 1040-1041, 1048, 1157-1162
AID (Agency for International Development): 98-98
   overseas operations, 97-98, 183
   Washington operations, 97
aircraft as a communication channel: 730-735
Algerian Delegation in Cairo: 1146-1149
America Illustrated: 720-722, 848-854
American Division: 951
American Specialist Program: 93
Armed Forces Radio: 139-140
Armed Propaganda Team (APT): 25
Army Concept Team (ACTIV) report on PSYOP in Vietnam: 227-228
Assembly of Captive European Nations: 198
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ASD-ISA). 100
attitude change (see also persuasion; persuasion theory): 624-635, 658-662, 770-773, 796-805
audience analysis: See target analysis
audience, importance of in communication: 1027-1163
audience research: See target analysis
audience selection: See target analysis
Aux Frontières de l'Avenir: 1087
"back translation": 506
balloons as a communication channel: 727-728, 729
BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation): 5, 49, 186-191, 915-916, 1079-1085
Berlin airlift, PSYOP effect of: 50
Berlo, D.: 24
Bernays, Edward: 5
"Biafra lobby": 703-705
books, role of in communication: 1078
British Broadcasting Corporation: See BBC
British Council: 186-191, 1080-1084
British Information Service: 186-191
British PSYOP: See PSYOP, British
broadcasting, international (radio and TV): 923-938
broadcast monitoring, use of in PSYOP: 580
Buchanan-Cantril Adjective Check List: 806
Bureau of Applied Social Research: 28
Burston-Marsteller Associates: 193
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 8, 86-88, 113
   in Dominican intervention, 265
Cameroon insurgency: 234-241
cannon as a communication channel: 728-730
Cantril, H.: 70, 162-163
captured documents, use of in PSYOP: 596-545, 580, 955-956, 996-1002

Index 3
change agent (in communication): 770, 796-806
channels of communication: See communication channels
Chassin, Gen. L.: 254
Chieu Hoi Program: 26, 28, 33, 152, 391-396, 414, 416-420, 758, 911-913, 947, 953, 996-1002
Children Adrift: 924-925
China Pictorial: 1113
Chroniques de France: 1087
civic action: 54-55, 130, 438-459
civil affairs (civil-military relations): 58-60, 73, 256, 424, 444-454
civilians, use of in PSYOP: 579-580
Command and General Staff College survey of PSYOP effectiveness: 951-957
cross-cultural, 282-305, 590-594, 607-663
definition of, 65
development, 939-943
“development,” See “development” communication
as education (to inform), 24
effects of new technology on, 9-10, 12, 107-108
as entertainment, 24
face-to-face, 695-696
facilitative, 1012-1021
functions of, 24
from point of view of receiver, 24
from point of view of sender, 24
governmental, 1120-1130
governmental international, 191-194, 1011-1021, 1075-1084
interpersonal, 21, 23, 28, 35-36, 283-287
mass media,
in democratic societies, 1050-1058
in totalitarian societies, 1028-1050
nongovernmental international, 702-711
nonverbal, 143
persuasive (see also persuasion; propaganda), 21, 33-36, 609-624, 1012
as propaganda (to persuade), 24
purpose of, 33
role of, 23-25
total transmission, process of, 31-33
communication channels: 26-27, 72, 759-773
choice of, 693-698
interaction among, 697
nongovernmental, 116, 191-194
role of in communication, 25
communication models: 36-39, 38 (fig.), 636-642
communication: process and effects: 553-571
“communication revolution,” See communication, effects of new technology on
communication situation: 26
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT): 118
communication techniques: 26
Communist ideology, use of to influence people: 1059-1065
community relations: 55-66
congruity theory: 887-897
content analysis: 785-787, 835-862

