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# STUDENT ESSAY

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⑥ THE ANSWER TO RESERVE COMPONENT  
READINESS - AFFILIATION.

⑨ Student essay,  
BY

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USAWC ESSAY

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THE ANSWER TO RESERVE COMPONENT  
READINESS - AFFILIATION

by

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This essay examines the impact of the Affiliation/Roundout Program on the readiness posture of the reserve components. It delves into command and control and the purposes of the Army Readiness Region in the program. The research relies heavily on responses from the commanders, both Active Army and Reserve Components, of the units presently involved in the program. The conclusions reached are that this is a viable, strong and active program that has produced results. The participants are enthusiastic to develop a true One Army. The assistance in training, by the sponsor units have greatly increased the proficiency of the affiliated units. The program has produced dividends by upgrading the readiness condition of the reserve component units at minimal costs. Command and control is not a problem, as the parties understand the relationship and are working toward a common goal, readiness. The Army Readiness Regions are a necessity and contribute to the program. It is recommended that the program be expanded to include as many units as feasible.

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## BACKGROUND

The purpose of the Reserve Forces of the Army, described in section 262, Title 10, United States Code, is to provide the Active Army with those trained units and individuals needed in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, Army National Guard units and individuals must be trained and ready to perform state missions in time of emergency or disaster. Today's requirements of the citizen-soldier are greater than ever, while his role has become meaningful and important to the future military planning of the United States.

There is little comparison between today's units and those that date to the founding years. In virtually all past US wars, it was necessary to rely extensively on citizen-soldiers, although limited resources were made available to them for training. Fortunately, since World War II, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve have undergone a series of dramatic revisions in order to be better responsive to the needs of the Active Army. This concept continues today and is vividly illustrated in the Reserve Component Affiliation Program.

The affiliation program associates selected reserve component combat and combat support units with Active Army divisions. It is directive in nature, fully funded, and designed primarily to provide additional combat power in support of contingency plans. Only integral reserve component units, such as separate brigades and separate

battalions, are considered for the affiliation program.<sup>2</sup> Roundout units, which identify a reserve component unit to a specific Active Army division to bring it to a "standard configuration," are also included in the affiliation program.

Active Army divisions are tasked to provide training support to affiliated units, particularly to improve their readiness posture. This affiliation includes necessary instructional support and equipment as required, inclusion of affiliated units in exercises, and evaluation of affiliated units during Annual Training. Yearly training programs are developed in close consultation with all headquarters in the chain of command.

The most significant advantage of affiliation is that the Active Army division commander will share in the support of training the reserve component unit. This allows both component commands to become familiar with each other's methods of operations before activation, thus reducing the post-mobilization training time. For too many years, the Active Army has simply been the "evaluator" of training in the reserve components, not having a direct responsibility in monitoring and assisting in training. As a present reserve component affiliated brigade commander stated, "This is the best thing that has happened to the reserve components of the Army in its long history."<sup>3</sup>

Affiliation is an expansion of a concept which has been in use for some time. The first, limited test of how this might work in practice was undertaken during the summer of 1970 at Fort Hood, Texas. Five Army

National Guard battalions from four states, and one reserve battalion from another, were attached to either the 1st or 2d Armored Division for their two-weeks training period. The consensus of reaction from the Guard organizations spokesmen was that they liked it fine.<sup>4</sup>

Each year, since its inception, affiliation or roundout has been expanded by adding reserve component units to the program. There are currently 91 affiliated battalions and the number is expected to maximize at 102 within the next year. Although expansion is justified, it must be accomplished with caution. Though Active Army commanders have determined that support of the program has produced no significant degradation to the readiness of their commands to date, the impact of an expanded program has yet to be determined. Obviously, expansion will also be somewhat restrictive to the availability of funds, both for training and equipment.

The sponsor divisions and separate brigades listed below have participated in the affiliation program for the past two years. Only the 29th Infantry Brigade is a true roundout unit.

