

ROK Army Operations in the Jirisan Region
During the Korean War:
David Galula's Counterinsurgency Theory in Action

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

ROK Army Operations in the Jirisan Region during the Korean War: David Galula's Counterinsurgency Theory in Action, by MAJ Kwon Moon, 48 pages.

The research started with questioning which factors made the Korean Armed Forces counterinsurgency operations successful during the Korean War in 1950-1953. To analyze the case study of the Korean War, this study applied Galula's COIN warfare theory and principles in Counterinsurgency Warfare as an analytical frame: the four laws and the eight steps. His theory was suitable for this study in terms of the level of war, clarity of theory, and historical and regional backgrounds that informed the theory's formation. As the results of analysis as well as the frame, the key factors contributing to the success of the COIN operations in the Jirisan region during the Korean War in 1950-1953 were: initial gains of population's support through the destruction of insurgency forces; deployment of COIN static units demonstrating the ability to win; successful control of the population to build their support and turn an active friendly minority into a majority; and finally, destruction of the insurgent political organization by continuous and intensive efforts. With the results, three implications seem the most obvious: the importance of the Jirisan region in COIN operations; continuous and intensive governmental efforts; turning the active minority to the majority is the key in COIN. The author hopes this study contributes to fill a gap in the COIN study on the Korean War.

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Abbreviations

AROK	Army of the Republic of Korea
COIN	Counterinsurgency
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
ROK	Republic of Korea
TFP	Task Force Paik
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union)
YVU	Youth Vigilante Unit

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Introduction

The operations needed to relieve the population from the insurgent's threat and to convince it that the counterinsurgent will ultimately win are necessarily of an intensive nature and of long duration. They require a large concentration of efforts, resources, and personnel. This means that the efforts cannot be diluted all over the country but must be applied successively area by area.

—David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*

The Korean War has long been characterized as either a limited war, conventional war, or even by its hallmark amphibious operation at Incheon. What the war has typically not been known for is counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. However, COIN operations made up a significant portion of the campaign on the Korean peninsula during the war. Prior to their invasion and during the three years of open conflict, elements of the North Korean armed forces, the North Korean People's Army (NKPA), tried to form a second front in the rear area of South Korea through a series of insurgency operations. In particular, after the success of the United Nation's (UN) amphibious operation at Incheon, a force of nearly ten thousand troops, remnants of the NKPA projected into South Korean territory, united local partisans and established operating bases near Jirisan, at the south end of the Sobaek mountains. From here, these forces conducted insurgency operations to disrupt South Korean rear area operations. South Korean forces responded with a series of COIN operations against Jirisan's insurgents, operations that were ultimately successful.

While there are several studies that have chronicled these operations, few theory-based systematic analyses of the case exist. *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, which was published in South Korea in 1988, is a typical example of these historical narratives.¹ It offers foundational knowledge of the event by providing a chronology of the tactical operations that took place, but the book is not an analysis on the operational or strategic

¹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)* (Seoul, Korea: Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, 1988), 150.

levels of war. Nevertheless, this study relies heavily on this particular book because it is one of very few published works that contains detailed information on how the South Korean forces conducted their counterinsurgency operations. *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War* and *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* delivers more holistic analyses of military operations and includes information about COIN operations over the course of the Korean War.² Nevertheless, those studies lack theoretical analyses and thus cannot provide answers regarding why the South Korean forces won the COIN fight in the Jirisan region.

A study of David Galula's theory may provide answers. The theory of David Galula, in his book, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (1964), is one of the most well-known and organized works dealing with the topic of COIN operation. His theory has not only been widely used to explain the phenomenon of insurgency and COIN but also elucidate on a broad range of variables, from people to politics, into account. American COIN doctrine distilled his theory and concepts into its own doctrine. Furthermore, Galula's theory has solutions for countering the Chinese revolutionary warfare which had influenced insurgent operations during the Korean War.

This research will concentrate on ascertaining the theoretically based reasons for the South Korean forces' success conducting COIN operations during the period. Quite simply, this study asks what factors made the Korean Armed Forces counterinsurgency operations successful during the Korean War in 1950-1953. This study uses these findings to explore implications for future COIN operations in the Korean peninsula within its larger conclusions.

Based on initial historic, theoretical, and doctrinal readings, the proposed key factors contributing to the success of the COIN operations in the Jirisan region during the Korean War in 1950-1953 are: initial gains of population's support through the destruction of insurgency forces;

² Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2010); James L. Matray, ed., *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1991).

deployment of COIN static units demonstrating the ability to win; successful control of the population for their support and turning the active friendly minority to the majority; destruction of the insurgent political organization by continuous and intensive efforts. These factors are derived from Galula's theory of eight steps for operations, which relate closely with the four laws of COIN operations.³ As an example, the South Korean 11th Division and 8th Division had gained initial successes through the destruction of the North Korean insurgency forces.⁴ The successive commitment of Task Force Paik (TFP), as the COIN static unit, demonstrated the South Korean and UN's ability to win the COIN campaign.⁵ They also earned strong support from population through their initial gains with a unified command. TFP attained freedom of action and, more importantly, reinforced growing support from the local population through successful control of that population, and turned the neutral majority to the area of the active friendly minority. Furthermore, South Korea and UN forces successfully eliminated the core political group of the insurgency and the remnants of their forces by continuous and intensive efforts.

This case study analyzes the COIN operations of South Korean forces in the Jirisan region during the Korean War in 1950-1953. David Galula's COIN warfare theory and principles in *Counterinsurgency Warfare* will be a framework to analyze the actions of the Army of the Republic of Korea (AROK) against insurgent forces in Jirisan. Several historical sources provide foundational knowledge for these events, including the *Encyclopedia of the Korean War*, *Historical Dictionary of the Korean War*, and *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*. The last of these, published by Korean Department of Defense's Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, particularly, is the Korean government's official document.

³ The eight steps and the four laws of COIN warfare will be dealt with more deeply in the next section. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 107-135.

⁴ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 148-153; Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War*, 723.

⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 148-153; Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War*, 723.

The study will conclude by considering the implications of the Army's successes in Jirisan for future COIN operations.

This research is significant for two key reasons. First, its implications will contribute to the broader military community's preparations for future wars, which will likely see continued efforts by weaker forces to use insurgency as a means of countering stronger forces. Second, it will have significant impact on the Korean peninsula, where any future war will almost certainly see the inclusion of insurgency/COIN warfare again. Most military communities anticipate that future wars will be hybrid in nature, meaning those conflicts will be complex and contested wars made up of conventional operations in multiple domains, and will include insurgency and COIN operations, psychological operations, and operations with elements of national power other than military force. Today, the US military is changing its operational and doctrinal posture from COIN to large-scale combat operations, but the likelihood of hybrid conflicts in the future suggests that COIN operations should not be discounted. History suggests that adversaries adapt to counter dominant forms of warfare, and thus, the more the US military pursues advantages in large-scale combat operations with strong conventional forces or technological advantage, the more opponents will seek advantage in asymmetric ways to counter these strengths, including insurgency warfare. The results of this research can serve as a part of the knowledge on COIN operations for the military communities preparing for future hybrid wars.

In addition, nearly three quarters of the Korean peninsula is made up of mountainous areas where it is suitable for guerrilla forces to conduct insurgency operations, and the history of warfare in Korea illustrates this. In that vein, the Jirisan region was the place where remnants of North Korea's military forces most actively waged the insurgency operations against the South during the Korean War. The implications of the analysis of the successful but unknown COIN operations conducted during the Korean War through Galula's theory can have significant meaning for Korean military doctrine on COIN operations going into the future.

Theories of Counterinsurgency Warfare

Review of Other Theories

There are a variety of theoretic arguments as lenses for analyzing COIN operations, other than David Galula's theory. This section addresses why Galula's theory is the most suitable to this analysis by reviewing other theories. Also, it provides a framework which will be utilized throughout the analysis. In order to understand the strengths and weakness and match suitability of other theories on COIN to the case of the Jirisan COIN campaign, this monograph explores seven other theorists: Roger Trinquier, B. H. Liddell Hart, Thomas Hammes, Steven Metz, Douglas Ollivant, David Kilcullen, and Robert Grainger Ker Thompson. While the works of these theorists are not directly applicable to the case of Jirisan, they do each add to our understanding of the phenomenon of insurgency and COIN operations.

Of the many reputable theorists, one that should be addressed is Roger Trinquier. In his book, *Modern Warfare*, Trinquier emphasized that the aim of war in modern era is "to overthrow an authority and its regime," stressing on the interconnection among politics, economic, psychologic, and military.⁶ It reflected his various experiences of the Second World War, the First Indochina War, and the Algerian War. Having those practical experiences, he was skeptical of the conservative way to counter seemingly a new kind of warfare, which is insurgency. Despite his considerable contribution to the area of COIN in terms of terrorism and torture, his theory has limitations in that it cannot explain the whole spectrum of insurgency and COIN phenomena and that it is not able to explicitly distill how to conduct COIN operations into laws or theories.

