THE IMPACT OF CRISES ON THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY AND FORCES IN AN ERA OF DETENTE

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The United States has encountered international crises almost every year since the close of World War II in which an acute need developed for a decision regarding the use of force. Close study of these crises and their effects upon the intellectual process governing the development of strategy reveals that there is a perceptible cycle connecting crises, strategy formulation, and the development of forces. Strategy articulation establishes the parameters for force development; the characteristics of the forces determine their worthiness

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for responding to crises when called upon to do so; and experiences gained in the course of crises feed back into the intellectual process to modify the strategy in accordance with lessons learned. A number of external forces--such as foreign security commitments, technology, and costs--impact on the cycle, sometimes reinforcing the natural impulse, at other times deflecting the trend. The first part of this paper traces the cycle through six generations, from WorldWar II to present, emphasizing its fundamental continuity.

Using the established strategy-forces-crisis cycle as a model it is possible to project the shape of likely future strategy options designed to cope with the influences of recent crisis experiences. The most notable experiences lending an impulse to the development of novel dimensions of strategy relate to the disarray of the Western Alliance in the face of Soviet-backed Arab threats to Isreal in 1973 and to the emergence of the new power bloc manifested in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Definitions of the options for coping with the adverse implications of these experiences may be developed through arrangement of the spectrum of choices regarding relations with allies against the spectrum of choices regarding OPEC on a matrix. Intersections of choices among the variables outline the possible strategic options. Further analysis of the options suggests the rough outline of likely future US policy.

Detente is a relatively recent influence impacting upon the operation of the strategy-forces-crisis cycle. There is reason to believe that its effect will be favorable to the development of solutions to OPEC-consumer problems without involving great power issues.

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by

Brigadier General Edward B. Atkeson

21 August 1975

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FOREWORD

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

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THE IMPACT OF CRISES ON THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY AND FORCES IN AN ERA OF DETENTE

Crises and crisis management have become household terms to the US post-World War II generation. The United States has encountered some 28 international crises since World War II in which an acute need developed for a decision by the Government to employ or to avoid the use of force. Some degree of force (including demonstrations) was used in all but five of these cases, or approximately 80 percent of the time.

The incidence of 28 crises in 29 years gives us every reason to expect at least one in 1975 and one each year thereafter. Their frequency indicates that we might properly view them as something more than simple aberrations to the norm in international affairs, and, detente notwithstanding, we would be well advised to seek to understand not only their substance and causes but also the role they play in the development of our national security strategy and the impact they have on the process of the shaping of forces. Historians have devoted considerable attention to the background and episodic analysis of the crises themselves, beginning with Iran and Turkey in 1946 and continuing through the October War of 1973. What remain in short supply are perspectives which permit insights into the order of events and into cause and effect relationships (:) the extent that they exist. The intent of this discussion is to contribute to the process of

perspective development through a review of selected crises in context with the evolution of strategy since 1945. Assuming some success in this endeavor, we may expect to define a rough analytical model which will lend itself to forward extrapolation to permit some glimpses of the likely paths of the future in an era of major power detente and of shifting perceptions of threat.

For the most part we recognize that US reactions to acute crises have been made in context with the peculiar security conditions and perceptions prevailing at the time and in accordance with the accepted national security policies and strategy, to the extent that these pertained, and to the extent that they were deemed appropriate and adequate. When it became apparent that a given strategy was ill-suited to cope with a particular crisis, as was the case in 1950 in Korea, there was an abrupt change in strategy and concomitant destabilization of perceptions of the national security until the imbalance could be redressed.

As will become apparent as we progress in this review, the readiness of the Armed Forces to respond in an efficient manner has been highly dependent upon the force posture they have assumed, in accordance with presidentially-approved security strategy, prior to the time the situation assumed crisis proportions. We shall also see that just as strategy has had an impact on force posture and readiness in time of crisis, experiences gained during crisis situations have had an influence on the modification of strategy and its evolution. This concept of a strategy-forces-crisis cycle can be depicted graphically as in figure 1.

The three principal elements of the cycle: strategy, forces, and crisis, are shown in clockwise sequence, indicating the dominant order of occurrence. The major components of each are shown inside the circle. Examples of other important pressures and factors having significant impact upon the three elements and upon their interrelationships are represented by the centripetal arrows.

The following discussion demonstrates how this chain of successive iterations of strategy, force posture, crisis, and strategy modification has operated over the years. While many other factors have had an impact upon the development of current strategy and upon force posture and readiness, of particular pertinence here is the identification of the impelling relationships among the three basic elements. Following this examination of historical evolution, we shall pursue the established cycle forward into the future to explore the likely shape of US strategy in months (and possibly years) to come, based upon experiences and lessons learned in recent crises.



Figure 1. Strategy - Forces - Crisis Cycle

For purposes of this examination the evolution of US postwar security strategy may be roughly characterized as follows (dates approximate):

- Period of deteriorating major power cooperation (1945-47).
- Containment of communism primarily through economic and military assistance; Truman Doctrine (1947-50).
- Containment through military intervention (1950-53).
- Deterrence through doctrine of massive retaliation; "The New Look" (1954-56).
- Strategic "sufficiency"; Eisenhower Doctrine (1957-60).
- Mutual strategic deterrence and doctrine of flexible response (1961-70); the birth of detente (1967).
- Mutual strategic deterrence and local reliance on indigenous resources backed by US flexible response; Nixon Doctrine (1970-74).

THE PERIOD OF DETERIORATING MAJOR POWER COOPERATION

First Generation Strategy. The US-USSR partnership in World War II created a reservoir of good will in the United States toward the Russian people, and the hope prevailed that somehow the differences between the eastern and western allies which were becoming increasingly apparent could be overcome and that the international machinery of the United Nations (UN) might develop into a viable venue for the resolution of international conflicts. There was wide recognition that cooperation of the major powers was essential to the concept of a strong UN, and influential figures in the United States pressed vigorously for it. The design of the UN Security Council specifically reflected this cornerstone assumption of major power cooperation. For practical purposes, the principal "strategy" for the United States was to seek an understanding with the USSR which would preserve the peace which had been won.

