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# STUDENT ESSAY

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
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## THE TRAINING DIVISION AS A MOBILIZATION ASSET

BY

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INFANTRY



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THE TRAINING DIVISION AS A MOBILIZATION ASSET

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20 October 1975

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ABSTRACT

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There are 12 US Army Reserve Training Divisions, each with a mobilization mission to assume command and control of an Army Training Center and to conduct basic and advanced individual training for approximately 12,000 personnel. This mission is appropriate for a military buildup required by a conventional conflict of a World War II or Korea variety. But, given the long time frames between <sup>Training</sup> Division mobilization and its end product <sup>trained soldiers</sup>, soldiers who have completed basic and advanced individual training-- the mission should be reexamined and <sup>should consider the use of the Training Divisions for other types and intensities of warfare.</sup> ~~should consider the use of the Training Divisions for other types and intensities of warfare.~~ The essay examines: (1) the total time frame from mobilization of the Training Division to production of the "basic" soldier; (2) the numbers of Training Divisions <sup>TD's</sup> and training centers available for use; ~~upon mobilization~~ (3) the difficulties inherent in seeking to determine the probabilities of certain intensities of types of warfare; and (4) alternative roles for the ~~Training Divisions.~~ <sup>TD's.</sup> The essay concludes that a national emergency and mobilization should involve the ~~Training Divisions in two ways:~~ <sup>TD's by:</sup> (1) the immediate callup of Divisions which have functional training sites available to them and the beginning of the training cycle, and (2) the ~~utilization of non-mobilized Training Divisions for meeting the special training and testing needs of active army and activated reserve component units, as well as for training non-unit reservists called to active duty.~~

TD's to meet both

## THE TRAINING DIVISIONS: A 1975 PORTRAIT

There are 12 Training Divisions in the current force structure of the U.S. Army Reserve.<sup>1</sup> The mobilization mission of these Divisions is to operate Army Training Centers (ATCs). Each is a two-star general officer command with complete general and special staff sections and major subordinate units capable of providing both basic combat and advanced individual training. Apart from the nomenclature of the Divisions and their subordinate units-- Brigades, Battalions and Companies-- there is little similarity between these organizations and the traditional "Division." They are, in fact, training commands.

The subordinate unit inventory of the Divisions vary, but includes a Headquarters and some combination of Basic Combat Training (BCT), Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Combat Support Training (CST) Brigades, each of which is organized into Battalions and Companies, a Committee Group which provides general combat subject training, a Support Battalion and, in some Divisions, a Maneuver Training Command (MTC).

Overall, these Divisions are each capable of providing the command and control of an ATC and a large number of trainees-- 12,000 plus or minus-- and providing the complete range of basic training instruction from individual weapons and land navigation through the awarding of MOSs in such diverse specialty fields as communications, mechanics, clerks and cooks, and MOSs in the combat arms. The MTCs, an outgrowth of the larger Maneuver Area Command (MAC) structure, give some of the Divisions the additional mission and capability of planning, preparing, conducting and controlling company and battalion size command post exercises, field training exercises and army training tests.

Strength varies among the Divisions according to their configurations, but generally falls within the range of 2500 to 3000 personnel. Although changes to the tables of organization of the Divisions have occurred several times since first organized in the late 1950s and TDA's probably will be established in the near future to permit tailoring of the Divisions to mobilization ATC's, strength is likely to remain stable at the current level. Using the 2500 strength figure, the 12 Divisions collectively have some 30,000 officer and enlisted personnel assigned, approximately 15 percent of the total strength of the active Army Reserve. This percentage, however, does not reflect accurately the personnel investment in Training Divisions, for mobilization would result in a number of supporting organizations already in the Army Reserve inventory being appended to the Divisions to roundout the resources required to operate the ATCs. Included among these appendages are reception stations, garrison units, medical, military police, engineer units and the like. Combined with Division strengths, the total personnel commitment to the Training Division concept may be very nearly one-third of the entire Army Reserve strength of just over 200,000 personnel. It bears emphasis that a commitment to Training Divisions is a non-commitment to other types of organizations and missions: thus, there is a mandate, given this substantial personnel commitment, to insure that the potential of these Divisions is maximized.