Likewise, B. H. Liddell Hart had focused on a slightly different point. Experiencing severe suffering from the British frontal attacks in the Western Front during the First World War, he was critical on such form of attack that results in great casualties. Although he also has

⁶ Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

arguments on COIN operations, actually on guerrilla warfare, his focal point was the famous “indirect approach” strategy.⁷ He extolled T. E. Lawrence’s experiences and the Arab Revolt during World War I to emphasize the impact of insurgency.⁸ Liddell Hart acknowledged that the key factor to win against insurgency warfare is to gain the heart and mind of the local population.⁹ However, his theory concentrated heavily on contrasting the indirect approach to the direct approach as means to win war, showing the effectiveness of insurgency as a means to win in war by embracing the indirect approach. Still, his study focused more on the indirect approach as a concept for the insurgent, than through detailed study of its application by the defender.

Another theorist who aimed at introducing a conceptualization of insurgency rather than digging into the COIN warfare itself is Thomas Hammes, who dealt with the phenomena of insurgency and COIN in his work, *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century*. In that work, Hammes addressed what he termed “Fourth Generation Warfare,” focusing on the tendencies of insurgency operations.¹⁰ The book reflected the experience garnered during his lengthy career in the US Marine Corps. Hammes wrote that the United State was facing a different and unintended dimension (called the Fourth Generation Warfare) of the Second Gulf War. His work focused primarily on continued heavy reliance on technology, network systems, and organizational structure based on the nature of the Cold War in the face of a foes with greater political will.¹¹ Such political will works by forcing an enemy’s decision makers to believe that their goals are too costly to attain the perceived benefit.¹² Hammes’ focus primarily on employment of Fourth Generation Warfare by the insurgent limits its utility in this study.

⁷ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (New York: New American Library, 1974), 146-147.

⁸ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 361-370.

⁹ B. H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, 367-370.

¹⁰ Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), 1-15.

¹¹ Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone*, 190-291.

¹² Thomas Hammes, *The Sling and The Stone*, 207-223.

Unlike the theorists mentioned above, who examined different aspects of insurgency looking for universalist principles, Steven Metz, a senior research professor of National Security Affairs at the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, has a limitation of focusing on hybrid war almost exclusively from a US perspective. This perspective is firmly grounded in his lengthy career as a faculty member at various professional military education institutions, including the Air War College and the US Army Command and General Staff College and as advisor in government agencies and political organizations. Metz proposed five concepts for the complex future wars: maximum adaptability and flexibility, focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full dimensional precision, and integrated homeland security.¹³ That is, he argued that the United States should integrate above five concepts to cope with asymmetric enemies using insurgency or terrorism.¹⁴ However, his theory said little about fighting an insurgency from the tactical level and instead looked at the problem from a US's strategic standpoint.

There are, importantly, key theorists who have discussed COIN operations in terms of building an optimal tactical organization. Douglas Ollivant and Eric D. Chewning presented observations based in their experiences with COIN operations in Iraq. They insisted that COIN operations require simultaneous execution in the full range of kinetic and non-kinetic actions.¹⁵ However, their arguments focused on the idea that the basic tactical unit in COIN operations is the combined arms maneuver battalion associating with indigenous forces and living among the population.¹⁶ They argued how the US military should build a suitable tactical organization rather than distilling their experiences into a solid universal theory.

¹³ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts," Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monograph (January, 2001), 23.

¹⁴ Steven Metz and Douglas V. Johnson II, "Asymmetry and U.S. Military Strategy: Definition, Background, and Strategic Concepts," 23.

¹⁵ Douglas Ollivant and Eric D. Chewning, "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations," *Military Review* 86, no. 4 (July-August 2006), 50-59.

¹⁶ Douglas Ollivant and Eric D. Chewning, "Producing Victory: Rethinking Conventional Forces in Counterinsurgency Operations," 50-59.

Alternatively, Australian David Kilcullen, conducted research into a series of case studies that demonstrate practical ways to fight against insurgency.¹⁷ With the twenty-five years as an army officer, Kilcullen's career provided numerous opportunities to share his understanding as both scholar and practitioner. He served at various times as chief strategist for counterterrorism at the US State Department, as a counterinsurgency advisor to General David Petraeus during the development the US Army's counterinsurgency doctrine in the early years of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a special advisor to Condoleezza Rice.¹⁸ Nevertheless, Kilcullen study confines his study areas to the South Asia and Middle East regions and focuses on tactics and strategy, while ignoring the operational level.¹⁹ As this study deals with COIN operations on the Korean peninsula, it needs relevant case studies on the neighboring region involving China, Japan, Russia, and/or North Korea.

Finally, there is theorist Robert Thompson who is a British expert on COIN. He served in the Royal Air Force and participated in military operations in Malaya, Burma, and Vietnam as a staff officer or military advisor and his experiences formed the foundation of his thoughts. Like Kilcullen, however, Thompson's theory has limited scope by focusing on a specific region and time and not extrapolating his conclusions into a more general theory of COIN. In his book, *Defeating Communist Insurgency*, Thompson presented well-articulated principles on COIN operations in his book, arguing that the core of insurgency is political and aims to rescind the links between the government and the people.²⁰ His theory embraces these principles: establishing sound authority, military responding creating military problems from insurgency,

¹⁷ David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 86.

¹⁸ New America, "David Kilcullen," accessed 18 December 19, <https://www.newamerica.org/our-people/david-kilcullen/>.

¹⁹ David Kilcullen, *Counterinsurgency*, 86-87.

²⁰ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam (Studies in International Security)* (London, UK: Chatto & Windus, 1966), 24.

economy of force, cultural sensitivity, and time.²¹ This politically focused framework works well in examining his case, but study's narrow focus on the Southeast Asian region and concentration on strategic considerations for countering insurgency's political aims from a strategic perspective, limits its utility for the military practitioner.

David Galula's Theory

It is David Galula's theory that best fits the purpose and method of this study on counterinsurgency operations in Korea during the Korean War for three reasons. First, his theory examines COIN from both the operational and strategic levels of war, which is where this study will focus.²² Second, Galula's COIN theory is one that counters insurgency operating within the framework of Mao's Revolutionary strategy.²³ The remnants of NK forces and sympathetic SK partisan forces operating in the UN's rear area during the Korean War were heavily influenced by China, and more specifically, Mao's revolutionary thought. Finally, Galula presents a clear set of universalist principles designed to aid in understanding COIN operations beyond a single place and time. Galula distilled these principles into four laws of COIN warfare and eight steps for the conduct of operations to defeat insurgencies.²⁴

²¹ Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam*, 70-110.

²² Galula mentions "From Strategy to Tactics" in his book. However, the author interpreted the term of *the tactics* into *operational level* given his argument in his book. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 87-106.

²³ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, ix-xiv, 4-10.

²⁴ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 71-79, 107-135.




Figure 1. The Four Laws of COIN Warfare. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 74-79.

Galula’s greatest contribution to our current understanding of counterinsurgency warfare is the development of his four laws of COIN warfare, as shown in Figure 1. The first law stresses the importance of the population’s support in COIN warfare. The second law elucidates that the COIN forces should enable a neutral majority to rally in the favorable and should neutralize or eliminate the active hostile minority by using the active friendly minority. The third law emphasizes that military forces and police must maintain security in order to keep the support of the population. Furthermore, it stresses that elements of national power such as politics, society and economy should work with tight coordination to show that they have the will, the means and the ability to win the war, as early as possible. The final law is that they should intensely project these efforts local by local, rather than scattered.²⁵

²⁵ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 74-79.




Figure 2. The Eight Steps for COIN Operations. David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964), 107-135.

In addition to these laws, Galula drew an eight-step model to describe the execution of COIN operations that extends from the laws of COIN, as seen in Figure 2. The first step is to prepare the follow-on stage for the further progress of the COIN operations. Mobile units provide static units with freedom of action to start main COIN operations by destruction or expulsion of the insurgent forces. The purpose of the second step is to establish a grid of troops for providing the population and COIN operation teams with protection and security. In the third step, COIN forces re-establish the authority over the population, isolate them from the guerrillas, and gather the necessary intelligence. The fourth step recommends eradicating the insurgent political organization through a police operation dealing with the suspected agents. The common purpose of the fifth, sixth, and seventh step is to construct a stable system to consolidate and maintain the support of the population in the changed climate. The last step means liquidating the remnants of the insurgency forces by physical operations and amnesty offers.²⁶

²⁶ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 107-135.

A Frame for Analysis




Figure 3. A Frame for Analysis. Created by author.

