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# FAILURE STUDY AND RELIABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR RTE DESIGN VERIFICATION MODES

FEBRUARY 1976

Prepared for

DEPUTY FOR COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS DIVISION AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND UNITED STATES AIR FORCE Hanscom Air Force Base, Bedford, Massachusetts



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# **REVIEW AND APPROVAL**

This technical report has been reviewed and is approved for publication.

Kaymond. J. Carle

RAYMOND G. CARLE, GS-13 Project Engineer

FOR THE COMMANDER

FederMaulh

FREDRICK H. FAULKNER Lt Col, USAF Project Officer

(Febent & Strend

ROBERT J. LATINA, Col, USAF Director of ADPE Selection Deputy for Command and Management Systems

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse elde il necessary end identify by block number) The Remote Terminal Emulator is a minicomputer-based system which generates message traffic for use in testing and evaluating large-scale, multi-terminal systems. Throughout the development of two design verification models of the RTE, which used a Data General NOVA 800 and associated peripheral equipment, there appeared to be an abnormal amount of down time due to various hardware failures.				

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This report reviews those failures and compares the actual results with a theoretical reliability model for the NOVA 800. It determines that the failure rates were not abnormally high for this class of equipment in the operating environment to which they were subjected, and develops recommendations to systems in the future.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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LIST OF	TABLES		5
SECTION	I	INTRODUCTION	7
SECTION	II	FAILURE SURVEY	9
		DEFICIENCY CONCEPT	9
		SURVEY RESULTS	10
SECTION	III	RELIABILITY MODEL	13
		GENERAL	13
		FAILURE RATE FOR PARTS	14
		Subsystem Failure Rate	16
SECTION	IV	COMPARISON OF RESULTS	19
		SYSTEM RELIABILITY	19
		SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY	21
		Central Processor and Operator Panel	21
		Memory	21
		Disk	21
		Mag Tape	22
		Printer	22
		Teletype	22
		Paper Tape Reader	22
		Readable Real Time Clock and	2.2
		Incerval IImer	22
		Lard Keader	1.5

Page

	Asynchronous Line Units	23
	Synchronous Line Units	23
	Digital I/O	23
	Modems	23
	Power Supplies	23
	Other System Failures	24
SECTION V	PROBLEM AREAS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS	25
	GENERAL	25
	INTRODUCED DEFICIENCIES PROBLEM	25
	Corrective Actions	26
	COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS	27
	Memory	27
	Mag Tape Drive	27
	Power Supplies	27
	ALU	27
	Other Failures	28
SECTION VI	FAILURE DOCUMENTATION	29
APPENDIX I	FAILURE SURVEY DATA	31
APPENDIX II	PREDICTED FAILURE RATE CALCULATIONS	49

# LIST OF TABLES

Table Number		Page
I	Summary of Failure Study Results	11
II	Parts Failure Rates	15
III	System Failure Rates	18
IV	Actual and Expected Failure Rate	20

#### SECTION I

#### INTRODUCTION

In 1972 and early 1973, two Design Verification Models of the Remote-Terminal Emulator were developed by The MITRE Corporation under the sponsorship of the Air Force Directorate of Automated Data Processing Equipment Selection (MCS)\*. The fixed-site system, also referred to as the lab system, was installed at MITRE/Bedford - initially in H-Building and later in D-Building. The on-site, or fieldtest system, was initially installed at MITRE/Bedford and later moved to the following locations: Air Force Cambridge Research Laboratories (AFCRL) at Hanscom AFB, Bedford, Mass; Rome Air Development Center (RADC) at Griffiss AFB at Rome, New York; Air Force Data Service Center (AFDSC) at the Pentagon, and National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland. In early 1975, the field-test system was moved to Hanscom AFB, Bedford, Massachusetts.

Throughout this development and test period, there appeared to be an abnormal amount of down-time due to various hardware failures. Since further test and experimental uses are planned for both the lab and field-test systems, it was decided to conduct an investigation of the problems to date in the hope that they could be minimized in the future.

In this report, we review hardware failures that have occurred in these systems, determine if they were abnormally high for this class of equipment, and develop recommendations to help improve the overall availability of these systems in the future.

The results of a survey of hardware failures in RTE systems up to December 1974 are presented in Section II. In the case of the fixed site system, whose components are shared with the Data Handling Laboratory, the reported failures pertain only to RTE components.

Section III describes a theoretical reliability model of RTE subsystems, using part population counts, with each part reliability as specified in MIL standards. A comparison of the actual results and those predicted by the reliability model is presented in Section IV, including individual discussions for each subsystem.

<sup>\*</sup>D.L. James and D.W. Lambert "Remote-Terminal Emulator (Design Verification Model) - Introduction and Summary," ESD-TR-74-372, Electronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, Hanscom AFB, Bedford, Massachusetts, February 1975.

The major problem areas, as well as potential corrective actions are discussed in Section V. Finally, considerations about future failure documentation is presented in Section VI.

Appendix I includes the actual survey of RTE failure in chronological order, while Appendix II includes the detailed calculations of the predicted failure rate for each subsystem.

#### SECTION II

#### FAILURE SURVEY

#### DEFICIENCY CONCEPT

In attempting to list the failures of any type of equipment, it is important to define precisely which type of failures will be included in the survey. The range could extend from a single bit loss in a communication link to total system failure. For this survey, the decision about listing a particular failure was done on the basis of the type of deficiency that caused it.

According to Military Handbook 217A "Reliability Stress and Failure Rate Data for Electronic Equipment, " a deficiency is defined as a possible cause of failure because a part, equipment or system lacks some quality necessary to function according to specifications. In other words, a deficiency is the cause of a failure; therefore, every failure has at least one associated deficiency. It is possible to have two deficiencies as the cause of a specific failure and correcting one may not solve the problem or, on the other hand, a deficiency may be the cause of several failures.

Deficiencies can exist in hardware and yet never manifest themselves as failures because the equipment is not exercised environmentally and functionally to the level which causes failure.

Failure rate is the frequency per unit time that a deficiency is manifested as a failure. Correcting or eliminating a deficiency has a direct effect on failure rate. Therefore, equipment failure rate can be improved either by eliminating deficiencies or by reducing the probability of deficiencies manifesting themselves as failures.

Deficiencies can be classified in the following types:

- a) Initial deficiencies
- b) Component malfunctions
- c) Introduced deficiencies

The first type includes all design, fabrication and installation deficiencies. They normally cause failures during the initial set-up of the system. Failures caused by those deficiencies were not included in this survey unless the failures occurred much later than the original installation.

The second type includes all component failures, such as integrated circuits, resistors, contacts, motors, etc. Assuming perfect servicing of the equipment and complete elimination of the deficiency, these are the only failures that should occur in the operation of the equipment. Any theoretical reliability model predicting mean time between failures will be based on this type of failure only. In order to compare the predicted and actual failure counts in the following sections, these failures were specifically identified in the survey.

