

**REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE**

*Form Approved*  
OMB No. 0704-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing the burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.  
**PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 04/11/2019	<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's of Military Studies	<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> SEP 2018 - APR 2019
--	---	--

<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Cold, Hard Truths: Leadership Lessons From Korea, 1950	<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b> N/A

<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> Wells, Robert, A, Major, USMC	<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b> N/A
	<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b> N/A

<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> USMC Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Quantico, VA 22134-5068	<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b> N/A
--	--

<b>9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>	<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b> Dr. Lon Strauss, LTC Terje Bruoeygard
	<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b> N/A

**12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**  
Approved for public release, distribution unlimited.

**13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES**

**14. ABSTRACT**  
The severe winter conditions of 1950-51 on the Korean Peninsula shocked X Corps as it contended with the intervention of Chinese Communist Forces. Major General Oliver. P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division and his subordinate commanders demonstrated that the cold weather environment required deliberate and meticulous decision making, an appreciation of the special logistical challenges, and a command presence characterized by leadership from the front shown by Marines and Soldiers throughout X Corps. Military professionals today should absorb these cold weather leadership lessons in concert with related and equally important considerations such as the enemy, terrain, civilians, and information environment.

**15. SUBJECT TERMS**  
Cold Weather Environment; Leadership; X Corps; Logistics; Major General Oliver P. Smith.

<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			USMC Command and Staff College
Unclass	Unclass	Unclass	UU	40	<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code)</b> (703) 784-3330 (Admin Office)

*United States Marine Corps  
Command and Staff College  
Marine Corps University  
2076 South Street  
Marine Corps Combat Development Command  
Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068*

MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

---

---

**TITLE: Cold, Hard Truths: Leadership Lessons from Korea, 1950**

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT  
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  
MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

**AUTHOR: Major Robert A. Wells, USMC**

AY 2018-19

---

---

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Dr. Lon Strauss, PhD

Approved:  \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 5 April 2019

Mentor and Oral Defense Committee Member: Lieutenant Colonel Terje Bruøygaard, NOR Army

Approved:  \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 5 April 2019

Oral Defense Committee Member: Lieutenant Colonel Michael Byrne, USMC

Approved:  \_\_\_\_\_

Date: 5 April 2019

## Executive Summary

**Title:** Cold, Hard Truths: Leadership Lessons from Korea, 1950

**Author:** Major Robert A. Wells, United States Marine Corps

**Thesis:** Major General Oliver. P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division and his subordinate commanders demonstrated that the cold weather environment required deliberate and meticulous decision making, an appreciation of the special logistical challenges, and a command presence characterized by leadership from the front shown by Marines and Soldiers throughout X Corps. Military professionals today should absorb these cold weather leadership lessons in concert with related and equally important considerations such as the enemy, terrain, civilians, and information environment.

**Discussion:** The severe winter conditions of 1950-51 shocked planners, troops, and commanders as United Nations forces contended with the onslaught of Chinese Communist Forces. X Corps, a joint USA-USMC command consisting of the 1st Marine Division, 3rd Infantry Division, and 7th Infantry Division with Republic of Korea troop augmentation, faced the brunt of the cold in November of 1950 after landing in northeast Korea. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, commander of all UN forces on the Korean peninsula, directed X Corps to drive to the Yalu River as part of a grand strategy to support the 8th Army's seizure of Pyongyang and bring the war to a speedy conclusion before the end of the year. Major General Edward M. Almond, commander of X Corps, fully embraced this intent in his aggressive approach; however, it was mismatched with the unforgiving cold weather conditions. Major General Smith of the 1st Marine Division embraced a more deliberate, meticulous approach to leadership and decision making that, while at odds with his commander's overall intent, was entirely appropriate for the environment. His cautiousness while carrying out his orders allowed his division to overcome a numerically superior enemy under conditions of extreme cold. Smith and subordinate commanders made key decisions that locally prioritized logistical considerations over those of speed and tempo. Finally, across X Corps, commanders led from the front demonstrating decisive presence in the face of cold weather conditions that physically, mentally, and morally inhibited troops.

**Conclusion:** The cold weather leadership themes of Korea in 1950 are relevant for military leaders facing the cold weather environment today. Aspiring cold weather leaders should take time to analyze the deliberate, meticulous decision making and appreciation for logistics demonstrated by Major General Smith, as well as the enhanced presence and forward leadership displayed throughout X Corps.

## DISCLAIMER

THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT.

QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE.

*Table of Contents*

	Page
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .....	i
DISCLAIMER .....	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
PREFACE.....	iv
THESIS, DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS .....	1
APPENDIX A (MAPS) .....	34
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	37

## *Preface*

The Chosin Reservoir Campaign is well known in the United States military, particularly within the Marine Corps, where the story has become legendary and a key component of the Marine ethos. However, my inspiration for this thesis was the humble yet forceful leadership of Major General Oliver P. Smith, who in my opinion, is perhaps less exalted in the annals of the Marine Corps than some of the more readily recognizable combat leaders. I wanted to look at the campaign through the lens of leadership in the context of cold weather operations, which have become relevant today as the United States faces national security challenges in the Arctic. While this paper focuses on Smith and the 1st Marine Division, it also brings in experiences from US Army units to provide a more inclusive basis for leadership analysis. In this paper I have not addressed leadership within the Chinese Communist Forces.

I would not have completed this project without the constant guidance and expertise of Dr. Lon Strauss and Lieutenant Colonel Terje Bruøygaard, Norwegian Army, who I was lucky enough to have as my assigned mentors. Dr. Jim Ginther and the staff at the Archives Branch, Marine Corps History Division were immensely helpful guiding me to and accessing primary sources from the Korean War. I am also grateful to my father, Major Edward F. Wells, USMC (ret.), for reading all my drafts and providing valuable feedback. Finally, I am thankful to my wife, Erin Wells, who also proofread my drafts and provided unrelenting support throughout the whole process.

In November of 1950, US troops north of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel on the Korean Peninsula faced unexpected and unprecedented cold weather conditions. While there had been some American soldiers who were Second World War veterans of the winter conditions in the Italian Apennines or the Ardennes Forest during the renowned Battle of the Bulge, no previous experience could have prepared them for the subzero dry-cold that poured out of Siberia, through Manchuria, and into the rugged mountainous terrain of North Korea. The 7th Marines Annex to the 1st Marine Division Special Action Report described the rapid deterioration of conditions: “During the afternoon and night of 10-11 November, the temperature dropped sharply from approximately plus 32 to minus 8 and a wind of approximately thirty knots whipped up. The initial shock of subzero temperature stunned personnel and over 200 turned-in for medical treatment.”<sup>1</sup> That was only the beginning of the harsh conditions that characterized the X Corps experience in and around the Changjin Reservoir, more popularly known as the Chosin Reservoir Campaign.

Today, as the United States military considers the emerging threats as North Korea, China, and Russia (listed in the most recent National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy) a simple look at geography reveals the increased probability of US troops deploying in cold weather conditions. It is prudent, therefore, to glance back in history to the last time that the US military maneuvered on a large scale in the cold. That was in the North Korean winter of 1950-51. The military historian S. L. A. Marshall wrote of the Chosin campaign: “it provided one of the best opportunities for the study of the effects of extreme cold on men, weapons and

---

<sup>1</sup> Appendix No. 3 to Annex Roger Roger of the 1st Marine Division FMF Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, 79-RR.

other equipment under actual combat conditions, of any American battle in modern times.”<sup>2</sup>

After their experiences, the Army and Marine Corps synthesized lessons learned into doctrine and tactics written into modern publications. While this practical information is readily available and vital for troops preparing to deploy today, it is just as important to analyze the less tangible aspects of leadership and decision making in the cold weather environment. X Corps’s experience during the Chosin Reservoir Campaign offers leadership lessons to current military leaders facing combat in cold weather conditions that are difficult to simulate in training centers across the United States. Major General Oliver P. Smith of the 1st Marine Division and his subordinate commanders demonstrated that the cold weather environment required deliberate and meticulous decision making, an appreciation of the special logistical challenges, and a command presence characterized by leadership from the front shown by Marines and Soldiers throughout X Corps. Military professionals today should absorb these cold weather leadership lessons in concert with related and equally important considerations such as the enemy, terrain, civilians, and information environment.

Deliberate, meticulous decision making is not always appreciated. Cautiousness can quickly become equated with timidity, lack of force, or at worst, cowardice. The Army and Marine Corps have rewarded aggressiveness, boldness, and violence of action as reinforced by current doctrine in MCDP 1 *Warfighting*. Leaders are expected to out-cycle the enemy decision making process.<sup>3</sup> Once a commander makes a decision, so long as he or she issues a lawful order, Marines should carry it out with enthusiasm, ownership, and without delay. The cold

---

<sup>2</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, Notes by Lieutenant General OP Smith on Operations of 1st Marine Division During the First 9 Months of the Korean War, Oliver P. Smith Papers, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 1208.

