Organizational Identity Bias and Planning: Resistance to Post-Conflict Military Governance

A Monograph

by

MAJ Uliano P. Polatos
Australian Army

School of Advanced Military Studies
US Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KS

2020

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

1. REPORT DATE *(DD-MM-YYYY)*	2. REPORT TYPE	3. DATES COVERED *(From - To)*
04-09-2020	Master's Thesis	AUG 2019 – JUN 2020

4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE	5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Organizational Identity Bias and Planning: Resistance to Post-Conflict Military Governance	5b. GRANT NUMBER
	5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6. AUTHOR(S)	5d. PROJECT NUMBER
Major Uliano Peter Polatos, Australian Army.	5e. TASK NUMBER
	5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301	

9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)	10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
	11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

14. ABSTRACT
Organizational Identity Bias and Planning: Resistance to Post-Conflict Military Governance, by Major Uliano P. Polatos, Australian Army, 44 pages.

The US Army boasts a long history of providing governance in the aftermath of combat, from conflicts in Mexico to Iraq. The Army is the only organization with sufficient resources to perform governance, which is required to connect tactical victory to policy objectives. However, this monograph proposes that institutional bias limits the Army's conception of military power to large scale, decisive combat, derived from historical anomalies such as the Second World War. The organization's understanding of the application of military power is challenged by the requirement to provide governance, which is subsequently underrepresented in doctrine, organization, and training. The consequence has been poor preparation, inadequate allocation of resources, civil-military conflict, and often, failure to realize policy objectives following tactical success. This monograph seeks to understand the Army's institutional bias against governance by examining the preparation, execution and response to military governance in Operations Just Cause, Panama, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army must identify bias if it is to overcome it, and the repeated failure to prepare for governance in the past suggests that it is not a question of evidence, but aversion. By understanding the nature of this bias, the organization will be better positioned to objectively assess the causes of success or failure of past operations and will be more inclined to incorporate governance into operational planning in the future.

15. SUBJECT TERMS
Military Government, Governance, Organizational Bias, Operation Just Cause, Operation Iraqi Freedom

16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:			17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT	18. NUMBER OF PAGES	19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT	b. ABSTRACT	c. THIS PAGE			19b. PHONE NUMBER *(include area code)*
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	44	

Monograph Approval Page

Name of Candidate: MAJ Uliano P. Polatos

Monograph Title: Organizational Identity Bias and Planning: Resistance to Post-Conflict
Military Governance

Approved by:

_____, Monograph Director
Anthony E. Carlson, PhD

_____, Seminar Leader
James C. Reese, COL

_____, Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
Brian A. Payne, COL

Accepted this 21st day of May 2020 by:

_____, Acting Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, PhD

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other
government agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

Abstract

Organizational Identity Bias and Planning: Resistance to Post-Conflict Military Governance, by Major Uliano P. Polatos, Australian Army, 44 pages.

The US Army boasts a long history of providing governance in the aftermath of combat, from conflicts in Mexico to Iraq. The Army is the only organization with sufficient resources to perform governance, which is required to connect tactical victory to policy objectives. However, this monograph proposes that institutional bias limits the Army's conception of military power to large scale, decisive combat, derived from historical anomalies such as the Second World War. The organization's understanding of the application of military power is challenged by the requirement to provide governance, which is subsequently underrepresented in doctrine, organization, and training. The consequence has been poor preparation, inadequate allocation of resources, civil-military conflict, and often, failure to realize policy objectives following tactical success. This monograph seeks to understand the Army's institutional bias against governance by examining the preparation, execution and response to military governance in Operations Just Cause, Panama, and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Army must identify bias if it is to overcome it, and the repeated failure to prepare for governance in the past suggests that it is not a question of evidence, but aversion. By understanding the nature of this bias, the organization will be better positioned to objectively assess the causes of success or failure of past operations and will be more inclined to incorporate governance into operational planning in the future.

Contents

Acknowledgments

This monograph would not have been possible without the continued support and patience of my loving family. Thank you for sharing this adventure with me, and for reminding me to put down the books once in a while.

I am incredibly grateful to my monograph director Dr. Anthony Carlson for his enthusiasm, guidance, and support throughout this project and the academic year. I also wish to thank my seminar leader COL James Reese and my fellow students for the spirited debates, which helped to continually refine my thoughts.

Abbreviations

ADP   Army Doctrine Publication

CENTCOM   United States Central Command

CFLCC   Combined Forces Land Component Command

CJTF-4   Combined Joint Task Force IV

FM   Field Manual

JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff

JP   Joint Publication

JTF   Joint Task Force

NSD   National Security Decision

PDF   Panamanian Defense Force

SOUTHCOM   United States Southern Command

Tables

Introduction

Background

The US Army boasts a long history of providing governance in the aftermath of combat, including after conflicts in Mexico, the Southern States, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines, Germany, and Japan.[1] This trend has continued since the Second World War with interventions in Central America, Europe, and the Middle East, where the Army provided governance in the absence of a functioning civil authority. In almost every instance, the Army was the only organization with sufficient resources to perform governance, which sought to connect tactical victory to policy objectives. However, in each instance, there was strong resistance to the military performing a governance function, from both the military and civilian leadership.

Resistance to military governance persists, despite repeated evidence that combat alone does not achieve desired political ends. Resistance is evidenced by civil and military commentary during recent conflicts and in the Army's approach to governance in doctrine, organization, and training. The Army embraces a delineation of civil and military responsibility that sees the aftermath of combat as a civilian responsibility. However, conflict rarely ends with a clear and accepted victory, and circumstances often force the Army to provide governance when no civil institution is available for the transition of authority. The consequence of resistance has been poor preparation, inadequate allocation of resources, civil-military conflict, and often, failure to realize policy objectives following tactical success.

This monograph proposes that institutional bias limits the US Army's conception of military power to large scale, decisive combat, derived from historical anomalies such as the Second World War and the First Gulf War. Meanwhile, frequent limited-wars and governance

---

[1] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 2-8.

missions are ignored or seen as distractions from the Army's true purpose of destroying enemy

forces in a definitive combat phase. The organization's identity and understanding of the

application of military power are challenged by the requirement to provide military government

or governance support, and it subsequently excludes governance from doctrine. The result is

repeated shock as the institution is forced to adapt during subsequent operations to unexpected

and unplanned governance tasks.

This monograph will analyze the impact of the Army's institutional bias against military

governance. The Army must identify bias if it is to overcome it, and the repeated failure to

prepare for governance in the past suggests that it is not a question of evidence, but aversion. By

understanding the nature of this bias, the organization will be better positioned to objectively

assess the causes of success or failure of past operations and will be more inclined to incorporate

governance into operational planning.

The combat phase of operations receives the preponderance of attention in planning

because it is perceived as the phase that presents the most existential threat to the force. However,

in Operation Iraqi Freedom, before President George W. Bush's 'Mission Accomplished' speech,

the US military suffered 139 casualties, a figure which climbed to over 4,000 in the ensuing

insurgency until combat missions ceased in 2011.[2] The failure to plan for governance as a part of

combat operations fueled the instability that drove the insurgency. Furthermore, the war failed to

achieve US policy objectives, and fueled broader regional instability.

While predicting future wars is fraught with danger, governance has occurred in past

conflicts across the entire spectrum, from peacekeeping to large scale combat operations. Wars

are fought to reform the behavior or nature of an adversary's government, making governance an

inescapable requirement to connect tactical victory to policy objectives. Barring some

---

[2] Ujala Seghal, "Eight Years Ago, Bush Declared 'Mission Accomplished' in Iraq," *Atlantic*, May 1, 2011, accessed January 19, 2020, https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/05/mission-accomplished-speech/350187/; US Department of Defense, *Casualty Status* (January 13, 2020), accessed January 13, 2020, https://www.defense.gov/casualty.pdf

fundamental change in the nature of war, governance will remain a requirement in the future. Failure to plan and conduct governance may prove both lethal to troops and terminal to the attainment of policy objectives.

The US Army today is emerging from a long period of counterinsurgency operations and the global war on terrorism. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (2017), presents military governance as an extreme case, which reflects institutional bias and an effort to return the military to its preferred focus on decisive combat operations.[3] If the Army does not address this institutional bias, the loss of institutional knowledge, and the failure to plan for the aftermath of combat, may undermine future missions.

The US Army wrote FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017) within the broader context of the 2017 National Security Strategy, signaling a shift in focus for the United States away from counterinsurgency and nation-building in the Middle East, towards great power competition against the potential peer adversaries of China and Russia.[4] The manual reflected the Army's concern that years of counterinsurgency operations had reduced the force's preparedness and capabilities to fight large scale combat operations, where the corps would serve as a tactical echelon headquarters. This revised doctrine reflected the Army's aspiration for a larger force. However, the Army also acknowledged that combat success did not itself equate to policy objectives, reflecting the experience of recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army identified a need for action beyond the destruction of the main enemy force to achieve enduring strategic success. FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), therefore, introduced the Army's new strategic role of "consolidation of gains." The manual identified the consolidation of gains as the missing link between tactical victory and strategic success.

---

[3] US Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 8-12.

[4] The White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: DC: The White House, 2017), 2, accessed November 27, 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf

This monograph contends that the consolidation of gains reinforces the Army's narrow conception of war and does not address the critical role of military governance, which is a distinct concept. While consolidation of gains is an undisputed requirement to prevent enemy resurgence, conflating consolidation of gains with a connection to policy objectives is a critical flaw. It is, therefore, important to distinguish between the definition and scope of these terms.