The third type of deficiency consists of those introduced either by attempting to correct a deficiency of another type or, since we are dealing with several interactive subsystems, by other subsystem failures. These failures will be accounted separately.

#### SURVEY RESULTS

The following survey includes the hardware failures of the RTE Design Verification Models (both field test and lab system) during the period July 1972 to December 1974. In the case of the lab system, whose hardware is shared with the Data Handling Laboratory, the recorded failures are the ones related to RTE components exclusively.

Table I presents a summary of results, including the number of failures in each individual subsystem for the specified period. Only two types of failures were considered:

- 1) Failures due to component malfunctions.
- 2) Failures due to introduced deficiencies.

The actual survey is presented in Appendix A where each entry contains a failure description, the date of occurrence and the failure classification (due to a component malfunction or an introduced deficiency).

It should be pointed out that if a failure recurred a short period after the deficiency was presumably corrected, it was counted as a single failure. Also, if a failure due to an initial deficiency occurred much later than the original installation, it was accounted as an introduced deficiency.

# Table I

# Summary of Failure Survey Results

System	Subsystem	Due to Components Malfunctions	Due to Introduced Deficiencies
	Central Processor & Operator Pancl	2	1
	Memory	4	10
	Disk	1	-
Lab	Mag Tape	6	2
	Printer	2	3
	Teletype	6	4
	Paper Tape Reader	-	-
	Readable Real Time Clock and		
	Interval Timer	2	-
	Card Reader	1	1
	ALU	1	1
	Modems	1	14
	Power Supply	5	3
	TOTAL	31	37
	Central Processor & Operator Panel	2	1
	Memory	10	6
	Disk	3	3
	Mag Tape	4	4
	Printer	1	3
	Teletype	2	1
Field	Paper Tape Reader	-	1
Test	Readable Real Time Clock and Interval Timer	1	-
	ALU	2	1
	Digital I/O	1	-
15	Power Supply	5	3
	TOTAL	31	23

Sources for this survey included the Mini-Computer Facility report, Data General Field Service bills and Air Force reports. The survey results were also correlated with the installation log book for a one month period randomly chosen, for the purpose of determining if it included failures not reported elsewhere. No additional failures were found.

#### SECTION III

#### RELIABILITY MODEL

#### GENERAL

In order to determine if the actual failure rate for each version of the DVM was abnormal, it was decided to compare it against the results predicted by a theoretical reliability model based on stress factors and part population, as specified in Military Handbook 217A. This failure prediction method was chosen for two reasons:

- 1) The abundance of data on parts failure rates
- Some work by Data General using the same model, which simplified the gathering of data.

Basically, the model is based on the fact that the failure rate of a subsystem is dependent on the failure rate of each individual part, such as resistors, capacitors, integrated circuits, contacts, soldered connections, etc.

Assuming <u>n</u> components, the probability of no failures in a time t is as follows:

$$P(t) = P_1(t) \cdot P_2(t) \cdot P_i(t) \cdot P_n(t)$$

where  $P_i$  (t) = Probability of no failure in <u>ith</u> part.

Assuming a Poisson distribution for failure arrivals, the probability of no failures in the ith part during time t is:

$$P_i(t) = e^{-\lambda i t}$$

where  $\lambda i$  = failures per unit time of ith component.

The probability of no failures for the total subsystem then becomes:

P (t) =  $e^{-\lambda t}$  .  $e^{-\lambda t}$  ...  $e^{-\lambda t}$  =  $e^{-\lambda t}$ 

where  $\lambda = \lambda_1 + \lambda_2 + \ldots + \lambda_n$  = failure rate of subsystem.

i.e., the failure rate for the subsystem is equal to the sum of the failure rates of all individual parts. Similarly, the total system failure rate is equal to the sum of the individual subsystems failure rates.

In conclusion, if the failure rate for each individual part is known, the probability of failure for the total system can be determined. The next paragraph will deal with part failures, the following one will include failure rate predictions for each subsystem such as central processor, memory, ALU, etc., and finally, total system considerations will be presented.

It should be pointed out that all the failure rates predicted in these equations are for an optimum operating temperature.

#### FAILURE RATE FOR PARTS

According to MIL-HDBK-217A, there are basically three steps in predicting parts failure rates as follows:

a) Determination of Stresses for Each Part

The stresses to be considered are the ones associated with the cause of the principal modes of failure of the part, e.g., conditions such as power dissipation for resistors, voltages for capacitors, etc. The result is expressed as a ratio of actual stress to the rated stress which is the stated military rating for the part working under nominal conditions.\* All the applicable stress factors are shown in the first column of Table II and are as provided by Data General in their reliability Report for NOVA Minicomputers. Where no stress is applicable or it was not known, the ratio was assumed to be 1. (i.e., the part was assumed to work under nominal conditions.)

b) Determination of Basic Failure Rate

Using MIL-HDBK-217A and the stress ratio, determine the basic failure rate of each part. The results are presented in the second column of Table II. They represent the failure rate for the part under controlled test conditions, which usually differs from failure rates for the part when used in an

<sup>\*</sup> Nominal conditions are understood to be a 1/2 watt resistor dissipating 1/2 watt, a 12 volt capacitor working at 12 volts, etc.

# Table II

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# Parts Failure Rates

Dote Trace	Stress	Basic Failure	K	Factors <sup>(2)</sup>		(failure	Failure Rates es per millior	t hours)
Farr Type	Ratio(1)	(per million	Fixed	Lab	Field	Fixed	Lab	Field
		hours)	Ground	System	Test	Ground	System	Test
Triscential Circuit(3)	1	0 10	I	I	1	0 10	0 10	0 10
michtighen cilicuity		0.10				c1 .0	CT .U	CT . 0
Capacitor, Ceramic	0.10	0.0059	1.0	2.0	5.0	0.0059	0.0118	0.0295
Capacitor, Tantalum	0.20	0.008	3.0	6.0	20.0	0.024	0.048	0.16
Capacitor, Electrolytic	0.70	0.42	0.1	0.2	0.4	0.042	0.084	0.168
Resistor, Carbon	0.30	0.0035	6.0	7.0	8.0	0.021	0.025	0.028
Resistor, Wire	0.50	0.019	10.0	20.0	40.0	0.19	0.38	0.76
Diode, Signal	0.05	0.0019	1.5	2.0	3.0	0.0029	0.0038	0.0057
Diode, Power	0.50	0.9	1.0	3.0	10.0	0.9	2.7	9.0
Diode, Zener	0.30	0.77	1.0	1.5	2.5	0.77	1.16	1.93
Transistor, NPN, Signal	0.10	0.14	1.5	3.0	6.0	0.21	0.42	0.84
Transistor, NPN, Power	0.50	0.82	I.0	2.5	6.0	0.82	2.05	4.92
Transistor, PNP, Signal	0.10	0.3	1.5	3.0	6.0	0.45	0.9	1.8
Transistor, PNP, Power	0.30	1.34	1.0	2.3	6.0	1.34	3, 35	8.04
Oscillator, Crystal	I	0.02	1	I	I	0.02	0.02	0.02
Ferrite Core <sup>(4)</sup>	I	0.00004	I	I	I	0.00004	0.00004	0.00004
Transformer & Inductors	I	0.2	1.5	2. 5	5.0	0.3	0.5	1.0
Wire Wound Potentiometers	0, 10	1.0	1.0	2.5	6.0	1.0	2.5	6.0
Thermistor	I	0.3	I	I	I	0.3	0.3	0.3
Solder Connection	I	0.0057	I	I	I	0.0057	0.0057	0.0057
Wirewrap Connection	I	0.000004	I	I	1	0.000004	0.000004	0.00004
Connector, 5 Pin	1	2.5	1.1	2.0	4.0	2.75	5.0	10.0
Connector, 20 Pin	t	0.48	1.1	2.0	4.0	0.528	0.96	1.92
Connector, 100 Pin <sup>(5)</sup>	I	12.0	1.1	2.0	4.0	13.2	24.0	48.0
Switch	1	0.25	1.0	4.0	14.0	0.25	1.0	3.5
Lamp	I	1.0	0.5	1.0	2.0	0.5	1.0	2.0
Fan	I	4.0	I	I	I	4.0	4.0	4.0
Fuse	I	0.1	I	I	ı	0.1	0.1	0.1
Circuit Breaker	1	0.5	I	I	ı	0.5	0.5	0.5

