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**SOVIET TREATMENT OF JEWS - INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF AN INTERNAL ISSUE**

Hillard J. Trubitt

**Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania**

10 January 1975

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
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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AN INTERNAL ISSUE

by

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ABSTRACT

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An examination of the history of Jews in the Soviet Union, recent Russian pressures to assimilate them into the Soviet society, and Senator Henry M. Jackson's amendments to the Foreign Trade Act tying Soviet emigration practices to granting of increased trade privileges with the US. Data was gathered by literature search of historical reviews of Russian Jewish affairs, contemporary newspaper accounts of the Jackson Amendment's progress through Congress, and personal discussion with persons affiliated with the American Council on Soviet Jewry. The example of the treatment of the Jews is examined as indicative of Soviet repression and vulnerability to any external championing of its many subservient constituent ethnic and nationality groups. Possible risks to the US in pursuing such vulnerabilities are examined. The fact of the broad diversity and complexity of the Soviet ethnic question is underscored and is suggested as worthy of consideration for further sensitive exploitation.

SOVIET TREATMENT OF JEWS --
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF AN INTERNAL ISSUE

In late 1974 Washington announced that the USSR would permit emigration of up to 60,000 Jews annually from the Soviet Union, a concession long denied by the Soviets. The news was hailed as a victory for Senator Henry M. Jackson and the so-called "Jackson Amendment", which denied most-favored-nation status and other trade concessions by the US to the USSR or any Communist nation which denied its citizens freedom to emigrate and similar basic (to Western view) reliefs.¹ A review of USSR history revealed a lengthy pattern of apparent anti-semitic practices, many particularly cruel, which offended many American sensibilities, and which were reminiscent of Nazi brutalities. Since the Jewish population of the USSR represented one of the largest concentrations of Jews outside the safety of Israel, strong Western humanitarian concerns were aroused. Senator Jackson's efforts became identified with those concerns and the cause of Jewish rights.

Whatever it meant to Soviet or world Jewry, Senator Jackson, or any other participant, the entire "Jackson Amendment" episode, which lasted over two years, represented an apparently successful intrusion into the domestic affairs and policies of another major state without war. What makes this topic noteworthy beyond the obvious humanitarian considerations is the fact that US pressures produced such results. If this is in fact the case then study is warranted to extract lessons for further application in pressuring the USSR into other desirable behavior patterns. The focal point of Soviet vulnerability for this study is the internal discontent and weaknesses growing out of its extremely heterogeneous population and the divisive potential incorporated therein, as illustrated in the restiveness of the Soviet Jews.

Contrary to oft-held belief, the USSR is not monolithically composed of Great Russians. Russia, particularly following its pre-Revolutionary expansionist moves, has long been plagued with various social, racial, ethnic, and religious diversities. Within the USSR (excluding Eastern European satellites) there are at least 108 discernable ethnic and so-called "nationality" groups.² This diversity has long been a vulnerability of Russian solidarity, but one not often openly or frankly discussed. Despite present appearances of "pan-Socialism" there have historically been long-held animosities and several severe clashes among the groups.

History of Jews in the USSR

The Jews never fared well within Russia. Antisemitism traditionally found a natural home there, and intolerant practices and bloody pogroms (the word itself is Russian) date from the 1600's. Following partition of Poland at the close of the 18th Century, millions of Jews were included in the Czarist empire. To prevent them from coming into the major cities, restrictive laws "fixing" Jewish residence created the Pale of Settlement, a wide band running from the Baltic down to Crimea. The Jews were forced to remain in this area and there developed the village life style, popularized as "shtetls", which characterized the distinctive East European-Yiddish culture. This ghettoization and attendant oppressions helped produce Jewish reformist and counter-czarist movements, largely of a messianic or socialist cast. Many were Zionist-inspired (Zionism itself was one of the movements) but many also looked for relief and freedom within Russia, for themselves and others. Such activities produced large numbers of Jews participating in pre-Revolutionary events and in the Revolution itself (although many of these activists

ultimately fell as Mensheviks and lost their influence and power).³

Lenin had anticipated the "nationalities" problem and saw its resolution in recognition of each distinct group and assigning them certain autonomous capabilities, thus allowing each to move their own people toward socialism. To this end, a Ministry of Nationalities was created, with Stalin as its first Commissar. Within this framework Jews were ultimately seen as a distinctive "group", despite their lack of a traditional geographic base. An organization to handle Jewish affairs, entitled the "Yevsektzia", was created within the Ministry. Power in framing Jewish-oriented policies was the basis of several schisms and battles with pre-Revolutionary groups, who saw Jewish aspirations differently than Stalin.⁴ The precise nature of the fights is unimportant for purposes here. What is significant is that the USSR recognized the Jews as a distinct minority and eventually, albeit grudgingly, accorded them some official status.

