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
17 OCTOBER 1975

# STUDENT ESSAY

RESERVE COMPONENT COMBAT READINESS  
III 192 HOURS PER YEAR?

BY

COLONEL JOHN DEW, PELTON  
INFANTRY



CORRESPONDING COURSE

US ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA



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Item 20 continued.

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## USAWC ESSAY

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania  
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# ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John DeW. Pelton, COL, IN  
TITLE: Reserve Component Combat Readiness in 192  
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 The basic question is whether Reserve Component units are meeting their interim pre-mobilization training goals, and to determine the inhibiting factors. The research involved reviewing FORSCOM 1R's for all Reserve Component infantry battalions and companies in New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts; discussions with unit commanders; a unit commanders' opinion survey; and personal observations based on visits to all infantry battalions, brigades, and division headquarters in these states on numerous occasions during the past two years. 

The Reserve Components of the US Army comprise 44% of its authorized troop strength.<sup>1</sup> These part-time soldiers are expected to maintain training readiness goal at company level of C-2, and at battalion level of C-3.<sup>2</sup> The paid drill time allocated is 192 hours per year.<sup>3</sup> How well is this being accomplished? What are the inhibiting factors? What else is expected of them? Is 192 hours per year adequate? What can be done to alleviate the problem areas?

During the past two and a half years I have served as the Infantry Readiness Coordinator for Army Readiness Region I, I have visited with or participated in the training of all ARNG and USAR Infantry units of the Region, both during Inactive Duty Training (IDT) and at Annual Training (AT). I have discussed problem areas with commanders at company, battalion, brigade, and division level. In researching this essay, I have sent a questionnaire to all company, battalion, and brigade commanders, hereafter referred to as the "Unit Opinion Survey," included as Appendix 1. In order to secure frank opinions, I guaranteed the confidentiality of the

1. James R. Schlesinger, Annual Defense Department Report, FY 1976 and FY 1977, Report to the Congress, 5 Feb 1975, Table D-3.
2. US, Department of the Army, HQ US Forces Command, Training Guidelines, FY 76, 18 June 1975, p.6
3. US, Department of the Army, HQ US Forces Command, Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component (US Army) Training Guide, 30 April 1975, p. I-1

responder, and therefore will not identify units or commanders, and have deleted items which might compromise this confidentiality.

I have been happy to observe that contrary to the popular notion of an incompetent, bumbling weekend warrior, the average Reserve Component commander is a dedicated, hard-working professional who spends many hours trying to train his unit well, though he is beset by numerous obstacles and active-Army administrative requirements while trying to make his full-time living in his civilian job. He must also recruit for his own unit; something which is done for the active Army commander by a full-time Recruiting Command. If his 192 paid drill hours were broken into 40-hour weeks, this would equate to 4.8 weeks per year. Consider also that he must prepare for, and pass, an AGI once a year, as well as pass an ATT once every three years, which would equate to an AGI per month and an ATT per quarter were this translated to active-Army time; a difficult situation at best.

#### HOW WELL ARE THE RESERVE COMPONENTS DOING?

To analyze this status, I reviewed the FORSCOM Form 1R's prepared by active Army evaluators at Annual Training completed during the summer of 1975. These

results are based upon the evaluator's ratings and do not reflect the final ratings assigned by First US Army since all of these have not been received at the time of this writing. The average battalion was rated at C-4; the average company rating was C-3. Based upon the stated FORSCOM requirements, 17 battalions are below the required C-3, and 45 companies below C-2. This indicates that 52% of the battalions and 39% of the companies are below the stated FORSCOM requirements.

The Unit Opinion Survey results indicate that the average company commander believes his unit is at C-3, and the average battalion commander rates his unit C-3. Based upon unit commander opinions, 75% of the battalions and 67% of the companies are below FORSCOM requirements. A detailed statistical summary is at Appendix 1, Section II.

Considering where we are right now, as indicated above, the next logical question for National Defense planners is: "How soon can we commit forces to combat?" For the purposes of this essay, we will construe a combat readiness rating of C-1 as being essentially combat ready. If this is not acceptable, it should be considered as a base-line for the additional training required. Referring to AT-75's FORSCOM Form 1R's, it appears that the average companies can be combat-ready



with an additional six weeks of training, and battalions with a total of an additional three weeks.

From the unit commanders' opinions, it appears that an additional 6.4 weeks for companies and 5.6 weeks for battalions to reach C-1 are needed.

#### WHAT ARE THE INHIBITING FACTORS?

The factors inhibiting attainment of combat readiness are a mixed bag. Obviously one of them is available time for training, which will be discussed in more detail later in this essay.

#### STRENGTH

Perhaps the most critical of the factors in unit readiness is ability to maintain MTOE strength. Since the end of the draft, unit commanders no longer have waiting lists of people to join their units. There is constant pressure from higher commanders to recruit up to strength. Frequently units devote their total effort during specific months to conducting an all-out recruiting drive. This drops training emphasis to a low priority. Obviously all unit members are not necessarily good recruiters, particularly if they are dissatisfied with the training provided, lack of concern about individuals, or unhappy with haircut and personal appearance standards. In order to fill units and get

"higher" off their backs, some unit commanders will accept anyone who will sign up to fill a unit vacancy. Unfortunately, less concern is frequently exhibited towards retention of unit members through attention to their welfare, interesting (not adventure) training, and proper use of talents. These factors result in the loss of the individual, thereby requiring additional time to recruit and train a new man. One unit I visited expressed this well in a sign that reminds everyone that "It takes more time to recruit and train a man's replacement than to retain him by good training and care for his welfare." That feeling is demonstrated by the fact that the battalion has high retention plus a selective waiting list of people who want to join .

#### EQUIPMENT

Inadequate and outdated equipment is a factor which does inhibit good training. The units in this Region are slowly "getting well" on tactical radio equipment; however, the PRC-10 and AN/VRQ 3 radios are still very evident throughout. These radios work adequately for most purposes, but repair parts are becoming increasingly hard to acquire, since they are no longer produced for active Army use.

Ground Surveillance Radar and Redeye are not issued to any National Guard Infantry battalions. Unit commanders must recruit to full MTOE strength, which includes

filling these sections. Soldiers are sent to school to become MOS qualified and return to their units to find no equipment with which to train or to maintain their MOS proficiency. ARR I has conducted training at AT using limited amounts of equipment, plus demonstrating the use of the SONY TVT (available in each combat arms battalion), in conjunction with an expended Redeye launcher. These are inadequate substitutes. At least one brigade commander directed his battalion commanders not to fill these sections until adequate equipment or training substitutes are available for home station training. Why recruit a man for a position in a unit when equipment is not available? When the equipment is scheduled for issue, then recruit to fill the section.