As calculated by Data General.
 From MIL-HDBK 217A, unless otherwise noted.
 Semiconductor manufacturers data (as supplied by Data General).
 Based on IBM operational data for the 4 Pi series of Computers.
 Fallure rate calculated from base failure rate of 10 plus increase of 0.025 for every mating (80 matings assumed).

equipment. The application K-factors take this into account.

c) Determination of Application K-factors

To take into account the application environment for the part, it is necessary to multiply its basic failure rate by a factor dependent on the intended use. MIL-HDBK-217A provides K-factors for each part type and category of equipment, namely, fixed ground, vehicle mounted ground, shipboard, airborne, etc. Table II shows the application K-factors for three environments: (a) fixed ground, to be used as a reference; (b) RTE lab system, which was estimated to be larger than fixed ground due to the frequent configuration changes and updates and (c) RTE field test system, which was estimated at roughly 75% of vehicle mounted ground, to take into account all the moves to different field locations.

The failure rate for each part type and class is finally shown in Table II and it was obtained by multiplying the basic failure rate and the corresponding K-factor. When the K-factor was not known it was assumed to be 1.

#### Subsystem Failure Rate

The subsystem failure rate is the summation of the failure rates for the individual parts. The procedure that was followed was to obtain a part population count (i.e., how many resistors, how many integrated circuits, etc.) and then multiply the failure rate for that part by its population. The addition of those values is the predicted failure rate for the subsystem.

Parts population counts for the Central Processor, Operator Panel, Power Supply and Memory Modules were supplied by Data General.

For the peripheral controllers, Digital Computer Controls Asynchronous Line Units. Digital I/O, Real Time Clock and Interval Timer, the parts counts were estimated from circuit diagrams and visual observation of the boards.

For peripheral devices, the failure rate was estimated based on their mechanical complexity since no formal method is available.

The detailed part counts and subsystem failure rate calculations are presented in Appendix II. A summary of the results, including the system failure rate (the addition of the individual system failures) and its reciprocal, the MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) is presented in Table III.

# Table III

# System Failure Rates

		Failures Per Million Hours					
System	Subsystem	No. Units	Failure Rate Per Unit	Failure Rate			
Lab <sup>(1)</sup>	Central Processor & Operator Panel Memory Disk Mag Tape Printer Paper Tape Reader Readable Real Time Clock and Interval Timer Card Reader ALU Power Supply System Failure Rate	1 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	$\begin{array}{c} 216\\ 103\\ 300\\ 500\\ 200\\ 200\\ 42\\ 200\\ 175\\ 58\\ \end{array}$	$216 \\ 515 \\ 300 \\ 500 \\ 200 \\ 42 \\ 200 \\ 175 \\ 58 \\ 2706$			
	Mean Time Between Failures = $10^{6}/2706$ = 369 hours						
Field Test(2)	Central Processor & Operator Panel Memory Disk Mag Tape Printer Paper Tape Reader Readable Real Time Clock and Interval Timer ALU Digital I/O Board Digital I/O Terminator Power Supply System Failure Rate	$ \begin{array}{c} 1 \\ 6 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 8 \\ 12 \\ 1 \\ 2 \\ 252 = 166 \end{array} $	415 174 450 750 750 300 69 177 60 62 138	$ \begin{array}{r} 415\\1044\\450\\750\\750\\300\\69\\1416\\720\\62\\276\\6252\end{array} $			
	System Failure Rate $6252$ Mean Time Between Failures = $10^6/6252 = 160$ hours						

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(1) Not including Teletype and Modems.

(2) Not including Teletype.

#### SECTION IV

## COMPARISON OF RESULTS

#### SYSTEM RELIABILITY

Table IV presents a comparison of the predicted failure rate and the actual experience with the DVM's. The first column lists the number of weeks each component was in operation. Under the assumption that the lab system was powered up an average of 55 hours a week and the field test an average of 45 hours a week, the operating hours were calculated and listed in the second column.

The actual failure rates were calculated by dividing the number of failures by the power-up hours. It should be pointed out that this may not be correct for some subsystems such as the card reader or paper tape reader, but since their contribution to total failure rate were minimal, and for consistency. all subsystems were assumed to be powered-up all the time.

In considering the reliability and actual performance of the total system, the most used parameter is the MTBF or Mean Time Between Failures, which is inversely proportional to the failure rate.

For the lab system, without including teletype and modems, the actual MTBF due to component malfunctions was 277 hours, which should be compared with the estimated 369 hours as expected from the reliability model. If the teletype and modems are included, the MTBF is reduced to 215 hours, and if introduced deficiencies are taken into account as failures, the MTBF is 102 hours.

For the field test system, the predicted MTBF was 160 hours; in actual operation it was 130 hours and if introduced deficiencies are included, the actual MTBF is reduced to 70 hours.

All these values imply that the expected MTBF correlates with the actual experience for the field test system and to a lesser extent with the lab system. If the introduced deficiencies are included, however, there appear to be many more failures than expected.

Two main results can be observed by looking at Table IV, namely:

# Table IV

Actual and Expected Failure Rate

.