The initial surface goal of the Soviet regime appeared to be removal of Czarist disabilities imposed on the Jews and restoration of individual rights in the name of Socialism and equality. Obviously dislocations were necessary, not only to accommodate the Jews but also as part of the massive re-ordering of Soviet society. Consequently, attempts to resolve Jewish problems were carried out amidst severe upheavals and unrest, which also had ethnic overtones. A notable example of this occurred in the Ukraine in the 1920's, where resultant disorders reflected long-held hatreds and rivalries. They also foretold Stalin's ruthlessness in consolidating his power. An initial plan to settle Jews in the Ukraine and Crimea during this period was aborted, partly because of economic problems (insufficient land to accommodate all aspirants) but partly because of the legacy of antisemitism in the region.⁵

Out of this came the Biro-Bidzhan regional project which ultimately came to be seen as the "Jewish autonomous state" area. The idea began in 1928 with no reference to placement of Jews, but rather as part of the general economic development plan of the USSR. It was also part of a plan to populate the eastern regions as a military defense against the threat of Japan. Since the Jews were the only group who did not have a clearly-defined "geographic base", Biro-Bidzhan was touted as the development area for them. An unarticulated rationale for trying to get the Jews to the eastern region was that the move would simultaneously "solve" the Jewish locale problem and also offset "undesirable" Zionist feelings within Soviet Jewry. Hence the idea was originally to create a Jewish "territorial" unit, but in 1934 Biro-Bidzhan was described in terms of a "Jewish autonomous region", suggesting that this was the place, and the issues of Jewish identity and destiny were thereby solved.⁶ The idea never really materialized; Jews refused to go to the area and as late as 1959 only 14,269 Jews were counted in a total regional population of 162,856, a proportion of less than 10%, and a fraction of the over 2.0 million Jews known in the USSR.⁷

Consequently Jews, who ranked 11th in size of nationality groups, factually did not have their own area, but remained in western Russia, Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and the Baltic states --- the same general configuration as the Pale. A major difference was that they were no longer restricted to village life, but had been able to move into the cities and had generally become urbanized. They were by no means loved or accepted --- but they were legally free (albeit still suspected of harboring latent bourgeois tendencies).

With the development of the Five Year Plans and capture of total power by Stalin, the character of the Soviet philosophies changed

dramatically. Anxious to strengthen his political grip, Stalin launched several ruthless purges in the 1930's. His victims included several Jews who had been prominent in Party affairs, although the apparent basic premise of the bloodbaths was to protect Stalin rather than raw antisemitism. Post-Stalin writings indicate Stalin was himself virulently anti-semitic and took the opportunity to play out long-felt hatreds (which coincided with traditional Russian, Georgian, and Ukrainian prejudices).⁸ Nonetheless the bulk of the Jews remained in Russia, taking comfort in the notion that "things weren't as bad as they had been before".

All Russia suffered gravely under Hitler's invasion. As might be expected, Jews were singled out for Nazi extermination, and large numbers of Jews resident in the traditional Pale were overrun by the Germans. Many Jews fought in the Soviet forces, often with distinction, but thousands also were deported to the east by the USSR for no apparent reason other than their ethnic background (ostensibly to "protect them from the Nazis").⁹

Following the end of World War II, Stalin's monolithic hold on Russia became more and more despotic. His anti-Jewish proclivities became more and more apparent, culminating in the so-called "Doctor's Plot", which triggered off the spectre of Nazi-like purges. Many Soviet Jews, frightened by the turn of events, sought to emigrate to Israel, now a political reality, but were denied exit visas. Stalin's death did not significantly ameliorate their anxieties, and the bulk of Soviet Jewry felt quite insecure. Stalin's successors took Russia through de-Stalinization exercises, but to the Jews this represented no relief, especially since no announcements decrying anti-Jewish actions were forthcoming from the Kremlin. The Nazi ravages, followed by Stalin's new purges, and no prospect of relief, forced Soviet Jews to realistically

assess their position in Soviet society. The analysis, to many, suggested that emigration was their only viable answer to preservation of their Jewish identity.

