PEOPLE MANAGEMENT. FINAL REPORT OF THE PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

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25 April 1975

The Final Report
of the
People Management Committee

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The People Management Committee was established by the ADCSPER as an ad hoc committee to determine better methods of managing enlisted people from the HQDA level. This report contains a written description of the DCSPER family systems that impact directly on the management of enlisted personnel. The report also contains detailed descriptions of the problems the committee uncovered in the management of enlisted personnel and recommended solutions to those problems.

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FOREWORD

The People Management Committee was established by the ADCSPER as an ad hoc committee to determine better methods of managing enlisted people. The complete committee charter is at Appendix A. The Committee was made up of personnel managers from ODCSPER and MILPERCEN and met on a part time basis from November 1974 to April 1975. The Committee is deeply appreciative of the cooperation and enthusiastic interest in its charter proffered by directors, division chiefs, and personnel managers of the DCSPER family to include USAREC and HQ,TRADOC.

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CHAPTER I

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Purpose:

The People Management Committee was given three principal tasks. First to examine the entire enlisted people management systems, find the weak spots or where the various parts or subsystems were not in synchronization, and recommend appropriate corrective action. Second to examine alternatives to the way we currently manage people and third, to determine the feasibility of automating and integrating the entire people management system. During the research phase we found many weak spots that need to be fixed. In some cases the committee simply rediscovered what others had noted in previous studies, however if the weakness is still there, then obviously, corrective action hasn't been taken or the correction wasn't good enough. We also identified some current problems that are being worked on by the ODCSPER family. For the most part we did not make any comment or recommendations regarding these problems that are in the process of being solved. We also did not attempt to review any of the work done by the Personnel Support Systems Study Group, or the Assets and Authorizations Study Group. We have indorsed the findings of these groups where action has not been taken and the system weakness was within our charter.

B. Methodology:

The people systems as they apply to enlisted men and women, are a series of automated and manual subsystems, each designed to meet

the requirements of one part of the total system. When put together they sometimes mesh perfectly, frequently however, the output needs human adjustment or manipulation before it can be compared or interfaced with other parts of the system. It was necessary for the entire committee to examine the system in order to accomplish the assigned tasks. A three phase approach was used. In Phase I, the research and education phase conducted from 2 Dec 74 through 24 Jan 75, the committee heard presentations, principally from action officers, that described in detail how a particular part or subsystem of people management worked, how it interfaced and what future improvements or developments were scheduled for implementation. During the course of these presentations an apparent weakness or lack of synchronization, was assigned to two or more committee members for a detailed study, examination and appropriate corrective recommendations. During Phase II, from 24 Jan through 28 Feb the committee heard from ten different study teams, examined their recommendations and decided on a committee position. Phase III began on 1 March and terminated on 11 April. During this phase selected committee members were assigned the tasks of writing portions of the committee report. After they completed the first draft each page received detailed editing and review by the entire committee. This report can truly be called a "COMMITTEE REPORT".

C. Contents of the Report:

During Phase I of the committee effort it became apparent there was a need for a written description of the systems we were studying.

The committee decided early in its research that there was a need for a descriptive narrative to describe these systems in understandable terms that would be used by action personnel assigned to the DCSPER family. Chapter II of this report meets that goal. It is our hope that this chapter will be kept current and used not only by action personnel, but by division chiefs, directors and the senior leadership in DCSPER, the Army Staff and the Secretary of the Army's office, as well.

Chapter III of the report details the PROBLEMS in the enlisted people management system and recommends committee solutions. We did not comment on the many parts of the system that are in good working order or those currently being corrected within the DCSPER family. It may appear then, by omission, that the committee did not study all parts of the process. The reader may assume that the committee reviewed everything described in Chapter II and in Figure 2.4.

The balance of this executive summary is a brief of each problem, a short discussion, and a listing of the committee recommendations. A full explanation of the problem with appropriate discussion is in Chapter III and should be read in order to get a complete understanding of the problem with the committee rationale for recommended changes.

D. Major Problems in the System and Recommended Solutions:

1. Planning Lead Times:

a. Problem: There is a need to improve the lead times for changes which will require individual personnel actions.

b. Discussion: Force structure changes and MOS structure changes are not now announced sufficiently in advance of effective date to allow related personnel actions to be accomplished efficiently. Major Command authorizations are not documented with the proper lead time for accurate computation of training requirements.

c. Conclusion:

Personnel lead times must be established, published and complied with by the DA staff and field commanders.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That force structure changes be announced not less than 18 months prior to effective date and documentation completed by major commands so that PERSACS output is available 13 months prior to effective date.

(2) That MOS structure changes be announced 16 months prior to effective date and documentation and reclassification actions completed so that PERSACS output and EMF data reflect these changes 13 months prior to effective date.

(3) That FY authorizations for each major command be documented and PERSACS output available at least 13 months prior to the beginning of the FY.

2. Authorizations:

a. Problem: There is a need to improve the processing of authorization changes (TAADS) in order to provide accurate data (PERSACS) for personnel management.

b. Discussion: Authorization changes whether they initiate from Program Budget Guidance, MACOM authority or MOS restructuring must be processed with sufficient lead times to allow for planning with accurate data for training requirements, assignments, recruiting objectives, etc.

c. Conclusion: Current processing is slow, untimely, and generates planning and operating data which are obsolete or based on an "educated guess". Current documentation cycles accept lengthy delays from initiation of the requirement until it is approved and documented in the TAADS file. When the TAADS file is not documented as soon as possible, a PERSACS is produced which does not provide timely information and creates inaccurate and questionable data for use in personnel management actions such as developing recruiting objectives, projecting training requirements and making assignments against valid requisitions.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That PERSACS be accepted and recognized as the only authorized source of authorization data.

(2) That MACOM be required to document fiscal year changes in authorizations and have them reflected in the PERSACS output not later than 13 months prior to the beginning of each fiscal year.

(3) That specific effective dates for major force structure changes be determined and published within 10 working days after the announced decision.

(4) That MACOM authorization changes when accepted and posted to TAADS will have an effective date for requisitioning at least 10 months later for oversea commands and six months for CONUS commands.

(5) That MOS structure changes be announced by letter 16 months prior to effective date and that documentation changes be accomplished within 60 days following the announcement.

(6) That the DA Circular announcing MOS structure changes be discontinued.

(7) That procedures be developed to project reclassification of personnel concurrently with projected authorization changes and to enter the reclassification data action on the EMF.

(8) That action be initiated by ODCSPER PERSACS Branch to develop a regulation to define responsibilities and relationships between all staff sections and agencies (DCSOPS, DCSPER, DCSLOG, MILPERCEN, etc.) with respect to the objectives for attainment of authorization data accuracy and timeliness. This guidance should include staff and command responsibilities for unit activations, inactivations, reorganizations, and specific dates for progressive personnel fill objectives.

3. People and Skill Inventories:

a. Problem: There is a need to improve the accuracy of the data elements on the EMF so that current and projected inventories will be more valid.

b. Discussion: Errors in critical data elements on the EMF cause errors in related personnel actions, e.g., computations of training requirements, assignments and promotions on a one for one basis. AAA, GAO and DAPMT reports have shown that the accuracy of data elements on the EMF is less than desirable. PERSINSD is responsible for maintenance of the EMF but there is no single point of contact for matters pertaining to the EMF in that agency. Users of data elements do not coordinate with PERSINSD in developing edits and criteria to improve accuracy of data elements. PERSINSD has developed plans to begin verification of data elements on a selective basis, and their plans must be implemented as soon as possible. Valid projected inventories are currently prepared by EPD only twice yearly. Procedures must be developed to make monthly projections so that training requirements, reclassification and reenlistment guidance can be changed as the inventory changes.

c. Conclusions: Procedures must be developed as soon as possible to achieve and maintain a higher degree of accuracy of data elements on the EMF and to produce more timely and valid inventory projections.

d. Recommendations:

(1) The Commander MILPERCEN establish a single office as the EMF proponent to control and coordinate all actions pertaining to the EMF. Also, that this office develop and coordinate with EMF data element users a memorandum of understanding clearly delineating the responsibilities and functions of both PERSINSD and the users. These responsibilities should

include but not be limited to:

(a) Establishing priority sequence of data elements.

(b) Determining edit, update and error parameters.

(c) Developing functional user guides.

(d) Developing validation methods and techniques.

(2) PERSINSD proceed with the validation of selected data elements.

(3) EPD expedite efforts to revise Part X of the COPO 45 report to provide monthly projected inventories.

(4) EPD review projected authorization and inventory changes in detail each month between training requirement computations and recommend immediate adjustments to training programs to Training Division, ODCSPER.

4. Reserve Component Training Requirements:

a. Problem: There is a need to improve the computation of Reserve Components training requirements.

b. Discussion: Accuracy in the computation of Reserve Component training requirements is vital to the efficient utilization of the training base. Approximately 20% of the FY 76 training program belongs to the Reserve Components. Training requirements for the USAR and ARNG are affected significantly by unexpected changes in the force structure.

c. Conclusions:

(1) Current procedures do not accurately predict or validate annual REP requirements. A well defined policy and guidelines are needed for the computation and management of requirements.

(2) Decisions to change the structure of the USAR or ARNG without proper lead time to plan new training requirement produce turmoil, improper use of resources in the training base and a lack of trained personnel.

d. Recommendations:

(1) HQDA, in conjunction with the appropriate RC headquarters, publish definitive policy and guidelines for an effective management system which will provide validation, monitoring and supervision of the enlisted program.

(2) The USAR and ARNG use the data base and the dedicated computers at RCPAC and NGCC respectively to determine REP requirements.

(3) An improved computerized personnel inventory projection model similar to PIA be developed for the Reserve Components.

(4) Training requirement lead time be considered in decisions to change or move units in the force structure.

(5) Decisions to change or move units in the Reserve Component force structure adhere to the planning lead times as recommended for the active Army units in Chapter III, Section A.

5. Accession Management:

a. Problem: Frequent changes in the manpower program recruiting objectives have increased the need for management controls and alignments in areas where we were not fully prepared to respond and for which automated support is lacking.

b. Discussion: Over-recruiting and increasing retention rates during the first half of FY 75 potentially leads to exceeding the FY 75 man-year constraint, and cause frequent reductions in recruiting objectives which impact on operating agencies. Lack of systems controls and discipline is compounding the problem for operating agencies.

c. Conclusions: Although efforts are underway to improve systems controls, currently there is a need to:

(1) Align manpower objectives, training program, and training base capability.

(2) Control prior service accessions and reenlistees.

(3) Manage the DEP.

(4) Bolster systems discipline.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That manpower objectives, training programs and training base capability be aligned on a one-for-one basis in full recognition of the seasonality of recruiting and the inefficient use of training base resources.

(2) That emphasis on aggregate recruiting objectives be removed in favor of matching skill requirements.

(3) That training shortfall be recognized and accepted if recruiting for specific skill requirements fails to fill scheduled classes.

(4) That procedures be established to account for accession of already trained prior service personnel by

MOS so that training requirements can be adjusted.

(5) That a standing committee of representatives from ODCSPER, MILPERCEN and USAREC be formed to develop procedures and controls that will manage selective skill quotas in the DEP.

(6) That all applicants for enlistment in the Army be required to have a Social Security Account Number prior to enlistment. (Currently scheduled for implementation on 1 July 1975).

(7) That efforts be made to seek relief from either the man-year or the FY end strength constraint (preferably, the FY end strength).

6. Organization and Functions:

a. Problem: There is a need to better define the functional responsibilities of the elements within the DCSPER family. There is a need to consolidate the manpower programs under a single manager and a need for a better quantitative impact analysis capability within ODCSPER.

b. Discussion: Because of recent reorganizations and personnel reductions, functional responsibilities have been blurred resulting in redundancy in the work efforts of the DCSPER family. Prediction models used in programming manpower are spread among three different organizational elements, use different inputs and consequently develop dissimilar output data. Qualitative analysis is also organizationally split and uncoordinated.

c. Conclusions: A study should be made of ODCSPER and MILPERCEN functions to recommend changes that will eliminate vagueness and duplication of effort. A consolidation of manpower programming into one organizational element is needed to provide more consistency in manpower statistical projections. A consolidation of programming will constitute an organizational element with a considerable quantitative analysis capability.

d. Recommendations:

(1) DCSPER and MILPERCEN functions and responsibilities be reviewed and revised to clearly assign functional responsibility and eliminate impreciseness and duplication and/or omission of functions.

(2) The DCSPER consolidate the programming function in the Plans, Programs and Budget Directorate by:

(a) Directing DMPM to transfer the necessary individuals and the CIM-E function to DPPB.

(b) Directing Commander, MILPERCEN to transfer the necessary individuals, and the PIA function to include WEEM and mobilization training requirements to DPPB.

(c) Directing DPPB to initiate action to change appropriate regulations to reflect this consolidation of functions.

(3) The DCSPER task DPPB to develop the impact analysis capability computer model described in Chapter 3, Section F.

7. Education and Training:

a. Problem: Officers and NCO's have a very poor understanding of the Army's procurement, initial training and distribution system.

b. Discussion: Ignorance of the fundamentals of personnel systems remains a serious problem throughout the Army. A TRADOC OPMS Task Group has recently recommended significant changes to the Army Officer Education System, one of which includes a separate education/training pattern for specialists in Personnel Administration and Personnel Management. These changes will probably not take effect prior to FY 1977, and will not include training for officers other than personnel specialists. In addition, a need for an orientation course for newly assigned DA level action officers/NCO's/civilians has been identified.

c. Conclusions: The education/training of officers and most NCO's in personnel systems needs significant improvement. Also an orientation course for personnel assigned at the DA level is needed.

d. Recommendations:

(1) The DCSPER recommend to Commander, TRADOC, that personnel education in the core curricula of OBC, OAC, CGSC and NCOES be reoriented to provide the individual with an understanding of:

(a) Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.

(b) Force structuring.

(c) Authorizations data.

(d) Manpower procurement.

(e) Initial training.

(f) Distribution of manpower.

(g) Importance of input data.

(2) The DCSPER establish an orientation course for ODCSPER and MILPERCEN officers, senior NCO's and civilian action officers as described in Chapter 3, Section G.

8. Skill Utilization--Readiness Reporting:

a. Problem: Readiness pressures at the unit level cause commanders to cross-assign and cross-train soldiers, resulting in MOS mismatch, unit turbulence, and Army-wide distribution problems.

b. Discussion: The committee was unable to determine to what extent this pressure exists; however, sufficient instances have surfaced to highlight the readiness reporting system as a force that is counterproductive to good people management.

c. Conclusions: Alternatives to the current system need to be developed to reduce malassignments and mismanagement.

d. Recommendations:

(1) ODCSPER provide to ODCSOPS a monthly appraisal of ability to achieve personnel readiness goals in major units.

(2) ODCSPER recommend to ODCSOPS that critical MOS problems be publicized periodically to readiness reporting commands to indicate HQDA recognition of the problem in meeting MOS qualification requirements.

(3) ODCSPER recommend to ODCSOPS that readiness reporting regulations be reviewed and revised to preclude enlisted malassignments for the purpose of readiness reporting.

9. Systems Master Plan:

a. Problem: There is no master plan for the current and future development of personnel systems.

b. Discussion: The current personnel systems have been developed over a period of time and, for the most part, were designed to solve a specific problem existing at that point in time. While each system has been generally successful in accomplishing its original mission, these systems have not always been able to adjust to meet the new requirements because of rapidly changing management policies.

c. Conclusion: Current systems are being modified with "quick-fixes" and constantly being taxed to perform more and more functions for which they were not designed. Additionally, new systems are being developed in relative isolation with little or no requirement for interfacing with existing systems. This contributes to a lack of standardized data elements in all systems, redundant reporting of the same data in different systems, a lack of communication between systems, and the

absence of a central, reliable, and timely data base. Without a personnel systems master plan our functions and subsystems will continue to be fragmented with little or no interface between systems.

d. Recommendations:

(1) That the Consolidation of Enlisted Personnel Systems (Project '76) be established as a priority DCSPER project with a full-time staff for implementing the project.

(2) That the DCSPER family elements responsible for the predictive systems and the operating systems incorporate the reserve components into their master plan.

(3) That the DCSPER assign as a high priority the mission of developing and maintaining a long-range personnel system master plan incorporating all subsystems.

(4) That periodic seminars be held with representation from all interested agencies to discuss, review and update the master plan.

E. Summary: The variety of systems, programs and management effort devoted to getting the right people in the right skill, to the right place is, for the most part, in good working condition. The recommendations listed in this summary and in Chapter III can be compared to the tuning, adjusting and rebuild necessary to keep a good well built car running at peak efficiency. Our systems like those of a car can easily get out of tune or not be in proper synchronization and like

the car may still get where the driver takes it, but not without numerous fixes, either by bandaid approach or by piecemeal human effort. The recommendations in this report plus the continuing efforts of those in the personnel family who are working on tasks like Project 76, PERDDIMS and Accession Management, to name but a few, will get the system in fine tune and proper synchronization. Soldiers like Joe Tentpeg will be routinely assigned without exceptional management effort and without the brunt of management error landing on him.

CHAPTER 2

DESCRIPTION OF CURRENT SYSTEM

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

PREFACE

This booklet provides a comprehensive overview of the Army's Enlisted People Management System. It is designed to be published and issued as a ready reference not only for personnel staff officers at DA and MILPERCEN but also for action personnel in force development, operations, and logistics functions at all echelons of the Army. They, too, must realize the impacts of their decisions throughout the system and the eventual impact on our most important but most variable resource--people.

In an effort to explain the often maligned personnel system and its alleged unresponsiveness, this booklet attempts to describe the vast number of interrelationships which exist and their impacts on the "people system." Here, in layman's terms and simplified schematics, is a description of "who does what to whom, and when" throughout people management cycles and what impacts occur at the level of the individual enlisted soldier.

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1. INTRODUCTION

In FY 1974, the first year of the All-Volunteer Force, the Army enlisted 199,198 personnel into its active ranks. About 182,000 were men and women with no prior military service and about 17,000 were men and women who had previously served in the military services, had been separated, and decided to reenter the Army. That accomplishment, enlisting about one-third of the total enlisted force, in itself is admirable, but provides only one part of the picture. When one considers the process of determining how many accessions were needed in FY 74, how many were to be trained in any one of the more than 300 skills being trained, and where they would be assigned after training, the picture of how the Army handles its human resources takes on a much broader scope and complexity.

The description which follows will attempt to divide the complex system into its main components for easier understanding. The description of the system is oversimplified. If we were to discuss in detail all of the computer programs, reports, forms and procedures which are involved in managing over 600,000 people, this document would be both uninteresting and unreadable.

Personnel management is not a precise system because, eventually, it involves people dealing with people. The variables and intangibles involved in that relationship are difficult to

describe, either verbally or schematically, so the reader must visualize the human decisions and reactions involved in managing the Army's soldiers throughout the system described.

II. DETERMINING ARMY REQUIREMENTS

A. The Army Force Structure

The Army Force Structure is the composition by numbers and types of units of the Army. The Force Structure encompasses a current force and a projected structure for five fiscal years in the future. Let us consider how a force structure is developed or changed from one fiscal year to the next and the various data systems with which we develop quantitative (aggregate numbers) and qualitative (MOS and grade) requirements for enlisted positions.

End Strength and Man-years. Congress establishes the Army's end strength for each fiscal year. The year end strength is the total number of people (officer, warrant officer and enlisted) who may be on the active Army rolls as of the end of the fiscal year. On the basis of the approved budget, ODCSPER (DAPE-PBB) computes a man-year ceiling. This ceiling is the average monthly strength during the fiscal year, and, by law, this ceiling must not be exceeded. A man-year represents one individual in the Army for a full twelve months. Monthly accessions must be controlled by month during the year to conform to the man-year ceiling.

