

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
National Technical Information Service

AD-A024 911

THE IMPACT OF THE OCTOBER WAR ON SUPER-POWER
MIDDLE EAST POLICY

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

MARCH 1976



NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California

AD A 024911



THESIS

RECEIVED
MAY 27 1976

THE IMPACT OF THE OCTOBER WAR
ON
SUPER-POWER MIDDLE EAST POLICY

by

Allan Edward Rypka

March 1976

Thesis Advisor:

J.W. Amos

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

REPRODUCED BY
NATIONAL TECHNICAL
INFORMATION SERVICE
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
SPRINGFIELD, VA. 22104

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)


REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The Impact of the October War on Super-Power Middle East Policy		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; March 1976
7. AUTHOR(s) Allan Edward Rypka		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
13. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE March 1976
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 113
		14. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		14a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Middle East October 1973 War Super Power Policy		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This thesis analyzes the impact of the October 1973 Middle East War on super-power Middle East policy. The analysis is conducted within the context of the overall Middle East crisis, both before and after the 1973 War. Consideration is given to the historical roles of the US and USSR in the Middle East to highlight the changes in those		

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered:

(20. ABSTRACT Continued)

roles as a result of the War. New patterns of super-power involvement in the area are described and the potential effects of these patterns on future Middle East developments are projected.



DD Form 1473
Jan 73
S/N 0102-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE/When Data Entered:

The Impact of the October War
on
Super-Power Middle East Policy

by

Allan Edward Rypka
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.A., University of Minnesota, 1964

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

March 1976

Author

Allan E Rypka

Approved by:

W. W. [Signature]

Thesis Advisor

Ronald H Stolki

Second Reader

John [Signature]

Chairman, Department of Government

Jack R. [Signature]

Academic Dean

ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the impact of the October 1973 Middle East War on super-power Middle East policy. The analysis is conducted within the context of the overall Middle East crisis, both before and after the 1973 War.

Consideration is given to the historical roles of the US and USSR in the Middle East to highlight the changes in those roles as a result of the War. New patterns of super-power involvement in the area are described and the potential effects of these patterns on future Middle East developments are projected.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION -----	8
II.	CONCEPT AND BACKGROUND -----	10
III.	THE OCTOBER WAR -- PRECONDITIONS -----	27
IV.	THE WAR -----	36
V.	EUPHORIA -----	47
VI.	THE BREAKDOWN -----	55
VII.	THE SECOND SINAI DISENGAGEMENT -----	64
VIII.	THE FUTURE -----	71
IX.	CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY -----	79
APPENDIX A:	PALESTINE/ISRAEL POPULATION -----	86
APPENDIX B:	ROYAL COMMISSION PARTITION PLANS -----	89
APPENDIX C:	SYKES-PICOT/MANDATORY PARTITIONS -----	90
APPENDIX D:	UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION PLAN -----	91
APPENDIX E:	CHRONOLOGY OF OCTOBER WAR -----	92
APPENDIX F:	BREZHNEV'S PLAN -----	96
APPENDIX G:	SECOND STAGE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT -- SEPTEMBER 1975 -----	98
	BIBLIOGRAPHY -----	106
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST -----	113

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION

- (A) Names of persons or places that occur in translation are spelled as they normally occur in the original source. For example, "Nasir" is usually spelled "Nasser" in Western sources.
- (B) Generally Arabic names and places have been spelled in the shortened (double consonants removed) form, not the Western form. Exception may occur in quotation.
- (C) Hebraic or Israeli names are spelled in commonly accepted Western form. For example, "Israel" vice "Isra'il".
- (D) Although Arabic and consequently many translations do not utilize capital letters, proper nouns have been capitalized in conformity with English usage.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

The author wishes to express his gratitude to the US Mission to the United Nations and in particular, to Mr. Joseph Lorenz and the staff of the political section for their courtesy and invaluable assistance and guidance. The support of the Military Staff Assistance Committee is also sincerely appreciated.

The author now understands why works of this sort are dedicated to families, his own has clearly earned recognition.

The credit for any value contained herein should largely go to the members of the various UN Missions on both sides of the Middle East conflict, who generously and patiently provided many key insights. It is hoped that their efforts will help enable a just peace in the Middle East.

The responsibility for the content of the thesis, of course, rests completely with the author and does not necessarily represent the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the US Navy, or any other portion of the US Government.

I. INTRODUCTION

The involvement of non-middle eastern powers in Middle East affairs is as old as history itself, from before Alexander of Macedon to Henry Kissinger, conflicts have swept through the area with some degree of non-local participation. Currently, the overall situation is similar to a scarred and battered but complex tree of problems whose roots entwine about historical rocks and reach into a subsoil of passions, and underground caverns of greed and fear. Such a tree cannot be removed by simply cutting off the trunk and sprinkling a grass seed of economic aid on the stump. If grass is to grow the roots must either be dug out and removed or buried sufficiently deep in a subsoil of time for the advantages of peace to become apparent. The modern world rests on a delicate balance of multi-polar politics which faces tremendous destabilizing pressures of conflicting states, cultures, and ideologies competing for the world's reserves of food, minerals and energy. Technology must be believed capable of solving these problems if man is to survive, but technical solutions take time, opportunity, and wealth. Time is running out. The Middle East is not only sitting on top of the greatest single source of wealth which may be brought to bear on the world's problems (or used to destroy the future) but is also strategically located on the traditional routes of conquerors. It is natural, therefore, that the major powers would gravitate toward and attempt to control this vital area.

It is the contention of this paper that (A) as a result of changes in the overall Middle East situation during and resulting from the October 1973 war that an opportunity for a peaceful solution to the situation has been created.

(B) further, both this opportunity and the dangers of not exercising it have been recognized to a greater degree than any previous time in modern history, and (C) as a result of (A) * (B) significant changes in super-power behavior have occurred which are making the possibility of an eventual solution less remote. Just as in many games of chance where the opportunities are great, the risks are great and a solution may come only if the two super-powers (particularly the US) are willing to accept substantial long term commitments to both sides of the conflict.

II. CONCEPT AND BACKGROUND

Super-power involvement in all strategic areas of the world is an accepted feature of today's world but the Middle East in the post 1973 war period stands out, both in the degree and scope, of super-power involvement. From 1971 to 1973, for example, the US had only routine diplomatic contacts concerning the Middle East, but from October 1973 to May 1974 the US Secretary of State devoted between 1/2 and 2/3 of his total available time and effort to the area.¹ Assuming that the US Secretary of State's time is primarily (but of course recognizing that it is not, exclusively) devoted to securing for the US, a stable foreign policy which supports the interests of the US, an obviously significant change had occurred. This change of diplomatic consciousness was not, as will be shown, limited to the US but was at least tacitly agreed to by the USSR.² Another indicator of the seriousness of change was the October 1973 world-wide nuclear alert of US forces to a degree not seen since the Cuban missile crisis. These changes of pattern are reflections of the shattering changes brought about by the events around the October war.

¹Quandt, William B., "Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations", Journal of International Affairs, v. 9, #1, p. 38, 1975.

²Safran, Nadav, "Engagement in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs Quarterly, v. 54, p. 57, October 1974.

This paper will attempt to outline these diplomatic changes, concentrating on the resulting new roles of the super-powers. All of the objective conditions of the Arab-Israeli (See note on transliteration page 6) conflict must, of course, be dealt with to achieve any degree of comprehensiveness in achieving these goals. Since the paper is predicated on changes in these conditions, it will be necessary to briefly outline their development. Additionally, the historical role of the super-powers must be considered if changing patterns are to be discerned. These essentially descriptive problems will be limited in time to the 20th century since to go back further in the past would unduly expand the scope and place limits on the ability to concentrate on the post 1973 period.

After discussing the historical background and describing the changes in Middle East super-power diplomacy as perceived by interested parties in the area, the significance of these changes must be analyzed. In what ways were the changes brought about? What relationship(s) if any, exist between the new diplomatic efforts and oil, detente, and the internal politics of both major and minor powers of the Middle East? What are the perceptions of Middle East governments regarding the role of the PLO? Why did optimism on a settlement run on and off following the war? All of these questions are believed to be in some way related to the current super-power efforts and will be considered in building toward an analysis of future policies which would impact on developments in the

area. In order to consider all of these diverse areas appropriately it will be necessary to spend considerable effort on the events of the October war itself (Section III and IV). Finally, super-power involvement in the Middle East is part of a continuing process of change which perhaps should not be separated from the world's macro-problems of food, energy and survival. Some limitation must be placed on the scope of all endeavor and these macro-problems will be only indirectly considered.

Foreign involvement in the Middle East is, of course, not limited to the 20th century but goes back throughout history. At the beginning of the 20th century the remnants of thousands of years were still visible, but elements of change were also present. The Ottoman Empire nominally controlled the majority of the area although significant inroads had been made by European powers. Britain held Cyprus and Egypt. Syria and Lebanon were experiencing political unrest left over from the brief Turkish Constitution of 1878 and the literary movements of American and French educators.³ In Syria, a Pan-Arab movement stressed a revival of Islam under an Arab Caliphate. The modern Zionist movement was in existence as were nationalistic movements in most of the Middle East countries. Major foreign interests in the area centered around strategic

³Middle East A Political and Economic Survey, ed. by W. Mansfield, p. 11, Oxford Press, London, 1973.

considerations and were colonial and imperialistic in nature. Of the two super-powers to be, of the 1970's, Russia had evinced interest in the Holy places, the US had made only minor impacts. Palestine was simple a barren backwater, administered in part as the Sanjaq of Jerusalem and in part as the Vilayet of Beirut.⁴ Its population was approximately 600,000 Arabs and 80,000 Jews.⁵ Most of the Jewish population lived in the holy cities in relative harmony with their Arab neighbors. There were, however, several thousand Jews who lived in agricultural communes established by Western funds and concessions imposed upon the Sultan.⁶ These colonies hoped to eventually realize the dream of Zionism and were beginning to be disliked by Arab scholars.⁷ Islam in all its variations rested securely over the entire area, largely unaltered to the impending upheavals of the 20th century.

World War I proved to be a major watershed in the development of the Middle East crisis. Even after the passage of many years, its beginning, the documents, events and efforts

⁴Ibid, p. 47.

⁵Peel Commission Report, p. 23, London, 1937. (See Appendix A Table I for population estimate.)

⁶Op. cit., Middle East A Political and Economic Survey, p. 48.

⁷Mandel, N., Zionism and Indigenous Population of Palestine, Thesis, Oxford University, London, 1965.

of World War I are cited by authors of both sides of the Middle East as bearing on the conflict there. Unfortunately, more often than not, current writers fail to portray these circumstances within the context of a world war whose major protagonists believed their very survival at stake. In addition to the implications of the overall results of the war, including the break-up of the Ottoman Empire and imposition of Western mandatory power over portions of the Middle East, some of the famous or infamous documents of the war years should be considered. The McMahon correspondence, the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour declaration are often used and abused in the current age.

Sir Henry McMahon was British High Commissioner in Egypt during World War I. He was tasked by the Foreign Office in late 1915 to communicate with Sharif Hussein of Mecca to secure Hussein's opposition to the Ottoman Sultan's call for a jihad against the British. Hussein was encouraged to revolt against Ottoman rule. In return, British assistance for the revolt was promised and delivered. The Arab revolt tied down some 30,000 Turkish troops along the Amman-Medina Railroad and effectively secured the right flank of the British army in Palestine. British commitments for the post revolt period, as far as a kingdom for the Sharif, is less than clear. The Arabs maintain it included Palestine - the British that

it did not.⁸ Post war claims have often failed to recognize that the primary motivation of the British was to preserve their strategic interest with respect to India, Egypt and Allied communications in the Far East.

In 1916, Britain and France, with the agreement of Russia, formed the Sykes-Picot Agreement whose provisions not only carved the expired carcass of the Ottoman Empire (see Appendix C for map), but did so in a way that conflicted with the degree and scope of Arab independence envisioned in Hussein-McMahon correspondence.⁹ In 1917 the Balfour Declaration stated that "His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a National Home for the Jewish People, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."¹⁰ Multiple rationales have been put forth for the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, they include morality, humanitarianism, strategic considerations and internal British politics. The precise weighting of these factors is

⁸Op. cit., Middle East A Political and Economic Survey, p. 13.

⁹Ibid., (See Appendix C for outline of Sykes-Picot partition plan and actual mandatory boundaries.)

¹⁰Balfour Declaration.

unimportant here except that considerable evidence does exist indicating that the document was definitely related to Britain's war effort.¹¹ Its significance to modern diplomacy lies in the legal premise claimed by supporters of Israel's existence. The Arab world strenuously objected(s) to both the Sykes-Picot agreement and the Balfour Declaration as betrayals of commitments made to the Arabs during the war. The post World War I treaties and the imposition of Western mandates further alienated the Arab leadership effectively shifting the Arab nationalism from resistance of the Turks to resistance of the Mandatory powers. Since the mandatory powers were Christian and had supported Jewish immigration into Palestine while reneging (in the Arab view) on commitments made to the Arabs, Islam began to be drawn into the hostility against the mandatory powers and eventually against the Jewish influx itself. Thus by the end of World War I, two elements of the current problem had been created - territorial conflict and the Jewish presence, both thoroughly laced with hostility toward the West. Britain, as the dominant mandatory power, became the target for most anti-Western feeling.

During the inter-World War I - World War II period, the Palestine problem became increasingly tense, this situation resulted in violence from 1920 on. This violence was studied

¹¹Op. cit., Middle East A Political and Economic Survey, p. 14.

by numerous inquirers both official and unofficial. These efforts resulted in numerous reports, white papers, etc., most of which were of little long term significance. One Royal Commission, the Peel Commission, was the first official document to state a belief that hostilities in the area were unresolvable and recommended partition into two states - Jewish and Arab (see Appendix B for proposed plans), but with Britain retaining control of the area.¹² The specific plan was rejected by both Jewish and Arab communities and the open hostilities continued. Jewish immigration grew during the 1930's until by 1937 Jews made up approximately 1/3 of the total population of Palestine (see Appendix A Table 1). While later studies considered the Peel Commission's plan unworkable, the idea of one Arab and one Jewish state in Palestine surfaces regularly. Arab objection to the plans centered around the existence of a Jewish entity with Palestine. Arab efforts in Palestine had by 1939, placed sufficient pressure on Great Britain to result in the issuance of a new White Paper which restricted Jewish immigration, restricted land purchase by Jews, proposed an independent Palestinian state with a population ratio fixed as it existed at the time (2 to 1 Arab to Jewish). The paper also made no provision for Jewish autonomy. This new state was to be established within ten years time. The White Paper, as might

¹²Ibid., p. 60. (See Appendix B for map of partition plans.)

be expected, was hotly opposed by Zionist organizations, the League of Nations considered it not in accord with the spirit of the mandate and even the Arab interests would have preferred immediate independence and a complete halt to Jewish immigration. Until the end of the mandate, however, the White Paper of 1939 remained official British policy.¹³

World War II essentially put the conflict in Palestine on hold, with a majority of both Zionist and Arab supporting the Allied cause with varying degrees of enthusiasm depending upon the fortunes of war. Certain Arab elements did support the Axis and the dissident Stern Group did continue violence against the British as a result of the 1939 White Paper. World War II Nazi repression of the Jews in Europe did, however, add to or intensify the overall problem. Sympathy for the Jewish community spread world-wide as the complete story of the atrocities became known. Pressure mounted on the British from within Palestine as both the Jews and Arabs strove for independence. American involvement grew in November 1945, as a Joint Anglo-American Commission studied the possibility of relocating European Jewish refugees to Palestine. The committee recommended such a relocation in 1946 but did not address the political future of the area.¹⁴ President

¹³Political Dictionary of the Middle East in the 20th Century, ed. by Y. Shimoni and E. Levine, Rev. ed., p. 296, and p. 420, Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., New York, 1974.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 297.

