Personnel Mobilization for Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations: The Future is in the Past

A Monograph

By

MAJ Andrew A. Brown US Army



School of Advanced Military Studies US Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, KS

2021

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18

sources, gathering a		information is actimate	d to overege 1 hour per r	oononoo including the	time for reviewing instructions, coording existing data
Information Operation any other provision	and maintaining the data tion of information, inclu ons and Reports (0704-0	a needed, and completi ding suggestions for re 0188), 1215 Jefferson I be subject to any penal	ng and reviewing this coll ducing this burden to Dep Davis Highway, Suite 120 ty for failing to comply wit	ection of information. partment of Defense, V 4, Arlington, VA 2220	time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other Vashington Headquarters Services, Directorate for 2-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding ation if it does not display a currently valid OMB control
	ATE (DD-MM-YY)				3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
23 05 2021			ER'S THESIS		JUL 2020 - MAY 2021
4. TITLE AND		MAST	ER 5 IIIE515		
			G 1 C	1	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
		r Sustained La	arge-Scale Com	bat Operation	
The Future	is in the Past				5b. GRANT NUMBER
					5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S)					5d. PROJECT NUMBER
	, ew A. Brown				Su. PROJECT NOMBER
MAJ Andr	ew A. Brown	L			
					5e. TASK NUMBER
					5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
			ID ADDRESS(ES)		8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT
U.S. Army C	Command and	General Staff	College		NUMBER
ATTN: ATZI	L-SWD-GD				
Fort Leaven	worth, KS 660	27-2301			
			E(S) AND ADDR	SS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S
	D MILITARY S				ACRONYM(S)
					11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
					NUMBER(S)
	r Public Relea				
13. SUPPLEM	ENTARY NOTES				
14. ABSTRAC					
		ns its organiza	tion and doctri	ne for great p	ower competition in the twenty-first-
As the US A	Army transform				
As the US A century, it a	Army transform ims to support	Multi-Domai	n Operations (N	ADO) as part	of the a joint force. In doing so,
As the US A century, it a army leader	Army transform ims to support s express confi	Multi-Domai	n Operations (M force's ability to	MDO) as part	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th	Army transform ims to support s express confi ne MDO conce	Multi-Domai idence in the f pt's focus on	n Operations (M force's ability to achieving quicl	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of	Army transform ims to support s express confi ne MDO conce f having a robu	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ust and function	n Operations (N force's ability to achieving quicl mal mobilizatio	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's	Army transform ims to support s express confi ne MDO conce f having a robu response to ag	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ist and function gression by the	n Operations (M force's ability to achieving quicl anal mobilizatione Communist H	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the lecture. This monograph analyzes the c's Army (KPA), and the subsequent
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's	Army transform ims to support s express confi ne MDO conce f having a robu response to ag	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ist and function gression by the	n Operations (M force's ability to achieving quicl anal mobilizatione Communist H	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement	Army transform ims to support s express confi the MDO conce f having a robut response to ag to rapidly exp	Multi-Domai idence in the f pt's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu	n Operations (M Force's ability to achieving quicl anal mobilization of Communist H lar Army endst	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ist and function gression by the pand US Regu- ilization and f	n Operations (M Force's ability to achieving quiclonal mobilization the Communist H lar Army endstr Force expansion	(IDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the ecture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t	n Operations (M force's ability to achieving quiel anal mobilization the Communist H lar Army endst force expansion o solve; that rem	(IDO) as part o achieve stra a success igno n support stru corean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the c's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war
As the US A century, it a army leader months." The relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arm n planning follo	Multi-Domai idence in the f pt's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu- pilization and f my problems to owed an outdate	n Operations (N force's ability to achieving quicl and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endstr force expansion o solve; that rep ated paradigm,	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the c's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first bat	Multi-Domai idence in the f pt's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat tlefield encourt	n Operations (N force's ability to achieving quicl and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endstr force expansion to solve; that rep ated paradigm, inters. Lacking a	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first bat	Multi-Domai idence in the f pt's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat tlefield encourt	n Operations (N force's ability to achieving quicl and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endstr force expansion to solve; that rep ated paradigm, inters. Lacking a	MDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the c's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an mobilization	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arm n planning foll- nd the first batton support struc	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ust and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat tlefield encoun- ture, today's U	n Operations (N Force's ability to achieving quicled achieving quicled achieving quicled and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endsta force expansion o solve; that rep ated paradigm, inters. Lacking a US Army will n	(IDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le o robust, funct ot be able to o	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the acture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an mobilization	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first batt n support struc my strength wi	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ust and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat tlefield encoun- ture, today's U	n Operations (N Force's ability to achieving quicled achieving quicled achieving quicled and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endsta force expansion o solve; that rep ated paradigm, inters. Lacking a US Army will n	(IDO) as part o achieve stra c success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le o robust, funct ot be able to o	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the every the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised execute a three-fold expansion of its
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an mobilization Regular Arr	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first batt n support struc my strength wi	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ust and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat the field encoun- ture, today's U thout cannibat	n Operations (N Force's ability to achieving quicled achieving quicled achieving quicled achieving and balan mobilization accommunist H lar Army endstr force expansion o solve; that rem ated paradigm, ated paradigm,	ADO) as part o achieve stra a success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le a robust, funct ot be able to operately need	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the ecture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised execute a three-fold expansion of its
As the US A century, it a army leader months." The relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an mobilization Regular Arm 15. SUBJECT Mobilization, I	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first batt n support struc my strength wi	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat thefield encount ture, today's to thout cannibat	n Operations (N Force's ability to achieving quicled achieving quicled achieving quicled achieving and balan mobilization accommunist H lar Army endstr force expansion o solve; that rem ated paradigm, ated paradigm,	ADO) as part o achieve stra a success igno n support stru Korean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le a robust, funct ot be able to operately need	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the ecture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised execute a three-fold expansion of its ed in the combat theater.
As the US A century, it a army leader months." Th relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an mobilization Regular Arr 15. SUBJECT Mobilization, I 16. SECURITY Unclassified	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first batt n support struc my strength wine TERMS Multi-Domain Oper CLASSIFICATIO	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ust and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat the field encoun- ture, today's U thout cannibat	n Operations (M force's ability to achieving quiel and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endsta force expansion o solve; that rep ated paradigm, thers. Lacking a US Army will n lizing units des Scale Combat Ope	ADO) as part o achieve stra a success igno n support stru Corean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le a robust, funct ot be able to o perately neede	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the ecture. This monograph analyzes the e's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised execute a three-fold expansion of its ed in the combat theater.
As the US A century, it a army leader months." The relevance of US Army's requirement June 1951. I Korea were mobilization hostilities an mobilization Regular Arm 15. SUBJECT Mobilization, I 16. SECURITY	Army transform ims to support s express confi- ne MDO conce f having a robu- response to ag to rapidly exp Personnel mob principally arr n planning foll- nd the first batt n support struc ny strength wi TERMS Multi-Domain Ope	Multi-Domai idence in the f ept's focus on ist and function gression by the band US Regu- ilization and f my problems t owed an outdat thefield encount ture, today's to thout cannibat	n Operations (M force's ability to achieving quiel and mobilization the Communist H lar Army endsta force expansion o solve; that rep ated paradigm, thers. Lacking a US Army will n lizing units des Scale Combat Ope	ADO) as part o achieve stra a success igno n support stru Corean People rength from 5 for enduring mains true too assuming a le a robust, funct ot be able to o perately neede	of the a joint force. In doing so, tegic objectives in "weeks not ores history, and minimizes the lecture. This monograph analyzes the s's Army (KPA), and the subsequent 91,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in large-scale combat operations in lay. Immediate post-war ngthy interval between the onset of ional, and well-exercised execute a three-fold expansion of its ed in the combat theater.

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Andrew A. Brown

Monograph Title: Personnel Mobilization for Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations: The Future is in the Past

Approved by:

//signed/29 MAR 21/TEH//_____, Monograph Director Thomas E. Hanson, PhD

//signed/30 MAR 21/BKE// ____, Seminar Leader Brit K. Erslev, COL

//signed/12 MAY 21/BAP//_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies Brian A. Payne, COL

Accepted this 20th day of May 2021 by:

_____, Assistant Dean of Academics for Degree Programs Dale F. Spurlin, PhD and Research, CGSC

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Fair use determination or copyright permission has been obtained for the inclusion of pictures, maps, graphics, and any other works incorporated into this manuscript. A work of the US government is not subject to copyright, however further publication or sale of copyrighted images is not permissible.

Abstract

Personnel Mobilization for Sustained Large-Scale Combat Operations: The Future is in the Past, by MAJ Andrew A. Brown, US Army, 50 pages.

As the US Army transforms its organization and doctrine for great power competition in the twenty-first-century, it aims to support Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) as part of the joint force's execution of the National Defense Strategy and National Military Strategy. In doing so, army leaders express confidence in the force's ability to achieve strategic objectives in "weeks not months." The MDO concept's focus on achieving quick success ignores history, and minimizes the relevance of having a robust and functional mobilization support structure. However, the aforementioned strategy documents agree that adversaries in great power competition possess peer or near-peer capability with the United States in all domains. This monograph analyzes the US Army's response to aggression by the Communist Korean People's Army (KPA), and the subsequent requirement to rapidly expand US Regular Army endstrength from 591,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in June 1951. Personnel mobilization and force expansion for enduring large-scale combat operations in Korea were principally army problems to solve; that remains true today. In 1946, fresh from victory in World War II, United States leaders placed great confidence in the US military's ability to respond to potential threats. They did so without fully understanding that the post-war force in no way resembled the massive organization fielded to defeat the Axis powers. Worse, immediate post-war mobilization planning followed an outdated paradigm, assuming a lengthy interval between the onset of hostilities and the first battlefield encounters. Thus, the mobilization plan proceeded deliberately, requiring three months just to prepare cadre and infrastructure, seven months to generate the first fully-trained individuals, and even longer to prepare units for combat. Luckily for the United States and its South Korean ally, the juxtaposition of D-Day with M-Day at the start of the Korean War was wholly mitigated by recalling approximately 640,000 trained World War II veterans to fight in the Korean war. Lacking a similarly robust, functional, and well-exercised mobilization support structure, today's US Army will not be able to execute a three-fold expansion of its Regular Army strength without cannibalizing units desperately needed in the combat theater.

Contents

Acknowledgments	vi
Abbreviations	vii
Figures	ix
Introduction	1
Literature Review	5
Strategy	5
Concept	7
Doctrine	7
US Army Mobilization Since 2001	10
Future Challenges of Mobilization and Rapid Expansion	11
Methodology	13
Gaddis: The Landscape of History	13
Background, October 1946 – June 1950	15
Army Ground Forces Mobilization Plan 15497	15
Defense Budget Turbulence	21
Universal Military Training (UMT)	23
Selective Service Act 1948	24
Division Force Structure	25
Calibrated Force Posture	26
Background Conclusion	27
Korean War Expansion and Mobilization June 1950 – August 1953	28
D-Day Before M-Day	28
Initial Mobilization Response: 25 June 1950 – 31 August 1950	29
Expanded Mobilization: 1 September 1950 – 30 June 1951	32
Mobilizing, Training, Fighting, Demobilizing (July 1951- August 1953)	34

Korean War Mobilization and Expansion Conclusion	35
Post Korean War Adjustments	36
Strategy and Policy (1955-1956)	36
Reserve Forces Act 1955	37
US Continental Army Command Mobilization Training Program (1958)	38
Post-Korean War Adjustments Conclusion	42
Conclusion	43
Bibliography	47

Acknowledgments

I want to thank Dr. Tom Hanson for truly caring about this research project. His feedback and guidance pushed me further than I thought possible at the beginning of this journey. His availability, expertise, and patience contributed greatly to this final product. I also thank Colonel Brit Erslev as well as my fellow classmates who all took time to discuss this research project and provide feedback while offering critical questions to explore. In addition, I owe a great deal of gratitude to Mr. Rusty Rafferty for his support in providing digital copies of army mobilization plans and several other historical documents that informed this research endeavor.