Force Structure Allowance. Once the year end strength is established, a force structure can be developed. Certain units which must be in the structure can be specified by OSD and/or SA/CSA. Generally, however, OSD issues general guidance in the form of threat scenarios and the Army force planners tailor the force to this guidance.

When ODCSOPS receives the year end strength a proposed force structure is developed. ODCSOPS furnishes ODCSPER the aggregate (officer, warrant officer and enlisted) space requirements for this proposed force broken out by month and totaled by long tour, short tour and CONUS areas of assignment. These figures represent the desired Force Structure Allowance (FSA) which is the total force by unit which is expected to be manned within the year end strength constraint.

To support any FSA, a number of individuals are required as overhead (called the Individuals Accounts). These are transients (individuals enroute from one duty station to another); trainees (individuals undergoing basic training or initial MOS training); patients (individuals assigned to hospital detachments as patients); prisoners (individuals carried on the rolls of a confinement facility); and students (individuals already trained in one MOS and undergoing training in another and those attending a civilian educational facility on a full time basis). These

individuals cannot be present as part of the operating force in units and accordingly, the spaces they occupy cannot be included as authorizations in the force structure.

ODCSPER takes the proposed Force Structure Allowance provided by ODCSOPS and by the use of an automated data processing model, Comparison of Manpower Programs Using Linear Programming (COMPLIP), determines whether the proposed FSA can be supported by month at a satisfactory trained strength operating level, i.e., when allowances are made for individuals in the overhead account, will the remaining people equal or closely equal the force structure allowance. Operating strength is described as the number of individuals assigned to and present for duty in a unit. People on TDY, leave or temporarily hospitalized are included in the operating strength of their unit of assignment for strength accounting purposes.

If ODCSPER determines that the FSA proposed by ODCSOPS cannot be supported at the desired trained strength operating level, then these two agencies must coordinate until a final FSA is reached. ODCSPER formally notifies ODCSOPS of the total number of spaces which may be included in unit authorization documents-Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE), and Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA).

ODCSOPS then notifies each MACOM of the aggregate number of spaces (officer, warrant officer, enlisted and civilian) which may be included in authorization documents for their units. This is included in Program Budget Guidance and is the basis for the establishment of MOS and grade requirements for the Army. Prior to dispatch of guidance to MACOM, ODCSOPS establishes a unit identification code and aggregate strength (officer, warrant officer, enlisted) for each unit in the FSA. This is done in an automated data processing system - The Force Accounting System (FAS) and total aggregate strengths in the system must equal the FSA.

Development of MOS and Grade Authorizations. Authorizations for the Army are also maintained by an automated data system - The Army Authorizations Document System (TAADS). At HQDA, this system (when all documentation is completed by MACOM) contains MOS and grade totals by unit and an aggregate total of the FAS. However, there are delays from the time MACOM are given their space ceilings until authorization documents are prepared for all units and entered in TAADS. A monthly qualitative summary equaling the FAS is necessary for reports preparation; therefore, a procedure is necessary to cause the qualitative data in TAADS by unit to equal the aggregate data in FAS by unit. ODCSOPS accomplishes this by a data processing system-Structure and

Composition System (SACS). SACS takes each unit in FAS by unit identification code and looks for a corresponding authorization document in TAADS. If one is found, it is accepted as the valid authorizations for that unit. If the unit is a TOE unit, and an MTOE is not on file in TAADS, then SACS selects a comparable TOE as the authorization document for the unit. If the unit is a TDA unit without documentation in TAADS, no authorization will be included in the total authorizations because a TDA defines a unique organization. SACS also performs another function which tends to degrade the validity of total authorizations. If the aggregate strength of a unit in FAS is above or below the strength shown in TAADS, SACS will raise or lower authorizations in TAADS by a factoring process, by MOS so that the totals correspond to the aggregate strength for the unit in FAS. When the MACOM submits an MTOE-TDA for the unit reflecting the proper strength, the MOS and grade totals probably do not agree with those established by SACS factoring. In the meantime, personnel actions are being accomplished based on the factored data.

When SACS has looked at all units in the force structure and compiled a world-wide total of authorizations, the end product is called the Personnel SACS (PERSACS). The monthly PERSACS contains current and projected authorizations and is used throughout the DCSPER family as the sole acceptable document for MOS and grade authorizations. The recently established PERSACS Branch of ODCSPER (DAPE-PBM) is responsible for coordination

with ODCSOPS in preparation and review of the PERSACS and for insuring the most valid document possible is produced.

In a simplified, sequentially numbered diagram, the process is depicted in Figure 2.1. Although a type sequence is shown, it must be understood that the process can be initiated anywhere in the cycle under various circumstances involving authorization or personnel inventory changes.

B. The Army's Retainable Enlisted Strength and Recruiting Objectives

The Army Manpower Program is the official Army projection of future strength, gains and losses of the aggregate active military force. The program is produced by the computer model system, Enlisted Loss Inventory Model - Comparison of Manpower Programs using Linear Programming (ELIM-COMPLIP). The Manpower Program is produced monthly by ODCSPER (DAPE-PBM) and is updated with the latest available strength, gains and loss history. It is the basic Army personnel document for the Military Appropriation, Army Budget, the Five Year Defense Plan and the Program Objective Memorandum. It also determines and specifies recruiting objectives for the Army. The total force is divided into officer, enlisted and US Military Academy strength. Officer and USMA gains and losses are estimated by the Officer Personnel Directorate and the Military Academy and



1. PPBS Decision to ODCSOPS and ODCSPER.
2. ODCSPER computed Force Structure Allowance to ODCSOPS.
3. ODCSOPS program assumptions revise FAS to approximate FSA.
4. FAS and FSA aggregates resolved.
5. PBG allocations to MACOM announced.
6. MACOM aggregate strength revised per PBG.
7. FAS updated by MACOM concept plan.
8. Updated unit documents(MTOE, TDA) to TAADS(MOS and grade).
9. TAADS and FAS compared for SACS update.
10. PERSACS output (MOS and grade by unit) provided to users.

Figure 2.1 Authorization Cycle.

are through-put in COMPLIP. The only calculations performed on officer and USMA data are computations of strength and man years. The flexibility within the manpower program and the optimization routine are all applied only to the enlisted force.

Loss and Gains Projections. The enlisted force is divided into Draftees (AUS), First Term (FT), Careerists (CAR) and Reserve and National Guard personnel on active duty (RES/NG). It does not include personnel in active duty for training status. Total strength, gains and losses are projected in each of these categories. The Draftee category currently is not used.

For making loss projections, the enlisted force is disaggregated into eight homogenous groups and each group is divided into number of months remaining prior to expiration of term of service (ETS) as shown below.

Populations	Months to ETS
AUS	-7 to 24
FT 2	-7 to 24
FT 3	-7 to 36
FT 4	12 to 48
FT 5	24 to 60
FT 6	36 to 72
CAR (non-retirement eligible)	-7 to 72
CAR (retirement eligible)	-7 to 72

FT 2 through FT 6 divides the first term soldiers by their initial enlistment contract with options being available for two years through six years. Careerists are defined as any soldiers with more than three years of active federal service. Non-retirement eligible applies to careerists with less than 20

years of service. The negative months to ETS are used to keep track of personnel who pass their ETS date and are still on the EMF through reporting error or omission.

Within each population cell outlined above, losses are estimated in 12 loss categories: misconduct, unsuitability/unfitness, physical disqualification, hardship, ETS, non-disability retirement, overseas returnees, special early release, immediate reenlistments, extensions, dropped from military control (DFMC), and other attrition. Unsuitability/unfitness includes losses due to unsuitability, unfitness, the Trainee Discharge Program and the Expeditious Discharge Program. DFMC represents personnel dropped as deserters after being in an AWOL status for 30 days.

Enlisted gains are projected in nine categories: non-prior service male, non-prior service female, prior Army service with 2-90 days break in service, prior Army service with over 90 days break in service, prior service in a service other than Army, Reserve Component, return to military control, administrative, and immediate reenlistments. The capability also exists to project draft calls if they are ever reinstituted.

The computation of a manpower program begins when the data base is updated with new historical data <u>each</u> <u>month</u>. The data is extracted from the Enlisted Master File and the Gain/Loss transaction tapes. The data base is continuous from January

1972 to the latest month. After the data is updated and processed into the appropriate population cells and loss categories, ELIM analyzes the data and applies exponential smoothing to produce loss factors for each population cell and each loss category for the first month of projection. For each projection month there are about 4,500 loss factors which must be considered by the system manager. Loss factors must then be developed for each cell and for each projection month (normally for five years). These future loss factors for each population and loss cause must be specified by the system manager. He may elect to do nothing, in which case the loss factor developed by ELIM for the first month would be repeated each future month. He may determine that there is evidence to believe a downtrend or uptrend will occur. He would then enter that projected trend line into the program. The manager could also specify a seasonal distribution or estimate the effect of new policies. All of these specifications are normally used in each run, depending on the managerial decisions made.

After completion of the factor development process the personnel inventory is projected into the future. This is done by starting with the current inventory, by population cells, adding gains and subtracting losses using the loss factors discussed above and a moving inventory technique. The data represents the quantitative projected inventory of the Army.

Recruiting Objectives. The data produced by ELIM is input to COMPLIP, a linear programming model. Various constraints, mandated by Congress or policy decisions, are also provided to COMPLIP. Constraints which might be applied include the end fiscal year strength, manyears (average strength for the fiscal year), recruiting objectives, BCT capacity, AIT capacity and Reserve Enlistment Program. The primary objective of COMPLIP is to determine the non-prior service accessions required to minimize the average difference between aggregate structure spaces and operating strength while remaining within all the specified constraints. The linear program package will examine many feasible alternative programs which satisfy all the constraints and then select the optimum program for any chosen objective. Normally the most important consideration is given to providing trained individuals to fill the structure requirements of the Army; however, the objective can be weighted to give more importance to accession seasonality, BCT utilization or AIT capacity.

The optimal Army Manpower Program, once approved, becomes the official Army projection. The near term accessions required to satisfy the program, normally for the next fiscal quarter, are provided to USAREC by ODCSPER (DAPE-MPR) as the non-prior service male and female and prior service recruiting objectives.

This data is also provided to MILPERCEN (DAPC-EPS) for distribution planning, to TRADOC for training load planning, and to other ODCSPER agencies for evaluation of management impacts. In a steady state environment, gains, losses and training requirements would remain relatively constant. In reality the Army Manpower Program, like personnel management, is very dynamic. Changes in the economy, loss trends, retention, new or changed policies, or directed personnel reductions or monetary reductions all generate immediate waves through the projection that might take three to five years to smooth out. Every effort is made to keep the program as smooth as possible within these considerations; however, users of the program must be flexible enough to absorb the required changes. The capabilities or incapabilities of action agencies to be flexible and respond to the rapid changes will be evident in the sections which follow - in most cases, flexibility to respond within the limited lead-times provided boils down to crisis management at the operating level.

From Manpower to People. Thus far in our description of people management, we have confined our effort to the DA Staff level of manpower management in which all analysis and computation have been based on quantity in the enlisted force and general factors of policy which rapidly change that quantity. The following

discussion will concentrate on the management which occurs at the operator level, MILPERCEN, where our first real consideration of quality management by MOS and grade is begun. Also, it is in MILPERCEN and USAREC that the first efforts at people management begin - there are faces, qualities, talents and feelings behind the numbers.

C. Computation of Individual Skill Requirements

Prior to launching into our training requirements process, it is considered worthwhile to familiarize you with some definitions of terms (some are repeats):

-- Enlisted MOS Training Requirements - The number of soldiers who must be trained in each enlisted MOS each fiscal year to achieve and maintain an operating strength balance with authorizations.

-- White Book - A document containing all training requirements officer and enlisted (Army), Active and Reserve Component, other services, foreign nationals and civilian, for all MOS and functional Army training courses.

-- PERSACS - (Personnel Structure and Composition System) - Computer generated personnel authorizations of the Army by MOS and grade based on data contained in The Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) and The Force Accounting System (FAS). The PERSACS is used in the DCSPER family as the detailed authorizations for all personnel planning and management. TAADS and FAS are ODCSOPS Systems. The PERSACS Branch, ODCSPER monitors preparation of and reviews the PERSACS.

-- Personnel Inventory Analysis System - (PIA II) - An automated data processing model which computes enlisted MOS training requirements. The PERSACS and the EMF are the data bases used by this model for authorizations and personnel inventory data, respectively.

The White Book Process. To maintain the trained strength of the Army in each enlisted MOS, individuals must continuously be trained to correspond to changes in the force structure and to replace losses. This training is planned and executed on a fiscal year basis for two years. The goal is to train sufficient numbers in each MOS each fiscal year so that the total trained personnel in each MOS equals the projected authorization as of the end of the fiscal year. It is of utmost importance that neither too many nor too few be trained in each MOS. The Army's vehicle for planning the required training is the White Book Conference. This is a meeting normally held twice yearly with representation from the DA Staff, US Army Military Personnel Center, training agencies and any other interested agencies. Training for officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel (Active Army and Reserve Components), training for other services, civilians and foreign nationals are addressed. The discussion which follows, however, pertains to Army enlisted training (active and reserve) only. Prior to the White Book Conference, requirements for active Army are computed by the Review and Analysis Branch, Enlisted

Personnel Directorate, MILPERCEN (DAPC-EPO). This is done by PIA II using PERSACS output for projected authorizations and the EMF for personnel inventory. Numerous other factors are applied during the computer run: reenlistment rates, retirement rates, unprogrammed loss rates, basic combat and advanced individual training attrition rates, estimated graduates from those individuals in training at the time of the computation, estimated reclassification between and among MOS, and any other known factors which affect the population in an MOS. The final output from the computer is a training requirement for each four-digit MOS which is basically the difference between the projected authorization and the projected retainable inventory. The accuracy of this requirement is directly affected by the accuracy/inaccuracy of the following source data:

-- SACS authorizations -- the projected authorizations are in many cases estimates on the part of the command managers in DCSOPS as to how directed force structure changes may be implemented by major commanders. For example, assume that a major commander has been directed to reduce X number of spaces in his command during a fiscal year. The command manager in ODCSOPS makes a "calculated guess" as to the units in which the major command will take those reductions. The authorizations for those units (as then on file in TAADS) are either eliminated or by a factoring process reduced to a specified number. At that point certain MOS in the unit show a projected reduction.

When the changes are documented in TAADS by the major commander he may have reduced or eliminated units other than those selected by the DCSOPS command manager. This results not only in changing MOS training requirements for the MOS already projected, but also may introduce training requirement changes for completely different MOS not considered in the command manager's update.

-- EMF data - Errors on the EMF in the data elements used to project the retainable inventory (e.g. primary MOS, expiration of term of service date, basic active service date) also result in errors in the training requirements.

-- Rates - The loss rates used in PIA II are based on historical data - any changes in these rates result in errors in the projected retainable inventory and consequently in direct errors in the training requirements.

The computer generated training requirements are reviewed in detail by MOS monitors, familiar with each MOS, and if any requirement appears questionable, the computer run is checked and adjustments made where warranted. These finalized requirements are then forwarded to the Programs Branch, Training Division, ODCSPER (DAPE-MPT) for review in a draft White Book format. The action officer in the Programs Branch then establishes a training objective for each MOS. He compares the projected non-prior service accessions for the year, as

determined in the Manpower Program, with the computed requirements for those MOS training courses to be filled by non-prior service accessions completing basic combat training. If the training requirements for such personnel are greater than the projected number of basic combat training graduates (data furnished by the Programs and Estimates Branch, Manpower Programs Division, DCSPER), then requirements in certain MOS must be reduced. Priorities for each MOS are established based on the needs of each in combat type units. Requirements in the MOS with lower priorities are reduced and an overall training objective established for those MOS which conforms to the projected basic combat training graduates. Since the training requirements are computed for two fiscal years, each time an objective for one fiscal year is increased, a leveling decrease for the following year may be made depending upon computed requirements for each year and the projected BCT graduates for each year.

Concurrent with the computation of enlisted Active Army training requirements, Reserve and National Guard enlisted training requirements are being prepared. Both the Reserve and National Guard requirements are in two categories: requirements for non-prior service personnel entering the Army Reserve or National Guard under the Reserve Enlistment Program (REP), and requirements for training of in-service members of the Army Reserve or National Guard. The REP requirements (new trainees) for each

component are furnished to the Programs Branch, Training Division, ODCSPER for inclusion in the draft White Book before it is forwarded to TRADOC. The in-service requirements are forwarded to TRADOC by both FORSCOM and the Chief, Army National Guard for Army Reserve and National Guard requirements, respectively.

The Draft White Book is forwarded to TRADOC, Health Services Command and other training agencies approximately one month prior to convening of the White Book Conference. TRADOC and HSC then consolidate all training requirements which have been furnished them (other services, civilians, foreign nationals) and arrive at a total training requirement for each MOS and establish a training capability for each MOS (within manpower, facility and dollar resources).

The White Book Conference is held to establish the total training program for each MOS. All active Army requirements are normally scheduled for training if the training capability exists. DCSPER is responsible for decision as to distribution of training spaces among Active Army and other claimants when a training capability shortfall exists. After the White Book Conference, the total program data is rechecked by Review and Analysis Branch, EPD, and Programs Branch, Training Division, DCSPER. It is reproduced and distributed to all interested

training activities and agencies. The training activities then prepare schedules of classes to conform to the total training program. These class schedules are forwarded to the Training Division, EPD, where quotas for the Active Army and Reserve are entered on the REQUEST system and are available for recruiting purposes. Because of the invalidity of the PERSACS authorizations and possible changes in projected retainable inventory, requirements must be continually reviewed between White Book Conferences. As PERSACS authorization data becomes available each month, the Review and Analysis Branch, EPD analyzes changes in authorizations and latest available data on personnel inventory and recommends changes to training when major changes in authorizations/retainable inventory occur.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the White Book process.

III. PROCURING QUALIFIED MEN AND WOMEN

A. The Recruiter and His Product

Options. The process by which the Army acquires its soldiers begins with the recruiters. Over 4700 of them in the states and territories make the initial contacts with potential enlistees in the civilian community. The objective of their recruiting effort is to obtain qualified and motivated volunteers to meet valid Army requirements. Enlistment options provide the vehicle by which Army applicants are attracted and enlisted in the Regular Army. The option package may be viewed as a commodity on the



1. Manpower Program (COMPLIP) computes aggregate NPS training requirements.
2. PIA computes MOS training requirements using PERSACS and EMF.
3. Aggregate and detailed MOS training requirements are compared and resolved for draft White Book.
4. White Book Conference develops annual training program including REP requirements input.
5. Training program to training commands and activities.
6. Class schedules and training spaces from training activities to EPD.
7. AIT training spaces by class programmed on REQUEST for use by career counsellors in AFEES.

Figure 2.2 White Book Development

open market from which individuals select a purchase. The option packages which have existed in the past have offered various incentives for applicants ranging from training guarantees, unit or station of choice assignments, guaranteed periods of stabilization in a specific unit or area, to payment of cash bonuses for certain enlistments. A consolidated option package, to be implemented on 1 July 1975, consists of 13 separate options which capitalize on historically successful incentives and provide for training and assignment flexibility. Each of these options requires a minimum enlistment period of three or four years. Specific details for all options are contained in AR 601-210, Regular Army Enlistment Program, the proponent of which is the Recruitment and Reenlistment Division of ODCSPER (DAPE-MPR).
In addition to the options for non-prior service applicants, the Army recognizes the need to attract already qualified personnel who require little or no training to perform satisfactorily. Individuals who meet that criteria include those who have civilian acquired skills needed by the Army. In the Stripes for Skills Program, accelerated promotions are offered for persons possessing one of the over 170 included skills; normal incentives of unit or area of choice and stabilization are included in the program. A second category of personnel considered qualified are those who have had prior service in the military services. They possess experience in the needed skills and represent a savings to the Army in terms of training time and associated

costs. Their entry, however, must be controlled to insure that vacancies for their specific skills exist.