Truman accepted the plan and began pressing the British for its acceptance, Arab hostility to such a plan led to British hesitation and the violence which had subsided during World War II resumed. The British, frustrated and under economic pressure resulting from the costs of World War II, decided that the only way out of the dilemma in Palestine was to withdraw. Accordingly, in April 1947, they turned the entire problem over to the UN and declared their intention to withdraw from the area. A UN commission studied the situation and proposed two partition plans. One of these plans was accepted by the UN General Assembly in November 1947 (Appendix D for map) but categorically rejected by Arab leaders. The British announced that they would neither implement the plan nor allow a UN commission to supervise it. Jewish and Arab groups openly began to consolidate their control in various areas of Palestine. Contested areas became local guerrilla warfare battlegrounds from February to March 1948 prior to the British withdrawal and proclamation of the State of Israel on 14 May 1948. This guerrilla warfare resulted in the creation of a new element in the Palestine problem - the refugees - Arabs in Palestine who fled or were expelled from their homes during the conflict.¹⁵ The traumas and atrocities of this period are explained in very differing

¹⁵Ibid., p. 299. (See Appendix A, Tables 2, 3 and 4 for data on Palestinian-Arab refugee distributions.)

ways by the two sides. Regardless of which side is more correct, or perhaps less incorrect, the sudden movement of 550,000 - 700,000 Palestinian Arabs to the Arab-held areas in Jordan, the West Bank (Jordan occupied) and the Gaza Strip caused a problem whose settlement has yet to be resolved. (See Appendix A Tables 2, 3 and 4 for development of refugee problem.) The magnitude of the numbers involved meant that they could not be ignored and yet most writings of the period refer to those Palestinian Arabs as simply refugees, as if they had no previous existence or homes.

The organized warfare following the British withdrawal resulted in an Israel roughly 2600 square miles larger than the Jewish area in the UN Partition Plan.¹⁶ A state had been created within the old mandate area with leftover portions occupied by surrounding Arab nations. The boundaries of this state (and its very existence in some views) form another essential element of the conflict which remain in contention today. The creation of Israel also marked the withdrawal of the British in the area, an absence which created a vacuum into which the US and USSR have (for a multiplicity of reasons) moved, forming yet another new element of the current conflict. Finally, the 1948 conflict raised the issue of the Holy Places of Jerusalem which

¹⁶Ibid., p. 30. (See Appendix D for map.)

continues to rankle Muslim emotions around the globe.¹⁷ Since the 1948 war and prior to 1973, the Israeli-Arab conflict has twice erupted in intense open warfare, and throughout the twenty-five year period guerrilla operations, reprisals and hostility have been the norm rather than the exception. During this 25 year period, patterns emerged of Israeli military domination, increased Arab bitterness and implacability as they felt their honor impugned by continuous Israeli victories. This led, in turn, to internal efforts in all Arab states for politicians to outbid one another in attempts to be more hostile toward Israel which was viewed as an extension of Western imperialist powers. As each successive war proved unsuccessful to the regular armies of the Arab states, a plethora of Palestinian guerrilla groups arose that grew in strength to the point where they became a threat to some of the Arab states in the area. Actual open conflict between guerrillas and Jordanian forces occurred in 1970. Attitudes of all participants in the area hardened to uncompromising hostility. Following the 1967 war, for example, Israeli leaders often stressed that Israel would not return to her pre-war borders, that any settlement required direct negotiations between Arab states and Israel. Arab leaders accused Israel of acting as an agent of the West and refused negotiations

¹⁷Armajani, Yahya, Middle East Past and Present, p. 375, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970.

until after an Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders. The US was accused of directly supporting and encouraging Israeli aggression. The USSR was seen by the US as exploiting the unrest in the area and using it to enhance her position by increasing Arab dependence on her for arms. Finally, the psychological implications of the situation by 1970 were such that many people in Israel were equating any disagreement with the Israeli government abroad as anti-semitism; the Palestinians were talking of their own diaspora and vowing to return if it took 1000 years; Arab politics and emotions would not allow any Arab leaders to directly negotiate with Israel. The super-powers were drawn into this caldron during the 25 years from 1948 to 1973, slowly changing from interested bystanders to verging on nuclear conflict during the October war.

Super-power positions and considerations of the Arab-Israeli conflict entering the decade of the 70's should be summarized, if changes due to the October war are to be properly highlighted. Since the 1950's Soviet policy in the Arab world has followed three broad areas - political alignment with radical Arab regimes, arming and rearming those regimes following defeats, and providing economic assistance to them.¹⁸ After 1967, Soviet military personnel also

¹⁸Lenczowski, George, Soviet Advances in the Middle East, p. 159, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C., 1972.

undertook defensive roles within Egypt. As of the death of Abd al Nasir (September 1970), the Soviet position in the Middle East was steadily improving. The USSR had acquired air and naval bases in Egypt and port rights in at least 5 other countries. To be sure, this new position had brought increased risk of conflict with Israel and the US.¹⁹ The Arab states, none the less, expected continued Soviet support in increasing amounts, on favorable terms while yielding only minimal concessions.²⁰ It was possible to ask, "Who was exploiting whom?"²¹ The USSR in all probability did not relish this situation, recognizing that "alternatives are: a political settlement or a military clash."²² The ability of the USSR to affect the policy of the Arab states was, however, not substantial. For example, although Syria and Iraq were heavily dependent upon Soviet support, both refused to go along with the USSR in supporting either UN Resolution 242 or the 1970 war of attrition ceasefire. The USSR hoped these would reduce the rapidly escalating conflict and counteract the growing impression in the Arab world that the US

¹⁹Friedman, Robert O., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, p. 33, Praeger Press, New York, 1975.

²⁰Klieman, A. S., Soviet Russian and the Middle East, p. 78, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970.

²¹Op. cit., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, p. 34.

²²Nikitina, G., The State of Israel, p. 361, Progress Publishers from Pravda 28 February 1971, Moscow, 1973.

might be changing its role to one more suitable to the Arab cause. Finally, growing disunity in the Arab camp and the absence of Abd al Nasir (on whom Soviet policy had rested for over a decade) presented growing problems to Soviet policy makers as 1971 approached.²³

The United State's role in the conflict began in substance during the immediate post World War II period with strong support for increased Jewish refugee immigration to Palestine.²⁴ President Truman, thus, began his rise as a most unpopular US leader, in the Arab view, when he stated:

"I believe that and urge that substantial immigration into Palestine cannot await a solution to the Palestine problem and that it should begin at once. Preparations for this movement have already been made by this government and it is ready to lend immediate assistance."²⁵

Next the US supported the UN Partition Plan and recognized

²³Op. cit., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, p. 34.

²⁴American influence in the Middle East had previously been limited to missionary efforts such as the American University of Beirut, World War I policy statements, and studies such as the King-Crane Commission. Recognizing British supremacy in the area, American had largely ignored the situation politically while recognizing economic (oil) interests.

²⁵H. S. Truman statement 4 October 1946, author's emphasis, quoted from: Williams, W. A., America and the Middle East, p. 42, Rinehart & Co., New York, 1958.

Israel within minutes after its declaration. Progressing into the cold war era, US policy settled down to simply opposing Soviet inroads, although in the 1956 war she sided with the USSR to restrict the efforts of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion forces. The cold war mentality of the US policy, as expressed by Dulles and the Eisenhower doctrine, unfortunately created hostility amongst many Arabs who saw Zionism/Israel as a far greater threat than communism. This hostility was also exploited by the Soviets who labeled the Eisenhower doctrine as a new American colonialism, a view many Arabs were willing to accept.²⁶ Thus, although the doctrine did provide a basis for active American participation in the area, it was not suited to meet the developing problems in the region.²⁷ The development of a power vacuum in the area following 1948, the 1956 war, the Lebanese intervention, and economic interests in oil, drew the US into greater involvement in the area. The US was forced to simultaneously attempt to underwrite Israel's existence, limit Soviet gains in the area and present an objective face toward the Arab countries with the latter effort definitely in last priority.

²⁶Bose, T. C., The Superpowers and the Middle East, p. 47, Popular Press, Bombay, India, 1972.

²⁷Ibid., p. 49.

The elements of the conflict in Palestine entering the decade of the seventies were, thus, a complex melange of issues whose opposing sides seemed to be stiffening in position and intensifying in hostility. Super-power involvement in this conflict was largely limited to supplying arms to their respective clients and playing a zero sum game of countering each other's influence in the area. Due concern was given to each other's interest, but little high level effort was directed at moving the Arabs and Israelis in the direction of a comprehensive settlement of the conflict. Elements of change, however, were beginning to surface (such as the Palestinians becoming so spectacular as to defy being ignored), but in the perceptions of leaders in the early 1970's another major war in the Middle East could only result in a complete replay of previous conflicts. The preconditions that developed for the 1973 war contained some unusual components which should be considered in detail as must the war itself.

III. THE OCTOBER WAR - PRECONDITIONS

The thirteen months from August 1969 thru September 1970 formed a watershed from which history slid rapidly toward the October war. During this period Palestinian guerrilla activities peaked and waned, the US put forth a plan for a comprehensive solution, Soviet pilots began flying combat missions over the Suez, Abd al Nasir died and with his passing the Soviet presence in Egypt became progressively less secure. Super-power interest in the Middle East, however, apparently became of lesser importance as the distractions of detente, Vietnam, and internal pressures grew.

To the Arabs, the pressures of these events added new conditions to the open sore of defeat in 1967 and should, therefore, be given some considerations. Egyptian-Soviet relations from al Nasir's death to the October war remain somewhat of an enigma of which at least two distinct analyses exist. The majority (or perhaps most frequently encountered) view is that following the death of al Nasir, Soviet influence began to drop sharply because al Nasir's intense personal humiliation following the 1967 war had made him willing to make major concessions to the Soviets in order to acquire the weapons necessary to recross the Suez. Soviet assistance to al Nasir, however, included restricting Soviet personnel and modern equipment to defensive roles. Exclusive

Soviet enclaves were established in Egypt and resentment against Soviet methods, attitudes, and restrictions began to mount. Al Nasir's successor, Muhammed Anwar al Sadat, began to feel that the Soviets were supporting Ali Sabry against him. He was, furthermore, concerned by the communist supported coup in the Sudan. In early 1971 al Sadat moved to strengthen his internal position by removing Ali Sabry and the chief of the secret police. When the Soviet Union disregarded these changes (at least publicly), and pressed for the Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty in late May, many Egyptians believed that the Soviets did earnestly support a canal crossing and had agreed to avoid negotiations with the US behind Egypt's back. By the spring of 1972, however, al Sadat had become disillusioned due to Soviet reluctance to provide certain weapons and continued Soviet dealings with the US. After first warning the Soviets, he expelled the majority of Soviet personnel in the summer of 1972.²⁸ He then moved to organize the Egyptian military for the October war beginning in late 1972 with the appointment of Ismail Ali as war minister.²⁹ The minority view of these events

²⁸ Ra'anan, Uri, "Soviet Decision Making in the Middle East", found in Soviet Naval Policy - Objectives and Constraints, ed. by Michael McGwire, Ken Booth, John McDonnell, p. 184, Praeger Press, New York, 1975. See also Op., cit., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970.

²⁹ A. S. Sadat, 7 October 1974, FBIS 11 October 1974.

holds that the apparent reversal in Soviet presence in Egypt was essentially a Soviet decision based on internal Soviet politics whose considerations were - avoidance of another defeat of Soviet arms, a desire to avoid an open conflict with the US, and dissatisfaction with trends in Egyptian politics. The Soviets, therefore, decided to withdraw Soviet combat personnel from Egypt and prepare to support the reopening of Arab-Israeli conflict, as they had in the past in an attempt to reemphasize the necessity of their support to the Arabs.³⁰

Regardless of the degree of accuracy in either view, neither represents, sufficiently, the importance of internal Arab problems and politics. These can be shown to have been a major determinant in the decision to launch the October attack. Most Arab thinking by 1970 agreed on the necessary elements in redressing the balance against Israel.³¹ Actual accomplishments in this regard would require more effective Syrian-Egyptian coordination than had as yet been possible. The near simultaneous accession to power in both Egypt and Syria of relatively moderate leaders (al Sadat and al Asad)

³⁰Op. cit., Soviet Naval Policy - Objectives and Constraints, p. 200-201, 205.

³¹Undoubtedly the more radical Palestinian elements believed that the guerrilla was the only hope after the 1967 war, but most believed that any substantial achievements would require the active participation of the Arab states, particularly Syria and Egypt.

who not only considered a pragmatic approach to the overall situation but also emphasized an Islamic approach toward day-to-day affairs, made the attack possible. There are several reasons for this, namely rising internal and Palestinian radicalism due to the 1967 war, internal economic pressures, internal competitive political pressure, external relationships with other Arab states and finally perceptions of non-Arab international events. While the exact priority of these factors cannot be properly assessed within the scope of this paper, it is likely that Syrian and Egyptian internal and inter-Arab pressures were of the type which could have led directly to the overthrow of either al Sadat or al Asad and were, therefore, of greater significance to them. In any event, the pragmatic responses to these various pressures led not only to Syrian-Egyptian cooperation militarily but also to a situation which made the economic power of the conservative oil rich states available providing financial and political support while retaining the modern military capabilities obtained from the USSR.

During the final twelve months prior to the October war the operation of the foregoing factors may be clearly seen in the following events. In Egypt, the replacement of General Sadiq and many other senior officers on 26 October led to intense protests from the army³² (which had been one of the

³²Arab World Weekly, 22 January 1972, and An Mahar Arab Report, 26 February 1973.

pillars on which Sadat had been basing his power). Economic restrictions were put in effect in late 1972 and an ambitious development plan proclaimed in 1973 on top of continued expense for the military. Sadat himself, recognized that the economic pressure of continued mobilization was untenable.³³ In Syria a similar situation persisted involving religious conflicts and splits within the military. Moderation of the state secularism and inclusion of Islam as the religion of the state was, however, apparently sufficient cause for the Saudis to provide money for military assistance.³⁴ Coordination of Egyptian-Syrian planning for the attack as the only viable response to these various pressures was underway by the spring of 1973 but serious obstacles remained in addition to purely military considerations. The strategic position of Jordan and its extremely poor relationship with the Palestinian resistance (since 1970) promised to be a problem which was not satisfactorily resolved until shortly before the war. Finally, if the strategy of winning at least a victory (if not a war)³⁵ was to succeed, coordinated action by all of the major Arab oil producing states would be required to reinforce the political implications of any victory. Finally, the

³³FBIS, 27 August 1974.

³⁴Arab Report and Record, 1-15 April 1972, 10 million pounds.

³⁵First set forth by Haykal, Publisher of Al Aram in Arab World Daily, 11 April 1969.

maximum possible diplomatic position of Muslim states not directly involved with the conflict, particularly Iran and Turkey, would be valuable to Egypt and Syria both during the war and in the negotiations following the war. Efforts to achieve these ends were conducted throughout 1973, the results of which and accuracy of the perceptions which generated them would become clear in the following months.

Israeli perceptions and policies during the immediate pre-war period were heavily colored by the leftover impact of the 1967 war. Secure in the perception of unquestioned Israeli military supremacy, the government and society concentrated on internal problems, of which there was no shortage. Tourism was booming, including, ironically and perhaps significantly for the future, approximately 150,000 Arabs in 1972-73.³⁶ Both Gaza and West Bank economies were heavily involved with Israel (and began to be after the war as well) with significant numbers of Palestinians working in Israel, taking their wages back to the Gaza and West Bank, there purchasing goods from Israel.³⁷ Internationally, the Israelis felt that super-power activity in the Middle East represented more of what had become a familiar litaney of words, which

³⁶Op. cit., Political Dictionary of the Middle East, p. 480.