System Subsystem		No. of Weeks in Operation	Operating Hours*	No. of Failures	Introduced Failures	Actual Failure Rate Per 10 <sup>6</sup> Hours	Predicted Failure Rate Per 10 <sup>6</sup> Hours
	Central Processor &						
	Operator Panel	121	6655	2	1	201	216
	Memory	121	6655	2 A	10	601	515
	Disk	121	6655	1	0	150	300
	Mag Tape	104	5720	6	2	1049	500
	Printer	121	6655	2	3	Actual FailuresActual Failure Rate Per 10 <sup>6</sup> Hours1301 601 010601 021049 33301 44902 00301 150 141150 150 1437465819360641022 255 11511 6 2554 31511 1511 162554 3 766 4 1022 3 2551511 111 12550255 10 1058 529 3 3 1277238174227663130130	500
	Teletype	121	6655	6	4	902	_
	Paper Tape Reader	121	6655	Ő	Ó	0	200
	Real Time Clock &			Ů	ľ	Ŭ	200
	Interval Timer	121	6655	2	0	301	42
	Card Reader	121	6655	1	1	150	200
Lab	ALU	121	6655	1	1	150	175
	Modems	121	6655	1	14	150	-
	Power Supply	121	6655	5	3	751	58
	TOTAL SYSTEM	121	6655	31	37	4658	-
	TOTAL SYSTEM						
	(Without Teletype	121	6655	24	19	3606	2706
	and Modems)						
	Mean Time Between	Failures				277	369
	Central Processor &						
	Operator Panel	87	3915	2	1	511	415
	Memory	87	3915	10	6	2554	1044
	Disk	87	3915	3	3	766	450
	Magnetic Tape	87	3915	4	4	1022	750
	Printer	87	3915	1	3	255	750
	Teletype	87	3915	2	1	511	-
	Paper Tape Reader	87	3915	0	1	255	750
	Real Time Clock &	1					
Field	Interval Timer	87	3915	1	0	255	69
Test	ALU	42	1890	2	1	1058	1416
	Digital I/O	42	1890	1	0	529	782
	Power Supply	87	3915	5	3	1277	276
	TOTAL SYSTEM	87	3915	31	23	8174	-
	TOTAL SYSTEM (Without Teletype)	87	3915	29	22	7663	62 52
	Mean Time Between 1	Failures				130	160

\* Operating hours are power-up hours, which were assumed to be 55 hours/week for Lab System and 45 hours/week for Field Test.

- a) A small number of subsystems caused a large number of failures. This is true for the mag tape and power supply on the lab system and memory, tape and power supply on the field test.
- b) There were as many introduced failures as actual component malfunctions. Among many reasons for this result are absence of updates, design faults and numerous interactions with other subsystems.

While the operation of the system appears within tolerance, there is room for improvement in the introduced deficiencies and certain key subsystems. They will be covered in Section VI. In the next paragraphs, the performance of each individual subsystem will be reviewed.

#### SUBSYSTEM RELIABILITY

There were discrepancies in the actual and expected performance of individual subsystems. All comments that follow are based on the data as reflected in Table IV.

#### Central Processor and Operator Panel

Performed within the expected range in both lab and field test systems.

#### Memory

While the lab system memory performed according to the expected value, the memory of the field test system has almost two and a half times its share of expected failures plus a large number of introduced deficiencies. Most of the memory failures were concentrated in a 3-month period while the system was serviced exclusively by Data General personnel, without close supervision by MITRE personnel. The absence of ECO updates or the incorrect installation of some of them, resulted in a disproportionate share of introduced deficiencies. A case in point is the repair to a memory board for a drop of solder dropped in a previous repair.

#### Disk

While the lab system disk performed as expected, the field-test disk has almost double the number of failures. It should be pointed out, however, that these results were obtained because of a single major failure with the disk motor, so no conclusions can be reached from this unique incident.

## Mag Tape

The performance of the mag tape drive for both the field-test and lab system was below expectations. The main problems were arms collapsing and some skewing problems (the head not being perpendicular to the tape movement). This resulted in aborted runs and incompatibility of recordings between the drives. The failure of the arms could not be diagnosed for a long time resulting in numerous failure incidences of the same deficiency which was a leak in a line filter capacitor. The problem of skewing was not corrected for a long time due to the insistence by Data General personnel that there was no corresponding adjustment; it was not mentioned in the relevant literature either.

Not included in the survey were the numerous failures in the lab system of the AMPEX tape drive, which was eventually replaced by the WANG drive.

#### Printer

Performed within the expected range for both systems. There was a large number of introduced deficiencies due to incorrect paper.

#### Teletype

Failures in both teletypes were numerous, in particular, in the lab system, which required minor and major overhauling. There is no accurate comparison data, but the experience of many Model 33 users has been less than satisfactory. The only practical alternative is its replacement by a more reliable unit, as was done in the lab system.

#### Paper Tape Reader

Performance was as expected in both systems. There was only a serious failure in the field test system.

#### Readable Real Time Clock and Interval Timer

Performance was less than expected in both lab and field test systems, but these boards, being of special design and not subject to the quality inspection and testing of an off-the-shelf product, may have some minor design deficiencies. In any case, the number of failures was low enough to avoid reaching a definitive conclusion.

#### Card Reader

Performance was as expected.

#### Asynchronous Line Units

The lab system ALU performed as expected and, while this may surprise DVM's users, so did the field test ALU's. There were several failures which were attributed to ALU contacts, but the complexity of the setup for the experiment in which these failures occurred, namely, 60 EIA interface cables converging to the same area, made it difficult to trace the cause of the failure. It should be mentioned that ALU's have the highest expected failure rate and additional failures are to be expected.

#### Synchronous Line Units

There was no extensive experience with synchronous communication so as to include those boards in the reliability study. It should be mentioned, however, that the Data General SLU's had some design deficiencies in the wrong quiescent voltage for the data lines and the improper clearing of interrupts. The effect of the latter deficiencies has not yet been established. All tests on the Digital Computer Controls SLU were unsuccessful.

### Digital I/0

Digital I/O performed within the expected range. Some failures were attributed to improper matings of the contacts.

#### Modems

The Teledynamics modems in the lab system never quite functioned satisfactorily. There were numerous introduced deficiencies due to faulty design. As in the case of the teletype there is not a basis for comparison.

#### Power Supplies

There were from five to ten times as many failures as expected from those units. While some of the failures can be attributed to accidental short circuits or overloading of the supplies, there was more than a normal share of component malfunctions, in particular voltage regulator failures and numerous blown fuses due to apparent voltage spikes in AC lines which the supplies cannot presumably handle.

# Other System Failures

In spite of the fact that they were not counted as failures in the survey, it is worth mentioning that the DVM's, the lab system in particular, prove to be quite susceptible to discharges of static electricity. This appears to be a general deficiency of NOVA computers, as corroborated by other users. The problem was much less severe for the field test system working in humidity-controlled environments such as large computer rooms.

## SECTION V

## PROBLEM AREAS AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

#### GENERAL

As mentioned in previous sections, there were basically two areas of deficiency:

- a) A large number of introduced deficiencies
- b) A large number of failures in a small number of subsystems, namely, memory, tape and power supplies.

These problem areas and the potential corrective action will be described in detail in the next paragraphs. It should be pointed out that most of the recommended corrective actions are already being implemented with good results.

