

The Operational Reserve: Potential Impacts on Strategic Manpower Depth during Mobilization for Large-Scale Combat Operations

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

The Operational Reserve: Potential Impacts on Strategic Manpower Depth during Mobilization for Large-Scale Combat Operations, by MAJ Joshua Wayne Yarbrough, 55 pages.

Beginning with World War II, the US Army Reserve (USAR) underwent several transformations in force structure and design to meet the nation's strategic objectives, culminating as an operational reserve. The ultimate ramifications of the operational transition remain to be determined, but the USAR's decreased emphasis on total mobilization, increased specialization, and reduced force structure have left the Total Force lacking strategic depth. This study examines how changes to US doctrine and policies have constricted the ability of the USAR to support expanding the Total Force beyond its authorized 1,035,000 end-strength objectives. The study further reviews how the overreliance on reserve units, driven by reductions and mismatch in the Total Force structure, has limited the USAR's ability to simultaneously support operational requirements and provide the foundation of a strategic reserve. While better equipped, trained, manned, and ready today, the USAR has become increasingly functional – focused on combat support, combat service support, and training units that support up to full mobilization only. The USAR, therefore, remains limited in its capability to reorganize and support the expansion of the US Army beyond the existing force structure. Given these conditions, this monograph seeks to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the potential ways the USAR would assist the US Army to conduct a total mobilization, if required, to support large-scale combat operations against current and future adversaries.

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Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AR	Army Regulation
ARNG	United States Army National Guard
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DODI	Department of Defense Instruction
FM	Field Manual
IRR	Individual Ready Reserve
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP	Joint Publication
LSCO	Large-scale combat operations
NDA	National Defense Act
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
ORC	Organized Reserve Corps
RA	Regular Army
RC	Reserve Component
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USC	United States Code

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Introduction

The historic preoccupation of the Army's thought in peacetime has been the manpower question: how, in an unmilitary nation, to muster adequate numbers of capable soldiers quickly should war occur.

– Russell Weigley, note to author George Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973*

Since World War II, the US Army Reserve (USAR) has undergone a series of transformations culminating with its transition from a strategic to operational reserve force. The changes occurred roughly during three periods: World War II to the Berlin Crisis, the Berlin Crisis to Operation Desert Storm, and Operation Desert Storm to post-9/11 stability operations. Each successive modification provided additional context to understand better how the USAR evolved from a strategic to an operational reserve. The changes reflected emergent national strategies designed to meet current and anticipated future operational environments. Each iteration, therefore, provided insight into how the USAR might support large-scale combat operations (LSCO), including expanding the force beyond merely improving its readiness and capacity to mobilize rapidly. Resulting from its operational emphasis, the USAR today represents the most lethal and ready federal reserve force the United States has fielded. The increased readiness, however, has corresponded to a progressively focused and tailored combat support and combat service support (CS/CSS) force that lacks sufficient strategic depth. The erosion of strategic depth resulted from the USAR's decreased force structure, increased functional specialization, and its enlarged utilization as an operational reserve.

The USAR's strategic to operational reserve evolution did not occur in a vacuum. The shift in the role of USAR reflects the implementation of the US Army's Total Force Policy. This policy dictates the integration of the active and reserve components (RC) into a single,

interdependent force.¹ The concept originated with Secretary of the Army Melvin Laird during the establishment of the All-Volunteer Force in the 1970s and included elements of GEN Creighton Abrams' "Abrams Doctrine."² Laird and Abrams thought that following the Vietnam War the US Army should be structured so that a president could not send military forces to combat without activating reserves. The events of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War further reinforced that the next war might be won or lost before a draft-based mobilization could occur.³ The RCs, therefore, became full partners in US Army operations, but only to support strategic requirements for full mobilization against the Soviet Union or a similar threat.

The end of the Cold War resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union, representing a significant paradigm shift in the employment of RC forces. Numerous studies following Operation Desert Storm (ODS), including the Base Force and Bottom-Up Reviews, recommended additional utilization of the RCs to meet limited contingency operations. The increasing operational tempo exacerbated by additional post-9/11 mission requirements exposed capability shortfalls in the active component that required the complete shift of the RCs from a strategic to operational reserve. The increased use of, and possible overreliance on, the Army Total Force has unfortunately decreased focus on the ability to rapidly expand the Regular Army (RA) beyond the capabilities currently maintained in the RCs, a historical purpose of the USAR.

The strategic necessity to support total mobilization remains evident. The 2018 National Defense Strategy stresses that "the Nation must field sufficient, capable forces to defeat enemies and achieve sustainable outcomes that protect the American people and our vital interests."⁴ It

¹ National Defense Research Institute, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1992), xx.

² Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).

³ Lewis Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and the Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime," *Parameters* 21, no. 2 (Summer 1991): 35.

⁴ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018).

remains unclear, though, how an operational USAR could support a total mobilization similar to World War II or even a significant contingency operation such as Korea. The solidification of the Operational Reserve concept as a tenet of the Army Total Force Policy instead indicates that the US Army lacks a dedicated strategic reserve capable of expanding beyond its authorized 1,030,500 end strength.⁵ The USAR specifically provides functional CS/CSS that hinder its ability to reorganize and integrate draftees or volunteers to generate additional combat power.

While this monograph focuses on the total mobilization of manpower, it is essential to differentiate the various types and legal authorities associated with mobilization. During the early stages of mobilization, the Secretary of Defense or President possesses the authority to mobilize up to 60,000 Selected Reserves through Involuntary Call-Up (fifteen days), Reserve Continental United States Emergency Call-Up (120 days), and Preplanned Mobilization Support (365 days). The Presidential Reserve Call-Up (Title 10 USC 12304) authorizes the President to activate, without a national emergency, up to 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve for no more than 365 days for any operational mission. Partial Mobilization (Title 10 USC 12302) entails the expansion of the Armed Forces of the United States by the President following a declaration of a national emergency through the mobilization of Ready Reserve units up to 1,000,000 members for no more than twenty-four months. Full Mobilization (Title 10 USC 12301a) includes all existing active and reserve force structure for crisis duration plus six months. Finally, Total Mobilization requires a declaration of national emergency and legislation by Congress to authorize force expansion beyond current authorizations to meet national security objectives and requirements for a war involving an external threat to the national security.⁶

⁵ John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law 115-232, 115th Cong., 1st sess. (August 13, 2018), 132.

⁶ US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, *Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers for Congress*, by Lawrence Kapp and Barbara Torreon, CRS Report RL30802 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, October 4, 2018), 14-17.

This monograph predominantly reviews total mobilization from a manpower perspective, examining the lack of strategic depth and focusing explicitly on the USAR's role supporting the expansion of the US Army. The author acknowledges the United States Army National Guard's (ARNG) strategic and operational capabilities that would be critical during total mobilization. The author similarly notes that the ability to expand manpower rapidly cannot establish strategic depth without a robust and expansible industrial base. The infrastructure, mobility, and access required by the US to build strategic depth are likewise critical. The ability of the American government to generate the strategic impetus to expand the US Army remains a final consideration. The need for popular support plays a critical role in passing the legislation and appropriations necessary to raise new forces. These topics certainly merit additional discussion and research, but the author has deliberately chosen to scope the argument due to space constraints.

Research for this project focuses on historiography, current and past doctrine, and theoretical frameworks to study the role of the USAR and potential challenges faced when rapidly expanding the US Army. The scholarship of three transformational periods provides historical context for USAR development and employment as well as potential challenges and solutions. Doctrine and policy also provide particularly important lenses, as both allow an analysis of what has remained consistent, what has changed, and the possible impacts on the US' ability to enact total mobilization today. Thomas Kuhn and John Lewis Gaddis further shape the theoretical framework and conceptualization for the monograph. Kuhn's paradigm shift assists in understanding how conditions in the operational environment influence change to reserve purpose, doctrine, and size. Gaddis meanwhile facilitates deeper appreciation of the historical context underlying that paradigm shift.⁷

⁷ Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 43; John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 149.

The decision to place the limits and framework above was made primarily based on the following sources beginning with the US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0's discussion of the current and future operational environment. FM 3-0 outlined the necessity of examining how the US Army might rapidly expand, if necessary, during LSCO. In the foreword, LTG Michael Lundy, former commanding general of the US Army's Combined Arms Center, described the world as more dangerous than any time since the Cold War. The US Army faced adversaries achieving overmatch or parity to US combat power. He attributed this to the proliferation of advanced technology and the increasing lethality of a highly contested operational environment. LTG Lundy also pointed to US reductions in capabilities and capacities in the post-Cold War era. He asserted that the US must win with the force it has; however, Lundy left the question of what is next once the US commits everything in its current force structure.⁸

The reduction in the RA also parallels a similar decrease in the capabilities and capacities of the USAR. COL James Currie and COL Richard Crossland's *Twice the Citizen: A History of the US Army Reserve, 1908-1995* provides an overview of how the reductions also impacted the USAR through a historical lens. The work annotates the evolution of the organization, roles, and challenges faced by the USAR as it shifted from a wartime-only mobilization force to a standing strategic reserve. The USAR's strength peaked during the Cold War, but domestic politics and finances resulted in significant fluctuations culminating in a small, functional force. A key theme highlighted by the authors is that force tailoring to make the USAR complement the RA leaves the latter reliant on the former for not only strategic depth but also for smaller contingency operations.⁹ USAR historian Katherine Coker's *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Reserve, 1990-2010* reinforces the shift to an operational force by detailing the

⁸ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), vii.

