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Colonel Charles W. Bromi. USA

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## USAWC MILITARY RESEARCH PROGRAM PAPER

(AN ARTICLE FOR MILITARY REVIEW)

THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER SOLDIER: WILL HE FIGHT?

## (A PROVISIONAL ATTITUDINAL ANALYSIS)

INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PROJECT

by

Colonel Charles W. Brown, USA



US Army War College Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 2 June 1975

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AUTHOR(S): Charles V. Brown, COL, SC

TITLE: The American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight? (A Preliminary Behavioral Analysis) FORMAT: Individual Research Project

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CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified This article is devoted to the development of a profile of the

volunteer American soldier, a characterization of some of his prevalent attitudes and a projection of those attitudes into combat behavior. The latter is virtually an impossible task, for combat behavior can only truly be measured in a combat environment. As a framework for determining the attitude of the volunteer soldier a conceptual model was developed which characterized the external variables most likely to influence the soldier's attitude and behavior. The variables used are leadership, training, discipline, group relationships, ideology and social influence. Data sources were literature research, current empirical data from several Department of the Army sources and a survey administered to 400 junior enlisted soldiers in four combat units; airborne infantry, infantry, ranger and tank battalions. Assessment of the data indicates that the volunteer soldier will fight as well as or better than the draftee; however, just how much better is difficult to project. Not being complacent with this hypothesis, variables were sought wherein the attitude of the volunteer soldier could be improved. These were in the areas of leadership, training and unit cohesiveness. These are not necessarily weak areas in themselves, but the voluateers perception of them can be improved.

#### --PREFACE--

The research for this article began as a project to satisfy two academic requirements: an Individual Research Project for the U.S. Army War College and a Master's Paper for The Pennsylvania State University. During the course of my initial research, my adviso. at the Army War College, Colonel Mike Malone, asked Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Professor and Chairman of the Sociology Department of Northwestern University, to assist him in advising me on my research. Dr. Moskos, an eminent military sociologist, readily agreed.

During the period of my secondary research, Dr. Moskos was also teaching an elective course at the War College titled "The American Soldier," a truly outstanding course and the finest indepth behavioral analysis of today's soldier available anywhere. For reasons I'll never teally understand, Dr. Moskos suggested then that we go together and attempt to co-author two articles on the volunteer soldier. This proposal was agreed upon by both the War College and Penn State as a suitable vehicle to meet their academic requirements.

Part of the research design called for a field survey of volunteer soldiers in combat units, and both Dr. Moskos and myself planned to travel to four units to administer a questionnaire and conduct open-ended interviews. My travel was to be financed with government funds from the Army War College and Dr. Moskos planned to use funds from a research grant at Northwestern, sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI). In January 1975 a moratorium was placed on all student travel at Carlisle Barracks. In order to circumvent this problem, Dr. Moskos suggested that I apply for a research grant from the Army Research Institute. I submitted a proposal to ARI, which was rapidly approved so that the field study could commence on time. Thus, Dr. Moskos and I were able to complete the field study which yielded a wealth of information on the volunteer soldier that was not available from other sources.

Readers of this paper will note that the article limits the findings and discussion to only the results of our survey, while several footnotes and appendices provide supporting data from two other surveys; one from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, and the other from the Army Research Institute. The writing was done in this manner to keep the size of the article down to less than five thousand words, as it is anticipated that the footnotes and appendices will not be published.

Since this research and resulting articles are a joint venture a word is necessary about who has done what. The secondary research, questionnaire, and data analysis was done mostly by me at Carlisle Barracks, using the excellent library and computer facilities available. I also made two trips to Northwestern to consult with Dr. Moskos; one to finalize the questionnaire, and the second to go over the first draft of this paper and lay the groundwork for the second paper. I have essentially prepared this paper alone. Dr. Moskos has acted as my advisor and editor (and a fine one he is). He will be the prime author for the second paper and I will assist mainly in the data analysis, much of which had to be completed prior to preparation of this paper.

Our goal is to publish this paper, the first article, in <u>Military Review</u>. The second paper is to be presented to the "Inter-University Seminar on the Armed Forces and Society" in October at the University of Chicago; and if it's accepted well, try and publish it in a new quarterly journal, <u>Armed Forces and Society</u>.

Though it may not be proper, I am compelled to dedicate my efforts in this research to Ronald Hines, Lt. U.S. Army, who was killed in Vietnam in April 1964, over ten years ago (see <u>Life</u>, June 12, 1964, p. 40). Ronnie was my "hooch-mate," and the finest soldier and fellow human I've ever known. 'His inspiration has remained fresh with me throughout the years. Though a great loss personally to me and all who knew him, his death was not in vain; for he, like so many others, knew that what he was doing was good and right. That is what has to separate our profession from others.

C.W.B.

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#### --ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS---

The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance and support given this study by the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences; the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army; the U.S. Army War College and Penn State University. Specifically, we want to thank Colonel Dandridge M. Malone, Dr. Rupert Chisholm, Dr. Robert F. Holz, Dr. Donald D. Penner and Major Robert Phillips for their assistance and patience. Lastly, this research could not be completed without the help of the Army War College Computer Center, with their assistance in the data analysis, and our typist/editor Mrs. Beverly Eak-c.

#### --DISCLAIMER---

The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of the Army or the personnel and organizations that assisted the authors. The conclusions presented are based on a preliminary analysis of four of many combat units in the Army, and while we feel they are valid we also recognize and hope that more extensive research will be conducted on the attitude of the volunteer soldier toward combat.

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### THE AMERICAN VOLUNTEER SOLDIER: WILL HE FIGHT?

--A PROVISIONAL ATTITUDINAL ANALYSIS--

COL Charles W. Brown, U.S. Army, and Dr. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., Northwestern University

--INTRODUCTION--

"Brandy is for Heroes"

--Ernest Hemmingway

Over two years have elapsed since the last draftee entered the military and the United States Army began its conversion to an all-volunteer force. Today the Army is composed entirely of volunteers. This conversion has been assessed and facilitated by a variety of pilot projects, studies, and surveys.<sup>1</sup> But virtually nothing has been done to answer the most important question of all-will the new volunteer soldier perform well in combat.

The purpose of this article is to present an attitudinal profile of the volunteer soldier in combat units and to try to project these attitudes into some kind of understanding of possible combat behavior. We stress, however, that inferring combat behavior from attitudinal items is an impossible task. For it is only in the immediate circumstances of actual ground warfare that the behavior of combat soldiers can be truly assessed. But short of such circumstances, there are partial indicators which can give researchers and

Army leaders some ideas as to what the volunteer soldier's motivation and performance might possibly be.

As formidable as predictions of combat behavior are, at least until the end of the draft in 1973 the U.S. Army could base expectations on the experiences of a generation-long reliance on the conscription system. But today precious little is known about the attitudes of the new volunteer soldier toward possible combat involvement. How much did the turbulent social unrest of the latter years of the Vietnam War affect the values of the contemporary soldier? What is the interaction between societal values and the commitment of young soldiers to military goals? What does the volunteer soldier think about participation in possible future conflicts? To even pose these questions suggests how clusive--but important--are the answers. We propose that some limited understanding of these issues can be gained by the presentation and interpretation of data we have collected from an in-depth survey of volunteer junior enlisted combat soldiers.