Abbreviations

AGF	US Army Ground Forces
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
CATS	Combined Arms Training Strategy
CCF	Communist Chinese Forces
CONUS	Continental United States
DoD	Department of Defense
D-Day	Day on which an operation commences or is to commence
FECOM	US Far East Command
FY	Fiscal Year
FORSCOM	US Army Forces Command
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JP	Joint Publication
KPA	Korean People's Army (North Korean Army)
LSCO	Large-Scale Combat Operations
M-Day	Mobilization Day
MDO	Multi-Domain Operations
MOS	Military Occupation Specialty
NDS	US National Defense Strategy
NMS	US National Military Strategy
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	National Security Strategy
ORC	Organized Reserve Corps
SFAB	Security Force Assistance Brigade
UMT	Universal Military Training
ROK	Republic of Korea (South Korea)

- TRADOC US Army Training and Doctrine Command
- USCONARC US Army Continental Army Command
- ZI Zone of Interior (Continental United States)

Figures

Figure 1. Army Strategy and Doctrine Mobilization Key Word Search.	. 2
Figure 2. Replacement Training Center Flow Period M + 121 – M + 365.	17
Figure 3. Division Order of Mobilization	19
Figure 4. Replacement Training Center Capacity M – M + 240	20
Figure 5. USCONARC Mobilization Training Capacity.	40
Figure 6. Fort Jackson Replacement Training Center Mobilization Capacity.	40
Figure 7. Fort Bragg Unit Training Center Capacity	41

Introduction

The permanent army should not only always be upon a respectable footing, but it should be capable of being doubled, if necessary, by reserves, which should always be prepared.

-Antoine-Henri, Baron de Jomini, The Art of War

As the US Army transforms its strategy and doctrine for great power competition in the twenty-first-century, it aims to support Multi-Domain Operations as part of the joint force. In doing so, Army leaders express confidence in the force's ability to achieve strategic objectives in "weeks not months."¹ At the same time, however, those same leaders anticipate an exponential increase in battlefield lethality.² Despite the evolving character of war and the means used to wage it, it remains probable that conflict between near-peer competitors will not be resolved in weeks and perhaps not even in months. This likelihood of long-duration/high-lethality hostilities should push American strategic leaders to reconsider the importance of rapidly mobilizing potential combat forces into operationally ready formations. The following case study of the US Army's response to the Korean War can inform modern mobilization planning in preparation for large-scale combat operations (LSCO). Moreover, this is the US Army's problem to solve; since 1945, the US Air Force has never used the draft as a personnel source, while the US Navy and US Marine Corps have used it sparingly.

This study is vital because the Total Force (Regular Army, Army National Guard, and US Army Reserve) is now so interdependent that, in any future conflict, victory will require some level of mobilization. Despite this certainty, the US Army's foundational documents, *Army Strategy - 2018* and the *Multi-Domain Operations Concept*, scarcely discuss mobilization.³

¹ US Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations* 2028 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), 31.

² Ibid., vi.

³ US Department of the Army, *Army Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), accessed 10 October 2020, https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf;

Figure 1 shows how many times the key words "mobilize," "(de)mobilization," and "total force" are mentioned in our national strategy documents, as well as in US Army strategy, concepts, and doctrinal documents.

Document	Published	Pages	Mobilize	(De)Mobilization	Total Force
National Security Strategy	2017	55	2	0	0
National Defense Strategy	2018	12	1	0	0
National Military Strategy	2018	6	0	0	0
US Army Strategy	2018	11	1	5	2
Multi-Domain Operations	2018	102	1	0	3
ADP 3-0, Operations	2019	102	4	4	0
FM 3-0, Operations	2017	311	5	15	0

Figure 1. Army Strategy and Doctrine Mobilization Key Word Search. Created by author.

The limited inclusion of mobilization in our guiding strategic policy and doctrine is striking. Still, it may simply be a reflection that the last US military mobilization and force expansion to support large-scale combat took place between 1950-1953. However, *Joint Publication* (JP) 4-05 captures the strategic importance of personnel mobilization correctly, stating "responsive mobilization capability is critical to our national security..."⁴ The varied actors and authorities involved in personnel mobilization make the process naturally complex. As Nassim Taleb warns, "complex systems are weakened or even killed when insulated from stress."⁵ Since seven decades have now passed since the army's last rapid expansion and mobilization stress test, a critical review now can mitigate a future national security calamity resulting from the army's inability to execute a rapid expansion and mobilization.

The US Army today faces strategic and fiscal challenges similar to those of the periods 1946-1950 and 1955-1958. War weariness, domestic politics, and fiscal constraints limited army

US Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations* 2028 (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018).

⁴ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), v – vii.

⁵ Nassim N. Taleb. *Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder* (New York: Random House, 2014), 5.

endstrength to levels less than adequate for known requirements in 1946. Friction between the military departments generated by the National Security Act of 1947 distracted strategic leaders from crucial readiness issues in 1948, 1949, and 1950. Post-war American strategy remained undefined until the announcement of the Truman Doctrine in 1947, which caused the defense budget to oscillate between expansion and contraction multiple times each year.⁶ In 1955, war weariness and fiscal constraints again directed budget and endstrength cuts on the Army. President Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy, based on massive atomic and then nuclear retaliation, favored the Air Force while directing the Army to mitigate mobilization risks by strengthening its reserve forces.⁷ In 2021, the US Army's current strategy and projected operating concept are still under refinement; fiscal uncertainty stemming from economic woes and domestic spending in response to the pandemic threatens to force drastic cuts to all services; and a new presidential administration may impose significant organizational changes.

This monograph analyzes the US Army's response to aggression by the North Korean Communist Korean People's Army (KPA), and the subsequent requirement to rapidly expand US Regular Army endstrength from 591,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 by June 1951.⁸ The first section analyzes the period October 1946 – May 1950. This section includes a review of the Army Ground Forces mobilization plan of 1946 as well as the strategic environment from 1946 to the start of the Korean War. The second section analyzes how the US Army mobilized and rapidly expanded its Regular Army endstrength from 591,487 in June 1950 to 1,552,000 in June

⁶ US Military Academy, Department of History. *Confrontation in Asia: The Korean War* (West Point, NY: The United States Military Academy, Department of History, 1981), 7.

⁷ Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956*, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6 – (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1998), 2-9, accessed 24 February 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy_V006.pdf

⁸ Thomas E. Hanson, *Combat Ready? The Eighth US Army on the Eve of the Korean War* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 13; Kathryn R. Coker, *United States Army Reserve Mobilization for the Korean War* (Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Reserve Command, 2013), 37, accessed 7 JAN 2020,

https://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/Korean%20War%20Pub_Revised%20June %2012-2013.pdf

1951. The focus in this section is how the army responded at the enterprise level to a previouslyunforeseen requirement to expand the army rapidly in response to a situation where combat operations commenced (D-Day) prior to mobilization declaration (M-Day), and then sustaining the increased endstrength through July 1953. The third section examines lessons learned and adjustments to mobilization between 1955 to 1958. This section includes a review of strategic priorities that result from reliance on "massive retaliation," the reforms included in the *Reserve Forces Act of 1955*, and the Army's 1958 mobilization plan. This monograph concludes by offering recommended changes the Army should pursue immediately to improve its ability to rapidly expand to support large-scale combat operations that last longer than weeks or months.

Literature Review

Strategy

The 2017 US National Security Strategy (NSS), 2018 US National Defense Strategy (NDS), 2018 US National Military Strategy (NMS), and 2018 Army Strategy each provide insight on mobilization objectives, assumptions, and assessments of changing environments.⁹ Taken together, the strategies acknowledge that future conflict with peer adversaries requires a resilient joint force capable of rapid mobilization.

The 2017 *NSS* changed azimuths from its predecessors by proclaiming a change in the strategic environment from regional competition to great power competition. After discussing the potential impact of armed confrontation between peer or near-peer militaries, the *NSS* assessed that overconfidence in technology fueled a false assumption that "all wars would be fought and won quickly, from stand-off distances and with minimal casualties," implying a need for organizational resilience. Further, the *NSS* declared it a priority of the Donald Trump Administration to reverse pre-2017 decisions to reduce the size of the joint force. The 2017 *NSS* directed the military to prioritize "field forces capable of operating in sufficient scale and for ample duration..."¹⁰

The 2018 *NDS* predicted that "the fully mobilized Joint Force will be capable of: defeating aggression of a major power, deterring opportunistic aggression elsewhere; and disrupting imminent terrorist and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] threats."¹¹ This prediction

⁹ Office of the President of the United States of America, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), 2, accessed 18 December 2020. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf; US Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy: Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 5; US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 2; US Department of the Army, *The Army Strategy*, 1.

¹⁰ Office of the President, *National Security Strategy*, 27-29.

¹¹ US Department of Defense, *National Defense Strategy*, 5.

makes "the fully mobilized" force a critical prerequisite to success. If full mobilization of all components is not possible due to lack of time or other resources, how then can the joint force achieve the stated goals? The *NDS* nests within and expands on the environmental assessment of great power competition found in the *NSS*, foreseeing that competition with "strategic competitors" will present increased challenges in all domains.¹² The *NDS* adds an assessment that the United States homeland can no longer be considered a "sanctuary."¹³ Each of those conclusions leads to significant challenges for mobilization plans. The 2018 *NMS* envisions a "joint force capable of defending the homeland and projecting power, now and into the future."¹⁴ Other than the objective of projecting power, the *NMS* does not mention mobilization. The section on endstrength growth focuses on building and strengthening allies' and partners' capabilities and capacities.¹⁵

The 2018 *Army Strategy's* plan for "national level mobilization, reconstitution of combat capacity, and defense industrial base expansion," for large-scale contingencies rests on inadequate and unconfirmed assumptions. Its two priorities to support rapid expansion, security force assistance brigades (SFABs) and reserve component mobilization exercises, address symptoms of inadequate enterprise-level resilience, but offer no cure for the disease of an overstretched and brittle force. Each of the army's six SFABs' design includes the capacity to "expand rapidly to a full brigade combat team" if necessary. ¹⁶ National-level mobilization and defense industrial base expansion are critical mobilization assumptions in the *Army Strategy*, but they do not align with the stated priorities found in other national-level strategic guidance documents.

¹⁵ Ibid., 3.

¹² US Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy, 5.

¹³ Ibid., 3.

¹⁴ Joint Staff, *National Military Strategy*, 2.

¹⁶ US Army, Army Strategy, 6-8.

Concept

The Army Strategy identifies the Multi-Domain Operations (MDO) concept as the foundational concept for "establishing overmatch with adversaries." The MDO concept informs planning for modernization and organization to achieve an objective "Army 2028" force.¹⁷ One of the three tenets of MDO is calibrated force posture, defined as "the combination of capacity, capability, position, and the ability to maneuver across strategic distances."¹⁸ One assumption in the MDO concept holds that calibrated force posture can create opportunities to defeat an enemy in "weeks rather than months."¹⁹ The NSS explicitly calls out such "overconfidence" in the power of precision technology, creating cognitive dissonance between the two documents. Moreover, the MDO concept's focus on achieving quick success deliberately minimizes the relevance of having a mobilization support structure. However, the aforementioned strategy documents all agree that adversaries in great power competition possess peer or near-peer capability with the United States in all domains. With the universal agreement in NSS, NMS, NDS, and Army Strategy of the reality of competition in all domains, how can the Army's MDO concept, grounded as it is in an overconfidence bias for short wars, properly guide the army to develop the right future force? The MDO concept as written has a near-complete disregard for the challenging process of mobilization.

Doctrine

Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*, links mobilization to national security, details mobilization roles and responsibilities, and provides considerations for planning and executing joint military mobilization, demobilization, force expansion, use of volunteers, and

¹⁷ US Army, Army Strategy, 1, 7.

¹⁸ US Army, *The US Army in Multi-Domain Operations* 2028, 31.

¹⁹ Ibid., 31.

Presidential Reserve Call-up.²⁰ JP 4-05 identifies "manpower" and "industrial base capacity" as the two most critical mobilization resources. The five tenets of successful mobilization include objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability.²¹

JP 4-05 outlines and defines the levels of mobilization, military commitment, and the corresponding legal authorities, and lists seven mobilization levels starting from involuntary callup for a period of fifteen days up to total mobilization, which includes force expansion (see Figure 2). The top three levels are important to define for this monograph. Partial mobilization requires a presidential declaration of national emergency and makes up to one million members of the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) available for up to twenty-four consecutive months. Congress exercises sole legal authority to allow full mobilization in time of war or national emergency. Full mobilization allows all existing reserve forces to be mobilized and placed in federal service. Total mobilization is the level at which personnel requirements requiring force expansion exceed peace-time authorizations.²²

²⁰ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), v – vii.

²¹ Joint Staff, JP 4-05, V-4, II-1.

²² Ibid., IV-8-9.




Figure 2. Levels of Mobilization. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018), I-8.