⁹ James T. Currie and Richard B. Crossland, *Twice the Citizen: A History of the US Army Reserve, 1908-1995* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, Army Reserve, 2018).

critical combat and combat support capabilities the USAR has provided.¹⁰ Both books deliver insight into what role the USAR might support during a future total mobilization by establishing the context in how the USAR has supported operations from World War II through today.

Similarly, historians Henry Detlef and Gerald Shenk’s *Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present* also offers context for the US Army’s transition from a small regular force augmented by volunteer militia to a modern standing professional army with a dedicated system of reserves. The book illustrates key US legislation and policies established to assist with rapidly raising forces in times of war. More importantly, it also describes how the United States has continuously engaged in military actions in almost every year since World War II. The number and breadth of operations,

Table 1. Number of USAR Personnel Mobilized for Major Military Operations, 1950-2000

Operation/Conflict	USAR
Korean War	240,500
Berlin Crisis	69,263
Vietnam War	7,640
Just Cause / Panama	Unavailable
Desert Storm / Shield	66,357
Restore Hope / Somalia	Unavailable
Uphold Democracy	1,897
Joint Endeavor, Guard, Forge / Bosnia	12,652
Desert Falcon / Fox	268
Kosovo Force (KFOR)	505

Source: US Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. *Involuntary Reserve Activations for US Military Operations since World War II for Congress*, by Lawrence Kapp, CRS Report RL30637 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 14, 2000), 4-25.

¹⁰ Katherine R. Coker, *The Indispensable Force: The Post-Cold War Operational Army Reserve, 1990-2010* (North Carolina: Office of the Army Reserve History, 2013).

including those in Table 1, cement the need for an operational reserve but also reveals the lack of a strategic manpower reserve. The increasing utilization leaves the USAR leaves potentially overextended in the event of a conflict with a peer adversary.¹¹

Numerous policies, directives, and studies also investigated various mobilizations and the genesis of an operational reserve, but neglected to or barely mention strategic requirements. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 1200.17 ordered the RCs to provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.¹² The *2016 Reserve Forces Policy Board Annual Report* proposed definitions for an operational and strategic reserve but noted that neither are doctrinal definitions. The board defined the strategic reserve as providing supplemental capabilities and capacity to meet military mission requirements, and will generally require additional time and resources for utilization.¹³ The US Army has assigned this mission to the USAR with the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), but, as of 2017, the IRR contained only 95,000 soldiers, effectively limiting the USAR's capacity to expand the strength of the RA.¹⁴

The smaller size and high specialization of the reserve left questions about how the USAR would assist with growing the Total Army. The RAND Corporation study *Evaluating the Army's Ability to Regenerate: History and Future Options* examined regenerating the RA while simultaneously meeting operational requirements during peacetime. The study concluded that the US Army would have to draw extensively on the RCs at high levels, including significantly

¹¹ Henry Detlef and Gerald Shenk, *Citizen and Soldier: A Sourcebook on Military Service and National Defense from Colonial America to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2011), 156.

¹² US Department of Defense, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, DOD Directive 1200.17 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008).

¹³ Reserve Forces Policy Board, *Reserve Forces Policy Board Report FY17-01: Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves* (Falls Church, VA: Reserve Forces Policy Board, November 1, 2016), 78.

¹⁴ US Army Human Resources Command, "Individual Ready Reserve," February 5, 2018, accessed October 1, 2019, 0:07, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyhQ-FaYkhk>.

reducing dwell time to expand the force.¹⁵ FM 3-0 characterized LSCO as chaotic, intense, and highly destructive. It anticipated that the intensity, lethality, and brutality resulting from such operations pose significant challenges to the US Army.¹⁶ Given this environment, the options listed in the study appear incapable of replacing the all-volunteer forces promptly short of total mobilization. Beth Bailey's *America's Army: Making an All-Volunteer Force* asserted that only a massive, total war would permit the reinstatement of a draft.¹⁷ Her reasoning mirrored many of the studies, doctrines, and policies reviewed. All, however, acknowledged the potential for total mobilization but limited their discussion on how the US Army would conduct a total mobilization today. Viewed through John Lewis Gaddis' *The Landscape of History*, an examination of the history of the USAR, therefore, can provide a more sophisticated understanding of the potential ways the USAR might assist total mobilization, if required, to support LSCO against current and future adversaries.¹⁸

World War II to the Berlin Crisis: Building the Strategic Reserve

Actually, professional forces cannot satisfy the needs of large-scale warfare, because they cannot furnish more than a minor fraction of the needed strength. A democratic nation should have, in addition to its standing forces, another military organization capable of supplying quickly and efficiently great numbers of trained soldiers.

– Frederick Martin Stern, *The Citizen Army*

During World War II and the Korean War, the USAR's predecessor, the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC), filled critical personnel and equipment shortages encountered by the RA and the National Guard. Additionally, the ORC provided the supplementary force structure necessary to establish new divisions and support elements using draftees inducted by the

¹⁵ Shanthi, Nataraj, et al., *Evaluating the Army's Ability to Regenerate: History and Future Options* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017).

¹⁶ US Army, FM 3-0, 1-2.

¹⁷ Bailey, 260.

¹⁸ Gaddis, 149.

Selective Service System. However, the ORC faced significant challenges due to a lack of funding, equipment, and prioritization due to interwar and postwar fiscal policies. The doctrine, plans, and policies leading into World War II presented attempts to improve on the citizen-soldier mobilization from World War I, but many attempts at cultivating readiness were circumvented before implementation by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Similarly, the revitalization of the RC following World War II fielded a larger reserve but possessed limited flexibility to respond to a crisis such as the Korean War. Despite these underlying issues, the mobilizations for World War II and the Korean War represented progress as the US Army adapted doctrine and policy to facilitate expansion for LSCO.

World War II and Total Mobilization

The United States went to war in 1941 using doctrine and policy formulated during and immediately after World War I. Regarding policy, the National Defense Act of 1916 created the ORC, the Officer Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC). The act also established a wartime strategic reserve of trained officers as well as enlisted soldiers in medical, engineering, and quartermaster fields to facilitate expanding the RA and Army National Guard. Additionally, it authorized the first large RA of 175,000 soldiers, but it also relied heavily on traditional citizen-soldier call-ups in the event of a major conflict.¹⁹ The National Defense Act of 1920 amended the 1916 legislation, making the ORC a mandatory RC and assigned responsibility for training the reserves to the RA corps area commanders with mobilization footprints similar to the present USAR's readiness divisions.²⁰

US Army Regulation 120-10, published in 1928 and updated in 1934, provided the doctrinal foundation for mobilizing the ORC. It defined mobilization as the assembly and

¹⁹ Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of the Mobilization of the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1955), 192-195.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 378-380.

preparation of manpower for war.²¹ Detailed mobilization plans supplemented specific war plans based on anticipated conflicts and operational environments. The regulation also presented a general mobilization plan based on national defense regardless of the enemy, which reflected ORC's strategic role. The doctrine outlined roles and responsibilities for executing War Department mobilization plans to various zones of interior corps commanders and staff that could provide a model for the USAR. The 1939 version of Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, listed the ORC as constituting organized land forces of the Army of the United States but failed to prescribe the roles and functions of the reserve units.²² The 1941 and 1944 editions completely omitted the Army National Guard and ORC.²³

The lack of specificity in the doctrine above led the US Army War Plans Division to mostly ignore it and instead build plans using integrated organizational laydowns authorized in the National Defense Act of 1920.²⁴ On paper, the RA included nine divisions supported by eighteen Army National Guard divisions and thirty-three ORC divisions, which consisted of twenty-seven infantry and six cavalry divisions.²⁵ Congress failed to pass appropriations to match the 1920 authorization in the years proceeding World War II, resulting in only 104,228 reserve officers and 3,233 enlisted soldiers available in 1941.²⁶ During the war, the ROTC and other commissioning programs increased the Officer Reserve Corps to 200,000, which constituted a quarter of the entire officer corps and averaged fifty percent of mid-grade officers in draftee

²¹ US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 120-10, *Mobilization* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1928), 1.

²² US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1939).

²³ US Army, FM 100-5 (1941); FM 100-5 (1944).

²⁴ Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and A Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 2013), 44.

²⁵ I. Heymont and E.W. McGregor, *1972 Analysis of Recent Mobilizations and Deployments of US Army Reserve Components* (McLean: Research Analysis Corporation, 1972), 12.

²⁶ Currie and Crossland, 66.

divisions.²⁷ The ORC's strategic mission focused on manpower under the multiple iterations of plans, but all followed the World War I model of mobilizing a vast citizen-soldier army. The condensed Total Force structure today would also be faced with the challenges resulting from creating new forces comparable to the World War II mobilization.