#### TRAINING AREAS

Suitable training areas for tactical training are not generally within a reasonable travel time for the units. This has a great impact on the time available for training. For example, an Infantry battalion from Buffalo assembles at its armory at 7 p.m. on Friday night, drives to Fort Drum arriving at about 1 a.m. Saturday morning, falls out on its equipment at 8 a.m. Saturday, trains until 11 p.m. Saturday. The unit trains and prepares equipment for turn-in to the equipment

concentration site between 8 a.m. and 12 o'clock noon Sunday. Then it travels back to Buffalo, arriving at 7 p.m. Sunday. This is scheduled as a MUTA 5 (minimum of 20 training hours), yet the unit must devote 12 out of 31 hours, or 38% of the time traveling. Other units traveling from NYC to Fort Dix schedule a MUTA 4 and spend approximately 44 to 50% of their time traveling. Other units are fortunate to have personal agreements with friendly neighbors which allow them to conduct non-mechanized, non-firing exercises on nearby farmlands, or in state or national parks. This severely limits the type of realistic training that combat units must conduct to maintain or develop proficiency. City-based units, such as the five infantry battalions of the 42d Infantry Division are ham-strung in this regard.

It is true that a limited amount of training can be gained in planning travel to training areas; however, this does not correct the major problem areas detected in Annual Training by active Army evaluators. Some leaders develop a great deal of proficiency in convoy operations, reporting crossing checkpoints, etc., but the trooper just rides. Frequently, these trips are made in commercial buses to reduce fuel consumption, soldier fatigue, and maintenance requirements for tactical vehicles. Airlift has been used, when it can be

adequately forecast both by USAF, Air National Guard and Army National Guard aircraft. However, this is the exception rather than the rule because of unpredictable weather conditions in the northeastern US, and the long-range requirement to mesh with other unit training schedules - it is a relatively complicated affair which most unit commanders are loath to tackle. It does not solve the basic problem of inadequate close-in training areas.

#### WHAT ELSE IS EXPECTED OF THEM?

Combat readiness is not the only thing expected of the Reserve Component unit commander. A National Guard infantry battalion is expected to perform civil disturbance missions for either the state; or, if Federalized, for the federal government. Units are expected to participate in Armed Forces Day parades and displays, and provide civic action support. Engineer units are more frequent participants in civic action support. These latter two categories are also important to the unit commander and his organization's image in the local community, if he is to effectively retain unit members and recruit in that area. Maximum participation cannot be guaranteed by expecting unit members to give up additional "time for the flag" in a non-paid status. As a result, paid-drill time is sacrificed. Command

inspections from higher headquarters require unit preparation time. From the Unit Opinion Survey, the following averages of unit training hours were required:

Ceremonies/parades:	6
Civic Action/support:	8
Command inspections:	7
Civil disturbance training	17

As alluded to earlier in this essay, the unit commander must also undergo an Annual General Inspection once a year. Ideally, a unit should be ready for such an inspection at any time. In reality, every unit, including the active Army does place some emphasis on areas known to be of interest immediately prior to the AGI. For the Reserve Component unit, a large measure of this time is used by the commander, key staff officers, and the full-time technicians. Unit commanders indicated that, exclusive of administrative nights and technician time, they spent an average of 21.9 hours preparing for their AGI. Discussions with unit commanders indicate that AGI failure is a more frequent reason for relief from command than ATT failure.

Since the move to AT requires the movement of all personnel, TOE equipment and training materials to a location at a distance from home stations, some unit time is used in preparation for this move, Reconditioning, turn-in, and storage of equipment following return from

AT also requires some unit time. Maximum participation frequently demands the use of paid drills to complete this. Average times reported in the Unit Opinion Survey are 16 hours for preparation and 8 hours post-AT activities.

#### IS 192 HOURS PER YEAR ADEQUATE?

It becomes evident that 192 hours per year is not an adequate amount of time if we sum up the times gathered from the Unit Opinion Survey and compare them to the results of the FORSCOM 1R's of 1975.

Preparation for AT	16
Post AT activities	8
AGI preparation	21
Civil disturbance	17
Ceremonies	6
Civic action	8
Command inspections	7
<hr/>	
Total hours	83

Unit commanders were also requested to respond to the amount of tactical mission-oriented training that was conducted exclusive of AT. The unit commanders responded that, on the average, they spend 94 of the paid drill hours doing so. Other drains on unit time are church services, MOS testing, unit picnics, annual qualification,

maintenance, and recruiting. (See Section II, Appendix 1). There was no attempt to delineate the amount of time required to complete individual weapons qualification during IDT. For the most part, it is completed during a MUTA 4 in the fall or spring. Crew-served weapons firing frequently cannot be conducted at local ranges during IDT and must be accomplished at the AT site.

Reorganizations are a continuing factor which plague the Reserve Component commander. Of the 21 Infantry battalions surveyed in this essay, three were affected by major reorganizations during the past year, which included changing an armor battalion to an infantry battalion (resulting in greater recruiting problems due to higher strength requirements); creating one infantry battalion from a maintenance battalion headquarters, an engineer company, an ambulance company, a light equipment company, and a Special Forces company; "converting" an engineer battalion, a truck company and an infantry company into a mechanized infantry battalion. The end result was better from a state-wide strength and recruiting standpoint; but immediately provided a large MOS-mismatch and retraining problem, plus a resultant low C-rating. Eight other battalions were impacted on by de-mechanizing two of them (within months after starting mechanization of one), plus transfers of companies from other battalions



being inactivated. It is not uncommon for this to happen in the Reserve Components. I was told by one Guardsman that: "If you haven't changed branches at least once, you're not a real Guardsman." That may be overstated, but it indicates the problem is not new, nor likely to disappear. Most changes have been the result of drawing down units to insure the strength of those remaining. The professional Guardsman keeps up with branch changes by his correspondence courses, as did an artillery battalion commander who completed the Artillery Advanced Course, assumed command of an Armored Division Brigade, and subsequently completed the Armored Advanced Course. The following year, his brigade became part of an infantry division and within two months of the change he had completed the Infantry Officers Advanced Course. The problem is considerably more complex at the junior officer and enlisted level where mechanical and practical work skills are more difficult to develop with new machinery, equipment, and weapons.

It takes a bit longer to develop an ambulance driver as a machine gunner or a bulldozer operator as a mortarman. It can be done, but takes expertise not available in bulk when entire units are converted. Essentially, units start from scratch when reorganized, from the leaders who normally are the teachers, through the riflemen and gunners who are the taught. Teachers and taught must

learn simultaneously.

#### WHAT CAN BE DONE TO ALLEVIATE THESE PROBLEMS?

##### STRENGTH

The success of the Guard and Reserve recruiting must still rest on the shoulders of the unit commander. He must develop a training program that is interesting and productive to the unit members if he is to retain the first-termer or "Try-One" prior service enlistee. Reducing his losses will thereby reduce the number of personnel to be recruited and the time spent to train them to fill unit vacancies. The Guard and Reserve must still depend, in large measure, on the local community and their relations with it to become a part of the social and economic fabric of that community. Admittedly, this is more difficult in the affluent and "non-local community" of the New York and Boston metropolitan areas. Here the liaison NCO's with the Army Recruiting Command may pay off more than in the local communities.