--THEORIES ABOUT COMBAT BEHAVIOR--

### AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

It would take us far afield to give a detailed account of theories of combat motivation. But if we are to examine the attitudes of the volunteer soldier toward combat, we must first refer to some of the more well known previous writings on the subject. Prior to World War II, Ardant Du Picq's <u>Battle Studies</u>--which frontally introduced the notion of soldier morale--had the widest influence over the

development of military theory and speculation about combat behavior. Arising out of World War II, two landmark studies appeared which empirically examined American combat behavior in that war. One was S.L.A. Marshall's <u>Men Against Fire</u> based upon data collected in afterbattle interviews. The other was the four volume series entitled <u>The American Soldier</u> which relied upon large survey samples which were analyzed by the sociologist Samuel A. Stouffer and his colleagues.

Du Picq was the "French S.L.A. Marshall of his day." He felt that the leadership of the French Army in the 1860's was out-ofdate, and through his study of history and the analysis of questionnaires administered to fellow officers he tried to "identify the human reaction" of soldiers in combat.<sup>3</sup>

The studies of Stouffer and other sociologists (and Marshall implicitly) strongly emphasized the role of face-to-face or "primary" groups, and explained the motivation of the individual combat soldier as a function of his solidarity and social intimacy with fellow soldiers at small group levels. Correspondingly, the World War II combat studies deemphasized the value systems of soldiers, and, to a lesser extent, formal organizational factors as well. In its more extreme formulation, combat primary relationships were viewed as so intense that they overrode not only preexisting civilian values and formal military goals, but even the individual's own sense of selfconcern.<sup>4</sup>

Somewhat surprisingly, there have been only a handful of studies published about the American soldier's combat behavior since World War 11.<sup>5</sup> Roger W. Little's participant observations of combat

troops in the Korean War revealed that the basic unit of cohesion was a two-man or "buddy" relationship instead of the form of World War II which followed squad or platoon boundaries. Although Little's conclusions were within the framework of the primary-group explanation, his study also noted the salience of organizational factors such as Army personnel policies and differences between echelons.<sup>6</sup>

During the Vietnam War, Charles Moskos gathered data on combat motivation based on his stays with combat units in 1965 and 1967. Among other findings, Moskos stressed the overriding importance of the rotation system as a determinant of combat motivation and the corresponding likelihood for soldiers to see the war in very private and individualistic terms. Moreover, Moskos introduced the concept of "latent ideology" and argued an understanding of the combat soldier's motivation required a simultaneous appreciation of both the role of small groups and the underlying value commitments of combat soldiers. Moskos concluded that primary groups maintain the soldier in his combat role only when he has an underlying commitment, if not to the specific purpose of the war, then at least to the worth of the larger system for which he is fighting.<sup>7</sup>

### A CONCEPTUAL MODEL

Drawing upon the above hypotheses as well as the literature on Army leadership and training, we present in Figure 1 a heuristic model of combat behavior. The relevant variables include external factors of both an organizational (e.g. discipline, leadership, training, and personnel policies) and environmental (e.g. societal influences, small group relationships, and the combat situation) nature. These factors impinge on a core value system of the individual soldier which include subjective perceptions of the external factors and cognition of the soldierly role. In concert all these factors determine combat attitude and motivation which in turn is directly related to eventual combat behavior.

# /Figure 1 Here/8

We are not so brash as to assign weights to these variables, nor even to reify their discrete importance. We are fully aware that life--and especially the life and death of combat--are too complex to be captured in any schematic model. But we do hold that attitudinal items measuring these variables can suggest relevant considerations in trying to evaluate the propensity of the volunteer soldier to exert himself in combat.

### --COLLECTION OF DATA---

To gather data on the volunteer soldier's attitude and motivation toward combat, a questionnaire was constructed which tapped the items covered in the schematic model presented in Figure 1. The focus of the study was on junior enlisted personnel who had direct combat responsibilities.<sup>9</sup> For reasons of manageability and economy, the sample was projected at a total of 400 volunteer soldiers. Four combat units were selected with the objective of getting about 100 soldiers from each unit to complete the questionnaire. The units selected were an infantry battalion, a tank battalion, an airborne

infantry battalion, and a ranger battalion. In selecting these units there was a presumption that there might be a contrast between the normal volunteer units--the infantry and tank battalions--and the more elite units--the airborne and ranger battalions.<sup>10</sup> All the units selected were stationed in the southeastern part of the United States. All the units were surveyed in April, 1975.

Even though all the units had busy schedules, the commanders were very interested in our research effort and gave us the utmost cooperation. In preparation for our visit, we requested that the selection of the sample of soldiers to be surveyed be as nearly representative as mossible of the total unit. We feel confident that the soldiers who were administered the questionnaire were indeed representative of the volunteer soldier in the surveyed combat units. Thus, for example, comparison of the racial distribution of the unit with the soldiers actually surveyed showed no marked discrepancies. All told, 358 questionnaires were found to be usable.<sup>11</sup>

The mechanics of the administration of the questionnaire were that each item was read aloud. If required, clarification was given as to the intended meaning of the item. In Army parlance, the questionnaire was administered "by the numbers." Additionally, following the completion of the questionnaire proper, small numbers of soldiers--usually a dozen or less--took part in a give-and-take interview session with the researchers.



#### --A PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE--

#### \*AGE AND RANK

The average age of our sample was between 20 and 21 years.<sup>12</sup> Within our groups, the elitist units were slightly younger than the others. Comparison of age to race and education indicated no significant relationship, except that 20 year olds were slightly higher educated than the others.

There were only slight differences in rank distribution among the units we surveyed and these can be correlated with age, which would also relate to the time in service of the individual.<sup>13</sup> The tank battalion had an unusually high distribution (62 percent) of E4's in comparison to the other units (30-35 percent), however, this was offset by a proportionately lower percentage of E3's.

#### \*\*RACE AND REGION

The racial distribution between the units surveyed varied. The infantry and tank battalion samples were over 50 percent black and about 4 to 5 percent other minorities. The two elitist units had a higher representation of whites. The airborne battalion sample had 22 percent blacks and 15 percent other minorities, while the ranger battalion sample had 9 percent black and 7 percent other minorities.<sup>14</sup>

This high percentage of minorities--mainly blacks--in the infantry and tank battalions is explained by the fact that they were

\*See Appendix A. \*\*See Appendix B.

recruited locally. Seventy-one percent of the sample personnel from these units came from the southern states, whereas only 35 percent of the sample from the elitist units came from the south.

Slightly over half of the soldiers in our survey had spent most of their lives in small communities, ranging from farms to small cities, while slightly over one third came from suburbia or large cities. This is not representative of the distribution of society in general,<sup>15</sup> but it can be explained by the previously mentioned fact that two of the units were recruited in the south and many of the blacks in those units (63 percent) came from rural communities.

### \*EDUCATION

Analysis of the education variable reveals some interesting facts. Overall, the volunteer soldiers in our survey are slightly better educated than junior enlisted soldiers Army-wide, <sup>16</sup> i.e., 23 percent versus 25 percent who had not completed high school, respectively--which includes GED credit for the Army-wide group but not our group. The elitist units were the most highly educated. Only 16 percent of the elitists had not completed high school and almost one fourth of the rangers had attended or completed college. Interestingly, in our survey there was no relationship between race and education, in fact the same amount of blacks percentage-wise had completed high school as whites, which is highly significant considering the area of recruitment.<sup>17</sup>

\*See Appendix C.