In order to understand the conduct of COIN operations in the Jirisan region during the Korean War and answer the research question, this study has used Galula's four laws and eight steps to develop four specific factors to use as a frame for analysis. The factors' steps are a compound originated from. The fifth, sixth, and seventh in the eight-steps of Galula's concept, which relate to cases of regime change, are not relevant to the Jirisan campaign and thus, this study's analytical frame excludes them. During the Korean War, because the South Korean government could extend its influence to the region, and the function of the administrative agencies had been maintaining, the campaign did not need local elections, testing the local leaders, or organizing a party. Also, the fourth factor in Figure 3 encompasses the fourth step and the eighth step due to their similar meanings. Finally, although the laws of COIN warfare should apply to all the steps, each factor in the frame includes part of the laws emphasized at the specific steps: the first has the support of population in the first law; the second contains demonstrating ability to win in the third law; the third takes using active minority; the fourth embraces the continuous and intensive efforts.²⁷

²⁷ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 71-79, 107-135.

Counterinsurgency Operations in the Korean War

Prior to Japan's long colonial occupation, Korea had a long history of dynastic rule such as the Three Kingdoms period, the North and South States, Goryeo, and Joseon. Internal ideological struggles during the Joseon dynasty, in part, created political instabilities that ultimately led to Japan's colonial rule in 1910.²⁸ As the Japanese colonial period ended in 1945, the peninsula was plunged into yet another ideological conflict, the Cold War. The division of the peninsula at the end of World War II left the newly formed Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the north and Republic of Korea (ROK) in the south divided both physically and ideologically. The north fell under the control of the Soviet Union (USSR) and Stalinism, while the South came under the control of US liberalism and capitalism. The majority of the Korean people, both north and south, at that time, however, were more of a neutral majority as described by Galula than their counterparts in their respective governments.²⁹

Before the Korean War, North Korean leaders had been establishing the second front, that is, insurgency operations, in the rear of South Korean territories. Stalin had cautioned Kim Il-sung and Pak Hon-yong that subversion could work both insurgency and South Korean Labor Party (SKLP) infiltration of the security forces.³⁰ Kim Il-sung placed Pak Hon-yong in charge of the Democratic Front for the Unification of the Fatherland, created to direct the partisan war in South Korea and conduct political actions designed to undermine the authority of the Rhee Syngman's regime.³¹ The US Central Intelligence Agency, in 1949, calculated the total number of guerrillas in the South excluding those on Jeju Island to be between 3,500 and 6,000.³² These

²⁸ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 4.

²⁹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 76.

³⁰ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 177.

³¹ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 177.

³² James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia* (Denver, CO: ABC-CLIO, 1999), 26.

guerrillas operated mostly out of mountainous areas such as the region of Jirisan, taking care to locate away from roads and railways.³³ On June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded the South with Pak Hon-yong promising an uprising of 200,000 insurgents.³⁴

Early Stages of the Korean War

At the beginning of the Korean War, the offensive of the NKPA forces appeared unstoppable. About six weeks after the invasion, they had captured ninety percent of South Korea's territory.³⁵ While the North prepared for the war based on a meticulous plan coordinated with the Soviets and China, South Korea was not prepared for a war and did not have enough war supplies.³⁶ For example, South Korean forces had no anti-tank guns or tanks to cope with NKPA armor units. In August and September 1950, the ROK government and the UN forces formed the Pusan Perimeter along the Naktong Defense Line.³⁷ The ROK government was at the edge of the cliff. However, an audacious amphibious operation changed the entire environment.

The Incheon Amphibious Operation (Operation Chromite) was a successful operation, and completely reversed the situation that had emerged in those early months. But, unfortunately, the Jirisan area came to face another form of warfare against the remnants of the NKPA regular troops, partisans in South Korea, and the complexity of both, as the North began to withdraw following Chromite. The success of the Incheon Amphibious Operation trapped the NKPA soldiers invading deep into South Korea.³⁸ Most of them moved to mountainous areas, such as the Jirisan region, where South Korean and UN forces could not reach. They became guerrillas and threatened the lines of communications of the South Korean and UN forces.³⁹

³³ James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia*, 26.

³⁴ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 244.

³⁵ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom* (McLean VA: Brassey's (US), INC., 1992), 1-34.

³⁶ Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950*, 175-195, 241-246.

³⁷ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 28-46.

³⁸ James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia*, 26.

³⁹ James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia*, 26.

The total number of guerrillas operating in the Jirisan region during AROK's counterinsurgency operations was approximately 30,000 to 40,000.⁴⁰ In particular, the Nambu Corps, commanded by Lee Hyun-Sang, was large enough to have several divisions and was equipped with heavy arms and equipment.⁴¹ Not only did they disrupt the rear of the UN forces, but also they created anxiety and fear for the people in the region by plundering food, livestock, and clothes. They caused severe damage to the local people. Indeed, the region was like "the Republic of Korea during day-time and the People's Republic of Korea during night-time."⁴²

North Korean Insurgency Operations in the Korean War

As the troops participated in Operation Chromite linked with the UN troops conducting the offensive north from the Pusan Perimeter on September 27, 1950, the NKPA 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, and 10th Divisions projected into the front of Masan and Changryeong lost their lines of communication and routes for the retreats were interdicted.⁴³ Cooperating with the sympathetic partisans in the rear, the remnants of about 10,000 men established bases and sanctuaries around Jirisan for harassing the rear of UN forces and South Korean forces.⁴⁴ By October of 1950, the number of guerrilla troops south of the thirty-eight parallel reached over 15,000.⁴⁵ The insurgency, as the second front, raided transports and personnel, destroying facilities and

⁴⁰ Suk Gyun Jeong, "The Operations of the General Paik's Field Combat Command and Its Lessons," *Military History*, no. 53 (2004): 31.

⁴¹ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 182; Suk Gyun Jeong, "The Operations of the General Paik's Field Combat Command and Its Lessons," 31-32.

⁴² Suk Gyun Jeong, "The Operations of the General Paik's Field Combat Command and Its Lessons," 32.

⁴³ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 148.

⁴⁴ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 149.

⁴⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 150.

supplies, and trying to interdict the communications of the UN forces.⁴⁶ Their efforts caused the logistical operations of the South Korean and UN forces to deteriorate rapidly in the early operations of the war.⁴⁷

The guerrillas, scattered in different provinces, were mostly destroyed by the COIN operations of two South Korean divisions (the 8th and 11th Division) from October 1950 to May 1951. However, in August 1951, Lee Hyun-sang, known as the supreme commander of the insurgency in South Korea, unified the command and control of insurgent forces in the south. After holding a convention encompassing the guerrillas of six provinces at Nonggol, the north of Jirisan, he reorganized the individual ranger troops in the provinces, promoted them into divisions, and put them under the control of the Nambu Corps which he directly commanded.⁴⁸




Figure 4. Order of Battle of the Nambu Corps, August 1951. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)* (Seoul, Korea: Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, 1988), 184.

⁴⁶ James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia*, 26; Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 151.

⁴⁷ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 151.

⁴⁸ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 183.

The order of battle of the Nambu Corps is shown in Figure 5. Of these forces, the 81th and the 92th divisions were most well-organized units, having been directly subordinate units under the Nambu Corps prior to the reorganization. The 57th division of Kyeongnam province, and three divisions of Jeonbuk province (45th, 46th, and 53th divisions) made up the remainder. In September 1951, they changed the tactics, raiding small cities and police stations with massed troops, instead of smaller raids on point objectives by small numbers of men and run-aways. Occasionally, they occupied small villages for certain time periods, plundered food, and kidnapped villagers.⁴⁹

Furthermore, insurgents expanded their influence through sinister recruitment tactics. They used the ambitions of young men to trap them on a slippery slope of ever-increasing commitment, as described in the prisoner interrogations discussed in Sun Yup Paik's book:

The communist insurgents approached young men of military age in the villages and hamlets throughout the Jirisan region and promised these men that if they joined the guerrillas, the communist leaders would appoint them to prize positions in local government such as mayors of townships, county chiefs, and heads of post offices once a communist society had been set up in the south. Dazzled by the temptation of filling posts they regarded as highly desirable, young villagers often left their families to join the guerrillas in the mountains. We discovered that many of these young people carried actual certificates of appointment hidden in the waistbands of their trousers. Once a villager joined the guerrillas, the new recruit often found that his first mission was to win his own village over to the communist cause, a process that usually involved the punishment of reactionary elements in the hamlet, even their assassination. Once a recruit had committed criminal acts, he had no choice but to remain with the communist cause and could not flee the mountains and return to his village.⁵⁰

South Korean Armed Force's Operations in the Rear Area

Though it appeared that UN forces had turned the tide with their successful landings at Inchon, the advancing US Eighth Army faced a major setback when Chinese forces intervened into the Korean peninsula on October 19, 1950.⁵¹ To mitigate the problem, the Army committed

⁴⁹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 184.