<u>Active Army Unit</u>	<u>Affiliated RC Unit</u>	<u>Component</u>
1st Inf Div (M)	32d Inf Bde (M)	WI ARNG
4th Inf Div (M)	67th Inf Bde (M)	NE ARNG
9th Inf Div	81st Inf Bde (M)	WA ARNG
25th Inf Div	29th Inf Bde	HI ARNG
101st Abn Div	39th Inf Bde	AR ARNG

Obviously, there are many other units in the affiliation program of battalion size. These include some 14 maneuver battalions, 18 artillery battalions, 19 engineer battalions, and five signal battalions. Two



additional separate brigades have recently been added to the program, both are Army National Guard units, and are expected to become roundout units of two new Active Army divisions. Our State of Louisiana will provide its own 256th Infantry Brigade as a new affiliated unit to the 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and is a significant cause for the subject of this essay.

The affiliation program is related to the defense department's plan for general purpose forces, in conjunction with our allies, to deal simultaneously with one major attack and one lesser contingency. Accordingly, most of the affiliated units would be operationally attached to divisions at least during the initial combat period, probably in Central Europe, but also likely in Northeast Asia. Central Europe is the most important of these deployments, because of the powerful forces from the Soviet Union and its allies that lie in such close proximity to it.<sup>5</sup>

To be useful, our reserve component units, particularly the affiliated units, must have a high standard of readiness. Whether they do, and whether they are worth their costs, are questions that affiliation and roundout anticipatively will provide the answers. As alluded to earlier, a base of two years experience is available to build this usefulness on and, both the Active Army and the reserve components, are displaying a "can do" attitude toward accomplishing this goal.

Although affiliation is a definite plus, we must also recognize the restrictions and limitations of reserve components. The citizen-soldier is a citizen first and then a soldier. He must be better skilled in his

civilian occupation than he is in his military occupation, while caring for a family and being a good citizen in the community. Likewise, the community must recognize the need for a strong reserve component and support it, particularly with its life-blood, the members.

Many times a reserve component unit will be reorganized or relocated because of strength or other community related problems. The Active Army sponsor unit can provide little assistance in this area, which very definitely restricts the affiliation program. In the Army National Guard, state control is still prevalent and all personnel, equipment, and funding will remain in the Guard's chain-of-command.

The defense department also provides some built-in limitations, as it determines priorities on funding and equipment. Generally, affiliated units have been receiving a high priority, but as more units become affiliated, the resources become more limited. Unfortunately, in many instances, reserve component equipment and Active Army equipment are either incompatible or have significantly differing support needs, which restricts the support that can be provided by the sponsor unit.<sup>6</sup> This equipment problem is especially critical for roundout units in the affiliation program.

Every effort was made to affiliate as closely, geographically, as possible.<sup>7</sup> However, the need to affiliate like type units resulted in many reserve component units being separated from sponsor units by relatively long distances. Again, a restriction on the program, because of funds needed to provide Active Army support teams to affiliated units. In all

cases, these are additional funds required for training assistance beyond that normally provided the reserve components.

Finally, a reserve component unit has a limited amount of training time available to attain and sustain a high level of readiness. Training plans must be developed based on this available time that will be progressive, but meaningful and interesting to the citizen-soldier. Specific yearly requirements and objectives should be established, after coordination with appropriate headquarters, that focus on preparing the affiliated unit for deployment as a combat ready unit. To the maximum extent practicable, training plans should provide for cross-attachment between Active Army and reserve component units during training and exercises, as a means to maximize available expertise.

#### THE ARMY REORGANIZATION

Any paper on the affiliation program must also address the Army's "Steadfast" reorganization and its continued need for the Army Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups. Active Army and reserve component commanders, who are presently involved in the affiliation program, were asked to comment on the need for region and group support to a brigade that has a sponsor division to assist it. Some of the more pertinent replies will be presented as this essay covers this and other related subjects.

Initially, one must briefly review the Steadfast reorganization and its intended goal of assisting reserve component units in achieving improved readiness. Under Steadfast, each continental U S Army is subdivided

into Army Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups, introducing a fresh new approach to assisting reserve component commanders. As the name implies, each region is totally dedicated to reserve component readiness. Ideally, each region organizes mobile functional teams capable of providing hands-on, down-to-earth, practical assistance at the time and place needed.<sup>8</sup> Obviously, the objectives of Steadfast are very similar to affiliation and close coordination becomes a necessity.