### --ATTITUDES TOWARD ARMY LIFE--

#### ENLISTMENT INFLUENCES

In considering just what motivates an individual to volunteer for the Army, it must be assumed that more than one single factor will influence his decision. Based on this assumption, our questionnaire listed eight factors and asked the respondents to rank each of them independently on a scale of importance. The highest motivators were--"learning a skill or getting an education," which ranked first (73 percent), followed by a chance to "serve my country" (70 percent) and a chance to "travel and get away from home" (64 percent).

The combat arms bonus did not rank as high as expected (49 percent), nor did civilian unemploymer.c (46 percent) except for some of the minorities; however, this may be misleading as these soldiers entered the service before the current recession. Least important was the influence of joining with a friend, followed by a military career, and family influence.

### PREFERRED LOCATION OF ASSIGNMENT

Less than one fourth of the soldiers prefer their current station of assignment; however, this is not surprising since the best place is alweys the one a soldier just left or is going to. Nost of them (78 percent) wanted to be closer to their home town or somewhere else in the United States (43 percent). However, few of them were interested in going to Korea (27 percent) and even fewer were interested in Germany (7.2 percent). Comments during the interviews indicated that this adversity to overseas duty was based on rumors about poor living conditions and status, or the lack of mobility, boredom and poor morale in units.

### SATISFACTION WITH THE ARMY

Our survey revealed that half of the soldiers liked Army life and slightly over one third disliked it, while the remainder (13 percent) were undecided. The infantry battalion sample disliked the Army the most (42 percent) followed by the tank and airborne battalions in that order at between 36 and 37 percent, while only 27 percent of the rangers disliked the Army.<sup>18</sup> Education-wise in our study there was no significant difference between the feelings of high school graduates about the Army and those that hadn't finished high school. This repres the a change in attitude from the days of the draftee, when it was found that the non-high school graduate draftees liked Army life slightly better than high school graduate 19

The majority of the soldiers in our survey felt that their squad and platoon leaders depended too much upon "threats or harrassment to get things done" (Table 1).<sup>20</sup> This feeling was most prevalent in the infantry and tunk battalions (64-70 percent) and to a lesser degree in the elitist units (45-50 percent). This data supports the postulation that men are persuaded to fight, not coerced.<sup>21</sup>

### /Table 1 Herc7

As shown in Table 1, when asked if the best friends they had ever made had been since they joined the Army, the responses were quite

### Table 1. Volunteer Soldiers' Attitudes Toward

Army Life

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	<u>(N-)</u>
"leaders depend too much on harrassment"	34.4	23.7	9.2	20.7	12.0	(358)
"best friends in Army"	12.9	17.6	<b>19.0</b>	31.1	19.3	(357)
"should have volunteer Army"	39.3	28.4	14.9	9.6	7.9	(356)

divergent. Among the units the rangers response was the lowest, with only 9 percent agreeing strongly, 14 percent agreeing, and 23 percent undecided.

When asked if the U.S. should have a volunteer Army rather than the draft, two thirds of the soldiers agreed (Table 1). The agreement among the units were practically identical, but the disagreement ran slightly higher in the infantry and tank battalions (18 percent).

### --SOCIAL ATTITUDES--

### ARMY TRADITIONS

With the end of the draft it was anticipated that so too would end the issue of hair length among soldiers, because surely the volunteer soldier who enters the Army would know that the Army's policy on haircuts is not the same as civilian life.<sup>22</sup> Our survey asked the soldiers two questions about the hair issue. Based on the response to one of the questions, shown in Table 2, and the other one, which asked if there were no haircut regulations, how long their hair would be?, the hair issue is still with us. In response to the latter question 79 percent of the soldiers stated that they would wear their hair longer. Unit-wise the rangers were more conservative than the others in response to both questions. It was also found that soldiers who had attended college tended to be alightly more conservative.

When asked if "the army should try to maintain as many traditions as it can which make it different from civilian life"

(Table 2), our sample group was about evenly split between agreement and disagreement--with a rather high degree (18 percent) undecided. The split was fairly even among the units except the rangers which were 58 percent in agreement with the question.

### /Table 2 Here/

#### AMERICAN SOCIETY

In order to assess the volunteer soldier's attitude toward the society from which he stems we asked our sample how they felt about liberal attitudes and permissiveness in our society. As shown in "able 2, the responses to this question were diffused with a very high degree of uncertainty. To test their ideology, we asked if they thought the U.S. was still "the best country in the world" (Table 2). The agreement among the elitist troops was slightly above average (84 percent), while the other two units were slightly below average (74 percent).<sup>23</sup> It should be pointed out that the term "ideology" among young soldiers does not encompass patriotic slogans such as "duty-honor-country" or "defending democracy"--rather, it is latent in nature and embraces materialistic values, "manly honor" and "life back home," and even the superiority of "the American way of life."<sup>24</sup>

Our survey also questioned the volunteer soldiers on the need to have the best trained and equipped Armed Forces in the world.<sup>25</sup> The response (Table 2) in favor was over 80 percent, with the majority strongly agreeing. Once again the highest response came from the rangers, with 68 percent agreeing.

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	<u>Undecided</u>	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	<u>(N-)</u>
• "relax Army haircut standard	61.2 s"	13.7	6.7	12.0	6.4	(358)
"Army should maintain traditi	16.3 ons"	23.9	18.0	<b>22.</b> 8	18.9	(355)
"American people too permissive"	12.7	32.2	34.7	12.4	7.9	(354)
"America best country"	54.1	25.8	14.3	2.8	3.1	(357)
"America have best military"	52,0	30.1	8.7	7.3	2.0	(356)

# Table 2. Volunteer Soldiers' Social Attitudes (percentages)

During our interviews, when the volunteer soldiers were asked about communism the definitions ranged from moderately cognitive to downright poor. During the course of these discussions we stumbled onto an interesting point. The volunteer soldier has little conception of why the U.S. has forces in Europe and the Pacific. Also, when it was explained to them that Russia and the reoples Republic of China are not really opposed to the U.S. having forces there and why, they became intensely interested and one soldier commented, "Why the hell hasn't anyone ever told us that."

--ATTITUDES TOWARD COMBAT--

### TRUST OF AND RESPECT FOR FELLOW SOLDIERS

More than any other one variable the relationship of the individual to his group in combat seems to exert the most influence in terms of combat effectiveness.<sup>26</sup> Unfortunately though, it is also the hardest to measure short of the soldier experiencing actual combat, for "an individual's survival is directly related to the support--moral, physical, and technical--he can expect from his fellow soldiers."<sup>27</sup> Realizing this, it becomes extremely difficult to project the cohesion and role relationships of soldiers from a peace-time environment into combat.

Our survey asked two questions about what individuals thought of their peers in a combat role (Table 3). The first one, concerning "respect" for a fellow soldier who tried to get out of combat, brought similar opinions with rather high degree of undecidedness. Of those disagreeing the elitist units were the highest (49 percent).