⁵⁰ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 191-192.

⁵¹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 154.

the US 9th Corps, which had been operating in the rear as a reserve, to defend along the Cheongcheon River front. To fill the gap created in the rear area, on October 15, 1950, the Army of Republic of Korea (AROK) issued Operational Order 216, creating the 3rd ROK Corps and placing it in charge of rear operations. The army detached six ranger battalions and the 2nd / 5th / 9th / 11th divisions to the Corps. In doing so, the 3rd Corps came to conduct missions for eliminating the guerrillas and securing the rear lines of communication on behalf of the US 9th Corps.⁵²




Figure 5. The Task Organization of the 3rd Corps in October 1950. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)* (Seoul, Korea: Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, 1988), 155.

The Corps established its main command post in Wonju and the 11th division in the Jirisan region.⁵³ Reflecting the changed operational environment, the Corps moved the main command post from Wonju to Daejeon.⁵⁴ Additionally, on November 17, 1950, AROK returned

⁵² Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 154.

⁵³ The 3rd Corps disposed other divisions in scattered regions: the 2nd division in Pyeongkang followed by Chuncheon, the 5th division in the Yeongnam province, the 9th division in the Daedunsan region, the six ranger battalions in the center and eastern regions. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 156.

⁵⁴ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 156.

the 2nd and 5th divisions to the control of the ROK Army headquarters.⁵⁵ On December 10, the army had ended the mission of the 3rd Corps and deployed it to the front line, leaving only the 11th division to continue COIN operations in Jirisan.⁵⁶

Counterinsurgency Operations in the Region of Jirisan

Jirisan is a broad region bordering North and South Jeolla and South Kyeongsang provinces as seen in Figure 6. The Jiri mountains consist of high and heavily wooded peaks and lie on the southern area of the peninsula.⁵⁷ The region is famous for its ruggedness. Korean ancestors used to tell descendants that bandits had lived in the region in the past because of its harshness. In this study, Jirisan is the core area, and the region of Jirisan embraces the neighboring areas and mountains in concert with the insurgency activities.




Figure 6. The Location and the Figure of Jirisan. Dae-Ho Jung, Hong Seomun, Dong-Ju Song, Eun-Hye Choi, Sa-Hyun Lee, Yong-Hak Lee, Chea-Un Cho, Byeong-Cheol Song, and Doo-Ha Yang, “Analysis of Asiatic Black Bear's foods by using Scats in the Jirisan National Park,” Korean J. Environ. Ecol. 30 (October 2016), 867; “Jirisan National Park,” accessed 29 October 19, <https://www.trazy.com/spot/3429/jirisan-national-park-지리산-국립공원#&gid=1&pid=1>.

⁵⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 157.

⁵⁶ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 157.

⁵⁷ James E. Hoare and Susan Pares, *Conflict in Korea: An Encyclopedia*, 26.

COIN operations in the region of Jirisan consisted of the four phases, based on the unit leading the effort: the first phase, 4 October 1950 to 30 March 1951, was led by the 11th division; the second phase, 15 April to 11 May 1951, led by the 8th division; the third phase, 30 November 1951 to 15 March 1952, led by Task Force Paik (TFP); and the fourth phase, 13 July to 4 August 1952, led by the 1st division.⁵⁸ Although AROK forces could not eliminate the insurgent forces entirely, they successfully dismantled and destroyed the organization of these guerrilla forces throughout the four phases of operations. After TFP's Operation Rat-killer, the AROK estimated that ROK Army forces had killed or captured a total of more than 19,000 guerrillas and bandits.⁵⁹ Overall, the number of the guerrillas operating only in the major mountain areas of the southwest region had reduced from 8,942 in November 1951 to 1,206 by August 1952.⁶⁰ Numbers alone would suggest that these COIN operations were successful, however it is important to note that it was the ways in which AROK operated that created the success.⁶¹

Each phase of the operations in the Jirisan campaign follows what Galula has since defined as his operational steps and four laws. The first two phases, conducted by the 11th and 8th divisions, match Galula's first step which is the *destruction of insurgency forces for initial gains*. The TFP's divisions, as follow-on static units, started their own COIN operations with freedom of action enabled by the earlier expulsion of insurgent forces occupying villages and hamlets in the area. The third phase operations, conducted by TFP, aligns with Galula's second and third steps, *deployment of the counterinsurgency static units demonstrating ability* and *turning the active friendly minority to the majority* as the third step. Over the course of the third and fourth phases, AROK forces completed Galula's final step, the *destruction of the insurgent*

⁵⁸ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 167-225.

⁵⁹ Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War*, 723.

⁶⁰ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 185, 225.

⁶¹ Spencer C. Tucker, ed., *The Encyclopedia of the Korean War*, 723.

political organization by continuous and intensive efforts. TFP did this by establishing a grid of troops for providing the population and COIN operations teams with protection and security. They re-established the authority over the population, isolated them from the guerrillas, and gathered the necessary intelligence. Throughout the third phase operations of Task Force Paik and the fourth phase operations of the 1st division, AROK eradicated the insurgent political organization and showed the will to win the campaign by continuous and intensive efforts.

Analysis on the Counterinsurgency Operations

Destruction of Insurgency Forces for Initial Gains

The first and second phases of AROK operations made three significant gains in the fight against communist insurgents, but also bear the stain of attacks against civilians that could have negated the good done. Above all, the destruction of a large number of guerrillas in the cities and the towns of the region provided the freedom of action needed for Task Force Paik to launch larger scale operations. In addition, AROK divisions forced insurgents out of populated areas and into the mountains, effectively separating guerrillas from the people. In doing so, the 11th and 8th divisions laid the foundation for increasing support the military by the population by returning the more stabilized cities and villages to the citizenry. Sadly, however, in the process, a few units committed terrible massacres which could have had significant negative impacts to the COIN operations that followed.




Figure 7. The South Korean Administrative Districts and Major Mountains in the Southwest. Created by author.

In September 1950, after the amphibious landings at Inchon and the subsequent UN counteroffensive, the defeated North Korean stragglers joined the partisans in the region of Jirisan

and began the insurgent activities.⁶² They organized the Jeonnam Province Ranger Command.⁶³ Likewise, they created the Jeonbuk Province Ranger Command.⁶⁴ The ranger units had bases in rough mountains like Backunsan, Duckyusan, Hwoimunsan, Sokrisan, Bulgabsan, Backasan, and Hwahaksan, as well as Jirisan.⁶⁵ The region of Jirisan was the hatchery for the rangers at the time.

The 11th division moved from Daegu to Namwon in mid-October 1950. The division, under BG Duck-Sin Choi, was made up of 9th, 13th, 20th regiments, and five security battalions. The commander deployed the three regiments in Jirisan, Jeonbuk, and Jeonnam respectively and apportioned the five security battalions, police, and the Youth Vigilante Units (YVU) to the securing of main supply lines and important facilities.⁶⁶

The regiments of the 11th division took the initiative through aggressive action against insurgents in the towns and cities suffering from the guerrillas. The 9th regiment conducted missions in around Jirisan region such as Namwon and Backunsan, the most fierce of which was a battle in Daejeonri of Namwon on November 20, 1950, which the first battalion of the 9th regiment killed 532 guerrillas and captured ninety-eight men and ninety-nine rifles.⁶⁷ The 13th regiment's operational areas were mainly cities and towns north of Jirisan like Duckyusan and

⁶² Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 167.

⁶³ The command included the Hwasun-Boseong ranger, the Hwasun Coal-mine ranger, the Eastern Naju ranger, the Yeongguang ranger, the Guangsan ranger, the Jangheung-Guangyang-Jangsung ranger, the Namhae brigade, the Obeoi (parents) troops, the Damyang ranger, the 522 / 523 / 524 troops, the 1 / 3 / 8 / 15 regiments, an artillery, and the 540 / 550 troops. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 167.

⁶⁴ The command consists of the Byeorak (thunder) troops, the Docsuri (eagle) troops, the Katusa troops, the Bongae (lightening) troops, the Bowee troops, the Kipo troop, and other ranger units. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 167.

⁶⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 167.

⁶⁶ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 167-175.

⁶⁷ Other towns and regions the 9th regiment operated were Hamyang, Duckyusan, Guangyang, Dansung, Geochang, Gyeojoksan, Backasan, and Suncheon. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 169-171.

Jeonju. The unit was to secure the supply line of between Jinju and Namwon and clear it of insurgents. They not only accomplished mopping up the most guerrillas in the areas of operations but also helped to stabilize the region of Jeonbuk. Likewise, the 20th regiment operated in west and southwest of Jirisan: Gwangju and Bulgabsan.⁶⁸ Their operations against the guerrillas were so effective as to make the insurgents unable to reconstitute.

