Political and Military Factors for Consolidation of Gains in Large Scale Combat Operations

A Monograph

by

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2020

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)* 09-04-2020	2. REPORT TYPE SAMS Monograph	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)* JUN 2019 – APR 2020

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE

Political and Military Factors for Consolidation of Gains in Large Scale Combat Operations

5a. CONTRACT NUMBER

5b. GRANT NUMBER

5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)

MAJ Trulsson, Conor

5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College
ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)

Advanced Military Studies Program

10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT

In 2017, the US Army introduced into doctrine the term consolidation of gains. The conceptual requirement is proven in both historical case studies and theoretical literature, but the planned application of military forces in all contexts is novel and widely contested. This research explains the genesis of the inclusion in US Army doctrine, examines the similarities between doctrine and theory on the matter, and explores two historical case studies in which military forces conducted consolidation of gains. The purpose of this study is to assist commanders and planners in their preparation and execution of post-combat activities, specifically as it relates to transitioning to legitimate authorities. Both doctrine and theory describe the importance of security, legitimacy, and planning among the foundations of successful for post-combat activity. The findings include the need for political decisions that identify the legitimate authority to which administrative and security responsibility will transfer; the type of authorities extended to military forces; and, the identification of any strategic points around which a geographical post-combat framework should be constructed. Findings for the military element include planning considerations, methods of securing access through the consolidation area, and, the need for identification programs. Also identified is the absence of the need to search and care for Prisoners of War (POWs) in current military doctrine and academic theory.

15. SUBJECT TERMS					
Consolidation of Gains, Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO), World War II France, World War II Germany, Post-combat operations, Transfer to legitimate authorities,					

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON MAJ Conor Trulsson
a. REPORT (U)	**b. ABSTRACT** (U)	**c. THIS PAGE** (U)	(U)	52	**19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER** *(include area code)* (573) 450-9863

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Conor E. Trulsson

Monograph Title: Political and Military Factors for Consolidation of Gains in Large Scale
                        Combat Operations

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Abstract

Political and Military Factors for Consolidation of Gains in Large Scale Combat Operations, by MAJ Conor Trulsson, 52 pages.

In 2017, the US Army introduced into doctrine the term consolidation of gains. The conceptual requirement is proven in both historical case studies and theoretical literature, but the planned application of military forces in all contexts is novel and widely contested. This research explains the genesis of the inclusion in US Army doctrine, examines the similarities between doctrine and theory on the matter, and explores two historical case studies in which military forces conducted consolidation of gains. The purpose of this study is to assist commanders and planners in their preparation and execution of post-combat activities, specifically as it relates to transitioning to legitimate authorities. Both doctrine and theory describe the importance of security, legitimacy, and planning among the foundations of successful for post-combat activity. The findings include the need for political decisions that identify the legitimate authority to which administrative and security responsibility will transfer; the type of authorities extended to military forces; and, the identification of any strategic points around which a geographical post-combat framework should be constructed. Findings for the military element include planning considerations, methods of securing access through the consolidation area, and, the need for identification programs. Also identified is the absence of the need to search and care for Prisoners of War (POWs) in current military doctrine and academic theory.

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Acknowledgements

Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
FCNL	French Committee for National Liberation
FFI	French Forces of the Interior
FM	Field Manual
GLOC	Ground Line of Communication
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JP	Joint Publication
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
POW	Prisoner of War
SAC	Supreme Allied Commander
SPOD	Sea Port of Debarkation
TMA	Transitional Military Authority
US	United States of America
WMD	Weapon(s) of Mass Destruction

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Introduction

In April of 2003, the US military seized the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. An interim Iraqi government was established in June of that same year. The military success of April was not immediately followed by any military operation to ensure that administration or governance of Iraq would continue in the absence of a deposed government. The short time between the military success and the implementation of administrative efforts is one of the most recent examples of military operations failing to link to strategic success, better referred to as political victory. The finding from a 2006 Rand study on Operation Iraqi Freedom summarizes the cogent point of the matter: "Problems arose from the failure of the planning process to identify resource requirements for the transition from combat to post-combat operations, as well as from the failure to challenge assumptions about what postwar Iraq would look like."[1] The US military, in particular the Army, continues to struggle in addressing this problem.

In October of 2017, the US Army published the most recent version of US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0 *Operations*, which incorporated a new term: consolidation of gains. This term was then reiterated with the 2019 publication of US Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 *Operations*. ADP 3-0 defines consolidation of gains as "the activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and set the conditions for a stable environment allowing for a transition of control to legitimate authorities."[2] Consolidation of gains is an umbrella term that primarily coincides with the final two phases of US Joint Operations: phase IV-stability operations, and phase V-enable civil authority. US Army doctrine stipulates that consolidation of gains is an ongoing activity, not tied to a specific timeline or phase, but the implementation

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[1] Walter L. Perry, Richard E. Darilek, Laurinda L. Rohn, and Jerry M. Sollinger, eds., Operation IRAQI FREEDOM: Decisive War, Elusive Peace (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), accessed 27 October 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1214.html.

[2] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 1-6.

largely occurs between phase IV: stabilize and the return to phase 0: shape. This concept is the

US Army's method to bridge the gap between tactical actions and achieving strategic aims.[3]

Consolidation of gains is designed to not only link the victory on the battlefield to a political

victory, but also perpetuate peace after combat operations.

The US joint force transition from phase III: dominate into phase IV: stabilize, is a

relatively straight-forward matter of assigning distinct missions to aircraft sorties and naval

assets. The US Army, however, is in the unique position of having to conduct minimal stability


Figure 1. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant Military Activities. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018), V-13.

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[3] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 8-2.

tasks in the consolidation area, while still conducting combat operations in the close and deep areas, with the perpetual potential of kinetic operations. Before the joint force conducts stability operations in aggregate, the Army begins to conduct consolidation of gains immediately upon conclusion of phase III: dominate activities, before the joint force transitions to phase IV: stabilize.


Figure 2. Introductory figure. FM 3-0 logic chart. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 6 October 2017), x.

The US Army is also in the unique position of interacting with inhabitants of an operational environment on a scale not expected of the US Navy or US Air Force. This applies equally in territories being liberated or conquered. While not a novel concept, the introduction of consolidation of gains into US Army doctrine emphasizes political considerations and the art of balancing security requirements with post-combat preparation. In other words, commanders in contemporary Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) will not only face a frenetic combat scenario, likely in foreign territory (from US perspective), with a thinking and capable adversary, possibly in a degraded communications environment, but are now also responsible for setting conditions for a return to normalcy via a planned transition process.

Army formations (most likely divisions and corps, according to FM 3-0[4]) will have to integrate stability, offensive, and defensive tasks in order to achieve success in the newly framed consolidation of gains phase.[5] In addition to coordination of the three most complex military

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[4] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-2.

[5] Ibid.

missions, commanders must transition a literal battlefield to an undetermined legitimate authority, under the continued threat of enemy contact, while regenerating combat power to return to combat operations in the close or deep areas as soon as possible. FM 3-0 does list four activities (area security, stability tasks, influence audiences, and security from external threats) and seven actions (conduct reconnaissance, establish security, eliminate enemy resistance, position forces, adjust fire planning, prepare for potential additional missions, and shape the information environment) that facilitate consolidation of gains.[6] However, all these actions and activities apply universally to combat operations, and are not unique to consolidation of gains (with the exception of stability tasks - which is a mission set unto itself). One hopes commanders inherently understand the need for these actions and activities regardless of the mission. The lack of specificity concerning consolidation of gains can be addressed with the identification of explicit requirements for tactical formations during LSCO.

This study argues that there are two requirements for successful consolidation of gains. First is the political requirement to identify to whom transfer will occur. The second is the military requirement to balance security with post-combat preparation. It will demonstrate effective methods of transitioning security and administrative functions to legitimate authorities during, and immediately following LSCO. The economy of force and resources used in a measured application will shorten the time required for tactical formations consolidating gains, allowing them to return to combat operations, or redeploy. Identification of requirements will not only assist military commanders in their efficiency, but also provide military leaders and civilian agencies a common framework for post-combat operations facilitated by the US Army, enabling timely and effective integration. These civilian organizations are the key to the political victory, and the means to a more effective and longer-lasting peace.[7]

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[6] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-3.