Annual evaluations confirm that the Training Divisions are able to accomplish their mobilization mission: that capability is not challenged, although three separate but related questions are surfaced in this essay:

1. what are the time frames for accomplishment of the Training Division mission?

2. what is the probability that the Training Division mission is relevant?
3. what are the alternative missions which might be accomplished by the Training Divisions?

#### TIME FRAMES FOR TRAINING DIVISIONS

The end product of the Training Division after its own mobilization is a soldier who has completed basic combat and advanced individual training and is ready for assignment to a unit. The significant events which collectively fill the overall time frame for the Division are six in number:

1. the mobilization of the Training Division and arrival at the mobilization station/ATC;
2. the preparation of the ATC to receive both the Training Division and trainees;
3. the reinstatement or reenactment of the draft by the Congress and the operationalizing of the legislation to include re-establishment of draft boards and the entire selective service process;
4. the reporting time for draftees from the date of being ordered to duty until arrival at the ATC;
5. the length of time required for trainees to complete basic training, currently 16 weeks, more or less;
6. the administrative time before, during and after basic training including in- and out-processing, travel, leave; and
7. although not a Training Division function, unit training with the unit of assignment after completion of basic training.



It is not important here to indicate with precision the amount of time involved in any one of these or related activities; indeed, some may be sequential or concurrent: It is, however, critical that the total accumulation of time be considered. General estimates suggest the following activity time frames:

1. the mobilization of the Training Division, from announcement of "callup" to closure at the mobilization site with all attached units (reception stations, garrison units, military police, etc.) in place, should not exceed 30 days. For the purposes of this essay, it is considered a given that the Division is capable of conducting the required training after closure at the ATC.
2. the preparation of the mobilization station to serve as an ATC may vary significantly from 0 to 180 or more days, as outlined below.
3. reinstatement or reenactment of selective service legislation by the Congress in a time of national emergency and the creation of selective service organizations and processes should not exceed 45 days, assuming that the standby draft legislation now in existence is terminated.
4. from receipt of notification of being drafted to arrival at the ATC should not exceed seven days.
5. although the length of basic training may be shortened during a national emergency, it should not exceed the current length of training, 16 weeks.
6. the total administrative time should not exceed two weeks; and
7. training with the unit of assignment (particularly for those

personnel joining combat organizations) should be calculated even though such unit training is a post-Training Division activity since it will significantly extend the total time frame.

Adding these estimates together and assuming only that the ATC is operational for training and the Division is prepared to conduct training, the first draftee would be ready for assignment to a unit at approximately Division mobilization plus 180 days. This is portrayed below:

| Activity Number | M-day      | Time Frame in Months |    |                                |   |   |    |           |
|-----------------|------------|----------------------|----|--------------------------------|---|---|----|-----------|
|                 |            | 1                    | 2  | 3                              | 4 | 5 | 6  | 7         |
| 1               | XXXXXXXX   |                      |    |                                |   |   |    |           |
| 2*              | XXXXXXXX   |                      |    |                                |   |   |    |           |
| 3**             | XXXXXXXXXX |                      |    |                                |   |   |    |           |
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| 6               |            |                      | OO |                                |   |   | OO |           |
| 7***            |            |                      |    |                                |   |   |    | XXXXXXX ? |

\* assumption: ATC is prepared to receive the Division and the trainees and the Division is prepared to conduct training

\*\* assumption: reenactment/reinstatement of the selective service system will take 45 days, the first 30 of which are concurrent with activity number 1

\*\*\* unit training after completion of basic training is not estimated here

It is important to emphasize that the 180 day estimate is probably optimal, although some considerable variations and reductions in time expended might occur if there were a reduction in the length of basic

training from 16 to 12 or 13 weeks, a standby draft authority were maintained, and so on. It is also important to note that a one day delay at the beginning of the mobilization sequence will result in a one day delay at the end of the sequence. Clearly, a sophisticated PERT/GANT chart could be prepared for presentation here, but the point to be emphasized is that the product of the Training Divisions-- a basic soldier ready to join a unit-- is months, not days or weeks away from mobilization.

