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UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT AND TEST CENTER
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS PHASE III-THE PHASEDOWN

29 JUNE 1975 - 19 SEPTEMBER 1975

PART III IN ONE VOLUME



Phase II - A017704

EGLIN REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER
EGLIN AIR FORCE AUXILIARY FIELD #2
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

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OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS.

PHASE III THE PHASEDOWN

29 June 1975 - 19 September 1975.

PART III. IN ONE VOLUME

11 Oct 75

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Office of History
3201st Air Base Group
Headquarters
Armament Development and Test Center
Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

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INTRODUCTION

Certain activities and factors of operation at the Refugee Processing Center (RPC), Eglin AFB, Auxiliary Field 2, Florida, became known only after earlier publication of Phases I and II of this three-part study. These have been incorporated into the recapitulation of the Chronology in the Phase III portion of the story of Operation New Arrivals at Eglin. The Phase III chronology contains a summary of Phases I and II, some events that occurred which came to light ex post facto, and the events which took place from 29 June to the closing date of the Refugee Center, 19 September 1975. For specifics and supporting documentation pertaining to Phases I and II, the reader is referred to those reports (Phase I -- Buildup, Phase II -- Pipeline Phase).

The after-action reports and attachments included in the TAB section, except for TAB K, are as received. Those individuals who prepared the after-action reports could not make editorial corrections because the greater majority were on temporary duty (TDY) at Eglin and had departed for their home stations before closure of the Processing Center. The Logistics after-action report at TAB K has been revised. Credit for the revision has been given at the end of that report.

The report at TAB L prepared by Mr. Lester Gottlieb, the last Senior Civil Coordinator from the State Department assigned to the Processing Center at Eglin, is a thorough assessment from the viewpoint of the State Department and complements the report prepared at Eglin AFB by personnel of the Office of History, Armament Development and Test Center (ADTC). (See Introduction of Mr. Gottlieb's report, TAB L.) The problems and the lessons to be learned discussed in his report have been referenced in the Phase III of the ADTC report in the section titled Observations, Problems, and Recommendations. Because of the pressure to coordinate many operations from various government and civilian agencies (Volunteer Agencies-the VOLAGs), it was felt that discussion of the problems the Civil Coordinator staff encountered would be germane to the overall assessment of what improvements might be made in the future if a

similar situation should occur.

The Refugee Liaison Office (RLO) was the last element of the New Arrivals Task Force (NATF) to leave Eglin AFB. The personnel assigned to the RLO departed on 30 September. Before their departure (four military and one secretary), the residual RLO records were moved on 19 September from Auxiliary Field 2 to the ADTC Office of History. Their intent was to review all the documentation and write a report of the RLO activities before departing for their home stations. Because of Hurricane ELOISE (23 September), the RLO personnel departed this station upon expiration of their TDY without completing their report. Upon their departure, the RLO documents were placed in the custody of personnel of the ADTC Office of History. The final disposition of these records and data of the Vietnamese has not yet been resolved.


The report on Operation New Arrivals prepared by the ADTC Office of History mirrors and chronicles an event without precedent for the United States and, in particular, the United States Air Force. Painstaking efforts were exerted to make this trilogy available to all in the present and future. Furthermore, this report is of especial historical value as one of the sequels to the entire historical coverage of the Southeast Asia experience. This report will serve to answer the inevitable question in the future: "Whatever happened to the refugees from Southeast Asia?" With this in mind, the effort that went into the preparation of this document will stand on its own. The report for Phase I served as the model for the record of policy-making decisions at all levels in the Department of Defense and the Executive agencies of the Federal government.

For these reasons, the historical record would not be complete without acknowledging the efforts of the following:

Major General Howard M. Lane, now the ADTC Commander, as the NATF Commander from 28 April-23 May 1975, for his continuing support in military history; the military personnel and civilians who came from all parts of the United States to be assigned to the NATF at Eglin and who developed an esprit de corps instantly; the staff elements of the

State Department for their ever-ready cooperation and professionalism; the ADTC staff personnel who grappled with the myriad of problems to provide available resources for the comfort of the Vietnamese; the volunteer local civilians who came to Eglin and freely devoted their energies and talents to assisting the Task Force members; and in particular, to Mr. Melvin M. Kessler, Assistant ADTC Historian, Mr. Thomas Brewer assigned to documenting the history of the NATF, Mrs. Cheryl Muldowney, secretary-typist, and Mr. William Shaver, Historian, Tactical Air Warfare Center, who all have contributed their share to making this singular report the model it is.

10 October 1975



RUSSELL D. ROTH
Chief, Office of History
Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida

PART I

C H R O N O L O G Y

OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS

EGLIN REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER

PHASE I: 27 Apr - 23 May

27 Apr Armament Development and Test Center (ADTC) alerted of impending task; staff assembled; and site selection begun.

28 Apr Eglin AFB selected as a refugee center and may receive up to 20,000 refugees. Task Force appointed.

29 Apr Oplan for Reception of Indochina Refugees formulated; ADTC designated as the point of contact for procurement of all supplies and equipment.

30 Apr Construction of refugee center begun; first group of logistics aircraft arrived.

1 May Construction intensified. More support personnel arrived. Field 2 site completely cleared for construction. Personnel involved in buildup: 1,234.

2 May Mr. James B. Chandler, Interagency Task Force Coordinator (Department of State) for Eglin AFB arrived. Press Center operational. Center construction on schedule. Over \$1 million spent to establish the Center.

3 May Operations became centralized at Field 2. Tent construction continued. Kitchens became operational.

4 May First refugees arrived; camp areas defined. Tent erection continued.

5 May Local purchases total \$545,000; Departure Control Center commenced. Tent construction continued and bed occupancy augmented.

6 May Vietnamese Councils formed. Field 2 facilities could absorb 2,500 refugees. Tent construction continued and bed occupancy further augmented.

7 May Second planeload of refugees arrived. Manning document published for the Processing Center.

8 May Base Exchange trailer provided. Relocation process of refugees continued. Bed capacity at the Processing Center increased.

9 May Contingency plan formulated for 5,000 refugee capacity. Random search of vehicles initiated. Refugee sponsorship increased.

10 May More refugees arrived at Field 2. Total 2,777.

11 May Security improved. Volunteer agencies became more active.

12 May Field 2 capacity to increase to 5,000. Vietnamese to help maintain the Processing Center.

13 May Second manning document published. DOD officials visited Field 2.

14 May Field hospital enlarged. Refugee sponsorship continued.

15 May First refugee newspaper published. More refugees arrived for a total of 3,020 at Field 2.

16 May TDY augmentees arrived. Total refugees sponsored number 299.

17 May Staff personnel cut proposed. Total refugees sponsored number 349.

18 May First Vietnamese born to refugee parents. Theft reported. Refugees sponsored reach 396.

19 May Possibility that the Processing Center would close in the summer of 1975. Environmental impact survey started. Refugees sponsored reach 410.

20 May First fire at the Center. Manpower status revised. Refugees sponsored reach 424.

21 May Environmental report dispatched. Meeting for future construction. Refugees sponsored reach 427.

22 May Refugees deposited their money in local bank. Refugees sponsored reach 465.

23 May At the end of Phase I, 5,258 Vietnamese had arrived at the Processing Center on 25 flights. Cost for Operation New Arrivals was over \$2.2 million for Phase I.

PHASE II: 24 May - 28 Jun

24-30 May	Arrivals:	403
	Departures:	640
	On Hand:	4497
	Total Relocated:	1164
	Support Personnel:	1175

USAF/USA/Civilian Air Force TDY personnel during this period replaced the initial cadre for the most part.

31 May-
6 Jun

Arrivals:	357
Departures:	719
On Hand:	4135
Total Relocated:	1820

1 Jun

The Refugee and Sponsorship Registration Unit of the Refugee Processing Center came under the direct administration of the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF).

5 Jun

The Family Planning Clinic at the Refugee Processing Center was organized to assist in educating refugees on methods of birth control.

7-13 Jun

Arrivals:	924
Departures:	912
On Hand:	4203
Total Relocated:	2691

14-20 Jun

Arrivals:	906
Departures:	653
On Hand:	4456
Total Relocated:	3440

JCS msg 182131Z, June 75, directed that the Center prepare for a surge to 6,000 refugees during the period 20-25 June 75.

18-20 Jun

The US Postal Service provided to Vietnamese refugees and Americans was evaluated by a USAF officer from the Postal and Courier Service.

21-28 Jun

Arrivals:	2105
Departures:	580
On Hand:	5868
Total Relocated:	4080

26 Jun

The maximum number of 5,997 refugees was reached at the Refugee Processing Center.

PHASE III: 29 Jun - 19 Sep

29 Jun-
5 Jul

Arrivals: 26
Departures: 527
On Hand: 5372
Total Relocated: 4668
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 5155
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 285
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 282

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 949

Civilian firemen replaced military personnel at the Fire Department. The 10,000 gallon Harvest Eagle water tanks, which had been kept for possible use, were turned in. (TAB D)

4 Jul

A high percentage of the Center population participated in the Fourth of July celebrations. Stunt flying, a parachute jump, baseball game, and a parade all contributed to the observance. A special edition of the Center newspaper, Dat Moi (The New Land), enhanced the event.

6-12 Jul

Arrivals: 3
Departures: 583
On Hand: 4835
Total Relocated: 5251
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 4665
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 547
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 544

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 884

6-12 Jul

Continuous use of the kitchen tents caused structural failure of the floor frames and wore out the plywood decking. An overlay of 3/4" plywood was installed to strengthen and resurface the floors. (TAB D)

9 Jul

From 6 May to 9 July the YMCA with a few staff personnel and a number of volunteers from nearby areas operated an unofficial Information Office and also began to register prospective sponsors. During this period, all telephone activities including sponsor offers and requests for information were handled by a small group of local volunteers. (TAB L)

The Senior Civil Coordinator (State Department) established a telephone contact unit to interview sponsors furnished on IATF computer listings. This unit enabled the VOLAG case workers to speed up their activities by providing the basic data necessary for determination of sponsorship. YMCA then turned the function of sponsorship registration entirely over to State/AID officers. (TAB L)

10 Jul

Fourteen portable 400 gallon water trailers (Model TWT-400) were turned in to Eglin Transportation who shipped them to Holloman AFB, New Mexico.

13-19 Jul

Arrivals:	15
Departures:	699
On Hand:	4108
Total Relocated:	5750
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed:	4035
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed:	457
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification:	457

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 867

13-19 Jul

A postal service center was constructed in Section 3 at one of the vacated INS tents. This center consolidated the unit mail room and the post office facility. (TAB M/1)

An acute increase in the gnat population provoked the spreading of pink-eye among the refugees. Tall grass around the tents had sheltered the gnats from insecticides. The showers and latrines were sprayed and no-pest strips were installed. In addition to the regular fogging with malathion, area thermal fogging with diabrom was carried out twice a day. (TAB D)

15 Jul

Publication of the first accurate Unit Manning Document. The product reflected the authorized positions, both civil and military, and the military assigned (TDY or attached) to those positions. (TAB E)

16 Jul

The problem of the lack of dependable interpreters for the hospital at Field 2 and at Eglin Main was solved when the first of nine Vietnamese interpreters were hired on 16 July. (TAB M/2)

17 Jul

The ADTC Safety Office assumed safety surveillance for the NATF.

20-26 Jul

Arrivals:	13
Departures:	568
On Hand:	3638
Total Relocated:	6518
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed:	3523
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed:	450
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification:	450

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 926

20-26 Jul

All Civil Engineering positions with the exception of the Officer in Charge were civilianized. Manning strength totalled 58.

21 Jul

A new mail facility was opened at Tent 8 in Section 3.

27 Jul-

2 Aug

Arrivals: 2
Departures: 433
On Hand: 3135
Total Relocated: 6940
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 3133
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 369
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 369

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 924

28-31 Jul

Severe rain resulted in curtailment of normal services at the Center. All effort was focused upon keeping people, material, and equipment dry. Some refugees were moved to different sections because of flooding.

31 Jul

CSAF msg 311848Z, 31 Jul 75, stated that "Eglin will be closed NLT 1 Sep 75. Tents and facilities should be dismantled as camp population diminishes. Refugees without sponsors as of 20 Aug 75 will be moved to Fort Chaffee prior to 1 Sep. Facilities should be provided in the Eglin area to accommodate those refugees with firm sponsorship and travel plans within period 1 Sep-15 Sep." (TAB A)

During the month of July, the 23rd Tactical Hospital had 2,964 out-patient visits, 877 laboratory procedures, 504 X-ray films exposed and 2,760 pre-prescriptions filled. Thirty patients were admitted to the hospital(s) with an average of 5.4 days spent in bed for a total of 161 in-patient days. (TAB M/2)

2 Aug

Definite closure of the Refugee Processing Center was announced. Directives were received at NATF announcing closure date of the Refugee Processing Center. (TAB A)

3-9 Aug

Arrivals: 5
Departures: 347
On Hand: 2793
Total Relocated: 7290
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 2748
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 279
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 279

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 871

5 Aug

Publication of Change 6 to New Arrivals Oplan. Change 6 incorporated Annex T, Phasedown Actions, which addressed requirements for the gradual phasedown to the termination of operations at the Refugee Reception Center.

7 Aug

First of 28 tents removed from Section 6.

9 Aug

The hours of the Baby Store were reduced from 0800-1800 to 0800-1000 and 1600-1800 hours.

10 Aug

Two major phase-down actions were in process: (1) 136 of the 454 refugee tents were dismantled. Excess cots were returned to supply channels. Current refugee capacity was 3173. (2) The number of military personnel on TDY dropped from 377 on 1 August to 330 on 10 August. Variable personnel requirements were to reduce as the drawdown in refugee population permitted.

10-16 Aug

Arrivals: 4
Departures: 347
On Hand: 2337
Total Relocated: 7756
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 2309

10-16 Aug

Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 324
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 324

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 784

Removal of tents continued in Section 6: The Visitor Control tent at Gate 1, Vietnamese Kitchen 5 and 6, one dining hall composed of two tents, and 25 tents in Section 5.

17-23 Aug

Arrivals: 0
Departures: 457
On Hand: 1871
Total Relocated: 8213
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 1853
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 301
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 301

USAF/USA/Civilian Support Personnel totalled 722

Remaining tents in Section 5 were removed with a total of 152 tents down and folded by the weekend.

18 Aug

Kitchen #2 closed because of reduction in refugee population.

19 Aug

Combined Unit Manning Documents were first issued showing military and civilian personnel. (TAB E)

20 Aug

A meeting, under chairmanship of Colonel Carl B. Crumpler, 3205th Maintenance and Supply Group, ADTC, was held with State Department officials, Eglin Supply, GSA representatives, and Logistics personnel to discuss cost and disposition of remaining supplies and equipment. It was agreed that supplies and equipment would be moved from

20 Aug

Field 2 to Hangar 68 at Eglin Main for holding until final disposition action was effected. It was further agreed that specific instructions from the State Department were required for final disposition of property at Field 2. (See Senior Civil Coordinator's report for details at TAB L)

21 Aug

The plan for phase out of the Eglin Refugee Processing Center was finalized and jointly agreed to by the Civil Coordinator and the Air Force. A State Department telegram discussing the plans was sent to the IATF. (TAB A)

Mr. Goss and Lt Colonel Huntingdon from Ft Chaffee visited the Center to coordinate the refugee movement to Ft Chaffee, Arkansas.

Meeting conducted with Lt Colonel Huntingdon (Deputy Commander of Ft Chaffee), Mr. Kellogg (State Department), Mr. Smead (GSA Representative), Lt Colonel Pollock (NATF/LG), Mr. Partin (Logistics), and Captain Sacco (NATF/LG).

Lt Colonel Huntingdon listed Ft Chaffee supply requirements. The Senior Civil Coordinator was to authorize movement of excess property to Ft Chaffee. (See Senior Civil Coordinators's Report (TAB L)

22 Aug

Reverend Joseph Hoc, Vietnamese speaking Catholic Priest from Boston University who was ministering to the Vietnamese Catholics, was dismissed. Father Hoc was dismissed because he promised some Vietnamese that he would get sponsors for them and encouraged these Vietnamese to refuse sponsors provided through the authorized VOLAGs.

24-30 Aug

Arrivals:	0
Departures:	955
On Hand:	916
Total Relocated:	9168
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed:	Unavailable
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed:	Unavailable

24-30 Aug

Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: Unavailable

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 609

The tents of Vietnamese Kitchens 1 and 2 and the Education Center were removed. Total tents removed: 173.

25 Aug

The telephoning of sponsors was ended and the staff reduced to American personnel only. Letters were sent to all prospective sponsors in the non-contact category. These letters included application forms, details of sponsorship, responsibility and instructions to contact the Refugee Center at Ft Chaffee, Arkansas, if they were still interested in sponsoring. (TAB L)

31 Aug-
6 Sep

Arrivals: 1 (Birth)*
Departures: 336
On Hand: 581
Total Relocated: 9504**
Total refugees with security clearances, but not departed: 540
Total refugees with sponsor verification and authenticated to INS, but not departed: 456
Total of refugees cleared and who have firm sponsor verification: 456

USAF/USA/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 364

Work continued on removal of tents in Section 1 and the hospital area. A general clean-up of all areas produced large amount of scrap lumber and homemade furniture which had to be hauled to the Civil Engineering yard. (TAB D)

1 Sep

The responsibility for public affairs was transferred to the ADTC Office of Information.

Clothing issue was ended as a Center function.

* Cumulative births to date: 28
** Cumulative deaths to date: 7

1 Sep

The 600-line mobile control office AN/TTC-28, was phased out on 1 September 1975. This facility was to be retained in place for subsequent utilization by Joint Readiness Exercise BRAVE SHIELD XIII. (TAB C)

2 Sep

The 23rd Tactical Hospital ceased operation at Field 2.

0800

Medical service transferred to the USAF Regional Hospital Eglin. A clinic was operated from a trailer.

For the month of August (through and including 2 Sep) there were 2013 out-patient visits, 832 laboratory procedures, 126 X-ray films exposed, and 1,580 prescriptions filled. Thirteen patients were admitted, averaging 3.3 days for each. Total in-patient days: 43. (TAB M/2)

3 Sep

Mobile microwave equipment which was provided by the 3d and 5th Mobile Communications Groups was deactivated and released. (TAB C)

4 Sep

All 23rd Tactical Hospital equipment was returned to England AFB, Louisiana, by commercial carrier (van and flatbed trucks). ETA at England AFB is 6 Sep 75. (TAB M/2)

4-5 Sep

A meeting was held to resolve ownership and disposition of property at Field 2. (TAB K)

5 Sep

1972d Communications Squadron personnel ceased manning the Center on a full-time basis.

6 Sep

NATF/LG received message from Ft Chaffee, Arkansas for ~~items required for immediate shipment~~. Other items required were requested via telecon with Mr. Noah Rose, Ft Chaffee Supply Officer. (See TAB K)

The Departure Control Center was moved to smaller quarters due to decreased workload.

6 Sep Kitchen #4 was closed.

8 Sep Only two of the original six sections remained occupied by refugees.

11 Sep Sixty-three refugees airlifted to Ft. Chaffee.

12 Sep Kitchen #3 was closed.

15 Sep Departure of the last 24 refugees.

On Hand: 0
Total Relocated: 10,085

USAF/Civilian/Support Personnel totalled 248

During the period 29 June - 15 September, administrative statistics consisted of the following:

Incoming messages processed: 658
Outgoing messages processed: 408
Total electro-static copies produced: 23,338
Approximate volume of incoming personal mail processed: 10,456
Approximate volume of incoming official mail processed: 3,789

Over 2,000 cases (8,500 people) were resettled in the US through efforts of the six resettlement agencies.

16 Sep The last meal was served. All Food Service working equipment and food supplies were shipped to Eglin Base Supply.

17 Sep A meeting was held by NATF officers and officials responsible for logistical support for Exercise BRAVE SHIELD XIII (October 1975). Discussion regarded use of State Department property during the exercise. (See TAB K)

18 Sep

Colonel R. G. Davis, BRAVE SHIELD Coordinator, discussed logistical problems with NATF/LG.
(See TAB K)

19 Sep

Commercial leased circuits and equipment were terminated. (TAB C)

The New Arrivals Task Force was disbanded.
All TDY personnel were released from TDY status.

PART II

OBSERVATIONS, PROBLEMS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

It would be gratifying to all concerned to be able to arrive at a set of conclusions that would be applicable to similar refugee situations. Such is not the case. For the knotty dilemma facing the Vietnamese and Cambodian refugees who came to the United States was the fact that they were leaderless, alien to the mores of the West, and psychologically distraught. They were forced to abandon overnight their life-long customs and adopt to the ways and customs of the United States, except for those few who chose to settle in third countries. The refugees were confronted with changes in every area of their lives and were faced with radical adjustments.

The first wave of refugees to arrive at Eglin could be described as being mainly composed of professionals such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, military personnel, and upper-level individuals. For the most part, these refugees could speak English. Because of background, training, and skills, their sponsorship was relatively easy and sought after. Collectively, they represented 62 percent who professed the Buddhist faith.

The Roman Catholics eventually became more numerous among the refugees because of the arrival of 1,500 refugees from Guam in early July 1975, just before the typhoon season started in the Pacific. Approximately more than half were of or professed to be of the Roman Catholic faith. This was perhaps one of the many reasons why the USCC was the Volunteer Agency (VOLAG) chosen by the majority of refugees. Because of its large staff and other factors, the USCC by late July 1975 had dominated the VOLAG sponsorship program at Eglin. USCC repeatedly asserted to the Civil Coordinator (see his report at TAB L) that the USCC could easily arrange to the sponsorship of all its cases and more by mid-August.

It was not until late May that the desire to have a Buddhist VOLAG formed came to the attention of some of the RLO officials at the Eglin Refugee Center. In late May, the Buddhist Bhante H. Gunaratana, assigned to the chaplaincy at Field 2, approached one of the RLO personnel about Buddhist representation as a VOLAG at Eglin's Auxiliary Field 2. The Bhante's concern was that there existed so many nonBuddhist VOLAGs, yet there was no Buddhist representation, despite the fact that the refugees by late May consisted of over 60 percent who professed the Buddhist faith. Efforts to form a Buddhist

VOLAG at Eglin are given at TAB M/3.

When the books were closed in SEA on 30 April 1975, almost without precedence in historical migrations, if one excludes the Arcadians, the United States, in general, and, for our purpose, Eglin Air Force Base, in particular, undertook a task of tremendous complexity. What comes through with amazing clarity was the ability of diverse elements (military, State Department, and civilian agencies at all levels) to close ranks and bring order and purpose out of what initially appeared to be unbelievable chaos. This unity and leadership were overwhelmingly evident at Eglin AFB.

In this instance, it was the task of the USAF as assembled at Eglin to meet the needs of the refugees by easing their apprehension, uneasiness, and finally to facilitate their entrance into American society. At Eglin, the standard structured military way had to be altered to accommodate the State Department and the other civilian agencies, primarily the authorized VOLAGs, who had a hand in determining the fate of the refugees from Southeast Asia. The bottom line was unprecedented cooperation and flexibility to meet innovative exigencies.

An initial problem at Eglin was how to set up an in-processing system to receive and register the first refugees who arrived for

sponsorship. Fortunately, the YMCA had a staff on board which contributed to establishing a processing and control system. At the outset, only two VOLAGs were represented who worked with the Senior Civil Coordinator's (SCC) staff.

The YMCA and the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) of Health, Education, and Welfare performed sponsorship activities. Not until mid-or late May did the other VOLAGs arrive. These included the Church World Service (CWS), the U. S. Catholic Conference (USCC), the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS), and the Lutheran Immigration Refugee Service (LIRS).

The experience at Eglin with the Refugee Program revealed problems that should be avoided in any future similar activity. The ^{VOLAG} planning from the start of such an operation should include a full complement of personnel, equipment, furniture, and working space. The problems generated by lack of these were overcome only at the cost of excessive time and energy.

Since each VOLAG had its own system of maintaining records this presented a continuing problem. A system of handling case files should be uniform and under control of a registration section of the Coordinator's Office for checkout and return of cases lent to a VOLAG agency. At Eglin, the three largest VOLAGs were in a continuous state of confusion because of inefficient

filing and recordkeeping. The noncentralization of records required SCC personnel to spend many man-hours tracking down files and accounting for the activities of the VOLAGs. What became evident was the reluctance of the VOLAGs to be completely open with the SCC staff regarding their activities. This lack of cooperation on part of the VOLAGs was a cause for concern and contributed to loss of man-hours to track down specific problems.

Except for the USCC, all of the VOLAGs which operated at the Eglin Refugee Center were understaffed and could never, therefore, reach their full potential. The results were that the well-staffed USCC received the major portion of the workload. Because of the preponderance of USCC workers, the USCC tended to intimidate the other VOLAGs. The lesson learned at Eglin showed that it would be advisable that refugee registration and control remain a U. S. Government responsibility.

Specific sets of conclusions are necessarily lacking because of the diversity of the operation. However, as an exception see TAB L. Nevertheless, it is deemed advisable for the person seeking problems and answers to consult Parts I, II, and III for areas of their particular interest.

In conclusion the formula for such a similar refugee operation to succeed must once again have as ingredients leadership,

discipline, indepth military occupational specialities, and dedication harnessed with a rapid and responsive military logistics capability.

GLOSSARY

ADTC	Armament Development and Test Center
AFB	Air Force Base
AFSC	Air Force Systems Command
AID	(U. S.) Agency for International Development
ARC	American Red Cross
BRAVE SHIELD XIII	A STRICOM Exercise composed of Army, Air Force and other DOD elements.
CAMA	Christian and Missionary Alliance (VOLAG)
CE	Civil Engineering
GES	Civil Engineering Squadron
CSAF	Chief of Staff Air Force
CWS	Church World Service (VOLAG)
DC	Directorate of Communications and Electronics
DEAK & CO	Money Exchange Company
DOD	Department of Defense
DPAO	Defense Public Affairs Office
EAFB	Eglin Air Force Base
ETA	Estimated Time of Arrival
FAD	Force Activity Designation
GSA	General Services Administration
HEW	Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HIAS Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (VOLAG)
 HR Heavy Repair
 IATF Interagency Task Force composed of senior officers from Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Housing, HEW, Justice, Labor, Interior and Transportation and AID, USIA, OMB, and CIA.

<u>Agency</u>	<u>Function</u>
DOD: Marine Corps (Pendleton) Army (Chaffee) Air Force (Eglin)	Cooperates with Senior Civil Coordinator in operation of the center. Responsible for general support, safety, and security of the center.
State	Coordinates the civil activities relative to the care, processing, and resettlement of refugees. Primary contact point for Interagency Task Force.
Justice: Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)	Identifies and processes refugees entering the United States and ensures they have met requirements for security clearances and sponsorship.
HEW: Social Security Admin- istration	Issues Social Security numbers to refugees processed through the center.
Public Health	Ensures that refugees receive basic medical examinations and tests that medical problems are identified.
Social and Re- habilitation Service (SRS)	Assists the voluntary agencies in locating and certifying sponsors. Investigates financial resources of refugees.

	Assists refugees in making travel arrangements.
Labor	Determines occupational, educational, and training background of refugees seeking employment in the United States.
Voluntary Agencies	Obtain sponsorship for refugees leaving the center. Provide personal services to refugees within the center.
INS	Immigration and Naturalization Service
IRC	International Rescue Committee (VOLAG)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
LIRS	Lutheran Immigration Refugee Service (VOLAG)
MET	Management Engineering Team
Msg	Message
NATF	New Arrivals Task Force
NCO	Noncommissioned Officer
NLT	Not Later Than
OIC	Officer In Charge
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PHS	Public Health Service
RLO	Refugee Liaison Office
SATO	Scheduled Airline Ticket Office
SCC	Senior Civil Coordinator

SRC	Social and Rehabilitative Services
SSA	Social Security Administration
TAC	Tactical Air Command
TAWC	Tactical Air Warfare Center
TDY	Temporary Duty
USAF	United States Air Force
USCC	United States Catholic Conference (VOLAG)
VCC	Volunteer Coordination Center
VLO	Vietnamese Liaison Office
VOLAG	Volunteer Agency - nonprofit organizations established by a group of private citizens for a state philanthropic purpose and supported by voluntary contributions from individuals concerned with the realization of their purposes. The nine voluntary agencies participating in the entire resettlement program as of May 12, 1975, were:
	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. U. S. Catholic Conference 2. The American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees 3. The Church World Service 4. The Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 5. The United HIAS Service, Inc. 6. The Tolstoy Foundation, Inc. 7. The International Rescue Committee 8. The American council for Nationalities Service 9. Traveler's Aid-International Social Services
VVC	Vietnamese Volunteer Council

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3. Indochina Evacuation and Refugee Problems. Hearing before the Subcommittee to Investigate Problems Connected with Refugees and Escapees of the Committee on the Judiciary. United States Senate. Ninety-Fourth Congress. First Session. Parts I-III and Part V (8 April 1975-24 July 1975)
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* Inconsistencies in capitalized and noncapitalized words have been retained as they appeared on the title page.

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 - Phase II - The Pipeline, 24 May 1975-28 June 1975
 - Phase III - The Phasedown, 29 June 1975-19 September 1975Eglin Air Force Base, Florida: Office of History, Armament Development and Test Center, July-October 1975
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TAB A

Messages

OTTIZ YLW RUEHCAA1615 2130133-UUUU-RUCLBMA.

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

0010011Z AUG 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUHNSAA/CINCPACREP GUAM TTPI MI IMMEDIATE

RUMJDA/CG CAMP PENDLETON IMMEDIATE

RUMTMA/CG FORT CHAFFEE IMMEDIATE

RUCLBMA/EGLIN AFB FLORIDA IMMEDIATE

RUEERQA/INDIANTOWN GAP MILITARY RESERVATION PA IMMEDIATE

RUHWA/WAKE ISLAND/FOR STATE REP IMMEDIATE

INFO RUEKJCS/DCD/PDASD (C)

RUEKJCS/JCS/J-4

BT

UNCLAS STATE 181615.

FOR CIVIL COORDINATORS

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: REF

SUBJ: PRESS RELEASE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT THAT WILL BE RELEASED AT STATE DEPARTMENT NOON BRIEFING 1 AUGUST:

"PLANNING ESTIMATES FOR THE PHASING OUT OF THE FOUR REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTERS WITHIN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES AND THE TWO REMAINING PACIFIC STAGING AREAS WERE ANNOUNCED TODAY BY JULIA VADALA TAFT, DIRECTOR OF THE INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE FOR INDOCHINA REFUGEES.

EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA, SMALLEST OF THE FOUR CONTINENTAL CENTERS, SHOULD BE EMPTY BY THE FIRST WEEK IN SEPTEMBER SHE SAID. ITS CURRENT POPULATION STANDS AT 3,278 AND, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF FAMILY REUNIFICATIONS, NO NEW ARRIVALS ARE SCHEDULED. CAMP PENDLETON, CALIFORNIA IS SCHEDULED TO CLOSE NEXT, IN MID-OCTOBER.

THE RECEPTION CENTER AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP, PA., WILL BE PHASED OUT IN TWO STAGES, WITH A CUTBACK TO A POPULATION OF 6,000 BY MID-SEPTEMBER AND A TOTAL CLOSE-OUT SCHEDULED FOR THE END OF NOVEMBER. THE DOUBLE DATES ARE A REFLECTION OF THE CENTER'S CAPACITY FOR HEATED ACCOMMODATIONS IN COLD WEATHER. THERE ARE CURRENTLY 13,393 REFUGEES AT FORT INDIANTOWN GAP.