[7] Hans Binnendijk and Patrick M. Cronin, *Civilian Surge, Key to Complex Operations* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2009), 5.

This paper is comprised of four sections, with this introduction as the first. Section two presents a literature review, which offers a doctrinal review of US Army publications regarding consolidation of gains, and select academic literature that discusses post-combat history, environment, frameworks, and theory. Section three presents two historical case studies, and section four is the conclusion of this study, offering findings and recommendations. Applying the lenses of theory, history, and US doctrine to examine the transitions of security and administration between different authorities, the monograph will focus primarily on the transition between military echelons and governance organizations. Specifically, the military echelon transition will be from brigade to division, and division to corps. In conquered territory, the concern is how tactical formations conduct consolidation of gains prior to political submission – precluding the discussion of military occupation, while allowing for military administration. Theorists such as Conrad Crane, G. John Ikenberry, Robert Orr, and Nadia Schadlow will inform the terminology, framework, and purpose of the theoretical lens. These theorists, and others, are also referenced for a brief history of the concepts that preceded consolidation of gains, showing the progression that currently undergirds our understanding of linking military success to political victory. The analysis will also consider the evolution of doctrine, using both sources from WWII, such as orders, regulations, and handbooks; and current publications such as FM 3-0: *Operations*, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 3-0: *Operations*, and Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07: *Stability Techniques*.

Historical analysis of US military operations will assess the European Theatre of Operations during World War II (WWII), and specifically two case studies of Allied forces in France and Germany. These case studies were chosen because they occurred within the same war, demonstrating different ways to pursue consolidation of gains within the same broader political and strategic context. The only exception was the ultimate purpose of the combat action, as France was liberated, whereas Germany was conquered. The distinction between the two is valuable for the study of consolidation of gains to illustrate how it can vary in implementation.

As both were successful (on the criteria that facilitated enduring peaceful relationships between the United States and both France and Germany), they will then be compared to current Army doctrine to note similarities, discrepancies, and changes.

In World War II Allied forces liberated France from Axis occupation and transitioned liberated territory to legitimate authorities. They subsequently conquered territory in Germany in a progressive effort to reach Berlin. Once liberated or conquered, Allied forces secured the territory for following forces and interacted with local civilians. France will be the case study for a liberated territory, and Germany will be the case study for a conquered territory. Comparing and contrasting these two studies will demonstrate how military organizations link tactical success to strategic victory. The study will achieve this by focusing on exploring the political transition as well as the balance between security and post-combat preparation in the identified historical cases.

The findings will prove that Allied forces transitioned responsibility to legitimate authorities in France and Germany following combat operations - effectively consolidating gains during LSCO. Originally, this research also claimed to prove that tactical commanders initiated and terminated consolidation of gains. This latter claim was only partially proven, which does allow for differences in how tactical formations consolidate gains in conquered and liberated territories. Research questions behind the findings were primarily the following: When was the receiver of responsibility identified? How was security balanced against post-combat preparation? What role did tactical formations have throughout the process? What did commanders do immediately following combat operations? What authority did commanders have in the context of consolidation of gains? How did commanders transition responsibility to another authority? The analysis of the findings also allows the author to identify gaps in current doctrine of consolidation of gains, new as it is. Recommendations for inclusion into doctrine relate to political inputs, description of military authorities, and lessons learned from historical case studies.

This study is presented for a military audience, and consequently has limitations in the scope of what is intended for consolidation of gains. Civilian organizations were not consulted in the development of contemporary concept of consolidation of gains,[8] nor can any agency's participation be predicted prior to the need. The role and capacity of civilian entities is one of the limitations of this study. The economic considerations, while vital for consolidation of gains, are dependent on the military (security) and political (stability) conditions preceding economic efforts. New domains such as cyber and space have no precedent to reference in historical case studies which have contemporary correlations for other modern domains.

This study is focused on strategic planning for and tactical execution of actions immediately following combat operations that facilitated transition to higher echelons or civilian organizations. Transition is a multifaceted term that incorporates relinquishing and consequent receipt of responsibility for physical security, general administration, political authority, and legitimacy. Though these aspects are addressed as individually as possible, they are inextricably linked in a complex system of social, political, military, and environmental realities. This is not a study about military governance, which better falls within the purview of the Civil Affairs branch. The administration of an area and its potential civilian populace by a commander that is not a military governor is as close as this study will come to exploring military occupation or governance.

This paper assumes perceived US legitimacy in LSCO. This is necessary to describe an international community that is willing to cooperate with US forces during combat operations. This assumption also accounts for the ability of the United States to exert a whole-of-government approach that will be necessary to consolidate gains during LSCO. US domestic sentiment and international public opinion would not support expenditure of resources after a perceived threat was destroyed, defeated, or neutralized by military measures if US legitimacy was in question.

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[8] Interview with Army doctrine writer Jeffrey LaFace, conducted by author, 04 September 2019.

Literature Review

Doctrine

Current US Army doctrine concerning consolidation of gains can be found in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0 *Operations*, as well as Field Manual (FM) 3-0 *Operations*. Both stipulate that consolidation of gains is the linkage between tactical operations and enduring political and strategic outcomes. Before addressing consolidation of gains in practice, there are two doctrinal frameworks that will assist understanding of the tasks associated with consolidation of gains.

Field Manual (FM) 3-07 *Stability* provides the useful frameworks of Transitional Military Authority (TMA) and progressive phases for stability. TMA is defined as "a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority."[9] This doctrinal definition describes an overarching framework for how a tactical commander consolidates gains and transitions from combat operations to legitimate authority, without proceeding to military occupation.

The progressive framework for stability is broken into three phases: Initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability.[10] Initial response is when US forces are acting either alone, or only with allied/partnered militaries. Transformation is the cooperation between military and civilian agencies. Fostering sustainability is the hand-over or relinquishing of responsibility to the host-nation government. Consolidation of gains is part of each of these phases, but the concept is useful to begin breaking down the timing of consolidation of gains, for which there is no doctrinal guidance pertaining to LSCO.[11]

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[9] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 2-7.

[10] US Army, FM 3-07, 1-2.

[11] Interim host-nation governments are depicted as progressively changing on a 3-6 month cycle, per Figure 5.1. US Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5 *Stability Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 5-3.

Returning to consolidation of gains in practice, FM 3-0 is more detailed than ADP 3-0, and is the primary reference for tactical commanders on the issue. FM 3-0 directs units conducting consolidation of gains to execute four actions: Conduct area security, conduct stability tasks, influence local and regional audiences, and establish security from external threats.[12]

The first of the four actions that FM 3-0 directs in consolidation of gains is conduct area security, in which "Forces conduct security tasks to defeat enemy remnants and protect friendly forces, routes, critical infrastructure, populations, and actions within an assigned AO."[13] Two examples given are search & attack, and cordon & search. These are the offensive operations conducted during consolidation of gains, to destroy or defeat by-passed enemy forces. Because the lowest echelon that can have a consolidation area is a division[14], this study assumes that the lowest echelon that can be tasked with consolidation of gains is a brigade. Consequently, the by-passing of forces is presumably planned only for battalions (or formation equivalent) or smaller. The threat-to-consolidation force ratio will be a key insight in the historical case study of conquered territory.

Second are minimum essential stability tasks. Five of the six stability tasks directed in FM 3-0 come from FM 3-07, *Stability*.[15] The five tasks are: Establish civil security, establish civil control, restore essential services, support to governance, and support to economic infrastructure and development. FM 3-0 has the additional stability task of conduct security cooperation. US Army Techniques Publication 3-07.5 *Stability Techniques* has the most detailed information on stability operations, but is purposed for stabilization in isolation, not in the context of LSCO.

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[12] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-3.

[13] Ibid.

[14] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-5.

[15] US Army, FM 3-07, 1-2.