FORSCOM must take a hard look at the MTOE's of every unit to determine the bare minimum strength that a unit can function with tactically, and reduce these MTOE's accordingly. For example, a mortar platoon must have three FO's, an FDC capable of split operation when displacing, yet can do without one or two ammo bearers per squad. A rifle squad should have a squad leader and two

fire teams of at least three men each, in order to practice squad battle drill and overwatch techniques. Reductions of a similar nature could be made in other areas. In all cases, I would not reduce company or battalion headquarters which must function at full strength to carry out routine administrative functions, regardless of the unit's strength. I do not consider this a cadre, but an operating unit which can accept and train a minimal number of fillers in relatively short time without jeopardizing effective training upon mobilization. This would reduce the recruiting requirements of the commander, yet allow him to train his unit under reasonable strength conditions.

Allied with this, I would recommend an official position of temporarily deleting from the MTOE those sections for which there is no equipment, such as the GSR and Redeye. As previously stated, when that equipment is scheduled for issue, MTOE's could be upgraded to reflect addition of those sections based upon issue dates of equipment. This should be done on a unit-by-unit basis, and closely coordinated with AMC.

#### EQUIPMENT

A partial solution to equipment problems has been discussed above. Another solution with wider application would be the establishment of equipment pools under the

supervision of the Army Readiness Regions, wherein certain items could be used by all units within a geographical area on a rotating basis as scheduled by the ARR's. Qualified instructors would be on hand to conduct instruction for, or assist the unit instructors. All ARR's cannot be handled exactly alike because of the size of the geographical area, the number and type of units involved. In some cases, providing funds for airlift to an active Army installation for the weekend use of sophisticated and sensitive equipment may be a more practical solution. The ARR's should be solicited by FORSCOM to provide specific recommendations for selected items of equipment of concern in their respective areas. This is in addition to the affiliation program which affects a limited number of units.

#### TRAINING AREAS

This is a tough nut to crack, and there are no easy solutions. Purchase of training areas is expensive, and particularly difficult in an era of tight money and environmental consideration. Long-range planning of training to secure military (Air Force or Army) air assets is perhaps the best bet, but still does not solve the problem of New York based battalions, which must spend almost as much time getting to and from suitable airfields as it

would to travel to Fort Dix by road. Other units might be granted money to pay for commercial air transportation to suitable IDT sites. The key in either case is better long-range planning, which must include a suitable substitute program should weather or funds preclude the primary plan. Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWT) are a beneficial way to train leaders on the ground, but exercises must also be conducted with troops to demonstrate combat readiness proficiency. TEWT's can be conducted adequately in Farmer Smith's backyard.

#### OTHER REQUIREMENTS

AGI preparation will continue to steal time from the training program, as long as AGI's are announced well in advance. They should be no-notice inspections, with a call to the unit the day before the team arrives to insure that the commander is aware of the inspection. These inspections should not be conducted within the month before or following AT. This should reduce the "cramming" for the AGI and present a more realistic picture of the unit. Some units do poorly even with announcement several months in advance. If a unit is Satisfactory, it should not be inspected again within the next year. With the incentive of having to be ready at any time, unit commanders most likely would develop a continuing interest

in keeping their house in order and could be encouraged to include maintenance of equipment, records, and procedures updated through integrating these requirements into their Yearly Training Program.

Participation in displays and parades cannot be eliminated. Unit commanders can attempt to display their tactical capabilities within the framework of a display so as to require such things as demonstration of mortar crew proficiency through the use of a pneumatic range, which could be set up in a shopping center. While demonstrating this range and the mortars, the crews could be undergoing training as opposed to simply standing by the weapons discussing weight, range, etc. A rifle platoon could demonstrate the overwatch techniques, or use SCOPES in a built-up area as an example. This depends largely on the type of activity, physical arrangements, and safety requirements, as well as local ordinances. Nevertheless, it is a necessary adjunct to the commander's involvement with the local community and potential recruiting source.

#### CONCLUSIONS

The biggest gains can be made in improving combat readiness by an effective training management effort. This requires that a unit analyze where it must go -

its mission for the year. A three-year period is better. The commander then determines where it is and programs all of its requirements, including known or recurring commitments for ceremonies, civic action, civil disturbance, et al. The plan should include input from all staff sections, not just the S-3. In this way, maintenance, MOS testing, officer and NCO schools, AT preparation, and continuous updating of administrative requirements can be built in on a planned basis. This will permit the unit to take advantage of outside resources such as ARR or active Army support, USAR schools, air assets, worthwhile IDT training sites, and Maneuver Training Command or Maneuver Area Command support. ARR support is available to assist in this effort, not for the unit, but with the unit. It has been our experience that when this type of planning is done for the unit, it is not as well understood or accepted as when it is developed by the unit with an assistance team.

This technique has been used with some success in ARR I. Unit training officers who formerly had difficulty deciding how to fill the 192 hours now find that they need more hours to conduct mission-essential training, and must establish priorities. Units can develop concurrent training and administrative requirements with greater efficiency. They find that

they have not been making best use of the training hours available. An example of solving an administrative requirement at no loss of training time would be to place all unit clerks at tables in the mess line in the field. As soldiers wait in line, Form 20's and Emergency Data Cards can be updated. With several clerks present, there will be no slowdown in the feeding. This requires organization and mental flexibility to do things differently. Weapons could be cleaned in the vehicles returning to the armory, so troops are not required to spend extra time after arrival. This permits all weapons to be maintained with less lost time and would assist in preparing for an unannounced AGI. Officer and NCO schools conducted during unit admin nights prior to a MUTA would cover platoon tactics prior to executing in a local park when light conditions permit, or a sand-table exercise prior to a field exercise.

The Unit Opinion Survey indicates that commanders need additional paid drill time on the order of 96 hours per year. I concur, but being realistic, I do not think Congress will appropriate more money for this unless commanders make better use of the funds and time now provided. Nor is it certain that the unit will be able to retain people with increased time requirements. From the soldiers viewpoint, he must also be convinced that his



leaders are not wasting his time. The Meadows' Study<sup>4</sup> indicated that:

"Reduction of wasted time coupled with increase in meaningful training were cited as the most significant leadership items."

Leadership items as opposed to money items were considered the key to retaining soldiers in units. High retention is a strong indicator of good training.

Yes, more time is required - but first let's insure that we're doing the most with the available time - that starts with good training management and the thoughtful development of a long-range, integrated training program.



JOHN DeW. PELTON  
Colonel, Infantry

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## APPENDIX I

### SECTION I: PURPOSE, METHOD, AND ANALYSIS

#### "THE UNIT OPINION SURVEY"

To secure statistical data and comments, I mailed a questionnaire (Inclosure 1) to every infantry company, battalion, and brigade commander in the geographical area of Army Readiness Region I. This included seven brigade commanders, 21 battalion commanders, and 115 company commanders, for a total of 143 questionnaires. I discussed this with the ARR I Commander and received his concurrence, since our operating procedure dictates that when we assist a unit commander, at his request, we "tell it like it is" to that commander. We then forward a report of specific assistance accomplished to the commander through his higher headquarters. The unit commander receives the desired assistance, his higher headquarters is informed that the assistance was provided, but the unit's "dirty laundry," if any, is not aired in front of his superiors. This has gained for ARR I a high degree of credibility, established excellent rapport, and provided units a degree of hands-on assistance they would otherwise be reluctant to request. In the preparation of this survey, I assured commanders of the confidentiality of their responses, and have been gratified with the frank recommendations provided by those

responding. Without this guarantee, I would have received only perfunctory responses, if any. Therefore, I have eliminated any references which could serve to pinpoint a unit or an individual.