<sup>3</sup> “In general, whoever can make and implement decisions consistently faster gains a tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decision-making in execution thus becomes a time-competitive problem, and timeliness of decisions becomes essential in generating tempo.” – MCDP 1 *Warfighting*, 85.



weather environment, however, created a special situation for field leaders in Korea as fall began to turn into winter in 1950. The situation became one where decision making had to incorporate the numerous considerations for fighting in the cold or suffer the consequences. In contrast to the aggressive speed and tempo of Commander, Far East Command, General of the Army Douglas A. MacArthur, and X Corps commander, Major General Edward M. Almond, the more cautious decision making of Smith was better suited to the punishing cold weather conditions that, along with the Chinese Communist Forces, nearly destroyed the First Marine Division (1st MARDIV).

MacArthur's design to land X Corps at Wonsan was aggressive considering the terrain and impending North Korean winter, placing pressure on leaders to move quickly north to the Yalu River. It is important to understand the context of this decision at the strategic and operational levels. First, the strategic envelopment at Inchon in September of 1950, the amphibious assault that virtually all of MacArthur's planners had told him was impossible, had been an overwhelming success, enabling the capture of Seoul and the destruction of most North Korean forces south of the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel. The success of Inchon against all odds only further magnified MacArthur's prestige and swagger, silencing voices of dissent from the Pentagon, MacArthur's staff, and his subordinates.<sup>4</sup> As MacArthur gave guidance to his planners, he considered another successful amphibious operation at Wonsan would open up a port that nearby Japan could easily sustain.<sup>5</sup> Despite the known logistical challenges of Northeast Korea, the plan met no resistance from the Pentagon.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup> Stanley Weintraub, *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero* (New York: The Free Press, 2000), 204.

<sup>5</sup> James F. Schnabel, *U.S. Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction, The First Year* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1992), 191.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

Second, MacArthur sent X Corps to Wonsan on the east side of Korea in October of 1950 as support to the 8th Army's seizure of Pyongyang, in an attempt to place the North Koreans in the jaws of a pincer.<sup>7</sup> In the words of Almond, the movement of X Corps to Northeast Korea was dual-purposed: "one was to provide tactical flank maneuver to assist the Eighth Army in its effort to capture Pyongyang, the enemy capital; and the other, to relieve further burdening of the Eighth Army with the supply of X Corps."<sup>8</sup> However, by the end of October 1950 the advance of 8th Army on Pyongyang was successful enough to no longer warrant help from X Corps, and by the time 1st MARDIV finally landed at Wonsan on 26 October after a multi-week mine-clearing delay, they had received orders to advance north to the Yalu River.<sup>9</sup> MacArthur believed that if he could secure key crossing sites on the Yalu, he would be able to de-legitimize the North Korean regime's offensive, prevent the entry of China into hostilities, and end the war rapidly.<sup>10</sup>

Third, MacArthur misunderstood and downplayed the presence of Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in North Korea. He was aware of China's warning to its Indian ambassador of CCF intervention if UN forces crossed the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel during the 15 October conference with President Truman on Wake Island, and assessed that the Chinese would not cross the Yalu because of the overwhelming presence of US airpower.<sup>11</sup> Reports on the ground of Chinese troops throughout the second half of October and into November were inconclusive about whether they were volunteers in North Korean uniforms or regular CCF, feeding into

---

<sup>7</sup> Roy E. Appleman, *Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1990), 3.

<sup>8</sup> Lieutenant General Edward M. Almond, "Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950 – 31 December 1951" (speech, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1951), The Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 15-16.

<sup>9</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 384.

<sup>10</sup> Shelby L. Stanton, *America's Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Novato, CA: Presido, 1989), 168.

<sup>11</sup> Brigadier General Edward M. Simmons, *Frozen Chosin: U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoir* (Washington, DC: US Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002), 7.

MacArthur's rosy assessment and confidence.<sup>12</sup> Combined, these factors drove an aggressive operational plan in the face of an impending North Korean winter. X Corps' delayed landing at Wonsan and Iwon made contending with winter increasingly probable, yet this was eclipsed by an overly optimistic "home by Christmas" momentum.<sup>13</sup>

The X Corps Commander fully embraced the aggressive approach in his planning, decision-making, and execution of MacArthur's intent. Almond was frequently annoyed with what he perceived to be his subordinates' and peers' timidity and over-cautious action. This was a recurrent theme that began with the landing at Inchon and seizure of Seoul, when he pressed Smith to achieve his objectives faster and chided him for not meeting timelines.<sup>14</sup> As X Corps conducted its amphibious landing at Wonsan in late October, the pace of the Navy's mine clearance operations frustrated Almond, causing him to lash out at the Amphibious Task Force Commander, Admiral James Doyle.<sup>15</sup> When X Corps finally landed, Almond's intent was to advance to the Yalu through multiple axes of advance through the mountainous Taebaek range.

In the words of historian Shelby Stanton:

He envisioned moving X Corps northward in a broad fan-like advance against melting North Korean Resistance. While regimental task forces would be separated beyond mutual supporting range, their exposed flanks would be safeguarded from overland counterattack by momentum, the nature of the difficult terrain, and enemy disorganization.<sup>16</sup>

In Almond's view, the rugged mountains presented more difficulty to the enemy, in their ability to mount resistance and coordinate attacks, than to friendly maneuver. He assumed a short and decisive campaign.

---

<sup>12</sup> US Army Center of Military History, *Korea 1950* (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1997), 153.

<sup>13</sup> Richard W. Stewart, *Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, 1950* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, CSI, 1991), 2.

<sup>14</sup> Hampton Sides, *On Desperate Ground: The Marines at the Reservoir, The Korean War's Greatest Battle*. (New York: Doubleday, 2018), 42.

<sup>15</sup> Stanton, 153-154.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid*, 169.

When elements of the 7th Infantry Division on the far northeastern flank of X Corps reached the Yalu River, this seemed to validate Almond's approach. Landing three days after the 1st MARDIV at Iwon unopposed, the 17th Infantry Regiment hurried northward meeting limited North Korean resistance, which led to optimism and unrealistic expectations about bringing the war to a speedy end.<sup>17</sup> The Army experienced cold weather challenges to include icy serpentine roads and a frigid crossing of the Ungi river in subzero temperatures, which resulted in the following non-combat casualties: 1 killed, 6 wounded, and 18 out of action for frostbite.<sup>18</sup> Nevertheless, lead elements of the 17th Infantry Regiment reached the banks of the Yalu by 21 November, prompting MacArthur to praise Almond saying:

The fact that only twenty days ago this division landed amphibiously over the beaches of Iwon and advanced 200 miles over tortuous mountain terrain and fought successfully against a determined foe in subzero weather will be recorded in history as an outstanding military achievement.<sup>19</sup>

This early success validated Almond's approach, at least towards the beginning of X Corps' deployment to northeast Korea. However, X Corps units were dispersed across hundreds of miles of cold, mountainous terrain as seen in figure 1.0 of Appendix A. The accomplishment of US Army units reaching the Yalu also made Smith's comparatively slower advance look less favorable in the eyes of his Corps Commander. For Smith and the 1st MARDIV, a race to the Yalu was mismatched with the reality of cold weather warfare that they believed they would face that late in the year. The terrain of the Taebek mountains in the 1st MARDIV sector and the deteriorating weather later in the month of November presented a graver problem.

---

<sup>17</sup> Roy Appleman, *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, U.S. Army, 1992), 732-33.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 735.

<sup>19</sup> General MacArthur to Major General Almond, *Ibid*, 736-37.

Smith's well-known letter to General Clifton B. Cates, Commandant of the Marine Corps at the time, highlighted his concern for Almond's decision-making and operational approach. In the letter dated 15 November 1950, Smith noted that "there is a continual splitting of units and assignment of missions to small units which put them out on a limb. This method of operating appears to be general in Korea. I am convinced that many of their set-backs here have been caused by this disregard for integrity of units and of the time space factor."<sup>20</sup> While the 7th Division embraced this approach and propelled its elements to the banks of the Yalu, it was not the case for the 1st MARDIV. Almond's sacrifice of mass for speed and tempo contrasted with Smith's slower, more methodical approach that caused the two commanders to clash throughout the Chosin Campaign.