The Last Decade

As indicated above, hopes among Jews that Stalin's death would produce a new regime that would relieve their disabilities proved false. The fundamental work of assimilation of the Jews, of complete Russification of them (and other minorities) went forward. Since Jews were seen in both national and religious terms by the Soviets they were vulnerable to a two-pronged attack; the "nationality" thrust basically being that "Jews had problems because they were not in their area, i.e., Biro-Bidzhan", and the religious assault catering simultaneously to traditional antisemitic canards and, from time to time, orthodox Communist "we don't support any religion" circumlocutions. The net effect was seen as a carefully orchestrated program by the USSR to destroy the Jews as a viable group by destroying their sense of group identity and forcing assimilation and Russification.¹⁰

Physical liquidation a la Hitler was clearly unacceptable for world consumption; hence sub-physical pressures were exerted. Forced closure of synagogues, prohibition of teaching of Hebrew, myriad forms of harassment, refusal to grant exit visas, threats from the MVD, snide publication of arrests of Jews for economic offenses (designed to induce undercurrents of anti-Jewish pressure by traditional Jew-haters), physical removal from jobs and forced relocation in remote regions, etc., were common techniques. The list is almost interminable; to liberals it can almost be seen as Nazism revisited, except for the absence of crematoria and other instruments of physical genocide.¹¹

Attempts by Soviet Jews to leave Russia were abortive. Relatively few had the resources to be able to afford consideration of such a move. To the elderly, poor, or handicapped, it remained a messianic dream. In 1966 Moscow announced that any Jew who wished to leave Russia could do so upon application, but the offer was seen as a cruel mockery, for external consumption only. Soviet bureaucracy, when presented with an application for an exit visa, would create horrendous obstacles, and another carefully orchestrated campaign of harassment against applicants and their families would follow. In mid-1972 the Kremlin announced that an "exit tax" would be assessed "for the value of education received at State expense" on all emigrants. Such a tax would effectively halt almost all migration, since the levies were enormous (as high as \$30,000 US).¹² Thus, to the Jews, the "offer" of emigration was even more of a mockery and their situation appeared almost hopeless, since as a group they were better educated than average and hence more vulnerable to higher duties, even if the tax was not just an antisemitic facade.

US Involvement

The US, reluctant to interfere in the internal affairs of another state, traditionally had not concerned itself with the plight of Soviet Jews, considering its support of Israel as the appropriate vehicle for assisting Judaism.¹³ President Eisenhower had broached the subject of harassment of Jews to Krushchev in 1959, and was told it was an "internal affair".¹⁴ Bertram Russell, the English philosopher, engaged in open correspondence in 1962-1963 with Krushchev, challenging the USSR's apparent policy of de facto antisemitism. Krushchev denied the allegation, but observers felt a moderation or "playing down" of some of the more crude aspects of Soviet anti-Jewish activities followed.¹⁵ Nonetheless,

no significant emigration ensued and the issue laid dormant for all but Zionist zealots and smaller interest groups.

Matters came into much sharper focus following the Six Day War of 1967. The USSR, angered with the defeat of their client Arab states, broke diplomatic relations with Israel, initiated a propaganda theme of "international Zionism is the enemy", and entered into a campaign of vilification which continues unabated.¹⁶ US interests in the Middle East, long associated with Israel, now faced the demands of not only championing Israel militarily, but also openly combatting Soviet antisemitism, operating under the guise of anti-Zionism. However, the US continued its tradition of noninterference in what were considered domestic affairs of another state, and especially so with Russia. Hence, US policy appeared to be a combination of support of Israel, maintenance of military pressure through Israel as its client state, and deliverance of appropriate statements about human rights in the UN. We did not seem anxious to expand US-USSR conflicts to include Jewish concerns outside the security of Israel. Seemingly the USSR was free to continue its internal practices, confident that the US concern would not go beyond rhetoric.

