CRISIS AND THREAT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING: SOME RELATIONAL CONCEPTS

Charles A. McClelland

University of Southern California

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Summarizes recent research and theory on international political/military crises in world politics. Advances new concepts on the relationship between the theory of threat to national security and the theory of severe crisis responses. Outlines an approach to empirical research based on the threat-crisis conceptualization.

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Charles A. McClelland
International Relations Research Institute
University of Southern California
School of International Relations
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

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CRISIS AND THREAT IN THE INTERNATIONAL SETTING: SOME RELATIONAL CONCEPTS

Charles A. McClelland

June 1975

Almost everyone who has studied the topic of international crises recently has had to struggle with the problem of identification. What, really, is an international crisis and how may it be distinguished, systematically, from non-crisis instances of rivalry, clash, confrontation, and danger involving two or more national states? So many studies of crisis have been published in the last fifteen years from so many different angles of inquiry that it is more difficult than it once was to be sure about the denotations and connotations of the term. Not only is there a heavy popular usage of the word in ordinary discourse but also there are indications that historical change has brought about an expansion of the variety of situations that are called readily by the crisis name.

MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO CRISIS RESEARCH

The authors of a lately-published proposal on how to go about forestalling international crises through the use of computer conferencing have had the advantage of studying the accumulated scholarly writings of a decade and a half on the subject of crisis definition, yet they remark, ". . .it is tempting to start by defining what is meant by a crisis, but this is a difficult matter. Crises are matters of degree, being emotionally linked to such subjective terms as calamity and emergency. In fact it is not necessary to define crises in order to discuss problems generally common to their management. . ." (1) James Robinson, in a guiding article in the INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, begins his discussion of the general topic of crisis by saying, "'Crisis' is a lay term in search of a scholarly meaning." (2) The problem of simply providing satisfactory definitions is one approach to the study of crisis.

A second preoccupation, related closely to that of definition, has been the search for adequate classifications of types of crises according to their observed characteristics or attributes. Perhaps the best known to date of the classificatory efforts is the categorizing of a number of crisis episodes in terms of combinations of varying amounts of threat, surprise, and decision time involved in the situations. (3)

Although he does not think well of the results, Edward

L. Morse points to the concentration of recent research in a third sector that he describes as inquiries into the "etiological analysis of the causes of crises and the various stages they go through before resolution..."(4) Morse asks for greater attention to the incompatibilities of objectives, which he thinks are central in the occurrences of international crises. Perhaps less neglected than he believes, the study of ends, goals, and objectives in crises is a third main aspect of the investigation into crisis phenomena.

A fourth area of interest and of active research is that of decision-making under conditions of crisis. Charles Hermann has delineated the sub-field of conflict and crisis studies as falling into two main branches: the decision-making and the systemic. (5) Under the decision-making perspective, interests have run to the problems of perception, of small group motivation, behavior, and interaction, of processes of arriving at decisions under conditions of psychological stress, and of effects on individual decision-makers. Closely related, if not entirely part of the decision-making focus, are studies of the organizational settings of government and of the organizational or bureaucratic behavior exhibited during times of severe international crisis.

We can distinguish still another area of the new research on crisis in the field of applied statecraft. This interest might be called, "how to wage a crisis effectively," or, perhaps, "how to plan for and cope with crises." Crisis management is the phrase now used commonly to identify this interest. Alexander George has done leading work in conceptualizing the approach to practical crisis management problems. (6)

This brief noting of several aspects of investigation in the more recent studies of crises serves mainly to suggest that a social phenomenon of extraordinary importance is now more fully recognized and more clearly understood than hitherto. Before 1960, scholarly interest went mainly to the historical reconstruction and description of the more famous instances of international crisis. Three sets of historical crises, set apart by two World Wars, then attracted scholarly labors. The first series of crises dominated the era of diplomatic history between 1870 and the outbreak of World War I in 1914. The second series was provoked by the aggressions and confrontations of the dictators of the 1930's, the two Munich crises of 1938 being the dramatic cases. The third followed soon after the close of World War II and was recognized quickly as belonging in

the context of Cold War. The latest series achieves identification merely by mention. Thus, the recall of place names of tension-ridden episodes has served the definition function: Berlin, Suez, Quemoy, the Congo, Cuba and others. The definition of what an international crisis is did not arouse serious problems in the pre-1960 period. The landmark instances of crisis in the three series seemed to be all anyone needed to establish an identification. Thus, "definition by mention" was the rule.

VARIOUS CURRENT CRISIS IDENTIFICATIONS

The present situation presents a great contrast: there is today no assurance that different analysts are addressing their thoughts and words to the same phenomenon. There are many different meanings and emphases. A confusing situation exists to the extent that one is well advised to go through the tiresome prelude of setting forth one's own definition before launching any other discussion. The variety of current meanings is readily illustrated. Two writings mentioned earlier specify present and future crisis perspectives in a way to puzzle those whose orientations are backward-looking to the Cold War series of confrontations. Edward Morse, for example, has declared that the kinds of "high politics" and security crises that everybody expected in the 1960's simply did not appear. Instead, in his view, economic crises took their place in the sixties. The new type was manifested in multinational conference rooms instead of on battlefields and national borders and had to do with "low" matters such as the prices of products, agricultural policy, and monetary problems. The French, in Morse's interpretation, became masters at instigating crises in order to advance their own national purposes.

The authors, quoted earlier in the passage saying that crises are difficult to define but that the definitional problem could be set aside safely, provide the names of topics they think may reach "crisis proportions" in the future: "worldwide inflation, worldwide resource shortages, extensive famine, and the inexorable quest for more deadly weapons..." (7) There is occasion for some anxiety about communication when we gather together under the crisis rubric such diverse circumstances as the Suez Crisis of 1956, the manipulative strategies of French negotiators at international conferences, and the future possibility of extensive famine. Where is the common ground? There are disorders of a similar kind in crisis identification even when the perspective is held to the simpler and more understandable environment of the Cold War period. Two governmental insiders wrote an informative article in

FOREIGN AFFAIRS in 1966 in which they described the approach then current in the government in Washington to "crisis management." The writers, John C. Ausland and Hugh F. Richardson, described the measures taken by the high level bureaucracy during the Berlin, Cyprus, and Laos embroilments of the period and proceeded, somewhat disturbingly, to explain how "crisis management" extended to the handling of what seem clearly to have been post-crisis affairs (such as the 1963 Autobahn convoy incidents). (8) The question, with respect to the identity of international crises, is whether or not such occurrences as the Autobahn incidents should be taken to be actual crises or something less.

These examples provide a reference point for directing the question of why, after fifteen years of special attention and reasonably intensive research, the specification of what an international crisis is has not yet achieved satisfactory status. Viable definitions seem to be even further out of reach than they were when definition by mention sufficed.

Scholars have considered the problem of specifying exactly what an international crisis is and also have acknowledged how important it is to find some solutions. The diagnosis of why the precise identification of crises has not been achieved is the standard one: the lack of theory. James Robinson is firm about this in saying, "We may open the discussion of theories by stating flatly that there is no such thing as a theory of crisis or even theories of crisis." (9) The diagnosis is not very useful because it leads into a circular problem. Definitions, perspectives, and propositions about crisis cannot be integrated and ordered properly due to the lack of appropriate theory but theory does not emerge when there is no clear intellectual focus on the fundamentals of the phenomenon. Further, pointing to the need for theory is a long way from the actual development of theory. In this imperfect world, all kinds of recognized needs persist and remain unmet. The repeated calls for better theory by social scientists on almost every subject appear to have become mostly a ritualistic habit.

In the case of the problem of defining international crises, I think the difficulty is better accounted for in more specific observations:

1. The concept of crisis (and, similarly, that of threat which is to be taken up later on in this discussion) involves important psychological

dimensions with the result that attending "subjective relativities" are hard, inherently, to clarify and explain.

2. It is a common result that when a topic is exposed to intensive query, its original, putative simplicity turns into something far more complicated and difficult to comprehend than anyone thought. This may be what has happened lately to the topic of crisis.

3. Multi-disciplinary investigations call forth exploration into recesses of specialized field literatures, dredge out different meanings and perspectives, and bring them into contact. Frequently, these orientations and approaches to meaning are incompatible or they are merely disjoint. Scholarly insights into the nature of crisis have come from political science, history, psychology, economics, and sociology. These have not emerged automatically in a harmonious gestalt.

4. Historical experience changes constantly and affects the intellectual outlook. The pace of change has a variable tempo. There is a strong and important possibility that the difficulty in knowing what an international crisis is stems from recent and quite rapid shifts in the historical context. Old global situations that were familiar and that periodically provided crisis occasions may be yielding quickly to new global situations with unfamiliar crisis potentials. If we are living in a major historical transition, we should expect some intellectual confusion.

A more detailed review of the many meanings of crisis as set forth in specialized literatures by various writers should not be needed here. (10) For the task ahead of indicating some conceptual junctions between international crisis and threat, it is necessary only to summarize a few high points in the recent search for the definition of crisis and to review the common understanding (however imprecise) of the concept (our "folk knowledge," so to

speak).

THE COMMON GROUND IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF CRISIS

Most basic to the common understanding is the extension of the medical analogy. This is the "turning point" theme and it is drawn, obviously, from the situation of the victim of an acute disease who has come to the critical stage between recovery and death. The image is projected conventionally to both private and public affairs without special consideration or worries over exact meaning. "The worst crisis in Cambodia since the ceasefire," "Six Crises," and the "The American Crisis" are example expressions found in ordinary discourse. The simplest transfer of the image to international politics occurs in references to the transition from peace to war. (11)

Nevertheless, it seems likely that the strongest meanings in the ordinary usage of the crisis concept are not those oriented to transitional phases (peace-war, recovery-death, etc.), but are, instead, directed to the psychological accompaniments: "feelings" of mingled hope and fear over the outcome, of optimistic and pessimistic appraisals of the nature of the probable resolution, of anxiety, of uncertainty, and of distraction on the part of concerned onlookers who cease many of their "normal" activities during the tense waiting period of the critical stage. The disease analogy, including the psychological side-effects just referred to, draws on well-known situations experienced by observers--such as diptheria cases in the 20's when the physician would announce to friends and relatives that he had done everything he could and, that, for the next 72 hours or so, all anyone could do would be to wait for the typical signs that forecast the outcome.