### /Table 3 Here/

When asked if they would "trust" the members of their unit in combat (Table 3), the responses were much more divergent, with only 19 percent of the normal (tank and infantry) units agreeing and 71 percent of the elitists agreeing.<sup>28</sup> There was also a higher degree of uncertainty ("undecided") among the normal units. In comparing those in the units that "strongly agreed" versus "agreed," the rangers stood out with 45 percent strongly agreeing.

#### UNIT COMBAT LEADERSHIP

When asked in our survey about serving with the officers and NCO's in their unit in combat (Table 4), the elitist units had more confidence in their leaders than the others.<sup>29</sup>

### /Table 4 Here/

When asked about their overall perception of the combat performance of officers and NCO's in the Army, based upon what they had seen or heard since they joined the Army, three-quarters thought that officers would perform "good" or "very good" and almost 90 percent felt the NCO's would do the same. Overall the senior NCO's faired the best in the soldiers' evaluation.

In garrison, or when not directly engaged in a combat role, historically the junior enlisted man has always had a lower perception of his unit leaders than when they experience the solidarity of combat.<sup>30</sup> Accepting this theory, then the unit leader situation found in our survey is probably not serious. This theory is further supported indirectly by the fact that 84 percent of the soldiers

### Table 3. Volunteer Soldiers' Trust and Respect

### of Fellow Soldiers

Item	Strongly Agree	Agree	<u>Undecided</u>	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	<u>(N-)</u>
"respect combat shirker"	17.1	16.6	22.8	16.3	27.2	(356)
"trust fellow soldiers in combat"	16.8	28.2	23.2	14.8	17.0	(358)

### Table 4. Volunteer Soldiers' Perceptions of

Unit Leaders in Combat

"Would Want to Serve Under in Combat"	<u>A11</u>	Most	About Balf	Fey	None	<u>(N=)</u>
Officers	6.2	20.8	12.1	34.4	26.5	(355)
Noncoms	5.3	34.8	16.0	34.8	9.0	(356)

in our survey stated that in combat they "must follow orders" and 85 percent believed that they "must carry out (their) mission."

### READINESS TO PARTICIPATE IN COMBAT

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A good portion of our survey dealt with trying to determine the volunteer soldier's attitude toward a variety of stress situations ranging from general war, limited war, domestic disturbances, to disaster relief. The responses to those situations involving combat with a hostile force are shown at Table 5.

### /Table 5 Here/

Using two recent national polls, the volunteer soldier's attitude in our survey was compared to the public's attitude in those situations where a comparison could be attained. It was found that in these situations the attitude of the volunteer soldier toward the U.S. involvement in a war is not readily mirror that of the general public. For example, recently a Harris Poll in a nationwide survey revealed that barely one-third of the public surveyed were in favor of sending U.S. troops into the middle east if Israel was being defeated, and a recent California Poll where "almost half" of those sampled did not want U.S. troop: fighting in Israel and only one-fourth supported U.S. troops fighting in Korea.<sup>32</sup> When given the same scenarios, almost three-fourths of the troops in our survey indicated they would "volunteer" or "go if ordered." This is also custained by the fact that almost the same amount responded positively toward two opposing situations--a war the U.S. people supported and one they didn't (see Table 5). In all

the situations depicted in Table 5 the elitist units, led by the rangers, responded the most positively.

Our survey also asked the soldiers what people they preferred to fight alongside; men from their "high school" or "home area," their "own race," men of "all races and from all regions," or their "present unit--as is." The elitist units preferred to fight with their own unit (60 percent) while the others tended toward preferring to fight with men from their home town (49 percent). However, who they fought with didn't seem too important to any unit except the rangers.

In order to determine our sample's evaluation of their own reactions to combat we asked them--"Suppose the Army needed people to go into combat. What would you do?" In response 79 percent stated that they would "volunteer to go" or "go if ordered," and the remainder said they would "try to get out of it" or "refuse to go." Unit-wise the elite units scored the highest, with 90 percent responding positively, while the normal units scored 69 percent.<sup>33</sup>

## --NORMAL-VS-ELITE COMBAT UNITS: A SUMMARY OF SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES--

In comparing the normal units we surveyed, the infantry and tank battalions, to the elite units, the airborne and ranger battalions, there were basic similarities and differences found between the two groups.

# Table 5. Volunteer Soldiers' Readiness to

Libert's that had to

### Participate in Combat

•	Definitely <u>Volunteer</u>	Go lf Ordered	Try to Avc id	Probably Refuse	<u>(N-)</u>
"Army Needed You Go Into Combat"	34.2	45.2	13.6	7.1	(354)
"Invasion of U.S.A."	65.3	24.9	7.1	2.8	(354)
"Invasion of Westerr Europe-Cermany"	31.7	44,5	17.6	6.2	(353)
"Invasion of Far East-Korca"	27.6	48.3	17.0	7.1	(352)
"Invasion of Middle East-Israel"	31.9	42.5	17.4	8.3	(351)
"Overseas War Americans Support"	36.4	44.0	12.2	7.4	(352)
"Oversees War Opposition at Home"	23.3	46.9	21.3	8.5	(352)

Profile-wise we found that the units were similar demographically except for differences in the black and white race distribution and area of origin. However, as mentioned previously, these differences can be attributed to the area of recruitment between the two groups.

Attitudes toward the Army in general were also similar within some of the eight enlistment influence variables, assignment preferences, and satisfaction with Army social life. Differences noted in enlistment influence variables were--getting away from home, where the elitists were more influenced--and difficulty in getting a decent civilian job, which influenced the normal group significantly more than i elite group. Similarities were also found in attitudes toward military discipline, except that the normal group indicated that their leaders were relying too much on coersion to get a job done.

Analysis of social attitudes toward the Army in relation to American society revealed similarities in attitudes toward ideological and political variables such as America still being the best country in the world, the need for a strong armed forces, and a volunteer Army versus the draft. The main difference in social attitudes was found in the issue of hair length in the Army, wherein the elite units were found to be slightly more conservative about longer hair.

Analysis of attitudes toward combat situations revealed that all the units were similarly willing to follow orders and accomplish their mission, but the normal group's perception of the

performance of their unit leaders and peers in combat was significantly lower than the elite group. Most significant though was the overall more positive attitude of the elite units toward combat. In every combat situation the elitists were significantly more willing to commit themselves than the others were.

### --CONCLUSIONS--

"None love the messenger who brings bad news."

--Sophocles, ANTIGONE

The results of our research and preliminary analysis indicates that the transition to a volunteer Army is not really bad news, as some thought it would be.<sup>34</sup> The volunteer combat soldier in the Army today can be expected to perform as efficiently or somewhat better in combat as the draftee of the 1970's. This argument can be supported when combat motivation is linked to such variables as: attitude toward the Army and toward the authority and the discipline structure, latent ideology, and the social, non-military influences.

We also find that there is a diverse attitude among the volunteer soldiers and that he thinks out situations independently, relying upon his own internalized value system rather than duck the issue or rely upon group opinion. For example, in abstract ideological situations such as stopping communism and protecting the free world, the positive support and commitment of the volunteer soldier is equally as abstract and diluted. However, when given definitive political situations, foreign or domestic, his support increases. Lastly, on issues with overriding social implications
such as military tradition and the hair issue, his attitude becomes more in line with the prevailing civilian attitude.