³⁷Ibid.

could be ignored, and actions (primarily arms agreements), which could not be ignored. In this atmosphere, there was little Israeli incentive to seriously consider any option, other than the status quo that had so many economic and political benefits to the majority of Israel's citizenry. To be sure, there did exist a group in Israel that pointed to the large Arab populations in the West Bank and Gaza as insoluble problems due to sheer numbers (approaching 1/3 of the entire population of Israel), but this group was overwhelmed by the optimistic status quo majority.³⁸ That this view prevailed was not entirely due to the external Arab-Israeli relationship, but was also related to internal Israeli societal conditions.

Since the creation of modern Israel, the society had been undergoing a steady change (see Appendix A, Table 5). In 1948 more than half of the population had been born in Europe, over a third was native born and only the remaining (less than 10%) percentage came from Asian or African countries. By 1972, the European and American born were less than 30% of the population. Half (48%) of the population was native born (of whom many were of Sephardic descent due to a higher birthrate) but Asian and African born Jews now represented

³⁸ Monroe, E., Farrar-Hockley, A. H., "Arab-Israel War, October 1973, Background and Events", Adelphi Paper #111, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, p. 11, 1974.

nearly 25% of Israel's population.³⁹ This quantitative change in favor of the Sephardi or Oriental was not accompanied by commensurate qualitative changes in Sephardic living standards which remained relatively low compared to the European Jew. Communal stresses (in the form of riots) first surfaced in 1959 and by 1971 were visible in the protest of the Black Panthers, a group of violent Sephardic youth. To be sure, the violence and political visibility of this discontent is minimal compared to many Western societies where ethnic differences and economic differences coincide.⁴⁰ Nevertheless, when it became evident in the 1967 war that the Sephardic Jew not only placed his loyalty to Israel above ethnic considerations but was able to credibly perform the various defence tasks, many Israelis (perhaps in a collective sign of relief) came to the conclusion that the Orientals now felt they were a full part of the society and were accepted by the Europeans. Various studies indicate that these views may not have been as a result of any substantive change.⁴¹ A typical Israeli, of European extraction, holding this view

³⁹Peretz, Don, "Israeli Diversity", The Middle East Quest for an American Policy, ed. by W. A. Beling, State University of New York Press, Albany, p. 74-75, 1973. Also op. cit., Political Dictionary of the Middle East, p. 462.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 77.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 77.

would logically tend to support the status quo political view since it not only minimized the significance of the internal dissension, but also focused on the one element of substantial agreement, namely hard line defense.

The sum of Arab and Israeli perceptions can, thus, be seen as having led to the 1973 war. On the one hand, the situation was intolerable to the major Arab states and on the other, the status quo position in Israel precluded any progress diplomatically. The overwhelming need for movement versus a lack of positive motivation for movement coupled with super-power inaction⁴² or more appropriately priority concerns elsewhere made another round of the conflict certain. The conflict when it came, was to radically alter the overall equation of growing hardness on both sides.

⁴²Sadat stated in a March 1974 Time interview that the May 1972 detente between the US and the USSR had "put our problems in the freezer."

IV. THE WAR

(See Appendix E for chronology of events)

"The strategic aim ... is ... as follows: ... to inflict the heaviest losses on the enemy to convince him that his continued occupation of our territory imposes on him a price which he cannot pay, and consequently, defying the Israeli theory of security based on psychological, political, and military armament, showing him that this is not a steel shield that can protect him now or in the future. If we succeed ..., this will lead to certain results in the short and in the long run."⁴³

The above guidance to the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief indicates that the Ramadan War was not undertaken simply as a military adventure but as an integral part of a plan to move the Middle East, from its stalemate, in a direction favorable to Arab goals.

What specifically did occur during October 1973 that bears on Sadat's strategic aims? As may be seen above, Operation Badr aimed at conveying psychological and political messages to the Israelis and the world. At least three actual messages were conveyed. First, initial Arab military successes demonstrated a substantial capability to not only operate modern weaponry but also to plan, coordinate and conduct large scale operations. When combined with the

⁴³FBIS, 7 October 1974, Address by Ahmad Isma'il Ali, 6 October 1974.

numerical superiority of the Arabs over Israel, this demonstration can only have an ominous impact upon the future of the conflict. Secondly, political messages were conveyed, primarily by the oil embargo, which brought home to the modern world the stark reality of the crucial importance of the Middle East. Finally, the interaction of the two super-powers during the conflict generated awareness in each that the pre-war status quo held dangers that were greater than either (or at least the US) was willing to risk. The relative significance of these messages varies widely with the beholder and coming to grips with them at all is heavily dependent upon the perspective of the viewer. If the impact of the war on super-power policy is to be properly assessed, each of these concepts must be seen as viewed by the two super-powers.

The USSR, regardless of its position in the immediate pre-war time frame obviously had prior knowledge of the conflict.⁴⁴ Whether the USSR was advised by the Arabs, actively participated in the planning, or simply detected and recognized the upcoming event in intelligence, is unknown.⁴⁵ Removal

⁴⁴See Section III and Appendix F.

⁴⁵Western and Israeli intelligence agencies did not believe hostilities were eminent until immediately prior (within 10 hours in the Israeli case - Agranat Commission Report Summary, Aviation Week and Space Technology, "Both Sides of Suez", p. 26, November 1975) and in some cases after the initial attack (New York Times, October 31, p. 1, col. 5, 1973). Soviet intelligence, however, did have the advantage of being in position to directly observe what was happening in the Arab countries. Certain Soviet reactions such as in-flight divert of Soviet aircraft to pick up personnel are more typical of a timely reaction to key intelligence than of a pre-planned operation.

of Soviet citizens from the area began prior to the attack, resupply of Egypt and Syria began within 48 hours of the attack and initial UN attempts at a ceasefire were thwarted. By October 19th, Soviet resupply efforts were on a massive scale and within a week after the initial hostilities the Soviet navy had moved to counter the 6th Fleet. Finally, as the Arabs begin to fare poorly, the USSR shifted to support of a ceasefire and then to demanding one backed by a threat of unilateral intervention. Once again, whether these actions were according to Ra'anan's Brezhnev Plan⁴⁶ (see Appendix F), or resulted from an opportunistic decision within the Soviet Defense Council as the crisis developed, is not of significance here. What is crucial is that for the first time in modern Middle East history, the USSR was moving within a war in an attempt to secure a favorable outcome rather than reacting to an outcome. As a minimum, this is seen as a bottom line of Soviet policy - refusal to see the destruction of a client state or even a catastrophic defeat of a client's armed forces. The element of Soviet power as exercised to accomplish these aims during the war, range from logistic to military (naval suasion⁴⁷ and threatened air-land

⁴⁶Op. cit., Soviet Naval Policy, p. 205.

⁴⁷Term, naval suasion, taken from Lutwak, The Political Uses of Sea Power, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974. Soviet naval actions encompassed nearly all of the potential variations of naval suasion discussed therein. See charts on p. 6 and p. 74.

intervention), to diplomatic maneuvering with the nations in conflict, bilaterally with the US, and internationally in the UN.

The Soviet motivation to conduct these operations is by no means insignificant. Because of the concern their moves generated, culminating in a nuclear confrontation with the US, the possible gain from those moves must have appeared to have been very great. The results of this effort, however, if viewed in the context of the Middle East alone, netted very few substantive gains for the USSR. In fact, it may be said that the USSR lost ground vis-a-vis the overall Arab community, particularly with Egypt. Why then did the Soviets make the effort?⁴⁸ Several possible explanations exist.

(1) Miscalculation - the USSR simply did not recognize the changes taking place within the Middle East and was moving to minimize any possible criticism which could be leveled against it by the Arabs; (2) Planned support of an agreed move - the USSR agreed to support the entire war effort, recognizing that it could incur losses, but felt that the potential to be gained from a reopened Suez in Arab hands

⁴⁸It should be noted that at the time, as the war itself progressed, substantial gains seemed to be accruing to the USSR. (1) The Arab unity displayed by the oil embargo sharply attacked the US Middle East position; (2) Soviet arms were performing well; (3) The Soviet position as champion of the Arab cause was resumed, reversing the verbal attacks that had been ongoing with Egypt since the 1972 expulsion/departure of Soviet troops.

and secure Soviet positions in Syria and Iraq outweighed the risks; and (3) A larger context - the USSR viewed the Middle East October War not as an isolated crisis area, but as an opportunity to enhance or demonstrate its overall strategic position vis-a-vis the United States; (4) Some combination of the foregoing. Judging by the changing Soviet actions during the war and the rapid shift in the overall balance following the war,⁴⁹ it seems highly unlikely that the USSR was playing an agreed role of a preconceived plan. A combination of muddling through (albeit with skill, daring, and determination) along the line of explanations (1) and (3) seems to be the most logical answer to the question of Soviet moves during the war itself.

When viewed from the United States, the events of the October War displayed tremendous problems of several types and simultaneously created both the motivation and opportunity for new or, at least, dramatically altered US role in the area. US policy initiatives in the Middle East since the failure of the Rodgers Plan had been an on again, off again (mostly off) and somewhat uncoordinated effort.⁵⁰ Secretary of State Kissinger had by the fall of 1973, opened talks

⁴⁹Sadat interview in Al Anwar, 29 March 1974, taken from H. Tanner article, New York Times, 30 March 1974.

⁵⁰Op. cit., Journal of International Affairs, p. 34 and 35.

with Arabs at the UN aimed at beginning wider negotiations following the Israeli elections.⁵¹ Kissinger recognized before the war that another conflict, if prolonged, could create a "high possibility of great power involvement."⁵² It is not surprising then that he quickly realized that the war, once started, was of crucial importance and that US decisions taken during the war must be taken with a view towards a managed settlement⁵³ that would aid in continuing those negotiations. In the process of this effort, five key decisions were made which structured the conclusion of the war and enabled the events of the upcoming months. The decisions were: (1) resupply of Israel (2) emergency requests to Congress for \$2.2 billion aid for Israel (3) cooperate with USSR in imposing a ceasefire as the war moved against the Arabs, (4) pressuring Israel to allow resupply of the Egyptian 3rd Corps (5) world-wide alert. The purpose of these decisions, as outlined by N. Safran⁵⁴ was to establish a negotiating situation by conveying several messages. The

⁵¹Ibid.

⁵²Washington Post, 26 September 1973.

⁵³Perlmutter, A., "Crisis Management", International Studies Quarterly, p. 316-342.

⁵⁴Safran, Nadav, "Engagement in the Middle East", Foreign Affairs Quarterly, vol. 54, p. 58-59, October 1974.

first through the fourth were intended to (A) convey to the Israelis (in view of the Arabs), that the US was willing to ensure Israeli security but did not believe in an imposition of Israeli will on the Arabs and (B) to demonstrate to the Arabs (in view of the Israelis), that they could not achieve their goals by force, although the US was not interested in seeing them humiliated or again defeated. The fifth decision was meant to neutralize any Soviet interference with the communication of the foregoing messages.

Safran's analysis doesn't credit the full impact of Soviet moves because the fifth decision would very likely not have been made were it not for the United States' perception that Soviet threat to intervene unilaterally in the conflict was credible. It is more likely that the US alert was an attempt to save some US potential out of what seemed to be a very pro-Soviet turn of events. That the US actions in Israel following the alert conveyed the other messages is highly probable. The final event, the alert, could have, however, conveyed some extremely undesirable messages since it could have appeared as the only possible way for the US to save face while giving way to a Soviet ultimatum. This has been suggested by the former US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Zumwalt.⁵⁵ This possibility, while it should not be overlooked

⁵⁵Adm. Zumwalt's view of the US alert, put forth in numerous interviews following his retirement, has been accused of being politically motivated by Secretary Kissinger.

in overall US-Soviet relations, has not had any apparent impact on the Middle East, perhaps because of the success of the first two messages. Another possibility which should not be overlooked is that the personal diplomatic contact during the war between Kissinger, al Sadat and Mrs. Meir concentrated or focused the exchange on the direct issue between the Israelis and Arabs, effectively screening out the US-Soviet confrontation that was developing. That this personal contact on both sides was significant during the war is reflected by Sadat's October statement that "the US is playing a constructive role"⁵⁶ while Israeli Prime Minister Meir issued a similar statement.^{57 58}

The net effect, however, of the involvement and interaction of the super-powers on a global scale combined with the military and political actions of the Arab states and Israel had created a new equation or process of events which could not have occurred had the war not progressed as it did. This new equation hinged primarily upon war induced changes in the overall perception of the situation by Western, Arab,

⁵⁶ FBIS, 18 October, 1973.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ The impact key personalities had in creating the post-war euphoria (of the possibility of rapid progress to a settlement) will be analysed in Section V.

and Israeli leaders. Naturally, it is extremely unlikely that all of the various leadership had the same views on each of the following conditions. This is particularly true concerning the relative significance of each, but, nevertheless, it is likely that the following perceptions had or were emerging by the end of the immediate post-war period.⁵⁹

(1) The oil embargo had demonstrated a degree of Arab unity heretofore believed impossible, its impact had illuminated the vulnerability of all industrial states and the enormous economic leverage of the Arab states. Side effects of this vulnerability made direct inroads on Japan and on the European states' (and therefore NATO's) attitude toward the continuance of conflict in the Middle East since in the scramble to insure adequate energy supplies, it became obvious that future conflicts could result in even more devastating economic impact. Motivation to prevent the conflict, thus, rose dramatically.

(2) The initial performance of Arab armies, under moderate political leadership, had restored the personal honor of Arabs throughout the world. The cry "now we can talk" was enabled by the initial successes and clearly capable performance of the regular armed forces, both Egypt and Syria. The same performance had demonstrated to the world (and particularly Israel) that continued Israeli successes or superiority were

⁵⁹ Defined as prior to the Israeli-Egyptian Disengagement Agreement of 18 January 1974.

not necessarily foregone conclusions and traditional principles of war such as surprise, operated against as well as for the Israelis. The Suez Canal was a logical, militarily defensible border and it had been crossed. What then was the value of holding out for geographical "secure" borders since it had been demonstrated that intentions and attitudes of the surrounding Arab states did count after all? Continuing this logic, since those states had been emphasizing the key importance of the Palestinians for several years, was it not logical to conclude that perhaps they were serious about this element of the conflict as well? (3) Israeli dependence upon the US had been highlighted both by the Arab efforts and the US resupply efforts. US recognition and demonstration of its concern both for its interest in supporting Israel and its interest in the Arab side, achieved a movement of the balance which was one of the initial goals of al Sadat.

(4) US-Soviet confrontation over the developing conflict had demonstrated that the Soviets were willing to go to greater lengths than had been widely assumed and that continued conflict in the Middle East held not just potential stress for the detente process, but danger of actual direct US-Soviet conflict. Since the latter possibility would represent a new element in the now standardized client state support form of super-power competition, both super-powers had new interest in cooperation (at least superficially) in the area.

The foregoing perceptions, taken together, created a situation in which most of the participants in the Middle East arena desired substantive progress toward a settlement and the remainder felt they were not in position to protest, at least until the direction of that movement became apparent. In such a situation, particularly when following closely on the heels of an extremely tense confrontation, emotions tend to produce an even more favorable impression of events than is justified. This quirk of human nature may account for the near euphoric period that Western and Arab press developed following the conclusion of the war.

