

# Seapower: Integrating Doctrine and Capabilities to Complement the Joint Force

A Monograph

by

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2020

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<b>REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE</b>			<i>Form Approved</i> <i>OMB No. 0704-0188</i>		
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<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 09-04-2020		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> SAMS Monograph		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> JUN 2019 – APR 2020	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b>  Seapower: Integrating Doctrine and Capabilities to Complement the Joint Force			<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>		
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b>  Maj Newman, Matthew			<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>		
			<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>		
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>  U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301			<b>8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER</b>		
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b>  Advanced Military Studies Program			<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>		
			<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>		
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> The US Navy and US Marine Corps desires unity of effort in maritime expeditions which complement the joint force, and history offers a lens to synthesize elements of effective or ineffective expeditionary operations. In one case, the strategic, operational, and tactical success of John Paul Jones during the Whitehaven expedition in 1778 represents doctrinal application of all contemporary elements of seapower. In another case, the Allied seizure of Sicily, Operation Husky in 1943 represents doctrinal dissonance among services eventually rectified through cooperation between the US Army and US Navy to support sea control and power projection. Finally, the British seizure of the Falkland Islands, Operation Corporate in 1982 represents doctrinal compatibility but capability gaps mitigated though coordinated efforts between the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force and Commander of the Landing Force. This study examines the relationship between doctrine, capabilities, and Multi-Domain Operations through the lens of seapower. The study uses a structured, focused comparison of the Whitehaven expedition, Operation Husky, and Operation Corporate. The questions focus on doctrinal alignment, command and support relationships, capability employment, and gaps and mitigation measures in domain superiority. The analysis demonstrates that doctrinal alignment is critical to the success of Multi-Domain Operations. Capability gaps can be mitigated to address shortfalls in domain superiority. All-domain superiority is not essential to the operational success of a campaign, though an operational artist accepts risk and fights from a position of disadvantage.					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Seapower, Joint Forcible Entry Operations, Power Projection, Sea Control, Maneuver warfare, Composite Warfare Command					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b> (U)	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b> (U)	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b> (U)	(U)	59	Maj Matthew Newman
					<b>19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b> 913-758-3300

## Monograph Approval Page

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Monograph Title: Seapower: Integrating Doctrine and Capabilities to Complement the Joint Force

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## Abstract

Seapower: Integrating Doctrine and Capabilities to Complement the Joint Force, by Maj Matthew M. Newman, US Marine Corps, 59 pages.

The US Navy and US Marine Corps desires unity of effort in maritime expeditions which complement the joint force, and history offers a lens to synthesize elements of effective or ineffective expeditionary operations. In one case, the strategic, operational, and tactical success of John Paul Jones during the Whitehaven expedition in 1778 represents doctrinal application of all contemporary elements of seapower. It demonstrated tenets of commerce raiding, coastal raiding, and fleet engagements culminating in decreased British domestic support for the war against the American Revolution. In another case, the Allied seizure of Sicily, Operation Husky in 1943 represents doctrinal dissonance among services eventually rectified through cooperation between the US Army and US Navy to support sea control and power projection. Finally, the British seizure of the Falkland Islands, Operation Corporate in 1982 represents doctrinal compatibility but capability gaps mitigated through coordinated efforts between the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force and Commander of the Landing Force.

This study examines the relationship between doctrine, capabilities, and Multi-Domain Operations through the lens of seapower. The study uses a structured, focused comparison of the Whitehaven expedition, Operation Husky, and Operation Corporate. The questions focus on doctrinal alignment, command and support relationships, capability employment, and gaps and mitigation measures in domain superiority.

The analysis demonstrates that doctrinal alignment is critical to the success of Multi-Domain Operations. Capability gaps can be mitigated to address shortfalls in domain superiority. All-domain superiority is not essential to the operational success of a campaign, though an operational artist accepts risk and fights from a position of disadvantage. The research is significant because it addresses the importance of nesting the US Navy doctrine of Composite Warfare Command with the US Marine Corps Operating Concept as the Marine Corps breaks the current Marine Air-Ground Task Force model in support of seapower.

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## Abbreviations

A2AD	Anti-Access/Area Denial
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
CAP	Combat Air Patrol
CATF	Commander Amphibious Task Force
CLF	Commander of the Landing Force
CMC	Commandant of the United States Marine Corps
CPG	Commandant's Planning Guidance
CSG	Carrier Strike Group
CTF	Carrier Task Force
CWC	Composite Warfare Command
EABO	Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations
EEZ	Economic Exclusion Zone
ESG	Expeditionary Strike Group
EXWC	Expeditionary Warfare Commander
FMF	Fleet Marine Force
GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
JFEO	Joint Forcible Entry Operations
JOE	Joint Operating Environment
JTF	Joint Task Force
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MDO	Multi-Domain Operations
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
OPCON	Operational Command

OTC	Officer in Tactical Command
SAS	Special Air Service
STWC	Strike Warfare Commander
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USN	United States Navy

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## Introduction

The world population is growing, and it is concentrating in the littorals. Approximately 95 percent of the global population is located within 600 miles of a coastline, with 80 percent of global trade conducted via sea.<sup>1</sup> The *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035*, published in 2016 addresses emerging regional powers competing across the air and maritime domains in contested territories.<sup>2</sup> As a nation with a global economy, the United States relies upon sea lines of communication to facilitate both benevolent endeavors like unrestricted international trade, and less egalitarian endeavors like military coercion to support national security objectives. The essential elements to the United States Navy's (USN) doctrine of seapower involve sea control and power projection which link domains to achieve national security objectives.

The USN recognized the requirement to project land power from the sea well before modern naval theory when it created the Continental Marine Corps in 1775. Historically, the United States Marine Corps (USMC) augmented USN vessels with shipboard detachments across a multitude of vessels on regular deployments.<sup>3</sup> Throughout the interwar period between World War I and World War II, the USMC became the principle proponent for amphibious operations, commencing with creating doctrine which facilitated maritime operations and localized the operating environment into the Pacific theater of operation.<sup>4</sup> This manifested into an organizational shift in 1933 when the USMC service schools diverted from the US Army curriculum and focused on the seizure of advanced bases in the Pacific.<sup>5</sup> History provides

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<sup>1</sup> Milan Vego, *Naval Classical Thinkers and Operational Art* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2009), 2.

<sup>2</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE) 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered World* (Norfolk, VA: Department of Navy, 2016), 7.

<sup>3</sup> Robert J. Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), 700.

<sup>4</sup> Alan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 72.

<sup>5</sup> Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*, 222.

examples of effective and ineffective employment of land forces in conjunction with maritime forces to support both sea control and power projection, though recent USMC operations remain primarily focused on power projection and maneuver warfare.<sup>6</sup>

Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986, the USN-USMC symbiotic relationship has diverged and jeopardizes the unity of effort between services.<sup>7</sup> The seminal doctrine of the USMC does not appreciate or recognize sea control, and the USN Composite Warfare Command (CWC) doctrine does not recognize the land force as a facilitator for sea control. Moreover, the USMC has consolidated Marine capabilities into Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs) or Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESGs) serving solely in the role of power projection. The USMC possesses an abundance of capabilities to contribute to the USN which has historically benefitted from maintaining a limited power projection capacity on a wide range of vessels.

This study asserts that if the USN and USMC doctrinally align concepts and reorganize capabilities across maritime platforms, then it will positively synchronize operations across multiple domains. The purpose is to demonstrate that land forces and maritime forces operating without unity of effort in doctrine and capabilities cannot synchronize operations across multiple domains. This study will analyze three distinct case studies, the Whitehaven expedition in 1778, the US invasion of Sicily in Operation Husky in 1943, and the British seizure of the Falklands in Operation Corporate in 1982.

The research provided in this study is significant for strategic and operational planners because global trends show an increasing emphasis in maritime activities. By 2035, 60 percent of the global population will live in cities, and 60 percent of cities will reside near the ocean.<sup>8</sup> Consequently, competitive regional powers will gain “new high-end, capital intensive

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<sup>6</sup> Department of the Navy, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 2019), 4.

<sup>7</sup> Department of the Navy, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, *38th Commandant's Planning Guidance*, 2.

<sup>8</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)*, 11.

capabilities,” to include anti-access/area denial (A2AD) capabilities to extend military reach and contest operations in the littorals.<sup>9</sup> The JOE 2035 describes adversarial tactics of “encroachment, erosion, and otherwise disregard for US sovereignty and the freedom of navigation of its citizens,” forcing the US to contend with regional powers through expeditionary operations.<sup>10</sup> The nature of future expeditionary operations places the onus to secure global trade on the USN, and into the purview of the USMC.

In July 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), General Berger, released the Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), to redesign the USMC for the future operating environment. The CPG redirected the USMC operating concept towards the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), placing Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs) under the operational control (OPCON) of Navy fleet commands as an element within USN CWC doctrine.<sup>11</sup> The Marines have not served in such a role since 1921.<sup>12</sup>

According to the CMC, the impetus behind the shift is a service acknowledgement that the USMC cannot fulfill its Title 10 obligations under the current ARG/MEU construct.<sup>13</sup> An emerging threat is recognized, the US can only currently maintain sea control in the South China Sea east of the Philippines and Japan along the second island chain.<sup>14</sup> Further, the Chinese navy has grown exponentially under Chinese President Xi Jinping’s lead, becoming larger than the US Navy in 2017.<sup>15</sup> This study will contribute to the body of seapower theory by demonstrating the

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<sup>9</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)*, 19.

<sup>10</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, *Joint Operating Environment (JOE)*, 25.

<sup>11</sup> Department of the Navy, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, *38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance*, 10.

<sup>12</sup> Moskin, *The U.S. Marine Corps Story*, 222.

<sup>13</sup> Department of the Navy, Headquarters, US Marine Corps, *38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance*, 3.

<sup>14</sup> Sam J. Tangredi, “Anti-Access Strategist in the Pacific: The United States and China,” *The US Army War College Quarterly Parameters*, no 1-2 (Spring-Summer 2019): 6.

<sup>15</sup> Steven L. Myers, “With Ships and Missiles, China is Ready to Challenge US Navy in Pacific,” *New York Times*, August 29, 2018.

importance of aligning doctrine and capabilities between maritime and amphibious forces and the gaps in MDO that emerge when there are incongruities between doctrine and capabilities.

This study involves five key terms: Composite Warfare Command (CWC), Multi-Domain Operations (MDO), Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO), power projection and sea control. Composite Warfare Command is the US Navy's service specific application of mission command in maritime operations. According to US Army doctrine, MDO involves actions taken across many domains and information environments, to gain freedom of action for other members of the joint force.<sup>16</sup> According to the joint publications, a JFEO is the act of seizing and holding lodgments in a contested environment to gain freedom of action.<sup>17</sup>

The USMC facilitates JFEO for the USN in the maritime domain. The USMC conducts expeditionary operations, power projection, and JFEO organized as a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). According to the USMC Operating Concept, MAGTFs operate in three echelons, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), and Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).<sup>18</sup> In planning during the 1920s and 1930s, the USMC recognized that, "expeditionary forces could not rely on guile for success but would require local superiority in every element of air, naval, and ground combat power."<sup>19</sup>

Power projection is an element of JFEO. The Navy Operating Concept describes JFEO as the ability to rapidly respond to a crisis, in austere locations, to deter or enhance regional

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<sup>16</sup> US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-19.