Index 4
computer, 836-848
of documents from the People's Republic of China, 836-848
of Ho Chi Minh's will, 606-608
quantitative, 835-836
of radio broadcasts, 534-536
of rival communications, 855-862
conversion effect (of communication): 47-49
Cooley, C.: 22
Coordinator of Information: 82
counterinsurgency planning and operations: 83
CPOC (combined PSYOP centers): 143, 246-248
credibility:
of communication, 32-33, 412-413, 531-532, 905-906
of communicator (see also source analysis), 32, 49, 408-411, 642-649, 796-805
Creel Committee (U.S. Committee for Public Information): 4
Creel, G.: 4-5
Cuban missile crisis: 46, 50, 129-130, 178-181, 259-261, 386-391
Cultural Presentation Program: 88
cultural troupes as a communication channel: 737
culture-drama teams (in Vietnam): 744-749
culture shock: 283-287
customs, importance of in PSYOP: 508-510
dance as a communication channel: 735-736
Daugherty, W. E.: 82, 578
Davis, E.: 6
deception as a tactic in PSYOP: 760-761
decoding (in communication theory): 234
defection and surrender themes, combining: 416-420
defectors, use of in PSYOP (see also Chieu Ho Program): 518-534, 578-579, 668-670, 758
Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC) (of NSC): 88
De Fleur, M.: 22
Department of Defense (DOD): 98
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 99
PSYOP groups, 8
Special Operations groups, 8
deprecation of enemy as PSYOP theme: 406
Deutsch, K.: 21
Deutschmann, P. J.: 26
"development" communication: 50-52, 943-946, 1062-1065, 1087-1089
development (economic) and PSYOP: 144-149
institution building, 144-149, 465-471
role of communication in, 470-471
role of military in, 140-149
Dialogue: 718-719
Dicks, H. V.: 490, 576, 578
Dicks-Shills Questionnaire: 576
dissemination: 141-142
document, PSYOP. See PSYOP doctrine
dogmatism scale: 304
Dominican intervention, PSYOP in: 228-232, 262-266, 454-457
Donovan, Gen. William: 6
drama as a communication channel: 24, 736, 739-749
Drogheda Committee (British): 186, 1080

Index 5
Dulles, J. F.: 3, 156
Duncan Committee (British): 186–190
Dyer, M.: 9

“Earlyword” system: 725–726
East German uprising (1953): 127–128
EDCOR (Economic Development Corps—Philippines): 450–452
effects analysis: See PSYOP effectiveness, measuring
Eisenhower, President Dwight:
and USIA, 104–105
elites, political and cultural (see also key communicators): 297–298, 366, 561–562
encoding (in communication theory): 284
definition, 479–480
estimating foreign attitudes: 299–305
Exchange of Persons Program: 93, 95
exhibitions as a communication channel: 737–738
“eye of God” technique: 769–770
feedback: 21, 479
films: See motion pictures
1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile): 948
1st Infantry Division: 947
1st PSYOP Battalion: 229–232
foreign government officials as a communication channel: 706–707
foreign legislators as a communication channel: 705–706
foreign pressure groups, as a communication channel: 708–705
foreign policy and PSYOP: 85
Fourteen Points: 2, 13(n), 68, 72
4th Infantry Division: 949
frame of reference: 29–31
France: Panorama: 1087
Free Europe Exile Relations: 198
Free Europe, Jr.: 198–211
Free Europe Press: 198
Fulbright Act: 110
Fuller, J. F. C.: 18
Galitzine and Partner: 193
Giap, General: 397–398
gossip as a communication channel: 770–773
governmental and intergovernmental reports, use of in PSYOP: 582
groups, social (see also reference group): 23
influence of on communication, 27
“Gustav Siegfried Eins”: 761
Haines Board: 84
Herz, M.: 672
Ho Chi Minh: 398, 606–608
Hoi Chanh: See Chieu Hoi Program
Hombre: 923
Hovland, C. I.: 610, 1016
Hungarian uprising: 129
H. Wm. Bernhardt (agency): 193
Independent Television Authority (Great Britain): 1086

Index 6
indicators of PSYOP effectiveness: 946-957
institution building: See development (economic) and PSYOP
insurgent appeals and methods: See propaganda, insurgent
intelligence: 57-58, 83
model of PSYOP intelligence process, 479-486, 481 (fig.)
utilization of in PSYOP, 477-496
intelligence reports, use of in PSYOP: 549-553, 580-581
Interdepartmental Groups (IGs) (of NSC): 87
Interim International Information Service: 103
international assistance, psychological aspects of: 314-326
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA): See AID
international humanitarian organizations as a communication channel: 707-708
International Media Guarantee (IMG) Program: 116
international organizations, PSYOP effects of: 50
interpreters: 284, 313, 340-342
interrogation: 517-518, 576-578, 953-954
"interviewer effects": 490
Izvestia: 712, 1069-1040
ideology, Communist: 1059-1065
ideology, expansion of U.S.: 823-829
ideology, relationship to PSYOP: 7
in USSR, 9
Jackson, C. D.: 8
Jackson, W.: 8, 128
jamming: 982-984, 1045
Janowitz, M: 82
JFK Center for Military Assistance: 83
John F. Kennedy, Years of Lightning, Days of Drums: 1124
Johnson, Gen. H. K.: 225, 422
Johnson, President Lyndon B.: and public opinion polls, 164-165
and USIA, 107-110
Joint Anglo-American Magazine Program: 125
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS): 99
definition of PSYOP, 46
Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force: 129-130
organization and function, 232-234
JUSPAO: See Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office
JUWTPA (Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force Atlantic), writing of PSYOP annex for: 259-261
Kennan, G.: 3
Kennedy, President John F.: 10, 121-122, 178-181
and public opinion polls, 163-164
and USIA, 105, 115
key audiences (see also target groups; key communicators): 480-484
key communicators: 45, 297-298, 386, 662-666
perception of U.S. by, 45
Kit Carson Scouts: 357-358
Klapper, J. T.: 25, 36, 1018
Kommunist: 1090
la guerre révolutionnaire: 248-259
language training: 288-287, 312-313
Larson, A.: 6