Army Regulation 500-5, *Army Mobilization*, provides direction to army leaders and delineates roles and responsibilities. The three most critical leaders in the US Army mobilization process identified in the regulation are the Army Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS) G-3/5/7, the Commanding General (CG) US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and CG, US Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). The DCS G-3/5/7 responsibilities include: develop army mobilization and operations policy; guidance; planning assumptions for mobilization; and expansion of forces beyond previously-approved force structure. The CG, FORSCOM, serves as the US Army's principal executive agent and supported command within the continental United States (CONUS) for unit mobilization and is also responsible for replacement training center operations. The CG, TRADOC, is responsible for developing individual mobilization training, and expansion of the training base. Another critical responsibility for CG, TRADOC, is to

coordinate all mobilized IRR personnel processing to include skill assessment and certification or refresher training.²³

Army Regulation 600-8-111, *Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operations*, provides policy and guidance for filling the US Army's personnel requirements during war, crisis, or national emergency.²⁴ The regulation identifies the IRR and retired soldiers as the primary sources for trained individuals to fill personnel requirements in an emergency force expansion.²⁵

US Army Mobilization Since 2001

Pursuant to a presidential declaration in 2001, the army currently possesses the legal authority to execute a partial mobilization of reserve forces. The partial mobilization authority allows for the mobilization and federalization of up to one million drilling Guardsmen and/or reservists for a period of up to twenty-four months.²⁶ Between 2001 and 2015, the US Army's reserve components mobilized more than 800,000 soldiers for service both within the United States and around the world.²⁷ At one point in 2005, National Guard brigades constituted fifty

²³ US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 500-5, *Army Mobilization* (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2015), 5-8.

²⁴ US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 600-8-111, Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019), 1.

²⁵ Ibid., 9.

²⁶ Olen C. Bridges and Andree Navarro, "Mobilizing for Major War," *Parameters* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 88, accessed 16 November 2020, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol47/iss2/10/.

²⁷ Office of Army Reserve History, "Our History: Post 9/11," accessed 8 January 2021, https://www.usar.army.mil/OurHistory/SinceSept11/#:~:text=Since%202001%2C%20more%20than%2030 0%2C000,include%20every%20major%20combat%20zone.&text=As%20an%20enduring%20operational %20force,missions%20at%20home%20and%20abroad; Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau, "About the Army National Guard," accessed 8 January 2021,

https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact%20Sheets/ARNG%20History%20Fact%20Sheet%20(Dec.%202017).pdf.

percent of the US Army Brigade Combat Teams (BCT) in Iraq.²⁸ By August 2006, all thirty-four reserve component BCTs had exhausted their available mobilization time under existing law.²⁹

The Regular Army also faced significant personnel staffing pressure supporting global operations in the first decade of the war on terrorism. In response, the Regular Army employed the force-shaping involuntary extension or "stop-loss" measure extensively. Between 2001 and 2008, the army issued 58,300 stop-loss orders, extending individuals beyond their end of term of service date.³⁰ For Fiscal Year 2009, faced with even greater staffing challenges, the army issued 61,700 stop-loss orders, more than the previous seven years' total.³¹ While offering immediate relief, such practices cannot be used as an enduring solution. Unfortunately, their previous success helps blind senior leaders to the cognitive gaps in the MDO concept.

Future Challenges of Mobilization and Rapid Expansion

Supporting operations in Iraq and Afghanistan certainly tested the army's capacity to sustain partial mobilization for more than a decade. However, significant questions remain regarding the army's ability to expand rapidly. The army's focus on MDO and faith in shortduration conflict present additional challenges to preparing for force expansion in the near future. Joseph Whitlock expressed concern similar to that described in the *NSS* regarding overconfidence. In his view, the army's MDO concept "ignores the mobilization problem" by simply assuming it can project forces into the desired location on time. He also points out that the MDO concept seems to embrace a change in the character of war toward increased lethality, but fails to consider and adjust to the reality that the army has lowered its Regular Army personnel

²⁸ Office of Public Affairs, "About the Army National Guard."

²⁹ Forest L. Marion and Jon T. Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and the Reserve* (Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018), 157.

³⁰ Matthey Ivey, "The Broken Promises of the All-Volunteer Military," *Temple Law Review* 86, no. 3, (2014): 548, https://www.templelawreview.org/lawreview/assets/uploads/2014/08/Ivey_ForPub.pdf.

³¹ Ibid., 548.

strength, reduced its forward-stationed ground forces in favor of a rotational model, and relies heavily on the reserve components as an operational reserve.³²

US Army Chief of Staff General James C. McConville seeks to move the army beyond industrial age mentalities to compete in the information age.³³ General McConville's focus on changing the army's talent management process has brought significant change to individual career patterns, but has had nothing to say about the challenge of a rapid expansion to meet an emergency. With initial entry training for enlisted armor and infantry recruits increasing to twenty-two weeks, the challenge of sourcing personnel expansion with large numbers of young men and women with no previous military experience becomes even more difficult.³⁴

In December 2020, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, provided an assessment that the character of warfare is changing. One of the changes General Milley predicted is tanks operating autonomously, without human crews.³⁵ The development of autonomous platforms may significantly alter the concept of mobilization and force expansion in the future. However, General Milley also noted the likelihood of significant Department of Defense (DoD) budget cuts in the near future. If those occur the question then becomes, what will the US Army do if the budget cuts cause a reduction in military endstrength before that loss can be offset with autonomous machines? Could such an outcome influence the army's mobilization network in a more significant way?

³² Joseph Whitlock, "The Army's Mobilization Problem," *The War Room*, US Army War College, 3 October 2017, accessed 10 November 2020, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/armys-mobilization-problem/.

³³ Michelle Tan, "Putting People First: McConnville Looks to Revolutionize How Soldiers Serve," *Association of the US Army*, 3 October 2019, accessed 10 December 2020, https://www.ausa.org/articles/putting-people-first-mcconville-looks-revolutionize-how-soldiers-serve.

³⁴ US Army, Army Strategy, 5.

³⁵ John Grady and Sam LaGrone, "CJCS Milley: Character of War in Midst of Fundamental Change," *USNI News*, 4 December 2020, accessed 8 January 2021, https://news.usni.org/2020/12/04/cjcs-milley-character-of-war-in-midst-of-fundamental-change.

Methodology

Gaddis: The Landscape of History

This monograph will employ the historical case study approach outlined by John L. Gaddis' book *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past.* Gaddis argues that unlocking insights through historical analysis requires the historian or researcher to view history as a landscape. When viewing the landscape, the researcher needs to stand above events and achieve a "wider view" of events, that is, a more informed perspective than is possible in the present. Gaddis' method directs researchers to "smooth over the details, to look for larger patterns" all with the purpose of identifying significant lessons for the future. After doing so the historian or researcher is closer to having enough insight to distill the landscape, creating a "package" for others to learn from the events and process.³⁶

When applying Gaddis' method to Korean War mobilization, this monograph will examine the US Army mobilization plan in 1946 and the US strategic environment between 1946 and 1950. Then assess the US Army's execution of mobilization and expansion in 1950-1951, followed by identifying impacts of sustaining mobilization through July 1953. Finally, the monograph concludes by reviewing the Eisenhower Administration's "New Look" strategy, the 1955 *Reserve Forces Service Act*, and lastly examines the 1958-59 Army mobilization plan.

As Gaddis puts it, "we know the future only by the past we project into it."³⁷ In the end, after critically applying Gaddis' analytical method to the mobilization plan before the Korean War, the execution of mobilization and expansion between 1950 and 1953, and the updated plans following the Korean War, this monograph aims to identify measures that will mitigate the friction of a future US Army mobilization effort in support of LSCO, and to provide informed

³⁶ John L. Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 5-8.

³⁷ Ibid., 3.

recommendations for US Army mobilization in a post-industrial age.

Background, October 1946 – June 1950

Army Ground Forces' Mobilization Plan 15497

This case study's first step is to review the US Army Ground Forces (AGF) *Mobilization Plan 15497*. Created in 1942, AGF oversaw the US Army's mobilization during World War II, and also executed the army's demobilization after the war's end. AGF updated the army's mobilization plan and published *Mobilization Plan 15497* in October 1946.³⁸ The AGF 1946 mobilization plan is chosen for further study because it was the last AGF update prior to June 1950.

Mobilization Plan 15497 provided the framework to expand US Army units in the continental United States in the event of major war. The personnel numbers were informed by authorized strengths outlined in various War Department Troop Basis summaries published earlier that year. The base document also highlights critical assumptions, timing and readiness goals, priorities for training, and guidance for processing re-inductees versus non-prior service inductees. Mobilization activities in the first three months would be decentralized, with the eight regionally-distributed numbered field armies developing their own mobilization operations plan. The field armies were directed to include National Guard units in their mobilization plans. Transition to centralized execution would occur after three months when additional infrastructure, trained cadre, and other overhead would support such a shift.³⁹

Three foundational requirements would largely determine whether or not the mobilization plan would meet its throughput objectives. First, the plan relied upon the availability of a large pool of previously-trained personnel to meet immediate requirements. Second, the plan assumed that the declaration of mobilization day (M-Day) would precede the commencement of operations

³⁸ US Army Ground Forces, *AGF Mobilization Plan 15497* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, 1946), 1.

³⁹ Ibid., 1-6, 17.

(D-Day) by at least three months, time that would allow the training infrastructure to become operational. Third, all National Guard units would immediately federalize on M-Day.⁴⁰

Preparing infrastructure and cadre would take at least ninety days; AGF plans forecast full operational training capacity seven months after M-Day. The plan called for all inductees in the first four months of mobilization to be assigned directly to units; first-time inductees would receive an eight-week basic training from their unit, while re-inductees would receive "little or no basic training." New inductees arriving at replacement training centers between M + 91 and M + 180 would complete a thirteen-week basic training. Those arriving after M + 181 or after would receive a seventeen-week basic training.⁴¹

The AGF plan included a breakdown of anticipated personnel input and output at the respective army camps, as well as by each combat arm. In total, replacement training centers would receive 338,000 combat arms trainees (cavalry, infantry, field artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, and armor) between the fifth and twelfth months of mobilization, an average of 42,250 each month. The AGF mobilization plan forecast a total of 2,142,500 soldiers mobilized in one year, of whom re-inductions would account for 1,267,000. New inductees would comprise a scant 332,500 of the total.⁴²

⁴⁰ US Army Ground Forces, *Mobilization Plan*, 3-5, 17.

⁴¹ Ibid., 4, 67.

⁴² Ibid., 12, 19.

			and the second second	ILTZATION	PERIOD				
COMBAT ARM *	V	· VI	VII	VIII	IX	X	XI	XII	
AA.	800	800	800	800	800	800	1600	400	
10 ²	18600	19200	24800	22000	29600	44800	24400	22200	
ι.	4800	6400	7200	8000	8800	13600	8000	7600	
AA	3200	3200	4800	4000	5600	8000	4800	3800	
RMD	1600	21400	2400	3200	3200	4800	3200	3000	
OT AL	29000	32000	1,0000	38000	48000	72000	42000	37000	

Figure 2. Replacement Training Center Flow Period M + 121 – M + 365. US Army Ground Forces, *AGF Mobilization Plan 15497* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, 1946), 1.

The mobilization plan's third annex, "Phased Troop Basis," provided details for Regular Army units' phased deployment from the "Zone of the Interior" (ZI), as the continental United States was then called, to an overseas theater. The cascading chart of personnel expansion starts with army and corps headquarters (HQs), moves down to divisions, and provides details down to battalion, company, and detachment. In the first six months, projected units ready to deploy included one field army and one corps HQs, two infantry divisions, and one armored division. The pace changed significantly between the sixth and the twelfth month. In that period, mobilization would produce two additional army HQs, six more corps HQ, nineteen infantry divisions, and five armored divisions. Under certain circumstances, some units would deploy overseas at reduced combat readiness but were to be assigned only "defensive roles at outlying bases." The mobilization focused on Regular Army units; National Guard (NG) and Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) mobilization plans would only be developed following activation.⁴³

Figure three shows that AGF planners accepted that 2d Infantry Division would be the only non-airborne infantry division above fifty percent of its authorized strength of 15,936

⁴³ US Army Ground Forces, *Mobilization Plan*, 22-23, 2-3.

personnel on M-Day. Eleven infantry divisions would start mobilization at 1,993 personnel, just thirteen percent of authorized strength. The average M-Day personnel strength of the first twenty-nine infantry divisions to mobilize would have been twenty-four percent (3,897 of 15,936 authorized). In the following figure the symbol (s) indicates the month available to deploy.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ US Army Ground Forces, *Mobilization Plan*, 21-22.