The time required to restore essential services and provide support to economic infrastructure and development in the wake of LSCO may preclude their inclusion in the minimum essential stability tasks. Additionally, the civilian support required to achieve these two time-intensive stability tasks may necessitate the cessation of hostilities across the Operational Environment (OE). The identification of stability tasks which meet the minimum threshold is a simple matter. Currently, the doctrinal guidance for decision authority referencing minimum essential stability tasks resides with division and corps commanders.[16] In LSCO, it likely that a theater army may want to influence this decision as well. Here is one of the perpetual issues in the current consolidation of gains construct: Who can make what decisions, and when?

Support to governance is military assistance to local authorities in administration of their region, with the purpose of enabling them to be self-sufficient. In the absence of such a government, the military is prepared to act as a TMA.[17] Regardless of whether or not a local government exists, US forces are legally obligated to provide shelter, food, water, and medical treatment if conditions allow.[18] This is likely the first point where commanders will have to balance security (continuing combat operations) with preparing for post-combat operations (civilian considerations, enabling third party assistance, taking account of things in proximity, etc.). This is also another instance that begs the question of who can make what decision when.

Civil security and civil control are closely related, and are the most obviously applicable to consolidation of gains. Civil security is the physical safety of all persons residing in the consolidation area. Civil control is the incorporation, or re-introduction, of civil systems which enable the rule of law, as well as foster adherence to it. The line between the two of these is easily

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[16] US Army, FM 3-0, 5-6.

[17] US Army, FM 3-07, 1-4.

[18] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-3.

blurred, and presents possible delay in transition if different echelons are responsible for distinct stability tasks.

Security cooperation is closely related to Security Force Assistance, and deals with US forces assisting military partners. This likely looks very different between conquered and liberated territories. Security cooperation does not weigh heavily into this research, as it cannot be consistently relied on across all LSCO contingencies.

The third action stipulated for consolidation of gains by FM 3-0 is influence local and regional audiences, in which "Commanders communicate credible narratives to specific audiences to prevent interference and ultimately generate support for operations."[19] To the modern operational commander this is the function of Public Affairs Officer (PAO), Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Civil Affairs (CA) attachments. In the context of the historical case studies, there will be correlations to propaganda and public announcements. Though the task organization of a consolidation of gains force will always be case and purpose dependent, this third requirement supports the tenet of heavily weighting a consolidation of gains echelon with the preponderance of PAO, MISO, and CA personnel available to the assigning headquarters.

The fourth and final action required for consolidation of gains according to FM 3-0 is establish security from external threats. This constitutes the defensive operations conducted during consolidation of gains. Not only is this physical security, but also entails preventing external threats from influencing the consolidation area across all domains.[20] In liberated territories, this action can be facilitated by the integration of security cooperation, support to governance, and establish civil control. Specifically, the police or security force in a liberated territory can be leveraged to more efficiently transition to legitimate authorities. In a conquered

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[19] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-3.

[20] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-3.

territory, this same issue is complicated by authorities of both the TMA and the conquered nation itself.

FM 3-0 also distinguishes responsibilities between echelons. Broadly, theater armies resource, corps manage, divisions synchronize, and brigades execute.[21] No insight is provided for how geographic dimensions, population size, or relation to military objectives influence the echelon directed to consolidate gains. Additional clarity on potential roles and responsibilities between the various echelons will be an outcome of this study.

In summary, US Army doctrine provides a framework and extensive checklists of what to do in consolidation of gains. US doctrine does not provide clear guidance on all authorities pertaining to consolidation of gains. This monograph attempts to address the issues of authority, additional considerations for consolidation of gains not found in doctrine, and a more explicit delineation of responsibilities between echelons (See Appendix).

Theory

This section of the literature review will present post-combat theory, highlighting where it agrees with US doctrine. Post-conflict theorists such as Robert Orr, John Ikenberry, Conrad Crane, and Nadia Schadlow are also presented as historical authorities. Theory and US doctrine agree on three key aspects of consolidation of gains: security, legitimacy, and planning.

The first of these prevailing themes is the primacy of security. Orr states that "Security… is the precondition for achieving successful outcomes in the other pillars."[22] Crane asserts that "at the beginning of Phase IV, strong warfighting skills are essential, and no progress is possible without peace and security."[23] Security obviously falls within the purview of the US Army. Consolidation of gains is the US Army's effort to fully link US doctrine to theory, by framing the

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[21] US Army, FM 3-0, 8-13.

[22] Robert C. Orr, "The United States as a Nation Builder," in *Winning the Peace* (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004), 11.

[23] Conrad C. Crane, "Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won," in *Turning Victory Into Success*, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 14.

transition as a process of maintaining the security on the ground gained in armed conflict until it can be guaranteed by another entity.

The second aspect of consolidation of gains that theory and doctrine agree on is legitimacy. Nadia Schadlow's concept of *jus post bellum*[24] speaks directly to actions taken during consolidation of gains. Schadlow describes *jus post bellum* as "a judgement about what is likely to happen when the fighting stops, since 'what we intend to do after we have fought must be part of the moral calculus in determining whether or not we may justly go to war.'"[25]ATP 3-07.5 sub-divides legitimacy into four factors: Mandate, manner, consent, and expectations.[26] Mandate does not pertain to the tactical commanders that will conduct consolidation of gains, but the remaining three most likely will. Both the United States Institute of Peace and the US Army consider legitimacy a central principle, as reflected in the two graphics at the end of this section (pages 18 and 19), because it will not only engender peace among the populace, but garner support from the international community for sustaining efforts.

The third aspect of consolidation of gains on which theory and doctrine agree is the importance of planning and accounting for consolidation of gains. Consolidation of gains must factor into more than just military considerations, with an emphasis on the timeliness of their consideration. Theorists differ on the approach to planning.

In his book, *Every War Must End*, Fred Charles Ikle analogizes campaign plans in war as a bridge that only crossed half a river, failing to reach the end of conflict on the other side.[27] Among authors listed here, not only was he the first to perceive a gap between military and political end-states, but he is also the only author whose work preceded US action in twenty-first

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[24] Nadia Schadlow, *Art of War and Governance* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 10.

[25] Ibid.

[26] US Army, ATP 3-07.5, 1-21.

[27] Fred Charles Ikle, *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 6.

century Iraq and Afghanistan. In his introduction, Ikle articulated the problems that would come to light three decades later, and be the topic that theorists attempted to present to a world that understood war differently than previous generations. "Thus, it can happen that military men, while skillfully planning their intricate operations and coordinating complicated maneuvers, remain curiously blind in perceiving that it is the outcome of the war, not the outcome of the campaigns within it, that determines how well their plans served the nation's interest."[28] Ikle also identified that a nation's end-state may change throughout the course of war, a theme that future theorists would echo. The potential for change in political objective, after military action begins is (to employ Ikle's metaphor) analogous to starting a bridge, then moving the opposite bank end point mid-construction. In fact, Nadia Schadlow referenced Ikle's problem of "intellectual difficulty of connecting military plans with their ultimate purpose" as the theme of her book.[29]

Nadia Schadlow's book, *War and the Art of Governance*, shows that the US Army has historically conducted consolidation of gains because it "is the only US policy instrument capable of decisively acquiring, holding, and stabilizing territory… to provide a foundation for the reestablishment of political order."[30] In the Mexican War, General Kearny was directed to establish civil governments in California and New Mexico.[31] In Mexico proper, General Scott, absent orders from Washington DC, took the initiative to create a commission that implemented martial law for his own troops and cooperated with Mexican courts and political bodies for civilians.[32] Immediately following the American Civil War, the Union implemented Reconstruction through the Military Reconstruction Act. In the Spanish American War, Army commanders governed the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico before Spain's surrender, and

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[28] Ikle, *Every War Must End*, 2.

[29] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 23.

[30] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 3.

[31] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 35.

[32] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 37.

continued until Spanish influence was reduced enough to allow a local government to come to power.[33] WWII is perhaps the best known example of transition operations, with the occupation still in living memory, and the Marshall Plan held up as a component of an ideal, modern post-combat operation. Despite these successful examples, Schadlow proposes that continued resistance to consolidation of gains derives from "American Denial Syndrome,"[34] which has four symptoms: 1) Discomfort in democracy when military takes lead on political activities; 2) Concerns about colonialism; 3) Perspectives or views that civilians should take the lead on governance operations; 4) Traditional views about what constitutes war and the military profession.

