Mutual Confidence to Continue: Integrated Reconstitution in Multinational Operations

A Monograph

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Reconstitution is a vital set of activities that commanders and staffs must prepare to execute in order to sustain endurance of combat power in large scale combat operations. In the context of multinational operations, the necessity for the US Army to plan and execute reconstitution as part of a multinational force is significant. A multinational force structure provides unique opportunities for contributing nations to integrate capabilities and resources with partner nations to fulfill reconstitution efforts. However, multinational operations also feature obstacles that can inhibit integration, such as language and cultural differences, doctrine, and national caveats. This monograph argues that US Army and partner nation forces were able to conduct integrated reconstitution by fostering a quality of cohesion that General Dwight D. Eisenhower termed "mutual confidence." Using current US Army reconstitution doctrine as a lens, this monograph studies two historical cases of integrated reconstitution: the 93rd Division in the First World War, and the Mars Task Force in the Second World War. This monograph then uses the concept of mutual confidence to evaluate how operational and tactical-level commanders of each nation cooperated to fulfill reconstitution efforts. Finally, this monograph offers recommendations for developing a multinational approach to integrated reconstitution operations.

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Abstract

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Reconstitution is a vital set of activities that commanders and staffs must prepare to execute in order to sustain endurance of combat power in large scale combat operations. In the context of multinational operations, the necessity for the US Army to plan and execute reconstitution as part of a multinational force is significant. A multinational force structure provides unique opportunities for contributing nations to integrate capabilities and resources with partner nations to fulfill reconstitution efforts. However, multinational operations also feature obstacles that can inhibit integration, such as language and cultural differences, doctrine, and national caveats. This monograph argues that US Army and partner nation forces were able to conduct integrated reconstitution by fostering a quality of cohesion that General Dwight D. Eisenhower termed "mutual confidence." Using current US Army reconstitution doctrine as a lens, this monograph studies two historical cases of integrated reconstitution: the 93rd Division in the First World War, and the Mars Task Force in the Second World War. This monograph then uses the concept of mutual confidence to evaluate how operational and tactical-level commanders of each nation cooperated to fulfill reconstitution efforts. Finally, this monograph offers recommendations for developing a multinational approach to integrated reconstitution operations.

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Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
AEF	American Expeditionary Force
BEF	British Expeditionary Forces
CARL	Combined Arms Research Library
CBI	China Burma India Theater
CEF	Chinese Expeditionary Force
FM	Field Manual
GHQ	General Headquarters
JP	Joint Publication
NARA II	National Archives and Records Administration II
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCAC	Northern Combat Area Command
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
SEAC	South East Asia Command
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force

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Introduction

> Success in future land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and such soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations. They will have to be prepared to do without regular lines of communication, to guide themselves and to subsist largely on what the country has to offer…The use of new weapons and technical devices can be quickly taught; to develop hardihood, initiative, mutual confidence, and stark leadership takes longer.
>
> —Field Marshall Viscount William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*

Since its existence, the US Army has reconstituted units following periods of combat engagements. In its first major battle with the British Army at Long Island in 1776, the American Continental Army under GEN George Washington's command learned how to integrate resources with colonial militia units to restore effective composite formations for continuing operations.[1] Reconstitution further evolved in the context of multinational operations, as Washington integrated American units with French expeditionary forces to conduct an offensive against the British in Yorktown, Virginia in 1781.[2] These experiences since the Revolutionary War shaped the foundation for how the US Army reconstituted units in subsequent conflicts, as well as how it engaged with partner nation forces to achieve unity of effort and to sustain operations.

Reconstitution operations are comprised of extraordinary actions that commanders plan and execute to restore the combat readiness of degraded units, enabling those units to continue their missions. These include immediate actions following combat engagements to reorganize units for short durations, which are often followed by deliberate regeneration actions to fully restore unit combat power for longer durations.[3] US Army sustainment doctrine recognizes multiple methods of reconstituting units, including cross-leveling of available crews and

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[1] David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 266–287.

[2] Allan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, *For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States from 1607 to 2012*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 2012), 68–70.

[3] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 4-0, *Sustainment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 3-13.

equipment, combining degraded units to form composite units, and prioritizing the replacement of personnel and equipment through coordination with higher echelons.[4] Although sustainment activities such as replacing and replenishing personnel and equipment are essential elements, reconstitution is not a purely sustainment operation. Rather, reconstitution goes beyond normal sustainment activities and involves increased effort by commanders and staffs to rebuild readiness, including unit cohesion, training, preparation, and a competent chain of command. The approaches that commanders take to reconstitute units depend primarily on assessments of objectives, operational variables, and available resources to fulfill requirements. Increased attrition and casualty rates affect the commander's assessment of the situation and could invoke adjustment decisions or branch plans that will change the course of action. Thus, reconstitution operations involve all US Army warfighting functions operating within the operations process to address changing, dynamic situations.[5]

In the context of multinational operations, the aperture broadens even more regarding complexity and available resources to reconstitute units. For several decades, US Army forces have cooperated with alliances and coalitions to achieve common objectives. Central to this is the concept of mutual confidence. GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower described the idea of mutual confidence following his command of the multinational Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). He emphasized the importance of collaborating with partner nation commanders and staffs to build trust and agree upon common objectives. According to Eisenhower, SHAEF was able to overcome many barriers of language, culture, and available resources by maintaining mutual confidence, shared understanding, and flexibility.[6] Political

[4] For more information, see Appendix C of US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 4-0, *Sustainment Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019).

[5] US Department of the Army, *Corps and Division Planners Guide to Reconstitution Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019), 7–9; US Department of the Army, Army Doctrinal Publication (ADP) 5-0, *The Operations Process* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 1-1–1-13.

[6] Dwight D. Eisenhower, "Problems of Combined Command," Lecture (National War College, Washington, DC, June 18, 1948), Box 86, Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers, Pre-Presidential, 1916-52,

scientist Patricia A. Weitsman explored a variation of mutual confidence at the strategic level with her concept of alliance cohesion. She discussed that after alliances form to balance against common external threats, alliance members must achieve collective internal cohesion to carry out strategies. They do this by having shared values and by compromising on objectives.[7] Current joint doctrine codifies these approaches through the Tenets of Multinational Operations, which includes respect, rapport, knowledge of partners, patience, mission focus, trust, and confidence.[8] By practicing these tenets, US Army and partner nation forces can cooperate to build the necessary mutual confidence to achieve unity of command or unity of effort.

With multinational operations, the implications for reconstitution are significant. Integration of US Army forces with partner nation forces presents unique challenges and opportunities for commanders when assessing, planning, preparing, and executing reconstitution operations. Collaboration with partner nation commanders enables not only broader perspectives for assessment but also potential access to critical resources from partner nation forces that could enhance reconstitution. These might include supplies, facilities, or capabilities available to integrate with US Army forces. However, risk increases with this approach to reconstitution, affected by differences in language, cultural, or technology, which could inhibit mutual confidence and cohesion.[9] Some risks could be unavoidable, but cooperation as a multinational force could prove to be a decisive factor for successful reconstitution. The ability of a US Army unit to reconstitute demonstrates endurance and the will to continue its mission. If a multinational

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Principal Files, Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, KS; Anthony J. Rice, "Command and Control: The Essence of Coalition Warfare," *Parameters* 27, no. 1 (1997): 152–167.

[7] Patricia A. Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 23–29, 153–159.

[8] US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), I-2–I-5.

[9] Ibid., III-1–III-16.

force can reconstitute following major combat engagements, it could demonstrate not just operational readiness but also significant resolve and cohesion of an alliance or coalition.

The US Army's experience in the First and Second World Wars demonstrated a paradigm shift for the approach in which unit commanders conducted operations, including reconstitution. Mobilization efforts stressed the US Army's mobilization, training, equipping, and transportation systems. Casualties reached overwhelming rates across multiple theaters, creating further strain on sustainment. The geographic scope of operations also necessitated US Army forces to operate alongside partner nation forces.[10] Although commanders were able to reconstitute entire divisions using American national resources, some situations occurred in which reconstitution was not a purely US Army effort. Cases in which US Army tactical units collaborated with partner nation forces to conduct reconstitution sometimes resulted in the creation of multinational units.[11] These multinational units of the First and Second World Wars have received only modest attention in military historical research, yet the implications of reconstitution in the framework of multinational operations bears much significance regarding reconstitution in future large-scale combat operations. Over the next five sections, this monograph examines how the US Army collaborated with partner nations to reconstitute units in the First and Second World Wars. This monograph seeks to outline how these experiences can inform concepts and planning considerations for reconstituting multinational forces in future large-scale combat operations.

[10] Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 312–325; John Mosier, *The Myth of the Great War: A New Military History of World War I* (New York: Perennial, 2001), 303–308; Mark A. Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 64–79.

[11] Mitchell A. Yockelson, *Borrowed Soldiers: Americans Under British Command, 1918* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 213–223.

Historiography and Methodology

Many scholars have studied reconstitution in large-scale combat operations but have rarely given attention to multinational cooperation. Edward J. Drea compiled a comprehensive historical analysis of reconstitution operations in the First and Second World Wars. His analysis examined how the US Army and partner nation forces individually employed available resources to reconstitute units during periods of sustained large-scale combat operations. These cases revealed that in the First World War, nearly all belligerents entered combat with standard systems for restoring combat power under the conditions of short, limited aims and thus had to evolve their methods of reconstitution to respond mass quantities of casualties.[12] Many of the findings contributed towards concepts covered in modern US Army reconstitution doctrine, including replacement systems, in-theater training, and reorganization of command and leadership. However, Drea's analysis leaves out much detail regarding the commander's role in reconstitution, as well as examples of how the US Army cooperated with partner nations to integrate reconstitution efforts.

To better understand the interaction of multinational force commanders during reconstitution, many historians have analyzed the French and British experiences in the First World War. Holger Herwig's *The Marne, 1914* sheds light on the commanders' assessments and decisions under intense pressure during the Battle of the Frontiers, resulting in integrated reconstitution efforts by French Marshal Joseph Joffre and British Field Marshal John French to create the composite French 9th Army.[13] Additional accounts by Hew Strachan, Roger Board, and David Silbey illustrate how the British learned from their losses at the Frontiers and the Marne, leading to reforms in their mobilization system. British Secretary of War Horatio Kitchener led

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[12] Edward J. Drea, *Unit Reconstitution - A Historical Perspective* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1983), 2-10, 16-51.

[13] Holger Herwig, *The Marne, 1914* (New York: Random House Trade Paperback, 2009), 173–183.

innovative efforts in 1915 to integrate Territorial and Commonwealth troops into the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), transforming it into what became known as "Kitchener's New Army."[14] Unfortunately, narratives covering the major defeats in the 1916-1917 period overshadow many of these adaptive efforts by the French and British regarding mobilization, capabilities integration, and reconstitution. Scholars including David Stevenson, Leonard V. Smith, Robin Prior, and Trevor Wilson discuss had France and Britain both reached breaking points in their mobilization systems, leading to thousands of casualties in the 1916 Battle of the Somme and the 1917 "Neville" offensive. These historians identified that poor logistics, exhausted manpower, and the "cult of the offensive" led to poor leadership decisions that depleted entire divisions of Allied troops, despite having elaborate mobilization and reconstitution systems.[15]

For the American experience, much scholarship has focused on the mobilization and training of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF), with scarce attention given to multinational cooperation in reconstitution operations. Works by Jeffrey D. Clarke, Hew Strachan, and John Mosier analyze how GEN John J. Pershing rejected Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig's and French Marshal Ferdinand Foch's controversial proposal of amalgamation, an idea that would have integrated American troops into partner nation units to fulfill reconstitution efforts. Pershing's counterargument followed that morale and discipline in the British and French Armies was severely lacking, and that the AEF would provide more effective combat power as a single,

[14] Roger Broad, *Volunteers and Pressed Men: How Britain and Its Empire Raised Its Forces In Two World Wars* (Croydon: Fonthill Media, 2016), 9–30, 95–98; David Silbey, "A Citizen Army Learns to Fight: The Tactical Evolution of the British Army in 1916," The MacArthur Memorial World War I Podcast, October 2016, accessed November 4, 2019, https://macarthurmemorial.org/418/World-War-I-Podcast-Season-Four; Hew Strachan, "Operational Art in Britain, 1909-2009," in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, ed. John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 109–111.

