recalled via telegram that evening. "I returned on 9 December, travelling all day down the San Joaquin Valley in a driving rain aboard a slow-moving Santa Fe train," he writes. "Boarding the AT&SF in Oakland instead of the Southern Pacific meant, in this case, that I would not have to change trains in Bakersfield, riding from one station to the other (the depots were located on opposite sides of town) in the process aboard an ancient and diminutive streetcar, but rode the same train over Tehachapi Pass and, instead of getting off at Mojave, riding on to Muroc station. The train was ineffably slow and all curtains were pulled and shades drawn so the Japanese could not track and assault us with their imaginary long-range bombers."

The military did little to assuage the public's fears, for a high degree of alertness was sensible and highly desired. Much has been written about the military's inadequate and defective intelligence of this period, but insofar as the disposition of the Japanese armed forces was concerned it was as well-informed as any European Power and perhaps better informed than most. It knew, for example, how many troops comprised the Japanese Army, what portion of its strength was still assigned to Manchuria and the fighting in China and the total strength assigned to the task forces planned for the assaults on the Dutch East Indies and Malaya. It was aware of the departure of the naval task forces and troop convoys for the projected campaigns in the Southwest Pacific.

What it didn't know, however, was the full extent of the smashing defeats administered to the Japanese forces on the Korea-