Detente, Trade, and Jackson

The price for US-USSR accord under the Nixon Doctrine was revealed in early 1972 --- a massive trade agreement, with liberal credit features and a most-favored-nation status for Russia and its eastern satellites. The Nixon administration, anxious to maximize detente and continue its record of diplomatic successes (especially in an election year) agreed to the trade provisions and the most-favored-nation (MFN) status. Protestations by Jewish interest groups in the US against dealing with anti-Jewish Russia were met by administration proposals to handle those

discussions sub rosa and, apparently sensing embarrassment over unpleasant publicity growing out of charges of harassment of Jewish would-be emigres, not to tie them to the trade treaty, lest the momentum of detente suffer.¹⁷

In the summer of 1972, immediately after President Nixon had agreed to the trade deal, the Soviets took a decided hard line on Jewish emigration attempts by imposition of the above-mentioned exit tax and other barriers to departure. The American Council on Soviet Jewry, a private interest group, loudly decried this move as yet another example of Soviet perfidy. They found their champion in Senator Jackson, a long-time "friend" of Israel, an avowed "hawk", and a consistent "hard-liner" and skeptic of conciliation toward the USSR. Jackson, a presidential hopeful, leaped into the breach to dramatize what he saw as a pattern of dangerous appeasement of the Russians by the Nixon administration.

On 4 October 1972 Senator Jackson, leading 71 (ultimately 76) other Senators, introduced his "amendment" to the impending Foreign Trade Bill. The amendment barred extension of credit, use of Import-Export Bank facilities, credit guarantees, or MFN status to the USSR (although Russia was not specifically named) as long as the USSR barred Jewish emigration or imposed more than a minimum exit tax. Jackson asserted that his bill was in response to the "diploma" or exit tax imposed that summer. The administration response was to "acknowledge the situation" and attempt to solve these problems with the USSR through "quiet diplomacy", inasmuch as Jackson's amendment would not be considered prior to 1973 and the agreement was then in the final stages of negotiation.¹⁸

Senator Jackson reintroduced his bill in the 93rd Congress in March 1973, following months of maneuvering by the USSR and various Congressmen attempting to determine each other's real positions. A Congressional

delegation visiting Moscow advised Soviet leaders that the Congress was definitely "hard-line" on the issue and it was no mere political ploy. The Kremlin, in turn, considered the entire affair an outrageous intrusion in an internal Soviet matter, and that the entire US-USSR relationship was endangered.¹⁹ Shortly thereafter some remission of the harsher features of the tax were noted. US analysts suggested such easing was fundamentally part of a Soviet attempt to erode obvious popular support for the amendment, trying to curtail any further hardening of terms, and hence probably was not genuine or lasting.²⁰

Counterpart legislation was introduced in the House by Congressman Mills, supported by over 250 members of the House. Mr. Mills stated his support came because of "ideological sympathy with the plight of Soviet citizens", and not just the Jews.²¹ The Administration continued to oppose Congressional interference (the amendment) but congressional leaders made it quite clear they were serious. More Soviet waivers of the tax were noted at this time but were felt designed to appease Congress and also to prepare a public relations base for Brezhnev's projected visit.

In April 1973 the President openly asked Congress to pass the trade bill without the amendment, characterizing the amendment as "counterproductive and unrelated" to the basic problems of trade. Senator Jackson remained unmoved; when the President displayed documents asserting that the tax had been removed in all but "state security" cases, the Senator opined that the President had been hoodwinked.²² A Congressional delegation to Moscow in April 1973 was personally assured by Brezhnev that the tax had been lifted; Jackson and his hard-core colleagues did not waver.²³

On 26 September 1973 the House Ways and Means Committee voted out the Jackson restrictions over the President's repeated objections that such

actions hurt detente and did not help the cause of the Jews. Soviet reaction was to decry "persistent interference in Soviet internal affairs" and also to openly bemuse that MFN status "wasn't so important"; that the momentum of trade could be carried by private concerns, and the USSR could get along very well without the agreement. The statement was seen as "sour grapes", designed to elicit sympathy for the "put-upon" Soviets.²⁴

A vote scheduled for 17 October 1973 by the full House was delayed for a week at the request of the Secretary of State to "avoid interference in US-USSR negotiations to end the October Middle East War". Senator Jackson thereupon amended the pending legislation to demand open emigration for all Soviet citizens and not restrict the focus to Jews. This move passed; one wonders if failure of the USSR to quickly stop the war did not help the Jackson cause and induce a punitive attitude in Congress which, coupled with US organized labor support, helped make the vote definitive.

