



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Research Report



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Navy Leadership: Are Recruit
Expectations Accurate?

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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>The expectations of 303 new Navy recruits regarding the type of leadership climate and leadership power practices they would experience during basic training and later on in Navy duty were compared with reports of these actual situations by 365 basic trainees and 599 experienced enlisted men. The expectations of the new recruits regarding boot camp were significantly inaccurate on six of ten leadership climate and power variables. (over)</p>		

These new recruits were overly optimistic with respect to three of the six variables and overly pessimistic regarding the other three variables. Four out of five predictions by new recruits about leadership climate on regular Navy duty were inaccurate. In most cases, the real Navy leadership climate was more positive than recruits expected. This was so even though new recruits expected that Navy duty would be characterized by much more positive leadership climate than would be typical of boot camp. The potential benefits to recruiting and adjustment to Navy life of more realistic orientation programs are discussed.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this report is to provide recruiters and personnel at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Stations (AFEES) with information regarding the accuracy of perceptions of Navy leadership held by inductees. Such information could have a bearing on Navy orientation programs and be helpful to personnel who talk with potential and recent recruits.

The Navy relies on voluntary enlistments to fulfill its total manpower requirements. With elimination of the draft there is no longer pressure to enlist in the Navy to avoid being drafted by another branch of the Armed Services. A variety of new recruiting programs and programs to encourage reenlistment may be necessary to ensure adequate manpower levels. One type of change might relate to the development of a more realistic orientation program for inductees.

Previous research on attitudes toward civilian employment (Porter & Steers, 1973; Wanous, 1973) suggests that realistic job previews lead to increased job satisfaction, fewer thoughts of quitting, and longer tenure. An analogy of this civilian situation can be made to satisfaction in Navy duty. Thus, it would be useful to determine whether or not recruit anticipations of various aspects of Navy life are accurate--whether recruits unrealistically fear the worst or underestimate the difficulties they are about to face. By presenting a realistic picture of what is to come, recruiters and AFEES personnel can minimize misconceptions of the leadership and organizational

climate in the Navy. Such a program would possibly improve satisfaction at later points and may reduce the incidence of negative reappraisals that lead to turnover.

This report focuses on how accurately Navy inductees perceive the types of leadership style and organizational climate that exist in basic training and subsequent Navy duty. It was hypothesized that significant differences would be found between inductees' expectations of and enlisted men's descriptions of these phases of their careers. Expectations are defined as inaccurate if they differ from enlisted men's descriptions.

METHOD

Sample. A total of 1,267 men from the United States Navy participated in this project. Three groups were defined in terms of respondents' position in the Navy and were composed as follows: 303 inductees at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examining Station (new recruits) at Los Angeles (N=165) and Denver (N=138), 365 trainees at the Navy Training Center (basic trainees) in San Diego, and 599 enlisted men with eighteen months experience on various duty stations throughout the world (experienced enlisted men).

Demographic characteristics, such as mean age, high school class ranking, and size of home town were found to be similar for all three groups of men with the exception of age comparisons as presented in Table 1. Age was not obtained from the eighteen-month enlisted men but it can be assumed

they were approximately eighteen months older than the trainees. The eighteen-month sample came from slightly smaller home towns.

The questionnaires were administered to the inductees and trainees in groups and returned anonymously. The eighteen-month sample was identified from the master enlisted file of Navy personnel and surveyed by mail sent directly to each individual at his duty station. The respondents completed the questionnaires anonymously and mailed them directly back to the researchers. Of the 1700 questionnaires mailed out, 78 were returned unopened and 22 were returned after analyses began. From past experience in conducting mail surveys of Navy personnel under similar conditions it was estimated that approximately 1/4 to 1/3 of the questionnaires did not reach the intended subjects. Thus, the estimated effective response rate was approximately 50-60 percent. The new recruits and basic trainees samples were surveyed in the summer of 1972; the eighteen-month sample received their questionnaires in the spring of 1973.

The questionnaires given to the three groups were similar in form and content. They were designed to assess attitudes toward five organizational climate dimensions and five modes of expression of interpersonal influence or leadership power.