The first part of Smith's deliberate measures involved recognizing that his troops were not prepared mentally or physically for a cold weather campaign and doing everything he could to prepare them for the shock. Very few of the regulars among the Marines had any kind of cold weather service since the Marines' contribution to the Second World War was predominantly in the tropical climate of the Pacific. Some Marines had participated in cold weather operations, such as Smith himself as a Battalion Commander during the 1st Marine Brigade's 1941 occupation of Iceland. The British strategically sent Royal Marines to occupy Iceland in order to secure weather stations and protect North Atlantic sea lanes. Prior to the United States' entry into the war, the British requested relief to free up forces to fight in Europe; therefore, President Roosevelt sent the 1st Marine Brigade as a gesture of support.<sup>21</sup> Hardly tactical cold weather training, during the winter of 1941 the Marines mostly stayed indoors conducting academic

---

<sup>20</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith to General Clifford Cates, 15 November 1950, in Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives.

<sup>21</sup> Clifton La Bree, *The Gentle Warrior* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 9.

instruction to pass the dark months.<sup>22</sup> More recently, a handful had participated in Operation NORAMEX in Labrador in 1949.<sup>23</sup> This exercise, again, did little to school the Marines in the realities of cold weather warfare as it was a combined US-Canadian amphibious landing conducted on the coast of Labrador in October.<sup>24</sup> Unit leaders identified these Marines with cold weather experience as the readily available subject matter experts, however, the milder climates were quite different from the Siberian blast of subzero conditions within which they had to shoot, move, and communicate. Smith had to assume a non-existent baseline of cold weather experience within his division that helped frame how he went about preparing them.

Given the limited amount of time and resources available, Smith put forth a concerted effort to prepare his inexperienced troops for the cold in coordination with available Army experience within X Corps. On the 13th of November, he issued Division Training Bulletins 38-50 and 39-50. The first document, “Cold Weather Indoctrination,” outlined a plan for a small mobile training team from the Army to “acquaint all personnel with the techniques involved in the proper use of cold weather clothing and equipment which has been issued or will be issued to units.”<sup>25</sup> The second document, titled “Cold Weather Survival Training Program,” provided Marines rudimentary tips on preventing cold weather injuries and charged small unit leaders with providing at least two hours of training and implementing preventive measures such as sock-exchanges and troop rotations.<sup>26</sup> While two hours of training seems like hardly enough, Marines executed these programs while fighting the Chinese whom they came into contact with shortly

---

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>23</sup> Appendix No. 3 to Annex Roger Roger of the 1st Marine Division FMF Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January, 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 78-RR.

<sup>24</sup> “Joint United-States-Canadian Operation NORAMEX 1949” *Polar Record* 6, no. 41 (1951): 102.

<sup>25</sup> Division Training Bulletin 38-50, “Cold Weather Indoctrination”, 13 November 1950, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives.

<sup>26</sup> Division Training Bulletin 39-50, “Cold Weather Survival Training Program”, 26 November 1950, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives.

after disembarking. Ironically, the documents mandated that all the elements of the Division except for the Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) train from 24 November through 1 December when the Division was in its heaviest combat during its breakout and fighting withdrawal.<sup>27</sup> As a result, these measures had limited effectiveness and ultimately became hasty “hip-pocket” classes at the discretion of the small unit leader.<sup>28</sup> Even with these measures, the 5th Marines Special Action Report noted “During the period experienced, it became apparent that the lack of cold weather training among officers and enlisted men contributed greatly to the high non-battle casualty toll.”<sup>29</sup> This hasty training was not unique or free-standing within the 1st MARDIV. The Marines relied on Army quartermaster cold weather indoctrination teams furnished by X Corps to implement their training plan.<sup>30</sup> Nevertheless, the recognition of the problem and top-down planning from Smith and his staff reflected that they were factoring in cold weather considerations to decision making.

The second aspect of Smith’s deliberate approach was his insistence on maintaining a consolidated Division to the extent possible given his mission. As early as 7 November the Division had RCTs spread out across 170 miles, with RCT 7, the furthest north at Chinhung-ni, already beginning to experience the combined onslaught of cold and Chinese attacks.<sup>31</sup> During a conference with his Corps Commander, Smith wrote “my recommendation was that during the winter we commit ourselves only to holding enough terrain to provide for the security of Wonsan, Hamhung, and Hungnam, but this not involve an attempt to hold positions on the

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Appendix No. 3 to Annex Roger Roger of the 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 78-RR.

<sup>29</sup> Annex Charlie to Fifth Marines Special Action Report for 7 October to 15 December 1950, 17 February 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 27.

<sup>30</sup> Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 1216.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid, 552.

plateau north of Chinghung-ni.”<sup>32</sup> Figure 2.0 in Appendix A shows the vastness of the 1st MARDIV area of operations. While General Almond was temporarily amenable to this idea as the 8th Army ran into trouble during its seizure of Pyongyang, by 10 November X Corps reiterated the order to drive to the Yalu.<sup>33</sup> Smith complied, but continued to control the advance. In Smith’s own words:

The advance of RCT 7 was methodical, but it was so planned. The Division and the Regiment were concerned over the vulnerability of the MSR to both the enemy and the weather. The advance was kept at a slow pace in order to build up supplies and give the Division an opportunity to move additional troops behind RCT-7.<sup>34</sup>

Writer Hampton Sides, author of the recent book *On Desperate Ground*, noted that Smith keenly recognized the intelligence unknowns, including Chinese troop numbers, harsh terrain, and cold weather, were creating a “trap” which could easily destroy his entire division similar to the destruction of Napoleon’s Army in Russia in 1812.<sup>35</sup> In *Breakout*, a history of the campaign, author Martin Russ wrote, “Reluctant to commit his troops to a winter campaign he was logistically unprepared to fight, and faced with unrealistic demands from X Corps, Smith had slowed the Marine advance to the point of insubordination.”<sup>36</sup> Since Smith’s actions could easily have gotten him relieved, he showed great moral courage in standing by his approach in the face of pressure from higher headquarters.

Aggressiveness and initiative in military leaders were not mutually exclusive from the meticulous decision making required in the cold weather environment. Subordinate commanders across X Corps no doubt possessed aggressive and driven leadership characteristics. The Commanding Officer of the 7th Marines, Colonel Homer Litzenberg had a reputation for

---

<sup>32</sup> Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 552.

<sup>33</sup> Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 553.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid, 576-77.

<sup>35</sup> Sides, *On Desperate Ground*, 116.

<sup>36</sup> Martin Russ, *Breakout* (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), 62.



toughness, impatience, and ruthlessly high expectations of performance, describing himself to one of his new officers as a “hard taskmaster.”<sup>37</sup> Upon learning of the magnitude of the Chinese intervention, he brought all his officers and staff noncommissioned officers (NCOs) together in early November and impressed upon them the importance of decisively winning the first engagement of what very well might be World War III.<sup>38</sup> Nevertheless, even he recognized the importance of caution in the face of the challenges posed by an unknown enemy and the cold weather environment. As RCT 7, the lead element of the Division, pushed north of Chinghung-ni onto the high plateau of the Chosin Reservoir, Litzenberg sent out a reconnaissance patrol consisting of volunteers from his three battalions.<sup>39</sup> When asked how he selected the officer to lead the patrol, he included in his reply, “I place great stress on officers being careful. An officer can be aggressive and still be careful, and husband his men... There is a big difference between aggressiveness and simple foolhardiness.”<sup>40</sup> This drives home the point that there is a time and place for rapid action, though it should be tempered with a cautiousness that is especially cued to the conditions of enemy, terrain, and, especially so, to the severe cold.

It is apparent that from the start of X Corps’ deployment to northeast Korea, leaders had to contend with top-down pressure from MacArthur to race to the Yalu under the auspices of a speedy conclusion to the war. Almond fully embraced this guidance. His directed speed and tempo saw some success as elements of the 7th Division reached the Yalu; however, this only eclipsed the reality of impending cold weather conditions. Army and Marine leaders demonstrated a deliberate effort to prepare their troops for the shock through hastily executed

---

<sup>37</sup> Bob Drury and Tom Clavin, *The Last Stand of Fox Company* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009), 26.

<sup>38</sup> Martin Russ, *Breakout*, 25.