Quality Constraints. The recruiter, even though his option packages are attractive, is constrained in his efforts by individual quality standards which must be met in order to satisfy the Army's needs. Basically, a potential enlistee is categorized as a result of an Army Classification Battery (ACB) test which grades nine aptitude area levels to aid in classification and selection of the individual and an Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) or Armed Forces Women's Selection Test which tests basic mental capability. Both tests are used to categorize individuals into four basic mental groups. In addition, the scores are used to derive enlistment standards which must be met for enlistment qualification. These minimum standards vary for several categories of personnel - high school graduates, non-high school graduates, male and female, and 17 year old males. In addition to the requirements for individual qualifications, the recruiter is constrained by Army quality standards which limit the number of personnel in certain mental groups and qualification categories that may be enlisted during periods of the year. These quality standards are variable and are dependent on the desired Army-wide population in the qualification categories.

B. AFEES and the Career Counsellor

Once the recruiter has determined the applicant's desire to enlist and his interest areas, he can evaluate the individual's high school test scores, or he can administer the Enlistment Screening Test which gives an informal indication of how the applicant may fare on the ACB and AFQT given at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station (AFEES). The AFEES is a joint services facility charged with mental testing, physical examination, and administrative processing of the enlistment of qualified accessions. DA is the DOD Executive Agent for the AFEES and USAREC operates the AFEES for DA. The responsibility for completion of applicant processing is shared by USAREC and the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station and is accomplished in four phases: preliminary processing by the recruiting station; orientation, mental and medical testing by the AFEES; selection of options and verification of eligibility for enlistment; reservation of training space by the career counselors; administration of oath of enlistment; opening records; and making necessary travel arrangements to BCT.

Delayed Entry Program. The primary market that recruiters seek is the bonafide high school graduate who may be undecided about his future. That market is most accessible during the June-September time frame each year, and the large number of enlistees during that period and during college mid-term in January

describe a definite seasonality in ability to obtain enlistments. To insure that high-quality potential enlistees are not lost to the Army during any period of the year, recruiters and career counsellors take full advantage of the Army's Delayed Entry Program (DEP). The DEP provides for enlistment in a Reserve component for inactive duty with up to 270 days delay in assignment to extended active duty. The authority for enlistment under this program is granted solely for the purpose of allowing enlistment of qualified individuals who have agreed to enlist in the Active Army in 30 to 270 days to attend a specific service school or course of training. Prior to enlistment in the DEP, applicants must meet the eligibility requirements and be processed for the specific active duty enlistment option for which they are applying. Individuals are attracted to the DEP because they can sign up in advance for a specific military school course and be assured that the Army will honor that commitment. This is particularly beneficial to those in their last year of high school and those who desire a military course that is offered only a few times each year. The Army also benefits from the DEP. It provides for better utilization of available school seats, enhances scheduling of processing at AFEES and permits recruiting activities to manage their requirements for accession flow into particular career fields.

C. Management of Training Spaces - REQUEST. The Recruit Quota System (REQUEST) is an automated training space reservation

system similar to those used by airlines to allocate seat space, and it is the first time in the people management chronology where a face is matched with a space. The system programs available AIT training spaces as determined by the training program in the White Book and the scheduling by training commands. It displays the training quotas for each MOS and class start date in several programs within the system. If a career counselor at the AFEES is interviewing an applicant for enlistment, he can use his remote REQUEST terminal to query the following programs which will provide him space and minimum qualification information to enable him to better consummate the enlistment of the applicant:

-- "Look-up" program - If the applicant knows which training he wants, and it has been determined that he meets the pre-requisites, the counselor accesses the "look-up" program to find a training space in the first available AIT class and reserves that space.

-- "Search" program - If the applicant is uncertain concerning his training desires "Search" will match the applicant's qualifications with minimum course requirements and display choices of courses in increments of five. The first two choices are priority for fill courses; the others are additional courses for which the applicant is qualified. Once a choice is made, the space can be reserved.

-- "KWIKSALE" Program - this program displays for the counselor all available training vacancies for a particular start date. It also specifies which MOS are priority fill MOS and if they are available for WAC.

The training quotas available on REQUEST are the total requirements for the Active Army and the Reserve Forces (USAR and ARNG). As of this writing, the system permits reservations on a first come, first-served basis. Controls to limit reservations when White Book Program ceilings are reached for each component are scheduled for implementation in 4th quarter, FY 75.

The REQUEST system is the controlling element for recruiters in correlating the aggregate recruiting objectives developed in the manpower program to the MOS needs of the Army as reflected in the White Book training program. The two goals of meeting each year's recruiting objectives and the Army's skill needs are dependent on the success of the USAREC recruiting effort and management controls in REQUEST.

IV. TRAINING FOR NEEDED SKILLS

A. Basic Training

Currently, there are seven US Army reception stations (RECSTA), located at each Army Training Center in TRADOC. The purpose of the RECSTA is to receive and process for basic training enlistees of the Active Army and Reserve Components. Processing

lasts three working days. Activities include orientation, clothing issue, haircut, records processing, ID card issue, eye and dental check, partial pay, testing (as required), classification interview, personal affairs interview, immunizations, and shipment to a basic training unit.

Active Army enlistees arrive at RECSTA from the Armed Forces Examination and Entrance Stations (AFEES) on a daily basis. The flow of enlistees from AFEES is monitored by HQ TRADOC, and the AFEES are directed by HQ USAREC to ship to various RECSTA based on training input requirements in the training base. No formal command relationship exists between RECSTA and AFEES.

In many instances, surge input from AFEES has caused the processing capacity and, in some cases, the billeting capacity of reception stations to be exceeded. The problem of billeting capacity during these peak input periods is exacerbated if basic training units are in a "back-to-back" training status and unable to accept RECSTA shipments, thus creating a backlog of unprocessed personnel in reception station barracks.

BCT and WAC basic training (BT) commences each week on Friday. Each unit starting training on Friday is filled by enlistees who arrive after 2100 hours Monday of the previous week up to 2100 hours Monday of the same week in which training commences.

REQUEST programs enlistees against available AIT or MOS school seat availability. An enlistee's assigned RECSTA date will ensure a BCT start date that, barring unforeseen occurences such as academic deficiency or injury which necessitates recycling, will schedule a BCT graduation date just prior to the scheduled AIT. If an enlistee arrives after 2100 hours (cut off time) on his RECSTA date, that individual will miss the programmed BCT start date and, consequently, the AIT start. In effect, a training space has been lost when this occurs. If the enlistee arrives prior to 2100 hours on the Monday prior to the RECSTA date (also a Monday), he will be input to BCT a week early which will result in early arrival at AIT (a week before the scheduled AIT start date). The latter situation at times, has created a significant backlog of personnel awaiting training at TRADOC schools and AIT units.

B. Advanced Individual Training

After processing in the reception station, trainees are transported to their basic training units. By the end of the first week of basic training, personnel data on every individual is transceived to MILPERCEN and input to a system used for the assignment and control of trainees (ACT). This input to the ACT data base is the first receipt by MILPERCEN of a complete, consolidated by-name list of pertinent data on each individual who began basic training on any given weekly start date.

During the third week of training, Training Input Branch, EPD, receives the AIT training quotas from Schools Branch. These quotas are then matched by the ACT program against each individual's qualifications, enlistment commitment, course prerequisites and other management parameters in the ACT data base. All assignments are analyzed, and necessary corrections are made. After these corrections, a final tape is produced and final AIT assignments for trainees are transceived to the basic training centers during the fourth week of basic training. The following week, rosters are mailed confirming all assignments. Additionally, rosters are also mailed to the gaining training command and to the units who have enlisted these individuals. Information to the various commands includes name, SSN, training MOS, location, start and graduation dates, follow-on MOS training location and dates, leave information and security clearance information.

When the individual arrives at his AIT location, commanders there transceive another Data Card (TCC 70) to MILPERCEN acknowledging his arrival, training MOS and training start and graduation dates. This information then produces a roster of readily available trainees (REVAIL) from the ACT system. This report is used to make the initial unit assignment for all AIT graduates.

The above process applies to individuals who go through BCT and AIT with no problems, and the majority of trainees are in this category. If the individual is not able to comply with his original assignment instructions, he is reported back to MILPERCEN and his new assignment instructions to AIT are issued by an assignment clerk after consideration of his enlistment commitment, aptitude scores, physical profile, available training spaces and MOS training priorities. If training activities fail to report the change in the trainee's status and take unilateral action to reassign the individual to different training, all future management actions pertaining to that individual will be in error and will result in his being held over or delayed prior to receiving his unit assignment.

C. Assignment of Newly Trained Personnel

When a trainee reports to his AIT unit, his arrival date, training MOS and projected graduation date are transmitted to MILPERCEN for entry into the ACT system. If his graduation date is within 99 days after receipt of the data report, the ACT system generates a roster of readily available trainees (REVAIL) to indicate that the time has come to assign him to a unit as a trained soldier. If the individual has an enlistment commitment, he is matched to an appropriate requisition that had been coded and set aside from the normal requisitioning/assignment processes accomplished in the Centralized Assignment Procedures System (CAP III). If no requisition was set aside, the individual is assigned using a

generated requisition. Committed personnel are assigned to the unit of commitment despite the absence of a "hard-card" requisition in order to honor the individual's contract.

If the individual has no enlistment commitment, he is assigned in accordance with a distribution plan prepared by the Deputy for Distribution, EPD. His assignment may be delayed by at least a week beyond those individuals who are committed, but it is necessary to satisfy changing priorities.

When individuals are matched to requisitions, assignment instructions are sent directly to the losing training activity via the AUTODIN communications system. The assignment transaction than is posted to the Enlisted Master File (EMF) and to CAP III to account for a requisition fill. This posting generates assignment instructions which are sent as information to the gaining unit via normal CAP III output.

The second phase of the AIT assignment process is the generation of a port call for those AIT graduates destined for overseas shipment. Port calls are initiated automatically as a result of successful posting of an assignment to the EMF and CAP III. If the update posting is not recorded because of an error in data reporting, the automated feature is lost, and the losing training activity must initiate action to secure a port call

through manual processing. Because two systems (one manual and one automated) currently are involved in transmitting assignments for AIT graduates to the field, the potential for erroneous assignments exists. The only interface between the two occurs when manual transactions are posted to CAP III. If amendments to or deletions from assignment instructions are made by field commands and not reported back to MILPERCEN, the individual may be reported on another REVAIL and assigned a second time. Therefore the success of the trainee assignment process from beginning to end is highly dependent on the accuracy and timeliness of reporting from training installations. On-going efforts to incorporate AIT assignments in the CAP III automated system will enhance detection and correction of reporting errors. The entire trainee reporting and assignment process is illustrated in Fugure 2.3.

V. DISTRIBUTION AND ASSIGNMENT

A. Distribution Planning and Priorities. The determination of priorities for all Army resources (money, people and materiel) is the responsibility of the DCSOPS (DAMO-ODR), and these priorities are published annually in the DA Master Priority list (DAMPL). Each major command, unit or activity listed in the DAMPL is assigned a specific five digit sequence number, the fifth digit of which designates the priority of the organization for personnel resources. The fifth digit is provided



1. AFEES reports enlistment data to EMF and reception station and sends recruits to reception station.
2. After processing and move to BCT, arrival and personal data reported to ACT.
3. By fourth week of BCT, AIT assignment provided trainee.
4. After arrival at AIT, TCC 70 card updates ACT with graduation date.
5. ACT provides REVAIL and unit assignment made against requisition from unit.
6. Soldier arrives at unit and EMF is updated by unit.

Figure 2.3 Trainee Reporting and Assignment

to DCSOPS by ODCSPER (DAPE-MP) and reflects three groupings of priority organizations as derived from the Personnel Priority Model (PPM). The purpose of the PPM is to provide qualitative fill guidance to MILPERCEN in the form of relative fill ratios. When the Army's strength is high and MOS are near balance, the PPM is of no great consequence; however, when qualitative shortages in critical MOS or grades exist, the relative fill ratios of the PPM prescribe which organizations and activities will share the shortages and to what degree. The PPM is a standing priority policy, but in instances where major emphasis is required for certain units or activities, ODCSPER (DAPE-MPE) issues additional policy guidance to MILPERCEN as exceptions to the PPM.

Since a portion of the Army's trained strength is intransit between assignments at any given time, planning must be accomplished to enable the distribution and assignment system to react to the constant needs of Army units with available personnel assets. Currently, distribution planning is based on a nine month strength projection for major CONUS and oversea commands by the Deputy for Distribution, EPD (DAPC-EPS). Basically, the distribution plan is quantitative in nature, with the beginning month indicating actual operating status of the command at the end of the past month. The remaining eight months are aggregate strength projections using projected authorizations and assignment gains and losses. The first five

months projections are based on known assignment data and a known number of personnel undergoing training in BCT or AIT. The last three months, however, are projections based primarily on recruiting objectives derived from the manpower program--many of the people being distributed have not yet enlisted in the Army at the time the planning is done. Although the plan is quantitative, it includes a distribution by MOS for AIT graduates, and the requisitions in the CAP III system provide the MOS goals for assignment managers to fill. The plan is updated each month and provides a management tool for detecting distribution problem areas and developing alternative corrective measures.

B. Requisitions Versus Assigned Strength. A unit's trained strength requirements for any given month are conveyed to MILPERCEN by way of requisitions submitted to arrive five months prior to the requirement month for CONUS units and nine months prior for oversea units. The individual requisition represents a requirement for a soldier of a particular grade possessing a specific MOS for assignment to a particular unit. Requisitions are derived from a unit's evaluation of its current status-authorized strength versus assigned strength and a compilation of its known and projected gains and losses. The resultant vacancies by MOS and grade are the basis for requisitions. Upon receipt of the requisitions at MILPERCEN-EPD, they are

logged and forwarded to managers in the office of the Deputy for Distribution. Individual command/installation managers edit the requisitions for errors in format which may preclude their further processing in CAP III, correct the errors, or refer them back to the command/installation for correction when errors are gross. The second effort of these managers is validation-comparing their own projection of the command/installation MOS status in the requirement month against the submitted requisitions. If an apparent over or under requisitioning exists, the manager attempts to resolve the discrepancy with the command/installation prior to making a decision not to validate the requisition. Discrepancies in the two projections may be caused by a proponent approved authorization change at the unit level not yet recorded in PERSACS or by more current gain and loss data for the unit available in MILPERCEN. The problem is resolved prior to the submission of the validated requisitions for assignment processing in the Centralized Assignment Procedures System (CAP III). CAP III is an automated nomination/assignment system which compares the qualitative requirements as recorded on requisitions against a multitude of variables for each individual soldier recorded on the EMF. The output of CAP III is a nomination listing of optimum matches of qualified available individuals against valid requisitions in the system. The CAP III system has four basic subsystems:

-- Requisitioning subsystem - this subsystem receives requisitions from distribution managers after they have been

manually edited and validated. The system subjects those requisitions to an extensive machine edit procedure, and requisitions are prioritized according to input from the Deputy for Distribution directing which requisitions by unit will get first priority for nominations, to what level the organization's requisitions will be filled, and a priority of emphasis for each month of the requisition cycle.

-- Parameter Deck, Personnel Assignment Policy Subsystem - This subsystem is the control mechanism for CAP III. It determines the order in which requisitions will be processed, the personnel eligible for reassignment consideration and their degrees of eligibility as constrained by ODCSPER assignment policies, and, finally, how the processing will be done. It uses output from the Unit Identification System (UIS) furnished by ODCSOPS and active MOS listings from Personnel Management Development Directorate (DAPC-PM).

-- Assignment Subsystem - this subsystem is normally referred to as CASCADE because its program considers the highest priority requisition first and scans the entire list of assignment eligible personnel until it finds a soldier who satisfies the minimum requirements. It then continues its scan of eligibles and if it finds a soldier who matches the requirement better than the one originally slotted, it "bumps" the first soldier back into the eligibles. The scan continues in this manner for every requisition until the best qualified soldier for each has been slotted and every possible requisition has been filled.

its output is a list of "nominees" for requisition fill which is forwarded to individual assignment managers for review. Based on personnel file data available to them, assignment managers either accept or reject the nominations listed and return the nominations to the system. Even though the nominations are matched by a computer, human judgment makes the final decision for each assignment.

-- Output Subsystem - this program receives accepted nominations from assignment managers, consummates the assignment, issues assignment instructions to both the losing and gaining commands, and updates the EMF and management reports.

C. Trained Strength Shortage - Impacts on Readiness and People

In theory, the distribution planning and assignment processes just described place the right soldier in the right skill at the right place at the right time. In fact, the system does a very credible job for those MOS and grades which are nearly balanced, those for which the overseas to sustaining base ration is supportable, and for those in which there is a high density of personnel in substitutable skills. The problem arises in the MOS where these conditions do not exist, and a sharing of shortages is required for all commands as indicated by the relative fill ratios of the PPM. Here lies the beginning of crisis management which eventually creates adverse impact, sometimes even hardship, on our people. It is quite common that

decisions are made at the national, DOD or DA level to support worldwide requirements that upset the basic theory and practical application of the DA priority system. When certain commands or organizations are exempted from the "shortage sharing" requirements of the PPM, it causes compounded shortages to be shared by the organizations lower in priority than the excepted one. One is tempted to observe logically that we must suffer through that shortage until personnel are available. However, now we must introduce a pressure which is characteristic of a mission - oriented organization - the monthly Readiness Report. It displays an objective and subjective evaluation by the commander as to what degree of readiness to perform its mission his unit has achieved for the month past. To provide documented backup to his readiness evaluation, the commander begins the manipulation of personnel, cross-leveling of unit strengths by MOS, filling critical vacancies with qualified personnel despite the MOS consideration, and beginning, where appropriate, reclassification actions for individuals. The resultant impacts are MOS mismatch, malutilization, and turbulence for the people involved - all adverse impacts in the areas of promotion, specialty pay and career development. Granted many of these moves are mission essential, but many are precipitated solely by the pressures of monthly readiness reporting. The distributor in EPD, in addition to bearing the brunt of complaints from the field concerning the shortage, contends with the problem of validating requisitions

for MOS perceived as needed by the field units, while the inventory in those PMOS shows no requirement. His attempts to assign people in the PMOS which are short in the unit tend to compound the MOS mismatch, malutilization and turbulence.

In summary, enlisted personnel distribution is a very complex business, replete with pitfalls and shortcomings because of the rapidly changing variables which exist - force structure changes, recruiting success, training attrition rates, retention rates, and most of all, the unpredictability of the individual soldier, his health and his family. All of these variables point up the really critical factor which governs successful distribution - the accuracy and timeliness of the data bases being used for analysis. Authorizations not approved and posted expeditiously to PERSACS and individual change data not properly reported for posting on the EMF make the already complicated distribution system less responsive.

VI. SUMMARY

This description has covered the enlisted people management system from the determination of a broad requirement in a Planning, Programming and Budget decision until the newly trained soldier arrives in his first unit of assignment. That system has been depicted in its entirety in Figure 2.4 During that cycle, planning takes place in the areas of manpower objectives,

determination of specific skill requirements, development of a training program, recruiting, training, distribution and assignment in order to get that soldier to his first unit. The current system consists of numerous components, both automated and human. The system is imperfect because human beings are managing human beings, and all of the variables inherent in each soldier cause exceptions in the system which impact on other soldiers. We can, however, make vast improvements to the benefit of all soldiers if we better understand the planning lead-time required for the system to operate smoothly and the criticality of accuracy and timeliness in the data used.