Data from AT 75 FORSCOM Form 1R's was prepared from the draft 1R's processed through ARR I Headquarters, and do not reflect the approved training C-ratings assigned by Headquarters, First US Army, since all are not currently available.

The survey was undertaken with more than this essay in mind. Since my assignment has put me in close contact with Reserve Component units, I was anxious to develop data which could be used by our Headquarters in more effectively carrying out our mission. Where it is possible to do so, without compromising the respondents, the information gathered will be used to provide background data for our assistance to units in trying to alleviate inhibiting factors. Though many of the areas brought to light are infantry-oriented, many others have wide application to other type units.

Of the 143 questionnaires mailed, I received replies from 47 commanders. In retrospect, based on responses, it would have been better to either put questions 12 and 13 on a separate paper, or to indicate "over" on the bottom of page 3, since a large number failed to respond

to these questions. In addition to the comments indicated in the "Summary of Comments" in Section III, I received a number of personal notes, letters and personal comments from commanders in the field following receipt of the questionnaire; all were favorable and indicated a great deal of interest in the final study. I have included one of these letters as Inclosure 2, deleting the unit and commander's identification.

## SECTION II

### TABULAR DATA

The following tabulation is taken from the Unit Opinion Survey. FORSCOM Form 1R ratings are listed where applicable.

1. I consider my unit to be:

		FORSCOM 1R	
	Co	Bn	
C-1	<u>—</u>	<u>—</u>	<u>2</u> <u>0</u>
C-2	<u>18</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>17</u> <u>1</u>
C-3	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>51</u> <u>9</u>
C-4	<u>10</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>45</u> <u>11</u>

2. I consider that my unit could be C-1 in:

		FORSCOM 1R	
	Co	Bn	
2 wks or less	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>18</u> <u>0</u>
2-4 weeks	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>46</u> <u>1</u>

	Co	Bn	Co	Bn
4-6 weeks	<u>12</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>9</u>
6 wks or more	<u>12</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>40</u>	<u>11</u>
Avg number of				
wks if more than				
six	<u>8</u>	<u>8.2</u>	<u>8.03</u>	<u>10.54</u>
Overall avg				
number of wks	<u>6.4</u>	<u>5.62</u>	<u>6.34</u>	<u>8.61</u>

3. I consider a realistic goal for ARNG/USAR units to be:

	Co	Bn
C-1	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>
C-2	<u>22</u>	<u>8</u>
C-3	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>
C-4	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u>

4. In preparation for AT, my unit spends:

	Co	Bn
Up to a MUTA 4	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
A MUTA 2	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>
A MUTA 3	<u>3</u>	<u>6</u>
A MUTA 4	<u>10</u>	<u>1</u>
More than a		
MUTA 4	<u>11</u>	<u>7</u>
Average	<u>MUTA-4</u>	<u>MUTA-2</u>

5. Upon return from AT, my unit requires the following time to unpack, clean, and store all equipment for IDT:

	Co	Bn
Up to a UTA	<u>5</u>	<u>1</u>
A MUTA 2	<u>19</u>	<u>9</u>
A MUTA 3	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>
A MUTA 4	<u>7</u>	<u>2</u>
More than a MUTA 4	<u>0</u>	<u>2</u> (+32 hrs for 1 Bn)
Only admin nights & tech time is required	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
Last day of AT only		<u>1</u>

6. In preparation time for an AGI, my unit spends:

	Co	Bn
Admin/tech time only	<u>3</u>	<u>2</u>
Up to a UTA	<u>1</u>	<u>5</u>
A MUTA 2	<u>0</u>	<u>3</u>
A MUTA 3	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
A MUTA 4	<u>7</u>	<u>6</u>
More than a MUTA 4	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>
Average	<u>21.9</u>	<u>20.1</u>

7. To be answered by ARNG unit commanders only. In preparation for a civil disturbance mission (exclusive of those units responding to a specific threat), my unit spends:

	Co	Bn
Admin nights only	—	<u>1</u>
Less than a UTA	—	—
Up to a MUTA 2	<u>4</u>	<u>1</u>
Up to a MUTA 3	—	—
Up to a MUTA 4	<u>22</u>	<u>7</u>
More than a MUTA 4	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Average hrs more than a MUTA 4	<u>9</u>	<u>21</u>
Average hrs overall	<u>17.9</u>	<u>19</u>

8. Tactical mission-oriented training is conducted  
(exclusive of AT) during:

	Co	Bn
Less than 2 MUTA 4	—	—
Between 2 and 4 MUTA 4	<u>4</u>	—
Between 4 and 6 MUTA 4	<u>15</u>	<u>7</u>
More than 6 MUTA 4	<u>14</u>	<u>8</u>
Average hrs more than 6 MUTA 4	<u>28.3</u>	<u>28.8</u>
Average hrs overall	<u>94.9</u>	<u>103.8</u>

9. List the number of unit training hours required  
during TY 74-75 for the preparation and conduct of the  
following:

	Co	Bn
Ceremonies/parades	6.8	6.7
Civic action or support	8.8	10.6
Command inspections	7.3	9.6



Other:

Recruiting	9	
Maintenance	30	34
Church	11	10
Meals	32	24
MOS testing	4	4
Movement	24	20
Admin requirements (higher HQ)		16
Personnel Admin	20	
Training Admin	30	
Range firing	8	10
Assembly & inspection of troops-		10
Orientation	4	10
Showdown inspection	2	2
Retention Counseling	24	As reqd
Operational Readiness Insp		4
Reorganization		8
Commander's Time		4
Command Information Program		4
AR 135-1		1
AR 135-91		1
Military Ball		
Unit Picnic		
Christmas Party		
Medical Support for Scout marches		
Volunteer for Horizon for Youth March		

What is important to note here is the variety of things other than mission-oriented training for which unit time is used. Hours indicated are an average; however, since this was a "write-in" question, responses were somewhat limited and hours too small a sample for analysis.

10. List additional time (estimated) per week to accomplish planning or preparation for unit requirements:

	Co	Bn
You the Commander	<u>9.54</u>	<u>8.25</u>
Your staff (bn/bde)	<u>      </u>	<u>6.30</u>
Key personnel (Co)	<u>7.30</u>	<u>      </u>
Other	<u>      </u>	<u>      </u>

11. See comments in Section III.

12. How many drill hours in excess of the currently authorized 192 per year do you feel are required to achieve your stated readiness condition?