Index 7
Lasswell, H. D.: 20, 24, 609, 611, 777
Lazarsfeld, P.: 23, 609
leaflets: 4, 26, 403-408, 670-673, 678-679, 684, 689-690, 713-716
in Korean War, 713-716
in Korea, 527-530
in Lebanon intervention, 714-715
in Malaya, 714
in Vietnam, 716-717, 762-763, 901-905
in World War II, 713-716
Le Boulevard de Saint Laurent: 926
Lenin, V. I., views on propaganda and agitation: 356
Lerner, D.: 72, 82, 484
Lerner, M.: 3
Lewin, K.: 609-611
Lilies of the Field: 923
Linebarger, P. M. A.: 58, 68, 82, 589-590, 666-668
Lippmann, W.: 3, 5, 131
Little, LTC J. T.: 458-459
loudspeakers as a communication channel: 729-730, 901-905
McLuhan, M.: 10, 116-117
magazines: 718-719, 720-721
mail as a channel of communication: 699-700, 725-727, 739, 763-765
Mallin, J.: 265
Mao Tse-tung: 398
Marks, L. B.: 108-109
Martin, J. B.: 265
Mass media: See communication, mass media
media: See communication channels
media, PSYOP: See communication channels
media analysis: 788, 897-946
qualitative, 913-946
interviewing, 913-919
quantitative techniques, 898-913
Megre, M.: 258
message composition: 670-692, 903-906
importance of language in, 578-579
importance of timing, 687-693
messages (PSYOP), content of: 484-485
Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAGs): 100
Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV): 226-228
military operations, psychological effects of: 70
"Military" study: 254
Mint Tea: 225
motion pictures (see also television, films): 690-692, 697, 701, 736-737, 943-946, 1084-1089
use of in intercultural communications, 919-928
movies: See motion pictures
multinational corporations as a communication channel: 707
Murrow, E. R.: 105-107, 115
My Lai: 173
national images: 806-823
national policy and PSYOP: See PSYOP policy and national policy
National Security Act of 1947: 86
national security and PSYOP (see also PSYOP policy and national policy): 2, 12-13, 40-41

Index 8
National Security Council (NSC): 86–88
   and Cuban missile crisis: 178–181
National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM): 86, 88
   national security policy and public opinion: 155–166
National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM): 86, 98
   national security system: 8, 85–101
national security policy and public opinion: 155–166
   nation building: 125, 463–471
Neu(e) Ausselese: 126
New China Nc vs Agency: 195
news broadcasts: 545–547
   Soviet: 111–113
newspapers:
   international, 709–711
   in People's Republic of China, 29
9th Infantry Division: 951
Nixon Doctrine: 44
NLF (National Liberation Front of North Vietnam): 25
North Korean views:
   of People's Republic of China, 551–553
   of United States, 549–551
North Vietnamese Army (NVA) soldier as a PSYOP target: 498–506
ODCSOPS: See Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations
Office de Radiodiffusion Télévision: Francilse: 1086–1087
Office of Strategic Services: See OSS
Office of the Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW): 82–84
Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs: 81–82, 103
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (ODCSOPS): 84, 185
Office of War Information (OWI): 82, 103
191st Airborne Division (Airmobile): 949–951
Open Sky Proposal (Eisenhower): 45
   "Operation Annie": 761
   "Operation Cornflakes": 763–761
   "Operation Mincemeat": 760–761
   "Operation Roundup": 414–416
Operations Coordinating Board: 106
Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS): 1142–1145
organization, PSYOP: See PSYOP organization
OSS (Office of Strategic Services): 6, 82
Peking Renew: 1113
People's Daily (Renmin Ribun): 195
   perception of the enemy: 71–72
   persuasion (see also attitude change): 790–796
   cross-cultural, 886–897
   definition of, 21
   international (see also communication, persuasive), 47–52, 1011–1021
   persuasion theory (see also attitude change): 21, 609–624, 1003, 1011
   bibliography of, 621–624
   persuasive communication: See communication
Phoebe: 925–926
Pike, D.: 156–151
Plowden Committee (British): 190
plays: See drama as a communication channel
postage stamps, us.: in PSYOP: See mail as a communication channel

