Change Initiative: Improving Morale in Times of Defeat

A Monograph

by

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Large Scale Combat Operations pose significant risk to morale based on the chaos created by high casualty rates, near-peer capabilities, and contention across all domains. Leaders can use John Kotter's change model and Ardant du Picq's morale theory to quickly improve the fighting spirit of their organizations by creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change to maintain high morale and enable victory. The leadership of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery of the British Eighth Army in World War II and General Matthew B. Ridgway of the American Eighth Army in Korea are evaluated using structured, focused comparison logic. Ultimately, establishing trust, unity of effort, and confidence in abilities improves morale and likely leads to future victory as long as the political environment supports continued combat operations.

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Abstract

Change Initiative: Improving Morale in Times of Defeat, by MAJ Brittany E. McCroan, 59 pages.

Large Scale Combat Operations pose significant risk to morale based on the chaos created by high casualty rates, near-peer capabilities, and contention across all domains. Leaders can use elements of John Kotter's change model and Ardant du Picq's morale theory to quickly improve the fighting spirit of their organizations by creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change to maintain high morale and enable victory. The leadership of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery of the British Eighth Army in World War II and General Matthew B. Ridgway of the American Eighth Army in Korea are evaluated using structured, focused comparison logic. Ultimately, establishing trust, unity of effort, and confidence in abilities improves morale and likely leads to future victory as long as the political environment supports continued combat operations.

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Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
CCF	Chinese Communist Forces
FM	Field Manual
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
NKPA	North Korean People's Army
ROK	Republic of Korea
UN	United Nations
US	United States
WWII	World War II

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Introduction

Success is stumbling from failure to failure with no loss of enthusiasm.

—Winston Churchill

Overcoming failure is something humans encounter whether in business, the stock market, or personal relationships. Some setbacks are minor while others have dire consequences that can persist for a lifetime. Military leaders face similar challenges in combat and how they react to such failures could determine the fate of their nation. Carl von Clausewitz described war as a human endeavor, therefore, the human psyche is a key ingredient to overcoming defeat.[1] Theorists have studied the effects of morale on victory in battle since the nineteenth century. French Colonel Ardant Du Picq wrote that "nothing can wisely be prescribed in an Army…without exact knowledge of the fundamental instrument, man, and his state of mind, his morale, at the instant of combat."[2] Leaders must develop techniques to rapidly restore the fighting spirit in their Soldiers during times of defeat and uncertainty.

Chaos and unpredictability characterize today's operational environment, which has detrimental effects on the morale of units. Failures in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) can cause significant demoralization requiring leaders to affect rapid change in an organization. The enemy has near-peer capabilities which drastically increases the casualty rate and adversaries will contest all domains, degrading communications and attacking where least expected. To cope with these challenges, it is necessary for leaders to have a framework for quickly improving morale. United States (US) Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession,* asserts that "leaders who demonstrate genuine concern for the welfare of their

[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 149.

[2] Colonel Charles Jean Jacques Joseph Ardant Du Picq, *Battle Studies,* 8th ed. trans. Colonel John N. Greely and Major Robert C. Cotton (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), 39.

subordinates strengthen morale," but it fails to provide a systematic process for morale improvement.[3] Although designed to transform an organization's culture over time, John Kotter's change model is a tool that leaders can use to rapidly improve fighting spirit after a combat loss.[4] However, Kotter's model fails to account for discipline required in the military and unit cohesion essential for combat victory. Therefore, leaders can use a combination of Kotter's model and elements from Ardant du Picq's morale theory to quickly improve the fighting spirit of their organizations by creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change that maintains high morale and enables victory.

Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* describes LSCO as "lethal and brutal," placing these actions on the far end of the conflict continuum (see Figure 1).[5] Further, FM 3-0 characterizes LSCO as "more chaotic, intense, and highly destructive than those the Army has experienced in the past several decades" potentially lowering morale due to increased casualties and uncertainty in the environment.[6] Therefore, it is important to determine how leaders manage the adverse reactions LSCO has on morale by transforming their organizations during times of defeat and ultimately achieving victory. Recent examples of commanders successfully changing the spirit of demoralized units during LSCO are Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery's command of the British Eighth Army in World War II (WWII) and General Matthew B. Ridgway commanding the American Eighth Army during the Korean War. These historical case studies demonstrate how leaders used elements of Kotter's model and Du Picq's theory to generate rapid change in morale during times of failure and uncertainty inherent in LSCO.