The proponent doctrine publication, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (2019), defines the term consolidate gains as "activities to make enduring any temporary operational success and to set the conditions for a sustainable security environment, allowing for a transition of control to other legitimate authorities."[5] The doctrine identifies consolidation tasks applicable at each echelon, shown in Table 1, focusing upon defeating remaining enemy forces to achieve a secure environment. The doctrine strongly reflects the broader context of the Army's pursuit of a larger force by requiring a dedicated consolidation force to conduct consolidation tasks, thus adding weight to the justification for force expansion.[6]

Table 1. Consolidate Gains Purpose by Echelon.

Echelon	Tasks to Consolidate Gains
Strategic-operational level (joint force land component commander—corps)	Establishing the security conditions necessary to achieve the desired political end state.
Operational-tactical level (field army—corps)	Exploiting tactical success to ensure the enemy cannot mount protracted resistance by other means.
Tactical level (corps—division)	Maintaining tempo and ensuring the enemy enjoys no respite; defeating the enemy in detail.

Source: US Army, ADP 3-0, *Operations* (2019), 3-6.

ADP 3-0, *Operations* (2019) identifies the ultimate purpose of consolidation of gains as allowing for the transition of control to other legitimate authorities. However, the consolidation tasks imply that the military's role is restricted to the provision of security, failing to make

---

[5] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 1-6.

[6] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), 8-5.

explicit that the military must assume responsibility for the civilian population until such transition has occurred.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil Military Operations* (2018) is the proponent doctrine for military government, defined as "the supreme authority the military exercises by force or agreement over the lands, property, and indigenous populations and institutions of domestic, allied, neutral, or enemy territory, therefore substituting sovereign authority under rule of law for the previously established government."[7] Military governance operations are the means of executing military government, defined in FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (2019), as "operations executed by Civil Affairs to provide expertise in the civil sector functions in order to establish transitional military authority or conduct support to civil administration."[8] The objective of military governance operations is to exercise authority over the population and institutions and establish civil control and stability. Governance is the crucial element that connects tactical success to strategic objectives, suggesting that the Army's responsibility extends beyond the mere establishment of a secure environment through consolidation of gains.

So if military government and governance operations already reside in doctrine, what is the purpose of this monograph? The problem lies in the treatment of governance in capstone doctrine. By failing to make explicit that the military is responsible for governance once the sovereign authority is deposed or degraded, and by delinking governance from the attainment of strategic objectives, joint and army doctrine remove governance from the organization's consciousness and discount it as a core component of operational planning. FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017) acknowledges that international law requires the military to provide governance in the absence of a functional host nation government; however, it qualifies military responsibility for governance as an extreme case. In fact, such conditions are both frequent, and potentially

---

[7] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, *Civil Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), II-11.

[8] US Army, FM 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations* (2019), 1-4.

inherent, in wars of attrition where the enemy is destroyed or dis-integrated, or where policy aims to reform or replace an adversary's government.

Theoretical Framework

Throughout history, the US Army has found that combat and security have fallen short of achieving policy objectives, and have subsequently provided governance and governance support to achieve the political aim of war. This monograph uses the term governance to encapsulate either military-led, or military-supported, civil administration. It proposes that in successful campaigns, governance is indistinguishable from combat, thus defying classification or separation as a distinct phase or form of war.

There is sufficient historical evidence of the Army's repeated adaptation for governance to consider governance a proven requirement. As such, this monograph does not attempt to justify the requirement for military governance beyond identifying that, historically, decisive battle has proven chimerical; a narrow focus on battle rather than war has squandered early tactical successes, and the failure to consider governance and strategic objectives has resulted in grinding attrition.[9] Instead, this monograph seeks to evaluate how institutional bias prevents these repeated experiences from being codified in doctrine and accepted as a core requirement of military operations. Secondly, the monograph is not concerned with arguments that suggest governance is the responsibility of other government departments or beyond the scope of the Department of Defense. Repeated experience has shown that no other department has sufficient resources to achieve the task and that successive administrations have not seen fit to resource an independent governance office for this purpose.[10] The fact remains that, by virtue of its presence and resources, the Army will be required to govern until the transition to a civilian government.

---

[9] Cathal J. Nolan, *The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 6.

[10] Robert Worley, *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015), 246.

Literature Review

The literature review provides an overview of relevant research, which underpins the subsequent hypotheses and analysis of the case studies. The review commences with an overview of academic theory on the nature of bias and institutional identity, leading to a conceptual overview of the military's identity and conception of war, and finally an empirical overview of the impact of this conception on military operations.

Theoretical

What is known as cognitive bias encompasses elements of the theories of sociology of knowledge, historical method, and scientific revolution. These theories explain the influence of identity and experience on individuals and institutions, and their influence on the interpretation of events. The relevance of bias to this monograph lies in American political scientist James Rosenau's distinction between value and empirical theory, with empirical theory aspiring to isolate bias and provide central tendencies that encompass the highest possible degree of probability.[11] Empirical theory, therefore, encapsulates the optimal approach to doctrine.

The first question of fundamental importance to this research is how knowledge comes to be institutionalized. Noted sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann describe this process as habitualization and institutionalization, by which individual and collective experiences are typified and embedded into the organization's social stock of knowledge. The organization determines which experiences will be embedded and passed to subsequent generations through a process of selective retention, and as the stock of knowledge expands, the organization creates sub-universes to allow for greater specialization of knowledge. The organization tolerates these sub-universes only so long as they do not conflict with the organization's core beliefs.[12]

---

[11] James Rosenau, "Thinking Theory Thoroughly," *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy,* ed. James N. Rosenau (London: Frances Pinter, 1980), 35.

[12] Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990), 41, 53.

American Cold War historian John Gaddis pursues the question of what knowledge passes to subsequent generations in his inquiry of historical method. Gaddis describes the representation of past events as "the rearrangement of reality to suit our purposes," enabled through the three frames of selectivity, simultaneity, and scale.[13] Gaddis contends that events are constructed in their aftermath to suit a particular purpose and that the particular frame of explanation can result in a representation of history with little bearing on reality.

American philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn argues that our interpretation of new events is contingent upon the existence of a paradigm, which is an incomplete representation of the past.[14] The paradigm obscures other processes and theories which may better explain events, and only when it consistently fails to explain developments can a competing paradigm replace it. Kuhn's theory thus indicates that the existing paradigm governs the interpretation of new information and experience, and the absence of competing theories means that only failure serves as the catalyst for change.

Conceptual

The sociologists Berger and Luckmann argue that we must understand the historical processes that produced an institution to understand it truly.[15] Thomas Builder, a RAND Corporation analyst who conducted a landmark study into service culture throughout a two-year assignment within the Department of Defense, argues that each military service has a unique identity and dominant concept of war, shaped by the memory of a historical experience that exemplifies organizational competence and power.[16] Builder points to the final year of the Second World War, where large scale combat resulted in a decisive outcome, as the basis of the

---

[13] John Gaddis, *The Landscape of History* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 22.

[14] Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 113.

[15] Berger and Luckmann, *Social Construction of Reality*, 53–4.

[16] Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), 132.

Army's identity and conception of war. Builder argues that experiences which do not validate this core conception, no matter how frequent, form secondary and subordinate concepts of war, which are relegated to fringe elements of the organization and not emphasized in organizational development or planning. Rather, the dominant conception of war drives the qualitative development of the force.[17] American military theorist Antulio Echevarria describes this as a separation of war's first and second grammars, with the first grammar of large scale, conventional warfare embraced as the organization's core purpose, and the second grammar of irregular conflict regarded as a lesser, exclusive, and specialist skill.[18]

The idea of secondary concepts of war is expanded upon by military historian John Lynn, who identifies a divergence between realities of war and discourses on war.[19] Lynn argues that an organization's discourse, or conception, of war is shaped by self-image and history, which drives its preparation and cognitive approach. As the organization cannot impose this discourse on others, it faces a reality of war shaped by external forces, from political forces to the enemy. The strength of the institution's discourse determines how the organization will adapt, or reject, this reality. Lynn introduces the phenomenon of "refusal to consider as war," whereby the organization refuses to adapt its discourse to fit reality and instead rejects the particular situation as something other than war. Lynn argues that the military may respond with ad hoc measures, however, has no intention of accepting these measures as being of enduring relevance, and will not enshrine them in doctrine.

Historian Edward Drea supports this phenomenon of rejection through his argument that, while military defeat may serve as a catalyst for change, the key determinant of whether a change

---

[17] Builder, *The Masks of War*, 131.

[18] Antulio J. Echevarria, "American Operational Art, 1917-2008" in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 152.

[19] John A. Lynn, "What War Should Be, What War Is," in *Turning Victory Into Success Military Operations After the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 45.

is accepted is how an institution views the defeat through the lens of its military tradition.[20] Conrad Crane, director of military history at the US Army War College, builds on this thesis to argue that, emerging from the Vietnam War, the US Army viewed counter-insurgency as an aberration from its understanding of war, and an experience it wished to avoid. Crane contends that, instead of adapting to achieve the closer integration of military and political tools indicated by that conflict, the Army responded by a singular focus on large scale combat, and interpreted the Gulf War as a validation.[21]

Military historian Cathal Nolan provides further context to the Western preference for decisive battle, arguing that the idea of decisive battle is alluring, avoiding the moral, aesthetic, and historical aversion to prolonged attrition warfare, reinforcing the utility of war as a tool for resolving political disputes.[22] Nolan points to the works of Carl von Clausewitz and Antoinne Henri Jomini, historically influential works that idolized the battle-seeking of Napoleonic warfare and raised decisive battle to the level of "pseudoscientific dogma," as evidence that decisive battle constitutes a heroic ideal despite its illusory nature.[23]

Empirical

Having established a theoretical and conceptual understanding of the Army's identity and conception of war, this next section explores literature addressing the impact upon operations. For instance, historian Max Boot addressed the impact of legacy and paradigmatic war experiences on the war in Vietnam, quoting General William Westmoreland's famous dictum, "we know how to do this war. We're going to put massive firepower down on our targets because that's the way we

---

[20] Edward J. Drea, "Tradition and Circumstance: The Imperial Japanese Army's Tactical Response to Khalkin-Gol, 1939" in Charles R. Shrader, ed., *Proceedings of the 1982 International Military History Symposium: The Impact of Unsuccessful Military Campaigns on Military Institutions, 1860-1980* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1984), 134.