<sup>17</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, *Joint Forcible Entry Operations (JFEO)* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), viii.

<sup>18</sup> Currently, the Marine Corps employs three MEUs across the globe simultaneously, working for the Joint Maritime Component Commanders (JMCCs) for respective Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDRs). The MAGTF organization and employment through maneuver warfare is inherently multi-domain at a smaller tactical echelon than traditional land or maritime forces. See Headquarters, US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Marine Corps, 2001), 12-9.

<sup>19</sup> Millet and Murray, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 77.

stability.<sup>20</sup> According to joint doctrine, power projection is facilitated and sustained through sea control, local maritime superiority in vital sea areas which facilitates actions to destroy enemy maritime forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, and protect sea lines of communication.<sup>21</sup>

The study will use the theory of seapower as the framework to analyze the four cases. According to the USN, seapower is the synchronization of operational access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security operations.<sup>22</sup> Seapower theory is described in the USN service capstone strategy, *Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower*, a joint operating concept which describes how the USN, USMC and US Coast Guard will design, organize and employ to support the National Military Strategy. Air Land Battle doctrine does not often account for the maritime domain, but maritime theory accounts for the interdependence of land operations in conjunction with maritime operations and is therefore inherently multi-domain. Since this study is concerned with multiple domains, it will rely upon the maritime theory of seapower to analyze the four cases.

This study uses three hypothesis and a total of nine research questions to navigate the research for the historical case studies. The first hypothesis contends that changing both the USN and USMC doctrine to incorporate both sea control and power projection will enhance unity of effort. The second hypothesis contends that reorganizing and augmenting a greater number of USN vessels with USMC capabilities link power projection and sea control. The third hypothesis contends that if USN and USMC doctrine and capabilities reorganize, then it will enhance the joint forces ability to conduct MDO.

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<sup>20</sup> US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 60.

<sup>21</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1-0, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), 192.

<sup>22</sup> US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-32, *Joint Maritime Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2018), x.

This study is analyzed through the theoretical lens of seapower and does not interpret the historical cases through the tenets of land warfare. This study has two delimitations. First, it examines a variety of maritime operations, classical, contemporary, multinational, and foreign. Second, it looks outside contemporary USN and USMC operations, to both US Colonial and modern British military cases. Lastly, this study assumes that MDO, an evolving US Army theory, will remain the cornerstone of future joint force employment and replace the current concept of Full-Spectrum Superiority, defined in joint doctrine as superiority in the air, land, maritime, space, information, cyber, and electromagnetic spectrum.<sup>23</sup>

This monograph is organized into six sections. Section I is the introduction which includes background, problem statements, thesis and hypotheses, significance of the study, theoretical underpinning, limitations, delimitations, assumptions, and organization. Section II is a literature review. Section III is the methodology. Section IV constitutes three case studies. Section V discusses the findings and analysis. Finally, Section VI illustrates the contemporary utility of the analysis.

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<sup>23</sup> US Department of Defense, JP 1-0, 92.

## Literature Review

The literature review serves three purposes. First, it reviews some primary sources on the theory of seapower. Second, it reviews the concepts of CWC, MDO, JFEO, sea control and power projection. Third, it reviews post-modern theorists and contemporary debates about the doctrine, capabilities, and integration of maritime and amphibious forces. The theoretical divergence of seapower that emerge from the analysis of the current literature leads to doctrinal dissonance between the USN and USMC which contribute to capability gaps that impact synchronization of MDO. Consequently, the USN and USMC cannot optimally facilitate sea control or power projection.

The theory of seapower constitutes the theoretical framework for this study. According to USN doctrine, seapower is the synchronization of operational access, deterrence, sea control, power projection, and maritime security operations.<sup>24</sup> Seapower theory dates to two noteworthy authors, an American theorist, Alfred T. Mahan (1840-1914), and a British theorist, Julian S. Corbett (1854-1922). While the two were contemporaries, they gleaned contrasting views on the strategic purpose, operational employment, and resource requirements for seapower.

Mahan published two works: *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, and *The Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire* published in 1891. According to a modern maritime theorist, Milan Vego, Antoine Jomini heavily influenced Mahan work which places heavy emphasis on the scientific employment of fleets.<sup>25</sup> Mahan refers to the sea as a highway, with preferred routes, on which maritime powers contend to facilitate trade and national prosperity.<sup>26</sup> To gain and maintain sea power, Mahan emphasizes massing capital ships

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<sup>24</sup> US Department of Defense, JP 3-32, x.

<sup>25</sup> Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1666-1805* (Greenwich, CT: Bison Books Corporation, 1987), 6.

<sup>26</sup> Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power*, 30.

to decisively battle enemy fleets, and blockade ports to obtain command of the sea.<sup>27</sup> Mahan did not support maritime commerce raiding, and coastal defense, which consequently impacted the operational employment of naval forces ashore. Mahan's view perpetuated a separation between maritime and land operations which lasted for generations and is contradictory to his contemporary, Julian S. Corbett.<sup>28</sup>

Corbett published *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* in 1911, borrowing heavily from Carl von Clausewitz by defining the overall object of war to achieve a political aim.<sup>29</sup> Corbett contends that the object of naval war is to "secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it either directly or indirectly."<sup>30</sup> Corbett describes command of the sea as a temporary state, which can be obtained through a naval blockade or obtaining a decision, though it does not necessarily require a decisive battle. Further, Corbett argues that division or dispersal of the fleet allows commanders to act decisively as required, and "strategical" combinations exist that facilitate freedom of movement and flexibility. Corbett placed emphasis on the protection of commerce, particularly if the enemy fleet still exists.<sup>31</sup>

Mahan and Corbett differed on certain elements of naval theory. Both agreed that blockading and destruction of the enemy fleet guaranteed command of the sea, but Corbett explains the control of sea lines of communication is a temporary state.<sup>32</sup> The two differ widely on the interdependence and necessity for land-maritime integration, at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. Mahan argues that the concentration of naval assets, volume of ships, and decisive battle are paramount for fleet operations, whereas Corbett acknowledges that massing

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<sup>27</sup> Vego, *Naval Classical Thinkers*, 4.

<sup>28</sup> Vego, *Naval Classical Thinkers*, 4.

<sup>29</sup> Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1911), 17.

<sup>30</sup> Vego, *Naval Classical Thinkers*, 6.

<sup>31</sup> Vego, *Naval Classical Thinkers*, 8.

<sup>32</sup> Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 64, 91.



fleets limits flexibility, responsiveness and freedom of movement.<sup>33</sup> Finally, Mahan places no emphasis on protection of maritime commerce, while Corbett contend that the fleet's task is to guarantee protection and safe passage of friendly maritime commerce and thus preserve the "national life at sea in the same way that we check it on land by occupying his territory."<sup>34</sup> At first glance, the modern USN prefers to operate with the Mahanian model, separate Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) and Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). However, the current USN mission and operating concept reflects Corbett's theory; contemporary naval theorists further investigate this difference. Seapower is the theoretical framework for this research because it provides context for the doctrinal application maritime and amphibious forces in current operations and explains the root cause of a doctrinal division and capabilities gap.

Five concepts constitute the boundaries of this study, CWC, MDO, JFEO, sea control and power projection. According to the USN doctrine, CWC facilitates, "offensive and defensive combat operations against multiple targets and threats simultaneously," by warfare commanders or functional group commanders.<sup>35</sup> The impetus behind CWC was to integrate the multiple capabilities across many naval platforms by unifying function under defined commanders, not exclusively under a single ships' captain.

Maritime operations require a different employment methodology than land operations. One-star fleet commands can be responsible to multiple Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) simultaneously. Fleets must balance external requirements with internal constraints over

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<sup>33</sup> Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 133.

<sup>34</sup> Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 93.

<sup>35</sup> Command by negation is akin to mission command, executing one's mission operating on guidance in a decentralize manner with preplanned responses and predetermined delegation of authority. See US Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56, *Composite Warfare Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 1-15.

vast distances. Furthermore, the requirement to protect the force requires judicious disaggregation of fleet assets, and assumption of risk.<sup>36</sup>

CWC supports distributed fleet activities.<sup>37</sup> The concept enables the senior ranking officer, the Officer in Tactical Command (OTC), to designate a Composite Warfare Commander. The commander may designate subordinate warfare commanders, functional group commanders and coordinators to execute a range of activities which support synchronized maritime operations, reference Figure 1.




Figure 1. Composite Warfare Command Organization.  
 US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-32, *Joint Maritime Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2018), II-17.

<sup>36</sup> Composite Warfare Command (CWC) is the US Navy’s solution to this constant alteration of the command and support relationship, and persistent requirement for force protection. CW emerged in the 1970s, from a Navy effort to defend its aircraft carriers from Soviet threats. The Aircraft carriers retained the ability to conduct offensive operations at long ranges when CW in practice provided the stand-off and protection against anti-maritime threats from all domains. See Terry C. Pierce, “MAGTF Warlords: A Naval Perspective,” *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1991, 3.

<sup>37</sup> US Department of Defense, JP 3-32, II-14.

Composite Warfare Command operates with similar construct as land warfare. Fleets divide areas of operation in a similar manner as most ground forces but change the terminology in application, reference Figure 2.<sup>38</sup>




Figure 2. Composite Warfare Commander Areas and Integration with the Joint Operating Area. US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication 3-32, *Joint Maritime Operations*, (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2018), IV-3.

CWC facilitates command and control for one or multiple carrier battle groups to facilitate fleet missions by assigning commanders warfighting functions, authorities, and responsibilities executed through command by negation, or decentralized execution.<sup>39</sup> Currently,

<sup>38</sup> The surveillance area is the area of interest, the classification, identification, and engagement areas (CIEAs) are the areas of influence, and the vital area is the area immediately surrounding the fleet. Within the surveillance area, CIEAs and vital areas, assets perform actions coordinated by warfare and functional group commanders to accomplish fleet missions. See US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-32, *Joint Maritime Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 2018), IV-3.

<sup>39</sup> US Department of the Navy, Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56, *Composite Warfare Doctrine* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 2-1.

the USMC afloat operates in separate maritime formations independent from Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs). As shown on Figure 1, Marine commanders are neither a warfare commander nor a functional group commander within CWC doctrine; the USMC provides no specified role to support sea control or CSG operations other than informal arrangements between ships captains and land force commanders.<sup>40</sup>

According to the US Army operations doctrine, MDO involves the employment of capabilities across multiple domains and information environments.<sup>41</sup> The USMC doctrinal organization as a MAGTF complements MDO by operating across the maritime, land, air, cyber and information domains. The USMC doctrinal concept of maneuver warfare advocates for the generation of tempo through simple operations, decentralized execution, efficient planning, and involving commanders in the decision-making process.<sup>42</sup> However, the USMC falls short in integrating in USN planning. Only one of the USMC six core competencies address the requirement to provide specialized detachments for service aboard USN vessels, and no USMC publication addresses the requirement to augment or facilitate the missions of the CWC.<sup>43</sup>

The MAGTF complements MDO and is supported by the USN, but the USMC refrains from relinquishing OPCON of the MAGTF elements. Instead, according to the joint maritime doctrine “a single [Marine] commander leads and coordinates the MAGTF through all phases of deployment and employment.”<sup>44</sup> The absence of that commander in CWC presents a dilemma, a single entity possesses MDO capabilities, for only a portion of the maritime force, operating on USN vessels, in a parallel command structure. The MDO capacity to link USMC assets into sea

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<sup>40</sup> US Navy, NWP 3-56, 6-14.