Schadlow points to past American post-combat actions as examples of ways to conduct consolidation of gains in the future. Though not part of past doctrine, the US Army has successfully consolidated gains. The US Army was capable of doing so when given clear guidance, minimal guidance, or no guidance from political leaders. What Schadlow identifies as American Denial Syndrome has simply kept the US military from remembering (or at least applying) lessons learned.

Conrad C. Crane writes from a military perspective. His terminology closely resembles the current Army lexicon. In his presentation, *Phase IV Operations: Where Wars are Really Won*, he uses the term "transition operations" rather than "post-conflict operations" because fighting can still occur during phase IV.[35] Crane defines phase IV as "activities conducted after combat operations to stabilize and reconstruct the area of operations."[36] He does not elaborate on stabilization or reconstruction, but the explicit use of those terms is useful in the context of this literature review. Crane asserts that transition operation planning has historically been done by

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[33] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 55.

[34] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 22.

[35] Crane, *Turning Victory Into Success,* 14.

[36] Crane, *Turning Victory Into Success*, 1.

echelons above Corps,[37] though current doctrine directs consolidation of gains down to the brigade level. Crane does not offer definitions or distinctions when he uses the terms nation-building, peacekeeping, or stabilization, though these are frequently used in conjunction with phase IV operations. Crane identifies Cuba, Puerto Rico, Philippines, Germany, Italy, Japan, Austria, South Korea, Panama, and Kuwait as successful instances of phase IV operations.[38] Crane considers Haiti, Nicaragua, Somalia, Vietnam, Kosovo, Bosnia, Iraq, and Afghanistan US failures. US failures in phase IV were usually caused by insufficient capabilities, resources, or commitment, as a result of a national aversion to nation-building.[39] The two themes that Crane reinforces (for purposes of this literature review) are the gap between tactical success and political victory, and that political victory is measured by integration into the victor's system, resulting in an enduring peace. The prime example is post-WWII Germany, whose economy enjoyed American investment and subsequently became a major player in the international system of trade and commerce in which the US benefitted.

Conrad Crane advocated for specialized peacekeeping units, more multipurpose units, increased active component CS/CSS (Combat Support/Combat Service and Support) Force Structure, and strengthened civilian agencies as potential solutions to phase IV operations.[40] By incorporating consolidation of gains into US Army doctrine, its units will ostensibly be more multi-purpose. However, the US Army is constrained in the size of the force it can maintain. In contemporary conflicts, it has incorporated civilian contractors to off-set personnel constraints. The civilian capacity to influence post-combat areas is mentioned in more than one publication concerning transition operations, but does not fall within the scope of this monograph.

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[37] Crane, *Turning Victory Into Success*, 1.

[38] Crane, *Turning Victory Into Success*, 2.

[39] Crane, *Turning Victory Into Success*, 12.

[40] Crane, *Turning Victory Into Success*, 14.

Robert C. Orr is both contributor to and editor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies publication, *Winning the Peace*. The first sentence in the preface is "The United States is in the nation-building business."[41] Orr proposes four pillars for post-conflict reconstruction, which are very similar to the doctrinally required actions in FM 3-0: Security, governance and participation, economic and social well-being, justice and reconciliation.[42] Orr categorizes US post-conflict reconstruction efforts into three generations: First generation post-WWII occupation; second generation post-Cold War humanitarian intervention; third generation post-9/11 interventions in an era of global terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Because the historical case-studies fall into first generation, and current doctrine pertains to third generation, there may be incongruities in the application of this particular author. However, these categories allow the reader to understand the context and purpose that effect decisions in consolidation of gains.

Robert C. Orr proposed ten building blocks for an American reconstruction strategy[43]: 1) Define national interest and triage accordingly; 2) Be prepared to assist allies and provide priority international public goods; 3) Balance 'high end' and 'low end' capabilities; 4) Ensure basic agreement on goals and objectives for each reconstruction; 5) Build and maintain bi-partisan consensus; 6) Design flexible instruments and use an adaptive strategy; 7) Focus on Speed; 8) Ensure sustainability of interventions; 9) Pursue multilateralism first, not as a last resort; 10) Prioritize and master handoffs. The last block identifies multiple transitions along the road to political victory: military to civilian actors; US actors to international actors, and; international actors to local actors.[44] These are all consistent with consolidation of gains, but there is also the military-to-military transition to consider.

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[41] Orr, *Winning the Peace*, x.

[42] Orr, *Winning the Peace*, 10.

[43] Orr, *Winning the Peace*, 289.

[44] Orr, *Winning the Peace*, 302.

G. John Ikenberry presents a global perspective on post-combat operations in his book, *After Victory*. The primary theoretical contribution is that of Institutional Theory of Order Formation (Institutional Theory). Ikenberry's theory purports that nations have progressively increased the use of institutions in the aftermath of war to stabilize and preserve a system that benefits the victor.[45] Security is gained by adding an additional member to an existing system, and the existing system has legitimacy through participation. Identifying the political end-state of war using this framework constitutes political planning - the other half of Ikle's bridge.

In summary, the theory of post-combat operations centers on security, legitimacy, and planning. Doctrine accounts for these theoretical tenets. There are multiple theories and guidelines for post-combat operations, but only the US Army will likely be at the forefront of learning what is effective in LSCO for the foreseeable future. This section also showed the consensus on the requirement for war plans to bridge the gap between tactical action and strategic success. The theme of transition operations establishing institutions and systems intended to stabilize the defeated nation to prevent further violence is also evident. Two of the above academics agree that nation may change their end-state throughout the course of the war, with no contrary opinion from the other authors.

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[45] Ikenberry, *After Victory*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 51.

Figure 3. Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction. United States Institute of Peace, *Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), 2-8.

Figure 4. Stability tasks and stability principles. US Department of the Army, Amy Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-07.5, *Stability Techniques* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 31 August 2012), 1-19.

Historical Case Studies

Consolidation of Gains in Liberated France

The United States entered WWII after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor on 07 December, 1941. Allied strategy adopted a Germany first approach, and actions against Nazi Germany were prioritized over those against Imperial Japan. However, access to Germany proper

was inhibited by the lack of Allied controlled territory with a land border (other than Russia to the East) from which British, US, and Canadian forces could begin their offensive. To remedy this, the Allies discussed operation Overlord at a conference in Quebec Canada in August 1943,[46] then agreed on its implementation at the Tehran conference later that year.[47] This now famous operation was the plan for an invasion of German occupied Europe, which was executed on 06 June, 1944. The initial point of penetration for the amphibious assault was Normandy, on the French Coast. A second French front was opened in the Mediterranean to relieve pressure on the first. The second front was named operation Dragoon.

The Allies did not only want to use France for its border with Germany, but also to liberate the French people from Nazi occupation. Toward this end, the Allies executed two named operations: Eclipse and Dragoon. Operation Eclipse was the follow-on operation after operation Overlord, and dealt with post-combat across the whole of Europe, with an emphasis on Germany. Consequently, it spanned from the day after the Allied invasion of Europe, 07 June, 1944, until the military passed responsibility to the legitimate authority - in this case the military government - on 10 July, 1945. Operation Dragoon was an Allied invasion of Southern France from the Mediterranean to relieve pressure on operation Overlord which occurred 15 August, 1944 to 14 September, 1944.[48] The distinction between Eclipse and Dragoon, as it pertains to consolidation of gains in France is only in location. 12th US Army Group consolidated gains in northern France, and 7th Army, an element of the 6th Army Group, consolidated gains in the South. Both elements had the same directives and were focused on military operations against German forces. Upon completion of operation Dragoon combat operations in France, operation Eclipse was enacted

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[46] Albert Norman, *The Allied Invasion of North Western Europe: Design and Reality, 1940-1944* (Worcester, MA: Clark University, 1949), 3.

[47] "FDR attends Tehran Conference", *History*, A&E Television Networks, November 22 2019, accessed February 1, 2020, https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/fdr-attends-tehran-conference.

[48] "Operation Dragoon," *HistoryNet*, accessed 09 March 2020, https://www.historynet.com/operation-dragoon.

there to consolidate gains in liberated territory, largely through facilitation by the French Resistance.