A
(CSY)
FKD#2

091
2L

AUG 75 01 57

A-1

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS WILL SO UTILIZE A DUAL SEQUENCE; IT WILL PHASE DOWN FROM ITS PRESENT POPULATION OF 22,400 TO 17,000 REFUGEES BY THE END OF SEPTEMBER AND IT ANTICIPATES A FINAL CLOSING DURING THE MONTH OF DECEMBER. FORT CHAFFEE'S PLANS ALSO REFLECT THE FACILITY'S COLD-WEATHER HOUSING CAPACITY.

AS BEFORE, REFUGEES STILL AT THE TWO REMAINING STAGING SITES, ON WAKE ISLAND AND GUAM, WILL BE TRANSFERRED AS SPACE BECOMES AVAILABLE IN CENTERS IN THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES. IT IS ESTIMATED THAT THE 1,482 REFUGEES ON WAKE AS OF 30 JULY WILL BE MOVED BY THE FIRST WEEK IN AUGUST; THE 2,870 REFUGEES NOW ON GUAM WILL ALL HAVE COME TO THE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES BY EARLY OCTOBER. THE FACILITIES FOR THE 2,232 WOULD-BE REPATRIATES ON GUAM WILL REMAIN IN OPERATION, HOWEVER, UNTIL THE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES AGREE TO ACCEPT THEIR RETURN.

IN MAKING THE ANNOUNCEMENT, MRS. TAFT STATED THAT "THE OPENING OF ADDITIONAL CENTERS DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE REQUIRED, AS OVER FIFTY PER CENT OF THE REFUGEES HAVE ALREADY DEPARTED FOR NEW HOMES IN THREE MONTHS OF TASK FORCE OPERATION. IT IS A GREAT CREDIT TO THE MANY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE SELFLESSLY DEDICATED THEMSELVES TO THE TASK OF RESETTLING THE MORE THAN 130,000 REFUGEES FROM VIETNAM AND CAMBODIA THAT WE CAN SAY WITH SOME CERTAINTY THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO MEET OUR GOAL OF PROGRAM COMPLETION BY THE END OF THIS CALENDAR YEAR".

INGER SOLL

BT

#1615

NNNNOATUZYUW RUEKJCS4227 2231919-~~UUUU~~--RUCLBMA.

ZNR UUUUU

① 111910Z AUG 75

FM JCS WASH DC

TO RUEFHQA/CSAF WASH DC

RUEADWD/CSA WASH DC

RUEBAHA/CDRMTMC WASH DC

RUWIBMA/CDR FORT CHAFFEE AR

~~RUECBMA/CDR EGLIN AFB FL~~

RUEOAWA/AFSC ANDREWS AFB MD

INFO ZEN/SECDEF WASH DC

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASH DC

RUEOFIA/CMC WASH DC

RUENAAA/CNO WASH DC

BT

UNCLAS 9561

J4 SENDS

SECDEF FOR PDASD/C

SECSTATE FOR IATF

SUBJ: RESIDUAL REFUGEES TRANSFER FROM EGLIN AFB TO FORT CHAFFEE

REF: SECDEF 9288/302238Z JUL 75 (NOTAL)

1. REF DIRECTZD EGLIN AFB CLOSURE AS REFUGEE CENTER BY 15 SEPTEMBER

IMMEDIATE

9 AUG 75 19 39

175
13

FH2
CSF

PAGE 2 RUEKJCS 4227 UNCLAS

1975. RESIDUAL REFUGEES REMAINING EGLIN AFB 20 AUGUST WITHOUT FIRM SPONSORSHIP AND TRAVEL PLANS WILL BE TRANSFERRED TO FORT CHAFFEE BETWEEN 20-31 AUGUST.

2. FOR EGLIN AFB. REQUEST PROVIDE MTMC WITH PLANNING ESTIMATE NLT 15 AUGUST OF RESIDUAL REFUGEES TO BE TRANSFERRED TO FORT CHAFFEE 20-31 AUGUST. COSTS INCURRED FOR REFUGEE AIRLIFT CHARGEABLE TO NEW LIFE FUNDS.

3. FOR MTMC. REQUEST PROVIDE APPROPRIATE COMMERCIAL AIRLIFT TO ACCOMMODATE REFUGEE TRANSFER FROM EGLIN AFB TO FORT CHAFFEE 20-31 AUGUST.

4. FOR ALL. DIRECT LIAISON ALCON AUTHORIZED. MTMC MUST MAINTAIN FLEXIBILITY IN AIRLIFT SCHEDULES WITH ONLY CONSTRAINTS BEING EGLIN AFB AND FORT CHAFFEE IN/OUT PROCESSING RATES COMMENSURATE WITH ICEM CHARTER FLIGHTS AND 31 AUGUST DEADLINE. IN VIEW OF MAXIMUM EFFORTS BEING MADE BY IATF TO REDUCE REFUGEE POPULATION REQUIRING MOVEMENT TO FORT CHAFFEE, IT SHOULD NOT BE EXPECTED THAT INITIAL AIR MOVEMENT WILL BEGIN PRECISELY ON 20 AUGUST.

5. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS. THE DAILY INDOCHINA REFUGEE SITREPS BY EGLIN AFB AND FORT CHAFFEE WILL BE UTILIZED TO INCLUDE DAILY STATUS OF REFUGEE TRANSFER.

BT

#4227


A-3 36

NNNN




TAB B

Organization Charts



**FLOW CHART DEPICTING THE BASIC FLOW OF REFUGEES
FROM INDOCHINA AND THE LINE OF RESPONSIBILITY
FOR HANDLING EVACUATION OF REFUGEES**



a. President's Inter-Agency Task Force is composed of senior officers from Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, Housing, HEW, Justice, Labor, Interior and Transportation and AID, USA, OMB, and CIA.

b. Western Pacific Restaging Areas include Guam, Wake Island, Clark AB, and Subic Bay where most of the work is done by DOD.

c. About 5,700 refugees were air-processed at Travis AFB in the early stages of the evacuation activities. Travis AFB will not be a continuing processing center.

d. On May 28, 1975, a 4th reception center at Indiantown Gap Army Reservation capable of handling 14,000 to 15,000 refugees was opened.

— ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITY
- - - GENERAL MOVEMENT OF REFUGEES



TAB C

Communications Report

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1972D COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON (AFCS)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



6 OCT 1975

REPLY TO:
ATTN OF: **CC**

SUBJECT: **Final After-action Report**

TO: **NATF/CS**

The following report is submitted in response to your request and covers the period 29 June - 22 September 1975.

a. Chronology of significant events:

(1) The 600-line mobile control office, AN/TTC-28, was phased out on 1 September 1975. This facility will be retained in place for subsequent utilization by Joint Readiness Exercise BRAVE SHIELD XIII.

(2) Mobile microwave equipment which was provided by the 3d and 5th Mobile Communications Groups was deactivated and released on 3 September 1975.

(3) 1972d Communications Squadron personnel ceased manning of the Refugee Center on a full-time basis as of 5 September 1975 and any further communications actions were provided as needed from Eglin Main.

(4) Commercial leased circuits and equipment as reflected in our 13 June 1975 report were terminated as of 19 September 1975.

(5) Government-owned telephone equipment (telephone extensions and key systems) was removed on 22 September 1975.

(6) Intrabase radio equipment obtained from the 2179th Communications Squadron, Patrick AFB, Florida and the 1960th Communications Squadron, Kirtland AFB, New Mexico is still in use by civil engineering and security police forces. US Department of State radio resources are currently being returned.

b. Significant problems and their solutions: None.

c. Statistical data on personnel, supplies, etc:

(1) Communications Costs:



(a) Supplies	\$ 35,718.55
(b) Civilian Labor Costs:	
Regular	24,618.96
Overtime	3,077.12
(2) Administrative Communications:	
(a) Tolls, WATS, FTS, Trunks, Connection Charges, etc.	94,311.83*
(b) Intrabase Radio (IBR)	4,371.85
(c) Military Pay	<u>62,075.49</u>
(3) Total Costs as of 121600L Sep 75	\$224,173.80

d. Recommendations: None

*This figure will be readjusted when final commercial billings are received and processed.

Clarence R. Smith

CLARENCE R. SMITH, Lt Col, USAF
Commander



TAB D

Civil Engineer's Report

AFTER ACTION

Week of 29 Jun to 5 Jul 1975

As the Center population rose to 6000 the work necessary to maintain facilities and services intensified. The trash collection effort required continuous attention. Gate valves and ball valves used in the showers began to wear out and Globe valves were placed on order as replacements. Globe valves have a greater cycle life. Vietnamese children caused problems in the new latrines by plugging them up with wads of toilet paper and plungers were ordered for RLO use. Civilian firemen replaced military personnel at the Fire Department. The 10,000 gallon water tanks from Harvest Eagle were turned in (they had not been needed) and the phase down plan was reviewed for changes. A BOD efficiency of 81% was reached in the sewage plant.

Week of 6 Jul to 12 Jul 1975

The continuous use of the kitchen tents caused structural failure of the floor frames and simply wore out the plywood decking. Working in the late evening after the dining halls were closed, an overlay of 3/4" plywood was installed to strengthen and resurface the floors.

A major setback occurred in the sewage plant when the clarifier tank inverted and the settled sludge rose to the surface. At first it was thought that the problem stemmed from an unknown chemical introduced into the sewage system. Further analysis of the floating sludge showed that it resulted from an overload on the clarifier. This was the result of some work done the previous week which necessitated pumping the level of the aeration tank down, interrupting the normal processes. The BOD* efficiency during this period dropped to 76%. The problem was corrected by the end of the week.

Week of 13 Jul to 19 Jul 1975

A postal service center was constructed in one of the vacated INS tents in Section 3. The Center consolidated the unit mail room and the post office facility.

The insect problem became acute with an increase in the gnat population and the discovery that the Vietnamese refugees were suffering from pink eye. A detailed analysis of the problem was made by the Entomologist. It was determined that the tall grass around the tents was a major factor which limited the effectiveness of chemicals used to combat the insects. A more effective method for treating the showers and latrines

* Biochemical Oxygen Demand

would be an electric mister using liquid Pyrethrum. In addition, pest strips were installed in the showers where they proved effective but were rapidly pilfered. Because the gnats reproduce rapidly a decision was made to try, twice daily, area thermal fogging with Diabrom in addition to the regular fogging with 95% Malathion which is effective against flies and mosquitoes. Unfortunately the thermal fogger could not be kept operational to continue this program. The BOD efficiency for the period was 91% indicating that the sewage plant was again functioning properly.

Week of 20 Jul to 26 Jul 1975

Civilianization of all CE positions with the exception of the OIC was completed. Manning included a total of 58 people. The lawn mowers arrived and were assembled and serviced. They were adjusted to cut at four inches in an effort to keep from cutting the tent electrical wiring, and signed out on hand receipts to RLO sections. Additional tents were prepared for Departure Control waiting rooms. The sewage plant had a BOD efficiency of 91%.

Week of 27 Jul to 2 Aug 1975

On Monday, the 28th, a Tropical Depression settled over the area, and it started to rain. In Section 1 a stopped up sewer line was dug up for repair but while the broken top of the 8 inch main was uncovered, the rain intensified and the excavation became saturated and collapsed, dumping a half yard or more gravel into the sewer system. The hole was shored up and work stopped. The rains continued throughout the night and Tuesday morning, found the sewage plant on the verge of washing away. Actually, two problems existed: (1) the back wall of the aeration pond was saturated and beginning to slide, large gullies formed where the fill simply washed away. Emergency repairs were made using large sheets (20x100 ft) of plastic draped over the edge to prevent further saturation and washing; (2) the second problem involved the surge pond where the effluent is stored prior to pumping to the irrigation field. This pond was within 10 inches of the top of the side wall, but of greater concern was that it was within 2 inches of drowning the float switch controlling the irrigation pump. Failure of the pump would have expedited the overflow of the wall which would have rapidly washed out the whole pond structure. An emergency call to the main base brought an additional pump which, with the

existing pump, began to bring the level of the pond down. That evening, the wall at the back of the aeration pond had started to crumble under the plastic, due to cracks in the asphalt surface which let water in. An emergency repair was again made using more sheet plastic but this time under the most adverse conditions of darkness and rain. The wall was secured for the night. The electric irrigation pump, which had been acting up all day, lost its prime again and failed. Several remedies were tried and it was approaching 2100 hours when the right combination of solutions proved effective and the pump was restored to full capacity. By morning of 30 Jul the levels in the ponds were normal and the erosion of the fill was somewhat stabilized. It was Friday, however, before repairs to the sewer in Section 1 could be made. Needless to say the entire camp suffered from the deluge of rain. Several refugee families had to move to different tents due to high water, torn tents or collapsing foundations, but by the weekend some semblance of normalcy returned and everyone went about drying out. Portolets were removed from Section 6 on 1 Aug as this area closed down.

Week of 3 Aug to 9 Aug 1975

The sewage plant continued to operate at 90% BOD efficiency. On Thursday 4500 gallons of sludge were removed from the clarifier,

D-6(5)

which further improved the balance of the system. On 7 Aug the first tents were removed in Section 6. A total of 28 tents were removed in three days. Weather was a major hold as it took two to three hours in the morning before the tents dried and then afternoon showers caused a work stoppage. It was found that the easiest way to remove the tent was to peel it off the end of the frame into a truck. When a truck load had been pulled off they were taken to the yard and folded on a specially designed table. All electrical wiring, plumbing fixtures, signs and trash were removed from the area. The only thing left was the tent frame which will be disposed of at a later date by the Defense Property Disposal Office.

Week of 10 Aug to 16 Aug 1975

Tent removal continued with the completion of Section 6, the Visitor Control tent at Gate 1, Vietnamese kitchens 5 and 6 and one dining hall (two tents) and 25 tents in Section 5. Forty potolets in Section 5 were terminated on 11 Aug and moved out.

Week of 17 Aug to 23 Aug 1975

Repair of the rear wall of the sewage plant was started. The wall was badly washed during the week of 27 Jul to 2 Aug.

D-6(6)

The problem was compounded by the existence of several springs at the base of the fill. These springs are the head waters of Swift Creek, which runs into Rocky Bayou. After hauling in more dirt the hill was seeded with Pensacola Bahia seed. In retrospect, this should have been accomplished when the plant was constructed. The remaining tents in Section 5 were removed with a total of 152 tents down and folded by the weekend.

Week of 24 Aug to 30 Aug 1975

Repair continued at the sewage plant with dirt being added behind the aeration pump and around the surge pond. The sewage plant operation began to fail as the camp population was reduced to less than 1500. The sludge level in the system was insufficient to support the bacteria. The tents at Vietnamese Kitchens 1 and 2, and the Education Center were removed, bringing the total tents removed to 173. A construction equipment operator was struck by lightning while working at the sanitary land fill. He was hospitalized.

Week of 31 Aug to 6 Sep 1975

Work continued on removal of tents in Section 1 and the hospital area. General clean up of all areas has surfaced large amounts of scrap lumber and homemade furniture to be hauled to

D-6(7)

the yard. Manning was reduced when two plumbers were transferred to Eglin Main. The man struck by lightning remained hospitalized.

Final Entry

Work continues on tent removal and clean up of the area.

D-6(1)

Item: Hard Back Frames

Problem: Some of the 2x4 framing material purchased for the Eglin camp were treated with an oil based preservative which soaked into the canvas. This chemical rapidly rotted out the canvas to the extent that wind and rain caused some tents to rip wide open. Approximately 20% of the tents were salvaged due to this problem.

Recommendation: Lumber using this oil based preservative should not be used in hard back frames.

Item: New Fill Erosion

Problem: The new fill supporting the sewage plant was badly eroded during several heavy rains. It was apparently felt the tenure of the plant would be so short that stabilization of the fill by normal compaction methods was not warranted.

Recommendation: During any field situation earth moving results in an embankment subject to erosion immediate action should be taken to plant grass seed. The investment is minimal but the root structure formed can be a major saving factor if unexpected rains threaten the project.

Item: Sewage Plant Start Up

Problem: When start up of the plant occurred during the early weeks of the camp operation extra effort was required because of the problems encountered with half digested sludge floating through on top of the system.

Recommendation: If the sewage plant is reactivated to support another group at Field 2 (Brave Shield XIII) it should be "started" with a 5000 gallon load of sludge from one of the base plants.

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY


MELVIN M. KESSLER
ADTC, Historian

D-6(10)

TAB E

**Personnel Status Chart
and
Personnel Report**

PERSONNEL STATUS

FUNCTIONAL AREAS	June												July											
	29	30	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19			
RED HORSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
HOSPITAL	53	53	46	49	44	39	39	39	41	40	38	37	37	36	36	36	36	36	36	36	37			
COMMUNICATIONS	57	57	61	62	62	70	60	60	62	64	61	61	57	56	56	56	61	54	54	53	52			
DIRECT TDY SUPPORT	517	518	487	479	463	455	452	452	452	449	449	441	440	442	439	439	438	441	439	433	430			
DETAIL SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0			
USAF CIVILIANS	125	125	125	157	157	157	157	157	140	140	158	158	165	165	165	165	164	165	167	164	164			
NON-DETAIL SUPPORT	19	19	23	23	23	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	33	33	33	33	32	35	35	35	36			
STATE DEPARTMENT	4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	5	4	4	4	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1			
AID	28	28	27	27	27	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26			
HEW	16	16	16	16	16	17	17	17	17	17	18	18	18	18	18	18	17	17	17	17	17			
INS	53	53	39	39	39	37	37	37	37	37	35	35	35	35	35	35	33	33	33	33	33			
VOL AGENCIES	36	36	36	36	36	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35			
CONTRACT PERSONNEL	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	3	3	3	2	2			
TOTAL	910	911	865	893	872	873	860	860	849	846	858	849	851	849	846	845	848	846	846	855	833			

PERSONNEL STATUS

20 July thru 10 August 1975

FUNCTIONAL AREAS	July										August											
	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
RED HORSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOSPITAL	36	36	36	37	37	37	46	46	37	38	38	39	35	35	35	35	35	34	34	33	32	32
COMMUNICATIONS	52	53	53	59	53	53	53	53	53	64	56	57	57	57	57	57	57	57	58	57	57	57
DIRECT TDY SUPPORT	430	431	429	428	424	422	401	401	403	382	384	393	378	370	370	372	379	360	355	344	330	330
DETAIL SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF CIVILIANS	166	166	163	206	212	215	215	215	218	218	224	221	221	221	221	224	220	219	215	216	216	216
NON-DETAIL SUPPORT	36	36	37	37	40	39	39	39	40	40	42	42	40	36	36	37	37	37	38	37	37	37
STATE DEPARTMENT	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AID	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	26	25	25	25	25	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24
HEW	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	17	15	15	15	16	16	16	16	11	11	11	11	10	10	10
INS	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	33	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32	32
VOL AGENCIES	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	35	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	41	41	41	41
CONTRACT PERSONNEL	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	834	836	832	881	880	880	868	868	869	860	859	846	852	836	836	837	840	819	810	794	779	779

PERSONNEL STATUS

11 August thru 31 August 1975

FUNCTIONAL AREAS	August																				
	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
RED HORSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOSPITAL	31	31	31	31	30	26	26	26	26	25	25	25	25	24	24	24	23	23	23	29	29
COMMUNICATIONS	57	58	58	58	58	56	56	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	54	56	56	55	57	56	56
DIRECT TDY SUPPORT	325	312	298	289	279	271	271	268	264	261	258	243	239	239	237	232	231	227	202	189	189
DETAIL SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF CIVILIANS	216	216	211	214	214	214	214	215	216	212	207	207	205	205	204	201	199	194	188	174	174
NON-DETAIL SUPPORT	37	37	37	37	38	39	39	39	39	37	36	36	36	36	36	35	35	35	35	35	35
STATE DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AID	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	24	23	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21	21
HEW	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
INS	32	32	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	19	15	15	15	15	15	17	17	17	17	17
VOL AGENCIES	41	41	41	39	39	39	39	39	39	34	37	38	38	38	38	38	31	31	31	31	31
CONTRACT PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	773	761	729	721	711	698	698	694	691	676	669	649	642	642	641	631	624	615	583	562	562

PERSONNEL STATUS

1 Sep thru 16 Sep 1975

	September															
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
FUNCTIONAL AREAS																
RED HORSE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HOSPITAL	23	23	20	14	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
COMMUNICATIONS	55	55	7	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DIRECT TDY SUPPORT	178	171	162	150	147	141	141	131	122	119	103	98	90	90	87	69
DETAIL SUPPORT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
USAF CIVILIANS	167	167	158	157	157	156	156	143	130	125	125	125	118	118	111	60
NON-DETAIL SUPPORT	32	32	33	29	29	26	26	26	24	24	24	24	25	25	25	18
STATE DEPARTMENT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AID	21	14	14	14	14	12	12	11	11	11	9	9	9	9	5	2
HEW	10	3	3	3	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	0
INS	17	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	10	10	10	10	10	1
VOL AGENCIES	31	9	12	12	12	10	10	13	13	13	13	13	13	13	6	0
CONTRACT PERSONNEL	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	534	480	415	390	374	355	355	332	308	300	286	281	267	267	246	150

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS EGLIN AFB NEW ARRIVAL TASK FORCE
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: NATF/DP

15 September 1975

SUBJECT: After Action Reports - Phase Down (29 Jun - 15 Sep 75)

TO: NATF/CS

1. Chronological Listing of Significant Events:

a. On 15 Jul 75, the first "clean" Unit Manning Document, locally devised, was disseminated, together with the revised, more comprehensive new Release Certificate Letter, and notice to discontinue the submission of Personnel Change Letters. The product reflects the authorized positions, both civilian and military, and the military assigned (TDY or atch) to those positions.

b. Statement of replacement/extension policy, and format for requesting fill action received from AFSC/DPX 18 Jul 75 (Refer their message 181230Z Jul 75) for end of July time frame.

c. Restatement of replacement/extension policy, and revised format for requesting fill action for August time frame received from AFSC/DPX 25 Jul 75 (Refer their message 242105Z Jul 75, Subject: manning/closure of Eglin Refugee Center.)

d. Change of instructions relative to approach for identifying replacements required/persons to be involuntarily extended received from AFSC/DPX (Refer their message 052130Z Aug 75, Subject: DOD Support for Indochina Refugee Center Operation for Fall and Winter months.) Also contained in this message was a clear statement by AFSC/DP that the command was "unable to support" NATF/CC's position on involuntary extensions, and, therefore, would request (from AFMPC) involuntary TDY extensions on identified personnel through 1 Sep 75 time frame, leaving the final decisions to the Military Personnel Center and the MAJCOM of assignment of each individual.

e. On 19 Aug 75, the first combined i.e. showing military and civilian assigned on the Unit Manning Document, was disseminated.

f. Last extension request on key people to enable us to wrap up the operation submitted to AFSC/DPX via my msg 252233Z Aug 75. Contained eleven (11) names.

g. Personnel Liaison Office officially closed 15 Sep 75. Records transferred to Eglin CBPO. Unit Manning Product discontinued.



2. Identification of Problem Areas/Solutions:

a. During the latter part of June it came to our attention that many of the orders sending our people that were TDY did not include an FY 76 fund citation. Under the circumstances, we knew our people would experience difficulties in getting paid per diem and collecting for missed meals. Therefore, DP was tasked with collecting a copy of everyone's TDY orders, determining whether FY 76 fund citation was on them, and requesting amendment of those lacking.

b. On 9 July 1975, DP covered problem areas as observed since arrival on Field #2, with AFSC/DPX. Areas covered: (1) 30 day TDYs in support of the New Arrival Task Force were not conducive to efficient operation, as they are insufficient to permit adjustment to working environment, establishment of rapport with refugees, nor learn camp operating procedures. 60 day TDYs are acceptable, and 90 days are ideal. (2) Persons unsuitable have been selected to fill TDY levies. TDY selection criteria has been ignored or "stretched". This is not the place to send nonquality personnel or misfits. (3) In order for the DP to keep track of in bounds, it is essential that NATF/DP be an info addressee on all message traffic (Refer my message 092330Z Jul 75). AFMPC must use its authority to require compliance with established operating procedures and existing regulations.

c. During the entire period covered by this report, Personnel, which is a servicing function, dedicated to responding to the needs and requirements of the Commander and his people, has been unreasonably hampered in the pursuit of our mission by the lack of firm guidance, specifically, a firm date of closure for the camp. The lack of this information resulted in delays in identifying personnel requirements, and fostered reversal of requirements, and excessive individual mind changing as regards volunteer status for extensions, etc. The end result of all this confusion, frustration and delay, was unnecessary, inconvenient, and upsetting to people, our people, Personnel people at every echelon, and to the people selected with short notice to join us. The solution was self-evident from the beginning, but beyond the control of Personnel to affect change.

d. Because of the vast number of voluntary and involuntary extensions requested during August, and the short lead time provided to CBPOs for execution, most everyone's orders expired prior to receipt of amendments extending them. This resulted and is still resulting in pay problems. NATF/DP made an issue of this and recommended AFMPC support on 19 August 1975 (Refer NATF/DP message 191931Z Aug 75, Subject: Operation New Arrivals, Receipt of Extension Orders on Amn

Mitchell (622X0) Willie J., 256-90-5140.) In the meantime, beginning week of 18 August, NATF/DP began sending messages to respective CBPOs case by case.

3. Statistical Data: See Atch.

4. Recommendations: None.

Susan M. Behling
SUSAN M. BEHLING, Major, USAF
NATF/DP

4 Atch

1. Personnel Status - Jun
2. Personnel Status - Jul
3. Personnel Status - Aug
4. Personnel Status - Sep

TAB F

Manning Document

EGLIN AFB
REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER
MANNING DOCUMENT
30 JUNE 1975

(Based on a 60 hour week & supporting 6000 Refugees)

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>COMMAND/1010</u>				
Commander	0026	OOL	1	
Vice Commander	0026	OOL	1	
Executive Off	7024	MAJ	1	
Admin Supt	70490	SMS	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	5
<u>INFORMATION/1040</u>				
Information Stf Off	7916	LTC	1	
Information Off	7924	CPT	1	
Information Supt	79191	SMS	1	
Information Spec	79150	SSG	2	5
<u>OPERATIONS/13XX</u>				
Director of Ops/Chief Cmd Post	0036	LTC	1	
Graphic Spec	23151	SSG	1	
Air Oper Off	14XX	MAJ	4	
Air Oper Off	14XX	CPT	3	
Air Ops Supv	27170	TSG	2	
Air Ops Spec	27150	SSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SGT	4	16
<u>MEDICAL/5XXX</u>				
Health Svc Admin	9025	CPT	1	
Family Physician	9346	CPT	4	
Internist	9386	MAJ	1	
Veterinarian	9925	CPT	1	
Dental Officer	9826	CPT	1	
Aero Med Physician	9356	MAJ	1	
Clinical Nurse	9756	CPT	3	
Med Svc Supt	90292	SMS	1	
Med Svc Tech	90270	MSG	1	
Med Svc Tech	90270	TSG	1	

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>MEDICAL/5XXX (Cont)</u>				
Med Svc Spec	90250	SSG	5	
Med Svc Spec	90250	SGT	4	
Oper Room Tech	90272	TSG	1	
Oper Room Spec	90252	SSG	1	
Radiology Tech	90370	TSG	1	
Med Lab Tech	90470	TSG	1	
Med Lab Spec	90450	SSG	1	
Med Admin Supt	90690	SMS	1	
Med Admin Spec	90650	SSG	1	
Med Admin Spec	90650	SGT	1	
Envir Health Tech	90770	TSG	1	
Envir Health Spec	90750	SSG	1	
Veterinary Tech	90870	MSG	1	
Veterinary Spec	90850	SGT	1	
Biomed Equip Maint Tech	40370	TSG	1	
Med Mat Supv	91570	TSG	1	
Med Mat Spec	91550	SSG	1	
Pharmacy Tech	90570	TSG	1	
Dental Spec	98150	SSG	1	
				41
<u>SAFETY/106X</u>				
Safety Tech	24170	TSG	1	
				1
<u>LOGISTICS/12XX</u>				
Logistics Stf Off	6616	LTC	1	
Supply Opns Off	6424	MAJ	1	
Inv Mgt Supv	64570	MSG	1	
Inv Mgt Supv	64570	TSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1	
				5
<u>VEHICLE OPERATIONS/4210</u>				
Motor Veh Mgt Off	6024	LT	1	
Veh Opns Tech	60370	TSG	2	
Veh Operator/Disp	60350	SSG	8	
Veh Operator/Disp	60350	CIV	8	
Veh Opns Supv	60370	MSG	1	
				20
<u>TRAFFIC MGT OFC/4220</u>				
Traffic Mgt Supv	60270	TSG	1	
Pax & Household Spec	60250	SSG	3	
Pax & Household Spec	60250	SGT	2	
				6

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>NATF SUPPLY/41XX</u>				
Supply Serv Ops Off	6424	CPT/LT	1	
Inv Mgt Supv	64570	TSG	2	
Inv Mgt Spec	64550	SSG	1	
Inv Mgt Spec	64550	SGT	3	
Mat Fac Spec	64750	SSG	1	
Mat Fac Spec	64750	SGT	2	
				10
<u>REFUGEE STORE</u>				
Mat Fac Spec	64750	SSG	1	
Inv Mgt Spec	64550	CIV	2	
				3
<u>FUELS/4170</u>				
Fuels Spec	63150	SGT	2	
				2
<u>SUPPORT COOR</u>				
Chief	0026	COL	1	
Vice Chief	0026	LTC	1	
Admin Supt	70490	CMS	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1	
				4
<u>CIVIL ENGINEERING/44XX</u>				
CE Stf Off	5516	MAJ	1	
Structural Supt	55295	SMS	1	
Structural Supt	55295	CIV	1	
Steno Spec	70450	CIV	1	
Fire Prot Supv	57170	CIV	3	
Fire Prot Specl	57150	CIV	6	
Apr Fire Prot Specl	57130	CIV	4	
Prog Work Contr Tech	55570	CIV	5	
Apr Pave Maint Specl	55130	CIV	3	
Mat Fac Specl	64750	CIV	3	
Constr Eqp Opr	55151	CIV	3	
Pavmt Maint Specl	55150	CIV	1	
Carpenter Specl	55250	CIV	3	
Apr Carpenter Specl	55230	CIV	2	
Plumbing Specl	55255	CIV	5	
Apr Plumbing Specl	55235	CIV	2	
Ref/AC Specl	54550	CIV	2	
Electrician	54250	CIV	4	
Envir Supp Techn	56370	CIV	1	
Envir Supp Specl	56350	CIV	4	
Veh Operator/Disp	60350	CIV	1	
Entomology Specl	56650	CIV	2	
				58

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>SERVICES STAFF/46XX</u>				
Supply Svs Ops Off	6224	LT	1	
Supply Svc Supv	61170	TSG	1	2
<u>BILLETING/465X</u>				
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	
Admin Supv	70270	SSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SGT	2	
Mat Fac Spec	64750	CIV	2	6
<u>HOSPITAL ESCORT/XXXX</u>				
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	2	2
<u>LINEN EXCHANGE/468X</u>				
Apr Supply Svc Spec	61130	A1C	3	3
<u>FOOD SERVICE/4670</u>				
Food Service Supt	62290	CMS	1	
Food Service Supt	62290	SMS	1	
Food Svc Supv	62270	MSG	7	
Food Svc Supv	62270	TSG	17	
Cook	62250	SSG	27	
Cook	62250	SGT	20	
App Cook	62230	A1C	36	
App Cook (KP)	62230	CIV	84	
Inv Mgt Spec	64550	SSG	4	
Admin Spec	70250	SGT	3	
Cook	62250	CIV	20	220
<u>SECURITY POLICE/43XX</u>				
Security Police Off	8124	CPT	1	
Security Police Supt	81291	SMS	1	
Law Enforcement & Corrections Supv	81271	MSG	1	
Law Enforcement & Corrections Supv	81271	TSG	4	
Law Enforcement Spec	81250	SSG	16	
Law Enforcement Spec	81250	SGT	16	
App Law Enforcement Spec	81230	A1C	26	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1	66

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>ADMINISTRATION/11XX</u>				
Admin Supt	70490	CMS	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SGT	2	
Apr Admin Spec	70230	ALC	3	
				8
<u>PERSONNEL/16XX</u>				
Personnel Staff Off	7316	MAJ	1	
Pers Tech	73270	MSG	1	
Pers Tech	73270	TSG	1	
Pers Tech	73270	SSG	2	
Pers Spec	73250	SGT	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1	
				7
REFUGEE LIAISON OFFICE				
<u>DIRECTOR'S OFC</u>				
Director	0026	COL	1	
Exec Off	7016	LTC	1	
Steno Spec	70450	CIV	1	
Dep Director	2116	LTC	1	
Exec Support Off	7024	MAJ	1	
Steno Spec	70450	CIV	1	
Interpreter	20350	CIV	2	
Admin Supt	70490	CMS	1	
				9
<u>REFUGEE AFFAIRS</u>				
Exec Supt Off	*XXXX	LTC	1	
Interpreter	20350	REF	(1)	
				1
<u>ADMIN OFC</u>				
Admin Supv	70270	MSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	2	
Admin Spec	70250	CIV	1	
				4

*NOTE: Volunteers with SEA exp in PsyOps, Civic Affairs, CORDS, intel exp. etc. AFSC such as 14XX, 15XX, 22XX, 80XX or any experienced officer.