<sup>41</sup> US Army, FM 3-0, 1-17.

<sup>42</sup> US Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0, *Marine Corps Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-4.

<sup>43</sup> US Navy, *Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 9.

<sup>44</sup> US Department of Defense, JP 3-32, II-16.

control operations is inherently contradictory to joint MDO concept. History demonstrates cases of effective and ineffective MDO employment which impact the success of the campaign.

The MAGTF facilitates JFEO, the seizure and maintenance of lodgments against an opposing adversary.<sup>45</sup> A JFEO requires an array of maritime and amphibious capabilities.<sup>46</sup> The USN recognizes the critical requirements to gain and maintain sea control and neutralize A2AD threats, but conspicuously lists only a “host of naval capabilities” required to accomplish the mission of sea control.<sup>47</sup> The Naval Operating Concept makes no mention of land or amphibious capabilities facilitating sea control in power projection through amphibious assault.<sup>48</sup>

According to the Navy Operating Concept, sea control is closing “to within striking distance of land to neutralize land-based threats to maritime access, which in turn enhances freedom of action at sea.”<sup>49</sup> Sea control facilitates power projection, which is the capacity to “rapidly deploy and sustain forces in and from multiple dispersed locations to respond to crises, to contribute to deterrence, and to enhance regional stability.”<sup>50</sup> While sea control and power projection are inherently interdependent, doctrinal dissonance and capability gaps illustrate a divide between theory and practice.

The USN acknowledges that there is greater need to integrate USMC capabilities in the existing CWC doctrine. There is a potential solution to include the MAGTF commander as an “expeditionary warfare commander” (EXWC) or employment of MAGTF assets under a strike

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<sup>45</sup> US Department of Defense, JP 3-18, I-1.

<sup>46</sup> An array of amphibious assault ships, connectors, beachmasters, Maritime Preposition Squadrons (MPS), and expeditionary facilitate power projection in austere environments without access to ports or airfields, providing greater access throughout the littorals. See US Department of the Navy, *Naval Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 61.

<sup>47</sup> US Navy, *Naval Operating Concept*, 61.

<sup>48</sup> US Navy, *Naval Operating Concept*, 61.

<sup>49</sup> US Navy, *Naval Operating Concept*, 51.

<sup>50</sup> US Navy, *Naval Operating Concept*, 60.

warfare commander (STWC) generally not organic to an ARG.<sup>51</sup> The divide between theory and practice is illustrated in the contemporary academia of maritime operations.

Literature about the contemporary theory of seapower exists in abundance and demonstrates the dissonance of key theorists in the field of maritime operations. Dr. Geoffrey Till, is a current naval theorist and author of *Seapower a Guide to the Twenty-First Century*, wherein he postulates that there are two distinct tribes of naval theory: modernist, and post-modernist. Modern naval theory is “wary of the implications of globalization for their own security and sovereignty, more protectionist in their economic policy, and less inclined to collaborate with others in the maintenance of the world’s trading system.”<sup>52</sup> Therefore the missions of the modern navy should include: sea control, nuclear deterrence, maritime power projection, exclusive good order at the sea, and competitive gunboat diplomacy.<sup>53</sup>

Gunboat diplomacy is concerned with persuading, deterring, supporting, or coercing for diplomatic purposes, and elicits competition vice cooperation in maritime affairs. Jeune Ecole, a French naval theorist described this operating concept as *guerre d’escadre*, or campaigns involving large fleets and warships engaging enemy vessels operating under a similar concept. The central concept for this Mahanian approach is preservation of national interest against an existential threat. It is for this reason, that Till states that, “the modern navy is weary about entering into collaborative activities...or global maritime partnerships.”<sup>54</sup>

As a result of globalization, Till believes that the post-modern naval mission will alter to include: expeditionary operations, stability operations, humanitarian assistance, and cooperative

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<sup>51</sup> US Department of the Navy, *Littoral Operations in a Contested Environment* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 11.

<sup>52</sup> Geoffrey Till, *Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Abingdon, 2013), 32.

<sup>53</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 32.

<sup>54</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 34.

naval diplomacy.<sup>55</sup> Till believes that gunboat diplomacy, maritime power projection and nuclear deterrence are not the missions for future naval operations.<sup>56</sup> Future naval operations will focus on international vice national security, and maintain supervision of the sea, vice command of the sea. *A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower* published by the USN in 2015, reflects Till's post-modernist view and details the interdependences of maritime economies, and the need for interoperability as the world approaches the future operating environment.<sup>57</sup>

Till explains that as China prospers, it will continue to develop its maritime capacity, and warns about the danger of falling into a Thucydian trap, wherein actions to preserve the global or national economy and freedom of navigation are unintentionally interpreted as acts of aggression and edge closer to hostilities. Till identifies one commonality among modernist and post-modernist, the need to respond in the littorals, which Till defines as land within your Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ).

Dr. James C. Bradford is a contemporary naval theorist and historian. He has published several books and articles relating to naval operations and suggests that the US Navy adopted different operating concepts based off the character of naval war during different periods in history. Till alludes to the concept of fleet battle (*guerre d'escadre*), but Bradford explains that the USN has historically conducted commerce raiding (*guerre de course*) as well as coastal raiding (*guerre de razzia*).<sup>58</sup> Fleet battle is considered the most noble form of naval warfare, and certainly the most costly, and war on commerce incurs risk of retribution and global indignation in a globalizing world. Coastal raiding, conversely, carries a less ignominious image than

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<sup>55</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 35.

<sup>56</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 39.

<sup>57</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 86.

<sup>58</sup> James C. Bradford, "John Paul Jones and Guerre De Razzia," *The Northern Mariner*, October 2003, 1.

commerce raiding, and requires a force with a credible military, the impetus to divide forces to protect possessions.

The effects-based concept of coastal raiding traces its origins to the Continental Navy during the Revolutionary War, and was employed extensively by John Paul Jones, an American Naval Commodore, in several daring expeditions. While coastal raiding likely involves amphibious actions, it is not exclusively amphibious. Bradford contends that, “for the first century, the US Navy relied on commerce raiding, for the past century on fleet battle,” but another option exists, coastal raiding, which is proven to disaggregate navy fleets and gain the initiative in naval campaigns.<sup>59</sup>

Dr. Ian Speller and Dr. Christopher Tuck are two modern naval theorist who co-authored a novel, *Amphibious Warfare, Strategy and Tactics*, and who postulate that new systems, partner interoperability, and a balanced amphibious force will meet the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) in the future operating environment.<sup>60</sup> Steady-state with emphasis on partner and joint interoperability typifies maritime activities since the end of the Cold War, but does not address a shift in theory or operating concept.

Modern and post-modern theorist provide lenses to observe maritime operations. The debate between Mahan and Corbett illustrate the tribalism of maritime and land operations and service reluctance to integrate capabilities and preference for self-reliance. Till identifies the littorals as a domain for commonality between maritime and land employment, potential future missions for the USN as the world continues to globalize. Bradford provides a lexicon for maritime operations over time, the ways in which maritime forces intended to achieve a military objective. Lastly, Speller and Tuck illustrate the two camps of thought, the progressive reformers and the reactionaries who prefer steady state in maritime operations. Several gaps exist in theory

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<sup>59</sup> Bradford, *Guerre De Razzia*, 15.

<sup>60</sup> Ian Speller and Christopher Tuck, *Strategy and Tactics: Amphibious Warfare* (St. Paul, MN: MBI Publishers, 2001), 171.



and practice, and no contemporary theorist will advocate for new doctrine aligning USMC capabilities to sea control, or USN assets toward land power projection.

This study uses the lens of seapower to assess doctrinal alignment and capability organization in analyzing the success of maritime operations synchronized across multiple domains. Modern seapower theorist vary on the requirement to link maritime and amphibious operations. Conceptual employment demonstrates an attempt to link maritime and amphibious capabilities but refrains from doctrinally aligning amphibious forces in support of sea control and maritime forces in power projection beyond the littorals. Empirical theorist contends that coastal raiding is an element in post-modern seapower theory which will only increase as the global population masses in the littorals.

## Methodology

The methodology outlines the framework to examine the three case studies. It includes a description of the structured, focused comparison approach, the historical case studies, the research questions, and the expected outcomes and primary data sources. This will serve to test the hypotheses and validate the thesis that if the USN and USMC doctrinally align concepts and reorganize capabilities across maritime platforms, then it will enhance the joint force capacity to conduct MDO.

This study uses a structured focused comparison methodology, prescribed by Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, to qualitatively assess the three historical case studies.<sup>61</sup> The Whitehaven expedition in 1778 was chosen as a study because it illustrates the perspective of US Continental maritime operations as a baseline for seapower theory prior to Mahan or Corbett's influence. Operation Husky, the Allied seizure of Sicily in 1943 was chosen as a campaign because it illustrates a modern multi-lateral, multi-domain campaign fought prior to the influence of contemporary seapower theory. Operation Corporate, the British seizure of the Falkland Islands was chosen because it represents a contemporary multi-domain expeditionary campaign fought against an adversary with a robust A2AD capability.

The Whitehaven expedition of 1778 was the first instance of seapower projection of the US Continental Navy against the British homeland and territorial waters led by Commodore John Paul Jones. First, Whitehaven was strategically decisive in redirecting the British Royal Navy's attention away from colonial waters. Second, the colonial expeditionary maritime force employed both naval and land forces in conjunction to achieve local temporary sea control. Third, the expedition involved both power projection and sea control through coastal raiding and fleet battle. Finally, while the raid was small in scale, it was the first expeditionary multi-domain campaign

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<sup>61</sup> Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67-72.

the Continental Navy conducted and galvanized Commodore John Paul Jones as the pre-eminent maritime commander in the US colonies. In this context, this case study is essential to understanding the pre-Mahan, pre-Corbett theory of seapower and application of land and maritime capabilities to achieve effective multi-domain superiority. Further, it demonstrates to operational artists and planners, the qualities of doctrinal alignment and unity of effort when confronted with a numerically superior maritime force, like the British Royal Navy in 1778.

Operation Husky was the first large scale, multi-national JFEO conducted with US forces during WWII. The campaign was tactically successful in seizing airfields and compelling Axis forces to withdraw from Sicily. The campaign was operationally unsuccessful in isolating and defeating the Axis forces which withdrew from Sicily to Italy and conducted a stubborn defense throughout 1943. The expedition involved both power projection and sea control in multi-domain battle. The campaign educated Allied forces and provided valuable critiques which aided in Operation Overlord in 1944. In this context, this case study is essential to understanding modern theory of seapower and application of land and maritime capabilities to achieve effective multi-domain superiority. Further, it demonstrates to operational artists and planners, the elements of effective multi-domain operations when confronted with a numerically superior force which retained local air and land superiority during the initial JFEO.

Operation Corporate was a JFEO conducted by the British military involving a near-peer adversary comparable to the current maritime operating environment. First, the campaign was operationally and strategically successful in seizing the Falklands and compelling the Argentinians to surrender. Second, the expedition involved power projection in a contested multi-domain battle. Third, while the British attained land superiority over time, the air and maritime domains remained contested and illustrate capability gaps and doctrinal dissonance between land and maritime forces. Finally, after action reports and first-hand testimonies illustrate post-modern seapower themes for operational artists and planners.