[15] David Stevenson, *1917: War, Peace, & Revolution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017); Robin Prior and Trevor Wilson, *The Somme* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 158–190; Leonard V. Smith, "'War and Politics': The French Army Mutinies of 1917," *War in History* 2, no. 2 (1995): 180–201.

unified force.[16] Additionally, Edward J. Drea, Allan R. Millet, and Mark E. Groteluesche offer that the AEF avoided major reconstitution operations until after the Meuse-Argonne offensive. AEF units mitigated risk by accelerating troop mobilization, rotating replacement divisions into theater, and adjusting "open warfare" doctrine to reduce casualties.[17] These narratives, however, overlook the few instances of American units integrating with partner nation units to reconstitute multinational forces, which Mitchell A. Yockelson's *Borrowed Soldiers* and Frank E. Roberts' *The American Foreign Legion* identify as exceptionally rare examples.[18]

Moving on to the Second World War, scholarship of the Allied experience focuses more extensively on the phenomenon of multinational army groups under a unified command. Works by Williamson Murray and Mark A. Stoler discuss how Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin D. Roosevelt agreed to combine commanders and staffs in Europe and the Pacific to better command and control Allied forces across four different theaters. In many ways, the combined commands consisting of British, American, and French military personnel represented the strength of the Allied strategy.[19] Niall Barr's *Eisenhower's Armies* analyzed how GEN Eisenhower collaborated with British senior commanders and formed SHAEF, which transformed the Anglo-American approach into combined multinational operations.[20] Themes of

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[16] Jeffrey D. Clarke, "The U.S. Army in World War I, 1917-1918," in *American Military History: The United States Army in a Global Era, 1917–2008*, ed. Richard W. Stewart, vol. II (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2010), 9–30; Hew Strachan, *The First World War* (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 306–310; Mosier, *The Myth of the Great War*, 306–313.

[17] Drea, *Unit Reconstitution,* 6-10; Allan R. Millett, "Cantigny, 28-31 May 1918," in *America's First Battles*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 178-185; Mark Ethan Groteluesche, *The AEF Way of War: The American Army and Combat in World War I* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 25-44.

[18] Yockelson, *Borrowed Soldiers,* 9-20, 213-223; Frank E. Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion: Black Soldiers of the 93d in World War I* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 193-202.

[19] Williamson Murray, "Combined and Joint War during World War II: The Anglo-American Story," in *13th International Forum on War History: Proceedings* (presented at the International Forum on War History, Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2014), accessed September 24, 2019, http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/event/forum/pdf/2014/07.pdf; Stoler, *Allies and Adversaries*, 103–116.

[20] Niall Barr, *Eisenhower's Armies: The American-British Alliance During World War II* (London: Pegasus Books, 2015), 216-243, 283-285, 461-469.

mutual confidence and unity of effort emerge as central concepts to the idea of cohesive alliances. Yet, tactical-level American and British units remained mostly autonomous and did not achieve the same qualities of mutual confidence and understanding.

One of the most studied cases of reconstitution in the Second World War is the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest. Military historians and officers including Charles B. MacDonald, Robert S. Rush, Kelly P. Bennion, Nathan J. Power, and Adam R. Grove analyzed how units such as the 4th Infantry Division and the 28th Infantry Division interacted with the VII Corps to reconstitute subordinate units while actively engaging enemy forces.[21] From these studies emerge several concepts that have contributed to current doctrine for division and corps-level reconstitution, including assessments, medical evacuation, training of replacements, supply replenishment, and strong commanders.[22] Much of this scholarship concludes that the combination of an efficient replacement system, operational priorities of support, and resilient leadership were what enabled VII Corps to reconstitute their divisions in less than sixty days. However, strategically the priority of support to the European theater was arguably a key contributing factor to the efficiency of reconstitution operations in the Hurtgen Forest.

In contrast, narratives of the Pacific theater paint a much different approach to reconstitution. Due to geographic isolation and the Allied "Europe First" policy, American units in the Pacific theater had to integrate many of their combat power capabilities and resources with Australian and British units.[23] The 32nd Infantry Division displayed how reconstitution took

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[21] Charles B. MacDonald, *The Battle of the Huertgen Forest* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003), 95–120; Robert S. Rush, *Hell in the Hurtgen Forest* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001), 280–308; Kelly P. Bennion, "Reconstituting US Brigades and Battalions: The Human Touch" (Masters Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1992); Nathan J. Power, "Reconstitution: Leadership Methods and Considerations" (Masters Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1987); Adam R. Grove, "Re-Forging the Iron Division: The Reconstitution of the 28th Infantry Division Between the Hurtgen and the Ardennes" (Masters Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2015).

[22] Rush, *Hell in the Hurtgen Forest*, 309–335; Power, "Reconstitution: Leadership Methods and Considerations"; Grove, "Re-Forging the Iron Division."

[23] Peter J. Dean, *MacArthur's Coalition: US and Australian Operations in the Southwest Pacific*

place with support from Australian forces. Analysis by Peter J. Dean, James Campbell, Jay Luvaas, and Robert M. Young reveals how the division integrated Australian infantry battalions and artillery batteries during the Battle of Buna, New Guinea in November 1942. These experiences displayed much closer cooperation by American units with partner nation forces to conduct hasty reorganization and deliberate regeneration of combat power, which eventually led to the creation of an American-Australian task force.[24] The case demonstrated how in a multinational environment with widespread geography and limited resources, American forces improvised and collaborated with partner nation forces to continue operations.

From the historiography, a dominant theme that emerges is the Allies' dependency on mobilization and replacement systems to reconstitute units. However, analysis of both wars shows that reconstitution operations still depended on informed leadership assessments and decisions at the division and corps levels, as well as cooperation with partner nations to enable in-theater training of replacement personnel. In the First World War, partner nations reached culmination points in which their organic sustainment systems could no longer reconstitute units. Although the US Army was reluctant to cooperate with partner nations to amalgamate American soldiers with Allied units, there were some cases in which integrated reconstitution efforts occurred. Ironically, despite the broader scope of multinational operations in the Second World War, collaboration by US Army and partner nation forces to reconstitute multinational units was still a rare phenomenon.

Given these observations, this monograph therefore seeks to explore two of the rare cases in which the US Army collaborated with partner nation forces to reconstitute multinational units.

Area, 1942-1945 (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2018), 88-101.

[24] Ibid., 157–201; James Campbell, *The Ghost Mountain Boys* (New York: Crown Publishers, 2007), 258–293; Jay Luvaas, "Buna, 19 November 1942 - 2 January 1943: A 'Leavenworth Nightmare,'" in *America's First Battles*, ed. Charles E. Heller and William A. Stofft (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 203–225; Robert M. Young, "Stalemate to Victory: Combined Arms in World War II's New Guinea Campaign," in *Bringing Order to Chaos: Historical Case Studies of Combined Arms Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations*, ed. Peter J. Schifferle (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018).

The first case study examines the 93rd Division (Provisional) and its contributions to reconstituting French Army divisions in the First World War. The second case study examines the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) and its reconstitution as the multinational 5332nd Brigade (Provisional).[25] Using current US Army reconstitution doctrine as a lens, each case study analyzes how the commanders assessed their respective operational situations, the subsequent decisions that led to reconstitution, and the process by which tactical units conducted reconstitution operations. Additionally, this monograph will use the concept of mutual confidence as codified in Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 to evaluate how collaboration between US Army commanders and partner nation force commanders enabled or hindered integrated reconstitution operations. Finally, this monograph will conclude with recommendations for commanders and staffs of US Army and allied partner nations for developing mutual confidence and deliberately planning reconstitution activities as part of multinational operations and campaigns.

It is necessary to denote key terms used throughout this monograph relating to US Army and multinational forces. The first is the identification of the 93rd Division's African American regiments in the case study of the First World War. Although these regiments consisted of black enlisted soldiers and a mixture of black officers and white officers, the War Department designated these segregated units as "negro" or "colored" regiments in order to distinguish them from "white" units. For the purposes of this research and analysis, this monograph will refer to these regiments primarily by their numbered designation, using the term "African American" only as necessary to distinguish them from other US Army divisions who were comprised entirely of white soldiers.

The second area this monograph will clarify is the use of terms relating to multinational operations. Current joint and US Army doctrine uses "multinational operations" to cover a wide range of military operations conducted cooperatively by two or more nations, usually operating

[25] Hereafter, this monograph will omit the "(Provisional)" title from each unit number designation.

through an alliance or a coalition.[26] Historical accounts of the First and Second World Wars often use terms such as allies, allied partners, or combined forces to describe integrated command structures of American forces and military units of other nations. To avoid confusion and remain consistent with current joint doctrine, this monograph will use the following terms: "Alliance" and its variations refers to the formal partnerships among US and friendly nation states in both World Wars, "partner nations" describes national level leadership elements, "partner nation forces" describes friendly foreign military units who cooperated with the US Army, and "multinational forces" or "multinational units" describes combined US Army and partner nation forces under a unified command.

[26] US Joint Staff, JP 3-16 (2019), I-1.

The 93rd Division in the First World War

In December 1917, the soldiers of the 93rd Division began arriving in France to conduct operations as part of the AEF in the European theater. The division remained in a provisional status and never became a fully active division during the First World War, as it lacked the force structure of a complete division headquarters and supporting elements.[27] Four infantry regiments made up the 93rd Division's units. Three of these regiments, the 369th Infantry, 370th Infantry, and 372nd Infantry were National Guard units federalized from various states, while the 371st Infantry Regiment was comprised of conscripted African American soldiers. Of these regiments, the 369th Infantry Regiment of the New York National Guard was the first to arrive at the Port of Brest near St. Nazaire, France.[28] This regiment set the foundation for the subsequent decision to contribute American forces to the French Army, thereby paving the way for reconstitution of numerous French infantry divisions.

Upon arriving in theater, the 369th Infantry Regiment did not immediately perform its tactical wartime mission. Given its status as a racially segregated unit, US War Department policy forbade the regiment from integrating with the white AEF divisions already in theater. As a result, AEF General Headquarters (GHQ) attached the 369th Infantry Regiment to the 316th Labor Battalion, also a segregated unit, and tasked them with improving deep water port infrastructure around St. Nazaire until the remainder of the 93rd Division, outlined in Figure 1, arrived.[29] While this mission was essential for the buildup of AEF combat power, the effects on the regiment were detrimental to the overall theater situation. Not only was this task another

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[27] The original unit history published by the War Department in 1921 indicates that the division headquarters was still mobilizing at Camp Jackson, SC in late 1917 and was scheduled to arrive in theater after its four infantry regiments. However, instead of reassembling the regiments and their parent headquarters into a complete division, AEF GHQ organized the headquarters personnel into the 1st and 42nd Divisions after they arrived in theater. US War Department, Historical Division, "Ninety-Third Division Unit History," March 30, 1921, Albany, NY, New York State Archives, accessed October 16, 2019, http://www.archives.nysed.gov/education/93rd-division-record-march-30-1921.

[28] Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion*, 1-5, 46-47.

[29] Stephen L. Harris, *Harlem's Hellfighters* (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc., 2003), 154-160.

discriminatory blow against an already racially segregated unit, but it also provided very little assistance to improving the tactical situation for the AEF or partner nation forces.[30]



Figure 1. Provisional task organization of the 93rd Division, March 1918. Illustration by author, based on Frank E. Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion: Black Soldiers in the 93d in World War I* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), Appendix C.

The disposition of the 369th Infantry Regiment as a labor unit particularly infuriated the regimental commander, COL William Hayward, who lobbied to have the regiment reassigned in the theater to a combat arms role. With no division or corps commander in his chain of command, Hayward corresponded directly with GEN Pershing and later met with him to discuss reassigning the 369th Infantry to an American division. Citing the poor conditions of the work environment and effects it had on the morale and welfare of the soldiers, Hayward made a strong case for his regiment to fulfill its purpose of fighting the Germans as part of the American mission in France.[31] Although GEN Pershing led African American troops during the Spanish-American War and developed great rapport with them, he rejected Hayward's repeated requests for reassignment. Pershing appeared to base his stance on the obligation to the US War Department's segregation policy. However, Pershing also seemed to have given in to pressure by other senior commanders in the AEF, who claimed that African American soldiers were not properly trained

[30] Chad L. Williams, *Torchbearers of Democracy: African American Soldiers in the World War I Era* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010), 119-120.