Despite the war plans and organizational structure, the USAR remained an expansion base for total mobilization. The officers and soldiers represented pools of trained men plus cadres to help organize, train, and equip large numbers of citizen-soldiers.²⁸ Unfortunately, the officers and soldiers received limited training and equipment. The lack of attachment to organized units also compounded the soldier's readiness issues. Mobilizing reserve soldiers individually to augment RA and National Guard divisions stripped the few organized units of their officers. When the reserve-designated units began activating in 1942, most divisions included a mixture of active cadre and draftees, making them reserve only in name. The reserve officers further faced antipathy from RA and National Guard units during integration, mainly due to the overall unreadiness of the reserve force.²⁹ The lack of readiness, failure to equip, and the ad hoc employment of the ORC reflected its neglect by the RA before the war. The activation of the ORC units accordingly failed to meet mobilization plans that caused many challenges.

The Korean War and Partial Mobilization

World War II ORC mobilization issues, among others, resulted in many changes to policy and doctrine, which were not implemented fully until after the Korean War. As noted above, the Organized Reserve divisions existed in name only and were not recognizable as reserve units by the end of World War II. Post-war policy planned for the ORC to comprise twenty-five divisions and 2,400 non-divisional units with an end strength objective of 949,000.

²⁷ Currie and Crossland., 78.

²⁸ Martin Binkin, *US Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 18.

²⁹ Currie and Crossland, 76.

Efforts to recruit veteran officers and enlisted soldiers met with limited success due to disorganization and lack of organized units.³⁰ Competition with the Army National Guard for funding led to deficiencies in equipment, facilities, and training that units undermined readiness before the Korean War.³¹ Because of these complications, President Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 10007 in 1948, directing the Department of the Army to “organize all RC units, and to train such individuals...as may be required for the national security” to overcome challenges reconstituting the ORC.³² The 1947 National Security Act also streamlined governmentwide mobilization planning and linked it to the national strategy.³³

By 1949, the ORC end-strength objective adjusted to 579,300 soldiers, but only reached a strength of 508,617 soldiers by the start of the Korean War. Employment of the force remained postured on providing twenty-five divisions, 2,400 CS/CSS units, and 91,000 individual fillers to support the RA during the early phases of mobilization.³⁴ Organized units existed and prepared for Korea; nonetheless, a higher number of non-drilling reservists mobilized to fill shortages in RA units.³⁵ The mobilization plans reflected a World War II total mobilization, but in reality, ended up being limited in scale based on the US desired political end state. Regardless of being a limited war, over 240,500 reservists, 95,000 national guardsmen, 175,000 volunteers, and 550,000 draftees augmented the RA, resulting in over 1,060,500 soldiers total by the end of 1950.³⁶ The size of the force raised for Korea and to still maintain other global commitments exceeded the current 2019 NDAA, which authorized a Total Army of 1,030,500 soldiers.³⁷ The

³⁰ Binkin, 86-88.

³¹ Currie and Crossland, 88.

³² *Ibid.*, 95.

³³ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, and Demobilization* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), iv.

³⁴ Currie and Crossland, 95.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 99.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 99.

³⁷ NDAA 2019, 134.

scope of the Korean War reinforced the point that LSCO, even in a limited war, can require the large-scale mobilization of forces beyond current authorizations.

The USAR's difficulties organizing and managing assigned personnel and equipment directly impacted its ability to act as a strategic reserve. It also demonstrated that massive mobilizations might be necessary to support limited contingency operations outside of total war. The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 passed in response to the weakness of the ORC during the Korean War mobilization. The act eliminated the ORC and combined the divided officer and enlisted reserves corps into a unified USAR. The USAR further organized its force into ready, standby, and retired reserves with an end strength ceiling of 1.5 million soldiers. Ready reserve forces became available for wartime or any national emergency declared by the President or Congress. The soldiers further gained the ability to volunteer for active duty without involving mobilization authorities to serve in peacetime or limited contingency operations. The standby and retired reserve were subjected only to recall in the event of wartime or national emergency by congressional declaration. Most importantly, the act also directed that soldiers should mobilize and deploy as members of units instead of as individuals where practicable.³⁸ These provisions enabled the USAR to become a flexible and scalable organization capable of providing manpower depth as a strategic reserve.

The pressures and threats of the Cold War led to a continued review of the USAR. The Reserve Forces Act of 1955 amended both the 1952 act and the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. It specified an increase in the ready reserve ceiling from 1.5 million to 2.9 million soldiers. It also gave the President the authority to mobilize 1 million soldiers during a national emergency without congressional action.³⁹ The two acts, combined with the failed merger of the Army National Guard and USAR requested by the Gray Board report in 1948, led

³⁸ NDAA 2019, 100-101.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 123.

to the establishment of the USAR as a parallel strategic force to the RA and the Army National Guard.⁴⁰ Even with the adjustments, the USAR remained an expansion base for total, prolonged mobilization.⁴¹

Conclusions

The establishment of the USAR as a strategic reserve attempted to solve the complications arising from US Army failures to mobilize and integrate reservists during World War II rapidly and the Korean War. The present potential for LSCO, similar to these conflicts, emphasized that operational planners should review the doctrine/policy, organization, employment, and challenges faced by the ORC. Legislation mired by fiscal constraints created a hollow USAR supporting a skeletonized RA. Mobilization during World War II suffered significantly in early phases due to a lack of organized units, while the Korean War suffered from a lack of equipment and readiness. Both conflicts led to challenges for the US Army in creating new units, including finding available cadre, staffing the units, and integrating draftees into the formations due to organizational inefficiencies. The smaller USAR structure today would face similar challenges in the event of total mobilization.

Additionally, the establishment of new forces must also balance against casualties occurring against existing US forces. FM 3-0 details casualty rates from World War II exceeding 5,000 soldiers killed in ten days, with an average of 1,337 soldiers lost per day early in the war.⁴² Casualty rates of this magnitude would strain the regenerative ability of the RA and potentially necessitate mobilization of the entire RC. Higher lethality would also confront integration and unit cohesion issues from ad hoc employment of replacements – cautioning against utilizing the USAR as a source of individual fillers to expand the US Army.

⁴⁰ Detlef and Shenk, 129.

⁴¹ Binkin, 19.

⁴² US Army, FM 3-0, 1-2.

The specialization and operational nature of the current USAR presently inhibit more than just providing fillers for RA units. The reserve force structure lacks combined arms units, and the existing division-level headquarters units primarily conduct theater support missions. The distribution of geographic and functional headquarters, however, presents the opportunity to perform roles similar to the zone of interior corps headquarters during World War II for integrating new soldiers into the US Army. USAR generating force units and headquarters could potentially support the expansion of the US Army in this fashion, and the third section of the monograph outlines the present lack of doctrine and plans to support total mobilization.

Finally, the reforms and changes resolving the challenges encountered during World War II and the Korean War manpower mobilizations stress the importance of maintaining strategic depth while preserving operational flexibility. The next conflict might not require 8 million soldiers as in World War II, but the Korean War demonstrates that even just doubling the current force structure can overwhelm existing doctrine, policies, and plans. The USAR can overcome the possible manpower issues by reexamining the role of its individual ready reserve (IRR) similar to the limited 1940 call-ups. In addition to expanding pre-trained soldiers, the USAR stands to benefit from reexamining the roles of reserve headquarters units and developing plans supporting the expansion of the US Army beyond the current focus on existing unit readiness. The next section further examines the performance and adaptation of the USAR as a strategic reserve. The mobilizations for the 1961 Berlin Crisis, the Vietnam War, and the transition to the All-Volunteer Force reinforce the difficulty of balancing strategic and operational requirements within fiscal and policy constraints.

Berlin Crisis to Operation Desert Storm: Reorganizing the Strategic Reserve

Not only have the reserves been more important to our country, but the Army cannot accomplish its mission without well-trained Ready Reserves.

– Secretary of the Army Howard H. Callaway, 1977

The period following the Korean War saw the USAR attempt to maintain its status as a strategic reserve designed to provide a manpower pool. The reserve reorganized into units that were staffed and capable of deploying to augment the RA.⁴³ As early as 1961, legislation and fiscal policies resulted in the RA unable to go to war without the USAR. The USAR's strategic role remained ambiguous as it mobilized for the Berlin Crisis, yet minimally participated in the Vietnam War.⁴⁴ Smaller contingency operations between Vietnam and ODS utilized volunteers from the USAR and sidestepped mobilizing units. Additionally, the strength of the Ready Reserve alone fell from 585,064 to approximately 260,000 soldiers from 1961 to 1968.⁴⁵ The US avoiding mobilization of USAR units combined with declines in available manpower across all reserve categories created significant uncertainty about the purpose of the reserve.