#### INTRODUCED DEFICIENCIES PROBLEM

Without even considering the numerous initial design deficiencies in many components (as serious as missing connections, incorrect etching of the boards, etc.) there were almost 30 failures per system due to the following basic causes:

- a) Use of the Lab System for Hardware Testing: When adding a new device or board, there was no way of debugging or testing it other than its connection to the lab system. If there was failure of the board, it resulted in a system failure, power supply overload etc. In addition, the requirement for new backboard wiring for new devices and measurements using backboard pins was an always present potential source of deficiencies.
- b) Incorporation of ECO's: Every so often, Data General issues some ECO's to correct detected design deficiencies. If those ECO's are not incorporated, or worse yet, partially incorporated, the board eventually fails. On the other hand, incorporating those ECO's in the field, under less than ideal conditions is in itself a good source of introduced deficiencies. A case in point is the memory failures in the field test system during the experiments at NSA from August to December, 1974.

c) <u>Use of New Development Devices</u>: The special requirements of the RTE necessitated the use of specially designed equipment or the first "off-the-line" models of standard equipment. This is reflected in the fact that many serial numbers of DVM boards were very low indicating first production models. For these very reasons, those components were not thoroughly checked and debugged by the manufacturer upon delivery and they resulted in a large number of initial deficiencies. Correcting those deficiencies was again in itself a source of new malfunctions.

#### Corrective Actions

Based on the causes of failures as mentioned before, there are a number of corrective actions that could be taken to minimize the introduction of new deficiencies. Many of these actions have been incorporated into the normal maintenance procedures to produce good results. They are as follows:

- a) <u>Timely incorporation of ECO's</u>: Proper notification of the existence of ECO's must be obtained from Data General and, if possible, the boards should be sent to the factory for incorporation of any ECO other than very minor ones; it should never be done in the field. This has the following advantages:
  - The actual soldering and connections are performed in a better environment, less conducive to the introduction of new deficiencies.
  - 2. The ECO is tested in a system other than the DVM's.
- b) Minimize use of DVM for Hardware Testing: The reduction in the introduction of new specialized devices in the Data Handling Laboratory has resulted in a decrease in the number of introduced deficiencies.

In general, it can be said that as in maintaining every new system, there is a learning curve for the proper maintenance procedures. That learning cannot be completed until the configuration remains stationary for a while. This being the case at the present time, it is anticipated that extensive preventive measures outside the ones mentioned above will not be required.

#### COMPONENT MALFUNCTIONS

As seen in Section IV, the main areas of deficiency for component malfunctions were magnetic tape, power supplies and memory. A potential area of deficiency is the asynchronous line units. Each will be discussed individually.

#### Memory

The field test system memory had more memory failures than would be normally expected. Since all maintenance of those memory boards was done by Data General personnel, not too much can be done to improve the failure rate other than acquiring a spare board, so a faulty one can be easily replaced and it does not impact the availability of the system. It should be a rule that ECO's are not incorporated in the field. Checkerboard tests should be run at fixed intervals (every month or so) rather than only when a failure is suspected. Runs must be overnight if possible. A point worth noticing is that the expected failure rate for the 8K and 4K memory boards is about the same; therefore, systems using 8K boards will have half the predicted memory failure rate of comparable ones using 4K boards.

#### Magnetic Tape Drives

The collapsing arm failures were due to two factors: a leak in a line filter capacitor and bad contacts. The alignment problem did not reappear since the lower roller tension guide was adjusted. Proper maintenance of the tape should include marking the roller guides adjustments and visually inspecting them for misadjustments. The test routine should be run periodically, as well as a benchmark tape for periodic alignment checks.

# Power Supplies

The regulator needs replacement every 6 months or so. However, if a failure does not occur, which is normally the case during periods when the system is not moved nor new boards being debugged, the risk of introducing additional deficiencies by this replacement makes it not advisable. A spare should always be on hand, however.

#### ALU

The expected failure rate for the ALU's is high. If 64-line applications are going to be extensively used, it is imperative to

acquire a spare board. An alternative approach is to consider the emulator capacity as 56 lines with 8 spares. This is normally the case in communications processors.

# Other Failures

Concerning the static electricity problem, not much can be done except to improve the environment by adding a humidifier during winter months. This is a general problem for all NOVA's.

#### SECTION VI

#### FAILURE DOCUMENTATION

Proper maintenance requires a learning period with a stable system. This in turn requires good documentation of failures. The documentation should include the source of the deficiency, either introduced or due to component malfunctions.

An installation failure log book should be maintained rather than relying on the installation log book, since there are large differences in the extent of the entries by different users and since the log book documents symptoms rather than failures. This makes it difficult to correlate them with a particular deficiency.

The failure logs should contain all the failure incidents, and once the deficiency is detected, even if not eliminated, it should be cross correlated with the pertinent failures. For all cases where Data General personnel service the machine, the deficiencies should be documented from the service bills, so care should be taken that those contain adequate details.

## APPENDIX I

#### FAILURE SURVEY DATA

Sources for this survey included the Mini-Computer Facility report, Data General Field Service bills and Air Force reports. The survey results were also correlated with the installation log book for a one month period randomly chosen, for the purpose of determining if it included failures not reported elsewhere. No additional failures were found.

Each failure is classified as: (a) Due to component malfunctions; (b) Due to introduced deficiency, or (c) Not accountable. Based on the definitions in Section I, the following criteria were used in classifying the failures:

- If a failure recurred a short period after the deficiency was presumably corrected, it was counted as a single failure (i.e., the second failure was classified not accountable).
- 2) If a failure could be traced to an initial deficiency, but occurred much later than the original installation, it was classified as an introduced deficiency.
- If there is a common failure to more than one subsystem, the failure was accounted for each one of them.
- 4) The distinction between the causes of the failure (component malfunction or introduced deficiency) was determined based on the failure description. If the failure is minor (e.g., fuse blown) it was classified as not accountable.

CENTRAL PROCESSOR UNIT FAILURES (INCLUDING OPERATOR PANELS)

Lab System

	Date	Failure Description	F		
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	10/16/72	Bit 4 address register light failure. Bulb replaced.	1	-	_ *
2.	6/6/73	CPU board interchange caused system to crash. An ECO was not installed		1	-
3.	2/20/74	Common failure to CPU, Core Memory and Power Supply. (System down 2 days).	1	-	-
4.	2/22/74	Failure recurrence. Failures to CPU1, CPU2 and delay lines. (System down 6 days).	-	-	1
		Total number of failures	2	1	1

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Field-Test System

Date Failure Description

			Due To Component	Due To Introduced	Not
1.	6/6/73	Timing inconsistency on CPU. ECO installed incorrectly.	Malfunction -	Deficiency 1	Applicable
2.	9/24/74	CPU failed to halt. Broken etch repaired.	1	-	-
3.	10/10/74	Could not load system. Found AC2 bad. Defective chip replaced.	1	-	-
4.	10/16/74	Could not load system. Replaced two chips in CPU1.	_	-	1
		Total number of failures	2	1	1

Failure Type

# MEMORY

# Lab System

Field-Test System

Note: Individual boards could not be identified from failure data.