Over the course of about six months, the 11th division successfully stopped local insurgents from conducting organized and unified activities. Instead, guerrilla forces were forced to leave the villages and enter deep mountainous area to avoid the AROK's offensive operations. That helped to reduce guerrilla damages, alleviate civilian suffering, and largely stabilized the area. During that time, the division inflicted on the guerrillas 1,950 killed in action (KIA) while capturing 2,178 prisoners and 261 rifles. In contrast, the 11th division suffered 531 killed, 843 wounded, and eighty-five missing.

Yet despite the satisfactory outcomes, the 11th division also severely undercut their own local support by committing a massacre at Geochang massacre during their operations. Over two days, beginning on February 10, 1951, the third battalion of the 9th regiment executed groups of the civilians in the Geochang village of Shinwon because the unit believed the villagers to be in league with the insurgents. Fortunately, the 11th division turned over the mission to the 8th division two months later and moved to Daegu.⁶⁹

Despite heavy casualties and the damage done by the village massacre, the division's tactical successes provided freedom of action for the follow-on COIN units in the area's major cities and towns. Still, the insurgent was able to reorganized their dispersed troops and rebuild

⁶⁸ Other areas 20th regimem operated were Damyang, Jangsung, Yeongang, Sunchang, Hwasun, Naju, and Hwoimunsan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 169-174.

⁶⁹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 174-175.

some of their sanctuaries.⁷⁰ For example, at the moment of transition, the number of guerrillas in certain region of Jeollado was still about 3,000 men. However, their main areas of activity were confined to the mountains, where they launched raids against police offices, looted food, committed kidnappings and massacres of the local population, and continued to threaten major routes like the Jeongeup-Jangseong and Jeongeup-Sunchang-Imsil roads.⁷¹

Once the 8th division had finished building its combat power in Daegu, they moved to Jeonju to relieve the 11th division on April 3, 1951. The 8th division, under the command of Brigade General Young Hee Choi, was smaller than the common division. The division consisted of a cavalry battalion, two infantry battalions, a security battalion, an engineer battalion, two police battalions, and a YVU. They were to wage the second phase of operations, continuing the completion of Galula's first step operations started by the 11th division, focusing on northwest of Jirisan.⁷²

The 8th division operated for only a month, from April 15 to May 11, 1951, but in that time killed 535 guerrillas and captured 624 prisoners, with losses of only twelve KIA and twenty-one wounded within the division.⁷³ The division carried out several major battles in mountainous areas.⁷⁴ The fact that the 8th division waged in mountainous areas demonstrates the degree to which the 11st division's operations provided freedom of action in the cities and towns and

⁷⁰ The guerillas in Geumsan, Jeongeup, Sunchang, and Buan reorganized dispersed troops and rebuilt their bases. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 176.

⁷¹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 176.

⁷² The division focused on Geumsan, Guksabong and Buan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 176-178.

⁷³ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 183.

⁷⁴ In the battle of Geumsan District, they operated at Hill 662.7, Daedunsan, and Unamsan. The battle of Guksabong District took place in Yeobusan, Baekhaksan, and Hoemunsan as well as Guksabong. The operational areas of the battles of Buan District were Hill 638, Ssangsunbong, Hill 334.6, and Yongdeung. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 179-182.

forced the insurgents to hide in the deep mountains. The AROK had clearly taken the initiative away from the guerrillas in the Jirisan region in only seven months. Although the number of casualties on the insurgent side seems small, the negative impact on their insurgent activities was significant. On 19 May, the division left Jeonju and moved to support operations on the front.⁷⁵

Deployment of the Counterinsurgency Static Units Demonstrating Ability

The AROK's third phase of operations (consisting of four sub-phases) implemented by Task Force Paik in the Jirisan region destroyed the main body and commanding system of the insurgent Nambu Corps over the course of about three and half months.⁷⁶ AROK forces inflicted severe damage on the guerrillas: 6,961 KIAs and 7,016 POWs from the first sub-phase to the third sub-phase.⁷⁷ TFP planned to destroy the guerrillas by focusing on Jirisan itself, focusing on main insurgent bases for the first sub-phase, then shifting to peripheral areas for the second sub-phase, expanding to both regions simultaneously for the third sub-phase, and focusing on the peripheral areas again for the fourth sub-phase. And they did it. They destroyed the guerrillas' psychological will as well as damaging them and their networks physically. They achieved the goals Galula describes in the second step for COIN operations. Task Force Paik established a grid of troops to provide the population and COIN operational teams with protection and security. Furthermore, they demonstrated their ability and will to win.

Despite the efforts of the 11th and 8th divisions (the first and second phases of AROK), the Nambu Corps, led by Lee Hyun-Sang, revived as a robust force following their operations. The estimated number of the troops was approximately 20,000.⁷⁸ They ambushed and raided

⁷⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 183.

⁷⁶ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 217.

⁷⁷ As mentioned early, the detailed casualties of the insurgent during the fourth phase was unknown.

⁷⁸ Suk Gyun Jeong, "The Operations of the General Paik's Field Combat Command and Its Lessons," 32.

major logistic lines and railroads of UN forces to steal or harass the supplies and equipment moving toward the front. More importantly, they again created anxiety and fear for the local population by plundering food, livestock, and clothing.⁷⁹

The National Assembly passed a resolution demanding the restoration of law and order in South Korea's southern districts on October 8 and 31, 1951.⁸⁰ This facilitated President Rhee to earnestly request General Van Fleet to take action.⁸¹ Van Fleet, in turn, presented Major General Sun Yup Paik with the following guidance:

General Van Fleet said, "I'm informed that you have a lot of experience in counter-guerrilla warfare. You've got to take charge of this thing. We can temporarily pull two divisions out of the line for this mission, and I'll leave it up to you which ones we use." He then laid out a map and presented an outline of the mission.

1. The ROK government would announce martial law south of Taejon for the duration of the operation.
2. One division would land at Yosu and then march north. The other division would travel overland to Taejon and then march south. The two would converge on the Chiri Mountains and attack from all sides at once.
3. The ROK Air Force would provide close air support.
4. I would prepare detailed operations plans under the direction and with the cooperation of the ROK Army chief of staff.
5. Eighth Army and the UN Command would provide all needed support.
6. The US Far Command Headquarters in Tokyo would provide psychological warfare support in the form of broadcasts and leaflets.⁸²

On November 16, 1951, MG Paik was appointed commander of the unit to clear guerrillas around the Jirisan region. The US Eighth Army's operation order named the unit as Task Force Paik (TFP) and the operation as Operation Rat Killer.⁸³ The main sub-units of the TFP consisted of the Capital division and 8th division from the front lines.⁸⁴ Other than the two

⁷⁹ Suk Gyun Jeong, "The Operations of the General Paik's Field Combat Command and Its Lessons," 32.

⁸⁰ Korea National Assembly Archives, "Korean National Assembly's Historic Chronology," accessed 7 April 20, <http://archives.nanet.go.kr/assemblyHistory/assmCurrentStateList.do#none>.

⁸¹ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 180.

⁸² Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 180-181.

⁸³ Suk Gyun Jeong, "The Operations of the General Paik's Field Combat Command and Its Lessons," 33.

⁸⁴ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 181.

divisions, TFP had local police forces and the Southwest District Command attached. The task organization of TFP is shown in Figure 7.




Figure 8. The Task Organization of TFP on November 25, 1951. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)* (Seoul, Korea: Committee for Compilation of Korean War History, 1988), 187.

The operational plan of the ROK Army Headquarter shows how AROK had prepared for Operation Rat Killer. Unlike the operations tasked earlier to the 11th and 8th divisions, ROK Army Headquarters gave TF Paik a detailed plan articulating the type of forces to be used, such as striking forces, interdicting forces, and forces occupying strong points. Therefore, the employment of Task Force Paik shows an example of the counterinsurgency static units mentioned by Galula. The summary of the operational plan is the following quotation:

1. TFP: a. Start the attack at H-hour on D-day and conduct the operation in the four phases: 1) For the Phase I, attack the Jirisan region, which is the strongest base of the insurgent, by all the forces. The anticipated end date is on December 10; 2) For the Phase II, attack simultaneously strong bases in two regions, Kyeongnam and Jeonbuk, by projecting each unit. The anticipated end date is on December 30; 3) For the Phase III, eliminate the remnants of the enemies in the areas of operation where the forces would operate during the phase I and II. The anticipated end date is on January 10, 1952; 4) For the Phase IV, clear the remnants of the insurgent in the other area by some of the units. b. Each unit should be prepared for readiness for a maneuver and an immediate deployment to the front on order.