The Future

The requirement for accurate data for authorizations and personnel inventory becomes even more critical in the future as automated systems presently being developed are introduced into the management cycle. The interfaces throughout the system and the increased lead-times required to do the best management job we can for our soldiers will require that commanders and managers throughout the Army meet their deadlines in all data reporting requirements. If we do not, soldiers will continue to suffer inconvenience and personal hardship, and a unit's manning requirements will not be met in a timely, responsive manner.

The schematic in this Figure portrays the parts of the people management system we have described for determining Army requirements, procuring enlistees, training them, and distributing them to initial units of assignment. The schematic has been blocked and color-coded to illustrate the main components of the system - both automated systems and human management actions which interface to make the system work.

- DCSOPS functions and systems (red) develop planning output which serves as input or action data both for DCSPER agencies (blue)and major field commands (green).
- In turn, the policy and planning output of the DCSPER system (blue) causes operational management actions to occur in MILPERCEN-EPD (orange), in USAREC (brown), in the Reserve Components (yellow), and in the training commands (purple).
- The flow of impersonal data (black lines) among all systems consists of that information which affects individuals indirectly without their knowledge.
- Personal data flow (blue dashed lines) represents information about each soldier, by name, which causes direct impact on him or her in the operational portions of the system.
- (Solid blue lines) indicate the movement of people among the operational field commands.
- The symbols as described in the legend have been oversimplified to depict only broad general differences between the automated systems and their output and the human management actions and their results.

Figure 2.4 A Schematic of Enlisted Personnel Acquisition

A SCHEMATIC OF ENLISTED PERSONNEL ACQUISITION

Initial Entry Requirements Through First Unit of Assignment



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CHAPTER 3

MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE PRESENT SYSTEM

AND RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS

(QUICK FIXES AND LONG TERM)

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

A. PLANNING LEAD TIMES:

1. General: Lead times for personnel actions are just as critical as those for procurement of equipment and materiel. People can be procured on a crash basis but their training cannot. Actions involving people must be planned sufficiently in advance for procurement, training and assignment at the proper time. The enlisted personnel management system is entirely dependent upon MOS and grade authorizations established by Major Commanders for units in their commands. Lead times must be sufficient for changes to be documented and entered in the HQDA data base as far in advance of effective date as necessary for related personnel actions to be processed properly.

2. Current Problems: Force structure changes and MOS structure changes are now announced with insufficient lead time prior to the effective date for proper personnel planning and management. Major Commanders may, with certain constraints, change MOS and grade authorizations with an immediate effective date. Executive decisions and/or congressional mandates force the personnel manager into untimely exception practices which generally result in undesirable personnel actions.

3. Optimum Personnel Management Lead Times: Figure 3.1 shows desirable lead times for training requirements computations, force structure changes and MOS structure changes. The following rationale was considered in developing the optimum lead times:

a. Training Requirements Computations - White Book Conferences are held semi-annually to consider training programs for two consecutive fiscal years. In addition to providing planning and development time for training commands and agencies, the two-year time frame permits an optimum leveling of training loads across both years. Until this year, field commands have been permitted to submit TAADS document changes resulting from PBG up to the first day of the new fiscal year. In effect, this meant that the training program for the new fiscal year was based, for the most part, on last year's authorizations. In the FY 77 PBG, this problem has been alleviated and commands have been advised to submit FY 77 documentation by October 1975, a full year prior to the beginning of FY 77. Because the October White Book Conference normally develops an initial program for the second fiscal year, it is highly desirable to have an updated PERSACS for that year. Submission of TAADS documentation 13 months prior to the beginning of the FY rather than the current 12 months would permit a more accurate PERSACS to be developed and used.

b. Force Structure Changes - A major structure change normally requires training of lower grade enlisted personnel to support the change. Optimum lead time for people managers requires that the structure decision be announced to the staff and to major commands

18 months prior to the effective date (E-date). This time frame provides 90-120 days for the major commands to prepare their new documentation for units involved and to submit that new data to TAADS by the 14th month prior to E-date. Ideally, the command manager's review and approval will permit reflections of the new authorizations in PERSACS output in the 13th month. This solid data source at that time enables personnel managers to adjust the annual training program already underway to reflect new training requirements or deletions. By the 11th month, those new training requirements will be reflected on the REQUEST system. USAREC can begin recruiting in the delayed entry program, and requisition managers have a reliable PERSACS authorization output to validate requisitions from oversea commands received in the 9th month prior to E-date. The ensuing 4 months permits distribution systems to provide necessary personnel fill from in-service perscnnel and to give individuals about 6 months notification of their new assignments. Newly-recruited personnel in the majority of MOS must enter the training base 5 months prior to the E-date in order to guarantee timely arrival. If interim E-dates are specified to provide for phased personnel fill prior to final E-date, planning lead times should be adjusted accordingly to preclude crisis management which normally creates adverse impacts on personnel involved.

c. MOS Structure Changes - Currently, changes to the MOS structure are provided to the field for implementation on semi-annual effective dates. The delays which have been experienced in recording changes to TAADS documents and accomplishing personnel reclassifications have caused serious problems in the proper assignment and utilization of personnel. To alleviate the requisition, assignment and utilization problem it is essential that MOS structure changes be reflected in PERSACS and projected MOS classifications reflected in the EMF 13 months prior to the effective date as discussed in paragraph 3b above. To allow 60 days for commands to change and submit TAADS documents and to project reclassifications, MOS structure changes must be announced for implementation at least 16 months prior to the effective date.

4. Conclusions: Personnel management lead times must be established, published and complied with by the DA staff and field commanders.

5. Recommendations:

a. That force structure changes be announced not less than 18 months prior to effective date and documentation completed by major commands so that PERSACS output is available 13 months prior to effective date.

b. That MOS structure changes be announced 16 months prior to effective date and documentation and reclassification actions completed so that PERSACS output and EMF data reflect these changes 13 months prior to effective date.

c. That FY authorizations for each major command be documented and PERSACS output available at least 13 months prior to the beginning of the FY.

B. AUTHORIZATIONS:

1. General:

a. MOS and grade authorizations contained in TOE, MTOE and TDA documents are the foundation for enlisted personnel management functions. Each function requires planning, budgeting, coordination and reaction from several agencies and commands. Therefore, accurate documentation and sufficient planning and reaction time are necesarry for effective personnel programming and management.

b. Basic authorization data is the TAADS documents file which provides detailed grade and MOS information by unit. The Force Accounting System (FAS) file is a complementary, time-sensitive data base which derives authorized strength from TAADS and projected strength from command plans, force programming and other planning data. The Structure and Composition System (SACS) combines detailed information in the TAADS file with time-sensitive information in the FAS file. This detailed, time-sensitive file of current and projected personnel authorizations (PERSACS) is the only acceptable data available for the personnel manager.

2. PBG Force Structure Changes: Force changes are normally accomplished by fiscal year. The documentation cycle of TAADS starts in June with the aggregate strength authorization accouncement to major commands in the Program Budget Guidance. A change in authorization requires the major command to submit new documentation indicating specific adjustments by grade and MOS. These changes are not required until the following June with the adjustment effective 1 July. Example: FY 76 (1 July 1975) is not required to be documented until 30 June 1975. This procedure denies the ODCSPER people manager the necessary time for planning and programming the changes in personnel requirements. ODCSOPS, proponent for TAADS, is attempting to correct this problem with FY 77 PBG guidance. PBG published in June 1975 will require documentation for FY 77 in October 1975. (12 mos prior to start of FY 77)

3. Documentation of Proponent Authorized Changes: Authorization changes within the authority of MACOMS are made frequently. These changes are normally within authorized strengths and consist of changes in MOS authorizations. Although the changes may appear minor, they must be planned to provide sufficient time prior to implementation to be documented so that they become valid requirements for numerous personnel actions.

4. Impact of Authorization Changes:

a. Authorization changes, regardless of their origin have an immediate impact on MOS distribution, training requirements, requisition validation and assignment/reassignment of personnel.

b. Training Requirements:

(1) Although MACOM authorized changes affect the annual training requirements, the requirements can be adjusted during semi-annual update of the White Book if the changes are not made too late in the fiscal year. Major changes in PBG, however, have a dramatic impact on programmed training requirements. The decision to go to the 16 Division Force is a prime example of a major change which had a tremendous impact. Previous discussion highlighted the problem of the documentation cycle which fails to document the force in time to plan training requirements. Force structure decisions frequently are made without due consideration for appropriate lead times.

(2) A training requirements conference is held twice each year in March and October. These months were selected because they provide continuity with the budget cycle and reaction time for changes prior to the beginning of the fiscal year. A four month lead time is necessary for computations, dissemination of data and reaction time. Computations for training requirements to be scheduled at the conference are provided by month-end September and April PERSACS and the EMF. The computation and scheduling cycle is as follows:

COMPUTATION	SCHEDULING
May 1976	October 1976
Computation begins for:	Address training requirements for:
Oct WB Conference	FY 77 (finalize)
	FY 78 (initial review)
October 1976	March 1977
Computation begins for:	Address training requirements for:
Mar WB Conference	FY 77 (minor update revision)
	FY 78 (revised)
May 1977	October 1977
Computation begins for:	FY 78 (finalize)
Oct WB Conference	FY 79 (initial review)

In order for the computations to be accurate the PERSACS must be documented with previously prescribed lead times in order to provide valid requirements. The final end FY 78 authorizations should be available in PERSACS not later than 1 September 1976 to insure availability of valid authorizations for the computer run beginning in October. This is a period of 13 months prior to the beginning of FY 78. This may appear unrealistic; however, training space will be allocated in November 1976 for advanced individual training beginning in October 1977 taking into consideration the current 270 day Delayed Entry Program (DEP). Final training requirements for FY 78 will be computed in October 1977. A review of monthly PERSACS projections during the period October 1976 to October 1977 will provide the necessary information to make minor adjustments to training requiremer

c. Assignments: Assignments are very sensitive to minor as well as major changes in authorizations. Two areas must be considered to give the personnel manager sufficient time to plan, identify, alert and move personnel to fill a vacancy.

(1) It takes at least 30 days for the MACOM to process changes to authorization documents in PERSACS and additional time for the requisition to be prepared and submitted to MILPERCEN.

(2) The requisition cycle is five months for CONUS and nine months for overseas. Requisitions must be validated by MILPERCEN using PERSACS. Therefore, the force planner at the requisition activity must plan to establish the effective date of requisitions to fill force structure changes 6 to 10 months after documentation of the changes in PERSACS.

d. MOS Structure Changes: A change in the MOS structure is a change in authorization documents. MOS changes are announced by DA Circular twice a year, approximately six months prior to the March and September specified effective date. However, authorization documentation and reclassification of individuals is not always accomplished during the specified time. MOS changes fall into two categories:

(1) Type A - One for One - If all authorizations in one MOS are changed to another MOS and personnel are reclassified from one to the other, training requirements and assignment actions can be programmed by automatic data processing systems.

(2) Type B - Other than one for one - If authorizations are changed from one MOS to two or more MOS and individuals

reclassified similarly, then the documentation and reclassification must be accomplished by the MACOM. This is time consuming and completed too late to influence training requirements and assignments.

5. Conclusions:

a. Personnel managers require at least 12 months prior to the effective date of the MOS changes in order to influence training requirements and assignments. There is also a need for a method to expedite reclassification procedures so that projected MOS will be reflected on individual personnel records on the EMF prior to the effective reclassification date. The change from current to new could be posted at the appropriate time. In the interim, data would be available for training requirements and assignments.

b. The availability of timely and accurate authorizations data is the foundation for enlisted personnel management. It is recognized that directed actions from Congress, OSD, OSA and CSA must be implemented without regard to lead or planning time necessary for proper personnel management. It is also realized that frequent force structure changes have been recommended and directed within the Army Staff without due consideration for personnel implications. This shortcoming may be due to a lack of knowledge of the people management system on the part of force planners and decision makers.

c. The present system of establishing and accounting for authorizations must be revised. While this is a DCSOPS system, DCSPER is completely dependent on its output for qualitative personnel management. Action officers within both agencies as well as the DCSOPS and the DCSPER must recognize and accept the criticality of authorization data and necessity for sufficient lead time to accomplish ensuing personnel actions. Minor changes can be handled as exceptions but personnel requirements must be considered in all major actions.

6. Recommendations:

a. General:

(1) That PERSACS be accepted and recognized as the only authorized source of authorization data.

(2) That MACOM be required to document fiscal year changes in authorizations and have them reflected in the PERSACS output not later than 13 months prior to the beginning of each fiscal year.

b. Force Structure changes:

(1) That specific effective dates for major force structure changes be determined and published within 10 working days after the announced decision.

(2) That MACOM authorization changes when accepted and posted to TAADS will have an effective date for requisitioning at least 10 months later for oversea commands and six months for CONUS commands

c. MOS Structure Changes:

(1) That MOS structure changes be announced by letter 16 months prior to effective date and that documentation changes be accomplished within 60 days following the announcement.

(2) That the DA Circular announcing MOS structure changes be discontinued.

d. Personnel Reclassification: That procedures be developed to project reclassification of personnel concurrently with projected authorization changes and to enter the reclassification data on the EMF.

e. Documentation:

(1) That action be initiated by ODCSPER PERSACS Branch to develop a regulation to define responsibilities and relationships between all staff sections and agencies (DCSOPS, DCSPER, DCSLOG, MILPERCEN, etc.) with respect to the objectives for attainment of authorization data accuracy and timeliness.

(2) This guidance should include staff and command responsibilities for unit activations, inactivations, reorganizations and specific dates for progressive personnel fill objectives.

C. PEOPLE AND SKILL INVENTORIES:

1. General: A people inventory by trained skill must be maintained just as stock records are kept on items of equipment. People are not inanimate objects which may be stockpiled or stored in a warehouse and they are the subject of many changes

which do not apply to equipment. A soldier may change his MOS -- the stock number of an item or piece of equipment does not change. The maintenance of an accurate and timely people inventory is much more difficult than accounting for equipment and materiel. However, when coupled with authorizations, the people inventory becomes the controlling factor in all personnel management functions -- procurement, training, assignments, promotions, incentive pays and all other related actions.

2. Enlisted Master File:

a. We maintain our people inventory on an automated data file known as the Enlisted Master File (EMF). The Personnel Information Systems Directorate (PERSINSD) has responsibility for operation of the Army Personnel Information System including format and maintenance of the EMF. The EMF contains a record on each enlisted person in the Army with a complete record currently consisting of 175 data elements. These are referenced in the EMF Users Information manual published by PERSINSD. Data is fed to the EMF by both field and HQDA agencies. In the past data flowed from installation/division level through an intermediate data processing center to PERSINSD and vice versa. On 1 April 1975 Direct Reporting (DIRREP) from the Standard Installation/Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) was implemented and data now flows directly between installation level and PERSINSD.

b. The accuracy of data elements on the EMF is of utmost importance to the entire enlisted personnel management system. For example, erroneous PMOS data produces errors in MOS training requirements and results in over/under procurement in some skills, it causes malassignment and MOS mismatch and can affect promotions and career progression. It is mandatory that we achieve and maintain the highest possible degree of accuracy for key data elements. PERSINSD in the past (with the exception of certain data elements) has had no procedures for determining the accuracy of the various elements. Their efforts have been directed toward insuring that a properly formatted element is contained on the EMF. Reports compiled by the Army Audit Agency, the General Accounting Office, CPMI and DA Personnel Management Teams (based on sampling of EMF data against hard copy records) have provided the only measurement of accuracy. These reports have been sufficient to show that action must be taken to improve the data.

c. With the implementation of DIRREP on 1 April 1975, PERSINSD has the capability of verifying most of the data on the EMF with the installation SIDPERS file. SIDPERS will provide each individual a printout of his record quarterly for review and accordingly there should be a major improvement in the accuracy of the installation file. PERSINSD representatives presented to the committee their plans to begin verification of data elements. Since current capability will not allow

verification of all data elements concurrently, those elements most critical to the enlisted personnel management system will be selected for initial concentrated efforts. Functional users must be asked to participate with PERSINSD in this project. The results of this verification process must be carefully reviewed over an extended period of time to determine if other measures are necessary.

d. There is no single point of contact within PERSINSD to which all questions or actions pertaining to the EMF and the data thereon can be referred. Users of the data elements and reports generated therefrom are not involved to any great extent in the development of edits and other methods to improve data accuracy. The committee discussed at length who should have proponency for the various data elements and their accuracy. The committee consensus was that this responsibility should rest with PERSINSD; however, some members felt that the prime users of the various elements should have responsibility for their accuracy. This would include prescribing source of input, developing edits to preclude posting of erroneous data and establishing desired levels of accuracy and timeliness of reporting. The committee was unanimous in their belief that a single office to which all actions involving data on the EMF and its accuracy could be referred should be designated.

3. Projected Skill Inventories and Their Impact on Management Actions:

a. Data from the EMF is used not only to indicate current skills inventory but also to project retainable inventories in the future. In addition to errors on the EMF, there are many other factors which affect our ability to maintain a balanced inventory in each Military Occupational Skill (MOS) and grade. A MOS inventory is considered balanced when the total number of people holding a MOS and assigned to Force Structure Unit is plus or minus 5 percent of the total authorization for those MOS with a total authorization of 200 or more and within 10 people in those MOS with an authorization of less than 200. To achieve and maintain MOS balance we must train sufficient numbers of people in each MOS each fiscal year so that our trained inventory as of the end of each year equals the authorizations within the limits stated above. Since trainors must be provided with requirements at least a year in advance of each training year retainable inventory must be projected at least 30 months in the future.

b. The actual requirements are computed by EPD using an automated data processing model called Personnel Inventory Analysis II (PIA II). The PERSACS output is used for projected authorizations and the EMF for personnel inventory data. Projected accessions, losses and reenlistments, basic combat and advanced individual training attrition rates are applied to the current inventory by computer process to determine the projected retainable inventory. The training requirements for each MOS is the difference between the projected retainable inventory and the projected authorization.

c. Training requirements are normally computed twice annually. Monthly comparisons of projected authorizations are furnished EPD by the PERSACS Branch, ODCSPER. EPD reviews these computations and recommends changes to training requirements where indicated. However, there is currently no monthly projection of retainable people inventory. EPD is currently revising a monthly report (Part X, COPO 45) to produce a projected retainable inventory as of the end of the current and two succeeding fiscal years using standard loss rates. This report will provide the basis for adjustment of training requirements as the orojected inventory changes.

d. Other personnel actions which affect MOS inventory which are currently not considered in the computation of training requirements, but can be considered on a monthly basis when revision of Part X of the COPO 45 report is completed are:

(1) Reclassification Actions: These are not now considered in any way in the semi-annual training requirement computation. They have been considered after the fact as they are entered on the EMF between computations.

(2) Enlistment of Prior Service Personnel: An estimated number of prior service personnel who will reenlist in each MOS without retraining have in the past been added to the retainable inventory during each training requirement computation on the basis of historical data. These estimates are very questionable and a more accurate means of accounting for these individuals

should be developed. Changes programmed for REQUEST during FY 76 will allow reduction of a training space for each prior service individual reenlisting in his MOS without retraining.

(3) Promotions: Selection of individuals for promotions to grades E7, E8 and E9 by DA Centralized Promotion Boards can cause MOS and grade imbalance. Procedures have been developed by ODCSPER in coordination with EPD to control these selections by CMF/MOS status. Additionally, EPD is taking action to include these selections by promotion MOS in retainable inventory projections.

(4) Retraining of In-Service Personnel: Individuals in certain grades and MOS as announced in overage/shortage guidance in Appendix IV, AR 600-200 may apply for or be directed into retraining in other MOS. This is another category of changes previously not accounted for in computation of training requirements and retainable inventories. The monthly projected inventories, when developed by EPD, will allow earlier consideration of these actions and adjustment of training requirements where required.

(5) MOS Structure Changes: These changes, particularly when a MOS is deleted from the structure and individuals must be reclassified into two or more MOS, affect the current and projected personnel inventory. These actions were discussed in detail in Chapter III, Section B, paragraph 4d.