[31] Arthur W. Little, *From Harlem to the Rhine: The Story of New York's Colored Volunteers* (New York: Covici Friede, 1936), 99–104.

to integrate with white soldiers in other divisions.[32] As a result, the 369th Infantry was kept in its role as a labor unit, unable to exercise its combat potential.

From the French perspective, the tactical situation was becoming graver by the day. Marshal Phillipe Petain, Commander in Chief of the French Army, and Marshal Ferdinand Foch, French Chief of the General Staff, faced an operational problem of allocating French divisions to assist Italy against Austria-Hungary, while trying to rebuild enough Allied divisions to respond to the imminent German offensive in eastern France.[33] France had sustained over 4,400,000 combined military and civilian casualties since 1914, and the French Army was still reconstituting several depleted divisions following the 1917 Neville Offensive. Simultaneously, the British struggled to balance their constrained resources to sustain the BEF alongside their blockade in the English Channel. Additionally, the Bolshevik revolution in Russia compounded these challenges, resulting in Tsar Nicholas II abdicating his throne and Russia conceding a separate peace with Germany. The revolution discontinued Russia's cooperation with the Triple Entente, enabling German and Austria-Hungarian forces to reorganize in Italy and France.[34] Therefore, Petain and Foch needed urgent assistance from the AEF to repel the German threat.

Assessment and Decision to Reconstitute

With the operational situation in France in early 1918, the problem that GEN Pershing faced was twofold: he had to simultaneously employ the regiments of an incomplete division into combat, sustain the restoration of a partner nation force's combat power, and continue building

[32] Among the AEF, LTG Robert L. Bullard, who later commanded Second Army in 1918, was one of the most vocal commanders who objected to the integration of African American soldiers, arguing that unit cohesion would be degraded on the basis of the "race question" of the period. Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion,* 48-49; L. Albert Scipio, II, *With the Red Hand Division: The Black American Regiments in the 157th Division* (Silver Spring: Roman Publications, 1985), iv-vii, 1.

[33] Ferdinand Foch, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*, trans. T. Bentley Mott (London: William Heinemann LTD, 1931), 261–269.

[34] Eliot A. Cohen, *Supreme Command* (New York: Anchor Books, 2002), 55–56; Stevenson, *1917: War, Peace, & Revolution*, 104–114, 138–144; Strachan, *The First World War*, 260–265, 303–310; Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 152–153.

AEF combat power. However, with only four complete AEF divisions in theater by January 1918, British and French leaders continued to request for American companies and battalions to integrate into their formations.[35] As March 1918 approached, greater external risk to the Allied force developed as German GEN Erich Ludendorff prepared forty-four German divisions for offensive operations in eastern France.[36] Figure 2 illustrates the disposition of German forces on the Western Front in 1918.



Figure 2. The Western Front, 21 March to 5 April 1918. Adapted from Eric B. Setzekorn, *Joining the Great War: April 1917-April 1918*, The US Army Campaigns of World War I Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2017), 68–69.

[35] Yockelson, *Borrowed Soldiers,* 15–20.

[36] Eric B. Setzekorn, *Joining the Great War: April 1917-April 1918*, The US Army Campaigns of World War I Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2017), 68–69; Strachan, *The First World War*, 290–297.

Strategically, Pershing experienced a dilemma in policy objectives. Although he upheld guidance from President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker by firmly standing against amalgamation of American soldiers with partner nation forces, the operational variables created a problem that required Pershing to change his original plan. Given that he had four infantry regiments that lacked a division headquarters, and because the French needed American assistance to fill gaps along their lines in eastern France, Pershing assessed that his best course of action was to attach the four regiments of the 93rd Division to the French Army. In his memoirs, Pershing describes his decision:

> To meet the need for replacements in their units, I consented to send temporarily to the French four colored infantry regiments of the 93d Division. Some of the units had arrived, and others were expected soon to be en route, but they did not have even the beginning of a brigade or divisional organization. One regiment was to go to each of the four divisions, with the provisions that they were to be returned for the formation of the 93d Division when called for.[37]

In March 1918, the 369th Infantry Regiment became the first African American regiment to integrate with the French Army. The regiment was task organized under operational control with the French 16th Infantry Division, VIII Army Corps, 4th French Army stationed in in Givry-en-Argonne. Later in the war, the regiment served under the command of the 161st Infantry Division in support of the Meuse-Argonne offensive. Contrary to what Pershing initially stated, the 369th Infantry and its three sister regiments remained attached to the French Army for the duration of the war.[38]

Like the 369th Infantry, the 370th Infantry Regiment received attachment orders to the French Army. The regiment, comprised of federalized units of the Illinois National Guard, arrived in theater in April 1918 and immediately railed to Morvillars, France for task organization with

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[37] John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, vol. I (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1931), 291.

[38] W. Allison Sweeney, *History of the American Negro in the Great World War* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1919), 137; Emmett J. Scott, *Scott's Official History of the American Negro in the World War* (New York: Arno Press, 1969), 214–222.

the French 73rd Infantry Division, 40th Army Corps. Eventually the 370th Infantry became a separate infantry regiment under the command of the 40th Army Corps that rotated under the operational control of various French divisions. Over the course of the war, the regiment served with at least five divisions.[39] They experienced their most significant combat engagements with the French 36th Division at Auzeville during the Second Battle of the Marne, and later with the French 59th Infantry Division at La Ferte-Milon during the Oise-Ainse Offensive. Figure 3 illustrates the task organization of the 370th Infantry with the French 59th Infantry Division.[40]



Figure 3. Task organization of the French 59th Division, incorporating the American 370th Infantry Division, September 1918. Illustration by author, based on Frank E. Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion: Black Soldiers in the 93d in World War I* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2004), 152-153.

In contrast to the 369th and 370th Infantry Regiments, the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments experienced a much more enduring relationship with their French Army units, serving mostly as sister regiments task organized under a French division. The two regiments arrived in theater around the same time in April 1918. Immediately after disembarkation at St. Nazaire, both

[39] Field orders indicate that the regiment served with the French 73rd, 133rd, 10th, 34th, 36th and 59th Infantry Divisions. "Field orders of the 371st Infantry Regiment," May-November 1918, Records of 1st-388th & 559th Infantry Regiments, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, National Archives and Records Administration II (hereafter NARA II), College Park, MD; Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion,* 70-73.

[40] American Battlefield Monuments Commission, *93d Division: Summary of Operations in the World War* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 5; Sweeney, *History of the American Negro in the Great World War*, 166–171.

regiments received attachment orders to the French XIII Army Corps at Givry-en-Argonne. As with the 369th and 370th Infantry Regiments, the 371st and 372nd spent their first two months training as separate corps-level regiments rotating under operational control of various French divisions. However, in June 1918 both regiments received orders from the XIII Army Corps for integration with the French 157th Infantry Division, commanded by French GEN Mariano F.J. Goybet.[41] GEN Goybet discussed the 157th Infantry Division's heavy casualties alongside a British Division. After assuming command, Goybet described his scheme of reconstitution operations for the division:

> In spite of this deplorable situation this division, attacked at the same time in front and on the flank, fought from daybreak until night against odds of 10 or 15 to 1, occupying new positions and holding back the advance of the Germans. It was for this reason that when I had the honor to be called to reconstruct the 157th to make it into the *new* 157th or Red Hand, I used all the former members of the Staff, the Cavalry, Engineers, Artillery, and the different departments of the Health and Commissary, etc. I chose of the regiments of Infantry, the 333rd, your fellow combatants. The other two were two much weakened by their losses to be able to be used at once. (original emphasis)[42]

With two of its three infantry regiments rendered ineffective, the 157th Infantry Division integrated the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments to complete its reconstitution. Thereafter, the multinational 157th Infantry Division task organized with the multinational IX French Army Corps, which included the French 161st Infantry Division and the 2nd Moroccan Division, illustrated in Figure 4.

[41] Perry L. Miles, "Brief Report of Operations of the 371st Infantry," 1918, Records of the 1st-388th & 599th Infantry Regiments, 1916-1921, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, NARA II, College Park, MD; Brooke Payne, "Brief History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment," August 7, 1919, Records of the 1st-388th & 599th Infantry Regiments, 1916-1921, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, NARA II, College Park, MD; Scipio, II, *With the Red Hand Division*, 53–65.

[42] Chester D. Heywood, *Negro Combat Troops in the World War: The Story of the 371st Infantry* (Worcester, MA: Commonwealth Press, 1921), 57–58.



Figure 4. Task organization of the French 9th Army Corps, incorporating the American 369th, 371st, and 372nd Infantry Regiments, September 1918. Illustration by author, based on L. Albert Scipio, II, *With the Red Hand Division: The Black American Regiments in the 157th Division* (Silver Spring: Roman Publications, 1985), 68.

Upon reviewing Pershing's assessment and decision to attach the regiments of the 93rd Division to the French Army, his reasoning appeared to be a compromise to reassure the will of the United States to its allies. As a means of affirming the AEF's commitment to unified action, Pershing viewed his decision as fulfilling the many requests from Petain and Foch for American personnel replacements to integrate into a largely overcommitted French Army. Although French and British military leaders held a firm stance towards Pershing, Foch also became somewhat sympathetic to the painstaking mobilization process that the AEF experienced. Foch stated in his memoirs, "Everything had to be created. The Regular Army, maintained on a scale sufficient for the narrow requirements of peace time, could only furnish a small fraction of what was necessary for the mobilization of numerous Divisions which America had to raise."[43]

In addition to maintaining relations, Pershing's decision in retrospect also appeared as a perfunctory way of dealing with the issue of employing African American soldiers in the war. As

[43] Foch, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*, 268–269.

historian Chad Williams argues, by handing the regiments over to the French, Pershing seemed to be appeasing the white senior commanders of the AEF and effectively casting out these soldiers from their own country.[44] Pershing described in his memoirs how he regretted his decision as the African American regiments soon became mistaken as being French and thus isolated even more from any association with the AEF. However, Pershing also mentioned that he later felt reassured by his decision as the French commanders expressed commendation upon receiving the regiments among their ranks.[45] In an operational environment where elements of politics and national loyalty ran high, the psychological risks of contributing the 93rd Division to French reconstitution efforts were significant.

While GEN Pershing's decision created the impression that he succumbed to pressure for not integrating the four African American regiments of the 93rd Division into the AEF, Pershing appears to have logically assessed the strategic and operational situation, as well as recommendations from unit commanders, prior to making his decision. Through his conversations with Foch, Pershing began to understand the threat of the Ludendorff offensive and the associated risk of an incursion deeper into France and Italy. Part of the challenge that Pershing faced operationally in early 1918 was providing enough complete AEF divisions to fill the gaps on the defensive lines with the existing French and British divisions. This was difficult for the AEF to fulfill given the slow mobilization process from the United States to France. In February 1918, the flow of AEF divisions into theater was simply not rapid enough to build acceptable combat power for countering the emerging German threat. Additionally, with no division headquarters established to command and control the four regiments, Pershing's decision to assume risk and place them under operational control of the French seemed to fulfill multiple objectives: the French could accelerate their reconstitution activities, the regiments were now

[44] Williams, *Torchbearers of Democracy,* 119-120.

[45] Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, vol. I, 290–291.

fulfilling their purpose under the command and control of an actual division, and the entire allied front in Lorraine increased its combat power to counter the Ludendorff offensive.

Reconstituting the French Divisions

Except for the 369th Infantry, the regiments of the 93rd Division arrived in France with no prior knowledge of GEN Pershing's decision to integrate their units with French divisions. This initially created confusion and further degraded shared understanding among the regimental commanders who still lacked a proper division chain of command for guidance and direction. COL Perry L. Miles, commander of the 371st Infantry, did not find out about the decision until his regiment reached their initial bivouac area in Chaumont, France a week after arriving in theater. Miles expressed anger upon discovering the decision through the adjutant's office at AEF GHQ, although he mentioned that he was not completely surprised, as he knew of the previous French and British requests to Pershing for amalgamating AEF troops with allied partner forces.[46] Despite initial turbulence, the regiments' soldiers mostly displayed good attitudes going into the integration process with the French Army. For African American soldiers, this was an immediate relief from the labor duties they initially performed at the Port of Brest, France.

As part of reconstitution operations, the regiments of the 93rd Division all experienced two very drastic transformations. The first transformation was a set of orders from the War Department to reorganize each of the National Guard units to comply with the federal table of organization and equipment for an American infantry regiment. This included several personnel reclassifications and losses of capabilities, such as the deletion of ancillary medical personnel and the transition of the regiments' replacement detachments into dedicated rifle companies.[47] The

[46] Perry L. Miles, *Fallen Leaves: Memories of an Old Soldier* (Berkeley: Wuerth Publishing Company, 1961), 253–255, accessed November 21, 2019, http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015016754718.