[21] Conrad C. Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002), 2.

[22] Nolan, *The Allure of Battle*, 6.

[23] Ibid., 575.

did it in World War II and Korea. That's the American way of war."[24] British military historian Hew Strachan argues that the US Army modeled its approach to Vietnam on a preferred template of conventional war in Europe, reflecting the entrenched separation of civil guidance from military operations, and the consequent disconnect of military strategy from policy.[25]

Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Policy Nadia Schadlow contends that the Army's conception of war elevates the defeat of enemy military forces above a connection to policy objectives. Schadlow points to an extensive history whereby the defeat of enemy forces failed to establish the conditions desired by policy, and the Army was subsequently required to lead on the provision of political and economic order. However, Schadlow points to a repeated reluctance to accept responsibility for the planning and execution of governance, the disbandment of governance organizations once they have achieved their immediate purpose, and the separation of planning and expertise for governance from the regular Army. Schadlow argues that the exclusion of governance capabilities from the regular force, and their placement in unresponsive reserve elements or special forces, is evidence that the Army considers governance extraneous to the conduct of war.[26] American military historian Frederick Kagan argues that the US Defense establishment has accepted a simplification of Carl von Clausewitz's work *On War,* resulting in a fixation on destruction of the enemy's force, as well as the belief that political success will inevitably follow. Kagan contends that the separation of military and policy objectives is evident in planning processes that focus on Phase III of the Joint Phasing Model – Dominate Activities,

---

[24] Max Boot, interviewed by Harry Kreisler, *Conversations with History*; March 11, 2003, Institute of International Studies, UC Berkeley, accessed January 13, 2020, https://conversations.berkeley.edu/boot_2003

[25] Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 69.

[26] Nadia Schadlow, *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017), 20.

as opposed to commencing with Phase IV – Stabilize, which is the phase that achieves overarching policy objectives.[27]

This monograph makes frequent reference to the Joint Phasing Model; however, the model has undergone several revisions in doctrine in response to recent conflicts. JP 3-0, *Operations* (2001) provided a four-phase model to help commanders delineate changes in the focus of a majority of subordinate units, consisting of Phase I – Deter/Engage, Phase II – Seize Initiative, Phase III – Decisive Operations, and Phase IV – Transition.[28] The 2001 manual described the purpose of Phase III as being the accomplishment of objectives established by the National Command Authority and Joint Force Commander, and "winning through full-spectrum dominance." Phase IV followed the successful attainment of objectives, during which the force prevented enemy resurgence and redeployed.[29] In 2006, the Joint Phasing Model was modified, with the redefinition of Phase IV as "Stabilize" and the addition of Phase V – Enable Civil Authority.[30] Though both manuals stressed that phases may occur sequentially or simultaneously and that various types of operations may continue throughout the entirety of a campaign, the existence of a model in doctrine invariably led to the inflexible application of linear phases. JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (2017) removed the Joint Phasing Model entirely, retaining the concept of phasing but removing from doctrine the use of numbered and themed phases.[31] Where this monograph refers to the Joint Phasing construct herein, it is used consistent with the definition in doctrine at the time of that event or publication.

---

[27] Frederick W. Kagan, "War and Aftermath", in *Turning Victory Into Success Military Operations After the Campaign*, ed. Brian M. De Toy (Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 37.

[28] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001), III-19.

[29] Ibid., III-21.

[30] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), IV-29.

[31] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), iii.

Methodology

The literature review supports four hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that the Army sees itself as an organization designed and intended for short, decisive, large scale combat operations, and that governance does not inform this identity. The second hypothesis is that bias causes governance to be ignored when planning combat operations, which can lead combat operations to fall short of achieving policy objectives. The third hypothesis asserts that the Army has been forced to adapt to provide government or governance support because of the absence of suitable institutions. Finally, the fourth hypothesis is that the Army rejects governance as contributing to the operation's success or failure, and thereby fails to codify the centrality of governance in doctrine.

The monograph will use a structured, focused comparison of two case studies involving military governance. The case studies will be analyzed through focused research questions, allowing for a direct comparison of data. The two case studies selected are Operation Just Cause, the 1989 invasion of Panama, and Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. These case studies seek to demonstrate the applicability of governance across the spectrum of conflict, from low-intensity regional interventions to large scale, multi-national combat operations.

The case studies will be analyzed through five research questions to test the four hypotheses. Question one asks, "what were the policy objectives of the conflict?" As detailed in the literature review, the goal of war is to satisfy a policy objective, which must, therefore, be central to the development of the military strategy. The monograph expects to find that, in both case studies, the policy objective extended beyond the destruction of enemy forces to the attainment of a stable environment and the establishment of a government more acceptable to US interests.

The second and third questions are related: "did the planned military objective nest with the policy objective," and "did planning consider the provision of governance and the transition

to legitimate authority?" The monograph expects that if the military strategy was nested then planning would consider the transition of authority and the force would be assigned resources and tasks to assume governance responsibility. Fourth, "was the Army required to provide governance or governance support to achieve policy objectives?" The study expects that the defeat of enemy forces would not of itself achieve policy objectives, and governance of the population would be required to stabilize the situation and enable a transition of authority.

Fifth, "if governance constituted a requirement, was this incorporated into subsequent doctrine?" The study expects that, if governance materially contributed to the successful attainment of policy objectives, then it would be reflected in subsequent lessons learned and encapsulated in doctrine.

Case Studies

This section analyzes two case studies: Operation Just Cause and Operation Iraqi Freedom. The case studies will consist of the background, key organizations involved in planning, and overview of the operation. A detailed examination of the role of governance in the operation will follow each case through the use of research questions posed in the methodology. The monograph will then summarize each case study in preparation for the final analysis in the subsequent section.

Operation Just Cause

In June 1987, Panamanian dictator General Manuel Noriega was publically accused of drug trafficking and the assassination of political opponents, leading to protests and calls for his resignation. Noriega responded by fostering nationalist, anti-US sentiment, and quelling protests through armed repression.[32] In April 1988, the Commander in Chief of US Southern Command

---

[32] Lawrence A. Yates, "Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause - Before and After," *Military Review* 121, no. 10 (October 1991): 59.

(SOUTHCOM), General Fred Woerner, established Joint Task Force Panama (JTF Panama) to coordinate security operations, engage in contingency planning, and manage the crisis.[33]

In the May 1989 national elections, the Panamanian people elected candidates opposed to General Noriega. Noriega declared the election illegitimate and released his so-called Dignity Battalions against the political opposition, escalating violence and instability.[34] In response, President George H.W. Bush authorized Operations Nimrod Dancer and Blade Jewel, which jointly pre-positioned an additional 1,900 combat forces at US facilities throughout Panama and implemented a partial non-combatant evacuation.[35] The implementation of National Security Directive 17 (NSD 17) resulted in a more aggressive military posture via the enforcement of US Treaty rights and information and psychological operations against Noriega's regime. On 30 September 1989, the more aggressive General Maxwell Thurman replaced General Woerner, who had favored a diplomatic resolution to the crisis.[36]

On 15 December 1989, Noriega delivered a vehemently anti-US speech at the National Assembly. The following day, Panamanian security forces killed United States Marine Corps First Lieutenant Robert Paz at a Panamanian roadblock. In response, President Bush authorized Operation Just Cause, the US intervention in Panama, to commence on 20 December 1989.[37]

The Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) consisted of approximately 14,000 troops, of whom 4,000 were combat forces.[38] US troops in Panama numbered approximately 13,000, and airlifts commencing on 20 December delivered an additional 14,000 troops. XVIII Airborne Corps, forming JTF South under SOUTHCOM, coordinated the near-simultaneous action on 27

---

[33] Yates, "Joint Task Force Panama," 59.

[34] Ibid., 66.

[35] Ronald H. Cole, *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988 – January 1990* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995), 10.

[36] Ibid., 12-13.

[37] Ibid., 30.

[38] Cole, *Operation Just Cause,* 6-7.

targets within the first 24 hours of operations, with priorities including airports, PDF facilities, key bridges connecting Panama City, the canal zone, electrical infrastructure, prisons, and US facilities and personnel.[39] The overwhelming force brought by US numerical and firepower superiority led to the disintegration of the Noriega regime, and the defeat of most PDF units within this first 24 hours.