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>CHAPLAIN/105X</u>				
Chaplain	8916	LTC	1	
Chap Mgt Tech	70170	TSG	2	
Chap Mgt Spec	70150	SGT	1	
Chap Mgt Spec	70150	AIC	1	
Chaplain	L8924	CIV	3	
Interpreter	L8924	REF	(1)	
				8

NOTE: The Chaplain Function can be augmented by Priests who are among the refugees. "L" Prefix denotes requirement for Linguist.

REFUGEE INFO, ORIENTATION, & EDUCATION

Info Tech	79170	MSG	1
Education Off	7524	CIV	1
Education Spec	75150	CIV	2
Info Spec	79150	CIV	1
Info Spec	79150	CIV	1
Admin Spec	70250	CIV	1
Interpreter	20350	CIV	1
Info Spec	79150	CIV	1
			9

REQUIREMENTS

Chief	XXXX	MAJ	1	1
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REFUGEE SUPPORT COORDINATOR

Inv Mgt Supv	64570	MSG	1
Inv Mgt Spec	64550	SSG	1
			2

VOLUNTEER COORD CENTER

Chief	XXXX	CPT	1
Exec Supt Off	XXXX	LT	1
			2

VISITOR/VOLUNTEER/SPONSOR CONTROL

Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1
Admin Spec	70250	SGT	4
			6

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>VOL INTERPRETERS/CAMPWORKERS SEC</u>				
Spec Serv Supt	74191	CIV	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	
Admin Supv	70270	CIV	1	
Admin Spec	70250	CIV	1	4
<u>CLOTHING ISSUE</u>				
Supply Serv Spec	XXXXX	A1C	6	6
<u>ACCOUNTABILITY</u>				
Chief	14XX	LTC	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	2
<u>REFUGEE ACCOUNTABILITY CENTER</u>				
Exec Supt Off	7024	MAJ	1	
Admin Supv	70270	MSG	1	2
<u>REFUGEE PROCESSING CENTER</u>				
Exec Supt Off	7024	CPT	1	
Exec Supt Off	7024	LT	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SGT	3	7
<u>REFUGEE DEPARTURE CENTER</u>				
Personnel Off	7324	CPT	1	
Personnel Off	7324	LT	1	
Personnel Tech	73250	SSG	2	
Apr Personnel Spec	73230	SGT	2	
Apr Admin Spec	70230	CIV	4	
Escort	XXXXX	SSG	3	13
<u>REFUGEE LOCATOR SEC</u>				
Exec Supt Off	7024	CPT	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	
Admin Spec	70250	SSG	3	
Apr Admin Spec	70230	CIV	2	7

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>REFUGEE OPNS</u>				
Chief	*XXXX	LTC	1	
Assistant Chief	*XXXX	MAJ	1	
Admin Supv	70270	TSG	1	
Ops Duty Off	XXXX	CPT	3	
Ops Duty NCO	XXXXX	TSG	3	9
<u>REFUGEE MORALE & REC</u>				
Special Svc Supt	74191	CMS	1	
Spec Svc Supv	74171	MSG	1	
Spec Svc Supv	74171	TSG	2	
Recreation Spec	74151	CIV	6	
Recreation Spec	74151	CIV	5	15
<u>SENIOR REFUGEE LIAISON OFC</u>				
Chief	*XXXX	LTC	2	
Admin Supv	70270	MSG	1	
Interpreter	20350	REF	(1)	3
<u>SCHEDULING OFFICE</u>				
Scheduling Off	*XXXX	CPT	1	1
<u>SECTION REFUGEE LIAISON OFFICERS</u>				
Exec Supt Off	*XXXX	CPT	9	
Exec Supt Off	*XXXX	LT	27	
Admin Supv	XXXXX	TSG	27	63
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/38XX</u>				
Comm-Elec Off	3055	LT	1	
Grd Comm Maint Supt	30496	SMS	1	
Mat Control Spec	64590	SSG	1	
Tele Eqpt Inst/Repairman	36254	SSG	1	
Tele Eqpt Inst/Repairman	36254	SGT	3	
Tele Eqpt Inst & Repair Tech	36274	MSG	1	
Tele Swx Eqpt Repairman	36251	SSG	2	
Tele Swx Eqpt Repairman	36251	SGT	4	

*NOTE: Volunteers with SEA exp in PsyOps, Civic Affairs, CORDS, intel exp. etc. AFSC such as 14XX, 15XX, 22XX, 80XX or any experienced officer.

	AFSC	GRADE	NR	FUNCTION TOTAL
<u>COMMUNICATIONS/38XX (Cont)</u>				
Radio Relay Eqpt Repairman	30450	SSG	7	
Radio Relay Eqpt Repairman	30450	SGT	9	
Radio Relay Eqpt Tech	30470	TSG	1	
Comm Center Supv	29170	TSG	1	
Comm Center Spec	29150	SSG	4	
Comm Center Spec	29150	SGT	8	
Comm Center Spec	29150	CIV	3	
Inside Plant Maint Supt	36390	SMS	1	
Elec Pwr Prod Tech	54370	TSG	1	
Elec Pwr Prod Spec	54350	SSG	5	
Elec Pwr Prod Spec	54350	SGT	3	
Tele Comm Sysm Cont Tech	30770	TSG	1	
Tele Comm Sysm Cont Spec	30750	SSG	3	
Tele Comm Sysm Cont Spec	30750	SGT	4	
Ref-A/C Spec	54550	SGT	3	
				68

AERIAL PORT OPS/4230

(Contingency only - To be used when C-130 scheduled)

MAINTENANCE

Acft Maint Stf Off	4096	LTC	1	
Acft Maint Off	4024	LT	1	
Acft Maint Tech	43171F	TSG	1	
Acft Maint Spec	43151F	SSG	1	
Acft Maint Spec	43151F	SGT	2	
Aero Grd Eq Rpmn	42153	SSG	1	
Acft Pneud Rep Tech	42172	TSG	1	
Acft Elect Rep Tech	43370	TSG	1	
Acft Maint Tech	43171F	MSG	1	
				10

OPERATIONS

Air Ops Gen	1495Z	MAJ	1	
Air Ops Spec	27150	SSG	1	
				2

AIR CARGO


Air Trans Supv	60571	MSG	1	
Air Trans Supv	60571	TSG	1	
Air Cargo Spec	60551	SSG	2	
Air Cargo Spec	60551	SGT	2	
				6

RECAP

	30 JUN	0	A	C	T
COMMAND	5	3	2	0	5
Information	5	2	3	0	5
Ops/Command Post	16	8	8	0	16
Medical	41	11	30	0	41
Safety	1	0	1	0	1
Logistics	5	2	3	0	5
Vehicle Ops	20	1	11	8	20
TMO	6	0	6	0	6
NATF Supply	10	1	9	0	10
Refugee Store	3	0	1	2	3
Fuels	2	0	2	0	2
Support Coordinator	4	2	2	0	4
Civil Engineering	58	1	1	56	58
Services Staff	2	1	1	0	2
Billeting	6	0	4	2	6
Hospital Escort	2	0	2	0	2
Linen Exchange	3	0	3	0	3
Food Service	220	0	116	104	220
Security Police	66	1	65	0	66
Administration	8	0	8	0	8
Personnel	7	1	6	0	7
REFUGEE LIAISON (RLO Sub-Totals)	(174)	(59)	(79)	(36)	(174)
Director	9	4	1	4	9
Refugee Affairs	1	1	0	0	1
Administration	4	0	3	1	4
Chaplain	8	1	4	3	8
Refugee Info, Orient & Ed	9	0	1	8	9
Requirements	1	1	0	0	1
Refugee Support Coord	2	0	2	0	2
Vol Coord Center	2	1	1	0	2
Visitor/Vol/Spon Cntrl	6	0	6	0	6
Vol Interp/Campworkers					
Sec	4	0	1	3	4
Clothing Issue	6	0	6	0	6
Accountability	2	1	1	0	2
Refugee Acc Center	2	1	1	0	2
Refugee Processing Cen	7	2	5	0	7
Refugee Dept Cen	13	2	7	4	13
Refugee Locator Sec	7	1	4	2	7
Refugee Operations	9	5	4	0	9
Refugee Morale & Rec	15	0	4	11	15
Senior Refugee Liaison Off	3	2	1	0	3
Scheduling Off	1	1	0	0	1
Sect Refugee La Off	63	36	27	0	63
Communications	68	1	64	3	68
TOTALS	732	94	427	211	732


Does not include Aerial Port Contingency

NEW ARRIVALS TASK FORCE
 Eglin AFB Refugee Reception
 Center, Eglin AFB, FL
 25 Jun 75



F-11


Refugee Liaison Office



TAB G

Refugee Processing Flow Chart

REFUGEE PROCESSING FLOW CHART



TAB H

Arrivals and Departures



ARRIVALS BY THE WEEK

Week of:

4-11 May -----	2777
12-18 May-----	1091
19-25 May-----	1596
26 May - 1 Jun-----	364
2-8 Jun-----	442
9-15 Jun-----	1073
16-22 Jun-----	939
23-28 Jun-----	1727
29 Jun-5 July-----	31
6-12 July-----	3
13-19 July-----	15
20-26 July-----	13
27 July-2 Aug-----	4
3-9 Aug-----	5
10-16 Aug-----	4
17-23 Aug-----	0
24-30 Aug-----	0
31 Aug-6 Sep-----	1
7-15 Sep-----	0

TOTAL: 10085-----includes 28 births

DEPARTURES

DAY 1#

JUNE 29 69
30 84
JULY 1 84
2 93
3 89
4 74
5 32
6 35
7 72
8 72
9 93
10 47
11 43
12 42
13 120
14 131
15 83
16 83
17 120
18 73
19 128
20 52
21 194
22 42
23 106
24 50
25 35
26 85
27 38
28 55
29 125
30 60
31 47

AUG 1 61
2 36
3 46
4 33
5 36
6 84
7 55
8 57
9 34
10 25
11 103
12 13
13 152
14 49
15 118
16 9
17 155
18 57
19 35
20 32
21 70
22 45
23 63
24 16
25 16
26 335
27 30
28 30
29 217
30 311
31 32

SEP 1 16
2 18
3 26
4 75
5 67
6 102
7 63
8 5
9 10
10 22
11 123
12 153
13 77
14 74
15 24

TOTALS 5845

U.S. CITIZENS 30*

TOTALS 5875

*30 U. S. Citizens were relocated
from Government Control but were
not recorded as departures.

Outprocessed from 29 Jun to 15 Sep 75
HIGH DAY - 335 Tuesday 26 Aug 75
LOW DAY - 5 Monday 8 Sep 75
DAILY AVERAGE - 62.85
WEEKLY AVERAGE - 449.6
(93 DAYS, 2 DAYS OVER 13 WEEKS)

STATISTICAL DATA - ARRIVALS 29 June - 15 Sep 75

<u>ZULU DATES</u>	<u>COMMERCIAL</u>	<u>MILITARY</u>	<u>MEDEVAC</u>	<u>OTHER</u>
30 Jun	1	-	-	-
1 July	7	-	-	-
2 July	5	-	-	-
5 July	5	-	-	-
6 July	-	-	-	1
10 July	2	-	-	-
15 July	12	-	-	-
19 July	2	-	-	-
24 July	7	-	-	-
25 July	-	-	-	2
30 July	1	-	-	-
<u>5 Aug</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
TOTALS	46	-	-	3

After 5 Aug 75, there were 6 births

ANALYSIS: For all intents & Purposes, input to the Center ceased W/ the last surge flights out of Guam on 28 June 75. From that time to the closing of the Center, only family reunifications were processed into the center.

TAB I

Cost Documents

HQ

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT AND TEST CENTER (AFSC)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

ACBS (New Arrivals)

1 OCT 1975

SUBJECT:

Monthly List of Costs for Indo-China Orphans/Refugees/Evacuees

TO:

Hq AFSC/ACXA

In accordance with your AFSC/ACFA message 021835Z May 75, the attached list of costs is submitted from Eglin AFB (ADSN 527900) for the period 1 Sep 75 through 31 Sep 75.

IRA D. JENNINGS
IRA D. JENNINGS, SSGT, USAF
Comptroller New Arrivals Cost NCO

1 Atch
List of Costs



I-1

1. 5763600	296 4786	PE 65807F	P690999	S527900
A. <u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>	<u>Prior Billings</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>	
140	\$ 3,088.81	\$ 13,497.00	\$ (10,408.19)	
391	129,426.66	95,689.78	33,736.88	
392	899,046.48	702,278.72	196,767.76	
408/409	17,021.29	14,033.20	2,988.09	
432	27,571.02	32,755.05	(5,184.03)	
46X	11,021.99	492.85	10,529.14	
472	17,863.71	15,804.71	2,059.00	
473	9,966.47	9,236.45	730.02	
480	8,710.60	7,277.25	1,433.35	
492	148,318.39	123,224.41	25,093.98	
521	1,745.00	1,745.00	-0-	
529	77,421.00	77,421.00	-0-	
533	200.00	-0-	200.00	
569	8,156.71	8,171.23	(14.52)	
570	13,756.43	11,180.10	2,576.33	
592	642,764.59	642,645.54	119.05	
593	23,015.16	20,496.63	2,518.53	
601	868.10	868.10	-0-	
607	804,925.21	777,642.56	27,282.65	
609	1,749,331.23	1,750,050.02	(718.79)	
619	209,867.48	208,936.52	930.96	
628	445,228.97	449,035.27	(3,806.30)	
716	<u>15,727.44</u>	<u>15,727.44</u>	<u>-0-</u>	
Total	\$5,265,042.74	\$4,978,208.83	\$286,833.91	

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

140 - Credit due to turn-in of three metal buildings.

391 - Overtime expended in direct support of the operation showed a significant increase due to non-reporting of overhire overtime by staff agencies for the months of Jul, Aug, and Sep.

392 - Overhire of civilian personnel in direct support of this operation.

40X - For vicinity travel.

432 - Accruals for rental of passenger vehicles in support of the operation decreased due to contract adjustments.

46X - For commercial transportation of equipment to Ft. Bragg, Robins AFB, England AFB, Tinker AFB, Ft. Chafee, and Dept of State warehouse, Alexandria, Va.

472 - Computer time on CDC 6600 computer.

473 - Copier rental.

480 - Utility estimate for 1 Aug - 15 Sep.

492 - Sep communications estimate.

533 - Contract for cleaning grease traps.

569 - Decrease due to adjustments in purchase order estimates.

570 - BISS relocation costs incurred in May 75 but not reported through JOCAS until September due to program error.

592 - Contract quarters.

593 - For laundry and dry cleaning of organizational items.

607 - Subsistence costs for refugees.

609 - Excess supplies turned in.

619 - Locally procured supplies to support the operation.

628 - Equipment turn-ins.

2.	5763600	306	4721	PE81211F	527900
A.	<u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>		<u>Prior Billings</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
	391	\$ 1,658.09		\$ 56.78	\$ 1,601.31
	392	43,938.55		29,893.74	14,044.81
	40X	274.79		102.62	172.17
	593	2,355.42		2,303.38	52.04
	599	<u>96,345.42</u>		<u>93,794.99</u>	<u>2,550.43</u>
	Total	\$144,572.27		\$126,151.51	\$18,420.76

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

391 - For overtime expended by civilians assigned to the hospital in direct support of the operation showed a large increase due to non-reporting of overhire overtime for the months of Jul, Aug, and Sep 1975.

492 - For hospital overhires in direct support of the operation.

40X - For vicinity travel.

593 - For laundry and dry cleaning of hospital linens and whites used in direct support of the operation.

599 - Costs of inpatient and outpatient care at standard rates.

3. 5763600 296 47R1 PE62602F PE690999 \$527900

A. <u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>	<u>Prior Billings</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
391	461.65	461.65	-0-
40X	449.91	374.31	75.60


B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

40X - Vicinity Travel

4. <u>NON-ADD ITEMS</u>	<u>CUM TOTAL</u>
1. Reg Civ Pay	\$882,567.23
2. M11 Pay	\$1,136,029.58

I certify that the above costs have been incurred in support of the Indo-China Orphans/Refugees/Evacuees Evacuation Program.

I further certify that a previous billing has not been submitted for these costs.



JOHN P. HANRATTY, Major, USAF
Accounting & Finance Officer
Eglin AFB FL S527900

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT AND TEST CENTER (AFSC)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



REPLY TO

4 Sep 1975

ATTN OF: ACBS (New Arrivals)

SUBJECT: Monthly List of Costs for Indo-China Orphans/Refugees/Evacuees

TO: Hq AFSC/ACXA

In accordance with your AFSC/ACFA message 021835Z May 75, the attached list of costs is submitted from Eglin AFB (ADSN 527900) for the period 1 Aug 1975 through 31 Aug 1975.

/s/ Ira D. Jennings
IRA D. JENNINGS, SSGT, USAF
Comptroller New Arrivals Cost NCO

1 Atch
List of Costs

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

Melvin Mander

COPY

1. 575 3600 296 4786 PE 65807F P690999 S527900

A. EEIC	<u>Cumulative Total</u>	<u>Prior Billing</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
140	\$ 13,497.00	\$ 13,497.00	\$ -0-
391	95,689.78	93,282.34	2,407.44
392	702,278.72	428,421.85	273,856.87
408/409	14,033.20	8,617.94	5,415.26
432	32,755.05	20,657.00	12,098.05
46X	492.85	492.85	-0-
472	15,804.71	11,478.64	4,326.07
473	9,236.45	9,177.90	58.55
480	7,277.25	4,413.11	2,864.14
492	123,224.41	60,177.31	63,047.10
521	1,745.00	1,745.00	-0-
529	77,421.00	77,421.00	-0-
569	8,171.23	5,789.76	2,381.47
570	11,180.10	11,180.10	-0-
592	642,645.54	502,134.14	140,511.40
593	20,496.63	18,103.22	2,393.41
601	868.10	868.10	-0-
607	777,642.56	632,529.27	145,113.29
609	1,750,050.02	1,473,897.74	276,152.28
619	208,936.52	207,477.95	1,458.57
628	449,035.27	449,035.27	-0-
716	<u>15,727.44</u>	<u>15,820.73</u>	<u>(93.29)</u>
TOTAL	\$4,978,208.83	\$4,046,218.22	\$931,990.61

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

- 391 - Overtime expended in direct support of the operation.
- 392 - Overhire of civilian personnel in direct support of this operation.
- 40X - For vicinity travel.
- 432 - Total accruals for rental of passenger vehicles in support of the operation.
- 472 - Computer time required for implementing and reporting refugee status on CDC 6600 computer per requirement of Department of State.
- 473 - Copier Rental.
- 480 - Utility Estimate.
- 492 - Aug Communications Estimate.
- 569 - Repair typewriters, televisions, sewing machines, and calculators.
- 592 - Contract Quaters.
- 593 - For laundry and dry cleaning of organizational items, i. e., sheets, pillowcases, blankets, cook whites, and all other government owned property.
- 607 - For subsistence costs for refugees.
- 609 - Supplies for maintenance, construction, housekeeping, billeting, food preparation, recreation, hygiene, and administrative support for the operation.
- 619 - Locally procured supplies to support the operation.
- 716 - For the use of Civil Engineering vehicles in direct support of operation. This includes the cost of fuels, lubricants, and maintenance of the vehicles. Credit figure due to error in estimate.

2. 5753400 306 4721 PE81211F S527900

A.	<u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>	<u>Prior Billings</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
	391	\$ 56.78	\$ 146.42	\$ (89.64)
	392	29,893.74	33,787.06	(3,893.32)
	40X	102.62	-0-	102.62
	593	2,303.38	2,039.73	263.65
	599	<u>93,794.99</u>	<u>82,734.23</u>	<u>11,060.76</u>
	TOTAL	\$126,151.51	\$118,707.44	\$ 7,444.07

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

- 391 - For overtime expended by civilians assigned to the hospital in direct support of the operation.
- 492 - For hospital overhires in direct support of the operation.
- 40X - For vicinity travel.
- 593 - For laundry and dry cleaning of hospital linens and whites used in direct support of the operation.
- 599 - Costs of inpatient and outpatient care at standard rates.

3. 5753600 296 47R1 PE62602F P660999 S527900

A. <u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>	<u>Prior Billing</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
391	\$ 461.65	\$ 461.65	-0-
40X	374.31	279.81	94.50

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

391 - For overtime expended by civilians in direct support of the operation.

40X - Vicinity Travel.

4. NON-ADD ITEMS

CUM TOTAL

1. Reg Civ Pay \$778,952.18

2. Mil Pay \$1,109,922.19

I certify that the above costs have been incurred in support of the Indo-China Orphans/Refugees/Evacuees Evacuation Program.

I further certify that a previous billing has not been submitted for these costs.

/s/ John F. Hanratty
JOHN F. HANRATTY, Major, USAF
Accounting & Finance Officer
Eglin AFB FL S527900

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

Melvin Mander

C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS ARMAMENT DEVELOPMENT AND TEST CENTER (AFSC)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



REPLY TO
ATTN OF:

ACBS (New Arrivals)

6 August 1975

SUBJECT:

Monthly List of Costs for Indo-China Orphans/Refugees/Evacuees

TO:

Hq AFSC/ACXA

In accordance with your AFSC/ACFA message 021835Z May 75, the attached list of costs is submitted from Eglin AFB (ADSN 527900) for the period 1 Jul 1975 through 31 Jul 1975.

/s/ Wimberly D. Stevens
WIMBERLY D. STEVENS, SSGT, USAF
Comptroller New Arrivals Cost NCO

1 Atch
List of Costs

Certified True Copy

Melvin Menden

C O P Y

1.	575 3600	296 4786	PE 65807F	P 690999	S527900
A.	<u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>		<u>Prior Billing</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
	140	\$ 13,497.00		\$ 13,497.00	\$ -0-
	391	93,282.34		87,560.43	5,721.91
	392	428,421.85		155,096.95	273,324.90
	408/409	8,617.94		8,295.74	322.20
	432	20,657.00		17,913.20	2,743.80
	46X	492.85		492.85	-0-
	472	11,473.64		5,658.63	5,820.01
	473	9,177.90		3,994.18	5,183.72
	480	4,413.11		4,413.11	-0-
	492	60,177.31		60,177.31	-0-
	521	1,745.00		1,745.00	-0-
	529	77,421.00		77,421.00	-0-
	569	5,789.76		5,638.05	151.71
	570	11,180.10		11,180.10	-0-
	592	502,134.14		348,737.09	153,397.05
	593	18,103.22		8,173.34	9,929.88
	601	868.10		868.10	-0-
	607	632,529.27		374,698.34	257,830.93
	609	1,473,897.74		1,337,204.02	136,693.72
	619	207,477.95		247,429.21	(39,951.26)
	628	449,035.27		435,757.57	13,277.70
	716	<u>15,820.73</u>		<u>14,868.21</u>	<u>952.52</u>
	Total	\$4,046,218.22		\$3,220,819.43	\$825,398.79

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

391 - Overtime expended in direct support of the operation.

392 - Overhire of civilian personnel in direct support of this operation.

40X - For vicinity travel.

432 - Total accruals for rental of passenger vehicles in support of the operation.

472 - Computer time required for implementing and reporting refugee status on CDC 6600 computer per requirement of Department of State.

473 - Copier Rental.

569 - Repair Typewriters and television.

592 - Portolets, Contract Quarters, and Burial Expences.

593 - For laundry and dry cleaning of organizational items, i.e., sheets, pillowcases, blankets, cook whites, and all other government owned property.

607 - For subsistence costs for refugees.

609 - Supplies for maintenance, construction, housekeeping, billeting, food preparation, recreation, hygiene, and administrative support for the operation.

619 - Locally procured supplies to support the operation. Credit figure due to machine error resulting in a double charge.

628 - For fans, lawn mowers, administrative office equipment required to support the operation.

716 - For the use of Civil Engineering vehicles in direct support of operation. This includes the cost of fuels, lubricants, and maintenance of the vehicles.

2.	5753400	306	4721	PE 81211F	S527900
A.	<u>EEIC</u>	<u>Cumulative Total</u>		<u>Prior Billings</u>	<u>Current Billing</u>
	391	\$ 146.42		\$ 56.78	\$ 89.64
	392	33,787.06		18,365.58	15,421.48
	593	2,039.73		1,380.57	659.16
	599	<u>82,734.23</u>		<u>54,924.03</u>	<u>27,810.20</u>
	Total	\$118,707.44		\$74,726.96	\$43,980.48

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

391 - For overtime expended by civilians assigned to the hospital in direct support of the operation.

392 - For hospital overhires in direct support of the operation.

593 - For laundry and dry cleaning of hospital lines and whites used in direct support of the operation.

599 - Costs of inpatient and outpatient care at standard rates.

3. 5753600 296 47R1 PE 62602F P660999 S527900

A. <u>EEIC</u>	<u>CUM TOTAL</u>	<u>PRIOR BILLING</u>	<u>CURRENT BILLING</u>
391	\$461.65	\$178.60	\$283.05
408	279.81	-0-	279.81

B. NARRATIVE JUSTIFICATION

391 - For overtime expended by civilians in direct support of the operation.

408 - Vicinity Travel.

4. <u>NON-ADD ITEMS</u>	<u>CUM TOTAL</u>
1. Reg Civ Pay	\$510,708.50
2. Mil Pay	\$1,041,634.49

I certify that the above costs have been incurred in support of the Indo-China Orphans/Refugees/Evacuees Evacuation Program.

I further certify that a previous billing has not been submitted for these costs.

/s/ A. B. Restivo
A. B. RESTIVO, DAFC
Accounting & Finance Officer
Eglin AFB FL S527900

A TRUE COPY

Melvin M. Menden

C O P Y

TAB J

Public Affairs Report

DOD PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

AFTER ACTION REPORT

2 Sep 75

BACKGROUND

The Eglin Refugee Processing Center's Public Affairs Office began operation on 30 April 1975, only four days before the arrival of the first refugees. The manning requirement levied by AFSC OI/CC msg dated 302143Z April 1975 outlined the following grades and AFSCs to report for duty for a "minimum of 14 days."

Air Training Command: one O-3 or O-4 (7924/7916)

Air Force Logistics Command: one E-5 or above (79150/70)

Aerospace Defense Command: two E-5 or above (79150/70)

Tactical Air Command: two O-2/O-3 and one E-5 or above (79150/70)

In addition to these positions, one O-6 and one O-5 slots were filled as director and deputy director, respectively. All selected persons to fill those slots were present for duty on 2 May 1975. The initial cadre consisted of the following individuals:

Col Richard K. King (AFSC)

Lt Col Michael A. McLean (SAF/OI)

Capt Robert Brus (ATC)

Capt Karen Miller (TAWC)

1Lt Eric C. Koch (TAC)

SMSgt Billy E. Helms (ADC)

MSgt Gustave Vinas (ADC)

MSgt James J. Strizak (AFLC)

Sgt Mark Goldstein (TAC)

Initially, two press centers were established, one at Eglin Main Base in Bldg 1, 2nd floor conference room, and the second at the Processing Center at Field 2. Both were operational 24 hours a day. The press center

at Bldg 1 was closed at 2300 hours on May 6 because most press interest and activity had switched from the arrivals to the processing of refugees at Field 2. Media representatives numbered well over 200 during the first few days of operation.

At first, two NCOs were assigned the overnight task of answering queries. However, due to "thin" manning overall, one NCO was released each evening about 2300 hours for stand-by duty in his motel room. Toward the end of May, all night-time queries were handled by an on-call officer or NCO, through the command post.

At the outset, PAO ground rules required all media representatives to be escorted by PAO personnel at all times while inside the Refugee Processing Center. This policy was obviously impractical in terms of ratio of newsmen to PAO personnel and it was quickly challenged by the media reps. The escort policy was eliminated upon approval of the Task Force commander and the Civil Coordinator. Effective on 4 May, upon presentation of credentials, press representatives were only required to exchange badges, i.e., the red and gray for the gate entry and for activities at Eglin Main, and a green badge for entry into the refugee tent area. Although 150 each of the two badges were prepared, this proved to be an insufficient number for the first few days.

It was soon evident in the early days that lack of an administrative specialist for PAO was a significant handicap, and by mid-May that situation had been corrected, to some degree, by assignment of airman (E-3). Hindsight at this point indicates it would have been useful to assign a senior admin type at the very beginning, one who would have been experienced in setting up files and filing systems and other administrative procedures.

It has been the general consensus of opinion of those assigned to PAO that the assignment of an O-6 majcom director of Information as the first director of PAO was a significantly useful move. Colonel King was able to generate sufficient support in the early days to overcome the general confusion and establish firm and full backing for PAO activities.

SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT

Office equipment and supplies were initially provided by ADTC/OI at Eglin AFB. However, by 10 May a supply system was established at the Field 2 Center thereby eliminating the need to draw supplies from the host IO. As with most other functions associated with the refugee effort, supply and equipment accountability became an administrative nightmare compounded by rapid turnover of personnel and a confusing proliferation of hand-receipts. By the time the operation was about to end, it was difficult if not impossible to determine what equipment belonged to what unit and to whom and through whom it should be returned.