[47] William Hayward, "General Order 8-1-1: Reorganization of the Regiment," Records of the 1st-388th & 599th Infantry Regiments, 1916-1921, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, NARA II, College Park, MD; Scipio, II, *With the Red Hand Division,* 43.

transition was part of the War Department's larger approach of standardizing all three components of the AEF in order to improve cohesion and interoperability, an approach that many National Guard units largely retained as part of future federal service.

The second transformation of the 93rd Division came upon integration with the French Army. Under an agreement between AEF GHQ and the French High Command, each regiment would comply with the French table of organization and equipment. The American regiments reorganized to align with the design of a French infantry regiment, as well as refitted all American soldiers with French rifles, helmets, gas masks, and rations. The purpose behind this reorganization and reequipping process was to strengthen interoperability within the French regimental system and to streamline distribution of replenishment items among the French supply system.[48] Aside from their uniforms, the American soldiers looked nearly identical to their French counterparts. At first, many of the American soldiers were reluctant to adopt some of the French equipment such as the Berthier rifle, which they viewed as inferior to the American Springfield 1911 rifle. CPT Hamilton Fish, a company commander in the 369th Infantry, recalled how the Berthier only held three cartridges at a time and seemed more appropriate for use during bayonet charges, which revealed some of the stark differences between American and French doctrine.[49] This rapid integration into a multinational force increased anxiety for some commanders and leaders in the regiments. Yet, for many African American soldiers who had long faced discrimination within their own service, their integration to the French Army was a warm welcome to opportunities not afforded to them before.

With these two major transformations, the regiments of the 93rd Division were mostly able to integrate smoothly with their French counterparts. Unlike the white units in the AEF who rejected the inclusion of African American soldiers, the French units showed no hostility and

[48] Payne, "Brief History of the 372nd Infantry Regiment"; Little, *From Harlem to the Rhine,* 148–150.

[49] Harris, *Harlem's Hellfighters*, 181.

warmly welcomed the soldiers of the 93rd Division into their ranks. COL Hayward of the 369th Infantry Regiment recounted in a letter to Emmett J. Scott that upon integration with the French 161st Infantry Division, "The French soldiers have not the slightest prejudice or feeling. The poilus and my boys are great chums, eat, dance, sing, march and fight together in absolute accord. The French officers have *little*, if any feeling about Negro officers."[50] From the French perspective, the idea of integrating black soldiers into their ranks was not unordinary as many of the French officers had trained African units from Morocco, Algeria, and Senegal. However, a marked difference emerged regarding the relationship between French and African Americans. Earlier in the war, French officers treated Africans more as subjects, segregating their units and using the African soldiers as "shock troops" on the forward lines.[51] In contrast, the French officers treated African American soldiers as equals, viewing them as free men sent to help the Allies. GEN Goybet of the 157th Infantry Division expressed a mutual sense of respect for the newly integrated 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments, saying, "at the moment when two American colored regiments join us, I am bowing to their colors and I am wishing the best welcome to our companions in arms."[52] For the French, the presence of African American soldiers contributed to a very necessary improvement of morale.

Regarding language and communications, the regiments of the 93rd Division overcame many barriers with their French counterparts by using interpreters and liaisons. Upon reception into the French Army units, each regiment received a group of French cadre and interpreters, whose duties were to train and integrate the American troops according to French doctrine and tactics. Additionally, as the American regiments were in compliance with the French table of organization, the American chain of command selected soldiers and officers from the additional

[50] Scott, *Scott's Official History of the American Negro in the World War*, 200.

[51] Joseph H. Lunn, "Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese Oral History of the First World War" (Dissertation, University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1993), 230–275.

[52] Heywood, *Negro Combat Troops in the World War*, 57.

fourth company to serve as liaisons in each respective regimental and divisional headquarters.[53] This approach, as CPT Fish recalls from his experience with the 369th Infantry, helped to strengthen the Franco-American chain of command as the organization built rapport and knowledge through daily interaction.[54] By May 1918, American and French soldiers with bilingual abilities were serving as permanent liaisons, communicating orders among headquarters elements over cables and wired telephone systems. These liaisons also helped to better integrate communication with French-African colonial units.[55] In response to German counterintelligence, American units collaborated with the French to create a "liaison axis" that included a wireless system of ciphered communication, as well as alternate and contingency channels using aerial, courier, and visual signals. Monroe Mason and Arthur Franklin Furr recounted their experiences in the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments, discussing how the regiments collaborated with the 157th Infantry Division to create ad hoc liaison "runners" to each command post during offensive operations in the Sub-Sector Argonne West. This liaison axis eventually solidified into a formal plan published by the 157th Infantry Division for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[56]

In conjunction with the reorganization and integration process, the French divisions conducted extensive training with American regiments in vicinity of forward defensive battle positions, as well in rear echelon camps and garrisons. There were two tiers of training that took

[53] CPT Chester Heywood explained that under the French table of organization, American infantry regiments ended up with an additional rifle company in each battalion that many commanders used either as a replacement detachment to train incoming personnel or to augment each battalion headquarters element. Heywood, *Negro Combat Troops in the World War,* 36–37.

[54] Little, *From Harlem to the Rhine*, 148–151; John Guttman, "Black Doughboy's Pride: An Interview with Hamilton Fish," *Eyewitness to War: A Special Edition*, 2002, 29-35.

[55] "2nd Moroccan Division field message to 157th Infantry Division, copy to 371st Infantry Regiment," September 25, 1918, Records of the 1st-388th & 559th Infantry Regiments, 1916-1921, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[56] "157th Infantry Division Field Order No. 2037/3," September 23, 1918, Records of the 1st-388th & 559th Infantry Regiments, 1916-1921, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, NARA II, College Park, MD; Monroe Mason and Arthur Franklin Furr, *The American Negro Soldier with the Red Hand of France* (Boston: The Cornhill Company, 1920), 52–57, accessed November 3, 2019, http://archive.org/details/americannegroso00furrgoog.

place. The first was immediate "training-under-fire" that focused on orienting each of the regiments to entrenched defensive operations. This initial orientation was necessary in order to help relieve exhausted French infantry battalions who had occupied forward areas in the Argonne Forest for several months.[57] The second tier was institutional, classroom-level training that took place at various garrisons around France. Field orders and individual accounts from the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments reveal that from July to September 1918, the regiments took part in institutional training as part of the French 157th Infantry Division that included company leader and non-commissioned officer courses, as well as individual skills including chemical protection, rifle marksmanship, and operation of the newly-fielded British Fullerphone. While in a division reserve status, regiments continued individual and small unit tactics with their French counterparts in forward sectors.[58] This training program yielded considerable benefits for the multinational 157th Infantry Division. Not only did it improve doctrinal and functional interoperability, but the continuous training helped to create a greater quality of mutual confidence, build cohesive teams, and mitigate risk among the multinational force.

One of the most contentious elements that required reconciliation between the American and French units was that of command and control. In terms of command and support relationships, the 93rd Division's regiments were attached under operational control of their respective French divisions. As part of the effort to streamline logistics and supply, the French inherited an additional administrative control measure of equipping and supplying the American units. On the other hand, AEF GHQ still maintained an overall administrative control relationship that included responsibilities for pay of American personnel, integration of American replacements into the regiments, and in-theater reassignment orders. This ensured that each of the

[57] Heywood, *Negro Combat Troops in the World War*, 40–42; Mason and Furr, *The American Negro Soldier with the Red Hand of France*, 48–51.

[58] "Correspondence from 157th Infantry Division to 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments," June to September 1918, Records of the 1st-388th & 599th Infantry Regiments, 1916-1921, Entry 2133, Record Group 391, NARA II, College Park, MD.

regiments stayed manned at their authorized levels, while also moving personnel as required by AEF GHQ. Regimental commanders also retained the authority to appoint leadership positions, promotions, and recommendations for transfers in and out of the units.[59] Although this process appeared to work efficiently in theory, it was not without its conflicts, particularly among the officer ranks. Officers consisted of both black and white officers, and only the commander of the 370th Infantry Regiment, COL Franklin Denison, was black. Officer reassignments occurred frequently every few weeks among every regiment, with commanders replacing black officers with white officers.[60]

The constant reassignment of officers created tension among the chain of command for multiple months. At the regimental level, a growing quality of mistrust spread across the units, particularly between white officers and African American enlisted soldiers, not only within the regiments but also with the French division commanders. In August 1918, the 372nd Infantry saw dozens of its African American officers relieved from their leadership positions and reassigned to other AEF African American units, with little to no explanation for the reassignments.[61] This reinforced a perception among the regiments that the white officers were attempting to suppress the performance of the African American soldiers with the French Army. Many French commanders disagreed with the constant turnover of officer leadership. However, GEN Goybet attempted to handle the situation diplomatically in order to maintain stability between the American and French officers while also protecting the enlisted African American soldiers. Goybet wrote to GEN Pershing and the commanders of the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments to tell them how pleased he was with the performances of the regiments as part of the Red Hand Division, specifically citing the valorous actions exhibited by many of the African American soldiers during the Champagne Offensive in September 1918. He also reiterated how these

[59] Scipio, II, *With the Red Hand Division*, 53–61.

[60] Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion*, 70–75.

[61] Mason and Furr, *The American Negro Soldier with the Red Hand of France*, 98–103.

soldiers boosted morale and upheld the honorable traditions of the Red Hand Division.[62] This correspondence, Goybet not only solidified the valorous service records of the African American soldiers, but he also signaled to Pershing to halt the needless reassignments.

Aftermath and Evaluation

By August 1918, the regiments of the 93rd Division had made significant contributions to the reconstitution of many French divisions. The 369th and 370th Infantry Regiments displayed flexibility and independence as corps-level elements that augmented various divisions degraded from enduring defensive operations. This contributed to the French Army's success during the Second Battle of the Marne and the Meuse-Argonne Offensive. Similarly, the 371st and 372nd Infantry Regiments demonstrated a model for deliberate reorganization of a division-sized unit, the 157th Infantry Division, following offensive operations in the Saint-Mihiel Sector. GEN Goybet showed no hesitation integrating the two African American regiments to round out the division's formation. These regiments were equipped and organized by the French XIII Army Corps and already gained immediate "training-in-contact" experience in entrenched defensive operations while stationed in Conde-en-Barrois. From there, training and liaison integration continued at the institutional and field levels to strengthen unit cohesion and interoperability. Additionally, despite many of the internal conflicts over leadership assignments within the regiments, GEN Goybet and later COL Quillet maintained a coherent chain of command. Figure 5 illustrates the division's operations in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[63] Through these extraordinary efforts, the 157th Infantry Division reconstituted as a multinational division that served with distinction.

[62] Scipio, II, *With the Red Hand Division*, 112–117.

[63] Paul B. Cora and Alexander Falbo-Wild, *Supporting Allied Offensives: 8 August-11 November 1918*, The US Army Campaigns of World War I Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2018), 59.



Figure 5. Regiments of the 93rd Division, attached to the French 157th Infantry Division, advancing north to Sedan-Mézières railroad, 26 September to 8 October 1918. Map adapted from Paul B. Cora and Alexander A. Falbo-Wild, *Supporting Allied Offensives: 8 August-11 November 1918*, The US Army Campaigns of World War I Commemorative Series (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2018), 59.

FM 4-0 states that the purpose of reconstitution is to restore a unit's combat readiness in order to continue its mission, particularly when operational tempo and mission variables do not allow for replacing that unit. Reconstitution operations provide unit commanders with prolonged endurance during large-scale combat operations.[64] The 93rd Division's experiences reflect how

[64] US Army, FM 4-0, C-1.

integration of multinational forces fulfilled the reorganization element of reconstitution operations. Upon reception, the French Army reorganized their exhausted divisions by integrating the 93rd Division's regiments, providing additional trained unit capacity that enabled the French to later transition towards regeneration of combat power. Quantitatively, the 93rd Division provided an average force flow of 10,669 troops from August 1918 until the end of the Meuse-Argonne Offensive.[65] While the French provided supplies and training, the Americans provided people and morale, creating a foundation of resources for sustained reconstitution. Notably, the French leadership clearly understood the value of a deliberate training program, necessary to fully reconstitute division combat power. The combination of immediate field-level training with institutional instruction in theater effectively rebuilt the French Army and improved skills and proficiency of the American units. US Army doctrine appropriately recognizes the significance of the training component of reconstitution, emphasizing the need for all warfighting functions to actively contribute to these operations.