The unclear role of the USAR resolved itself in a series of policy reforms that filtered the majority of its combat arms and divisions. Combat support, combat service support, and training divisions became the USAR's primary focus. The reorganization of the US Army into an All-Volunteer Force precipitated this change. The transformation of the USAR as an indispensable component of the Total Force following Vietnam set the conditions to support ODS successfully, but also shifted its strategic focus to becoming a force provider for limited contingency operations.⁴⁶ The new emphasis amplified the conversion to a specialized force provider

⁴³ *Armed Forces, US Code 10* (1970), §§ 1 et seq., 1261.

⁴⁴ Currie and Crossland, 1.

⁴⁵ US Department of Defense, *Selected Manpower Statistics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976).

⁴⁶ Currie and Crossland, 184.

augmenting RA capability gaps. The USAR reorganization during this period precipitated the gradual erosion of the strategic manpower depth and increased access to reserve units, supporting the transition to an operational force. The increased accessibility of the USAR allowed it to meet current requirements but further diminished its capabilities to support the total mobilization of the US Army for LSCO.

The Berlin Crisis to Vietnam

The period between the Berlin Crisis and Vietnam saw numerous changes to policy and doctrine concerning the USAR's organization and employment. In May 1961, President John F. Kennedy directed the Army to review and propose a reorganization of its RCs, which led to the 1962 Army Reserve reorganization. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara attempted to merge the ARNG and the USAR to improve efficiencies in the RC structure.⁴⁷ Political lobbying prevented the merger, but McNamara still acquired concessions that lay the groundwork for the Total Army concept, facilitating the integration of all Army components and civilians.⁴⁸

The changes left the USAR postured to expand the fourteen division RA as necessary, but full mobilization for general war became relegated to specific war plans. The USAR decreased its division structure from ten to six, but increased manpower in non-divisional units.⁴⁹ The USAR retained ten infantry divisions, thirteen training divisions, two maneuver area commands, sixty-three combat battalions, fifty-three non-combat battalions, and 138 major headquarters. Additionally, it maintained the three individual ready, standby, and retired manpower pools. USAR end strength accounted for 1,893,747 soldiers, but only about 301,796

⁴⁷ National Defense Research Institute, 30.

⁴⁸ Currie and Crossland, 134.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 150.

soldiers were drilling inside 4,358 units.⁵⁰ 748,000 soldiers served as a reinforcement echelon, including 330,000 dedicated to bringing RA divisions to full-strength.⁵¹

Reorganization of the USAR failed to prevent inconsistencies in end strength, leading the US Congress to pass Public Law 88-110, or Reserve Enlistment Program (REP 63) in 1963. The law created a uniform six-year service obligation that significantly reduced fluctuations in end strength caused by the previous enlistment options. The universal obligation included four months of active duty training to ensure soldiers completed advanced individual training and reduced fluctuations in USAR strength caused by inconsistent service obligations.⁵² The stabilization of USAR strength allowed Congress to also address the overextension of Strategic Army Forces (RA units) due to deployments to Vietnam. The Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act of 1967 enabled selected reserve units to achieve full strength, receive priority for equipment fills, and to conduct seventy-two drills to improve mobilization readiness. The policy changes improved the readiness of existing ready reserve forces but also contributed to USAR's declining ability to provide additional combat arms forces for a general war.

Amidst the reorganization, the USAR participated in partial mobilizations for the 1961 Berlin Crisis and to augment forces in Vietnam following the 1968 Tet Offensive. The USAR mobilized a training division and 444 company-sized units comprising approximately 68,883 soldiers for Berlin. The units mobilized with about sixty-seven percent of the table of equipment strength thanks to force structure balances implemented following the Korean War.⁵³ Reserve units had to cross-level 15,234 individual reservists to make up the remaining shortages. Department of the Army mobilization plans divided the USAR into three priority groups

⁵⁰ Currie and Crossland, 153.

⁵¹ US Army Reserve, "Summary of Major Events and Problems, 1 July 1960 to 30 June 1961" (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief, US Army Reserve and ROTC Affairs, 1961), 12-16.

⁵² Currie and Crossland, 162.

⁵³ Heymont and McGregor, 53.

according to mobilization schedule and established manning plus equipping allocations. Political considerations, however, prevented implementation of the plans and were instead modified to meet President Kennedy's directive not to declare a national emergency. The USAR's struggle to execute a partial instead of full mobilization resulted in changes to the priority system that enabled USAR's successful mobilization, which deterred with the Soviet Union by expanding the US Army's strategic reserve.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, because of its strategic role, the USAR was not seriously considered for mobilization during the Vietnam War despite the calls for additional troops. The USAR instead remained on the sidelines as a calculated hedge against the Soviet Union, a strategic role that its current operational role limits.

Vietnam War Mobilization and the All-Volunteer Force

To prepare for the Vietnam War, the RA expanded from fourteen divisions to an eighteen and two-thirds division force of 1.3 million soldiers.⁵⁵ Political considerations again kept the expansion from using the USAR or ARNG.⁵⁶ Although the USAR contained 1,217,984 soldiers by 1965, the USAR retracted to six infantry divisions and 3,482 units, while only 261,957 soldiers assigned that attended paid drill.⁵⁷ The USAR's continued reorganization resulted in the inactivation of the remaining infantry divisions by 1968. USAR also kept thirteen training divisions, two maneuver area commands, one field army support command, four support brigades, three separate combat brigades, and seventeen combat battalions. The remaining units predominantly comprised of CS/CSS units. The ready reserve drilling force downsized to 3,478

⁵⁴ Currie and Crossland, 136; US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Doctrinal Note 1-18, *Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018). The doctrinal note describes the threat of force as used to compel an adversary to modify current behavior or shape future action. It works by deploying and posturing military capabilities and issuing warning statements that convey a decision to use force if one's conditions are not met.

⁵⁵ Heymont and McGregor, 12.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 63.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 10-11.

units, with 216,957 soldiers drilling but enlarged the IRR from 748,000 to 931,000 by 1970.⁵⁸ The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended mobilizing reserve forces, despite political objections, in sufficient numbers to maintain a strategic reserve while half of the RA remained mired in Vietnam.⁵⁹ Multiple contingency operations in the future could likewise find an activated USAR unable to provide strategic depth.

USAR forces mobilized and deployed to Vietnam under the Partial Mobilization Plan, which was outdated due to not using the reserves earlier in the war.⁶⁰ The three-year wait before using reserve forces allowed USAR to complete its reorganization. Many mobilized units continued to face shortages of equipment, but the organizational inefficiencies enabled units to mobilize with eighty-six percent of their authorized table of equipment strength.⁶¹ The USAR mobilized 5,869 soldiers distributed across one infantry battalion plus forty-one other units, which included eleven medical, nine transportation, and a variety of other combat service support units. Thirty-five units served in Vietnam while another seven augmented the RA's Strategic Army Forces. The IRR provided 1,692 fillers for reserve units and an additional 1,060 to augment RA units.⁶² The theater "infusion" policy, however, transferred reserve personnel to other units, which led to a few units maintaining their reserve character upon redeployment.⁶³ The present IRR might be required to infuse forces as well, limiting its ability to serve as a basis for expanding the RA.

Following the Vietnam War, the United States ended the draft in 1973, placing the RCs as the primary instrument for expanding the military forces.⁶⁴ The advent of the Total Force

⁵⁸ Currie and Crossland, 183; Heymont and McGregor, 64-66.

⁵⁹ Currie and Crossland, 200.

⁶⁰ Heymont and McGregor, 64.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 75-76, 66-67.

⁶² Currie and Crossland, 204.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 208.

⁶⁴ Binkin, 22.

Policy originated with the transition to an all-volunteer force and post-war fiscal reality. The Nixon administration sought budget reductions and intended to leverage less expensive reserve forces to maintain capabilities that were necessary only during a major war. Congress also enacted changes that reversed the trend of lessening reserve mobilizations and corresponding increased size of the RA. The President instead became legally obligated to utilize the reserves to expand the active component before enacting other means such as a draft.⁶⁵ This amendment attempted to avoid manipulation of the political and strategic narrative by using the RA and draftees to fight a future war – thus requiring popular support.

The RA conducted a drawdown to 800,000 soldiers from a peak of 1.3 million leading to its dependency on the ARNG and USAR.⁶⁶ The USAR force structure remained relatively untouched, including three infantry brigades, eleven support brigades, thirteen training divisions, twenty-four support commands, 108 army hospitals, and sixty-five separate battalions. The selected ready reserve by 1975 maintained 234,000 soldiers, the individual ready reserve 911,000 soldiers, the standby reserve 332,000 soldiers, and the retired reserve 336,000 soldiers. The end of the draft and post-Vietnam reductions in force size also precipitated the rapid drawdown of IRR soldiers from 1,059,064 in 1972 to 143,882 in 1978. Drilling reservists also dropped to 185,783, which, combined with the loss of IRR soldiers, severely reduced the trained, strategic manpower pool maintained by the USAR.⁶⁷

The rapid surprise, initial success, and high lethality achieved by the Egyptian army against Israel in 1973, however, shocked US Army leaders into reconsidering its drawdown of forces. The high casualties and losses of equipment almost caused Israel to lose before its reserve forces could mobilize to respond. The 1973 Arab-Israeli War reinforced the need for a stronger and readier reserve. GEN William DePuy, US Army Training and Doctrine Commander,

⁶⁵ Binkin, 22.