V. EUPHORIA

Institutionalized Change or Individual Glory

On the 12th of November 1973, the day after the ceasefire implementation agreement was signed at Kilometer 101 on the Sinai front, Prime Minister Heath of Great Britain told Prime Minister Meir of Israel that "we believe there now exists a real opportunity, the first perhaps for many years, to convert truce and ceasefire into permanent settlement and lasting peace."⁶⁰ A few days later the editor of Al Ahram quoted Kissinger as saying "the Soviet Union can give Egypt arms but the US is able to give it a just peace which would allow the recovery of occupied territory."⁶¹

In the months following these optimistic statements, the hopes of the world grew (and so did the lines at Western gas stations) as the ceasefire was followed by the first stage disengagement on the Sinai (18 January 1974), official reopening of US-Egyptian diplomatic relations (28 February 1974), the

⁶⁰ Statement closing UK-Israeli discussions on the Middle East quoted from: Middle East Economic Digest, p. 1504, 28 December 1973.

⁶¹ Kissinger's statement allegedly made during his 5-16 November 1973 tour of the Middle East countries was quoted from: Middle East Economic Digest, p. 1505, 28 December 1973.

easing of the embargo (19 March 1974),⁶² and the Syrian ceasefire (31 May 1974). These events, a steady progression of impossible accomplishments coming roughly a month apart, formed a seemingly irresistible peace locomotive fueled by the motivation of the October War and unerringly engineered by Henry Kissinger's shuttle. This impression of everything is all right now, the new US role will solve everything was not limited to somewhat fickle journalists and graduate students, tough businessmen, as reflected by the Wall Street Journal, also loaned their influential views to the belief.⁶³

That the US was simultaneously involved in a deep internal crisis seemed to have no effect on the apparent progress that was being made. To be sure, the shifts that the various accords reflected were significant steps but were they, as many believed at the time, the result of dynamic US-Middle East policies or something else?

Cairo radio, in commenting on the reopening of US diplomatic relations indicated that Egypt was proceeding in a "straight line, in accordance with ..., the spirit of 6 October ..., which caused a historic transformation in the

⁶²Seven Arab states announced the end of the oil restrictions on that date.

⁶³For example, see Wall Street Journal editorial, p. 20, 8 May 1974.

situation in the Middle East."⁶⁴ Little mention was made of US foreign policy except that President al Sadat said that it is "tantamount to showing good will, and this paved the way for the restoration of relations."⁶⁵ In other words, the US was simply reacting to the changed situation created by the war rather than acting on any new policies. Cairo continued to link a final peace accord (as it does today) with the rights of the Palestinians and the return of occupied Arab lands. All of the agreements at that time (and at this writing as well) addressed only disengagements that resulted in the return of relatively minor amounts of territory to Arab states.⁶⁶ The euphoric mood, then, in Western and Arab capitals seemed to be based on separate impressions of the same events.

This disparity was also evident in the view toward the "other" super-power. In most Western capitals, the USSA had been sinking fast in the wake of US increasing influence in the Middle East, this was not entirely the case in the Arab world. In late February of 1974, Soviet Foreign Minister

⁶⁴ Abd al Fattah Hilal commentary, Cairo Domestic Service in Arabic, 0800 GMT 28 February 1974, in FBIS, 1 March 1974, p. 65.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ The Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement had left Egypt in control of the Suez, undoubtedly a significant financial and symbolic area, but still minute compared to the total still held by Israel.

Gromyko visited Arab capitals shortly after one of Kissinger's visits. Jordan's news service Cir'Ra'y commented that the "Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to Damascus immediately following the visit of the US Secretary of State gives a new impression of Soviet support for the mission assigned to the US Secretary of State."⁶⁷ This commentary shows that while the US may have been playing a more glamorous role, there existed an impression of at least, tacit Soviet support for that role. In reality, the USSR was working hard to regain lost ground, playing down the significance of the Kissinger moves, urging Arab states to maintain the embargo. The results of these efforts was a natural Soviet drift toward the more radical Middle East states who were sympathetic toward actions of this sort.⁶⁸ This movement toward the radical camp tended to drive the moderate elements in the Middle East even closer to the US since the moderate leaders were now able to demonstrate substantive gains by breaking from the pattern of outbidding (or simple opposition to Israel) and taking on the role of successful statesmen. After all, it was moderate leadership, both in the war and the diplomacy that followed, that resulted in the first return of any Arab lands. This fact enormously strengthened the

⁶⁷ Amman Domestic Service, in Arabic, 0510 GMT, 28 February 1974, in FBIS, 1 March 1974, p. 1.

⁶⁸ Wall Street Journal, p. 1, 24 May 1974.

internal position of al Sadat and al Assad in their own countries and throughout the Arab world. It also, perhaps unfortunately, reinforced the expectations of the world that substantive progress towards a final solution was imminent.

One element of the euphoria seemed to be agreed on by all sides of the issue, the role of Secretary Kissinger as the crisis manager extraordinaire, whose touch never failed. "He even brought the rain to Spain" (literally a drought ended as he landed), commented one analyst.⁶⁹ Obviously Kissinger was not a product of the October War, obviously he was accomplishing a great deal. Where did the impact of the war stop and Kissinger's magical presence start? Was Kissinger's personal presence the catalyst that enabled movement or was (is) he a skilled artisan leading a remodeled US foreign policy apparatus newly responsive to a changing world? Kissinger himself seems to believe the latter. He has stated that "when I came in, I deliberately set myself the task of trying to turn the Department of State into an instrument that can serve succeeding presidents and succeeding secretaries of state."⁷⁰ Since the organization of the State

⁶⁹Keatley, Robert, Wall Street Journal, p. 6, 11 January 1974.

⁷⁰Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger by James Reston, originally published by the New York Times, 13 October 1974. Quoted from Department of State Office of Media Services Release, US Government Printing Office 584-229/4, p. 7, 1974.

Department had been aimed at the use of cables, that is, day to day tactical decisions, Kissinger first concentrated on reorientation of the organization toward conceptual national policy emphasizing the Policy Planning Staff.⁷¹ He does admit that "individual tours de force by Secretaries of State can be counter-productive if they don't leave a tradition behind."⁷² The parties involved in the various agreements had a different view of the Secretary's role, al Sadat said "by all standards, Dr. Kissinger has once again performed a miracle."⁷³ The PLO Executive Committee said that "Kissinger utilized all his skill ..., depending on several realities which provided him with the opportunity for success."⁷⁴ It would seem that the institutionalization deemed important by the Secretary of State was not too evident at the time (mid 1974), rather the individualization of negotiation was occurring. In fairness, it should be pointed out that some institutionalization of US-Middle East relationships was occurring at this time in the formation of the Joint

⁷¹Ibid., p. 8.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Sadat commenting on the Syrian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, Cairo Domestic Service, in Arabic, 1730 GMT, 30 May 1974. In FBIS p. 21, 31 May 1974.

⁷⁴PLO Executive Committee Political Report, Baghdad, 2 June 1974. In FBIS, 3 June 1974.

Cooperation Commissions.⁷⁵ Since the commissions' work will not become particularly evident until 1976,⁷⁶ little substance was visible at the time and the focus of the world's attention fell on Kissinger personally.

The dangers present in an unrealistic mood occurring over a period of time are manifold, however, in the case of the 1973 Middle East War several distinct possibilities arose which posed substantial problems for super-power policy makers. Rising expectations of the Arab side based on glorification of the October War, that now the tide had turned, could lead to a hardening of position believing that time was on their side. Israeli concern that such a view by the Arab side was forming could lead to hardening of their position and military preparedness to ward off any Arab moves, if followed to its fullest, this logic could lead to pressure for an Israeli preemptive strike to destroy Arab armies. Continued negotiations and agreements that focus only on military movement,

⁷⁵From June to November 1974 Joint Commissions were formed with five Middle East nations; Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel and Iran. They are jointly chaired at the cabinet level meeting regularly to discuss ways in which the countries may work together to broaden the base of mutual understanding and expand national contacts concerning trade, investment, science, technology, education and cultural exchange. Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Economic Foreign Policy, series 9, released May 1975, p. 2.

⁷⁶Ibid, p. 3.

studiously avoiding any discussion of the question of the Palestinians would undoubtedly lead to protest by the Palestinians that they were being sold out by the major Arab states' internal political interests in regaining lost territory. This view would very likely be supported by the vocal radical states and since Egypt and Syria continue to claim the interest of the Palestinians as the key factor in their policy, some response would have to be made.

While a case may be made for the post-war euphoria as an accurate reflection of reality at the time, in light of the breakdown that occurred after mid-1974 culminating with the end of the shuttle in early 1975, it seems more likely that major miscalculations were made concerning the overall situation at the time. These miscalculations or misperceptions contributed to the breakdown of the locomotive and must be considered as an integral part of the impact of the war on super-power foreign policy.

VI. THE BREAKDOWN

"Dr. Kissinger's mission ..., has been interrupted."⁷⁷
"The efforts, ... to reach a second disengagement agreement ..., have ended."⁷⁸ "The step-by-step approach pursued by the United States ... has suffered a setback. Now, ... the Middle East issues have to be dealt with comprehensively, under more difficult circumstances."⁷⁹ These words from Israel, Egypt, and the United States shocked the world and created the unpleasant conjecture that it was still possible that the Middle East could slip back into the old routine. Both sides of the issue simultaneously accused the other of obstinacy that had meant the end of the line for the negotiations. "Kissinger's efforts have ended because of the Israeli Government which insisted on certain demands which Egypt has categorically rejected from the beginning."⁸⁰ And

⁷⁷ Jerusalem Domestic Service, in Hebrew, 2200 GMT, 22 March 1975. In FBIS, p. n7, 24 March 1975.

⁷⁸ Statement by Isma'il Fahmi, Cairo MENA, in English, 0709 GMT, 23 March 1975. In FBIS, p. d8, 24 March 1975.

⁷⁹ Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger beginning 26 March 1975 press conference, Washington, D. C., quoted from Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Press Release, 172/51, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Op. cit., statement by Fahmi.

"This rejection by Egypt" (of Israeli proposals) "precipitated the break in the talks."⁸¹

Although prospects of doom quickly formed in many quarters, it is apparent that just as the previous euphoria had not accurately reflected the actual situation a year earlier, the shock of the breakdown was not the cataclysmic event it appeared to be. Prior to considering the effect of the breakdown, and the accompanying US reassessment of Middle East policy, an insight into the overall situation in the Middle East between mid-1974 and spring 1975 should be developed. Although the PLO had been active during the October War, its role had been overshadowed by that of the regular armies since they operated under Egypt's control.⁸² By June of 1974, Arafat had recognized that the future potential progress for the Palestinians lay in close cooperation with Syria and Egypt. At that time the Palestinian National Council, in its ten point program, decided that it would seek to establish a national authority over any portion of Palestinian land that could be liberated. When specifically asked by Senator McGovern (D - S. D.) if this meant the West Bank

⁸¹IDF Radio, in Hebrew, 2300 GMT, 23 March 1975, statement by Dan Patir (advisor to the Prime Minister). In FBIS, p. n8, 24 March 1975.

⁸²Yasir Arafat, 5 June 1974, address to Palestinian National Council on Cairo MENA, 1840 GMT, 5 June 1974. In FBIS 6 June 1974.

and Gaza, and two mutually recognized states (Israel and Palestine), Arafat replied, "yes" and added that on the basis of the Council's June 1974 decision "this meant that the PLO would accept Israel's boundaries of 1967."⁸³ ⁸⁴ Arafat's reply to McGovern came several months after the PLO "Foreign Minister" Qaddumi stated similar views following Arafat's UN speech.⁸⁵ The two statements, thus, indicate a relatively stable, if not completely official, position for the PLO.

The position of the PLO with respect to cooperation with Egypt and Syria essentially set the stage for the Rabat Conference of late 1974 where the PLO was recognized by the Arab

⁸³"Realities of the Middle East", report to Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate, 94th Congress, US Government Printing Office, 52-743, Washington, D. C. p. 10, 1975.

⁸⁴The report (above) was recommended to the author by a Palestinian as a clear expression of PLO views. The quoted replies to Senator McGovern's questions have been condensed into one sentence from several pages of discussion of the entire conflict. Analysis of the entire report should be carefully conducted to insure correct contextual understanding. It is the author's understanding that: (a) Arafat's informal reply to Senator McGovern represents the feeling of moderate realistic elements within the PLO and should not be taken to mean the entire spectrum of PLO opinion; furthermore, (b) recognizing that due to internal political pressure within the PLO and other radical Arab states, these moderate elements will not in all cases be able to state their views in as clear and positive a manner as the McGovern report. Western students should, therefore, carefully scrutinize the contextual environment of PLO statements realizing that just as their own future hopes and dreams may differ from probable resolutions, there is a considerable difference between what an individual dreams and what they are willing to peacefully accept.

⁸⁵Farouk Qaddumi, Head of PLO Political Department, in exclusive interview to J. R. Adams, published in the Wall Street Journal, p. 18, 22 November 1974.

states as the "sole representative of the Palestinian people."⁸⁶ Due largely to the impact on Israeli politics, this unanimous declaration by the Arab summit followed by Arafat's appearance at the UN was viewed by many US analysts as a tremendous complication of the negotiation process that had previously been progressing successfully.⁸⁷ The rationale being that the recognition of the PLO represented a hardening of the Arab negotiating stance due to an Arab perception of dealing from a position of strength, this in turn conflicted with Israel's situation where Prime Minister Rabin's government held only a narrow margin in the Knesset and could potentially fall over the issue of dealing with the Palestinians.

The immediate impact of this situation on super-power policies seemed to be a setback for the US efforts and represented a shift toward the more radical elements of the Arab world as supported by the Soviet Union. Capitals all over the world predicted a high possibility of another round of conflict if the parties were unable to continue diplomatic progress before spring 1975. Public opinion in Israel, stung by the triple impact of the PLO's new status, renewed guerilla attacks, and perceived erosion of US support, ran strongly

⁸⁶ Cairo, Akbar Al Yawm, in Arabic, 2 November 1974. In FBIS, 8 November 1974.

⁸⁷ For example editorial by R. J. Levine, Wall Street Journal, 11 November 1974, and R. Keatly, Wall Street Journal, 30 October 1974.

in favor of hard line defenses and vigorous retaliation for attacks.⁸⁸ The resolution of this gloomy outlook seemed to become a goal of continued US diplomatic efforts. Secretary Kissinger continued to schedule trips for early spring 1975 saying "we are still hopeful that progress can be made and believe it will be made."⁸⁹ Various military analysts believed that due to the concern generated by the October War and US supply efforts, the Israeli armed forces were in substantially better condition than they were during 1973 and that although Syrian forces had been re-equipped, Egyptian forces were not ready for a fifth round of conflict. The latter case (Egypt's readiness) might, in fact, encourage a pre-emptive Israeli attack on Syria if the negotiations stalled.⁹⁰ This view was also put forth by the PLO in late December 1974 with Arafat going so far as to predict that if another conflict occurred

⁸⁸ Jerusalem Domestic Service, quoted in FBIS on 20 November 1974. Summarized major Israeli press commentary linking Rabat, Arafat's UN speech, attacks at Bet She'an and Ma'alot, Under Secretary of State Sisco's statement to the effect that the US considered the PLO as the roof organization of the Palestinians. One notable exception to the general tone was expressed by Dr. Nahum Goldman, President of the World Jewish Congress, who said "Israel should ... set conditions for negotiating with Arafat", "I told (Mrs. Meir) that the Palestinians exist." The Times, London, p. 11, 19 November 1974.

⁸⁹ Secretary of State Kissinger quoted by Keatly and Levine, published in the Wall Street Journal, p. 1, 27, December 1974.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 14.

in the Middle East, a super-power engagement in the Mediterranean would also take place, possibly expanding to a world war.⁹¹ Soviet-Egyptian talks preparatory to a proposed Brezhnev trip to the Middle East (later cancelled) stressed that progress could only be achieved at the Geneva Conference which should be commenced as rapidly as possible.⁹²

Apparently, however, the danger of another war and its consequences was too great for all of the powers involved to actually attempt a military solution. How close another exchange came to taking place is unknown but by late February 1975, Syrian President Assad in an interview to Newsweek Magazine was making statements of a much less warlike tone than the generally accepted view only two months earlier.⁹³ Whether actually hopeful or not, the Middle East powers elected to return to the shuttle rather than try the military route. They returned to negotiations in March 1975 with hardened resolve, perhaps due to the tension immediately prior to the renewed efforts. At this time, the triumph of

⁹¹Voice of Palestine Radio, 28 December 1974. In FBIS, 30 December 1974.