<sup>39</sup> Transcript of Interview with Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, 27-30 April and 10 July 1951, Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 39.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid*, 39-40.

training, but it proved too little, too late. Smith's cautiousness and slower, deliberate decision making in the face of pressure from above allowed his division to adjust to the cold weather environment and prepare for the consequences of CCF intervention.<sup>41</sup>

Deliberate and meticulous decision making goes hand-in-hand with the proper application of logistics. The decisions and leadership of commanders within X Corps throughout the campaign reflected an appreciation for the unique logistical challenges of the cold weather environment. As explored earlier, the Marines and Soldiers were for the most part mentally, physically, and materially unprepared for the severe cold weather conditions that struck in mid-November on the plateau north of Chinghung-ni, so it was a quick and harsh education made easier for those with an acumen for logistics. While logistics is vital in all kinds of military operations, it is especially so in the cold weather environment. The Division Special Action Reports were rife with notes and recommendations on the effects of the cold on vehicles, weapons, communications equipment, materiel, and the human body. It was all-resource consuming, especially taxing on those things which helped sustain human survival in combat such as food, clothing, water, and ammunition. For example, an excerpt from the 7<sup>th</sup> Marines Special Action Report described in a snapshot the logistical considerations leaders had to contend with:

This regiment was faced with the problems of mountain warfare made more complex by the extreme cold which was encountered. Water, rations, and ammunition had to be carried from dumps located at the base of hills to the top...Snow found its way into recesses, ports, and receivers of weapons and froze...Base plates of mortars bent and warped as a result of heavy firing and continued exposure to temperatures of from -10 to -20 degrees.<sup>42</sup>

---

<sup>41</sup> William B. Hopkins, *One Bugle, No Drums* (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1986), 93-94.

<sup>42</sup> Appendix No. 3 to Annex Roger Roger of the 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 80-RR.

Decisions surrounding logistics were critical for the survival of the 1st MARDIV and contributed greatly to the successful breakout and fighting retrograde to Hungnam. These prudent decisions are therefore key aspects of leadership that is important to understand when operating in the cold weather environment.

Logistics had been omnipresent in the minds of Smith and his staff ever since their landing in Wonsan on the east side of Korea. Smith wrote to Cates on 15 November, “What concerns me considerably is my ability to supply two RCTs in the mountains in winter weather... .”<sup>43</sup> A significant portion of the letter is a physical network analysis of Northeast Korea noting deficiencies in the railroads, cableways, and roads as well as the impact of the winter weather on all of them.<sup>44</sup> He identified early on in the letter the need for engineering support and an expeditionary airstrip for both sustainment and the evacuation of the inevitable casualties.<sup>45</sup> Although credit must also go to his logistics staff section, clearly Smith held a high regard for logistics and kept it in his mind while making decisions.

In order to operate effectively, Smith, his staff, and subordinate commanders recognized the requirement for the establishment of incremental supply dumps to support the Division’s advance north. This was a coordinated effort between the Division and RCT logistics sections. Commanders made logistical decisions issuing very specific orders directing action to facilitate the buildup of supplies. The 7th Marines Special Action report noted: “On 14 November, the CO directed that 5 days Class I and III and 1 ½ U/F (units of fire) would be maintained at all times in the RCT dumps. This was carried out but was a considerable burden to all supply personnel due to the transportation difficulties and numerous and rapid displacement of the

---

<sup>43</sup> Letter from Major General OP Smith to General Clifford Cates, 15 November 1950, Oliver P. Smith Papers, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

RCT.”<sup>46</sup> Smith made the command decision to push the service battalion behind RCT 7, the lead element of the Division as it advanced north.<sup>47</sup> This enabled the RCTs to draw supplies needed for finite portions of their advance, however, Colonel Litzenberg noted “each time we stopped, as at Chinhung-ni and Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri, we built up additional supplies before moving forward again.”<sup>48</sup> This approach was slow-moving and burdensome. Yet, it was prudent when considering the resource-draining North Korean winter and the magnitude of CCF attacks. Troops burned more calories in the cold and requirements for all classes of supply increased, especially regarding the maintenance of heavy equipment (lubricants, fuel, and batteries).<sup>49</sup> In 1950, the metric for food consumption was 1.5 times the regular number of rations to cover over 5,000 calories a day.<sup>50</sup> Smith and his RCT commanders understood this and incorporated it into their decision making as best they could in the circumstances.

Smith’s logistical conscientiousness ultimately led him to make a critical decision: the establishment and defense of a logistics node at Hagaru-ri. Smith identified early on that the Division required certain critical capabilities related to logistics. It required the ability to distribute supplies and sustain battalions that were separated by snowy, rugged mountain ridgelines as well as conduct casualty evacuation given the high number of non-battle casualties. These capabilities were all the more important when X Corps issued Operations Order 7-50 on 25 November that directed the Division to “seize Mupyong-ni and to advance to the Yalu River

---

<sup>46</sup> Annex Roger Roger to the 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 40-RR.

<sup>47</sup> Transcript of Interview with Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, 27-30 April and 10 July 1951, Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 36.

<sup>48</sup> Transcript of Interview with Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, 27-30 April and 10 July 1951, Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 36.

<sup>49</sup> Annex Xray Xray, Cold Weather Operations, 1st MarDiv Special Action Report, Phase II (Advance Copy), 3 February 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 12-14.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

destroying the enemy in zone.”<sup>51</sup> This order was significant because the attack to the west thrust X Corps and the 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV further out on a limb, deeper into the Taebaek mountains and into colder conditions at higher elevations to the north. It also meant that the Division had to seize Yudam-ni on the western side of the Reservoir which Smith directed in Division Operation Order 24-50, “RCT-7 was ordered to seize and secure Yudam-ni without delay. When passed through by RCT-5, the Regiment was to protect the Division Main Supply Route from Sinhung-ni to Yudam-ni...”<sup>52</sup> Once again, Smith displayed his consciousness of logistics to protect the Main Supply Route (MSR). This thrust to the west and any follow-on operations required the logistics node at Hagaru-ri to provide adequate sustainment.

In order to ensure that Hagaru-ri could best support the Division with the approaching winter, Smith made another key decision regarding the organization of his logistics. On 19 November, he established a “Supply Regulating Station,” putting the CO of his Service Battalion in charge and detaching a Motor Transport Battalion from RCT 7 to fall under his control.<sup>53</sup> Although this contributed to the semi-permanence of Hagaru-ri and slowed the advance north, it allowed the Division to conduct push-logistics to its RCTs and controlled the flow of supplies and casualty evacuations on the limited number of MSRs. It also gave the Division a pool of general support trucks, centralizing control of distribution. In an environment where RCTs were fighting for their own survival against both the cold and CCF attacks, this lifted the burden off subordinate commanders and their logistics staff sections (S-4s), as well as gave the Division commander the ability to redistribute critical resources. It also enabled the build-up of supplies

---

<sup>51</sup> 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 54.

<sup>52</sup> 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 55.

<sup>53</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 614-15.

at Hagaru-ri that compensated for the lack of air drop capacity in the poor winter weather. Smith later noted, “Air drop did not have the capability of supplying a Marine division in combat...What gave us some cushion was the fact that with our own transportation, before the roads were cut, we had built up at Hagaru-ri a level of six days rations and two units of fire.”<sup>54</sup> Smith’s organization of the logistics node inside Hagaru-ri reflected his great understanding and acumen for operational logistics and kept his Division tactically effective in the cold weather environment against relentless CCF attacks.

Smith’s decision to carve an expeditionary airstrip out of the frozen conditions was key to establishing a logistics base of operations at Hagaru-ri. One solution to sustaining the Division in the mountainous terrain in winter with limited MSR’s was air drop. Marines advocated for this relatively new capability in the 1st MARDIV Cold Weather Operations Annex arguing, “more emphasis should be placed on this method of logistical support in cold weather doctrine.”<sup>55</sup> Marines and Soldiers used air drop extensively throughout the campaign with aircraft from Japan. However, Soldiers and Marines quickly figured out it had its limitations due to weather and accuracy. As Smith noted in his letter to Commandant Cates on 15 November, “Air drop in winter is not a feasible means of supplying two RCTs. Moreover, it will not provide for evacuation.”<sup>56</sup> The next day on 16 November, OP Smith and the commander of the 1st Marine Air Wing, Major General Field Harris, conducted a site survey in the vicinity of Hagaru-ri determining that the flat ground, though consisting of soil that was loose and marshy under warmer conditions, was sufficient for an airstrip in the subzero conditions of the Chosin

---

<sup>54</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Extracts from Letter to General Clifford B. Cates, 5 Jan 1951, Oliver P. Smith Papers, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 8.

<sup>55</sup> Annex Xray Xray, Cold Weather Operations, 1st MarDiv Special Action Report, Phase II (Advance Copy), 3 February 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 18.

<sup>56</sup> Letter from Major General OP Smith to General Clifford Cates, 15 November 1950, Oliver P. Smith Papers, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives.

Reservoir.<sup>57</sup> The Division's 1st Engineer Battalion immediately set to work constructing the airstrip in a period of eleven days, enabling the first landing of a C-47 on 1 December and the evacuation of sixty casualties.<sup>58</sup> Prioritizing the construction of an airstrip at Hagaru-ri was another example of Smith's understanding of the unique logistical challenges that the harrowing cold weather conditions presented. It also enabled him to address the growing problem of mounting non-battle and combat casualties.