Due to the emphasis on defeating the PDF and securing critical infrastructure, US forces had deliberately avoided operating in Panama City and Colon during the initial phases. The disintegration of the PDF led to a security vacuum, with widespread lawlessness perpetrated by Noriega's Dignity Battalions, escaped members of the PDF still loyal to Noriega, and criminal elements.[40] JTF South had not anticipated resistance or violence after the defeat of major PDF units, and quickly found that its combat troops were poorly trained for policing and that it possessed too few Military Police for security.[41] The combination of growing lawlessness and the lack of forces led to the desperate cobbling together of a new Panamanian Police Force using demobilized members of the PDF, which compromised the force's legitimacy from the outset.[42]

Noriega sought sanctuary in the Vatican's diplomatic residence, where he remained until voluntarily entering US custody on 3 January 1990. With Noriega's capture, President Bush announced that Operation Just Cause had achieved all of its stated objectives. The United States was assisting the new Panamanian President, Guillermo Endara, who was elected at the national elections in May of 1989, to form a new national government. By 11 January 1990, Operation Just Cause had ended, with US troop numbers returning to pre-crisis levels.

---

[39] R. Cody Phillips, *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004), 20.

[40] Ibid., 40.

[41] Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, 41-2.

[42] Phillips, *The Incursion into Panama*, 43.

The first question used to analyze this case study is, "what were the US policy objectives of Operation Just Cause?" On 17 December 1989, President Bush met with key members of the national security establishment to deliberate on the objectives of a possible military intervention. The objectives emerged as safeguarding the lives of US citizens in Panama, protecting the canal and US defense installations, helping the Panamanian opposition establish genuine democracy, neutralizing the PDF, and bringing Noriega to justice.[43]

The second and third questions used to analyze the case study are "was the military objective nested with the policy objective," and "did planning consider governance and the transition of authority?" The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued direction for planning operations against the PDF to SOUTHCOM in February 1988.[44] SOUTHCOM conducted its subsequent planning efforts in a strategic vacuum with no specified policy objective and thus focused upon logical military objectives such as capturing Noriega, dismantling the PDF, and securing US personnel and facilities. The resultant SOUTHCOM contingency plans for the build-up of forces, non-combatant evacuation, and combat against the PDF, known collectively as *Elaborate Maze*, addressed all of President Bush's eventual policy objectives short of establishing democracy.

President Bush did not articulate the specific policy objective of democracy until December 1989; however, the SOUTHCOM Regional Security Strategy reflected the extant guidance of the Reagan administration to promote democracy in Latin America.[45] General Woerner possessed extensive civil-military experience, which led him to direct his staff to develop a detailed civil-military plan, known as *Blind Logic,* for resolution of the crisis and the transition from Noriega to a subsequent government, despite lack of direction from the JCS.[46]

---

[43] Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, 29.

[44] John T. Fishel, *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama* (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992), 2.

[45] Ibid., 5.

[46] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 7.

17

Elaborate Maze was strictly compartmented within the military community, and no liaison or planning occurred inside of the US Embassy in Panama or any other US Government agencies, although it was clear to SOUTHCOM planners that these efforts would require interagency cooperation.[47]

Numerous changes in command and responsibility further complicated the effort to develop a military strategy for the restoration of Panama. In February 1989, the JCS designated XVIII Airborne Corps as the executive agent for planning and, if required, execution of *Elaborate Maze*. The Corps, still based in Fort Bragg, took responsibility for the "conventional" JCS-approved *Elaborate Maze* plans.[48] General Woerner maintained ownership of *Blind Logic* at SOUTHCOM, designating his J5 as the responsible planner and head of the Civil Military Operations Task Force (CMOTF).[49]

General Woerner approved several assumptions for planning *Blind Logic*, based on the premise that destruction of the PDF would lead to a breakdown in law and order, for which the Panamanians would have no solution. General Woerner assumed that the Commander in Chief, SOUTHCOM, would form a military government for a period of fewer than 30 days to allow for the establishment of a new Panamanian Government, after which responsibility would shift to the US Ambassador. SOUTHCOM planners also assumed that law and order would not break down outside of the major urban centers of Panama City and Colon, which would therefore make these cities the focus of operations by XVIII Airborne Corps. Security would be a precondition for the commencement of Civil-Military and Government Operations.[50] Most critically, however, was

---

[47] Richard H. Schulz Jr, *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Operation Just Cause* (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1993), 18.

[48] Yates, "Joint Task Force Panama," 65.

[49] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 12.

[50] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 8.

the assumption that the Presidential authority to call-up the Army Reserve would be enacted, providing the Civil Affairs specialists required to manage a transition.[51]

General Woerner raised *Blind Logic* and key assumptions to the JCS, but the plan was never acknowledged or approved. Similarly, although the SOUTHCOM J5 provided the CMOTF's planning assumptions to XVIII Airborne Corps to incorporate into *Elaborate Maze*, they were ignored as the Corps focused on "winning the war."[52] Throughout, the strict security classification prevented sharing with the US Embassy or other departments, preventing any collaboration, preparation, or validation of military government assumptions. General Thurman, replacing General Woerner, had little interest in *Blind Logic* and did not review the plan until 18 December.[53]

The fourth question used to analyze the case study is, "was the Army required to provide governance or governance support to achieve policy objectives?" Before the commencement of combat operations, the United States had arranged for the swearing-in of the President-elect, Guillermo Endara, to allow for a rapid transition of authority to a new Panamanian government. However, in doing so, the United States had made Endara's government responsible for security and administration without the means to provide it.[54] Once the Bush administration made the establishment of democracy a policy objective, the success of the Panamanian Government emerged as an explicit requirement. On 20 December, General Thurman ordered the SOUTHCOM J5, Brigadier General Ben Gann, to establish the CMOTF, move his organization

---

[51] Schulz, *In the Aftermath*, 22.

[52] Phillips, *The Incursion into Panama*, 43.

[53] Schulz, *In the Aftermath*, 68-9.

[54] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 36.

to the Legislative Assembly building, and assist the new Panamanian government.[55] The JCS

subsequently approved *Blind Logic* as *Promote Liberty* on 21 December.[56]

The XVIII Airborne Corps plan was developed without regard to the CMOTF plan and

focused on military objectives outside of Panama City and Colon. As early as 20 December, with

the destruction of the PDF, a breakdown in law and order unfolded that required the JTF to

perform policing duties in the cities while still undertaking combat against remnants of the PDF

and Dignity Battalions.[57] SOUTHCOM decided to create a new police force, using demobilized

members of the PDF and Dignity Battalions, in their haste to relieve US troops from policing

duties.[58] This decision complicated the government's efforts to separate itself from the machinery

of Noriega's regime and failed to achieve its desired effect, as additional US troops focused on

conducting partnered operations until the new force could be properly established and trained.[59]

The JTF also discovered that, by disintegrating Noriega's machinery of control, they

occupied a country without functioning law courts or prisons, which further complicated efforts

to establish security and allow the new government to function. General Thurman hurriedly

established a Judicial Liaison Group to support the development of police, courts, and prisons,

requiring extensive commitment from the US military and other government departments.[60]

XVIII Airborne Corps, and the CMOTF, lacked specialist Reserve Civil Affairs and

Military Police enablers to support reconstruction, due predominantly to the lack of prior JCS

approval of *Blind Logic* or *Promote Liberty*. The JCS deployed additional conventional and

special forces troops to fill the gap. General Thurman immediately asked the Commander of the

---

[55] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 33.

[56] Phillips, *The Incursion into Panama*, 52.

[57] Ibid., 39-40.

[58] Ibid., 43.

[59] Ibid., 43; Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 53.

[60] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 42.

96th Civil Affairs Battalion, arriving in Panama on 22 December, for assistance to "restore basic functions throughout Panama City, establish a police force, provide emergency food distribution, create a night watch using helicopters with spotlights, protect property, supervise Panamanian contractors in cleaning up the city, restore the production and distribution of newspapers, and develop a grassroots organization to "sell" the Endara government to the public.".[61] The first Civil Affairs reservists did not arrive until one week after the commencement of the campaign, and substantial numbers not until 15 January 1990. As Civil Affairs personnel arrived, they supported efforts to restore essential services, distribute food and medical aid, organize camps for displaced persons, and provide support and advice to the Endara Government in the establishment of ministries and national administration.[62]

Despite efforts to extract conventional troops from these responsibilities, in light of ongoing instability and violence, US Ambassador Arthur Davis requested that the troops remain to prevent interference in the Endara Government's efforts to build a democratic architecture and separate national security functions that had been centralized under the PDF.[63] State Department officials reluctantly accepted the involvement of military personnel in the development of the Panamanian government, recognizing that there was no other source of support available.[64] The military was only able to commence drawdown on 10 January 1990 once the design of the new government and police architecture was complete and the commander of the Dignity Battalions surrendered.[65] Operation Just Cause concluded on 11 January; however, assistance to the Endara Government continued long afterward under the framework of SOUTHCOM regional engagement.

---

[61] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 53.

[62] Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, 66.

[63] Ibid., 67.

[64] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 38.

[65] Cole, *Operation Just Cause*, 69.

The fifth question used to analyze the case study is "if governance was a requirement, was this incorporated into subsequent doctrine?" FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993), incorporating lessons learned from operations since the publication of the 1986 manual, utilized Operation Just Cause as a historical vignette of a *coup de main*, or the achievement of strategic objectives in a single operation.[66] The manual included this representation despite the disconnect of the military from the strategic objectives and the lack of attention given to achieving the policy objective of establishing democracy. Overall, the 1991 Operation Desert Storm had an overwhelming influence on the manual, which downplayed the significance of low-intensity warfare.[67]

Several key lessons learned during Operation Just Cause were, in fact, reflected in FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993). The manual explicitly acknowledged that a gap existed between the termination of combat and attainment of policy objectives, emphasizing early joint and inter-agency planning to mobilize assets needed to support post-conflict operations and managing the transition to peace. However, the manual did not adequately address several other lessons learned, specifically the intrinsic link between governance and combat planning, and that the army must be prepared to conduct governance in the absence of suitable support from other government departments.