The most important variable impinging upon the total time frame of the Training Divisions is the readiness of mobilization stations/ATCs. No other factor can impact as significantly on the capability of the Divisions to accomplish their mission. Although the number of ATCs varies over time (Fort Ord, for example, is scheduled to close out its ATC role early in 1976), there are not an adequate number of ATCs to immediately and concurrently accommodate 12 Divisions. Indeed, because of this, it would be necessary to PERT/GANT Training Divisions individually against an assigned mobilization station/ATC. Clearly, the Training Division scheduled for mobilization at an ATC currently functioning as an ATC (Fort Leonard Wood, for example) is in a distinctly unique situation from that Division which must mobilize at a site which is literally months away from readiness (Camp Roberts, for example).

In general terms, the mobilization stations/ATCs may be divided into broad categories, each of which adds a different time dimension to the total mobilization process. These classifications, with examples, and arranged in sequence of usage from least to most prepared include:

1. Installations which are inactive or only partially active

(Camp Roberts)

2. Installations which do not have an ATC function, but historically have been ATCs and could, with time and some resource investment, be reconverted to ATCs (Fort Lewis)
3. Installations which currently house an ATC and an active army Division (Fort Ord and the 7th Division)
4. Installations which have a very recent history of utilization as an ATC, now have a different function, and at which conversion back to an ATC would not require enormous time or resource investment (Fort Ord for several years after 1976)
5. Installations which are now serving as ATCs (Fort Leonard Wood).

Even though these distinctions may be blurred, the point to be emphasized is that 12 Training Divisions cannot at this time "start up" on M-day. And, since the number of available sites is changing and installations move from one to another of the above categories over time, individual PERT/GANT charts must be constructed and updated for each Division against a specific, designated installation.

To the major consideration of mobilization station/ATC readiness, two other factors impacting on accomplishment of the mobilization mission must be surfaced: the civilian work force available to support the mobilization stations/ATCs and the transition from TO&Es to TDAs. There is a requirement for a civilian work force to support the mobilization sites, this in addition to the normal military appendages to the Training Divisions. The availability of civilians in the marketplace will vary from site to site with west coast extremes serving as examples: Camp Roberts in central California is without a significant civilian

capability; Fort Lewis, in the Seattle-Tacoma metropolitan area, has a large urban population upon which to draw.

Training Divisions are currently organized on a TO&E: there is growing consensus that the TO&E model is inappropriate and that a TDA is required. Current configurations and staffing of the Divisions do not appear adequate for the operation of major installations and the training of thousands of recruits. FORSCOM and TRADOC are now examining "the feasibility of changing MTOEs for RC Training Divisions to coincide with their mobilization mission" based upon:

1. Dissimilar structures between ATCs and RC Training Divisions;
2. Training Divisions supplementing rather than replacing existing training assets to achieve maximum expansion of the training base at M-Day; and
3. Some mobilization sites will be active installations with small training establishments. Other designated sites are inactive or semi-active and will require garrison support from mobilized RC units.<sup>2</sup>

These points need not be belabored here: the availability of civilian personnel is an ongoing concern and TDAs are now being examined to match Divisions with the mobilization site requirements.

To the question posed above about the time frames for accomplishment of the Training Division mission, the answer is not less than 180 days and probably considerably longer depending upon the readiness of mobilization sites to serve as ATCs, the availability of supporting civilian personnel, the conversion of TO&Es to more meaningful TDAs, and all of this based upon the assumption that the Divisions themselves are ready to conduct training.

## RELEVANCE OF THE TRAINING DIVISION MISSION: 1975 AND BEYOND

It is certain that Training Divisions have a relevant mission if the United States again requires a military buildup of the proportions of World War II, Korea or Vietnam, for there then would exist a mandate for an almost assembly line-like production of hundreds of thousands of soldiers. But what is the probability of a large scale and prolonged land war in Europe or Asia or elsewhere involving the United States and requiring such a massive buildup? What can our military planners tell us about the potential conflicts of the future and with what degree of certainty?