In an attempt to force the issue, Secretary Kissinger, in March 1974, told Congress he would recommend presidential veto of its own trade bill if it included the Jackson proposals. On 19 March 1974 Senator Jackson indicated he would consider relief of his opposition provided absolute assurances could be given that the Soviets would keep the emigration level above 35,000 (the 1973 level) and stop harrassing visa applicants. Editorial opinion called for Jackson to relent; the point had been made. Nonetheless the Senator continued his obstruction, arguing that the principle exceeded specific application to Jews but was one of vital interest to "a nation of immigrants", as the US. The unfolding denouement of Watergate, coupled with US anger over the unpleasant aftereffects of the Russian wheat sale, then moved the negotiations and deliberations out of

the limelight. It was during this period that quiet negotiations between the Senator, Secretary Kissinger, and the Soviets apparently produced the agreement announced on October 1974.

With the obstacle apparently removed the Trade Act sailed through Congress, passing in December 1974. To the nation's surprise the Soviets thereupon announced, angrily, that "no deal" had been made to gain the treaty and any representations to the contrary were false; that Soviet sovereignty over its internal affairs remained inviolate. Observers felt the denouncement was for propaganda purposes inside the USSR (the Russians had not been informed of the October 1974 "agreement"). Attention was called to the fact that Senator Jackson had made the October announcement and not the State Department; that only Jackson had alluded to the problem and used the figure of 60,000 Jews. The feeling was that the State Department had soft-pedalled the entire deal, not wishing to embarrass the USSR by appearing formally to have intruded in its domestic affairs. At the end of 1974 the Soviets were reported to be threatening to undo the SALT agreements of Vladivostok, and to forego the Trade Act benefits unless the concessions were granted without restriction.²⁵ Analysts felt it possible that Brezhnev was in serious difficulty within the Kremlin for having "given too much" for the trade package, and the apparent reneging was an attempt to "save face". Other sources suggest Soviet furor was a screen to mask concern over the \$300 million credit limit set on them -- a limit which would restrict their ability to acquire technological assets in the quantity they desired.²⁶

There the matter rests, although the chances for trade breakdown are not high, since the Soviets are geared up for heightened trade and withdrawal now would not help their situation. To many, the threats and bluster are considered as traditional USSR techniques, and simply denote

irritation at revelation of details which they consider as "internal matters".

Analysis

From this background the following questions emerge:

1. What is present Soviet policy vis-a-vis Jews?
2. Is the USSR vulnerable to US (or other) pressures with regard to (a) Soviet Jews, and (b) other Soviet nationalities?
3. If so, what are the nature of the vulnerabilities?
4. Can the US successfully exploit them to our advantage?

1. What is present Soviet policy vis-a-vis Jews?

The USSR, despite lofty constitutional egalitarian rhetoric, has never really fully accepted Jews as part of the Soviet menage. From Stalin's earliest days of power, Jews were seen as petit bourgeois, either real or incipient. Hence they were suspect, and their tendency to move to cities and take up urban skills reinforced these prejudices. They did not fit the peasant/worker mold, despite their participation in the Revolution. From this base, coupled with a Soviet dread of Zionism as a competing philosophy with Marxism-Leninism, prejudicial attitudes and practices have always existed. Emergence of Israel as a viable Western-aligned state exacerbated the prejudices, permitting the Soviets to distinguish between Judaism and "Zionism" but merging them when faced with dissidence within Russia.

The basic policy toward Soviet Jews today appears to be a drive toward total assimilation of the Jews into the greater society. It is the same policy displayed toward all minorities, and calls for complete Russification of all peoples. Jews, by virtue of their cultural and religious experience, resist assimilation strenuously, thus intensifying efforts

upon them. In a genocide-conscious world, pressures on Jews are heavily publicized, thereby spotlighting the situation. But the Soviet policy is clearly elimination of the Jews as a distinct and viable minority and their ultimate merger into a monolithic, Soviet-oriented, socialist Russia --- a uniform Russia, without troublesome minorities.