The ordinary psychological reaction to the physician's announcement is an additional dimension that is carried over to public affairs through the translated image. This is, on the one hand, a reluctant acknowledgement that power to direct matters has been lost momentarily and, on the other hand, a strong impulse to get somebody to make a decision and to try some further control measure before it is too late.

The recent conceptualizing of international crisis, it is easy to see, has drawn heavily on the "folk knowledge" image of the medical crisis. The psychological accompaniments, in particular, have been exploited heavily. In some definitions, the equivalent of the attacking disease such as diptheria is the onset of war, of conflict, of

violence. The notion of change through worsening stages to a critical point and then to resolution is a similar borrowing for the international crisis. When the criticisms are met that (1) conflict, violence, or war should not be taken, necessarily, as pathological and (2) that other situations (severe famines, for example) are becoming as important as political-security concerns over conflict, violence and war, the reformulations still cleave to the basic analogy of acute disease. Thus, it is interesting that a suggested system definition of international crisis rests fundamentally on the idea of homeostasis.

A crisis marks an important upset in the functioning of the international system. The old idea of a mechanical balance where the "system" remains inactive and at rest in equilibrium until it is disturbed by a force is replaced by a notion of complex, ongoing, overall "system" activity within some "normal range." Many small upsets and malfunctionings are accommodated but there also are occasional large and important disturbances that threaten the normal range operations of the international system. The outbreak of large-scale violence is but one of the possible important disturbances.

Oran Young, Andrew Scott, and many others have set forth abstract definitions of international crises along this line of system thought. The essential theme connects the crisis concept to the impact of a major disturbance on the "living balance" or homeostasis of a system being stressed away from its usual operating condition. (12) Many critics who surely use the term "crisis" in their ordinary daily speaking and writing become outraged when they note such "systemic" definitions and they complain against the employment of "organismic analogies." I see nothing wrong in the use of this particular abstraction, however, provided the homeostatic regulation and disturbance insight can be shown to fit the social domain and, in particular, the actual functioning of the international system. In any case, the baseline notion, either in ordinary folk knowledge terms or in system jargon, stems from the understanding of the sort of thing, in general, that takes place in the instance of somebody contracting a serious disease like diptheria.

When we turn to the psychological attributes associated with the everyday concept of crisis and consider how they have been elevated and expanded through recent scholarly analyses, we find the origin, again, in the medical or disease analogy. Look in this light, for instance, at Hermann's triad of high threat, short time, and surprise. (13) By Hermann's requirements, all three of these

situational elements must be present to identify properly a crisis and to set it apart from other situations.

The decision-maker faced by an emergency foreign policy problem, like the physician with a patient in a critical turning point condition, is very likely to feel the pressure to act quickly--to try to do something immediately to control the direction of events. There is a meta-decisional problem here: that of finding a level of behavior between the extremes of under-reaction and over-reaction. Reacting too little and too slowly may cause the decision-maker, as was said in Britain in the 1930's, to miss the bus. Reacting too vigorously may easily propel affairs toward an unwanted catastrophic outcome. The sad medical history of the last days of Charles II of England is, perhaps, the pacesetting example of all time by decision-makers who try too much too fast--in this instance, physicians who wished "to leave no stones unturned in his treatment." The treatment undertaken, according to contemporary records, included in part:

> one pint of blood taken from the left arm
> eight ounces of blood cupped from the shoulder
> an emetic and purgative administered
> an enema consisting of antimony, sacred bitters,
> fennel seed, linseed, cinnamon, saphron,
> cochineal and aloes
> a blister raised on the shaven scalp
> sneezing powder of hellebore root administered
> cowslip powder to "strengthen the brain" given
> soothing drinks of barley water, licorice and
> sweet almond
> soothing drinks of white wine, absinthe and anise
> a plaster on the feet of Burgundy pitch and
> pigeon dung
> further bleeding and purging
> further medication including melon seeds, manna,
> slippery elm, black cherry water, flowers of lime,
> lily of the valley, peony, lavender, and dissolved
> pearls.

As the King's condition worsened, Raleigh's antidote and bezoar stone were tried.

"As a sort of grand summary to this pharmaceutical debauch a mixture of Raleigh's antidote, pearl julep, and ammonia was forced down the throat of the dying King." (14) Over-response to perceptions of strong threats to important values and of short decision-making time due to the apparent acceleration of the pace of events is noted to be one of the principal dangers of international crises when this topic is

approached on the foreign policy-making side. Under-reaction is also a menace. A notable instance in British diplomatic history illustrating the point was Lord Grey's initial relaxed response to the 1914 crisis, founded on his reading of the affair as likely to follow the course and outcome of the 1908 Bosnian crisis.

Under the decision-making perspective, the main question is how to respond--what posture and what line of action to pursue--in the circumstance of a mounting crisis. Our common understanding of what any crisis is about includes, indeed, the elements of high threat and short time to act. An unelaborated, layman-like description is, simply, that a crisis is an emergency situation calling for close attention to signs of risk and danger and stimulating non-routine reactions. The third element proposed by Hermann as a necessary ingredient--surprise--does not fall into place as easily as the other two.

While it is true that an international crisis is, in a sense, always unexpected with regard to when and where it appears in a particular concatenation of historical detail, the surprise characteristic appears not to be a central feature. In fact, in this discussion, it is to be argued later that historical developments that are genuinely surprising do not lead directly into crisis stages. Our concept is, instead, that familiarization with changed historical circumstances is a necessary process that is carried out before crises begin to make their appearances. At this point, we are not yet ready to develop the argument on the surprise issue. There are other basic concepts of crisis identification, especially psychological ones, yet to consider.

CRITICAL EFFECTS IN RECENT CRISIS RESEARCH

The critical reception given to scholarly attempts to formulate crisis definitions has produced insights of importance and also some serious reservations about the easy transfer of the common knowledge image of crisis to the international setting. Since these criticisms may well be the chief products of the recent investigations into crisis phenomena, they deserve some attention. The psychological connotations that go with the crisis concept and that have been noted earlier do not present difficulties of general understanding. These are the "feelings" that cluster around emergency conditions: anxiety, tension, uncertainty, fear, hope, the need to act, and so on. This psychological dimension is most prominently "affective." Not yet brought

into full sight here is a second aspect of the psychological accompaniment: the "cognitive." Cognitive aspects have to do with recognizing, classifying, intellectualizing, rationalizing, interpreting, and factualizing. Here is where the principal troubles appear in transposing the image of the common sense medical analogy to public affairs (and to that part of public affairs designated as international affairs).

Overlooked most readily is the difference between physical and biological problems of crisis, on the one hand, and the political and economic problems of crisis in human society, on the other hand. The acute disease with its turning point characteristic is a representative example of the physical and biological instance. Although detection and diagnosis are not at all perfect here, a large enough number of instances of occurrence are experienced to allow skilled observers to develop lists of clear signs of both the nature and the progress of the disorder. Uncertainty is greatly reduced on the question of what is going wrong. Uncertainty may remain high on what intervention is best and also on the probable outcome, but high agreement on the trouble, itself, is frequently achieved. In human relations of all kinds, such agreement is obtained more rarely. The lists of clear signs do not develop. Instead, each new instance is perceived to take up its special place in the stream of history and the current instance is seen as different in its circumstances and without precedent in comparison with earlier instances. There are several ways to express the contrast between the physical-biological and the social phenomena, in these matters of detection and diagnosis.

One is to refer to the greater range of variability in human behavior and to the capacity of human individuals to act outside of established patterns. Another is to call attention to intellectual limitations when observations-of-self are attempted, compared to the reduction of the limitations when observations-of-others are made. A third is to reflect on man's shortcomings in reading and learning the lessons of history, especially in international affairs. (15) And, a fourth is to repeat what Kenneth Boulding has said: the trouble with history is that not enough happened in it. Of all the possible developments in human affairs, each capable of turning one way or some other, only one, the one that materializes historically, is factually known to us. Boulding meant something like this: the historical record is just a single track through time and it seems a serious loss that we cannot know much about the possible tracks of the various "might have been's." A further insight is that, in history, repeating forms of

experience seem to be few and far between with the result that we are hard-pressed to come to agreement on patterns and to recognize the evidence of reappearing forms. However the problem is described, the conclusion is that the cognitive activities of recognizing, classifying, and interpreting developments have less strength for social phenomena than for physical-biological phenomena.

To make the disease analogy fit the international crisis definition more comfortably, we should use in the illustration of disease types, not the well-identified ones such as smallpox and diptheria, but, instead, the more mysterious psychosomatic ones whose symptoms vary greatly from case to case and whose leading signs are complex and only dimly understood.

The diversity of perceptions relating to crisis identification in public affairs yields a rich harvest of uncertainties and relativistic evaluations. Who is seized by what crisis situation under what circumstances is a question whose answer is approached by "cognitive appraisal." Due to the differences in the appraising, one party's crisis may be another party's heaven-sent opportunity. The characterization depends on the cognitive equipment carried by the party. Anticipations of approaching harm or of approaching benefits have much to do with whether or not a set of circumstances will be interpreted as a crisis.

Weak and unsatisfying explanations arise from the reflection that a crisis does or does not exist according to the kind of appraisal brought forward to interpret the situation. If a great many people in a society regard their affairs to have come to a critical and dangerous point, there is a crisis. If the "prevailing outlook" does not focus on such a judgment, then the conclusion is forced that there is no crisis.

Anthony Wiener, apparently thinking in a similar vein, has raised the serious question of whether or not it is mistaken to refer to "international" crises. The crisis experience of major interest takes place at a national level. Wiener makes the telling point that "we are talking about a national crisis stemming from international relations" (16) and not about a particular condition in the international system. His further suggestion is that when Americans recognize international crises they really are identifying U.S. national crises. The same holds for other nationals and other nations. A definition that puts the cognitive appraising aspect of crisis in a central position and that also emphasizes the national point of view is the

statement that a crisis is a state of affairs authoritatively perceived to be of vital importance to the national society, still undecided as to outcome, not presently under control but potentially controllable by the taking of initiatives, and containing the prospect of very adverse consequences as one of the possible outcomes of the situation.