Our finding about the lack of understanding of the role of the American armed forces overseas as a stabilizing agent for the prevention of war is open for further argument. But this evident need should certainly be pursued further and if our hypothesis is valid, some sort of indoctrination program should be instituted in the units and military schools system.

Lastly, we believe that beneath that veneer of cynicism lies a basically good soldier with a fundamental willingness to serve his country in the ultimate test of combat. That tendency is definitely there, what remains for all of us--especially at the unit level--is to cultivate and improve it. For to just have an Army that's better than the one we had during the draft is not good enough. Our country has opted to pay for a professional force. Our job is to strive to make it a <u>highly</u> professional one.

In closing, a word about the conceptual model we have used (Figure 1) as a framework for our research. We believe that this model is valid, as it depicts the internalized value system of the soldier and the external environmental variables that influence this system, the resultant attitude, and behavior of the soldier in combat. We have tried to offer evidence on the relevant variables in this model, now we commend the readers of this article to test this model in their own environment to see if they agree with this concept.

1. The voluntary Army was a major plank in Richard M. Nixon's bid for the Presidency in 1968; followed by the Cates Commission study and an independent study by the Institute of Defense Analysis; plus the VOLAR (Voluntary Army) and MVA (Modern Volunteer Army) pilot projects. There were also several surveys conducted by HumRRO (Human Resources Research Organization) just prior to the transition. Since the transition the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral & Social Sciences, and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Department of the Army, have been conducting field surveys among the volunteer soldiers.

2. U.S. Army, Combat Developments Command, Personnel and Administrative Services Agency, <u>Personnel Offensive (Phase I)</u>, September 1971, pp. 2-3.

3. <u>A Review of "Battle Studies</u>," date unknown, p. 1. "Colonel du Picq feit that the human heart is the starting point for all matters pertaining to war . . . Especially pertinent is his recurring emphasis on the requirements for readiness--drill, training, military education, leadership, discipline, foresight-to provide unity and espirit to combatants prior to wartime." pp. 1 and 4.

4. Charles W. Brown, Colonel, USA, The Behavier of Soldiers in Combat: Why Men Flybt, pp. 4-9.

5. This does not include the many psychological writings that have been published since World War II. However, these studies are criented more on personality than social behavior.

6. Repor W. Little, "Buddy Relations in Conhat," in The New Military, ed. by Horris Janowitz, pp. 7-29.

7. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man; the Rank and File of Today's Hillmary, pp. 134-156.

8. Fremont E. Kast and James E. Rosensweig, <u>Organization and Propres</u> ment: <u>A functions Approach</u>, p. 251. This model is very similar to Mast and Rosensweig's sudde on the "influences of behavior in a work situation."

9. The roldiors selected as the comple were all in a direct combat role (i.e., infantry-mon or tank arcumen. The assumption at this point was that other soldiers, in a more indirect combat role would have very similar activutes, and the effort should be directed at those most directly influenced by the life-and-death stress of combat.

10. The elitist units, the sirborne and reason battelions, must be considered volunteers on top of volunteers. These junior enlisted soldiers volunteered first to come into the Army and second they volunceered for these units, which are both composed entirely of volunteers in the latter sense in the junior calisted grades. 11. Those not used (9.2%) were rejected for incompleteness or suspect as to the individual's true feelings. For example, questionnaires found with obscenities such as "FTA" (a carryover term from Vietnam) were eliminated.

12. U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, <u>Human Readiness Report No. 2</u>, January 1975, Tab Q, Question 62. The age distribution in our survey correlated with this Army-wide survey of over 11,000 junior enlisted men.

13. Ibid., Tab Q, Question 19. There was a significant difference in rank between our survey and the Army-wide survey, but this can be explained by the fact that the Army-wide survey included basic and advanced trainees that had yet to be assigned to a unit.

14. Ibid., Tab O, p. O-1. In relation to the racial mix of junior enlisted men, E5 and below, Army-wide our sample is not representative, as indicated by the comparison below (also see App. A):

	WHILE	MINOFILY
Our Survey	54.5	45,5
HRR No. 2	71.6	28.4

15. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, <u>Social Indicators</u>, 1973; Selected Statistics on Social Conditions and Trends in the United States, p. 239.

16. "When Someone Asks," Soldiers, June 1975, p. 61.

17. National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, <u>Community Crime Prevention</u>, p. 163. Although some might argue that the quality of education among the blacks is lower, this is not important because the theory throughout the Army today is that there is a marked difference in the rate of disciplinary problems between the high school graduate and the dropout--regardless of the quality of education.

18. <u>Human Readiness Report No. 2</u>, Tab Q, Question 41, 40. In the Army-wide survey 61 percent were satisfied to some degree, but only 21 percent said they planned to reenlist and 51 percent said they planned to leave the Army. Over 60 percent of the same group were satisfied with their job which corrolates with those in the same group t at were satisfied with Army life.

19. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Eulisted Hun, p. 208 and Robert B. Smith, Way Saldiers Fight, Chapter 14.

20. <u>Burnan Readingers Report No. 2</u>, Question 15, 50, 39, 23 and Eugene H. Brucker, <u>Changes in Loldiers Activudes</u>, pp. 22-23. The recent Army-wide survey reveals that in relation to 1970 soldier attitudes analyzed by Drucker, it has become more important to most of the volunteer soldiers (90 versus 77 percent) to have a good record in the Army. Army-wide, a majority (59 percent) of the soldiers accept authority and are willing to show unfailing obedience and loyalty to their leaders. A slight majority (56 percent) also feel that military control and discipline in their unit is about right. However, comparing this to Drucker's 1970 data on draftees reveals a trend that slightly more soldiers today feel that discipline is too strict than the 1970 draftee. On the negative side, Army-wide, the volunteers lack faith in the promotion system as only 41 percent believe it is fair.

21. James M. McFadden, Persuacion in Military Combat Units, p. 25.

22. "Hair Rules Reflect Conservatism," <u>Army Times</u>, March 12, 1975, p. 13.

23. <u>Human Readiness Report No. 2</u>, Questions 52 & 56. The Armywide survey questioned the volunteer soldiers on whether or not they thought a military career was special and demanded more dedication, and implied that it was a "calling"--"truly a service" (the duty-honor-country theme). In response, 59 percent agreed and 15 percent didn't know. A statement was also made to the same group that soldiers must be prepared to face hardships and die for their country, also implying that they should place country before self. In response, slightly more than half (52 percent) agreed and 18 percent didn't know.

#### 24. Moskos, The American Enlisted Man, pp. 148-155.

25. <u>Human Readiness Report No. 2</u>, Question 2. The Army-vide survey also questioned the need for a "strong Army." The response was well over 80 percent, with the majority agreeing strongly.

26. Edward A. Shills and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration of the WENRMACHT in World War II," <u>Public Opinion</u> <u>Quarterly</u>, Vol. 12, Summer 1948, p. 281.

#### 27. Moskos, The American Faileted Mon, p. 145.

28. <u>Human Scadiuces Report No. 2</u>, Questions 14, 10 & 3. When volunteer coldiers were asked in the Army-wide survey if their unit would do a good job in combat, slightly less than half (49 percent) thought it would, while 25 percent were not sure. The same group was also asked if most of the mon in their unit could be counted on to come through in a pinch, and they responded in about

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the same manner (52 percent agreed and 27 percent were undecided). When asked if they thought the "guy" next to them cared what happened to them, only 44 percent felt the "guy" did and 20 percent were "not sure."