The Allies prepared for consolidation of gains well before execution. The United States generated its first military government field manual (FM) in 1940 in anticipation of the occupation of Germany.[49] The Allies, as a whole, began training Civil Affairs (CA) officers for the post-combat European battlefields in 1944.[50]

Allied forces transitioned administrative responsibility to Charles de Gaulle's provisional French government as they progressed across France, yet retained all de facto authority until conclusion of the war. The French Committee for National Liberation (FCNL) was known to the Allies well in advance of the Normandy invasion, but was only formally recognized as a legitimate authority as a last resort. The delay stemmed from Allied fear of influencing the post-conflict government of France; specifically that designating the FCNL as a legitimate authority to which political responsibility would transition would influence the French people prior to (re)establishment of democratic procedure.[51] The French resistance, collectively referred to as French Forces of the Interior (FFI), was formally recognized as a legitimate military force by the Allied military chiefs prior to the execution of operation Overlord.[52] The political decision identifying FCNL was made by political consensus among the Allied Powers, but the FFI's recognition was done by Allied military leaders.

Allied forces focused on security and continuing combat operations as the French resistance conducted the majority of post-combat activities. The FFI were subordinated to the

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[49] Harry Coles and Albert Weinberg, "Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors," *US Army in World War II, Special Studies* (Washington DC: Center for Military History 2004), 7. The 1940 FM was made for Civil Affairs personnel, not as a doctrinal reference for all forces.

[50] Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance*, 113.

[51] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors*, 667.

[52] Martin Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, United States Army in World War II, the European Theater (Washington DC: Center For Military History, 1993), 595.

Third Army commander on 01 August, 1944, and immediately tasked to seize and secure

railroads and act as guides, in addition to their guerilla activity. FFI assistance rendered after

combat operations usually consisted of the following: 1) Providing information about city

officials, 2) Pointing out places the Germans had occupied and those utilized as headquarters, 3)

Identifying Germans wearing civilian clothing, 4) Controlling and checking the movement of

refugees, 5) Assisting in the search for isolated German generals, arms, ammunition, and signal

equipment, 6) Aiding in quelling riots between civilians and pro-Nazi elements, 7) And reporting

information on suspects, and in some cases, turning over the suspects themselves.[53] The FFI

received supplies and weapons from the Allies, and in return, secured Ground Lines of

Communication (GLOCs) for them. The French Director (French military officer under Allied

command) provided civil administration in the rear until a more official transfer occurred.[54]

      Throughout the planning, execution, and transition phases, the military considerations

remained of paramount importance for tactical formations. Tactical formations coordinated with

the French Resistance during the planning process and enjoyed intelligence and supporting efforts

behind enemy lines.[55] In execution, the number one priority given to Allied forces was to defeat

Germany, with the post-combat preparation of France as secondary, and military control of civil

affairs only as necessary for the conduct of the war.[56] As able, the Allies did supply the local

population with food and medical supplies.[57] French control of administrative functions was

encouraged, and the French resistance was eager to resume control of formerly occupied

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[53] Committee 9, *Super Sixth in Exploitation* (Fort Knox, KY: Advanced Officer Course, 1949), 180.

[54] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 664.

[55] Committee 9, *Super Sixth in Exploitation*, 176.

[56] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 662.

[57] Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 590.

territory.[58] In France, the FFI ensured continued access and mobility through the consolidation area, reducing the need for Allied combat power to secure GLOCs.[59]

Tactical commanders did little to initiate or terminate consolidation of gains. The incorporation of the French 1st Army, the FFI, and the eagerness of the local populace largely relieved other Allies from that task.[60] Conventional French forces joined Allied forces for operation Overlord, and received the honor of liberating Paris. The city was not bypassed because it was the only place from which French government could administer France.[61] The overall termination of military oversight in France ended with the transfer from US 15th Army to French forces at 2359 on 10 July, 1945.[62] This coincided with the transfer of conquered German territory from 12th Army Group to Headquarters, United States Forces, European Theater.[63] The US army continued to exercise consolidation of gains in liberated France until Germany was officially under military occupation.

Prior to the Allied arrival, FFI engaged Germans occupying Paris and reached a limited agreement for Paris proper.[64] The FFI in Paris had, in contradiction to Allied wishes and directives, been overly antagonistic towards the German occupiers. Rather than escalate the situation the FFI and the German general in command of Paris, German GEN Dietrich von Choltitz worked through the Swedish consul general to agree to a nebulous non-interference pact. The FFI gained time to wait for the Allied army and GEN Choltitz gave himself another reason

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[58] Jeffrey J. Clark and Robert Ross Smith, *Riviera to the Rhine*, US Army in World War II The European Theater of Operations *(*Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1993), 216.

[59] Committee 9, *Super Sixth in Exploitation*, 178.

[60] Clark and Smith, *Riviera to the Rhine*, 216.

[61] Martin Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 594.

[62] G-5 Section, Headquarters, 12th Army Group, A.E.F, *After Action Report of Civil Affairs and Military Government in "OVERLORD" and "ECLIPSE" Operations 1944-1945* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library), II-6.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 596.

not to burn Paris, which he was apparently loathe to do.[65] Paris was officially liberated when GEN Choltitz surrendered to both French GEN Philippe Leclerc de Hauteclocque (LeClerc) and the FFI commander in Paris.[66] Interestingly, the German surrender was accepted on behalf of the would-be French government, not the Allies, even though GEN Leclerc was subordinated to the SHAEF commander. Supporting 6th Army Group in the South for OPERATION DRAGOON, French liaisons provided by de Gaulle's FCNL were responsible for linking up with and assisting in the establishment of local governance. Between French resistance, FCNL liaisons, and CA teams, tactical commanders were largely relieved of any requirement to initiate or terminate consolidation of gains, though they maintained the ultimate authority and responsibility for the areas they were in.

Immediately following combat operations tactical commanders issued instructions to the civil population. In descending order, these preferably went through local civil authorities, an Allied CA team, or an on ground Army officer.[67] Typical instructions included: Curfew designation, blackout procedures, movement prohibition, confiscation of cameras and binoculars, and a directive to surrender any arms or ammunition.[68] First Army demonstrated some media savvy in this regard when they reported a Civil Affairs detachment and First Army collaboration in the preparation of a poster and a recording as part of a plan to make standfast orders effective. Displaced persons of the target audience nationalities made the drawings and supplied music and

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[65] GEN Choltitz refused several German orders to do serious harm to Paris, France. The book *Is Paris Burning?* is about the credit he is due for the survival of the historic city. Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, *Is Paris Burning?* (New York, NY: Grand Central Publishing, 1991).

[66] Blumenson, *Breakout and Pursuit*, 618.

[67] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 724.

[68] Ibid.

words for the recording.[69] Tactical commanders also typically conducted a supply assessment,[70] promoted reestablishment of local industry and economy (e.g. fishing),[71] and encouraged the creation or increase of a police force. Third US Army, for example, reported on 27 January, 1945 "Liberated Areas: A total of 60 auxiliary and regular Gendarmes are now in Redange Canton performing normal duties and assisting the Army in conducting investigation, patrolling, checking identity cards, and controlling traffic. Continuation of house-to-house check in METZ (U-8757) resulted in the arrest of six American AWOLs; 27 civilians were taken into custody by French police, and four by CIC."[72] This is a prime example of small initial efforts by tactical commanders, compounded by time, resulting in the transition intended in consolidation of gains.

Tactical commanders had complete authority in so far as it contributed to the defeat of Germany. The Allies transitioned responsibility to the FFI/FNCL, but retained both military and political authority. Wherever the FCNL had administrative authority, the Allied powers sought to support them, but only in a manner that would not detract from their ultimate ability to defeat Germany. In transitioning to the FFI, military necessity dictated everything down to the level of free speech, opinion, press, and correspondence.[73] The Joint Chiefs of the Allies explicitly described their desired post-combat conditions: "1) Total authority to conduct war until completion, 2) French comprise CA government under the Supreme Allied Commander (SAC); Director must be French officer appointed by SAC from Allied force, 3) Duration will be as short

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[69] C.R. Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library), 244.