52	3	24	5	ę	12	8	RI 19	2	• • • •	2	2	5 1	5	0	2	8		141	F	⊊ : -		£ 3	12	148	64	50	51	24	25	55	8	1 57	28	2	619	8	b3	3	50	_			IIX			1	9774			
-	_		_	_	+	+	+		-		+		+	_	-	(S)	(S)	(3)		_	+	-	_				_		-			_	_	-					-	-		1	IX		+LL6	4226				
					4	-		ľ				1-1	(3)	(3)	[3]			_	_	_								<u> </u>				_	-				[3]	(3)	1	4	T	T	X		T	1	T		(\$)	
										101	(2)	(8)																	-			14740	14740			(8)						+		-	-	+	+	(3)	_	
					101	(2)	(S)	101	(0)	101					1													T	1	14740	14740				(8)					-		+	H			-	+		_	
	-		(s)	(3)	(s)			T	T	Î		-		1	T	T	T	-	T		Î		1				T	40	14740			Ť	1				1		1	-	_	1	TITY							
-	-	(S)	-	-	-		1	t	T	1	-			1		-		-	+	+	t	-				13	85		1	-		-	-		+			+	+	-			IIA	-						
_				-	-	+		+	+	+	+			+	-	+			-			18	5	33	89	13778	14485		+	-		-	-	-	-			+	+	_	T		PT		_	1	T	1	Π	
_				_	_	+	-		-		-	1	-									12808	142	13683	129							-	_		1		_					t				+	+	+	-	-
																1 cena	15385	14085	14588	11565	11929																					+			-	+	+	+	-	_
											90251	12507	14045	13008	11894	11603	ľ																					11 900	TTEN	4			P.		_	1	-			
	(S)				-	16735	14046	0000	10/0	Ť.	1	T	T	T	1	1	1			T	T	Ĩ			1		-	T	T	T			1	1	T		95AA		1	1			111							12770
(s)		+	14976	15126	16735		1	-	-	•	1	T	T	t	t	1				-	-	1			T	_	+	t	1	Ħ	-	1	1		+		5	7	+	-		1	11						13675	
6020	11121	13383	14	15	16	+.	1	+-	+-	+	1	+-	-	+	-	+		-	-	-	-	+-		+	$\left \right $	-	+	+	1	+	+	+	+	56 (S)		11258			+	-		T	-				5117016	14307		
797 6	797 11		197	797	797	LAL	197	104	101	100		LAL	797	197	797	797	197	797	197	797	797	797	797	. 197	797	797	797	101	464	197	797		TUT	538 5565		538	58	536	8 -	-			1	Pactor	538	538	F	681		1 107
1993	1993		-		1995	-	1004	1.00	+-	CRIT	-				T		-		-	-		-			-	-		-		-	-	-	+	3032 6	+	1416 5	-	-		ŕ	1	PT11.000			1	1	1	1537	H	
	17	t	-	+	+	÷	+	+-	+-	+	- 0			_	-				_				1		_	8				10	-			t	1)	I		To F/O Pos	31	9236	9236	+	12089		
3230	8331	12586	12186		1995 15945		12210	11061	1001	12441	1001	01/21	15246	12211	11097	10808	12686	13286	12791	10586	10026	112011	113451	12886	17121		22KD 15AA6	1904	1995 13945	1995 13945	1004 15945	1995 1304.5	1006 18045	1996	1516 9256	MC 0	7619	1516 92 <u>36</u>		1	6	1		Cadre	- 11		1516	1537 18		
96	05	50	8		19	+	0.0			0.4	0		8	90	62	0 4	2 9	0	10	0	2 9	2 10	22	0	19	++	22	101	161	191	101	191	100	+	+	9		1516	-	-	T	+	INITIAL STRENGTH	M-Day Ce	1	1	10000	Colo	632	
12706	4	3350	_	2600	-	÷	4660	4.4		7-4 2406	- 1	4		3726		1 5130	Ť	-	2145		0400	1			1	2960	-	+	0	4	124	-		8757	1	1548		64	-	_		+		-H	+	-		1		-
. Wash	mbell Kv	Calif.	. 164	son, Col	, Wash	pbell Ky	N 1 1000	nu had	Tanna Tanna	KOT, ALB	" Annale	inridge,	T Gab	k, La	r, Mich	ffee, Ar	od. No.	llen, Al	on, SC	ain, Mis	ey, Iex.	lace. Te	uis Obis	le, Cali	20, Tex.	te, Ore	orn, Mis	MA BU	son, Col	Wash	Moll I	o Mano	-	d. Tex.	R	d, Tex	III .	Tool Tool	Tat anno		-		PTOM.		Tex .	IN . un	a, Calif	Inc. Oa	JN -	att Vo
Pt Lewis, Wash	Comp Campbell Kv	Pt Ord, Calif.	Pt Meade, Md	Camp Carson, Colo	Pt Lewis, Wash	Camp Campbell Ay	Ft Devens, Mass	Town Edu	Tennand dama	Case Kucker, ALA	Camp Accessonry Amo	Cp Breckinridge, K	Indiantown Gap, Pa	Camp Polk, La	Pt Custer, Mich	Camp Chaffee, Ark	Ft L. Wood. No.	Ft McClellan, Ala	Ft Jackson, SC	Camp McCain, Miss	Camp Maxey, rez.	Cemp Forrest, 184	Cp San Luis Obispo	Camp Beale, Calif	Cemp Howze, Tex.	Camp White, Ore	Cp Van Dorn, Miss	The Manda MA	Cemp Carson, Colo	Pt Louis Wash	Cann Camball Ev	t Deven	Pt Dix, 1J	Camp Hood . Tex.	Pt Luox Ky	Cent Hood, Tex	Mine Cam	Camp Cool			1.12		SPARTOM.		Cp Hood, Tex	Pine Came - MY	Co Cooke, Calif Pt Bunce MC	Pt Benning Oa	Tt Brage NC	AUS (1) by Pickett Va
None	None	1	1			T	BOILe		15							Hone	TC		None	- N	Mone	1	1		None	None (00	1	1			25				Tom-	~	T	-	1		CADRE	SOURCE	119		RA			AUS (1)
15936						t	1	1	Ì		1	1				1	Ī		Ī			1	Î			1				H	+	-	+	10762	+	-		-	+		T	1		AGG .			ACASI	TJUCU		
15096		-	-		1		-	+	-	-	T		-	-	-	+					1						+	-	-		-	+	+	-				+	+-			-	ETO	a	+		-	12/30		
44 150	-	<u>.</u>	-			+	+	+	+		+	+	-	-	-	+	-		_	_	-						+	+	-		-	4	+	5A 10066	1					-		-	H STRENDTH		_	_		21 16		_
769			1			1	1	1	t	1	1				+	1				1	+	t				T	+		-	+	+		+	612		-	-		+	-			AUTH	OFF N/WO	+	-		27	-	-
7	-	-				T	1				1	-			-						-	-	-					2	1	+	-	ť	+	19			-			-		-	0/4	Pa C		-	e	1	-	-
24	3d	40	58	35	RA		2	36	0.0		0	12	28	21	40	55	5	20	51	39	00 Da.	- 14	1	52	37	43	92	ATTR	ADS AD	RA	RA					48	8	1	li	-			Tant	nate	AUS	1	e'l	âl	198	AITS
	2																				09 100 170 070 070 100 100 100 100 100 100	0, 410 M					-	-	1		1	3	G) Bi						ĺ	1					\$				1 (c) X-1 2	
Infar.try							Ē										0				140 17	17 122712			-	R.V.				1	4										-		The Party	IARMORED			J) Tř		1 1 1 1 1 1	
22 Ir	~	3	25	26	122	00	30	-	- 22			*	35	0	37	0 0	Pi Pi	1	42	43	+ -	41 0+	47	60	pu -	50	14	1 12	54	a 55 ±	at ac it	1	1) 29	60 1 09	-	62	1	64	+	-			Line	No LARM		201	3		ر. جنہ	

Figure 3. Division Order of Mobilization. US Army Ground Forces, *AGF Mobilization Plan* 15497 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters Army Ground Forces, 1946), 22-23.

The fourth annex, "Replacement Training Centers for AGF," detailed the anticipated branch-immaterial basic training load at each of the fourteen planned replacement training centers. Seven of the fourteen were in operation at the time of the plan's publication, and those seven were assumed to be active on M-Day. The other replacement centers would gradually become operational, reaching full capacity at the seventh month. AGF planners projected an average trainee capacity of 38,000 for the first month. This number would increase by 2,000 – 5,000 for each of the first six months, ending month six with a load of 56,000. Just as in the division-and-above mobilization plan, throughput increased significantly from month seven onward. Throughput projections reached 142,000 in month nine, and peaked in month eleven at 181,500.⁴⁵

13,000 58,000 19,000	. 38, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 18, 1	opo Ovechaud istu istu istu istu	46	000 2,500 0verteed 1920 3050	44	4903 4500 0varbest 1920 2080	5) 18 18 3800 7800	,600 ,600 ,500 07967.bmad 970 1520	14 37 <u>Lend</u> 3200 7200	460 460 0verheed 970 2360	97, 188,	480 480 07% rbs.sd 1920 2540	116	
18,040 d Orertac 10 1010 10 1610 10 1670	18, al Lond 5800 6800 4400	opo Ovechaud istu istu istu istu	13 Love 7200 7700	0700750000 0700750000 1920 2050	- <u>15</u> Lond TRDO	0mertaen±	18 Lend 3800 7800	,500 Overhead 970 1920	517 Level 3200 7200	0mmmead 970	lait, <u>Lond</u> (6400	,480 Overband 1920	46 Lond (8800	4680 Overtheed 2530
d Omertae 19 1910 19 1910 19 1970	1 Lond 5500 6800 4400	Overhaud Into 1610 1970	<u>Lond</u> 7200 7700	Overteend 1920 2050	Lond	Onertaest 1920	50057	Overhead 970 1920	Level 3200 7200	Overheed 970	Lond (Overband 1920	Lond (07478484 2530
0 1610 0 1610	5800 6800 6400	1810 1810 1970	7200 7700	1920 2050	TROO	1920	3800 7800	970 1920	3200 1200	970	6400	1920	8830	2530
0 1610 0 1670	6800 6400	1610 1970	17:00	8050		-	7200	1920	1200					
0 1610 0 1670	6800 6400	1610 1970	17:00	8050		-				23.60	RADO	2540	10400	\$120
io 1870	6400	1970			0000	2000								
			5400				8000,	2060	800	2400	6300	2540	10600	3120
0 1670	MOO			1670	6400	1710	8400	1710	5402	1920	6830	3540	104:00	5140
	varv	1870	5400	1670	7600	1989	7400	1980	1000	2220	8800	2640	10400	5120
							1700	710	6200	970	4800	1440	5400	1920
									24:00	630	5600	1680	7200	21.60
									2700	900	8,000	1680	7200	2180
											8200	SID	6800	2060
					1500	680	5800	VTÓ	8800	PRO	4800	1440	7800	23.80
											2600	940	8600	1980
1870	6600	1400	6400	1470	540C	1710	6400	1710	8400	1980	8300	3490	9809	20 10
0 1460	. 5800	3480	6900	1680	5800	970	1400	680						
					8800	970	3200	970	3200	970	4800	1640	1400	8340
-		770	\$200 42,500	970 11,410	\$200 68,800	95) 12,990	8200 51,500	97Ú	3200	810	5400 87,500	1990	10400	5120
000	1462	1460 5800 770 2400 0 10,280 88,000	1483 5200 3400 770 2400 770 0 10,220 88,636 10,220	1462 5200 3480 5200 770 2400 770 5200 0 10,280 88,060 10,280 42,800	1462 5830 1480 5900 1480 7760 2400 770 5900 970 8 10,582 18,086 10,286 42,830 15,410	0 1870 6600 1670 6400 1670 6400 1462 5800 1480 5900 1480 5900 8800 770 2400 770 8200 670 9000 0 10,580 88,080 10,280 42,800 15,410 48,800	0 1870 6600 1670 6400 1670 6400 1970 1460 5800 3480 5800 3460 5800 970 8800 970 770 2400 770 8200 970 8500 970 0 10,220 88,630 10,220 42,620 33,410 68,800 12,780	0 1870 6600 1670 6600 1670 6600 1770 6600 1460 5800 3480 5900 1680 5800 970 5800 5800 970 5800 970 5800 0 770 2400 770 8800 970 8800 970 5800 0 10,580 58,080 10,280 42,800 15,410 68,800 12,980 51,500	1870 6600 1670 6600 1670 6600 1710 1462 5800 1680 5800 1660 5800 370 460 680 1462 5800 1680 5800 1660 5800 370 480 680 2400 970 2400 770 3200 970 4200 370 0 770 2400 770 4200 17.400 51,600 17.400	2730 1870 6660 1670 6400 1670 6400 1710 6400 1710 6400 1462 5800 1480 5900 1460 3900 970 1480 980 8300 970 2400 770 8300 970 12,000 970 3200 0 10,220 88,000 10,200 42,000 12,000 51,000 51,000 48,000	2730 300 1670 6600 1670 6600 1670 6600 1710 6600 1710 6400 1800 1670 5600 3680 5600 1670 6600 1710 6600 1800 1680 970 5600 970 5600 970 370 370 370 570 7400 770 5600 970 560 970 560 970 370 370 970 770 7400 770 5600 11,410 66,000 12,668 53,600 77,500 970 0 10,820 68,000 10,220 48,000 12,600 77,600 33,600 14,600 17,200	2730 300 8600 5500 1500 880 8800 870 8800 970 8800 970 8800 1600 100 1600 1600 1600 100 8400 1710 8400 1900 8200 1600 100 8400 1600 1600 1900 8400 1710 8400 1900 8200 1460 5000 1600 5600 1600 1600 970 8600 5300 970 5800 970 8200 970 8400 6300 970 3200 970 8400 17,200 87,500 0 10,220 88,000 12,800 12,800 31,800 14,800 17,200 87,500	2700 300 2600 1680 2500 970 1500 680 5800 970 8400 970 4600 1440 2400 940 1670 6400 1490 6400 1710 6400 1710 6400 1980 8300 2400 1460 5800 3400 5800 1480 5800 970 2400 660 1460 5800 3400 5800 1480 5800 970 2400 660 5800 970 2400 770 5800 970 4800 1980 5800 970 820 970 3200 970 4800 1980 0 10,220 2400 770 5800 12,400 49,600 33,600 14,600 17,200 87,500 82,630	2700 300 2400 1.680 7200 1500 800 1440 7820 1500 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800 800