The way in which Smith handled the evacuation of casualties was a subset of his appreciation for logistics. Despite the Division's best efforts in preparing and training the Marines with the resources available at the time, the cold weather conditions inevitably produced a high number of non-battle casualties (NBCs). For example, when examining the strength reporting from RCT 7 by 28 November 1950, the number of cumulative NBCs broke 600, the majority from frostbite and trench-foot.<sup>59</sup> These NBCs, coupled with casualties as a result of the Chinese (also breaking 600 by the same date), produced a grim situation for the Division commander and forced him to make key decisions. By 30 November, X Corps had already issued orders to cease the offensive; General Almond authorized the destruction of equipment to hasten the breakout and retrograde to Hamhung.<sup>60</sup>

Smith's response to the orders reflected the great priority he placed on casualty evacuation: "I told him that my movements would be governed by my ability to evacuate the wounded, that I would have to fight my way back and could not afford to discard equipment, and

---

<sup>57</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 614.

<sup>58</sup> First Marine Division Historical Diary for December 1950, 5 April 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 2.

<sup>59</sup> Annex Roger Roger to 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 36-RR.

<sup>60</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, Extracts from Letter to General Clifford B. Cates, 5 Jan 1951, Oliver P. Smith Papers, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives, 5.

that, therefore I intended to bring out the bulk of my equipment.”<sup>61</sup> In S. L. A. Marshall’s previously classified 1951 report on the campaign, he noted that “It was ordered that no vehicle be left which might be capable of salvage; any wrecked vehicle could be abandoned only on the permission of the senior commander present.”<sup>62</sup> Smith’s response to Almond’s orders regarding the destruction of equipment showed first, that he regarded casualty evacuation as a critical task at the expense of speed and tempo, and second, that he valued every piece of working equipment as vital to sustaining his force through the brutal conditions. The able-bodied marched, while the dead or wounded rode on all available vehicles at the speed of the slowest infantryman.

The number of casualties Smith was able to evacuate via air transport from Hagaru-ri following the first successful landing of an aircraft on 1 December was truly remarkable. On 2 December, a succession of aircraft lifted 919 casualties, mostly from the Army’s 7th Infantry Division on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir.<sup>63</sup> On 4 and 5 December, 1000 and 1400 casualties respectively were evacuated, including the dead, from RCTs 5 and 7.<sup>64</sup> None of this could have been possible without Smith’s decision to establish an airstrip at Hagaru-ri and his prioritization of the care of casualties. Smith noted that this care was not just his own, but extended to his subordinate commanders, “Credit must go to the troop commanders whose determination and self-sacrifice made it possible to get the wounded out....”<sup>65</sup> Casualty evacuation was a component of logistics that did not directly relate to the destruction of the enemy at hand, yet weighed heavily on the morale of the troops and their trust in their leadership. Additionally, for those casualties that could return to duty, an effective casualty evacuation plan

---

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>62</sup> S.L.A. Marshall, “1951, CCF in the Attack” in *One Bugle, No Drums* by William B. Hopkins (Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1986), 260.

<sup>63</sup>S.L.A. Marshall, “1951, CCF in the Attack”, 7.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.



helped to support manpower levels in theater. As the Chosin campaign portrayed, cold weather operations forced the commander to contend with a wicked combination of battle and non-battle casualties, ambulatory and non-ambulatory.

Smith's decisions and actions suggest that he envisioned the logistics node at Hagaru-ri as what Clausewitz defined as a center of gravity, "the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."<sup>66</sup> One way in which this was evident was the great weight he placed on defending Hagaru-ri when surrounded by the Chinese 58th Division. The situation by the end of November had worsened to the point that the Division was broken into four defensive perimeters isolated from one another by CCF roadblocks: RCT 5 and 7 out to the west in the vicinity of Yudam-ni, a single infantry company (F 2/7) holding the Toktong Pass, the Division Headquarters at Hagaru-ri, and Colonel Lewis B. "Chesty" Puller's RCT 1 at Koto-ri (see figure 3.0 in Appendix A).<sup>67</sup> CCF attacks on the night of 28 November nearly over-ran the Division CP and all its logistics at Hagaru-ri. In response, Colonel Puller assembled Task Force Drysdale, a hastily organized unit consisting of Soldiers from the 31st Infantry Regiment, Marines from George Company, 1<sup>st</sup> Marines, Royal Marines from 41 Commando, an attachment of tanks, and various headquarters and service personnel.<sup>68</sup> As the Task Force drove north on 29 November it faced overwhelming resistance from the Chinese who controlled the high ground and established multiple road blocks between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri.<sup>69</sup> Smith became aware of the situation when he made radio contact with Lieutenant Colonel Drysdale, RM. In the words of Bob Harbula who was present on the ground with George Company, "Gen Smith, in view of the dire

---

<sup>66</sup> Carl Von Clausewitz, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, *On War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 595-96.

<sup>67</sup> Clifton La Bree, *The Gentle Warrior: General Oliver Prince Smith, USMC* (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001), 153.

<sup>68</sup> Patrick K O'Donnell, *Give Me Tomorrow* (Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2010), 114-115.

<sup>69</sup> Bob Harbula, *At All Cost*, Bob Harbula Memoir, COLL 4311, US Marine Corps Archives, 18.

straits and urgent need for reinforcements at Hagaru-ri, had little choice and ordered the task force to proceed ‘at all cost.’”<sup>70</sup> When considering the Task Force started out with over 900, it suffered staggering casualties (approximately 162 killed or missing) at a roadblock halfway between Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri known as “Hellfire Valley.”<sup>71</sup> Nearly half of the force never made it into the perimeter (300 staggered back to Koto-ri); however, around 400 British and American Marines ultimately reached Hagaru-ri with 28 tanks.<sup>72</sup> This additional manpower and firepower prevented the CCF from over-running and taking possession of the supply dumps and other logistical resources at Hagaru-ri.<sup>73</sup> Smith’s decision to protect his friendly center of gravity set the conditions for a successful breakout against overwhelming CCF numerical superiority while suffering from the equally devastating adversary of the cold weather environment.

1st MARDIV’s experience in the Korean War exemplified the paramount nature of logistics in cold weather. As the special action reports showed, the weather changed consumption rates, added additional supply considerations, and the high number of non-battle casualties increased the number of troops requiring evacuation. Smith and his subordinate commanders, with the help of their S-4s, demonstrated a keen understanding of these cold weather problems that influenced their critical decisions. That the commander directed logistical actions to include regulation of supply rates, the utilization of dumps, airfield construction, and casualty evacuation gave weight to these decisions and were a function of deliberate and conscientious leadership.

Equally important to the deliberate approach and appreciation for operational logistics in the Chosin Reservoir Campaign was a leadership style that emphasized presence and leadership

---

<sup>70</sup> Ibid, 21.

<sup>71</sup> Simmons, *Frozen Chosin*, 70.

<sup>72</sup> Simmons, 70.

<sup>73</sup> Harbula, *At All Cost*, 33.

from the front. This manifested itself at all levels within X Corps, from Commanding Generals to the squad leaders on the line. The cold weather environment was a great equalizer on the human element; it was indiscriminate in its effects regardless of rank and leadership position. Leaders were out in front, making their presence known in an environment that physically and mentally drained troops, forcing them to “go internal” and lose situational awareness and willpower. Cold weather directly influenced leadership during the Chosin Campaign. As a result, decisions of leaders in 1<sup>st</sup> MARDIV portrayed the significance of presence and leadership from the front.

When the subzero cold first showed up in mid-November, as the Division advanced north towards the Reservoir, the effect was a psychological shock that few had experienced before.

The Regimental Surgeon from RCT 7, Lieutenant Junior Grade Edward George Byrne described the effect:

I noticed when we first moved up on the plateau near Koto-ri (9 Nov.) and met suddenly our first intense cold that there was a shock reaction among many of our men. Throughout the night hundreds of men came to the various aid stations in a condition similar to what you would see of men under terrific mortar or artillery barrage... This was a physical and mental change in these men due to the sharp cold. Some of them even came in sobbing...<sup>74</sup>

Byrne noted that many of these men recovered and acclimatized within a few days; nevertheless, the shock effect demonstrated one problem with which leaders had to contend: how to get men moving who were psychologically incapacitated. The cold was a fatigue-inducing distraction, especially so for those Marines on post in a defensive position or temporarily on halt during a movement. Private First-Class Dean Westberg from B 1/7 described his first night on the line at Hagaru-ri:

---

<sup>74</sup> Transcript of Interview with Lieutenant Junior Grade Edward George Byrne, 4 Jan 1951, Raymond Davis Papers, COLL 2079, US Marine Corps Archives, 20.