First Generation Forces. The United States emerged from the Second World War as the most powerful of the victorious partners. Its armed forces were at an all-time high in size, modernity, and efficiency. It maintained important bases on six of the seven continents, and had a monopoly of the "ultimate weapon" the atomic bomb. The US economy was the strongest in the world: the United States was the only major participant in the war not to have suffered an attack upon its industrial plant. Geared early in the conflict to becoming the "arsenal

of democracy," by 1945 the United States had achieved enormous production capacity for the hard goods of military significance.

However, the maintenance of this awesome power was fundamentally inconsistent with the liberal traditions of American democracy. The industrial plant was rapidly converted to consumer production and the armed forces were dismantled as quickly as was administratively possible. Consistent with the national strategy of cooperation with the USSR, the US Army collapsed from a peak strength of over eight million men in 1945 to under two million the following year. By June 1948 it stood at barely over 550,000.[1] It was considered unnecessary to maintain much more than sufficient forces to occupy the conquered territories and to maintain local order until indigenous administrative machinery could be politically cleansed, reconstituted, and set upon a new path of providing acceptable planning and directive functions to the former enemy peoples. While there was increasing concern for the evolving strategic position of the United States with respect to its wartime partners, the concern did not manifest itself in a requirement for a large military establishment.

First Generation Crises. Beginning shortly after the close of the war, a series of crises arose which created increasingly grave doubts about the soundness of relying on cooperation among the major powers. It soon became apparent that the Soviet concept of occupied territory in Germany and Korea was quite different from that commonly held by the Western Powers. The latter considered the territorial divisions temporary and viewed the zonal boundaries principally as of only administrative importance. The Soviets, on the other hand, tended to treat the divisions as substantive frontiers clearly delineating the extent of political control or influence exercised by the occupying authorities. In both the Soviet occupied territories and elsewhere in Europe, a series of events followed which indicated that a wave of Communist accessions to power might in time engulf all of Eurasia, capitalizing on the economic wreckage resulting from the war.

Communist regimes were firmly in control of Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria by 1945. In Rumania, after a campaign of violence, the Communist leadership claimed a popular victory over the opposition in December in 1946. In spite of an overwhelming Royalist Popular Party election victory in Greece earlier that year, Communist activists began an insurgency in that country supported by the three new Soviet "satellites." Poor economic conditions in Hungary led to a gradual Communist takeover there in the spring of 1947. In Turkey the Soviets

made outright territorial demands and called for revision of the Montreaux Convention governing international traffic through the Turkish Straits, pressures which Turkey felt unable to resist without outside assistance.[2]

Elsewhere, civil war had resumed in China and increasing restiveness was noted among the colonies of the European states which in several cases seemed to be heavily influenced by Marxist ideology. In each crisis occurring in Europe (none of which involved serious consideration of use of US combat forces), the key ingredients were judged to be the low state of economic activity and the great dislocations brought about by the war. Communism was widely perceived as a monolithic menace, perhaps global in scope, as suggested in Marxist literature. It was seen to feed upon poverty and internal disorder, and thus to be vulnerable to economic counteraction and to assistance to local anti-Communist military forces. US strategy turned away from reliance upon major power cooperation in favor of containment of communism through recourse to two of America's greatest assets, its economic power and its military technology. Thus the strategy-forces-crisis cycle completed its first postwar revolution, and the stage was set for a second.

CONTAINMENT THROUGH ECONOMIC AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE

Second Generation Strategy. In June 1947, the Secretary of State announced his sweeping proposal for US assistance to all countries in Europe willing to cooperate in multilateral recovery efforts (the Marshall Plan). Also that year, in requesting congressional approval of aid to Greece and Turkey, President Truman set forth his Doctrine that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting pressures . . . (and our) help should be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to economic stability and orderly political processes.[3]

Second Generation Forces. The concept gradually found support in the US Congress inasmuch as it represented an alternative to massive US rearmament. To most observers, the response appeared appropriate, and the downward drift in the Armed Forces was allowed to continue. National Security Council (NSC) 20, the guiding policy document at the time, articulated the need for containment of Soviet expansionist tendencies, but took little note of any need for armed forces to support the policy.[4]

Nor was there any coherent voice within the military community which could effectively define the developing dangers and make a persuasive case for a systematic and effective approach to countering them. The Air Force and the Navy were deeply enmeshed in the internecine battle over the supremacy of the B-36 bomber or the super carrier. The Army had only the most limited ideas regarding its role in a world where the atomic weapon seemed to render all other arms obsolete.

Appearing before the House of Representatives Appropriations Committee in connection with the 1950 budget hearings, Lieutenant General Wedemeyer, then Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, described the four missions of the Army at the time:[5]

- Provide occupation forces.
- Defend the Western Hemisphere.
- Prevent loss of other key land areas (unspecified).
- Provide a mobile striking force.

The Honorable Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army, gave a clear picture of the modest missions which the Army contemplated in wartime. "The Army does not get, and does not seek," he said, "much publicity as to its functions in the event of war." He itemized the following:[6]

- Defense of the United States with antiaircraft and other forces.
- Protection against sabotage.
- Provision of service support units to support Army and Air Force operations.
- Seizure and defense of important bases from which air attacks could be made against a possible enemy.
- Maintenance of a foothold on the Eurasian Continent.

Considering the poor state of readiness to which the Army had lapsed (in conformity with the prevailing strategy) even these functions may have been ambitious. Army budget expenditures had dropped from over $27 billion in the first year following World War II to $4 billion in 1950.[7] Upon his departure as Chief of Staff, General Eisenhower wrote to the Secretary of Defense decrying the weaknesses of the Army. It was 100,000 men under its authorized strength, and dwindling. Even the "modest Emergency Force of two and one-third divisions" maintained in the continental United States was below strength. He asserted that either action would have to be taken to hold the Army at the existing level or it would waste away to the point where occupation forces could no longer be maintained abroad "and

the areas involved would have to be abandoned to chaos and communism."[8]

But manpower deficiencies were only part of the difficulty. "The problem of materiel," he wrote, "is hardly less serious . . . with certain negligible exceptions, we have purchased no new equipment since the war. Consequently we cannot arm even the few regular combat troops with new weapons developed late in the war but which had not achieved large-scale production. Obviously we have not been able to equip them with weapons developed since the war."[9]

Second Generation Crises. Thus it was that the crises of July 1948, when the Soviets stopped all rail and road traffic between Berlin and the West, and of June 1950, when North Korean forces invaded the South, found US forces poorly prepared to react. In the former case, an alternative to force was found in the airlift. In the latter case it was apparent that the existing strategy of reliance upon economic aid and provision of military supplies to indigenous forces was totally inadequate. In terms of the cycle depicted above, the forces were consistent with the strategy, but poorly prepared for the crises encountered.