Without exception, reserve component commanders are complimentary on the support provided by the region and groups. Active Army expertise has been made available that was not feasible in the past, due to other priorities and geographical locations. Likewise, shortcomings and problem areas have been exposed by the assistance teams that cause commanders to re-evaluate their programs and procedures.

The region accomplishes its missions through the readiness coordinators, readiness groups, advisors, and other resources organic to the reserve component or Active Army units. It coordinates support and other assistance requirements directly with Active Army installations located in their areas of responsibility as necessary.<sup>9</sup> This concept is designed to improve the management of reserve component training through application of specialized resources and skills according to need and priority.

The region is not in the chain of command between the continental U S Army and the reserve, nor is it in the Army National Guard command structure. It is an extension of the Army headquarters and its commander

serves as a deputy commander for training and readiness of reserve component units within his region.

Under the 1973 reorganization, battalion advisors for reserve component units were deleted from all but a few selected units and those manpower assets (spaces) were consolidated with the Army readiness regions. Removing most of the battalion level advisors was a very significant aspect of Steadfast. However, the reserve component units need for assistance were usually in a wide variety of areas, such as maintenance, administration, field training exercises, etc. The average battalion level advisor did not have the expertise to give the "hands-on" type of help needed in such a variety of areas.<sup>10</sup> Larger reserve components did, however, retain their dedicated Army Advisor, although the size of the advisory elements in these units was reduced. It is also significant to point out that the advisor is now a part of the readiness region and serves as an extension of that headquarters; particularly to coordinate mobile training team assistance to reserve component units.

Most of the responses from division commanders were favorable toward the continued need for readiness region support. A sampling of their replies is shown below:

With respect to Army Readiness Region support for affiliated units, there continues to be a need for this relationship, at least as in the case of our program. The readiness region has a group of highly qualified individuals located close at hand to provide assistance. If the division were located closer to the brigade, we could assume these duties, but my judgment is that the day-to-day support can best be provided by a dedicated organization such as the readiness region.<sup>11</sup>

The primary mission of the ARR's and the Active Army sponsor divisions in the affiliation program, simply stated, is to assist in improving the readiness posture of the reserve components. To accomplish this mission, the two ARR's within the 6th U S Army area have each established three readiness groups. The readiness groups provide branch assistance to the RC units within their geographical boundaries. The ARR's through their respective readiness groups can readily provide assistance in writing and administering CPX's, FTX's and small unit tactical problems. Likewise, they provide assistance in the area of supply and administration, maintenance and maintenance instruction; however, the readiness groups are limited in their capability to lend assistance where large numbers of troops or large quantities of equipment are required. Thus, through close coordination, the division sponsor units and the ARR's can each accomplish their RC support mission by performing the training tasks for which is best suited.<sup>12</sup>

Army Readiness Region (ARR) support to the brigade does provide assistance which is not available within the division. I am sure that if ARR's did not exist, the division could, with coordination, obtain additional special assets now obtained through ARR's. An excellent example of support not available within the division assets and coordinated by ARR personnel occurred just prior to AT 1975. The brigade's cavalry troop was converted to M551 Sheridan Tanks about one month before AT. ARR personnel assisted in preparing a complete training program to include support from Fort Hood, Texas, and the Armor/Tank command.<sup>13</sup>

In addition to the above, it is significant to point out that most of the memorandum of understanding and letters of instruction includes guidelines or coordination instructions for using readiness region assets. The emphasis is directed to providing all available assistance to the reserve component unit as it strives to attain an improved level of combat readiness.

Affiliated brigade commanders replies on the continued need for readiness region support seem to parallel their sponsor divisions. Generally, they are pleased to receive assistance from all resources,

if it is meaningful and will help their unit attain its readiness objective.