The temperature was well below zero. A howling wind blew the snow and cold into the foxhole. We were like cats. You know how cats hate to be out in the wind because they become disoriented; the noise of the wind makes it seem danger is lurking everywhere. That's the way perk and I felt...<sup>75</sup>

This passage demonstrated how the cold magnified feelings of fear and uncertainty within the individual Marine. As a result, troops were disoriented and less alert on the line, requiring clear and visible direction from leadership.

Along with this psychological burden, another challenge was the effect of the cold on communications. In terms of the equipment, the extreme cold drained batteries, made handsets ineffective, and caused wire to turn brittle and unserviceable.<sup>76</sup> This, and problems of line-of-sight in the mountainous terrain, created additional friction for leaders as they conducted operations at times blind to higher headquarters or adjacent units, something not entirely new in the conduct of warfare, but certainly a pervasive theme during the North Korean winter. Simple communications among squad members was also made difficult due to cold weather clothing. In the words of Colonel Litzenberg, "A man wearing his helmet over the hood of his parka can't hear orders that are shouted to him, and just passing the word in the platoon often took a considerable amount of time because the men couldn't hear in the cold, the way they were bundled up."<sup>77</sup> All of these factors together created the condition of having to direct Marines who were heavily fatigued, distracted, and unable to effectively receive orders. This was the leadership challenge met with greater visibility of leaders and a more "hands on" approach with regards to executing both tactical tasks and cold weather survival measures. The mentally and physically absent leader created a vacuum filled by fear, apathy, and inaction.

---

<sup>75</sup> Pfc Dean Westberg B 1/7 in, *The Korean War, An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin*, compiled by Donald Knox (New York: HBJ, 1985), 477-78.

<sup>76</sup> Appendix No. 3 to Annex Roger Roger of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marine Division FMF Special Action Report 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 2809, US Marine Corps Archives, 91-RR.

<sup>77</sup> Transcript of Interview with Colonel Homer Litzenberg, 27-30 April and 10 July 1951, Historical Division, US Marine Corps, 50.

One way in which command presence manifested itself across all levels of leadership was in the fight against the accumulation of non-battle casualties due to frostbite and trench foot. Admittedly, between the landing at Wonsan on 26 October and 15 December 1950, the 1st MARDIV evacuated 1,988 frostbite cases causing the Marine Corps to seriously evaluate its cold weather preparedness in later years.<sup>78</sup> The prevention of cold weather injuries required keen supervision and observation in an environment that isolated men from one another physically and psychologically. The 1st MARDIV cold weather operations annex noted, “Company commanders stated that differences in the physical condition of men by squads could be traced to the activities of the squad leader. More than ever leadership and man management problems are accentuated by the cold weather.”<sup>79</sup> Thus, commanders took measures to carefully inspect their men to the extent that it was possible. For example, Colonel Litzenberg required RCT 7 platoon commanders to certify to their company commanders that socks had been changed within the last 24 hours, as well as requiring everyone to carry extra sets of socks and insoles on their bodies and readily accessible sleeping bags.<sup>80</sup>

However, the reality of near continuous combat with the CCF did influence the extent to which troops could perform cold weather continuing actions. The 1st MARDIV official report on cold weather operations noted that “Tactical situations, which due to heavy and continuous enemy action prevented continuance of measures initially employed, such as warming tents, exchange of clothing, ect. The majority of frostbite cases, estimated at 80%, can be attributed to

---

<sup>78</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, “Cold Weather, Special Report on,” 3 Feb 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 2.

<sup>79</sup> Annex Xray Xray, Cold Weather Operations, 1st MarDiv Special Action Report, Phase II (Advance Copy), 3 February 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 6.

<sup>80</sup> Transcript of Interview with Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, 4 January, 1951, Raymond Davis Papers, COLL 2079, US Marine Corps Archives, 18-19.

these enemy imposed tactical situations.”<sup>81</sup> In other words, most of the cold weather injuries occurred when troops were on the move and engaging the enemy. This does not suggest that small unit leaders were failing at their job of supervising their troops at all times. It does show that individual cold weather continuing actions were more difficult to enforce and fell to the wayside when hotly engaged with the enemy. The lesson was that leaders must be cognizant of this reality. Had the majority of cases been during non-tactical situations, when the time and opportunity were available to conduct preventative measures, then this would have pointed to a lack of small unit leader supervision.

Smith recognized that the result could have been much worse and attributed great credit upon his officers and enlisted leaders, “it is considered that the control and disciplinary measures to prevent undue cold injury under extremely adverse weather and tactical conditions were exercised in a commendable manner...”<sup>82</sup> Although these actions were in line with small unit leader expectations and one interpretation may be that the officers and NCOs were simply “doing their job,” their quiet success in light of the conditions was all the more remarkable and reflected an enhanced leadership presence.

Far from concealing themselves within the depths of their command posts, senior leaders within X Corps were constantly circulating around the area of operations and making their presence known to their men. Throughout the campaign, Smith was constantly on the move, visiting his separated commanders by means of helicopter, a relatively new means of transportation on the battlefield that was riskier in the cold temperatures and high elevations of the Taebaek mountains. When helicopters were unable to takeoff due to weather, he reverted to

---

<sup>81</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, “Cold Weather, Special Report on,” 3 Feb 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 2-3.

<sup>82</sup> Major General Oliver P. Smith, “Cold Weather, Special Report on,” 3 Feb 1951, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 3.

using jeeps on the risky and limited MSRs, which meant it took an entire day to visit a RCT.<sup>83</sup> With X Corps dispersed across a wide swath of northeastern Korea, General Almond was also constantly visiting his subordinate commanders, including both Smith and his RCT commanders in the heart of the action. Although Smith and other subordinates did not hold him in high regard, Almond certainly could not be faulted for lack of enthusiasm and energy.<sup>84</sup> In the deplorable cold weather conditions, it was important for the men to see their leaders out in front and sharing the same misery. Joseph R. Owen, who was a platoon commander in Baker Company 1/7, wrote of his Regimental Commander: “Colonel Litzenberg was no stranger to the forward troops, and he was aware of our fatigue... ‘Litz the Blitz,’ our troops had named our gray-haired, grizzled regimental. We saw him often; he would get out of his jeep and walk our column, chatting with the men.”<sup>85</sup> This type of presence showed genuine concern and was no doubt a morale booster in the face of punishing conditions.

One of the best examples of presence and leadership in face of the cold weather conditions, however, was the case of Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Davis, Commanding Officer of 1/7, while leading his battalion on a night attack to relieve Fox Company 2/7 at the Toktong Pass. Leading by compass over mountain ridgelines in temperatures below -20 degrees, the Commander found himself directing companies and platoons that were on the verge of succumbing to the elements. While physically moving up and down his column, Davis recalled:

Among A Co. I found men already completely exhausted and in a state of collapse. I asked them what outfit they were from and they could not even answer. I’d shake them bodily to try and rouse them and I got my command group to do the same thing. In the course of moving C Co. around I found one platoon that had sat down and it struck me that they were all in a state of a coma.<sup>86</sup>

---

<sup>83</sup> Letter from Major General OP Smith to General Clifford Cates, 15 November 1950, Oliver P. Smith Papers, COLL 213, US Marine Corps Archives.

<sup>84</sup> Sides, *On Desperate Ground*, 124.

<sup>85</sup> Joseph R. Owen, *Colder than Hell* (Canada: Ballantine Books, 1996), 210.

<sup>86</sup> Transcript of Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Davis, 4 January, 1951, Raymond Davis Papers, COLL 2079, US Marine Corps Archives, 20.

The cold and fatigue affected the commander as well; however, Davis mitigated this by having his subordinate commanders repeat and back-brief his own orders multiple times and check his navigational work.<sup>87</sup> This showed that the leader was not immune to the mental and psychological effects of the cold, and it required humility and self-awareness to identify and mitigate this truth. During this ordeal, Owen recalled, “Time had no meaning. We labored through infinite darkness in ghostly clouds of snow over an icy path that rose and fell but seemed to lead nowhere. We saw only the back of the man ahead, a hunched figure in a long, shapeless parka whose every tortured step was an act of will.”<sup>88</sup> This also portrayed how individual Marines felt isolated and beyond mentally fatigued as they proceeded towards Toktong pass. When this occurred, it was even more important for forward leaders to help subordinates overcome the encroaching apathy. Davis gave great credit to his Marines, but his presence, encouragement, and heavy-handed leadership from the front drove the mission forward as he kept them moving through the oppressive cold weather conditions. Davis’ battalion successfully reached and relieved a weary yet defiant Fox 2/7 at the Toktong Pass, an action which earned him the Medal of Honor.