Index 9
Index 11

comparison of U.S. and Soviet, 9, 348-354
in counterinsurgencies, 370-379, 446
in the Cuban missile crisis, 178-181, 259-261, 386-391
definitions of, 40-47, 69
in Dominican Republic, 229-232, 262-266
in the era of national liberation wars (post-1960), 10-11, 69, 149-154, 397-409
evolution of, 2-13
French, 234-241, 248-259
in Cameroon, 754-761
in Hungarian uprising, 382-386
importance of systematic research to, 479
in intelligence agencies (see also PSYOP in the era of national liberation wars), 149-154, 183,
229-229, 234-241, 397-400, 454-457, 465-471, 1130-1141
in Korean War, 7, 82-83, 412-413, 518-534
lack of definition, 2
in Laos, 1119-1120
in Lebanon intervention, 241-246, 280-282, 714-715
in Malaya, 73, 370-380
Nazi, 1036-1043
as “new diplomacy,” 8, 14(n19)
in the Nigeria-Biafra War, 191-194, 702-711
NLF (National Liberation Front-Vietnam), 680-682, 716-717, 750-753, 1117, 1152-1163
in a non-war/limited war, 419, 439-471
North Korean, 532-534
North Vietnamese (see also PSYOP, Viet Cong), 403-407, 537-545, 1115-1119
in the Philippines, 73, 401-403, 440-454, 767-770
in Portuguese Guinea, 1130-1141
role of in military, 67-74
South African, 1122-1139
South Vietnamese, 450-465
Soviet, 9-9, 41-43, 346-353, 672, 676-678, 711-13, 1029-1050, 1090-1105
directed toward the PRC, 1100-1105
and ideology, 1090-1100
by Special Forces in S.E. Asia, 337-340
strategic, 362-400
strategic and tactical, 420-471
tactical, 400-420
use of force and, 422-424
U.S. in general, 27, 49, 161-163, 720-721
deficiencies of, 11-12, 113-114, 684-687
future of, 12, 732-735
Soviet view of, 823-829
Viet Cong (see also PSYOP, North Vietnamese), 131-132, 150-152, 345, 397-400, 536-545, 680-683, 996-1002
Viet Minh, 233, 236
in Vietnam, 130-132, 134-144, 150-154, 220-228, 397-400, 403-411, 412-416, 684-687,
730-735, 886-913, 946-951, 996-1002
location of PSYOP units in, 224 (map)
organization of, 220-225, 222 (fig.), 246-248
in World War I, 4-5 (n19), 68, 678
in World War II, 5-6, 83, 672-673, 678-679, 763-765
World War II to Korean War, 7, 41, 50, 81-82, 407-408
PSYOP channels: See communication channels
PSYOP community: See PSYOP organization; national security system
PSYOP country plans: 133
PSYOP cycle: 137-144
PSYOP Division (in International and Civil Affairs Directorate of ODCSOPS): 84
PSYOP doctrine: 1-2, 6-8, 10
for the 1970s, 11-13
PSYOP effectiveness: 777-1026
criteria of, 492-483, 778-784, 898-899
importance of audience predisposition to, 985-996
letters from listeners as a measure of, 976-979
measuring, 485-486, 491-493, 788, 946-1021
diversity of methodologies, 946-957
post-testing for, 142, 487-491
interviews: 489-491, 972-975
surveys, 488-490, 957-972
pre-testing for, 139, 487-491, 690-693, 781-782, 1003-1011
by means of informal media testing, 491
panels, 490, 988-995
surveys, 488-490, 957-972
use of POWs in evaluation, 780-781
PSYOP framework at national level (see also PSYOP organization): 85-101
PSYOP goals: 370-379
PSYOP information sources: See PSYOP intelligence sources
PSYOP intelligence:
and research, 138
in Vietnam, 138
PSYOP intelligence methods (see also content analysis): 571-608
direct observation, 587-590
interviewing, 590-594
intuition, 585-587
sampling, 594-606
PSYOP intelligence sources: 510-570, 572-584
methods for exploiting, 572-584
PSYOP and nationbuilding: See nationbuilding
PSYOP objectives, situational variables in: 440-454
PSYOP organization (see also PSYOP framework at national level; PSYOP, in Vietnam, organization of): 81-101, 177-206
civilian, 81-85
definition of in-country, 177
headquarters-field coordination, 247-266
for in-country communication, 219-247
interface between civilian and military, 10-11, 81-101, 225-232
for international communication, 177-219
military, 81-85, 132, 137-144, 181-185
PSYOP personnel: 269-358
characteristics of an effective PSYOP officer, 272-292, 299-305
cross-cultural relationships, 282-305
professionalism, 271-272
PSYOP policy:
democratic style, 132-133
and national policy, 122-133, 262-296, 362-370, 385
planning, 120-154
priorities in, 133-137
totalitarian style, 132-133
PSYOP-related personnel: 305-358
indigenous scout, 357-358
information officer, 326-333