A sampling of their replies is shown below:

The training support from both agencies has been excellent. Support from the division normally is given by personnel serving in the same MOS (i. e., Mortarmen teaching our Mortarmen). These people are living the role they are teaching. Our ARR would like more opportunities to assist us. The assistance not available from division is normally provided by ARR.<sup>14</sup>

The training support from a sponsor division is comparable to that provided by readiness regions/groups. However, there is a much greater source available from the division. We do feel there is a requirement for continued ARR/Group support, since these personnel have become familiar with administrative and supply requirements peculiar to the National Guard. An Active Army unit does not have occasion to work with ARNG directives and also experience a higher turn-over return of personnel.<sup>15</sup>

Training support from the division compared to the readiness group is on a par generally, although if anything, the group is superior. We do have an outstanding group, who are committed wholeheartedly to assisting the brigade. They have conducted some outstanding training for us, and we make heavy use of them; however, they are organized mainly in the basic combat skills areas, i. e., up through infantry platoon only, company level training comes from our own assets or from the divisions MTT's. We use the group heavily due to proximity, but I would see no reason for both so long as the sponsor division was physically closer.<sup>16</sup>

The reply from our only roundout brigade commander, Brigadier General Yoshimasu, is unique because his state of Hawaii does not have a readiness region. General Yoshimasu replied:

We do not have an ARR in Hawaii. Recently, the USASC command was given the mission to function in the role of the ARR with the dedicated advisors centralized into the Hawaii Command. How the new set up will work is still to be seen. However, with the direct, close and all-out support from the 25th, I see no real advantage of the ARR's getting into the picture. General Brooks has often stated at his commanders' conference that roundout is the number

two priority of the five priorities he has set for the division. We have established a sister battalion or gaining command relationship identifying all the roundout units down to battalions and separate companies married up with counterparts in the division. Any support requested is readily available from these sister units. In fact, the CG expects his commanders, staff and support personnel out with the 29th Brigade units each time the brigade is conducting Inactive Duty Training. At this point in time, the division will have 175 to 190 dedicated individuals with the brigade during its AT, 9 - 23 August, to serve as evaluators, instructors, test personnel, weapons specialists, etc. In my capacity as Assistant Division Commander, designee (support) for General Brooks, I play a major role in assisting him in roundout. 17

Certainly, the need for readiness region support to affiliated units, like all functions of the Army, will be under constant review. It is likely that the regions and groups will provide less assistance to the affiliated units, but this will simply allow them to devote their effort to other reserve component units. Additionally, they will continue to coordinate assistance outside the capability of the sponsor divisions or when technical assistance may be needed.

Our research does, however, justify a change in the region commander's role in establishing or approving training objectives or levels for affiliated units. The sponsor division commander should be charged with reviewing the annual training evaluation report and recommending the training level. It seems obvious that the division and brigade commanders will be more familiar with training capabilities and training needs, and will have closer and more frequent coordination.



## CHAIN-OF-COMMAND

Both roundout and affiliation present potential problems in chain-of-command relationships between Active and Guard units which the National Guard Bureau has spelled-out to forestall tangles. The bureau is the legal channel of communication with the states; communication to the units must be through the State Adjutant General; the Guard commander is responsible for his unit's training; the training level must be commensurate with the unit's training level objective; training programs must be coordinated; brigade unit integrity will not be violated, and all personnel, equipment and funding will remain under Guard control unless otherwise coordinated.<sup>18</sup>

Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution states Congress has the power "to lay and collect taxes" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."<sup>19</sup> Sections 501 through 505 of Title 32, US Code, outlines the dual status of the Army National Guard and its requirement to conform to the training guidelines of the Army.

Commanders of sponsor divisions and affiliated brigades agree that the command relationship that existed within the reserve component units prior to implementation of the affiliation program remain in effect. They encourage direct contact between sponsor units and their affiliates

as well as between respective staffs. This contact is predicated upon keeping higher headquarters informed and upon the principle of non-interference in the chain-of-command.

### PROGRAM IMPROVEMENT

The wheels of affiliation have been in motion for two years and seem to be rolling at a respectable pace. Under the watchful eyes of dedicated soldiers and civilians, the program is producing better trained reserve component units than the Army has ever possessed. Like all projects or undertakings, there continues to be room for improvement, particularly with demands for readiness increasing each training year.

Throughout this paper we have emphasized the effort being taken by all agencies to improve readiness in the reserve components. However, it must be made clear that no effort will be successful unless reserve component unit members are willing to prepare themselves for this all-important mission. There is a definite need for rededication of individual Guardsmen and Reservists to carrying out the responsibilities they have accepted by enlistment or appointment. With the all-volunteer Army, some personnel turbulence is occurring and it will likely continue until affiliation is a fully accepted program by citizen-soldiers.