⁹²Cairo MENA, in Arabic, 30 December 1974. In FBIS, 31 December 1974.

⁹³President Assad's comments to Newsweek have been hotly debated with denials and charges as to specific content, what is of significance here is the difference in tone which Secretary Kissinger recognized as a "hopeful sign". From a press conference, Washington, D. C., 25 February 1975.

negotiations over war (if in fact it was), was attributed to an after effect of the 1973 War by Undersecretary of State Sisco. Speaking on a nationally aired TV show, Sisco stated that "we are where we are principally because that October War, I think, did change the objective conditions in the area." And "I really believe that each side is pretty sick and tired of war. I think the principle moderate leaders in the Arab world would like to find a way diplomatically. I think Israel would like to find an agreement on the basis of diplomacy."⁹⁴

Within a week of Sisco's remarks the shuttle was back in operation, however, from the outset it was recognized by many people involved with the negotiations that this time the shuttle was facing greater obstacles because of the hardening position of both sides. President Sadat needed continuing progress, particularly a withdrawal of as much occupied territory as possible, the Israelis were tying any significant withdrawals to a political quid-pro-quo of some form of non-belligerency by the Egyptians, precisely what the Egyptians could least afford to concede since it would appear to be the separate agreement that Syria and the PLO feared, yet for Israel to settle for less would severely test the

⁹⁴ Bill Moyer's Journal, International Report, produced by WNET/13, New York, 6 March 1975. Quoted from Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media News Services News Release, Washington, D. C., p. 6-7.

government of Prime Minister Rabin. That the established pattern of previous shuttles was unable to bring together positions so substantially contradictory, is not particularly surprising. With the assistance of hindsight, it may be said that optimism expressed at the time was a combination of relief over the willingness of the Middle East states to refrain from force and hope that the shuttle would work another miracle. Since the previous miracles were not really miracles but understandable derivatives of the situation, the breakdown did not represent a substantial change in the post-war equation. Rather it was a pause in which the Arabs and Israelis could consider not only the possible alternatives to continued contacts but also ways in which the necessary concessions (on both sides) could be made acceptable within their respective internal political frameworks. The US assessment of its Middle East policy, announced shortly after the interruption of the shuttle placed pressure on both sides of the conflict to re-examine their positions. This was spelled out on national TV by Secretary Kissinger when he declared that "All parties on both sides have an obligation to examine what they can do to produce peace."⁹⁵ That both sides apparently were doing so became obvious as the US

⁹⁵ Interview of Secretary of State Kissinger, Tuesday, 6 May 1975, by Barbara Walters on NBC TV Today Show. Quoted from Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Service Release, p. 5.

reassessment continued while the world focus momentarily shifted to the Helsinki Conference, by July 1975 the Secretary of State was able to state "Egypt and Israel, in my view are now both making serious efforts, ..., if the two sides can survive each other's public statement, ... I believe they are now beginning to talk ... in a negotiable manner."⁹⁶

In fact, the breakdown had allowed several crucial steps including strengthening of the internal position of Sadat and Rabin by allowing both to appear firmly committed to the philosophical goals of their respective camps. It had tested and confirmed the new equation in the area resulting from the 1973 War and thereby paved the way for a successful second stage Sinai disengagement agreement acceptable to both sides.

⁹⁶ Secretary of State Kissinger, press conference, Washington, D. C., 25 July 1975. Quoted from Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Release, PR387/64, p. 5.

VII. THE SECOND SINAI DISENGAGEMENT

(See Appendix G for text of the agreement and map)

"The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means."⁹⁷ The first sentence of the first article of the September 1975 Agreement between Egypt and Israel may well mark a watershed in the long term effort toward peace. It is a veritable jewel in the crown of diplomatic art. While committing both parties to peaceful effort, it does not constitute a separate agreement relating to only Israel and Egypt but addresses the entire Middle East conflict. It, therefore, satisfies the Israeli need for some form of nonbelligerence but does not constitute an Egyptian renunciation of any of its commitments to the other Arab states.⁹⁸ The Agreement further commits the two countries to reach a final and just peace settlement based upon Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973, jointly sponsored by the Soviet Union and the United States. The Agreement, thus, committed the prestige of both super-powers to its support, thereby calling

⁹⁷The Agreement between the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel, September 1, 1975, Article 1. Quoted from the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Revised News Release, p. 1. (Signed in Geneva, Switzerland 4 September 1975)

⁹⁸Author's opinion.

for the agreement of the most diverse and powerful group of states in modern Middle Eastern history. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union boycotted the formal signing of the Agreement allegedly because the Agreement brings in American technicians to monitor the early warning systems.⁹⁹

The Soviet response to the Agreement triggered an angry response from al Sadat who claimed that Soviet action was "a flagrant provocation and attempt to divide the Arab front."¹⁰⁰ Assuming that the Soviet action was an attempt to cut Soviet prestige losses, moving closer to the radical Arab camp by torpedoing the Agreement, what then was the motivation and considerations of the other powers involved in the pact? This question is particularly valid when it is considered that the negotiations had come to a standstill only six months earlier. All three nations receive benefits from the Agreement and as well, assume risks which should be considered individually prior to putting the whole together.¹⁰¹ Israel's Prime Minister Rabin appeared to have gained considerable political stature internally by his firm stance in the earlier

⁹⁹ Wall Street Journal, 5 September 1975.

¹⁰⁰ ibid.

¹⁰¹ Analysis of gains versus risks essentially taken from an analysis by William Beecher, Boston Sunday Globe, 2 September 1975, p. A4.

negotiations. This gave him considerably greater flexibility in dealing with the overall problem than he had previously possessed. What he gained and the Knesset approved,¹⁰² was time to pursue longer term agreements, firm its relationship with the US including aid commitments of advanced arms and its petroleum needs guaranteed. This may have caused a break in the regular schedule of recurring wars in which Israel can rebuild its sagging economy. Israel gained the use of the Suez Canal for non-military cargoes. Considering the number of Egyptian civilians who will move into the revitalized canal area, Israel has probably succeeded in reducing the threat from the Egyptian front to very low level. Finally, from a security point of view, the combination of buffer zones, regular US air reconnaissance, and US monitored sensor fields means that the Israelis have lost little militarily and may even have gained a certain amount. Israeli risk is minimal militarily, another tank road exists north of the passes which could be utilized by attacking forces, but the terrain is such that command of the air is a key factor to its use. Israel's aid commitments should insure its capability in that respect.

¹⁰²Knesset approved the Agreement by a vote of 70 - 43, with seven abstentions. Three members of the ruling Labor Party, including Moshe Dayan, voted against the Agreement. As reported in the Wall Street Journal, p. 1, 3 September 1975.

Egypt's gains are multiple, the territory recovered has some military value but has great symbolic value, thereby enhancing Sadat's internal position. The return of Abu Rudeis will annually provide roughly 350 million dollars of oil, but the most significant potential gain for Egypt is the element of potential peace which will enable outside investment to assist in the rebuilding of the economy, long in need of revitalization. The risk for Egypt lies in the political stress placed upon the fragile Arab unity. Radical elements within the Arab camp consider the Agreement a sell-out on Egypt's part and will intensify their efforts to create incidents which will jeopardize the continued existence of the agreement thereby placing Sadat himself under considerable pressure. Sadat is heavily dependent not only upon continued progress in the overall situation, but also replacing Soviet with Western arms - he may have burned his bridges behind himself with respect to Soviet aid although this could be resumed if he were willing to reverse his current stand.

The United States is not, as some have put it, simply paying for what Israel gives to Egypt, although the US commitment does involve both US personnel injected into the area and increased security assistance to both sides of the

conflict.¹⁰³ Nor does the US entry into the agreement seem similar to the beginnings of another Vietnam.¹⁰⁴ What the US does gain is a substantial increase in prestige in Egypt and the conservative Arab group led by the Saudis at the expense of the Soviets. More importantly, the US gains a commitment from both sides to refrain from the hostilities that led to not only near open conflict with the USSR but economic pressure in the form of the oil embargo. A recurrence of either could cause devastating economic reversals. The cost of security assistance to both sides of the conflict is minimal compared to the potential losses involved with either an exchange with the Soviets or another embargo. Finally, the reopening of the Suez¹⁰⁵ and its enlargement to accommodate supertankers could bring the US substantial strategic advantages since such a modernization would allow

¹⁰³ FY 76 Security Assistance Program allocates \$3,383 million out of a world total of approximately \$4,600 million total to Middle East security assistance. Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Syria are the primary recipients. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Gist-Security Assistance, December 1975.

¹⁰⁴ US involvement in Vietnam was military support of one side, the Middle East role is civilian and was requested by both sides, in fact, the US presence is a key upon which both parties of the agreement not only agree but insist upon.

¹⁰⁵ Although not directly referred to in the Agreement, the disengagement secures the canal, making investment in its enlargement to accommodate large tankers feasible.

Sixth Fleet carriers to pass, thereby greatly increasing US naval flexibility of options in the entire Indian Ocean and African area.

World-wide commentary over which nation gave-received-risked-or-did not-risk will undoubtedly go on unabated until some group of analysts gets the opportunity to say I told you so. What is undeniable in the agreement is that for the first time in modern Middle East history a document has been produced where in if successful both parties stand to gain more than either would gain if it were to fail. Secondly, for the first time in modern Middle East history, two opposing countries have agreed not only to disengage but to seek a just and durable peace by peaceful means. Finally, they have agreed on a Joint Group¹⁰⁶ to assist in the implementation of the accord, another beginning. In other words, for the first time a step has been made that addresses one of the key elements of the overall problem. To be sure, the critical issues of the overall problem have not been addressed, however, as may be seen by the complexity of the Agreement, annex and protocols to the Agreement, the magnitude of the overall problem is massive. It is, therefore, understandable that all would not be addressed given the sensitivity and intensity of the situation. What is of significance is that

¹⁰⁶Article VI of the Agreement. See Appendix G.

in the situation following the October War, the major opponents have twice¹⁰⁷ gone to the brink of war, considered the options and decided against the military option. What this demonstrates is that clearly in the eyes of both sides the potential gains versus risks involved in a negotiated settlement outweigh the gains versus risks of a military effort. The second stage disengagement agreement further indicates that the political climate within Israel and Egypt are such that the government leaders have sufficient internal strength and flexibility that they are able to overcome internal opposition to achieve some progress toward their respective perception of what a complete settlement may include. Realistically, at this point, the impact of the other elements of the Middle East equation must be considered.

Considering that the September 1975 Agreement was a forward step with respect to Israel and Egypt which had incidental benefits for US policy to the detriment of the USSR, what does the future hold for the Middle East powers with respect to super-power policies. Have tensions eased on one front to the point of dooming progress on the others? While it may be too soon for accurate analysis, some consideration of future prospects for progress based on the new situation should be undertaken.

¹⁰⁷ November 1974 - January 1975 prior to the shuttle breakdown in February - March 1975 and again after the breakdown.

VIII. THE FUTURE

The role of future super-power foreign policies in the Middle East will probably generate speculation as long as the world exists in the form we know today. If, however, the impact of the Yom Kippur War has been as substantial as is the contention of this paper, some consideration must be given to the future prospects resulting from that impact. These possibilities will be affected by the internal politics of both super-powers, the overall world situation, and the balance between the two powers, currently characterized as the process of detente. Although these various levels are interrelated, an attempt will be made to trace these interactions in the two super-powers beginning internally, and moving to the international arena, concluding in their possible interaction in the Middle East.

The significant upcoming event in the near term United States' scene is the 1976 Bicentennial Year election. An often heard comment is that after the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, there is little US motivation for continued progress in the Middle East until after the US election because the administration will be unwilling to take the risks inherent in continuing the process. As a result, Egyptians and Israelis, the idea continues, will also be unwilling to make substantive efforts since they have stabilized

their bilateral situation. A case may certainly be made for this rationale, however, an equally good, and in some ways superior, case may be made to the contrary. To be sure, the US will be looking inward during the oncoming year, focusing on the economy and other internal political issues. Many of these issues will be contested in both parties as the respective nominee races narrow. Since the incumbent administration faces substantial competition, a relatively rare event on the political scene, pressure is on the administration to not only avoid errors but to demonstrate within the party that it is capable of producing substantive results on the issues facing the country. This pressure is particularly strong in the area of foreign affairs, since the in-house challenge to the Administration comes from the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Questions concerning the strategic balance between the US-USSR, US resolve in support of friends, and positive accomplishments in the foreign area, in general, are key concerns to this element of the President's party. If the President were able to arrive at the convention having recently sponsored the opening of negotiations which continued the progress in the Middle East, it would be a substantial political asset. It would demonstrate an ability to deal with one of the most difficult and dangerous problems facing the US. Finally, because of the ever present pressure of the energy question, stability and continued positive peaceful progress in the Middle East would give the President a strengthened position in the general election. This is

true because it would affect both foreign and domestic issues by reducing the danger of an international confrontation and the possibility of another oil embargo.

Regardless of which party succeeds in the November 1976 election, since the economy and the US role in the world will have been major campaign issues, pressure on the Administration to continue the progress will be substantial. The US, furthermore, is now bound to the Middle East by congressional approval of the US role in the Egypt-Israeli Agreement of September 1975, security assistance programs to both sides of the conflict, and Joint Commissions with both sides of the conflict. The urgent need for recycling of the oil dollars of the conservative Arab states rests, to a large degree, on continued efforts to prevent another embargo. If in any future embargo, the added weapon of withdrawal of Arab financial reserves from Western countries was employed, an economic disaster of even greater potential than the oil weapon could possibly occur. This fact adds to the already potent economic motivation for continued and even increased US commitments to the Middle East. On the international scene, the key US relationships with Europe and Japan were tested by the conflict during the October War and the economic impact of the war was even greater than on the US. Due to the multiple linkages between the US and these countries, it is likely that they will also support continued US involvement along the lines of the past two years. Finally, with respect to

the USSR, due to the simultaneous internal US political pressures to both continue the process of detente while insuring that the US is not substantially weakened, a posture of continued resolve in the Middle East would be most productive for any future Administration. This posture would undoubtedly also be tempered by continued contacts with the USSR-bilateral, in the UN and at Geneva. The US overall future prospect in the Middle East was recently addressed by Secretary Kissinger, he said, "There is no longer any doubt of the United States' irrevocable commitment" (author's emphasis) "and active involvement in furthering peace and progress in the Middle East. Important changes have taken place in the American peoples' attitudes. This is irrevocable" (author's emphasis) "and of tremendous importance for the future."¹⁰⁸

Analysis of future Soviet posture with respect to the Middle East is, of course, a difficult but necessary task. The most common danger in such analysis seems to lie in oversimplification of the USSR as either a mirror image of the US (only colder) or an exact opposite (bad guys) approach. In reality, the USSR lies between these two extremes, presenting an immense challenge to any modeler including the

¹⁰⁸ Secretary of State Kissinger statement, 29 September 1975, at the United Nations. Quoted from Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Release, PR506, p. 1-2.

classic works of Graham Allison.¹⁰⁹ Obviously within the context of this work, analysis must be kept to macro levels and details left for future effort. As has been seen in Sections III and IV, considerable controversy exists over Soviet Middle East operations since the death of Nasir. Internal to the decision making process, the controversy previously discussed will undoubtedly continue but must continue within the context of the everpresent struggle for position within the Kremlin. While forecasts of Brezhnev's intention to voluntarily retire have become less frequent in recent months, the probability of a change at the top within the next few years increases steadily with the passage of time. Pressures on the Politburo members include that of an ever lagging agricultural base; the yellow peril of a China increasingly accepted by the remainder of the world and actively seeking to limit Russian effort anywhere on the globe; individual bureaucratic survival in one of the toughest political arenas; and of course, the position of the USSR in relation to the US. To the individual leader rising within the Soviet system, policies and attitudes which will fit these complex pressures together in such a way as to maximize both his own and USSR's continued development are, of course,

¹⁰⁹Allison, Graham T., Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard, 1971. Allison applies three models, rational actor, organizational process, and governmental politics to both the US and USSR in an attempt to explain a particular international crisis.

likely to be pursued. Thus, the Soviet leadership of the future is likely to display a relationship between internal and external pressures.