⁶⁶ Heymont and McGregor, 11.

⁶⁷ Currie and Crossland, 231.

recognized this in numerous papers that deemed larger strategic forces to be essential for maintaining a credible deterrence given the increased battlefield lethality.⁶⁸ Recognizing the RC dependency created by the all-volunteer force, the US Army took steps to build RC strength by improving benefits, expanding enlistment options, improving maintenance, and associating units with RA units for training. The US Army also conducted mobilization exercises to test, revise, and improve mobilization deficiencies.⁶⁹ By the mid-1980s, USAR ready reserve strength reached 266,200, then 319,244 drilling soldiers just before ODS. The IRR likewise rose to an average of 275,000 soldiers. Beyond manpower, the USAR also increased readiness through additional exercises, including overseas annual training missions. Congress also contributed to resolving equipment issues by increasing appropriations.⁷⁰ The USAR transformed from a parallel RA combat force to a streamlined reserve force structure providing forty-eight percent of the Total Force's combat support and combat service support while retaining less than seven percent of its combat arms strength.⁷¹ The reforms and specialization integrated the USAR into the Total Force, yet at a significant tradeoff to its strategic depth.

Conclusions

The mobilizations and reorganizations that occurred from the 1961 Berlin Crisis to ODS offer several insights for the roles and challenges the USAR might anticipate during a future total mobilization. The 1961 Berlin Crisis demonstrates the need for the mobilization of significant reserve forces to maintain credible deterrence.⁷² The forces not only had to be raised but also

⁶⁸ William E. DePuy, *Selected Papers of GEN William E. DePuy* (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1995), 26, 59, 115.

⁶⁹ Currie and Crossland, 260.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, 302-304.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, 320.

⁷² US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), IV-8. The joint publication discusses mobilization for instances similar to the Berlin Crisis, but astutely points out the difficulty in managing the various mobilization authorities required under current law.

equipped, trained, and postured for employment. The active Total Army forces rose to approximately 1 million soldiers, equal to today's total end strength objective. It portends that the United States' ability to expand by activating the current RCs may be insufficient to deter a peer adversary.⁷³ The activation of the 100th Training Division, which trained over 30,000 soldiers, indicates a role USAR could quickly takeover to enable faster force generation outside of the existing Total Force structure.⁷⁴

The Vietnam mobilizations provide important considerations arising from recruiting additional fillers to meet any manpower shortfalls. The mobilization of USAR units demonstrates how the increasing technical/specialization requirements for combat support and combat service support units combined with a decreased IRR manpower pool could extend force generation timelines.⁷⁵ The USAR managed to rapidly settle equipment issues due to the small number of units, but training still took longer than expected as units formed with training cadre and fillers that had to complete AIT.⁷⁶ Expansion of the present RA for total mobilization will also be confronted likewise with balancing training reserve soldiers and building new units.

Mobilization exercises following Vietnam further highlighted the need for a ready and capable USAR. Exercise Nifty Nugget-78 estimated that "400,00 troop 'casualties' equal to seventy percent of the RA end strength." It also predicted that thousands of tons of supplies, and 200-500,000 trained combat troops would fail to reach the conflict promptly. The 1986 Department of Defense Authorization Act added a requirement to muster the entire 313,000

⁷³ David Barno and Nora Bensahel, "Preparing for the Next Big War," *War On the Rocks* (blog), January 26, 2016, accessed December 4, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/preparing-for-the-next-big-war/>.

⁷⁴ Heymont and McGregor, 72.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 58-59; Currie and Crossland, 345. A Department of the Army study in 1984 determined that there were not enough soldiers in the IRR to fill active and reserve component units scheduled for deployment upon full mobilization. It additionally was concerned by the quality and quantity training especially for armor branch soldiers.

⁷⁶ US Joint Staff, JP 4-05, IV-9. Joint mobilization planning must account for training untrained reservists.

member IRR to assess its ability to meet manpower requirements during the first 180 days of combat. Fiscal concerns constrained to just 30,000 soldiers, of which only 6,678 mustered. Screenings continued until ODS, but limited funding resulted in subpar IRR call up.⁷⁷ With these challenges in mind, the Department of Defense (DOD) published a master mobilization guide in 1989, and the US Army published Army Regulation 25-5, *Mobilization*, in 1985 that the mobilization for ODS tested.⁷⁸

Operation Desert Storm to the Post-9/11: The Operational Reserve

We cannot face the future simply by walking into the past backward.

– President Dwight D. Eisenhower

ODS and the subsequent post-Cold War drawdown set the conditions for the USAR to transition from a strategic to operational reserve. The challenges meeting global commitments posed significant shortcomings to the US' ability to project force, thus cementing its reliance on RCs. ODS entailed the most massive mobilization since World War II, including approximately 500,000 soldiers of whom 160,000 were ready reservists from all components.⁷⁹ The mobilization of the USAR represented a significant shift from past mobilizations. The US Army expected early deploying units to deploy with and sometimes before RA units.⁸⁰ Since 9/11, the RA has continued to rely heavily on mobilizing USAR units to meet domestic and overseas campaigns in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The Total Force, however, faced different challenges compared to previous mobilizations since recent conflicts allowed the US military to operate

⁷⁷ Currie and Crossland, 349.

⁷⁸ Olen C. Bridges and Andree Navarro, "Mobilizing for Major War," *Parameters* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 92, accessed October 18, 2019, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3368.pdf>.

⁷⁹ Association of the United States Army, *The US Army in Operation Desert Storm* (Arlington: Association of the US Army, 1991), 10.

⁸⁰ Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, *US Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1989), 1.; National Defense Research Institute, xxxix.

from a position of advantage and to only engage in relatively limited contingency operations. The US Army was able to send forces into theater uncontested during partial mobilizations but never had to confront a great power. Compared to the 537,000 soldiers in Vietnam, the Army peaked at 171,000 and 100,000 soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan respectively.⁸¹ The adverse effects of lacking a peer competitor such as the Soviet Union combined with eighteen years of stability operations to leave the US Army without the doctrine, policy, organization, and global posture to mobilize for a large-scale war.⁸²

Operation Desert Storm and the Post-Cold War Drawdown

Leading into ODS, the RA and RCs organized and aligned using the CAPSTONE program. CAPSTONE associated independent RC units with active component units for purposes of peacetime planning and training. Upon wartime footing, the RA planned for the same units to mobilize and deploy together to increase interoperability.⁸³ The intended associations also facilitated rapid wartime deployment and employment since, by 1989, the RC provided fifty-three percent of force structure. The USAR also increased to 1,224,200 soldiers, including 285,000 IRR, 1,100 standby reserve, and 622,100 retired reserve by 1990.⁸⁴ The USAR and ARNG

⁸¹ Ian S. Livingston and Michael O’Hanlon, *Afghanistan Index* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015), 4; Tim Kane, “Global US Troop Deployment, 1950-2003,” published October 27, 2004, accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>.

⁸² Barno and Bensahel, “Preparing for the Next Big War,” *War on the Rocks* (blog), January 26, 2016, accessed December 4, 2019, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/preparing-for-the-next-big-war/>.

⁸³ US Army, AR 25-5, 18. The Army CAPSTONE Program established the AC and RC organizational structure for developing peacetime planning and training associations. Ideally, the RA and RC units would train in peacetime with same units they aligned with for mobilization. The ultimate impact of this and subsequent programs was negligible as the associations were not followed during mobilization. CAPSTONE’s largest gap was the lack of flexibility combined with varying readiness rate of RC units. RC units, especially those from the USAR, have taken other measures to improve readiness and deployability since 2001 due to operational requirements. CAPSTONE and the subsequent WARTRACE programs, however, merit further research for determining how the USAR might restore its strategic role and assist with aligning new units as the US Army expands for total mobilization.

⁸⁴ Binkin and Kaufmann, 5.

together represented sixty-seven percent of the Total Force's CS/CSS capability.⁸⁵ The USAR grew its support focus with health services, communications, transportation, engineering, and other unique capabilities comprising eighty-one percent of its force mix. Its remaining nineteen percent strength included three maneuver brigades and thirteen battalions.

The USAR mobilized 35,000 drilling reservists from 626 units in support of ODS.⁸⁶ The USAR also activated 23,324 soldiers from the individual mobilization augmentee, retired reserve, and other reserve volunteers. Many soldiers from transportation and logistics units volunteered early to assist RA units ship equipment from ports of embarkation. USAR provided a quarter of the total engineer units and significant numbers of military police, medical, quartermaster, and other CS/CSS. The IRR likewise provided support soldiers plus recalled combat arms specialties, including approximately 8,033 infantry, armor, artillery, and air defense artillery specialties.⁸⁷ Some reserve units, including the 3-87 Infantry Battalion, took over security roles in Germany and backfilled other RA posts. The USAR allowed the RA to free up forces but also revealed that during opening stages of mobilization that sending all forces forward is not possible. The delays moving units onward could also be seen as opportunities during future mobilizations to use existing reserve units to train new units until deployed.