Index 12
interpreters, 340-342
MAAG advisor, 312-313
military advisor, 306-312
political officer, 343-353
propagandist and agitator, 353-356
radio programming officer, 333-337
security assistance advisor, 314-326
Special Forces, 337-340
PSYOP targets: 498-506
PSYOP terminology: See terminology for PSYOP
PSYWAR: See PSYOP; terminology for PSYOP
PSYWAR Center and School: 83
Public Affairs Officer (PAO): 94-95, 169-174, 326-333
public diplomacy: 178-181
public information: 56-57
public opinion: 155-166, 365-368
definition of, 156-157
global, 159
regional, 159-160
role of in international affairs, 155-156
role of in policymaking, 160-166
in the Far East, 553-570
published documents, use of in PSYOP: 583
radio:
compatibility of equipment, 139-140
role of international, 831-832, 928-938, 983-996
short-wave, 5
effects of broadcasts to U.S., 985-996
use of in PSYOP, 676-678, 696, 700-701, 738, 761
broadcasts, 676-678, 830-835, 901-905, 913-919, 985-996
in Korea, 530-531
in People’s Republic of China, 29, 738
Soviet, 711-713, 1040, 1044-1046, 1100-1105
Radio Free Europe (RFE): 197-211, 382-385
corporate structure, 198-202, 200-201 (figs.)
European headquarters, 199-202
facilities and staff, 199
funding, 119, 205
image in Europe, 867-868
and national policymaking, 127-129
New York headquarters, 199
operations, 205-212
organization, 205-212
policymaking, 202-212, 383-384
publications, 876-878
research and analysis, 208-211, 862-878, 883-885, 913-919
Radio Liberty (RL): 213-219
funding, 119
policy, 215-217
measuring effectiveness of, 972-985
programming, 217-218
staffing, 333-337
target analysis by, 878-883
Radio Moscow: 985-995, 1040, 1101-1105
Radio Peking: 545-547

Index 13
RARET: 292
Red Flag (Houggi): 195
reference group: 658-662
reference group theory: 886-897
reinforcement effect (of communication): 47, 49
reinforcement function (of communication): 27-28
residual effect: 1013
Reuters: 1078
"revolutionary development" (South Vietnam): 135
research:
government-sponsored, 7
interviews, 590-594
sampling, 594-606
types of samples, 605 (table)
social science and PSYOP, 609-648
Rockefeller, Vice President Nelson: 6, 81-82
Roosevelt, President Franklin D.: 162
Ruder & Finn: 193
rumor: 765-767, 771-773, 1037-1039, 1043-1045
RVNAF Political Warfare Department: 135
safe-conduct pass: 31, 49, 407-408, 669
samizdat: 830
Sarnoff, R. W.: 1089
satellites, communication: 930-931, 1089
SCAME formula: 784-789
Schramm, W.: 9, 29, 606, 1013
Scope: 1129
"seafloating" as a communication channel: 729
secondary group: 65-67
self-critique (self-criticism): 1035
self-images, national: 806-823
self-praise as PSYOP theme: 405
Senior Review Group (of NSC): 86-88
7th PSYOP Group: 140, 143, 226-227
sex as PSYOP theme: 405
Shakespere, F.: 115
Shils, E.: 49
"sleeper effect": 1017
slogans: 682-683, 1093-1094
Smithsonian Institution: 93-94
"socialism," misunderstanding of term: 667
social movement as PSYOP: 1152-1165
society and culture: 553-571
in the Far East, 553-571
relation to communication, 29
songs as a communication channel: 749-753
source analysis: 785-786, 793-835
example of Soviet, 823-829
relationship of source to a political hierarchy, 823-829
sampling technique in, 806-822
attributes of sources, 790-805
South African Digest: 1129
South African Panorama: 1129
South African Summary: 1129