A reasonable extension of this definition to an international level can be made by specifying that the crisis becomes international when the perceived state of affairs is approximately the same in at least two national regimes. One common occurrence of this sharing is in the political confrontation of one nation by another. Some basic patterns, growing out of the relations of political confrontation, can be detected. One such pattern is in the case of shared perceptions where both parties foresee and dread the coming of an international crisis but can find no effective means to avoid it. A second pattern develops when one party is ruled by the perception of opportunities for gain to be advanced through crisis engagement while the other party reads the same signs but is preoccupied by a vision of forthcoming danger, hardship, and loss. A third pattern is the occasion on which both sides perceive that the opportunities for gains outweigh the risks and costs and, therefore, both enter the confrontation stage of crisis with strong expectations that only the other will be stressed by crisis problems.

The psychological relativism that confounds attempts to formulate universal definitions of crisis carries further than some basic patterns of confrontation such as those noted above. There is, for example, its impact on the factor of perception of short decision time. Robinson, in reaction to Hermann's definition for the decision-making perspective, points out certain complications. He states, "Duration is relative. What is a short time for one problem may be more than ample for another. . . .

"Response time should not be equated with clock time for at least two reasons. The first is that time has different meanings and effects for different decision makers. . . .

"The second difficulty with duration cannot be so easily disposed of or transferred conceptually. We refer again to task complexity as an element of response time. . . . It varies with the intricacies of the task at hand." (17)

There is a facet of time not noted by Robinson but

well-known in historical cases of international crises. Evaluations of threat and opportunity mingle frequently in these cases. A regime may be won over by the argument that a fleeting opportunity is at hand and that if the chance to subdue an opponent is not seized at once, the opportunity will not come again. The threat of an opportunity lost can be as great a motivating force as any other kind of threat. A similar idea is the judgment that "time is running out for our side."

The factual basis behind the arguments and judgments to act quickly is weak, invariably, because the critical events and circumstances envisaged in such arguments and judgments are anticipated eventualities. That is, they simply are forecasts since they refer to history that has not yet happened. Counter-arguments tend to lack effect because they, too, must stand without firm evidence of what will happen in the future.

OTHER PERSPECTIVES ON CRISIS IDENTIFICATION

Definitions or theories that would escape the psychological uncertainties would appear to have much in their favor. Those who have attempted to guide crisis analysis away from the affective and cognitive aspects have proposed that the goal-seeking or valuational side of the crisis topic might be an improvement. The relativistic status of the valuational approach has not always been appreciated, nowever. The premise in the concept is an acceptable common sense notion that a participant's crisis behavior must be motivated by a strong impulse to gain some objective being denied by an opponent or by an external condition of some kind. I. this "threat to values" were as simple and direct in human affairs as it is in the alternatives of recovery and death in the critical stage of a case of smallpox, then the valuational approach to crisis identification would have great merit.

The difficulty is that the evaluations brought to bear by individuals and organizations of a national society have an immense variety. National goals are, in fact, anything but simple. Instead, they commonly cross a wide spectrum, some elements being active and others latent. Some have a high psychological valence while others carry affect close to the level of indifference. Many individuals may feel their welfare would be endangered directly should a crisis strike but many others may fail completely to understand the threat to "cherished values," whatever the direction taken by public affairs. Crisis defined in terms of the defense of national values merely shifts the burden of identification

to the complex set of values requiring a defense. This identification is at least as difficult as for crisis, itself.

Even if we accept the "fact" that some complex of purposes, goals, and objectives is active under crisis conditions without our being able to say just what the complex is, we are then faced by the additional conceptual obstacle of change. Values shift their elements and their configuration in modern societies. Group aspirations vary over time and "permanent interests," if there are such, achieve different contexts in successive historical periods. Case studies of international crises have indicated that one aspect of crisis experience frequently is a quite rapid shift in the context of goal-seeking. There often is a shift in the terms of settlement the participants would be willing to accept. If a crisis is severe and tends toward stalemate, the initial objectives of the parties in conflict ordinarily will be trimmed back as the crisis continues. (18) The valuational approach appears to be both too complex and too variable to undergird any stable and universal definition or theory of crisis.

The oldest explanation of the coming of international crises is immune to the uncertainties and relativities that well up from the psychological source. It suffers other drawbacks, however. The progressive hardening of the lines of conflict between the members of the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente in Europe in the pre-1914 period appeared to be the cause of the series of clashes and crises that culminated in the Sarajevo Crisis in the summer of 1914. The generalization drawn from this experience is that whenever Great Powers join opposing armed camps and solidify their relations in committing alliances and alignments, political pressures will grow and the room to maneuver for settlements, accommodations, and compromises will shrink. Crises erupt at pressure points and they become increasingly difficult to resolve without pulling the opposing alliance members into war. Each crisis is worse than the previous one so that the occurrence of each marks a step closer to war. (19) It is this structural theory of crisis, based mainly on the pre-World War I experiences, that is in accord with the popular assumption that crises always represent a threat of approaching war.

The concept of increasing pressure can be replaced by the concept of a finely-adjusted balance. The mechanical analogy of equilibrium can be invoked so that a balance of power among nations can be imagined. Given a fine balance--an almost exact counterpoise--, the image is raised

that a small disturbance (i.e., a crisis) would be capable of producing large effects of unbalancing. On the other hand, the notion of growing pressure in a confined political space is more powerful because it permits an alternative explanation, namely, that a series of crises lets off excessive pressure, and thereby may become a preventive or a meliorative influence against the outbreak of war. The proposition emerges from this idea that the longer the run of crises, the less the probability of a war outcome. (20)

The political pressure concept facilitates an explanation of when crises will occur. An independent variable (crystallization of opposing alliance structures with attending commitments) is made to predict to a dependent variable (the outbreak of crisis). Without considering the difficulties in providing measures for the independent and dependent variables, we can see the weakness in the approach as soon as we reflect on the small number of historical cases available for testing the concept. In fact, the three series of crises available for analysis do not offer strong factual support for the pressure theory. Confrontations, that in their historical periods were regarded widely as international crises, appeared as prominently in the times the alliances were being forged as in the times following their apparent polarization and crystallization. Nor do we need to introduce the consideration that if the political leaders of Great Powers believed that crises were "the road to war," then crises probably would be interpreted in history that way. If they were not so regarded, crises might well be judged as having no relationship to the outbreak of war. The pressure concept appears to be in error simply on the ground of a poor fit with historical records. Whether or not the bipolarity of the Cold War period produced more crisis situations and greater war dangers than a multipolar system would have is unanalyzable but it is a matter of continuing speculation and controversy. (21)

Standing in contrast against all other conceptions mentioned previously is an approach to the identification of crises, based on the insight that public, overt behavior ought to be different in crisis situations compared with non-crisis situations. The idea resembles that used in economic analyses where aggregated behavior indicators (GNP, stock market averages, etc.) are employed to trace changes in the conditions of national economic activity. "Recessions," for example, are being defined technically according to quantitative indicator levels maintained longer than two successive quarters of a year. Political activity and economic activity are not alike sufficiently to allow

easy transfers by analogy from one to the other, however. International political behavior has no traditionally-founded quantitative measures such as money values, for instance. Nevertheless, some progress has been made lately toward classifying and measuring international events. Such events are recorded in the flow of public reports on what representatives of national governments say and do to each other. This saying and doing activity is the behavioral phenomenon of interest.

Common sense suggests, initially, that as a crisis develops, there should be a proportional increase in the amount (or, perhaps, the intensity) of conflict actions compared with neutral and cooperative kinds of actions. An index might be built to record the rising proportion, and above some level, a crisis could be said to exist, in a technical sense. Much research on the flow of public reports of international events fails to support strongly this expectation of a changed ratio of conflict actions as a sign that a crisis is appearing. A simpler indicator works better: the rising volume of reported events of all kinds appears to mark the advent of crisis. Another promising indicator, made more interesting because it runs against usual expectations, is the observed tendency for the proportions of conflictful, cooperative, and neutral event flows to move toward an equal distribution in a crisis period. The variety of events increases during the onset of a crisis. (22)

This behavioral approach, focused on the analysis of international events, has not yet reached its full development. Difficulties in stabilizing the selection of sources of reports of international events and liabilities in the short spans of historical experience analyzed to date explain why the definition of an international crisis has not yet become a matter of reading and interpreting behavioral event levels. It may yet come about that further research will succeed in the development of a composite indicator of international behavior which, when it passes a specified numerical value, will be the occasion for declaring a crisis to be in existence.

The ordinary objection to identifying international crises by behavioral indicators is that the theoretical basis for the procedure is thought to be weak. Robinson, in making a survey of conceptualizations of crisis, excluded the "event approach" because he judged it as contributing, perhaps, to crisis measurement but not to crisis theory. (23)

THREAT THEORY AS AN APPROACH TO CRISIS IDENTIFICATION

One approach to the explanation of international crises, not yet fully exploited, is to shift the main attention to a contributing concept. Theorists of crises may have been standing too close to their subject and, perhaps, they should retreat one step. By putting the prime focus on threat, they might arrive indirectly at a better understanding of crisis occurrences. A theory of threat, developed with an eye on crisis as an outcome, may be an advantageous approach to improved crisis theory.

Most of the students of crisis already have recognized that threat is a basic element in a crisis situation but that awareness has not led many of them into explorations of the factor. Instead, threat has tended to be taken as given by the setting of historical circumstances. In some respects, previously noted, threat is as difficult to define and identify as crisis. The same psychological characteristics hold sway. There is, however, a slight asset in conceptualizing threat because the connection between the threat response and the stimulus of experienced events is direct.

The fundamental proposition to be explored here is that events and event sequences beget the recognition of threats and that threats beget crises. Since it is evident immediately that not all events and event sequences generate threat responses and that not all threats lead into crises, the theory problem centers on the question of what the general statements should be concerning the conditions that do produce these results.