	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	2/20/74	Common failure to CPU, memory and peripherals. Several components in two memory boards were replaced. (System down 2 days).	2	-	-
2.	2/22/74	Failure recurrence. 4 memory boards defective. (System down 6 days).	-	-	1
3.	9/30/74	Core stack failed. Repaired by Data General. (System down 7 days)	1	-	-
4.	8/74- 10/74	Ten failures of 8103/3800 and 8103/ 1461. Failures were traced to a design incorporating 2 different chip with the same value for a compensation capacitor.	98 9 <b>6</b> -	10	-
5.	11/12/74	8K core failing. Change sense amplifier.	1	-	<b>en</b>
6.	11/13/74	8K core intermittently failing. Char another sense amplifier.	nged –	-	1
		Total number of failur	es 4	10	2

	Date	Board	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
1.	5/74		Unidentified memory failure at Data Service Center.	Due To Component <u>Malfunction</u>	Due To Introduced Deficiency -	Not Applicable 1
2.	7/25/74	10	Dropping random bits, random locations. Replaced 3 inhibit drivers.	1	-	-
3.	7/26/74	10	Adjusted read strobe delay. Found address 7101 inopera- tive.		**	1

# MEMORY (CONTINUED)

	Date	Board	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
				Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
4.	7/26/74	363	Dropping bit 2. Repaired OC driver.	1	-	-
5.	8/2/74	320	Dropping bits. Replaced transistor.	1	-	-
6.	8/2/74	1852	Dropping bits. Replaced transistors.	1	-	-
7.	8/5/74	320	Dropping bit 9. Replaced transistors and install 100 pf caps.	-	-	1
8.	8/5/74	363	Dropping bit 0, location 53021. Replaced transistors.	1	-	-
9.	8/28/74	10	Replaced broken core. Inter- mittent driver causing address errors. Temperature sensitive component replaced.	1	-	-
10.	9/13/74	10	Recurrent failures. Send to office for repairs.	-	1	-
11.	9/13/74	363	Dropping bits. Repaired sense amplifier.	e 1	-	-
12.	9/18/74	260	Picking up bits 1 and 14. Re- placed transistors.	. 1	-	-
13.	9/18/74	363	Picking up bits. Adjusted strobe.	-	1	-
14.	9/19/74	363	Picking up bits. Replaced sense amplifier, capacitor and resistors. Installed ECOs but failure persisted. Re- soldered loose connections.	5	-	1
15.	10/16/74	1428	Picking up bits. Failure could not be repeated.	-	-	1
16.	12/5/74	10	Failing. Replaced sense amplifier and other com- ponents.	-	1	-

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MEMORY (CONTINUED)

Date	Board	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
17. 12/9/74	260	Failing. Replaced Transistor.	1	1	-
18. 12/10/74	320	Failing. Replaced Transistor.	1	-	-
19. 12/11/74	363	Picking up bit 2. Replaced sense amplifier.	- 1	1	-
20. 12/27/74	320	Picking up bits. Replaced several burned components. Found solder connection to ground.	-	1	_
21. 12/30/74	10	Intermittent failures. Replaced sense amplifier.	- 1	1	-
		Total number of failure	es 10	6	5

DISK

Lab System

#### Date Failure Description Failure Type Due To Due To . Component Introduced Not Malfunction Deficiency Applicable Inoperative. Clocking timing pulses out of sync. Data General 1. 9/25/72 rewrote clock timing marks. Two days downtime. 1 \_ \_ Total number of failures 1 \_ \_

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# Field-Test System

	Date Failure Description		Failure Type			
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable	
1.	5/2/73	Intermittent failures. Bad connection in power supply.	-	1	-	
2.	6/25/73	System would not load from disk. Electrolytic capacitor improperly installed.	-	1	-	
3.	6/29/73	System would not load from disk. Sloppy factory resoldering repaired.	-	1	-	
4.	2/13/74	Excessive noise in disk. New drive motor ordered.	-	-	1	
5.	2/16/74	Drive motor failure. New one installed. (System down for 6 days).	1	-	-	
6.	2/23/74	Starting relay switch faulty. New one installed.	1	-	-	
7.	3/7/74	Pronounced squeak. Cooling fan slipped on spindle of disk motor. Refastened on 3/11/74.	1	-	-	
		Total number of failures	3	3	1	

MAGNETIC TAPE

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# Lab System

D	a	t	e	
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# Failure Description

Failure Type

Due To Due To

		1	Component Malfunction	Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	9/72 - 1/73	Numerous serious failures of Ampex Tap Drive led to its replacement by a Wang drive on 1/9/73.	e 3 –	_	1
2.	5/4/73	Parity errors while writing. Loose connection found.	1		-
3.	6/13/73	Parity errors. CPU to Tape Adapter Unit connector loose.	-	1	_
4.	6/25/73	Not operational. Defective fuse replaced.	1	-	-
5.	9/13/73- 10/13/73	Tape drive dropping out of system. Service call.	1	-	-
6.	11/28/73	Tape would not power up. Fuse blown.	1	-	-
7.	2/22/74	Common failure to CPU, memory and tape controller. (System down 6 days.)	1	-	-
8.	9/25/74	Arms collapsed. Cleaned connectors	-	1	-
9.	11/5/74	Unable to laod DOS. Picking up bit 9. Replaced sense amplifier.	1	-	-
Fie	ld-Test Sy	Total number of failures	6	2	1
	Date	Failure Description		Failure Type	2
	Date	Failure Description	Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduce Deficiency	d Not y Applicable
1.	8/29/73	Tape drive dropping out of system. Failure did not recur.	-	1	-
2.	4/74	Tape rewind in middle of operation. Possible loose connection.	-	1	-
3.	6/74	Arms collapsing. Head alignment probl	ems. 1	-	-

# MAGNETIC TAPE (CONTINUED)

	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	-
	-		Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
4.	7/25/74	Arms collapsing. Line filter capacitor leaked. Also adjusted read amplifier quiescent voltage.	1	-	-
5.	8/2/74	Parity errors. Moved cables and problem did not reappear.	-	1	-
6.	8/8/74	Continuing tape alignment problems. Found lower roller tension guide off. Adjusted.	1	-	-
7.	10/7/74	Tape rewind during write. Could not repeat failure. Replaced chip.	-	1	-
8.	12/11/74	Sporadic failures of arms collapsing. Adjusted tension rolls and dynamic and electrical skew.	1	-	-
		Total number of failures	4	4	0