Planning for mobilization is both hazardous and complex. It is hazardous because errors in judgment may be the difference between survival and destruction of the United States and her allies, indeed, the entire "free world." The history of mankind can provide innumerable examples of the consequences of adequate or inadequate planning and preparation for armed conflict. It is complex because planning at best can never provide certainty about the future, only probabilities, and because the tools of the planner, the time frames which serve as his parameters, and his methodologies and processes are generally at the "state of the art" level. And, the transition from planning to operational readiness is often a slow and torturous process.

Central to military planning in general and mobilization planning in particular is the definition of future mission(s) for the armed forces. This articulation is difficult except in the broadest of terms and normally results in a conclusion that the United States must be ready for every contingency. But preparedness for future missions is

responsive to the pressures of today, reflects the large and complex organizations involved in planning and operationalizing the results of planning, is impacted upon by limited resources, and should recognize the unequivocal facts that there are innumerable uncontrollable elements in the present and future environments and that directions for the future are significantly influenced by the past.

Time frames for planning include among other distinctions such standard categorizations as normative, strategic and operational or long-, mid-, and short-range. These classifications are easily blurred within a twentieth century environment marked by social and political upheaval and technological advances of the "future shock" variety.

Descriptions of the planning process-- simple to verbalize-- are difficult to operationalize. The techniques of planning, whether originating from the military, aerospace or corporate worlds are complicated, diverse, and increasingly becoming so sophisticated that these planning tools often may be used and understood only by the planning expert. The names of these tools and processes-- delphi, morphological modelling, systems analysis, synectics, regression analysis, regression trees, multi-attribute utility analysis, trend extrapolation, simulation, gaming and scenarios, cross-impact analysis, and others-- suggest the delivery of much more accurate and precise products than in fact can be delivered.

And in addition to the vagueness surrounding time frames and the complexity and imprecision of planning tools and processes, there must be a recognition that military planning takes place amidst a variety of non-military force fields which place extreme and frequently competing demands upon planners and decision-makers. There are social, economic,

moral and political forces at work and extreme competition for scarce resources from other social institutions including education, justice, health, agriculture, welfare, and so on. Further, various decision-makers-- both military and non-military, the latter including the Congress, the executive branch of the government and the corporate world-- individually and collectively ("the military-industrial complex") are able to exert direct and/or subtle pressures on planners so that the outcomes of the planning processes are sometimes simply verifications of preconceived ideas. The military planner finds himself within a complicated network of competing forces, newly emergent and untested techniques, limitations on resources, and an uncertain world environment with a tenuous and possibly hostile future.

To all of this, one must add other vagaries about the types, durations and locations of potential conflict, all of which are defined in undifferentiated and non-quantitative terms. Thus, there are "conventional," "nuclear" and "guerilla" types of war, seemingly related to the intensity of conflict or the weaponry utilized, "short" and "long" wars tied to ill-defined time frames, and wars classified by geographic labels such as in western Europe and Southeast Asia or on the Korean Peninsula. Placed into combinations, the planner must consider the possibilities of a high intensity, short duration, conventional conflict in the Middle East, as well as a low intensity, long duration, guerilla war in Africa. Environmental conditions also are used to define the planner's parameters, so that considerations of "desert" or "mountain" conditions must be examined. Then too, there are political definitions which circumscribe the planning parameters; urban wars and conflicts in underdeveloped, emerging or industrialized nations. These political con-



siderations must be extended to such tenuous relationships as may exist among super and lesser powers, normally described in terms of alliance, detente, rapprochement, neutrality, normalization, and the like. And it must be emphasized that the planner must focus in large measure upon "rational" behavior on the part of potential enemies; planning for irrationality produces new uncertainties. The parameters of military planning are imprecise and infinite; the tools available are inadequate, and this, combined with political, social, economic and other pressures, make the task of planning at best an uncertainty. Perhaps the only certainties are those of uncertainty and that the United States, even with its great resources cannot realistically prepare for every conceivable type, duration, location and environment of conflict in the future. At best, the United States can be prepared only in the most general way for hostilities ranging from World War III to another Mayaguez-like incident.