PAO was issued five PT-300 mobile radio sets and arrangements were made to use the local Forestry Service frequencies in order to avoid frequent conversion costs of \$75 per set. Strict radio procedures were used from the start. As each DPAO member traveled through the area to obtain information or update existing information, each unit would request a clear channel and if the answer was affirmative, the info could be transmitted in the open. This reduced the risk of news leaks to media reps within hearing of the receiving sets in the DPAO admin area.

A telecopier was obtained in the beginning but the machine was returned in mid-May because of limited use, largely brought on by the frustration experienced when site operators would disconnect the circuit upon hearing no voice transmission over the autovon line. Perhaps use of Watts lines

would have solved that difficulty.

Vehicles supporting the DPAO function were a rental car and a USAF station wagon. The station wagon was used to transport DPAO enlisted personnel to and from work, since work hours did not always coincide with bus schedules. All enlisted personnel were housed in the Fort Walton Beach area, some 20 miles from the processing center. Later a USAF Dodge Van was added to the DPAO inventory, greatly easing the transportation problems.

REPORTS

Daily situation reports (SITREP) were prepared by the command post and DPAO was tasked to prepare a daily input which either described DPAO-related activities or a negative input was indicated. Informal reports by telephone were made periodically with OSD/PA, SAF/OI, AFSC/OI and ADTC/OI.

PHOTOGRAPHY

No photographer was assigned to DPAO, since photography was not a DPAO responsibility. Media requests for aerial photos of the camp were satisfied through the base photo lab at Eglin by distribution of 8 x 10 black and white glossies. Documentation was handled by an AAVS film crew and by the base photo lab. The base photo lab provided outstanding support to DPAO, whenever required and were available on 4-hour notice, and sometimes sooner, to cover VIP visits, etc.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

The mission of the Public Affairs Office is described by the 14 May Organization and Functions Chart Book:

"Advises and assists the task force commander and the civil coordinator on matters of public affairs, which includes briefing the task force commander and civil coordinator on DOD public affairs policy on certain matters prior to their meeting with the press or with local officials and civic organizations.

"Acts as official spokesman for the Refugee Processing Center in relations with the news media, local officials, civic organizations and the general public.

"Assists the news media in their coverage of the activities at the Refugee Processing Center."

One of the most significant difficulties of the DPAO operation was the failure to assign information officers for extended periods of TDY. Sporadic manning never exceeding 30-45 days led to a lack of continuity that could have been easily avoided had some Majcom bitten the bullet earlier. As it was, Major Tilton's tenure from 15 June - 2 September was the sole example of an officer being assigned for an adequate period of time. Why the need for extended periods of assignment? Simply the complex nature of the refugee resettlement effort drove the need for a rapid and thorough learning curve. The myriad of rapidly changing policies and the complex nature of the relationship between military and civilian agencies dictated the requirement for experienced PAOs who not only had general experience with public information, but specific experience with the general problems of the Task Force and a sustained involvement in the specific day-to-day problems and solutions which were heavily-laden with public affairs implications and innuendoes.

This observation applies not only to the position of director, but also to that of deputy. There was a tendency to believe that as the operation went on, experience was less of a necessity. The opposite is the case in such an operation, because the reporters who covered the refugee story were going through a learning curve themselves and as they grew more familiar with the operation and its ramifications, the questions got tougher to handle.

6-6-6

In any future situation of similar public affairs dimensions, strongly recommend that PAOs be assigned for extended periods of TDY, with sufficient overlap to transmit the nuances and sensitivities of the operation, along with its problems.

Another difficulty sprang from the dual responsibilities of DPAO and the structure of the PAO reporting chain. The director of DPAO was responsible both to the military task force commander and to the civil coordinator, with public affairs guidance funneled from the IATF/PAO through OSD/PA to DPAO. This arrangement led to some interesting but frustrating complications.

For example, when the decision was made by IATF to transfer unsponsored refugees from Eglin to Ft Chaffee, PAO was advised by OSD/PA to make no statement relating to the transfer because DOD did not want to catch the flak from the Arkansas Congressional delegation, who were upset about bringing more refugees into the Arkansas camp. "Refer all queries to IATF" was the guidance on that point, "because it should be HEW and not DOD that takes the flak on the transfer." This is intolerable guidance for a PAO who feels his responsibilities to the civil coordinator to be just as heavy as his duties to the task force commander and to DOD.

Strongly urge that in any future civilian-military joint task force operation, wherein a civilian agency has overall public affairs and management responsibility, that the director of PAO be from that dominant civilian agency's ranks.

Since the senior civil coordinator is really the ultimate decision maker on the task force, his man should be in the director's chair, with the deputy PAO from the military side of the house. PAO guidance should come directly from the IATF/PAO, with no filtering agency between the local center PAO and the IATF/PAO.

7-7-7

In practice, this would not violate the "single-voice" concept, because the PAO director would have overall responsibility for public affairs. In day-to-day operation, the civilian PAO would handle primarily those queries dealing with sponsorships, breakdowns, security clearances, overall IATF policy, etc., while his military deputy would focus on the military house-keeping side of the house.

It is an obvious mandate of effective public relations that the PAO function should report to and work primarily with the top executive structure. In Operation New Arrivals, with its predominantly civilian agency orientation and thrust, the PAO function was far too heavily military-oriented.

Another difficulty that complicated the PAO operation was the OSD/PA guidance issued from the outset that the PAO function should be sustained in a low-key, low-profile, response-to-query only posture. While the political ramifications of the refugee relocation effort are too obvious for recitation here, it should still be realized that PAO could have played a more active role in the generation of sponsorships had the "wraps" been lifted and the controls over initiative loosened. Much more extensive use of speakers bureaus, development of slide briefings, a positive program of releases and press advisories, and targeted materials aimed at specific markets, trade magazines, organizational journals, etc., from the very beginning, might have paid off in a more positive image of the program and in increased sponsorship interest.

Again, this problem harkens back to the previous dilemma of DOD control with a low-key strategy, versus the wishes of the local civilian coordinator who wanted an aggressive, positive public affairs operation which would have been creative in contributing to solutions of his management problems rather than simply reactive to queries and passive in the face of possible adverse

8-8-8

political impact. In this operation, the military worried more about adverse political implications than did the civilian side of the house.

For all practical intent and purposes, there was no internal information program for personnel assigned to the Center. There should have been. If ever there is an operation which needs internal info methods and channels of communication, in order to squelch rumor and clarify confusing and often apparently contradictory policy, it is this kind of operation. The task force worried about an internal info program for the refugees, and even devoted psyops resources and effort to it.


However, that effort was strictly refugee-oriented and divorced from DPAO except for oversight or review of English-language text in the daily newspaper, the Dat Moi, which could have had public affairs implications if the press got hold of copies, which they invariably did. This review of Dat Moi on a daily basis by DPAO did not begin until about the 1st of July, after a couple of incidents in which the press picked up items from the paper and featured them in their own papers, over-dramatizing and overplaying references to "fights" among the refugees, "thefts," etc.

Additional information resources should have been made available to conduct a strong internal information program in the camp, a program that, as a minimum, should have included a camp newspaper and regularly scheduled commander's calls. With additional manpower resources, it might have also been possible to accomplish more in the way of recognition of individuals, e.g., through the Hometown News Release Program and through feature material for internal Air Force media.

CONCLUSION

The criticisms and observations above should not be taken to mean that the DPAO mission was unsuccessful. It succeeded within the parameters circumscribing it. There was more good press than bad. Amicable relations were maintained with the local and regional media representatives. Queries were staffed and answered professionally and to reporters' satisfaction. Several speaking engagements were successfully arranged, monitored and orchestrated by DPAO. Special television shows on the refugee operation were arranged and organized through DPAO. Many public affairs crises were kept to manageable proportions, and everything was accomplished without compromising credibility or candor.

However, it is important that we view our public affairs operations in terms of its problems, not simply in terms of accomplishments. It is easy to fill squares and follow marching orders. The difficulty lies in pinpointing our faults and shortcomings in such a way that we learn lessons that can be applied in the future.


JAMES E. TILTON, Major, USAF
Director, DOD Public Affairs Office

TAB K

Logistics Report

PHASE DOWN OPERATIONS

LOGISTICS

To 22 August 1975

PART A

Phase down operations were concentrated on the movement of loaned equipment and the return of supplies and equipment to applicable organizations. Studies were conducted to determine supplies required to maintain the decreasing population of refugees at Field #2 during the close out phase.

On 10 July 75 fourteen portable 400 gallon water trailers, Model TWT-400 (NSN 2330007825973) were turned in to Eglin Transportation who shipped them to Holloman AFB, New Mexico. Registration numbers follow: (68C-72, 73, 74, 76, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 758, 759, 761, 762, and 855).

One additional unit was borrowed from Duke Field (Eglin Auxiliary Field #3) for use by Security Police.

Two personnel from the 4400 Mobility Support Harvest Eagle Assets visited Field #2 for a period of two weeks in July. They evaluated the inventory of Harvest Eagle equipment and trained assigned personnel at Field #2 on proper inventory, packing, and shipping procedures. On 8 August 75, ten pallets were returned to the 4400 Mobility Support Flight at Robbins AFB, Georgia. On 12 August 75 an additional three pallets were forwarded. During this period Field Kitchens Numbers 2, 5, and 6 were closed and prepared for shipment.

Administration Sections 5 and 6 were closed. Tents were removed from frames, inspected, and prepared for shipment. Difficulties arose when it was discovered that the frames containing creosote cross members which caused rot damage to tent canvas. The exact damage was not accessible at this time.

During the month of August excessive rain created increased demands on plastic garbage bags. They were utilized as tent liners for control of water seepage, rain coats, and protection of personal property. Some intuitive mothers made raincoats with collars and arms for their children from these bags. Their availability significantly improved environmental conditions and refugees morale during the rainy periods.

Civilian temporary hired employees were used to replace existing TDY military personnel. They were distributed as follows:

	Date	Number of Personnel
Logistics Supply	4 August 75	4
Transportation (drivers)	28 June 75	8
Transportation (fuels)	3 July 75	2

On 9 August 75 the hours of the Baby Store were reduced from 0800-1800 to 0800-1000 and 1600-1800 hrs. No problems were encountered. A total of 142 baby food ration cards were issued at the beginning of August with the following breakdown in age groups:

Months Old	Population	Months Old	Population
1	1	13	10
2	3	14	6
3	8	15	3
4	10	16	4
5	12	17	5
6	7	18	5
7	21	19	5
8	5	20	1
9	10	21	1
10	8	22	3
11	6	23	0
12	7	24	1

TOTAL 142

On 9 August 75 on duty personnel assigned to the Supply Point after hours operation were reduced from two to one. Night requests were not delivered to the customer except in emergency situations. Since Civil Engineering had their own Supply Point only occasional requests for baby food, sanitary napkins, or administrative supplies were encountered.

RLO Departure Control and Billeting personnel required cardboard boxes for packing luggage or supplies and equipment.

Billeting utilized the following boxes for packing supplies:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>Box S/N</u>	<u>Dimensions</u>
Pillows	8115001905411	26x18x26 1/2
Sheets and Pillow Cases	8115001839401	33 1/2x14x13
Blankets	8115001839401	33 1/2x14x13
Cots	8115009932790	40x48x36

RLO Departure Control required two boxes (SN 8115002903374 Dimensions 13x13x24") per refugee for use for containing luggage. Extra twine and tape was provided.

K-3

Meetings were conducted with State Department officials, Eglin Supply, GSA Representatives, and Logistics personnel to discuss expensing and disposition of remaining supplies and equipment. On 20 August 75 a meeting was conducted with the following personnel:

Chairman - Colonel Crumpler	M & S
Lt Colonel Nouss	M & S
Lt Colonel Sluth	M & S
Colonel McNulty	Supply
Mr. French	Supply
Maj. Peckham	Civil Engineer
Mr. Flanagan	State Department
Mr. Smead	GSA Representative
Mr. Pare	State Department
Lt Colonel Pollock	NATF/LG
Colonel Davies	Comptroller

It was agreed that supplies and equipment would be moved from Field #2 to Hangar 68 for holdup until final disposition action is affected. It was further agreed that specific instructions from the State Department are required for final disposition of property located at Field #2.

On 21 August 75 a meeting was conducted between Lt. Colonel Huntingdon (Deputy Commander of Ft. Chaffee), Mr. Kellogg (State Department), Mr. Flanagan (State Department), Mr. Smead (GSA Representative), Lt. Colonel Pollock (Logistics), Mr. Partin (Logistics), and Capt. Sacco (Logistics).

Lt. Colonel Huntington presented a list of Ft. Chaffee supply requirements. It was agreed that the listing of excess property at Field #2 will be discussed with Ft. Chaffee personnel to determine their requirements. The Civil Coordinator will provide authority for movement of excess property

to Ft Chaffee. Also pending is determination of Funds Site for
Transportation express for shipment of subject property.

/s/ John L. Sacco

JOHN L. SACCO, CAPT USAF
NATF Logistics

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY
(Spelling Corrected)



Melvin M. Kessler
ADTC Historian

K-5

PHASE DOWN PHASE III PART B

LOGISTICS

The completion of the Close Out phase can be divided into two parts: first, a decision had to be made to determine who owned the property at Field 2 and disposition instructions for equipment and supplies. The second part was primarily coordinating the disposition of this property to the applicable agencies.

Order of Events

15 August 75-Received message to ship hospital unit to England AFB

(Attachment 1)

20 August 75- A meeting was conducted to discuss movement of supplies
(Refer to previous LG Part A, Phase III-Phase Down)

21 August 1975- Message received giving negative approval for air shipment of Mobile Hospital unit (Attachment 2)

26 August 75- Twenty baby cribs were delivered to Eglin Family Services to replace loaned cribs.

27 August 75-Began storing property in clothing tent area, This area enclosed three tents within a chain link barrier. It was the only secure area besides the Butler buildings.

29 August 75- Moved baby food store to a two door locker in Section 1 and 2. Hours of operation were 0800 to 1000 hours. Logistics provided an attendant during the operative hours until 9 September.

Until 9 September, at which time RLO assumed responsibilities. On August 29, 1975, thirty two babies were under 24 months of age. During August the population consisted primarily of fisherman and their families: 4% of which were children under 24 months of age.

2 September 75- Purchased \$1084 of supplies for the Hospital Unit

K-6

to replace damaged equipment. Included was flashlight batteries, ponchos, undershirts and sleeping bags. (Letter attachment 3)

4 Sep-5Sep 75-A meeting was conducted including the following individuals:

Mr. Jerry Dwayne	HEW Committee Chairman
Mr. Maurice Pare	State Department
Mr. Marion Kellogg	State Department
Mr. French	Supply
Mr. Joseph Vego	State Department Supply
Mr. Arnold Smead	GSA Representative
Mr. Sanders	DSA Representative
Mr. Frankie Fulton	GAO
Mr. Thomas Owens	GAO
Capt Chamberlain	AFSC Supply
Mr. Sammy Whitehead	AFSC Supply
Mr. Partin	Eglin Logistics Representative
Capt Sacco	NATF/LG
TSgt Canales	NATF/LG

The discussion resolved that the State Department owned property at Field #2. State Department property turned into Eglin Supply would only receive credit if local demands were levied on pertinent items. If property was not in demand, it would be incorporated in the USAF Stock Fund and transferred within the Air Force with no credit allowed to the State Department. It was decided special procedures had to be established by IATF and sent to Eglin Refugee Center as to the disposition of property.

Action individual was Jerry Dwayne. As of 19 September 75 no written instruction have been given.

All repair cycle items would be turned in by State Department and repair costs paid by the State if required. Provisions for transfer of property from one State function to another were to be given. Tents were negotiated at a higher level as to retaining them during Brave Shield. Any

items over \$1,000 would be considered investment items and not charged to the State Department. Baby beds were not required by the State. Distribution would be approved by GSA.

Disposition of property would be as follows in order of priority:

1. Turn in to Eglin Supply for credit
2. Fill IATF requirements - ship to other refugee centers
3. State Department to screen property
4. Turn over to GSA Representative for disposition
5. Remainder would be given to Property Disposal Office, Eglin AFB

6 Sep 75. Received message (attachment 4) from Ft. Chaffee for items required for immediate shipment. Other items were decided via telecon with Mr. Noah Ross, Ft. Chaffee Supply Officer (AV 962-2240)

During September, several meetings with GSA representative, Arnold Smead and the Federal Prison officials at Eglin AFB indicated their desire for excess property not returned for credit by the State Department.

11 September 75- SSgt Hutzulav from 3246th Test Wing requested disposition information on his 3 trailers, 3 desks, refrigerator, and one electric cooler which were loaned to NATF. Subject trailers and equipment are to be utilized for Brave Shield Exercise.

15 Sep 75. Mr. Ray Wactor, DSA Representative arrived to discuss disposition of cots, blankets, tents, and associated items. He inventoried and inspected tents to be used by Brave Shield (109 Serviceable, 46 repairable, 193 Unserviceable). The 155 tents which could be turned in

for credit will be returned to DSA at the termination of Brave Shield. Tents will be inspected at DSA facilities to determine condition and credit to be given to State Department.

17 Sep 75. Meeting with officers responsible for logistics support for Brave Shield.

Meetings were held at 1000, 1300, 1500 hours on Eglin Main, Building 1, Room 225. Members present were as follows:

1000 & 1300:	Colonel Miller	Chairman
	Colonel Davis	Brave Shield Coordinator
	Colonel Troop	Finance
	Lt Col Glowa	
	Mr. French	Supply
	Mr. Partin	M&S Logistics
	Capt Sacco	NATF/LG
	Jim Shelaton	C.E.
	MSgt Kinder	
	SSgt Lennines	
	4 other civilians-names unknown	

1500:	In addition:	
	Mr. Roy Kellogg	Civil Coordinator NATF
	Mr. Arnold SMead	GSA Representative

This meeting was to discuss the memorandum (attachment 5 and 6) with the State Department regarding use of State Department property during the Brave Shield Exercise. Earlier meetings were USAF personnel only. They were definitely one sided without apparent concern for State Department and without concern for detail planning of control of items, of custodial assignment and plans for disposition of property after Brave Shield. They just assumed it would somehow be accomplished. They were going to exclude items from the memorandum. Capt Sacco explained problems they would encounter since experience was gained through Operation New Arrivals, but to no avail. The committee was primarily interested only in getting a memorandum for the record and did not consider recommendations at this time.

18 Sep 75. Colonel Davis, Brave Shield Coordinator, discussed logistical problems with NATF/LG which might occur. It was again recommended that procedures for disposition of property be designed before exercise and that additional phase down time should be allowed for disassembly of tents. We experienced a 12 man crew could disassemble, inspect, replace ropes and pack 20 tents per day, weather permitting.

The following problems were encountered:

Problem 1: There were several problems which evolved as a result of poor planning by key personnel in IATF in regards to ownership of property. It should have been decided who owned the property during the initial phases.

Problem 2: Disposition procedures should have been established during beginning of Operation New Arrival. Validated procedures were not available even though it was necessary to dispose of property immediately at the termination of the Center. Processing was significantly delayed. Property was moved several times whereas it could have been shipped directly from Auxiliary Field #2 (Attachments 7-10).

Problem 3: Hangar 68 was used for storage of assets. No other building was made available. Hangar 68 was always open and was subject to pilferage. Twenty cots were stolen from banded pallets. Eglin Security Police were not responsive to our call. Paper cups and plates were stolen. It was easy for anyone to drive a vehicle into the hangar and remove property. Security guards were not available although a sincere request was made by NATF/LG. Hangar 68 was the assembly point for all property from Field #2; however, to minimize pilferage only palletized/

banded equipment and bulky supplies were stored. Desks were placed double high with filing cabinets placed in the center of several desks to minimize thefts. Baby supplies were secured in a van at Field #2 and the baby food store. Small items such as coolers, fans, chairs, typing tables and typewriters were secured in the clothing tent area at Field #2. Pillows, pillow cases, sheets, blankets, and soap were stored in secured areas on Eglin Main, Buildings 607 and 609 and Eglin Supply. Operating stock for food service was stored in a tent in Vietnamese dining facilities.

Problem 4: Numerous organizations called requesting "free" supplies and equipment at the Eglin Refugee Center. These varied from begging to demanding requests. This hindered normal operations.

Problem 5: Many items were loaned to NATF during the initial phase. Hand receipts and verbal agreements constituted control of these items. Many of the original proprietors had terminated their assignments without explaining to remaining personnel ownership of property. This resulted in misunderstandings regarding validity of outdated hand receipts. There was no means to assure property was loaned.

Problem 6: Even though only one week remained, personnel began swapping furniture to upgrade their current furniture. Since inventories had already been made, loaned property was being distributed, and pick up procedures initiated, this greatly hindered operations.

Problem 7: Obtaining adequate vehicles from Eglin to move property during Phase Down was difficult if not impossible. Their procedure for fire repair kept vehicles in down status for several days. On vehicle with a flat tire was towed from Field 2 to Eglin Main. It was returned to its home station without any coordination with NATF personnel. Another vehicle with a flat tire was transported to Eglin Main Transportation required NATF personnel to go to transportation to take the tire off the truck. Eglin Transportation still refused to repair the tire until a credit card was presented. Then NATF personnel had to return a third time to put the tire back on the vehicle.

Problem 8: Agencies receiving free issue of items only fulfilled part of their agreement. Final disposition of property to the Federal Prison at Eglin AFB was still open as of 19 September 1975.

Problem 9: There was difficulty controlling vehicles assigned to Field #2. This was probably due to the constantly changing situation and temporary establishment of the refugee center.

Problem 10: Removal of desks at close out became a minor problem since some organizations still remained. Therefore all permanent chairs and desks were replaced with folding chairs and tables.

Problem 11: Since the Security Police force was reduced significantly, it was necessary to secure vehicles assigned to Logistics in either the enclosed fence area by the American mess facilities or the secured C. E. holding area.

Problem 12: Some organizations neglected to forecast supply requirements when previous knowledge that supplies would be necessary in the future. This necessitated priority ordering on items that could have been received within time frames on a routine request.

SOLUTIONS:

1. Establish procedures for ownership of property (i.e., supplies, equipment, and investment items) and disposition of property during the initial phase of operation. Procedures established also would eliminate need for organizations outside of Task Force requesting property. Only those people willing to reimburse the Task Force should be recorded for later disposition.
2. Establish a central point for movement of all property, both loaned and purchased. Accurate records should be kept with adequate marking of property. Any movement from current locations should be recorded. Therefore, disposition could be conducted without confusion during phase-down.
3. A secure warehouse should be provided with sufficient custodians to account for transfer of property.
4. Transportation should be made readily available. Eglin Transportation should indeed review their tire repair procedures. Presently, custodians of vehicles maintain their own vehicles. A cost study analysis should be conducted to determine expense of maintaining minimal build-up tires versus man hours and vehicle down-time costs, and damage to vehicles

towed for tire repair. Cost of additional rims and spare tires would be negligible compared to wrecker expenses and additional vehicles required in Eglin's inventory to supplement for excessive vehicle down-time.

5. Contact GSA and DSA representatives during beginning of operations to alert them of inventory balances which would be present during Phase-Down operations.

6. A primary and alternate should be assigned for each organization to control all matters regarding maintenance and control of applicable organizations vehicles.

CONCLUSIONS:

The same supply problems which beset NATF/LG in Phases I and II continued in Phase III*. As during the Pipeline Phase, the logistics effort was directed toward establishing more effective procedures for supply support of the Refugee Center. The many, varied, and often unforeseen needs of the refugees presented supply problems, especially during the first month of operation. The RLO, as the primary organization responsible for the needs of the refugees, established a supply officer (later a supply sergeant) to coordinate the needs of the RLO with NATF/LG. The RLO established their own support functions within their organization and prepared operating procedures for processing of supplies. The procedure was written, presented, and briefed to all RLO administrative supervisors. RLO continued to seek the highest quality items in regards to equipment

* See Operation New Arrivals, Phase II - The Pipeline, 24 May-28 June, Tab E.

and supplies; often, because these items were not in the Air Force inventory, they required long lead times. Therefore emergency buys were often made with greater interest in priority rather than cost. When advanced planning was possible, supply requirements were of course met through normal channels more quickly. All agencies were generally cooperative and conducted their activities efficiently with minimal difficulty. This could be attributed to personnel with applicable AFSC's being assigned in each organization, although there were initial difficulties.*

Attachment 11 is a list of baby food costs for the duration.

* Textual alterations to Captain Sacco's report were made by Lt Colonel Bruce G. Keller on 2 October 1975 and Colonel Bill R. Keeler on 6 October 1975, two of the RLO Directors during the operating of the Eglin Refugee Processing Center.

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AUG 15 1975

AUG 28 1975

PPHRTTUZYUW RUKLAA6087 226223-UUUU--RUCLEMA

ZNR UUUUU

R 142000Z AUG 75

FM TAC LANGLEY AFB VA/LGT

TO RUEOAWA/AFSC ANDREWS AFB MD/LGT

RUCLEMA/32014BN EGLIN AFB FL/LGT

RUCLEMA/23TACHOSP EGLIN AF AUX FLD 2 FL/OC

BT

UNCLAS

SUBJECT: REDEPLOYMENT OF 23D TAC AIR TRANSPORTABLE HOSPITAL

1. REQUEST NECESSARY ACTION TO MOVE 23D TAC HOSPITAL FROM EGLIN FIELD TO ENGLAND AFB LA COMMENCING 4 SEP 75 BY SURFACE TRANSPORTATION.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS APPLICABLE FOR THIS MOVEMENT:

A. EXCLUSIVE TRUCK-EXPEDITED SERVICE WILL BE USED.

B. FIELD AMBULANCES AND WATER TRAILERS ARE TO BE TRANSPORTED BY MOTOR CARRIER RATHER THAN DRIVEN.

C. RCM CODED ITEMS ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN BY MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND SHIPPED SEPARATELY.

3. FUNDS CHARGEABLE WILL BE THOSE AVAILABLE TO EGLIN AFB FOR SUPPORT OF OPERATION NEW LIFE.

4. FOR 23 TAC HOSPITAL: REQUEST NECESSARY SHIPPING DOCUMENTS BE INITIATED (DD FORM 1149) ON THIS SHIPMENT AND HAND CARRIED

PAGE 2 RUKLAA6087 UNCLAS

TO BASE TRANSPORTATION OFFICER, EGLIN AFB, EARLIEST POSSIBLE DATE. SHIPPING DOCUMENT SHOULD INCLUDE WEIGHT, CUBE AND ROD.

5. CONTACT AT 23 TAC HOSPITAL IS LT RICH, AUTOVON 872-1111 EXTENSION 883-4503

6. YOUR ASSISTANCE IS APPRECIATED.

BT

46CHT

2-5270

Helmings

ATTCH 1

Distribution
ADDITIONAL INFO
CC
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121
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ZNR UUUUU

R 221346Z AUG 75

FM AFSC ANDREWS AFB MD/LGT

TO 3201ST AB WG ECLIN AFB FL/LGTT/ACSG
BT

UNCLAS

SUBJ: REDEPLOYMENT OF 23D TAC AIR TRANSPORTABLE
HOSPITAL.

REFERENCE IS MADE TO TELECON BETWEEN MR L. DEMOS
AND MR BOB MURRAY PERTAINING TO HQ TAC/LGT MSG 142000Z
AUG 75 AND INSUFFICIENT TRANSPORTATION FUNDS.
REQUEST YOU COMPLY WITH TAC'S REQUEST.

AFSC/ACB ADVISED THAT ANY EFFORT ACCOMPLISHED IN SUPPORT
OF OPERATION NEW LIFE IS TO BE HANDLED AS A REIMBURSABLE
ITEM. REQUEST YOU ADVISE YOUR CONTROLLER THAT YOUR
TRANSPORTATION FUNDING COMMITMENTS, OBLIGATIONS AND
POSSIBLE EXPENDITURES WILL EXCEED YOUR AUTHORIZED
TRANSPORTATION FUNDING PROGRAM, PENDING REIMBURSEMENT
ACTIONS, AND SEEK HIS ASSISTANCE ACCORDINGLY. THIS MSG
HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH AFSC/ACSC.

BT

07273

23 AUG 75 00 59

30
LGT

ACB

ATTACH 2

K-17

SG

Replacement of Mobility Bay Components

LG

1. Request that the following mobility bay components be issued to the 23 Tac Hospital on a 'fill or kill' basis not later than Tuesday, 2 September 1975:

<u>NSN</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Quantity</u>
6135-542-6216	Battery Dry, "D" Cell	78
6230-299-3035	Flashlight	16
6545-952-5325	Snake Bite Kit	18
8405-290-0550	Poncho	19
8415-270-2008	Drawers, cold weather	22
8455-772-5345	Brassard, Red Cross	29
8465-242-7856	Sleeping Bag	17
8415-270-2012	Undershirt, cold weather	18

2. These items were damaged due to continuous use and exposure to very unfavorable climactic conditions during Operation New Arrivals. Every attempt was made to salvage items which were not completely ruined. Several items were laundered and returned to service.

3. Request your assistance in researching any stock numbers that have been replaced or that have substitutes available.

/s/

CHARLES L. RICHE, 1Lt, USAF, MSC
Hospital Administrator

THIS IS A CERTIFIED TRUE COPY


MELVIN M. KESSLER
ADTC Historian

K-18

PRIORITY

TPPTLZ:UW RUMTBMA0681 2491622-UUUU--RUCLBMA.

6 SEP 75 17 43

ZNR UUUUU

P 061537Z SEP 75

FM CDR US ARMY TASK FORCE 7 GARRISON FORT CHAFFEE FORT CHAFFEE AR

//ATZR-B-01//

TO RUCLBMA/CDR EGLIN AFB FL

INFO RUMTROA/CDR US ARMY FIELD ARTILLERY CENTER AND FORT SILL FT SILL

OK//ATZR-01//

BT

UNCLAS

ATTN: CPT SACCO, SUPPLY OFFICER, OPERATION NEW ARRIVALS

SUBJ: EXCESS PROPERTY

1. REFERENCE PROPERTY LISTING, EGLIN AFB, 19 AUG 75.

2. THE FOLLOWING ITEMS OF EQUIPMENT CAN BE UTILIZED AT THIS INSTALLATION IN SUPPORT OF NEW ARRIVALS:

FSN	NCMEN	QTY	PRICE	EXT PRICE
A. 4140-00-083-3086	FAN, 30" CIRC	33	99.00	3,267.00
B. 4140-00-831-9819	FAN, 16" SAFETY	38	54.00	2,052.00
C. 7210-00-148-1017	SHEET	10,000	2.36	23,600.00
D. 7210-00-231-2373	PILLOW CASE	10,000	1.21	12,100.00
E. 7330-00-895-8330	JUG, INSULATED	150	6.30	945.00
F. 7430-00-634-5062	TYPEWRITER, 15"	15	184.33	2,764.95
G. 7430-00-267-3456	TYPEWRITER, 15"	10	378.70	3,787.00

PAGE 2 RUMTBMA0681 UNCLAS

H. 7110-00-663-6360	FILE CAB, 2 DWR W/COMB	2	450.12	900.24
I. 7110-00-531-3483	FILE CABINET, 4 DWR	1	195.00	195.00
J. 7220-00-269-8334	CABINET, STORAGE	50	110.88	5,544.00
K. 3610-00-248-1703	DUP MACHINE, MOL 1230	1	3,003.00	3,003.00
L. 4120-00-983-4230	AIR CONDITIONER, 18,000 BTU	10	282.38	2,823.80
M. 7130-00-093-2823	CRIB, BABY	23	50.29	1,156.67
N. 7210-00-946-2823	SHEET, BABY	200	2.56	512.00
O. 7210-00-947-2823	BLANKET, BABY	200	1.87	374.00
P. 7420-00-009-1943	CALCULATOR	1	60.73	60.73
Q. 7420-00-162-1393	CALCULATOR	1	773.06	773.06
R. 7430-00-P835	BLUE TYPEWRITER, ELEC, IBM	1	587.43	587.43
S. 7430-00-P835	BLUE TYPEWRITER, ELEC, IBM	1	741.51	741.51
T. 7430-00-P835	BLUE TYPEWRITER, ELEC, IBM	1	562.52	562.52
U. 4110-00-288-7644	REFRIGERATOR, 7CU	4	550.00	2,200.00
V. 4110-00-879-0026	REFRIGERATOR, 9 1/2 CU	4	100.00	400.00
W. 5820-00-907-1360	MICROAMMETER	1	187.80	187.80
X. 5820-00-921-0374	OSCILLATOR	1	636.00	636.00
Y. 4120-00-983-4230	AIR CON 18K	3	282.38	847.14

ATTCH 4

132
K-19

PAGE 3 RUMENAG631 UNCLAS

FSN	NOVEN	QTY	PRICE	EXT PRICE
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7. 7210-WP512-9341 WASH POST		200	2.10	420.00
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3. SOME EXPENDABLE ITEMS POSSIBLY CAN BE UTILIZED IF A LISTING OF MATERIAL, QUANTITY AVAILABLE, COULD BE FURNISHED THIS INSTALLATION FOR SCREENING.