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# PRINTER

# Lab System

	Date	Failure Description	Failure Type		
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	9/14/72	Blower fan inoperative. Replaced on warranty.	-	1	-
2.	9/14/72	Power supply inoperative. Board replaced on warranty.	-	1	-
3.	9/11/73	Fuse blown	-	-	1
4.	12/28/73	Printer dropping column 80. Print hammer and switch replaced.	1	-	-
5.	9/16/74	Ribbon jammed. Replaced with thicker ribbon.	-	1	-
6.	10/3/74	Incorrect printout. Adjusted drum mechanism.	1	-	-
Fie	ld-Test Svs	Total number of failure	s 2	3	1

Date	Failure Description	Failure Type

			Due To	Due To	
			Component	Introduced	Not
			Malfunction	Deficiency	Applicable
1.	7/3/73	Printer would not accept data from CPU. Timing problem corrected.	-	1	-
2.	7/9/73	New timing problem not compensated by the previous fix.	-	-	1
3.	8/17/73	Printer intermittently dropping out of system. Out of tolerance con- ditions were adjusted.	- ,	1	-
4.	8/27/73	Continuing intermittent failures. Two new control boards were installed.	1	-	-
5.	12/28/73	Printer would not power up. Fuse Blown.	-	-	1
6.	4/74	Ribbon jams. Improper ribbon was used.	-	1	-
		Total number of failur	es l	3	2

# TELETYPE

L	ab System	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	i
	Date	`	Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	12/21/72	Erroneous character transmitted. Adjusted home position of commutator brush.	-	1	-
2.	1/15/73	Erroneous characters. Commutator brush thoroughly cleaned.	1	-	-
3.	2/15/73	TTY would not echo properly. Film of oil on keyboard contacts. Contacts cleaned.	-	1	-
4.	2/23/73	TTY would not echo properly. Film of oil on contacts. TTY returned to Teletype Corp. for degreasing and recalibration.	-	1	-
5.	3/12/73	TTY returned. Intermittent line feed problem. Corrected under warranty for factory service.	1	-	-
6.	5/4/73	Excessive noise. Fault would not repeat.	-	1	-
7.	6/6/73	Not operational. Partial overhaul required.	1	-	-
8.	7/10/73	Power supply failure. Fuse replace	d	-	1
9.	8/9/73	TTY would not power up. Fuse replaced.	-	-	1
10.	8/27/73	TTY would not power up. Fuse replaced.	-	-	1
11.	9/7/73	TTY would not power up. Fuse replaced.	-	-	1
12.	9/19/73	Continuous character error. Minor overhaul performed.	1	-	-
13.	10/11/73	TTY would not power up. Fuse replaced.	-	-	1
14.	9/27/74	Power switch failure. Replaced switch.	1	-	-
		Total number of failur	es 5	4	5

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# TELETYPE (CONTINUED)

# Field-Test System

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	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	7/25/74	TTY running independently of CPU control. Replaced relay.	1	-	-
2.	7/27/74	Not switching properly. Replaced local-remote switch.	1	-	-
3.	8/74	Erroneous characters. Adjusted commutator brush.	-	1	-
		Total number of failures	2	1	0

PAPER TAPE READER

Lab System

No Failures

Field-Test System

	Date	Failure Description	F	-	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	7/25/74	Oil leak in capacitor caused corrosion. Replaced capacitor and diode. (Reader in repairs for 2 weeks.)	1	-	-
		Total number of failures	1	-	-

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REAL-TIME CLOCK AND INTERVAL TIMER

Lab System

	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	10/18/74	Inoperative. Cold solder repaired.	1	-	-
2.	9/24/74	Failure. Replaced chip.	1	-	-
		Total number of failures	2	-	-

# Field-Test System

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	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type		
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable	
1.	5/30/73	Erroneous readings in interval				
		replaced.	1	-	-	
		Total number of failures	1	~	-	
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CARD READER

# Lab System

	Date	Failure Description	1	ailure Type	-
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	9/27/72	Motion errors. Photo electric cell lenses cleaned.	-	1	
2.	8/23/73	Incorrect reading. Service call.	1	-	-
		Total number of failures	1	1	-

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# ASYNCHRONOUS LINE UNITS

#### Lab System

#### Date Failure Description Due To Due To Introduced Not Component Malfunction Deficiency Applicable 1. 10/26/72 Incorrect carrier detect signals. Defective transistor replaced. 1 Solder bridge on address straps did not allow loading of system. 2. 7/23/73 .... 1 . ----Total number of failures 1 1

Failure Type

# Field-Test System

	Date	Failure Description	Failure Type		
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	2/12/74	Short on ALU board causing spurious interrupts.	-	1	-
2.	4/74	Numerous failures. Bad contacts.	1		-
3.	4/5/74	Board failure. Bad chip replaced.	1	-	-
		Total number of failu	res 2	1	-

MODEMS AND DIGITAL 1/0

# Lab System

	Date	Failure Description	Ē	ailure Type	•	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable	
1.	4/16/73	Continuous malfunctions on Tele- dynamics modems including carrier detect problems.	1	1	-	
2.	4/17/73	Power supply failures. Additional power supply installed.	-	1	-	
3.	5/14/73	Continuing failures. Seven modems to be replaced by Teledynamics.	-	7	-	
4.	6/15/73	4 additional modems sent to Tele- dynamics.	-	4	-	
5.	7/23- 12/74	Continuous minor failures. Rest of modems sent to Teledynamics.	-	1	-	
		Total number of failure	es l	14	-	
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Field-Test System

	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type		
1.	3/18/74-	Failure Description Lines not logging on. Digital I/O boards not seated properly. Total number of failures	Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable	
	3/30/74	Lines not logging on. Digital I/O boards not seated properly.	1	-	-	
		Total number of failures	1	-	-	

# POWER SUPPLIES

Lab System

	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
1.	7/16/73	CPU would not power up. Fuse replaced.	Due To Component <u>Malfunction</u>	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not <u>Applicable</u> 1
2.	9/19/73	CPU would not power up. Faulty diode bridge replaced.	1	_	-
3.	11/20/73	Expansion chassis power failure. Service call.	1	-	-
4.	2/20/74	Common failure to CPU, memory and power supply. (System down 2 days	s) 1	-	-
5.	2/22/74	Failure recurrence. Power supplic affected. (System down 6 days)	-	-	1
6.	9/23/74	Power supply (+5V) failure. Re- placed regulator and fuse.	1	-	-
7.	10/30/74	Repaired +15V supply. Failure caused by connecting DCC SLUs to expansion chassis.	-	1	-
8.	11/12/74	Dual +5V power failure. Replaced voltage regulator.	1	-	-
		Total number of failure	es 5	1	2

# Field-Test System

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Date		Failure Description		Failure Type	
			Due To Component Malfunction	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
1.	5/15/73	System would not power up. P supply fuse holder assembly replaced.	ower 1	_	_
2.	11/12/73	Two power supplies for the CPU failed. Taken to factory to r (System down for 4 days).	had epair. l	-	-
3.	11/19/73	Power supply failure. Several etches on a power supply repai	broken red. 1	-	-