The IRR mobilization likewise faced issues with contact information, muster locations, and life support once reaching initial duty stations. The shortfalls from insufficient musters/screenings led to some being discharged shortly after call-up for medical, financial, and other legal reasons. IMA agencies also had not exercised how to access their soldiers and resulted in many not serving until after the ground war subsided. The request process for IMA soldiers

⁸⁵ Ronald E. Sortor, et al., *Planning Reserve Mobilization: Inferences from Operation Desert Shield* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1993), 2.

⁸⁶ Office of Army Reserve History, "Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm," accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.usar.army.mil/OurHistory/DesertShield-DesertStorm/>.

⁸⁷ Currie and Crossland, 497-498. These pages contain a table that provides detailed breakdown by military occupational specialty for more information on how IRR soldiers were utilized.

went unrehearsed, and the agencies did not understand how to activate their support soldiers, which led to many serving after the actual conflict was over. The USAR surpassed these issues and demonstrated the importance of maintaining IRR and IMA to provide trained manpower.

The DOD recognized the issues encountered during the reserve component mobilization and subsequently updated its mobilization doctrine based on lessons drawn from ODS. The plans utilized for ODS drew upon the 1985 Army Regulation (AR) 25-5 that assumed a partial mobilization would occur before operations commencing and linked to established CAPSTONE alignments.⁸⁸ CAPSTONE failed to function according to design during ODS since some associated units lacked the required readiness, while planners bypassed others for a variety of reasons. Despite issues, AR 25-5 reflected years of developing partial mobilization doctrine that proved largely successful.

AR 25-5 provided context for how not only how existing USAR and ARNG units would mobilize, but also discussed the mobilization of Compo 4 and Compo 6 units. Compo 4 is unmanned and unequipped units approved in force structure, but not funded for activation unless full mobilization occurred due to peacetime budget constraints. Compo 6 units are outside force structure and designed to form only upon total mobilization. These units would require the USAR or the RA to support their training by providing cadre and initial entry training for newly accessed soldiers that would fill the units.⁸⁹

AR 25-5 described the institutional and unit training requirements for expanding the US Army. For full and total mobilization, the USAR would activate reception stations and be integral to training the influx of soldiers. The RA would provide cadre acquires from table of distribution and allowance positions, officer/non-commissioned officer students, and through accepting prior service volunteers. Additionally, the IRR would provide fillers, while individual mobilization

⁸⁸ Sortor, et al., 5.

⁸⁹ US Department of the Army, Army Regulation (AR) 25-5, *Training for Mobilization and War* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1985), 3-4.

augmentees would support assigned wartime agencies. The regulation also anticipated the mobilization and use of civilians with valuable skills into continental United States billets with only a basic military orientation. AR 25-5 further detailed how it would scale the deployment of the newly inducted personnel from partial to total mobilization. The doctrine provided detailed charts and tables outlining expected force generation pipelines by types of units. In summation, AR 25-5 reflected a pinnacle doctrine that culminated from the force restructuring and amended policy adjustments made throughout the Cold War.⁹⁰ The minuscule level of detail in subsequent regulations and field manuals proved apparent in the US Army's lack of a total mobilization plan after the Cold War.⁹¹

Mobilization doctrine primarily examined partial mobilization for contingency operations. FM 100-17, published in 1992, described itself as AR 25-5's heir as the pinnacle doctrine for mobilization and called for a redesigned, forward-deployable, regionally/contingency focused force. It notably integrated national strategic direction and translated it into guidance for mobilization. The doctrine focused heavily on force projection of units from the Total Army for a crisis or contingency operation. FM 100-17. The doctrine heavily emphasized maintaining the US' ability to expand rapidly but delved only into projecting existing forces up to full mobilization.⁹² FM 100-17 did not expound upon total mobilization with the same level of detail seen in AR 25-5. AR 500-5, published in 1996, introduced the Army Mobilization and Operations Planning and Execution System. This system provided a framework for mobilization through

⁹⁰ US Army, AR 25-5, 14-15.

⁹¹ National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA), "Report to the President and the Congress of the United States," January 28, 2016 (Arlington, VA: NCFA, 2016), 80.

⁹² US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1992), iv.

various levels as required and addressed the requirement to develop scalable mobilization plans. Like FM 100-17, it does not significantly indicate how total mobilization would occur.⁹³

The shifts in doctrine coincided with continuous policy revisions that unfolded during the post-Cold War drawdown. The ad hoc pursuit of a peace dividend resembled the tenuous reorganization of the RCs following the Berlin Crisis through Vietnam. US policy became informed by several studies, including the Base Force, the Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Each study introduced variations of force structure and size meant to address diverging geopolitical situations created by the operational environment paradigm shift following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The first study originated in the National Defense Authorization Act of 1990, which directed the DOD to study the Total Force Policy and to recommend a Base Force as part of the 1992 defense budget request.⁹⁴

As part of the study, the DOD examined reducing its overall force structure. It recommended decreasing the RA to 536,000, the ARNG to 338,000, and the USAR to 229,400 soldiers, 187,000 fewer reservists than Congress authorized. The disagreements between President George H.W. Bush's administration and Congress regarding force structure and size hampered the implementation of the recommended Base Force. In the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal years 1992 and 1993, Congress mandated the Bottom-Up Review to provide a more comprehensive study of the force structure. The act held the USAR to 296,230 soldiers, which the subsequent 1994 act slightly reduced to 260,000 soldiers, pending the

⁹³ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 500-5, *Army Mobilization* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), 1-2.

⁹⁴ National Defense Research Institute, 5.

outcome of the study.⁹⁵ Congress intended for the Bottom-Up Review to address concerns with the Base Force, especially the RC size.⁹⁶

The Bottom-Up Review, conducted under the auspices of Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, reviewed the nation's defense strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations.⁹⁷ Aspin largely neglected the USAR and instead focused on the RA and ARNG combat power.⁹⁸ Instead of addressing the RC component size issue, the RCs fell victim to President Bill Clinton's policy priorities, which sought to reduce deficit spending and balance the federal budget. Secretary Aspin recommended further reductions of both the RA and RCs beyond those called for in the Base Force.⁹⁹ The two studies led to a thirty-three percent reduction in the size of the US Army.¹⁰⁰

The significant cuts from the two studies also reflected in the Offsite Agreement between the RA, ARNG, and USAR. The agreement enabled the RA to pare down by the fiscal year 2000 to ten divisions and 482,000 soldiers. The agreement called for the USAR to transfer 14,000 predominantly combat arms-related positions to the ARNG and to receive back 10,000 CS/CSS positions. The transfers between the RCs reflected the increasing specialization of the USAR and its function to fill critical CS/CSS gaps in the RA. Unfortunately, the USAR ended up losing 91,000 soldiers as drawdown units inactivated in place of swapping, which left a residual 208,000 soldier strength.¹⁰¹ The IRR initially surged in strength with a large number of active soldiers

⁹⁵ National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993, Public Law 102-190, 102nd Cong., 1st sess. (December 5, 1991); National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1994, Public Law 103-160, 103d Cong., 1st sess. (1 November 30, 1993).

⁹⁶ National Defense Research Institute, 8.

⁹⁷ Lee Aspin, *The Bottom-Up Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993).

⁹⁸ Currie and Crossland, 529-530.

⁹⁹ Larson, et al., *Defense Planning in a Decade of Change* (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2001), 20.

¹⁰⁰ Coker, 180.

¹⁰¹ Currie and Crossland, 536-537.

released but fell to less than 100,000 by 2000, severely reducing its ability to provide trained manpower.¹⁰²

The net effect of the force structure policy decisions from 1990 to 2000, however, ensured that the reserves were a mandatory component of any future action.¹⁰³ The US Army conducted twenty-five major deployments during this decade compared to only ten from 1950 to 1989.¹⁰⁴ Reserve units regularly activated to support these limited contingency operations due to the revised USAR force structure that included forty-five percent of the Army's combat support and twenty-six percent of combat service support units. The USAR accounted for one hundred percent of training divisions, railway units, enemy prisoners of war, and chemical brigades. It also contained ninety-seven percent of civil affairs units, eighty-five percent psychological operations units, eighty percent of medical brigades and transportation groups, sixty-nine percent of petroleum supply battalions, and sixty-two percent of chemical and biological defense resources.¹⁰⁵ USAR's increased specialization ensured its employment during subsequent contingency operations, yet also precipitated its inability to support expanding the Total Force beyond full mobilization.

The Post-9/11 Operational Reserve

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Global War on Terrorism rapidly highlighted the necessity of the reserves along with the associated costs from shrinking end strengths. The US military maintained overseas commitments of 206,002 soldiers in 1999, but that number soared to over 387,920 by 2003.¹⁰⁶ The USAR alone contributed thirty-five percent of its strength by

¹⁰² US Army Human Resources Command, "Individual Ready Reserve," February 5, 2018, accessed October 1, 2019, 0:07, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eyhQ-FaYkhk>.