This study involves three hypothesis and a total of nine research questions to navigate the research for the historical case studies. The first hypothesis contends that changing both the USN and USMC doctrine to incorporate both sea control and power projection will enhance unity of effort. Three questions aim to support this hypothesis. The first question asks how did maritime forces support power projection? The second question asks how did the land force support sea control? The third question asks what was the command and support relationship between the land force and the maritime force?

The second hypothesis contends that reorganizing and augmenting a greater number of USN vessels with USMC capabilities link power projection and sea control. Three questions aim to support this hypothesis. The first question asks what land force capabilities supported sea control? The second question asks what maritime capabilities supported power projection? The third question asks what were the impacts of capability gaps in the campaign?

The third hypothesis contends that if USN and USMC doctrine and capabilities reorganize, then it will enhance the joint forces ability to conduct MDO. Three questions aim to support this hypothesis. The first question asks, how did land and maritime commanders converge capabilities across multiple domains? The second question, asks what domain gaps the adversary exploited during the campaign? The third question, asks how the exploited domain gaps were mitigated?

This study anticipates finding that forces with doctrinal dissonance, wherein power projection, sea control and command and support relationships are incompatible have capability gaps. The capability gaps created by misaligned doctrine prevent effective multi-domain battle, which force the commander to accept greater risk in the conduct of the campaign.

These case studies use primary and secondary sources to answer the research questions. Sources for the Whitehaven expedition include primary sources and archive documents exchanged between General George Washington, Benjamin Franklin serving as the ambassador to France, and Commodore John Paul Jones. Sources for Operation Husky include operation

orders and unit after action reports. Sources for Operation Corporate include official correspondence, operation orders, and unit after action reports.

This section provided the methodology of the study to understand how doctrinal and capability compatibility impact multi-domain operations. Nine research questions facilitate a structured research approach to validate or negate the hypothesis. The author collected data for this study firsthand from the Library of Congress in Washington, District of Columbia; the Combined Arms Research Library archive in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; and the Gray Research Center archive in Quantico, Virginia. The next section will examine the case studies.

## Case Studies

This section analyzes the three historical case studies: Whitehaven, Operation Husky, and Operation Corporate from an American perspective through the lens of seapower. The examination of each case study follows the same research approach. First, an overview provides the context of the conflict. Second, a summary of the campaign or operation describes relevant actors, key events, objectives, in context to the war. Finally, the case is examined through the research questions posed in the methodology. This section concludes with a summarization of the cases and salient points for analysis.

### Whitehaven

The Whitehaven expedition lasted from February to April 1778. A comprehensive analysis of Whitehaven needs to go back to 1775, the year the Second Continental Congress created the Continental Marine Corps.<sup>62</sup> The first missions of the integrated maritime force involved raids on British garrisons and isolated frigates in the Caribbean in March 1776. In Nassau, the Continental Navy detained three British noblemen and exchanged them for a colonialist leader, Lord Sterling, who promptly returned to Connecticut, raised his own colonial militia, and supported General Washington in his attack on Danbury in April 1776.<sup>63</sup>

In a letter exchange between General Washington and Commodore Hopkins, the senior ranking naval commander, Washington expressed his approval and requested Alexander Hamilton recompense the Commodore.<sup>64</sup> The raid of New Providence translated into an operational success, enabling General Washington to regain an influential colonial leader, gain

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<sup>62</sup> M. Almy Aldrich and Richard Strader, *History of the United States Marine Corps* (Boston, MA: H. L. Shepard and Company, 1875), 33.

<sup>63</sup> Benjamin Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men: Maritime Raiding, Irregular Warfare, and the Early American Navy* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2019), 17.

<sup>64</sup> Gurdon Saltonstall, "Revolutionary War Series." *The Papers of George Washington* (Charlottesville, VA: Charlottesville University of Virginia Press, 1777), 298.

combat power and enhance the legitimacy of the new colonial government. The success against lightly defended land garrisons exposed the importance of the maritime domain to the struggles of the Continental Congress. On 25 November 1776, Congress legalized the capture of British warships and transport vessels.<sup>65</sup>

The Whitehaven expedition commenced on 13 February 1778. The legalization of commerce raiding, enticed privateering and emboldened the Continental Navy. Galvanized by success in New Providence, John Paul Jones, an ambitious subordinate of Commodore Hopkins, began collecting small British vessels.<sup>66</sup> Jones began planning an expedition across the Atlantic Ocean to strike settlements along the coast of Great Britain. Jones intended to, “surprise [British] defenseless places and thereby divide their attention and draw it off from our coasts.”<sup>67</sup>

In January 1778, Jones received his orders from the Continental Congress:

Proceed with her [the *Ranger*] in the manner you shall judge best for distressing the enemies of the United States, by sea or otherwise, consistent with the laws of war, and the terms of your commission... we rely on your ability, as well as your zeal to serve the United States, and therefore do not give you particular instructions as to your operations.<sup>68</sup>

On 13 February 1778, the *Ranger* sailed for Britain and began harassing British merchant ships in British waters.<sup>69</sup> Jones clearly was engaged in a traditional naval mission, commerce raiding, however, Jones was preparing for a raid against a civilian maritime community ashore: coastal raiding.<sup>70</sup> On 23 April 1778, Jones raided Whitehaven, Scotland seizing the coastal

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<sup>65</sup> Charles O. Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, and Its Achievements* (Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishers, 2007), 126.

<sup>66</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 18.

<sup>67</sup> Reginald De Koven, *The Life and Letters of John Paul Jones* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913), 1-116.

<sup>68</sup> Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and Silius Deane, “Founders Online: The American Commissioners to John Paul Jones, with Arthur Lee’s Dissent and Their Rejoinder: Three Documents, 16[–18] January 1778,” National Archives and Records Administration, 2019, accessed 12 September 2019, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-25-02-0381>.

<sup>69</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 24.

<sup>70</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 23.

defense batteries by stealth, igniting vessels moored in the harbor, seized the armory, and attempted to detain the local nobleman, Lord Dunbar Douglas.<sup>71</sup> The psychological impact of the raid was profound among the population in Britain. Jones claimed, “what was done, however, was sufficient to show that not all their [Britain’s] boasted navy can protect their own coast, and that the scenes of distress which they have occasioned to America may be soon brought home to their own door.”<sup>72</sup>

Correspondence among naval commanders and diplomats concurred that the small Continental Navy should seize the initiative and fight in British waters, diverting attention from Colonial activities.<sup>73</sup> Robert Morris, the Secretary of the Marine Committee, believed that if the Colonial Navy strikes the British Isles, it would force Britain to withdraw a portion of the fleet from the Colonial coast, demoralize the British population, legitimize the Colonial Navy among international powers and convince the Continental Congress to authorize future naval operations.<sup>74</sup> Coincidentally, Morris’ future proposal, an expedition into Barbados demonstrates an immutable naval strategy, that “the weak spots in a nation’s armor often prove to be its outlying dependencies [territories], especially when they are situated near the enemy’s coast.”<sup>75</sup> These territories are vulnerable because they are a resource, serving as a refueling or staging area for future expeditionary operations, or as a staging area for force projection.

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<sup>71</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 28.

<sup>72</sup> Lewis F. Tooker, *John Paul Jones* (New York: Macmillan, 1916), 59.

<sup>73</sup> George W. Bush, Michael J. Crawford and William S. Dudley. *American Theatre: January 1, 1778 – March 31, 1778. European Theatre: January 1, 1778 – March 31, 1778*. Vol. 11 (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2005), 1150.

<sup>74</sup> Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution*, 87.

<sup>75</sup> Paullin, *The Navy of the American Revolution*, 180.





Figure 3. Voyage of the *Ranger* and Whitehaven Expedition. Created by the author.

The raids of Jones and policy envisioned by Morris illustrate the value of a clandestine raiding force capable of temporarily harassing an adversary’s port or staging area, operating in conjunction with naval forces. The naval historian, Benjamin Armstrong states the revelation as, “amphibious invasion and occupation is a great threat to maritime warfare, but irregular operations and raiding, particularly as part of a larger and balanced strategy, can have a psychological, political, and sometimes economic effect . . . on littoral populations that far outweigh the resources required for such missions.”<sup>76</sup>

This section investigates six of the nine questions in the methodology. This section will not focus on MDO concepts because the domains were limited to land and maritime in 1778. The first question inquires, how the maritime forces supported power projection? Evidence suggests that the John Paul Jones facilitated power projection by working through political channels to gain safe voyage for the expedition. Jones recognized the combat power mismatch the *Ranger* faced against the more heavily armed Royal Navy vessels and coordinated with the French Navy to provide local maritime security and safe passage. On 13 February 1778 escorted by a French

<sup>76</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 33.

frigate, the *Ranger* departed the Canadian waters and set sail for Britain.<sup>77</sup> Jones used the protection of a partnered navy to mitigate harassment from British littoral vessels, the practice of multinational fleet actions is common in joint operations today. The French government did not sanction the attack on mainland Britain, though they were willing to cover the *Ranger's* movement while in territorial waters to deter the Royal Navy.<sup>78</sup>

The second question asks how the land force supported sea control? Evidence illustrates that the Marines seized and destroyed cannons directed at the ports of Whitehaven during coastal raiding and attempted to seize high value targets to achieve political objectives. The actions of the Marines in destroying the fort cannons to support the *Ranger* draws interesting parallels to the current A2/AD predicament. During the initial assault, Marines scaled the port fortifications and spiked the cannons, allowing the *Ranger* access to the harbor.<sup>79</sup> Once the *Ranger* entered the harbor, the Continental Navy gained a firepower overmatch which prevented the citizens from contesting the landing party. The following evening, a detachment of Marines landed north of Whitehaven and attempted to capture Lord Douglas for a future prisoner exchange with France serving as the negotiators.<sup>80</sup> Lord Douglas was not present, and the capture was unsuccessful.<sup>81</sup>

The third question queries the nature of the command and support relationship between the Marines and the Navy forces? Jones retained operational control of the Marines and directly involved in the land operations prior to local sea control superiority. During the raid on Whitehaven, Jones went ashore with a detachment of thirty Marines and directed the destruction

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<sup>77</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 24.

<sup>78</sup> John Paul Jones, "Founders Online: To Benjamin Franklin from John Paul Jones, 18 May 1778," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 12 September 2019, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-26-02-0438>.

<sup>79</sup> Robert D. Heinl, *Soldiers of the Sea: The United States Marine Corps, 1775-1962* (Baltimore, MD: Nautical and Aviation Publishers of America, 1991), 7.

<sup>80</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 28.

<sup>81</sup> John Paul Jones, "Founders Online: To Benjamin Franklin from John Paul Jones, 18 May 1778," National Archives and Records Administration, accessed 12 September 2019, <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-26-02-0438>.

of 32- and 42-pound cannons, allowing for local sea control and port access.<sup>82</sup> Recognizing the opportunity to destroy enemy maritime assets at port, Jones ordered the burning of a British frigate, the *Thomson*, a ship which posed a threat if the *Ranger* had to retreat from British waters.<sup>83</sup> Throughout the expedition, Jones retained control of all forces and capabilities tasked to the *Ranger*.