### ALTERNATIVE ROLES FOR TRAINING DIVISIONS<sup>3</sup>

The preceding pages have emphasized two points:

1. Training Divisions, representing a significant proportion of the strength of the Army Reserve are capable, over an extended time frame, of mass-producing new soldiers. The mission is appropriate for a massive mobilization preparatory to a large scale, prolonged, land mass conflict.
2. Despite the emergence of numerous and increasingly sophisticated planning techniques, there cannot be certainty about the nature of future conflict; there cannot be assurances that the next conflict, or the one after that, will require the buildup po-

tential provided by these Divisions.

The search for alternative roles for Training Divisions at mobilization is not simply a search for an alternative-- many alternatives exist: the requirement is to determine what role(s) might be filled which maximize the established potential of these Divisions to conduct training, to serve in some degree as a deterrent to escalation of a conflict, to prepare for a long war concurrently with assisting in the preparation for a potentially short conflict, and to be reality-oriented in terms of mobilization sites/ATCs available. The search must seek the best of two worlds-- the maintenance of the massive buildup capability and the potential to employ these Divisions at short range in a conflict environment which, although appearing to be of short duration, always stands the possibility of escalation in terms of time and intensity. It seems established that the Training Divisions have a significant role to play in a war which exceeds 180 days (or whatever the precise number of days from Division mobilization to the production of new soldiers) and in which there is a need for replacement or additional personnel. Are there roles for these Divisions in a projected less-than-180 day conflict?

As alternatives are examined, one central theme must remain in focus: there is an absolute requirement for maintaining the capability of generating new soldiers. Any proposal which envisions conversion of a significant number of Training Divisions into combat or support organizations which would diminish or terminate that critical capability should be rejected. There cannot be assurances of short duration wars or guarantees against escalation of short duration conflicts into longer ones. This point is emphasized because two possible alternative roles are the

conversion of Training Divisions into cadre for the creation of new combat or support organizations or into full strength small combat or support units.

The creation of new organizations with Training Division personnel as cadre would, in the first instance, require years in the peacetime reserve environment and the nagging question would persist as to what organizations would be available to train soldiers for these and other organizations if Training Divisions were not available at mobilization because they were filling some other-than-training role. The same issues surface if Training Divisions were redesignated as full strength combat or support units with a mission for rapid deployment upon mobilization in what seemingly appears to be a short duration conflict. Again, the conversion would be prolonged in the peacetime environment and the potential for long range buildup is eliminated or reduced in exchange for a limited number of additional units ready for deployment. And this would be true, in varying degrees, if only some of the Divisions were converted to cadre for new organizations or became complete units: there would be a diminished capability for the production of new soldiers. In terms of tradeoffs, the few additional organizations-- cadre or full strength-- which could be created from Training Divisions would be in exchange for the long range buildup potential. This is an unacceptable level of risk and clearly does not maximize the potential inherent in these Divisions for the "long haul."

Rejection of the convert-the-Divisions possibility does not address the need for retention of long term training capability and relevant utilization of Training Divisions at short range. An overall mobilization strategy which, in the simplest of terms, could provide both, would be:

1. Mobilization of that number of Training Divisions for which there are active training sites and the startup of the basic training cycle as soon as trainees are available; and
2. Utilization of the balance of the Training Divisions to assist in the training and preparation for deployment of active army and other Reserve Component units-- both Army Reserve and National Guard-- which have been or are about to be mobilized, and for training non-unit reservists prior to or immediately after their mobilization.

As relates to this first point, if there are "x" number of mobilization sites/ATCs which can be utilized at M-day, "x" number of Training Divisions should deploy to them and start the training cycle. Some 180 days later (or whatever the precise number of days), the flow of replacement and/or additional personnel from the training pipeline into active units will have commenced. As other mobilization sites/ATCs are readied/prepared, and based upon need, additional Training Divisions will move to them and start the training cycle. Thus, the capability of generating new soldiers for conflicts which extend beyond 180 days is assured. And it must be emphasized that any conflict which requires commitment of active army units and/or the mobilization of any Reserve Components should require that Training Divisions concurrently start their mobilization process.