Average of all co/bn 96

13. See comments in Section III.

### SECTION III

#### SUMMARY OF CONTENTS

All comments received are summarized, by company commanders and by battalion and brigade commanders, if this could be determined from the responses checked in question 10 or from those who indicated units on the questionnaire or those stamping return addresses on envelopes.

## QUESTION 11

### COMPANY COMMANDERS

Q: What is the single biggest restriction inhibiting combat readiness training of your unit?

A: Too many peripheral commitments by higher headquarters--Brigade, Battalion.

Recruiting.

Inspections, inspections, inspections!

Multiple duties, i.e. ID cards, physicals, MOS testing, etc., on each weekend--only 1/2 company is present as a unit to train on any one weekend.

Equipment - I must add here that we do have adequate equipment for training at this level. The equipment on hand; mainly radios, is out of date and difficult to keep working.

Unit strength.

Inability to get rid of the bad apples, specifically the poor attitude soldiers enlisted in lieu of Vietnam during the time period 1969-1970.

Equally important - political pressures.

The short time this unit has been in existence. We are trying to establish meaningful mission-oriented training and consequently the interest of individuals has been growing steadily. Our battalion has been great, if you'll excuse the trite expression. I, however, am fortunate to have had the initial training performed by the ARR teams and intend to utilize them again. The one largest drawback is the lack of proper equipment, clothing (winter and summer) and facilities for the 106 RR squad to perform.

Lack of mission-oriented essential equipment such as portable radar, Redeye training, new family radios and shortages of organizational field equipment such as compasses, etc. Some outdated equipment hampers training, but this is overcome by unit leaders.

Poor training areas at home station. State makes no provisions for this. Most commanders must find a training area of their own.

Time.

Lack of equipment and turnover of personnel.

Strength: Tremendous problem to be handled by part-timers. Vehicular mounted radios, as CSC commander, I need the radios. Better cooperation and coordination, i.e., mutual support by way of armor, aviation, Air Force, Navy. Anything we can get to make training realistic and dynamic.

The continuous turnover of personnel makes training NCO's difficult.

The method of procurement makes most junior officers worthless. Too much time is spent worrying about the frills--weapons teams, CPX's, short fuse requirements from on high.

A split unit and loss of enlisted personnel because of politics.

Meeting requirements such as weapons qualifications every year takes up two MUTA-4's.

Lack of a training site, and lack of equipment. This unit was an Armor company until April 1, 1975. At that time, I was 108% over-strength and in a C-2 status. Since reorganization, we are at 57% strength and in a C-4 status as of AT-74. I consider my unit to be in a C-3 status at this time.

Up-to-date operational equipment. Radios with batteries. Administrative and support activities restrict training mission.

Lack of equipmen      Excessive paper work.

Availability of equipment, APC's, commo, vehicles, no Redeye or ground surveillance equipment.

Trained Infantry instructors.

Most of my time as unit commander is spent on paperwork, satisfying battalion, state, division, etc., daily requirements.

The biggest deficiency in the unit training is in radios and ground surveillance equipment. A Redeye trainer would also be very helpful.

Lack of training aids for the Redeye section and the ground surveillance section. GSR have no radar sets. Redeye section has no viable training aids to stimulate interesting training. After the Redeye people come back from Fort Bliss, we cannot maintain their interest with the training aids that we have available.

Unit strength.

Morale - most of the troops don't want to be here.

Discipline - no support from above; troops can't understand all the last minute changes.

Leadership - 80% state military graduates do not, in my experience, make good officers.

Chicken shit - e.g., haircuts. You can't expect a two-day a month soldier to dress/groom like a full-timer; his civilian job won't allow it.

A specific guideline to follow: i.e., it seems DA has an idea; NGB interprets it one way, division interprets it another way, and battalion, another. What happens, we try to please whoever is going to visit our training, and no visitor is around long enough to look and get the overall picture of our training objectives. Thus, we're usually doing training wrong or ineffective, depending on the visitor. But nobody seems to care if the individual instructed has learned something.

Lack of equipment.

QUESTION 11

BATTALION AND BRIGADE COMMANDERS

Q: What is the single biggest restriction inhibiting combat readiness training of your unit?

A: Career counseling--takes much of our time, especially at the platoon leader, company commander, CSM, and battalion commander areas.

Administrative records checks and order, issue, turn-in of clothing/equipment take time away from training as this is the only time the AST can get the man. IN THE OLD DAYS.....we had the guys every Monday night.

MOS test ties up both the men taking the test and the administrators. If we do it in an ET status, we still lose them on a portion of the MUTA.

Marking of clothing and equipment and maintaining a locker. We should give the men the pro-rata share for clothing the same as their counterpart in the Active Army and let them take it all home. When it gives way--they buy new clothes.

Drawing weapons slows down the process of getting people into the training areas. (Battalion answer)

Too many mission requirements - cannot concentrate on one phase (too many number 1 priorities at the same time).

This limits on-the-spot correction--consequently we do too many things, but it seems we don't do any of them right.

Another area is the lack of continuity of personnel, too many changes in key personnel starting at the top down to unit CO's. This also includes changing unit mission and TOE (reorganization, etc.) Consequently you end up with men in different type units other than what they enlisted. Good example: Members of C/S are mavericks from many other units. It takes too long to retrain them in new MOS position. (Battalion answer)

Time. 192 hours used in 4 or 8 or 16 hour increments is non-productive when compared to using the same amount in, say four 48-hour weeks. For a RC unit, IDT is a series of starts and stops wherein a new beginning is made each time. Continuity is hard to achieve because many of the lessons learned in a previous period have to be reviewed to insure understanding. Time is used in non-training activities. Each time the soldier has to make the transition from civilian to soldier and too many times, he brings his problems with him from home. (Brigade answer)

Not enough training time. (Battalion answer)

MOS qualification.

Personnel turnover

Small unit leaders' experience and expertise. (Battalion answer)

Failure of state to support FORSCOM, Army, and division training objectives and goals. Too much lip support. Too much, and too high, a priority to attaining 100% strength and PR matters. Too much concern and fear of adverse publicity taking tough stands might - repeat - might bring. Making decisions and policies based on what would create a better image rather than what is best for the Guard! (Brigade answer)

The single biggest restriction on the training of this battalion is proper equipment shortage. The adage of "Come as you are to fight" is nothing more than an invitation to suicide. Our outdated communications (with next to no repair parts), inadequate, and in some cases, no new mortars (which inhibit training), lack of vehicular repair parts (for the outdated wheeled vehicles), shortage of new tactical weapons systems (Redeye, etc.), no ground surveillance radar equipment, etc., and the loss of above equipment to Israel and South Vietnam (or is it North Vietnam?) makes combat readiness against a potential enemy, who has modern equipment, virtually impossible. Unless we get the new equipment, we can't win the first battle. (Battalion answer)

The lack of strength is the biggest restriction. The recruiting effort is not producing enough E-2's and E-3's; in some cases, E-5's and E-6's are being enlisted who do not have an MOS compatible with their position in the unit. (Battalion answer)

Qualified, capable junior leaders, both enlisted and officer. (Battalion answer)

Lack of personnel. If battalion had 90-95% strength, we could be a C-2 or better. (Battalion answer)

Ineffective, unrealistic and unimaginative training conducted to create the impression that we are well trained. We repeat the same stale training because we do it well.