As the Soviets often point out, as a Middle Eastern power their interest in the area is considerable, a secure position on the land bridge would give them substantial gains relative to both the US and China and access to the oil that the Soviet economy will soon need. To be sure, the Soviet policy would prefer to develop increased internal oil in Siberia and elsewhere, but the economic cost required for this development, with current technology, looks huge and contains a high element of risk of failure. If astute policy selection can achieve Soviet access to (relatively) inexpensive Middle Eastern oil, the benefit to other sectors of Soviet economy would be substantial.¹¹⁰ If these same policies produce substantive strategic gains as well, they become highly desirable. On the other hand, avoidance of an all out nuclear war and even local conflicts wherein the USSR has a low probability of success are also likely. The

¹¹⁰Resource allocation planning in the USSR is a complex planning process. Open source literature is becoming available which indicates a multi-sector, input-output process which generates several plans covering varying time frames from greater than 15 years down to 1 year, all of which consider strategic economic policies. See Economic Development and Perspective Planning, ed. by N. P. Fedorenki, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975 and Soviet Finance, ed. by I. D. Zlobin et. al., Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975.

process of detente is described in Soviet writings in a manner much different from the West. The Party Journal Moscow (Partinaya Zhizn) describes it as a "reflection of the growing influence of the cooperation of socialist states on the course of world development." Which has been "the basis of the outstanding successes of the socialist foreign policy ... made up of the largest achievement of the Soviet Union ... in the area of economics and defense."¹¹¹ It further postulates that support of wars of national liberation will continue and under appropriate circumstances be increased. The operation of such a definition could well explain many of the USSR's efforts in the Middle East, including the protest against the US role in the Egypt-Israel Agreement of 1975. It is likely that the Soviet situation described above will continue largely unchanged barring a cataclysmic event such as a nuclear exchange or a major clash with China. What specific Middle Eastern super-power interaction may then be reasonably expected based upon the foregoing analysis of their individual situations?

Due to the impact of the October War, it would seem logical that there exists a high probability of continued US commitment to develop increased contacts between the

¹¹¹ Joint Publications Research Service, Translations on USSR Political and Sociological Affairs, N. 642, "Party Journal Cites Soviet Views on Detente", Moscow Partinaya Zhizn, in Russian, N. 9, May 1975, p. 5-7, 25 June, 1975.

parties to the conflict. A likely next US effort (not necessarily step) would be to encourage some form of dialogue between the PLO/Palestinians and Israel. Also as a result of the October War, the Soviet shift toward the more radical of Palestinian and Arab views and the fact that the primary Soviet role in the states still cooperating with the USSR is that of arms supplier, the following Soviet policies appear likely: (1) Public and private encouragement of Arab radical elements, particularly Palestinian groups in that category. (2) Private support of efforts to limit or even topple the moderate leaders of the key states (Egypt, Syria, and Israel). (3) Private efforts (carrot and stick), on arms flow to those states still heavily committed to Soviet arms (Syria and Iraq) to increase their support for the radical cause to the frustration of US efforts.

What the long term impact of the interaction of these potential super-power policies within the every changing milieu of the Middle East will be is, of course, unknown and may remain so for several years.

IX. CONCLUSIONS AND COMMENTARY

The full impact of the October 1973 War on super-power policies in the Middle East may not yet have occurred. Substantial changes, however, have taken place in the Middle East roles of the US and the USSR. It has been shown that the War was planned and initiated to begin a political process of movement in the conflict.¹¹² This process has involved a striking new role for the United States which now rests its Middle East policy on three points.¹¹³ (1) A firm commitment to work for a just and lasting settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict which takes into account the legitimate interests of all states and peoples of the area, including the Palestinians. (2) Improve US relations with all the states of the Middle East on a bilateral basis, maintaining support for Israel's security while strengthening relations with Arab states. (3) Prevent the Middle East from becoming a sphere of influence of any outside power. One of the key questions of the conflict to date has been the manner in which the Palestinians should be introduced into the peace efforts. The PLO and its policies have been such that no

¹¹² See Sections III and IV.

¹¹³ "United States Foreign Policy, Overview", p. 27, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., May 1975.

negotiations with the Israelis has been possible, this may be in the process of beginning to change. The US position has been that it will not deal with the PLO until it recognizes the existence of Israel and accepts Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.¹¹⁴ It is possible that both Israel and the PLO are now considering ways to moderate their positions such that communication would be possible. It is felt in many interested quarters that it is highly desirable for the next agreement/understanding to contain some indication of the form of the final settlement, or at least, the aim toward this goal must be expanded if progress is to continue. Delineation of such an indication may be the greatest hurdle faced by the post-1973 War equation. If it can be achieved, it will be the most substantial step toward a final resolution of the Middle East crisis.

Senator McGovern, in his report to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recognizes three realities in the Middle East: America's interests in Israel, US interests on the Arab side, and the Palestinians. To these three areas, if one adds the inescapable interests of the USSR and the religious question of Jerusalem one has the major elements which must be balanced in attempting to solve the entire crisis. Little

¹¹⁴Most recently stated by Secretary Kissinger in Washington, D. C., press conference, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Release, PR596/79, p. 6.

has been said of late about the Jerusalem question, perhaps in recognition of the fact that it lies last on most lists of issues that must be discussed. While the Middle East powers and the great religions of the area have intense interest in the question, it has little impact on major power interests. It must, of course, be recognized that any settlement, if it is to be successful, must satisfactorily answer the Jerusalem question because of its great religious significance.

While this paper has concentrated on the impact of the events surrounding the October War on super-power Middle East policies, little attention has been paid to events outside of the Middle East which may have affected those policies. It has been shown that the USSR relates other world areas to the Middle East,¹¹⁵ but what of the US? Have the failures in Vietnam and the trauma of Watergate colored US policies in the post-1973 time frame? In the view of President Sadat, they have not. When specifically asked the question concerning Southeast Asia, he replied "not at all."¹¹⁶ Another issue that has not been addressed herein is the possibility of a settlement jointly imposed and enforced by

¹¹⁵See Section VIII.

¹¹⁶Al Sadat interview with Senator McGovern, McGovern Committee Report, "Realities of the Middle East", p. 2, op. cit.

the super-powers. The probability of such an event is believed to be bordering on minute given the current situation in the Middle East and the ongoing process resulting from the 1973 War. Secretary Kissinger has stated that "we have not thought it wise to impose a settlement, and our policy has been designed to enable the parties concerned to negotiate."¹¹⁷ In fact, it was essentially a Soviet ultimatum to either join in an imposition/intervention or risk a unilateral Soviet intervention that triggered the US alert during the War. It is, thus, difficult to develop a scenario wherein such a degree of super-power cooperation could be generated coincident to their other interests. Additionally, even if the US and the USSR were to attempt such a course, it is by no means clear that a joint intervention could produce a solution. Naturally, it does remain clear that any final solution, to be viable, must have at least the tacit acceptance of both powers.

The recent effort to equate Zionism with racism and the effort to expel Israel from the UN should also be considered. Analysts have ascribed varying significance to these events, of concern here is the perception of the super-powers of these events. If the analysis in Section VIII of this paper

¹¹⁷ Secretary of State Kissinger, Press Conference, Washington, D. C., 24 May 1975. Quoted from Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Release, PR297/56, p. 7.

is substantially correct, these forms of condemnation of Israel are typical of the public efforts which the USSR may be expected to support. With respect to the US, it seems that the position of the Administration, Ambassador Moynihan's eloquence not to the contrary, is that the Zionism vote in the UN was a form of moral condemnation of Israel and not an abstract vote on Zionism.¹¹⁸ If such is the case, the vote, while distressing to the US, Israel, and many others, does not constitute a severe threat to continued progress in the Middle East.

Although the key test of the new balance in the Middle East resulting from the 1973 War may be yet to come in the on-going negotiations to hammer out some agreement which mentions a form for a final overall settlement, it is clear that the events associated with the War have already had substantial impacts on super-power Middle East policy. Central among the various changes has been the US assumption of a new role in the conflict. A role approved by both sides of the conflict and one that is recognized and approved by both major political parties in the US. This role was initiated by the dual pressures of Soviet actions during the war and Arab political/economic pressure of oil embargo. It has

¹¹⁸ Secretary of State Kissinger Press Conference, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 12 November 1975, Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services Release, PR566/74, p. 1

expanded at the request of both sides to include a US civilian presence in the Sinai as part of the first substantive step toward an overall settlement. It continues to expand in the form of increasing economic and security assistance to both sides. It has been enabled by the recognition of both sides that in both the long and short run, resorting to the military option is likely to be less productive than negotiations. This US role is likely to continue. The impact of the War on the Soviet Union has been to reduce its influence, or perhaps, confirm that its actual influence never really was reflected accurately by its position as the leading arms supplier of the Arab cause. Because of the strategic and economic significance of the Middle East to the USSR it may be expected to exercise every opportunity to secure a stable position in the area at the expense of the US whenever possible. This combination makes it likely that the USSR will continue its increasing support of radical Arab elements to the detriment of the moderates.

While it is not the object of this work to make policy suggestions, some obvious conclusions stand out. The US role, and consequently the current process, depends largely upon the continuance in office on both sides of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of strong moderate leaders. Support of those leaders, whenever and wherever possible is likely to bolster the new process. While both sides of the dispute have more than once since the War, rejected the military option, it

does not follow that they would no longer resort to war under any circumstances. On the contrary, given a long stagnation in the current process, pressure on the major Arab leaders for another round would mount. In similar fashion, if a clear and present threat to Israel was perceived by the leaders, for example, a PLO/Syrian attempt to take over or partition Lebanon, internal pressure for a preemptive Israeli strike would mount.

The leaders of both sides of the conflict have demonstrated great courage, wisdom, and perseverance in the post-War period. They now have the responsibility to continue their efforts. It is the hope of the world that the leaders of Egypt, Israel, Palestine, and Syria will succeed in concluding a just peace for their people. If they do succeed, it may well be that the impact of the October War on super-power Middle East policy marked the beginning of the end of one of the most dangerous conflicts the world has experienced.

APPENDIX A

TABLE 1
PALESTINE: POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION¹
(Estimates in thousands)

Year	Arab Christian	Total non-Jewish ² Population	Jews	TOTAL	Jewish Immigration ³	
1914	70.0	534.3 ²	604.3	84.7	689.0	— ³
1919	74.0 ²	568.0	642.0	58.0	700.0	1.8
1922	71.5	589.2	668.3	83.8	752.1	8.7
1931	87.9	753.8	851.7	172.0	1,023.7	4.1
1935	103.4	826.5	940.8	320.4	1,261.2	66.5
1936	106.5	848.3	966.0	370.5	1,336.5	29.6
1939	117.0	927.1	1,056.3	445.5	1,501.8	31.2
1942	127.2	995.3	1,135.6	484.4	1,620.0	4.2
1946	145.1	1,076.8	1,237.3	608.2	1,845.5	15.8

ISRAEL: POPULATION AND IMMIGRATION⁴

May 15- Dec. 31						
1948	—	—	120.0	758.7	878.7	101.8
1949	34.0	111.5	160.0	1,013.9	1,173.9	239.6
1950	36.0	116.1	167.1	1,203.0	1,370.1	170.2
1955	43.3	136.3	198.6	1,590.5	1,789.1	37.5
1960	49.6	166.3	239.1	1,911.2	2,150.4	24.5
1965	57.1	212.4	299.3	2,299.1	2,598.4	30.7
1966	58.5	223.0	312.5	2,344.9	2,657.4	15.7
1967 (Sept. 5)	—	—	1,385.0	2,365.0	3,750.0	—

¹Palestine Royal Commission, Memorandum Prepared by the Government of Palestine (Colonial No. 133, 1937), *ibid.*; A Survey of Palestine (1946), II, 794f; UN, Spec. Com. on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly (1947), I, 12; Government of Israel, Statistical Abstract, 1967, Table D/3.

²Totals include Druze and others. In Israel, the Druze made up about 10 per cent of the total non-Jewish population before the June war.

³Between 1882 and 1914, from 55,000 to 70,000 Jews migrated to Palestine and between 1882 and 1967, the estimated percentage of world Jewry in Palestine increased from 0.3 to 17.1. Between 1919 and May 14, 1948, 44,809 (10.4 per cent) of those coming to Palestine originated from Asia and Africa and 385,066 (89.6 per cent) from Europe and America. Between May 15, 1948 and 1964, 640,635 (54.8 per cent) came from Asia and Africa and 528,996 (45.2 per cent) from Europe and America (Statistical Abstract, 1967, Tables B/3, D/3, and D/4).

⁴Statistical Abstract, 1967, Tables B/1 and D/3; Israel Digest, Oct. 20, 1967, 7; Government of Israel, Facts about Israel, 1968 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), 60.

⁵Population figures apply to both Israel and the areas occupied as a result of the June War.

APPENDIX A (Continued)

TABLE 2
ARAB REFUGEES REGISTERED WITH UNRWA—KINDS OF ASSISTANCE—1951-1967

Year ended	Full-ration recipients	Half-ration recipients	Babies and children registered for services only	Members of Families receiving no rations or services	Total
June, 1951	826,459	51,034	2,174	24,455	904,122
June, 1952	805,593	58,733	18,347	32,738	915,411
June, 1955	828,531	17,228	60,227	63,403	969,389
June, 1960	849,634	16,202	150,170	73,452	1,120,889*
June, 1965	859,048	15,546	251,131	107,122	1,280,823*
June, 1966	845,730	15,392	284,025	108,750	1,317,749*
May, 1967	845,625	15,326	311,466	106,843	1,344,576*

* Includes members receiving no rations and members of families receiving only educational and medical services.

SOURCE: Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967, GA, OR 22nd Ses, Supp. No. 13 (A/6713), Table 1, 59.

TABLE 3
ARAB REFUGEES REGISTERED WITH UNRWA—AGE GROUPS AND COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE, May 31, 1967

	1 year and below	1-15 years	15 years and over	Total	No. of families
Jordan	11,993	255,985	454,709	722,687	128,273
Gaza	8,984	120,941	186,851	316,776	55,617
Lebanon	3,481	64,432	92,810	160,723	36,998
Syria	3,794	59,620	80,976	144,390	33,359
Totals	28,252	500,978	815,346	1,344,576	254,247

SOURCE: Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1966-30 June 1967, GA, OR 22nd Ses, Supp. No. 13 (A/6713), Table 2, 60.

APPENDIX A (Continued)

TABLE 4
POPULATION CHANGES RESULTING FROM THE JUNE WAR
(Estimates in thousands by UNRWA)¹

	Flight after June War			Remaining in Israeli-Occupied Areas		
	Refugees	Residents	Total	Refugees	Residents	Total
Jordan's west bank (incl. Jerusalem)	110	120	230	270	500	770 ²
Egypt's Sinai	— ³	60 ³	60	—	90 ⁴	90 ²
Gaza Strip	18 ³	7 ³	25	270	140	410 ²
Syria's Golan Heights	16	100	116	—	6	6
Totals	144	287	431	540	736	1,276

¹Statement by Commissioner-General of UNRWA to the UN General Assembly's Special Political Committee on Dec. 11, 1967 (A/SPC/121, 2ff): and a letter in March, 1968 from the UNRWA Liaison Office, New York City.