4. SHIPPING DOCUMENTS FOR EQUIPMENT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO:
CONSOLIDATED PROPERTY OFFICER
FORT SILL, OKLAHOMA 73503

~~ACCOUNT NOT WADDT~~

SHIPPED TO: PROPERTY OFFICER
BUILDING 206

FORT CHAFFEE, ARKANSAS 72931

5. FUNDS ALLOCATED FOR TRANSPORTATION COSTS ARE:
2162020 571782 P720000 S34-051 T450

BT

07081

ATTACH 4

ATTACH 4

K-20

1600 5 15 00 H

PTT/220 RIENCA03 17 2591050-UUUU--RUCLHIA.

ZNY CRYPT ZNY
4-130432 ZP 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEFHIA/CSAF/LOXX PRIORITY
RUCLHIA/EGLIN AFB FLA PRIORITY
INFO RUEKJG/SECDEF PRIORITY
RUEKJG/JCS PRIORITY
BT
UNCLAS STATE 220317

E.O. 11652 N/A

TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: BEDDOWN, EXERCISE BRAVE SHIELD XIII

FOR: SEC DEF FOR CIN CAIRNS, JCS FOR J4,
EGLIN FOR SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR

1. REFERENCE MESSAGE REQUESTED CONCURRENCE IN TEMPORARY USE OF REFUGEE FACILITIES AT EGLIN AFB FOR EXERCISE BRAVE SHIELD XIII. IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT AN INSTALLATION MUST BE CONSTRUCTED IF THESE FACILITIES CAN NOT BE MADE AVAILABLE.

2. IATF CONCURS UNDER FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

A. REQUESTED USE WILL BE AT NO COST TO REFUGEE PROGRAM, WILL NOT RESULT IN ANY LOSS OF CREDIT FOR RETURNABLE ITEMS AND WILL NOT UNDULY DELAY CREDIT ACCOUNTING TRANSACTIONS.

B. A WRITTEN MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BE JOINTLY PREPARED BY AFB EGLIN REPRESENTATIVE AND SCC EGLIN.

C. AIR FORCE ASSUME ALL INCREMENTAL COST ASSOCIATED WITH EXTENDED USE OF REFUGEE FACILITIES. INCLUDED WOULD BE SUCH ITEMS AS COST OF DAMAGED TENTS, TEMPORARY HIRES NEEDED TO PREPARE MATERIAL RETURNED TO BASE SUPPLY AFTER EXERCISE, ETC.

D. THAT FACILITIES NOT BE USED BY BRAVE SHIELD XIII UNTIL SCC STATES THAT HE HAS NO MORE NEED FOR FACILITIES.

3. SEC DEF CONCURS. SISCO

BT
#2317

Arach 5

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PERMIT FULLY LEGIBLE PRODUCTION

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N
N

100 00 25

018
23

VRITLIZYUW RUEQAWA724 162195 HUUU-RUCLBMA.

ZNR UUUU

R 111957Z JUN 75 ZEX

FM AFSC ANDREWS AFB MD/ACBC

TO ALAFSC

BT

INCLAS ALAFSC C345/75

FOR: AC/LG, SUBJ: ISSUES TO PROJECT NEW LIFE.

THIS MESSAGE CLARIFIES INSTRUCTIONS PERTAINING TO THE METHOD OF
ISSUES OF SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT FOR PROJECT NEW LIFE AS FOLLOWS:

1. SUPPLIES AND EQUIPMENT PROVIDED PROJECT NEW LIFE WILL BE
PROCESSED AS A REIMBURSABLE SALE TO STATE.
2. REIMBURSEMENTS WILL NOT BE PROCESSED FOR ISSUES OF MAJOR
INVESTMENT ITEMS SUCH AS AIRCRAFT, VEHICLE, HARVEST EAGLE
KITCHENS ETC.
3. REIMBURSEMENTS CAN BE PROCESSED FOR PERSONNEL SUPPORT
EQUIPMENT AND THOSE COMPONENTS OF MAJOR EQUIPMENT ITEMS WHICH
MAY NOT BE RECOVERED. FOR EXAMPLE: PORTABLE CHAIRS, TABLES,
POTS AND PANS, ETC, WHICH ARE COMPONENT TO FIELD KITCHEN EQUIP-
MENT, AND COTS, SHEETS, MATTRESSES, SLEEPING BAGS, ETC.
4. FIELD COMMANDS ARE AUTHORIZED TO DIRECT FUND CITE O&M FUNDS
FOR THE REPLACEMENT OF THESE ITEMS.

FLD#2

ACTION/INFO
LG CC
DOC
DATA

PAGE 2 RUEQAWA724 UNCLAS

5. IF ANY ADDITIONAL EARNED REIMBURSEMENT OR OBLIGATION AUTHORITY
IS REQUIRED, ADVISE AFSC/ACBC.

6. REIMBURSEMENTS WILL BE HANDLED IN THE NORMAL MANNER FOR SALES

FROM THE AIR FORCE STOCK FUND.

7. FIELD COMMANDS MUST RIGOROUSLY MONITOR APPLICATION OF THIS
GUIDANCE. AS AN EXAMPLE, ONLY THOSE ITEMS SUCH AS MESS KITS,
BLANKETS, SHEETS, COTS, CLOTHING, POTS, PANS, UTENSILS, GARBAGE
CANS, TABLE WARE, TENTS, ETC, SHOULD BE REQUISITIONED. IT IS
NOT INTENDED TO COVER EQUIPMENT ITEMS WHERE THERE IS A REASONABLE
EXPECTATION OF ECONOMICAL RECOVERY SUCH AS REFRIGERATORS, RANGES,
TYPEWRITERS, AND SIMILAR ITEMS, WHERE USAGE HAS NOT ALTERED VALUE
THEREOF.

7234

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Attach 7

K-22

NNNRTITUZYUW RUEHCAA3454 2270154-UUUU--RUCLEMA

ZNR UUUUU ZZH

R 142509Z AUG 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUWJDTA/CG CAMP PENDLETON CAL

RUWBTMA/CG FT CHAFFEE ARK

RUCLEMA/EGLIN AFB FLA

RUEEKA/INDIANTOWN GAP PA

RUWISAA/CINCPACREP GUAM/TTPI MI

BT

UNCLAS STATE 193454

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: DISPOSITION OF CENTER PROPERTY

FOR CIVIL COORDINATOR

1. AT THE REQUEST OF THE IATF, GSA HAS ASSIGNED A TECHNICAL EXPERT IN PROPERTY DISPOSAL TO EACH REFUGEE CENTER. HE IS TO PROVIDE ADVICE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE CIVIL COORDINATOR AND HIS STAFF IN THE DISPOSITION OF CENTER PROPERTY.

2. THE NAMES, PHONE NUMBERS, AND CENTER TO WHICH ASSIGNED ARE: CARL MANNING 202-962-3371 - INDIANTOWN GAP; ARNOLD BREAD, 504-377-2739 - EGLIN AFB; PAUL VIRVACK, 405-231-4628, FORT CHAFFEE; JACK MCINTTRICK, 714-293-6553, CAMP PENDLETON.

3. IT IS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY ARE TO ACT AS A MEMBER OF THE IATF STAFF IN ALL MATTERS PERTAINING TO PROPERTY, BOTH MILITARY STOCK ITEMS AND ADMINISTRATIVE EQUIPMENT.

4. WE BELIEVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS SHOULD BE GIVEN TO ASSURING THAT THE PROCEDURES AND PROCESS FOR PROPERTY IDENTIFICATION, CLASSIFICATION, AND DISPOSITION ARE SATISFACTORY AND OPERATING PROPERLY. KISSINGER

BT

~~PLAS4~~

Dist. Section
10/11/01 INFO
DS
Kelly
INFO
cc
Pare
U.S. govt
Murphy
Doyle

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Attach 8

K-23

PTIUZYUW RUEHCAA2484 2260124-UUUU-RUCLEMA.

ZNR UUUU ZZM

P 140037Z AUG 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUEKJCS/JCS/J-4 PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/DOD/PDASD(C) PRIORITY

INFO RUEKJCS/JCS/J-4 PRIORITY

RUEKJCS/DOD/PDASD(C) PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS STATE 192484

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SREF

SUBJECT: PROPERTY

FOR SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATORS, JCS FOR JA, SECDEF
FOR DASO (COMP)

UNDERSTAND CHAFFEE DISCUSSED WITH EGLIN CHAFFEE REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR PROPERTY BECOMING EXCESS TO EGLIN NEEDS. IF THIS
IS PROPERTY WHICH IS OT RPT NOT RETURNABLE TO DOD STOCKS;
CONSIDER THE CONCEPT OF MOVING PROPERTY TO CHAFFEE TO BE
SOUND. REQUEST YOU PROVIDE JUSTIFICATION FOR CHAFFEE RE-
QUIREMENTS AND ESTIMATED SHIPPING COST TO IATF/WASHINGTON.
FOR EXPENDABLES PROVIDE EXTIMATED SHIPPING COST ONLY. KISSINGER

BT
#2484

ATTACH 9

*

K-24

(X) / AUG 19 1975 (X)

INWPTTIZYW RUENCA6042 2310200-UUUU--NUCLEMA.

FM UUUU'ZZH

102311Z AUG 75

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO RUHJDA/CG CAMP PENNLETON CAL PRIORITY

RUHJDA/CG FORT CHAFFEL ARK PRIORITY

RUHJDA/EGLIN AFB FLA PRIORITY

RUHJDA/INDIANTOWN GAP PA PRIORITY

BT

UNCLAS STATE 196042

FOR CIVIL COORDINATORS

E.O. 11652: N/A

CLASS: SREF

SUBJECT: OPERATION NEW LIFE, INSPECTION, CLASSIFICATION,
AND DISPOSITION GOVERNMENT PROVIDED MATERIAL.

FOLLOWING IS A REPEAT

QUOTE

P202032Z JUN 75

FM JCS WASHDC

JCS SENDS

SECSTATE FOR IATF

SECDEF FOR ASD:IL/COMP

REF JCS 5653 UNCLAS

REFS: A. CINCPAC 220503Z MAY 75

" B. JCS 5103/292322Z MAY 75

" C. CINCPAC 010010Z JUN 75

" D. JCS 1413/052150Z JUN 75

" E. DALO-SMS-R 111312Z JUN (NOTAL)

" F. CINCPAC 150030Z JUN 75 (NOTAL)

THIS MESSAGE IN THREE PARTS.

PART ONE FOR ALL

1. PREVIOUS GUIDANCE AS STATED IN JCS 5103/292322Z MAY 75
AND JCS 1413/052150Z JUN 75 STILL APPLIES. THE FOLLOWING
INFORMATION IS PROVIDED IN RESPONSE TO CINCPAC 150030Z
JUN 75.

PART TWO FOR CINCPAC

2. IT WAS AND IS INCIDENT UPON THE INDIVIDUAL SERVICES
AND DSA/USA TO ESTABLISH PROCEDURES TO INSURE THAT
MATERIAL ISSUED TO OPERATION NEW LIFE IS BILLED TO STATE
DEPARTMENT OR, IF IT WAS/IS CLEARLY THE GUILT OF THE
SERVICES OR DSA/USA THAT CERTAIN ITEMS BE LOANED ONLY,
THAT SERVICES OR DSA/USA ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL ACTIONS
NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL AND INSURE RETURN OF MATERIAL

IN BEST CONDITION.

ATTACH 10

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PERMIT FULLY LEGIBLE PRODUCTION

K-25

3. ITEMS WHICH ARE NOT SUBJECT TO SERVICES/ESA CONTROL OR PRIOR CLAIM SHOULD BE PRESUMED TO HAVE BEEN ISSUED (SOLD) AND PROPERLY BILLED TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE. WHEN DETERMINED EXCESS TO NEW LIFE NEEDS, THEY SHOULD BE SCREENED IN ACCORDANCE WITH CURRENT SURPLUS PROPERTY REGULATIONS AND PROCEDURES. IF IN SERVICEABLE OR REPAIRABLE CONDITION, THE ITEM SHOULD BE DECLARED TO THE ITEM MANAGER WHO WILL DETERMINE WHETHER IT IS REQUIRED FOR STOCK, RECONSTITUTION OF WRM/PWRS OR OTHER NEEDS AND IF SO WILL REPURCHASE THE ITEM WITH CREDIT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE. COSTS OF NECESSARY REPAIR OR REFURBISHMENT WILL BE DEDUCTED FROM CREDIT ALLOWED THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. ALL TRANSACTIONS SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED TO INSURE THAT IN EACH CASE THE LEAST POSSIBLE COST IS INCURRED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT. IM

4. DISPOSITION OF NEW LIFE MATERIAL FOR WHICH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE HAS BEEN OR WILL BE BILLED BY A MILITARY SERVICE MAY BE MADE ONLY AFTER RELEASE BY A SENIOR CIVIL COORDINATOR AT THE LOCATION. UPON RELEASE BY THE CIVIL COORDINATORS, THE NEW LIFE MATERIAL SHALL BE HANDLED LIKE ANY OTHER SURPLUS MATERIAL, WITH THE ONLY VARIANCE BEING THAT, FOR THIS SPECIFIC PURPOSE, THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WILL BE TREATED AS WOULD BE A DOD COMPONENT.

PART THREE FOR CSA

5. IT IS INCUMBENT UPON THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY TO SPECIFY WHICH ITEMS ARE ARMY-OWNED (I.E., THOSE ITEMS FOR WHICH STATE DEPARTMENT HAS NOT AND WILL NOT BE BILLED) AND TO PROVIDE DISPOSITION INSTRUCTIONS TO ALLOW ON-SITE TEAMS TO ACCOMMODATE PARA 3 OF DALO-SMS-R 111312Z JUN 75.

UNQUOTE SISCO
BT
#6042

Atch 11

BABY FOOD COSTS FOR DURATION

MEAT @ \$.31/bottle

Beef	\$328.80
Ham	\$537.12
Veal	\$152.88
Lamb	\$282.96
Liver	\$178.56
Pork	\$148.80

VEGETABLES @ \$.13 or \$.14/bottle

Sweet Potatoes	\$441.28
Carrots	\$258.48
Squash	\$ 3.12
Green Beans	\$ 68.64
Peas	\$ 58.28

FRUITS @ \$.13/bottle

Bananas	\$493.36
Applesauce/Apricots	\$43.68
Applesauce	\$322.80
Peaches	\$305.04
Pears	\$170.40

JUICE @ \$.11 to \$.14/can

Apple	\$1405.36
Orange	\$1155.36
Grapefruit	\$ 52.80
Tomato	\$ 52.80

TOTAL	\$8504.65
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Note: Diapers and milk were provided by Medical Supply. Accurate cost figures were not available.

TAB L

Senior Civil Coordinator's
Report



FOREWORD

This final report of the Senior Civil Coordinator, Eglin AFB Refugee Reception Center, addresses those aspects of "Operation New Arrival" which were the prime responsibility of Civil and Voluntary Agencies. The United States Air Force adequately covered the build-up and logistical support activities in their own historical record. Also covered in the USAF record was a Chronology of Key Events and Basic Statistical Highlights.

CONTENTS

- I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
- II. PROCESSING (OPERATIONS)
 - A. VolAg Liaison
 - B. Refugee Registration
 - C. Sponsorship Registration
 - D. Family Reunification
 - E. Consular Affairs - Third Country Resettlement
 - F. Drawdown
 - G. Unaccompanied Children
- III. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - EMPLOYMENT SKILLS
- IV. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SUMMARY
- V. ADMINISTRATION
 - A. Phase-Out Operations Plan
- VI. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING
- VII. STAFFING
- VIII. RECORDS

OFFICE OF CIVIL COORDINATOR
EGLIN REFUGEE RECEPTION CENTER
OPERATION NEW ARRIVAL
AFTER ACTION REPORT

I. INTRODUCTION

This after action report of the Senior Civil Coordinator, Eglin Air Force Base Refugee Reception Center must be viewed as a supplement to the U. S. Air Force publications, "Operation New Arrival - Phase One - The Build-Up" and "Operation New Arrival - Phase Two - The Pipeline". The USAF is currently preparing "Operational New Arrival - Phase Three - The Phase-Out".

There will be no attempt here to duplicate the comprehensive historical work the USAF has and will put into their trilogy which was shared with the Senior Civil Coordinator from its inception to its publication. The U.S. Air Force has effectively chronicled events as they happened, along with problems as they arose and were resolved. The Senior Civil Coordinator's attempts here will be to highlight the special problems encountered which were outside the normal purview of the Air Force, and the lessons we learned from our efforts and our experiences.

1. Operating Concepts:

It is important to note that from the first moment the Eglin Task Force became operational on May 2, 1975, there was a tacit understanding that all problems, all choke points and all decisions would be aired and shared. Thus, from the inception, Operation New Arrivals formed into a single team, pooling knowledge, talent, resources and sharing decisions as well as mistakes.

There were two other major elements which marked the effectiveness of the Eglin operation. First and foremost, there was a conscious, though informal, selection process in the assignment of personnel to their specific functions and responsibilities. This process was employed by both the Air Force and the civilian side of the Federal Government contingent. Personnel whose work brought them in regular contact with refugees were chosen on the basis of their understanding, empathy and effectiveness at their assigned tasks. Those personnel who did not display an appropriate commitment (and they were very few indeed) were assigned to roles where their apathy would have no influence on the principal operations. Thus, the first major element was the quality of the manpower assigned.

The second major element was the commitment of resources - particularly human resources. It had been decided from the outset that while the Vietnamese should participate in all of the essential support activities, they should not be given control or any decision-making responsibility. They would advise and counsel; they would provide voluntary manpower; they would be a sounding board for needed feedback; but, they would not be given any authority. This required committing some additional U.S. manpower in order to maintain needed control

2. Organizational Structure:

While much can be written about the organization and structure of the Eglin AFB Refugee Center, only what we judge to be significant lessons learned will be noted here. See "Operation New Arrival - Phase One - The Build-Up" for organization charts.

The Center was initially designed to accommodate no more than 2500 refugees at any one time. This was subsequently increased to 5000 on May 12, 1975, and later permitted to peak to 6000 during the drawdown of the Guam Staging Area in late June.

It became evident at an early stage that there was an optimum number of refugees who could be accommodated and processed smoothly and effectively. This optimum level we judged to be between 4000 and 5000. Not only did resettlements seem to flow better at that level, but logistical support was also most effective. Furthermore, at the 4-5000 level both the military and civilian staffs, as well as the Voluntary Agency staffs, operated at increased efficiency. They were fully occupied; the momentum was steady; the sense of urgency and the pressure was comfortably felt and perhaps, most important, senior management was clearly in full control.

There were obviously other elements which contributed to our conclusions about optimum level of a resettlement operation. Certainly, the assigned manpower was a factor, as was prior experience, competence and commitment. However, in terms of senior management, we firmly concluded that a 4-5000 level was most manageable. If Eglin's capacity had been doubled or quadrupled, we would have reorganized around individual processing modules of 4-5000 refugees. Each module would have been completely autonomous with its own managers, support elements, VolAgs, etc. Only the most remote functions, e.g. the data system, the financial accounting which clearly lend themselves to centralization, would have been consolidated.

It is also apparent to us that the USAF struck upon an optimum section level at 6-700 refugees per section. This permitted the small USAF section staff to maintain appropriate oversight at all times, maintain good communications and keep accurate accountability of refugees.

The USAF established a Refugee Liaison Office (RLO) to provide the management for support of the refugees. This RLO element maintained the most direct and intimate contact, manned the sections, provided for services including a daily newspaper, orientation and education programs, recreation, organization of section councils and volunteer activities of both refugees and the local community. Senior Civil Coordinator personnel were assigned and integrated into the RLO structure but it was essentially an Air Force responsibility which was carried out with both precision and warmth.

3. Physical Structure:

The 6-700 section unit occupied an area about the size of a typical city block. These were clustered around a section of equal size wherein was contained the entire processing center. The center was arranged

for a logical flow-through the various steps in processing beginning with INS in-processing and ending with the Departure Center. Tab A describes the processing steps which evolved for each category or group of refugees. This evolution stemmed from a trial and error experience. The early arrivals at Eglin included large numbers of professional people and former U.S. Government employees. A more elaborate and comprehensive processing system was employed with some success. It soon became clear, however, that as the refugee composition changed to include greater numbers of less educated, more simple people, the system needed simplification. What resulted was a system with a minimum of steps - almost by the numbers. *

Tab B is a plan of the Processing Section depicting the actual layout and processing stations. Volunteers and USAF personnel assisted refugees through the processing steps.

The close proximity of all resettlement functions shortened communications links and response time to any and all problems.

3. Relationships - Voluntary Agencies:

Recognized from the beginning was the critical role of the Voluntary Agencies. Theirs was obviously the most vital function in the resettlement process. We assumed their long experience and their established networks for ready effective response to the resettlement needs of the refugees. We assumed also inter-VolAg coordination and relatively compatible practices.

We also recognized their public image and presumed their public influence. These factors led to a management decision to provide all the support they needed with a minimum of official involvement in their substantive activities. As it turned out, this was their desire as well.

Later events convinced us that some of our assumptions did not hold up. Experienced resettlement expertise was rare, VolAg networks were limited, and the sense of urgency within the networks was far below what we anticipated. This is not intended to disparage the dedication and actual accomplishment of the Voluntary Agencies or their staffs. We merely wish to point out that we failed to fully appreciate the limitations with which they had to live. Except for one or two experienced staff people at best, each VolAg recruited from the local community. They developed competitive attitudes and possibly even adversary relationships. They failed to coordinate their efforts and our innumerable attempts to urge greater cooperation, exchange of common problems or development of compatible procedures met with polite disinterest. The result was confusion for the refugees, duplication of sponsorship efforts and somewhat less than adequate accountability.

Eventually, the Senior Civil Coordinator felt it necessary to take and maintain greater control of the refugee case files and to establish some firmer procedures for follow-up and accountability as well as for appropriate transfer of cases among the VolAgs.

While we believe the VolAgs' record for resettlement is nothing to be ashamed of; we also believe more could have been done.

One of our major continuing concerns throughout the program was the amount and adequacy of counselling for refugees. While every major element at Eglin informally worked at counselling, we were never quite satisfied with its effectiveness. The real responsibility obviously fell to the Voluntary Agencies. Unfortunately, they arrived late; they were short staffed; and they lacked experienced personnel, and in some cases leadership. Furthermore, their priorities did not extend much beyond processing resettlements. It is felt that many of the problems experienced by refugees refusing sponsorships, banding together in large extended families, and switching VolAgs could have been avoided with some better organized counselling.

It is doubtful that better counselling could have avoided the attempts to create an informal refugee organization devoted to the creation of a Vietnamese community. Leader of the movement was a Vietnamese-American clergyman who subtly persisted with the attempt until his removal. Nevertheless, a lot of confusion, doubt and delay in sponsorship could have been avoided if the attempt could have been prevented.

PROCESSING PROCEDURES

The objective of processing is to take the refugees through INS clearance and departure as rapidly as possible.

I. Group I

In the case of refugees who are spouses, children, parents, and parents of spouses of U.S. citizens or permanent resident aliens, the processing procedure is as follows:

1. Report to INS to begin processing. (Station 1)
2. Report to SSA for Social Security Card. (Station 2)
3. Report to SRS for notification of relative. (Station 4)
4. Report to INS to receive I-94. (Station 6)
5. Report to Travel Control for travel arrangements. (Station 7)
6. Report to billeting area to clear Section RLO.
7. Report to Departure Center for check-out. (Station 8)

II. Group II

In the case of refugees who have sponsors but do not fall into Group I, the processing procedure is as follows:

1. Report to INS to begin processing. (Station 1)
2. Report to SSA for Social Security Card. (Station 2)
3. Report to PHS for medical check. (Station 3)
4. Report to SRS for sponsor contact and verification. (Station 4)
5. Report to Sponsorship Registration for logging-in to sponsor processing. (Station 5)
6. Report to Voluntary Agency as directed by Sponsorship Registration for sponsor processing.
7. Report to INS for issuance of I-94. (Station 6)
8. Report to Travel Control for travel arrangements. (Station 7)
9. Clear billeting area with Section RLO.
10. Report to Departure Center for check-out. (Station 8)

III. Group III

In the case of the refugee who does not have a sponsor (or cannot locate the sponsor), processing is as follows:

1. Report to INS for processing. (Station 1)
2. Report to SSA for Social Security Card. (Station 2)
3. Report to PHS for medical check. (Station 3)
4. Report to Sponsorship Registration for logging-in to sponsor processing. (Station 5)
5. Report to Voluntary Agency as directed by Sponsorship Registration.
6. Report to INS to receive I-94. (Station 6)
7. Report to Travel Control for travel arrangements. (Station 7)
8. Report to Section RLO for check-out of billeting area.
9. Report to Departure Center for check-out of Center. (Station 9)

Civil Coordinator
4 June 1975

II. PROCESSING (OPERATION)

1. Overview

The multiple activities under the Processing Coordination Office--refugee and sponsor registration, liaison with voluntary agencies, family reunification, third country contacts, search for specific persons among the evacuees, and preparation of passenger lists for close-out flights to Fort Chaffee--are described in detail in attachments; therefore, only a summary account, with recommendations on problem areas, follows.

The Eglin AFB Reception Center's Refugee and Sponsorship Registration Unit came under the direct administration of the Inter-Agency Task Force (IATF) on June 1, 1975. (The YMCA and HEW/SRS had earlier carried on the activities subsumed in those units, after the Reception Center began operating on May 4, 1975.) Briefly, the duties of each were as follows: the Refugee Registration Unit interviewed the head of each refugee family (case), referred the case to a resettlement agency, maintained a file on each case, and prepared reports concerning their status; the Sponsorship Registration Unit interviewed (both face-to-face and telephone) prospective sponsors and referred an interview data sheet to a resettlement agency.

From May 4 to May 31, the YMCA registered 1755 families (cases), approximately 4160 people, and referred each to one of the six resettlement agencies--CWS, USCC, IRC, CAMA, LIRS, and HIAS--engaged in the process of resettling Indochina refugees in the United States. From June 1 to August 22, the IATF registered and referred another 1184 cases, approximately 4425 people, to the resettlement agencies. (Approximately 50 people who did not register for resettlement in the United States left the camp for Canada on May 18, 1975). In addition to initial registration and referrals, the IATF processed the subsequent transfer of 573 cases from one agency to another. It should be noted, however, that records were not kept on case transfers processed by the YMCA; and many cases were transferred from agency to agency without the agencies notifying the Refugee Registration Unit.

By September 15, over 2000 cases (8500 people) were resettled (out-processed) in the United States through the efforts of the six resettlement agencies. (A few cases were also resettled by the Church of Latter Day Saints (LDS), the American Red Cross (ARC), the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), and the Tolstoy Foundation.) The IATF out-processed 385 cases (1300 people) which were transferred or reunified with members of their families in another camp, and 33 cases (154 people) which elected to resettle in third countries. The American Red Cross out-processed another 40 cases which elected to return to Vietnam; these cases were transferred to Camp Pendleton.

In addition to the cases processed out by the resettlement agencies, the Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) resettled 257 cases (SRS registered), approximately 900 people. Generally, these people fell into one of the following categories: (1) U.S. citizens; (2) registered aliens re-entering the U.S.; (3) relatives of U.S. citizens, or (4) those with sponsors already verified

by the time the refugee arrived at the Eglin Refugee Reception Center. Since these refugees (or evacuees) did not need the assistance of the resettlement agencies in finding a sponsor, they registered with SRS, and the SRS assisted them in processing out by verifying sponsors, expediting INS and PHS clearances and making travel arrangements.

As a result of double registration, 214 "Y" cases were voided--159 registered with a second resettlement agency and 55 (approximately 250 people) also registered with SRS. The latter were--out-processed by SRS and are included in the 257 SRS cases mentioned above.

For historical reasons, Catholics were disproportionately numerous among the refugees, and thus the US Catholic Conference was the VolAg chosen by the majority of heads of families. The USCC had the largest staff of any of the six VolAgs, and hence for many weeks there was no reason to reverse the policy of refugee choice; moreover, until mid-July it was not certain that Eglin would not receive more refugees (other than a few joining members of their families already here, under the family reunification program). In July, USCC repeatedly asserted that it could easily arrange the sponsorship of all its cases, and more, by mid-August, so no moves were made to redistribute caseload until it became obvious by mid-August that the large but inexperienced staff was swamped and unable to meet its boast, despite the assistance given to it by the STATE/AID sponsor contact team which since mid-July had made extensive telephone contacts with potential sponsors on behalf of the VolAgs.

Earlier efforts to persuade USCC to share its unsolved caseload with those other VolAgs who had relative success with their small numbers--especially LIRS and HIAS--having met with objections and delay, sharing was made obligatory by August 18. Unfortunately, it was then so late that the remedy was only partially successful; however, the system devised might well prove useful if implemented at other camps on a timely basis.

In brief, the measures mandated by the Civil Coordinator required the USCC and CWS to turn in all cases not yet sponsored to the IATF VolAg Liaison Office, which would record and reissue the cases to case workers of any VolAgs upon request for a limited period. The requests of case workers were to be based on the refugee family size and skills which the prospective sponsors desired and the liaison office attempted to provide cases which suited the specifications. The VolAgs would thereby be spared time-consuming searches for appropriate files, and could concentrate on sponsor verification and match-making. The IATF team indexed cases by family size and skills of adult members, and logged the cases in and out. Since the same personnel had earlier been engaged in the sponsor contact activities, they were familiar with the peculiarities of sponsors and could make a reasonably good first cut of possible candidates before passing on three or four files to the case worker with a verified sponsor.

Were the Eglin Refugee Reception Center not already scheduled for closing, these new control measures might have had a better trial period.

Nevertheless, the system did force VolAgs to some better management and to unearth cases long neglected. Thus, many refugees were sponsored who might otherwise have been transferred to Fort Chaffee.