A complete discussion of the limiting and facilitating conditions in the linking of two processes of event-threat interaction and threat-crisis interaction becomes too complex to present with any clarity. In the interest of setting forth directly the prime ideas related to the conceptualization of the workings of the two connected processes, I propose to describe at this point only a first, rough approximation, with both oversimplification and under-specification featured. Complications and reservations will have to be dealt with separately in other following discussions. The means chosen to provide a first approximation to the wanted construct is to limit attention to the generalized case of the socialized, encultured individual human being. The individual psychological aspects of threat and crisis reactions prompt that choice but there remain the formidable complications involved in the shifts of level of inquiry from the individual to the group, to the

organization, to the societal aggregate of a nation or state, and to the inter-nation, inter-state plane. What will be done about these shifts in the first presentation will be to make some observations about effects, without developing full arguments about them. Later approximations and refinements will be needed to cope with these.

THE INDIVIDUAL CASE: EVENT FLOW TO THREAT RECOGNITION

When we say somebody is gaining experience, we are referring primarily to the contacts made and the effects produced in the ambient of the individual's life by specific occurrences and happenings. The sensation "of things happening" in a stream of time is a matter of personal knowledge. Psychological access to a single "happening" is provided either by a unitary perception of some series of directly sensed activity or by reports communicated by other individuals about their experiencing of the perception-activity integration. Cognition is the name of the transactional process that merges the intrapsychic perceiving and the sensed external activity. The product of cognition is the awareness or knowledge of a happening. By an "event" we mean such a single, delimited product of cognition, whether it is immediately produced or known only at secondhand through communication. It follows that a definition of an event has to be variable. The integrating process may have a small or a large span for the series of activities, depending on the individual, his enculturation, his concerns and purposes, and other considerations, as well. Thus, to a geologist, when he thinks as a geologist, an event may be the retreat of ice caps taking several millenia, to an historian, it may be the Thirty Years War or, in another context, the death of Hitler, but to a wife, remembering in a personal context, it may be in the recall of the first time she met her husband. The kinds of events, whether experienced directly or reported by others, need definition according to the "purpose" or "function" they serve in the cognitive processing by the individual perceiver. Affect influences the definition by adding a key to the cognitive product so that the latter is "important" or "trivial," or "ordinary" or "unusual," or "fear-arousing" or "gratifying," or "relevant" or "irrelevant," or some other (or added) potential of evaluation and emotion in a multidimensional "mental space."

A constant process in the individual works on the fitting of received, specific, place-and-time bounded events into dynamic affective/cognitive structures. Each event, "within one's ken" is unique in its actual time-place status but each is treated intrapsychically as a member of a class

and is sorted into place cognitively. Each individual seems to have some mental space reserved for such sorting and fitting of both experienced and reported events. Some of these are security-confirming while others are anxiety-inducing. The ones that are of particular interest in the present context are those that are read to reflect forthcoming risk, harm, danger, and unwanted change. These are, in a word, the events that are connected with threat.

What constitutes a threat for an individual? What is an appropriate definition of a threat? From the investigations made by the psychologists, we receive some helpful terminology and a basic concept of threat at the individual level. Simply put, a threat is an individual's anticipation of approaching harm that triggers a characteristic response called "stress." It has been shown that the onset of stress may be traced through a variety of psychological observations and physiological measurements. (24) Stress produces behavioral reactions and consequences known collectively as "coping." In the event-threat-crisis perspective, we need to note particularly the coping "output"--what an individual does under stress and after having experienced threat recognition. The coping generates new activities, some of which are attended to by others and interpreted as relevant events. These new events join with the memory of other events and are perceived as involving threat. We end with a conception of an event flow populated by "input" and "output" events that are related and interactive with respect to threat perceptions. This idea is of singular importance in the characterization of a crisis.

Those who follow the psychological literature on cognition, learning, and purposive behavior will be aware that I have been drawing out a very simplified version of the notion of intervening variables lying between stimulus and response and of still-controversial "mentalistic" formulations with respect to motives, expectations, and cognitive structures. This is made even more evident in the use of Edward Tolman's concept of the "cognitive map." (25) The reference to a "map" will remain vague and partly figurative since this "map" has no known physical being or empirically-verified construction. Its complexities are so great that they have not been described adequately even for one person. The abstraction serves a purpose, however, by furnishing both a concept and some language useful for further defining of threats. One's cognitive map is the stored and partly-ordered assembly of one's awareness and understanding of many ranges of topics, conditions, and circumstances. Its multidimensionality is considered to be one of its most prominent features. What we propose is,

simply, that on the cognitive map there is a "region" that is sensitive to cognitively-established events which indicate danger present or danger approaching. This "threat region" is conceived not to be always active in the sorting and integrating of arriving stimuli but is thought of as serving an early warning and alerting function in the recognition of potential threat-bearing events. In other words, the individual thinks about some events, briefly and in passing, as possibly containing some danger or harm or adverse future effect.

The threat region lies within the cognitive map. In turn, specific, active threat "fields" lie within the threat region. An active threat field is a focus on events to which special saliency is attached and to which decisions about appropriate response are rehearsed and brought forward into the foreground of awareness. A personal experience may be useful to illustrate the hypothesized movement of a "cognitive threat product," from the "region" to the "field" and back again ultimately to the "region."

Several years ago, my car was struck from behind at high speed by a passing car on a slight turn on the freeway. The collision put my vehicle out of control and led to a moderately bad wreck. The dangerous prospect of such a thing happening is present in the back of the mind of the regular freeway driver. That kind of latent awareness of danger and disaster would occupy what we have named the "threat region." In my case in the matter of automobiles and driving, the experience of being sideswiped and wrecked resulted in a cognitive and affective change lasting for many months in my subsequent coping behavior. Any car passing at fairly close range would trigger a sharp awareness of what was happening and would heighten immediately my preparedness to steer away from the possible contact. Further, I would find myself rehearsing, without consciously intending to, what the best defensive driving tactic probably would be for the road immediately ahead. Gradually, the reaction weakened and all but disappeared. This is an example of what is meant by an event causing a movement from the threat region to the active threat field. The general threat of freeway driving pre-existed the event of the collision, the collision event brought the threat forward to a specific "special alert" threat field but, in due course, probably for lack of the arrival of new reinforcing events, the threat field decayed and its residue finally moved back into the general region.

Whatever the particular items are that accumulate and populate the cognitive map in the form of active threat

fields, they appear to persist for some time. They also seem to generalize and expand to cover classes of events of wider scope than the original, traumatic, shaping incident. Thus, after a collision, the driver may well find himself more frequently stressed than previously by stops ahead, left turns, and closely following vehicles. An active threat field will order meaning and supply interpretations for a variety of experiences and not merely for the single type that induced the active threat field to emerge. Further, the sequence of events in the perceived event flow gives meaning to subsequent interpretations in the threat field. The integration of those events, keyed to the threat field, includes estimates and forecasts based on the past and current content in the event flow. Do the latest events fit into a trend? Do they heighten stress and coping responses because of a net assessment that the situation is worsening? Either because the numbers of new events per time span are lessening or because they are evaluated as less threatening than earlier ones, the assessment in the active threat field may bring about progressive relaxation and, eventually, the progressive decay of the field itself. Sometimes in these dynamics of sequential interpretations, a point may be reached at which the "need to act" by the individual overpowers the tendency to wait a little longer for more signs. Inactivity is abandoned quite suddenly in favor of overt, decisive responses to the perception of threat. It is, obviously, this change in response that marks the shift from the event-threat process to the threat-crisis process. The idea is that a threat burden may increase for some time without setting off any unusual or exceptional behavioral response. Eventually, a breaking point may be reached, after which the behavioral reaction is unusual and exceptional. This notion is a bridge between theory and method in the event approach to the identification of international crises.

We come to the destination too quickly in the preceding proposition, however, because the speculative paradigm concerns threat perception, recognition, and response only in the individual. While attention to the individual should not be neglected, it is completely unsatisfactory to interpret the activities of collectivities, such as organizations or nation-states, as the simple sum of individual member performances. Threats to a national system and international threats may be referred to appropriately only when some conceptualization is provided to describe how the individual-to-collectivity transfer is thought to be made.

THREAT REGION AND THREAT FIELD AT THE NATIONAL SOCIETAL LEVEL

In discussing the relationships between cognition and culture, the cultural anthropologist, Anthony Wallace, has offered some observations that are of help in moving forward the argument about threat recognition to levels of social organization beyond the individual. Wallace states:

> "This assemblage <the "cognitive map"> has been variously denoted the 'image,' the 'mazeway,' and so on; the term refers to the entire structure of the individual's cognition about himself and the surrounding world, including memories, abstract knowledge, and rules of thought. Although the total description of any one person's mazeway would doubtless be an impracticably large task, portions of any one mazeway can be described as a set of propositions which, in symbolic form, will approximate an internally consistent system. If they do sum to a system, then that sum is referred to as an aspect of 'their culture.' In general, summing to culture will occur under two conditions; : first, and obviously, if the individual mazeways are identical in content and internally consistent in structure; and second, if the individual mazeways, even if not all identical, sum to a consistent system. Anthropologists have traditionally drawn attention to the existence of identical (shared) structures and to a certain kind of sum (the equivalence structure) of nonshared structures." (26)

When the level is shifted to public affairs of a contemporary national society and to the flows of current international events, something like Wallace's explanation is required to make the transition from the individual level to the collective level. A theory of culture is needed to encompass the insight that modern national societies may be said to support, across national populations of individuals, some common threat regions and some common active threat fields. It is clear that, if these can be shown to exist by research investigations, they will belong in the category of nonshared structures. This means, obviously, that if we follow a theory of threat regions and fields, we should not anticipate that all individuals will be discovered to be sharing at the same time the same cognitive and behavioral characteristics. The variety of perception and reaction

should be great. To establish who shares what perception with whom is an important consideration.

Ethology, the study of animal behavior, provides extreme case observations about such sharing among individuals and these observations can be used as a baseline against which we can begin to evaluate the circumstances of modern human society in its responses to anticipated dangers. Profuse illustration of the general manner of "building in" to animal communities of the mechanisms of alarm reaction and threat response is readily available. Frequently, the threat response directed against a recognized external danger and the issuance of a warning of approaching danger to the community are combined efficiently in a single behavioral activity. Tinbergen tells a story about how Lorenz accidentally discovered an "(identical) shared structure" in a flock of jackdaws:

> "...once when Lorenz, coming back from a bath in the Danube, stood on his roof, surrounded by his Jackdaws, he discovered that he had quite forgotten to take the wet bathing suit out of his pocket. He took the black suit out, and in the same instant was surrounded by a cloud of panic-stricken Jackdaws, all uttering the alarm call and attacking him."