The fourth question investigates what land force capabilities supported sea control? Marines manned and piloted small vessels in Whitehaven, provided local port security, raided, and reduced enemy defensive capabilities, and subsequently defended the fleet against a maritime threat. Jones recognized the disciplined quality of the Marines and elected Lieutenant Samuel Wallingford to lead the port navigation and initial assault.<sup>84</sup> Once ashore, the Marines provided local security and prevented the British citizens from descending on the lodgment, and subsequently facilitated Jones egress following the burning of the *Thomson*.<sup>85</sup> The following day, the *Ranger* was engaged by the *Drake*, a Royal Navy ship, wherein the Marines manned cannons and small arms, forcing the *Drake* to surrender in a Mahanian fleet battle engagement.<sup>86</sup>

Question five asks what maritime capabilities supported power projection? The Continental Navy labored to acquire vessels support the expedition and Jones firsthand intelligence of Whitehaven increased the tempo of land operations. Initial planning for the expedition delayed through 1777, as the colonial diplomat to France, Benjamin Franklin, labored to attain a French vessel to aid in the attack against mainland Britain, which would provide an

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<sup>82</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 26.

<sup>83</sup> Lincoln Lorenz, *John Paul Jones, Fighter for Freedom and Glory* (Annapolis, MD: US Naval Institute, 1943), 146.

<sup>84</sup> Heintz, *Soldiers of the Sea*, 9.

<sup>85</sup> Samuel E. Morison, *John Paul Jones, A Sailor's Biography* (Toronto, Canada: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), 141.

<sup>86</sup> Gerald W. Johnson, *The First Captain, The Story of John Paul Jones* (New York: Coward-McCann Inc., 1947), 185.

allied component to the endeavor.<sup>87</sup> However, the plan to attain a larger French vessel never materialized, and Jones began training and manning a colonial schooner, the *Ranger*, for future operations.<sup>88</sup>

An essential element to the speed and accuracy of the raid was Jones firsthand knowledge of Whitehaven, it was his hometown.<sup>89</sup> Furthermore, his knowledge of Lord Douglas' exact residence provided excellent precision for the attempted capture mission.<sup>90</sup> Furthermore, Jones understood the local operating environment, knowing that a different captive would not suffice among the citizenry, Jones ordered the crew return to the *Ranger* without a captive.<sup>91</sup>

Question six asks, how capability gaps were mitigated in the campaign? The expedition relied on multinational cooperation, close coordination with the Marines, the element of surprise, and psychological shock to achieve the military objectives. The *Ranger* was outgunned and smaller than most Royal Navy ships and relied on the French Navy for conveyance across the Atlantic. The Marines relied upon the real-time intelligence Jones provided which facilitated accuracy and achieved the element of surprise.<sup>92</sup> The psychological shock of the raid forced the British government to emphasize maritime national defense over the Revolutionary War which alleviated pressure for the Colonial militia with the aid of the French Navy.<sup>93</sup>

## Operation Husky

This section investigates US maritime operations during World War II through the lens of seapower. This overview provides broad context from November 1942, the beginning of Allied offensive operations in the Mediterranean, to January 1943, the release of the directive for

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<sup>87</sup> Phillip Russel, *John Paul Jones, Man of Action* (New York: Brentano Incorporated, 1927), 88.

<sup>88</sup> Russel, *John Paul Jones*, 89.

<sup>89</sup> Russel, *John Paul Jones*, 95.

<sup>90</sup> Lorenz, *John Paul Jones*, 154.

<sup>91</sup> Lorenz, *John Paul Jones*, 156.

<sup>92</sup> Lorenz, *John Paul Jones*, 148.

<sup>93</sup> Morison, *John Paul Jones*, 142.

Operation Husky. In November 1942, Anglo-American forces commenced Operation Torch in North Africa with an approach to expel the Axis forces from North Africa, attack Sicily as an intermediate objective for an assault into Italy, eliminating Mussolini and attrite Germany in preparation for an assault across the English Channel.<sup>94</sup>

In seapower terminology, seizure of Sicily, and more importantly the airfields and ports, provided the Allies sea control in the Mediterranean to enhance freedom of action and power projection on the Italian mainland. The operational approach draws comparison to the current methodology of sea control, by reducing opposition of maritime transit, and reducing A2/AD in theater.<sup>95</sup> The operational approach involved gaining limited local maritime and air superiority, power projection through land forces to seize ports and airfields to gain permanent maritime and air superiority, and concurrent land operations to defeat Axis forces.<sup>96</sup>

This section summarizes the origins of the operation, principal actors, objectives, key event, and outcomes of Operation Husky from January until August 1943. Following the Casablanca conference in 1943, both Admiral King and General Marshall acquiesced that the limited maritime zone provided in the Mediterranean, the proximity of forces in North Africa and readiness of forces in theater made a strike in the Mediterranean more feasible than a cross channel offensive in northern Europe in 1943.<sup>97</sup>

In January 1943, a Combined Chiefs operational directive tasked the Commander of Allied Expeditionary Forces in North Africa to seize Sicily in July 1943, in a multi-national campaign called Operation Husky.<sup>98</sup> Leadership for the joint multinational task force was mixed,

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<sup>94</sup> Joint History Office, *World War II Inter-Allied Conferences* (Washington, DC: Joint History Office, 2004), 162.

<sup>95</sup> Department of the Navy, *Naval Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010), 53.

<sup>96</sup> H. K. Hewitt, *Action Report Western Naval Task Force, The Sicilian Campaign* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1943), 20.

<sup>97</sup> Joint History Office, *World War II*, 146.

<sup>98</sup> Joint History Office, *World War II*, 127.

the naval forces was Admiral Cunningham, Royal Navy, commanding ground forces was General Alexander, US Army, and commanding the air component was Air Chief Marshal Tedder, Royal Air Force.<sup>99</sup>

The operational aim of Husky was to seize Sicily to free the Mediterranean and prevent the Axis from harassing shipping bound for Russia, a mission facilitate maritime security.<sup>100</sup> Hitler regarded two components essential to the defense of Germany, materials from the Balkans and political stability in Italy.<sup>101</sup> An attack in the Mediterranean would divert pressure from the eastern front, while concurrently pressuring Mussolini to desert Hitler and open a southern axis of approach to Berlin.<sup>102</sup> On 10 July 1943, Operation Husky commenced with a dual force landing in south eastern Sicily by General Montgomery's Eighth Army, General Patton's Seventh Army and General Bradley's II Corps. The Eighth Army battled north along the eastern axis while the Seventh Army battled north and subsequently east from the western axis of approach. On 17 August 1943, Operation Husky concluded following the Axis withdrawal across the Straits of Messina.

Operation Husky accomplished the operational aim and improved Allied sea control in the Mediterranean, however, tactically Husky was unable to prevent over 40,000 Axis forces, and several thousand vehicles and pieces of ordnance from withdrawing across the Strait of Messina over the course of two weeks in August 1943.<sup>103</sup> Not until late in the campaign were the Allies able to wrestle air superiority from the Axis, even after seizing the initial airfield objectives.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Headquarters, Commander in Chief, *United States Fleet, Amphibious Operations During the Period, August to December 1943* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1944), 1-7.

<sup>100</sup> Joint History Office, *World War II*, 16.

<sup>101</sup> Albert N. Garland and Howard M. Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1986), 49.

<sup>102</sup> Western Naval Task Force, Joss Attack Force, Operations Plan No. 109-43, Annex A, June 20, 1943 (Combined Arms Research Library history annex, Fort Leavenworth, KS), 1.

<sup>103</sup> Carlo D'Este, *Bitter Victory, The Battle for Sicily, 1943* (New York: Penguin Publishing, 1988), 503.

<sup>104</sup> Hanson Baldwin, *Battles Won and Lost* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), 231.

The withdrawal and consolidation of Axis forces on the Italian peninsula contributed to the slow progress of Allied forces during the Italian Campaign and allowed Hitler to maintain the Axis force posture in the western theater.<sup>105</sup>




Figure 4. Operation Husky Timeline and Scheme of Maneuver. Created by the author referencing Hanson W. Baldwin, *Battles Won and Lost* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1966), 207.

This section investigates all the nine research questions. The first question inquires, how the maritime forces supported power projection? Evidence suggests that the US Navy facilitated power projection by integrating fires to compensate for inferiority in the air domain and sustaining the land forces throughout the land offensive. Since the US Army Air Corps focused on strategic bombing, naval gunfire replaced close air support and pre-bombardment for assault echelons.<sup>106</sup> Throughout planning and execution, “the most crucial aspect of all Army logistical planning remained the balancing of Army requirements with the availability of naval shipping capacity.”<sup>107</sup>

<sup>105</sup> Robert K. Greenfield and Robert W. Coakley, *Command Decisions, The Persian Corridor as a Route for Aid to the USSR* (Washington, DC: Center of Military Studies US Army, 2006), 233.

<sup>106</sup> John T. Mason, *The Atlantic War Remembered* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), 286.

<sup>107</sup> Greenfield and Coakley, *Command Decisions*, 103.

The second question investigates how the land force supported sea control? Evidence illustrates that the land forces reduced coastal defense guns, capture enemy airfields, and beachheads to prevent a contested amphibious landing. On the D-Day assault, all five of the task forces were assigned missions to capture beachheads, two were assigned missions to reduce coastal defense batteries, and capture three airfields.<sup>108</sup> The reduction of coastal batteries, aided in local maritime freedom of movement, the capture of three airfields reduced Axis local tactical air superiority and reduced the range of tactical bombers against Allied maritime vessels.<sup>109</sup>

The third question asks the nature of the command and support relationship between the Army and maritime forces? The US Army, US Navy, and US Army Air Corps did not understand the supporting-supported relationship and interdependence at the operational level. Coordination among services and allies, remained a point of contention throughout Husky. During the planning phase, the Task Force Headquarters, Navy Headquarters, Air Command Headquarters and subordinate commanders headquarters were spread throughout Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, and never consolidated for planning.<sup>110</sup> A joint detailed plan to isolate the Axis forces in Sicily was never devised during the limited planning evolution, Patton and Montgomery's task force would not be mutually supporting, and remained fixated on terrain objectives vice the enemy.<sup>111</sup> Consequently, when Kesselring began withdrawing the Axis forces, each service or ally operated independently.<sup>112</sup>

The fourth question determines what land force capabilities supported sea control? Land forces used airborne operations to seize beachheads, airfields and coastal defense batteries which supported local maritime superiority. Following the initial assault and seizure of the southern

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<sup>108</sup> Hewitt, *Action Report Western Naval Task Force*, 21.

<sup>109</sup> Barbara B. Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit, Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean 1942-1945* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 201.

<sup>110</sup> Hewitt, *Action Report Western Naval Task Force*, 17.

<sup>111</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 58.