Strength.

Attendance.

Junior officer and NCO leadership.

Turnover of personnel. (Battalion answer)

Equipment - especially commel! Next - equipment for my Redeye and ground surveillance sections. (Battalion answer)

Equipment.

Personnel qualification/strength.

Local tactical training areas. (Brigade answer)

Although there are many minor aggravating problems which I'll go into, I think our biggest inhibiting factor is personnel turnover and training new people to fill that void. If we could get ready-made leaders to fill the gap instantly, I would be inclined to consider my battalion a C-1 potential in two or less weeks.

NOW FOR THE IRRITANTS:

Physicals must be programmed, and although every four years, becomes a problem when you don't have the medical backup to accomplish it.

Immunizations are in the same capsized boat.

ID cards -- the men are extending one year at a time because of that foolish bonus probability. This means a new card (and picture) every time. (Battalion answer)

Strength (Division answer)



### QUESTION 13

#### COMPANY COMMANDERS

Q: Assuming you had the authority to do so, what feasible changes would you make in IDT to improve your combat readiness posture?

A: Direct implementation of professional soldiers for training purposes; i.e., conduct training similar to that which is given during basic or AIT, so as to develop and maintain basic proficiency.

Make all drills except maintenance drills MUTA-5's and travel to Fort Devens for tactical training. Monday nights and MUTA-2 drills leave no time for adjustment. It becomes something just jammed into an already busy week for the average soldier. MUTA-5's give us more time with the 11B.

Let individual companies conduct MUTA-4's.

Have extra drills, paid, so that all NCO's, officers, and key unit personnel could get together and train with each other on week-nights. That should be down to and including team leaders. There are a lot of good classes on leadership that you can't give on a weekend, and this is the only time you can do it.

Nothing. It is all run smoothly.

Make use of ARR I teams to maximum on section training, with emphasis on small unit leadership problems, in those areas. Also, more use of military installations for live firing throughout the year in heavy and light weapons. Form a junior leadership training center, making use of ARR I and USAR instructor personnel and school qualify as many as possible in leadership slots. Also, make maximum use of military installations and schools for specialty slots.

I could write a book, but since my time is so precious, this is my admin time I am using now. I think we have talked enough; however, I think myself as a unit commander somehow are not getting my points across to higher headquarters, and I continue to be frustrated in my mission. The company commanders are the guys you should work with and listen to.

One of the biggest problems facing the unit commander at my level is the lack of control over my troops. The HQ unit commander should have at least four MUTA-2's per year just for the purpose of getting his troops properly trained (i.e., inspections, weapons qualification, etc.).

The first thing I would do is get some equipment that it wasn't necessary to beg, buy, borrow, or bargain parts for. I would make it more expedient to gain the proper supplies for training purposes. I would make an attempt at lessening the paperwork burden of commanders to allow more time to be spent on training, maintenance, and other necessary functions. I would also give the commanders more power to exercise over their troops to have them present for drills or equivalent training. In all, there are many things I would like to change, but the primary areas I have answered.

Go to Camp Edwards. Send all visitors home, all generals, too, until the last couple of days; the unit commander could invite them to see what the unit could do. Men in the Guard are intelligent (lawyers, bankers, etc.) and when they see a general or colonel running around about haircuts, boots, etc., they see him for a fool. You know, most company commanders would do the job well, if they had everybody off their back about the small stuff.

Full TOE equipment availability.

Problem exists for weekend training sites; Camp Edwards too small, especially when two or more battalions are there on MUTA-4. We seldom go to Fort Devens. Fort Drum for AT, in my opinion, is excellent. But we get in each other's way at Edwards.

Being new at infantry, I can recognize that for me and my officers and NCO's to train ourselves and our people with our inexperience and lack of key training items; such as: Zero APC's, Minus 2 4.2 mortars and sights, no ground surveillance and Redeye equipment. It is to say the least, very difficult.

Our first AT (31 May-14 Jun 75) at Camp Edwards went pretty well with the support we had from ARR I and division mortar people, but we have had no assistance since then from even our battalion, as far as training goes.

Training must be made more interesting. Dynamic training should be instituted into the NG program. The following programs should be started: confidence courses, "Slide for Life," combat water survival, waterborne operations, scuba diving, first-aid, and specialized riot training.

More air support during IDT is needed. Helicopters could be used for CA's, reconnaissance missions, LRRP's, and repelling.

The Redeye school at Fort Bliss is outstanding. As many people as possible should be encouraged to go to this. A two-week school in lieu of summer camp should be available for ground surveillance radar.

The biggest improvement would be to stabilize the chain of command at company level. Company commanders, platoon leaders, and platoon sergeants do not spend enough time in the same unit to establish consistent policies and to generate productive training. Many company commanders do not even spend a full year in their company before being promoted to battalion staff. CO's should command companies for a minimum of three years. Four or five years is

even better.

More practical work in all phases of training should be encouraged.

All too often, the NG concept is to present a classroom lecture.

"Hands-on" training and practical work should be encouraged.

More use should be made of ARR I Group instruction and 1049th Reserve School instructors.

More class rehearsal time, at least six hours.

Active duty personnel to teach more classes.

A training site nearby.

More drill time for cadre personnel.

Less drill time for the "troops." Cadre training can be accomplished without the troops. Subjects, such as tactics and leadership, are not necessary to give to all personnel.

Have a training MUTA-4; also have a MUTA-2 or two UTA's for maintenance, miscellaneous subjects; i.e. command info, race realtions, mandatory subjects, inspections, and administrative procedures.

Use of helicopters, air transport to give realistic training - now you request air support and it's never available.

Do away with moving units five-six hours for a MUTA-5. Nothing has ever been accomplished that could not have been accomplished at local training area. We spend two to three UTA's just driving and riding.

Go into a level training. Make sure unit knows basic and then squad, platoon training. Now new Try-one people have to always play catch-up training. With the turnover in NG now, we many times assume the EM know basics, and he does not.

More realism; cross-train all MOS's; problems that run the entire MUTA-4.

### QUESTION 13

#### BATTALION AND BRIGADE COMMANDERS

Q: Assuming you had the authority to do so, what feasible changes would you make in IDT to improve your combat readiness posture?

A: Decrease quantity of training assemblies for other than key positions. Maintain number of assemblies for cadre and key personnel.  
A controlled preparation time by cadre and key personnel would improve training during assemblies for all personnel. (Battalion answer).