The AGF 1946 mobilization plan reflected lessons learned from World War II

⁴⁵ US Army Ground Forces, *Mobilization Plan*, 22, 67.

mobilization. The plan's strengths included initial decentralized execution, unit mobilization priority, and clear expectations for personnel input and outputs by location and skill. Two primary weaknesses, though, remained unmitigated. First, the plan focused only on total mobilization and expansion of the army, *a lá* World War II. With an output goal of over 2.1 million soldiers at M + 365, AGF's plan did not discuss how a scaled-down mobilization might be accomplished. Second, the 1946 plan absolutely depended on more than 1.2 million re-inductees. In 1947, trained personnel remained abundantly available; the plan offered no suggestions regarding what changes might be required as the veteran demographic aged out of eligibility. Another consideration seemingly unappreciated in the mobilization plan was the expected reaction from a democratic society to a strategy that asked men who had already fought for their country to fight twice before others would fight for the first time.

Defense Budget Turbulence

President Harry S. Truman invested significant effort to drive defense spending down to a level he considered reasonable for a peacetime environment. President Truman, a veteran of World War I, believed that the Pentagon was flush with "waste and duplication.".⁴⁶ In *The War for Korea 1945-1950: A House Burning*, Allen Millet characterized Truman's view as wanting "to run the DoD like his failed clothing store: on the cheap.".⁴⁷ In addition to President Truman's pressure to reduce federal expenditures, World War II demobilization, the concept of Universal Military Training (UMT), and the US atomic monopoly all contributed to a turbulent planning environment for army leaders.

Between V-E Day and the North Korean attack across the 38th Parallel, the US military's

⁴⁶ Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: American in Korea 1950-1953* (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 11.

⁴⁷ Alan R. Millet, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2005), 234.

annual budgets oscillated between growth and contraction. The Army Fiscal Year (FY) budgets followed a similar back-and-forth pattern. President Truman openly prioritized funding the air force and navy as being a better investment than ground forces in the atomic age. Between 1946 and 1950, the US Army's budget swung from contraction to growth and back to contraction again. The US Army's FY 1947 (1 July 1946 – 30 June 1947) budget was \$5.3 billion. It fell to \$4.6 billion 1948, before rising to \$6.02 billion in 1949, and then contracting to \$4.27 billion in FY 1950. This unpredictable movement year to year on budget wreaked havoc on the Army's ability to forecast personnel, equipment, and training requirements. Truman requested just thirteen billion dollars for the total Department of Defense budget for FY 1950; Congress instead allocated \$14.34 billion. In response, Truman signed the budget authorization but "impounded" the \$1.34 billion difference and directed the services to limit expenditures to his requested amount of \$13 billion. Worst of all, none of the above budget determinations resulted from an attempt to match budgets to requirements...⁴⁸

Along with a declining budget, army personnel strength shrank precipitously with the World War II demobilization. Following the war, Truman saw rapid demobilization as part of the nation's character, stating, "No people in history have been known to disengage themselves so quickly from the ways of war." In an April 1946 press conference, Truman called the completed demobilization of seven million uniformed personnel "the most remarkable demobilization in the history of the world, or 'disintegration' if you want to call it that.".⁴⁹

In 1947, US Army endstrength authorization stood at 684,000.⁵⁰ In tandem with the army budget cuts, personnel authorizations fell in 1948 to 667,000; 651,000 in early 1949; and 591,000

⁴⁸ William W. Epley, "America's First Cold War Army 1945-1950," *AUSA Land Warfare Paper*, no. 32, August 1999, 17-23, accessed 16 December 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a383639.pdf.

⁴⁹ Marion and Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force*, 30.

⁵⁰ Richard W. Stewart, *The United States in a Global Era, 1917-2008,* American Military History series, vol. 2 – (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009), 205.

by June 1950.⁵¹ Actual strength in 1948 was significantly lower than the authorized strength. The failure to adopt Universal Military Training and shortfalls in recruitment led to an actual strength of only 538,000, a shortfall of 128,000 from the budgeted endstrength.⁵² The continual budget oscillation, reduced personnel authorizations, and even lower actual staffing levels together significantly threatened any successful execution of the rigid AGF mobilization plan.

Universal Military Training (UMT)

Universal Military Training offered a possible solution to the problem of how to maintain a pool of trained personnel to support the AGF mobilization plan. UMT first emerged as a potential solution for rapid mobilization following World War I. The demand for a four-million man expeditionary army was unforeseen before April 1917. Following the war, UMT became the centerpiece of arguments for improving mobilization laws and regulations..⁵³

President Truman communicated a preference for UMT to his cabinet on 17 August 1945, and at the same time showed disdain for the draft process as "important for long-run military security.".⁵⁴ President Franklin D. Roosevelt broached the idea of UMT in his final State of the Union address but offered few details; President Truman filled in the gaps during an address to a joint session of Congress in October 1945..⁵⁵ Truman's UMT plan called for males to complete a year of "defense training" upon graduating high school or upon turning eighteen years old. Trainees would receive basic military instruction and education on citizenship, morality,

⁵¹ Epley, "America's First Cold War Army," 11.

⁵² Ibid., 16.

⁵³ John M. Kendall, *An Inflexible Response* (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1983), 29.

⁵⁴ George O. Flynn, "The Draft and College Deferments During the Korean War", *The Historian* 50, no. 3, (May 1988): 371, accessed 10 November 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/24447108

⁵⁵ John Sager, "Universal Military Training and the Struggle to Define American Identity During the Cold War", *Federal History 5*, (2013): 57-74, 60, accessed 13 December 2020c http://shfg.org/resources/Documents/FH%205%20(2013)%20Sager.pdf

hygiene, vocational skills, and basic education.⁵⁶ After completing initial training, the graduates would serve six years in the non-drilling inactive reserve, available for recall in the event of war.⁵⁷ Over time, UMT would provide a reliable pool of trained personnel while maintaining the American tradition of a small standing army. For Truman, probably the most attractive benefit of UMT would be the cost savings from having a small Regular Army.

Truman received strong support for UMT from army leaders, who estimated UMT could provide three million trained men by 1958.⁵⁸ Despite support within his cabinet and the Pentagon, the UMT concept enjoyed very little support in Congress. Clay Blair bluntly asserted, "the UMT had no chance of being approved in peacetime.".⁵⁹ Terrence Gough characterized UMT simply as "infeasible.".⁶⁰

Selective Service Act 1948

The legal authority for compelling citizens to serve in the military following World War II fell victim to the same turbulent environment surrounding defense budget and strategy decisions. The Wartime Selective Training and Service Act expired in March 1947, and at the same time, Soviet attitudes became increasingly aggressive. The Soviets overthrew the non-Communist Czechoslovak government in March 1948. Fearing further Soviet aggression in Europe, US Army Chief of Staff Omar N. Bradley pushed Truman to request a reinstatement of the draft..⁶¹ Congress, eager to formally reject the UMT concept, reinstated the draft with the

⁵⁶ Brian M. Linn, *Elvis's Army: Cold War, GI's and the Atomic Battlefield* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016), 30.

⁵⁷ Ibid., 60.

⁵⁸ Hanson, Combat Ready, 14.

⁵⁹ Blair, Forgotten War, 7.

⁶⁰ Terrence J. Gough, *US Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach*, The US Army in Korean War series (Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1987), 21.

⁶¹ Blair, *Forgotten War*, 38.

Selective Service Act of 1948. Truman signed it on 24 June, the same day the Soviet Union closed Berlin's ground transportation routes to the west.⁶²

The *Selective Service Act of 1948* required males aged eighteen to twenty-six to register for the draft, with inductions possible at age nineteen. The service commitment for those chosen and qualified to serve was twenty-one months, followed by five years of non-drilling reserve time or three years in a drilling unit of the National Guard or Organized Reserve. The 1948 Act allowed men who enlisted in the National Guard before 18.5 years old a deferment from service in the Regular Army, provided they participated in National Guard unit training. The *Act* was a boon to National Guard accessions, at the same time reducing the available pool of new inductees for the Regular Army. In addition to outlining induction parameters, the *Act* also provided the president the legal authority to access the reserves. Specifically, without a declaration of war or national emergency, the president could order reservists to active duty without their consent for twenty-one months.⁶³

Division Force Structure

The AGF mobilization plan assumed forward-deployed units at full strength. The combination of reduced budgets, occupation duty missions, and the predominant view that M-Day would precede D-Day contributed to a decision by the Department of Army to set the peacetime strength of even overseas divisions at 12,500, a much lower strength than the combat authorization of 18,900.⁶⁴ Often the on-hand strength of US Army units fell well below the 12,500 peacetime ceiling. The Eighth US Army in Japan was no different. On 25 June 1950, the first day of the Korean War, Eighth Army aggregate personnel strength equaled about ninety-three percent of the peacetime authorization, resulting in division personnel strength averages of

⁶² Marion and Hoffman, *Forging the Total Force*, 32.

⁶³ Ibid., 32.

⁶⁴ Hanson, Combat Ready, 14.

11,625, with a deficit of roughly 7,000 soldiers per division to reach combat strength.⁶⁵

The Eighth Army infantry divisions' combat readiness arguably rated worse than the personnel numbers show, due to a lack of new equipment appropriations, personnel turnover, and personnel imbalance. James Schnabel termed the imbalance of support personnel over combat personnel as "excessive.".⁶⁶ Reaching the 12,500 personnel cap came at the cost of three rifle battalions, six heavy tank companies, three field artillery batteries (105mm), three anti-aircraft artillery batteries, and 100 anti-tank guns (90mm) per division..⁶⁷ Adding to this challenge was the average annual turnover rate of personnel throughout FECOM of 43 percent..⁶⁸ Millett labeled the turnover of personnel the "greatest villain preventing the Eighth Army from being combat-ready.".⁶⁹

Calibrated Force Posture

In June 1950 the Regular Army included 591,000 personnel, the vast majority organized into ten divisions.⁷⁰ Four of those divisions were in Japan, two were in Europe, and the remaining four divisions were in the ZI. Army personnel in FECOM totaled roughly 108,000; their assessed response time to deploy from Japan to Korea via air or sea was estimated at one to two weeks, compared to the expected response time for US-based divisions estimated at two to three months..⁷¹ Arguably on the eve of the Korean War, the army could respond faster in FECOM than any other overseas theater.

⁶⁵ James F. Schnabel, *The United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009), 54.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 54.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 54.

⁶⁸ Blair, Forgotten War, 49.

⁶⁹ Millet, A House Burning, 81.

⁷⁰ Epley, "America's First Cold War Army", 23.

⁷¹ Department of History USMA, *Confrontation in Asia*, 8, 153.

Background Conclusion

The years between World War II and the Korean War were marked by turbulence and uncertainty, but the army's guiding paradigms remained largely intact. Preparing for another total war, the *AGF Mobilization Plan* relied predominantly on trained veterans to meet the personnel demand inherent in mobilization and expansion. The rigid plan did not consider a time where a large pool of trained personnel would be unavailable. The concurrent turbulence in army budget allocation and endstrength were antithetical to the programmed personnel expansion found in the 1946 mobilization plan. UMT, seen as the key to creation of a perpetual pool of trained personnel, never gained congressional support. The army's decision to cap division endstrength below sixty-seven percent created a massive deferred demand for individual and small unit replacements to allow the divisions to fight as designed. In June 1950, the army's ability to mobilize and respond rapidly relied overwhelmingly on war being in proximity to its large concentration of forces in Japan and Europe as well as the large pool of trained veterans.