4. Conclusions:

a. Accuracy of data elements on the EMF is less than desirable. Procedures must be developed and implemented as soon as possible to achieve and maintain a higher degree of accuracy. A single MILPERCEN office needs to be established in order to improve the accuracy and timeliness of the data on the EMF and to be a single point of contact for all data elements listed on the EMF. This office would be similar, in some respects, to the PERSACS Branch in ODCSPER and be staffed with both data processing personnel and personnel managers from MILPERCEN resources.

b. A capability must be developed to produce monthly projected retainable inventories so that training requirements may be adjusted and other related personnel actions controlled on a more timely basis.

5. Recommendations:

a. The Commander MILPERCEN establish a single office as the EMF proponent to control and coordinate all actions pertaining to the EMF. Also, that this office develop and coordinate with EMF data element users a memorandum of understanding clearly delineating the responsibilities and functions of both PERSINSD and the users. These responsibilities should include but not be limited to:

(1) Establishing priority sequence of data elements.

(2) Determining edit, update and error parameters.

(3) Developing functional user guides.

(4) Developing validation methods and techniques.

b. PERSINSD proceed with the validation of selected data elements.

c. EPD expedite efforts to revise Part X of the COPO 45 report to provide monthly projected inventories.

d. EPD review projected authorization and inventory changes in detail each month between training requirement computations and recommend immediate adjustments to training programs to Training Division, ODCSPER.

D. RESERVE COMPONENT REQUIREMENTS:

1. General:

a. Accuracy in the computation of Reserve Components training requirements is vital to the efficient utilization of the Army training base. The impact of these requirements is significant as indicated in the FY 76 White Book Program in which 20% (45,465 personnel) of the 09B fed AIT training base program belongs to the Reserve Components. Training computations which are not accurate because of techniques in computation or changes in force structure are costly in terms of manpower, dollars and facilities.

b. The FY 75 training program presented by USAR and ARNG as firm requirements were in gross error. At the Oct-Nov 1974 White Book which was a fine tuning of the FY 75 requirements, the USAR needed 13,129 space changes in 185 MOS. The USAR total program of 14,771 requirements was increased 2,623 to 17,394.

The ARNG needed 5,974 space changes in 74 MOS. The ARNG total program of 33,269 spaces was reduced 2,381 to 30,888.

2. USAR: USAR requirements are requested from FORSCOM by Department of the Army, Army Reserve (DAAR). FORSCOM solicits the requirements from Armies and FORSCOM oversea elements who in turn solicit through the ARCOM/GOCOM from company/detachment sized units. The requirements provided to FORSCOM are factored with PS/NPS accession trends and historical rates for reenlistment and provided to DAAR. DAAR aligns the requirements, if necessary, with any constraints e.g. budget.

3. ARNG: ARNG requirements are requested from each state, Virgin Islands and the District of Columbia. They in turn request requirements from individual units. The requirement input to the ARNG is factored by their Personnel Division with reenlistment rates and managerial judgment based on historical sales of MOS. Final adjustments are made by DAAR and ARNG at the White Book Conference to align requirements with respective school capacity.

4. Conclusions:

a. Current procedures do not accurately predict or validate annual REP requirements. A well defined policy and guidelines are needed for the computation and management of requirements. There is a need for an accurate computerized system to compute and validate requirements based on authorizations and personnel inventory. Unexpected changes in force structure coupled with geographical limitations for movement and recruiting of personnel, cause significant pulsations in training requirements.

b. Training requirements for the USAR and ARNG are affected significantly by changes in the force structure. As an example, "The Realignment of ARNG Split Divisions" which involves consolidation of three combat divisions, forming of three separate brigades and the elimination of several units, does not adequately address or plan for the significant training requirements inherent in this realignment. Reserve Component units are tied to a geographical location by the permanent residency of its personnel. Decisions to change the structure without proper lead time to plan new training requirements produce turmoil, improper use of resources in the training base and a lack of trained personnel.

5. Recommendations:

a. HQDA, in conjunction with the appropriate RC headquarters publish definitive policy and guidelines for an effective management system which will provide validation, monitoring and supervision of the enlisted program.

b. The USAR and ARNG use the data base and the dedicated computers at RCPAC and NGCC respectively to determine REP requirements.

c. An improved computerized personnel inventory projection model similar to PIA be developed for the Reserve Components.

d. Training requirement lead time be considered in decisions to change or move units in the force structure.

e. Decisions to change or move units in the Reserve Component force structure adhere to the planning lead times as recommended for the active Army units in Chapter III,

E. ACCESSION MANAGEMENT:

1. General: It was apparent that, although component parts of the system were in synchronization at the beginning of each fiscal year, deviations in one or more of the components caused crisis management situations during the latter stages of the fiscal year. Since fine-tuning of operating systems such as REQUEST and trainee flow must be accomplished on a manual exception basis and because of the sheer volume of transactions involved, responsive fine tuning is difficult. The synchronization and control gap widens as the frequency of changes increases. Further compounding the problem in FY 75 is the different accession environment which exists from that in FY 74. In FY 74, the end-of-year problem was one of achieving end strength numbers, and all stops and controls were lifted. Conversely, the FY 75 problem is one of tight quality control of accessions dictated by the continuing successes of USAREC in overachieving recruiting objectives in the first half of the year and the increasing retention rates for in-service personnel. The potential exists for exceeding the congressionally-imposed man-year limits unless constraining actions to limit accessions are continued. Additionally the requirements to meet a designated end strength by 30 June while not exceeding the man-year average poses another complicating factor.

2. Alignment of Objectives:

a. To preclude exceeding the man-year constraint, the manpower program projections have been produced on an increasingly frequent basis in order to use the most recent gain and loss data available. Although the necessity for the present frequency is understood, the constantly changing accessions objectives cause serious problems in the operating field elements of the system. For USAREC, it has resulted in the receipt of at least four sets of 3rd quarter FY 75 recruiting objectives in a two-month period. For MILPERCEN, it has required manual calculation and reduction of available training spaces to correspond to decreasing recruiting objectives. In some MOS, this reduction may result in a training shortfall for the year. For TRADOC, the changing objectives and training space manipulations have resulted in ebbs and flows within the training base which range from near-idleness to a perennial overtaxing of capability at year end.

b. The crux of the difficulties lies in the fact that frequent changes in manpower objectives have increased the need for controls in areas where we were not fully prepared to respond and for which automated support is lacking.

3. Control Limitations: Basically, the lack of adequate control exists in three key areas: (1) management of active Army training spaces on REQUEST, (2) control of prior service

enlistments and in-service reenlistments, and (3) validation of REP training requirements.

a. REQUEST currently is programmed to include the annual advanced individual training program for each MOS by class start date and location. The program represents the total AIT training seats available to active Army claimants (non-prior service male and female, prior service male and female and in-service personnel requiring retraining) and to Reserve Component Personnel (U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard). The problem is that the REQUEST system presently is incapable of managing these quotas by claimant category, and, in any given month, under a first-come, first-served philosophy, all of the spaces could be reserved by one or two categories of claimants. Under this philosophy, both the active Army training spaces and REP spaces are available for active Army claimants. If, as in the past, the REP requirements on REQUEST are overstated beyond the capability of USAR and ARNG to recruit, they represent spaces available to active Army claimants above the required training program. Each time there is an infringement on a REP space, there is a potential overtraining in that MOS for the active Army. In the easy-to-sell MOS this is a potentially significant problem. A program change to alleviate this problem by providing a cumulative count of the Active Army program spaces and precluding reservations beyond that program is projected for implementation in 4th quarter FY 75.

b. Since there is only a limited automated capability at the present time to accumulate REQUEST reservation data by category, a time-consuming manual effort is required each time there is a need for quota adjustment. The current frequent manpower objective changes are generating requirements for such adjustments, and the means for timely reaction are not available. Additionally, the continuing reduction of recruiting objectives requires that total spaces on REQUEST for the remainder of the year be reduced. Within the manual means available, it is an extremely difficult task, and decisions must be made as to which MOS spaces will be reduced and will absorb a potential training shortfall for the year.

c. In the area of prior service enlistments and in-service reenlistments, controls also are lacking. The manpower program provides to USAREC prior service enlistment objectives by month, but MOS considerations are not factors at that point. The procedure used by recruiters and career counselors until recently was to query field units for confirmation of vacancies for trained prior service personnel desiring to enlist. The current procedure requires that all prior service accessions be cleared through MILPERCEN to insure that vacancies exist for the limited number of specific MOS in which prior service personnel may reenter. At this point, there are controls by MOS and number, but there is no procedure for decrementing REQUEST spaces until the total prior service objective has been achieved. Therefore, the

potential exists for filling all REQUEST quotas in an MOS with non-prior service accessions while prior service personnel in the same MOS are reentering the Army without reduction of training spaces therefore an excess of trained assets in that MOS occurs.

d. The description above represents systems control problems which deter the efficient realignment of the manpower program, training spaces, and training base capability as the fiscal year progresses. The problems will persist unless control measures are developed for REQUEST which will be alterable as recruiting performance dictates. The discussion which follows will outline other difficulties in the people-managed factors in the system which complicate the picture even more.

4. Temporary Identification Numbers:

a. Personnel who enter the active Army without a Social Security Account Number (SSAN) are issued a Temporary Identification Number (TIN) at the AFEES. A procedure, the "Notify Employer System", requires that an employing organization undergo the administrative procedures required to open an account for a new employee. It was adopted by the Army to enable an enlistment to be consummated and to provide for the enlistees' accountability and pay pending the assignment of an SSAN. Upon enlistment, an individual is required to complete a SSAN application to be forwarded and processed with his enlistment records. Of the 4,000 applicants who enter

the Army annually without an SSAN, about 15% are processed without executing the application for SSAN, and extensive administrative follow-up is required to locate those individuals and to initiate SSAN applications.

b. For all applicants without SSAN, the personal data on the EMF, forwarded from USAREC, reflects a TIN issued at the AFEES. The data received via TC1 and 2 cards from reception stations and basic training centers should provide the same TIN to the ACT I data base. However, when an individual's SSAN application has been processed by the Social Security Administration (SSA) and an account number issued, the ACT data should be updated by a TC 70 card from the training activity to which the individual is assigned. If that update is not provided to MILPERCEN, the individual is moved between training centers and assigned to his initial unit using his TIN. Because his DA assignment instructions using TIN do not match his actual SSAN, delays are encountered in resolving the two numbers and the individual may remain in the training center pending resolution. Additional problems are created for the soldier because of the two identification numbers, and he may be penalized in pay actions and personnel actions, or he may be deprived of government benefits for periods of service not recorded in a social security account.

c. The Air Force has eliminated the problem by precluding the enlistment of an applicant who does not have an SSAN. In a procedure requiring about one day, the applicant is sent to the nearest SSA office where he requests that an SSAN be

issued under "EXPEDITED PROCEDURES" authorized in SSA manuals. By teletype, the SSA files are checked for a previously established account. If one is recorded, the SSAN is reissued; if not, an account is established and the SSAN forwarded. The individual then is enlisted with a correct identifying number in all of his records.

5. Delayed Entry Program (DEP) Management:

a. The DEP provides for an applicant to enlist in the U.S. Army Reserve with a specific commitment to an AIT training space on REQUEST and enlistment in the active Army up to 270 days in the future. That delay, added to the approximately two months required for BCT, means that an individual, in fact, can have a reserved REQUEST space as early as 11 months prior to his entry on active duty. If late year adjustments are required in the training program, the spaces reserved for DEP are virtually untouchable, and the flexibility to adjust training within priorities is extremely limited in certain MOS where DEP has reserved a major portion of the spaces. This is particularly true in the MOS which are easy to sell to applicants but may not be of critical importance to the Army. There have been instances when the total annual training program in an MOS has been satisfied by DEP reservations within the first few months of the fiscal year. Any significant reduction of training requirements in those MOS necessitates either an extensive administrative process to renegotiate enlistment

contracts or an acceptance of overtraining in those MOS. Similarly, requirements for unprogrammed unit activations may be impossible to satisfy because the entire training capability has been committed to DEP enlistees committed to other units.

b. The DEP problems mentioned, coupled with the space control limitations of REQUEST, potentially permit achieving aggregate annual recruiting objectives by overselling popular skills in DEP early in the year while more critical hard-to-sell skills are left unfilled until year end when significant training shortfall in those MOS could occur. It appears that, even with an improved category control capability in the REQUEST system, there must be some limitation imposed on DEP spaces available to recruiters early in the year for easy-to-sell MOS. Although such a limitation would make the recruiter's job more difficult, it would force achievement of recruiting objectives by obtaining enlistees for all available REQUEST MOS spaces, especially those in the critical, hard-to-sell skills.

6. System Discipline: All of the problems which have been discussed thus far impair the efficiency of existing systems, but they have been controlled through the efforts of personnel managers. The hardest problem to overcome and the one which consumes a major portion of managers' time is the extensive lack of systems discipline by users.

a. The emphasis on achievement of aggregate recruiting objectives frequently has caused recruiters and career

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~~o The emphasis on achievement of aggregate recruiting objectives frequently has caused recruiters and career~~

counselors to by-pass proper enlistment procedures with practices which, although decreasing in use, are still evident in the system. The shipment of personnel in the DEP earlier than their scheduled active duty enlistment dates has created problems not only in accountability of REQUEST spaces, but also has led to unprogrammed movement from AFEES to reception stations. This practice taxes the processing and basic training capability of the training centers involved, overworks trainors, and makes a poor impression on new soldiers when it appears we are not prepared to process and train them efficiently. In certain instances, the extent of the problem dictated that trainees be delayed from entry into training or transported to other training centers. Similar practices, also decreasing in use, include making reservations on REQUEST for non-existent persons ("phantoms") or erroneously reporting individual qualifications in order to gain enlistees for certain specific courses. The failure to cancel the DEP reservations for early shipments or the "phantoms" further complicates training management because the AIT spaces lost through such practices may not be retrievable, and training shortfalls are increased.

b. The training centers, although victims of the practices just described, also contribute to the disciplinary breaches in the system. The failure to report to MILPERCEN the changing status of individual trainees on a timely basis often leads to hardships for the trainee. If he is dropped from a scheduled course and is recycled into another or transhipped to another training center without notification to MILPERCEN, the trainee often is held over after completion of AIT until the data base errors are resolved and his assignment to a unit is consummated.

c. HQDA is not immune from creating problems in the system. Policies such as the Trainee Discharge Program and the Voluntary Release Option tend to improve quality of the Army, while the Combat Arms Switch Program tends to increase the combat arms inventory, but the AIT spaces which were reserved for individuals taking advantage of the programs will be vacated, probably too late in the training cycle to retrieve for use by others. A training shortfall again is created, and another management by exception problem has been introduced.

7. Training Base Flexibility:

a. The training base currently has inherent flexibility and can adjust to some extent to meet training space crises such as the large surge at the end of fiscal year 74 caused by recruiting drives to meet year end strength. Flexibility is generated in the BCT structure by saving BCT companies when requirements are slack, overfilling BCT companies, switching AIT company missions

to BCT and eliminating the maintenance week by conducting back to back training. AIT seating capacity can be increased in many MOS, facilities can be overfilled and adjustments made in instructor personnel. The training base can exercise this limited flexibility for short periods in BCT and most AIT but needs ample warning of pending surges. Flexibility is limited because seasonality of recruiting is considered in programming training but school courses are basically spread evenly over the entire fiscal year to maximize resources, facilities and equipment for many MOS are limited, funds and manpower are limited by tight budget and manpower constraints, and the programming for training must begin up to 24 months prior to AIT start date.

b. There are additional problems which reduce the efficiency of the training base, and many which involve the lack of discipline in the system have already been discussed. The full implementation of the One Station Training (OST) structure will reduce the capability to respond to surges and major program adjustments because there will be fewer companies, both BCT and AIT, to absorb varying inputs. Also, the continuing shortfall in use of programmed spaces during the year creates a requirement for overall increased capability and funds near year end when reprogramming is difficult. Since the year end shortfall normally is in hard-to-sell skills, it leads to recruiting for easy-to-sell skills without regard to program requirements and requires crisis

management to expand training capability in those MOS. The requirement to hold over graduated trainees destined for oversea deployment until they complete 120 days continuous training time in accordance with Title 10, U.S.C. (PL 51) causes demands on facilities which could be used to increase flexibility.

c. Despite the fact that the training base is structured for a level training load, it does have the capability to expand within limits if sufficient lead-time is provided.

8. Conclusions:

a. Most of the problems described above have not suddenly emerged for discovery only by the People Management Committee. Staff action elements have been working full-time to solve many of them, and various efforts in ODCSPER, MILPERCEN and USAREC have been initiated. USAREC is involved in an intensive effort to preclude the practice of "phantom" reservations and early shipments from the DEP. Policy parameters in ELIM-COMPLIP are being added to project both BCT output and AIT input in an effort to align and adjust the training base to the manpower program. TRADOC has been queried regarding the feasibility of aligning its monthly AIT and BCT training capability with the monthly manpower program and the qualitative requirements available on REQUEST. Prior service enlistment controls have been temporarily imposed to limit the skills in which prior service personnel can reenter. Reenlistment policies and

controls are being revised and developed to improve control of reenlistments of personnel in skills and grades which the Army needs. A very comprehensive programming of REQUEST has been directed for implementation in 1976 which will provide:

(1) Management of accessions by category.

(2) Accession routing from AFEES through specific reception stations and training centers, and

(3) Guidance for distribution by unit vacancies and location for most MOS.

b. All of these efforts hold promise for the future, and they should be continued. However, there are additional requirements to develop procedures for better management of the DEP in order to provide more flexibility in training program adjustment. The system is required to react to the manpower program but it can only be expected to respond within limits. The driving forces behind manpower program changes are the man-year constraints and the end strength and these often cause conflicting actions within the system. It appears that the congressionally-imposed man-year constraint is the more binding factor, and relief should be sought from the added requirement to achieve end strength on the magic date of the last day of the fiscal year. Above all, users of the system must be required to operate within strict system controls, and they should be educated in the total system impacts which occur when that discipline is ignored. Not only does the Army

program fall short, but the individual trainee usually is the one who experiences the inconvenience and hardship when a system is abused.

9. Recommendations:

a. That manpower objectives, training programs and training base capability be aligned on a one-for-one basis in full recognition of the seasonality of recruiting and the inefficient use of training base resources.

b. That emphasis on aggregate recruiting objectives be removed in favor of matching skill requirements.

c. That training shortfall be recognized and accepted if recruiting for specific skill requirements fails to fill scheduled classes.

d. That procedures be established to account for accession of already trained prior service personnel by MOS so that training requirements can be adjusted.

e. That a standing committee of representatives from ODCSPER, MILPERCEN and USAREC be formed to develop procedures and controls that will manage selective skill quotas in the DEP.

f. That all applicants for enlistment in the Army be required to have a Social Security Account Number prior to enlistment. (Currently scheduled for implementation on 1 July 1975)

g. That efforts be made to seek relief from either the man-year or the FY end strength constraint (preferably, the

FY end strength).

F. ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS:

1. General: During the past two years there have been reorganizations within MILPERCEN and ODCSPER. Also, there have been some significant personnel reductions and selective adjustment of functional responsibilities. Frequently an issue is surfaced that finds no one office in charge, or two or more offices all trying to shoulder responsibility and move the action forward. When these actions come to the attention of Directors, resolution of responsibility is quickly made. Unfortunately, time and effort are lost due to lack of preciseness in assigning functional responsibilities. The fragmentation of similar functions among ODCSPER and MILPERCEN often leaves voids in the staff and structure. The manpower programming function is one which is divided amongst several DCSPER family elements. Since this function is the one that develops the basic data upon which policies are formulated and operations are performed, it is the function which has the most crucial need for systems interface and interaction. There is also a need for a qualitative impact analysis capability function which exists only to a limited degree in the DCSPER family.