²Israel claimed that on the basis of her Sept. 1967, census, there were (1) 597,000 refugees and residents still living on the west bank—excluding the Old City of Jerusalem, with 66,000 people and the surrounding area formally annexed by her; and (2) 356,000 refugees and residents in the Gaza Strip—including 2,000 citizens of the former Egyptian half of the town of Rafah. (Israel Digest, Oct. 20, 1967, 7; Facts about Israel, 1968, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 52.)

³Egyptian government estimate.

⁴The Israeli census covered only the northern section of the Sinai, where it found 33,000 Egyptians, nearly all in the al-Arish area. Israel estimated earlier that there were approximately 40,000 Bedouin in the central portion of the Sinai. (Israel Digest, Oct. 20, 1967; Sept. 8, 5.)


TABLE 5¹
JEWISH POPULATION BY ORIGIN

	Nov. 1948	%	Dec. 1972	%
Israel	253,700	35.4	1,305,400	48
ME and Asia	57,800	8.1	318,000	11.7
Egypt and Africa	12,200	1.7	358,300	13.2
Europe-America	393,000	54.8	743,000	27.5


¹Political Dictionary of the Middle East, 1974, p. 462.

APPENDIX B

ROYAL COMMISSION PLANS FOR PARTITION OF PALESTINE¹



Plan A




Plan B


¹Commission Report 1938

APPENDIX C

SYKES-PICOT PARTITION PLAN¹
1915-1917




MANDATE SYSTEM - 1920¹



¹Middle East Past and Present, Y. Armajani, p. 305.

APPENDIX D

UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY PARTITION PLAN
1947¹



¹The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, W. Quant, p. v.

APPENDIX E¹

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS DURING THE OCTOBER WAR

1973

Oct. 6. War breaks out in the Middle East on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. Egyptian forces cross the Suez Canal and Syria attacks the Golan Heights. Israeli forces counter on Oct. 7, striking back in the Sinai on the Golan Heights.

Oct. 7. Iraq nationalizes the American-owned Mobil Oil Corporation and Exxon Corporation.

Oct. 8. Tunisia, the Sudan, and Iraq pledge support of Egyptian and Syrian forces battling Israel.

Oct. 10. Israel announces it has abandoned the Bar-Lev line along the Suez Canal but has pushed back Syrian forces from the Golan Heights. Egyptian forces cross the Suez and advance nearly 10 miles onto the East bank. The Syrian army is pushed back to the 1967 cease-fire line.

Oct. 12. Israeli forces advance to within 18 miles of Damascus, the capital of Syria.

Oct. 13. Jordan announces it will join Egypt and Syria in the war against Israel. The same day Israel claims to have nearly eliminated an Iraqi division in Syria.

Oct. 13. Saudi Arabian troops join the war against Israel after urging by Egyptian President Sadat.

Oct. 15. The United States announces it is resupplying Israel with military equipment to counterbalance a "massive airlift" to Egypt by the Soviet Union.

Oct. 17. Egyptian President Sadat, in an open letter to President Nixon, proposes an immediate cease-fire on the condition that Israel withdraws to pre-1967 boundaries. The same day, foreign ministers of four Arab states meet in Washington with President Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to present a similar peace proposal.

Oct. 18. Libya cuts off all shipments of crude oil and petroleum products to the United States.

¹Chronology, 1972-1973.

APPENDIX E (Continued)

Oct. 18. Saudi Arabia announces a 10 per cent cut in oil production and pledges to cut off all US oil shipments if American support of Israel continues.

Oct. 19. President Nixon asks Congress to appropriate \$2.2-billion for emergency military aid for Israel.

Oct. 19. Libya cuts off all exports to the United States and raises the price of oil from \$4.90 to \$8.92 per barrel.

Oct. 20. Saudi Arabia halts oil exports to the United States.

Oct. 20. Secretary of State Kissinger arrives in Moscow for talks with Soviet Communist Party chief Leonid I. Brezhnev on restoring peace to the Middle East.

Oct. 21. Iraq nationalizes the holdings of Royal Dutch Shell Corp.

Oct. 21. The United States and the Soviet Union present joint resolution to the U.N. Security Council calling for a cease-fire in place in the Middle East and for implementation of a Security Council resolution calling for Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied since the 1967 war. The proposal, formulated during Kissinger's trip to Moscow, is adopted by the Security Council early Oct. 22.

Oct. 22. A cease-fire takes effect on the Egyptian-Israeli front, but fighting continues nonetheless.

Oct. 22. Kissinger confers with Israeli Premier Golda Meir in Israel on his way back to Washington from Moscow. Meanwhile, Jordan accepts the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cease-fire proposal. Iraq and the Palestinian Liberation Organization reject it.

Oct. 23. The U.N. Security Council votes to reaffirm the Middle East cease-fire, asks Egypt and Israel to return to the cease-fire line established the day before, and asks that U.N. observers be stationed along the Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire line. The U.N. secretary general announces Syria will accept the cease-fire if Israel withdraws from lands occupied during the 1967 war.

Oct. 24. Tension mounts as Israel and Egypt continue fighting despite the cease-fire arrangement. Israel claims a 20,000-man Egyptian force, encircled by Israeli forces on the east bank of the Suez Canal has tried unsuccessfully to break out. In Washington, the White House announces it will not send troops to the Middle East and urges other powers to follow suit.

APPENDIX E (Continued)

Oct. 25. President Nixon orders a world-wide U.S. military alert as tension mounts over whether the Soviet Union may intervene in the Middle East crisis, Kissinger says there are "ambiguous" indications of that action.

Oct. 25. To avert a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation in the Middle East, the U.N. Security Council votes to establish an emergency supervisory force to observe the cease-fire. The force would exclude troops from the permanent Security Council members, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union.

Oct. 27. The United States announces that Egypt and Israel have agreed to negotiate directly on its implementing the cease-fire.

Oct. 29. The trapped Egyptian III Corps receives food, water and medical supplies after Israel agrees to allow a supply convoy to pass through Israeli lines. It is reported that Israel yielded following U.S. warnings that the Soviet Union threatened to rescue the troops.

Oct. 29. In a flurry of diplomatic activity, Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi meets with Kissinger in Washington.

Oct. 29. Syrian President Assad says Syria accepted the cease-fire after U.S.S.R. guarantees of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territory and recognition of Palestinian rights.

Oct. 31. Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir arrives in Washington for talks with President Nixon on her country's concern over U.S. pressure to make concessions. The same day, Egyptian President Sadat warns that his country will take up the fight again if Israel does not withdraw to the cease-fire lines of Oct. 22, 1973.

Nov. 1. Israeli Prime Minister Meir, meeting in Washington with President Nixon, says she has been assured of continued U.S. support.

Nov. 2. Secretary of State Kissinger meets separately in Washington with Meir and Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmi.

Nov. 4. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) cuts back total oil production by 25 per cent.

Nov. 6. Israel lists 1,654 casualties from the war.

APPENDIX E (Continued)

Nov. 7. After talks between Kissinger and Sadat, it is announced that Egypt and the United States will resume diplomatic relations. Ties are resumed Feb. 28, 1974.

Nov. 8. Kissinger flies to Jordan and Saudi Arabia to meet with leaders there.

Nov. 11. Israel and Egypt sign a cease-fire accord, drawn up by Kissinger and Sadat during recent talks. The six-point plan calls for (1) both sides to observe the cease-fire, (2) immediate discussions on the return to the Oct. 22 cease-fire lines, (3) immediate food and medical supplies for Suez City, (4) access for non-military supplies to the stranded Egyptian III Corps on the east bank of the Suez Canal, (5) replacement of Israeli troops along the Suez by U.N. forces, and (6) exchange of all prisoners of war.

APPENDIX F

"BREZHNEV'S PLAN"¹

"Brezhnev's new plan, as submitted to his colleagues, seems to have consisted of the following interconnected elements:

1. A further Soviet buildup of the forces of the "progressive" Arab regimes--Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria--starting in the fall of 1972 and escalating gradually during the subsequent year. They would be supplied with highly sophisticated weapons, which the USSR had been unable to spare previously and which would extend even to items not previously given to non-communist states, but the weapons would be accompanied this time by intensive training of the most thorough kind.

2. As extra insurance against renewed failure or incompetence on the part of the Middle East recipients, some of the most complex new hardware would be handled in combat not by Arab or Soviet or Warsaw Pact personnel, but by military elements from other communist countries, whose death or capture would not involve a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation.

3. Most remaining Soviet would be withdrawn in a demonstrative fashion once the USSR's Middle East clients were ready for combat and had decided to proceed to war, as an "alibi" to convince Washington that Moscow at least had not defaulted on its basic commitment to eschew direct combat involvement.

4. Moscow's clients then would go into offensive deployment, exploiting an occasion when the United States was distracted by a domestic or other crisis, and the Israelis would be forced to mobilize their citizen army, a costly operation that they could not sustain for long or repeat continuously.

5. Once the Israelis had mobilized, their opponents would back off but would return to offensive dispositions as soon as the Israeli alert was called off and the whole maneuver would be replayed until the Israelis, because of economic drain or because their vigilance gradually had become dulled, were caught responding tardily.

¹Fa'anan, Uri, "Soviet Decision Making in the Middle East 1959-1973", originally in *Orbis*, 17, 3, reprinted and quoted from Soviet Naval Policy, Objectives and Constraints, MccGuire, Booth and McDonnell, ch. 11, p. 205-206.

APPENDIX F (Continued)

6. Moscow's clients would thus, at the least, achieve a tactical surprise, which if it did not suffice for them to gain a final and decisive victory, would probably be enough to drag Israel into a relatively long, defensive struggle, the attrition of which might prove too much for a small state.

7. To ensure its clients "longer breath" than Israel during such an attrition period, the USSR would rapidly launch a massive air-and-sea lift to its Middle East friends.

8. As long as fighting favored its clients sufficiently for them to seize and hold ground, and to recoup prestige, the USSR would sabotage U.S. efforts, at the U.N. and elsewhere, to terminate the bloodshed.

9. The moment the war turned against its clients, the Kremlin would insist on an immediate cease fire in place and would embarrass Washington into agreeing to it by suddenly offering at least partial support for the kind of proposals Washington undoubtedly would have made earlier, at the outbreak of the war.

10. If the Israelis demurred at being thus robbed of the fruits of victory and insisted that the invading forces be thrown back at least to the preconflict lines, Soviet leaders could always dramatically go through the motions of preparing the dispatch of an intervention force to the area; at which point Washington no doubt would attempt to deter Moscow, but, at the same time would be only too eager to avoid an actual confrontation and, as a "compromise," would agree jointly with the USSR to impose a cease fire upon the combatants.

11. Such a naked demonstration of Soviet determination and might would have the additional advantage of making Cairo and Damascus say "Thank you, Moscow" rather than "Thank you, Moscow and Washington" for being rescued in time. Moscow's clients would end up with some symbolically important territorial gains and would have caused Israel painful losses, and Soviet prestige would be triumphantly restored--all this without real danger of nuclear confrontation with the United States since Soviet combat forces would not actually be involved. Above all, Washington, frightened by this dramatic orchestration of the Arab-Soviet claim that the Middle East was a "tinderbox," would pressure Israel into a basically pro-Arab settlement to avoid dangers. This would constitute substantial proof that it paid to be a client of Moscow rather than of Washington.

APPENDIX G

SECOND STAGE DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT¹

Text of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel, the Annex to the Egypt-Israel Agreement, and the U.S. Proposal for an early warning system in Sinai.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL

The Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt and the Government of Israel have agreed that:

ARTICLE I

The conflict between them and in the Middle East shall not be resolved by military force but by peaceful means.

The Agreement concluded by the Parties January 18, 1974, within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, constituted a first step towards a just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 of October 22, 1973.

They are determined to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338, this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.

ARTICLE II

The parties hereby undertake not to resort to the threat or use of force or military blockade against each other.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall continue scrupulously to observe the ceasefire on land, sea and air and to refrain from all military or para-military actions against each other.

The Parties also confirm that the obligations contained in the Annex and, when concluded, the Protocol shall be an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE IV

A. The military forces of the Parties shall be deployed in accordance with the following principles:

(1) All Israeli forces shall be deployed east of the lines designated as Lines J and M on the attached map.

¹Department of State News Release, 1 September 1975.

APPENDIX G (Continued)

(2) All Egyptian forces shall be deployed west of the line designated as Line E on the attached map.

(3) The area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and F and the area between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines J and K shall be limited in armament and forces.

(4) The limitations on armaments and forces in the areas described by paragraph (3) above shall be agreed as described in the attached Annex.

(5) The zone between the lines designated on the attached map as Lines E and J, will be a buffer zone. In this zone the United Nations Emergency Force will continue to perform its functions as under the Egyptian-Israeli Agreement of January 18, 1974.

(6) In the area south from Line E and west from Line M, as defined on the attached map, there will be no military forces, as specified in the attached Annex.

B. The details concerning the new lines, the redeployment of the forces and its timing, the limitation on armaments and forces, aerial reconnaissance, the operation of the early warning and surveillance installations and the use of the roads, the United Nations functions and other arrangements will all be in accordance with the provisions of the Annex and map which are an integral part of this Agreement and of the Protocol which is to result from negotiations pursuant to the Annex and which, when concluded, shall become an integral part of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

The United Nations Emergency Force is essential and shall continue its functions and its mandate shall be extended annually.

ARTICLE VI

The Parties hereby establish a Joint Commission for the duration of this Agreement. It will function under the aegis of the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East in order to consider any problem arising from this Agreement and to assist the United Nations Emergency Force in the execution of its mandate. The Joint Commission shall function in accordance with procedures established in the Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

Non-military cargoes destined for or coming from Israel shall be permitted through the Suez Canal.

APPENDIX G (Continued)

ARTICLE VIII

This agreement is regarded by the Parties as a significant step towards a just and lasting peace. It is not a final peace agreement.

The Parties shall continue their efforts to negotiate a final peace agreement within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338.

ARTICLE IX

This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the Protocol and remain in force until superseded by a new agreement

ANNEX TO THE AGREEMENT

Within 5 days after the signature of the Egypt-Israel Agreement, representatives of the two Parties shall meet in the Military Working Group of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva to begin preparation of a detailed Protocol for the implementation of the Agreement. The Working Group will complete the Protocol within 2 weeks. In order to facilitate preparation of the Protocol and implementation of the Agreement, the two Parties have agreed on the following principles, which are an integral part of the Agreement, as guidelines for the Working Group.

1. Definitions of Lines and Areas.

The deployment lines, Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments, Buffer Zones, the area south from Line E and west from Line M, other designated areas, road sections for common use and other features referred to in Article IV of the Agreement shall be as indicated on the attached map (1:100,000-U.S. Edition).

2. Buffer Zones

(a) Access to the Buffer Zones will be controlled by the United Nations Emergency Force, according to procedures to be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

(b) Aircraft of either Party will be permitted to fly freely up to the forward line of that Party. Reconnaissance aircraft of either Party may fly up to the middle line of the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J on an agreed schedule.

(c) In the Buffer Zone between Lines E and J, there will be established under Article IV of the Agreement an Early Warning System entrusted to United States civilian personnel as detailed in a separate proposal, which is a part of this Agreement.

(d) Authorized personnel shall have access to Buffer Zone for transit to and from the Early Warning System; the manner in which this is carried out shall be worked out by the Working Group and the United Nations Emergency Force.

3. Area South of Line E and West of Line M

(a) In this area, the United Nations Emergency Force will assure that there are no military or para-military forces of any kind, military fortifications and military installations; it will establish checkpoints and have the freedom of movement necessary to perform this function.