29. Ibid., Question #35 and Drucker, <u>Changes in Soldiers' Attitudes</u>, p. 19. Almost two-thirds of the Army-wide volunteer sample perceived that all or most of their unit officers knew their "stuff," which correlated closely with a 1970 survey. A slight majority in the Army-wide survey also believed that their leaders cared about them and were concerned for their welfare.

30. Little, Buddy Relations in Combat, pp. 14-20.

31. \_\_\_\_\_ Now York Times, March 4, 1975, p. 12.

32. "California Poll Shows Antiwar Feeling Strong," <u>Wachington Post</u>, May 25, 1975, p. A-9.

33. U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, <u>What You Think About the Army-</u> <u>III</u>, (A 1974 Survey), Question 75. The same question was asked in the ARI survey. A percentage comparison of the responses appears below:

	Brown	
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	Moskes	ARI
•	Survey	Survey
Volunteer To Co	34.2	24.4
Go If Ordered	45.2	54.6
Try To Get Out Of It	13.6	11.7
Refuse To Go	7.1	9.3
No	354	721

34. George Walton, Colonel, Retired, The Ternished Shieldi A Report on Today's Army, p. 189, and Edward L. King, LTC, Retired, The Death of the Army: A Pre-Marton, pp. 88-89 and 227.

# APPENDIX A - AGE AND RANK

**1. AGE:** 

AGE=	17	18	19	20	21	OVER 21
Drown & Moskos Survey - Apr 75 (N=358)	1.1	7.5	20.4	18.4	20.9	31.7
a/ Human Readiness Report No. 2, Jan 75 (N=14,410 Jr EM)	6.1	14.5	21.5.	18.6	17.0	22.3

Remarks: The larger number of 17 and 18 year olds in the Army-wide survey is because that survey includes soldiers in basic and advanced training that hadn't yet joined their first unit, whereas the soldiers in our survey had all completed this training.

2. RANK

	RANK=	PVT E1 & E2	PFC E3	CP1/SP4 E4	SGT/SP5 E5
Brown & Moskos Apr 75 (N=358)	Survey	15.9	38.5	40.2	5.3
$\frac{b}{HRR}$ No. 2, Jan (N=8398)	75	42.7	20.3	31.5	5.4

Remarks: The same situation exists with rank in the two surveys as did with age and the same explanation applies.

a/ Question #62.

b/ Question #19.

## APPENDIX B - RACE

 RACIAL COMPARISON - Actual to Sample, Brown & Moskos Survey, Apr 75. (In Percent)

BATTALIONS	BLACK	WHITE	OTHER	
TANK:				
ACTUAL	55.0	45.0	UNK	
SAMPLE	51.7	42.5	5.8	
INFANTRY:				
ACTUAL	58.6	39.5	1.9	
SAMPLE	53.3	36.7	10.0	
RANGER:				
ACTUAL	3.0	95.0	2.0	
SAMPLE	9.3	80.2	10.5	
AIRBORNE INF:				
ACTUAL	27.9	62.8	9.3	
SAMPLE	22.0	59.3	18.7	
TOTAL:				
ACTUAL	33.2	63.4	3.4	N=2186
SAMPLE	34.2	54.5	11.3	N= 354

 RACIAL COMPARISON - Army-wide Sample to our Sample (Brown & Moskos Survey, Apr 75-vs-Human Readiness Report No. 2, Jan 75)

	WILTE	OTHER
Brown & Moskos	54.5	45.5
HRR No. 2 a/	71.6	28.4

### a/ Question #69.

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> Remarks: In relation to the current racial mix of junior enlisted men in the Army-wide sample, our sample and the racial population of the four units surveyed is not representative. This high percentage of minorities-mainly blacks--in our units is explained by the fact that two of the units, the infantry and tank battalions, were recruited locally. Seventy-one percent of the sample personnel from those units come from the southeast, whereas only 35 percent of the sample from the elitist units come from the southeast. Also, there is an unusually small number of blacks in the ranger battalion.

# APPENDIX C - FDUCATION BY RACE (Brown & Moskos Survey, Apr 75)

EDUCATION						
RACE	NOT HIGH SCHOOL GRAD	HIGH SCHOOL GRAD	SOME COLLEGE	COLLEGE GRAD	GRAD STUDY	<u>N=</u>
Black	21.8	65.5	12.6	0	0	119
White	21.8	58.8	16.6	1.6	1.0	192
Other Minorities	27.5	47.5	25.0	0	0	40
TOTAL	22.5	59.8	16.2	0.0	0.6	351

Remarks: In the "other minorities" category, the Spanish-Americans were the most poorly educated, and the "other" races and American-Indians were the most highly educated. However, due to the small number in the sample no conclusions were drawn.

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### QUESTIONNAIRE

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## THE BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN SOLDIER IN COMBAT

This questionnaire is part of a research project in which we are attempting to learn about what motivates soldiers in combat. You are asked to complete this questionnaire, as your responses will provide us with vital information about what may, or may not, motivate the modern volunteer soldier in a combat situation.

The identity of all persons answering this questionnaire will be kept absolutely confidential. This step is to protect your privacy so you are completely free to express your <u>true</u> feelings as <u>frankly</u> as possible--as getting your true feelings is most important.

So, DO NOT PLACE YOUR NAME OR ANY OTHER IDENTIFYING MARKS ON THIS QUESTION-NAIRE.

Once again, it is most important that you answer each question as <u>thought-fully</u> and <u>frankly</u> as possible. Take as much time as you need. This is not a test. Except for the questions about your background, there are no right or wrong answers.

If you have any questions, or need clarification of a particular item, please ask the person administering the test, or raise your hand and they will gladly help you.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION.

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> Charles W. Brown U.S. Army War College or Charles C. Moskos, Jr. Northwestern University

## HOW TO FILL OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

There are several types of questions in this questionnaire. EXAMPLES of the types you will encounter are listed below:

FILL IN: [EXAMPLE]

1

The capital of Georgia is A+++ir L.

MULTIPLE CHOICE: [EXAMPLE]

The capital of Georgia is:

(1) X Atlanta

(2) Augusta

(3) Columbus

(4) Savanna

SCALE OF AGREEMENT OR IMPORTANCE: [EXAMPLE]

Raquel Welch is a beautiful woman.

- (1) X Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_ Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

In comparing the area you are currently living in with your home, how important are the following conditions: (Circle one number for each statement)

		Excellent	Good	Not Important
(1)	Climate	(1)	2	3
(2)	Recreational Areas	1	2	3
(3)	Living Conditions	1	2	3

NOTE THAT ONLY ONE RESPONSE SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EACH QUESTION, OR SUBQUESTION (AS IN THE CASE OF THE BOX TYPE QUESTION, ABOVE).

Remember, if at any time you have a question don't hesitate to ask.