An attempt had been made in 1949 in the State Department, with support from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to alter the strategy through recognition of a need for forces to underwrite the objective of containment. In the wake of the news of the first Soviet atomic blast and of the Communist victory in China, the State Department initiated a paper for the National Security Council (NSC 68) which clearly laid out requirements for a massive rearmament program. However, the matter remained controversial and was accepted with little enthusiasm by the Secretary of Defense. Congressional debate on the matter was overtaken by the outbreak of hostilities in 1950.[10]

CONTAINMENT THROUGH MILITARY INTERVENTION

The Korean Experience. Weak as it was through years of neglect, the Army was poorly postured to respond to the requirements of combat. For the first three months of the war it withdrew under North Korean pressure. General MacArthur's initial estimate of a two-division US force requirement for launching a counterattack was quickly doubled. The 24th Infantry Division on occupation duty in Japan was ordered to move to Korea on June 30th even though it was rated as only 65 percent effective. The 7th Division had to be stripped of personnel and

equipment in an attempt to overcome deficiencies in the other units deploying from Japan.[11]

The Reserve components were little better fit to respond. Of the three quarters of a million active reservists on call rolls, only 2,457 were in full strength "A" units. The National Guard stood at slightly over half its objective strength of 435,000. Fortunately, the National Guard had received quantities of materiel left over from World War II and was able to help to meet active Army requirements for equipment. In 1951 the National Guard turned over more than 700 tanks, 5,500 general purpose vehicles, and 95 aircraft to the Active Army.[12]

Greatly complicating the Army response to the Korean crisis was the perception of threat in Europe. The rapid shift of US strategy from economic aid to US force commitment impelled an almost simultaneous buildup of forces in Europe, where it appeared that the Soviet Union could make a direct military thrust westward. The United States no longer had an atomic monopoly, and the utility of conventional ground forces was becoming clearer. The need for forces in Europe was determined so acute that General Bradley, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later referred to the war in Korea as the "wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."[13]

The Korean involvement proved to be a much longer and costlier engagement than intially foreseen. The Chinese intervention and the subsequent development of prolonged negotiations at Panmunjom while the war continued, extended the effort beyond the patience and interest of much informed public opinion in the United States. A successful campaign slogan of the Republican Party in the elections of 1952 was a pledge to bring the war to a close. Public apathy in the latter months of the conflict stood in marked contrast to the strong initial support for the expedition which had been perceived as a brief resort to arms in a "police action" as a logical response to blatant aggression by a Communist state.

The close of the war offered the new Administration an opportunity to reassess US security strategy. A number of important conclusions were drawn from the involvement in the conflict which impacted directly upon the formulation of a new strategy. Most notable was the realization that a land war in Asia pitted the technology-rich United States against the manpower-rich Asian Communists on terms most favorable to the other side. There was a general aversion to any strategic concept which might depend upon repeated US involvement in a local

(particularly Asiatic) conflict on the ground. Secretary of State Dulles articulated this aversion when he said, "There is no local defense which alone will contain . . . (the Communists; therefore the Free World) should not attempt to match the Soviet bloc man for man and gun for gun."[14]

DETERRENCE THROUGH MASSIVE RETALIATION

Third Generation Strategy. The new strategy to emerge had two basic elements:

- Domestic economic health (President Eisenhower expressed as much concern for the vitality of the US economy as with the Communist menace from abroad).
- US strategic superiority and a "New Look" in the Armed Forces designed to fit them for a deterrent role over the long haul.

The pressures for economy under the first principle served to reinforce the effects of popular distaste for maintenance of large US conventional forces for emergency reaction to crisis situations. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Radford, explained, "The other free nations can most effectively provide in their own and adjacent countries the bulk of the defensive ground forces."[15] The logic of US reliance on its great technological strength and upon its growing thermonuclear global strike power was highly persuasive.

The key strategy document to receive presidential approval was NSC 162/2, dated October 30, 1954. This paper reflected the abandonment of the assumption that large-scale limited wars might be fought without recourse to nuclear weapons. The services should henceforth plan on using nuclear fires in conflicts where their use would be desirable from a military point of view. An important point in the guidance was the emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons for deterrence of local aggression.[16] The paper was the implementing document for the policy of "massive retaliation" articulated by Secretary Dulles in his famous speech in New York to the Council on Foreign Relations in January of that year.

While there were many other factors at work in the development of the new strategy, it is clear that the experiences of the Korean crisis had a strong impact. The desire not to be caught so poorly prepared again was matched by pressures for economy. Thus, the "New Look" appeared to offer a venue for reconciliation of the competing pressures. The theme was to maximize US technology and to deemphasize

manpower requirements. It envisioned greatly-reduced conventional forces in favor of nuclear retaliatory forces, particularly the Strategic Air Command.

Third Generation Forces. The impact of the strategy on the Army was reflected in a sharply-reduced budget and in declining strength and structure figures. Army expenditures fell from about $13 billion in Fiscal Year (FY) 1954 to under $9 billion in FY 1955. In the same period the strength of the Active Army fell about 15 percent (196,000 men), and it continued to decline for the rest of the decade. The inventory of major units fell from 20 divisions and 18 regimental combat teams at the end of the war to 14 divisions and 9 separate battle groups in 1960.[17]

One of the most visible effects of the new emphasis on nuclear warfare on the Army's field structure was the institution of the "Pentomic Division" in 1956. Composed of five battle groups with relatively little organic conventional artillery initially, the new organization was designed to fit it for operations on a nuclear battlefield. Specifically it conformed to four basic principles:[18]

- Ready adaptation to requirements of the atomic battlefield.
- Pooling of equipment and units at higher echelons not habitually required with subordinate units (notably armored personnel carriers concentrated in a transportation battalion rather than in the infantry battle groups).
- Recognition of increased span of control possible through modern signal communications.
- Adaptability to the integration of new and better materiel as it developed.