In the framework of multinational operations, mutual confidence was necessary for the French and American units to successfully reconstitute divisions and to continue operations until the end of the war. Mutual confidence, as outlined by current US Army and joint doctrine, takes time to develop among American and partner nation forces and can be an intangible decisive factor regarding the cohesion of multinational forces.[66] As the evidence reveals, mutual confidence among operational leaders took several months to develop, as GEN Pershing was often at odds with GEN Petain and Marshal Foch on how to best integrate the AEF into allied operations. However, Pershing eventually assumed a greater level of risk to his own forces by employing the regiments of the 93rd Division with the French, understanding that this decision would increase the combat power of the overall allied effort. At the tactical level, mutual

[65] Roberts, *The American Foreign Legion*, 203–204.

[66] US Army, FM 3-16, 1-2; US Joint Staff, JP 3-16 (2019), I-2–I-5.

confidence developed very rapidly during the first weeks of integration of the American regiments with the French Army Corps. French and American tactical commanders maintained mutual respect and gradually built greater qualities of rapport, knowledge of partner capabilities, and cohesion. Thus, mutual confidence became a decisive factor that determined the American and French forces' abilities to successfully integrate reconstitution operations.

The Mars Task Force in the Second World War

In May 1944, the 5307th Composite Unit completed the second phase of an operation to gain control of the village of Myitkyina, Burma. The brigade-sized composite unit, originally codenamed "Galahad," was later nicknamed Merrill's Marauders under BG Frank D. Merrill's command.[67] The 5307th Composite was one of several Allied long-range penetration units modeled after British MG Orde Wingate's special forces, known as the "Chindits." Together, they operated as part of the Second Burma Campaign in the China-Burma-India (CBI) theater.[68] Operations in northern Burma focused on regaining command of the air by controlling the Myitkyina airfield and later regaining control of the Burma Road, a key line of communication that connected supply transport from the Port of Rangoon to western China. The campaign's land operations consisted of US forces operating alongside the Chinese Expeditionary Force (CEF) advancing through northern Burma, eventually linking up with GEN William Slim's multinational 14th Army advancing from eastern India into Burma. The 5307th's original mission was to conduct long range reconnaissance into areas surrounding Myitkyina in order to set conditions for an offensive against the Japanese 18th Division.[69] This would allow US and Chinese forces to establish a base of operations at the airfield for close air support and aerial resupply from India to China. However, the 5307th faced heavy resistance from Japanese forces as well as extreme weather, disease, and other health issues in a complex operational environment.[70] These conditions made reconstituting the 5307th one of the most difficult tasks of the campaign.

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[67] Gary J. Bjore, *Merrill's Marauders: Combined Operations in Northern Burma in 1944* (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1996), 1–14; Troy Sacquety, *The OSS in Burma: Jungle War Against The Japanese* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2013), 112–125.

[68] Gerald Astor, *The Jungle War* (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2004), 130–138.

[69] James E.T. Hopkins, *Spearhead: A Complete History of Merrill's Marauder Rangers* (Baltimore: Galahad Press, 1999), 85–113; William Slim, *Defeat Into Victory: Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945* (New York: Cooper Square Press, 1956), 257–281.

[70] Hopkins, *Spearhead*, 526–529.

Strategically, the CBI theater was at a disadvantage compared to the other Allied theaters. In accordance with Churchill and Roosevelt's "Europe First" policy, following the Cairo Conference in November 1943 all Allied landing craft were reprioritized to SHAEF to support the amphibious phase of Operation Overlord.[71] In the Pacific theater, priorities shifted to ADM Chester Nimitz and GEN Douglas MacArthur to support amphibious operations in New Guinea and the Philippines.[72] Because of these competing objectives, the CBI theater's South East Asia Command (SEAC) lacked necessary resources for amphibious operations in Central Asia as originally planned. Therefore, British ADM Louis Mountbatten, Supreme Allied Commander, reframed the approach of the Burma campaign. Allied air forces would interdict the Japanese in Burma while sustaining aerial supply deliveries from India to China. Wingate's Chindits would conduct long range insertions into northern and central Burma to provide reconnaissance for the land component. The 14th Army, as the main effort, would advance into Arakan to defeat Japanese forces.[73] With troops mustered from multiple countries, it was a true multinational operation.

Operationally, the Allied command and control structure in the CBI theater was very complicated. LTG Joseph Stilwell, commander of US forces in the CBI theater, split his responsibilities between SEAC and the Chinese High Command. For SEAC, Stillwell was the deputy to ADM Mountbatten, as well as commander of Northern Combat Area Command (NCAC), a multinational corps-level headquarters that commanded and controlled Allied forces in northern Burma. For China, Stilwell was the Chief of Staff to Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, as well as provisional commander of the CEF. While China was not part of SEAC, it

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[71] Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), 256–260; Rana Mitter, *Forgotten Ally: China's World War II, 1937-1945* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 307–314.

[72] John Prados, *Islands of Destiny: The Solomons Campaign and the Eclipse of the Rising Sun* (New York: NAL Caliber, 2012), 216-219, 315-331.

[73] Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 251–255; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 203–220; Jon Latimer, *Burma: The Forgotten War* (London: Thistle Publishing, 2017), 194–201.

provided CEF units in India and western China that directly supported operations in northern Burma.[74] The Allied command structure was an often frustrating one, as senior leaders from three different nations attempted to exercise command and control over all forces in Burma.

Although the 5307th Composite Unit made significant gains to control the Myitkyina airfield, illustrated in Figure 6, casualties were overwhelmingly steep. There were many factors that contributed to the high attrition of the 5307th. Many of these stemmed from the disjointed command and control of the operation, as well as disagreements among the Allied commanders. Chiang Kai-Shek was reluctant to place many of his Yunnan Force divisions into Burma, and the units that he did give to Stilwell were undertrained and often hesitant to provide mutual support to the 5307th.[75] On the British side, while GEN Slim's 14th Army aggressively pursued Japanese forces through central Burma, Mountbatten preserved much of SEAC's combat power to sustain operations in Kohima and Imphal, India.[76] This friction was compounded by several sustainment issues across the theater. The 5307th could not receive aerial resupply from the Tenth US Army Air Force (USAAF) due to heavy monsoon rains. Additionally, officers of the 5307th learned after the seizure of Myitkyina airfield that NCAC held many supplies intended for their unit and reallocated them to Chinese units, which further infuriated the chain of command.[77] Finally, several cases of disease, including malaria, dysentery, and typhus severely affected the 5307th. By June 1944, several hundred soldiers required medical evacuation, but heavy monsoon rains forced field medical and surgical teams to treat sick and wounded casualties in place.[78]

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[74] Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956), 3–10; Latimer, *Burma*, 198–204.

[75] Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 204–213; Astor, *The Jungle War*, 289–290.

[76] Louis Mountbatten, *Personal Diary of Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten*, ed. Philip Ziegler (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd, 1988), 114–115; Charles Newton Hunter, *Galahad* (San Antonio: The Naylor Company, 1963), 168; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 337–357; Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 221–222.

[77] Hunter, *Galahad*, 170–171; Hopkins, *Spearhead*, 603–606, 614.

[78] George P. Hickman, "Report on the Myitkyina Campaign by a Veterinary Officer," Military Attache Report, Military Intelligence Division, War Department (Washington, DC, December 11, 1944),



Figure 6: Force Disposition in Myitkyina, May to July 1944. Map adapted from Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1956), 231.

Despite these enormous challenges, Stilwell continuously demanded the 5307th Composite complete nearly impossible tasks in the Myitkyina operation, employing them simultaneously in reconnaissance and offensive maneuver. For Stilwell, they were the only unit

World War II Operations Documents, Archives and Special Collections, Combined Arms Research Library (hereafter CARL), Fort Leavenworth, KS, accessed September 24, 2019, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/4819/rec/7; Hopkins, *Spearhead*, 617–621.

over which he maintained positive command and control. Of the nearly 3,000 soldiers with whom they began, the 5307th suffered over 1,000 casualties in three months, 501 of whom did not return to duty.[79] As the unit eventually secured the Myitkyina airfield on 17 May 1944, they surpassed acceptable casualty rates and could not continue to the next phase of the operation to control Myitkyina. Even with these gains, the Japanese still controlled the Burma Road and blocked ground lines of communication to China.[80] With the 5307th's diminishing capabilities and China unwilling to provide more units to support, Stilwell needed to find a way to restore combat power to continue the mission.

Assessment and Decision to Reconstitute

Following the seizure of the Myitkyina airfield in May 1944, the 5307th Composite, now commanded by COL Charles Hunter, took advantage of the monsoon season to preserve its diminishing combat power. Figure 7 illustrates the 5307th's task organization. Meanwhile at NCAC, LTG Stilwell received new guidance from GEN Marshall at the War Department to support an amphibious assault from Burma into the East Indies. Stilwell's forces were to control Myitkyina at all costs, then continue advancing to the Burma Road to defeat all remaining Japanese forces. This approach required a more multifunctional force that could conduct reconnaissance and combined arms maneuver to support unity of effort with SEAC. Yet, this also meant that Stilwell could not withdraw the 5307th from Myitkyina as he had planned.[81]

[79] This statistic is based on research by Joseph E.T. Hopkins and John M. Jones and does not include soldiers who suffered from illness in theater and returned to duty, infantry replacements, or attached engineers. Hopkins, *Spearhead*, 746–754.

[80] Ibid., 614–615.

[81] Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 200–203.



Figure 7: Task organization of the 5307th Composite Unit in May 1944. This does not include separate Chinese infantry battalions temporarily attached to the unit during various phases of the Myitkyina operation. Illustration by author, based on Troy Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away," *Veritas* 5, no. 4, (2009): 1-18, accessed October 30, 2019. https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/pdf/v5n4_over_the_hills.pdf

That same month, 2,600 replacement personnel arrived in Bombay, India to integrate with American forces in Burma. Known as "New Galahad," the replacements provided some relief to the 5307th Composite Unit. However, the flow of replacements into theater did not fully resolve the 5307th's ongoing strength issues. COL Hunter and his predecessor BG Merrill assessed that replacement personnel required much in-theater training and acclimation to the operational environment.[82] Additionally, the unit still lacked an approved table of organization and equipment that would have enabled them better resource allocation.[83] LTG Stilwell requested more units from the United States to reinforce and relieve the 5307th, but new units would not begin to arrive in the CBI theater until August 1944.[84] With these conditions, Stilwell faced a problem in which replacement and force flow systems could not fulfill operational requirements.

[82] Astor, *The Jungle War*, 276–283; Hopkins, *Spearhead*, 614–619.

[83] In a memorandum to LTG Stilwell, dated 25 May 1944, COL Charles Hunter summarized the 5307th Composite Unit's poor morale, which he identified was due to Stilwell's mistreatment of the unit. This included lack of sustainment and denial of awards and promotions. Hunter, *Galahad*, 192–193.

[84] Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 89–94.

As a solution, on 25 May 1944 the War Department authorized the constitution of the 475th Infantry Regiment. The instructions stipulated that the 5307th Composite would use existing personnel to man the new regiment.[85] The new orders gave the unit benefits of regimental affiliation, basis of allocation for supply, and award recognition, all of which were essential items that COL Hunter consistently requested for the 5307th but never received. However, to staff the regiment Stilwell would have to salvage the remaining 5307th soldiers still fit for duty and employ them once again into combat.[86] These soldiers had very little time for rest and recuperation through the monsoon season while they continued encirclement operations.

By July 1944, American casualties in Burma reached 2,207 and Chinese casualties reached 4,156.[87] On 29 July, LTG Stilwell met with COL Hunter to discuss his decision to reorganize the 5307th. Stilwell told him, "I am going to organize a brigade, out of what is left of Old and New Galahad. We will organize the 475th Infantry Regiment. On the way and due in at Bombay shortly is the 124th Cavalry. I would like you to command the 475th...General [Thomas] Arms will be your brigade commander."[88] Originally, Stilwell had envisioned this organization to be a composite Chinese-American division. Given the urgency of operational objectives, Stilwell assessed that the best way to build combat power quickly was to integrate his available units into a multinational task force. He planned to organize the new task force with a complete brigade staff, which became the headquarters of the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional). Unlike the 5307th, the 5332nd would have enough capabilities to reconnoiter and maneuver autonomously.[89] Hunter,

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[85] R.S. Kessymu, "Memorandum to Commanding General, CBI Theater, Subject: Constitution and Activation of the 475th Infantry Regiment," US War Department, Washington, DC, May 25, 1944, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[86] Hunter, *Galahad*, 195–198.