Admittedly, the VolAgs will have--or feel they have-- a proprietary interest in prospective sponsors checked by their system, and especially those elicited solely by their field operations or network. Similarly, case workers become attached to the refugee case in their hands, and often are reluctant to give it over to another worker. There is some merit to the claims of VolAgs in these respects, but successful early resettlement of as many refugees as possible has overriding priority, and only greater control of cases can ensure that VolAgs focus on matching and do not dissipate energies and neglect accountability.

Attachments:

- A. VolAg Liason
- B. Refugee Registration Unit
- C. Sponsorship Registration Unit
- D. Family Reunification
- E. Consular Affairs
- F. Drawdown

VolAg Liaison

With only two VolAgs initially represented and a total Senior Civil Coordinator's (SCC) staff of 8 - 10 people, our first major concern was how to set up an in-processing system to receive and register the refugees into the sponsorship system.

Fortunately, YMCA had a staff on board during the first days of operation and were induced with the help of volunteer workers to set up a processing and control system for registering refugee families. This was not the intended function of the YMCA but recognizing the necessity, they agreed to cooperate in whatever way we felt necessary.

During the first few weeks of operation, sponsorship activities were performed by YMCA and HEW's Social and Rehabilitation Service (SRS) particularly for refugees with known sponsors. This supplemented the work of IRC and CAMA. While this caused some concern for the Eglin Task Force since SRS and YMCA were not official VolAgs, the action was necessary to begin resettlements.

Other VolAgs did not arrive until mid to late May. This included Church World Service (CWS) and the U.S. Catholic Conference (USCC) followed shortly by the Hebrew Immigration Aid Society (HIAS) and the Lutheran Immigration Refugee Service (LIRS).

YMCA, with guidance from the Civil Coordinator established the sponsorship registration system. We were constantly revising and improving the system in order to have more accurate counts and controls of both refugees and on sponsor offers, as well as the flow through a central control system to the various VolAgs.

By May 25 it had been agreed that the YMCA should be released from the registration and sponsorship activities and move directly into their primary function of providing assistance in the recreation and education programs. SCC personnel were phased into the registration section for processing and sponsor activities. They continued with this activity to the end of August.

From the beginning of camp activities until July 9, all telephone activities including sponsor offers and requests for information were handled by a small group of local volunteers. The sponsor offers were recorded and forwarded to the registration section where they were distributed to the VolAgs.

SCC personnel also took on the initial interviewing of incoming refugees previously handled by local volunteer workers.

During the first few weeks of the operation, these volunteer workers were the salvation of the camp since neither State nor VolAg staff were present in sufficient numbers to properly handle the work required. As additional personnel arrived, volunteers were replaced in positions where continuity and continuous performance was needed. By the end of May most functions were

adequately staffed and a more efficient control was maintained.

Early in July, the Senior Coordinator established a telephone contact unit to interview sponsors furnished on IATF computer listings. This unit enabled the VolAg case workers to speed up their activities by providing the basic data necessary for sponsorship determinations.

With additional staff, a more complete complement of VolAgs and an established system of registration, file distribution and cross reference files, the operation began to smooth out after a hectic beginning. Lack of personnel at the inception of the program, however, resulted in problems that required continuous resolutions throughout the life of the camp.

The experience with the Refugee Program at Eglin brought to light problems that should and could be avoided in any future activities of a similar nature.

Initial planning should have included a full complement of personnel, equipment, furniture and working space. Problems caused by initial lack of personnel, equipment and working space were overcome only at the cost of excessive time and energy.

The variations in the record systems of the VolAgs were a continuing problem and should not be allowed to occur in future programs. The system for handling case files should be uniform and under control of a registration section of the Coordinator's Office. Cases should be checked out and back through a central system providing continuous control of each case. In the Eglin operation the three largest VolAgs were in a continuous state of confusion because of inefficient filing and recording methods. Many man-hours were expended by SCC personnel tracking down files and accounting for the activities of the VolAgs. The reluctance of the VolAgs to be completely open with SCC staff regarding their activities has also been cause for concern and unnecessary man-hours expended in tracking down problems that were magnified by a lack of cooperation.

With the exception of USCC all of the VolAgs working at the Eglin Refugee Center were understaffed, and, thus never reached their full potential. As a result USCC received, by far, the major portion of the case load. Furthermore, the sheer numbers working in USCC tended to intimidate the other VolAgs.

From the lessons learned at Eglin, it would be advisable that refugee registration and control remain a U.S. Government responsibility. This action was taken at Eglin somewhat late, with the result that unnecessary time was spent in attempting to identify missing and misplaced folders and redistribute them under controlled missions.

Refugee Registration Unit

This unit was staffed by a unit supervisor, four US personnel who worked as interviewers, Vietnamese interpreters, file clerk, and two clerk-typists. The unit was responsible for interviewing and registering refugees and determining to which of the six resettlement agencies (CWS, IRC, USCC, CAMA, HIAS, or LIRS) working at Eglin a refugee should be referred. In most instances, the refugee himself indicated which resettlement agency he wanted. The interviewing and registration process was as follows:

1. Interview and register a case unit of refugees. A case unit might consist of one refugee, a refugee and his immediate family, or a refugee and his extended family.

a. Each case unit was assigned a "Y" number (case number).

b. The head of each case unit was interviewed and a refugee biographic referral form prepared on each case. The form contained information on each member in the case unit and was prepared in triplicate: one copy was filed in the "Y" file, one copy forwarded to the resettlement agency to which the case was referred, and one copy was forwarded to the computer center.

c. A 3x5" index card was prepared on each member of the case unit. The card contained the following information: (1) the refugee's alien registration ("A" number), (2) name, (3) date of birth, (4) tent number, (5) "Y" number, and (6) the name of the resettlement agency to which the refugee was referred. The card was sent to the refugee tracing unit where it was filed numerically by the alien registration number ("A" number), to surface incidents of double registration by locating and providing information on refugees.

d. The head of each case was given a yellow card on which his name, the name of the resettlement agency to which his case had been referred, and his "Y" number were recorded.

2. Occasionally, after being registered and referred to a resettlement agency, the refugees for one reason or another requested to be transferred to another agency. These cases were referred back to the refugee registration unit by the agency to which they were originally referred, with the agency signing off on a "case transfer paper" (three copies). The paper and the agency's case file (which included the agency's copy of the refugee biographic referral form, Department of Labor form, and any other documents relating to the case) were returned to the refugee registration unit which referred the case to another agency. The process was as follows:

a. An entry was made in the "case transfer log".

b. The agency's copy of the refugee biographic referral form was amended to show the name of the resettlement agency to which the case referral was being transferred (usually the case head indicated to which agency he wanted his case to be transferred).

c. The first copy of the "case transfer paper" was sent to the refugee tracing file.

d. The second copy of the "case transfer paper" was sent to the agency to which the case was transferred along with the agency's copy of the refugee biographic referral form, Department of Labor form, and any other documents related to the case.

e. The third copy of the "case transfer paper" was sent to the computer center.

f. The refugee "yellow card" was amended to show the name of the new agency and the date of transfer.

3. Occasionally, a member or members of a registered "Y" case wanted to be sponsored apart from the other members of a case unit. When that occurred the case was referred back to the refugee registration unit by the agency handling the case, with the agency signing off on a "split case paper". The paper and agency case file were returned to the refugee registration unit where the members who separated from the original case were re-registered. The process was as follows.

a. An entry was made in the "split case log".

b. The member or members who separated from the original case unit were assigned a new "Y" number (case number).

c. The agency refugee biographic referral form which was prepared on the original case unit was amended to show that a member or members had been re-registered and a reference was made to the new "Y" case number.

d. Two copies of the "split case paper" were sent to the refugee tracing file (one copy filed with the first "Y" case and the other with the new case).

e. The third copy of the "split case paper" was sent to the computer center.

f. The head of the "split case" unit was interviewed and a refugee biographic referral form prepared. (A notation was made on the new form that the case member(s) were previously registered with another case and reference made to the old "Y" number.

g. The "split case" was now handled like a new case.

4. The refugee registration unit maintained a "Y" case log which provided a quick reference to the following information on each "Y" case: name of the head of the case unit, tent number, name of the resettlement agency to which the case was referred, date of referral, and number of members in the case unit.

5. The refugee registration unit maintained a "case transfer" log. This log provided a quick reference to the following information on each "Y" case that had been transferred from one agency to another: "Y" number, name of the head of the case unit, name of the old agency, name of new agency, tent number, and "A" number of each member of the case.

6. The refugee registration unit maintained a "split case" log. This log provided a quick reference on the following information on each "Y" case that split off from another: old "Y" number, new "Y" number, name of the head of the new case unit, tent number, name of old agency, name of new agency (if appropriate); and "A" number of each member of the new case.

7. The refugee registration unit also maintained a "section/tent" log: This log provided information, by section and tent number, on (1) the name of the refugee assigned to each tent, and (2) their "Y" numbers.

8. The refugee registration unit provided the refugee tracing unit with the following daily reports:

a. Number of cases registered, with a breakdown on referrals by agency.

b. Number of cases transferred, with a breakdown on referrals by agency.

c. Number of "split case" registrations, with a breakdown on referrals by agency.

9. A file (3x5" card) was maintained on each refugee who was processed through the refugee registration unit. The cards were filed numerically by the refugee's alien registration number ("A" number). Each card contained: the refugee's name, "Y" number, "A"

number, date of birth, name of the resettlement agency to which his case had been referred, tent number, and date departed Eglin.

Sponsorship Registration Unit

On May 6, 1975, two days after the first Vietnamese arrived at Eglin, the YMCA started operation of an unofficial information office and also began to register prospective sponsors. Telephone numbers were soon publicized and a number of volunteers from nearby areas manned five telephones along with YMCA staff personnel and one or two State/AID officers. Initial operation of the office was less than orderly as many reports have surfaced indicating lost records, or no records made of some sponsorship calls during the first five days. YMCA then turned the sponsorship registration function over entirely to State/AID officers.

Operation

A system was set up in which a 3x5" index card was made on each phone interview, each letter and each walk-in interview. It showed the sponsor's name and address, the date, initials of the person taking the information, telephone numbers and a brief statement of what type and number of refugees he wanted to sponsor (including adoption and foster care cases). It also showed whether the request came by letter, phone-in or walk-in. This same information, plus other details, such as lodging, pay rates, food and clothing arrangements, etc., were also recorded on a yellow 5x8" card. This card and the 3x5" card were then annotated with the initials of one of the voluntary agencies working at Eglin (IRC, USCC, CWS, HIAS, LIRS, LDS, YMCA, and CAMA). For foster care and adoption cases SRS (Social Rehabilitation Service) was marked on the cards. The larger cards were then delivered immediately to the agency which would endeavor to match the prospective sponsor with refugee(s) meeting his specifications. The small cards went into a permanent reference card file. The 5x8" cards were revised several times to include more pertinent data.

Voluntary agencies were repeatedly asked to return those sponsorship requests which they could not fill within ten days of receipt. In actuality, most of them held cases four weeks or longer before they were returned and some were never returned.

A separate card file was maintained on cases that were completed, combined with cases that failed to meet the selection criteria of the voluntary agencies. Completed cases were posted from the departure notices which VolAgs prepared on all refugees departing the camp.

In July, the IATF finally sent down a computer listing of prospects from nine eastern states. The computer list was dated June 30, 1975, and finally reached the sponsorship office at Eglin on July 6, 1975. At this time, the office moved to a larger tent, and the staff was augmented to six AID American employees as follows: B. Rush, R. Holdren, A. Antrillo, J. Martin (reassigned 1 August 1975), K. Judy, and B. Fry, and one or two volunteers (usually working one-half a day).

Later we added three Vietnamese assistants to the staff to handle the clerical work. Nine telephones were installed, including four direct dial WATS lines to expedite telephoning. To help reduce VolAg clerical work, the 5x8" card was replaced by a long two-sided form designed to record much more detail on the sponsorship offer. The 3x5 cards on IATF computer prospects were filed separately from other sponsors and this was facilitated by use of different colors (pink and blue for IATF and salmon or orange for others).

A schedule of special hours was arranged for the sponsorship office giving them a six-day week with duty overnight one day a week, and one day off. Later this was revised to seven hours of night duty per week with two days off. At least three persons worked every day to keep the office functioning seven days a week during July and August.

The sponsor application form was revised again and later it was revised a fourth time. At one point, it consisted of three pages and considerably reduced the production turnout of completed applications because of the time consumed on each application.

On August 25, the telephoning of sponsors was ended and the staff reduced to American personnel only. Letters were mailed to all prospective sponsors who were in the "non-contact" category (i.e., no answers, undecided, want to delay decision, etc.). These letters included application forms, details of sponsorship responsibility and instructions to contact the Refugee Center at Fort Chaffe, Arkansas, if they were still interested in sponsoring.

The telephoning operation resulted in a total of 5063 attempts, of which 3866 were actual sponsor contacts. The remaining 1375 attempts were failures due to wrong numbers, no answers, etc. Of the 3688 contacts, only 660 were considered good enough to forward to Voluntary Agencies. Of this total, it is estimated that about 200 were actually processed and received refugees. Thus, 25 telephone attempts were required for each IATF computer-listed sponsor processed and receiving refugees.

Following is a final summary of the telephoning and form letters sent:

<u>State</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>Phone Contacts</u>	<u>Letters Sent</u>
KY	131	40	5
TN	245	60	12
NC	329	317	42
SC	141	131	30
FL	2139	2085	237
LA	256	236	65
AL	331	320	50
GA	399	369	40
MS	143	130	30
	<u>4114</u>	- 2 - 3688	151

Family Reunification

Over the three-month period during which family reunification cases were most active, 315 people were sent from Eglin to other centers--all involving family separations considered serious enough to inhibit active sponsorship efforts. Several factors contributed to the fact that more than two-thirds of all reunification cases encountered resulted in movements from Eglin to other centers. They were: (1) relative ease and speed with which people could be booked out of Eglin, (2) the prevalent feeling that Eglin would be the first center to close, and (3) the tendency, owing to Eglin's small size, for Eglin to discover and begin work on cases in which it ultimately made little difference whether one or the other of the separated family elements traveled in which direction.

The policy for determining whether inter-camp transfers should be initiated was based on the position that the integrity of nuclear family groups should be promoted. Husbands, wives, children too young to be separated from their families, and old people incapable of living independently in United States' society, were moved to live with family groups responsible for them.

The major problem which plagued the reunification program was the lack of an efficient system by which the Vietnamese could themselves (without having to resort to State Department cables) communicate quickly and effectively between Wake and Guam and United States centers. Early improvement in the mail system could have saved thousands of man-hours spent by State Department and Red Cross workers laboriously confirming, through cables and tele-cable systems, locations of lost relatives whose whereabouts could most easily have been found through an efficient mail system. As a further aid to independent searches, computer printouts, updated weekly, of all Vietnamese in and out of the centers in Guam, Wake, third countries, and in the US should have been made available to refugees from the time those printouts were first available. Everyone had access to them, it seems, except the refugees themselves--and that fact resulted in increased use of computer terminals and general dissatisfaction, on the part of refugees, with retarded efforts to find missing relatives by that means. Use of Washington computer center printouts distributed, in three or four copies to each camp, would have been more efficient and probably less costly.

Consular Affairs

The Consular Office was tasked with providing assistance to refugees desiring resettlement in third countries, and with facilitating reunification of refugee families by helping to insure that eligible family members in third countries were brought to the US. In addition, the Consular Office was charged with meeting all incoming refugee flights from the Pacific in order to extend personal assistance to US citizens arriving on these flights.

Third Country Resettlement

A total of 204 refugees departed Eglin for third countries. The breakdown by country is as follows: 76 to France, 50 directly to Canada and 71 to Indiantown Gap Refugee Center for processing for Canada, 1 to Italy, 3 to Belgium, and 3 to the United Kingdom.

In supporting the application process for third country resettlement, the office maintained liaison with consulates of these countries and of Germany, Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, and Iran. Application procedures varied in keeping with the requirements of each country. For Australia, for example, telephone notification of application was sufficient. Other countries required notification by letter from the Consular Office. The Canadian immigration authorities required the applicant to fill out forms kept at Eglin. An officer of the Canadian Ministry of Manpower and Immigration came to Eglin on occasion to interview the applicants and review the forms, which he took back to Ottawa.

In all third country resettlement cases, simultaneous applications by the refugee's sponsor in the third country was an essential step toward obtaining approval for entry.

In the case of France, the application procedure in its entirety was handled in France by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs acting on a request from the sponsor. Upon receiving notification of approval for entry, the French Consul at New Orleans would telephone this office requesting forms and photographs of the refugee to be used in making up a "laissez passer", which would then be sent to us for issuance. The French Consular Officer managed to visit Eglin on one occasion to issue a number of laissez passers on the spot.

In all cases, this office conducted interviews of the applicants to determine intentions and eligibility. Lists of applicants were maintained, and when several African and South American countries offered resettlement opportunities, the Consular Office solicited applications.

The Consular Officer contacted the ICEM representative in Washington in order to obtain ICEM transportation assistance in cases where neither refugee nor sponsor had sufficient means to pay the fare to the third country. HEW/SRS would pay the fare from Eglin to the point of exit. ICEM would pay for the transportation from the point of exit to the third country. A departure from this practice occurred when the Canadian Government took a plane load of refugees directly from Eglin to Canada on a chartered flight.

Reunification of Families with Members in Third Countries

The Consular Officer drafted cables to US Embassies in third countries and to IATF requesting assistance in moving to the US refugees eligible for parole whose relatives were at Eglin.

Search and Response

This office was charged with receiving sponsorship offers for specific refugees forwarded by IATF, and with locating the refugees and insuring that the appropriate voluntary agency would try to match them with the prospective sponsors. IATF was informed of the disposition of each case via a "response" form. We dealt with a total of 86 specific sponsorship cases.

Drawdown

The initial movements of large numbers of refugees from Eglin to Chaffee began on about August 10 with three charter plane loads of "extended family" group reunification cases. The charters were organized on the basis of several factors: (1) the approaching close of the Eglin Center, (2) the large numbers of family reunification cases involving people having recently arrived at Chaffee from Guam and Wake, and (3) the existence of a number of family groups in the camp whose heads of household were absent and not likely to be found (but whose members refused sponsorships pending appearance of lost members). Because of the nature of these movements, there were very few problems. Everyone was anxious to go to Chaffee. These early flights proved to be timely and valuable in reducing camp population to more manageable numbers.

Because they occurred during a time when mass sponsorship offers were taking shape, when voluntary agencies were firming up previously weak and negligible sponsorships for large families, and during a time when the hopes of refugees who had never been offered sponsorships before were suddenly raised daily by rumors of new mass sponsorships--the last flights were difficult to fill. Manifests changed so often and people were on and off sponsorship lists so often that no flight manifest was ever firm until planes were off the ground. Had it not been for lists of people whose names and case situations had been developed during waves of depression and exasperation which spread through the camp as news of mass sponsorships ebbed and flowed, there would, during the two-week period of close-out, have been times when flights would not have been filled.

The high numbers of sponsorships finalized during the closing days when Chaffee flights were being manifested, however, might very well have been a function of the refugee's realization that the center was, in fact, closing. That, along with a general fear on the part of many, of being sent into the anonymity of Chaffee, might very well have affected the numbers of people accepting sponsorships.

The "can or worms" method of organizing manifests and loading airplanes--however, successful--proved to be both exasperating and exhausting. The easier method would have been to stop all sponsorships two days previous to the beginning of inter-camp airlifts. The overall pressures and increased opportunities, however, during the closing days, of having a reduced refugee population interact with a still large and active group of voluntary agency case workers, made it unlikely that anyone could have chosen to have increased sponsorships halted in order that orderly airlifts might be prepared. Eglin did, in fact, experience increased sponsorships right up to the time when the last unsponsored individuals were sent off to Chaffee.



DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND REHABILITATIVE SERVICES **STATE OF FLORIDA**
Emmett S. Roberts, Secretary
Reubin O'D Askew, Governor

POST OFFICE BOX 2050 • JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA 32203 • PHONE (904) 725-3080
E. Douglas Endsley, Director

TO: H.E.W. - S.R.S.
FROM: Division of Family Services
DATE: September 5, 1975
RE: Unaccompanied Children at Eglin Air Force Base

IN RESPONSE PLEASE
REFER TO: DFS -

H. E. W.-S. R. S. brought to the attention of the Bureau of Children's Services, Florida Division of Family Services in early June the fact that there were unaccompanied children in the Refugee Camp. Interim arrangements were worked out by S. R. S. with Catholic Charities Bureau of Northwest Florida to provide care for these first children. As the number of children escalated, the Bureau of Children's Services, Division of Family Services recognized the need to have a professional social worker on the base to identify, locate, and arrange placement for these children who had no one interested or able to assume responsibility for their care.

Since the Division of Family Services was deeply involved in reorganization of all state social services, it was determined advisable to contract for the care of children with Catholic Charities Bureau of Northwest Florida, who were on the scene and already involved in the total Refugee Program.

The Division of Family Services began a program for unaccompanied Vietnamese children at the Eglin Air Force Base Refugee Resettlement Camp on July 11, 1975. A social worker was assigned the task of locating any unaccompanied children in the camp and referring for placement to Catholic Social Services. A Vietnamese interpreter was hired to assist the social worker.

Prior to the inception of the program, a meeting was held with the Voluntary Agencies, INS and the State Department, to explain the purpose of the program of the Florida Division of Family Services. The military were not included in this briefing and as a result of this oversight some misunderstandings developed which required clarification at a later date by SRS and the State Department.

A second meeting was held with the Voluntary Agencies requesting their assistance in identifying children not with own parents who might require foster home care. (See attachment) The purpose being to develop a bank of information on unaccompanied children to be forwarded to other states where resettlement occurred. This resulted in fair cooperation from the Voluntary Agencies, mainly where there was a question of either placing children with relatives in a sponsorship situation or determining if there was a need for foster care. Many of these cases were assisted in working out problems so that family ties could remain intact. In those cases where a clear need for foster care presented itself, plans were made in accordance with a contractual agreement between the Division of Family Services and Catholic Charities Bureau of Northwest Florida. Those children needing care were screened and referred to Catholic Charities Bureau by the Division Social Worker.

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Political pressure from elected public officials resulted in some children being forced to remain in camp alone for an extended period of time because of the necessity to check out these plans. Also, many well-meaning Americans attempted to sponsor unaccompanied children rather than following normal procedures and pressure was applied to designate foster homes for specific children.

As would be expected, there was a high level of cooperation from HEW, SRS, State Department and INS which resulted in several placements which are very successful.

As of September 4, 1975, there are 47 unaccompanied children in Catholic Charities Bureau care. There are four children in care under the Division's supervision in other areas of Florida.

At the present time, the State of Florida is aware of approximately 73 children who have either been placed in care or resettled with relatives or friends. Also, approximately 100 foster home applications were received from Florida as well as a large number from out-of-state. Those applications from Florida were forwarded to the state office of the Division of Family Services. Out-of-state applications were forwarded to the Atlanta Regional Office of HEW to be sent on to their respective state agencies.

All inquiries about children in foster care should be directed to the state office of the Division of Family Services in Jacksonville (above-address), Bureau of Children's Services where records will be maintained.

DS/nlr

cc: files
Virgil Dechant
Doris Abraham
Dorothy McCrary
James Van Vessen

MEMORANDUM

July 22, 1975

TO: Resettlement Agency Executives

FROM: (Mrs.) Dorothy McGrary, Florida Division of Family Services

RE: Unaccompanied Vietnamese Refugee Children

On Friday, July 18, 1975, representatives of the Resettlement Agencies met with staff of the Florida Division of Family Services and H.E.W. - S.R.S. to discuss procedures and policies regarding planning for unaccompanied Vietnamese Refugee Children.

In all four States where the Refugee Camps are located, H.E.W.-S.R.S. has involved the respective Public Welfare Children's Services to assist in protection and planning for these children.

An unaccompanied Vietnamese child is a boy or girl under the age of 18 who is in the United States without his or her parents. Within this definition we find the following classifications of children:

- 1) A child with relatives
- 2) A child with family friends
- 3) A child alone or for whom neither relatives nor friends are willing to assume responsibility.

H.E.W.-S.R.S. and the Florida Division of Family Services have three responsibilities to the Vietnamese unaccompanied children - protection, identification, and a location bank.

It is recognized that there have been and will continue to be instances of real public and political pressure regarding plans for individual children. It is recommended that when the Resettlement Agencies encounter such pressures that they take the position that the Florida Division of Family Services has responsibility for planning for unaccompanied children. In such instances the case should be referred to Mrs. Debbie Schneider, Social Worker for the Florida Division of Family Services.

We have an obligation to afford the same protection to Vietnamese refugee unaccompanied children that we guarantee to American children. There is a basic public welfare policy that no dependent child should be sent across County or State lines without some assurance as to what he or she will be going to and that needed services will be available in the receiving community.

For these reasons the Florida Division of Family Services needs the cooperation and assistance of the Resettlement Agencies since it is your staff who generally first identify the unaccompanied child. When you encounter an unaccompanied child (whether with relatives, friends, or alone) we will sincerely appreciate your contacting Mrs. Schneider.

If the child is with relatives we will want to obtain identifying information L-27

..

In cases where children are with family friends the Division of Family Services will have to do more exploration because the legal status of these children has yet to be clarified. It may be that a licensed child placing agency will have to be involved in the receiving community to act in the child's behalf.

..

Whenever possible we do want to preserve these family or familiar ties, and avoid exposing the Vietnamese children to additional unknown situations.

..

However, if a child has no one who is interested or willing to care for him or her that case should be promptly referred to Mrs. Schneider. These children will be referred to the North West Florida Catholic Charities Bureau, Inc. for placement. The Division of Family Services is entering into a contractual agreement with this agency to provide care for Vietnamese unaccompanied children. Catholic Charities does serve children and foster parents of other faiths.

..

The Division of Family Services sincerely appreciates the offer by the resettlement agencies to help Mrs. Schneider back track and obtain data on children already resettled from the Camp. Whenever your staff recalls a case and has the time to share this with Mrs. Schneider or her assistant, this information will provide a more complete location audit.

..

When the resettlement agencies receive inquiries from potential foster parents within the State of Florida, it is suggested that identifying information be given to Mrs. Schneider. Inquiries from outside the State of Florida should be left with the H.E.W. - S.P.S. staff for dissemination to the respective States.

D'C:mtd.

III. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR - REFUGEE EMPLOYMENT SKILLS

As Vietnamese refugees began arriving at the Eglin Refugee Center, representatives of the Department of Labor, Washington, and the Atlanta Regional Office, and the manager of the Fort Walton Beach Office of the Florida State Employment Service established procedures for interviewing incoming refugees to determine their employment skills. Initially, the interviews were performed by employment interviewers from the Fort Walton Beach and Pensacola local offices. In early June, three additional interviewers were hired on a temporary basis at Fort Walton Beach, thus relieving Pensacola of this function. For the rest of the summer, the Department of Labor function was manned with four people.

During the in-processing of arriving refugees, each person between 16 and 65 years of age was interviewed, with the information essential to job placement being recorded. Among the data noted were work experience, special training, age, sex, and education. Primary and secondary skills were determined and coded with standard six digit occupational codes. Interviews were conducted at a rate of about 100 to 150 a day, which generally stayed abreast of the inflow into the center. In all, approximately 3400 individuals were interviewed.

These files were then arranged numerically according to occupational codes, enabling us to identify specific skills as requested by potential sponsors and the voluntary agencies arranging sponsorships. Also, weekly statistical reports were submitted to the Atlanta Regional Office.

Another service provided was job bank information from state and national microfiche film.

Arrangements were made with the State Department to obtain information on departures to keep our active file current and containing only those individuals still in the center. Subsequently, occupational codes were fed into the computer data bank, making it possible to screen for specific skills either manually or automatically.

After the influx of refugees to the center stopped and the classification of all potential workers was completed, an "Orientation to the World of Work" briefing was prepared, covering such subjects as establishing employment goals, sources of information on job openings, conduct at an employment interview, and keeping the job once hired. This briefing was given four times a day to groups of 30 or 40 until all interested persons had heard it.

In general, the labor function was accomplished satisfactorily, but there were some lessons learned that could contribute to a smoother execution of this sort of an operation in the future.

Both the interviews and briefings had to be conducted through interpreters, for whom we depended on volunteers among the refugees. For the most part, this arrangement was satisfactory, but funds to pay interpreters would have resulted in a more effective and reliable performance of this function.

At various stages during the operation, several different control numbers were used; i.e., a "Y" number, "A" number, and a computer control number. This resulted in some inaccuracies and confusion, which could have been avoided by the establishment of a firm control number at the outset.

IV. FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

The financial management function at the Eglin Refugee Resettlement Center evolved beginning with the activation of the Center and continuing throughout the operational phase.

Essentially, the following functions were performed during the period of operation at Eglin:

1. Funds control (transportation cost and refugee support and processing costs).
2. Forecast, estimates and budgets.
3. Payroll function for interpreter/translator services.
4. Consulting and technical advising to Civil Coordinator and Eglin AFB Base Controller.
5. Review and analyze reports, audits, cost studies and estimates.

Funds to carry out the refugee resettlement tasks were basically provided pursuant to the Presidential determination from AID allotment in the amount of \$98,000,000 and the Migration and Refugee Act of 1975 in the amount of \$405,000,000.

Eglin Resettlement Center operating costs were financed by the Air Force from its 1975 operating and maintenance funds. Operating costs incurred by the Air Force in the support of the refugee resettlement effort at Eglin will be reimbursed by the Department of State from the above-mentioned appropriations.

The following is a summary of costs reportedly incurred by the Eglin AFB. This data has been submitted to the Air Force Systems Command to support billings to the Department of State. The estimate to complete operations at Eglin is included for the period 1-15 September 1975.

Eglin Air Force Base Refugee Resettlement Costs (1975)

<u>Month</u>	<u>Operating Cost</u>
May	\$ 2,293,948.32
June	1,001,776.67
July	869,942.13
August	939,529.94
September (Est. 1-15)	243,128.94
Total	\$ 5,348,325.24

The above total cost should be the maximum amount that the Air Force will request reimbursement for. We expect to receive various credits to these total amounts for investment items, equipment and supplies that the Air Force absorbs in its inventory.

This has become a major problem and will not be resolved until GSA, IATF and Air Force develop a firm disposition plan. We believe that the Department of State should receive proper credit for all serviceable items transferred to all Government agencies. The disposition team should provide an inventory of the items transferred to the Air Force and other agencies. The inventory should contain acquisition costs and estimated value at the time of transfer or disposal. This data will serve as a sound basis for adjusting billings and obtaining proper credit for serviceable items.

Additional funds were authorized by the Inter-Agency Task Force for the transportation of refugees to their respective resettlement sites in the US. As of September 4, 1974, we have expended \$426,811.77 for this purpose. A final wrap-up telegram will be sent on September 15, 1975, and will be the total charges for transporting refugees to sponsor locations.

In summary, the Eglin AFB Controller staff has been responsive to all requests made by the Civil Coordinator at the Center. We further believe that all future requests and settlement negotiations will receive equitable treatment. Negotiations regarding closing costs and complete settlement on billing matters should be addressed to Mr. Bertram C. Kelsey, Deputy Controller, Eglin AFB, ADTC/AC, Telephone (904) 882-5855.