¹⁰³ Coker, 53.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 175.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 193.

¹⁰⁶ Tim Kane, "Global US Troop Deployment, 1950-2003," October 27, 2004, accessed December 10, 2019, <https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/global-us-troop-deployment-1950-2003>.

2003.¹⁰⁷ As the sheer number of requirements grew, the United States relied heavily on its RC forces, resulting in no strategic reserve at the height of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars.¹⁰⁸ Even in 2019, the US Army remains obligated, with 182,000 soldiers stationed globally in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Europe, and the Pacific.¹⁰⁹ The global commitments combined with a smaller Total Force led US policy to shift from a strategic to operational reserve. The United States increasingly employed USAR and ARNG units to allow RA units to rotate from the theater and to sustain readiness. By 2010, USAR units and 195,707 soldiers successfully mobilized to support multiple contingency operations.¹¹⁰ The continued reliance on USAR and other RC units facilitated a paradigm shift where the USAR's role became operational.

The expanded USAR operational role stemmed from the 2001 QDR, which charted the post-9/11 employment of RC units and adapted a “capabilities-based strategy” that enhanced American asymmetric advantages.¹¹¹ The 2005 QDR similarly constructed this narrative by focusing RC efforts to support combatant commanders' requirements and to meet extended pressure generated by the demands of the Global War on Terrorism. The 2005 QDR also directed the rebalancing of the active-reserve force mix and increasing access to the RC to support a full range of military operations.¹¹² The evolved role under this strategy removed the emphasis on strategic depth and instead enabled it to meet emerging operational mission requirements.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also recognized the necessity for acknowledging the RC as an operational force and cemented this role in DODD 1200.17. The directive integrated the

¹⁰⁷ Coker, 294.

¹⁰⁸ Robert Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the US National Security System* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 208.

¹⁰⁹ Olen Chad Bridges and Andree Navarro, “Mobilizing for Major War,” *Parameters* 47, no. 2 (Summer 2017): 88-89, accessed October 18, 2019, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3368.pdf>.

¹¹⁰ Coker, 300.

¹¹¹ Donald Rumsfeld, *2001 Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), iv.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, 76.

RA and RC as an operational force and directed the DOD to resource the RC to meet readiness requirements. Secretary Gates stressed that the RC provided operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet US defense objectives across the full spectrum of conflict.¹¹³ The switch to an operational reserve coincided with changing domestic and international considerations driven by increasing debt, war-weariness, and the fallout from the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

The 2010 National Security Strategy released by President Barack Obama sought to deal with national security issues regarding this context through a renewed focus on defending the homeland and selective engagement overseas instead of retaining the capability to fight two major theater wars. The strategic document embraced domestic financial considerations that called for reducing the end strength of US forces, which further condensed US strategic depth and introduced another significant paradigm shift. The shift led to the US preparing to meet emerging regional threats. The United States, however, no longer postured to engage peer competitors in conventional warfare. The US expected to instead mobilize only for limited contingency operations supporting national interests.¹¹⁴

The large-scale use of RC soldiers for contingency operations resembled this strategy, but the resurgence of peer competitors led the 2014 QDR to recommend a comprehensive review of preparedness for national mobilization. The readiness of the USAR to support mobilization factored as a critical requirement for homeland defense, global security, power projection, and decisive victory.¹¹⁵ Simultaneously, the 2014 QDR expected the Total Force to drawdown as required due to sequestration. The RA drew down from a war-time high of 570,000 to approximately 440,000 soldiers. The USAR also retracted from 205,000 to 195,000 soldiers. The QDR resulted in a force mix that continues to be interdependent and complementary but assumed

¹¹³ US DOD, DODD 1200.17.

¹¹⁴ Barrack Obama, *2010 National Security Strategy* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 1, 32-34.

¹¹⁵ Chuck Hagel, *Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 31, 62.

significant risk in the size of ground forces.¹¹⁶ The cuts ensured the USAR a continued operational result but further reduced the available manpower for national mobilization.

Besides force structure changes, the 2014 QDR also precipitated the first significant update of US mobilization doctrine. Before that, mobilization doctrine remained little changed from Army Regulation 500-5, *Mobilization*, published in 1996. An updated revision published in 2015 focused on the roles and responsibilities for implementing the Army Mobilization Plan. It directed all commands, including the USAR, to develop mobilization and demobilization plans.¹¹⁷ It also referenced various DOD directives, DOD instructions, and joint doctrine specific to systems for mobilizing individual soldiers or units, but contains zero information on total mobilization.¹¹⁸

Joint Publication (JP) 4-05 published in 2018 attempts to rectify lacking mobilization doctrine, but aligns heavily with the employment of reserve forces as an operational force. It provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning and executing mobilization of existing forces. The doctrine emphasizes the five tenets of mobilization (objective, timeliness, unity of effort, flexibility, and sustainability), which improve access to the RC for contingency operations. JP 4-05 also addresses the role of mobilization for strategic purposes following the 2018 National Defense Strategy, yet does not elaborate on how the RC provides strategic depth other than by existing. It does, at a minimum, define methods for executing force expansion up to full mobilization, which includes manpower augmentation from the USAR, including the IRR, retired reserve, and volunteers. The doctrine also recommends using a stop loss on existing forces from

¹¹⁶ Hagel, 29.

¹¹⁷ US Department of the Army, Army Regulation 500-5 (FM), *Mobilization* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 1-5.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

all components to stabilize the force during the conflict but fails to discuss potential draft during total mobilization adequately.¹¹⁹

JP 4-05 improves the general understanding of mobilization up to full mobilization but follows the doctrinal and strategy trends of largely neglecting total mobilization. The doctrine provides only the cursory definition of total mobilization seen in the monograph introduction. It considers that incorporating volunteers and draftees increases the risk to mission. The risk arises from the extensive time necessary for building additional capability, though with minimal detail. JP 4-05 also annotates that parallel to adding personnel to the joint force faces the increasing complexity of systems and operations. It recognizes that emerging technologies undermine the relevance of training timeliness for basic and initial skills given dynamic complexity. AR 25-5, in contrast, provides much more detail outlining timelines for activating new units. JP 4-05, despite its shortcomings, represents a solid doctrinal foundation that could integrate additional details similar to AR 25-5.¹²⁰ The doctrine, however, still lacks clarity on how the RCs and specifically the USAR would support total mobilization.

The shortcomings of strategy and doctrine reflect in the organization of the USAR today. While better equipped, trained, manned, and ready, the USAR provides functional CS/CSS units to support RA and ARNG combat units (see Table 2). The mixture of units critically complements the Total Force, and that only up to full mobilization. Several specialized units under each category also remain unique to the USAR, and current operations alone tax their availability.¹²¹ Additionally, the USAR maintains multiple training divisions that serve as a critical portion of the generating force. These USAR units hold the responsibility to assist with

¹¹⁹ US Joint Staff, JP 4-05, II-1.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, IV-3, IV-6-IV-9.

¹²¹ US Army Reserve Command, “America’s Army Reserve at a Glance” (Fort Bragg: Army Reserve Communications, 2020), 5-7.

mobilization force generation installations. Twenty-five installations existed in 2014, including seven active, five secondary, and thirteen support sites, while only two remain active in 2019. The need to reactivate these sites to mobilize and train other RC units potentially constrains the USAR’s ability to support training new inductees or reorganizing into new combat units capable of integrating draftees.¹²²

Table 2. Total Force percentage of CS/CSS capabilities provided by the USAR, May 2019

Support & Sustainment Capabilities	USAR Percentage
Civil Affairs	87
Psychological Operations	83
Chaplain	81
Military History	86
Quartermaster	59
Transportation	54
Medical	53
Adjutant General	42
Chemical	41
Information Operations	40
Public Affairs	38
Engineers	35
Military Intelligence	31
Military Police	26
Space	24
Judge Advocate General	20

Source: US Army Reserve Command, “America’s Army Reserve at a Glance” (Fort Bragg: Army Reserve Communications, 2020), 7.

The need to maintain the generating force while simultaneously deploying forces in the vent of the major war that potentially proves to be a critical weakness. The Total Force would lack the capability to increase combat power by generating Compo 4 and Compo 6 units to support replacement operations during large-scale ground combat. The training base for 2 million soldiers, double the current force, requires an estimated 360,000 soldiers in the generating force alone.¹²³ The USAR faces extreme difficulties surging forces for a generating force mission of this magnitude, let alone meeting its other CS/CSS support requirements to the RA and ARNG.

¹²² Bridges and Navarro, 88.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, 89.

The four reserve training commands comprise 23,000 soldiers or twelve percent of the USAR end-strength objective of 189,500 soldiers. The commands would have to balance training reserve formations preparing for mobilization with the additional responsibility of assisting with training new units.¹²⁴ The IRR presently also lacks a mandated strength objective and most likely could support only initial replacement operations. The USAR maintains a present strength of 191,000, while the IRR comprises only 79,046 additional soldiers as of December 2019.¹²⁵ Given these conditions, the USAR, including the IRR, potentially requires either a modification to its force structure or to re-incentivize the IRR to provide the actual strategic depth necessary to support the rapid expansion of the US Army.