Although Operation Just Cause separated combat and civil-military planning between the JTF and SOUTHCOM, which suggested that they would occur in distinct phases, their execution was, in fact, indistinguishable.[68] General Thurman requested that forces deployed under *Promote Liberty* operate under rules of engagement for *Just Cause*, reflecting the fact that combat conditions continued.[69] FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993) separated conflict and post-conflict phases,

---

[66] US Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993), 3-10.

[67] Crane, *Avoiding Vietnam*, 12.

[68] Fishel, *The Fog of Peace*, 32.

[69] Schadlow, *War and Governance*, 205.

with the post-conflict phase consisting of a variety of "Military Operations Other Than War" before the accomplishment of the national strategic goals and objectives.[70] The list of Operations Other Than War did not include military government, and the post-conflict phase was intended for other elements of national power to achieve overall policy objectives.[71] This delineation served to reinforce the divide between decisive combat operations, being the primary role of the army, and governance as something performed by other government agencies. By the time of the next capstone manual, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2001), all references to military government had been removed.

Operation Iraqi Freedom

The US-led victory over Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War resulted in the destruction of the Iraqi Army, but left Saddam in power. The subsequent ten years saw sanctions, airstrikes, and support to anti-Saddam uprisings, all designed to foment an Iraqi-led overthrow of the dictator.[72] However, Saddam clung to power and continued to demonstrate defiance to the United States and United Nations (UN), most notably through his refusal to cooperate with UN Weapons Inspectors, and further demonstrations along the Kuwaiti border.[73] The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 fundamentally changed the US perspective on Iraq and led to decisions within the administration of President George W. Bush to finally remove Saddam from power.[74]

Contingency planning began in November 2001, when Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld instructed the Commander, US Central Command (CENTCOM) General Tommy Franks to provide military options for Iraq to institute regime change.[75] Assumptions

---

[70] US Army, FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993), 6-23.

[71] Ibid., 3-11.

[72] Joel D. Rayburn, and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., *The U.S. Army in The Iraq War: Volume 1 – Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War 2003-2006* (Carslisle Barracks: US Army War College Press, 2019), 15.

[73] Ibid., 16.

[74] Ibid., 31.

[75] Rayburn and Sobchak, *The Iraq War: Volume 1*, 32.

significantly shaped planning, specifically that the Iraqi Army would capitulate rather than fight, that the populace would welcome Americans as liberators, and that a rapid transition of responsibility to a new Iraqi government and security forces would occur.[76]

In light of these planning assumptions, Secretary Rumsfeld advocated a rapid invasion by less than a single Army Division.[77] Senior Army leaders strongly opposed an invasion with such small numbers, evidenced by Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki's testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee that it would take several hundred thousand troops to occupy Iraq after Saddam was deposed.[78] However, CENTCOM plans continually reduced the number of troops required in line with Secretary Rumsfeld's guidance, focusing on the qualitative difference between American and Iraqi forces.[79] The plan developed around a "running start," with operations being launched simultaneously with the commencement of airstrikes and before all forces were available in theater, to achieve tactical and operational surprise.

In October 2002, Lieutenant General David McKiernan was appointed head of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) built around the Third Army headquarters and staff. McKiernan presided over the development of the CFLCC Campaign Plan, known as Cobra II, the arrival of forces, war games, and training. As CENTCOM retained responsibility for the ongoing war in Afghanistan, McKiernan and CFLCC took responsibility for planning the ground campaign in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld complicated planning by maintaining pressure on planners to reduce troop numbers, and by approving troop assignments individually as opposed to using the Army's preferred Time-Phased Force Deployment Data system, which required pre-approval of all forces assigned to an operation.[80]

---

[76] Rayburn and Sobchak, *The Iraq War: Volume 1*, 35.

[77] Ibid., 39.

[78] Ibid., 68.

[79] Ibid.

[80] Rayburn and Sobchak, *The Iraq War: Volume 1*, 39.

On 19 March 2003, US surveillance aircraft detected signs that the Iraqis were preparing to fire the oil wells, leading to the decision to commence the ground invasion before the launching of the air campaign and before all forces had completed arrival in theater and preparation. The 3rd Infantry Division (ID) crossed into Iraq on 21 March as the only division ready to fight out of the four identified in the invasion plan.[81] Coalition troops moved over 400km in the first 72 hours, capturing the oil fields as their primary objectives. The rapid initial movement enabled tactical and operational surprise; however, it resulted in a constant deficiency of troops available to maintain the assault whilst simultaneously securing lines of communication, logistics bases, and rear areas.

Saddam had arrayed seventeen regular divisions and six Republican Guard divisions to defend against the invasion. Instead of the anticipated capitulation, these forces disappeared. Resistance consisted predominantly of urban defense and attacks against logistics and lines of communication by irregular forces, particularly in major towns and cities such as An Najaf. These unanticipated threats led to the decision to fix and bypass many centers of resistance and proceed to Baghdad, with the consequence that many US forces were tied down away from the main objective.[82]

Coalition forces arrived in Baghdad by 5 April and commenced an occupation on 9 April. Pre-war assumptions about the Iraqi response to the invasion proved to be incorrect as looting, sectarian violence, and attacks against US forces intensified. The disintegration of the Ba'athist regime resulted in a complete breakdown in social cohesion, and the lack of US troops created a security vacuum filled by sectarian militias and terrorist organizations. Coalition forces transitioned to a counter-insurgency campaign to provide stability and conditions for governance,

---

[81] Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, *On Point: United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 94.

[82] Donald P. Wright, and Timothy R. Reese, *The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January 2005: On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 15.

culminating in national elections in January 2005 and allowing the transfer of sovereignty to an elected Iraqi government. However, the emphasis on transferring responsibility and withdrawing US forces obscured the deepening sectarian civil war.[83] The violence served to undermine political legitimacy, overwhelm the nascent Iraqi security forces, and resulted in a protracted coalition commitment to Iraq, which lasted until 2011.

The first question used to analyze this case study is, "what were the US policy objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom?" The *Iraqi Liberation Act of 1998* established the US Government's policy to remove Saddam Hussein, as well as to promote democracy in Iraq and the region.[84] On 27 November 2001, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld directed CENTCOM Commander General Franks to provide the President with military options for Iraq, with the following specified end states:

1. Iraq's regime enablers, leadership, and power base destroyed;

2. Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction capability eliminated;

3. Iraq retains sufficient forces to defend itself but no longer has the power to threaten neighbors;

4. Iraq has an "acceptable provisional government in place;"

5. Iraq's territorial integrity remains intact.[85]

The US policy objectives can therefore be summarized as regime change and the promotion of democracy.[86]

The second question used to analyze the case study is, "was the military objective nested with the policy objective?" Throughout 2002, CENTCOM developed its contingency plan, titled 1003V, which aimed to set the conditions for a ground invasion to isolate Saddam's regime and

[83] Rayburn and Sobchak, *The Iraq War: Volume 1*, 653-6.

[84] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 32.

[85] Rayburn and Sobchak, *The Iraq War: Volume 1*, 32.

[86] Schadlow, *War and Governance*, 238.

defeat the Iraqi army and Republican Guard forces.[87] The military objectives articulated in Plan 1003V were to:

1. Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government;

2. Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure;

3. Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks;

4. Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq;

5. Gather intelligence on global terrorism;

6. Detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime;

7. Support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region.[88]

Lieutenant General McKiernan and the CFLCC staff were assigned to develop the ground scheme of maneuver. The CFLCC Mission Statement, which remained consistent from October 2002 until May 2003 when Cobra II concluded, stated: "When directed, CFLCC attacks to defeat Iraqi forces, to control the zone of action and to secure and exploit designated sites, and removes the current Iraqi regime. On order, CFLCC conducts post-hostilities stability and support operations; transitions to CJTF-4."[89] The end state specified: "Operational end state is removal of key regime leadership, coalition forces physically controlling Iraq, RA/RGFC forces defeated or capitulated, and vital infrastructure to provide life support to the Iraqi population sustained. Expect SSE to continue well after cessation of hostilities. Conditions established to effect CFLCC

---

[87] Rayburn and Sobchak, *The Iraq War: Volume 1*, 57.

[88] Kevin Benson, "A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003", *Parameters* no. 4, Vol 43 (Winter 2013-14), 120.

[89] Kevin Benson, ""Phase IV" CFLCC Stability Operations Planning", in *Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaigns,* ed. Brian M. DeToy (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004), 181.

battle handover to CJTF-4."[90] Although CENTCOM objectives included support to a new government, the CFLCC objectives centered around the destruction of Saddam's regime, with subsequent objectives being the responsibility of a different headquarters and force element.

The third question used to analyze the case study is, "did planning consider governance and the transition of authority?" Although CENTCOM planning for the invasion of Iraq commenced with Secretary Rumsfeld's direction in November 2001, little attention was paid to Phase IV planning, which would encompass the policy objective of installing "an acceptable provisional government" and the broader strategic objective of supporting democracy in Iraq and the region.