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[3] US Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-22, *Army Leadership and the Profession* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 6-7.

[4] John P. Kotter, *Leading Change*, (Brighton, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2012), 21.

[5] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-15.

[6] Ibid, 1-2.

Figure 1. Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum. US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), 1-1.

Merriam-Webster's definitions of morale include a mental or emotional condition of an individual or group; a sense of common purpose; and psychological well-being based on confidence in the future.[7] The word morale is sprinkled throughout US Army leadership doctrine and although defined as "an individual's sense of well-being – mental, spiritual, and physical," it is difficult to measure.[8] Morale is typically associated with esprit de corps, or collective camaraderie and cohesion, which is influenced by organizational climate and how leaders create a positive environment built on trust.[9] In order for operational level leaders to achieve strategic objectives in times of tactical defeat, they must set conditions to enable change at the tactical level by improving morale.

John Kotter's eight step model forms a basis for the research questions used to analyze the case studies and consists of establishing a sense of urgency, creating a guiding coalition, developing a vision for change, communicating the vision, empowering subordinates, celebrating short term wins, consolidating gains, and anchoring change. The eight steps are categorized into three sections: creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change that define the three hypotheses used to examine the thesis.[10] The first hypothesis is when operational level leaders create a climate for change, then they engage and

[7] "Morale," Merriam-Webster, accessed August 24, 2019, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morale.

[8] US Army, ADP 6-22, 6-7.

[9] US Army, ADP 6-22, 6-4.

[10] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 22.

enable change. The second hypothesis is when operational level leaders engage and enable change, then their organization's morale improves. The third hypothesis is when operational level leaders implement and sustain change, then their organization maintains high morale and enables victory. Supplementing Kotter's model with Du Picq's approach to improving morale by including elements of instilling discipline and producing a sense of unity provides a comprehensive framework for leaders to quickly overcome demoralization in LSCO.

The scope of this study is limited by American and English sources and examines Field Marshal Montgomery's actions in North Africa from August 1942 to December1943 to focus on the rapid change he affected as the British Eighth Army commander. Additionally, the second case study focuses on General Ridgway in Korea and his positive effect on the American Eighth Army as commander from December 1950 to April 1951.

One assumption made is that historical examples can provide insight for today's leaders. Clausewitz argued that the psychological effect of war can only be determined by experience.[11] Therefore, actions that improved morale in WWII and Korea may not have the same effect on military organizations in the future. Another assumption is that the US Army will face failure in LSCO and commanders will have to cope with defeat in the future. It is possible that the next conflict America enters is nothing like LSCO or America may achieve victory quickly like in Operation Desert Storm. However, since humans are the constant in war, the military will continue to encounter fluctuations in morale and understanding how leaders can sustain the fighting spirit remains relevant.

This monograph is organized into five sections. The first section is a literature review to discuss the theoretical framework, conceptual variables, and existing empirical evidence for the topic. The methodology section follows and is used for instrumentation, data collection, and analysis. Next, are the case studies on how Field Marshal Montgomery and General Ridgway

[11] Clausewitz, *On War*, 170.

implemented rapid change in their organizations to improve morale. The fourth section is the analysis of the findings and the final section is the conclusion.

Literature Review

Introduction

This section serves two purposes and presents the rationale for conducting research on improving morale at the operational level. The first purpose is to describe the theory used to implement change in morale during times of defeat. Combining John Kotter's change model with Ardant Du Picq's framework for improving morale provides leaders a method for taking a defeated military organization and transforming it into a fighting unit. The second purpose of this section is to review the current literature on how Field Marshall Montgomery and General Ridgway improved morale by implementing rapid change in their units during combat. Although much has been written about the generalship of these two leaders, rarely does the literature address the specific steps taken to change morale.

Theoretical Framework

Change management theories provide models for leaders to transform their organizations. These theories prepare, support, guide, and enable organizations to action change necessary to improve their processes. Initiatives that drive change include technological evolutions, personnel turn-over, procedure reviews, crises, successes, and failures.[12] The most popular change management theories are Lewin's change management model, the McKinsey 7-S model, Nudge theory, and Kotter's eight-steps. Based on the advantages and disadvantages of each theory, Kotter's eight-steps are the most applicable to overcoming military defeat.