Conclusions

The successful reserve mobilization for Operation Desert Storm, the end of the Cold War, and limited contingency operations following the 9/11 terrorist attacks radically altered the organization, size, and mission of the USAR. The last three decades witnessed an increased reliance on RC units, culminating with their consideration as an operational reserve force. The operational reserve presented a critical paradigm shift from the strategic force postured against the Soviet Union to a ready, lethal force supporting multiple limited contingency operations. The rise of peer competition again, however, left the operational reserve lacking the strategy, policy, or doctrine necessary to support total mobilization.

The shift back to preparing for LSCO against a peer competitor highlights the potential inability of the Army Reserve to simultaneously support operational requirements and provide the foundation for a strategic reserve. The reserve force contains mainly CS/CSS units meant to augment capabilities gaps in the RA and ARNG force structures. USAR training commands

¹²⁴ US Army Reserve, “America’s Army Reserve at a Glance” (Fort Bragg: Army Reserve Communications, 2020), 84-87.

¹²⁵ MAJ Gabriel Gobeau, Office Chief of the Army Reserve, “Army Reserve Strength Report,” email message to author, December 27, 2019; LTC Donghan Lee, IRR Branch Manager, “IRR Strength Data / Research Assistance Request,” email message to author, December 10, 2019.

remain the basis of the generating force and face significant challenges in the event of national mobilization.

The USAR can prepare to meet potential requirements; however, by using its geographic readiness divisions similar to the World War II Zone of Interior Corps to manage national mobilization. In conjunction with the training commands, the readiness divisions could provide a solid foundation for the expansion of the US Army. The USAR should also consider the roles of its various functional headquarters, including engineers and military police. The headquarters are organized to provide command and control, but could, with augmentation, reorganize and integrate new draftees into new combat divisions to help expand the US Army.

Summary

The cost of the butcher's bill is paid, in blood, with American soldiers, for unready forces. And we have a long history of that... Wars are often thought to be short when they begin, they're not. They're often thought to cost less than they end up costing. And they end up with outcomes and take turns that you never know. It's a dangerous thing.

- General Mark A. Milley, US Army, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff

The US Army must ultimately address the debate of whether the existing small, professional force structure can produce sufficient mass to meet the demands of future combat operations. Mass possesses a quality of its own, and the US faces potential threats with conventional arms far more substantial than today's force.¹²⁶ The USAR has, since World War II, provided the strategic manpower depth necessary to overcome numerically superior adversaries. The smaller and more specialized forces available in the USAR and IRR today though provokes concern that the operational reserve can only meet the initial demands of a major war. The reduced RA force structure and eighteen plus years of contingency operations further compound

¹²⁶ Brandon J. Weichert, "The Next World War is Coming – and so is the Draft," *RealClearDefense*, January 7, 2020, accessed January 28, 2020, https://www.realcleardefense.com/2020/01/07/the_next_world_war_is_comingdashand_so_is_the_draft_311538.html.

the USAR's role as a specialized force provider. The relatively stable nature and predictable deployment schedule allowed it to transform and fill gaps presented by an overstretched RA. The success of post-9/11 mobilizations lulled the USAR into a sense of complacency. USAR units accustomed to rotational deployments and providing niche capabilities remain limited to support the expansion of the US Army beyond full mobilization without significant modification.¹²⁷

The USAR, therefore, remains in a state of flux and attempting to refocus on how best to support the Total Force during a new period of great power competition. The new focus away from limited contingency operations embraces strategist Eliot Cohen's warning that "committing oneself only to fight wars lasting a few weeks or months is to fatally cripple one's ability to use force," but leaves lingering doubts on how the USAR supports the expansion of the US Army beyond its existing structure. US Army modernization programs emphasize improving the existing expeditionary forces but fail to examine improving the capabilities of the RC to increase strategic depth.¹²⁸ Cohen's warning parallels that of the former US Senator from Georgia, Sam Nunn, during post-Cold War deliberations, who stressed: "using a fresh look at roles and mission characterizing the past forty years" to ensure reshaping and modernizing left the US able to meet the twenty-first century operational environment.¹²⁹

Nunn and Cohen both appeal to a deeper understanding of the role of the RC and the operational environment. The three periods the monograph reviews reinforce the need to develop strategic forces that can respond during inevitable crises. The US would then retain the ability to adapt to the new norm in military operations, especially given the potential for conflict without

¹²⁷ Lewis Irwin, *A Modern Army Reserve for a Multi-Domain World: Structural Realities and Untapped Potential* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, October 2019), accessed January 6, 2020, <https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/3707.pdf>.

¹²⁸ Eliot Cohen, *The Big Stick: Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 219.

¹²⁹ Worley, 105.

traditional US asymmetric advantages.¹³⁰ Cohen offers a solution to waning US strategic depth by re-establishing a mobilization-oriented military capable of building and equipping new forces rapidly.¹³¹ The USAR, through reform and expansion of the IRR, stands to play a pivotal role.

From the original premises of the ORC to today's USAR, the IRR provides the nation with the framework to build additional strategic depth during total mobilization. The initial ORC mobilization for one year with a follow-on ten-year commitment continues to appear throughout the deliberations on future iterations of the USAR. As recent as 2016, the Reserve Forces Policy Board's annual report deliberates on renewing this program to revitalize the IRR.¹³² The creation of a new service obligation, the first major overhaul since the four by four active or six by two reserve, presents a possible solution. The enlistment option requires select benefits to entice volunteers but allows US citizens unwilling or unable to commit to traditional options to serve. After an initial period of training, the new IRR soldiers should continue to muster annually, align with local reserve units, and conduct periodic synthetic training. The soldiers gain a flexible option while the USAR gains depth. Pre-trained manpower, similar to USAR roles during the period of World War II to Korea, provides the benefit of restoring the USAR's ability to support the expansion of the Total Force quickly. It also complements the recent readiness initiatives throughout the operational reserve force that enable the USAR to mobilize existing forces faster. The two together represent a multi-faceted approach that helps eliminate the oversight of focusing exclusively on mobilizing and employing existing force structure only without resorting to a draft.

The history of the USAR tempers optimism of any approach to restoring strategic manpower depth. Throughout the monograph, the recurring theme of peace dividends and fiscal constraints undermines attempts to increase reserve force structure. Growths with the USAR

¹³⁰ Kuhn, 92-93.

¹³¹ Cohen, 210.

¹³² Reserve Forces Policy Board, 88, 105.

often parallel decreases in the RA that fosters resistance to change. Reforming the IRR, therefore, only occurs if the US has the strategic will and popular support to pass proper authorizations and appropriations. Given this uncertainty, the USAR faces monumental challenges to meeting its requirement to provide strategic depth to the US Army.

Finally, any significant change may require a significant catalyst also that the volunteer force cannot sustain beyond what even an expanded IRR might afford. The changing character of war over seventy years might seem to preclude total mobilization, but more likely, challenges to US hegemony and international stability will continue to rise. The operational reserve plays a critical piece in the opening stages of a major war and rightly must increase its operational readiness. History, however, is replete with examples of imbalances within US strategy precipitating failure. The operational focus today potentially wins America's next first battle, but at the expense of its ability to sustain combat power in high-intensity conflict. The US Army, therefore, needs to renew its strategic doctrine, policy, and forces. If not, the nation faces daunting prospects for rapidly and coherently expanding its ground forces.

Appendix A - Definitions

Reserve Components. The reserve structures of each of the services, considered as a whole, constitute the RCs. The US Army's reserves are the National Guard of the United States and the United States Army Reserve.

Ready Reserve. Units and individuals of the Ready Reserve constitute the priority elements liable for involuntary active duty in time of war, the national emergency declared by Congress, proclaimed by the President, or when authorized by law.

Selected Reserve. Units of the RCs designated for priority call-up in time of national emergency are considered the Selected Reserve. Statistically, they are part of the Ready Reserve.

Individual Ready Reserve. Typically consists, of, members of the Ready Reserve not assigned to troop program units that still retain a limited-service obligation and can be recalled for active or reserve service.

Standby Reserve. Personnel who have completed their Ready Reserve training requirements and those in several special categories comprise the Standby Reserve. They may be called to active duty only by declaration of war or national emergency declared by Congress, or when otherwise authorized by law. Under current law, no standby reservist may be ordered to active duty until the Director of Selective Service determines that he is available for duty.

All-Volunteer Force. The force which resulted from the decision to abolish the draft has been designated the AVF to distinguish it from earlier conscript forces. It is also a concept for meeting the military manpower needs of the nation and applies to all military components, whether active or reserve.

Total Force. The policy which established the RCs as the initial and primary augmentation of the active forces was designated the Total Force Policy. Active forces and reserve elements are considered parts of a whole rather than separate entities. Planning for contingencies also incorporates appropriate forces of our allies into the Total Force concept.

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