Actions must be and are being taken to improve the affiliation program. The questionnaires sent to commanders of sponsor divisions and affiliated brigades generated some comments that seem very appropriate. Significant ones were:

Needless to say, there must be give and take, but we have

been successful in establishing a relationship based on mutual respect and on the knowledge that our desire is to help the brigade become as professional as possible. Last year, the brigade had already determined what its IDT would be and, for the most part, what AR would be. The division's early role was purely in response to the brigade's request. This is not the most productive if the training expertise of the Active Army is to be fully utilized.<sup>20</sup>

Our best vehicle for the overall planning of Active Army training support to the brigade has been found to be a semi-annual training conference normally held at the brigade headquarters and attended by representatives of the division, post reserve affairs, readiness region, readiness group, state headquarters, and the brigade. At these meetings, all projected training support requests are identified for the next six-month time frame. Each of the support conferees select those requirements best filled by their own expertise with the primary support being provided by the sponsor division.<sup>21</sup>

The affiliation concept has developed between the brigade and division as a sister-unit concept. Working this way, we have learned and benefited from each other as the program has progressed. The only additional guidance to the memorandum of understanding that the division has initiated is our letter of instruction on affiliation.<sup>22</sup>

The guidance from DA, FORSCOM, TRADOC, and other headquarters have been most adequate as we see it on how roundout is to be implemented. The guts of the total is simply mobilization readiness. We need to get the bodies on board, equip and train them with the assistance from the division so that when the balloon goes up we can mobilize and deploy with the division as its third brigade to any operational area. No additional directives can help in this respect. The success or failure of this top priority program depends entirely upon the attitude of the top commanders involved.<sup>23</sup>

How can the program be improved to insure desired mobilization time in consonance with the Active Army counterpart? Many comments in this paper have alluded to some problem areas in the affiliation program and suggestions on what corrective action is needed.

Realistically, a mobilization time in consonance with the sponsor division is not practical. We see continued improvement in the affiliated unit's readiness posture, but greatly dependent on personnel and materiel resources.

The program must continue to be fully funded to achieve its objectives. Track III of the affiliation program is now beginning, which eventually adds three new separate brigades to affiliation.

Accordingly, the following is a synopsis of FY 77 - 81 cost estimates:<sup>24</sup>

<u>Appropriation</u>	<u>Command</u>	<u>Amount</u>
OMA	FORSCOM/TRADOC	\$ 1.6M
OMAR	FORSCOM	\$ 2.9M
OMARNG	NGB	\$ 4.0M
NGPA	NGB	\$ 5.2M
PRA	FORSCOM	\$ .4M
MCARNG	NGB	\$ 2.4M*
TOTAL		\$16.5M*
		\$14.1M**

\*FY 77 only

\*\*Total per Fiscal Year 78 - 81

Significant in the cost estimate are funds for sponsor unit liaison with affiliated reserve component units, training individuals and units at Army service schools, and mandays and travel for special training. This effort develops mutual trust by all components, which has been a significant factor in the success in the program. Too many times in the past has the expertise been available to assist the citizen-soldier, but money was not available to bring the two together.

Likewise, equipment must be provided to the affiliated unit if it must attain a higher mobilization readiness status. It has been suggested that the next war will be a "come as you are war." Admittedly, reserve

component units should train and become proficient with the equipment they have been issued. However, if divisions and affiliated units are to deploy and fight together, equipment standards must be compatible and support needs (repair parts and ammunition) the same.

Without exception, the responses to our questionnaires reflected that sponsor divisions were providing standard authorized equipment and qualified instructors to train affiliated units. It seems only logical that procurement of specific items of equipment for the reserve component unit to raise present equipment levels to ALO-1 should be programmed and accomplished without delay. If this action is not completed, we could easily be faced with a problem of operators trained on one type of equipment and trying to perform with another type.

Another step forward can be achieved for affiliated units by greater use of the sponsor division's directives (standing operating procedures, communication-electronic operating instructions, etc.). An exchange of policy letters, training programs, publications, newspapers, and some standing operating procedures have proven to be an asset at each level of command, particularly at squad and platoon level.<sup>25</sup> Obviously, if a unit is expected to deploy and fight with a division, it should know and understand the current operation procedures.