Additionally, Lieutenant Colonel Don Carlos Faith, USA and RCT 31, also known as “Task Force Faith”, displayed these attributes of leadership in cold weather. The Task Force was actually a composite of battalions from the 31st and 32nd Regiments, artillery, anti-aircraft weapons, a tank company, and about 700 Republic of Korea (ROK) soldiers.<sup>89</sup> On the east side of the reservoir only miles from the 1st MARDIV, the Task Force faced multiple challenges on

---

<sup>87</sup> Raymond G. Davis, *Memoir: The Story of Ray Davis MOH*, with Bill Davis (San Diego, 1990), Raymond Davis Papers, COLL 2079, US Marine Corps Archives, 14-18.

<sup>88</sup> Joseph R. Owen, *Colder than Hell*, 234.

<sup>89</sup> Matthew J. Seelinger, “Nightmare at Chosin.” *On Point* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001): 8.



top of the severe cold during the last days of November. Its subordinate elements were strung out and isolated from one another with poor communications; CCF attacks by the 80th Division had been costly on officers and NCOs and wiped out the medical company, and its commander Colonel Allan D. MacLean went missing in action leaving Faith to take command.<sup>90</sup> This situation put the RCT at a grave disadvantage and presented Faith with a seemingly insurmountable leadership challenge.

On 1 December, bottled up in a defensive perimeter touching an inlet on the east side of the reservoir, RCT 31 was transferred to the operational control of 1st MARDIV. However, as the Special Action Report for that day noted, “In view of the critical requirements for troops to hold Hagaru-ri, RCT-31 was informed that no actual troop assistance could be furnished by the 1st Marine Division.”<sup>91</sup> Faith, essentially on his own, except for the liaison to air support provided by his Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO) forward air controller, Captain Edward P. Stamford, USMC, ordered a breakout to the south of his own initiative.<sup>92</sup> In *East of Chosin*, historian Roy E. Appleman cites many poor conditions that aided in destruction of the RCT during the breakout attempt. Units across X Corps had to contend with similar conditions including poor communications and utter exhaustion of the troops from fighting consecutive days in the weather with little food or sleep.<sup>93</sup> Additionally the high attrition of officers and non-commissioned officers from the beginning of X Corps’ deployment to northeast Korea made troop control under the cold weather conditions extremely difficult.<sup>94</sup>

---

<sup>90</sup> Seelinger, “Nightmare at Chosin”: 8-9.

<sup>91</sup> 1st Marine Division, FMF Special Action Report, Wonsan – Hamhung – Chosin Reservoir 8 October to 15 December 1950, Korean War Collection, COLL 3809, US Marine Corps Archives, 71.

<sup>92</sup> Roy E. Appleman, *East of Chosin* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987), 206.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid*, 305.

<sup>94</sup> Appleman, *East of Chosin*, 305.

Faith's leadership from the front was the only thing holding the outfit together up until he was killed. Amid the chaos of the breakout attempt, Private First-Class James Ransone, Jr. noted, "I felt better when I saw Colonel Faith in the middle of the perimeter. Here was a lieutenant colonel in the middle of everything. Usually, a CO is back in regiment and regiment is not close to the front lines. When the men saw Colonel Faith, their morale picked up some."<sup>95</sup> Appleman assessed from multiple accounts that Faith was mortally wounded by shrapnel at the head of his convoy, succumbing to his wounds at the furthest southern roadblock towards Hagaru-ri.<sup>96</sup> One officer in 32nd Infantry noted that "When Faith was hit, the Task Force ceased to exist."<sup>97</sup> The experience of Task Force Faith was tragic in the sense that the composite unit floundered in a void of communications and small unit leadership, ultimately ending in its destruction by the CCF. Approximately 1,000 survivors of Task Force Faith made their way to Hagaru-ri where they plugged into the Marines' defensive perimeter.<sup>98</sup> The actions of Faith, however, posthumously earned him the Medal of Honor and were another example of leadership from the front in the cold weather environment. Although RCT 31 was ultimately destroyed, Faith's visible presence and heavy-handed leadership were critical in getting his breakout attempt underway amid overwhelming friction. However, there is only so much that one leader can accomplish under such adverse circumstances and the RCT suffered greatly from the lack of officers and NCOs.

As demonstrated, the cold weather conditions during the Chosin Campaign had an overwhelming effect on the human element. While the cold temporarily degraded weapons

---

<sup>95</sup> Pfc James Ransone, Jr., *The Korean War, An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin*, compiled by Donald Knox (New York: HBJ, 1985), 550.

<sup>96</sup> Appleman, *East of Chosin*, 277.

<sup>97</sup> Seelinger, "Nightmare at Chosin.": 10.

<sup>98</sup> Seelinger: 10.

functionality, without keen small unit leader supervision body parts froze and put Soldiers and Marines out of action permanently. Morale plummeted with the mercury, troops turned internal and communications disintegrated. Numerous accounts from the Army and Marine Corps show how leaders contended with this challenge. Presence and leadership from the front filled the void. In the case of Davis and 1/7, this style of leadership pushed the Marines beyond the limits of human endurance. In the case of Task Force Faith, it did not prove to be enough. Nevertheless, these qualities surfaced during the most dire cold weather circumstances.

The cold weather leadership lessons of X Corps at the Chosin Reservoir are worthy of attention from US military leaders today. They are especially relevant since the Korean War was the last time that the United States engaged in cold weather combat on a large scale. The US military since Korea has engaged in combat operations in Southeast Asia, Central America, Africa, and the Middle East. All of these are regions that, for the most part, are tropical or hot and dry. There are of course exceptions, such as the snowy mountains of eastern Afghanistan where the United States has been engaged in counterinsurgency (COIN) for the last 17 years. However, it is difficult to make parity between COIN operations conducted out of static forward operating bases and the Division-sized maneuvers across hundreds of miles of frozen, mountainous terrain in a highly non-permissive environment.

This is not to say that cold weather warfare capabilities have stagnated since Korea. On the contrary, the Marine Corps operates the Mountain Warfare Training Center at Pickel Meadows, California (started during the Korean War) and the Army maintains multiple Brigade Combat Teams in Alaska where they train at the US Army Northern Warfare Training Center. Furthermore, the 2016 DoD report to Congress on protecting national security interests in the Arctic emphasizes the importance of military training and sharing lessons learned with allies

who have inherent cold weather warfare operational experience in the Nordic countries.<sup>99</sup> The most recent examples are exercises COLD RESPONSE and TRIDENT JUNCTURE, executed in Norway during 2018. Therefore, it is clear that some Marines and Soldiers today are better prepared for the cold weather warfare environment than those in 1950. However, the Chosin Reservoir offers a lens with which to view leadership in the context of extreme cold weather conditions and combat against a numerically superior enemy. This lens is not available in the training or combat operations the US has conducted in the last seventy years.

Military leaders facing the cold weather environment today should reflect upon Major General Oliver P. Smith's leadership during the Chosin Campaign. His deliberate, meticulous decision making was quite contrary to the orders from his Corps Commander and bordered on insubordination. Some such as Andrew R. Milburn in his article "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional," might argue that Smith was "slow rolling" Almond's orders, a form of dissent that is not open disobedience, yet clearly violates commander's intent without taking a stand.<sup>100</sup> However, Smith had a greater understanding of what was required in the cold weather environment and made decisions which slowed down his speed and tempo to ensure the survival of his Division. He also had no problem openly voicing his opinion and explaining his actions to his Corps Commander.

Marine leaders are encouraged and rewarded for being bold and rapid in their decision-making. Deliberateness, or anything like it, is not one of the 14 Marine Corps leadership traits.<sup>101</sup> MCDP 1 states "Boldness is an essential moral trait in a leader for it generates combat

---

<sup>99</sup> Department of Defense, *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interest in the Arctic Region* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2016).

<sup>100</sup> Andrew R. Milburn, "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional." *Joint Force Quarterly* 59 (4th Quarter 2010): 106.

<sup>101</sup> Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, MCWP 6-11 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2002), 121.

power beyond the physical means at hand.”<sup>102</sup> While this may be true, in the extreme cold, like that experienced in the Chosin Reservoir, it is far more difficult when the human condition is under such duress. The more relevant excerpt from MCDP 1 states, “Boldness is based on strong situational awareness: Marines weigh the situation, then act. In other words, boldness must be tempered with judgement lest it border on recklessness.”<sup>103</sup> This was certainly the case of Smith in contrast to the direction he received from higher headquarters. Perhaps, when examining the “Frozen Chosin” during a session of professional military education, Smith’s decision making and actions should be unpackaged with a little more rigor than simply celebrating the heroics of the breakout.