<sup>112</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 421.



lodgment, the 7th Army organized three parachute task forces to capture coastal defense batteries along the coast to the northern intermediate objective, Palermo.<sup>113</sup> These permitted maritime freedom of movement along the western Sicilian coast which consequently aided the land force with naval fire support.<sup>114</sup>

Question five investigates what maritime capabilities supported power projection? Maritime forces aided by creating a feint during the initial assault, and subsequently aided the 7th Army in bypassing the Axis defenses with shore-to-shore maneuver. Two naval diversions in the Mediterranean during the D-Day landing confounded the Axis forces and prevented mobilization of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division and two Italian mobile divisions until after the initial landings.<sup>115</sup> To support land force scheme of maneuver, Patton's Army carefully orchestrated the technique of "end runs," or bypassing defenses by using the sea as maneuver space and landing forces behind the Axis position defense. Three successive end runs on 8, 11, and 15 August 1943 effectively outpaced the Axis forces along northern Sicily.<sup>116</sup>

During Operation Husky, The Eastern Task Force, under General Montgomery, received heavier opposition and committed to land operations with naval gunfire support and limited air support. In his memoirs, the Naval Task Force Commander, Admiral Cunningham noted that the US military's use of end runs was a, "striking example of the proper use of sea power. . . . I thought at the time we [the British forces] might have lessened our difficulties and hastened the advance if we had taken a leaf out of the American book and used our sea power to land troops behind the enemy lines."<sup>117</sup> The British Royal Army and Royal Navy service parochialisms ultimately slowed the offensive along the eastern Axis.

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<sup>113</sup> Hewitt, *Action Report Western Naval Task Force*, 22.

<sup>114</sup> Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 217.

<sup>115</sup> Baldwin, *Battles Won and Lost*, 210.

<sup>116</sup> R. S. Edwards, *Amphibious Operations, August to December 1943* (Washington, DC: United States Fleet, 1944), 1-8.

<sup>117</sup> Viscount Cunningham, *A Sailor's Odyssey* (New York: Dutton and Company, 1951), 554.

Question six investigates how capability gaps were mitigated in the campaign. The Allies compensated for capability gaps by dispersing amphibious operations, scheduling assault waves during periods of darkness, using radio silence, and naval surface fire support to compensate for limited air support. The Allies conducted simultaneous landings at multiple beaches, which caused the Axis forces to commit the tactical reserve to the defense of Gela on 11 July 1943.<sup>118</sup> “The logic of these widely dispersed landings was that it would be impossible for the Axis defenders to react simultaneously.”<sup>119</sup> Further, Allies confused the enemy more by conducting initial landings during the night of 9-10 July 1943, under strict radio silence.<sup>120</sup> During planning, the Allies recognized that “because of the heavy commitment of Allied aircraft to these [landing force] missions, no direct or close [air] support was available to ground troops.”<sup>121</sup> To compensate, land forces relied upon direct fire support via naval vessels to reduce Axis armor and stubborn defensive positions.<sup>122</sup>

Question seven queries how land and maritime commanders converged capabilities across multiple domains? Allied maritime and land forces effectively exploited operational military deception and information operations to create an operational gap in the Mediterranean theater, which was exploited by Operation Husky. British and US intelligence agencies effectively deceived Hitler and the German General Staff by dumping a human corpse with disinformation off a Spanish beach.<sup>123</sup> The corpse provided a false plan, Operation Mincemeat, which described an offensive against Sardinia, using the northern island as an avenue of approach

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<sup>118</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 120.

<sup>119</sup> D’Este, *Bitter Victory*, 78.

<sup>120</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 123.

<sup>121</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 120.

<sup>122</sup> Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 197.

<sup>123</sup> Robert M. Colbert, *Operation Joss, 10-16 July 1943* (Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1984), 109.

toward northern Italy.<sup>124</sup> Another deception plan, Operation Barclay, aimed at convincing the Germans that the Allies intended to land in Crete in mid-May 1943. Both Operations Mincemeat and Barclay convinced General Kesselring, Commander OKW, to prioritize defense of Sardinia and the Peloponnesus over all other locations in the Mediterranean.<sup>125</sup> This effective application of military deception created an operational gap in the Axis Mediterranean defense.

Question eight determines what domain gaps did the adversary exploit during the campaign? Axis forces exploited the lack of Allied local air domain superiority by fighting a delay allowing 40,000 forces to withdraw across the Strait of Messina. Since the Allied land forces lacked close air support, they compensated with naval gunfire, and because the Navy was providing gunfire support, the navy failed to intercept the evacuating Axis forces at Messina.<sup>126</sup> While the naval and land forces remained engaged in Sicily, the Air Force under Marshal Tedder turned their attention to attacking the Italian mainland as early as 1 August 1943.<sup>127</sup> This action delinked the air domain from the unity of effort in Sicily.<sup>128</sup> To intercept the fleeing Axis forces, the Allied navy required an anti-air or air-intercept element capable of contending with Axis airpower originating from mainland Italy or a maritime intercept detachment.<sup>129</sup>

Question nine asks how were the exploited domain gaps mitigated? Operation Husky validated that maritime forces may operate in a contested domain if synchronized with land and air operations.

In official USN fleet after actions, the USN determined that “combatant ships may operate within range of shore based aircraft when suitably covered by friendly aircraft, that an unprotected flank on the seacoast may be turned by ground forces supported by

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<sup>124</sup> D’Este, *Bitter Victory*, 184.

<sup>125</sup> D’Este, *Bitter Victory*, 190.

<sup>126</sup> Baldwin, *Battles Won and Lost*, 232.

<sup>127</sup> Tomblin, *With Utmost Spirit*, 228.

<sup>128</sup> Ernest J. King, *U.S. Navy at War, 1941-1945* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Officer, 1946), 90.

<sup>129</sup> Mason, *The Atlantic War Remembered*, 293.

sea forces and that the early fall of ‘Messina’ can be accomplished by cooperation and coordination of air, ground, and sea forces.”<sup>130</sup>

Cooperation and coordination remain essential to the accomplishment of joint MDO.

Insufficient planning and coordination for airborne operations, exacerbated by a doctrinal dissonance between air and land operations resulted in several friendly fire incidents from D-1 to D+4.<sup>131</sup>

## Operation Corporate

This section investigates British maritime operations during Operation Corporate, the seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1982, through the lens of seapower. This overview provides broad context from 30 June 1981, the beginning of formal Argentinian incursion in the Falklands, to 2 May 1982, the first official military engagement between the parties during Operation Corporate. On 30 June 1981, following decades of international dispute over the ownership of the Falkland Islands between the British and Argentinian governments, the British government withdrew the HMS *Endurance* from Falkland territorial waters. On 26 March 1982, the Argentinian Navy commenced maritime patrols with A2AD armed frigates and on 2 April 1982, Argentina invaded the Falklands with land forces.<sup>132</sup>

Through the lens of seapower, Operation Corporate constituted a domestic security response after failed political and military deterrence. Argentinian control of land, airfields, and the great distance from British territory narrowed options to a maritime based JFEO. The Argentinian Navy was contesting Sea control and the sea domain, which intensified the difficulty of power projection.

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<sup>130</sup> Edwards, *Amphibious Operations*, 1-8.

<sup>131</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 423.

<sup>132</sup> British Information Services. *Policy Statement from the British Ambassador to the United Nations Security Council*. Prepared by the British Embassy Services, April 1982.

“The Falklands War was the first large-scale naval encounter, using modern weaponry since World War II. Air-to-surface anti-ship missiles, anti-aircraft/anti-missile missiles, homing torpedoes and an assortment of other advanced weapon systems were used in actual combat for the first time. Not only that, but for the first time in many years, a large-scale amphibious assault was carried out under very strong enemy air defense.”<sup>133</sup>

This section summarizes the origins of the operation, principal actors, objectives, key event, and outcomes of Operation Husky from 2 May 1982 until 14 June 1982. Upon seizing the Falklands, the Argentinian commander, General Mendez, fortified a garrison of 800 soldiers to Port Howard, 900 to Fox Bay, 120 to Pebble Island for the auxiliary airfield, and 1,200 to Goose Green to protect the Port Stanley airfield and harbor. Without an airfield or harbor, Mendez believed the British would be unable to sustain the task force and surpass their operational reach and be forced to withdraw.<sup>134</sup>

In early April 1982, the British Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher authorized the deployment of a task force to restore the territorial sovereignty of the Falklands.<sup>135</sup> The British assembled Combined Task Force (CTF) 317 commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, with operational command (OPCON) delegated to Rear Admiral Woodward.<sup>136</sup> The task force operational approach was guided by three principles: contain enemy forces in Port Stanley, defense in depth, and gaining and maintaining the initiative.<sup>137</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Daniel K. Gibran, *Strategic Imperatives, British Defense Policy, and the Case of the Falklands War 1982* (West Yorkshire, United Kingdom: University of Manchester Institute, 1990), 318.

<sup>134</sup> Duncan Anderson, *The Falklands War 1982* (Osceola, WI: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 33.

<sup>135</sup> Gibran, *Strategic Imperatives, British Defense Policy*, 213.

<sup>136</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falkland Islands: The Strength of Britain's Task Force*. Prepared by the House of Commons, April 1982.

<sup>137</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons* (London, United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1983), 16.

On 5 April 1982, the first ships began convoy to Ascension Island.<sup>138</sup> From 1-20 May 1982, the Royal Navy blockaded the Falklands and on 2 May 1982, the Argentinian battleship, *General Belgrano* was sunk by the *HMS Conqueror* a British submarine.<sup>139</sup> On 4 May 1982, the *HMS Sheffield* was sunk by the Argentinian Air Force, and on 14 May 1982, a special force raid on Pebble Island reduced an Argentinian expeditionary airfield off the coast of West Falkland Island.<sup>140</sup>




Figure 5. Operation Corporate Scheme of Maneuver. Created by the author referencing *Encyclopedia Britannica*, s.v. “The Falkland Islands War,” accessed 26 January 2020, <https://www.britannica.com/event/Falkland-Islands-War>.

Throughout early May 1982, several air and maritime engagements constituted shaping actions for the amphibious assault at San Carlos on 21 May 1982.<sup>141</sup> From 21-28 May 1982,

<sup>138</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign*, 13.

<sup>139</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign*, 13.

<sup>140</sup> Cedric Delves, *Across an Angry Sea, The SAS in the Falklands War* (London, United Kingdom: Hurst and Company, 2018), 155.

<sup>141</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign*, 13.

British forces attacked and defeated the Argentinian forces in East Falklands, forcing General Mendez to surrender at Port Stanley on 14 June 1982.<sup>142</sup>

This section investigates all the nine research questions. The first question asks, how the maritime forces supported power projection? Evidence suggests that the Royal Navy facilitated power projection by instituting a blockade, maintaining sea control, and isolating the Argentinian land force from reinforcements. On 2 May, *HMS Conqueror* (attack submarine) detected and engaged the Argentinian destroyer *General Belgrano*, sinking the vessel with a torpedo, forcing the local Argentinian maritime force to remain within 12 miles of the Argentinian mainland.<sup>143</sup> The *HMS Conqueror* achieved great operational success, ensuring that the Argentinian surface fleet would not attempt to contest the British fleet near the Falklands, bottling the Argentinian fleet inside the territorial waters of mainland Argentina.<sup>144</sup> Isolation from the Argentinian government played a direct factor into General Mendoza's final decision to surrender, though he still possessed the means to fight at Port Stanley.<sup>145</sup>

The second question inquires how the land force supported sea control? Evidence illustrates the land force conducted maritime intercept actions and raids to reduce the threat of ground launched or air launched A2AD systems contesting the Royal fleet. On 9 May, British SBS conducted a maritime intercept mission, strafing and boarding an Argentinian merchant "spy Ship," the *Narwal*, and recovering orders and dispatches from the Argentinian Navy.<sup>146</sup> To gain local air superiority and set conditions for the amphibious assault, on 15 May, the Special Air Service (SAS) undertook a night raid of the Pebble Island expeditionary airfield, destroying 11

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<sup>142</sup> Duncan Anderson, *The Falklands War 1982* (Osceola, WI: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 87.