The five organizational climate dimensions were (1) hierarchical vs equalitarian decision making, (2) formal vs informal superior-subordinate relations, (3) supportive vs

punitive handling of mistakes by subordinates, (4) close vs general supervision, and (5) considerate vs inconsiderate supervision. These five organizational climate dimensions were described by five pairs of contrasting situations. On each dimension the respondent used a five-point scale to describe (1) attitude toward Navy basic training, (2) expectation (or description) of Navy duty eighteen months after boot camp, (3) attitude toward civilian jobs, (4) the situation in which he would try hardest to do a good job, and (5) the situation in which he would be most satisfied. For this report only questions one and two will be analyzed. Discussions of other phases of the project can be found in other reports (Maynard, Thornton & Nealey, 1974; Thornton, Hamilton & Nealey, 1973; Thornton & Nealey, 1974a, 1974b, and 1974c).

The five leadership power dimensions used in this study were defined by French & Raven (1959) as follows: (1) legitimate power based on rank and position, (2) expert power based on knowledge, (3) reward power based on positive rewards, (4) referent power based on personal respect, and (5) coercive power based on negative sanctions and punishment. Attitudes toward the use of the five power modes by superiors were obtained by presenting situations that illustrated each mode. The respondents indicated (1) how frequently each form of power is used during basic training (or current duty), (2) how frequently they think each form of power should be used during basic training, (3) how frequently each form of power

is used in most civilian jobs, (4) how hard they would try to do a good job under each mode of power, and (5) how satisfied they feel with each mode of power. Only the results from question one relating to basic training is analyzed in this report.

In addition to the organizational climate and leadership power questions, respondents were presented fourteen Likert-type items designed to probe general attitudes toward the military, basic training, the supervision process, and taking orders. Each item consisted of a statement with which the respondent indicated agreement or disagreement on a five-point scale. The items were grouped by a priori judgment into four dimensions. Only two dimensions (A and B) pertaining to basic training are relevant to the focus of this report. The items are shown in Table 4. Dimension A consists of four questions indicating how enthusiastic or "gung ho" men are toward basic training. Respondents scoring high on this dimension feel boot camp is important, necessary, a useful preparation for combat, and should be rugged to enhance respect for the Navy. Dimension B consists of three questions designed to assess positive and successful reactions to boot camp. Respondents scoring high on this dimension try hard in basic training, feel they are doing well, and believe there is little chance of physical injury.

RESULTS

New Recruits' Perceptions of Basic Training

The new recruits' perceptions of basic training and the basic trainees' descriptions of basic training are presented in Table 2. Some expectations were accurate and some inaccurate. Inductees accurately perceived that decision-making would be hierarchical and undemocratic and the authority structure would be very formal. However, the basic trainees found the leadership climate more punitive of mistakes and inconsiderate than the new recruits expected. On the other hand, the basic trainees found supervision during basic training to be more general than the new recruits expected.

Results relating to the types of power modes used in basic training are also included in Table 2. New recruits expected to encounter legitimate and expert power significantly more than trainees reported experiencing in basic. In addition, new recruits thought their superiors would rely on reward power less frequently than trainees had encountered in basic. Speculations by new recruits on the use of referent and coercive power were consistent with basic trainee reports and can be considered accurate.

New Recruits' Perceptions of Navy Duty

When the new recruits at AFEEs were asked to look ahead and speculate on the way leadership power would be used in regular Navy service eighteen months after basic training, only

one expectation was accurate. This related to the democratic nature of decision making processes as shown in Table 3. New recruits expected to encounter a more formal authority structure, a more punitive evaluation system, and closer supervision than was being experienced by enlisted men. On the other hand, the experienced enlisted men found Navy leadership less considerate than the inductees expected. In other words, Navy duty was not as expected.

Prospective, Current, and Retrospective Attitudes Toward Basic Training

The two sets of attitudes toward basic training expressed by the three groups are reported in Table 4. The average scores for the first dimension show that the new recruits were the most "gung ho", basic trainees slightly less, and the eighteen-month enlisted men somewhat less enthusiastic about basic training. Results for the second dimension show that all three groups experienced about the same degree of positive commitment and confidence in their success in basic training.