Third Generation Crises. The first crises to occur under the new strategy were Indochina in 1954 and the Formosan Straits in 1955. General Ridgway reported in his memoirs that considerable pressure was generated within the Administration to intervene militarily with air and naval forces "to test the New Look." The General was unalterably opposed to US involvement on the basis of unsuitability of US forces for the environment in the first case, and of the high risks at great cost in both cases. He saw Indochina as a theater ideally suited to guerrilla warfare, and consequently not amenable to naval and air forces pressure, and he viewed the offshore islands as unimportant in themselves and defensible only with major land action in the proximate Chinese territory. This, he insisted, would have entailed enormous costs in all categories of resources for little or no political gain.[19]

"We could have fought in Indochina," he said. "We could have won, if we had been willing to pay the tremendous cost in men and money that such intervention would have required a cost that in my opinion would have eventually been as great as, or greater than, that we paid in Korea. In Korea we had learned that air and naval power alone cannot win a war and that inadequate ground forces cannot win one either. It was incredible to me that we had forgotten that bitter lesson so soon that we were on the verge of making that same tragic error."[20]

While intervention was under consideration, President Eisenhower also considered cancellation of a planned two-division force reduction (part of the general reduction in conventional forces). The President and other members of the Administration issued stern warnings to China not to interfere, under threat of "grave consequence which might not be confined to Indochina."[21] However, both the President and the Congress had some reservations about unilateral US intervention, and there was some latent suspicion of French political ambitions. The fall of Dien Bien Phu in May sealed the matter.

In the case of the Formosan Straits, there was considerable concern that the crisis might involve the larger issue of the defense of the Pescadores and of Taiwan itself. President Eisenhower secured congressional support to employ US armed forces to defend the larger and more distant islands. But as was the case in Indochina, the crisis abated without contact between US and Communist forces.[22]

In the face of the two crises, the judgment of success or failure of the strategy remained at issue. A persuasive case has been made that the Chinese were deterred in both instances from taking more aggressive action by hints of US nuclear counterattack. On the other hand, some argue that the United States, particularly the Army, was unsuited and ill prepared to cope with the immediate guerrilla and conventional threats which had manifested themselves. There is probably some truth in both contentions.

STRATEGIC SUFFICIENCY AND THE EISENHOWER DOCTRINE

In August 1957, the USSR announced the successful launch of an intercontinental range ballistic missile. The following October marked the first successful orbiting of an earth satellite, the Sputnik. Together the events raised serious questions in the United States regarding the viability of US strategic superiority, a cornerstone of the massive retaliation strategy.

Fourth Generation Strategy. The strategy of primary reliance upon nuclear counterattack for deterrence of aggression was retained by the Administration, but the concept of US superiority was discarded in favor of "sufficiency." Instead of reasoning that US technology provided this country with unmatched strategic power, the notion was advanced that sufficient power to destroy opponents' homelands was all that was required to maintain an effective deterrence against aggression. In Air Force Secretary Quarles' words, "it is not a question of *relative* strength" between "the two opposing forces," but rather, "it is the *absolute* power in the hands of each and in the substantial invulnerability of this power to interdiction."[23]

The Administration developed a three-pronged program upon which its emphasis on deterrence (as opposed to war-fighting capability) would rest: strategic sufficiency; an expanding network of alliances; and elaboration of the extent of US interests, such as in the "Eisenhower Doctrine: Middle East Resolution," to avoid conflict by miscalculation.

Limited Effects on Forces. This modification of the strategy only obliquely affected the accepted frame of reference for general purpose forces. While the weaknesses of continued reliance on massive retaliation in the face of apparent Soviet strategic advances became more widely recognized, the "New Look," as the concept of sufficiency came to be known, reflected little change in force structure.

Fourth Generation Crisis. The following year the Army forces which went ashore in Lebanon were configured in the pentomic pattern. While overtones of major power conflicts of interest in the crisis were present, the probability that an atomic battleground would develop was slight. The risks of United States versus Arab "Nationalist" or even United States versus United Arab Republic/Iraq conflict were much greater. In either case the US ground forces would have found themselves less than optimumly organized and equipped. Undue emphasis upon nuclear operations had limited the units' potential for extensive operations in a conventional environment. Experience in this crisis served to reinforce doubts about the suitability of the national strategy for dealing with local and limited conflicts. The cycle had completed another revolution.

MUTUAL STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND THE DOCTRINE OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE: THE BIRTH OF DETENTE (1967)

Fifth Generation Strategy. The political leadership of the country

passed to the Democratic Party in 1961. The change provided the opportunity for a shift in strategic thinking. Fiscal restraints on military spending were eased, and a strong move was made in the direction of reconstructing forces designed primarily for deterring and/or engaging in limited conventional wars. Expansion of the Army's capability for dealing with counterinsurgency through civic action, military assistance, and direct combat accompanied this shift. Troop sea and airlift were substantially strengthened, and new concepts for prepositioning of equipment and dual basing of forces were developed. A capability for fighting simultaneous wars in Europe and Asia while contending with one minor contingency elsewhere was established as an object for force planning.[24]

Fifth Generation Forces. The services were instructed to avoid any specific assumptions about the use or nonuse of tactical nuclear weapons in their planning. The effect of the change was to create additional requirements for conventional forces over levels recognized under the previous strategy. In an important US diplomatic success, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Council was eventually persuaded to accept the concept of "flexible response" for Europe.[25]

Fifth Generation Crisis. The new strategy was put to an early test in the Berlin crisis of 1961. In response to the Soviet announced intent to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and to relinquish control of all access routes to Berlin to the East German Government, the United States reinforced its garrisons in West Berlin and West Germany, and mobilized Reserve and National Guard units. Two National Guard divisions and 249 other Guard and Reserve units of various sizes were called to active duty.