## QUESTIONNAIRE

## BEGIN HERE.

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- I. Background and Demographic Data
- 1. What is your present age in years?
  - (1) \_\_\_\_ 17 years
  - (2) \_\_\_\_ 18 years
  - (3) \_\_\_\_ 19 years
  - (4) \_\_\_\_ 20 years
  - (5) \_\_\_\_ 21 years
  - (6) \_\_\_\_ 22-24 years
  - (7) \_\_\_\_ Over 24 years
- 2. What is your present rank?
  - (1) \_\_\_\_ PVT
  - (2) PFC
  - (3) \_\_\_\_ CPL/SP4
  - (4) \_\_\_\_\_ SGT/SP5

3. What is your Primary Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)? (Please specify)

MOS-

4. What is your current job? (Please specify)

5. What did your mother think about your joining the Army?

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly Approved
- (2) Somewhat Approved
- (3) \_\_\_\_ Was neutral

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5. (Continued)

- (4) \_\_\_\_ Somewhat Disapproved
- (5) Strongly Disapproved

(6) \_\_\_\_ Don't know, my mother was not consulted or is deceased.

6. What is your race or ethnic group?

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_ American Indian (4) \_\_\_\_\_ Spanish-American
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Black (5) \_\_\_\_ White

(3) \_\_\_\_ Oriental-American (6) \_\_\_\_ Other (Please specify)

7. What was the highest grade of regular school you had completed <u>before</u> you first entered Active Service?

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Not a high school graduate
- (2) \_\_\_\_ High school graduate
- (3) \_\_\_\_ Some college, but no college degree
- (4) \_\_\_\_ College degree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Graduate study beyond the college bachelor's degree

8. What is the highest grade in school completed by your father or male head of the household? If you are not sure give your best guess.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ I never lived with my father, and there was no head of the household
- (2) Not a high school graduate
- (3) High school graduate
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Some college, but no college degree
- (5) College degree
- (6) \_\_\_\_ Graduate study beyond the college bachelor's degree

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9. What do you consider your home state? (List)

10. While you were growing up, what kind of a place did you live <u>most</u> of the time up to age 15 years?

(1) \_\_\_\_ Rural area or farm

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- (2) \_\_\_\_ Town or small city
- (3) \_\_\_\_\_ Suburban area near a large city
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Large city
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Military community
- (6) \_\_\_\_ Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_
- [A] How important were the following in influencing you to volunteer for the Service: (Circle one number for each statement)

		Very Important	Somewhat Important	Not Important
11.	The influence of my family -	- 1	2	3
12.	A chance to travel and get aw from home	ay - 1	2	3
13.	Difficulty in getting a decen civilian job		2	3
14.	An opportunity to learn a ski and get an education		2	3
15.	The combat arms bonus	- 1	2	3
16.	My friend(s) joined and I wanted to be with him (them)	- 1	2	3
17.	To make the military a career	- 1	2	3
18.	A chance to serve my country	- 1	2	3

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2

[B] Listed below are some different areas of assignment. Indicate for each, if you were doing what you are doing now, how you would feel about being stationed in the various places. (Circle one number for each statement)

		Would <u>prefer</u>	Would not make any <u>difference</u>	Would <u>not</u> prefer
19.	Closer to my home town	1	2	3
20.	Where 1 am now	1	2	3
21.	Somewhere else in the United States	1	2	3
22.	Overseas in Germany	1	2	3
23.	Overseas in Korea	1	2	3

- II. Motivation
- 24. On the whole, how do you feel about Army life?
  - (1) \_\_\_\_ Like it very much
  - (2) \_\_\_\_ Like it somewhat
  - (3) Undecided
  - (4) \_\_\_\_ Dislike it somewhat
  - (5) \_\_\_\_ Dislike it very much

25. The leaders in your squad and platoon depend too much upon threats or harrassment to get things done.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

26. With the training you have received to date in the Army, you and the members of your unit are <u>ready</u> to be deployed into combat.

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(1) Strongly agree

(2) \_\_\_\_ Agree

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- (3) \_\_\_ Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

27. With the training you have received to date, you could not function as well as a replacement in a unit already in combat as you could if you went into combat with your current unit.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

28. The best friends I've ever made have been in the Army.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

29. I would respect a fellow soldier in my unit who tried to get out of combat.

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- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_ Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) Strongly disagree

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30. I would trust the members of my unit in combat.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

31. Suppose the Army needed people to go into combat. What do you think most of the <u>fellow soldiers</u> in your unit would do.

- (1) They would definitely volunteer for combat duty.
- (2) \_\_\_\_ They would go into combat if ordered.
- (3) They would try to get out of combat duty.
- (4) They would probably refuse combat duty.

32. Suppose the Army needed people like yourself to go into combat. What do you think you would do?

- (1) Definitely volunteer for combat duty.
- (2) Go into combat if ordered.
- (3) \_\_\_\_ Try to get out of combat duty.
- (4) Probably refuse combat duty.

33. If you had your choice, what type of unit would you prefer to go into combat with, if you had to go? (Don't base your choice on your current assignment, MOS, or any special training limitations) (Select only one.)

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Airborne
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Infantry
- (3) Mechanized Infantry
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Ranger
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Special Forces
- (6) \_\_\_\_\_ Tank

(7) \_\_\_\_ Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

[C] Listed below are some units made up of different kinds of people. Indicate for each, your preference if you had to go into combat with them: (Circle one number for each statement.)

		Would prefer to fight with them	make any	Would prefer not to fight _with_them
34.	A unit composed of men from my <u>high school</u>	- 1	2	3
35.	A unit composed of men from my <u>home</u> area	- 1	2	3
36.	A unit composed of men from my <u>own race</u>	- 1	2	3
37.	A unit composed of men from all <u>races</u> and <u>regions</u> of the U.S	- 1	2	3
38.	My present unit as it is	- 1	2	3

 [D] Imagine that you are in combat. Indicate how you feel about the following statements concerning what you should do (your role) in combat: (Circle one number for each statement)

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree
39.	I must follow orders	- 1	2	3	4	5
40.	I must protect my buddies-	- 1	2	3	4	5
41.	I must kill the enemy	1	2	3	4	5
42.	I must try to stay alive, matter what		2	3	4	5
43.	I must carry out my missic	on- 1	2	3	4	5
44.	I must get the enemy to surrender	- 1	2	3	4	5
45.	I must not risk the lives innocent civilians	-	2	3	4	5
46.	I want to be awarded a med for bravery or heroism		2	3	4	5

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47. How many officers in your company are the kind you would want to serve under in combat?

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_ All of them
- (2) Most of them
- (3) About half of them
- (4) Few of them
- (5) \_\_\_\_ None of them

48. How many NCO's in your company are the kind you would want to serve under in combat?

- (1) \_\_\_\_\_ All of them
- (2) Most of them
- (3) \_\_\_\_ About half of them
- (4) Few of them
- (5) \_\_\_\_ None of them
- [E] Based upon what you have seen and heard since you joined the Army, how well do you think each of the following groups would perform in combat? (Circle one number for each group)

		Very Good	Good	Poor
49.	Senior officers - Major and above	1	2	3
50.	Junior officers - Captain and Lieutenant	1	2	3
51.	Senior NCO's - E9-E7	1	2	3
52.	Junior NCO's - E6-E5	1	2	3
53.	EM - E4 and below	1	2	3

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54. All in all, America is still the best country in the world.