After a number of attempts to find the exact nature of that "stimulus situation" that alarmed the birds and caused them to respond so actively to a sign of danger, Lorenz isolated the triggering event as "Something black and dangling being carried." Tinbergen added the curious fact that this particular "black and dangling being carried" stimulus is very special to jackdaws: "Interestingly enough, there is no other innate reaction to predators in this social bird; the 'knowledge' of special predators has to be acquired, because the parents, during the long period of family life, warn the young when a predator appears, and this quickly conditions them." (27)

The distance is not immense between animal society and the small-scale units of human society prevailing through the millenia when the basic organizational forms were the peasant village and the band of the herdsmen or hunters. We can imagine readily how the perceptions retained from life experiences common to a few hundred people living together in close face to face relationships would be codified and passed along to new generations, with respect to what events augered danger and to what the community response to threat should be. Thus, the human equivalents for "something black, dangling and being carried" would be learned, communicated, and transmitted from generation to generation. The

possibility of finding close to identical cognitive structures, including threat regions and fields, shared by almost every member of the community would appear to be strong. In fact, anthropologists have taken advantage of such an assumption by conducting extended and intimate interviews with a few selected informants to discover the common cultural attributes of such small "traditional" communities.

Ethologists have provided a fundamental model of the workings of the perception of events activating alarm communications and threat responses in the community behavior of the social animals. This evidence is instructive to the extent that it suggests that characteristic group reactions to danger are both learned through experience and inherited through the genes. Ethnologists, whose studies of small traditional human communities enlighten us further, have furnished an understanding of how shared cognitive structures come into being for fairly large numbers of individuals bound together by common culture. The processes are cultural transmission (the substitute for genetic inheritance) and, again, group learning from directly experienced events arising in immediate environments. The integration of reactions to events that signal danger to the community and that mobilize ordered defense responses against threats is comprehended fairly readily. Without proceeding to do so, we can have some confidence that if we reviewed in detail a large number of the anthropological descriptions of the cultures of the small, face-to-face, nonliterate societies, we would be able to identify shared structures and, within them, recognizable threat regions. The important problem is, however, to account for similar phenomena in contemporary national cultures and societies.

Present day national societies are far from being large collections of villages held together by military control and extractive bureaucratic machinery. Many of the empires of the past were such collections of "building block" units whose local governance and welfare were little affected by the imperial regimes. It is said, of course, that India is a nation-state made up of 500,000 village communities but India is transitional. That country is well into the nation-building phase of modernity that penetrates villages and eventually replaces them. The aspiration of nation-builders often has been to create, on a large scale for millions of individuals, a replacement society that would be much like the village with respect to the sharing of culture. China today sends forth many reflections of the ambition to forge this kind of huge village for hundreds of millions scattered across thousands of square miles. The

historical thrust of social modernization, with its featured aspects of urbanization, industrialization, secularization, centralization, and skill specialization, has not resulted in the realization of the ideal of village community and culture writ large for the national society, however.

It has turned out that the individual members do not, at last, lead "whole lives" with the others of the national community. Instead, individual existence and experience are composed of varied and varying combinations of "part lives." Specialization (and the social segregation that goes with specialization) accounts for much of the segmenting of the "web of affiliation" of individuals. It has been observed appropriately that the modern man lives in a great crowd of fellow strangers. The individual does not know with any certainty that others with whom he associates and upon whom he depends share much personal knowledge and understanding with him. He is not sure that they have obtained similar cognitive and affective results from the lives they have led.

The calibration of self with others in the social bonding process is the same for the modern man as for the villager in that it is based both on direct, immediately perceived experience with events and on the communicated reports received from others. The significant difference is that under modern national circumstances, the proportions have changed greatly. If we take the image of the common life-sharing, integrated culture situation of the villager as the standard of comparison, we see that a much greater part of the modern man's socio-cultural calibration is based on communicated reports. Cognitive structuring becomes a matter of fitting "part life" pieces mostly acquired from remote sources at second or third hand into a mosaic. This is not easily accomplished. The difficulty with cognitive integration, commonly experienced, accounts for the otherwise silly-sounding question often heard: "Who am I?"

For the topic being pursued in this discussion, that part of the cognitive map that is devoted to the recognition of approaching hazards to self and community not only is likely to lack the clear ordering that we imagine has existed in the mind of the traditional man but is also likely to be unshared in detail across large numbers of individuals. Thus, if we are to assess the content of threats confronting national societies, we are going to have to contend with an intuitive summing up of non-shared structures, as Wallace proposes. The obstacles in the way of arriving at these estimates are not deficiencies in the epistemology, the theory, and the methods of social research

but exist in the phenomena to be investigated. What is one's threat is, literally, something else for large numbers of others.

The means invented in national societies for raising community alarms and communicating reports of impending dangers is, of course, mass communication. "The press" is such a familiar fixture in contemporary existence that thought is seldom given to it as an extraordinary culture-transmitting development. It does not occur to us readily or regularly that the daily gathering and diffusing of the news of the world are relatively new activities. In the period between the establishment of nation-wide news gathering organizations in the later decades of the nineteenth century to the second decade of the twentieth century, the access to "the news" of current events, along with guiding interpretations and opinions on what these events meant, was reserved to those able to read.

The coming of the electronic press extended mass communication first to audio and then to audio-visual access, thus skipping over, potentially, the barrier of illiteracy. The electronically-connected national society emerged concurrently with the electronically-connected planet in a developmental process that continues still at a rapid rate. When we analyze the question of what the main replacement is for the direct oral transmission of shared culture and common experience of the village community, the answer contains little mystery. Mass public communication is a main means substituted in mass society in the attempt to spread similar cognitive mosaics through national populations of individuals. With regard to the threat component of the cognitive structure, now presumably being spread and shared to a degree nationally, we should not be too ready to accept, however, the simple answer that mass communication is the mechanism that creates the common recognition of community threat. Such a potential is present but intervening factors modify the effects.

The flow of the public news, and along with it the flow of the commentary on its meaning, through the communication media accomplishes less than might be expected. Important constraints operate at both ends of the communication process and these complicate the picture of how the mass society integrates its responses to perceived dangers and how it organizes collective threat perceptions and reactions.

At the receiving end of the mass communication flow, modern man in the advanced national society ignores a large

portion of the reports of events brought to him. This has become well known through audience research. Communication systems bring a flood of messages to millions of individuals but most of the content fails to penetrate into cognitive maps. Among the more apparent reasons for this result are two main factors worth noting in the context of the interest in how threat signals are diffused in a large modern population. The first has to do with the individual's mental economy. The effect is simple and is known to all moderns. Given the constant torrent of arriving tele-sights, tele-sounds and other abstracted representations, one picks and chooses only a miniscule part for attention and remembering. The personal equation is one key in the process of selective perception: "does this item in the news, this persuasive message, or this supplied interpretaton apply to me?" The transmission of the public news about the coming of a foreign war is translated by mothers, for example, into the anxious question of whether their children will have to fight and be killed in the war. The checking of messages for personal relevance results in the turning aside of most. In the matter of personal response to alarm signals, to warning messages, and to reports of impending dangers, so many of these are carried along in the public communication flow about so many different situations that the individual develops a defense of indifference against them. Individual adaptation leads to the rejection or ignoring of most of such threat-bearing signals. The more advanced, the more intricately organized, and the more vulnerable to breakdown the interlocked specialized institutions of contemporary national societies become, the higher the threshold of indifference rises in the collective reception of reports of threat.

The second factor in the shared processing of the alarm-warning-threat elements in the public communication flow is the symbolic re-representation of the substantial content of arriving messages. The proposition that the medium is the message becomes sensible when we recognize that the repetitions, day after day, of the "stories" of the news of the day seen in newspapers and magazines and on radio and television programs generate a "second order" effect in audiences. Like inspectors on a production line manufacturing countless numbers of glass bottles, audiences scan configuratively, for "sameness" and "difference" in the passing items. Audiences also pay attention to the quantitative variations in the flow, itself. On some rare days, "nothing happens" in the news. The tendency is to evaluate not each item, one at a time, but, instead, to inspect whole sets or lots in sequential series. This assembly line perspective is enhanced by the development of

conventionalized expressions and standardized terminology in the presentation of the stories of the events and developments of public affairs.

George Orwell in exercising the artist's license to impress by exaggeration, emphasized how modern national societies ordinarily meet the problem of supplying a workable substitute for the village's shared cognitive experience. In NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, Orwell simply stepped up logically what he saw occurring all around him in public communication and, chillingly, advanced the practice to the ultimate of Newspeak. (28) Thus, the "B vocabulary" was his "political" or public affairs category, (1) dedicated plainly to a fused abstraction for the scanning of events in the communication flow ("The B words were in all cases compound words. They consisted of two or more words, or portions of words, welded together in an easily pronounceable form. The resulting amalgam was always a noun-verb, and inflected according to the ordinary rules.") (29) and (2) codified in a way to facilitate a recognition of standard expressions which are symbolic of the status of reports sent along the assembly line of communication ("The B words were a sort of verbal shorthand, often packing whole ranges of ideas into a few syllables, and at the same time more accurate and forcible than ordinary language.") (30) and ("The name of every organization, or body of people, or doctrine, or country, or institution, or public building was invariably cut down into the familiar shape; that is a single easily pronounced word with the smallest number of syllables that would preserve the original derivations.") (31)

Earlier, Norman Douglas had called attention to this tendency in modern society to produce standard simple meta-images (the various social equivalents bearing on threat as "Something black, dangling and being carried") which he had noticed especially by contrast through contacts in India with the intelligent but illiterate "traditional man." In a passage commenting on the latter, Douglas wrote:

> "There is a spontaneity in his utterance; not a chain of cliches more or less laboriously strung together. That talk of his, clear-cut and original, is like a breath of fresh air in our education-tainted atmosphere, where everybody says exactly what you expect him to say. With this man, you never can tell what he is going to say, because you never can tell what he has been thinking. Had he been reading the daily paper

> or the last novel you could tell at once. His brain has not been addled with such things, nor with chatter about them." (32)

To employ a musical analogy, one might say that the process of mass audience conversion and assimilation of communication content into shared cognitive structures resembles the audience attention to the performance of a musical composition, if the audience should ignore the "content" of the stream of notes in order to attend mainly to the title and the key signature of the composition and, thereafter, only to changes in the tempo and loudness of the performance. We know when to feel alarmed about the future safety of the national community because we receive threat cues in the stream of public communication composed, ostensibly, only of "news and comment." We react in phase with many others, knowing how to judge increasing and declining threat by retrieving such information from the symbolic overlay of the repetitions of event reports. (33)

It is to be theorized, then, that one mass media function is to bring to large national audiences the symbolic stimuli that ride on the stream of reports of factual detail about the distant situations and happenings of public affairs. These salient cues, carried in the flow of explicit communication, give both cognitive and affective guidance. With respect to national threat recognition, it seems likely that only a small set of threat fields can be held in the audience focus in a given period. The content shifts slowly, some new fields drift into the general awareness and some old fields erode away slowly. The fear of communist aggression from abroad has faded in recent years in the American image while the threat of ecological and economic dangers has come to the fore. Not as planned, incisive, and potent as Newspeak, the transmitted symbolism contained in the news of the day has effects that are similar to those that are greatly magnified in the Orwellian fiction. Not as stable, not as enduring, and not as fully shared as the passing down of lore in the traditional social system, the contemporary public communication facilities serve a similar purpose but for vastly larger numbers of the modern national society.

The useful proposition for directing research in all this is that the main data for tracing the ebb and flow of threat signs at the nation-state level exist in the common and readily-available material of news reporting via mass communication. It is to be assumed for purposes of research and testing that there is displayed daily at the "window" of the print and electronic media the important content from which is drawn the social equivalent of the individual's

threat region and threat field. Neither secret intelligence files nor specialized sources need be sought out for evidence of the changing status of national perceptions of threat. The information of importance appears in the public press. It only needs systematic and explicit translating by research into forms that accord with the symbolic evaluation process used intuitively by mass audiences. Event analysis, discussed earlier in the context of crisis measurement, thus has a theoretical grounding in the study of threat dynamics. By extracting indicators of the symbolic overlay, research should be able to produce not only an estimate of what matters exist on a country's national threat agenda, but also a record over time of the variations in the threat burden. Reinforcing this expectation are observations yet to be stated that relate to the initiating side of the mass communication process.

In the usual conceptualization of the nation-building process, much attention has been directed to the difficulties encountered by the central governments of new nations. It has been pointed out correctly that the transitional phases of modernization are extremely demanding, both politically and administrativel,. The central regime is harassed by needs and requirements to accomplish everything at once. Foreign enemies or foreign penetration must be resisted while local political opposition must be contained. Capital must be collected or borrowed to finance industry, education, public facilities, and military defense. Social and economic services must be instituted and directed while governmental institutions are being established and governmental machinery is being put into place. Typically, multiple problems with staggering dimensions have to be met by a woefully small force of trained and experienced governmental workers. Development in the Third World has been seen to be characterized by such awesome tasks of the transition.

Usually unstated but almost always inferred is the prospect that modernity, once achieved, brings into being a different and easier state of affairs. Until recently, the insight was obscured that the achievement of modernization does not lighten the burden of central government. The situation continues of having to attend to dozens of pressing problems, arriving all together. Having much more to do than can, in fact, be done is a basic condition in the advanced modernized society. Indonesia and Tanzania experience transitional management difficulties but Denmark and Japan feel the stress and strain of severe problems that come from being advanced and modernizing. In all these, there goes on some selection process to decide what will be

attended to and what not. This selection process of "setting the national priorities" in Britain, France, the Soviet Union, Sweden, the United States, Italy, Czechoslovakia and the other modern countries has different characteristics from place to place but it reduces to decisions on where scarce resources will be directed, where the mobilization of effort and attention will be placed and where problem-solving efforts will be focused. In system terminology, governments fall short on requisite variety compared against the variety existing in the societies at large. The latter cannot be put successfully under the regulation of the former. (34) Stated less abstractly, the situation prevails constantly of appeals, influence attempts, and urgent demands being brought to the central government for action and for program and resource allocations. Most of this "input" is fated to be turned aside and only a small part of the whole can be given "priority." The sorting out takes place in a hybrid setting that combines the elements of both a marketplace and a conflict arena. To be emphasized, of course, is the difference from nation-state to nation-state in the method of selection of the "national agenda of public affairs." Roger Cobb and Charles Elder have addressed the question of how the process occurs in the United States. They have been concerned to state how getting public policy issues on the national agenda takes place. Some of their observations have special relevance for the understanding of threat and crisis dynamics at the national community level.

Cobb and Elder are oriented toward democratic theory and, therefore, give particular attention to factors such as participation and representation. Their scope of inquiry is much larger than that appropriate for threat and crisis. What they emphasize, however, is how the struggle to bring a public policy issue into the national limelight and into the central governmental machinery results in a winnowing process. An "agenda" composed of relatively few items comes into being, chosen by a relatively small segment of the whole national "attentive" public, and transmuted into simplified and symbolized forms of identification. In addition, they emphasize the unusual staying power of a public policy issue, once it has made its way successfully to the agenda. They devote a chapter, also, to the role of the mass media. They refer to the "dynamic interplay between symbol usage and the techniques groups utilize to gain and direct supportive public attention. The mass media plays <sic> a pivotal role in highlighting this interplay and in determining the success of an issue." (35)

Within the context provided by these theorists, some

statements can be added having to do with the part played by the imagery of threat. Leaders and officials of the central government have a traffic with the symbolic overlay carried along with the mass communication of daily reports of events and developments, no less than the audiences at the other end of the communication chain. On first thought, one might conclude readily that the head of the state and a few officials at the top of the governmental hierarchy are the ones who originate the message flow that sounds the alarm signals, the warnings, and the important information of threats and crises for the public. Certainly, for the United States, the authoritative voice of the President in announcing emergencies and the approaches of serious imminent danger is the legitimizing factor of greatest weight for the national audience. It is also beyond doubt that the public communication system has become the vital link between the President and the public. It seems almost the case that a crisis does not exist for the nation until the President announces it.

A more realistic view is that when the spokesman of the central government, whether that be the President or somebody else, transmits a major alerting message, it will be about a circumstance or issue that already has risen to a top priority position on the agenda in the competition with other circumstances and issues. A complex process will already have been at work including the symbolization and simplification of the issue, the assessment of the consequences of inaction, the exploration of the possible policy lines that could be followed, and the preparation of the context for mass audiences via the news media. A reciprocally-influencing activity circulates within and around the central government. Ordinarily, no one individual, group, agency, or interest, decides on what issues will be made paramount. A convergence of cognition focused on some particular shared imagery and in phase with occurring events will have taken place. It may happen quickly and, in its timing, it may lead the attentive public somewhat or it may lag behind somewhat. The circulating flow of communication, perception, opinion, and influence is on the order of the portrayal of mutually causing and interacting effects as set forth by James Rosenau. (36) The interplay is the mechanism through which the cognitive convergence develops .

Press and government are in symbiotic relationship, as has often been said. The case is not the simple one of the regime deciding what fare to serve up to the mass communication organizations, which then dutifully transmit the chosen material to an indiscriminately-receiving public,

however. An approximate abstract description that emphasizes the circulation of reciprocal influences and effects is the better concept. It is to be kept in mind, also, that how a problem gets to the top of the public policy agenda in the United States would not be the same in France and the Soviet Union. Different but comparably complex processes would be expected in other modern countries. The Cobb and Elder formulation has the merit of stressing the complexity of agenda-building and it offsets the stereotype of the government and the press in a conspiracy to feed the national society a small and selected diet of public issues.

The filters and the selection procedures produce a phenomenon of considerable importance for the understanding of the relationship between threat and crisis. At the governmental end, the reaction to the vast and constantly incoming stream of matters represented as urgent and requiring attention is to reduce these to routine as far as possible. Modernized governments have built up proliferated administrative systems to cope with this traffic. Those items that fail to get into the public spotlight and on the national agenda are shunted to the administrative organizations for handling. This is also where most of the reports that carry elements of warning and threat regarding forthcoming societal dangers go. The administrative function is to buffer such signals and to respond to issues and problems so that they stay within some "normal" bounds and do not develop into emergencies and crises. The thankless task of middle and lower level bureaucrats is to cope and buffer. Here is an institutional counterpart to the raising of the threshold of indifference by the modern individual as protection against the constant bombardment of warnings and threats. What the bureaucrat most tries to do is to avert "heat."

"Heat" is an expression borrowed recently by politics from movie gangster argot to describe the impact of pressure and publicity. Heat is to the administrative apparatus what threat is to the collectivity of individuals in the national society. In both, the effect is to cause a break in routines and a reformulation of expectations. The devotion to routines presided over by sub-organizational units in government, where there is a stake in such maintenance, provides for some stability in the social system. The benefits to order brought about by holding to standard operating procedures are offset, however, by a loss in the capacity to meet problems that will become catastrophic unless they are dealt with promptly. Most of the time, situations calling for system adjustments and corrections in the national society are treated incrementally. Small,

piecemeal, and unspectacular actions are marshalled to cope with the problems that are brought to attention. Most problems are worn down gradually under administrative-style treatments.

The business-as-usual approach applies also to most of the issues that achieve a place on the national agenda. From time to time, there is a switch in the approach, however. When administrators feel "heat" in a situation, they know instinctively that the odds are decreasing that orderly routines will be thrown to the winds, and that an emergency mode of operation will take command. The latter outcome signifies failure to the administrative mind because it represents an inability to continue the assigned task of coping with and buffering problems. The anticipation of a coming break into the emergency mode of operation is, in itself, a significant threat to the "little world" of administrative routine. These observations may be generalized to a theoretical point: that in virtually all modernized national societies there exists a two-mode pattern of organizational behavior. Routine activity prevails. From time to time, routine is overridden by the emergency approach. The question of interest is, then, when does routine give way to emergency?