<sup>143</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign*, 7.

<sup>144</sup> David Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falkland's War* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987), 137.

<sup>145</sup> Anderson, *The Falklands War 1982*, 87.

<sup>146</sup> Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falkland's War*, 204.

Argentinian aircraft and temporarily neutralizing Pebble Island as a forward arming and refueling point (FARP).<sup>147</sup>

The third question determines the nature of the command and support relationship between the Army and maritime forces? The OPCON relationship was understood, however, tactical command relationships remained convoluted particularly with special forces. Rear Admiral Woodward retained OPCON of the task force, Commodore Clapp retained title of Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and Brigadier General Julian Thompson retained title of Commander of the Landing Force (CLF).<sup>148</sup> The Secretary of State for Defence [sic] did not see reason to alter the command and control structure for amphibious operations.<sup>149</sup>

While OPCON was delineated, it did not account for special forces. During the raid on Pebble Island, “Command of the support helicopters was not clear despite the telephone calls to Northwood [Joint Task Force Commander].” Allocation and apportionment of the aircraft remained a point of contention, particularly when linking SAS forces into the task organization.<sup>150</sup> Lack of a central strike command was evident, several hours after the SAS withdrew from Pebble Island, the already destroyed Argentinian aircraft on the airstrip were re-engaged by pre-planned (GR3) bombers; demonstrating a lack of effective fires integration at the Joint Task Force-level.<sup>151</sup>

Furthermore, planning for the SAS was always presumed as independent from the fleet, Commander of the SAS, Commander Delves states, “I never found out whether or not the carrier group’s operational staff ever viewed us formally as a strike asset that they should be

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<sup>147</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons* (London, United Kingdom: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1983), 7.

<sup>148</sup> Michael Clapp and Ewan Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands* (Yorkshire, United Kingdom: Pen and Sword, 1988), 51.

<sup>149</sup> British Policy Statement, *The Falkland Islands: The Strength of Britain’s Task Force*, Mr. John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defense, in the House of Commons on 7 April 1982, 12 April 1982, 6.

<sup>150</sup> Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands*, 111.

<sup>151</sup> Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands*, 166.



managing.”<sup>152</sup> Consequently, when the SAS rolled the raid 24 hours, this re-timing made a dramatic impact to the amphibious task force providing support for the raid force. “The plan might be simple on the ground, but it called for a lot of coordination out at sea. The *Hermes*, as the helicopter launch-platform, to get the aircraft in range would have to move closer in toward the Island, impacting every unit in the TF one way or another. She [the *Hermes*] would need at least one escort ship to provide defense against aircraft and submarines . . . and a gunship offshore.”<sup>153</sup> Because the SAS conducted a raid and did not occupy the airfield with follow-on forces, the Argentinians quickly replaced the lost Pucará aircraft at Pebble Island, demonstrating the Argentinian recognition of the need to maintain air superiority.<sup>154</sup>

The fourth question investigates what land force capabilities supported sea control? Land forces provided limited, non-integrated air defense which provided marginal support to the maritime force. On 20 May 1982, the amphibious assault of San Carlos established a lodgment for the 3rd Commando Brigade and the Parachute Regiment. As the amphibious task force entered the San Carlos sound, ships arrayed with the air missile defense assets screened for the offload outside of EXOCET missile range for the troop transportation ships and land-based rapier anti-air missiles positioned on the high grounds surrounding the sound, providing a “missile trap” for inbound aircraft.<sup>155</sup> The interior corridor of ship and land-based anti-air missiles provided the second layer of defense, the sea harriers on combat air patrol (CAP) provided the first layer of defense.<sup>156</sup> The inventory of air assets on the two light carriers (V/STOL capable) proved inadequate to establish local air superiority.<sup>157</sup> Further, the rapier system proved wholly incapable

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<sup>152</sup> Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, 131.

<sup>153</sup> Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, 155.

<sup>154</sup> Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, 173.

<sup>155</sup> Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falkland's War*, 204.

<sup>156</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons* (London, United Kingdom: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1983), 9.

<sup>157</sup> Girbran, *Strategic Imperatives, British Defense Policy*, 330.

of engaging low-flying enemy aircraft, launching 61 missiles and achieving hits on only 6 occasions.<sup>158</sup>

Question five queries what maritime capabilities supported power projection? Naval fire support, maritime sustainment, and medical support facilitated power projection. Land force after action reports illustrate that “naval bombardments were devastating and caused severe morale loss to the enemy...[though] ships were particularly vulnerable to the enemy air situation.”<sup>159</sup> The task force was sustained by a Royal Merchant Marine fleet comprised of forty-five ships which facilitated equipment conveyance, underway replenishment, minesweeping operations, communication and navigation, and water purification.<sup>160</sup> The naval hospital ship proved a vital component to land operations, retrieving, triaging, and saving 90 percent of casualties once admitted for medical support.<sup>161</sup>

Question six inquires how capability gaps were mitigated in the campaign? Capability gaps in air defense and counter-mine operations, assault support, and sustainment were mitigated through employment of forces, ingenuity, and audacity. The defense of the landing force was aided primarily by the destroyers, using the mountainous terrain around the San Carlos sound to force Argentinian aircraft into low-altitude high-speed runs which reduced pilot accuracy.<sup>162</sup> During amphibious planning the threat of maritime mines remained a persistent issue, naval fire support and the offload would be hindered if the vessels could not enter the sound, and the ships would be exposed to the Argentinian Air Force if the terrain could not be used to mask the assault. In response, Rear Admiral Woodward authorized “three civilian trawlers converted to the

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<sup>158</sup> Falklands-Initial Post Operational Reports, Headquarters, 33 Armored Brigade, dated November 1982. Page 2.

<sup>159</sup> Falklands-Initial Post Operational Reports, Headquarters, 33 Armored Brigade, dated November 1982. Page 2.

<sup>160</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign*, 26.

<sup>161</sup> Secretary of State for Defence [sic], *The Falklands Campaign*, 26.

<sup>162</sup> Martin Middlebrook, *Operation Corporate, The Falkland's War, 1982* (London, United Kingdom: Penguin Books, 1985), 220.

mine-sweeping role entering the Exclusion Zone on the way to San Carlos . . . we were anxious to employ trawlers, as we could not be entirely happy bringing naval gunfire support ships into waters that had not been swept.”<sup>163</sup>

Question seven asks how land and maritime commanders converged capabilities across multiple domains? The CATF and CLF recognized priorities of effort and worked to create a land scheme of maneuver nested with capabilities in both the maritime and land domains. On 25 May 1982, the *Atlantic Conveyor* was sunk by an Argentinian aircraft, along with the 3d Commando Brigade’s six assault support aircraft.<sup>164</sup> In an audacious action, 3d Commando Brigade commenced a 14 day assault the Eastern Falkland Island via foot march, supported by naval fire support provided by the *Arrow* and relying on maritime forces to sustain the Brigade at the Teal Inlet prior to assaulting Port Stanley.<sup>165</sup> To reinforce the maritime resupply up Teal Inlet, ground forces moved four rapier systems forward to protect the ships from Argentinian aircraft.<sup>166</sup>

Question eight inquires what domain gaps did the adversary exploit during the campaign? The Argentinians continued to exploit the air domain gap through sorties originating from Port Stanley, Pebble Island, and mainland Argentina. Through the Argentinian Air Force possessed an aging inventory of aircraft and missiles, the impact of aircraft employed limited options for the land and maritime forces. Throughout the war, the *HMS Sheffield* and *Atlantic Conveyor* were sunk by air-to-surface anti-ship missiles.<sup>167</sup> Further, the *HMS Glamorgan* was struck from a coastal defense launched anti-ship missile and survived in the final days of the campaign.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>163</sup> Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands*, 247.

<sup>164</sup> Brown, *The Royal Navy and the Falkland’s War*, 230.

<sup>165</sup> Middlebrook, *Operation Corporate, The Falkland’s War, 1982*, 282.

<sup>166</sup> Clapp and Southby-Tailyour, *Amphibious Assault Falklands* 220.

<sup>167</sup> Steward Menaul, *Lessons from the Falklands Campaign, The Arrival of Anti-Missile Warfare* (London, United Kingdom: Arrow House, Foreign Affairs Research Institute, 1982), 2.

<sup>168</sup> Menaul, *Lessons from the Falklands Campaign*, 2.

Question nine asks how were the exploited domain gaps mitigated? The exploited air domain was mitigated by raiding and neutralizing Argentinian aircraft launched from Pebble Island and Port Stanley airfield, and arranging fleet operations to protect the assault against Argentinian air power. The British recognized the significance of Pebble Island as both an expeditionary airfield for Argentinian aircraft refueling operations, and as an early warning radar station protecting the Falkland sound.<sup>169</sup> The British believed that, “Pebble Island had a significant place in the enemy’s overall operational level plan for the defense of the Falklands . . . their [Argentinian] navy would constitute the first line of defense, supported by mainland based fast jets...but should we [British] get ashore, this must surely be there for rapid response to pick up the counter-landing operations.”<sup>170</sup> To compensate for a contested air domain, the British created a screening force of “harriers and picket ships . . . the Argentinians had to penetrate at low altitudes and mass on British ships forcing the in order to have the numbers and fuel to reach their targets or abandon their attack sorties.”<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, 133.

<sup>170</sup> Delves, *Across an Angry Sea*, 135.

<sup>171</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman, “The Falkland’s Crisis: Emerging Lessons for Power Projection and Force Planning,” *Armed Forces Journal International* (September 1982): 34.

## Findings and Analysis

This section conducts a structured, focused comparison of the Whitehaven Expedition, Operation Husky, and Operation Corporate. The findings subsection compares the data collected in response to this study research questions. The analysis subsection examines these data to test the study's three hypotheses. Ultimately, this section aims to demonstrate that if the USN and USMC doctrinally align concepts and reorganize capabilities across maritime platforms, then it will positively synchronize operations across multiple domains

The first question is: how the maritime forces supported power projection? Evidence suggests that the Jones facilitated power projection by working through political channels to gain safe voyage for the Whitehaven expedition. Though the Continental Navy was unable to secure refuge after commencing commerce raiding, the commander managed to preserve the landing force in a contested maritime domain. During Operation Husky, the US Navy facilitated power projection by integrating fires from the maritime domain to compensate for lack of air domain coordination and sustained the land force throughout the offensive. During Operation Corporate, the Royal Navy conducted conventional deterrence by preventing reinforcement from reaching the Falklands and preventing the Argentinians from escaping the island via sea. Sustaining land operations ashore is a commonality among all cases, when involved in a contest over an island.

The second question is: how the land force supported sea control? Marines aided in raiding the Whitehaven fort to reduce the A2AD threat opposing maritime transit, attempted to seize a high value target, and subsequently reinforced the ship when contested by the British Royal Navy. During Operation Husky, the 7th Army reduced coastal defense guns and captured airfields, aiding the US Navy in gaining local maritime superiority for power projection and sustainment of the ashore. During Operation Corporate, land forces facilitated sea control for the Royal Navy by conducting maritime intercept operations and reduced local Argentinian air dominance by raiding Pebble Island and destroying the Argentinian expeditionary airfield.

Raiding airfields and coastal defenses are very effective ways of reducing adversary capabilities retain sea control.