[70] Third Army reported "Liberated Area: On 24 January 1945, a meeting was held in Sierck (Q-0095), France, of representatives of millers, bakers, truckers, and food distributors, and a systematic plan of supply and collection of food for the Canton was set up under the direction of the assistant mayor." C.R. Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* Headquarters, Twelfth Army Group (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library), 237.

[71] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 724.

[72] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* 267.

[73] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 662.

as necessary, 4) Transfer of civil responsibility may be progressive, if situation allows, 5) SAC impartial to all political groups sympathetic to Allied cause."[74]

The theoretical tenets of security, legitimacy, and planning were clearly exhibited in this example of Allied consolidation of gains in liberated territory during WWII. Security remained the foremost concern of military planners and tactical commanders throughout, though post-combat preparation was planned and executed as able. The planning for consolidation of gains in liberated territory was also clear. In the United States, accounting for post-combat operations began before they even entered the war, with the creation of the 1940 military government manual. Political planning was evident in seizure of Paris for effective functioning of the government. Military planning identified the invasion point, in part because of its ability to facilitate subsequent operations. Most important for planning was the integration of FFI/FCNL into Allied plans, which then also transferred to political capabilities with the near-instantaneous establishment of local governance. Political legitimacy was obtained by consensus among the Allied Powers, and conferred to both the FFI and FCNL. Liberated French also perceived the Allies as legitimate, and supported the legitimacy of the FFI/FCNL.

In summary, the French case study on consolidation of gains in liberated territory confirms the validity of post-combat theory as described in the previous section. In addition, there are four lessons to incorporate into modern doctrine. First, balancing security with post-combat preparation must not prioritize civil assistance to the detriment of military operations. Second, access to and through consolidation areas can be facilitated by the legitimate authority in receipt of responsibility. Third, identification is important for two reasons: Political input on strategic points; and, identification of key individuals in the consolidation area. Fourth, the practical autonomy of military commanders in WWII France is not realistic on a modern battlefield. A hypothetical framework to simplify levels of authority is posited in the Appendix.

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[74] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 662.

Consolidation of Gains in Conquered Germany

On 11 December, 1944, Allied forces crossed into Germany at the trilateral border of neighboring Belgium and the Netherlands.[75] After liberating France in the previous months, they intensified their focus on conquering German territory. Despite the obvious contrast between liberated and conquered territory, many of the themes of doctrinal, theoretical, and liberated territory lessons are evident in the conquered territory case study. The political questions of legitimate authority are answered much more simply in the form of an Allied political and military transition to itself, by means of military personnel in a combat role to military personnel in a governing role. The military questions in reference to balancing post-combat preparation with combat operations security are answered much more directly for the same reason. The Allies were conquerors and subsequently occupiers. The post-combat conditions that tactical formations began to establish would essentially perpetuate the status quo once the Allies achieved a theater-wide position of relative advantage. Whereas civil affairs was the appropriate term for post-combat specialists in liberated territory, military governance was the term applied to post-combat specialists in conquered territory.[76] Both terms are used interchangeably however, because the civil affairs detachment personnel comprised the body that, collectively, became the administrative arm of the military government in occupied Germany.

At the Moscow Conference, in 1943, the Allies began the discussion for what post-war Germany would look like.[77] The first Allied plan directly addressing this issue was from the Allied Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), simply named JCS 1067.[78] This plan reached its final form in operation Eclipse,[79] which was the overarching plan for post combat operations executed in all

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[75] Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, *American Military Occupation of Germany* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1953), 5.

[76] Norman, *The Allied Invasion of North Western Europe: Design and Reality, 1940-1944*, 160.

[77] Schadlow, *War and The Art of Governance*, 111.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Schadlow, *War and The Art of Governance*, 111.

the above named operations, in all territories, regardless of conquered or liberated status. Named combat operations in Germany were conducted until military objectives were achieved, then OPERATION ECLIPSE conditions were implemented to consolidate gains for the transition from kinetic operations to the TMA.

Operation Eclipse occurred from 07 June, 1944 to 10 July, 1945. Operation Eclipse was sub-divided into two phases, the first of which will be the focus of this case study. The first phase was described as "[a]n advance by our forces, conducted with the maximum speed that is consistent with security, designed to secure especially important strategic areas deep inside Germany, including Berlin, and to extend our air threat. This is really the consummation of Overlord."[80] The first phase of operation Eclipse has three elements that are highlighted in this case-study. First, the securing of strategic areas coincided with projected national zones of occupation; second, the Allies planned to transition to a military occupation, essentially transferring to themselves as the legitimate authority; third, the vital importance of Ground Lines of communication (GLOCs).[81] The policy of de-Nazification, in which Nazi party members and sympathizers were removed from authority, was a mainstay of operation Eclipse, but does not pertain to the scope of this research. One thing to note from operation Eclipse that is distinct from current US doctrine and theory, and will be highlighted below, is the emphasis on facilitating the movement of prisoners of war (POWs) out of the consolidation area.

The first phase of operation Eclipse was designated "Primary Phase" with the intent to "Move quickly to seize key terrain and extend air capability (Overlord consummation)."[82] The key terrain included two primary, one secondary, one tertiary, and one eventual objectives that

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[80] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944, *Operation Eclipse; Appreciation and Outline Plan* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library, 1944), 5.

[81] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944, *Operation Eclipse; Appreciation and Outline Plan*, 9.

[82] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944, *Operation Eclipse; Appreciation and Outline Plan*, 5.

would enable occupation and long-term administration.[83] The German capital of Berlin was a Primary objective for multiple reasons, including administration and transportation center; intelligence/information installations; and, as a display of strength. This was clearly a political consideration, as well as a military objective. The other primary objective was Hamburg-Kiel for its naval ports and industry, as well its position to isolate Germany from Norway and Denmark. The Secondary objective was Nuremberg-Regensburg-Munich for its existing administration centers, and to isolate Germany from Italy, Austria, and the Balkans. The Tertiary objective was Leipzig-Dresden because of the industrial capacity and associated lines of communication there - specifically to Prague and southeastern Europe. The Eventual objective was the Ruhr and Saar Valleys for both the industry and population centers there, as well as to control lines of communication. The Allied operational approach in conquered territory was terrain focused during combat operations to enable post-combat operations in the form of military governance.

Allied forces transitioned responsibility to military governance as the legitimate authority in Germany. This military governance came from personnel within the Allied military that received specific training, such as the European Civil Affairs Division (ECAD) and the US Army G-5 staff section. The United States began training officers for military governance in 1940[84] with the express purpose of employing them as a TMA in conquered territories. As implied in the name, the Allies did not intend to occupy Germany in perpetuity. The goal was to turn a pacified Germany over to the German people to function as an independent, sovereign country once again. For post-combat operations in Germany, the Allies created 14 Civil Affairs teams[85] of 2-9 personnel each[86] which were then assigned specific zones in conquered territory, based

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[83] Ibid.

[84] Coles and Weinberg, *Civil Affairs Soldiers Become Governors*, 10.

[85] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 11.

[86] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 6.

geographically on the German regional government structure.[87] These teams were attached to tactical units to employ in their role as soon as possible. Three distinct entities are addressed here: Civil Affairs detachments or teams, Civil Affairs staff, and the G-5 staff section. The Civil Affairs section became a General Staff section, the G-5, on 3 May, 1944.[88] The G-5 was the staff section at Corps echelon and above responsible for Allied planning in reference to the post-combat environment.[89] The CA staff coordinated between the G-5 and the tactical units in which they were resident - namely division echelon and below.[90] The CA detachments were those elements tasked with the execution of purely civil affairs (issues of a civilian nature, not the military specialty) and military governance tasks. These detachments were attached to conventional Army units, to begin post-combat transition operations at the first opportunity. Despite the foresight and planning, the number of CA detachments was insufficient to keep pace with the speed Allied forces conquered German territory. "The need for detachments was everywhere so acute that the Armies were authorized on 3 April to form new provisional Military Government detachments from tactical troops. The Commanding General, European Theater of Operations, approved an over-strength of Military Government grades for the Army Group of 850 officers, 75 warrant officers and 1500 enlisted men."[91]

Tactical commanders initiated consolidation of gains, but were not relieved of that responsibility until a civil affairs representative or military governor arrived. In the event that a CA detachment was attached to the conquering unit, they were the Allied element that initiated consolidation of gains, but subordinate to the authority of the tactical commander. When active

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[87] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Office of the Chief of Staff 1944, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, US Army Military History Institute (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combined Arms Research Library), 25.