The Reserve mobilization experienced mixed success. Political constraints inhibited the execution of existing mobilization plans, resulting in poorly-coordinated directives to field agencies. Most of the units reported to their posts with less than 50 percent of their authorized equipment. In addition, many of the men called were dissatisfied because of perceived inequities in the mobilization procedures.[26]

In December 1961 Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric indicated that the Defense Department had "revised" its thinking with regard to the use of Reserves for cold war crises. "I myself was under the belief earlier that we could successfully mobilize and demobilize reservists to meet crises in this cold war period," he said. "I may have been wrong in that. It may be that we might have to have more regular

force to deal with that type of recurrent crisis and use the Reserve for larger-scale crisis." He also stated that the Department was giving serious thought to a reduction in the size of the National Guard and the Army Reserve.[27]

Experience in one crisis had again modified strategic thinking, which in turn would impact on the force structure. In December 1962, the Secretaries of Defense and Army ordered a reorganization of the reserves, designating a priority force of 6 National Guard divisions to be maintained at 75 to 80 percent strength and having readiness objectives ranging from a few hours to not more than 8 weeks.[28] In a series of reorganizations, the Reserve components, including the number of divisions, were reduced. The Army Staff drew up a plan for partial mobilization, but the mainstream of thought regarding reserves was in keeping with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's misgivings about their responsiveness to crisis situations; the document was allowed to lapse into obsolescence.[29]

The gradual deepening of US involvement in Vietnam and a variety of special political factors were conducive to prolonged reliance upon the Active Army for meeting most troop requirements in Southeast Asia. Not until after the Tet Offensive in Vietnam and the *USS Pueblo* crisis off Korea did the Administration recognize a necessity for calling Reserve units. However, as a result of extended neglect, the partial mobilization plans had to be hastily assembled in the spring of 1968, and many errors of previous call-ups were repeated. The cost in terms of efficiency was again high because of the incompatibility of the action with prevailing concepts favoring a much higher level of mobilization.[30]

A more satisfactory manifestation of the operation of the strategy-forces-crisis cycle was the formulation of the US Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board (the Howze Board) in May 1962. Granted a broad charter for examination and experimentation in Army mobility, the Board considered the Army's requirements for operations in a wide spectrum of combat environments. Multiple war games were conducted in counterguerrilla actions, in combat against an unsophisticated, conventionally equipped enemy, and in combat against a highly sophisticated opponent.[31] A great deal of the Army's current organizational and operational doctrine was to flow from these tests. Long before the extent or nature of US ground combat involvement in Vietnam was to become apparent, the Army, in keeping with the strategy of flexible response to varied provocations, began to

reconfigure itself for diverse, highly mobile operations. The incidence of the Army's large-scale commitment to Vietnam in 1965 was accordingly much smoother than it had been in previous wars The forces were relatively well designed and equipped for the environment in which they would operate. There was a minimum of shock to Army doctrine as the "forces" engendered by the "strategy" encountered the "crisis."

Detente. A growing recognition of the realities and implications of mutual strategic deterrence, coupled with a yearning for creation of a more stable security environment, led to the initiation of discussions for limitations on deployments of strategic armaments and to a broad ranging exchange of views between President Johnson and Premier Kosygin at Glassboro in 1967. Haltingly, interrupted in 1968 by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the era of detente had begun. Thereafter almost all major actions taken by the superpowers on the international scene would be viewed in a new and special light. Detente, however ill-defined, and however fragile, had been adopted by the two countries and would take its place among their other national objectives in the ensuing years. President Nixon would describe the process as shifting "from confrontation to negotiation."[32] Within the new environment, and with the fresh experiences from Southeast Asia, the United States sought a new formula for its security strategy. The principal new element was outlined by President Nixon at Guam in 1969.

MUTUAL STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND LOCAL RELIANCE ON INDIGENOUS RESOURCES BACKED BY US FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Sixth Generation Strategy. The military and psychological effects of the extended US effort in Southeast Asia, together with extensive assistance to indigenous forces, gradually reduced requirements for US presence, and a political formula was assembled to cover a US withdrawal. The withdrawal was accomplished under the aegis of the principal points formalized by the President at Guam, henceforth known as the Nixon Doctrine:[33]

"The United States will keep all its treaty commitments."

"We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole."

"In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense."

Sixth Generation Forces. The third element of the Doctrine imparted the greatest impulse for change in force structure planning. Secretary of Defense Laird interpreted the Doctrine further to mean that "it is neither practical, nor the most effective way to build a lasting structure of peace to rely solely upon the material and manpower resources of the United States to provide this capability . . . Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends . . . In planning to meet (existing threats to the Free World) . . . we intend to use the Total Force approach. We will plan to use all appropriate resources for deterrence US and Free World to capitalize on the potential of available assets."[34] The objective was clearly to broaden the conceptual base of US strength and to establish a better balance within the partnerships existing between the United States and its allies in both a political and a military sense. The "Total Force" concept became a logical force planning extension of the Nixon Doctrine.

Sixth Generation Crisis. While subsequent modifications were made to various other facets of the national strategy, the Total Force concept remained as an effective frame of reference through 1972 and 1973, until the crisis of October 1973, when the United States was obliged to mount a massive airlift of supplies and war materiel to Israel. Until that time it had been assumed that Total Force was a part of a larger mutuality of interests, particularly among the NATO allies, which would permit the use of allied bases, ports, and airspace for emergency operations designed to insure continued regional stability. That this conclusion was not accepted universally as was apparent during the airlift operation came as a surprise. The episode may have considerable impact upon subsequent iterations of US security strategy.

A second experience of the October War was the oil embargo which affected both the United States and its most important European and Asiatic allies. In reaction to gestures and statements of sympathy and support for Israel, the Arab oil producers imposed various restrictions upon the production and distribution of their products.

While the Arab action may have had only peripheral effect upon the

formulation of US foreign policy, the impact upon Japan and upon Western European countries was much greater. Some were obliged to issue formal pledges of friendly inclination toward the Arabs; others embargoed shipments of war materiel to Israel. There was considerable disarray within the Western Alliance over the issue, exacerbating existing differences and irritants, particularly those between the United States and France.

THE FUTURE

To date there has been no clear reformulation of the US strategy to take these most recent experiences into account. Just as experiences in past crises have pointed the way for subsequent strategy, we may expect that a formula may be found to reconcile these experiences with the continuing security requirements of the nation. Likely developments in this area are discussed below.