In September 2002, Director of the JCS Lieutenant General John Abizaid noted that the CENTCOM plan paid insufficient attention to Phase IV and would not achieve the stated policy objectives. General Abizaid dispatched a substantial planning team, designated Combined Joint Task Force IV (CJTF-4), to assist CENTCOM with development of their Phase IV plan; however, by the time of their arrival in January 2003, planning was at an advanced stage for the invasion, and their efforts were deemed disruptive and not incorporated.[91] Importantly, the CFLCC plan anticipated handing responsibility for Phase IV operations to CJTF-4; however, the JCS intended CJTF-4's purpose to be planning and designing the Phase IV headquarters.[92]

In January 2003, President Bush signed National Security Directive 24, giving the Department of Defense responsibility for operations in Iraq following the removal of the Hussein regime.[93] Secretary Rumsfeld established the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), headed by retired Lieutenant General Jay Garner, to coordinate the civilian side of the effort. However, he restricted ORHA's ability to collaborate with other government

---

[90] Kevin Benson, "Phase IV," 182.

[91] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 67.

[92] Ibid., 70.

[93] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 70.

departments, particularly the Department of State, which reduced the organization's effectiveness. Garner would have approximately three months between his appointment and the start of the war to coordinate and plan for a post-Saddam Iraq, which would prove insufficient. The fact that the original CENTCOM plan called for ORHA to enter theater approximately 60 days after the end of the war, which would not put them in a position to influence post-war events, further limited Garner's effectiveness.[94]

Within CENTCOM, General Franks determined that Phase IV was not his responsibility. Franks infamously informed the JCS and Department "You pay attention to the day after, and I'll pay attention to the day of," highlighting his expectation that CENTCOM and CFLCC would concentrate on removing the regime, after which a new headquarters and Defense civilians would surge into theater to take over post-invasion efforts. Franks assigned responsibility for planning the abridged Phase IV plan to McKiernan and CFLCC, providing explicit guidance that responsibility would rapidly transition to CJTF-4.[95]

Led by the CFLCC Chief of Plans Colonel Kevin Benson, a Phase IV plan was attempted. However, McKiernan's focus remained on developing the Phase III plan for combat, anticipating that attention would shift to Phase IV once Phase III was underway. Consequently, the CFLCC Deputy Commanding General, Major General William Webster, confirmed that only a skeletal Phase IV plan existed.[96] Benson advised McKiernan that Phase IV would require an independent operations plan, the creation of which was approved by McKiernan on the day offensive operations commenced and was published on 12 April 2003, one week after Coalition forces occupied Baghdad.[97] Franks further complicated the transition to Phase IV operations at

---

[94] Public Broadcasting Service, "Interview with General Jay Garner," *Truth, War and Consequences*, on Frontline, accessed 9 January, 2020. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html

[95] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 70.

[96] Ibid., 72.

[97] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 73.

this time by instructing his subordinates to "be prepared to take as much risk departing as they had in their push to Baghdad," making clear his continued lack of interest in Iraq's stabilization and reconstruction.[98]

The consequences of the lack of Phase IV planning were threefold. Firstly, troops with the requisite skills and training to support the immediate aftermath of combat, specifically Military Police and Civil Affairs, were not available because they resided in the Reserve component which had not been mobilized.[99] Secondly, as divisions arrived at their final objectives having successfully deposed the Hussein regime, they found themselves armed with a Phase IV plan emphasizing general themes, and no operational detail, resources, or guidance on the specific programs or organizations that would facilitate the attainment of the strategic objectives.[100] Thirdly, as Phase III and Phase IV plans had not been developed in unison, infrastructure that was vital for Phase IV, such as the national telecommunications grid and government ministry buildings, were destroyed during Phase III, and no plan existed for their restoration.[101]

The fourth question used to analyze the case study is, "was the Army required to provide governance or governance support to achieve policy objectives?" In planning, senior officers had made assumptions about the conditions that would exist on completion of Phase III, particularly with regards to Iraqi institutions and infrastructure, which proved incorrect.[102] Because the planners specifically designed the campaign to destroy all of the control mechanisms of Hussein's regime, the success of Phase III resulted in a complete breakdown of governance and

---

[98] Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*, reprint ed. (New York: Vintage, 2007), 459.

[99] Benson, ""Phase IV," 200-201.

[100] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 77.

[101] Public Broadcasting Service, "Interview with General Jay Garner."

[102] Wright and Reese, *On Point II*, 79

infrastructure. The lack of planning and resources available to replace and repair these structures hastened instability.[103]

Although President Bush's National Security Directive 24 established the Department of Defense as the lead for post-conflict reconstruction and regime change, these responsibilities were given to Defense civilian organizations – first to ORHA, and shortly afterward, the Coalition Provisional Authority under US Ambassador Paul Bremmer. These organizations were ad hoc creations without sufficient staff, had no resources or expertise, and could not establish security, which limited their utility.[104]

The lack of overall strategic guidance and the civilian organizations' lack of capacity forced the military to provide security, law and order, humanitarian relief, and to re-establish services. The military's role quickly expanded to training the new Iraqi army and police force and conducting reconstruction projects, economic development, and governance. US forces were required to manage courts and prisons, and to work with communities to establish governance structures, in the absence of a central government or Iraqi constitution.[105] The lack of cohesion between military and civilian efforts rendered these early efforts largely ineffective, and it was only with the creation of a comprehensive civil-military operational plan that linked security and stabilization efforts that the situation began to stabilize.[106]

The fifth question used to analyze the case study is, "if governance was a requirement, was this incorporated into subsequent doctrine?" Although FM 3-0, *Operations* (2001) had introduced the concept of full-spectrum operations, consisting of offense, defense, and stability, stability tasks were associated with Military Operations Other Than War as opposed to being an integral component of warfighting. The post-Operation Iraqi Freedom update in 2008 dispensed

---

[103] Schadlow, *War and Governance*, 241.

[104] Ibid., 244-5.

[105] Ibid., 254.

[106] Ibid., 258.

with the separation of war from Military Operations Other Than War and emphasized that

stability operations were co-equal with offense and defense, reiterating that combat alone is

unlikely to achieve strategic objectives.[107]

Despite the greater attention paid to stability operations, the 2008 version of FM 3-0,

Operations reinforced the theme of previous versions that the core focus of the Army is combat

operations and that the number of units destroyed and objectives secured represent the metrics of

success.[108] The manual emphasized that other government agencies are responsible for

governance and that any period of military occupation would be a temporary solution until

civilian agencies or host-nation capabilities were established and could assume control.[109] The

manual also emphasized that the Civil Affairs functional specialty was responsible for the

conduct of governance assessments and planning, reinforcing the treatment of governance as a

function separate from general staff planning.

In a 2019 article, then Commander of the US Army's Combined Arms Center Lieutenant

General Michael Lundy suggested that experience in past campaigns, including Operation Iraqi

Freedom, demonstrated that the Army should plan for the execution of military governance as a

core part of combat operations and that governance was of such central importance as to demand

equal or greater professional forethought than combat operations themselves.[110] Such an

admission from a senior officer responsible for the integration of Army doctrine, training, and

leader development suggests that the role of governance in the failure of Operation Iraqi Freedom

was known; however, it failed to be codified in doctrine.

---

[107] US Department of the Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-2.

[108] Ibid., 2-69.

[109] Ibid., 2-1.

[110] Mike Lundy, Richard Creed, Nate Springer, Scott Pence, "Three Perspectives on Consolidating Gains," *Military Review* 99, no.5 (September-October 2019): 26.

Findings and Analysis

This section presents the findings from the two case studies, which were examined through structured research questions, and analysis of the findings against the original hypotheses. The findings are summarized in Appendix A.

The first two research questions were "what were the policy objectives of the conflict" and "did the planned military objectives nest with the policy objectives." Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz maintained that the political objective of war must determine the military objectives to be pursued, while Army doctrine affirms that the purpose of operations is to achieve or contribute to national objectives.[111] Therefore, military objectives should be designed to achieve or support national objectives.

The policy objectives of Operation Just Cause included removing the regime of Manuel Noriega, replacing it with a democratic government, and ensuring the security of the Panama Canal. The military objectives included removal of the Noriega regime and protecting US interests, however, did not specifically include support to a new Panamanian democracy. It was not until after the commencement of the ground campaign that the military added the additional objective of supporting the new government.

The policy objectives of Operation Iraqi Freedom were to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and establish a democratic government. The CENTCOM objectives included removing the regime and providing support to a democratic government; however, at CFLCC, the objectives were to remove the regime and defeat the Iraqi Army. Therefore, the strategic, operational, and tactical objectives were not nested.

The third and fourth questions were, "did planning consider the provision of governance and the transition to a legitimate authority" and "was the Army required to provide governance or

---

[111] Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 81; US Army, FM 3-0 *Operations* (2017), 1-2.

governance support to achieve policy objectives?" In both cases, albeit at different echelons and different stages, the military did consider the objective of support to establishing a new democratic government. Therefore, campaign design and planning should have reflected this objective.

For Operation Just Cause, General Woerner did direct planning for support to a new Panamanian government, but the JCS did not endorse the plan, it was not accepted by XVIII Airborne Corps as the executive agent, and it was not addressed by General Thurman when he assumed command of SOUTHCOM. The consequence was a stove-piped planning effort disconnected from the combat plan. XVIII Airborne Corps planned to rapidly disintegrate the Noriega regime and the PDF, thus setting the conditions for a complete breakdown of governance within Panama. The lack of coordination meant that the Army had to provide all governance support, and poorly considered governance decisions undermined the credibility and stability of the nascent democratic government.

For Operation Iraqi Freedom, although the establishment of a democratic government constituted a long-term policy objective, no detailed plan was developed. The ORHA was a belated attempt to coordinate the whole of government effort; however, the organization was not resourced and lacked a specified command relationship with the military. At CENTCOM, General Franks divested responsibility by telling the JCS and Defense civilians that they were responsible for everything after the completion of Phase III. Consequently, at CFLCC, Lieutenant General McKiernan focused his attention on Phase III and gave no attention to planning Phase IV until the operation had commenced. Consequently, the Phase III plan failed to set conditions for Phase IV and the establishment of a new government. Circumstances forced the Army to provide ad hoc governance support, which failed to achieve strategic objectives.