2. Southwest Command: Turn its operational control over TFP.
3. Taebaksan Command: a. Keep going the current mission, and interdict on the line of Punggi-Sangju and Chungju-Sangju against the insurgent's movement. b. On order, maintain readiness for reinforcement to TFP in twenty-four hours.
4. Department of Police: a. Keep going the current mission, and interdict on the line of Chungju-Daejeon-Jeonju and Cheonan-Gangkyeong against the insurgent's movement. b. On order, maintain readiness for reinforcement to TFP in twenty-four hours.
5. Coordination: a. The operation articulates three types of units: striking forces, interdicting forces, and forces occupying strong points. The striking forces contact the insurgent and destroy it. The interdicting forces block the enemy's retreats and support the striking forces in the disposition with sufficient depth. b. Once the bases of the insurgent in each region are destroyed, the striking forces should be prepared for movement for other area in order to eliminate the dispersed remnants.⁸⁵

With this plan, TF Paik began Operation Rat Killer, which consisted of four sub-phases based on the ones the AROK headquarters provided. For the first sub-phase, TFP planned to destroy insurgent forces and their bases by encircling the region of Jirisan, searching and attacking the guerrillas with striking forces from the Capital and 8th divisions, suffocating them with interdicting forces and strongpoint-occupying forces, and then repeating the process.⁸⁶ Then, for the second sub-phase, the command planned to destroy the dispersed guerrillas through search-and-attack operations toward each, base by base.⁸⁷ During this sub-phase, the major forces, which were the Capital division, 8th division, and the Southwest Command, each conducted independent operations in their designated areas.⁸⁸ In the operations of the sub-phase three, Paik projected his striking forces again to the Jirisan region simultaneously in order to

⁸⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 190-191.

⁸⁶ To prevent readers from being confused with between South Korean operational phases and TFP's operational phases, the author will use the term of sub-phase for TFP's operations. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 192.

⁸⁷ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 201.

⁸⁸ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 202.

eliminate the remnants of the insurgents.⁸⁹ During the final sub-phase, the Capital division, who assumed responsibility for the area when TFP departed, implemented clearing operations to remove guerrilla remnants in the peripheral areas of Jirisan, such as Backasan, Mohusan, and Jogyaesan.⁹⁰

TF Paik's plan for the first sub-phase focused on destroying the reconstructed guerrillas in the mountainous regions, springboarding from the secured areas established by the previous forces, 11th and 8th divisions. The time span of the phase was from December 2 to 15.⁹¹ The summary of the Operation Plan 1 (November 20, 1951) is:

1. The Capital division (attached the 117th reserve regiment, the second battalion of the 200th police regiment, and the third battalion of the 203th police regiment) attacks and occupies Objective B (Southern Jirisan) no later than D+5 while destroying the guerrillas by the attached interdicting forces.
2. The 8th division (attached the 110th reserve regiment and the 107th reserve regiment) attacks and occupies Objective A (Northern Jirisan) no later than D+5 while destroying...
3. The Southwest Command attaches the designated reserve regiments to the Capital division and the 8th division and occupies strong points in order to block and clear the guerrillas running away.
4. Destroying the enemies, the Capital and 8th divisions eliminate the dispersed insurgents individually.
5. Impose a curfew for the civilians in the operational areas and glean information on the activities the insurgents have been doing by reinforcing the scout's reconnaissance activities.
6. The anticipated time for the operation is at 06:00, December 2, but the real time is to be determined.
7. The main command post of TFP is at Jeonju and the forward post is at Namwon. Install command its posts: the Capital at Suncheon (Guryae as of H-hour), the 8 at Jeonju (Namwon as of H-hour), and the Southwest at Namwon.⁹²

The first sub-phase operations were successful in getting insurgent remnants to abandon their sanctuaries in the Jirisan region and flee into the peripheral areas to avoid TF Paik's offensive operations. The operations resulted in 1,715 guerrillas killed, 1,710 taken prisoner, 132 defectors and the confiscation of 509 rifles, eighty-six machine guns, 676 grenades, and 1,185

⁸⁹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 209.

⁹⁰ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 216.

⁹¹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 192-197.

⁹² Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 193-194.

bags of rice.⁹³ While conducting operations to search and destroy insurgent bases, the Capital division occupied southern Jirisan on December 6 when the first half of the mission had been finished.⁹⁴ They then conducted the same operations, but in the opposite direction, completing this second half by December 15.⁹⁵ Likewise, the 8th division occupied northern Jirisan on December 6.⁹⁶ The troops also advanced to search the remnants on December 7 and continued operations in the opposite direction through December 15.⁹⁷ Task Force Paik psychological operations included the distribution of 3,222,000 leaflets and thirty-five hours of broadcasts.⁹⁸

The guerrillas who lost their bases and other forces escaping the interdicting lines of the South Korean forces tried to rejoin with the local insurgents.⁹⁹ Among them, approximately 1,600 guerrillas of the 45th division of Jeonbuk and the 68th division of Chungnam in the region of Unjangsan, which is northeast of Jeonju, reconstituted themselves.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, apart from those divisions, there were a couple of insurgent groups in other areas who avoided contact with the South Korean forces.¹⁰¹

⁹³ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 200.

⁹⁴ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 196.

⁹⁵ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 196.

⁹⁶ The Objective A (Northern Jirisan) included the peak 1,248, the peak 1,134, the peak 1,806 near Cheonwangbong. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 198.

⁹⁷ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 198-199.

⁹⁸ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 200.

⁹⁹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 201.

¹⁰⁰ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 201.

¹⁰¹ There were about 1,000 troops in the region of Imsil-Hwoimunsan-Janggunbong-Sinsunbong and another 1,000 men in the region of Backasan-Mohusan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 201.

Throughout, TF Paik had been gaining information on the enemy and subsequently designed a plan to destroy the insurgent's bases individually with each subordinate division acting independently.¹⁰² The below quote is the summary of the TFP's Operation Plan 2.

1. The Capital division attacks to eradicate the guerrillas in the region of Unjangsan with unitedly commanding the 203th police regiment, the 207th police regiment, and the 18th police battalion. 2. The 8th division attacks to eradicate the guerrillas in the regions of Hwoimunsan and Backasan with unitedly commanding the 107th reserve regiment, the 1st and 2nd security battalions, the 205th police regiment, and the 36th / Chilbo / Backa / Gyeorim police battalions. 3. The Southwest Command attacks to eradicate the guerrillas who attempt to rejoin into the regions of central Jirisan with unitedly commanding the 110th reserve regiment, the 117th reserve regiment, and the 2nd battalion of the 200th police regiment.¹⁰³

During the second sub-phase, the static units of TFP disintegrated Lee Hyun-Sang's command system, destroyed most guerrilla bases in the peripheral regions of Jirisan, and forced the insurgent to move into Jirisan again due to the advantage of terrain favorable for insurgency. The outcomes were: 1,562 insurgents killed and another 1,564 captured. Being similar with the TFP's first sub-phase operations, the units operated in two periods, the first half (at 06:00, December 19 to at 06:00, December 31) and the second half (at 06:00, December 31 to January 4, 1952).¹⁰⁴ The Capital division formed encircling nets around Unjangsan.¹⁰⁵ In the first half of the sub-phase, they killed 790 guerrillas, secured 478 POWs, and captured 114 rifles and thirty rice bags at the cost of twenty-nine KIAs and twenty-nine men injured.¹⁰⁶ Unlike the Capital division's encircling and suffocating operations, the 8th division established ambush lines in the

¹⁰² Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 201-202.

¹⁰³ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 202.

¹⁰⁴ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 202-208.

¹⁰⁵ The division attempted to eliminate the guerrillas in Unbongsan, Seongsusan, Jangansan, Samdobong, Jubong, and Hwangsuksan as well as Unjangsan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 203-205.

¹⁰⁶ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 203.

west and forced the guerrillas to move the west by attacking with their striking forces from the east.¹⁰⁷ They conducted search-and-attack operations in the west and south of Jirisan.¹⁰⁸ The insurgent's casualties in the region where the 8th division operated were: 572 KIAs and 1,053 POWs. The Southwest Command destroyed the guerrillas trying to reenter the Jirisan region and waged reconnaissance against suspected bases. They killed about 200 guerrillas, captured thirty-three POWs in the phase's two halves. During the second sub-phase, TFP achieved the outcome of 370 defectors by distributing approximately 5,370,000 leaflets and broadcasting forty-nine hours.¹⁰⁹

To cope with the changed operational environment, TF Paik designed Operation Plan 3 (December 30, 1951) to eradicate the remnants of the destroyed Nambu Corps by projecting strike forces simultaneously into Jirisan, Backunsan, and Duckusan.¹¹⁰ The command enabled the Capital division to conduct search-and-attack operations in Jirisan while deploying the 8th division and the Southwest Command in the peripheral region for interdiction and elimination at the same time. That looked like a composition of the first and second phases. The summary of the plan is:

1. TFP eradicates the remnants of the dispersed guerrillas through the first and second phase operations.
2. The Capital division eradicates the guerrillas in the region of Jirisan, Backunsan, and Jangansan. Receive the command of the 110th reserve regiment (-), the 117th reserve regiment, and the second battalion of the 200th police regiment operating in the Jirisan region, while turns over the command of the 9th security battalion, the 203th police regiment, and the 18th police battalion to the Southwest Command by D+3.
3. The 8th division interdicts the retreat route of the insurgent and destroys them individually in the regions of Hwoimunsan, Backasan, Jogyeosan, and Hwahaksan. Receive the command of the 1st and 2nd security battalions, the 107th reserve regiment,

¹⁰⁷ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 206.