There are, of course, arguments against the early mobilization of Training Divisions which emphasize waiting to determine more precisely the nature of the conflict or until the situation has stabilized. The argument: if the conflict appears to be a high intensity, short duration "90 day" war, there are no advantages and a significant expense in

mobilizing Training Divisions and starting a training cycle which, at the end of the 90 days, would have mobilized Divisions somewhere in the 5th or 6th week of basic training. Two counterarguments-- both mentioned above-- are relevant. Despite the implied precision in discussions of 90 or any other number-of-day wars, there are no assurances first, that the war will not extend beyond the "prescribed" period of time and second, every day lost at the beginning of the training cycle is lost at the end of the cycle in terms of personnel emerging from the training pipeline. The advantages of personnel in training, preparing for a war which might extend beyond a projected termination of the conflict, far exceed the disadvantages of starting the training cycle 30, 60 or 90 days later and losing the potential of a buildup for that period of time. Indeed, the mobilization of Training Divisions and the beginning of the training cycle may serve as a deterrent to a prolonged war for it indicates that the United States is preparing for and willing to extend itself to that level and duration of conflict that will be required to bring the hostilities to a successful termination.

But what of the non-mobilized Training Divisions which await the availability of mobilization stations/ATCs? The resources of these Divisions, however many may fall into the non-mobilized category, may consist of one or more: Maneuver Training Commands, Support Battalions, Committee Groups, Basic Combat Training Brigades with subordinate Battalions and Companies, Advanced Individual Training Brigades with subordinate Battalions and Companies, and Combat Support Training Brigades with subordinate Battalions and Companies. To this list might be added, at least during the time frame that the first eight weeks of basic training are being conducted by the ECT Brigades, the AIT and CST Brigades

of those Divisions which were mobilized, in that these Brigades will not have trainees available for at least eight weeks after the initial training cycle begins. Collectively, the resources of the non-mobilized Divisions and components of those which are mobilized but are not immediately required for training, represent an enormous resource and reservoir of qualified instructors and personnel capable of supporting training and providing assistance to units preparing for deployment and to individual reservists being mobilized from the "control group."

It is precisely this use of mobilized Training Divisions to start the training cycle at mobilization stations/ATCs combined with the use of non-mobilized Training Divisions (and some segments of mobilized Divisions) to assist active army and other mobilized Reserve Component units prepare for deployment and the training of non-unit reservists that maximizes the potential of the Training Divisions collectively. Simply put, some Divisions should be mobilized to start basic training and prepare for the long war; others should be partially mobilized to assist active and activated units, units about to be activated and individual reservists prepare for deployment. This group of partially mobilized Divisions would revert to their primary mission of providing basic training when mobilization stations/ATCs become available to them. In the meantime, they have an assistance mission which can be accomplished.

Space limitations preclude developing details of this assistance mission. In general, however, there would be a requirement for active army and Reserve Component units with a high priority for mobilization to maintain, as part of their readiness estimates, a list of training and/or testing requirements which could be met by non-mobilized Training Division assets; these requirements would be those which would

severely tax the resources available to the host organization and result in a delay of deployment. This assistance might take several forms: an active army organization may have a requirement for field exercises which may be provided by the MTCs; Reserve Component units, activated or about to be activated, might need specialized or general refresher training in the wide range of subjects taught by the BCT, AIT, and CST Brigades and the Committee Groups.

With a list of current and regularly updated training and testing requirements, Training Divisions would be tasked to plan for the creation of mobile training teams or for the attachment of subordinate units-- a communication committee, for example-- to the active, activated, or about to be activated unit requiring communication training. These tailored mobile training teams and/or subordinate units would be available for general or specialized training until such time as those assets were required by the Training Divisions because of their own mobilization.