The final question was, "if governance was a requirement, was this incorporated into subsequent doctrine?" The lessons learned process involves collecting observations, analyzing them, and taking the necessary steps to change behavior to improve the capabilities of the joint

force.[112] The force uses doctrine as the predominant mechanism to codify operational lessons learned and change behavior in the force.

In both cases, commanders explicitly acknowledged that planning failed to account for the gap between combat and the achievement of strategic objectives. And yet, FM 100-5, *Operations* (1993), deemed Operation Just Cause an exemplar of a *coup de main*, and FM 3-0, *Operations* (2008), referred to Operation Iraqi Freedom as a model for rapid, effective combat operations.[113] While these publications did make incremental improvements in their attention to the aftermath of combat, neither publication adequately addressed the root cause of failure, that being an excessive focus on combat, and insufficient attention to setting the conditions for, and achieving, strategic objectives.

Although this monograph addresses the Army, it is instructive to compare the Army's doctrinal approach to combat operations with that of the Joint Force. Where FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017) identifies the purpose of large scale combat operations as "defeating an enemy's armed forces and military capabilities in support of national objectives," JP 3-0 *Operations* (2017) identifies the purpose as being "to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests."[114] The distinction is important, as the Joint definition makes explicit that large scale combat operations must achieve more than simply defeating the adversary's armed forces. Therefore, the Army's current definition is inconsistent with that in Joint doctrine and serves only to reinforce the institution's limited conception of war.

The structured research questions were designed to provide data for analysis against the four central hypotheses of the monograph. Hypothesis one is that the Army sees itself as an organization designed and intended for short, decisive, large scale combat operations, and that

---

[112] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), xxv.

[113] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2008), 1-16.

[114] US Army, FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), 1-1; US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, JP 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), V-5.

governance does not inform this identity. The evidence derived from the two case studies supports this hypothesis unequivocally. In both cases, the Army viewed its role as the destruction of the enemy force, with governance being the responsibility of other elements of national power. The second hypothesis was that bias causes governance to be ignored when planning combat operations, which can lead to combat operations falling short of achieving policy objectives. Again, the hypothesis is supported by the evidence. In both cases, the Army ignored governance planning, seeing it as both less important than, and conceptually distinct from, combat operations. In both cases, governance was deemed to be the responsibility of a separate headquarters, which was neither identified nor involved in the planning process. Consequently, the successful defeat of the adversary force failed to achieve policy objectives, and the design of combat operations contributed to the difficulty of achieving the transition to a legitimate government.

The third hypothesis was that the Army has been forced to adapt to provide government or governance support because of the absence of suitable institutions. In the case of Panama, the Army had failed to involve any interagency organization in planning, ensuring that no other entity was available. The Army was obliged to provide direct support in the establishment of new government ministries, courts of law, security forces, and services. In Iraq, other government agencies anticipated the requirement for governance; however, the Army had failed to integrate and coordinate their efforts. The Army was left to fill the void due to the lack of coordination and worsening security environment.

The final hypothesis was that the Army rejects governance as contributing to the operation's success or failure, and fails to codify the centrality of governance in doctrine. The Army updated doctrine in the aftermath of these operations, including additional guidance on the importance of stability operations. However, doctrine specifically identified both Just Cause and Iraqi Freedom as successful combat operations, with the subsequent deterioration attributed to the politically-mandated deficiency of forces, or unforeseeable changes in the operational environment. In neither case was the failure to plan for governance identified as contributing to

the failure to achieve strategic objectives. Current doctrine perpetuates the fiction that other government agencies are responsible for governance and that the Army, through consolidation of gains, is merely required to provide security.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The purpose of this monograph was to uncover how organizational identity affects the interpretation of experience. Specifically, the study asked why the US Army rejects the requirement to plan and conduct governance following combat, despite repeated evidence that governance is the essential component linking success in combat to the attainment of strategic objectives. The study utilized the methodological framework of theory, history, and doctrine, demonstrating the theoretical basis of the Army's organizational identity, the impact of this identity on the planning and execution of operations, and the interpretation of that experience in doctrine. The evidence supported the hypothesis that the Army rejects governance due to an identity based upon large scale combat operations and that this rejection results in adverse operational and strategic consequences.

However, it is not enough to simply acknowledge that such bias exists and submit to a fatalistic expectation of further failure. The monograph is presented in the firm belief that bias, once identified, can be overcome. Therefore, the study concludes with several recommendations, drawn from the two campaigns analyzed, which may help to reduce the impact of organizational bias in the future.

Recommendation One – Planning Starts at the End

Both of the cases studied featured planning processes that ignored the political and military consequences of military action. In each case, the land component planned and executed the Phase III combat plan with complete disregard for Phase IV, delinking combat plans from strategic objectives. Commanders did not consider the conditions required for success in

subsequent phases, which resulted in the loss of initiative as ad hoc arrangements were made to transition.

The cases also demonstrated that a clear and decisive end to combat operations is not the norm. In both operations, the security environment remained uncertain following the destruction of the main force, through the period where essential governance support was required. Further, the evidence suggests that an uncertain security environment is inherent in the aftermath of a rapid disintegration of a regime or security force. The implications are that critical enablers from the Army Reserve, such as Civil Affairs, are unlikely to be available to plan or execute governance operations, and this responsibility will fall to the force executing combat operations.

There are undeniable difficulties in planning for the aftermath of combat, which hinges upon a multitude of unknowable changes in the operational environment. This lack of fidelity causes many to focus instead on the more structured problem of defeating the enemy force, which provides planners a more tangible objective. However, as the well-known aphorism instructs, if we fail to prepare for what might occur, we ensure that some of it will.

Therefore, the first recommendation is that operational planning should begin with understanding the conditions required to achieve strategic objectives. To this end, the Army's capstone doctrine should be updated to reflect the Joint force's broader definition and purpose of combat operations. This change would help ensure that campaign and major operation planning serves the achievement of strategic objectives, with subsequent planning focused on achieving the conditions required to transition between each phase as opposed to a narrow focus on the defeat of the enemy force. Replacement of the deposed governance structure, specifically that providing law, order, and essential services, should be considered a pre-condition for stability operations, not a condition to be established in the aftermath of combat.

Recommendation Two – The Commander Owns the Whole Campaign

In both campaigns, the Joint Force Commander deliberately separated the force executing Phase III from subsequent operations. In both cases, this permitted the land component to conduct combat operations without regard to conditions required in subsequent phases, to avoid planning for governance, and to assume that some other entity was responsible for both the planning and execution of subsequent operations. As seen in both Panama and Iraq, in neither case did this entity exist beyond its establishment on paper.

In both cases, the situation was exacerbated by decisions to develop separate operational plans for governance, as opposed to including it within the campaign plan. In both operations, this decision led to the Combatant Command and land force commanders losing visibility of governance planning, with a concomitant loss of interest.

The second recommendation, therefore, is that the CFLCC Commander owns the planning and execution of both combat and subsequent stabilization. Where the COCOM Commander determines that a separate headquarters will assume responsibility for governance during subsequent phases, he must ensure that this headquarters is identified, established, and integrated into the campaign planning process.

Recommendation Three – Doctrine Should Help Train for an Uncertain Future

Although this monograph posits that doctrine should explicitly acknowledge the importance of governance, there is evidence that even the incremental improvements in doctrine following Operations Just Cause and Iraqi Freedom failed to make a significant impact on the force. Although FM 3-0, *Operations* (2001) stated that all Army units must have the capacity to conduct simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability and support tasks, in reality by 2003 few units were prepared to do so as the Army continued to focus its training on tactical proficiency for

large scale combat operations, a trend which has intensified with the publication of FM 3-0, *Operations* (2017), with its renewed focus on large scale combat against a peer adversary.[115]

Despite the lack of planning for governance in Panama and Iraq, there were some notable successes by commanders who, by virtue of experience, understood the need to reestablish governance after removing the existing regime. In Panama, General Woerner had extensive civil-military experience, prompting him to recognize the need for governance planning. In Iraq, General David Petraeus, commanding the 101st Airborne Division, similarly had experience in governance operations in Haiti, Kuwait, and Bosnia Herzegovina. The broad experience of these commanders enabled them to recognize that the offensive, defensive, stability, and support operations were intrinsic to all types of conflict and that governance was required to achieve strategic success. In these cases, experience overcame the limitations of doctrine.[116]

Therefore, the third recommendation is that the Army provides training opportunities for commanders and staffs at echelons above brigade to manage campaigns holistically, including planning and execution of the transition between combat and governance tasks. Doing so will provide experience to commanders and staffs in nesting combat plans with strategic objectives, and ensure that when the next conflict occurs higher echelons are not fixated on battle to the detriment of the war.

---

[115] Wright and Reese, *On Point II,* 3.