# POWER SUPPLIES (CONTINUED)

# Field Test System

	Date	Failure Description	F	ailure Type	
			Due To Component <u>Malfunction</u>	Due To Introduced Deficiency	Not Applicable
4.	11/23/73	Power supply failure. Break in insulation caused a short. (System down for 6 days for spare parts).	-	1	-
5.	12/14/73	Power failure. Fuse blown.	-	-	1
6.	2/74 - 5/74	l5 amp fuse blown periodically. Possible voltage spikes.	-	-	1
7.	5/74 - 7/74	Numerous fuse failures. Possible incorrect line voltages.	-	1	-
8.	7/30/74	Failure. Replaced +15V voltage regulator.	1	-	-
9.	9/18/74	Failure. Bad ripple on Dual +5V power supply. Replaced regulator.	1	-	-
10.	12/9/74	Several system failures. Replaced defective transistors in power supply	·	1	-
		Total number of failures	5	3	2

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# APPENDIX II

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# PREDICTED FAILURE RATE CALCULATIONS FOR EACH SUBSYSTEM

		[Failure		
Qty.	Part Description	Fixed Ground	Lab System	Field Test System
163	Integrated Circuits	30.97	30.97	30.97
84	Capacitors, Ceramic	. 50	.99	2.48
24	Capacitors, Tantalum	.58	1.15	3.84
138	Resistors, Carbon	2.90	3.45	3.86
1	Transformer	.30	.50	1.00
280 <b>0</b>	Solder Connections	15.96	15.96	15.96
4	Connectors, 100 Pin	52.80	96.00	192.00
1	Oscillator Crystal	.02	.02	.02
	TOTAL	104.03	149.04	250.13

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# Central Processor Predicted Failure Rate

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# Operator Console Failure Rate:

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Qty	Part Description	Fixed Ground	Lab System	Field Test System
20	Integrated Circuits	3.80	3.80	3.80
65	Resistors, Carbon	1.37	1.63	1.82
1	Capacitor, Tantalum	.02	.05	.16
150	Solder Connections	.86	.86	.86
24	Switches	6.00	24.00	84.00
37	Lamps	18.50	37.00	74.00
	TOTAL	30.55	67.34	164.64

# [Failures per million hours]

# 4K Memory Module Failure Rate:

Qty H	Part Description	Fixed Ground	Lab System	Field Test
80	Integrated Circuits	15.20	15.20	15.20
90	Diodes, Signal	.26	. 34	.51
16	Transistors NPN, Signal	3.36	6.72	13.44
102	Capacitors, Ceramic	.60	1.20	3.01
32	Capacitors, Tantalum	.77	1.54	5.12
20 <b>9</b>	Resistors, Carbon	4.39	5.23	5.85
2000	Soldered Connections	11.40	11.40	11.40
2	Connectors, 5 Pin	5.50	10.00	20.00
2	Connectors - 100 Pin	26.40	48.00	96.00
4	Thermistors	1.20	1.20	1.20
64000	Ferrite Cores	2.56	2.56	2.56
	TOTAL	71.64	103.39	174.29

[Failures per million hours]

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# 8K Memory Module Failure Rate:

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Qty. Part Description	Fixed Ground	Lab System	Field Test
100 Integrated Circuits	19.00	19.00	19.00
100 Diodes, Signal	. 29	.38	.57
16 Transistors NPN, Signal	3.36	6.72	13.44
120 Capacitors, Ceramic	.71	1.42	3.54
32 Capacitors, Tantalum	.77	1,54	5.12
230 Resistors, Carbon	4.83	5.75	6.44
2200 Soldered Connections	12.54	12.54	12.54
2 Connectors 5 Pin	5.50	10.00	20.00
2 Connectors 100 Pin	26.40	48,00	96.00
4 Thermistors	1.20	1.20	1.20
128000 Ferrite Cores	5.12	5.12	5.12
TOTAL	79.72	111.67	182.97

# [Failures per million hours]

# Real Time Clock & Interval Timer Failure Rate:

# [Failures per million hours]

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	i.	[Failures per million hours]
Qty.	Part Description	Field Test
100	Integrated Circuits	19.00
120	Capacitors	12.00
3	Transistors, Power	21.00*
10	Transistors, Signal	12.00
8	LSI Chips	1.52
150	Resistors	4.20
2000	Solder Connection	11.40
2	Connectors, 100 Pin	96.00
1	Oscillator Crystal	.02
	TOTAL	177.14

# DCC Asynchronous Line Units Failure Rate:

\* Average value for PNP and NPN power transistors

		[Failures per million	hours]
Qty	Part Description	Field Test	-
100	Integrated Circuits	19.00	
50	Resistors	1.40	
70	Capacitors	7.00	
2000	Soldered Connections	11.40	
2	Connectors, 100 Pin	96.00	
1	Oscillator Crystal	.02	
	TOTAL	134.82	

Data General Synchronous Line Adapters Failure Rate:

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# Digital I/O Failure Rate:

a) <u>I/O Boards</u>

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# [Failures per million hours]

Qty	. Part Description	Field Test
35	Integrated Circuits	6.65
15	Capacitors	1.50
20	Resistors	.56
500	Solder Connections	2.85
1	Connector 100 Pin	48.00
	TOTAL	59.56

# b) Terminator

Qty	Part Description	Field Test
10	Integrated Circuits	1.90
150	Resistors	4.20
50	Capacitors	5.00
500	Solder Connections	2.85
1	Connector 100 Pins	48.00
	TOTAL	61.95

# Power Supply Failure Rate:

Qty.	Part Description	Fixed Ground	Lab System	Field Test
8	Integrated Circuits	1.52	1.52	1.52
6	Diodes, Power	5.40	16.20	54.00
4	Diodes, Zener	3.08	4.62	7.70
4	Transistors, NPN, Power	3.28	8.20	19.68
5	Transistor, PNP, Power	6.70	16.75	40.20
3	Capacitors, Electrolytic	.13	.25	.50
12	Capacitors, Tantalum	.29	.58	1.92
87	Resistors, Carbon	1.83	2.18	2.44
2	Resistors, Wire	.38	.76	1.52
3	Transformers & Inductors	.90	1.50	3.00
150	Solder Connections	.86	.86	.86
2	Fuses	.20	.20	.20
1	Circuit Breaker	.50	.50	.50
1	Fan	4.00	4.00	4.00
	TOTAL	29.07	58.12	138.04

[Failures per million hours]

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# Other Subsystems:

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The failure rate for peripherals devices was estimated as follows; based on experience with similar equipment complexity:

	[Failures per million hours]					
Subsystem	Lab System			Field Test		
	Controller	Device	Total	Controller	Device	Total
Disk	100	200	300*	150	300	450
Таре	100	400	500*	150	600	750
DG ALU	120	-	120	-	-	-
Paper Tape	50	150	200	75	225	300
Card Reader	50	150	200	-	-	-
Printer	100	400	500	150	600	750

\* According to TACC Automation reliability report.

Failure rates for the modems and teletype were not estimated because of lack of information.