[88] G-5 Section, Headquarters, 12th Army Group, A.E.F, *After Action Report of Civil Affairs and Military Government in "OVERLORD" and "ECLIPSE" Operations 1944-1945*, I-3.

[89] Ibid., II-1.

[90] Ibid.

[91] Ibid., II-9.

resistance ceased, OPERATION ECLIPSE conditions were imposed, but not publicly due to troop morale concerns and political risk mitigation.[92] The decision authority for who could do so is not clear. As the Allies drove deeper into Germany, they kept their Military Police units immediately behind the frontline troops, and assigned tactical formations to the areas closer to liberated territories.[93] Tactical commanders were expected to consolidate gains both immediately following combat operations, and as a long-term augmentation effort to the military governance effort. 12th US Army Group transferred full responsibility for occupied Germany to the US European Headquarters, which oversaw the Military Government, on 10 July, 1945.[94]

Immediately following combat operations, tactical commanders posted proclamations, took the first steps in refugee control, and established security patrols.[95] The proclamations declared martial law and provided the rules that would be enforced by the military government. Refugee control quickly became a theater level issue, due less to congestion on the GLOCs, and more to the lack of food required to support Internally Displaced Person (IDPs) and refugees. In March of 1945, First Army reported "Occupied Germany: Due to food shortages in AACHEN (K-8443), the return of evacuees to their homes in AACHEN has been halted."[96] Third Army enforced civilian adherence through checkpoints manned with Military Police, which also served to restrict civilian travel toward the progressively eastern front.[97] While German civilians generally cooperated with Allied forces, they were unable to feed, clothe, house, and medically care for their own people, much less those civilians transiting through Germany.[98] Tactical

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[92] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 6.

[93] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 9.

[94] G-5 Section, *After Action Report of Civil Affairs and Military Government in "OVERLORD" and "ECLIPSE" Operations 1944-1945,* I-6.

[95] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 10.

[96] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* 222.

[97] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries*, 249.

[98] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 12.

commanders were prepared to conduct a number of post-combat activities, including[99]: the recovery and repatriation of Allied military personnel[100]; the location and disposal of American war dead; the care and disposal of surplus property and captured enemy material; the disbandment of the enemy armed forces; the destruction of fortifications; the punishment of war criminals; and, the arrest and detention of civilian internees.[101]

Commanders had complete autonomy in the conquered territories, but were encouraged to delegate as much as possible to local nationals, if trusted. Where tactical commanders were not relieved by military government officials, they were responsible for establishing and implementing multiple types of courts.[102] Prior to military governance, tactical commanders were also responsible for beginning more long-term efforts regarding economy and infrastructure associated with consolidation of gains. In February, 1945, Third US Army reported "Occupied Germany: A civilian construction crew is repairing a shelled bridge and road outside of IHN (Q-1881) and leading to LEIDINGEN (Q-1879)."[103] Tactical commanders either had, or assisted in the creation of Black, Grey, and White lists.[104] Respectively, these lists identified Germans to either summarily dismiss from public office, distrust on basis of association with Nazis or other war criminals, or keep in office as a trusted agent. This is another example of the need for an identification program in consolidation of gains; in conquered territory there may even be a need

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[99] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, iii.

[100] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* 242. 9th Army reported "All remaining Allied displaced persons, numbering 26, were evacuated from AACHN on 20 January 1945…"

[101] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* 229. 3rd Army reports "Occupied Germany: Arrangements are being made to establish a civilian prison at the German evacuee center at HEMMERSDORF (Q-1885)."

[102] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* 232. 1st Army reports "Occupied Germany: Two circulation violators were arrested in the MONSHAU (K-9518 area, and convicted before a Summary Military Court; each was fined 100 marks."

[103] Landon, *Civil Affairs and Military Government Summaries,* 230.

[104] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Office of the Chief of Staff, 1944, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, 197.

for more intense form of identification. In spring of 1945, all Germans over 12 years old registered with Allied occupiers.[105] Tactical commanders also retained authority which superseded military governance needs for any war-related materials or means, extending to the use of ports, rail lines, and ships.[106]

The Allies knew before the Normandy landings that Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs) were essential to the initial and enduring success of Allied operations to conquer and occupy Germany territory.[107] Though the Allies were no longer contested in the maritime domain (Sea Lines of Communication: SLOCs), and had superiority, with occasional supremacy (Air Lines of Communication: ALOCSs) in the air domain, the GLOCs held the key to executing both combat security operations, as well as post-combat preparation. The presence of civilians in the theater drastically impacted the Allied use of GLOCs and their capacity to conduct both combat and post-combat operations. Not only did civilians obstruct roads during their transit, but even when static, the logistic requirements to feed, clothe, and medically treat the vast number of civilians impacted the Allied sustainment of combat operations.[108] However, the Allies had the self-imposed requirement to repatriate IDPs of allied nations. The Allies continued to require GLOCs for transportation rearward of their own injured, POWs, and any foodstuffs captured in conquered territory that could ease the requirements in liberated France. Allied planning dismissed leveraging airpower to sustain OPERATION ECLIPSE.[109] Finally, by controlling the

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[105] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 10.

[106] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces Office of the Chief of Staff, 1944, *Handbook for Military Government in Germany*, 258.

[107] Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, 1944, *Operation Eclipse; Appreciation and Outline Plan*, 9.

[108] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 12.

[109] Office of the Chief of Military History, *American Military Occupation of Germany*, 12. Airpower could not provide the necessary amount of sustainment, could be negatively impacted by weather, and retained other missions.

GLOCs denied Germany the ability to move sufficient combat power in the time required to outmaneuver the Allies.

The theoretical tenets of security, legitimacy, and planning were exhibited in this WWII case study of consolidation of gains in conquered territory. Security was the paramount consideration for Allied operations. To the extent possible, Allied tactical commanders were relieved of their responsibility to conduct consolidation of gains by CA detachments and military governors, allowing them to focus solely on combat operations. When tactical commanders did not have this augmentation, they were required to consolidate gains only to further the military mission (current US doctrine of minimal necessary stability operations). Political legitimacy of the military government was inherent in the Allied mandate to establish a military government. From the German perspective, military governance was imposed by force, but was also likely to gain legitimacy from the Allied capability to provide desperately needed food and other services. The planning for consolidation of gains is evident in the training of military government personnel, the distribution of the 1944 Military Government Handbook[110], and the pragmatic establishment of the military government on top of the existing German regional governmental structure.

In summary, this historical case study on consolidation of gains in conquered territory confirms the validity of post-combat theory as described in the literature review. Also, there are four lessons learned for consolidation of gains in conquered territory. First, the dual aspects of identification will have an even more important role in conquered territory than in liberated. Identification of political objectives in conquered territory must account for the post-combat administration structure, since the conquerors will institute governance (whereas populations and organizations in liberated areas will determine and work to establish governance). Identification

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[110] This was a "desk reference" for the Allies. It was not a doctrinal publication, but provided large scope objectives and a framework for forces that would be operating across the whole of Europe. It is included among the primary sources.

of key personnel, both for positive and negative purposes, is a continuous effort for effective transition to any party. Second, the unpredictability of sustainment requirements obligates consolidation of gains to allow for freedom of movement along GLOCs. Third, tactical commanders can fill roles in military governance/consolidation of gains, but specially trained personnel are preferred if no other legitimate authority can be found. Finally, in conquered territory, tactical commanders cannot rely on any legitimate authority to be available for transfer of responsibility immediately following combat operations. The extent of consolidation of gains will be largely dependent on time, but tactical commanders should be aware of the long-term efforts they can begin influencing immediately after combat. A framework of significant security considerations is posited in the Appendix.