[116] Public Broadcasting Service, "Interview with Major General David Petraeus," *Truth, War and Consequences,* Frontline, accessed 9 January, 2020.
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/interviews/petraeus.html

Appendix
Summarized Case Study Findings Worksheet

	Research Question				
Case Study	Q1: What were the policy objectives of the conflict?	Q2: Did the planned military objective nest with the policy objective?	Q3: Did planning consider the provision of governance and the transition to a legitimate authority?	Q4: Was the Army required to provide governance or governance support to achieve policy objectives?	Q5: If governance was a requirement, was this incorporated into subsequent doctrine?
Operation Just Cause	- Safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens in Panama - Protect the canal and U.S. defense installations - Help the Panamanian opposition establish genuine democracy - Neutralize the PDF - Bring Noriega to justice	- Neutralize the PDF - Protect the canal and U.S. defense installations - Apprehend Noriega	- JCS guidance was to focus on destruction of the PDF - SOUTHCOM developed Blind Logic Plan, but not approved and no interagency involvement - XVIII Airborne Corps developed Phase III Plan to destroy PDF, no Phase IV Plan - Governance planning separated by phasing - Governance planning separated from the executing Land Component HQ - Governance not prioritized by Commander	Army was required to: - Reestablish law and order - Build and train new police force - Build prisons, reestablish courts - Advise and support creation of government ministries - Organize camps for displaced persons - Distribute aid, reestablish services	FM 100-5 Operations, 1993: - Operation Just Cause a coup de main, or achievement of strategic objectives in a single operation - National strategic objectives are achieved after conflict - Other elements of national power achieve overall strategic aims - Civil Affairs responsible for type of operations associated with civil government and its institutions - Even during the predeployment activity stage, senior Army and joint commanders, together with the State Department and other agencies, consider issues related to the strategic end state, postconflict activities, and the transition to peace.
Operation Iraqi Freedom	- Iraq's regime enablers, leadership, and power base destroyed - Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction capability eliminated - Iraq retains sufficient forces to defend itself but no longer has the power to threaten neighbors - Iraq has an "acceptable provisional government in place;" - Iraq's territorial integrity remains intact.	CENTCOM objectives: - Destabilize, isolate, and overthrow the Iraqi regime and provide support to a new, broad-based government - Destroy Iraqi WMD capability and infrastructure - Protect allies and supporters from Iraqi threats and attacks - Destroy terrorist networks in Iraq - Gather intelligence on global terrorism - Detain terrorists and war criminals and free individuals unjustly detained under the Iraqi regime - Support international efforts to set conditions for long-term stability in Iraq and the region. CFLCC objectives: - Removal of key regime leadership - Coalition forces physically controlling Iraq - RA/RGFC forces defeated or capitulated - Vital infrastructure to provide life support to the Iraqi population sustained - Conditions established to effect CFLCC battle handover to CJTF-4	- DoD established ORHA, no specified command relationships, no expertise, three months from establishment until war - CENTCOM gave responsibility to CFLCC, informed JCS and DoD that Phase IV was not CENTCOM or CFLCC responsibility - JCS establish CJTF-4, but organization not incorporated into planning and disbanded without ever effecting Phase IV - CFLCC create Phase IV Plan one week after forces arrive in Baghdad, not coordinated with DoD or ORHA - DoD disbands ORHA, establishes CPA - Governance planning separated by phasing - Governance planning not prioritized by Commander	Army was required to: - Reestablish law and order - Build and train new police force and army - Conduct economic development - Support development of regional governance structures - Support governance including national elections - Distribute aid, reestablish services	FM 3-0 Operations, 2008: - Army provides security for other government agencies can work to restore governance - Stability operations can help establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions and support the transition to legitimate local governance - Stability operations establish conditions that enable civilian and host nation agencies to succeed by establishing security and control FM 3-0 Operations, 2017: - Military can provide inerim government in extreme cases

			Operation Just Cause	Operation Iraqi Freedom	
Hypotheses:	The Army sees itself as an organization designed and intended for short, decisive, large scale combat operations, and that governance is not part of this identity.		- Evidence supports hypothesis - Isolated individuals recognized the importance of governance - Commanders did not take responsibility	- Evidence supports hypothesis - Isolated individuals recognized the importance of governance - Commanders did not take responsibility	
	Bias against governance causes it to be ignored when planning combat operations, which causes combat operations to fall short of achieving policy objectives.		- Phase III planning occurred over several years - XVIII Airborne Corps saw its role as destruction of PDF, set conditions for disorder - Destruction of PDF failed to achieve policy objectives	- Phase III planning occurred over several years - CENTCOM did not accept responsibility for governance - CFLCC Plan did not consider the aftermath of combat, set conditions for disorder - Neutralization of Iraqi Army failed to achieve policy objectives	
	The Army has been forced to adapt to provide government or governance support because of the absence of suitable institutions.		- Absence of alternate agencies with resources forced Army to provide governance	- DoD civilian organization established, but had no resources - Army forced to provide governance	
	The Army rejects governance as contributing to the operation's success or failure, and fails to codify the centrality of governance in doctrine.		- Doctrine regarded Operation Just Cause as an example of a coup de main, destruction of PDF achieved strategic objectives - Doctrine acknowledged gap between combat and achievement of policy, but assigned responsibility to other organizations - Doctrine does not explicitly acknowledge the role of governance or Army in providing for it - Doctrine does not acknowledge that Phase III Plan must be developed around Phase IV requirements	- Stability Operations introduced in doctrine as co-equal to Offense and Defense, tacit acknowledgement that more attention required - Failure attributed to political decisions to limit number of forces, leads to introduction of Consolidation of Gains and requirement for dedicated forces - Doctrine does not explicitly acknowledge the role of governance or Army in providing for it - Doctrine does not acknowledge that Phase III Plan must be developed around Phase IV requirements	

41

Bibliography

Benson, Kevin. "A War Examined: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003." *Parameters* no. 4, Vol 43 (Winter 2013-14): 119-123.

———. ""Phase IV" CFLCC Stability Operations Planning", in *Turning Victory Into Success: Military Operations After the Campaigns*, edited by Brian M. DeToy, 179-195. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. New York: Doubleday, 1966.

Builder, Carl H. *The Masks of War: American Military Styles in Strategy and Analysis*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989.

Cole, Ronald H. *Operation Just Cause: The Planning and Execution of Joint Operations in Panama February 1988 – January 1990.* Washington, DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995.

Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War.* Translated and edited by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.

Crane, Conrad C. *Avoiding Vietnam: The U.S. Army's Response to Defeat in Southeast Asia.* Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002.

Drea, Edward J. "Tradition and Circumstance: The Imperial Japanese Army's Tactical Response to Khalkin-Gol, 1939". In *Proceedings of the 1982 International Military History Symposium: The Impact of Unsuccessful Military Campaigns on Military Institutions, 1860-1980*, edited by Charles R. Shrader, 120-141. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1984.

Echevarria, Antulio J. "American Operational Art, 1917-2008." In *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*. Edited by John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Fishel, John T. *The Fog of Peace: Planning and Executing the Restoration of Panama*. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

Fontenot, Gregory, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn. *On Point: United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom.* Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Gordon, Michael R., and Bernard E. Trainor. *Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq*. Reprint edition. New York: Vintage, 2007.

Kagan, Frederick W., "War and Aftermath." In *Turning Victory Into Success Military Operations After the Campaign*, edited by Brian M. De Toy, 35-43. Fort Leavenworth, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

Kuhn, Thomas S. *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

Lundy, Mike, Richard Creed, Nate Springer, and Scott Pence. "Three Perspectives on Consolidating Gains." *Military Review* 99, no.5 (September–October 2019): 16-30.

Lynn, John A. "What War Should Be, What War Is". In *Turning Victory Into Success Military Operations After the Campaign*, edited by Brian M. De Toy, 43-59. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

McDonough, James R. "Building the New 100-5: Process and Product" *Military Review* 121, no. 10 (October 1991): 2-13.

Nolan, Cathal J. *The Allure of Battle: A History of How Wars Have Been Won and Lost*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Phillips, R. Cody. *Operation Just Cause: The Incursion into Panama*. Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 2004.

Public Broadcasting Service. "Interview with General Jay Garner." *Truth, War and Consequences.* Frontline. Accessed January 9, 2020. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/truth/interviews/garner.html

———. "Interview with Major General David Petraeus." *Truth, War and Consequences.* Frontline. Accessed January 9, 2020. https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/beyond/interviews/petraeus.html

Rayburn, Joel D., and Frank K. Sobchak, eds. *The U.S. Army in The Iraq War: Volume 1 – Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War 2003-2006*. Carslisle Barracks: US Army War College Press, 2019.

Rosenau, James N. "Thinking Theory Thoroughly." *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*. Edited by James N. Rosenau. London: Frances Pinter, 1980.

Schadlow, Nadia. *War and the Art of Governance: Consolidating Combat Success into Political Victory*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2017.

Schulz, Richard H. Jr. *In the Aftermath of War: US Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Operation Just Cause.* Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1993.

Strachan, Hew. *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013

US Department of Defense, Joint Staff. Joint Publication 1, *Doctrine of the Armed Forces of the United States*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

———. Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2001.

———. Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006.

———. Joint Publication 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

———. Joint Publication 3-57, *Civil Military Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018.

———. Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Planning*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

US Department of the Army. Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, *Operations.* Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019.

———. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008.

———. Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017.

———. Field Manual 3-57, *Civil Affairs Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019.

———. Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1993.

The White House. *National Security Strategy of the United States*. Washington D.C: The White House, 2017. 27 November 2019. Accessed November 27, 2019. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf

Worley, Robert. *Orchestrating the Instruments of Power: A Critical Examination of the U.S. National Security System*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2015.

Wright, Donald P., and Timothy R. Reese. *The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003-January* 2005*: On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign*. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008.

Yates, Lawrence A. "Joint Task Force Panama: Just Cause - Before and After." *Military Review* 121, no. 10 (October 1991): 58-71.