2. Programming:

a. Loss Forecasting: The key to manpower programming is loss forecasting. There are three major computer models, each one of which predicts the future, used in DCSPER programming.

Each of the models uses loss rates as a major input. COMPLIP, the manpower program run by Manpower Programs Division, uses losses generated by the Enlisted Loss Inventory Model (ELIM); PIA, the training requirements program run by EPD, MILPERCEN uses loss rates generated by Automatic Interaction Detector - Enlisted (AID-E) and CIM-E, the grade distribution program run by Enlisted Division uses AID-E loss rates also. These three major programming efforts do not formally come together until they reach the DCSPER level. Because of the different sources of loss rates, the programs produced by these models are dissimilar. Differing loss rates are not a new problem to PIA and COMPLIP analysts and much has been done to resolve it. However, the coordination and (to a lesser degree) communication problems caused by the fragmentation of the programming function among DMPM, MILPERCEN, and DPPB may hide many other more serious problems. Assured (and timely) flow of necessary information among these programming systems remains difficult under the current organizations.

b. Consolidation: Improved communications/coordination could be attained in the DCSPER system by consolidation of the programming projection models and the analysts into one unit or element of the organization (see Figure 3.2). A single manager of these models could insure commonality of input data and routines in order to provide users a more thoroughly coordinated output. A single source is better than relatively independent

projections from several sources. The single manager would be charged with the timely and coordinated programming of COMPLIP, PIA and CIM and could resolve programming differences or identify them to the appropriate management level for decision. He would be responsible for sustaining a continuous dialogue among analysts during the programming. The initial step in developing these interfaces would be through physical consolidation of the analysts. The free exchange of basic data, procedures, techniques and routines, without the currently existing parochialism would be a giant stride forward in bringing together the systems that directly impact upon soldier management. A reorganization is not required to accomplish the consolidation of programming. A programs division already exists (DAPE-PBM) along with the computer terminals required to do the job. The ELIM-COMPLIP and AID-E models and analysts are already in DAPE-PBM. A consolidation would require the physical movement of seven individuals from MILPERCEN to the Pentagon to manage PIA and the transfer of necessary individuals from DMPM to manage CIM-E. Movement of PIA would require transfer of responsibility for WEEM and mobilization training requirements.

3. Impact Analysis:

a. The Requirements: The impact on personnel management systems of sudden and unanticipated changes to personnel policy cannot always be quickly examined in depth and detail. One of the basic problems in assessing one or more courses of action

(what if? drills) is that personnel managers do not have the vision to predict impacts in their functional areas. Another problem is the lack of tools with which to do the job quickly. Sometimes the problem is that of coordination, i.e., no one contacted the "right" office. The DCSPER systems are so vast and complex that no one person can quickly analyze the impact of significant policy changes with any degree of certainty. Although little can be done to improve personnel managers' foresight and vision, save experience, there are tools available now and one that can be developed which will help assess the impact of policy changes.

b. Available Tools: An organizational matrix of the type at Figure 3.3 will help to get a type action or policy change into the correct organizational element. A like type matrix suitably expanded and localized could be developed by each division within the ODCSPER and MILPERCEN in order to insure that the "right" office is not bypassed in an impact analysis or coordination of staff papers. A systematic approach to manpower impact analysis recognizes that a rapid consideration of available information and rational assumptions are better than a rapid (or deliberate) subjective evaluation of the same problem. A current capability to analyze the impact of various personnel actions exists in the form of CIM-E, DEMOS, COMPLIP, PIA and IRGS. These programs and models are described in Appendix F. In addition to these models, a need has been

identified for a model that will translate gross manpower changes into a detailed inventory by MOS, grade and years of service in a timely manner.

c. A New Tool:

(1) There is a requirement for a capability to examine gross changes to the end strength or the structure of the Army and provide impacts in terms of the match between the projected inventory and projected requirements (structure). Currently the CIM-E model uses the PERSACS, specified TPPS, total aggregate strength constraints, and grade constraints to develop an enlisted objective force in terms of grade and years of service. Gross manpower changes can be analyzed by CIM-E by changing total aggregate strength constraints. It can also analyze major changes to the structure, but it must have a new PERSACS for this purpose. The new PERSACS can be developed by ODCSOPS, but their procedure whereby command and program managers make detailed assumptions is time consuming (3-4 weeks). However, if assumptions about the relationship between PERSACS and the FYDP program elements are made, a fairly rapid estimate of detailed grade and MOS changes is possible. These estimated will allow CIM-E to project the impact of the structure change in terms of MOS, grade and years of service.

(2) Changes to PERSACS can be estimated through a process similar to the current factoring methodology used by DCSOPS. This process is based on the assumption that the program

elements, the basic building blocks of the FYDP, can be used as a basis for estimating changes. Program elements are a set of budgetary categories prescribed by OSD and used in the FYDP to classify manpower authorizations in a way familiar to Congress and the other services. They also provide a functional definition of Army structure and overhead; moreover, they provide a rational start point for determining, by function, how gross changes to the structure should be applied. For example, infantry divisions fall under one program element. If an infantry division were added to or deleted from the structure, then the MOS and grades in that program element would be reduced in the PERSACS in direct proportion to the number of divisions in the program element. If one of four divisions were deleted, then one-fourth of the authorizations in each grade and MOS in the program element total would be taken our of PERSACS.

(3) The revised PERSACS and other new constraints (as required) when loaded into the CIM-E model, will allow it to produce a new projection of enlisted assets. CIM-E would then be able to provide the following management reports:

(a) Summary of Accessions/Losses.

(b) Projected Total Force (Grade/Years of Service).

(c) Projected First Term Force (Grade/Years of Service).

(d) Objective Force (Grade/Years of Service).

(e) Projected Year Group Shortages (Total Force).

(f) Projected Year Group Shortages (First Term Force).

(g) Fiscal Year Costs.

(h) Summary of Projected Promotions and Demotions.

(4) If the program element system for making "quick and dirty" changes to the PERSACS could be brought on-line, the impact analysis could probably be done in 2 or 3 days. Bringing the program element system on-line may take 6-12 months. There are currently no plans to bring the PERSACS data base on-line.

4. Conclusions:

a. There is a need to study ODCSPER and MILPERCEN assigned functions at Division level for duplication of responsibility, vagueness in assigned functions and clarity of responsibility.

b. A significant void in the DCSPER family is an integrated qualitative analysis capability. Currently, there is no single source in ODCSPER to get timely answers to force structure supportability questions. The DCSPER position must be resolved in each instance between DMPM, DPPB, and MILPERCEN, and the time constraints and lack of appropriate tools normally result in an incomplete analysis. The consolidation of qualitative programming models at the ODCSPER echelon of staff responsibility enhances the ODCSPER capability for decision making. Conversely, the movement of PIA from MILPERCEN limits the EPD capability to predict manpower capability and properly confines their efforts to the operational management of the enlisted force provided them by ODCSPER planning efforts. A qualitative analysis capability at the ODCSPER level provides not only a more

responsive source for the DCSPER in assessing manpower capability, but it also provides an internal source of qualitative data for all ODCSPER elements in evaluating policy changes and guidance.

5. Recommendations:

a. DCSPER and MILPERCEN functions and responsibilities be reviewed and revised to clearly assign functional responsibility and eliminate impreciseness and duplication and/or omission of functions.

b. The DCSPER consolidate the programming function in the Plans, Programs, and Budget Directorate by:

(1) Directing DMPM to transfer the necessary individuals and the CIM-E function to DPPB.

(2) Directing Commander, MILPERCEN to transfer the necessary individuals, and the PIA function to include WEEM and mobilization traning requirements to DPPB.

(3) Directing DPPB to initiate action to change appropriate regulations to reflect this consolidation of functions.

c. The DCSPER task DPPB to develop the impact analysis capability computer model described in para 3 above.

G. EDUCATION AND TRAINING:

1. General:

a. Throughout the Army, ignorance of the fundamentals of personnel systems is one of our biggest enemies. A thorough understanding of the Army's procurement, initial training and distribution of manpower is essential to every officer and most NCO's. OPMS has assured the Army of a trained pool of

personnel managers by providing for two specialities, Personnel Administration and Personnel Management, in the Military Personnel Career Field. Personnel Administration will be the basic entry specialty of most AG branch officers. Personnel Management, an advanced entry specialty, may be selected by AG officers and officers of other branches. OMPS will provide the means for increasing the skills and experiences in Personnel Management of selected officers. Each advanced entry specialty will have a separate educational pattern. However, as yet, no formal training/education program in personnel management exists for these officers. This is currently a serious deficiency. In addition and equally as important, OPMS will not meet the urgent need for training/educating other officers, notably commanders (present and potential) of the arms and services. This must be accomplished in the core curricula of OBC, OAC and CGSC.

b. The relatively new NCOES includes personnel administration in the POI's at each level of instruction, with the greatest emphasis at the senior level. The 75 series MOS has been established to provide more specialized training in military personnel matters. These two recent innovations will provide progressive training for personnel administration specialists in the enlisted ranks and will enhance personnel administration at the grass roots level.

c. Nevertheless mismanagement because of ignorance continues. The requirement for <u>all</u> officers and most NCO's to understand

the fundamentals of personnel management is succinctly pointed out in the Executive Summary of the PS3 (Personnel Support Systems and Services) report published in February 1973:

> "There is an abysmal lack of professionalism throughout the Personnel Support System. Enlisted personnel selection, training and distribution systems are inadequate. Line officers assigned to key personel staff positions are largely untrained and inexperienced in the PSS. Commanders at all levels are insufficiently knowledgeable of their important roles. Army personnel in general are not given sufficient training and orientation on personnel matters. Sufficient qualified personnel are not now available, notably at the division/installation level and below, to adequately staff personnel organizations and spaces. Unless a major and determined effort is made to rectify these critical problems, the situation will be further aggravated by the advent of a total Volunteer Army".

d. Training/education in and understanding of personnel systems are now serious deficiencies of the Army Officer/NCO Corps. Systems that are not understood cannot be intelligently supported and can hardly be expected to operate efficiently. The Army needs a more imaginative and dynamic program of general instruction and education in personnel systems for all officers and most NCO's.

2. <u>HQDA Level Officer/NCO Education</u>:

a. As a follow-on to the preceding discussion there is need for education for personnel managers assigned at the DA level. Decisions and recommendations are made on a daily basis in ODCSPER, MILPERCEN, and other agencies by action officers and senior officers who do not have a complete understanding of the personnel systems and their interrelationships or of the

impact in other personnel areas that may be caused by specific acts. This is neither a rare occurrence nor a small problem. Ripples are felt throughout the Army personnel system when "minor" changes are made at the DA level.

b. An orientation course is needed where attendance by newly assigned officers and NCO's between their 30th and 90th day of duty would be mandatory. The course should be administered by the Executive Office, ODCSPER, and Plans and Operations, MILPERCEN. As a minimum it would be of two to three days duration and use the guest lecturer teaching technique. The objective of the course would be to present the DA/MILPERCEN picture of personnel management. Chapter II of this report is designed to be used as an individual reference and for POI preparation.

3. Recommendations:

a. The DCSPER recommend to Commander TRADOC, that personnel education in the core curricula of OBC, OAC, CGSC and NCOES be reoriented as to provide the individual with an understanding of:

(1) Planning, Programming and Budgeting System.

(2) Force structuring.

(3) Authorizations data.

(4) Manpower procurement.

(5) Initial training.

(6) Distribution of manpower.

(7) Importance of input data.

b. The DCSPER establish an orientation course for DCSPER and MILPERCEN officers, senior NCO's and civilian action officers as described in paragraph 2b with a scope as described in recommendation 3a above.

H. SKILL UTILIZATION - READINESS REPORTING:

1. General: Although the Committee's efforts were concentrated on those elements of People Management Systems which affect the procurement, training and distribution of new accessions, a major impact on the individual soldier occurs after those processes are complete - namely, his utilization or malutilization in his units of assignment. In evaluating what pressures cause malutilization, MOS mismatch, and extra-legal attempts at reclassification, it appeared that readiness reporting was a basic motivating pressure involved.

2. Readiness Pressures:

a. Although the DA Readiness Reporting requirement is just that, a reporting requirement, the perception at the field level is often one of failure if readiness goals are not met. As in the case of most potential failures, a "band-aid" approach is taken to patch up the holes and provide some means for the commander to evaluate his readiness condition as A.O.K. each month. The "band-aid" often involves cross-leveling and cross-assignment at installation level to permit units to

achieve balanced readiness when, in fact, a better solution may be to suffer through imbalanced readiness posture for a month or two until the personnel replacement flow can correct the ills. In many instances, the soldier involved in one month's cross-assignment may be involved in another cross-assignment the following month to correct another units' readiness ills. His life becomes one of constant "musical chairs". To further compound the problem, the replacement flow to the unit is predicated on PMOS vacancies in the unit. If cross-assignment and cross-training to other MOS have occurred to fill those vacancies, there is a reluctance to move an incumbent, regardless of his mismatch, back to his PMOS position. This results in the further cross-training of replacements who are now perceived by the unit as no longer needed.

b. To what degree the readiness pressures cited exist in any given unit, the committee was unable to determine; however, sufficient instances were discussed to highlight the readiness reporting system as a force detrimental to good people management in some units. The point to be noted is that reactive corrections to readiness shortfall in each reporting period place challenges on the people management system which it can't meet. Square pegs being modified to fit into round holes while the system is still supplying round pegs results in an excess of round pegs to be modified to fit into square holes and the cycle continues to defeat itself.

3. Conclusions: The Committee feels that there are alternatives available to reduce the turbulence and mismanagement which impacts on the individual soldier. They are:

a. Have DCSOPS establish realistic readiness objectives for units based on ODCSPER capabilities analysis (discussed in ORGANIZATION section of this chapter). The analysis would keep DCSOPS apprised of critical MOS or grade problems which preclude attainment of quantitative readiness objectives. This realization, if publicized periodically to readiness reporting units by ODCSOPS or ODCSPER, could reduce pressures on those units to achieve objectives through mismanagement. In some MOS, everybody can't be REDCON C1.

b. At HQDA, major command and installation level, readiness reporting criteria and time-sensitive achievement of readiness be de-emphasized for individual units in order to provide time for people managers to respond with assignment of MOS qualified people as they are available. The commander should not be pressured into mismanagement of people to correct Army-side shortages which DA recognizes.

4. Recommendations:

a. ODCSPER provide to ODCSOPS a monthly appraisal of ability to achieve personnel readiness goals in major units,

b. ODCSPER recommend to ODCSOPS that critical MOS problems be publicized periodically to readiness reporting commands to indicate DA recognition of the problem in meeting MOS qualification requirements, and

c. ODCSPER recommend to ODCSOPS that readiness reporting regulations be reviewed and revised to preclude enlisted malassignments for the purpose of readiness reporting.

I. SYSTEMS MASTER PLAN:

1. General:

a. Throughout this report, numerous systems have been discussed which support the DCSPER family in performing its various functions. These systems have been developed over a period of time and, for the most part, were designed to solve a specific problem existing at that point in time. Each system has been generally successful in accomplishing its original mission; however, due to changing management policies, these systems have not always been able to adjust to meet the new requirements.

b. It has been emphasized that all the DCSPER systems (and some outside the DCSPER family), whether they be manual or automated, are closely related. Minor ripples, or indiscipline, in one can cause major shock waves in another. While recognizing this interdependence, it is easier to understand the various systems as a grouping into subsystems of related functions. Basically there are three subsystems:

(1) The first subsystem deals with how many of what kind do we need and when do we need them. In this subsystem we are trying to meet DA and congressional constraints by using various data to predict and program for the future. To do this we use systems and models such as PERSACS, PIA II, ELIM-COMPLIP, AID-E, etc.

(2) The second subsystem pertains to how we manage who we get. This subsystem is not a forecast or prediction like the first subsystem but instead involves the current realities of management policies. It affects the new enlistees as well as the Sergeants Major since they are all managed within some type of manual or automated system. This family of systems ranges from the very complex and automated type such as REQUEST or CAP III down to the most basic of manual systems such as posting of personnel records.

(3) The third subsystem is a former step-child of the active Army which only recently has begun to earn its proper recognition as an integral part of the total Army. This subsystem is the one which manages the reserve components and incorporates them into the total Army picture during both peace and war. At present this subsystem is predominantly manual but active Army automated systems such as REQUEST and SIDPERS are beginning to account for, or react to, its presence.

2. Current Systems Development: Before attempting to place these subsystems into a master plan, let's first look at how these subsystems are currently developed.

a. When management problems are identified which require the establishment of new controls or create a need for additional information, one course of action is that of identifying an existing system which can be modified to meet the requirement. As more and more modifications and new

requirements are placed on the system, we run the risk of overburdening the system to the extent that it can no longer perform its original mission in a timely fashion. Worse yet, the system could end up as a conglomeration of functions being performed in the wrong place at the wrong time by the wrong system with no interface with the other DCSPER systems. What has happened and is currently happening to the REQUEST system is an example of this type management.

b. The other course of action for satisfying new management requirements is to design a new system. This has been the usual procedure and over the past few years we have seen the proliferation of several independent systems and models such as WEEM and CIM-E. While these systems may be successful in performing their required functions, they have not always been designed to interface with other DCSPER systems. Also, since there is no long-range master plan for DCSPER systems development, new systems cannot always be evaluated in relation to other planned developmental efforts or their impact on other subsystems. This problem was highlighted on 13 Aug 74 in a Memorandum from BG Harris, DMIS to the ADCSPER wherein he stated:

> "The single matter of principal concern to me in attempting to respond to the several MIS needs of the personnel community--of which the USAREC problem is symptomatic--is the apparent absence of any DCSPER-approved master architecture or plan against which system ADPE requirements, general or detailed functional system requirements and economic analyses may be evaluated."

With the numerous personnel systems currently in existence, it is difficult enough to know where we are. Without a long-range personnel systems master plan, it is almost impossible to guess where we are going.

3. Current Systems Management:

a. Even though most of the systems which support the numerous DCSPER functions can be fairly easily categorized into one of the three subsystems described above, their interdependence can not be overstated. For example: An inaccurate inventory from the EMF (which is obtained from SIDPERS, ACT, and the USAREC MRS) can be factored with incorrect historical loss rates in PIA or COMPLIP-ELIM. This error can then be further compounded by comparing its results to inaccurate authorization data obtained from PERSACS as reported in TAADS. This compounded error is then translated into an aggregate recruiting objective and a detailed training objective as determined by the White Book and recorded in REQUEST. The aggregrate recruiting objective and summation of the detailed training objective should theoretically be equal. However, their resemblance in actuality can be attributed only to coincidence and the repetitive intervention of managers on what should be an exception basis. This inequality can be attributed to the many problems discussed earlier such as over-selling the desirable skills, phantom reservations in REQUEST, rapidly changing authorizations, constantly changing manpower requirements in order to meet a single manpower constraint at the end of the year, and lack of proper accounting or controls over reenlistments and prior service enlistments. The net result can be the enlistment of an unqualified individual for a skill we do not need, nor have the facilities for training,

so that we can assign him to a place that doesn't need him.

b. This committee would be the first to admit that the last sentence above is not descriptive of the personnel system in general even though specific cases of the above can be cited. Considering the complexity of the system as a whole and the numerous problems contained therein, we are amazed that it works as well as it does. For this we salute the many action officers who spend their routine day managing by exception in order to keep the overall system functioning. What appears to be lacking in coordinating all these systems and the frequent impulsive reaction to rapidly changing requirements, is an overall master plan that takes into account where we are, how we are managing, where we should go, and how we should be managing. We need a plan for curing the cause instead "quick-fixing" the symptoms.