¹⁰⁸ The division operated in Hwoimunsan, Janggunbong, Sinseonbong, Naejangsan, and Backyangsan during the first half and in Hwoimunsan, Backasan, Mohusan, and Hwahaksan during the second half. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 206-207.

¹⁰⁹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 207-208.

¹¹⁰ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 209.

the 36th and Chilbo police battalions, and the police troops under the Jirisan brigade. 4. The Southwest Command eradicates the guerrillas in the region of Duckusan and Unjangsan. 5. D-day: at 06:00, on January 6, 1952 for the Capital division and the Southwest Command, and at 04:00, on January 4, 1952.¹¹¹

Through the third sub-phase, TF Paik eradicated a significant number of guerrillas in the Jirisan region. During the sub-phase operations, TFP gained meaningful consequences again: 3,684 KIAs and 3,742 POWs at the friendly cost of 116 KIAs and 152 injured. Importantly, these operations resulted in the improved safety of the population in the area. For the Capital division encircled and attacked the central regions of Jirisan and Backunsan, resulting in 1,867 enemy killed and 1,155 prisoners at the cost of friendly sixty-eight KIAs and ninety-six injured.¹¹² The 8th division intensively interdicted and executed search-and-clear operations in the south areas of Jirisan.¹¹³ In doing so, they achieved the results of 1,715 enemy KIAs and 1,972 POWs at the friendly cost of forty-eight KIAs and fifty-six injured.¹¹⁴ The Southwest Command in the northern regions of Jirisan killed 102 guerrillas and captured 615 POWs.¹¹⁵

After the third phase, TF Paik paused operations and was redeployed to the front with the 8th division according to the AROK order 271 (January 20, 1952). Sun Yup Paik was promoted to Lieutenant General, and turned over his command to the commander of the Capital division as of February 6. He returned to the front on February 9 while the 8th division moved on February 5. Without TFP and the 8th division, for the fourth sub-phase, the Capital division and the Southwest Command operated in individually designated areas, much like in the second sub-

¹¹¹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 209.

¹¹² Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 209-213.

¹¹³ During the sub-phase, the 8th division operated in Hwoimunsan, Sinsunbong, Backasan, Hwoaaksan, and Jogyeosan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 213-214.

¹¹⁴ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 214.

¹¹⁵ During the sub-phase, the Southwest Command operated in Duckusan and Unjangsan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 214-215.

phase, in order to clear the remnants of the insurgents. The Capital division focused on the southwest of the Jirisan region such as Backasan, Mohusan, and Jogyaesan, which was the operation plan TFP designed.¹¹⁶ The Southwest Command deployed their reserve regiments and police forces into the north of, the eastern and southern Jirisan.¹¹⁷ Although the specific results attained by the force is unknown, reports were that the damage inflicted on the insurgents was severe. Following the completion of fourth phase operations on March 14, the Capital division returned to the front line after turning over the command and control for the operational areas and the forces to the Southwest Command.¹¹⁸

Turning the Active Friendly Minority to the Majority

Through the third phase, the ROK Army and TF Paik had waged the third step Galula presented, as well as continuing portions of the second step. Galula presented three objectives in his third step: to re-establish the counterinsurgent's authority over the population, to isolate the population as much as possible from the guerrillas by physical means, and to gather the necessary intelligence to support to the fourth step.¹¹⁹ TFP successfully re-established authority by destroying most guerrilla forces in the mountainous areas and providing the populations with security. Also, they isolated the guerrillas and worked to gather intelligence. In other words, TFP controlled the local population for their support. Furthermore, AROK turned the active friendly minority into a majority by convincing the neutral majority to become friendly as evidenced by Vice President Song Su Kim's letter regarding the protection of the civilian population, the

¹¹⁶ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 215-216.

¹¹⁷ The Southwest Command operated in the north like Unjangsan, Duckusan, Jangansan, Cheonhwangsan, and Hwoimunsan, in the eastern Jirisan, and in the southern Jirisan such as Backunsan. Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 216-217.

¹¹⁸ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 216-217.

¹¹⁹ David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice*, 115.

civilian considerations enumerated in the TFP's operational orders, General Paik's retrospect on civilian consideration, and TFP's effort to deal with orphans.

The chief secretary of the vice president delivered the letter in person to General Paik before the operations. The letter contained his concern on the forces' affection and consideration for people. After several massacres including Geochang, public criticism had blazed on the incidents of preposterous damage by the AROK and national police on inhabitant of the mountainous regions the guerrillas used for sanctuary.¹²⁰ That is, the Korean government cautioned TFP to pay special attention to the local population so that such tragedies would not repeat itself. The letter said:

...the Korean people are sunk in misery. Law and order do not exist in our mountains or in our interior, and the Korean people groan under the oppression of the communist guerrillas. If that were not enough, the military and the police impose an added burden of malfeasance on the people, impairing the crucial trust the people must have for the military. I am informed, General Paik, that you will command two picked divisions and eradicate the guerrilla threat. This puts me at ease, certainly. But you must restore law and order wisely, with affection and consideration for our people. You must not inflict more suffering on them. Your operation will put the people at ease, certainly, and they will be able to get on with their lives.¹²¹

Under the martial law, TF Paik considered civilian factors, as shown by the task force's operations orders. The command "imposed a curfew for the civilians in the operational areas and gleaned information on the activities the insurgents had been doing by reinforcing the scout's reconnaissance activities."¹²² Considering that one of the characteristics of guerrillas are that they are active mainly at night and that operations at night that make it difficult to identify between enemy and friendly, the distinction between residents and guerrillas through the implementation of a curfew was essential. Killing villagers by misunderstanding residents as guerrilla forces meant to help the insurgent operations. The antagonism of the inhabitants against the government

¹²⁰ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 184.

¹²¹ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 184.

¹²² Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 193.

and its forces was a main source of power as well as the ultimate objective to the insurgent. Moreover, TFP gathered information on the guerrillas' activities, which is necessary not only for following operations but also for turning the neutral majority to the friendly active minority and keeping the active minority in the friendly side. The process to gather information on the guerrillas through the populations also implanted confidence that the COIN forces were taking the initiative and would win the campaign into the local populations' mind. The process would enable them to contemplate their own ideologies and others' ones. Furthermore, the others' thoughts and perspectives might resonate other populations. By the process, the active minority consolidated their mind and the neutral majority shifted their mind toward much friendly side.

With that, General Paik always kept the civilian factor in mind. Reflecting the vice president's intent, he ordered very strict discipline for his soldiers. In the background of the orders, there was a significant incident for him at Kwangju in 1949, which is the Hanchon village incident. His 5th division units had burned all of the three hundred houses in the village, accusing the villagers of maintaining ties with guerrillas.¹²³ However, he had sincerely apologized to the villagers and had rebuilt the village with the cooperation of the Jeolla government.¹²⁴ Keeping the lesson in his mind, he had commanded TFP. A part of his biography is:

My very bones told me that we had to have popular support if TFP was to win the upcoming round with the guerrillas. Indeed, I regarded popular support to be every whit as crucial as actual military operations against the guerrillas. ... I issued a tough order directing that no task force unit would bivouac near any village or hamlet during Operation Rat Killer. I ordered officers and men not to take so much as a drop of water from civilian residents in the operational area, and I directed that no individual or unit should fire at anyone who was not in the act of resisting... The civilian residents' harsh experience had taught these long-suffering people to throw their support to the side they believed would win. I intended to show them that the army was stronger than the guerrillas. I also intended to show them that the army held all the Korean people in high esteem without exception.¹²⁵

¹²³ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 185.

¹²⁴ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 185.

¹²⁵ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 185-186.

The crux of TF Paik's civil considerations was the effort to deal with orphans during and after the operations. The creation of a number of orphans was a dreadful outcome of the operations. They could not "ignore the pitiful children who had lost their parents, whether those parents were North Korean guerrillas or South Koreans who joined them." Coordinating with the local governor, Ul Sik Lee, General Paik and his staff found a building in Songjong and turned it into an orphanage. They provided aid to the orphanage for thirty-five years. As an interesting fact, Dr. Bob Pierce, who was a war correspondent and later became as president of the World Visions Mission, was instrumental in taking care for the orphans in Songjong.¹²⁶ General Paik always kept it in mind that the core of the operations was getting hearts and minds of people and had considered how his units' activities would influence on their hearts and minds.