The third question is: what is the nature of the command and support relationship between the Marines and the Navy forces? Jones retained control of the landing force and the maritime force throughout the Whitehaven Expedition. Further, Jones participation in the raid placed his leadership capacity at the point of friction, with the main effort as Marines destroyed the cannons to facilitate maritime superiority. The US Army, US Navy, and US Army Air Corps, throughout Operation Husky, did not maintain a supporting-supported relationship nor appreciate the interdependence of domains at the operational level. During Operation Corporate, the command relationship was prescribed in the directives, but tactical control, particularly for the SAS units, remained ambiguous. Jones participation in both land and maritime operations demonstrated continuity of unity of command, whereas command in Operation Husky failed to nest actions because of service parochialism, and Operation Corporate illustrated failure to synchronize special operations at the tactical level.

The fourth question is: what land force capabilities supported sea control? The Marines were used as an amphibious force to reduce the British A2AD capacity and as ship defense during a maritime engagement in the Whitehaven Expedition. Patton's 7th Army facilitated sea control by conducting airborne operations to reduce the Axis A2AD assets prior to the main assault. During Operation Corporate, 3d Commando failed to integrate land-based air defense capabilities with maritime based anti-air capabilities resulting in significant damage to maritime vessels. The only commonality among cases remains the aim to reduce enemy A2AD to facilitate sea control, the means and domain are different for each case.

The fifth question is: what maritime capabilities supported power projection? Jones first-hand knowledge and intelligence on the enemy and the operating environment impacted the Whitehaven Expedition. Jones knowledge of the British fort allowed the small raiding party to surprise and detain the British guards without firing a shot. During Operation Husky, the US

Navy conducted demonstrations and transportation for shore-to-shore maneuver, allowing Patton's 7th Army to bypass the Axis defenses en route to Messina.<sup>172</sup> As a result of the expeditionary nature of Operation Corporate, the land force was heavily reliant on naval surface fire support, maritime sustainment, and medical support. For each case, once the land forces aided in securing local sea control, the navy used the sea as maneuver space to facilitate land operations through intelligence, fires, and sustainment.

The sixth question is: how capability gaps were mitigated in the campaign? Use of France as a multinational security element, close coordination with land forces, and the element of surprise allowed the *Ranger* to carry out power projection in Whitehaven. The *Ranger* conducted a raid, attempted a night capture, and engaged the *Thomson* in a 48-hour period, preserving the element of surprise which was essential to the success of the campaign. Through careful application of dispersion, surprise, non-standard communication procedures, and naval surface fire support, the Allies mitigated capability gaps in the air domain in Operation Husky. During Operation Corporate, careful employment of forces, and ingenuity in converting civilian vessels for counter-mine operations mitigated capability gaps in air defense and counter-mine operations. Surprising the adversary remains a crucial element for mitigating capability gaps for each case study.

The seventh question is: how land and maritime commanders converged capabilities across multiple domains? Military deception and information operations converged to create an operational gap in Sicily, which the Allies exploited during Operation Husky. The disinformation from Operation Mincemeat and Barclay prevented the Axis from recognizing the Allied approach until Operation Husky was underway. During Operation Corporate, the CATF and CLF recognized the interdependence of maritime and land forces and worked to create a scheme of maneuver which facilitated sustainment for the land force and protection for the maritime force.

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<sup>172</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 29.

For both cases, maritime and land forces integrated schemes of maneuver to converge capabilities across multiple domains.

The eighth question is: what domain gaps did the adversary exploit during the campaign? The Axis forces conducted a delay to withdraw forces across the Straits of Messina relying on the air domain gap in Operation Husky. Consequently, Allied forces fought a more stubborn defense on the Italian mainland. During Operation Corporate, the Argentinian Air Force inflicted significant losses to the Royal Navy by exploiting the gap in air defense coverage. In both cases, the adversary exploited the air domain gap to facilitate land force operations.

The ninth question is: how were the exploited domain gaps mitigated? Operation Husky demonstrated that cooperation, coordination, and planning among services are sufficient mitigation measures for gaps in domain superiority. During Operation Corporate, raiding Pebble Island mitigated the air domain gap and reduced the attack options and duration of the Argentinian Air Force attempts to interdict the maritime domain. Planning in coordination and control of execution remain essential to prevent the adversary from exploiting domain gaps in an operation.

This study's first hypothesis asserts that aligning USN and USMC doctrine to incorporate both sea control and power projection will enhance unity of effort. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. To a large extent, Jones' skillful application of both land and ground forces, with a clearly understood command relationship facilitated success of the expedition. In contrast, the doctrinal dissonance of the Allied air, land, and maritime doctrine impacted the Allies capacity to respond to the Axis withdrawing across the Straits of Messina. Further, the coordination between the CATF and CLF, during Operation Corporate, illustrates the interdependence of maritime and land force. To quote Corbett, "the duties of the fleet do not end with the protection of troops during transit as is the case of convoys . . . the protective



arrangements must be sufficiently extensive to include arrangements for support.”<sup>173</sup> Till suggests that amphibious operations require maritime superiority, specialized skill and training, a joint approach, and surprise.<sup>174</sup> Consequently, Jones broke typical service parochialism by engaging in both maritime and land operations. This application of theory illustrates doctrinal alignment of land and maritime concepts.

The second hypothesis argues that reorganization and augmenting a greater number of USN vessels with USMC capabilities links power projection and sea control. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is inconclusive. During the Whitehaven expedition, the Marines and Navy supported both the missions of power projection and sea control. However, it is a weak analogy to suggest that capability alignment in the colonial era is applicable to current maritime operations. During Operation Husky, services retained their respective capabilities, though close coordination of land and maritime capabilities supported both the missions of sea control and power projection. Operation Corporate illustrated that capability gaps, particularly a lack of anti-air system interoperability, allowed the Argentinian Air Force to interdict the Royal Navy. However, it is a false cause logic to argue that land based anti-air assets must protect the fleet during power projection operations. It is more logical to illustrate that land forces should reduce land-based enemy A2AD capabilities through surprise tactics to facilitate temporary local maritime superiority.

The third hypothesis argues that if doctrine is refined and capabilities are reorganized, then it will enhance the joint forces ability to conduct MDO. The evidence does not support this hypothesis. Operation Husky and Corporate exemplify that even without air domain superiority, sea control and power projection can be attained, and the mission can be accomplished. Speller and Tuck argue that factors that support a successful expeditionary operation include, “good

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<sup>173</sup> Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy*, 280.

<sup>174</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 190.

preparation, sound planning, sufficient forces, proper equipment, local sea and air superiority, and efficient command and control.”<sup>175</sup> Consequently, services may retain its respective doctrine and still facilitate the joint forces ability to conduct MDO.

The empirical evidence and the analysis demonstrate that the three hypotheses outcomes are varied. First, alignment of USN and USMC doctrine to incorporate sea control and power projection will enhance unity of effort as demonstrated by all three cases. Second, the reorganization and augmentation of USN and USMC capabilities does not definitively link power projection and sea control. Third, refinement of doctrine and reorganization of capabilities will not definitively facilitate the joint forces ability to conduct MDO. Therefore, this study partially supports the thesis that if the USN and USMC doctrinally align concepts and reorganize capabilities across maritime platforms, then it will enhance the joint force capacity to conduct MDO.

The investigation of doctrine and capabilities which support MDO was the genesis of this study. Ultimately, doctrinal alignment is a greater guarantor of success than capability alignment. The USMC remains a hidden force provider in CWC, and there remains no mention of sea control in the USMC operating concept. Hopefully, in the near future, the USN and USMC will unify their respective theories in practice. The longer a respective service holds to traditional parochialism, the further it strays from the supporting the joint force.

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<sup>175</sup> Speller and Tuck, *Strategy and Tactics*, 85.

## Contemporary Utility

Analysis of the Whitehaven expedition is relevant for strategist and operational artist because it demonstrated that a commander's interpretation of doctrine and wide latitude to accomplish a strategic aim can overcome a deficiency in domain superiority. For most of the Revolutionary War, the US fought from a position of disadvantage. Despite weakness in the maritime and land domain, Jones created an operational approach which nested the interdependencies of sea control and power projection in a littoral environment and employed a tactically inferior force against an adversary's vulnerability. The tempo with which Jones prosecuted the expedition stunned the British inhabitants, and the *Ranger's* ability to transition from commerce raiding, to coastal raiding, to minor fleet battle confounded the population. The impact was not just tactical success, the expedition drew public attention away from the American Revolution back to homeland defense.<sup>176</sup>

The impact of coastal raiding and eventual failure of the British at Gallipoli inspired the USMC to investigate the concept of amphibious operations in the interwar period and produce the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* in 1934.<sup>177</sup> Following the publication of the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*, the USMC completed a series of Fleet Landing Exercises from 1935 until 1940, perfecting the capabilities and conduct of opposed and unopposed power projection.<sup>178</sup> Essential to the understanding of the thesis is that the doctrine for power projection was developed prior to the capability to conduct power projection. The *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations* would serve as a baseline for US Army amphibious assaults in the Mediterranean, notably Operation Husky.

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<sup>176</sup> Armstrong, *Small Boats and Daring Men*, 36.

<sup>177</sup> Millet and Murray, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 75.

<sup>178</sup> Millet and Murray, *Military Innovation in the Interwar Period*, 76.

Operation Husky is the second case which offers important insight for strategist and operational artists about large-scale combat operations. Till argues that the range of requirements needed to facilitate seapower requires a joint approach among services intending to gain superiority in a respective domain.<sup>179</sup> Consequently, the interdependence of the US Army and US Navy demonstrated compatibility in doctrine, planning, and execution. However, the doctrinal orientation of the US Army Air Corps was delinked from the planning and execution of the campaign, and the Allies fought from a position of disadvantage in the air domain.<sup>180</sup> The air domain disadvantage was mitigated to an extent during execution by relying on capabilities provided by a respective service. Reduction of the Axis A2AD was facilitated extensively by the US Army airborne which supported sea control. The sea control gained by the US Navy supported sustainment and power projection from the sea.

The Allies learned a critical lesson learned in Operation Husky that would be remedied in time for Operation Overlord, command relationships among service and partners is essential to planning and executing an operational approach.<sup>181</sup> The gap in air domain superiority was not forecasted, extensive preparation was made to gain the air domain, but doctrinal dissonance prohibited unity of effort. The gap was mitigated in execution through collaboration and merging capabilities to gain sea control to facilitate power projection. The British gained important insight and addressed command and support issues in future amphibious operations, though the lesson was somewhat lost during Operation Corporate thirty-nine years later.

Operation Corporate is the third case which offers lessons for strategist and operational artists about expeditionary limited warfare. Carrier Task Force 317 effectively coordinated and executed both sea control and power projection. The air domain remained contested throughout the early stages of the campaign, and the CATF and CLF coordinated at the tactical level to

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<sup>179</sup> Till, *Seapower*, 86.

<sup>180</sup> Garland and Smyth, *Sicily and the Surrender of Italy*, 421.

<sup>181</sup> Hewitt, *Action Report Western Naval Task Force*, 117.

mitigate the impact of the air domain on sea control. There were capability gaps which plagued the operation, particularly the lack of anti-air system compatibility between the land and maritime forces. However, Operation Corporate demonstrated that success can be achieved in an expeditionary operation even if the air domain remains contested.

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