2. Is the USSR vulnerable to US pressures with regard to Soviet Jews and/or other minority groups?

3. If so, what are the nature of the vulnerabilities?

It is easier to answer these questions together, since the USSR definitely is vulnerable in many ways on the entire minorities problem (of which the Jews are but a part). Over 50% of the Soviet Union population is composed of minority group members. That alone is a major vulnerability in that the potential for divisiveness and weakness is high (short of physical invasion of the USSR, which coalesces all to the aid of "Mother Russia").

With regard to Jews, loss of the Jews represents a major "brain drain", which Russia cannot tolerate now. The core of the scientific and research and development community in the USSR is disproportionately composed of Jews. While they could be replaced, it would be difficult, and Russia would be loath to have these people functioning in other nations opposed to the USSR.

A further vulnerability lies in the sensitivity in the West to the entire matter of antisemitism; a sensitivity which a detente-oriented and westward-looking Russia would prefer not to irritate. Indeed, the Jackson amendment episode flows directly from this vulnerability.

Obviously the Soviet need for western technology and the entire array of benefits that could flow from reduction of tension represents a

major vulnerability of the USSR. This yearning for economic improvement and relative tranquility which would permit domestic development can be exploited; clearly the USSR is hungry for improvement of their economic bases. In bald terms, the USSR needs US trade and the situation is a seller's market, wherein the US can "set the price".

Of all the nationality groups, interestingly, the Jews are one of the smallest with an "external" interest group. If one desired to reopen the tensions of the Cold War and re-stir old flames, the Ukrainians, for example, could be a significant "sore spot". Numerically there are millions more Ukrainians and Ukrainian emigres anxious to embarrass the Soviets than there are Jews. Thus, the episode with the Jews could be a precedent which the Soviets would not especially want followed up.

In light of the above risk, a further vulnerability would be exploitation of the nationalities question to include the taken-over eastern European satellite states. This clearly is a risk that the USSR would not want to face again. The debacles of Hungary and Czechoslovakia are old wounds which the Kremlin would not want re-opened, especially if it were cast in ethnic terms, directly inflaming local ethnic and nationality interests and emotions.

There are other vulnerabilities applicable to both Jews and other minorities that could be exploited to Soviet discomfiture, but space precludes exhaustive listing here.

4. Can the US successfully exploit these vulnerabilities to our advantage?

To Senator Jackson the answer to this question was an unqualified "yes". As long as the USSR seeks concessions or advantages from the West, "hard bargaining" can capitalize on these (and other) Russian

weaknesses. Senator Jackson's point is that detente need not necessarily mean capitulation to Russian requests in the name of "peace" and detente. To a Russia thirsty for technology and all the West has to offer, tough bargaining by the West can only produce painful choices for them. However, in the view of several Sovietologists, unless the concession will seriously affect the basic internal order of the USSR, it can ultimately be won. After all, they argue, the Soviets are experienced bargainers themselves and know very well what "give and take" means. If they want something badly enough, the concession will be made.

There are risks for US pursuit of this "tough" policy. One obvious risk is a lessening of the spirit of detente. Senator Jackson is often characterized (especially in Moscow) as an unregenerate hard-liner, one ready to return to the Cold War. Without reference alone to the Senator, it is true that a hardening of attitude could undo much of the reduction of tensions and mistrust over the past few years. Unless as a matter of overt policy we wish to return to a firm "hard-line" position, the risks of misunderstanding and attendant reactions could reproduce pre-1970 confrontations and irritations.

Another risk is that the USSR may seek another trading partner who is not so demanding. France, for example, has been soliciting such a relationship, as have hungry West European nations anxious for Soviet and Warsaw Pact trade. They see themselves as "more realistic" than we, and are eager for trade opportunities with the eastern market, particularly if it can help them gain some foothold with Russia in the event the US economic position should worsen under the pressure of oil shortages.

Concessions extracted in tough trade bargaining can be compensated for by the creation of tensions elsewhere. An excellent example is in the Middle East; an audience to which the USSR unabashedly plays pro-

Arab. They are not only oil-conscious or interested in US discomfiture; they have an internal interest with 50 million Moslems resident within the USSR. Such fraternal protestations can materially help keep any Islamic dissidence down within the Soviet Union.