Our experience has shown that the separate brigade in the reserve components has attempted to train without a higher tactical headquarters, thereby functioning with limited or no operation procedures. Too many times the unit was forced to play the part of its own higher headquarters

in order to include realism in field exercises, particularly command post exercises. Limited opportunities to work or train with an Active Army division in an exercise have proven beneficial to staffs of battalions and brigades. Certainly, conducting the exercises with the same division, under their constant supervision or monitorship, will only improve proficiency.

All of these actions will certainly improve the affiliation program and should receive emphasis at the appropriate command level. A word of caution though; training priority in the reserve components, likewise in the Active Army, must first be directed to increased proficiency at "the cutting edge." Well-trained squads, sections, and platoons, who can execute orders and missions as efficient teams, are essential before any advanced training level can be obtained. Affiliation provides the opportunity for these key junior leaders to work together, and for an understanding and appreciation for each other's problems. General Bernard Rogers, Commander of U S Army Forces Command, explained it exceptionally well when he said: "We all must do everything we can in training to indoctrinate our young soldiers, our teams and crews, and our junior leaders in what to expect and how to react during that first battle which we are dedicated to winning."<sup>26</sup>

#### CONCLUSIONS

It would be simple to conclude that affiliation is an effective program, and obviously it is. A true total force has been talked about for many years, starting with the term "one Army concept" and now "the total

force policy." The "gut" feeling throughout the Army is that affiliation will make the total force a reality and provide the average taxpayer a dividend for his money.

Our questionnaires provided some interesting and pertinent conclusions. Some of the more significant ones from the sponsor divisions were:

There has been a marked improvement in the readiness posture of the brigade and is reflected by their readiness reports.<sup>27</sup>

The readiness posture of our affiliated brigade has improved during the past 16 months of its affiliation with the division. During this time the brigade has realized an increase in their Forces Activity Designator (FAD) from a FAD IV to a FAD III and an increase in their Department of the Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) also. This has significantly improved the brigade's priority for receipt of equipment and consequently improved their overall readiness posture. This improvement has been noted and reported on their FORSTAT reports. We feel that our affiliation program is tracking smoothly and is not only improving the readiness posture of the reserve components, but is enhancing ours as well.<sup>28</sup>

In addressing the brigade's readiness posture, I can only say that their readiness, from the logistical viewpoint, will improve because of their selection as an affiliated unit. By providing instruction on equipment not available (at this time) to the brigade, we are assisting personnel in their MOS test preparation. The AT periods have also become more interesting due to the fact that we provide aviation assets to the brigade for airmobile training. The total package hopefully provides the brigade with some recruiting and retention incentives.<sup>29</sup>

Comments from the affiliated brigades seem more significant since they compare training efficiency before and after affiliation. Since a major source in gathering information for this paper was the questionnaires,

it seemed appropriate to make this first-hand information available.

They included:

Substantial gains have been made in hard skill MOS training. During IDT mobile training teams from the division have come to our armories/unit training sites and provided excellent training. We do not have GSR equipment in our inventory and the division has brought it with them. Redeye training has made great advancements due to the moving target simulator (MTS) at Fort Carson.<sup>30</sup>

We feel the overall brigade readiness has definitely improved; however it cannot be seen in the FORSTAT reports as far as C-ratings go. Another area that has definitely improved has been where we have used the division to provide examiners, such as tank preliminary gunnery exams and tank tables. We had top-notch examiners who gave a very fair, Active Army standards evaluation. We must say an unqualified "yes" to improved meaningful staff training, since we gained from several aspects. Heretofore, each unit had to develop their own staff training program and present it with their own instructors. This ranged from very good to a very poor presentation depending upon the emphasis put on it by the commanders. The division prepared and presented a formal 12 hour staff instruction, prepared and administered a map exercise, and invited brigade observers/participants in exercises at Fort Riley and Exercise Reforger. The division sent the best people they could for these efforts, so we got extra benefits from that association.<sup>31</sup>