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- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_ Agree

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- (3) Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree
- [F] In comparing the United States with most other countries, rate how you feel about the following statements: (Circle one number for each statement)

		Strongly Agree	Agree	<u>Undecided</u>	Dis- <u>Agree</u>	Strongly <u>Disagree</u>
55.	The U.S. has <u>more</u> modern conveniences and a higher standard of living	- 1	2	3	4	5
56.	The U.S. has <u>more</u> politica freedom	al - 1	2	3	4	5
57.	The U.S. offers <u>more</u> equal opportunities for advancement.		2	3	4	5
58.	The U.S. has <u>lower</u> religion values.	ous - 1	2	3	4	5
59.	The U.S. has <u>less</u> natural scenery and beauty	- 1	2	3	4	5

60. In today's world, the United States should have the best trained and best equipped Armed Forces in the world.

- (1) Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

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[G] Indicate your feelings about the following statements as to whether or not they are legitimate reasons for the U.S. to be involved directly in a war. (Circle one number for each statement)

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Undecided	Dis- agree	Strongly Disagree
61.	To protect the free world	- 1	2	3	4	5
62.	To stop communism	- 1	2	3	4	5
63.	To protect the U.S	- 1	2	3	4	5
64.	To protect my home and family	- 1	2	3	4	5

65. Rather than have a draft, we should have a professional Army made up of volunteers.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_ Agree

- (3) \_\_\_\_ Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

66. The U.S. is spending too much money on defense.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_ Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

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67. The Army should try to maintain as many traditions as it can which make it different from civilian life.

(1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree

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(2) Agree

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- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

68. The people of America, with their liberal attitudes, are too permissive.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

69. Haircut standards in the Army ought to be relaxed to conform more closely with civilian styles.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Agree
- (3) \_\_\_\_ Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

70. If there were no Army regulations on haircuts, would your hair be:

- (1) \_\_\_\_ A lot longer than it is now.
- (2) \_\_\_\_ A little longer than it is now.
- (3) \_\_\_\_ About the same as it is now.
- (4) \_\_\_\_\_ Shorter than it is now.

[H] Listed below are several different situations that the U.S. may be involved in in the future. Considering each one <u>separately</u>, what do you think most of the <u>fellow soldiers</u> in your unit would do? (Circle one number for each situation.)

		Would volunteer to go	Would go when ordered	Would try to get out of, but go if ordered	Would refuse to go
71.	An invasion of the U.S. by a foreign enemy	1	2	3	4
72.	An invasion of a U.S. ally in Western Europesay, Germany	1	2	3	4
73.	An invasion of a U.S. ally in the Far Eastsay, Korea.	. 1	2	3	4
74.	An invasion of a U.S. ally in the Middle Eastsay, Israel	1	2	3	4
75.	A civil war in an overseas country in which the govern- ment asked for American help		2	3	4
76.	Rescuing American civilians who are in danger in an over seas country	- 1	2	3	4
77.	Rescuing American soldiers who are in danger in an over seas country	- 1	2	3	4
78.	Protecting installations in an overseas country which ar vital to America's economic needssay, oil	e 1	2	3	4
79.	An overseas war in which the American people wholehearted support.		2	3	4
80.	An overseas war about which there is a lot of opposition at home.	1	2	3	4
		-	-		-

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[I] Listed below are the same situations you saw in the previous question. Again, considering each one <u>separately</u>, what do you think you would do? (Circle one number for each statement.)

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		Would volunteer to go	Would go when ordered	Would try to get out of, but go if ordered	Would refuse to go
81.	An invasion of the U.S. by a foreign enemy	1	2	3	4
82.	An invasion of a U.S. ally in Western Europesay, Ger- many	1	2	3	4
83.	An invasion of a U.S. ally in the Far Eastsay, Korea.	. 1	2	3	4
84.	An invasion of a U.S. ally in the Middle Eastsay, Israel	1	2	3	4
85.	A civil war in an overseas country in which the govern- ment asked for American help		2	3	4
86.	Rescuing American civilians who are in danger in an over seas country	- 1	2	3	4
87.	Rescuing American soldiers who are in danger in an over seas country	- 1	2	3	4
88.	Protecting installations in an overseas country which ar vital to America's economic needssay, oil	e 1	2	3	4
89.	An overseas war in which the American people wholehearted support		2	3	4
90.	An overseas war about which there is a lot of opposition at home	1	2	3	4

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[J] Listed below are some situations in which soldiers in the United States might be involved. Indicate for each how you would probably feel about being sent on such a mission. (Circle one number for each situation)

		Would voluntcer to go	when	Would try to get out of, but go if ordered	refuse
91.	To put down a university campus riot	- 1	2	3	4
92.	To restore law and order in a disaster areasay, a floo	od 1	2	3	4
93.	To take over from striking public workerssay, police firemen, or garbage men	•	2	3	4
94.	To stop labor violence of strikerssay, automobile or steel workers		2	3	4
95.	To stop violence of whites opposing efforts to integrat public institutionssay, schools	te - 1	2	3	4
96.	To stop violence of blacks threatening private property	y. 1	2	3	4
97.	To put down a race conflict in which blacks and whites are fighting each other	- 1	2	3	4
98.	To attack a band of revolu- tionaries	- 1	2	3	4

99. Compared to civilians who never served in the military, a combat soldier can be said to be more of a man.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) Agree

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- (3) \_\_\_ Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

100. The policy during the Vietnam war was that a soldier's tour of duty was 12 months unless he voluntarily extended. This policy caused problems because it created turmoil from a high personnel turnover rate and a general lack of combat experience in combat units. In the event of another war in which American soldiers are fighting, do you think this policy should continue, or should everyone remain for some longer period?

- (1) Policy should be 6 months.
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Policy should be 12 months.
- (3) Policy should be 18 months.
- (4) Policy should be 2 years.
- (5) Policy should be the duration of the war.

#### III. Stress

101. If you were ordered today to go into combat, how frightened do you think you would be?

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Not frightened at all
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Slightly frightened
- (3) Moderately frightened
- (4) Extremely frightened

102. If you were sent into combat today, how easy or hard would it be for you to kill an enemy soldier?

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Very easy
- (2) Somewhat easy
- (3) Undecided
- (4) Somewhat hard
- (5) Very hard

103. Suppose you were sent into combat and your unit was ordered not to fire any weapons until <u>fired upon</u> by the enemy, and even if you were fired upon you could only shoot back in self defense. What would you think of such a policy?

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- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) \_\_\_\_\_ Agree

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- (3) \_\_\_ Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

104. A soldier should not be required to go into combat if he feels the war is unjust.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

105. A soldier should have the right to disobey any order that he feels is immoral, even in a combat situation.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) \_\_ Undecided
- (4) \_\_\_ Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

106. Any soldier in a combat zone who intentionally kills innocent civilians should be treated as a criminal.

- (1) \_\_\_\_ Strongly agree
- (2) Agree
- (3) \_\_\_ Undecided
- (4) Disagree
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Strongly disagree

107. How religious are you?

. . **.** .

- (1) Very religious
- (2) \_\_\_\_ Slightly religious
- (3) \_\_\_\_ Not religious
- (4) \_\_\_\_ I am an Atheist
- (5) \_\_\_\_ Other (Please specify) \_\_\_\_\_

- - - THE END - - -

ONCE AGAIN,

THANKS FOR YOUR COOPERATION