4. Conclusions:

a. The consolidation of the various personnel models in one office, as discussed earlier, is the first step in developing a master plan for the predictive subsystem. Once this consolidation has been accomplished, a plan should be established for identifying those predictive factors which influence future programming. Next, an evaluation of current models should b e made to determine how well they account for these factors. If there is a "best" alternative, it should be standardized in all models assuming redundancy of predictive

factors is necessary in all the current models. This is the next assumption which should be challenged. Why should all models have to consider the same factors? How can the models be consolidated so that the output of one (the predictor) becomes the input of another (the force or training programmer) without each having to determine its own input? Efforts along these lines should be undertaken now to determine what kind of predictive system we need for the future and what kind of operating system we need to support it.

b. The operating system which manages the active force, the second subsystem, also is in need of a master plan based on what it currently does and what it should be doing. An analysis of the current system reveals a lack of standardized data elements in all the systems, redundant reporting of the same data, a lack of communication between systems as an individual is moved from one to another for management purposes (e.g. ACT to CAP III) and the absence of a central, reliable, and timely data base for all users to include both the operating subsystem and the predictive subsystem. An effort currently in its infancy stages entitled "The Consolidation of Enlisted Personnel Systems" (Project 76) is an attempt to satisfy this need.

c. Some of the problems involved in incorporating the reserve components (the third subsystem) into the active Army systems have been discussed earlier in this Chapter. Another major problem which has not been addressed in this report is that of determining the mobilization requirements for the RC in time of war. In reality both the peace time training

requirements (discussed earlier) and mobilization requirements in time of war are dependent on the same active Army systems -- the EMF for what we have, the PERSACS for what we need, the White Book for what we can train, and REQUEST for reserving the training space. In either case, peace or war, the integration of the active Army and RC depends upon a well integrated system for accounting for what they/we have and what they/we need. At present this integration is missing. This subsystem exists on its own with little effort being directed toward its integration into the other subsystems. The planned establishment of a reserve components SIDPERS operating system is a move in the right direction but much more needs to be done to establish a master plan for their integration into active Army systems.

d. There is a definite need for the development and maintenance of a long-range personnel system master plan which incorporates all three subsystems. In addition, there should be a regularly scheduled personnel information systems planning seminar which would convene at least annually and include interested representatives from each of the activities, agencies, and directorates under the DCSPER supervision. The purpose of the seminar would be to present the long range plan and progress made since the last seminar so that the entire DCSPER family is aware of the planned and progress made. Representatives at the seminar, including outside civilian and military research organizations, should be invited and

encouraged to present concept papers which could provide the basis for additional long range planning. Concept papers deemed worthy of investigation could be accepted for feasibility studies or submitted for inclusion in the DCSPER studies program thus updating and extending the previous long range plan. A seminar of this nature could provide the vehicle necessary for encouraging the free exchange of ideas and innovation necessary for creative problem solving.

e. Without a personnel systems master plan our functions and subsystems will continue to be fragemented with little or no interface between systems. In this environment, independent systems will continue to be proliferated as "band-aid" type cures are identified for various symptomatic problems without the cause of the defect and its resolution ever being identified and resolved throughout the DCSPER systems.

5. Recommendations:

a. That the Consolidation of Enlisted Personnel Systems (Project 76) be established as a priority DCSPER project with a full time staff for implementing the project.

b. That the DCSPER family elements responsible for the predictive systems and the operating systems incorporate the reserve components into their master plan.

c. That the DCSPER assign as a high priority the mission of developing and maintaining a long-range personnel system master plan incorporating all subsystems.

d. That periodic seminars be held with representation from all interested agencies to discuss, review and update the master plan.

PROPOSED OPTIMUM LEAD TIME



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





NOTES:

★ PERSACS OUTPUT DA
FROM MONTH END R
COMPUTATION.

★★ TRAINING QUOTAS N
REQUEST 10-90 DAY
CONFERENCE.

Figure 3.1



NOTES:

★ PERSACS OUTPUT DATA AND EMF DATA PREPARED FROM MONTH END REPORTS 2 MONTHS PRIOR TO COMPUTATION.

★ TRAINING QUOTAS NORMALLY ENTERED INTO REQUEST 10-90 DAYS AFTER COMPLETION OF CONFERENCE.

Figure 3.1 Proposed Lead Times



Figure 3.2

TYPE ACTION	PBA	PBM	PBB	MPE	MPT	MPR	EPD
CHANGE TOTAL STRENGTH	I	A	C	C	C	C	C
REDUCE PCS MOVES	I	I	A	C	C	I	C
CHANGE STRUCTURE	C	A	I	C	C	C	C
CHANGE RECRUITING POLICY	I	C	I	C	C	A	C
FEMALE PROCUREMENT	I	C	I	A	C	C	C
CHANGE TRAINING POLICY	I	C	C	C	A	C	C
CHANGE TO DISTRIBUTION	I	I	C	A	C	I	C
CHANGE ALO	A	C	C	C	C	I	C
CHANGE ACCESSION REQUIREMENTS	I	A	I	C	C	C	C

I = INFORMATION

A = ACTION

C = COORDINATION

Figure 3.3

APPENDIX A

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

and

COMMITTEE CHARTER

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Full Time

COL Phillip Kaplan	Chairman
LTC Ronald L. Salvador	DAPC-EPS
LTC Russell A. Mericle, Jr.	DAPE-PBM
LTC Eldon K. Schroeder	DAPE-MPT
MAJ Robert W. Haubrich	DAPE-MPE
MAJ Francis Keough	DAPE-MPR
Mr. John Sandy	DAPC-PSS
Mrs. Barbara B. German	DAPC-EPT
MAJ Elmer E. Adams	DAPC-EPP
MAJ Melvin Nefzger	DAPC-EPC-A
Mr. Walter L. Hickle	DAPC-EPO
Mr. Fred R. Rote	DAPC-PMO

Part Time/Observers

COL L. D. Pence	OASA(M&RA)
LTC William Scarborough	OCAR
MAJ C. Heglund	NGB
MAJ R. Ladestro	OTSG
LTC Donald F. Van Eynde	DAS
MAJ James Adams	DAPE-PBA
Mr. Marvin L. Orndorff	DAPE-PBB
COL Jack L. Conn	USATRADOC
LTC Grayson C. Woodbury, Jr.	USAREC
MAJ Robert L. Phillips	DAPE-HRL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAPE-ZB

30 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: COL KAPLAN
MG PUTNAM
MG MOORE
BG WROTH

SUBJECT: People Management

1. Reference is made to Memorandum, DAPE-MPM, ODCSPER, 30 Oct 74, subject: Reasons for Insufficient AIT Spaces, Incl 1.

2. The inclosed memorandum is accepted as a first cut at the identification of a problem with many facets which must be solved as a matter of priority by the personnel family. COL Kaplan is appointed Chairman of an Ad Hoc Committee to facilitate coordination of the present systems and to develop a long range system which will result in better management of our people from recruitment through BCT and AIT, and distribution to initial duty assignment.

3. The committee will consist of two subcommittees. One subcommittee will coordinate on-going actions in order to maximize the effectiveness of currently inadequate systems. The other subcommittee will examine and design, if possible, an integrated single system for implementation as soon as practicable.

4. COL Kaplan is authorized to select his subcommittee members. When advantageous, an individual may serve on both subcommittees. Subcommittee work will be the first priority task for those selected. COL Kaplan and his subcommittees will also have immediate access to anyone in the personnel family for advice and assistance on a priority basis. The work of the committees will get into high gear immediately upon completion of the current White Book exercise.

30 October 1974
SUBJECT: People Management

5. The subcommittees will report progress and seek guidance biweekly in briefings for the ADCSPER.

6. The following observations/guidance are pertinent:

a. The several systems currently involved, which may be quite well managed independently, do not result in a cohesive and effective system in the whole. There is too much reliance on "coordination," and decision points in the subsystems are not in synchronization. Also, part of our problem is the failure of our institutional memory; our problem is not a reflection of the shortcomings of individual system managers.

b. Our goal should be to establish a single, automated, integrated system which will not permit the unilateral action of one element of the system to throw the other elements of the system out of synchronization. All elements of the system should reflect a real time situation; we cannot audit the parts of the system as infrequently as semiannually (as we do the White Book) to discover errors in our planning or implementation which, in the meantime, have had a snowballing effect on the system as a whole.

c. I have been assured that the current system will work if -- if we had a stable force structure, if we had a stable, constant-dollar budget, if we had a constant end strength, and if we had a fixed stationing plan. While our goal should be to seek stability, our Army is going to be dynamic and changing if it is to accomplish its mission -- if it is to respond to the will of OSD and the Congress, and if it is going to take advantage of changing technology. We must achieve stability in our piece of the action so that we dampen out -- not reinforce -- the shock waves which will unavoidably beset us in the environment in which we operate. This means that some sacred cows will have to be carefully examined and some of them may have to go.

d. (1) While the mission of the committee is to develop a single, integrated management system, any solution must be examined in great depth for feasibility. I am not persuaded that the several subsystems we have now have lived up to their expectations as far as their impact on the fortunes of Joe Tentpeg, Recruit, USA, are concerned. The system must be susceptible to the finest kind of tuning; we can no longer expect

the luxury of resources which will give all parts of the system the flexibility to cover up for a miscalculation in another part of the system. The farther we move the decision point from Joe Tentpeg and the more we centralize the decision-making process for the Army as a whole, the more sophisticated and fine tuned our system must be.

(2) We must be certain that our system is within the state of the art; I will not be satisfied with optomistic hopes or guesses, or a "can do" attitude -- we've been victimized enough already. What I'm saying is this: If a totally centralized system can't be made to function to the benefit of almost all our Joe Tentpegs, then consideration must be given to creating totally self-contained subsystems which can be managed by teams of experts who can comprehend and manage their pieces of the action, relying on automated data processing to provide facts, and substituting common sense and comprehension for "programs" in the decision-making process. Again, some sacred cows may be vulnerable.

e. Any system or systems we develop must be readily adaptable to a partial or full mobilization system. It cannot be geared to a 785,000-man Army and then collapse under the weight of a call-up of the IRR, the National Guard or USAR units, or a return to the draft.

f. I am not persuaded that we need to accept the inevitability of "seasonality" which only exacerbates the flaws in our current system; this may have to be one of the first sacred cows to tumble.

7. The committee will be organized and present its plan of attack to me by mid-November and to General Rogers by 1 December 1974, including tentative milestones for completion of the project.

/s/

1 Incl
as

HAROLD I. HAYWARD
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAPE-MPM

27 NOV 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: People Management Committee

1. REFERENCE: Memorandum, DAPE-ZB, 30 Oct 74, Subject: People Management, (Inclosure 1).

2. PURPOSE: This memorandum establishes an Ad Hoc Committee to:

(a) Improve the operating efficiency of our current system for managing our people from initial accession through training to initial assignment; and

(b) Determine the feasibility of design of a single, integrated, automated system for the immediate future; or

(c) Recommend an alternative system which is less interdependent but provides fine tuning capabilities.

The work to be accomplished by the Committee is a matter of high priority to the entire personnel family, and all on-going actions will be coordinated with the Committee to insure it knows about all proposed actions that may impact on this effort.

3. BACKGROUND: During the past two years, rapid changes have taken place in people management, including a reduction in the operational functions of ODCSPER and the creation of MILPERCEN. Concurrently, major changes in the Army as a whole have occurred; the advent of the Volunteer Army, USAREC emergence as the major source of manpower, staff reductions, and major reorganizations. As a result of these changes, people management has had to respond not only to new priorities, but also to new channels of staffing and coordination. That we have succeeded as well as we have to this point speaks well for the diligent effort exhibited by all management personnel. However, it is time to look closely at the evolving capabilities of automation to support people management. An effort must be made to tie together the several existing management systems

so that impacts of proposed changes in one system can be evaluated totally to ensure there will be no adverse impacts in other areas.

4. GUIDANCE: The Committee has been given a broad charter and access to all of the resources of the DCSPER family. Some personnel will be selected for subcommittee membership, others for informational presentations to the full committee during its research period. It is envisioned that changes to current systems, correction of weak procedural areas, and fill-in of coordination gaps will evolve during the study through efforts of individual agency representatives to the subcommittees. The product of the Committee's efforts should be:

(a) Documentation to improve the efficiency, control and responsiveness of current systems.

(b) A new, single, integrated system, if one is feasible, and within the state of the art, or

(c) Recommendation for an alternative management system which provides improved control and responsiveness.

5. CONCEPT OF STUDY: See details at Inclosure 2.

6. COMMITTEE MEMBERSHIP:

a. Committee Chairman: Colonel Phillip Kaplan.

b. The following offices/agencies will provide committee membership as indicated:

OASA (M&RA) (Observer)		OTSG	P
DAS (Observer) Program Analysis and Evaluation Directorate		USAREC	P
OCAR	P	ODCSOPS Force Development & Structure Division	P
TRADOC	P	NGB	P
ODCSPER		MILPERCEN	
Authorizations Division	P	PERSINS	F
Budget Division	P	EPD	
Manpower Programs Division	F	Deputy for Training & Accession Mgmt	F

DAPE-MPM
SUBJECT: People Management Committee

Training Division	F		
Enlisted Division	F	Deputy for Distri-bution	F
Recruitment & Reenlistment Division	F	Deputy for Planning & Coordination	F
		Assignment Control Division	F
		Deputy for Resource Planning	F
		PMDD MOS Division	P

F=Fill-time
P=Part-time

b. Full-time membership requires that representatives be present daily for scheduled research presentations from approximately 2 December 1974 to 10 January 1975. Daily sessions are planned from 0900-1100 hours, but the number of presentations may require both morning and afternoon meetings. During the systems examination phase from mid-January through end February, scheduled sessions will be less frequent, but individual investigation projects for subcommittee members will be required. It is planned that part-time members will attend only selected sessions involving their areas of interest. Timely notification for such sessions is planned to preclude travel inconvenience to part-time representatives from field commands.

c. Addressees are requested to designate a principal and alternate committee member for the divisions/offices listed in subparagraph a, above. Because of the need to maintain continuity throughout the study effort, it is expected that the principal will attend all scheduled meetings and the alternate will provide backup in infrequent absences of the principal. Names of designated committee representatives will be provided to LTC salvador (70860) by COB, 2 December 1974 and full-time principals should be prepared to attend an orientation from 0900-1100, Tuesday, 3 December in Room 2C745, the Pentagon.

/s/

2 Incl
as

HAROLD I. HAYWARD
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief
of Staff for Personnel

DAPE-MPM
SUBJECT: People Management Committee

DISTRIBUTION:

DAPE-MP	DAPC-PSZ-A
DAPE-PB	DAPC-PM
DAPC-EPZ-A	

INFO:

OASA(M&RA	DAMO-FDF
DASG-PTZ	DAPC-ZA
DAPE-HR	NGB-ZA
DAPE-DW	Commander, TRADOC
DAAR-ZB	Commander, USAREC

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

DAPE-MPM

30 October 1974

MEMORANDUM THRU: MAJOR GENERAL PUTNAM

FOR: MAJOR GENERAL HAYWARD

SUBJECT: Reasons for Insufficient AIT Spaces

1. Last week Mr. Walter Hickle, from EPD, Resource Planning Office, and I, interviewed representatives from several offices in order to determine the causes for the lack of AIT seats. We spoke to officers and civilians from MPM-Recruiting and Retention Division, Training Division and Enlisted Division; PPB-Manpower Programs Division and EPD-Training and Accession Management Office. We have identified several areas that appear to have caused our training space problem. We do not have solutions to many of these causes but have identified the problem and directorates who can find a solution in order to resolve the issues.

2. Sufficient AIT spaces were not available during recent months because:

a. Manpower Program Accessions Vs Training Requirements - The manpower program determines the number of accessions by month which must be brought into the Army to maintain trained strength and to meet FY end strength. It can be expanded to project the number of BCT graduates who will require an AIT space. Training requirements are computed by the Personnel Inventory Analysis System (PIA I) on the basis of SACS authorization. This system establishes the annual MOS training requirements which can be met with basic combat training graduates (trainees - 09B). Two other sources of input into 09B fed training are in-service personnel undergoing retraining and some of the prior service personnel reentering service. The in-service personnel may be individuals who reenlist for school training, volunteer for retraining or those whose retraining is directed by assignment managers to meet Army-wide requirements. When training requirements are computed these in-service and prior service individuals are not considered nor have they in the past caused a problem due to basic combat training output, i.e. there have been sufficient spaces to provide for the prior service and in-service input and still have sufficient spaces for the non-prior service accessions.

DAPE-MPM
SUBJECT: Reasons for Insufficient AIT Spaces

However, because of increased accessions in recent months, a training space problem has arisen which can be described best as follows:

February 1974 Manpower Program for FY 75:		
Non prior service accessions		207,600
Prior service accessions		14,100
Total Accessions		221,700
Estimated BCT graduates based on a 10%* BCT loss rate		186,840
BCT graduates not requiring a training space estimated 4,000 for ASA and 4,000 stripes for skills	-	8,000
Net BCT graduates requiring training spaces		178,840
Estimated number of PS accessions using training space	+	7,000
Total number of accessions requiring training space		185,840
Training spaces programmed in May 1974 White Book		185,100
Training space shortfall		740
Estimated requirements for in-service training		10,000
Total training space shortfall		10,740

* Now computed on a 13% loss rate.

This situation did not become apparent until the input of NPS accessions for the months of May through September entered the training base.

During the current White Book conference training spaces will be added to selected MOS to provide additional spaces for the remainder of FY 75. At this time we do not know if these spaces will be sufficient. The problem then remains as to what must be done in the future to preclude a similar situation

from occurring. Preliminary investigation has shown a difference in loss rates used in PIA and the manpower program. Accordingly a detailed review of these rates is required to insure that they are compatible. After each White Book computation an immediate comparison of the training requirements and current manpower program must be made. If necessary, additional spaces may be added in selected MOS to insure availability of required training spaces. The addition of spaces in selected MOS may cause temporary imbalances in some MOS. These can be compensated for at the next White Book computation. The Director, PPB has responsibility for the Manpower Program, the Director EPD computes the annual training requirement, however the Director MPM has overall responsibility for the White Book and final training program.

b. Over Recruiting. USAREC did an excellent job of recruiting. From May thru September they recruited almost 110,000 persons for the Army. Of this number an estimated 5,400 PS did not require an AIT space leaving a requirement for 104,600 spaces for the active Army. This includes male and female PS and NPS. During this same period of time the recruiting objective was 102,700, thus an over recruitment for the entire 5 month period of 7,300. The number of AIT training seats available for these 104,600 soldiers in REQUEST was approximately 110,000. However, in-service reenlistees and REPS also were able to reserve and use these spaces. An estimated 4,000 seats went for in-service retraining and reenlistment. The REP recruiting objective for these five months was 16,600. The principal directorates concerned with this problem are MPM and PPB.

c. Seasonal Recruiting Vs Level Training Base. The monthly accessions shown in the manpower program are driven by the need to keep trained strength shortfalls to a minimum and to capitalize on those recruiting months that are historically good. TRADOC structures class schedules, generally on an even flow throughout the year. The May 1974 White Book training requirement had an AIT input of 185,000 for a monthly average of 15,400. The accessions for May through September averaged 22,000 to start BCT. Subtracting a 10%* BCT loss rate, plus ASA and stripes for skill input, reduces the 22,000 BCT starters to an average of 18,800 per month who will begin AIT courses. This situation was aggravated by the fact that the October 1973 White Book Program for FY 75 was only 150,300 and reprogramming to the May White Book figure of 185,100 had not been accomplished to increase first quarter FY 75 input capability. The 1 October 1973 Manpower Program indicated a non-prior service accession requirement of 183,400 as compared to 207,600 in the February 1974 program. Monthly

input to BCT during these 5 months varied from a low of 14,775 in May to a high of 27,577 in June. TRADOC has shown some flexibility by increasing individual class capacity an additional 20% in selected MOS. MILPERCEN requested the 20% increase in 69 MOS. TRADOC could only concur in 46 MOS.