We have seen that US strategy has been derived from a blend of solutions to problems encountered in past crises and reactions to new pressures and threats generated outside the conceptual strategy-forces-crisis cycle. We may expect that lessons gained in recent crises and their aftermath and recent external strategic developments will constitute the major forces shaping our strategy in the immediate future. Crises experiences which may be expected to be most pertinent will probably be lessons gained from Vietnam and from the 1973 October War.

The Vietnam experience illustrated the deceptive ease with which incremental force application can operate to submerge the nation in large-scale military operations in pursuit of limited objectives and lead to inefficient force development for combat and deactivation following withdrawal. The national debate over war policy hinged on the question of what price the United States should be willing to pay to support a possibly unstable, but anti-Communist regime located in a geopolitically peripheral area. Questions were raised whether the continued existence of South Vietnam was worth the cost of sustaining it or whether it had some special psychological, political, or strategic importance which placed it in a key position with respect to regional or global security (as suggested in the "domino" theory). The clearest lesson gained from the experience was that there is a threshold of tolerance within the American political system for support of military expeditions abroad which is highly dependent upon perceptions of the acuity of the threat,

the justice of the US response, and the prospects for prompt unequivocal success. It seems probable that this consideration will weigh more heavily in deliberations over US responses to crises in the next ten years than it did in the last ten.

Secondarily, there was an important technical lesson from the war in the area of managerial efficiency. Largely because of the incremental nature of the development of the conflict and the attendant political problem of identifying a point at which mobilization should occur, the ground battles were fought almost exclusively with units of the regular establishment. Not until 1968 was there a call for Reserve component mobilization, and then only to a limited extent. The Army was sorely pressed to provide the forces required during the phases of heavy US involvement and to deactivate them rapidly afterward. Heavy prices were paid in efficiency and in individual justice which might have been avoided or significantly reduced had greater reliance been placed on the Reserves. The lesson has recreated pressures for readiness of the Reserve components to the demands of contingencies less than general war.

As noted above, the October 1973 experience provided us with clearer understanding of the degree to which we and our industrialized allies in Europe and Japan are dependent upon imported energy resources, and a recognition of the emergence of a new power center among third world countries. Our allies have been exposed as highly vulnerable to oil embargo, and to pressures from suppliers to comply with political demands, particularly with respect to Israel. These pressures have created strains within the NATO alliance, illuminating problems inherent in achieving a consensus and unity of action in dealing with threats other than that for which the alliance was originally designed. It now appears that the United States may from time to time be obliged to pursue courses of action which it views as wholly consistent with the common western interest without allied support. Also, the October 1973 experience marked the first occasion of the exercise of real power by member states of the third world. Never before have former colonial territories or nonaligned countries been able to dictate political and economic terms to industrialized nations on such a scale or with such effectiveness. The precedent is a strong one and at least temporarily marks a fundamental shift of international power in the direction of the oil exporting countries at the expense of the United States and its principal allies. Noteworthy here is the apparent increased resiliancy of superpower detente. While differences approached a flash point for a brief period of time in the

Middle East, the crisis passed quickly, and it was not permitted to have any lingering adverse effect upon other points of interface between the United States and the USSR.

Detente, and the (probably related) Sino-Soviet split, have tended to diminish Western perceptions of the acuity of the Eastern military threat, and, consequently, have raised the relative importance of other types of threats to Western security and stability. Two other changes in the strategic environment in recent years (external to the dynamics of the strategy-forces-crisis cycle) may also play an important part in shaping the course of future events. One encompasses the current experience with worldwide inflation and the threat of recurrence of economic depression. The other is the growth of Soviet capabilities for long-range military intervention and show of force operations, particularly with naval forces. Inflation and the threat of worldwide depression have for the time being assumed larger proportions, perhaps approaching, or even overtaking, existing Communist military threats in order of importance to Western society. While the threats are of a different nature and operate for the most part on different planes, they tend to compete for many of the same resources and to stimulate conflicting policies in Western capitals, resulting in dilemmas regarding the establishment of priorities between the two types of threat. Recognition is growing that the economic threat, if unchecked, could cause serious setbacks for some of the less stable NATO partners.

The growth of the Soviet naval surface and maritime fleets and Soviet experiences gained in long-range airlift operations in the Middle East have provided the USSR with an enhanced capability for extension of power on a global scale. Increases in Soviet ship presence have been noted in all major ocean areas. Such increased capabilities raise questions of the purposes for which they may be used. Pushed to their fullest extent, the forces could be used in accordance with the nineteenth century imperialist model to support the development of a far-flung ideological "empire" for prestige and power-extending purposes. Soviet clientele in Latin America could include such regimes as that of Castro in Cuba or the former government of President Allende in Chile. In Africa the forces could be used to bolster extremist factions in former colonial territories and to support Black African movements against white regimes. In South Asia, the forces could lend support to India in disputes with Pakistan and China. In Southeast Asia they could be employed to counter the anti-Communist revolution in Indonesia and to offset pro-Chinese tendencies throughout the region.

In Northeast Asia they might lend support to North Korea and possibly be used to bring pressures to bear upon Japan at times considered propitious for Soviet purposes, possibly in an effort to disengage Japan from the US security system.

There are, of course, countervailing pressures operating against such efforts by the USSR. First, there is the obvious deterrent extant in the risk of direct US-USSR confrontation and permanent derailment of detente. Secondly, Soviet experiences in developing distant client states have not all been happy ones. The Soviet experiment in the Middle East in the 1960's, apparently designed to bring the leading Arab states under firm control, ran into difficulties when Arab leaders perceived the magnitude of the differences between Soviet aims in the region and those of the Arabs themselves. The Soviet sponsorship of the Castro regime has placed a heavy economic drain on the USSR and has shown few concrete returns. Returns on political investments in South America and Africa have thus far been unremunerative. Inroads with the Sukarno regime in Indonesia were reversed by nationalist elements in the army. These sobering experiences, together with the threat of major power confrontation, may be expected to have a restraining influence on Soviet temptations to become too deeply involved in distant crises in the near term.