[87] These figures include combined totals of dead and wounded. Latimer, *Burma*, 379.

[88] Hunter, *Galahad*, 206–207.

[89] Ralph E. Baird, "Narrative History of the 5332d Brigade (Provisional)," April 3, 1945, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD; Troy Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away: The MARS Task Force, the Ultimate Model for Long Range Penetration Warfare," *Veritas* 5, no. 4 (2009): 1-18, accessed October 30, 2019, https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v5n4_over_the_hills.pdf.

however, declined to command the 475th Infantry due to being beyond the physical and mental ability to continue. He recommended LTC William L. Osborne to command the regiment.[90] The 475th Infantry became one of three maneuver regiments that constituted the 5332nd Brigade. With BG Arms commanding, the brigade was codenamed the Mars Task Force.[91]

Additional units mobilized from the United States that provided unique capabilities to the task force. Given that the 5307th Composite was primarily infantry and lacked reconnaissance training, BG Merrill identified that they needed a cavalry unit.[92] The 124th Cavalry Regiment of the Texas National Guard fulfilled this requirement, having changed mission in April 1944 to mobilize for the CBI theater. While at Fort Riley, Kansas, the 124th Cavalry traded horses for mules, which were more suitable for jungle warfare, concluding its position as the last horse-mounted cavalry regiment in the US Army.[93] Although the regiment's cavalrymen would operate as light infantry in Burma, they retained their table of organization as squadrons.[94] The most valuable capabilities that the 124th Cavalry provided to the Mars Task Force were skilled reconnaissance and greater mobility.

For fire support, BG Merrill identified that the 5307th Composite required dedicated field artillery assets since their organic 60-millimeter mortar sections were insufficient. The British 14th Army lacked artillery to assist the Americans, and the CEF Y Force artillery was unreliable.[95] To fill this void, the War Department mobilized the 612th and 613th Field Artillery

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[90] Hunter, *Galahad*, 205–206.

[91] Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away," 3.

[92] Franklin D Merrill, "Remarks by Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill during a Conference Held at AGF HQ," AGF HQ, September 20, 1944, Documents Collection, Maneuver Center of Excellence Headquarters (MCoE HQ) Donovan Research Library, Fort Benning, GA, accessed October 30, 2019, https://mcoepublic.blob.core.usgovcloudapi.net/library/Documents/Hardcopy/paper/D787.2_M55.pdf.

[93] Baird, "Narrative History of the 5332d Brigade (Provisional)"; Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away," 3.

[94] John Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma* (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1946), 39.

[95] John M. Jones, "Notes on Merrill's Expedition, 1944," New Delhi, September 27, 1944, Report No. 8623, World War II Operations, Archives and Special Collections, CARL, Fort Leavenworth, KS, accessed September 24, 2019,

Battalions. These battalions mobilized from Camp Carson, Colorado in July 1944 and staged in Bombay, India from October to November 1944. Like the 124th, the 612th and 613th Field Artillery Battalions provided mobility using pack mules to transport 75mm cannons. Both battalions detached their batteries to support each battalion and squadron from the 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry, respectively.[96] The Mars Task Force welcomed the increased mobility and logistics capabilities of the pack mule convoys to transport weapons, ammunition, and rations.

Finally, to round out the formation NCAC attached the 1st Chinese Infantry Regiment (Separate) for the next phase to control the Burma Road. Originally organized as a mortar regiment, LTG Stilwell converted them to light infantry. However, the 1st Chinese Regiment remained in reserve under NCAC's control for the entire operation; the Mars Task Force retained no operational or tactical control to employ them at any point.[97] While the reasons behind this arrangement with NCAC are not completely known, LTG Stilwell's papers indicate that the task organization of the regiment occurred during one of the multiple times in which he and Chiang Kai-Shek disagreed over CEF command authority.[98] Given Chiang's caveats, Stilwell's decision to keep the 1st Chinese Infantry Regiment in reserve was likely a means to compromise while keeping additional combat power close to NCAC headquarters.

Had NCAC actively committed the 1st Chinese Regiment, the Mars Task Force would have had three complete regiments to operate as a light division. BG John Willey, who commanded the task force in October 1944, remarked about his experience as a liaison officer with the 1st Chinese Regiment as part of the Chinese 14th Division:

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http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/4607/rec/1.

[96] Baird, "Narrative History of the 5332d Brigade (Provisional)"; Charles J. Stormont, "The 612th Field Artillery Battalion (PK)," Memoir, Mountain Artillery Association, Ellsville, Missouri, 1945, 202-612FA, Archives and Special Collections, CARL, Fort Leavenworth, KS; Headquarters, 613th Field Artillery Battalion, "Unit History," Memorandum, February 9, 1945, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[97] Baird, "Narrative History of the 5332d Brigade (Provisional)."

[98] Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, ed. Theodore H. White (New York: William Sloan Associates, Inc., 1948), 329–333.

> I trained the First Chinese Independent Regiment, but never committed it to combat. In my opinion, this was one of the best Chinese units I have seen in the theater. I further believe this was proven in battle. While under me the unit's commander obeyed direct orders; this was not merely a case of the power of suggestion. There was never anything other than complementary remarks that could be said of this commander, Colonel Lin now General Lin.[99]

Willey's positive experience training with the 14th Chinese Division and the 1st Chinese Regiment displays a quality of mutual confidence that developed among the CEF and its American advisor groups. NCAC's constraint on employing the 1st Chinese Regiment reveals a missed opportunity for the brigade to operate as a coherent American-Chinese task force.

Despite this, the Mars Task Force was able to integrate other enabling elements in theater. Office of Strategic Services Detachment 101 (OSS Det. 101), which had assisted 5307th with intelligence and reconnaissance, recruited and trained several Kachin guerrilla fighters and organized them into Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R) platoons. The 475th and the 124th each received three of the I&R platoons.[100] NCAC provided the task force with Japanese language and interrogation teams, as well as the 7th Chinese Animal Transport Company. Other enablers included several quartermaster pack troops, military working dog detachments, the 18th Veterinary Evacuation Hospital, and the 44th and 49th Surgical Hospitals.[101] With these new elements, illustrated in Figure 8, the Mars Task Force became a multinational force.

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[99] John P. Willey, "Notes on Liaison Duty with Chinese Army in India," Memorandum (Camp Landis, Burma, April 20, 1945), Memorandum, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[100] Sacquety, *The OSS in Burma*, 173–177.

[101] William Osborne, "History of the 475th Infantry," Operations Report, July 22, 1946, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD; Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma*, 34–39.



Figure 8: Task organization chart of the Mars Task Force in December 1944. Illustration created by author, based on Troy Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away," *Veritas* 5, no. 4 (2009): 1-18, accessed October 30, 2019, https://www.soc.mil/ARSOF_History/articles/v5n4_over_the_hills.pdf

Reconstituting the 5307th Composite Unit as the Mars Task Force

By August 1944, conditions in Burma had improved to the Allies' advantage as Stilwell employed his new forces to support SEAC's Operation Capital. With control of the airfield and the village of Myitkyina, NCAC now had a better foothold for basing operations and aerial resupply. The replacement pipeline from India to Burma sustained manpower, and the Tenth USAAF was able to fly replacement soldiers directly into Myitkyina. Plus, having this base of operations enabled NCAC and Tenth USAAF to also emplace more combat field hospital elements, deliver and receive more supplies, and evacuate several casualties sustained from the

5307th.[102] NCAC also had operational control of five Chinese divisions who patrolled around the southeast area of the Salween River. Finally, the British 36th Infantry Division rounded out NCAC's task organization, patrolling along railways southwest from Myitkyina.[103]

Twelve miles north of Myitkyina, Camp Landis was the main base of operations for the Mars Task Force. Built in August 1944 by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 5307th Composite, the camp became the focal point for sustainment, training, and command and control elements.[104] Ground transportation was an ongoing issue given the dense jungle environment with very few supply routes. Although the Ledo Road enabled ground resupply to Myitkyina, access to Camp Landis remained secluded with only one unimproved surface road leading to the camp. To mitigate this, the Tenth USAAF dismantled and delivered vehicle components for reassembly at Myitkyina airfield to transport supplies to Camp Landis. Additionally, local Kachin villagers assisted to salvage additional vehicle parts, ammunition, and other supplies from the surrounding areas.[105] These combined elements helped to extend operational reach of sustainment to the Mars Task Force.

While personnel and supplies arrived, the Mars Task Force prioritized training its new units at Camp Landis for jungle warfare. The 5307th veterans passed on many valuable tactics, techniques, and procedures that included individual packing lists, intelligence, reconnaissance, and protection methods.[106] NCAC consolidated these experiences and divided unit training across two locations. At the American training center in Ramgarh, India, incoming personnel received

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[102] Sacquety, "Over the Hills and Far Away," 7-10.

[103] US War Department, Historical Division Special Staff, "History of India Burma Theater, Volume 1," December 6, 1945, File No. 8-6 IB, World War II Operations Documents, Archives and Special Collections, CARL, Fort Leavenworth, KS, accessed September 24, 2019, http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll8/id/4701/rec/1.

[104] T.J. Dalton, "A Conscise Report of Unit Personnel Section, 475th Infantry," November 16, 1944, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[105] Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma*, 41–43.

[106] Jones, "Notes on Merrill's Expedition, 1944."

rations, orientated to the CBI theater, and trained on individual tasks such as map-reading. After completing onward movement to Camp Landis, individual training continued, including mule handling and weapons familiarization.[107] John Randolph of the 124th Cavalry mentioned that many cavalrymen and artillerymen had to orient themselves with new weapons such as flame throwers, rocket launchers and mortars. Randolph described, "crews were hurriedly and with some degree of thoroughness trained in their use and everyone was familiarized with them."[108] For collective training at Camp Landis, battalions trained on ambushes, road blocks, road marches, river crossings, and aerial resupply. By early November 1944, the Mars Task Force had trained its units to a proficient level for conducting long-range penetration missions as a coherent unit.[109]

As with the 5307th, integrated liaisons helped synchronize the Mars Task Force's operations with adjacent multinational units. COL William Peers of OSS Det. 101 provided semi-permanent liaison officers who embedded with the task force headquarters, the 475th Infantry, and the 124th Cavalry. Additionally, the attached US-Kachin I&R platoons enabled 124th Cavalry and the 475th Infantry to better coordinate intelligence and reconnaissance collection.[110] Other OSS Det. 101 liaison officers embedded with American advisor groups several CEF divisions. Like their counterparts in the Mars Task Force, the division liaisons conducted multiple activities such as translating correspondence, training soldiers and leaders, and providing readiness assessments to the chain of command.[111]

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[107] Richard Bates, "Transcript of an Oral History Interview with Richard Bates, Merrill's Marauders, Burma, WWII," interview by Mark van Ells, 1995, Wisconsin Veterans Museum Research Center, accessed October 30, 2019, https://wisvetsmuseum.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Bates-Richard-_OH41.pdf.

[108] Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma*, 44.

[109] Headquarters, 475th Infantry Regiment, "Synopsis of Training of 475th Infantry From 10 August Through 15 Nov," Field Report, 1944, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[110] Sacquety, *The OSS in Burma*, 146–147.

[111] Albert C. Wedemeyer, "Letter of Instruction to All US Officers Serving with the Chinese Combat Command," United States Forces China Theater, February 18, 1945, World War II Operations

Communication among the liaison network was a constant challenge over the dense jungles and high elevation. Although the US and Chinese units achieved some interoperability through American-made portable radios, geographic obstacles and severe weather often obstructed signals from these systems. To overcome these challenges, headquarters elements often relayed handwritten correspondence using pack mules and carrier pigeons traveling to "liaison strips." These were makeshift landing zones that served a dual purpose as rendezvous points for air liaison detachments, as well as retransmission sites.[112] Through anticipation, responsiveness, and field-expedient improvisation, the Mars Task Force achieved shared understanding and cohesion.