Korean War Expansion and Mobilization June 1950 – August 1953

D-Day Before M-Day

On the morning of 25 June 1950, the Communist Korean People's Army (KPA) crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the Republic of Korea. Discussion in President Truman's cabinet centered on the appropriate response. General Omar Bradley, since 1948 the presiding officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, advised Truman, "we must draw the line somewhere [and Korea] offered as good an occasion for drawing the line as anywhere else."⁷² On the day of the attack, Truman directed his representative in the United Nations (UN) to propose a resolution to the UN Security Council demanding an immediate end to hostilities and withdrawal of the KPA to the north. The resolution passed, but North Korean forces continued their attack. Two days later, the Truman Administration presented a second UN resolution, to provide air and naval support to the Republic of Korea. This resolution also passed, with fifty-three member states signifying support, twenty-nine of which offered specific assistance.⁷³ On 30 June, Truman authorized General MacArthur to employ American ground forces in Korea. The next day, elements of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment of the 24th Infantry Division deployed from Japan to Korea. Lieutenant Colonel Charles "Brad" Smith led this task force of 540 soldiers.⁷⁴ In just days, North Korean aggression and the subsequent US response had shattered all existing army mobilization planning assumptions, especially that M-Day would precede D-Day.

General MacArthur's first request to the US Joint Chiefs for reinforcements asked for two infantry divisions. He soon revised the request to a field army of four divisions, an airborne regimental combat team, an armored group of three medium tank battalions, and 30,000 fillers to

⁷² Blair, Forgotten War, 72.

⁷³ Stewart, *The United States in a Global Era*, 228.

⁷⁴ Alan R. Millet, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2010), 137.

bring Eighth Army units to their wartime strength.⁷⁵ MacArthur's request totaled more than 75,000 soldiers. At the time, the 82d Airborne Division was the lone ready division in the ZI. The DoD possessed no viable option to support MacArthur's request. In 1983, Colonel John Kendall, researching Korean war mobilization, bluntly stated that the army's mobilization concepts in June 1950 "did not in the least fit the Korea situation.".⁷⁶

Initial Mobilization Response: 25 June 1950 – 31 August 1950

On 30 June, President Truman signed an extension of the 1948 *Selective Service Act*, which pushed the expiration date out to 9 July 1951. On 1 July the army extended all current enlistment contracts by one year. On 6 July, the president approved Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson's request to raise the army's authorized strength from 630,000 to 680,000. On 14 July the president approved another requested personnel increase, this time to 740,500. Five days later Johnson secured a third increase; the army's authorized strength now stood at 834,000. On 3 August, the US Congress removed the existing limitations of the army's size at the president's request. On 10 August Truman approved an increase to 1,081,000 and approved federalizing four National Guard divisions and two Guard regimental combat teams.⁷⁷

The growth in trained personnel could not keep pace with presidential decisions. The four federalized divisions needed nine months to prepare for combat. General J. Lawton Collins, the US Army Chief of Staff, visited MacArthur on 10 July and informed him that his request for a field army and four divisions could not be approved. Instead, he should plan to have his four divisions brought to full strength and to receive one additional army division, an army regimental combat team, and a marine division.⁷⁸ Faced with this reality, General MacArthur and his

⁷⁵ Gough, US Army Mobilization and Logistics, 26.

⁷⁶ Kendall, An Inflexible Response, 158-166.

⁷⁷ Gough, US Army Mobilization and Logistics, 1-2.

⁷⁸ Ibid., 4.

subordinate commanders began reallocating their four understrength divisions to make three near full-strength divisions. Eighth Army chose to cannibalize the 7th Infantry Division in order to strengthen the other three divisions.

On 19 July the Department of the Army authorized full combat strength for all FECOM divisions.⁷⁹ To fill this requirement, the army levied Regular Army units in the ZI to provide 50,000 personnel of their available 140,000.⁸⁰ The army also prepared two Regular Army divisions for deployment to Korea, levying non-deploying units to bring the identified infantry divisions to combat strength. The moves came at a cost, as entire units were levied out of existence. Conrad Crane provides an example of this from September 1950 at Fort Lewis, Washington. The post adjutant general levied a recently federalized National Guard artillery battalion for forty percent of its enlisted personnel. The levied personnel then joined units deploying earlier than their Guard battalion, to include non-artillery units. The adjutant general then levied other Fort Lewis personnel—to include musicians, firefighters, and recent basic training graduates—to replace the losses in the artillery battalion.⁸¹ Kendall argued this created a "come as you are" mobilization process.⁸²

The 2d Infantry Division sailed for Japan on 17 July. Two weeks later, on 31 July the division landed instead in Korea. The 3d Infantry division sailed from San Francisco on 30 August. Deploying the 2d and 3d Infantry Divisions significantly lowered the army's available personnel to train inductees. Three months later, Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolté, the US Army G3, estimated that it would take until at least July 1951 to regenerate the group of CONUS

⁷⁹ Schnabel, United States Army and Korean War, 89.

⁸⁰ Ibid., 118.

⁸¹ Conrad C. Crane, et. al, '*Come as You Are' War: US Readiness for the Korean Conflict,* (Carlisle, PA: Historical Services Division, US Army Heritage and Education Center, n.d.), 33, accessed 17 October 2020. https://ahec.armywarcollege.edu/documents/U.S._Readiness.pdf.

⁸² Kendall, An Inflexible Response, 166.

Regular Army units considered the army's "general reserve."⁸³

The immediate personnel challenges remained, and the army turned to the Selective Service, Organized Reserve Corps (ORC), and the National Guard for a solution. On 27 July the army amended its draft call request up from 20,000 to 50,000, with inductees required no later than 30 September. After receiving an insufficient response to a request for volunteers, the army involuntarily recalled 30,000 enlisted men from the ORC's volunteer and inactive reserve categories on 3 August, leaving units in a paid drill status intact. This recall was quickly followed by an involuntary recall of 7,862 officers (lieutenant and captain) on 10 August. Thirteen days later the army announced another involuntary recall of 77,000 ORC members. The decision to mobilize National Guard divisions was less straightforward. Army leaders debated whether the National Guard should activate for anything less than total war. Also weighing on decisionmakers was the potential impact on the national economy, and which states would provide the units. Ultimately, on 10 August President Truman approved calling four National Guard divisions and two regimental combat teams to federal service. To minimize potential political and economic impact, divisions were chosen from four different regions: Pennsylvania (28th Infantry Division); California (40th Infantry Division); New England (43d Infantry Division); and Oklahoma (45th Infantry Division), as well as South Dakota and Tennessee (196th and 278th Regimental Combat Teams, respectively.⁸⁴

As the mobilization gears continued to churn in the United States, the fighting raged in Korea. Eighth Army casualties (wounded and killed in action) totaled 7,859 between 1 July and 5 August, while individual replacements to FECOM in the same period totaled only 7,711.⁸⁵ To turn the war in favor of the UN forces, MacArthur planned a turning movement, striking at what he estimated to be an overextended KPA. His attack would consist of a two-division amphibious

⁸³ Gough, US Army Mobilization and Logistics, 5, 28.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 5-8.

⁸⁵ Schnabel, United Stated and the Korean War Policy, 128.

landing at the port of Inchon, west of Seoul. For the attack, MacArthur would have the US Army's rebuilt 7th Infantry Division and the 1st Marine Division. For additional personnel, MacArthur turned to the South Korean people. He struck an agreement with South Korea's president, Syngman Rhee, and soon 8,600 Korean "augmentees" were shipped to Japan for two weeks of training with the 7th Infantry Division. The challenge of integrating the quicklynicknamed KATUSA's (Korean Augmentees to the US Army) was exacerbated by their "practically non-existent" knowledge of English or military training..⁸⁶

Expanded Mobilization: 1 September 1950 – 30 June 1951

In the third month of the war, mobilization objectives stabilized and the infrastructure capacity improved. On 1 September the 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions were federalized, and the 28th and 43rd Divisions followed four days later. The divisions, much like the Regular Army divisions, started at under fifty percent strength.

Efforts to fulfill the personnel expansion requirements were slowed by the lack of awareness of individual personnel readiness within the reserve components. On 30 June the army knew the ORC stood at 600,417 personnel, 416,402 in the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves, and 184,015 in organized reserve units. However, the readiness of individuals in the reserves was a mystery. To reduce expenses, the Army suspended the requirement for reserve member periodic physicals in 1947. They kept minimal records on reserve officers, and enlisted soldiers' records were "virtually non-existent." As a result, large numbers of recalled reservists proved to be physically unfit, and for many others active service caused economic hardship.⁸⁷ A significant number of selective service deferments further exasperated the army's ability to meet the personnel demands in FECOM and elsewhere. Over an eight-month period starting in August

⁸⁶ Gough, Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War, 47.

⁸⁷ Schnabel, US Army and the Korean War, 122.

1951 the Selective Service delivered 490,000 inductees. In the same period 5,257,000 men were granted deferments based on either dependency (a father or husband) or their job.⁸⁸

To quickly meet the personnel requirements the Korean War demanded, the army turned to the large pool of trained World War II veterans. Later in 1951, Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall praised those veterans for their compliance with their induction calls. He stated, "providing combat-ready reinforcements...could only be accomplished by extensive calls for additional service from the veterans of World War II." In all, roughly 640,000 World War II veterans served again in the Korean War, the vast majority by means of involuntary induction...⁸⁹

After the successful Inchon landing on 15 September, combined with further success against retreating North Korean forces, MacArthur's optimism became contagious. The June objective of restoring the pre-war borders evolved into annihilation of the North Korean Army and reunification of Korea under the Rhee government. As UN forces marched north towards the Yalu River, the Defense Department directed army leaders to review existing force requirements; as a result, November's individual replacements were canceled. UN "sending states" contributions were also reduced. Greece had promised a brigade, but supplied only a battalion. France deployed a battalion in late 1950, but as attention shifted to defense of Indochina against the Viet Minh, would not replace it once it completed its tour of duty.⁹⁰ Such decisions would prove costly only weeks later, when Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong, confident that his troops could change the outcome of the war, committed 400,000 of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) to the cause.⁹¹ Within weeks, UN forces retreated south of the 38th Parallel.

The Chinese intervention changed the war, and on 16 December President Truman formally declared a national emergency. Truman also announced that the armed forces would

⁸⁸ Flynn, "The Draft and College Deferments," 382.

⁸⁹ Marion and Hoffman, *Forging a Total Force*, 41.

⁹⁰ United States Military Academy, Department of History, *Confrontation in Asia*, 39.

⁹¹ Millet, *They Came from the North*, 298.

expand from 1.5 million personnel to 3.5 million.⁹² The following month President Truman signed an executive order providing an incentive to volunteer for men aged eighteen to twenty-five: by volunteering, men would only have to serve twenty-one months instead of three years for draftees. Later in June, as the 1948 Selective Service Act extension neared expiration, Truman signed the Universal Military Training and Service Act. The UMT Service Act lowered the draft age from nineteen to eighteen, extended selective service to 1 July 1955, and established a commission to generate a UMT program outline. In March 1952, Congress acted on the UMT commission's recommendations. In a 236 to 162 vote, the House of Representatives recommitted the bill to the Senate Armed Services Committee, which killed the initiative supported by President Truman.⁹³

As the Korean War approached the end of its first year, the total number of recalled reservists, federalized guardsmen, and draftees stood at roughly 853,000. The Army recalled 173,496 individual reservists, 34,225 reservists in troop units, 95,000 National Guardsmen, and drafted 550,397 through selected service.⁹⁴

Mobilizing, Training, Fighting, Demobilizing (July 1951- August 1953)

On 1 July 1951, Gen. Ridgway invited his North Korean and Chinese counterparts to begin negotiations for a cease-fire.⁹⁵ At the same time, FECOM revised the individual replacement standards. Under a "constructive months of service" (CMS) process, soldiers would earn points for each month of service as well as for where that service was performed. Soldiers on the front line or close to the front would receive four points each month, soldiers in rear areas, two points; additional points accrued for wounds and decorations of valor. After earning thirty-six

⁹² Marion and Hoffman, Forging a Total Force, 38.

⁹³ Gough, US Army Mobilization and Logistics, 11-12, 15.

⁹⁴ William M. Donnelly, " 'The Best Army that can be Put in the Field in the Circumstances': The US Army, July 1951-1953," *Journal of Military History*, 71, (2007): 815.