The apparent answer is that, when a series of events is connected with a perception of threat and when that perception of threat is resonant and communicated, the likelihood of an emergency response increases sharply. Many experiences involving small matters in daily public life provide rehearsals of how the change to the emergency response can be expected to occur. There is a standard sequence in the development. The monitoring by the news media brings about a focusing of attention on a series of events causing the latter to become significant. It often happens that very similar kinds of events have been reported previously without the effect of making them noteworthy. The difference is accounted for when a series of reported events fits in with a latent threat region and spurs the cognitive transition to an active threat field. Psychological stress appears and spreads, the feeling of the need to act emerges, uncertainty grows, and a sense of urgency develops. The routine administrative hold on the affair weakens. The barrier of indifference of the audience lowers so that more heed is given to warnings and to threat messages. As these things happen, the emergency mode of response progressively challenges the routine procedures. Nothing works more surely and more swiftly than the conjunction of reported events with an active threat image to bring an issue out of the crowd and to the front on an agenda of public affairs.

The foregoing description resembles closely the identification of a crisis as set forth earlier. The modification is that the appearance of the crisis phenomenon is now placed in a context of several added conceptualizations. Events beget threats and threats beget crises but through complex and subtle processes not reflected adequately in the summarizing statement itself.

If the triggering events have a large scope and if the perceived threat is symbolized as a major national danger (such as runaway inflation or the prospect of war), then the agenda of main issues of the national government will be affected. The two-mode response situation can be expected to be affected also. The onset of crisis is marked by the circular feedback of emergency responses between the audience and the regime. The two are brought into sympathetic interaction by the means of public communications. The readiness to react to crisis situations is reinforced constantly by the appearance of lesser threat-bearing events and symbols in audiences and organizations below the national level. The expectation of the switch to the emergency response stays active since many lesser instances always are occurring in the lower hierarchy of government and at local levels.

Crises are expected. They are not entirely adverse experiences. They break up the sameness of things and generate that combination of suspense, dread, and excitement that is gratifying after the fact when the passage is made back to a prosaic and safe condition. Indeed, a crisis response is conditioned by an expectation that a return to a safe state of affairs is possible and, in fact, that preparation has been made to reach that objective. If a threat field comes to full realization under genuinely surprising circumstances, no crisis is likely to develop. The reason is that emergency responses require guidelines and plans for countering the threat condition. Without at least some shared images of what measures are possible and relevant, a collective response is not possible. True surprise is disorienting and its social behavioral consequence is the aimless, milling-around activity so regularly observed on disaster scenes. A crisis cannot develop without a mobilization of some kind of emergency actions. Past patterns of response that matched past threat situations are brought into play, commonly. It must be known "what to do" to engage in a crisis.

For example, one can argue from the emergency response conceptualization that the oil embargo of the winter of

1973-74 did not produce an international crisis because its imposition contained enough surprise to catch the governments and publics of Europe, Japan, and the United States without practicable and available approaches for counter-action at that time. Since the ending of the embargo, very active searching has been going forward for avenues of response, should another oil embargo be instituted. On the basis of the readiness concept, it would be predicted that an international crisis would result if another embargo were imposed. That result would arise from the neutralization of surprise and a presumed availability of emergency plans to counter the threat.

The impulse to defend against threat is basic. The crisis theme at its most elemental has been repeated over and over in dozens of science fiction books and motion pictures. The typical sequence is as follows: An evil and growing presence appears on the planet. From its minute origin, this presence grows and spreads and is soon recognized by a few as a serious threat. The alarm that is raised by the few is discounted and repudiated by the authorities. Soon, the threat becomes too great to be ignored, however, and the established plan of emergency response is activated. By escalation, military force is used against the invader until the complete military capability has been engaged. These measures all fail and panic sets in. The hero, working under extreme conditions of high threat and short decision time, finally finds a "solution"--a countering plan to destroy the presence. It works at the last moment before complete disaster. Everyone returns then to the security of day to day routines.

The coming and going of little crises are less dramatic than the monster cases but they tap the same threat and crisis sources. An episode publicized recently in Los Angeles is a concrete illustration. The triggering event was the fall of a large and heavy palm tree across the roof of a small house. The tree had been planted many years before by the city. The homeowner was a man of modest means, long employed but at the moment thrown out of work like many others by the recession. The "threat region" being shared by many of the possibility of the loss of income may have had some bearing on what followed next. The homeowner sought help. The tree had to be removed, he felt the tree was too large for his own efforts and he judged he could not pay for its removal. Therefore, he turned to the agencies of city government for assistance. At each office and agency, he found understanding and, sometimes, sympathy for his problem but no help. Everywhere, rules and regulations forbade action by the municipal offices. At the homeowner's point of

ultimate despair, a local television station told his story on "the 6 o'clock news." The resulting glare of publicity put "heat" on the city administration. The threat brought action. The city councilman, whose staff had told the homeowner that no help could be given, reversed this opinion. He invoked emergency action, overrode the routine handling procedures, and ordered the tree to be removed.

In the Soviet Union, it has been a common practice to use the crisis mechanism to attack domestic inefficiency, malpractice, and dishonesty. Events of local incidents are broadcast by the government-directed communication media to highlight shortcomings and to stimulate reforms. Campaigns of corrective action are mobilized in the society by the utilization of the threat-emergency response device.

EVENTS, THREAT, AND CRISIS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ASPECT

The theoretical argument on how and why national governments are seized from time to time by major crisis situations may now be summarized. It is useful to review the pattern of action in reverse order and in terms of requisites. The end result of the whole process is a particular behavioral manifestation which serves to define crisis: the mobilization of emergency activities led by the national regime and supported by resonant responses from the governmental hierarchy and from the national mass public. Requisite to the emergency mobilization are several prior circumstances of readiness:

1. Widespread public reports of events that give the direct occasion for the move to an emergency status.
2. Activation of shared perceptions of threat connected with the reports of events.
3. Prior preparations that allow the activation of threat recognition including (a) a previous linking of a threat theme with an issue entrenched in the national policy agenda, (b) a previous exploration of possible lines of counter-action to the threat and (c) a simplified and symbolic re-representation of the complex situation that bears the threat.
4. An overturn of the public defense of indifference to warnings of danger and of the bureaucratic resistance to non-routine approaches to problems.

Requisite and prior to these preparations for crisis launching is the habituation of the national populace to unshared culture structures and to mass communication sources for much of the organization and content of the individual's cognitive map.

It should be apparent without making a great point of it that national societies act and respond in other ways than through the event-threat-crisis pattern to institute programs and to work toward shared objectives. In the governmental direction of the "home affairs" of a nation, the crisis route as described here is followed relatively rarely. It seems to be the case that the appearance of crisis behavior is more frequent in foreign affairs. From the history of the past thirty years of American experience, it is more difficult to recall instances in domestic affairs that match the requirements and requisites than in foreign affairs. The internal crises that fit the stated criteria, more or less, all have centered on the Presidency: the death of Franklin Roosevelt at a critical moment, the assassination of John Kennedy, and the Watergate disaster of Richard Nixon. On the international side, the cases that match are more numerous and they meet the definitional requirements more surely: the first weeks of the Berlin Blockade in 1948, the June week of decisions at the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the Soviet threat and the surprise in the Anglo-French participation in the Suez war in 1956, and the Cuban missile episode in 1962 are the more prominent instances.

One possible reason for the easier association of international events with widespread cognitive appraisals of threat may lie in the fundamental simplicity of the meaning of external danger. A somatic imagery is invoked readily and the actual expression of the idea of damage to the body frequently is employed. (37) In fact, most foreign policy matters, with respect to underlying motivation, can be reduced to essentials by relating them to avoidance or approach reactions to anticipated somatic damage.

The first basic anticipation is of harm delivered directly and violently by stabbing, shooting, slashing, exploding, and crushing. This imagining of being hurt from outside in these ways transfers to international politics as military action. Military force is the means both of executing such damage and of defending against it. The threat of armed attack is the classic form.

A second anticipation envisages harm arriving through

internal intrusion according to the analog of the body being poisoned or of being attacked by micro-organisms. Subversion, sabotage, and other kinds of "internal aggression" are projective concerns that can become politically active.

A third image of bodily hurt that may arise from the interpretation of foreign events is the possibility of being physically bound, held, encircled, besieged, or imprisoned. Constraint on movement is a distinct kind of somatic threat.

A fourth type occurs in the prospect of being shut off from essentials required to maintain life. Squeezing, smothering, seizing, throttling, starving, isolating, and excluding are among the descriptors of this threat image. Such a somatic representation of external threat is generated frequently by an awareness that access to a place, to an essential resource, or to some vital process is being closed down progressively. French foreign policy in the late nineteenth century "scramble for Africa" was built from the argument that, unless France took her "share" of African territory, there would be, later on, a deprivation of raw materials and manpower. These would have fallen into the hands of competing European countries and there would be no way at a later time to gain access to increasingly scarce resources. This anticipation of threat against access and future survival gave the direction to French colonial policy in that era.

How much importance should be assigned to the influence of somatic symbols of threat in foreign affairs? In the reduction of the complexities of international situations to terms simple and understandable enough to support collective national actions, do the anxiety images of bodily harm very frequently play a major part? The danger in responding to these questions comes from the possibility that an observer can be reflecting more his personal philosophical and social outlook than assessing the actual state of affairs. There are, in fact, such conflicting orientations regarding the degree of cooperation and conflict in international affairs that the issue is left in limbo. On the one hand, the assumptions of political realism include the idea that the game of international politics goes by the fundamental rule of self-protection of the national entity against the predatory tendencies of others. Other states will impose hurt and damage unless self-defense holds off these aggressive actions. On the other hand, there is the inescapable insight that basic factors of trust, goodwill, and collaborative intentions must be active in the relations among nations to allow the contacts and exchanges that in

fact take place. Undertakings abroad could not root and flourish as they do if threat were always uppermost.