Finally, reinstating a chain of command was one of the most difficult reconstitution tasks for the Mars Task Force. At the tactical level, the chain of command suffered from illness, disease, and injury as much as the soldiers did. In October 1944, BG Arms was injured in a jeep accident and subsequently replaced by BG Willey, who commanded the task force until its change of mission in March 1945.[113] That same month, LTC Osborne of the 475th Infantry was evacuated from theater for illness and replaced by COL Earnest F. Easterbrook. Also, the 124th Cavalry, 612th Field Artillery, and 613th Field Artillery went through several changes of command, most of these occurring due to medical injuries and illness from the Burma jungle.[114] As with many units before them, the constant turnover of the chain of command frustrated tactical leaders. However, two factors ensured that amidst the constant transitions the Mars Task Force continued integrating, training, and continuing their mission. One of these factors was the compilation of experiences passed on by the 5307th. The other was a consistent quality of

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Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[112] Baird, "Narrative History of the 5332d Brigade (Provisional)," 3–4; Pan Yu-Kun, "Battle Order No. A-12, 50th Division," Memorandum, December 30, 1944, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

[113] Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 95.

[114] Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma*, 43–44.

resilience displayed by the soldiers of the task force.[115] While command turnover was a problem, the Mars Task Force still maintained continuity through these intangible qualities.

Operationally, the Allied command structure of NCAC, SEAC, and the Chinese High Command went through a significant but necessary change to improve command and control. Following months of disputes between LTG Stilwell and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, Stilwell insisted for President Roosevelt and GEN Marshall to request that Chiang appoint him commander in chief of the CEF.[116] Although Chiang eventually agreed in September 1944 to give Stilwell command authority, Chiang still disagreed with employing forces in northern Burma. After a series of failed negotiations and soured relations, Chiang requested that Roosevelt recall Stilwell from the CBI theater. Roosevelt agreed to relieve Stilwell in late October 1944, and the War Department split the CBI theater area of responsibility between two commands. LTG Albert Wedemeyer assumed command of the China Theater and LTG Daniel Sultan, NCAC deputy commanding general, assumed command of NCAC and the new India-Burma theater.[117] This reorganization finally resolved many of the operational command and control problems experienced during the Myitkyina operation, albeit at the dismay of LTG Stilwell, and the Mars Task Force now had unity of command with NCAC.

Aftermath and Evaluation

In December 1944, the last elements of the 613th Field Artillery Battalion integrated into the Mars Task Force. The task force had completed its reconstitution and operated as a coherent division-sized unit under BG Willey's command. Together with the British and Chinese divisions under NCAC's operational control, the task force built upon the gains of the 5307th Composite

[115] Jones, "Notes on Merrill's Expedition, 1944."

[116] The War Department temporarily appointed Stilwell as a four-star general, given his responsibilities over all US forces and Chinese Expeditionary Forces in the CBI theater. Stilwell perceived that his temporary rank disrupted his relations with Mountbatten. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 301–314.

[117] Mountbatten, *Personal Diary of Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten*, 147–148; Mitter, *Forgotten Ally,* 337–344; Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 5–6.

Unit and pursued the retreating Japanese forces from Myitkyina to Tonkwa and Nampakka. With organic pack field artillery and close air support from the Tenth USAAF, the task force conducted synchronized long-range reconnaissance and combined arms maneuver through the Alluvial Valley, illustrated in Figure 9. By February 1945, field reports indicated that morale and readiness were high as the Mars Task Force secured elevated positions overlooking the Burma Road. This enabled the British and Chinese divisions to successfully envelop the remaining Japanese troops and secure the northern portion of the road.[118] Finally, the Mars Task Force had attained one of the key operational objectives of the Burma Campaign: reopening land lines of communication to China.



Figure 9: Mars Task Force disposition on 19 January 1945. Adapted from Charles Romanus and Riley Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI* (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1959), 191.

[118] Baird, "Narrative History of the 5332d Brigade (Provisional)"; Lamar W. Taylor, "Patrol Report 475th Infantry Regiment," Field Report, Nawhkam, Burma, February 11, 1945, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD.

In many ways, the Mars Task Force integrated critical capabilities that the 5307th Composite Unit did not have. The American units that arrived in theater brought mounted cavalry and pack artillery capabilities, allowing the task force to autonomously conduct deep reconnaissance and transition to combined arms maneuver. Concurrently, the Kachin I&R platoons provided additional intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities to the task force. OSS Det. 101's efforts to recruit and train these indigenous guerrillas are reflected in modern day special operations forces "by, with, and through" activities.[119] Finally, the attached medical and quartermaster pack units provided organic sustainment that traveled with each regiment. While the Mars Task Force has many strong capabilities, the inability to command and control the 1st Chinese Regiment restricted much of its combat power potential. It appears that friction at the operational level, mostly between Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek, prevented these opportunities from taking place. The convoluted Allied command structure also did not help for efficient decision making or command and control, although cohesion improved when NCAC realigned to the India-Burma theater. Despite these efforts, throughout the campaign Chiang sought to divert Chinese combat power away from Burma, leaving Stilwell with limited options for reconstitution.

Several accounts of the Burma Campaign tend to blame Stilwell's harsh personality for the breakdown of mutual confidence among the Allied command group.[120] However, LTG Stilwell's memoirs indicate that although he had a disdain for Chiang Kai-Shek, his rapport with the Chinese tactical units was much stronger. He mentioned that he highly respected the Chinese soldiers, regardless of their Nationalist or Communist affiliation, and he viewed Chiang Kai-Shek as the variable standing in the way of a unified China.[121] Conversely, ADM Mountbatten and

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[119] Morgan Kaplan, "Thinking Critically About 'By, With, Through' in Syria, Iraq, and Beyond," *Lawfare*, last modified January 20, 2019, accessed February 4, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/thinking-critically-about-through-syria-iraq-and-beyond.

[120] Michael Gabbett, *The Bastards of Burma: Merrill's Maurauders [sic] and The Mars Task Force* (Albuquerque: Desert Dreams, 1989), 135.

[121] Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers*, 316-321.

GEN Slim both respected Stilwell's enthusiastic leadership as he led the Chinese units. Slim particularly admired Stilwell's successful reconstitution of the 22nd and 38th Chinese Divisions in 1943.[122] On the other hand, Chiang developed a deep contempt for Stilwell, Mountbatten, and SEAC, as he perceived the American and British as threats conspiring with Mao Zadong of the Chinese Communist Party to overthrow him. Politically, Chiang rejected the idea of Stilwell as commander in chief of the CEF as he viewed it as an infringement of Chinese nationalist sovereignty, as well as an opportunity for the Mao to exploit the Chinese Army's resources.[123] Thus, NCAC could only exercise limited tactical control over the CEF divisions in Burma. After LTG Wedemeyer took command of the China theater, as a compromise the American mission shifted from building Chinese military readiness to simply providing general assistance.[124]

Tactically, the Mars Task Force sustained only a satisfactory quality mutual confidence with partner nation forces during its reconstitution. The rapport with the Kachin I&R platoons was the most significant in terms of restoring combat power and enhancing capabilities. Richard Hale of the 475th Infantry mentioned that the Kachins "were our guides, our advance scouts, and they provided flank security in the jungles and mountains far beyond what it would have been possible for us to do."[125] Similarly, local Kachin villagers also built rapport through their sustainment of the task force at Camp Landis. Michael Gabbett described that for the Kachin populace, the presence of American troops was a welcomed relief compared to the sinister Japanese Army.[126] On the other hand, mutual confidence between the Americans and the Chinese

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[122] Jonathan T. Ritter, *Stilwell and Mountbatten in Burma: Allies at War, 1943-1944* (Denton: University of North Texas Press, 2017), 131–140; Slim, *Defeat Into Victory*, 143–144; Mountbatten, *Personal Diary of Admiral The Lord Louis Mountbatten*, 36–38.

[123] Mitter, *Forgotten Ally*, 325–344.

[124] Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 6–16.

[125] Richard Hale, "The Mars Task Force in Burma: A Personal Memoir," *George William Haupin & The Mars Task Force Dedication Site*, last modified 1994, accessed October 30, 2019, http://www.haupinmarsman.com/accounts-of-other-marsmen/captain-richard-hale.html; Bates, "Transcript of an Oral History Interview with Richard Bates, Merrill's Marauders, Burma, WWII."

[126] Gabbett, *The Bastards of Burma*, 136–137.

troops was lackluster. John Randolph and W.B. Woodruff of the 124th Cavalry described how the Americans developed a scornful attitude towards the 1st Chinese Regiment. Although they rarely interacted directly with them, the Americans viewed the Chinese soldiers as aggressive and entitled yet unable to withstand combat engagements.[127] There were some exceptional cases, such as with the First Provisional Chinese American Tank Group. However, the soldiers of the Mars Task Force mostly operated adjacent to the CEF but did not fully integrate with them.[128]

In summary, the reconstitution of the 5307th Composite Unit into the Mars Task Force depended on reorganizing American units and attaching host nation enabling elements. Time-sensitive objectives combined with severe resource constraints contributed to LTG Stilwell's assessment and decision to reconstitute. He did not oppose multinational integration in his approach. However, the loss of mutual confidence among the Allied commanders limited Stilwell's access to partner nation conventional forces, forcing him to use American units to reconstitute the 5307th.[129] Despite these conditions the Mars Task Force was able to restore combat power and operate cohesively under NCAC's multinational command structure. Leveraging the experiences from the 5307th Composite and integrating OSS Det. 101 liaisons with Kachin I&R platoons, the task force was able to achieve interoperability with its partners. Overall, the Mars Task Force demonstrated high qualities of flexibility, rapport, and resilience throughout its operations in Burma. Their efforts contributed to many of the principles and techniques in current US Army reconstitution and multinational operations doctrine.

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[127] Randolph, *Marsmen in Burma*, 81–83; W.B. Woodruff, "Letter to George Haupin, Subject: Burma Maps, Roads, Etc.," Transcribed Letter, April 24, 2012, accessed October 29, 2019, http://www.haupinmarsman.com/accounts-of-other-marsmen/wb-woody-woodruff-2.html.

[128] James J. Deputy, "Memorandum to Commanding General, Headquarters, CCC, Subject: Historical Data," Headquarters, United States Forces China Theater, June 2, 1945, World War II Operations Reports 1941-1948, Entry 427, Record Group 407, NARA II, College Park, MD; Hale, "The Mars Task Force in Burma."

[129] Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 89–91.

Analysis

Reconstitution in multinational operations is a complex effort involving close cooperation between the US Army and partner nation forces amidst dynamic conditions. These operations require leaders of all contributing nations to be adaptive and flexible. In the case of the 93rd Division and the French Army during the First World War, the US Army contributed its forces to a partner nation's military, thereby integrating capabilities and directly assisting French reconstitution operations. American units used French-provided supplies and equipment, integrated American doctrine and British communications technology, and served under full operational control of the French chain of command. The resulting organizations were multinational infantry divisions that were interoperable across the entire coalition. However, during the Second World War the 5307th Composite Unit reconstituting as the Mars Task Force demonstrated how enabling elements from partner nation forces integrated into a US Army task force. Together with the Kachin I&R platoons and Chinese supply companies, this division-sized multinational task force maintained continuity of operations until SEAC achieved its objectives.

Both cases demonstrated how to employ many of the reconstitution activities outlined in current US Army doctrine.[130] The decisions to reconstitute followed tactical defeats in which friendly forces incurred heavy casualties and lost capability to continue operations due to Russia's separate peace and the Lundendorff offensive in March 1918. They therefore requested the AEF to integrate capabilities for reconstituting coalition land forces. Similarly, in the Second World War the 5307th Composite suffered very high casualties and could not advance to the Burma Road. Tactical commanders collaborated with operational commanders to assess relative combat power. They then jointly determined that theater sustainment systems were not enough to restore combat power each of the degraded units. Given the unfamiliarity with their operational

[130] US Army, ADP 4-0, 3–13; US Army, FM 4-0, Appendix C; US Army, *Corps and Division Planners Guide to Reconstitution Operations*, 1–7.

environments, operational commanders directed elements already in theater to train and equip incoming replacements and units. The French Army trained and sustained the Americans through both tactical and institutional systems. Similarly, NCAC coordinated training sites in India and Burma to develop individual and collective training proficiency, better integrating the partner nation capabilities into the Mars Task Force. These activities strengthened cohesion, thus fulfilling reconstitution efforts to restore unit readiness.