⁹⁵ Millett, They Came from the North, 456.

points, soldiers became eligible to rotate back to the United States. Following implementation of this policy, the monthly turnover rate for Korea as a whole in FY 1951 would average 29.6 percent..⁹⁶

Individual rotation in the summer of 1951 meant the army was now executing mobilization, training, fighting, and demobilization simultaneously. The stresses of doing so would build steadily into 1953, by which point the pool of eligible veterans as well as most of the recalled reservists and federalized guardsmen would no longer be available. The Fiscal Year 1953 projection from the US Army G-1 projected a personnel loss of 740,000, but projected gains were only 650,000. At the same time, personnel turnover increased to 56.5 percent in FY 1953. William Donnelly assessed that the high turnover rate negatively impacted leadership, quality training programs, endstrength, global force requirements, and force generation capacity.⁹⁷

Korean War Mobilization and Expansion Conclusion

Prior to 30 June 1950, the army prepared for total war. The Korean War proved that limited war was not only possible in the atomic era, but also that limited war was more probable. World War II veterans provided critical trained manpower in the first twelve months of the war. In the second and third years of the war the army found itself conducting large-scale combat operations while still mobilizing, training, and demobilizing. Sustaining mobilization was difficult and by 1953, most draftees had no previous military experience; meanwhile the army steadily lost institutional experience owing to the individual replacement policy. The army had added eight divisions in the first ten months of the war, and later added two more. The time to reflect on the experience and prepare for future mobilization was now at hand.

⁹⁶ Donnelly, "The Best Army that can be Put in the Field," 818.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 815.

Post Korean War Adjustments

Strategy and Policy (1955-1956)

As Gaddis directs us to view history as a landscape, the next step in reviewing adjustments and lessons from Korean War mobilization is to review the Eisenhower Administration's post-war strategy. The primary source for this review is the *Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956.*⁹⁸ Following the Korean War, President Dwight D. Eisenhower directed a reduction in defense funding to better align such spending with a peacetime environment. He also based the "New Look" strategy on massive nuclear retaliation. The strategy prioritized the navy and air force over the army in a way similar to what Truman had done before the Korean War. Critical to the strategy was an ability to employ "nuclear - air retaliation power." The strategy promised a balanced budget and strong economy, capable of transitioning and supporting war if necessary. A strong mobilization base was identified as an essential element of national security. Regarding force design, President Eisenhower observed that "we should base our security upon military formations which make maximum use of science and technology in order to minimize the number of men."⁹⁹ By 1957 the Eisenhower Administration strategy pushed the air force budget to \$16.5 billion, nearly as much as the army (\$7.5 billion) and navy (\$10 billion) combined.¹⁰⁰

In 1955, his final year as army chief of staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway objected to President Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy. He argued the strategy wrongly assumed that any future war would be total and involve large-scale employment of nuclear weapons. Explaining his position in his memoirs, Ridgway stated, "Korea taught us that all warfare from this time forth

⁹⁸ Kenneth W. Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956*, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6 – (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1998), 1, accessed 24 February 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy_V006.pdf

⁹⁹ Ibid., 2-9.

¹⁰⁰ Ingo Trauschweizer, *The Cold War US Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008), 29.

must be limited. It could no longer be a question of whether to fight a limited war, but of how to avoid any other kind."¹⁰¹ Fundamentally, Ridgway believed wars were won by men, not machines.¹⁰² Despite this objection, President Eisenhower's guidance remained unchanged; Regular Army endstrength would be cut, and reserve forces combined with a responsive mobilization enterprise would mitigate the risk. Army endstrength quickly fell from 1,404,000 in 1954 to 1,025,000 in 1956.

The rigid New Look strategy limited American options to respond to Soviet aggression to anything but rapid escalation, casting doubt on the wisdom of months- or years-long mobilization plans. The importance of mobilization remained a frequent topic of discussion among the service chiefs; the army and navy pushed for war plans laying out branch and sequel plans lasting up to D + 48 months, while the air force argued for plans covering only a year. Air force leaders argued that, due to America's nuclear capability compared to that of the Soviets, a war would not extend past a year. As a result, mobilization growth past M + 6 should not be considered relevant to future war plans. The chairman of the joint chiefs chose a horizon nearly in the middle of service chief recommendations, at D + 30 months. Internal to the planning horizon, D-Day and D + 6 months would serve as important benchmarks. In the army's case, it would consist of seventeen divisions on D-Day, expand to twenty-eight divisions at D + 6, and up to eighty-two divisions on D + 30.¹⁰³

Reserve Forces Act 1955

The next focus area for reviewing the landscape is to review legislation that impacted mobilization planning, specifically the *Reserve Forces Act of 1955 (RFA '55). RFA '55* amended the 1952 *RFA* and became law on 9 August 1955. The law's stated purpose was, "[t]o provide for

¹⁰¹ Burton I. Kaufmann, *The Korean Conflict* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999), 70.

¹⁰² Traushweizer, *The Cold War US Army*, 33.

¹⁰³ Condit, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy*, 27-30.

strengthening of the Reserve Forces..."¹⁰⁴ To strengthen the reserves and nest with the president's strategy, the armed forces reserve endstrength authorization rose to 2.9 million, up from the 1.5 million authorized in 1952. Of that 2.9 million total, the army's reserve component authorization equaled roughly fifty percent: one million in the US Army Reserve and 440,000 in the Army National Guard. To reduce the number of understrength reserve divisions that would expand if mobilized, the number of such divisions fell from twenty-five to ten...¹⁰⁵

As noted earlier, one of the challenges to mobilization during the Korean War resulted from the army's lack of visibility regarding which individual members were fit for combat. Another awareness gap resulted from a lack of knowledge regarding reserve unit training status. *RFA '55* focused on correcting both of those issues. It specifically directed each cohort to "provide a system of continuous screening of units and members of the Ready Reserve." The screening's purpose was to ensure "no significant attrition would occur to those members or units during a mobilization." To create a better awareness of reserve training status, *RFA '55* mandated the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report to the President and Congress. The report would summarize the previous fiscal year's reserve training and other efforts to strengthen the reserves.¹⁰⁶ *RFA '55* also mandated active participation in reserve training for Ready Reserve forces..¹⁰⁷

US Continental Army Command Mobilization Training Program (1958)

In 1948, AGF transformed into Army Field Forces (AFF). The mission of AFF in 1948 was "general supervision, coordination, and inspection of all matters pertaining to the training of

¹⁰⁴ Reserve Forces Act of 1955, Public Law 84-305, *U.S. Statutes at Large 69* (1955): 598-604, accessed 15 January 2021, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-69/pdf/STATUTE-69-Pg598.pdf.

¹⁰⁵ Stewart, *The United States in a Global Era*, 267.

¹⁰⁶ Reserve Forces Act of 1955, 598-600.

¹⁰⁷ Stewart, *The United States in a Global Era*, 266.

all individuals utilized in a field army."¹⁰⁸ In 1955 AFF transformed into US Continental Army Command (USCONARC).¹⁰⁹ USCONARC's responsibility included oversight of the six numbered continental armies, Regular Army and reserves' training, preparing the future army, and defending the United States..¹¹⁰ The plan in focus for this study is USCONARC's *Mobilization Plan Fiscal Year 1958-1959*, dated 19 September 1958.

The USCONARC Mobilization Plan was an expansive document that covered replacement training centers, service schools, unit training centers, and corps and divisions maneuver areas. The plan prioritized rapid expansion, with most training centers to begin training on or before M + 1 (month). The plan commonly projected full operational capability in the third month of mobilization. Nearly all unit and replacement training centers would operate at peak capacity by M + 6. Early inductees (M +1 to M + 6), anticipated to initially number 92,279, would undergo an eight-week basic training as the anticipated number would rise to 261,160 at M + 6. Service school operations would follow a similar pattern, with 53,562 soldiers in training in M + 1, rising to 160,197 at M + 6..¹¹¹

Under this plan, Fort Jackson, South Carolina, figured prominently as a replacement training center for infantry. Fort Jackson provided support for an eight-week basic combat training course and several advanced individual infantry training courses. The planned capacity of Fort Jackson basic training was zero on M-Day, 11,538 at M + 1, and peaked at M + 6 with a load of 21,000..¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ Crane, 'Come as You Are,' 27.

¹⁰⁹ Stewart, *The United States in a Global Era*, 262.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 262.

¹¹¹ US Continental Army Command, *USCONARC Mobilization and Training Plan - 1958* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters US Continental Army Command, 1958), 5.

¹¹² Ibid., 318.

Objective	Work Unit				Est Work	load (thou	usands)	
· · ·			M/1	M/2	M/3	M46	M/9	M/12
a. Fld ex & fld maneuvers	Pers		1,427	1,607	1,607	29,739	122,296	208,933
b. Army svc sch tng	Stu		53,562	72,828	100,415	160,197	158,833	158,772
c. Repl tng	Trn		97,279	146,162	180,389	261,160	254,548	254,548
d. Tng in AFSWP	Trn		631	797	555	531	141	188
e. Trp tests	Tests	,				NONE		
f. Extension crs the	g Part					NONE		
g. Ing in civ institutions <u>1</u> /	Stu		1,050	1,250	1,653	5,000	5,000	5,000
h. Tng in sch and/or fac of other svc								
 Unit tng at cl I instl; 	Pers							-
Asg CG USCONA	RC:		573,227	627,160	710,905	609,247	634,751	629,779
Asg other DA	agencies:		88,593	92,954	98,319	64,735	53,957	38,855
Total			661,820	720,114	809,224	673,982	688,708	668,634

Figure 5. USCONARC Mobilization Training Capacity. US Continental Army Command, USCONARC Mobilization and Training Plan - 1958 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters US Continental Army Command, 1958), 5.

- Jones		nfantry							
	REPLACEM	EPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTER							
	Ft Jackson, S.C.								
		Phased Inputs	and Training Loads (No	n-Cumulative)					
TYPE TRAINING	'TYPE INPUT'WKS' '& MOS LOAD'TNG'	M-DAY Month Mon		M+9 M+12 Months Months					
BASIC COMBAT TRAINING (Load)	BCT 181	11538 12	023 11/1/19 22000	1 21000 1 21000					
AIT AND REFRESHER TRAINING				1 1 1 1 1					
'111.0 ' Light Weapons '111.1 '	' AIT Input' 8'	18	0 180 180	180 180					
'111.7 ' Infantryman	MOS Load	1458 · 36 1689 · 92		1 28 1 28 1 374 1 374					
00, 112.0 Heavy Weapons	' AIT Input' 8 '	1 12	una de la constante de la const	· 120 · 120					

ī

168

1 31

Figure 6. Fort Jackson Replacement Training Center Mobilization Capacity. US Continental Army Command, USCONARC Mobilization and Training Plan - 1958 (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters US Continental Army Command, 1958), 318.

1

Ref Input' 2 '

MOS Load

Т 92

T 266 1 248

1 367

1148

1 314

1 1h8

1

314

1/18

1 314

, 112.1

Infantryman

		N+1 .	M+2	hthly Loads (1	N+6	1 N+9	M+12	N+15
ERANCH .	M-DAY	STRENGTH	STRENGTH	STRENGTH	STRENOTH	STRENGTH	STRENGTH	STRENGTH
LG	508	508	508	508	0	0	0	0
MD	911	897	684	752	1899	2049	1995	795
мі	490	579	579	608	352	21	21	21
MP :	668 ¦	668	668	668	0	i o	0	0
OD I	961	2941	2193	2172	1121	11460	1458	1063
PI	0	87	197	106	0	0	0	. 0
PW	514	1440	1440	1499	985	828	828	671
QM	513	3699	3699	3699	2836	2513	2578	2169
SC	1192	1337	290	290	290	290	290	2125
SF	1004	7075	4246	5613	6300	6506	1753	1151
TC	639	10529	10545	13746	6050	10016	10763	9046
						1		
			1		1			
TOTAL	27162	78013	76917	69946	58585	61311	46988	46432

U. S. CONARC

UNIT TRAINING CENTER

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

		N#1 -	M+2	hthly Loads (1	M+6	N+9	M+12	M+15
5.PANCH	M-DAY	STRENOTH	STRENGTH	STRENGTH	STRENOTH	STRENOTH	STRENGTH	STRENGTH
ASSIGNE	D_CG, USCO	NARC						
AB	11486	11486	11486	0	0	0	0	0
IN .	0	13748	18000	18000	31748	27496	13748	13748
(H)	111/2	1142	1142		0	i o	0	0
HQ	328	656	656	656	0	0	328	. 0
AA	704	704	704		0	0	0	0
AB	510	510	510		510	510	510	510
AG	13	82	69	163	168	30	55	80
AR	719	4378	4378	4378	0	0	0	0
AV	42	42	ц ц	42	42	42	42	42
CM	866	1697	2028	2172	2154	1265	1830	1826
- 324	1528	6928	6086	5908	2459	6209	7783	10216
FA	2393	6849	6736	7314	1671	2075	3006	2969
FI	31	31	31	. 0		0	. 0	

Figure 7. Fort Bragg Unit Training Center Capacity. US Continental Army Command, *USCONARC Mobilization and Training Plan - 1958* (Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters US Continental Army Command, 1958), 131-132.