DISCUSSION

As hypothesized, the result showed that inductees had few accurate expectations. Combining results from questions on the climate situations and power modes found in basic training and future Navy duty, only five expectations out of a total of fifteen were shown to be correct. The number of

inaccurate expectations increased when inductees were instructed to look ahead and speculate on Navy climate after eighteen months experience. Table 5 summarizes the findings regarding the perceptions of basic trainees. (Inaccurate expectations regarding regular Navy duty may be considered of more serious practical consequences than inaccurate expectations of basic training.) After all, recruits join the Navy to be in the Navy, not basic training.

Some of the inaccurate perceptions depicted Navy leadership more favorably than it was found to be, e.g., (trainees found basic training more punitive and inconsiderate than the inductees expected.) Expert power is used less frequently than expected. In addition, experienced enlisted men found less considerate behavior on Navy duty than expected by the inductees. In contrast, (the majority of the inaccurate perceptions painted an unrealistic negative picture of Navy leadership. At boot camp, trainees experienced more general supervision than new recruits expected and legitimate power was used less frequently and reward power more frequently than expected.) After eighteen months experience, the enlisted men found Navy leadership to be more informal, permissive and general than new recruits expected.

These results, on balance, indicate that basic training is prospectively viewed by new recruits as a somewhat disagreeable (if necessary) experience and that the leadership climate typical of regular Navy duty is looked forward to as

being somewhat more positive. This point can be seen clearly by comparison of the climate expectations of new recruits shown in Table 2 vs Table 3. However, the new recruits underestimate the extent to which the Navy has a more positive climate than basic training. As the right hand column of Table 5 shows, three out of four of the inaccurate perceptions that new recruits hold about the Navy are less positive than justified. Perhaps the bleak perceptions of basic training held by new recruits generalizes unfairly to Navy duty in general.

Results from the two groupings of Likert items are interesting when considered with results presented above. General enthusiasm toward basic training decreased across groups as experience in the Navy increased. Basic trainees were most "gung ho", while the experienced enlisted men were the least. Conceivably, the decline of enthusiasm among the more experienced Navy men is related to the high number of inaccurate expectations they may have had as inductees. Orientation at time of recruitment and induction into the Navy should be made as accurate and realistic as possible. Summarizing a vast number of research studies on the relationship of job satisfaction to turnover and absenteeism, Porter and Steers (1973) conclude that job satisfaction can be viewed as:

[The sum total of an individual's met expectations on the job. The more an individual's expectations are met on the job, the greater his satisfaction. Viewing withdrawal [absenteeism and turnover] within this framework points to the necessity of focusing on the various factors that make up the employee's expectation set. (p. 169)]

Realistic job previews have been found (Wanous, 1973) to lead to more realistic job expectations, fewer thoughts of quitting and higher numbers remaining on the job. Wanous also found that realistic orientation did not depress job acceptance rates.

To the extent that future satisfaction with the Navy is dependent on realistic expectations, consideration should be given to revision of existing orientation programs. The results of this study suggest several areas where Navy recruiters and AFEES personnel could improve the understanding of potential recruits and new inductees.

Table 1
Demographic Variables for Three Samples of Navy Recruits

Variables	New recruits		Basic trainees		Experienced enlisted men	
	\bar{X}	S.D.	\bar{X}	S.D.	\bar{X}	S.D.
Age (months) ¹	228	14.8	230	16.3		
Population of Home Town ²	3.46	1.72	3.32	1.57	3.02	1.70
High School Class Standing ³	2.85	.80	2.86	.74	2.98	.79
N in sample	303		365		599	