(b) Egyptian civilians and third-country civilian oil field personnel shall have the right to enter, exit from, work, and live in the above indicated area, except for Buffer Zones 2A, 2B and the United Nations Posts. Egyptian civilian police shall be allowed in the area to perform normal civil police functions among the civilian population in such numbers and with such weapons and equipment as shall be provided for in the Protocol.

(c) Entry to and exit from the area, by land, by air or by sea, shall be only through the United Nations Emergency Force checkpoints along the road, the dividing line and at other points, with the precise locations and number to be included in the Protocol.

(d) Access to the airspace and the coastal area shall be limited to unarmed Egyptian civilian vessels and unarmed civilian helicopters and transport planes involved in the civilian activities of the area as agreed by the Working Group.

(e) Israel undertakes to leave intact all currently existing civilian installations and infrastructures.

(f) Procedures for use of the common sections of the coastal road along the Gulf of Suez shall be determined by the Working Group and detailed in the Protocol.

4. Aerial Surveillance

There shall be a continuation of aerial reconnaissance missions by the United States over the areas covered by the Agreement (the area between Lines F and K), following the same procedures already in practice. The missions will ordinarily be carried out at a frequency of one mission every 7-10 days, with either Party or the United Nations Emergency Force empowered to request an earlier mission. The United States Government will make the mission results available expeditiously to Israel, Egypt and the Chief Coordinator of the United Nations Peacekeeping Missions in the Middle East.

APPENDIX G (Continued)

5. Limitation of Forces and Armaments

(a) Within the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments (the areas between Lines J and K and Lines E and F) the major limitations shall be as follows:

- (1) Eight (8) standard infantry battalions.
- (2) Seventy-five (75) tanks.
- (3) Seventy-two (72) artillery pieces, including heavy mortars (i.e., with caliber larger than 120 mm.), whose range shall not exceed twelve (12) km.
- (4) The total number of personnel shall not exceed eight thousand (8,000).
- (5) Both Parties agree not to station or locate in the area weapons which can reach the line of the other side.
- (6) Both Parties agree that in the areas between Lines J and K, and between Line A (of the Disengagement Agreement of January 18, 1974) and Line E, they will construct no new fortifications or installations for forces of a size greater than that agreed herein.

(b) The major limitations beyond the Areas of Limited Forces and Armaments will be:

- (1) Neither side will station nor locate any weapon in areas from which they can reach the other line.
- (2) The Parties will not place anti-aircraft missiles within an area of ten (10) kilometres east of Line K and west of Line F, respectively.

(c) The United Nations Emergency Force will conduct inspections in order to ensure the maintenance of the agreed limitations within these areas.

6. Process of Implementation

The detailed implementation and timing of the redeployment of forces, turnover of oil fields, and other arrangements called for by the Agreement, Annex and Protocol shall be determined by the Working Group, which will agree on the stages of this process, including the phased movement of Egyptian troops to Line E and Israeli troops to Line J. The first phase will be the transfer of the oil fields and installations to Egypt. This process will begin within 2 weeks from the signature of the Protocol with the introduction of the necessary technicians, and it will be completed no later than 8 weeks after it begins. The details of the phasing will be worked out in the Military Working Group.

Implementation of the redeployment shall be completed within 5 months after signature of the Protocol.

PROPOSAL

In connection with the Early Warning System referred to in Article IV of the Agreement between Egypt and Israel concluded on this date and as an integral part of that Agreement (hereafter referred to as the Basic Agreement), the United States proposes the following:

1. The Early Warning System to be established in accordance with Article IV in the area shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement will be entrusted to the United States. It shall have the following elements:

a. There shall be two surveillance stations to provide strategic early warning, one operated by Egyptian and one operated by Israeli personnel. Their locations are shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. Each station shall be manned by not more than 250 technical and administrative personnel. They shall perform the functions of visual and electronic surveillance only within their stations.

b. In support of these stations, to provide tactical early warning and to verify access to them, three watch stations shall be established by the United States in the Mitla and Giddi Passes as will be shown on the map attached to the Basic Agreement. These stations shall be operated by United States civilian personnel. In support of these stations, there shall be established three unmanned electronic sensor fields at both ends of each Pass and in the general vicinity of each station and the roads leading to and from those stations.

2. The United States civilian personnel shall perform the following duties in connection with the operation and maintenance of these stations:

a. At the two surveillance stations described in paragraph 1a. above, United States civilian personnel will verify the nature of the operations of the stations and all movement into and out of each station and will immediately report any detected divergency from its authorized role of visual and electronic surveillance to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force.

b. At each watch station described in paragraph 1b. above, the United States civilian personnel will immediately report to the Parties to the Basic Agreement and to the United Nations Emergency Force any movement of armed forces, other than the United Nations Emergency Force, into either Pass and any observed preparations for such movement.

c. The total number of United States civilian personnel assigned to functions under this Proposal shall not exceed 200. Only civilian personnel shall be assigned to functions under this Proposal.

APPENDIX G (Continued)

3. No arms shall be maintained at the stations and other facilities covered by this Proposal, except for small arms required for their protection.

4. The United States personnel serving the Early Warning System shall be allowed to move freely within the area of the System.

5. The United States and its personnel shall be entitled to have such support facilities as are reasonably necessary to perform their functions.

6. The United States personnel shall be immune from local criminal, civil, tax and customs jurisdiction and may be accorded any other specific privileges and immunities provided for in the United Nations Emergency Force Agreement of February 13, 1957.


7. The United States affirms that it will continue to perform the functions described above for the duration of the Basic Agreement.

8. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Proposal, the United States may withdraw its personnel only if it concludes that their safety is jeopardized or that continuation of their role is no longer necessary. In the latter case the Parties to the Basic Agreement will be informed in advance in order to give them the opportunity to make alternative arrangements. If both Parties to the Basic Agreement request the United States to conclude its role under this Proposal, The United States will consider such requests conclusive.

9. Technical problems including the location of the watch stations will be worked out through consultation with the United States.

APPENDIX G (Continued)

EGYPT-ISRAEL AGREEMENT 1975¹



¹US Department of State Revised Release, 1 September 1975.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:

- Abboushi, W. F., Political Systems of the Middle East in the 20th Century, Dodd Mead & Co., New York, 1970.
- Allison, G., Essence of Decision, Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Harvard, 1971.
- Antonius, G., The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, Beirut, 1962.
- Armajani, Y., Middle East - Past and Present, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1970.
- Bullard, Sir R., Britain and the Middle East, rev. ed., London, 1952.
- Badeau, J. S., The American Approach to the Arab World, New York, 1968.
- Barbour, N., Nisi Dominus, a Survey of the Palestine Controversy, Beirut, 1969.
- Be'eri, E., Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society, London, 1970.
- Bentwich, N., Israel: Two Fateful Years, 1967-69, London, 1969.
- Berque, J., The Arabs. Their History and Future, London, 1964.
- Bonne, A., State and Economics in the Middle East, 2nd ed., London, 1960.
- Bose, T. C., The Superpowers and the Middle East, Asia Publishing, Bombay, 1972.
- Burns, E. L. M., Between Arab and Israeli, London, 1962.
- Contemporary International Law, Ed. by G. Tunkin, Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, English ed., 1969.
- Coon, C. S., Caravan - The Story of the Middle East, Holt, Rhinehart, New York, 1961.

Dallin, Alexander, The Soviet Union at the United Nations, Praeger Press, New York, 1962.

Davis, J. H., The Evasive Peace, A Study of the Zionist-Arab Problem, London, 1968.

Draper, T., Israel and World Politics, Viking Press, New York, 1968.

Economic Development and Perspective Planning, ed. by N. P. Fedorenko, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975.

Elwell-Sutton, L. P., Persian Oil - A Study in Power Politics, London, 1955.

Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine, vol. II, Yale University Press, New Haven Conn., 1947.

Esco Foundation for Palestine, Palestine, A Study of Jewish, Arab & British Policies, Yale University Press, New Haven, Conn.

Evron, Y., Middle East: Nations, Superpowers and Wars, Praeger Press, 1973.

Friedman, R. O., Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, Praeger Press, New York, 1975.

Gervasi, F., The Case for Israel, The Viking Press, New York, 1967.

Goitein, S. D. F., Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through the Ages, New York, 1955.

Hitti, P. K., History of Syria, Including Lebanon and Palestine, London, 1951.

Hourani, A. H., Syria and Lebanon, Beirut, 1968.

Hurewitz, J. C. Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension, Praeger Press, London, 1969.

Hurewitz, J. C., Middle East Dilemmas: The Background of US Policy, Russel & Ruseel.

Hurewitz, J. C., Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record, vol. I - 1535-1914, vol. II - 1914-56, Princeton, 1956.

Ismael, T. Y., Governments and Politics of the Middle East, Dorsey Press, Homewood, Ill., 1970.

- Ismael, T. Y., Middle East in World Politics, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1974.
- Issawi, C., Oil, The Middle East and World, Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, Library Press, New York, 1972.
- Khouri, F. J., The Arab Israeli Dilemma, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, N. Y., 1968.
- Kimche, J., Palestine or Israel, Secker and Warburg, 1974.
- Klebanoff, S., Middle East Oil and US Foreign Policy, Praeger Press, 1974.
- Larson, T. B., Soviet Politics Since Khrushchev, Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1968.
- Leeman, W. A., The Price of Middle East Oil, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N. Y., 1962.
- Lenczowski, G., Russian and the West in Iran, 1914-48, Ithaca, N. Y., 1949.
- Lenczowski, G., Soviet Advances in the Middle East, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C., 1971.
- Lutsky, V., Modern History of the Arab Countries, Academy of Sciences Institute, Progress Publishers, Moscow, USSR, English ed., 1969.
- Luttwak, E. N., The Political Uses of Sea Power, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1974.
- Mandel, N., Zionism and Indigenous Population of Palestine, Oxford University, 1965.
- The Middle East, ed. by Michael Adams, New York, Praeger Press, 1971.
- The Middle East: A Political & Economic Survey, ed. by P. Mansfield, Oxford Press, London, 1973.
- Middle East: Quest for an American Policy, ed. by W. A. Beling, N. Y., State University Press, 1973.
- Middle East Oil and the Great Powers, 3rd ed., ed. by Shwadran & B. Wiley, Israel Program for Scientific Ties, N. Y., 1974.
- Miller, D. W., Moore, C. D. The Middle East Yesterday and Today, Praeger Press, New York, 1970.

Nikitina, G., The State of Israel, Progress Publishers, Moscow 1973.

O'Brien, P. K., The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System: From Private Enterprise to Socialism, 1952-1965, London, 1966.

Pahlevi, M. R. Shah, Mission for My Country, London, 1960.

Pennar, J., The USSR and the Arabs, Billing & Sons Ltd., London 1973.

Peretz, D., The Middle East Today, Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1971.

Peretz, D., Wilson, E. M., Ward, R. J., A Palestine Entity, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D. C., 1970.

Political Dictionary of the Middle East, ed. by Y. Shimoni and E. Levine, rev. ed., Quadrangle/New York Times Book Co., New York, 1974.

Quandt, W. B., Jaber, R. F., Lesch, A. M., The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism, University of California Press, London, 1974.

Robinson, J., Palestine and the United States, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., 1947.

Rodinson, M., Israel and the Arabs, Pantheon Books, New York, 1968.

Rondot, P., The Changing Patterns of the Middle East 1919-1958, Praeger Press, New York, 1961.

Safran, N., From War to War, Pegasus, New York, 1969.

Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, London, 1965.

Sharabii, H., Palestine and Israel, Pegasus, New York, 1969.

Soviet Naval Policy, ed., by M. McGwire, K. Booth and J. McDonnel, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1975.

Soviet Russia and the Middle East, ed. by A. S. Klieman, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1970.

Stocking, G. W., Middle East Oil: A Study in Political and Economic Controversy, Vanderbilt Press, 1970.

Stoessinger, J. G., The United Nations and the Super Powers, Random House, New York, 1967.

Sykes, J., The Mountain Arabs, Chilton Book Co., Philadelphia, Pa., 1968.

Tahtinen, D. R., The Arab-Israeli Military Balance Today, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D. C., 1973.

The USSR and the Middle East, ed. by M. Cofino & S. Shamir, Keter Press, Jerusalem, Israel, 1973.

Vicker, R., The Kingdom of Oil, Chas. Scribner's Sons, New York, 1974.

Williams, W. A., America and the Middle East, Rinehart and Co., New York, 1958.

Zionism: Instrument of Imperialist Reaction, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, USSR, English ed., 1970.

DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS: UNITED NATIONS

Jerusalem 1947-1969, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1970.

Palestine Refugees 1948-1967, Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1970.

US Policy in the Middle East 1956-1967, Department of State USCAO, Washington, D. C., 1967.

DOCUMENT COLLECTIONS: US GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE DOCUMENTS, OFFICE OF MEDIA SERVICES
RELEASE;

584-229/4, October 1974.

Series 9, May 1975.

172/51, 26 March 1975.

Press Conference, 25 February 1975.

News Release, 6 March 1975.

Interview, 6 May 1975, PR387/64.

Revised Release, 1 September 1975.

GIST-Security Assistance, December 1975, PR506 1-2.

US Foreign Policy Overview, May 1975.

Press Release, PR596/79.

Press Release, PR297/56.

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS;

Report to Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
"Realities in the Middle East", 94th Congress, US
Government Printing Office, 52-743, 1975.

JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE;

25 June 1975.

**FEDERAL BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE; ALL ENTRIES FROM
MIDDLE EAST SECTION;**

1973-18 October.

1974-1 March, 24 March, 31 May, 3 June, 6 June, 27
August, 7 October, 8 November, 20 November,
31 December.

1975-3 September.

NEWSPAPERS:

Boston Sunday Globe, 2 September 1975.

London Times, 19 November 1974.

New York Times, 30 March 1974.

Wall Street Journal, 1974-11 January, 8 May, 24 May, 5
September, 30 October, 11 November, 22 November,
27 December.

Washington Post, 26 September 1973.

PERIODICALS:

An Nahar Arab Report, 26 February 1973.

Arab Report and Record, 1-15 April 1972.

Arab World Weekly, 22 January 1972.

Aviation Week and Space Technology, Report, "Both Sides of
Suez", November 1975.

Foreign Affairs Quarterly, Safran, N., "Engagement in the
Middle East", v. 54, p. 57, October 1974.

International Studies Quarterly, Perlmutter, A., "Crisis
Management", 1975.

Journal of International Affairs, Quandt, W. B., "Kissinger and the Arab-Israeli Disengagement Negotiations", v. 9, #1, p. 38, 1975.

Middle East Economic Digest, 28 December 1974.

PAMPHLETS:

Adelphi Papers:

#26, "Sources of Conflict in the Middle East", Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 1966.

#53, "Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy", Institute for Strategic Studies, London, December 1968.

#11, "Arab-Israeli War, October 1973, Background and Events", London, 1974.

Arab Views, vol. XVI, #I, New York, January 1970, pp. 1-11.

Arab Israeli Dispute, Seminar at Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge University, December 1970.

Current History:

"The Middle East, 1971", vol. 160, #353, Philadelphia, January 1971.

"Africa, 1971", vol. 60, #355, Philadelphia, March 1971.

Editorial Research Reports:

"American Policy in the Middle East", Ralph C. Deans, vol. II, #7, Washington, D. C., August 1970.

"Arab Guerillas", Hoyt Gimlin, vol. I, #16, Washington, D. C., April 1969.

International Conciliation, "Issues Before the 23rd General Assembly", Carnegie Endowment, #569, New York, September 1968.

International Documents on Palestine, Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970.

Israeli Office of Information Reports:

"Arab Refugees", Ambassador M. S. Comay, New York, 1959.

"Arab Refugees", Abba Eban, New York, 1955.