Our brigade REDCON has improved and this improvement is reflected on FORSTAT reports. Most important, is the actual improvement in individual skills which can be directly attributed to instruction and assistance provided by mobile training teams from sponsor units. The quality of CPX's has definitely improved. Since the assets of the division G-3 plans section are available for writing CPX and FTX scenarios, a definite improvement of quality and realistic exercises has been realized.<sup>32</sup>

Affiliation has an impact on the Army National Guard - for those who are, or may be involved, which is almost as great as that of the wheel on civilization. In comparing it with changes in training procedures of the Army National Guard throughout the years, I think nothing has reflected



such a dynamic change in training methods since the requirement for all non-prior enlistees to attend basic and advanced individual training was initiated. As a matter of fact this program, in my opinion, is one of the most overt advances toward the "one force." It is very simple for generals and colonels to espouse the "one force" policy and believe it - however, it is quite another thing to have junior officers, senior NCO's and in fact all enlisted men of each component working together toward one common goal and understanding and appreciating each other's problems.<sup>33</sup>

Roundout with the Active Army for elements of the Hawaii Army National Guard is really nothing new. We have been closely affiliated since the end of World War II and have been receiving outstanding support from them for all these years. The roundout program is merely a formal identity of the brigade to become the 3d brigade of the division upon mobilization. I support this concept 100 percent and my views have the blessings of our Adjutant General and the all out support of the Active Army commands locally.<sup>34</sup>


Perhaps the most significant conclusion to be drawn from the questionnaires is the positive attitude of participants in the affiliation program, both active and reserve components. To many of these participants, it does provide a livelihood. But the majority are either citizen-soldiers or professional-soldiers who have a primary occupation to pursue. There is of course nothing new in this positive attitude for the American soldier, but it is new for two components to work so close together in a peacetime environment. Expansion of the affiliation program will provide an even greater opportunity for the Army to improve association of its own components, while increasing readiness.

Finally, the Active Army will do more than evaluate and criticize reserve component training. It will assist in planning the training, providing first-hand experience in developing sound, realistic programs.

It will assist in conducting the program, providing the expertise and professionalism of the world's best military organization. It will evaluate the effectiveness of the training and, where appropriate, recommend a course of action to improve or correct any shortcomings. In so doing, the professional-soldier will become more professional and gain in knowledge of the citizen-soldier, who he may later be required to deploy and fight with.

The Guard/Reserve must also be willing to give and take. It must accept the fact that the Active Army is well qualified to plan training and does possess the expertise to present a meaningful training program. It must listen to the constructive criticism and recommendations of the evaluators, and take the appropriate action to make a truly "total force." The reserve component brigade or battalion, like the Active Army, must be willing to associate in order to affiliate with or roundout its sponsor division.

  
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ROY L. NOMEY  
LTC, IN

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4. The National Guardsman, Roundout, October 1970, p. 12.
5. James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977, p. I-17.
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8. Glenn D. Walker, LTG, Commander First Army, "First US Army: A New Challenge", Army, October 1973, p. 73.
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12. John Q. Henion, MG, Commander 9th Inf Div, letter to author, p. 3.
13. John W. McEnery, MG, Commander 101st Abn Div, letter to author, p. 2.
14. George H. Fairfield, BG, Commander, 67th Inf Bde (M), letter to author, p. 2.
15. Richard N. Owens, LTC, Executive Officer, 81st Inf Bde (M), letter to author, p. 1.
16. Barry W. Young, LTC, Command Admin Asst, 32d Inf Bde (M), p. 2.
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19. Theodor Galdi, "Command and Control of Army National Guard Units, The Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, 13 August 1970, p. LRS 1.
20. Fuller, p. 1.
21. Richard A. Scholtes, COL, Chief of Staff, 4th Inf Div (M), letter to author, p. 1.
22. McEnery, p. 2.
23. Yoshimasu, p. 3.
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26. Bernard W. Rogers, GEN, Commander, FORSCOM, Realism in Training, 18 June 1975, p. 1.
27. Scholtes, p. 1.
28. Henion, p. 2.
29. McEnery, p. 2.
30. Fairfield, p. 2.
31. Young, p. 1.
32. Owens, p. 1.
33. Ibid, inclosure 1, p. 1 and 2.
34. Yoshimasu, p. 1.

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