The alternative uses of the Training Divisions described above have been "unit" oriented. But there are three other major sources of manpower in the event of a national emergency: the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), the Standby Reserve (SR), and Retired Personnel (RP).<sup>4</sup> The IRR is a pool of individuals who have recently served in the active army or Reserve Components and who have some period of obligated service remaining under their enlistment contract. Currently numbering about 400,000 personnel, it is estimated that the IRR will consist of 288,000 personnel in Fiscal Year 1980. The SR consists of individuals who have served in the active army and who have some service, normally one year or less, remaining on their original six year obligation. The RP con-

sists of individuals in a nondisability retired status from either active or reserve service. In general, members of these three manpower pools do not actively train, although they may be called to active duty if there is a presidential declaration of national emergency or a congressional declaration of war or national emergency.

The mobilization of personnel from these three non-unit classifications would require varying degrees of training and it appears that the non-mobilized Training Divisions may be able to partially fulfill these training needs. Two options include the attachment of non-mobilized Division personnel to Army Service Schools to assist in command and control as well as training, and/or the initiation of training programs in a pre-mobilization civilian environment pending callup. Assisting non-unit reservists increase their level of proficiency before or immediately after their mobilization is an important part of the availability-for-deployment time frame.

#### CONCLUSIONS

This essay has focused upon the Training Divisions of the Army Reserve. Consisting of as much as one-third of the personnel of the active reserve, the Divisions and their organizational appendages have the capability of operating Army Training Centers and conducting the complete basic training cycle, now approximately 16 weeks in length. These Divisions are able to accomplish their mission of training new soldiers, but the overall time frame from their own mobilization to the first soldier emerging from the training pipeline is not less than 180 days and then only if the mobilization sites are prepared to receive the Divisions and the trainees.



Concurrently, despite considerable investment in sophisticated planning techniques and processes and discussions of time-specific wars-- the "90 day war"-- there cannot be assurances that a war will be limited to a given number of days or that an "obviously" short war might not escalate into a long one. While the Training Divisions clearly can contribute to the conduct of the longer war, the challenge is to find a meaningful alternative role for them which will neither diminish their real capabilities nor waste an invaluable resource and which concurrently will serve to meet the shortterm needs of units which must be deployed quickly in any outbreak of hostility.

This essay suggests that a national emergency and mobilization should involve the Training Divisions in two ways: the immediate callup of that number of Divisions which have functional training sites available to them and the beginning of the basic training cycle and the utilization of the non-mobilized Training Divisions for meeting the special needs of active army and activated Reserve Component units for training or testing, as well as for training non-unit reservists. These two activities should commence on Day 1: the mobilization of Training Divisions and utilization of non-mobilized Divisions should be concurrent with the commitment of American military personnel to combat and/or the first callup of Reserve Components. There are no higher priorities than those which can be met by these Divisions-- preparing for the long conflict and assisting other units and personnel prepare themselves for rapid deployment in time of national emergency.



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FOOTNOTES

1. The twelve Training Divisions:

|                     |                            |
|---------------------|----------------------------|
| 70th Division (Tng) | Livonia, Michigan          |
| 76th "              | West Hartford, Connecticut |
| 78th "              | Edison, New Jersey         |
| 80th "              | Richmond, Virginia         |
| 84th "              | Milwaukee, Wisconsin       |
| 85th "              | Chicago, Illinois          |
| 91st "              | Fort Baker, California     |
| 95th "              | Oklahoma City, Oklahoma    |
| 98th "              | Rochester, New York        |
| 100th "             | Louisville, Kentucky       |
| 104th "             | Vancouver, Washington      |
| 108th "             | Charlotte, North Carolina  |

2. Message from CDRFORSCOM to CDR USAONE, USAFIVE and USASIX, subject: USAR Training Division Reorganization dated 082018 Aug 1975 (FOUO).
3. Insightful contributions to this section of the essay were made in letters to the author from Major Generals Orville K. Fletcher (104th Training Division), 25 Aug 1975; Benjamin J. Butler (100th Training Division) 27 Aug 1975; and William B. Pendlebury (76th Training Division) 24 September 1975. Major General Edwin B. Taylor (91st Training Division), in a number of conversations during the summer of 1975, provided guidance as to the overall direction of the essay.
4. Department of Defense, The Guard and Reserve in the Total Force, September 1975, p. 7.