NEW STRATEGIC DIMENSIONS

The foregoing factors derived from crisis experiences and from observations of global trends indicate that US security strategy in the next ten years may be affected in the following ways:

- The United States will avoid direct military involvement against indigenous forces in crises in peripheral areas (particularly the Asian land mass) which could grow incrementally into a large or prolonged conflict.
- The United States will seek to reduce the economic burdens of the maintenance of large standing forces and the unfavorable balance of payments effects of extensive overseas deployments. Additional emphasis will be placed upon Reserve component forces for meeting requirements of the larger contingencies.
- While supporting the broad concept of detente, the United States may be expected to oppose Soviet attempts to dispatch military expeditions to distant areas should the USSR seek to exploit its new long-range military capabilities.

• The United States will seek to reduce the global political and economic impact of the new power center manifested in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

Impact of OPEC. This organization represents a new kind of global power bloc. Its membership spans three continents, all situated well to the south of the traditional major power centers in the northern temperate zone. Since its formation in 1960 it has grown to include twelve (disparate) members and one associate member.[35] Its economic and political power cannot be gauged by traditional means. Until re. nt years many of the constituents have been industrially retarded and politically unstable. Not until the imposition of the oil embargo of 1973 and the concomitant quadrupling of petroleum prices did the political and economic potential of the bloc become widely understood.[36] There is an evident requirement for US security strategy to adapt to the reality of the new player in the international arena by developing a new strategic dimension for dealing with it on a global scale.

In accordance with the lessons learned in the most recent crisis, the principal choices open to the United States appear to hinge upon the approach to be taken with respect to the OPEC concept and the extent of cooperative effort to be pursued in this approach with traditional allies. These choices are interrelated and lend themselves to simultaneous analysis. Figure 2 portrays the interaction of these choices and identifies areas for the definition of strategic options where the choices intersect. While there are certainly gradations of choices between those shown (which generate additional strategic options) the extremes are described for clarity.

Strategic Option No. 1 envisions the United States recognizing the new power of the OPEC states as a major historical trend and seeking to achieve a position of influence through close identification with the movement. The objective would be to cast the United States in a role of progressive champion of an emerging world force. The option would tend to solidify ties with Arab countries and to freeze the Soviets out of the Middle East. Close US association with the Arabs and exclusion of Soviet influence, while not necessarily disturbing detente, would provide enhanced opportunities for peaceful settlement of most Middle East problems of more than local importance. US support for Israel would be greatly scaled down, and considerable pressure would be exerted upon the Israeli Government to come to terms with the Palestinians and the Arab countries.

Choices Regarding Allies / Choices Regarding OPEC	Cooperation With Allies	Unilateral Path
Pro-OPEC Policy	Strategic Option No. 1	Strategic Option No. 2
Anti-OPEC Policy	Strategic Option No. 3	Strategic Option No. 4

Figure 2. Options for OPEC Containment

All components of the UN initiative would be closely coordinated with other NATO members in recognition of their greater dependence upon oil imports. Security aspects of the concept would be particularly important for allied coordination, including military assistance programs in the Middle East and provisions for US emergency base and overflight rights in Europe. US force planning for Middle Eastern contingencies could be simplified through development of broader political understandings among allies regarding force missions and support requirements for dealing with crises other than those involving the Warsaw Pact. Also, there would be some chance that a military response to a crisis in the Middle East could be mounted using multinational contingents rather than US units only, should such action become necessary.

Costs of the strategy would be manifested primarily in the probable continued high price of oil and in the political price of seemingly turning against Israeli interests. An additional price may have to be paid at some time in the future through the precedent-setting effect of the choice; very likely other groups among third world suppliers of important resources would interpret the US policy as a license to form their own cartels and to maximize their returns through bloc action, confident of support in principle from the United States. It is also likely that the OPEC states, particularly the Arab members, would interpret the US reversal of its traditional policy toward Israel as a victory of considerable proportions. Such perception could magnify their view of the leverage gained on the international scene through application of the "oil weapon," undesirably emphasizing its effectiveness with respect to western industrialized countries. This could contribute to the development of temptations among oil producers in the future to resort to embargo or production limitations for capricious reasons, or to use the massive liquid credits accumulated through continued high prices for political or further economic gains adverse to US interests.

With Strategic Option No. 2, the unilateral path to close relations with oil producers would recognize the reduction of the former European colonial powers to positions of only regional importance and would emphasize the modern primacy of the US position in the Middle East. It would avoid the complications of allied restrictions on military operations encountered in 1973 by fostering advance unilateral planning. It would insure that US requirements for oil, both from the Middle East and from other OPEC states, would be met first, and would

probably result in a distinct competitive advantage to US economic interests. The effect on NATO cohesiveness would be generally unfavorable, and sharp distinction would have to be made between US concerns with NATO and those regarding the Middle East. Otherwise, Option 2 would provide most of the benefits and suffer most of the costs connected with Option 1.

Strategic Option No. 3, a fundamentally anti-OPEC strategy, would seek the benefits of continued access to Middle Eastern oil at lower economic cost. It would also seek to discourage other raw materials and agricultural products exporting countries from forming cartels for economic or political purposes. A principal objective would be to broadcast a clear signal that the oil crisis of 1973-74 was not a tolerable precedent or pattern for influencing future political conflicts. While the United States would not deliberately exceed the boundaries of political and economic pressure on OPEC countries to scale down current price demands, no further increases would be tolerated. The point would be made that the restriction of oil supplies in an era of worldwide dependence and severe economic strain could be interpreted as a hostile act, paralleling such actions as the Soviet closure of access to Berlin in 1948 or the Egyptian closure of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping in 1967. The argument might require ready availability of forces to render it credible.

To maximize pressure on OPEC, the United States would join with its allies, and possibly with other net petroleum importers, in a formal organization for the coordination of all relations with the OPEC group, political as well as economic. While military aspects of the association might not receive initial emphasis, the organization might develop into an alliance similar, or as an adjunct, to NATO, with clear identification of the threat and complete machinery for common defensive strategy. Heavy emphasis would be placed upon common technological development of alternate energy sources and upon coordination of regulation of OPEC investments, currency, and banking transactions in Western markets.