I simply feel to make any National Guard unit ready is more training hours. We are all part-time soldiers. Practice makes perfect! (Battalion answer)

I would like to change the drill pattern so that leaders would be required to drill 48 drills and the men only 36. The 12 drills for leaders would be used in their training and in developing and practicing SOP's which would permit efficient operations on the occasions when the entire unit was drilling. I would require close-in training areas sufficient to accommodate battalion maneuver. Needed are ranges reasonably available to permit the unit to do all its firing during IDT. If required, I would fund NCO schools, administrative nights, and all the other things we do for the flag by permitting these activities to be conducted as additional training assemblies. (Brigade answer)

All Reserve Component combat and combat support units must be at the highest DAMPL and issued a full allocation of DA TOE Required Column equipment. We cannot function at FAD 5 and lowest DAMPL while levying us a full combat training mission. The WHEELS program cannot work in National Guard Combat units. Basically, if the TOE is modified, then the training must also be modified, in which it is not!

This one concept is the only significant factor, as any other IDT change is systematically accomplished in order to get the job done. We call it--use of imagination and innovations. (Brigade answer)

Get new and better equipment for training.  
New and better training areas - NOT FORT DRUM, NY!  
Most of my people have fired on or at the same targets for five years.  
More benefits for men, so I can improve my recruiting and retention records.

More use of qualified instructors, such as ARR people (excellent) instead of my own unit members. My own people get so much more out of their training, and they should--they know it cold. Get rid of ALL excess personnel who are not carrying their load or accomplishing something beneficial on weekends. And that includes units, staff (battalion, brigade, etc.) (NCO and officers). (Battalion answer)

Authorize more paid time for cadre to prepare for drills. Better pay to attract better Guardsmen. (Battalion)

I think if we had a UTA before every MUTA-4, we could get a lot of the admin type duties taken care of, plus have the unit prepare for the weekend activity, rather than the select few that do it every time. This UTA could be geared to taking care of all the items mentioned in paragraph 9 and 11. I can't visualize any changes in our normal operations, and if I did, I would have tried them out by now. We're trying one avenue: that being an airlift to complete all of our crew-served weapons firing before AT. That way, we can be sure the platoon leader has all his people when doing a tactical exercise; but then, that will be a camp contribution. I feel that we could improve our combat readiness condition by:

- 1) Cadre training of key position personnel that can plug a hole when needed;
- 2) Take positive steps to help retain personnel and diminish the turnover rate, even though the thinking is anti-bonus;
- 3) longer annual training periods, i.e., three weeks. But then somebody will have to force the employers to stop bitching. Here's where we could have the Congress vote to take away tax shelters and/or tax breaks from those that did not want to let their employees participate;
- 4) Of course, more drills would have an impact on improved readiness. More time spent in doing a job has to have an added proficiency buffer built in; and
- 5) Procurement of large tracts of land to facilitate the training program. We could have had about 4,200 acres of forest and field for about \$145 an acre, but FUSA didn't think it feasible, as we have never heard from them again. We spent millions on equipment, weapons, ammunition, recruiting, and not a nickel on tangible goods that could improve the readiness posture of units in this area. (Battalion answer)

Conducting MUTA-4 once a month is great--two in the spring and two in the fall (fall and spring firing).

Conduct UTA's during the remaining year. This would give the commanders a chance to see their men every week; and make weekly follow-ups on individual and unit training (once a month is too long between visits).

Conduct squad and platoon training, increase drill and command training on all levels. (The staff conduct company and battalion-level CPX's--one, two, times per year). This would involve more participation among the NCO's and junior officers. (Presently many

of the above mentioned cannot fall in in the company, let alone march them between Point A to Point B).

Conduct more classroom training using NCO's covering basic subject. Conduct centralized training, utilizing committee type controllers and instruction. (This seems to be the more successful type training. It gives the instructor more opportunity to concentrate on preparation of one subject at a time).

Decentralized training puts too much on the shoulders of the commanders; thus, he cannot supervise, control, or correct the training during all phases properly. (Battalion answer)

Additional training time to train junior officers and NCO's. Make available better training areas within each state, with less restrictions on use of ammo and pyro-technics. Set realistic goals for units to achieve, not what a higher HQ would like them to achieve. (Battalion answer)

Complete conversion to the ARTEP program with more assistance from active Army units. New York state seems to be the only one that doesn't have units in roundout or other affiliation with active Army units. We need to have new training sites utilized (other than our 27-year stint at Fort Drum) and better training with our active Army counterparts. (Battalion answer)

An attempt should be made to lighten the burden (administrative) placed on the unit commander, especially at company level. This commander has the same load placed on him as does the active commander, plus the recruiting burden. He is a part-time soldier who has a living to make and a family to spend time with; he cannot be expected to be as knowledgeable as his active duty counterpart who spends all his working hours on the military. Equipment not required for his mission should be placed in storage so he does not have to maintain it. The civilian AST can be of some help; however, the responsibility still rests on the commander. The administrative actions required to discharge an individual for non-attendance is ridiculous. A drug and alcohol abuse program in a reserve unit is a complete waste of time. Nobody really understands the alert and mobilization plan requirements. IG inspections are necessary; however, the whim of the inspector sometimes determines whether one unit passes or fails, when they are probably pretty much in the same status. An IG will spend hours inspecting the unit fund when an expenditure of \$50 or \$60 is involved, and the only thing he can find wrong is a unit paid a tax on a few cases of beer. A rating should not be given, but assistance should. The CMMI teams have changed from nit-picking to assistance. This brigade over the past few years has been rumored to: move, disband, reorganize, or all three, which means some of our senior NCO's are looking at the Guard. Also, the Guard can promise an individual an E-5 or E-6, while a USAR unit can only give an E-4. This unit has been without a recruiting specialist since June, and we still do not have the authority to hire the man we want. We are short AST's in two companies, and cannot hire; the reason, lack of strength; actually the overhead and admin burdens are the same, if



not greater, when the strength of a unit is lower. I realize this probably does not answer your specific question, but it is an indication of the problems facing a Reserve Commander. (Battalion answer)

Operate company-level units at cadre strength only. Require all key personnel to become tactically and technically proficient. Owing AFT, send these cadre personnel to active Army units to test and evaluate their job assignments with regular Army troops. (Division answer)

77 Elm Street  
Ft Devens, MA 01433

Dear Unit Commander:

I am a corresponding student at the Army War College, and must write an essay on a subject of interest to the Army. Since my duty as Infantry Coordinator for ARR I has put me in close contact with Guard and Reserve units for the past two years, I have elected to write on the Reserve Component readiness. My title is "Combat Readiness in 192 Hours a Year?" To properly analyze the problem, I will need some statistical information and hope that you will complete the attached questionnaire and return it in the inclosed envelope prior to 17 October 1975.

I promise to hold this information confidential, although I may use the statistics in our work here in the Readiness Region. I will not identify you or your unit to anyone. Please be brutally frank in your responses since this is the only way I can make an accurate analysis and provide recommendations for improving Reserve Component readiness. As a matter of interest, these War College essays are not simply an academic exercise, but, in fact, have been presented to Department of the Army Staff Agencies and the Secretary of the Army on numerous occasions. I would greatly appreciate your assistance.