Fluctuations in the balance of the two tendencies must be made the basis of the proper interpretation. The notion of shifting proportions of trust and suspicion and of threat and reassurance only points in the direction of contingent answers. Thus, we may not be able to determine just when the welling-up of images of somatic harm becomes a dominating force. It may not be possible to account for the variations in the proportions in the collective cognitive interplay of hopes and fears and of conflict and cooperation as these are stimulated by the stream of international events. What can be asserted is that when the reported event flow merges with national threat sensitivites, the symbolic references are very likely to take somatic forms. The surface detail of the acts and motivations of foreign parties become subsumed in a structure of more basic meanings. The latter reduce, it is to be argued, to somatic interpretations of threat.

The more closely the historical cases of prominent international crises are reviewed from the standpoint of the four somatic types of threat references, the more central the concept of threat recognition cast at this most fundamental level appears. The theoretical result is to state that somatic characterizations of external threat are powerful catalysts of international crises. It is to be proposed that in virtually every historical instance of major international crisis, the guiding influence has been the primal image of a somatic type of threat.

THEORY TO RESEARCH: TESTING THE EVENT-THREAT-CRISIS CONNECTION

The theoretical arguments bearing on threat and crisis should be put to work through current studies of ongoing situations. Designs of empirical research should be formulated around the conceptions set forth here on what should be expected to develop in "real time" international situations. The expectations as projected can be compared with observations. Given one or several countries whose actions and responses are of interest in the event-threat-crisis aspect, the appropriate design of research would require the mobilization of three bodies of observation.

The first requirement would be to set forth the identifications of the principal items of the current threat agenda of public affairs of the countries in question. The key questions are, what is the existing threat burden being

carried and where are the main national threat sensitivities? The assumptions are that public communication will reflect the nature of the burden, that the agenda will mix internal and external concerns, and that there will take place some movement in the positions of issues according to relative importance and emphasis. New observations on the status of threat region sensitivity will need to be taken periodically in order to follow the dynamics of agenda-changing.

The second research capability would have to do with accounting for the impact of international events on the sensitivity to threat. A running record would be kept of the happenings in the world deemed salient and important enough to pass through the selection systems of the national news reporting and public communication channels. The maintenance of international event files over a period of time and kept up as close to the current date as possible would mobilize the needed evidence on the potential sources of threat activation.

The third requirement would lead to the development of the capability to observe the effects of those reports of international events and developments that strike home and that touch and activate threat sensitivities. The resulting evidence would accrue from a constant reading of the content of the symbolic overlay. The main objective would be to devise systematic procedures that would give explicit indications of the direction of movement between passive awareness and active response to perceived threat. The third body of evidence would be expected to give indications of the rise of specific threat fields and of the collective readiness to make shifts into the emergency mode of operation.

The estimation of the probability of the onset of new crisis situations would result from the analysis of convergence patterns in the three bodies of data. A shifting vector made up of three elements, each of which changes over time should be conceived. Analysis would run to repeated inspections of the paths of the vector while forecasting and early warning indications would be based on cumulated histories of the paths compared with the most recent observations of their latest positions.

The testing of the event-threat and the threat-crisis linkages in international settings needs to be focused on the study of current and emerging data. The possibility of acquiring a better grasp of knowledge of international conflict and crisis phenomena turns on the ability to arrive

at specific understandings of dynamics. The problem has a form similar to that faced in climatic analysis and weather forecasting. Similar circumstances include complex and variable patterning, large uncertainties, local effects, and frequent forecasting failures. In both, current movement is at the focus of research attention.

The need to engage in constant evaluations of current conditions is a prime consideration. It should not be the exclusive concern, however. Historical reconstructions and re-interpretations also are worth undertaking. These may be found to be useful and important for the clarification or the modification of theoretical constructs of threat, crisis, and their relationships.

Recent theoretical writing in the field of international relations has called attention repeatedly to the inter-locking and inter-linking processes of politics and economics within and between national societies. The conception of the international system as an interacting complex of internal and external activities and relationships continues to impose on theory and research the demand to specify more exactly what the complex is and how it works. It should be obvious that the complex is not driven entirely by the force of threat. That the international system is greatly affected by threat and the perception of threat is, on the other hand, a proposition with great face validity.

If we want to improve the understanding of the international behavior of another country, closer attention should go to the threat burden it is carrying and to the selective perceptions of government and populace about their anticipations of coming harm and danger. The tendencies toward friendship or hostility are affected by threat recognition. The impulse to maintain relationships and commitments with other countries or to change these in new arrangements stem, to a considerable extent, from the dynamic workings of threat recognition. Mutual causation relates events to threats and threats to crises. The reverse order also holds true, both logically and existentially: crises cause threats and threats cause events. The topic of threat deserves a more thoroughgoing examination than it has been given in social and behavioral sciences. Unpleasant to contemplate, it is, nevertheless, one of the important elements of motivation and behavior in human affairs.

Footnotes

1. Robert H. Kupperman, Richard H. Wilcox, and Harvey A. Smith, "Crisis Management: Some Opportunities," SCIENCE, 187 (February 7, 1975), 404-410, p. 404.

2. David L. Sills, ed., INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 17 vols., 1968. Volume 3, 510-514, p. 510.

3. Charles F. Hermann, "International Crisis as a Situational Variable," in James N. Rosenau, ed., INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY: A READER IN RESEARCH AND THEORY, rev. ed., New York: The Free Press, 1969, 409-421, p. 415.

4. Edward L. Morse, "Crisis Diplomacy, Interdependence, and the Politics of International Economic Relations, WORLD POLITICS, 24 (Spring 1972 Supplement), 123-50, p. 126.

5. Charles F. Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES: INSIGHTS FROM BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, New York: The Free Press, 1972, pp. 9-11.

6. Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William E. Simons, THE LIMITS OF COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: LAOS, CUBA, VIETNAM, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971, pp. 8-32.

7. Kupperman, Wilcox, and Smith, "Crisis Management," p. 404.

8. John S. Ausland and Col. Hugh F. Richardson, "Crisis Management: Berlin, Cyprus, Laos, " FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 44 (January 1966), 291-303, p. 294.

9. James A. Robinson, "Crisis: An Appraisal of Concepts and Theories," in Charles Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES, p. 27.

10. Such a review can be read in the early chapters of Hermann, INTERNATIONAL CRISES.

11. In the company of many others who have expressed the same thought, I once wrote, "A crisis refers to both a real prelude to war and an averted approach toward

war. Crises are most commonly thought of as interpositions between the prolongation of peace and the outbreak of war." "The Beginning, Duration, and Abatement of International Crises: Comparisons in Two Conflict Arenas," in Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES, p. 83.

12. Oran R. Young, THE INTERMEDIARIES: THIRD PARTIES IN INTERNATIONAL CRISES, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 10. Andrew M. Scott, THE FUNCTIONING OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967, pp. 216-228.

13. Charles F Hermann, CRISES IN FOREIGN POLICY: A SIMULATION ANALYSIS, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1969, pp. 24-34.

14. Summarized and quoted from Howard W. Haggard, DEVILS, DRUGS, AND DOCTORS, New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1946, pp. 350-51.

15. Earnest R. May, "LESSONS" OF THE PAST: THE USE AND MISUSE OF HISTORY IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, New York: Oxford University Press, 1973.

16. Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES, p. 8.

17. Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES, pp. 24-25.

18. Evidence of such goal-shifting was developed in investigations of U.S. consultation and decision-making during the Korean War of 1950. My study of the Quemoy crisis of 1958 presented an analysis of goal changes and shifts in decisional opportunities when conditions in the field of operations of the crisis were transformed. See Charles A. McClelland, "Decisional Opportunity and Political Controversy: The Quemoy Case," JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 6 (September 1962), pp. 201-13.

19. Quincy Wright, ed., A STUDY OF WAR, 2 vols., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, Vol. 2, p. 1272.

20. Charles A. McClelland, "The Acute International Crisis, WORLD POLITICS, 14 (October 1961), 182-204, p. 188.

21. Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES, pp. 12-13.

22. Charles A. McClelland, "Access to Berlin: The Quantity

and Variety of Events, 1948-1963," in J. David Singer, ed., QUANTITATIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: INSIGHTS AND EVIDENCE, New York: The Free Press, 1968, p. 183.

23. Robinson, in Hermann, ed., INTERNATIONAL CRISES, p. 25.
24. Richard Lazarus, "Stress," INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968, Vol. 15, pp. 346-47.

25. Edward C. Tolman, "Cognitive Maps in Rats and Man," PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 55 (July 1948), pp. 189-208.

26. Anthony Wallace, "Cognitive Theory," INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, New York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 17 vols., 1968, Volume 2, p. 538.

27. Niko Tinbergen, THE HERRING GULL'S WORLD: A STUDY OF THE SOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF BIRDS, Garden City: Anchor Books, 1960, p. 256.

28. Murray Edelman, THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964. He notes, "Politics is for most of us a passing parade of abstract symbols, yet a parade which our experience teaches us to be a benevolent or malevolent force that can be close to omnipotent." p. 5. He also points out the Orwellian type of contractions in political language and calls them condensation symbols. p. 11.

29. George Orwell, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949, p. 307.

30. Orwell, p. 306.

31. Orwell, p. 309.

32. Norman Douglas, GOOD-BYE TO WESTERN CULTURE, SOME FOOTNOTES ON EAST AND WEST, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1930, pp. 28-29.

33. Murray Edelman takes a more extreme view in discounting the "facts" in the news than I would. There is, I believe, an active interplay between the factual description and the symbolic representation. Edelman writes: "...The particular incidents in the news do not really matter so far as the creation of threat

is concerned. No matter what incidents occur--and which are reported, they will fit nicely as evidence to support peoples' preconceived hopes and fears." THE SYMBOLIC USES OF POLITICS, p. 13.

34. W. Ross Ashby, AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBERNETICS, New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1957, pp. 206-09.

35. Roger Cobb and Charles D. Elder, PARTICIPATION IN AMERCIAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-BUILDING, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1972, p. 141.

36. James N. Rosenau, PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY, New York: Random House, 1961, p. 22.

37. Johan Galtung, "Violence, Peace, and Peace Research," JOURNAL OF PEACE RESEARCH, No. 3 (1969), pp. 174-75.