The Directorates responsible for coordination and resolution of this problem are MPM and PPB. MILPERCEN, EPD has responsibility for the operation of REQUEST and on a daily basis coordinates closely with headquarters, TRADOC Training Centers and Schools.

d. Soldiers Entering Active Duty Early. Accurate numbers on the magnitude of this problem are not available without running an extensive audit trail. However, the training and accession management office in EPD estimates that 4,000 (+) soldiers who should have entered the Army in September 1974, actually entered August or earlier. The effect of this movement forward is to over subscribe the AIT capacity of selected MOS. This causes excessive waiting (1-6 weeks) and poor utilization of soldiers during this time. Director MPM and Commander USAREC are responsible for the management of these programs.

e. REP and Active Army Competition for AIT Space. We do not know that this caused a shorage of seats at this time, however it has impacted on the availability of seats for the REP at the more desirable times. All seats are sold on a first come, first served basis. REP ceilings are managed through REQUEST and when all REP spaces are sold the MOS is closed for the remainder of the year. Active Army seats are manually monitored. Because of the difference in monitoring REP and AA seats, it is possible for an MOS to be sold out for the year and only at that time realize that the active Army used some REP spaces. If this happens, additional training spaces are made available for REP if possible. Director MPM and EPD manage these programs.

3. I recommend that you chair a training space committee and that my office provide you with the necessary administrative support. The purpose of the committee will be to resolve those issues discussed in paragraph 2. The committee would meet periodically until all issues are resolved. Membership would include:

DAPE-MPM
SUBJECT: Reasons for Insufficient AIT Spaces

Directorates/Divisions

DCSPER Military Personnel Management: MPE, MPT, MPR

Plans Programs and Budget: PBM

MILPERCEN Enlisted Personnel Directorate: EPT, EPO

/s/

PHILLIP KAPLAN
Colonel, USA
Deputy Project Director
for MOS Mismatch

Copy for:
MG Putnam
MG Moore
MG Wroth
BG Heiden

CONCEPT OF STUDY

NAME: People Management Committee.

LOCATION: Room 2C745, the Pentagon.

PURPOSE:

1. To evaluate current policies, systems and on-going actions and implement measures to improve control and responsiveness of the system.

2. To determine feasibility of a single, integrated, automated personnel system for early implementation, or

3. To recommend an alternative system which will provide improved people management and increased capability to respond to the needs of a changing Army.

OBJECTIVES:

1. To examine personnel management policies for procurement, training and distribution and to determine their impacts on remainder of the system.

2. To recommend substantive policy changes if required to facilitate system effectiveness.

3. To examine personnel management organizations and procedures for problem areas in coordination or control.

4. To determine if maximum effective interface among automated systems has been accomplished to facilitate management. Consideration must be given to near-term on-going actions. Programs/Systems/Policies to be examined include, but are not limited to:

   a. Army Manpower Program (ELIM-COMPLIP).

   b. PERSACS-C, FAS, SACS.

   c. PIA (Personnel Inventory Analysis-PIA I & II).

   d. White Book Computations.

   e. CAP III, PERDDIMS, (Assignment System).

   f. REQUEST (Training Space Reservations).

   g. WEEM (WAC Expansion).

h. Training Base Capacity and Flexibility.

i. PPM (Personnel Priority Model).

j. MITRON (USAREC Accession Accountability).

k. Enlistment/Reenlistment Options.

l. MALOF (Minimum Levels of Fill).

m. Readiness Criteria.

n. Requisitions.

o. Recruiting Objective Computations.

p. CTAS.

q. FATES I & II.

r. EMF (Enlisted Master File).

s. TAADS (Authorization Documents).

t. ETAM.

u. Stabilization.

5. To determine the capability of the training base to expand in response to surges of new accessions and/or methods to dampen those surges.

6. To determine the feasibility of a single, integrated, automated system for early implementation.

7. To develop documentation which will provide:

a. A summary of total current system operation.

b. An information/analysis format for displaying impacts of change on all elements of the system and appropriate lead-times to effect changes in each element.

c. Recommendations for a single, automated system or alternative systems to improve people management.

MILESTONES.

1. Research and Education - 2 December 1974 - 10 January 1975.
During this period, the Committee will review current policies and operating procedures and will schedule presentations to the Committee by action officers involved in systems and programs being examined.

2. Examination of System Elements 13 January 1975 - 28 February 1975.

During this period, the Committee will study the various parts of the system and on-going actions to identify weaknesses in procedures, coordination or in systems linkages. Agency action officers may be scheduled for more detailed discussions with the Committee, and the formulation of documentation will begin. Feasibility for a single, integrated system will be studied during this period.

3. Documentation-March 1975.

The final product of the Committee's efforts, a summary of current systems operation and a report of feasibility of single, integrated system, will be prepared and submitted to the ADCSPER for approval for publication.

APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGY AND REFERENCES

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

METHODOLOGY AND REFERENCES

1. Methodology:

a. General: The ad hoc People Management Committee (PMC) was established by the ADCSPER to improve the operating efficiency of our current system for managing people and to determine the feasibility of a single automated system or an alternative system which provides fine tuning capabilities. The objectives of the PMC have been listed in Chapter I.

b. The initial meeting of the Committee took place on 3 December 1974 and it was determined that the committee work would be divided into three phases:

Phase I - Research and Education

Phase II - Examination of System Elements

Phase III - Documentation

c. Phase I was completed on 24 January 1975 and included briefings and study of the multifarious systems that impact on the procurement, training and distribution of our soldiers. Briefings and subject areas completed in Phase I are listed at Annex A to this chapter.

d. Phase II commenced 28 January 1975 and included detailed research into the various parts of the DCSPER system that had been identified as problem areas in order to further identify weaknesses in procedures, coordination or in system interfaces. The full committee met twice a week during this phase. Additional briefings were heard and problem areas researched during this phase.

e. Phase III commenced 4 March with a preview of the first draft of the final report. Research and documentation was completed in April.

2. References:

a. Memo for the Director of Enlisted Personnel, Subject: Conclusion and Recommendations, Study of the Enlisted Personnel Management System, dated 22 Feb 73 (Hauser EPMS study).

b. Memo for the Vice Chief of Staff, United States Army, Subject: Final Report Grade Structure and Manpower. Authorizations study, dated 30 April 1973 (Faces and Spaces Study).

c. Final Report, A Study of Army Data Bases for Personnel Authorizations and Assets, The General Research Corporation, Sep 74.

d. "Up With People"; A study of the present and projected Personnel Support Systems and Services (PS3) of the US Army 1972-1976; Vol I, II, III; February 1973.

e. Handbook, Military Personnel Information System, Prepared by US Army Audit Agency, 8 April 1974.

APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

ACRONYMS

ACT (I)(II)	Automated Control of Trainees (version I,II)
AEA	Assignment Eligibility and Availability (code)
AFEES	Armed Forces Entrance & Examination Station
AID-E (O)	Automatic Interaction Detector - Enlisted (Officer)
ALO	Authorized Level of Organization
AOR	Advanced List of Overseas Returnees for Assignment
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASI	Additional Skill Identifier
ATC	Army Training Center
AUTODIN	Automated Digital Network
BASD	Basic Active Service Date
BASOPS	Base Operating Information System
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BOIP	Basic of Issue Plan
BRC	Budget Review Committee
BT	Basic Training (for women)
CAR	Chief, Army Reserve
CAP III	Centralized Assignment Procedures (Version III)
CAT I (II,III,IV)	Mental Category
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CMF	Career Management Field
COMPLIP	Comparison of Manpower Programs by Linear Programming
CPMI	Command Personnel Management Inspection
CSMOS	Controlled Secondary MOS
CTAS	Centralized Transient Accounting System
DA	Department of Army

DAAR	Department of Army, Army Reserve
DAMPL	DA Master Priority List
DEMOS	Defense Enlisted Management Objectives Simulation Model
DEP	Delayed Entry Program
DEROS	Date Eligible to Return from Overseas
DIRREP	Direct Reporting
DOR	Date of Rank
DPA	Data Processing Activity
EDATE	Effective Date
ELIM	Enlisted Loss Inventory Model
EMF	Enlisted Master File
EPMS	Enlisted Personnel Management System
ES	End Strength
ETS	Expiration Term of Service
FAS	Force Accounting System
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
FSA	Force Structure Allowance
FT	First Term
FYDP	Five Year Defense Plan
GED	General Educational Development
GIT	Guide for Input to Training (List)
IDT	Inactive Duty Training
IRGS	Inquiry and Report Generator System
MILPAC	Military Personnel Accounting Center
MILPERCEN	US Army Military Personnel Center
MOVEM	Movement Overseas Verification of Enlisted Members

MOS	Military Occupation Specialty (Primary, Secondary, Duty - PMOS, SMOS, DMOS)
MRS	Management Reporting System
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NCOES	Noncommissioned Officer Educational System
NGCC	National Guard Computer Center
NPS	Non Prior Service
OAC	Officer Advanced Course
OBC	Officer Basic Course
OST	One Station Training
PBG	Program Budget Guidance
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
PERDDIMS	Personnel Deployment & Distribution Management System
PERSINSD	Personnel Information Systems Directorate, MILPERCEN
PIA II	Personnel Inventory Analysis (Version II)
PMC	People Management Committee
POC	Point of Contact
POI	Program of Instruction
POM	Program Objective Memorandum
PPBS	Planning, Programming, & Budgeting System
PPM	Personnel Priority Model
PRA	Projected Requisitioning Authority
PS	Prior Service
QIPS	Quality Incentive Program System
QMP	Qualitative Management Program
REQUEST	Recruit QUOTA System

RC	Reserve Components
RCPAC	Reserve Components Personnel & Administration Cente
REP	Reserve Enlisted Program
REVAIL	Roster of Readily Available Advanced Individual Trainees
RESTAS	Reception Station System
RMS	Recruiting Main Station
SACS	Structure and Composition System
SIDPERS	Standard Installation/Division Personnel System
SSA	Social Security Administration
SSAN	Social Security Account Number
TAADS	The Army Authorizations Document System
TCC	Training Control Card
TDA	Tables of Distribution and Allowance
TIN	Temporary Identification Number
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TTPPS	Trainees, Transients, Patients, Prisoners and Students (individual account)
TRADOC	US Army Training and Doctrine Command
UIC	Unit Identification Code
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USAREC	United States Army Recruiting Commard
USARECSTA	United States Army Reception Station
VTAADS	Vertical TAADS
WEEM	Women's Enlisted Expansion Model

APPENDIX D

BRIEFINGS RECEIVED BY PMC

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

SUBJECT	BRIEFER
Force Structure	COL Irons, DCSOPS MAJ Fegan, DCSOPS
PERSACS	LTC Gallagher, Manpower Programs Div.
Enlisted Master File	COL O'Leksy, PERSINSD CPT Haddock, PERSINSD CPT Bellone, USAPDSC (Edgewood Arsenal)
PIA II	Mr. Wiles, Resource Planning, EPD
Training Requirements	LTC Farmer, Training Division MAJ Green, Training Division Mr. Kendall, Training Division
Manpower Program	LTC Dorough, Manpower Programs Div.
PPBS	LTC Otstott, PA&E
Project 76	MAJ Adams, EPD
MOS Development & Changes	Mr. Mueller, MOS Division, EPD
Training Assignments	MAJ Schneider, Schools Branch, EPD Mrs. German, Training & Accession Mgt, EPD LTC Graham, Enlisted Division
AIT Assignments	MAJ Patterson, EPD
Distribution & Assignments	LTC Salvador, Distribution, EPD MAJ Nefzger, EPD
Enlistment Options	MAJ Wheeler, R&R, Div
Recruiting	COL Butler, USAREC LTC Woodbury, USAREC
AFEES Operations, Reporting & Accounting	COL Hansen, USAREC
The Training Base	COL Conn, TRADOC
MOVEM	MAJ George Fasching
PERDDIMS	LTC Plasket, PERSINSD Mr. Schindeman, PERSINSD
Human Resources Management	COL Johns, HRD

The following personnel were interviewed by the Committee:

COL Berge, DAPC-EP
COL Baker, DAPC-EPS
COL Eye, DAPC-EPT
COL Harrison, DAPC-EPC-A
COL Hampton, DAPC-EPP
COL Greynolds, DAPE-MPR
COL Williams, DAPE-MPT
LTC(P) Browne, DAPC-EPO
COL Stoverink, DAPC-PMO
COL Trask, DAPC-PO
COL Tuck, DAPE-PB
COL Thompson, DAPE-PBM
COL Doughtie, DAPE-PBA
COL Singletary, DAPE-MPE

APPENDIX E

BRIEF EXPLANATION OF DCSPER FAMILY SYSTEMS

PEOPLE MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

BRIEF EXPLANATION OF DCSPER FAMILY SYSTEMS

1. DATA BASES:

a. Master Data Bases:

(1) Enlisted Master File (EMF): The EMF contains a record for each enlisted man and woman on active duty and those who have not been separated for more than 4 months. Up to 184 data elements may be maintained on each individual. The primary input to the EMF and the method of transmission to HQDA are essentially from field submitted transactions. Other input such as senior grade promotions, language proficiency, and casualties is generated by HQDA. The EMF is updated about five times each month.

(2) Personnel Structure and Composition System (PERSACS): Serves as the authorization data base for personnel planners in developing objectives for procurement, training, and distribution. Projects worldwide personnel authorizations by month, by identity, MOS, grade, branch, location, command, and additional skill identifier. Projections are generally for 2 years. Output is used for input into the PIA System and other projection models.

b. Derivative Data Bases:

(1) Centralized Transient Account (CTA): The CTA contains a record on all Active Army personnel in a transient status. Each record consists of 54 data elements. Records in the CTA are created from arrival/departure transactions that update the EMF and OMF.

(2) Enlisted Query File (EQF): The EQF is created from the same source as the EMF as an on-line data base. Each EQF record contains about 130 data elements. The EQF is created monthly and is part of the Inquiry and Reports Generator System (IRGS) master file used for making random inquiries on personnel matters.

2. SYSTEMS:

a. Automated Control and Distribution of Trainees 1 (ACT 1): Collects qualification data on enlisted trainees

processing in at reception stations and basic training centers. Reports and controls trainees through BCT and AIT. Asset data are input into ACT II for selection and assignment to AIT.

b. Automated Control and Distribution of Trainees II (ACT II) : Assigns basic combat trainees to AIT courses based on assets provided from ACT I. Assignments are based on worldwide trained asset requirements and the availability of qualified trainees to fill the various AIT course. Matches the needs of the Army with the qualifications and desires of the individual trainee.

c. Centralized Assignment Procedure III (CAP III): Designed to make automatic assignments of all enlisted grades by matching eligible assets extracted from the EMF against worldwide line item requisitions. Sorts requisitions by priority, determines the best possible distribution of assets to fill requirements and selects enlisted men by name in accordance with the distribution plan.

d. Centralized Transient Accounting System (CTAS): Designed to simplify and improve personnel strength accounting at all levels. Monitors the movement of individuals while in transient status.

e. Inquiry and Report Generating System (IRGS): A random access file consisting of about 172 data elements from the EMF and about 245 from the OMF. The data is maintained on disk. Inquiries are processed from 48 terminals to the IRGS files.

f. Personnel Deployment and Distribution Management System (PERDDIMS): Developed as a fully automated personnel distribution and assignment program. Based on forecasting strengths, authorizations, and available assets. Has no field-input requirement. Projected authorizations and strengths will be compared and requirements by MOS and grade produced. Assignment information and distribution allocation is being planned for any desired level from parent/master unit to major command level. Requirements will be ordered by relative priority, using the PPM number, ALO and a forecasted MOS/REDCON. Available or deployable assets will be determined and ordered in accordance with assignment policies and equity of assignment. The assignment mechanism will be a CAP III -- type computerized assignment system for enlisted personnel and a specifically tailored mechanism for officer personnel. The program will produce distribution plans for at least 9 months in advance, provide for adjustments through an iterative, "look-ahead" capability, and then issue assignment instructions at a predetermined "lock-in" time in accordance with approval parameters. Assignment compliance will be monitored through a MOVEM/CTAS program application to insure a closed loop.

3. MODELS:

a. Automated Interaction Detector-Enlisted (AID-E): A statistical technique that explains enlisted personnel loss behavior by attribute in order of their importance. The end result of the AID-E program is a set of loss probabilities

for various subpopulations of the enlisted force, by type of loss. Also included in the AID-E package is a method to calculate the loss probabilities for manpower models that define their subpopulations differently.

b. Central Integrating Model-Enlisted (CIM-E): Takes the current enlisted inventory, computes, and simulates projected reenlistments, computes and subtracts projected losses, computes (or accepts specified values) and adds procurement, simulates promotion/demotion flow, and ages the result, thereby projecting the enlisted force at a future point in time. Uses grade and time-in-service as its basic inventory variables, and time-in-grade and time-to-ETS as criteria for simulation. The starting inventory can further be broken down by sex, race, mental category, civilian education, or career management field by sorting prior to execution of the dynamic model. The model cycle is repeated monthly for a projection period of up to 5 years. Also, incorporated is a cost program that takes the resultant inventory and applies cost factors to provide order of magnitude costs of different runs where alternative policies are considered.

c. Enlisted Loss Inventory Model (ELIM): Projects enlisted losses to the Army. This data is used as input to COMPLIP-GI (item number 44b) which projects a total strength of the Army by month. Input is the current enlisted inventory by

component, type tour, months to DEPOS and months to ETS, and loss factors derived from historical inventory and loss transaction data. Output is enlisted losses by component and category to the Army projected by month.

d. Personnel Inventory Analysis II (PIA II): Develops forecasts or projections of MOS inventory levels, i.e., the number of individuals who will appear in each of the MOS "inventory units" for each period in the future, for a projection term of up to 3 years by month, or 5 years by quarter. The basic philosophy is as follows. Initially a data base is compiled giving the status of each of the inventory units, as reflected b y the EMF of actual Army personnel at the current time. Beginning with this, the model projects on a month-by-month basis any changes in each of the inventory units. Losses to the system are projected, using appropriate user-supplied rates (and values) such as retention rates. Gains to the system are assumed to arise out of an influx of trainees, either draftees or volunteers. The numbers are again a user-supplied input. When authorizations cannot be met in full due to limitations of assets, decision rules are required to allocate the available resources to the various claimants, taking account of their priority levels. Major reports of the system will be available for the following levels of detail: 4-digit MOS; 3-digit MOS and grade; CMF and grade; and a combination of CMF's by 3-digit MOS/G and CMF/G. Monthly reports are available if a monthly run is specified, Generally, data by month for 36 months is printed on a one page for a given level of detail.

c. Personnel Structure and Composition UCH System (PERSACS-C): Provides personnel planners a tool to plan procurement, training, and distribution. Projects worldwide personnel authorizations by month, by identity, MOS, grade, branch, location, command, and additional skill identifier. Projections are generally for 2 years. Output is used for input into the PIA system and FATES Models.

e. Comparison of Manpower Programs Using Linear Programming Model (COMPLIP): COMPLIP is a linear programming model which computes an optimal manpower program directly in terms of several different categories of manpower gains and losses input from ELIM. Projects by month total strength, trained strength, trainees and NPS accessions (enlistees and inductees), REP enlistments, and total and excess training center capacities.

f. Defense Enlisted Management Objectives Simulation Model (DEMOS): This is a static model that simulates active enlisted personnel flow in all of the services and can be used to assess the quantitative impact of numerous qualitative (policy and legislative) alternatives under consideration. It allows the user to observe in isolation the effects of changing a single variable upon the force as a whole. A summary of the capabilities of this model is contained in the DEMOS manual.