Unit training centers followed a similar rapid expansion path between M + 1 and M + 3,

peaking at M + 6. Representative of this growth pattern is Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The

USCONARC Mobilization Plan calls an M-Day strength of 27,162 personnel with growth to

78,013 personnel at M + 1. Infantry unit training at Fort Bragg expands from zero on M-Day to

13,478 on M + 1 and 31,748 at M + 6. 113

¹¹³ US Continental Army Command, USCONARC Mobilization and Training Plan, 131-133.

Post-Korean War Adjustments Conclusion

Following the Korean War, the army once again faced reduced budgets and endstrength. President Eisenhower's focus on economic strength, reliance on massive nuclear retaliation, and dependence on rapid personnel mobilization to support another world war scenario all shaped USCONARC's *Mobilization Plan* design. The service chiefs agreed that, once begun, mobilization must be executed as rapidly as possible, emphasizing the first six months of the process. The key legislative adjustment following the Korean War was the *Reserve Forces Act of 1955. RFA '55* directed reserve screening to reduce individual attrition during mobilization and also required the services to report their efforts on strengthening the reserves. The USCONARC plan significantly enhanced measures to establish unit training, replacement training, and service training. Cumulatively, these strategy, policy, and authority changes facilitated the adoption of an informed and improved army mobilization plan in 1958.

Conclusion

Personnel mobilization and force expansion for the Korean War were principally army problems to solve, and this is still true today. In 1946, fresh from victory in World War II, United States leaders placed their confidence in the US military's ability to respond to potential threats. They did so without fully understanding that the post-war force in no way resembled the massive organization fielded to defeat the Axis powers. President Truman nevertheless accepted this situation out of fealty to the American tradition of a small peacetime standing army. Even with a Regular Army of more than 591,000 soldiers in 1950, its readiness in no way resembled what it had been just five years before. The decision to staff most Regular Army combat divisions between one-third to two-thirds of their combat strength, combined with mostly lower endstrength and readiness in the reserve components, created nearly insurmountable obstacles to successful mobilization. Worse, immediate post-war mobilizations envisioned only total war. The mobilization plan was gradual, requiring three months to prepare cadre and infrastructure, seven months to generate the first fully-trained individuals, and even longer to prepare units for combat. The juxtaposition of D-Day with M-Day at the start of the Korean War was wholly mitigated by recalling approximately 640,000 trained World War II veterans to fight in the Korean war. Their criticality to the success of the United Nations campaign during the first six months of war cannot be overstated.

The role the trained veterans played in Korean War mobilization was obvious to military leaders at the time. Following the war, reserve forces received renewed congressional attention as well as greater emphasis in the updated national strategy. These measures reflected the guidance from President Eisenhower to the Department of Defense, to prioritize technology and reduce personnel requirements. In response, the air force chief of staff argued that no future war would last more than a year, and mobilization was unlikely to be decisive in a conflict centered on nuclear exchanges. Still, army and marine leaders recognized that the first six months of

43

mobilization would be the most critical. The army updated its mobilization plan in 1958. Army mobilization would now start in the first month. Training center capacity would peak by the third month of mobilization—a stark contrast to the 1946 plans that required three months just to prepare to receive trainees.

The army of 2021 finds itself in an environment similar to that of both 1946 and 1955. There is fiscal uncertainty, and budget and army endstrength cuts are highly probable. Once again, the army risk mitigation strategy relies heavily on technology to offset personnel cuts. Considering the current environment, the army must act now to harden the army's mobilization enterprises. First, the army must update its strategy and MDO concept to account for protracted war. Second, the army must aggressively expand the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) to meet personnel demands of Regular Army divisions. Third, the army must double the number of Regular Army SFABs.

The army's strategy and planning documents must acknowledge the possibility of war lasting longer than a few weeks. *Multi-Domain Operations in 2028* governs every decision made in Washington, DC, to move the army into the future, at least to 2035. However, the concept fails to account for fiscal austerity, the likelihood of long-duration conflict, and a largely US-based force posture. An updated MDO concept that addresses the aforementioned realities would better guide for the army on its future path—and serve as a more credible message to potential adversaries.

Secondly, the army must expand its pool of trained personnel by strengthening the IRR to meet projected Regular Army personnel demand. The IRR should be incentivized and expanded to boost both overall numbers and their readiness for assimilation into a deploying unit. An improved and capable IRR becomes even more critical in a resource-constrained environment. Any cuts to Regular Army endstrength must be offset by additional authorizations in the IRR. Further, the skills and units that the expanded IRR should prioritize are combat arms skills and units that can readily "plug into" Regular Army divisions. Doing so supports the units most likely

44

to be the first to respond to conflict and the first to require individual replacements. The IRR critical skills list must be reviewed annually to ensure the IRR pool aligns with projected future personnel requirements. In addition, expanding the IRR is certainly more politically and socially acceptable than alternatives like UMT, as President Truman once envisioned, or a return to conscription through Selective Service. Nearly every effort to implement or resurrect those programs has been an effort in futility, with no practicable likelihood of congressional approval. Never mind that the army is ever more selective in accessing new recruits when considering mental and physical aptitude. This selectivity inherently makes any "universal" program wildly inefficient, potentially consuming significant organizational energy for minimal return. Instead, by recruiting and conducting both screening and training of individuals, the army can maintain high standards and better position itself to respond rapidly, in the first six months of conflict.

Third, the army must expand from five to ten Regular Army SFABs, and assign one to each division. Currently, the army has five Regular Army SFABs and one National Guard SFAB. The SFAB's current role includes training and integrating foreign partner forces and building partner capacity, but each is also capable of expanding to become a Regular Army brigade combat team. This flexibility would provide division commanders with credible options tailored to their mission and personnel needs. The ability of SFABs to integrate trained personnel mobilized from the IRR and provide relevant refresher training could be decisive for the commander. This capability also builds "anti-fragility" into a training enterprise based on fixed facilities. SFABs could provide the ability for flexible and resilient training centers at the parent divisions' installations or at an expeditionary location.

There is strong agreement that the army and the joint force as a team face an uncertain future of great power competition marked with potentially increased lethality. The time is now for the army to lead the joint force to prioritize mobilization. The army must update its strategy to account for long-duration conflict, expand and strengthen the IRR, and provide each combat

45

division with an SFAB. These three actions can increase the army's anti-fragility, ensuring it can respond to any unforeseen events and still complete the army mission to win the nation's wars.

Bibliography

- An Act to Provide for Strengthening of Reserve Forces, and for other Purposes, Public Law 84-305, U.S. Statutes at Large 69 (1955): 598-604. Accessed 15 January 2021. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/STATUTE-69/pdf/STATUTE-69-Pg598.pdf.
- Blair, Clay. *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953*. New York: Anchor Books, 1989.
- Bridges, Olen C. and Andree Navarro. "Mobilizing for Major War." *Parameters* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 87-93. Accessed 16 November 2020. https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol47/iss2/10/.
- Coker, Kathryn R. United States Army Reserve Mobilization for the Korean War. Fort Bragg, NC: US Army Reserve Command, 2013. Accessed 7 January 2020. https://www.usar.army.mil/Portals/98/Documents/historycorner/Korean%20War%20Pub _Revised%20June%2012-2013.pdf
- Condit, Kenneth W. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-1956*, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, vol. 6. Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, 1998. Accessed 24 February 2021, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Policy/Policy V006.pdf
- Crane, Conrad C., Michael E. Lynch, Jessica J. Sheets, and Shane P. Reilly. n.d. '*Come as You Are' War: US Readiness for the Korean Conflict*. Carlisle, PA: Historical Services Division, US Army Heritage and Education Center, 2019. Accessed 17 October 2020. https://ahec.armywarcollege.edu/documents/U.S._Readiness.pdf.
- Donnelly, William M. " 'The Best Army that can be Put in the Field in the Circumstances': The US Army, July 1951-1953." *Journal of Military History* 71, (2007): 809-847. Accessed 1 November 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/30052891
- Epley, William, W. "America's First Cold War Army 1945-1950." Land Warfare Paper, no. 32, August 1999. Accessed 16 December 2020. https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a383639.pdf
- Flynn, George O. "The Draft and College Deferments During the Korean War." *The Historian* 50, no. 3, (May 1988): 365-385. Accessed 21 November 2020. https://www.jstor.org/stable/244447108
- Gaddis, John, L. *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past.* New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Gough, Terrence J. US Army Mobilization and Logistics in the Korean War: A Research Approach, The US Army in Korean War series. Washington, DC: US Army Center for Military History, 1987.
- Grady, John and Sam LaGrone. "CJCS Milley: Character of War in Midst of Fundamental Change." USNI News. Last modified December 4, 2020. Accessed 10 January 2021. https://news.usni.org/2020/12/04/cjcs-milley-character-of-war-in-midst-of-fundamental-

change.

- Hanson, Thomas E. *Combat Ready? The Eighth U.S. Army on the Eve of the Korean War.* College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2010.
- Ivey, Matthew. "The Broken Promises of an All-Volunteer Military." *Temple Law Review* 86 (2014): 525-576. Accessed 15 January 2021. https://www.templelawreview.org/lawreview/assets/uploads/2014/08/Ivey_ForPub.pdf

Kaufmann, Burton I. The Korean Conflict. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999.

- Kendall, John M. An Inflexible Response: United States Army Manpower Mobilization Policies, 1945-1957. Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International, 1982.
- Linn, Brian M. *Elvis's Army: Cold War GI's and the Atomic Battlefield*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016.
- Marion, Forest L., and Jon T. Hoffman. *Forging a Total Force: The Evolution of the Guard and the Reserve*. Washington, DC: Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2018.
- Millett, Allan R. *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning*. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005.

—. *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came from the North.* Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2010.

- Office of Army Reserve History. "Our History: Post 9/11." Accessed 8 January 2021. https://www.usar.army.mil/OurHistory/SinceSept11/#:~:text=Since%202001%2C%20mo re%20than%20300%2C000,include%20every%20major%20combat%20zone.&text=As %20an%20enduring%20operational%20force,missions%20at%20home%20and%20abro ad
- Office of Public Affairs, National Guard Bureau. "About the Army National Guard." Accessed 8 January 2021. https://www.nationalguard.mil/Portals/31/Resources/Fact% 20Sheets/ARNG% 20History % 20Fact% 20Sheet% 20(Dec.% 202017).pdf.
- Office of the President of the United States of America. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: The White House, 2017.
- Page, Glenn. 1950: Truman's Decision; the United States Enters the Korean War. New York: Chelsea House, 1970.
- Sager, John. "Universal Military Training and the Struggle to Define American Identity During the Cold War", *Federal History 5*, (2013): 57-74. Accessed 13 December 2020. http://shfg.org/resources/Documents/FH%205%20(2013)%20Sager.pdf
- Schnabel, James F. *The United States Army in the Korean War, Policy and Direction: The First Year.* Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009.

Stewart, Richard W. The United States in a Global Era, 1917-2008, American Military History

series, vol. 2. Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2009.

- Tan, Michelle. "Putting People First: McConnville Looks to Revolutionize How Soldiers Serve." Association of the US Army. Last modified October 3, 2019. Accessed 10 December 2020. https://www.ausa.org/articles/putting-people-first-mcconville-looks-revolutionizehow-soldiers-serve.
- Trauschweizer, Ingo. *The Cold War US Army: Building Deterrence for Limited War*. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2008.
- US Continental Army Command. USCONARC Mobilization and Training Plan 1958. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters US Continental Army Command, 1958.
- US Army Ground Forces. Army Ground Forces Mobilization Plan 15497. Fort Monroe, VA: Headquarters US Army Ground Forces, 25 October 1946.
- US Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication 1-0, *The Army*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019.
- ———. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019.
- ———. Army Regulation 500-5, Army Mobilization. Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2015.
- ------. Army Regulation 600-8-111, Army Mobilization, Manning, and Wartime Replacement Operations. Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2019.
- ——. The Army Strategy. Washington, DC: Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018. Accessed 10 October 2020. https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/the_army_strategy_2018.pdf
- ———. Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-212, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945*. Washington, DC: 1955.
 - ——. TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The US Army in Multidomain Operations 2028*. Joint Base Langley-Eustis, VA: US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 6 December 2018.
- US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2018.
- ------. National Defense Strategy, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy*. Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018.
- US Joint Chiefs of Staff, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America*. Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018.
- US Military Academy, Department of History. *Confrontation in Asia: The Korean War*. West Point, NY: The United States Military Academy, Department of History, 1981.

Whitlock, Joseph. "The Army's Mobilization Problem." *The War Room*, US Army War College. 3 October 2017. Accessed 17 October 2020. https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/armys-mobilization-problem/.