¹Age not obtained from experienced enlisted men

²₁ = Less than 5,000

₂ = 5,000 - 10,000

₃ = 10,000 - 30,000

₄ = 30,000 - 100,000

₅ = 100,000 - 1,000,000

₆ = Over 1,000,000

³₁ = Bottom 25 percent

₂ = Below average but not in bottom 25 percent

₃ = Above average but not in top 25 percent

₄ = Top 25 percent

Table 2
Inductee Expectations of and Trainee
Description of Basic Training

	New recruit expec- tations	Basic trainee descrip- tions	<u>t</u>
<u>Climate Dimensions</u>			
Decision Making: Hierarchical (1) to Democratic (5)	1.96 ¹ (1.23)	2.00 (1.20)	-.42
Authority Structure: Formal (1) to Informal (5)	1.42 (.96)	1.35 (.84)	.99
Performance Evaluation: Punitive (1) to Permissive (5)	2.72 (1.61)	2.14 (1.53)	4.74**
Supervision: Close (1) to General (5)	1.84 (1.21)	2.37 (1.42)	-5.21**
Leadership: Inconsiderate (1) to Considerate (5)	2.79 (1.53)	2.45 (1.49)	2.89**
<u>Power Modes</u>			
Legitimate: Seldom (1) to Often (5)	4.16 (1.01)	2.93 (1.50)	12.60**
Expert: Seldom (1) to Often (5)	3.86 (1.16)	3.32 (1.40)	5.45**
Reward: Seldom (1) to Often (5)	2.73 (1.40)	3.40 (1.44)	-6.08**
Referent: Seldom (1) to Often (5)	2.82 (1.32)	2.78 (1.53)	.36
Coercive: Seldom (1) to Often (5)	3.84 (1.30)	3.72 (1.45)	1.13

* p < .05

**p < .01

¹Mean value; standard deviation in parentheses

Table 3

Inductee Expectation of and Enlisted Men's
Descriptions of Navy Duty after 18 Months of Service¹

	New recruits' expec- tations after 18 months	Enlisted men's descrip- tion of current job & duty	<u>t</u>
<u>Climate Dimensions</u>			
Decision Making: Hierar- chical (1) to Democratic (5)	2.75 ² (1.11)	2.65 (1.13)	1.27
Authority Structure: Formal (1) to Informal (5)	2.15 (1.16)	2.75 (1.09)	-7.49**
Performance Evaluation: Punitive (1) to Permissive (5)	3.06 (1.20)	3.37 (1.13)	-3.74**
Supervision: Close (1) to General (5)	2.70 (1.16)	3.45 (1.18)	-9.12**
Leadership: Inconsiderate (1) to Considerate (5)	3.28 (1.18)	3.04 (1.30)	2.32*

¹No analysis of attitudes toward the power modes used after 18 months service will be made since the relevant data are not available

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

²Mean value; standard deviation in parentheses

Table 4

Mean Responses of the Three Groups to General
Attitude Items Grouped into Two Dimensions

Dimension A items	Position in Navy		
	New recruits	Basic trainees	Experienced enlisted men
1. I believe basic training is a very important part of military training.	4.24	4.04	3.49
2. Basic training is mostly a lot of unnecessary things you have to go through to be "initiated". (reverse scoring)	2.31	2.78	2.62
3. If I'm ever in combat, the things I've learned in basic training will be very essential.	3.94	3.40	2.95
4. Without a rugged boot camp experience, recruits will have no respect for the service.	3.22	3.42	2.67
	$\bar{X}^1 = 3.43$	3.41	2.93
<u>Dimension B items</u>			
1. It's important to me to do well in basic training.	4.50	4.32	3.72
2. I am making it through basic training without any serious problems.	4.07	4.07	4.21
3. There is a good chance of being accidentally injured during basic training. (reverse scoring)	3.14	2.75	3.36
	$\bar{X} = 3.90$	3.71	3.76

¹ Recruits = Trainees > Experienced Enlisted Men (p < .05)

Table 5

Summary of Accuracy of New Recruit Perceptions
of Basic Training and Navy Duty

<u>Climate dimension</u>	<u>Basic training</u>	<u>Navy duty</u>
Hierarchical vs Democratic	As expected	As expected
Formal vs Informal	As expected	(+) Less formal than expected
Punitive vs Permissive	(-) More punitive than expected	(+) Less punitive than expected
Close vs General Supervision	(+) Less close than expected	(+) Less close than expected
Inconsiderate vs Considerate Leadership	(-) More inconsiderate than expected	(-) More inconsiderate than expected
<u>Power Mode</u>		
Legitimate	(+) Less than expected	
Expert	(-) Less than expected	
Reward	(+) More than expected	
Referent	As expected	
Coercive	As expected	
(+) Denotes the actual situation is more positive than expected (-) Denotes the actual situation is worse than expected		

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