TF Paik's operations had attained successful control of the local population and made the active friendly minority become a majority. Other than the efforts of TFP, there might be a consensus that AROK should be dealt with the local population more cautiously as seen in the vice president's letter. Fortunately, General Paik's previous experience and its lessons had influenced the planning COIN operations as seen in the orders, biography, and the story of the Songjong orphanage. Further showing the ability and will to win the campaign in the second step, AROK controlled the local people's hearts and minds.

Destruction of the Insurgent Political Organization by Continuous and Intensive Efforts

The UN and South Korean government exerted continuous and intensive efforts to the Jirisan region. They pulled active divisions from front line contact against NKPA and Chinese regular forces, enabling them to clear guerrillas from the region. They offered significant support for the COIN during the Korean War. Most of all, the South Korean government made sub-administrative organizations to help COIN operations by proclaiming a martial law in the

¹²⁶ Sun Yup Paik, *From Pusan to Panmunjom*, 192.

southwest area of the peninsula on February 1, 1951.¹²⁷ With that, many civilian officials in the government deployed to the region and supported the military operations. Additionally, TF Paik had made a field engineering battalion construct four light-plane runways in the cities and towns like Sunchang, Damyang, Galdam, and Jeongeup around Jirisan for their COIN operations.¹²⁸ Without governmental assistance, they would not have achieved the successes of these rapid construction projects. The most crucial effort from UN forces and the South Korean government was the concentration of effort against the insurgents in the Jirisan region and the perseverance of will to eradicate that threat even in the face of a continuing conventional fight. In doing so, the fourth phase of the 1st division started.

Effect of TF Paik's operations was a little bit beyond the third of the framework. The task force effectively destroyed the main body of the insurgent political organization, the Nambu Corps. After TFP's efforts, the organization of the corps collapsed. Remnants of the guerrillas then operated as separated units. They also changed the units' name. Nambu Corps changed to Independent Fourth Region while the 81th division shifted to Kim Ji-Whoi troop and the 92th division to Park Jong-ha troop. Additionally, the 45th division and the 46th division degraded itself to regiment individually.¹²⁹ However, despite AROK's passionate efforts, the insurgents reorganized their system and resumed guerrilla activities as summer approached, when vegetation grows tall.

The fact that the 1st division sequentially executed COIN operations though the former units destroyed almost all of the insurgent's bases and itself validates the continuous and intensive efforts that AROK performed for destruction of the insurgent political organization. The

¹²⁷ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 194.

¹²⁸ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 202.

¹²⁹ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 219.

1st division dispose the 11th and 12th regiment in the region of Jirisan while the rest 15th regiment was moved to Kyeongnam province. The former two regiments had conducted mopping-up operations in Jirisan, Hwoimunsan, Jangansan, and Duckyusan since July 13, 1952. The division who had the 11th regiment as the main effort hardly contacted the guerrillas and gained the insurgent of fifty-seven KIAs as the outcome for twenty days.¹³⁰ Only the 11th regiment had engagements with a few guerrillas in Jirisan and Jangansan. It confirmed that the former units had cleared the insurgent political organization as well as the majority of the guerrilla troops in the Jirisan region. With that, the operations reduced the communist guerrillas' violent activities referring to raids to logistical vehicles and rear lines of communication.

In the light of pragmatism, the most difficult and the most important part in COIN operations might be the continuous and intensive effort of counterinsurgent forces and the government. COIN operations look deceptively easy, leaving some to think that a few small-scale search-and-attack operations can effectively disrupt insurgent operations. A pitfall exists in the perception. However, as Galula shows, COIN operations mean focusing on matters of ideology, psychology, emotion, and hearts and minds, and not just killing guerrillas. That means the COIN context requires involvement of the whole government, not just military elements. While the defeat of armed opponents and the gaining of key terrain belongs mainly to the military, consolidating the gains and stabilizing insurgent areas ultimately is the work of the whole governments. That is, armed engagements are just the earliest stage of the war. Many examples show that in war, the restoration of society takes much more time than fighting itself.

UN forces and AROK exerted the necessary sustained effort and achieved the desired goal which is destruction of the insurgent political organization and the body. First, they took audacious actions: using divisions located on the front line in order to cope with the insurgent in

¹³⁰ Committee for Compilation of Korean War History in Korean Department of Defense, *History of the Counter Unconventional Warfare (1945-1960)*, 222-224.

the rear areas. Second, the South Korean government employed unified efforts to support COIN troops. They proclaimed local martial law and deployed government officials to support COIN troops with operations such as financing, legitimating, and coordination with other agencies. Lastly, they had operated COIN seamlessly in the region. The 11th, 8th, and 1st divisions and TF Paik conducted the COIN missions continuously. Even after the insurgents looked to be eliminated by the overwhelming effect of military COIN operations, the 1st division successively continued operations to prevent a reemergence of organized guerrilla activity. Then they confirmed that there was no significantly organized political and insurgent groups in the region.

Conclusions

The research started with the question of *what factors made the Korean Armed Forces counterinsurgency operations successful during the Korean War in 1950-1953*. Additionally, it sought to identify implications for future COIN operations on the Korean peninsula. To analyze the case study of the Korean War, this study applied Galula's COIN warfare theory and principles in *Counterinsurgency Warfare* as an analytical frame, using Galula's four laws and eight steps. His theory was suitable for this study in terms of the level of war, clarity of theory, and historical and regional backgrounds that informed the theory's formation.

As the results of analysis, the key factors contributing to the success of the COIN operations in the Jirisan region during the Korean War in 1950-1953 were: initial gains of population's support through the destruction of insurgency forces; deployment of COIN static units demonstrating the ability to win; successful control of the population to build their support and turn an active friendly minority into a majority; and finally, destruction of the insurgent political organization by continuous and intensive efforts.

Interestingly, those four factors closely match the sequence of COIN operations AROK conducted with the 11th and 8th divisions, TF Paik, and the 1st division. The 11th and 8th divisions achieved the destruction of a large number of guerrillas in the cities and the towns of the region and provided the freedom of action for following TFP which would launch larger scale operations. They forced the insurgent to locate outside of the towns and villages and move into the mountains where they were separated from the population. Furthermore, AROK's operations laid the foundation for the support of the population by returning the more stabilized cities and villages to the population. This was followed by sustained COIN operations in which TF Paik established a grid of troops, providing the population and counterinsurgency teams with more stable protection and security. Importantly, they showed their ability and will to win the COIN fight against the insurgents. TF Paik took explicit steps to turn the active friendly minority to the

majority through making the neutral majority change themselves to the friendly by re-establishing the authority. They set up their authority again by destroying most guerrilla forces in the mountainous areas, isolating the rest, and providing the populations with security. Finally, AROK achieved destruction of the insurgent political organization and the body through continuous and intensive efforts. They used divisions located on the front line, proclaimed a martial law, deployed government officials to COIN troops, and operated COIN seamlessly in the region.

As a final point, what implications does the analysis have? Three implications seem the most obvious: the importance of the Jirisan region in COIN operations; continuous and intensive governmental efforts; turning the active minority to the majority is the key in COIN. First, on the Korean peninsula, the region of Jirisan has a significant meaning in the perspective of insurgency. Geographically, Jirisan ranges over three provinces and many roads penetrate through its branches. Moreover, the region can and may provide guerrillas with secured bases due to the rugged terrain and inaccessible vegetation, especially in summer. Second, COIN operations require constant and rigorous efforts from the government. The nature of COIN, which usually operates with a relatively small size of units, allows it to operate with other organizations such as police, reserve forces, para-military groups, and other governmental agencies. The government needs to balance on providing its concerns and resources between the front line and the rear areas (and the consolidation areas). Concentrating on only the emergent front lines without consideration on the rear areas may harm the front lines ironically. Lastly, turning the active friendly minority to the majority is the essential effort in COIN. As seen in analysis, to do that, the COIN forces should focus initially on cities and towns to make the insurgent leave populated areas and become isolated. Furthermore, the COIN forces should show their will and ability to eliminate the guerrilla groups to populations as well as guerrillas. Then the majority in the grey zone would shift their hearts and minds to the COIN side, so they can be the friendly majority.

The author hopes this study contributes to fill a gap in the COIN study on the Korean War. Few Korean studies analytically dealt with the COIN operations in the war. Few American

studies intensively dealt with the Korean War as a study theme for the COIN operations. As seen in Korean history and the Korean War, the COIN should be studied for the future war on the Korean peninsula.

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