Sincerely,

JOHN DeW. PELTON  
Colonel, Infantry  
Chief, Readiness Group Devens

*Inclosure 1*



### QUESTIONNAIRE

(Need not be typed; request that answers simply be legible).

1. I consider my unit to be:
  - a. ☐ C-1
  - b. ☐ C-2
  - c. ☐ C-3
  - d. ☐ C-4
2. I consider that my unit could be C-1 in:
  - a. ☐ 2 weeks or less
  - b. ☐ 2-4 weeks
  - c. ☐ 4-6 weeks
  - d. ☐ 6 weeks or more (indicate number of weeks \_\_\_\_\_)
3. I consider a realistic goal for ARNG/USAR units to be:
  - a. ☐ C-1
  - b. ☐ C-2
  - c. ☐ C-3
  - d. ☐ C-4
4. In preparation for AT, my unit spends:
  - a. ☐ Up to a UTA
  - b. ☐ A MUTA 2
  - c. ☐ A MUTA 3
  - d. ☐ A MUTA 4
  - e. ☐ More than a MUTA 4
5. Upon return from AT, my unit requires the following time to unpack, clean, and store all equipment for IDT:
  - a. ☐ Up to a UTA
  - b. ☐ A MUTA 2

- c. ☐ A MUTA 3
  - d. ☐ A MUTA 4
  - e. ☐ More than a MUTA 4 (Specify hours \_\_\_\_\_)
  - f. ☐ Only admin nights and technician time is required
6. In preparation time for an AGI, my unit spends:
- a. ☐ Only admin nights and technician time during the week
  - b. ☐ Up to a UTA
  - c. ☐ A MUTA 2
  - d. ☐ A MUTA 3
  - e. ☐ A MUTA 4
  - f. ☐ More than a MUTA 4 (Specify hours total \_\_\_\_\_)
7. To be answered by ARNG unit commanders only. In preparation for a civil disturbance mission (exclusive of those units responding to a specific threat), my unit spends:
- a. ☐ Admin nights only
  - b. ☐ Less than a UTA
  - c. ☐ Up to a MUTA 2
  - d. ☐ Up to a MUTA 3
  - e. ☐ Up to a MUTA 4
  - f. ☐ More than a MUTA 4 (Specify hours of unit training time \_\_\_\_\_)
8. Tactical mission-oriented training is conducted (exclusive of AT) during:
- a. ☐ Less than 2 MUTA 4
  - b. ☐ Between 2 and 4 MUTA 4
  - c. ☐ Between 4 and 6 MUTA 4
  - d. ☐ More than 6 MUTA 4 (Specify number of UTA's in excess of 6 MUTA 4 \_\_\_\_\_)

9. List the number of unit training hours required during TY 74-75 for the preparation and conduct of the following:

a. Ceremonies or parades \_\_\_\_\_

b. Civic action or support \_\_\_\_\_

c. Command inspections \_\_\_\_\_

d. Other \_\_\_\_\_

_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____
_____	_____

10. List additional time (estimated) per week spent to accomplish planning or preparation for unit requirements:

a. You, the commander \_\_\_\_\_

b. Your staff (Bn/Bde) \_\_\_\_\_

c. Key personnel (Co/Bn/Bde) \_\_\_\_\_

d. Other (specify) \_\_\_\_\_

11. What is the single biggest restriction inhibiting combat readiness training of your unit?

12. How many paid drill hours in excess of the currently authorized 192 per year do you feel are required to achieve your stated readiness condition? \_\_\_\_\_

13. Assuming you had the authority to do so, what feasible changes would you make in IDT to improve your combat readiness posture? (Use additional pages, if necessary)

3 October 1975

Colonel John D. Pelton  
77 Elm Street  
Fort Devens, MA 01433

Dear Colonel Pelton:

I have completed your questionnaire, but I feel that this letter is necessary.

My military background is as follows:

1. Rifle Platoon Leader
2. XO Rifle Company
3. Weapons Platoon Leader
4. Support Platoon Leader
5. Recon Platoon Leader
6. XO Headquarters Company
7. CO Headquarters Company
8. CO Rifle Company
9. Bn Motor Officer
10. I am presently the Headquarters Company Commander of HHC, \_\_ Bn, \_\_ Inf, \_\_ ARNG.

The order in which I list my comments are not their order of importance.

1. All too often, the Regular Army Evaluators and Inspectors compare us, the National Guard, with Regular Army units. I do not think they are super critical of our organization, but they do expect us to be up to the standards of a full-time Army unit. In the area of maintenance, which is very necessary, we are just not given sufficient time to accomplish the mission. Many times we must ask our full-time employees (AST), to clean weapons, vehicles, etc., in order to pass inspections on top of inspections; the user of those items did not have sufficient time for maintenance. This may not seem right, but true and I'm not about to keep my men after drill to pull maintenance.

*Inclosure 2*

2. I have to prepare for an Annual General Inspection, I have to make sure everyone is being trained, or performing on-the-job training and still retain and recruit members into the National Guard. This cannot be accomplished in 48 drills (192 hours) and if the people upstairs don't realize this basic fact, then the Reserve and National Guard will go down the drain and maybe then they will be satisfied.

3. I believe many Evaluators and Inspectors are surprised by our professionalism and are afraid that if the Federal and State Government give us anything, such as up-to-date equipment, benefits, a 20-year pension payable upon completion of the 20th year, etc., then we, the Reserve and National Guard, will outshine a full-time regular Army unit.

4. We have been asked to do the very difficult, if not the impossible in such a short time that if you're not impressed with our productivity then your questionnaire and this letter is just a waste of time. Someone in authority will have to bring to the attention of the President of the United States and other politicians the dilemma of the National Guard and Reserve. It is very frustrating for us to receive questionnaires and to be interviewed by Generals in regards to our needs and complaints with our comments falling upon deaf ears.

5. My solutions are as follows:

a. All drill days to be counted as MUTA-3, that a Saturday and Sunday drill be considered as a MUTA-6 and not a MUTA-4.

b. Prior to important missions, such as AGI's, there is a need for two Saturday and Sunday drills. Prior to summer camp, at least three full days preparation is needed. Prior to maintenance inspections, three full days preparation is needed.

c. Training during the year should consist of qualification and expertise of assigned weapons, both accuracy and maintenance proficiency.

d. Key personnel, not including riflemen as concerns him with tactical movements, should perform in their MOS positions.

e. With the advent of the revised training program; Riflemen that show a proficiency with their TO&E weapon should be cross-trained with other weapons.

f. Tactics should be the primary mission at Annual Training.

g. Commanders at the lowest levels should be consulted, by outside unit field grade, and sometimes General Officers, on the morale and productivity of their unit.

6. You may feel that some or many of my comments are not justified, but you asked me to be frank. If my comments are not corrected, it will not surprise me. We will again experience a serious setback in a future conflict, but this time we will not be able to recover.

I would enjoy talking to you in regard to the problems that the National Guard members encounter. I also encourage the interviewing of members of my unit for constructive comments.

Thank you for allowing me to voice my opinions and good health to you and your family. We need more senior officers, as you, seeking constructive comments from us.