One rationale for Soviet "back-watering" on Jewish emigration holds that the Arab client states are concerned over Jewish immigration into Israel, and emigrant Soviet Jews simply strengthen Israel from their perspective. An obvious risk that flows from this is that the Soviets might "turn the tables" on us by their Arab surrogates; i.e., Arab oil flow will be contingent on US domestic policy changes (or withdrawal of support for Israel or other objectives). Should such an ultimatum be delivered to us, our response may well be dictated by the need for the withheld resource. We would then "taste the bitter pill", administered by a Soviet cabal eager for revenge.

Another factor which might weaken the thrust of the Jackson amendment technique is Senator Jackson's peculiar position as an "old-time hard-line:" and as a possible presidential candidate. His preeminence and charisma coalesces both Jewish interests and "frustrated hardliners" of all persuasions, who see the USSR as "THE enemy". In an era of frustration, it is nice to hear someone "talk tough" -- when things are smooth, though, the popular base for such jingoism may rapidly dissolve. Further, Senator Jackson's notoriety capitalizes in part on Congressional muscle-flexing in the realignment of sharing of power in foreign affairs. It is part of the reaction and backlash from Watergate, the realization of the erosion of Congressional power to the Executive, and an almost convulsive Congressional grasp to regain its position. In an age of searching for new parameters of the congressional-presidential relationship, Senator Jackson appears as "a man on horseback", and his "causes"

can become popular because of the man. As the constitutional crisis recedes and new power arrangements between the White House and Capitol Hill are made, the intensity of the issues may also fade and the Congress may turn from so direct a role in foreign affairs. In short, a return to the "traditional" roles may reduce Senator Jackson's potency and the impact of his issues and actions.

Nonetheless, little attention has been paid in the past to the fact that the Soviet Union is beset with ethnic and social tensions. We have tended to see them as monolithic and powerful. They are powerful, but skilful analysis of their vulnerabilities and appropriate exploitation of those weaknesses at the detente bargaining table might prove worth our interest in maneuvering Russian behavior, either openly and at risk, or quietly, but effectively.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Hillard J. Trubitt", with a long horizontal stroke extending to the right.

HILLARD J. TRUBITT
COL, MI-USAR

FOOTNOTES

1. "Foreign Relations", Time, 28 October 1972, p. 21.
2. Vaclav Lamser, "A Sociological Approach to Soviet Nationality Problems", in Soviet Nationality Problems, ed. by Edward Allworth, p. 183.
3. Joel Cang, The Silent Millions, pp. 23-40, 57-74. See also Gunther Lawrence, Three Million More, pp. 45-50, 56-59; and S. Ettinger, "The Jews at the Outbreak of the Revolution", in The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917, ed. by Lionel Kochan, pp. 15-27.
4. Cang, Ibid., pp. 53-56.
5. S. Levenberg, "Soviet Jewry: Some Problems and Perspectives", in The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917, ed. by Lionel Kochan, pp. 33-34. See also Cang, Ibid., p. 70; Chimen Abramsky, "The Biro-Bidzhan Project, 1927-1959", in Kochan, Ibid., pp. 64-65, 68; and B. D. Weinryb, "Anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia", also in Kochan, Ibid., p. 301.
6. Lawrence, pp. 59-60. See also Abramsky, Ibid., pp. 69-73; and Cang, pp. 142-143.
7. Abramsky, Ibid., Cang, pp. 144-146.
8. Cang, pp. 75-79; Weinryb, pp. 308-309; Lawrence, pp. 60-63.
9. Joseph L. Lichten, "The Jews in the Soviet Union", in Marquette University Slavic Institute Papers, No. 13, 1962, pp. 8-9. See also Cang, pp. 86-92, and Reuben Ainsztein, "Soviet Jewry in the Second World War", in Kochan, pp. 269-286.
10. Cang, pp. 183-192. See also Wm. Korey, "The Legal Position of the Jewish Community of the Soviet Union", in Ethnic Minorities in the Soviet Union, ed. by Erich Goldhagen, pp. 326-327.
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