V. ADMINISTRATION

1. Personnel

The major problem in the personnel area was that of obtaining authorization to hire refugees to work in the camp. IATF authorized the hiring of 50 such employees but did not specify how these employees were to be hired or paid. After many telegrams and telephone calls it was evident that a procedure to be used at all the camps would not be forthcoming. We then worked out a local procedure acceptable to all concerned.

In any future operation of this type, the need for hiring the refugees to assist in running the camp should be a foregone conclusion and procedures established to hire and pay such refugees.

The lack of a qualified Communications and Records Officer until late June was a major problem in the administrative area. Reproduction, distribution, filing, and locating messages was time-consuming and not always productive. In any similar operation in the future, a C&R employee should be one of the first employees assigned.

2. Automobiles

The renting of automobiles by individuals at \$12/\$16 per day proved to be costly both in terms of cost and utilization. As a result, all automobiles used from June through September 15, 1975 were obtained on a contract through Air Force procurement at a cost of only \$8/\$9.50 per day. These cars were used on a pool basis and proved to be far more economical.

3. Housing

Employees were on per diem and therefore selected their own quarters. The locations of these quarters varied from three to approximately twenty miles one-way from the camp. This, of course, necessitated a great deal of travel, poor utilization of vehicles, and required more vehicles than would have been required if personnel were centrally located. In any future operation of this type, the Government should lease a number of rooms in a central location and provide bus transportation to and from work.

4. Property

The question of who owned property purchased with IATF funds was questioned many times during the operation. While those working for State were of the opinion that everything paid for with IATF funds belonged to State (IATF), some Air Force personnel were of the opinion the Air Force owned all of the property. This question was finally resolved by direction from Washington. Questions of this kind should be addressed early in any similar situation.

5. Property Disposal

At a meeting held at Eglin AFB on Thursday, September 4 and Friday September 5, 1975, the following actions were agreed to regarding the disposition of State (IATF) property at Eglin. (DeWayne, IATF; French, Eglin Supply; Sanders, DSA; Smead, GSA; Sacco, NATF Supply; Whitehead, AFSC; Fulton, GAO; Pare, Vego and Kellogg).

Expendable and non-expendable property that can be returned for credit to Air Force, GSA and DSA is to be returned, and the State IATF account credited.

Property that is of a military nature and no longer economical to repair or maintain will be turned over to DPDO.

Property for which no credit can be obtained will be turned over to GSA for final disposition. All equipment costing in excess of \$1,000 is to be returned and full credit given to State IATF.

ATTACHMENT:

A. Phase-Out Operations Plan

EGLIN REFUGEE CENTER
PHASE-OUT OPERATIONS PLAN

Implementation
Date

Task

August 1, 1975

Executive Office - Property: All non-expendable property; i.e., desks, chairs, tables, etc., will be placed in storage areas (tents), and/or returned to the Air Force when no longer needed for movement to Eglin Main where final disposition will take place between Sept. 12-20, 1975. (Task Force/GSA representative will determine final disposition of all IATF funded property.) A reminder will be sent to USAF on the return of all radios borrowed from State Department.

Check List

Item

Actual
Completion Date

1. Property returned from other Agencies
2. Property returned from VolAgs
3. Property check at Hangar 66, Hangar 68 and Bldg. 609
4. AF return of radios to State Dept.

Files Disposition - None

Personnel Releases

Name

Release Date

J. Vego

Sept. 20, 1975

Action Officer - J. Vego

August 20, 1975

Executive Office - Automobiles: Turn in rented vehicles as assigned personnel depart. Turn in to start o/a August 20, and end Sept. 12, 1975. Cars needed after that date can be rented on individual basis under current orders.

Check List

<u>Item</u>	<u>Actual Completion Date</u>
1. Turn in two cars Aug. 19 .	8/19/75
2. Status to be checked on a daily basis to insure full utilization of available vehicles	

Files Disposition - None

Task Completion Date

Personnel Release - None

Action Officer - A. Maurice Pare

August 20, 1975

Processing Section: Sponsor calls and verification from computer printout to be terminated and the function transferred to IATF Washington.

Check List

<u>Item</u>	<u>Actual Completion Date</u>
1. Verify above	
2. Submit wrap-up report	

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. No.</u>
1. Sponsor follow-up effort	11

Task Completion Date - August 20, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
K. Judy	8/20/75
R. Holdren	8/20/75
A. Antrillo	8/20/75

Action Officer - W. Egan

August 21, 1975

Executive Officer - Telephones: Phones to be disconnected and returned to Centel when no longer required. State telephone units to be disconnected o/a Aug. 20, and all WATS and 678 numbers to be disconnected by Sept. 2. All calls will then be directed through the old Field 2 switchboard. All WATS and 678 numbers not on old Field 2 switchboard to be disconnected Sept. 3.

Files Disposition - None

Task Completion Date - Sept. 2, 1975

Personnel Releases - None

Action Officer - A. Maurice Pare

August 25, 1975

Controller Officer - Airline Billings for Transportation: The military transportation office and airline ticket office will be advised o/a Sept. 7 to mail all billings to State for payment. Most of the billings are going to State, but some are being sent to the Civil Coordinator's Office. The Controller will provide the addresses to where all billings are to be sent.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. No.</u>
1. Requests & authorization of official travel	5
2. Refugee transportation reports	6a - 6c

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Task Completion Date - Sept. 7, 1975

Personnel Releases - None

Action Officer - J. Murpny

August 26, 1975

Executive Office - Data Processing: Completion of certification that original demographic data collected at planeside has been entered on the computer file.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. No.</u>
1. Computer Info System	14
2. Questionnaire for Computer Input	15

Task Completion Date - Aug. 26, 1975

Personnel Releases - None

Action Officer - N. Rudd

August 25, 1975

Executive Office - Reports: Begin reduction in volume and number of reports and statistical surveys.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. No.</u>
1. Refugee population movement reports	1
2. Situation reports	19

Task Completion Date - Sept. 1, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
D. Dikcius	8/25/75

August 28, 1975

Refugee Processing Section: Consular and family reunification activities end.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. No.</u>
Third Country File	10

Task Completion Date - Aug. 28, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
M. Hauben	Aug. 28, 1975

Action Officers - M. Hauben, T. Barker

August 28, 1975

Refugee Processing Section: Finalization and sorting of documentation begins.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of Files</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. No</u>
1. Processing Coord. File System	9
2. Third Country File	10
3. Sponsor Follow-Up Effort	11
4. VolAg	12a-b
5. Refugee Referrals File by Y#	13

Task Completion Date - August 30, 1975

Action Officer - W. Egan

August 29, 1975

Controller - Financial Management Records: Review of all financial records utilizing the following disposition criteria.

<u>File Index</u>	<u>Disposition</u>
1. Reports refugee population movement	Destroy
2. Refugees cost reports	IATF
3. Correspondence	IATF
4. Payroll VN employees working at Eglin	IATF
5. Authority to pay refugee employees working at Eglin Refugee Center	IATF
6. Request and authorization of official travel	State/AID-C
7. Daily reports transportation cost refugees	IATF
8. Property	IATF
9. Contract/grants - voluntary agencies	IATF
10. Transportation's quotation	State/AID-C
11. Airline ticketing for refugees	IATF
12. Unmailed refugee payroll checks	IATF/Chaffee

Check List - None

Files Disposition - See Above

Task Completion Date - Sept. 10, 1975

Personnel Releases - None

Action Officer - J. Murphy

August 29, 1975

Processing Section: Close out sponsor referrals; forward letter; transfer refugee cases to Fort Chaffee; completion of split cases and other refugee/sponsor activities by the State Registration Section and VolAgs.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. N.</u>
1. Third country files	10
2. Sponsor follow-up effort	11
3. VolAg	12a-b
4. Refugee referrals file by Y#	13

Task Completion Date - August 29, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
W. Egan	8/29/75
W. Erdahl	8/29/75

Action Officers - H. Cushing, W. Egan, T. Barker

August 29, 1975

Processing Section: Rush, Gallick begin phase-out of the refugee registration and training sections.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. N.</u>
1. VolAg	12a-b
2. Refugee referrals file by Y#	13

Task Completion Date - Sept. 12, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
L. Gallick	9/12/75
B. Rush	9/12/75

Action Officers - B. Rush, L. Gallick

August 30, 1975

Executive Office - C&R: Resurvey records generated during operation and determine with IATF assistance those records to be retained.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

All files listed on attachment #1 except those maintained by Financial Management

Task Completion Date

Personnel Releases - None

Action Officer - E. McMahon

August 30, 1975

Processing Section: Forward all sponsorship offers by letter to IATF, Washington

Check List

Item

Actual
Completion Date

1. Check with IATF for name and address of person to whom sponsorship offers are to be forwarded

Files Disposition

Title of File

Atch 1 Ref. N

Sponsor follow-up effort

11

Task Completion Date - Sept. 1, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
H. Cushing	9/1/75
B. Fry	9/1/75
P. Levinsky	9/1/75
H. Doughty	9/1/75

Action Officer - H. Cushing

September 5, 1975

Executive Office: Shelf list and box records for transfer as appropriate.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

The above applies to all files with the exception of those maintained by Financial Management

Task Completion Date - Sept. 5, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
E. McMahon	9/7/75

Action Officer - E. McMahon

September 1, 1975

Trailers: The house-trailers 2, 3, 4 and 5 currently being used as offices, will be returned when no longer needed. For planning purposes, all trailers will be released by Sept. 14, and any remaining functions transferred to Trailer #1 which is a stationary Air Force-owned trailer.

Check List - None

Files Disposition - None

Task Completion Date - Sept. 14, 1975

Personnel Release

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
A. Maurice Pare	9/15/75

Action Officer - A. Maurice Pare

September 5, 1975

Phase-out of Deputy Civil Coordinator and Management Analyst function

Check List - None

Files Disposition - None

Task Completion Date - Sept. 5, 1957

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
L. Gottlieb	9/5/75
G. Butler	8/28/75

Action Officers - L. Gottlieb, G. Butler

September 7, 1975

Controller: Transportation costs for resettlement of refugees in the USA: Weekly report - COB each Wednesday. This report is a telegram to IATF to control funds used to resettle refugees. The report will be terminated after costs are recorded for the last charter flight.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

<u>Title of File</u>	<u>Atch 1 Ref. 1</u>
Refugee transportation reports	6a-c

Task Completion Date - Sept. 7, 1975

Personnel Releases - None

Action Officer - J. Murphy

September 7, 1975

Payroll for Refugees Work for Civil Coordinator's Office at Eglin Refugee Center: The payroll for the pay period ending Aug. 2, 1975, is currently being prepared. Two more payrolls will most likely be made. The last payroll will be prepared after all refugees have departed Eglin. We will need clerical/administrative support for payroll preparation. This last payroll for period ending Aug. 30 should be completed Sept. 4 or 5, if clerical support is available. Computer files will be used to provide forwarding addresses or departed personnel.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

Title of File

Atch 1 Ref. No

Payroll records-refugee employees
at Eglin

4a-c

Task Completion Date - Sept. 5, 1975

Personnel Releases

Name

Release Date

J. Murphy

9/7/75

Action Officer - J. Murphy

September 9, 1975

Executive Office - Reports: Final input for SitRep would depend upon the departure of the last refugee going to a sponsor.

L-44

Check List - None

Files Disposition

Title of File

Atch 1 Ref.

Situation reports

19

Personnel Releases

Name

Release Date

G. Malinowski

9/10/75

Action Officer: R. Kellogg

September 19, 1975

Executive Office - Data Processing: Completion of
phase-down and transfer tasks.

Check List

Item

Actual
Completion Date

1. Finalization of computer files at the
Computer Sciences Laboratory Eglin Main.
(This step will be somewhat delayed in
September because of a major retrofit
scheduled for the Eglin computer).
2. Preparation of the IATF tape file.
3. Disposition of the Eglin Main Base
computer files.
4. Return all video terminal equipment
to IBM
5. Transfer of computer files to Fort
Chaffee.

Files Disposition

Title of file

Atch 1 Ref. N

1. Computer info system
2. Questionnaire for computer input

14

15

L-45

Task Completion Date - Sept. 15, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
N. Rudd	9/15/75

Action Officer - N. Rudd

September 20, 1975

Termination of Operation New Arrival, Eglin AFB and release of remainder of personnel.

Check List - None

Files Disposition

Disposition instructions completed for few remaining files.

Task Completion Date - Sept. 20, 1975

Personnel Releases

<u>Name</u>	<u>Release Date</u>
C. Cain	9/15/75
R. Kellogg	9/15/75
T. Barker	9/15/75
M. Thall	9/15/75
J. Vego	9/20/75

PERSONNEL RELEASE DATES

August 20, 1975	- K. Judy R. Holdren A. Antrillo
August 25, 1975	- D. Dikcius
August 28, 1975	- M. Hauben G. Butler
August 29, 1975	- W. Egan W. Erdahl
September 1, 1975	- H. Cushing B. Fry P. Levinsky
September 5, 1975	- L. Gottlieb
September 7, 1975	- E. McMahon
September 10, 1975	- G. Malinowski
September 12, 1975	- H. Doughty L. Gallick B. Rush
September 15, 1975	- N. Rudd J. Murphy M. Thall R. Kellogg M. Pare T. Barker
September 20, 1975	- J. Vego

PHASE-OUT OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, RED CROSS AND YMCA

For planning purposes, it was assumed the last refugee to be transported to Fort Chaffee left Eglin AFB August 30, 1975. All remaining refugees would have sponsors and be awaiting transportation.

<u>Phase-Out Date</u>	<u>Agency</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Aug. 18, 1975	YMCA	The Information Office only
Sept. 2, 1975	Red Cross	Perhaps one or two workers would remain to assist refugees with sponsors and awaiting transportation
	YMCA	Recreation and child care activities
Sept. 5, 1975	INS	
	HEW/Education	
	PHS	
	SRS	

PARTIAL LISTING*
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE REFUGEE CAMP

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Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
Refugee Population Movement Reports	All camps daily activities	All levels of camp management for info	Financial management, et al	1 folder for copy see Tab A	Destroy - info available at IATF
Refugees Cost Reports	Special cost reports for camp management	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	Transfer to IATF financial Management
Financial Management Correspondence	Transmittal of financial documents	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	Transfer to IATF financial Management
Payroll Records Refugee Employees at Eglin	List of payments	Payroll	Financial management	4 folders	Transfer IATF
B. Authority to Pay Material	Back-up for 4a	Financial management	Financial management	1 folder	Payroll records Transfer IATF
C. Unclaimed Refugee Payroll Checks	Actual checks but contain error wrong name, etc.	Financial management	Financial management	50 checks	Transfer IATF payroll records
Request and Authorization of Official Travel	Travel orders, etc., of IATF employees	Aid Comptroller	Financial management	1 folder	IATF financial Management then Aid Comptroller Washington

USAF records were not reviewed except situation report, procedure and P.I.O. files. (b) PHS, OE, and SMS were not contacted but their input into computerized information system is included in this review.

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
5. Refugees Transportation Reports A. Daily Reports Transportation Cost Refugees B. Airline Ticketing for Refugees C. Transportation Quotes	Common all camps	Camp management and IATF	Financial management	2" file folder daily report May 26-present	IATF to assure duplication-the destroy if not needed by IATF financial management IATF financial management
7. Vol Ag Contracts	Details of each ticket purchased Bids on charters State Department Contract	Camp management Camp financial management	Financial management	1 folder	Destroy - Original retain at State Department
8. Property File	Limited information on property (desks, calculators, etc.)	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	IATF financial management
3. Processing Card File System	Reviews the processing status of each refugee in camp	Camp management	Bill Eichl	1 Card file box	Retain and transfer cards to accompany refugee to Chaffee. Destroy the rest since the computer tape also covers needed info

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
0. Third Country File	People wishing to go to 3rd countries or family reunion effort	Camp management	Bank Cushing	2" file folder	IATF or needed follow up-on the persons going to Chaffee a copy should accompany them.
1. Sponsor Follow-up Effort	Names, addresses, and phone numbers of potential sponsors	Vol Ag and camp management	Bank Cushing	4000+ cards 1 file drawer of correspondence	Special task team has arrived-all this material will eventually have to be moved to Chaffee or IATF where the follow on effort is to continue.
12. Vol Ag A. Vol Ag Case Load Over-Time B. Referral Log	Number of cases to each Vol Ag What case to what Vol Ag	Camp management Camp management	Bank Cushing Bank Cushing	1 file folder Log book	IATF-possible historical interest IATF-historical interest
13. Refugee Referral File by Y/ (see 11)	Info supplied Vol Ag on each case unit Y8	Camp management	Bank Cushing	5 file drawers 2900+ Y8s, 1-e., individuals or family units (copy see Tab B)	IATF for backup-info is supposed to be on tape but some errors have been spotted

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
4. Computer Info System	100 info units on each of 10,049 refugees from 9 questionnaires 20 management reports prepared 3 to 4 times a week ----- Occupation code to 6 digits only 3 required 9 questionnaires (see Tab C from refugees)	Camp management	Neal Rudd	Computer tapes (see Tab C for copies of 9 questionnaires which make up input to computer)	Transfer tapes to IATF computer operation with down of 20 management reports (1. 20 examples of how to use the tapes)
5. Questionnaires for Computer Input		News media	AF PIO	1 file folder	Destroy after review of questionnaire (Tab C) since tapes will be retained doublecheck on all questionnaire not in computers
5. Stories of Day File	PIO releases		AF PIO		IATF request- AF retain
7. Press Badge User File and Log	List of members of press who have visited camp	Camp management	AF PIO	1 book 1 folder	IATF request- AF retain
8. Press Clippings	Local press clippings	Camp management	AF PIO	6" of clippings	AF determine of copies to IATF needed for history

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
5. Situation Reports	Management review of camp since 29 April	Camp management	AF/command trailer	1/2 file drawer (see Tab D)	IATF should have copies - local copies should be destroyed except AF copies
3. Camp Newspaper		Refugees and camp management	USAF	(see Tab E)	IATF copies for historical purposes/copies to National Archive:
1. INS Files on Rach Allen	9817 files by AF		I.N.S. Wash. DC	(See Tab F for dummy file)	IATF work up agreement for access to this info system - critical overview run
2. Civil Coordinators files (not classified)	Communications	Camp management	Civil Coordinator Trailer #1	1/2 file drawer	IATF

VI. AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING

The Automatic Data Processing (ADP) effort at the Eglin AFB Refugee Resettlement Center has been two fold: the local computer system which has been implemented at the Eglin Main Computer Center and the centralized system implemented at the Task Force level in Washington, D.C.

The local system has been run on a CDC 6600 utilizing a commercial data management system known as the Multi-access Retrieval System (MARS). Data concerning the refugees at Eglin Center has been provided to the centralized system through periodic magnetic tape files which have been generated at Eglin and transmitted to Washington.

The local system was designed to establish a basic record for each refugee with data collected at planeside and to add to the record with data collected at each step of the refugee processing cycle. The unique control number used for each data base record is a six character number --the Guam ID number, if available, or a locally assigned number if the Guam number was not available. The local system produced 20 different reports on a regular basis as well as periodic special reports. At the height of the Center's activities over 100,000 original lines of reports were printed daily.

The centralized ADP system at the IATF accepts inputs in what is known as the 11 card format, i.e., eleven different input cards are required to complete a refugee record in the centralized data base. The system at Eglin did not utilize the same format, therefore, a special program was written to format an eleven card image tape on a periodic basis for processing by the IATF system.

A number of problems and deficiencies of a serious nature were encountered with the Eglin ADP system. These problems detracted from the overall utility of the system and were similar to problems encountered at the other centers. These problems centered around the data collection effort and not the ADP software.

A contributing factor to the overall system problems was the lack of uniformity in the record control number. Some of the Guam numbers had leading letters and some did not; additionally, individuals recording data on coding sheets sometimes used the leading letter, and sometimes they did not use it. Consequently, the control numbers introduced into the system had a wide range of formats, i.e., six numbers, one letter followed by six numbers (any letter was legal, a blank followed by five numbers or two letters followed by four numbers (the locally assigned number). This situation made it nearly impossible to determine if a valid control number was recorded on the data sheets. The immediate result was that a high percentage of update inputs were rejected by the system due to a no-match condition on the control number. The high volume of daily inputs during the peak processing period resulted in a nearly impossible task for the staff that researched the errors to properly correct the rejected data.

The extremely short lead-time available and the high rate of refugee arrivals during the early life of the Center combined to create a situation whereby nearly half of the total Eglin Center population had arrived before all data gathering procedures were implemented, and a great number of the early arrivals had already left camp. As a result, there are gaps in the data files for many of the early camp arrivals. The pressing need for keeping up with data processing requirements for new arrivals made the task of "catching up" an impossible one as many of the refugees on which data was missing were leaving camp in the normal daily outflow.

The lack of uniformity in the recording sequence of names among the agencies made data corrections and verification extremely difficult.

The lack of a permanent staff of personnel who understood ADP principles increased the difficulty of monitoring the data inputs, correcting errors, etc. Although the refugees who worked on the ADP project did very well under the circumstances, the turnover due to sponsorship arrangements had a detrimental effect on the project. In retrospect, it would have been advisable to have a paid U.S. staff on the project.

The lack of centralized procedures for transmission of information from one center to another has caused problems particularly where refugees transferred from one center to another. For example, the centralized computer system concept required that transferred refugees remain in the ADP system under their original control number; however, there has been no procedure established to insure this when refugees transfer.

Various processing organizations gave low priority (often out of necessity due to workloads) to the task of completing data collection forms. This resulted in many cases of missing and/or erroneous data and leading to gaps in the data files.

In the event a similar situation is encountered in the future, it should be recognized and accepted by all concerned parties that a centralized data base of complete and accurate data is a necessity. The following recommendations would help to insure this:

1. Emphasize immediately the need for standardized data collection procedures throughout the camps, and if necessary delay releases from camp until the required data has been captured. For example, a complete ADP record could be required as a part of the out-processing checklist.
2. Provide a full-time staff of U.S. personnel at each site to properly monitor and manage the ADP collection effort. Refugees could be used to supplement the staff by doing the clerical jobs.
3. Develop at the Washington level specific standards for generating control numbers, transferring refugees from one location to another, etc.

This last item can be beneficial to the current program to deal with the possible transfer of refugees from Camp Pendleton and Indiantown Gap to Fort Chaffee.

4. Probably the most logical solution to the control number problem would have been to assign each refugee an INS "A" number at planeside and use that as the file control number. Everyone in the processing cycle understood the meaning and value of the "A" number. Consequently, the incidence of recording invalid control numbers or coding sheets would have been minimized.

VII.

CIVIL COORDINATOR
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

STAFFING

COORDINATOR'S OFFICE

Coordinator
Secretary
Deputy Coordinator
Secretary

James B. Chandler/Charles F. Cain
Gloria Malinowski
Lester J. Gottlieb
Marcia Thall

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

Executive Officer
Management Analyst
C&R Officer

Marion L. Kellogg
Gerald Butler
Ellen McMahon

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE

Administrative Officer
Personnel Officer
General Services Officer
Secretary

A. Maurice Pare
Rita Lema
Joseph V. Vego
Patricia McKenna

DATA PROCESSING/REPORTS & STATISTICS

Reports & Statistics Officer
Systems Analysis Officer

Daniel C. Dikcius
Neil Rudd

CONTROLLER

Controller

Jack Murphy

REFUGEE COORDINATION

Refugee Coordinator

William Erdahl

REFUGEE PROCESSING

Processing Coordinator
Secretary

Henry B. Cushing
Marion Levinsky

VOLUNTARY AGENCY SUPPORT

VolAg Liaison Officer
VolAg Liaison Ofc (Processing Supv)
Out-Processing Officer
Out-Processing Officer
Out-Processing Officer
Out-Processing Officer
Sponsor Registration Officer
Language Officer
Secretary

C. Harvey Doughty
William Egan
Beverly A. Fry
Jack V. Martin
Anthony Antrillo
Kerlin O. Judy
Bruce Rush
Richard C. Holdren
Lydia Gallick

REFUGEE AFFAIRS

Refugee Affairs Officer

Terry J. Barker

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE

Information/Orientation/Education Officer


J. Reid

U.S. CITIZENS' SERVICE

Consular Officer
Language Officer

Robert Dorr
Michael Hauben


CIVIL COORDINATOR
ECILIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA
CURRENT ORGANIZATION CHART



Vietnamese employees reimbursed at minimum
rate of \$2.10 per hour.

CIVIL COORDINATOR
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL AND PERSONNEL CHART



Vietnamese employees reimbursed at minimum rate of \$2.10 per hour.

CIVIL COORDINATOR
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA

CURRENT PERSONNEL ROSTER

No.	Position Title	No. of Persons Assigned	Grade	Agency	Description of Duties
1	Senior Coordinator	1	FSR -1 AID		Coordinates the civil activities relative to the care, processing, and re-settlement of refugees. Primary contact point for Interagency Task Force.
2	Deputy Coordinator	1	FSR -1 AID		Assists the Senior Coordinator in above-mentioned duties.
3-4	Secretaries	2	FSS -7 AID		Secretarial and reception duties.
5	Executive Officer	1	FSR -2 AID		Supervises administrative personnel, statistical, data processing and communication functions.
6	Management Analyst	1	FSR -5 AID		Performs analytical duties/studies.
7	CAR Officer	1	FSS -4 AID		Controls and routes all incoming correspondence, maintains records.
8	Refugee Coordinator	1	FSR -5 AID		Identifies problems causing refugees to remain in camp and initiates appropriate action to ensure their early departure.
9	Clerk-Typist	1	WNese Emp		Types reports, files, maintains time and attendance records and acts as an interpreter.
10-21	Surveyors	12	WNese Emp		Surveys camp population to identify problem areas and to assist in expediting the timely departure of refugee families--bilingual.
22	Processing Coordr	1	FSR -3 AID		In the administrative tent processing area provides on-the-spot support assistance to Volags. Assists with special problems referred to Civil Coordinator.
23	Secretary	1	FSS -7 AID		Provides clerical assistance to unit, typing on an IBM Magnetic Card type-writer from letters on sponsorship inquiries, adoption of Vietnamese children, etc.
24	Controller	1	FSR -3 AID		Manages, directs and controls Interagency Task Force appropriated funds for the evacuation, temporary care and resettlement of Indochina refugees.
25	Accountant	1	WNese Emp		Performs necessary tasks to budget, estimate, and account for funds utilized to resettle Indochina refugees.
26	Admin Officer	1	FSR -3 AID		Provides Interagency support for administrative and general services functions.
27	General Serv Ofc	1	FSR -4 AID		Responsibility for expendable and non-expendable supplies.
28	Clerk-Typist	1	WNese Emp		Logs keys for passengers using shared vehicles, signs out gasoline credit cards--types as required.
29-30	Janitor	2	WNese Emp		Performs janitorial services.
31-36	Telephone Operators	6	WNese Emp		Assists refugees in placing personal calls to various points in US and receiving calls for refugees in camp--bilingual.

No.	Position Title	Persons		Grade	Agency	Description of Duties
		Assigned				
37	Personnel Officer	1		FSO -4	State	Performs personnel functions for Civil Coordinator Staff; interviews and recruits for 50 Vietnamese local hire. Assists former US Gov't Vnese employees.
38	Secretary	1		FSS- 6	AID	Provides clerical and administrative assistance to the Controller and Personnel Officer.
39	Messenger	1		VNese Emp		Picks up and delivers all correspondence for internal routing.
40	Time & Attendance Clk	1		VNese Emp		T&A Clerk and assists in typing vouchers & budget reports for Controller.
41	Personnel Clerk	1		VNese Emp		Assists Personnel Officer in recruiting; maintains all appropriate statistical and personnel records.
42	Systems Analyst	1		FSR -4	AID	Responsible for maintaining all data processing reporting to Washington and other areas.
43	Reports/Statistics Ofc	1		FSR -5	AID	Prepares internal and external reporting requirements and the Daily Situation Report.
44-47	Coding Clerks	4		VNese Emp		Check coding sheets for completeness & correctness; correct computer detected errors; distribute computer output.
48-50	Interpreters/Translators	3		VNese Emp		Assists the Military Refugee Liaison Office by translation as required.
51	Info/Orientation Ofc	Vacant			PAO	Coordinates the Center's English Language Training program, cultural orientation program and English/Vietnamese publications.
52	Clerk-Typist	1		VNese Emp		Types, files and answers inquiries.
53	Volag Liaison Ofc	1		FSR -4	AID	Coordinates with the Volags, assisting them as required; handles sponsor calls.
54	Volag Liaison Ofc (Supv)	1		FSR -5	AID	Interviews incoming refugees from Pacific areas to obtain biographic data on family members including occupational skills and status of sponsorship.
55	In-Processing Ofc	1		FSR -4	AID	See position #54.
56	In-Processing Ofc	1		FSR -3	AID	See position #54.
57	In-Processing Ofc	1		FSR -4	AID	See position #54.
58	In-Processing Ofc	1		FSR -5	AID	See position #54.
59	In-Processing Ofc	1		FSR -4	AID	See position #54.
60	Sponsorship Registration	1		FSSO-3	State	Handles walk-in and telephone sponsorship offers, questions, etc.
61	Language Ofc	1		FSR -5	AID	Acts as interpreter and general troubleshooter, as required. JRICO Liaison.
62	Secretary	1		FSR -7	AID	Provides clerical assistance to unit, typing on an IBM Magnetic Card type-writer from letters on sponsorship inquiries, adoption of VNese, etc.
63-64	Clerk-Typist	2		VNese Emp		Types, files and answers inquiries.
65-70	Translator	6		VNese Emp		Assists in obtaining biographic data from incoming refugees.
71	Messenger	1		VNese Emp		Delivers files to Immigration & Naturalization Service within reception areas.
72-73	File Clerk	2		VNese Emp		Files processing documents.

No.	Position Title	No. of Persons		Grade	Agency	Description of Duties
		Assigned				
74	Refugee Affairs Ofr	1		FSR -5	AID	Handles reunification problems, refugee mail and repatriation.
75-76	General Clerks	2		VNese Emp		Performs clerical and filing duties.
77	Clerk	1		VNese Emp		Responsible for operating Xerox machine.
78	Consular Affairs Ofr	1		FSO -4	State	Handles Third Country Nationals and US citizen problems; meets all incoming aircraft from Pacific areas.
79	Processing Ofr	1		FSR -5	AID	Assists section chief in assigned responsibilities and assists in processing of refugees to foreign countries.
80-81	Translators	2		VNese Emp		These positions rotate according to unit needs.

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VIII.

Track Migration & Activities
per Bulletin from B. Mitchell
14TF - 9/9/75
with in red
see - Aug -

SYSTEMS OF RECORDS
 PARTIAL LISTING*
 EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE REFUGEE CAMP

copy - u -
ship to IATF
** - ship to Paul Dickerson*
airforce file

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
D 1. Refugee Population Movement Reports	All camps daily activities	All levels of camp management for info	Financial management, et al	1 folder For copy see Tab A	Destroy - info available at IATF
Refugees Cost Reports	Special cost reports for camp management	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	Transfer to IATF financial management
X 3. Financial Management Correspondence	Transmittal of financial documents	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	Transfer to IATF financial management
X 4. Payroll Records Refugee Employees at Eglin	List of payments	Payroll	Financial management	4 folders	Transfer IATF Payroll records
X A. Payroll Records	Back-up for 4a	Financial management	Financial management	1 folder	Transfer IATF Payroll records
X B. Authority to Pay Material	Actual checks but contain error		Financial management	50 checks	Transfer IATF Payroll records
X C. Unclaimed Refugee Payroll Checks	Wrong name, etc.				
X 5. Request and Authorization of Official Travel	Travel orders, etc., of IATF employees	Aid Comptroller	Financial management	1 folder	IATF financial management then AID Comptroller Washington

* (1) Most USAF records were not reviewed except situation report, procedure and P.I.O. files. (b) PHS, OE, and SRS were not contacted but their input into computerized information system is included in this review.