Special consideration would have to be given to the possible realignment of OPEC states, particularly those in the Middle East, with the Soviet Union. Polarization of OPEC-NATO relations would create opportunities for a strong recrudescence of Soviet influence in the region, and possibly the toppling of traditional monarchies and sheikdoms. Such developments, if unchecked, could result in quite unfavorable redistributions of power in the region. However, the

monarchies may prefer to come to terms with the Western allies rather than assume the risks of too-close associations with the USSR. A likely casualty (at least for serious wounding) would be detente. Risks of eventual confrontation with the USSR would be increased if Soviet influence in the region showed marked increase. Careful management would be required, both to minimize the risks and to insulate other bilateral issues from Middle East arguments.

Strategic Option No. 4 represents unilateral US opposition of OPEC. Experience in the energy crisis of 1973-74 illuminated the difficulties in attaining coordinated action between European countries and Japan on the one hand, and the United States, which is far less dependent on oil imports, on the other. It may be expecting too much of our allies to press for their participation in strong bloc action in confronting OPEC. There would be considerable risk in such an approach that individual allied countries would collapse economically or politically from within under severe economic pressure and desert the group. Such collapse could have devastating psychological effects on the entire effort. Alternative No. 4 would avoid this risk by having the United States assume the principal burden of opposing OPEC. The task would be considerably more difficult, but there would be some benefits.

While doing nothing for detente, unilateral US action would avoid some of the East-West polarization inherent in Option 3, and reduce the risks of Soviet exploitation of the struggle. US allies would gain considerable trade advantages over the United States in the region, particularly in the armament field, but if the strategy were successful in reducing oil costs, all net importers would benefit. The greatest risk would be that of US isolation from its allies as well as from the OPEC states. Resentment over the burdens assumed by the United States in the common interest would very likely rise to the political surface in this country and operate to erode ties with Western Europe and Japan. Without Western European cooperation, the United States would have to look elsewhere for base and staging areas if it were to continue to maintain some capability for military reaction to crises in the Middle East.

This examination of US options with regard to the new threat manifested in OPEC reveals certain similarities to phases of the historical East-West struggle which we have just reviewed. First, we may note a parallel in the frame of mind with which the United States approached the military threat stemming from Moscow and that with which we face the economic threat stemming from OPEC headquarters

in Vienna. Confrontation is to be avoided if at all possible, but some sort of political action seems necessary. The most desirable approach in both cases would seem to be united action with allies to find a basis for accommodation with the opponent. Least desirable, certainly, would be unilateral US-opponent confrontation.

Second, we may note that inasmuch as the United States is endowed with some degree of self-sufficiency in energy resources, the threat is considerably more acute to our principal allies, Western Europe and Japan, than it is to us. Placing this situation in juxtaposition with the East-West struggle, we find some parallel with our relations with the Soviet Union in the postwar era, 1945-50. As we have seen, these years encompassed both the strategic periods of deteriorating major power cooperation and containment of the threat through economic cooperation with acutely threatened allies. Certainly since the oil embargo and the quadrupling of oil prices US relations with OPEC states have been strained, if they have not necessarily deteriorated; now it seems likely that there will be some effort on the part of the United States to "contain" the threat through common action with allies in political and economic areas. The hope, of course, is that a balance and modus vivendi may be achieved between energy suppliers and consumers, perhaps not unlike the detente between East and West.

Third, there is a geographic coincidence in the current phases of the two problems. The theater of greatest danger for both US-Soviet and US-OPEC confrontation appears to be the Middle East. And, as we have noted in the analysis of the new strategic options, there could develop an unfavorable relationship and mutual reinforcement of the threats if Soviet and OPEC interests were somehow to converge. An essential element of whatever new dimension of strategy the United States may devise will be the creation of disincentives to the other players to seek each other's counsel and support.

Cognizant of Rousseau's caution that, "the ability to foresee that some things cannot be foreseen is a very necessary quality"[37] we must nonetheless make the effort.

The most useful strategy for the United States to pursue in its efforts to control or to contain the OPEC threat over the next ten years would seem to lie in the area of allied cooperation between the extremes of Options 1 and 3 (such a hybrid may be the current US intent). With respect to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the approach would be "even-handed" with some pressure upon Israel to accommodate Arab demands for return of territories, and the creation of a demilitarized

Palestinian state (or states) on the Jordanian West Bank and possibly Gaza. In return, Israeli borders might be guaranteed by the UN Security Council, by neighboring states, and by the major powers. Cohesiveness among Western allies would be retained through creation of a permanent energy consumers' coordinating body with a broad charter for common energy policy formulation, burden sharing, and common negotiations with OPEC. However, desirable as such a strategy might be, pressures for divergence are already apparent. European finance ministers have indicated dissenting views from US efforts to secure lower oil prices through frank addressal of issues with OPEC. While such dissention is unlikely to force the United States into a unilateral position, it will complicate the coagulation of effort by energy consumers to define a common strategy and to realize the benefits of united action. A likely denouement, barring a major economic disaster in the West, would be prolongation of the current economic power imbalance between consumers and suppliers until new sources of energy are developed. A major economic crisis among consumers would be likely to solidify sympathies for a much tougher approach to the resource problem and presage a definite move toward Option 3. If the crisis were to be felt acutely in the United States before the dangers were sufficiently apparent to other major oil importers, the United States might even be obliged to move toward Option 4 (unilateral, anti-OPEC approach). While few responsible observers predict a sharp economic collapse in the immediate future, it cannot be discounted. Barring this, it would seem likely that pressures from European allies for moderation in dealing with OPEC and serious analysis of all factors on its own part will steer the United States into the midcourse described, with a slight bias toward Option No. 1 (cooperation with allies, pro-OPEC).

We have every reason to believe that our chances of achieving a stable relationship with OPEC are significantly enhanced as long as detente remains a priority effort between the superpowers. Secretary Kissinger has described detente in dynamic terms, as a "process," rather than static, as a "condition." The process, he says, focuses upon the development of as broad an interface as possible of areas of mutual interest between the two countries, with successes in certain areas enhancing the prospects of success in others.[38] Hopefully, the successes already achieved will work toward a deeper understanding of the issues at stake in the OPEC–consumer balance. Ideally, detente will permit the issues to be worked out within their own context, independent of the older problems of ideological and global power competition.

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