Additionally, improvised liaison networks were essential to coordinating command and control in both cases. As JP 3-16 outlines, liaisons enable doctrinal and organizational integration, as well as overcome linguistic and cultural barriers among multinational force commanders and staffs.[131] In both cases, liaisons translated and corresponded among all partner nation headquarters elements, helping to expand knowledge, rapport, and confidence among commanders. In France, American and French forces initially collaborated through basic competency in each other's languages and built upon this knowledge to broaden cultural understanding. In the CBI theater, OSS Det. 101 was instrumental in recruiting, training, and integrating Kachin guerrillas to provide reconnaissance, sustainment, and linguistic assistance to the Mars Task Force. As evidenced by these efforts, both cases demonstrated how commanders transcended obstacles, achieved interoperability, and integrated reconstitution efforts.

Regarding the major differences between the two cases, mutual confidence among operational and tactical level leaders emerged as a significant factor affecting the approaches that US Army and partner nation forces took to integrate reconstitution efforts. Personalities played a part, but what appeared to drive the differences in cooperation the most was the perception of the threat by US Army and partner nation force commanders. Reflecting on Weitsman's concept of alliance cohesion, although states might initially form alliances to balance power against common threats, they must also compromise on aims, loyalties, and national values to sustain internal

[131] US Joint Staff, JP 3-16 (2019), II-9–II-17.

cohesion.[132] These kinds of compromises resemble the principles of what Eisenhower eventually referred to as mutual confidence, which influences multinational forces' willingness to integrate capabilities and conduct operations.[133] The First World War displayed how operational objectives converged onto a mutually shared threat, laying the foundation for better cooperation and integration. However, in the Second World War objectives diverged among areas of operations, and disagreement over this divergence tarnished multinational force cohesion in the CBI theater. Variations in cohesion correlated with mutual confidence among commanders, which affected each partner nation's willingness to compromise over interests and commit forces to reconstitution.

In the First World War, the perceived threat to the Alliance was clearly a stronger German army operationalized through the Ludendorff offensive. GEN Pershing and Marshal Foch achieved shared understanding of this threat and jointly oriented their priorities and resources, collaborating to build Allied combat power against the Germans.[134] While initially apprehensive, Pershing's perception of amalgamation changed through frequent meetings with French and British leaders, and he developed enough confidence to accept more risk and entrust the 93rd Division to the French Army.[135] Once integrated, the American and French forces shared mutual respect based on each other's combined capabilities, morale, and resilience. The American regiments sought to prove their purpose as infantry units in combat, and the French units sought to reclaim sovereignty over German-occupied territory. French commanders including GEN Goybet and COL Quillet developed even stronger respect for the American soldiers as these commanders observed their combat abilities.[136] Operational and tactical-level

[132] Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances*, 24–27, 153-163.

[133] Eisenhower, "Problems of Combined Command."

[134] Foch, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*, 347–355; Mosier, *The Myth of the Great War*, 309–314.

[135] Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War*, vol. I: 290–294; Foch, *The Memoirs of Marshal Foch*, 267–270.

[136] Scott, *Scott's Official History of the American Negro in the World War*, 275–281.

leaders effectively achieved a strong quality of mutual confidence, and this enabled the French and Americans to execute a more integrated approach to reconstitution.

In contrast to the First World War, the threat perceptions in the Second World War differed among the three Allied partners. Although all three partners recognized the common threat of the Imperial Japanese Army, their approaches diverged based on national interests and strategic aims. While LTG Stilwell focused on controlling the Burma Road, US strategic aims shifted priorities to the Pacific theater. Concurrently, Chiang reoriented his priorities towards eastern China, and Mountbatten retained much of the 14th Army in south-central Burma.[137] These differences in threat perception among coalition commanders influenced their assessments and decisions to diverge available combat power. Furthermore, the commanders' disagreement over this divergence influenced the breakdown of cohesion among the Allied command group, creating perceptions of mistrust, internal threats, and loss of mutual confidence. Stilwell and Chiang's mutual distrust was strong, as neither of them could compromise over force employment in Burma, culminating with Mountbatten eventually supporting Stillwell's removal.[138] Internal threats among Allies thus emerged, which in turn disintegrated attempts to achieve mutual confidence and cohesive command and control. Despite these tensions at the operational level, the Mars Task Force was able to build better mutual confidence with partner nation forces. By integrating resources in theater, the task force was able to reconstitute the 5307th while it cooperated with Kachin guerrillas and OSS Det. 101 liaisons, all of whom helped to restore combat power. However, due to disputes over command authority of the 1st Chinese Regiment, LTG Stilwell never completely fulfilled his intent of creating a Chinese-American composite division.[139]

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[137] Romanus and Sunderland, *Stilwell's Command Problems*, 362–367, 374-384; Romanus and Sunderland., *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 4–11.

[138] Mitter, *Forgotten Ally*, 325–333; Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 280–282.

[139] Romanus and Sunderland, *Time Runs Out in CBI*, 89–91.

Recommendations

JP 3-16 states that the US joint force must prepare for future operations as part of a multinational force for the foreseeable future. The United States has several enduring bilateral and multilateral partnerships with allies around the world. US joint military forces are an essential component of the Northern Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), with long-term commitment to training, resourcing, and leadership for allied headquarters and task forces. Within NATO, the concept of collective security among alliance members includes goals for interoperability and sustainment of all member forces. In every Geographic Combatant Command, the United States sustains bilateral relations with several partner nations though security cooperation activities. Ongoing security force assistance in the Middle East and Central Asia involve US military forces operating as part of coalitions, many of which feature lead nation and integrated command structures. These partnerships support US national interests of mobilizing and globally employing the military instrument of national power.[140]

With this strategic context, the *Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future* emphasizes through its "Who We Are" line of effort that Army forces are interdependent with allies and partners. In order to conduct unified land operations, the US Army must seek opportunities to organize and integrate concepts and capabilities with allies and partners through multinational cooperation. Army forces must prepare to engage regionally and respond globally to attain security objectives that are in the interests of the United States and its allies and partners.[141] In large scale combat operations, commanders could direct these efforts through unity

[140] Eliot A. Cohen, *The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power & The Necessity of Military Force* (New York: Basic Books, 2016), 211–214; Yasmine Farouk, "The Middle East Strategic Alliance Has a Long Way to Go," Commentary, Carnegie Middle East Center (February 2019), accessed January 6, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/2-8_Farouk_MESA.pdf; US Joint Staff, JP 3-16 (2019), I-2–II-7.

[141] US Department of the Army, *Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 1–8; US Department of the Army, US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 16–20.

of command within a multinational force or unity of effort alongside partners. These forces must also prepare to accept the possible risk of heavy casualties and integrate available resources to reconstitute tactical units.[142] To complement this, the experiences harvested from the case studies above demonstrate ways in which commanders integrated reconstitution efforts in multinational operations.

Current US Army and joint doctrine recognizes many of the principles harvested from these historical experiences. However, separate doctrinal publications on these concepts only provides general guidelines for planning considerations. As the Center for Army Lessons Learned identifies, Department of the Army policy has yet to update personnel and supply replacement systems to efficiently sustain reconstitution of US Army forces for large scale combat operations.[143] This gap between doctrine and policy indicates that reconstitution might not be possible to execute quickly using current Department of the Army resources alone. Commanders and staffs must therefore coherently understand and practice the concepts of reconstitution in cooperation with partner nation forces, preparing their units to integrate capabilities for unified land operations.

Additionally, commanders and staffs will have to employ these principles in even more challenging environments. The operational environments illustrated in the First and Second World Wars could represent similar circumstances of future operations in which US Army forces will integrate with several partner nations over multiple geographic areas. However, in contrast to these cases the current strategic environment is even more dynamic, challenged by evolving threats in the arena of information warfare. Revisionist powers, rogue state, and insurgent forces now employ even more sophisticated combinations of information related capabilities, many of which aim to influence the decisions of US and partner nation forces. By shaping narratives that

[142] US Army, ADP 4-0, 2-1, 2-18–2-20, 3-13.

[143] US Army, *Corps and Division Planners Guide to Reconstitution Operations,* vii-viii.

affect cognitive perceptions of national interests and values, these threats could potentially degrade US Army forces' abilities to build cohesion, shared understanding, and mutual confidence with partner nations, which will in effect worsen efforts to conduct multinational operations. As the evidence demonstrates, internal threats can negatively affect cohesion and capabilities integration, and therefore the duty for commanders and staffs to mitigate these threats becomes even more significant.

This monograph offers three recommendations to commanders and staffs to better prepare US Army forces for the possibility of conducting integrated reconstitution in the framework of multinational operations. First, US Army forces must work towards establishing strong relationships with current and emerging partner nation forces. The basis of building these relationships comes from the tenets of multinational operations. The United States' participation in the Multinational Strategy and Operations Group, NATO standardization agreements, and similar forums are opportunities for strategic and operational leaders to maintain rapport, create shared understanding of capabilities, and align actions towards common goals.[144] Additionally, US Army and partner nation forces continue to participate in several security cooperation activities, including the state partnership program, military-to-military engagements, annual multinational exercises. With the introduction of the Security Force Assistance Brigades, current US Army force structure enables many leaders to regularly engage with partner nation counterparts and establish pathways towards mutual confidence.[145] Efforts to build partner capacity enhance other opportunities to jointly create doctrine, training, and sustainment for

[144] Michelle L. Pryor et al., "The Multinational Interoperability Council: Enhancing Coalition Operations," *Joint Force Quarterly* 82 (July 2016): 112–117; Multinational Strategy and Operations Group, "MSOG Charter," 2018, accessed January 14, 2020, https://community.apan.org/wg/msog/m/admin_files/141706; US Department of the Army, *News from the Front: NATO Standardization Agreements (STANAG) for Commanders and Staff* (Fort Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2019), 1–10.

[145] James M. Dubik, "SFABs Are Great, But They Can't Build Nations," Association of the United States Army, last modified June 18, 2018, accessed January 14, 2020, https://www.ausa.org/articles/sfabs-are-great-they-can%E2%80%99t-build-nations.

partner nation forces. Above all, US Army leaders must align efforts with a whole-of-government approach to achieve mutual trust and confidence from the policy level to the tactical level.

Second, US Army and partner nation force commanders and staffs must jointly plan for in-theater reconstitution in the framework of multinational operations. As displayed in the case studies, conditions could emerge from dynamic operational environments in which standard US Army sustainment systems might prove insufficient to fully reconstitute units. In a multinational force, commanders and staffs of all contributing nations should plan to integrate their available combat power assets in order to fulfill reconstitution efforts. Having established mutual confidence among contributing nations will enable US Army and partner nation commanders to synchronize their assessments and decision-making cycles, orienting available combat power towards common objectives. Conversely, having cohesive multinational units that are interoperable creates the components that commanders and staffs can coordinate to employ immediate reorganization activities in conjunction with longer term regeneration efforts. These approaches must also emphasize training incoming personnel and units, as well as reinstating cohesive command and control. As discussed in FM 4-0, these activities might require commanders to organize a reconstitution task force.[146] In multinational operations, Security Force Assistance Brigades and other trainer/advisor groups could provide the necessary cadre to train American and partner nation land forces and if necessary, form a coherent chain of command to lead these formations.[147] Commanders must flexibly balance risk with opportunities, and with mutual trust and confidence partner nations will be more willing to integrate resources.

Finally, US Army and partner nation forces must rehearse integrated reconstitution operations to test interoperability and assess capability gaps. While standardization efforts will help to align equipment and doctrine, the evidence presented above demonstrates that evolving

[146] US Army, FM 4-0, Appendix C.

[147] US Department of the Army, Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-96.1, *Security Force Assistance Brigade* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 1-14–1-16.

threats might require commanders to deviate from standard tables of organization and equipment, leading them to reorganize available capabilities across multinational units. Along with hasty and deliberate reorganization activities, US and partner nation forces must rehearse regeneration of combat power as part of reception, staging, onward movement and integration activities.[148] Reconstitution task force cadre must exercise training and integration pipelines for arriving units in addition to casualty evacuation and recovery operations. Liaison networks must also integrate with commanders, staffs, and national support elements to overcome cultural barriers and coordinate the direction of reconstitution activities among the multinational force. By creating opportunities for units to rehearse these activities in multinational operations and exercises, commanders can more realistically assess integrated reconstitution operations with partner nation forces.

[148] US Army, FM 4-0, 3-1–3-4.

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