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
<p>6. Refugees Transportation Reports</p> <p>D A. Daily Reports Transportation Cost Refugees</p>	Common all camps	Camp management and IATF	Financial management	2" file folder daily report May 26-present	IATF to assure duplication-the destroy if not needed by IATF financial management
<p>X B. Airline Ticketing for Refugees</p> <p>X C. Transportation Quotes</p>	Details of each ticket purchased Bids on charters	Camp management Camp financial management	Financial management Financial management	1/2 file drawer 1 folder	IATF financial management IATF financial management
D 7. Vol Ag Contracts	State Department Contract	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	Destroy - D Original retains at State Department
X 8. Property file	Limited information on property (desks, calculators, etc.)	Camp management	Financial management	1 folder	IATF financial management
X 9. Processing Card File System	Reviews the processing status of each refugee in camp	Camp management	Bill Erdahl	1 Card file box	Retain and transfer cards to accompany refugee to Chaffee. Destroy the rest since the computer tape also covers needed info

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason.
X 10. Third Country File	People wishing to go to 3rd countries or family reunion effort	Camp management	Hank Cushing	2" file folder	IATF or needed follow up-on the persons going to Chafice a copy - should accompany them.
D 11. Sponsor Follow-up Effort	Names, addresses, and phone numbers of potential sponsors	Vol Ag and camp management	Hank Cushing	4000+ cards 1 file drawer of correspondence	Special task tea has arrived-all this material will eventually have be moved to Chafice or IATF where the follow on effort is to continue.
* 12. Vol Ag * A. Vol Ag Case Load Over-Time * B. Referral log	Number of cases to each Vol Ag What case to what Vol Ag	Camp management Camp management	Hank Cushing Hank Cushing	1 file folder log book	IATF-possible historical interest IATF-historical interest
X 13. Refugee Referral File by Y# (see 11)	Info supplied Vol Ag on each case unit Y#	Camp management	Hank Cushing	5 file drawers 2900+ Y#s, 1.0., individuals or family units (copy see Tab B)	IATF for backup-info is supposed to be on tape but some errors have been spotted

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Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
X 14. Computer Info System	100 info units on each of 10,049 refugees from 9 questionnaires 20 management reports prepared 3 to 4 times a week ----- Occupation code to 6 digits only 3 required (see Tab C from refugees)	Camp management	Neal Rudd	Computer tapes (see Tab C for copies of 9 questionnaires which make up input to computer)	Transfer tapes to IATF computer operation with x down of 20 management reports (1. 20 examples of how to use the tapes) X Destroy after review of questionnaire (Tab C) since tapes will be retained doublecheck on all questionnaires not in computers IATF request- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AF retain IATF request- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AF retain
15. Questionnaires for Computer Input	9 questionnaires (see Tab C from refugees)				
16. Stories of Day File	PIO releases	News media	AF PIO	1 file folder	IATF request- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AF retain
17. Press Badge User File and Log	List of members of press who have visited camp	Camp management	AF PIO	1 book 1 folder	IATF request- <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AF retain
18. Press Clippings	Local press clippings	Camp management	AF PIO	6" of clippings	AF determine or 1 copies to IATF 1 needed for history

Further discussion to only a sketching

Title of Record or Information Content in Nonobvious Record Source	Content of Record	Prime User	Location of Record	Size of Record	Suggested Disposition and Reason
X 19. Situation Reports	Management review of camp since 29 April	Camp management	AF/command trailer	1/2 file drawer (see Tab D)	IATF should have copies - Local copies should be destroyed except AF copies
* 20. Camp Newspaper		Refugees and camp management	USAF	(see Tab E)	IATF copies for historical purposes/copies to National Archives
21. INS Files on Each Alien <i>INS discussion</i>	9817 files by AF		I.W.S. Wash. DC	(See Tab F for dummy file)	IATF work up agreement for access to this info system - critical overlook; run
* 22. Civil Coordinators Files [not classified]	Communications	Camp management	Civil Coordinator Trailer #1	1/2 file drawer	IATF *

TAB M

Miscellaneous Documents

Received
27 Jun 75
TJL

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
USAF POSTAL AND COURIER SERVICE NORTH CENTRAL DISTRICT (HQ COMD, USAF)
SCOTT AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS 62225



REPLY TO
ATTN OF CC

28 JUN 1975

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Mail Service at Eglin Field #2 (Your Msg, 162320Z Jun 75)

TO: Chief, Command Support (Col Briggs)
Eglin Field #2, FL 32542

In response to your request, an evaluation of postal service being provided to Vietnamese refugees and Americans assigned in support of Operation New Arrival was conducted 18 - 20 June 1975. Following are findings and recommendations.

I. FINDINGS:

a. General. Personal mail service is presently satisfactory, but could deteriorate if the volume of refugee mail increases significantly.

b. Routing. All mail addressed to Field #2 is dispatched from the Eglin Main Post Office twice daily, Monday through Friday. Collections of outgoing mail are made on the same days. On 20 June, the Eglin Main Mobile Distribution Section failed to dispatch any personal mail to Field #2, although mail was available for pickup from the Post Office at 0830 hours and again at 1100 hours.

c. Financial Service. The US Postal Service provides stamp and money order sales and claim service from 0930 - 1200 hours Monday through Friday in Section #3, Tent C-12. This service appears to be adequate for the refugees and little used by the Americans who either find it inconvenient or choose to use off-base postal facilities. All accountable mail, registered, certified and insured is delivered by the USPS representative during these hours. The patron must present a Notice of Mail Arrival (POD Form 3849), which he has received through ordinary mail channels, in order to claim the accountable mail. There is a lack of understanding by the refugees as to the use of this form.

d. American Addressees: Mail for Americans is distributed through a General Delivery Section in the Field #2 Administration Office. This procedure is convenient for the addressee, but is disruptive to the normal operation of the office. The DA distributes approximately 200 letters per day; most mail for Americans is addressed to their off-base quarters.

e. Refugee Addressees: Incoming mail for refugees is forwarded to the Office of Vietnamese Affairs, Section 3, Tent C-4, where it is separated for delivery to each of the eight Camp Sections. One Vietnamese employee, under the supervision of a State Department Language Officer directorizes the mail by use of a camp alpha roster, which is published once every four or five days. Since most letters have no specific address, this procedure is time consuming and laborious. The mail is then hand

Mr Erdahl
Mr Barker

carried to the Admin Tent in each Camp Section, and distributed by the Section RLO. Undeliverable mail is returned to Tent C-4, where it is held for ten day, then returned to sender. The Vietnamese mail clerk types lists of names of all refugees who have received mail on a given day, which are posted to a bulletin board. This procedure not only delays delivery of mail, but also violates USPS and Air Force directives in that it constitutes a mail cover, i.e., the release of information pertaining to an individual's mail. He has a current alpha roster, but as of 20 June did not have a current list of departures for use in forwarding mail. Refugee mail is under the control and surveillance of either the mail clerk or the Language Officer, although the latter has little time to devote to this function. The mail clerk is often interrupted by inquiries from refugees; there are no physical barriers to prevent refugees from picking up a handful of mail and sorting through it, which they were observed doing on two occasions. Mail volume averages 200 letters per day. At close of business on 19 June, all mail had been forwarded to the Camp Sections and undeliverable mail returned. There were approximately 300 pieces being held by the mail clerk, most of which had been received in camp on 16 and 17 June. There is no "mail backlog" at present.

II. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. All personal mail functions should be centralized in one location. The ideal facility would be a small building similar to the Camp Barber Shop, with service windows for financial and general delivery service. If such a building cannot be found, a portion of Tent C-4 should be partitioned off to enclose the postal function and prevent entry by patrons.

b. Mail deliveries from the Directorate of Administration, Eglin Main, should be scheduled to insure that all personal mail is included. The DA, Major Beach, has stated he would schedule distribution runs at any reasonable hours.

c. A second Vietnamese mail clerk should be assigned to answer inquiries and assist in directorizing mail. A 702X0 from the Administration Office should be designated as unit Mail Clerk to supervise both Vietnamese clerks, and handle general delivery of American mail. If a record of incoming mail is maintained at all, it should be done by annotating the alpha roster and used to answer individual inquiries from refugees. It should not be posted in public view.

d. A current roster of refugees who have departed should be obtained from the Departure Control Section.

e. The daily Bulletin or Refugee Newspaper should be utilized to explain to the refugees the purpose and use of POD Form 3849.

DONE on
15 Jun 75

III. KEY PERSONNEL CONTACTED:

Eglin Field #2/LG - Lt Col Pollock
/CE - Major Clarke
/DA - CMSgt Baird
/Office of VN Affairs - Mr. William Erdahl
Mr. Terry Barker

Eglin Main/DA - Major Beach
/USPS - Mrs. Cooper

Michael W. CuDe

MICHAEL W. CUDE, Major, USAF
Commander

Cy to: USAFPCS/DO
USAFPCS US Rgn

*Antenna 638-4768
4760*

CS Col Briggs

Charlie

Don't let lack of
personnel or facilities
be a problem. We
can get whatever you
need.

I want tight
control on this.

Vann

(Cy to Baird - 30 June)
Tel

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS EGLIN AFB NEW ARRIVAL TASK FORCE
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



CS

27 June 1975

Mail Procedures at Field 2

CC (Col Vanderkarr)

1. Major M. W. Cude, USAF Postal and Courier Service, evaluated our Field 2 postal service at our request. His final report was received today.

2. The major finding was that the mail service was satisfactory. At the same time, however, several recommendations were made for improvement:

a. The Vietnamese and American mail handling should be consolidated into a single separate small building.

Reason: To reduce traffic and interruptions in the Admin (DA) trailer (American mail), and increase mail security for the Vietnamese mail.

Disposition: We have found that a suitable building is not available. We will provide the improvements we can with the existing facilities.

b. A second Vietnamese mail clerk should be assigned to the mail function, with supervision from Admin (DA).

Reason: To improve control of the mail, and assist in dealing with and informing the refugees on mail matters.

Disposition: DA is working with the State Department on this.

c. The current practice of posting a list of Vietnamese mail recipients should be discontinued.

Reason: Such a public list is against postal directives.

Disposition: The Vietnamese mail clerk will be instructed to stop the public listing.



M/1(5)

d. A roster of departed refugees and addresses should be made available to the Vietnamese mail handlers.

Reason: To assist in forwarding mail.


Disposition: When such a roster is available, it will be provided to the mail handlers.

e. The purpose and use of POD Form 3849 (Notice of Mail Arrival) should be publicized.

Reason: Vietnamese have been discarding the form, which is needed to claim controlled mail.

Disposition: An explanation was published in the NEW LAND newspaper on 25 June 1975.

3. Summary: Within the constraint of existing facilities and a reasonable manpower approach, we are working to improve the already "satisfactory" Field 2 mail procedures.


CHARLES C. BRIGGS JR., Colonel, USAF
Support Coordinator

M/1(b)

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS EGLIN AFB NEW ARRIVAL TASK FORCE
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



REPLY TO

ATTN OF: SG

2 September 1975

SUBJECT: After Action Report—Phase Down (29 June—4 September 75)

TO: EX

A. CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING: The phase down period of the operation continued as a matter of daily routine. The Family Planning Clinic, which was organized on 5 June 1975, was highly successful in educating refugees on the various methods of birth control, providing physical examinations, and in issuing contraceptives. 202 patients were treated in the Clinic during the operation. The hospital was toured by General Jones, Air Force Chief of Staff, on 17 July, and by Congressman Sikes on 18 July 1975. During the period 25 July—21 August 1975, personnel strength was reduced by 29% (from 34 to 24). The 23 Tac Hospital officially terminated operations at 0800 hours on 2 September 1975. All hospital equipment will be returned to England AFB via commercial carrier (van and flatbed trucks) on 4 September 1975. ETA at England AFB is 6 September 1975. Medical coverage for Field 2 from 0800 hours 2 September 1975 until final closure of the camp will be provided by USAF Regional Hospital Eglin. A Clinic will be operated in Trailer 4.

B. IDENTIFICATION OF PROBLEM AREAS/SOLUTIONS: The problem of lack of dependable medically oriented interpreters mentioned in the pipeline phase report was solved during the phase down period by the hiring of nine highly competent Vietnamese interpreters. The first individual was hired on 16 July 1975. Severe rains hit the Refugee Center on 28–31 July 1975. When hospital tents started leaking badly on 30 July, the two patients on the wards were transferred to Eglin Regional Hospital. Normal services were resumed on 1 August. During this period, two ambulances, 68K2152 and 68K2195, broke down and replacement of engines was required. Outstanding support was received from the Eglin Motor Pool and the two vehicles were returned to service on 14 August and 22 August, respectively. Numerous cases of conjunctivitis (Pink Eye) were reported among the Vietnamese refugees and some Americans. A preliminary study conducted by the 23 Tac Hospital indicated that assistance from the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta would be required to determine the source of the disease. Dr. Zweighaft from the CDC conducted a survey on 18 and 19 August. The final results of that survey are not yet available but it is felt that gnats have been largely responsible for spreading the disease.



M/2(1)

C. STATISTICS: A survey conducted by the hospital revealed that only 3.5% of the refugees processed had reportable communicable diseases. This figure is low and does not present a significant public health problem. For the month of July 1975 the hospital had 2,944 outpatient visits, 877 laboratory procedures, 504 x-ray films exposed, and 2760 prescriptions filled. There were 30 patients admitted with an average of 5.4 days spent in bed for a total of 161 inpatient days. For the month of August (through and including 2 September), there were 2013 outpatient visits, 832 laboratory procedures, 126 x-ray films exposed, and 1580 prescriptions filled. There were 13 patients admitted with an average of 3.3 days spent in bed for a total of 43 inpatient days.

D. RECOMMENDATIONS: None.

Charles L. Riche

CHARLES L. RICHE, LLt, USAF, MSC
Hospital Administrator

M/2(v)

2 October 1975

Interview with Major Gaylan King, RLO Section 13 Commander Eglin Refugee Center, Eglin AFB, Auxiliary Fld #2.

In late May, Major King was approached by Bhante H. Gunaratana*, General Secretary of the Washington Buddhist Vihara Society, regarding the matter to have Buddhist representation as a VOLAG** at the Eglin Refugee Center.

Bante H. Gunaratana related to Major King that he was being approached by many Buddhist^{***} Vietnamese families who asked him why there were so many Christian organizations serving as VOLAGs, whereas there was no Buddhist representation among the VOLAGs. The Buddhist monk asked Major King what could be done to correct the situation and have Buddhist VOLAG representation. Major King related this information to Colonel Billy (legal name) Keeler, RLO Director, and Mr. Lester Gottlieb, Assistant Civil Coordinator, State Department. They gave Major King permission to aid in the formation of a Buddhist VOLAG at the Eglin Refugee Center if at all possible.

By telephone in late May, Major King contacted the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Incorporated, 386 Park Avenue South, New York, New York 60016, with the request for IRC to permit a group of Buddhist societies to sponsor a Buddhist VOLAG at Eglin AFB. Under an IRC contract,

* Bhante H. Gunaratana was the only Buddhist monk at Eglin AFB who had been assigned there by the Air Force Chief of Chaplains, Washington, D. C.

** Every VOLAG had a written contract with the IATF, Washington, D. C.

*** Buddhist spelled herein was the preference of the Bhante per Major King.

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the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CAMA) had served as a sub-contractor to IRC. The idea to use IRC for a possible Buddhist VOLAG was based upon the fact that CAMA was involved in Vietnamese resettlement at all the refugee centers in the U.S.; and this fact might serve as a precedent to establish a Buddhist VOLAG at the Eglin Refugee Center.

The final result was that IRC approved the proposed Buddhist VOLAG and the IRC received approval in turn from the IATF. This occurred at a time when the refugee flow to Eglin had definitely ended. Meanwhile, all refugees, families at the Eglin Center had already been registered with the existing VOLAGs. Overtaken by events, the desire to have Buddhist VOLAG representation at Eglin Auxiliary Field #2 eventually gave way to the fact that it would have created turmoil within the camp to have the Buddhist Vietnamese refugees change VOLAGs. This would have further delayed the processing procedure for resettlement of the Vietnamese refugees.

The names of Buddhist families living in the U. S. who wished to sponsor their Vietnamese compatriots were given to the existing VOLAG agencies at Eglin for such processing. The names of potential U. S. Buddhist sponsors were acquired by contacting numerous Buddhist societies in the U. S. by letter in early June 1975 and listing Major King's address and that of the Bhante.

Melvin M. Kessler
MELVIN M. KESSLER
ADTC Historian

M/3(2)



INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, INC.

CABLE: INTERESCUE, NEW YORK

386 PARK AVENUE SOUTH • NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10016 • TEL (212) 679-0010

June 12, 1975

Mr. Mike Rohm
Buddhist Vihara Society
8017 18th St. N.W.
Washington D.C. 20011

Dear Mr. Rohm:

In accordance with our telephone conversation today I enclose a list of the International Rescue Committee representatives in the Vietnamese refugee camps.

I also enclose a copy of the instructions that we sent them today regarding cooperation with the Buddhist Vihara Society in connection with the sponsorship of Vietnamese refugees.

I trust that these arrangements will work out satisfactorily for all concerned.

Yours sincerely,

Cecil B. Lyon
Cecil B. Lyon
Member of the Board of Directors

Encl.

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Contributions to the International Rescue Committee are tax deductible.

M/3(3)

INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE

386 PARK AVENUE SOUTH • NEW YORK, N. Y. 10016 • (212) 679-0010

To:

Date:

From:

Subject:

At the request of Mr. Mike Rohm, Assistant Treasurer and member of the Board of Directors of the Buddhist Vihara Society - 5017, 16th St. N.W. Washington D.C. 20011, IRC has agreed to process for clearance from the camps any refugees, families of refugees and/or groups of families of refugees who have sponsors vouched for by the Vihara Society.

IRC has also agreed, where necessary, to assist financially in the resettlement of refugees, families of refugees and/or groups of families of refugees for which the Vihara Society is prepared to vouch.

The above arrangement is in lieu of IRC entering into a sub-contract with the Buddhist Vihara Society, which had been proposed by the latter.

M/3(4)

IRC

FOUNDED 1952

**INTERNATIONAL
RESCUE
COMMITTEE, INC.**

CABLE: INTERESCUE, NEW YORK

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Berlin Dacca Geneva Hamburg Hong Kong Madrid Mexico City Montreal Munich Nuremberg Paris Rome Saigon Stockholm Trieste Vienna

June 19 1975. This supersedes all previous listings

The following are the present telephone numbers as well as mailing addresses to be used for the IRC Offices in Pendleton, Chaffee, Eglin, and Fort Indiantown Gap. You will note that mail should not be sent directly to the Offices, but rather to IRC workers living off base. There is no mail service to be relied on yet. (except for Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.)

People who call in with specific requests concerning refugees in any one of these camps should be advised to call the IRC Camp Offices directly:

1. Camp Pendleton IRC Person in Charge IRC Mailing Address
Oceanside, Calif. 92055 Mr. Halleck L. Rose Mr. Halleck L. Rose
Int. Rescue Committee
IRC Phone Numbers: Vietnam Refugee Camp
(714) 492-3852; 492-3904; 492-4130; U.S. Marine Corps Base
492-3414; 498-2603 Camp Pendleton, Calif. 92055

2. Camp Chaffee IRC Person in Charge IRC Mailing Address
near Fort Smith, Ark. Robert P. deVecchi Mr. Steve Klaus
Steve Klaus
IRC Telephone Numbers: Mr. Maghin Int. Rescue Committee
(501) 484-2432, 484-2434, Apt. 51
484-2416, 484-2426, 3500 S. 62nd St.
484-2546, 484-2554 Fort Smith, Ark. 72901

3. Eglin Air Force Base IRC Person in Charge IRC Mailing Address
Fort Walton Beach, Fla. 32548 Mrs. Doris Knight Mrs. Doris Knight
Int. Rescue Committee
IRC Phone Numbers: Americano Motel-Rm 29
(904) 678-5711 626 John C. Simms Parkway
678-6012 Niceville, Fla. 32578

4. Fort Indiantown Gap, IRC Person in Charge IRC Mailing Address
Pa. 17003 Mr. J. Carroll Morris Mr. J. Carroll Morris
IRC Phone Numbers International Rescue Comm.
(717) 782-4943 --toll. free # Inter-Agency Task Force
to use in preference to others. New Arrivals Area 5
(717) 255-1020 Ext. 2841 or 2842 Bldg. 115
or (717) 273-2601 Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa. 17003

Communications for Guam should be sent to : American Red Cross
 COMNAVMAF
 Agaña, Guam 96910

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5. IRC Area Offices are in Miami and Washington

Miami Vietnam Office
Mr. Cecil Goudie
International Rescue Committee
3826 S.W. 8th Street
Coral Gables, Fla. 33134

Phone Numbers: (305) 442-8555
442-8483

Miami Cuban Office
Mrs. Sylvia Goudie
International Rescue Committee
Cuban Refugee Emergency Center Rm 615
747 Ponce de Leon Blvd. 6th Floor
Coral Gables, Fla. 33134

Phone Number: (305) 448-6237

Washington D.C.
Mrs. Jeanne C. MacDaniels
1773 Church Street N.W.
Washington D.C. 20036

Phone Number: (202) 387-7502

M/3/61

Venerable Bhante H. Gunaratana
Chaplain's Office
Eglin Refugee Center, Field #2
Eglin AFB, FL 32542

Dear _____,

The purpose of this letter is to direct your attention to the fact that the evacuation of Vietnam has brought thousands of Buddhist families as Refugees to this Country.

I am Bhante H. Gunaratana, a Buddhist monk, General Secretary of the Washington Buddhist Vihara Society, Washington D.C., and Buddhist Chaplain of the American University. I have been working with the refugees at the Eglin Refugee Center since it was started on the 4th of May, 1975.

I have noticed various Christian organizations handling the placement of refugee families with sponsors, and strongly feel that the various Buddhist Organizations within the United States should be represented here in that capacity. I would also like to direct your attention to the fact that the great majority of the refugee families are Buddhist. Many of them have expressed to me a strong disappointment at not having a Buddhist Organization to aid them with this critical task of placement with a sponsor. At this most traumatic time, when they have lost their Country, and most of their material possessions, the only thing they are left with is their religion and culture - which they desperately wish to preserve. If they were to sacrifice their religion and culture in order to be re-settled somewhere in the U.S., this would be the last thing that they would do.

Therefore, We, the various Buddhist Organizations in this country MUST step forward and extend our kind and generous support by accepting as many families or individuals as possible. To make your support easily accessible to the refugees, we have already set up, at the Eglin Refugee Center, a Buddhist Agency which is not limited to one particular Buddhist Organization. Through the authority of the Interagency Task Force Headquarters, Wash., D.C., this Buddhist Agency has established itself as the focal point for sponsoring Buddhist families in this Refugee Center. We would appreciate it if your Organization would be kind enough to comply with one or both of the following requests:

1. A list of families from your organization which would be willing to undertake the responsibility of sponsoring individuals or families. This is a moral responsibility which involves providing them with all the basic needs, plus the love and compassion which they deserve now more than ever before.

2. As of this date, we are not aware of similar Buddhist Agencies being set up at the refugee centers at Ft. Chaffey, Ark; Camp Pendelton, Cal; or Ft. Indiantown Gap, Pa. There is an obvious need for this service, and it is our hope that your Organization will look into the possibility of setting up such Agencies. If this is your intention, please contact Interagency Task Force Headquarters, Wash., D.C. Phone: 632-3172; 632-3840; 632-9380.

For your information we are enclosing a guide to sponsorship. We also will be

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more than happy to furnish you with additional information if you will phone either me or Major King at 883-4674.

We sincerely hope that you will be able to aid in this noble cause.

Venerable Bhante H. Gunaratana
General Secretary,
Washington Buddhist Vihara Society

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS EGLIN AFB NEW ARRIVAL TASK FORCE
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542



REPLY TO
ATTN OF: NATF/CSV

17 September 1975

SUBJECT: Services Final After Action Report, Field #2, Eglin AFB, Florida,
(23 August through Camp Closure)

TO: CS

1. This report covers the specific events which occurred within the Services area of responsibility at Field #2 during 23 August 1975 until closure of the Refugee Reception Center.
2. Routine operation was experienced during this period. Services personnel picked up dirty linen from the various refugee sections; bundled it and forwarded it to the Eglin AFB laundry for cleaning. After cleaning, the items were picked up, counted and packed and crated and placed in building #609 for storage; cots were placed in Hangar # 68. All items are to be picked up at a later date by Base Supply and distributed at their discretion according to directives from higher headquarters.
3. Problem area - Written standard operating procedures should have been available to laundry and linen exchange personnel as to procedures for cleaning and picking-up of linen.
4. Food Service - At times we experienced refertroubles. Dry ice capabilities are essential in a field operation; especially for ice cream items. There was no dry ice capability; but it should have been looked into.
5. Food Service - Bed rock was utilized for drainage around the Augmentee dining area. Shell rock was used in the Vietnamese dining area and was unsatisfactory. Sanitation problems existed. Especially noted were flies and a sour smell. Shell rock has extremely poor drainage.
6. Food Service - All personnel who work with or around field cooking ranges should be thoroughly briefed on safety precautions necessary for proper operation.
7. Food Service - It is suggested that Vietnamese refugees be issued meal cards which could be punched each meal. Several problems existed whereby personnel would return more than two or three times to obtain a full meal.
8. Linen Exchange - A sufficient number of vehicles was not available to support the linen exchange operation. A minimum of three vehicles is necessary for an operation such as New Arrival. Two - 1½ ton covered



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trucks and one - 40 ft. tractor-trailor van (covered).

9. Linen Exchange - Sufficient number of packing and crating materials were not available. Several interim orders were placed and the delay in delivery caused a back-log in support operations. Also, proper moisture-proof tape was not available.


10. Linen Exchange - Two banding machines (complete) were necessary for operations. One is not enough if it malfunctions.

11. Food Service - Kitchen #4 closed on 6 September 1975.

12. Food Service - Kitchen #3 closed on 12 September 1975.

13. Food Service - Last meal served as of 16 September 1975. All assets were packed and stored and ready for pick up b. Base Supply.

14. Final Entry - All services activities ceased on 17 September 1975.


HAROLD H. HOLDEN III, C pt, USAF
Chief of Services

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VOLUNTEER RESOURCES

1 May - 3 Sep

- I. Utilized volunteers from many areas, clubs, organizations, etc.
 - a. General Volunteers-walk -in type
 - b. Red Cross Volunteers
 - c. Hurlburt Family Services
 - d. Eglin Family Services
 - e. Eglin Officer's Wives Club
 - f. Hurlburt Officer's Wives Club
 - g. Ladies Guild of Eglin
 - h. 33rd TFW Wives
 - i. British Officer's Wives Club
 - j. Niceville High School Band
 - k. Choctawhatchee District Boy Scouts of America
 - l. Okaloosa County Council on Aging
 - m. Religious organizations
 1. Shalimar Methodist
 2. Hurlburt Catholic Guild
 3. First Methodist
 4. First Presbyterian
 5. Southern Baptist
 - a. First Baptist of FWB
 - b. Cinco Baptist
 - c. First Baptist of Valparaiso
 - d. Shalimar Baptist
 - e. First Baptist of Niceville
 - f. Ocean City Baptist
 - g. Parkway Baptist-Seminole, FL
 - h. Mary Esther Baptist
 6. First Christian Church of FWB
 7. Church of Christ-Niceville, FL

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II. Volunteers Utilized:

From 1 May thru 27, we used an average of 38 Volunteers per day for assorted jobs (scheduled)

a. Baby Supply-Personal Needs	6
b. Sponsorship Phones	6
c. Volunteer Coordination Center	7
d. Clothing Issue	10
e. Clothing Sorting-Eglin Main	6
f. Day Care Center	<u>3</u>

TOTAL per day 38

27 Days @ 38/Day= 1026 Volunteers for scheduled functions

From 4 May thru 27 May we utilized volunteers to meet the refugees arriving at a ratio of 5 refugees per volunteers. This was the average figure. We utilized 1130 volunteers to meet the new arrivals during this time period.

III. Also, we issued 296 permanent volunteer passes during the month of May.

IV. From 28 May through 3 September 1975, we had 2,352 volunteers sign in at the control point for various duties for an average of 23.75 per day.

V. Visitors

From 4 May through 27 May, I used the average # of visitors per day for the period 28 May-28 June: $24 \times 420 = 10,080$ Visitors during 4 May through 27 May.

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From 28 May through 3 September, we had 27,603 visitors sign in at the control points.

For the period 4 May through 3 September (123 Days) we had a total of 37,683 Visitors at an average of 306 per day.

4 May-3 Sept--TOTAL Visitors and Volunteers = 42,190
at an average of 343/Day

CLOTHING TENT OPERATION

4 May 1975 to 30 Aug 1975
Open for business 102 days

Served 17,631 Men/Boys
18,376 Ladies/Girls

36,007

Served Average 353/Day
 70.6/Hr
 1.18/Min

Issued Red Cross Donated Items: All NEW

Men's Shoes----- 897 pair
Ladies Shoes----- 94 pair
Men's Socks----- 780 pair
Ladies Hose----- 80 pair
Thongs 2050 pair


Donated new shoes from Suave Shoes--Miami, FL

Men's shoes 100 pair
Ladies shoes 138 pair
Children's 150 pair


143 pair that were too large were given to the home for the
Mentally/Physically Handicapped

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Photographs of The
Eglin Refugee Processing
Center




Canvas being removed from tent shelters as the refugees departed.



An ice-cream treat before departure.



Time out for two volunteers in the clothing tent.



The cartoon drawings on one of the tent shelters served as a poignant reminder that many refugee families had experienced living at the Refugee Center.

Final departures from the Eglin Refugee
Processing Center - 15 September 1975.



The family of Mr. Nguyen Van Tu began out
processing in the Departure Control Center.



Mr. Nguyen Van Tu received complementary cigarettes.



Mr. Nguyen Van Tu and family and Mrs. Nguyen Thi Cuc and family posed for a final picture before departure.



RLO representatives bidding farewell
to Mr. Tu's family.



Colonel Charles C. Briggs, Jr., Center
Commander and Lt Colonel Bruce G. Keller, RLO
Director gave best wishes to the last depart-
ing refugee, Mr. Nguyen Van Tu.



The last child boarding the bus.



Refugee family awaited their flight to
Ft. Chaffee, Arkansas in the Okaloosa County
Air Terminal.



Colonel Keller helped with final
boarding arrangements.




The two families proceeded to board
the Southern Airways flight to Ft. Chaffee.



Refugees boarded the plane.



"Wheels up" for the last refugees.




The dining hall ain't what it used to be.




15 Sep 75

"Cinderella's Sandal"?



The last sign.

AFTERMATH



Early closure of the Refugee Center had been recommended to safeguard the refugees because of possibility of hurricanes. A week after the last family of refugees departed, hurricane ELOISE struck on 23 Sep 75, wrecking the tent frames.