Index 14
Soviet image: 42
Soviet society, effect of mass media on: 1043-1050
Special Forces: 10, 83, 337-340, 458-459
  psychological role of, 657-659
special warfare: 83
Special Warfare Center and School: 83
State Department:
  relationship with USIA, 8, 113
  rivalry with Creel Committee, 4
  role in national security system, 89-91
    overseas operations, 90-91
    Washington-level operations, 89-90
  role in PSYOP/information, 113
Steibert, T. C.: 105
sterotyping: 72, 806-823, 1031-1032
"strategy of truth" (BBC): 49
students as communication channels: 703, 1078
superstition, use of in PSYOP: 762-763
surrender, role of in PSYOP (see also defectors, use of in PSYOP): 400, 405-406, 416-420
symbolic acts as PSYOP: 754-755
symbols: 48
target analysis: 486-487, 658-657, 862-897
  analyzing cultural frame of reference, 862-883, 886-897
target audience: See target groups
targets groups: 141
  in Far East, 556-563
    army enlisted men, 557
    army officers, junior and middle rank, 559-560
    ethnic minorities, 557-558
    intellectuals and administrators, 561-562
    labor, 557
    labor leaders, 559
    mass media communicators, 558
    peasants, 557
    religious leaders, 558-559
    small businessmen, 560
    teachers, 561
    university students, 560-561
    upper-rank military officers, 562
    urban proletariat, 557
    voluntary associations and interest groups, 562-563
    women, 558
  in Korea, 518-534
Tass: 1046-1047
tatsepa? See wall posters
Tchakhotine, S.: 255
telecommunications (telegraph, telephone, wireless): 700
television: 1079-1080, 1084-1089
  films, 855-862
  French, 1086-1087
  international, 992-999
  in Nigeria-Biafra dispute, 698-699, 701
  in Soviet Union, 711-713
  West German, 1086
terminology for PSYOP: 2, 18-19, 68, 83-84, 252-253, 823-824

Index 15
terror:
- as a symbolic act, 425-439
- use of in internal war, 425-439
Tet in Vietnam: 508-510
theater: See drama
The Five “Ss”: 516
The Head Men: 1088
The Leopard: 922
The Loneliness of the Long Distance Runner: 924
themes, PSYOP: 503-506, 670-673, 856-862, 903-905
- need for simplicity in, 673-675
The Parable: 927-928
The Stage to Three: 1088
“The Voice of South Africa”: 1130
The World of Marshall McLuhan: 926
Thomson, C. A. H.: 82
Time Magazine: 1079
Training of Propaganda, Cultural and Educational Workers at the District and Village Levels: 1154-1155
translation: 506-508
trend analysis, example of (table): 535
troop behavior: 58
Truman Doctrine: 123-124
Truman, President Harry S.:
- “Campaign of Truth,” 7
  - and public opinion, 156
  - and USIA, 103
25th Infantry Division: 951
two-step flow of communication: 27
unconditional surrender: 72-73
Under Secretaries Committee (of NSC): 87-88
unintended audiences for PSYOP: 666-668
unintended effects of PSYOP: 689-690
United Nations (UN): 709
- importance as communication, 50
country plans, 95
- and the Cuban missile crisis, 180-181
cultural programs of, 25
- in Dominican intervention, 265
information programs of, 25
mission regarding Viet Nam, 110, 115
Office of Policy and Plans (IOP), 91
Office of Research and Assessment (IOR), 92
overseas operations, 94-96, 111-112
relationships with other agencies and departments, 92-93, 110, 119
role in national policymaking, 115-116
Soviet view of, 823-829
statement of mission (1953), 104-105
statement of mission (1963), 105-106
statement of mission (1967), 108-109
Washington-level operations, 91-92
United States Information Service (USIS): 94-96, 131, 229-232, 243-246, 364
unorthodox channels of communication: 769-773

Index 16
SUPPLEMENTARY
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