As far as an appreciation for logistics, the Chosin Reservoir shows that it is a warfighting function that must be fully embraced, understood, and driven by the commander. Smith and Litzenberg were well versed in logistics and understood its importance in the cold weather environment. If it was their S-4 officers that deserve the credit for the details, the commanders certainly put their weight behind them in implementing the plan for supply distribution, the establishment of Hagaru-ri, and the evacuation of casualties. Before going into the cold weather environment today, whether or not they are able to simulate the exact conditions of extreme cold, leaders should extend and strain their logistics to its limit in order to find weaknesses. They must understand that the culminating point comes fast in the extreme cold, and it can only be extended with extensive logistical support. In the future operational environment, the supply-dumps that sustained the RCTs as they pushed further into the Taebaek range may not be feasible, given the enemy’s ability to target from the air using drones. Therefore, commanders

---

<sup>102</sup> Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Warfighting*, MCDP 1 (Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, June 30, 1991), 57.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid*, 44.

and logisticians will have to work together to distribute supplies in a way that does not leave large, targetable concentrations vulnerable. Those who are not logisticians, as is the case of commanders who lead combat arms formations, can enhance their understanding and appreciation through enthusiastic involvement in logistics planning. Sometimes logistics becomes the main effort and is as critical to mission success as the devastation brought upon the enemy by combined arms.

Command presence and leadership from the front are not leadership principles that are exclusive to the cold weather environment. However, they certainly become more essential when troops are heavily fatigued, distracted, and fighting the urge to become completely internally focused. As demonstrated in the Chosin Campaign, O-5 level and above commanders were making constant physical contact with their subordinates, out in front of their troops, and sharing the hardship. Furthermore, their command posts were on the move at times with no communications other than man-packed radios, equipment highly vulnerable to the cold. This is hard to envision today or in a future conflict given the size of even a battalion command post, and the footprint of communications assets required to feed the intelligence and the command and control expected. Though technology changes the way we fight, the effect of the cold weather environment on the human element will largely stay the same even with improved personal equipment. There can be no substitute for the inspirational effect of physical presence.

The experience of X Corps in Northeast Korea during the Chosin Reservoir Campaign demonstrates the value of cautious decision making, understanding and appreciating logistics, and leading from the front under harrowing cold weather conditions. While these leadership qualities are applicable in other environments, the campaign demonstrates why they are especially well suited to cold weather operations. The experience was, on one hand, a tragedy of

miscalculation and under preparedness, and on the other a triumph of human endurance and leadership. Military leaders facing the cold weather environment owe it to themselves and those who they are charged to lead to conduct a thorough analysis of the Chosin Reservoir that goes beyond the popular lore. While much of the technical aspects of cold weather warfare can be learned in publications and field training, the dimension of leadership is harder to capture. X Corps' experience provides timeless leadership lessons that will endure well into future of cold weather warfare.

## Appendix A (Maps)

Figure 1.0<sup>104</sup>




<sup>104</sup> Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990), 85.





Figure 3.0<sup>106</sup>



MAP 8

From: *Ebb And Flow, November 1950-July 1951*  
 Center of Military History, 1990  
 By Billy C. Mossman

<sup>106</sup> Billy C. Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951*, 95.

## Bibliography

### Primary Sources:

1st Marine Division Historical Diary for December 1950, 5 April 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

1st Marine Division Special Action Report for the Wonsan-Hamhung-Chosin Reservoir Operation, 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Almond, Lieutenant General Edward M. "Conference on United Nations Military Operations in Korea, 29 June 1950 – 31 December 1951." Speech. US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, July 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Annex Charlie to Fifth Marines Special Action Report for 7 October to 15 December 1950, 17 February 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Annex Roger Roger to the 1st Marine Division Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Annex Xray Xray, Cold Weather Operations, 1st MarDiv Special Action Report, Phase II (Advance Copy), 3 February 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Appendix No. 3 to Annex Roger Roger of the 1st Marine Division FMF Special Action Report for Period 8 October to 15 December 1950, 15 January 1951. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Byrne, Lieutenant Junior Grade Edward George. Interview, 4 Jan 1951. Raymond Davis Papers. COLL 2079. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Davis, Lieutenant Colonel Raymond G. Interview, 4 January, 1951. Raymond Davis Papers. COLL 2079. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Davis, General Raymond G. *Memoir: The Story of Ray Davis MOH*, with Bill Davis. San Diego, 1990. Raymond Davis Papers. COLL 2079. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Division Training Bulletin 38-50, "Cold Weather Indoctrination", 13 November 1950. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Division Training Bulletin 39-50, "Cold Weather Survival Training Program", 26 November 1950. The Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Harbula, Bob. *At All Cost*, West Mifflin, PA. Bob Harbula Memoir. COLL 4311. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Litzenberg, Colonel Homer L. Interview, 4 January, 1951. Raymond Davis Papers. COLL 2079. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Litzenberg, Colonel Homer L. Interview, 27-30 April and 10 July 1951. Historical Division, Headquarters US Marine Corps, Washington, DC.

Owen, Joseph R. *Colder than Hell*. Memoir. Canada: Ballantine Books, 1996.

Ransone, Jr., Private First Class. In *The Korean War, An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin*.

Compiled by Donald Knox. New York: HBJ, 1985.

Smith, Oliver P., Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51, Notes by Lieutenant General OP Smith on Operations of 1st Marine Division During the First 9 Months of the Korean War. Oliver P. Smith Papers. COLL 213. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Smith, Major General Oliver P. "Cold Weather, Special Report on." 3 February, 1951. Korean War Collection. COLL 3809. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Smith, Major General Oliver P. Letter to General Clifford Cates, 15 November 1950, in Aide-Mémoire, Korea 1950-51. Oliver P. Smith Papers. COLL 213. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Smith, Major General Oliver P. Extracts from Letter to General Clifford B. Cates, 5 Jan 1951. Oliver P. Smith Papers. COLL 213. Archives and Special Collections Branch, Library of the Marine Corps, Quantico, VA.

Westberg, Private First-Class Dean B 1/7. In *The Korean War, An Oral History: Pusan to Chosin*, compiled by Donald Knox. New York: HBJ, 1985.

### **Secondary Sources:**

Appleman, Roy E. *East of Chosin*. College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1987.

Appleman, Roy E. *Escaping the Trap: The US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea, 1950*. College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1990.

Appleman, Roy E., *South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu*. Washington, DC: Center for Military History, US Army, 1992.

Clausewitz, Carl Von, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. *On War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Department of Defense. *Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interest in the Arctic Region*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, December 2016.

Drury, Bob and Tom Clavin. *The Last Stand of Fox Company*. New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2009.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Leading Marines*, MCWP 6-11. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, 2002.

Headquarters US Marine Corps. *Warfighting*. MCDP 1. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corps, June 30, 1991.

Hopkins, William B. *One Bugle, No Drums*. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1986.

La Bree, Clifton. *The Gentle Warrior: General Oliver Prince Smith, USMC*. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2001.

Marshall, S. L. A. "1951, CCF in the Attack" in *One Bugle, No Drums* by William B. Hopkins. Chapel Hill, NC: Algonquin Books, 1986.

Milburn, Andrew R. "Breaking Ranks: Dissent and the Military Professional." *Joint Force Quarterly* 59 (4th Quarter 2010): 101-107.

Montross, Lynn and Nicholas A. Canzona. *U.S. Marine Operations in Korea: Vol III The Chosin Reservoir Campaign*. Washington, DC: Historical Branch, G-3, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, 1957.

Mossman, Billy C. *Ebb and Flow: November 1950 – July 1951*. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 1990.

“Joint United-States-Canadian Operation NORAMEX 1949” *Polar Record* 6, no. 41 (1951): 102

O’Donnell, Patrick K. *Give Me Tomorrow*. Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2010.

Russ, Martin. *Breakout*. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.

Schnabel, James F. *U.S. Army in the Korean War: Policy and Direction, The First Year*. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 1992.

Seelinger, Matthew J. “Nightmare at Chosin.” *On Point* 6, no. 4 (Winter 2000-2001): 7-10.

Sides, Hampton. *On Desperate Ground: The Marines at the Reservoir, The Korean War’s Greatest Battle*. New York: Doubleday, 2018.

Simmons, Brigadier General Edwin H. *Frozen Chosin: U.S. Marines at the Changjin Reservoir*. Washington, DC: U.S. Marine Corps Historical Center, 2002.

Stewart, Richard W. *Staff Operations: The X Corps in Korea, 1950*. Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, CSI, 1991.

Stanton, Shelby L. *America’s Tenth Legion: X Corps in Korea, 1950*. Novato, CA: Presido, 1989.

US Army Center of Military History. *Korea 1950*. Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1997.

Weintraub, Stanley. *MacArthur's War: Korea and the Undoing of an American Hero*. New York: The Free Press, 2000.