Conclusion

This conclusion is comprised of three sections: Findings, analysis, and recommendations. The findings first address significant political and military factors for consolidation of gains, then additional items of note. The analysis presents insight into contemporary consolidation of gains. The recommendations are proposed to increase the efficacy of US Army formations conducting consolidation of gains.

Successful consolidation of gains requires identification of a body to which authority will transfer. There are three distinct authorities which require prescribing to an entity. First, identifying the legitimate authority(ies) to which administrative authority will transfer. This answers the question of who will administer the territory post-liberation or post-conquest. Second, the authority for security must be identified. Security authority can be retained in the conquering or liberating military force; transferred to the same political body that has administrative control; passed to local military or security forces, or; granted to a third party from the international community. Third, the judicial authority must be identified. Though more pertinent in conquered territory for these case studies, judicial authority in liberated territory will

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be the more complex for contemporary operations. Additional political considerations are the extent of authorities granted to military forces. These must be specified to avoid confusion. Finally, the identification of strategic points around which a geographical post-combat framework will be constructed is a political consideration that military planners must address. In liberated France, the political structure was top-down in design, with all administrative functions running from the central hub in Paris. In conquered Germany, the political structure was regionally administered, with each region reporting to a military occupational authority in Berlin.

Successful consolidation of gains requires a balance between post-combat preparation with conduct of necessary security for combat operations. There are four main military measures that address this balance. First, the incorporation of any friendly organizations, armed or otherwise, at the earliest possibility. Second, the preparation and dissemination of public standards to which all in the consolidation area are expected to adhere. Third, the securing of access (GLOCs, APODs, SPODs) throughout the consolidation area for both friendly military forces and civilians. Fourth, identification of individuals, places, and capabilities that either prevent or enable continued consolidation of gains by the identified legitimate authority(ies). This final measure is ongoing and continuously updated for distribution.

The distinction between liberated and conquered territories is more nuanced than the purposes. Liberated territory presents a much more complex political environment, due to the balance of maintaining a relationship with political partners and conducting effective combat operations. The French case study exemplified this with the reticence of Allied nations to identify the FCNL as the legitimate authority, and forcing the Allied military to acknowledge the FFI as a legitimate military to proceed with planning for combat operations. The French case study (liberated) was primarily enemy-focused, with the exception of Paris. Conversely, the German case study (conquered) was terrain-focused. This is simply an observation of the case studies herein, and not a proposal to conduct differently focused military operations in conquered vs. liberated territories. The final distinction is the advantage of maintaining combat power in

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liberated territory when cooperating resistance forces can be dedicated to maintaining GLOCs or strategic points after seizure, rather than subordinate conventional forces.

Consolidation of gains can be supported immeasurably by third party assistance. Hans Binnendijk's book, *Civilian Surge*, posits that civilians and civilian organizations are the key to complex operations. None of the theorists discussed earlier convey the idea that any military should conduct consolidation of gains in isolation. The US Army has cooperated with US and international agencies in the past, but the continued degradation of US agencies has left the military to fill the void.[111] US Army doctrine of consolidation of gains is a result of the continued need for transition to occur, but with the US military as the only organization capable of doing so. The US Army should welcome civilian assistance in the preparation and execution of post-combat operations.

Analysis of the research and findings contained in this monograph fall under two categories: Authorities and task organization. It is unlikely that modern military planners will assume a similar level of authority granted to tactical commanders in WWII. Nor should commanders expect equally clear guidance for their tactical formations. One example is the confiscation of select electronics (cell phones representing the most controversial) in either liberated or conquered territory. This is a potentially escalatory act, though certainly understandable from a military perspective for security purposes. Current US doctrine does not identify responsible parties for authorization of prioritizing post-combat activities over combat operations. Simply put, there is no doctrinal termination authority for consolidation of gains. Can commanders assigned to a consolidation area determine when they are ready for transition? In the absence of a legitimate authority, are consolidated gains held indefinitely?

Task organization will determine much of the duration and impact of consolidation of gains. The potentially long-term requirements to have a turn-in point for weapons and obtain a

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[111] Binnendijk, *Civilian Surge*, 2.

reliable supply estimate, for example, depends on the enablers provided to the consolidation force by higher headquarters. The enduring expectations of police force assistance and economic recovery are likely only achievable after national, political capitulation, unless transitioned to a non-military entity. The expectation of a corresponding justice system implemented devoid of trained legal personnel is a shortcoming inherent in any military unit conducting consolidation of gains. The final point for task organization is a combination of both analysis categories. When cooperating with IGOs and NGOs, who will determine the relationships? Who will authorize the entrance of civilians into a battlespace or assignment to a military formation?

Finally, there are four recommendations. First, that the Army incorporate transition to legitimate authorities as part of culminating training events, in pursuit of Robert C. Orr's "prioritize and master hand-offs." Second, in light of the role that economics played in the historical case studies, and will inevitably play in future consolidation of gains, the author recommends research into the military role of financial and industrial systems that support institutional integration, as presented by Ikenberry's Institutional Theory. Third, the search and care for POWs should be integrated into consolidation of gains doctrine. Finally, a similar study on the post-combat operations conducted in WWII Italy is recommended, due to neither conquered, nor liberated status of the consolidation area.

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Appendix

Hypothetical Framework for Authorities during Consolidation of Gains

Table 1. Authorities Framework

Framework	BCT	DIV	Corps	Theater Army
Surrender	Conventional military forces	Militia/Paramilitary Organziations	Metropolitan Areas	Regional Government
Administration	Town of <100,000	Multiple cities <100,000/ Single City <1 million	Multiple cities <1million/ Single City >1 million	In coordination with identified governance
Occupation	Weapon Depot/Military Installation	Media centers	Mobility Hubs	Regional Government offices
Integration	Support to military effort	Support to civilians directly	Support to local economy	Inherent
Termination	Requested	Delegable @ Metropolitan level	Delegable @ regional level	Recommends/advises @ national level
Authorities	*Level 1: Mil-Mil authority*	*Level 2: Mil-Civilian authority*	*Level 3: Mil-Political authority*	*Level 4: Military governance/occupation*

Source: Created by author

Hypothetical Framework for Security in Consolidation of Gains

Table 2. Security Framework

Security	BCT	DIV	Corps	Theater Army
Conventional	Destroy	Destroy	Destroy	N/A
Irregular	Isolate	Disintegrate	Defeat	N/A
Police	US forces police	Host-Nation Police	International Police	Defeated Military Police Force
Population*	Civil Security	Civil Control	Support to Governance	Restore Essential Services
Non-Military	Prisons	Critical Infrastructure	Transportation Centers	Government offices
Access	GLOCs/APODs	Refugess/IDPs	US Government agencies	NGO/International Support
	hours/days	days/weeks	weeks/months	months/years

Source: Created by author.

Suggested Political and Military Considerations for Consolidation of Gains

Table 3. Considerations in Conquered and Liberated Territories

PolMil	Political (Conquered)	Political (Liberated)	Military (Conquered)	Military (Liberated)
Before — To whom will responsibility transition?	US Military (Occupation)	International Organization	Dissolved	Independent
	International Organization	UN/Combined government agency	Disarmed	Subordinate to identified governance
	UN/Combined government agencies	Local National Government	Incarcerated	Under US military authority
	Local National Government	Return of exiled government	Employed as police force	Employed as police force
	Return of exiled government	Regional governments only	Allowed to partner with US forces	
During — Who decides that transition can proceed?	US Military	Identified Governance	Directed (US political decision)	International body (e.g. UN)
	Identified Governance	Bound by time	JFC	Combined force coordination
	Bound by time	Agreed upon conditions	Field Army/Corps	Liberated government
	Agreed upon conditions	Region specific	Division	
		Level of government specific	BCT	
After — What are the implications for US forces post-transition?	Administration	Administration	Control Access	Ensure Access
	Appointment of leadership	Civilian judiciary	Limitations/Constraints (US imposed)	Limitations/Constraints (Mutually agreed)
	Civilian judiciary	Military tribunals	SOFA	SOFA
	Military tribunals	Coordinate NGO support	Security requirements	Security requirements
	Coordinate NGO support			

Source: Created by author.