Kurt Lewin developed his change management model in the 1950s using a block of ice metaphor. Lewin determined that organizations were frozen in their current state and needed to unfreeze from the status quo to prepare for transformation. Once in liquid form, leaders could

[12] "Human Change Management Book of Knowledge," Human Change Management Institute, accessed October 19, 2019, https://www.hucmi.com/en/hcmbok/.

implement their strategy to affect the required changes and then refreeze the organization to stabilize the new processes.[13] This method works well for discovering mistakes in the current state of the organization and helps to implement drastic changes; however, Lewin's model takes a long time to implement and the steps are not specific enough to provide a clear framework for military professionals.

In the late 1970s, Tom Peters and Robert Waterman identified seven elements to transform an organization that they turned into the McKinsey 7-S model. This approach recommends assessing an organization's strategy, structure, systems, shared values, style, staff, and skills to ensure they are in balance for successful performance.[14] This framework excels at identifying areas of an organization that need improvement but it does not provide a formula for implementing change.

Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein wrote *Nudge* in 2008 that outlined a behavioral science approach to change management. Nudge theory suggests that leaders convince their subordinates to change by making it a choice and "nudging" them in the appropriate direction. This theory provides a high level of cooperation and commitment, but it can be slow and unpredictable if employees are indecisive, and its bottom-up approach is not conducive to military structure.

First published in 1996, John Kotter's *Leading Change* was written for civilian business leaders and begins by describing why firms fail at change initiatives and then discusses eight steps to overcome those failures. Kotter's eight-stage process is intended to change business culture over time but its sequential steps and hierarchical nature make it the most applicable model to the military when compared to the four previous theories. The only problem with

[13] "Major Approaches and Models of Change Management," Magazine, Cleverism, accessed October 19, 2019, https://www.cleverism.com/major-approaches-models-of-change-management/.

[14] "McKinsey 7-S Framework: Making Every Part of your Organization Work in Harmony," Strategy Tools, MindTools, accessed October 19, 2019, https://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newSTR_91.htm.

Kotter's framework is that it takes time, so to speed up the change initiative Kotter's change management theory must be combined with Ardant du Picq's military model of improving morale through discipline and cohesion.

Conceptual Definitions

Kotter's eight steps are divided into three major sections. The first section focuses on creating a climate for change and includes the first three steps which are establish a sense of urgency, create a guiding coalition, and develop a vision for change.[15] Identifying a crisis in the organization establishes a sense of urgency and draws members attention to this crisis.[16] Forming a guiding coalition helps drive change by empowering trusted, subordinate leaders to champion the new idea.[17] Developing a vision directs the change effort by focusing the organization on a common goal.[18] These three steps help to pull the organization out of complacency and challenge the status quo.

The second section engages and enables change by communicating the vision, empowering broad based action, and generating short-term wins.[19] Ensuring the entire organization understands the change vision by communicating it effectively creates commitment, motivation, and direction. Employees will feel empowered to embrace change through broad based action plans that remove barriers and align systems with the vision.[20] Emphasis on short-term wins builds momentum and convinces employees that the change effort is worthwhile.[21] These three steps introduce the organization to new practices and facilitate a smooth transition.

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[15] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 21.

[16] Ibid, 45.

[17] Ibid, 66.

[18] Ibid, 68.

[19] Ibid, 21.

[20] Ibid, 115.

[21] Ibid, 123.

The third and final section implements and sustains the transformation over time by consolidating gains to produce more change and institutionalizing the change.[22] Showing employees how several short-terms wins together form a strategic change initiative helps to produce more change towards the vision. These united achievements avoid complacency and keep employees motivated.[23] Institutionalizing change involves anchoring the new approaches in the culture of the organization.[24] These last two steps ensure that the transformation persists over time and becomes the standard for that organization.

John Kotter's model is an appropriate tool for improving the morale of a military organization because it is a leadership theory intended to transform an organization by changing the behaviors of its members. The military is similar to corporate businesses in that they have hierarchical structures, a code of conduct, organizational culture, and leaders at all levels that must find ways to motivate their subordinates to do their job. However, the military's business is war and convincing Soldiers to fight after a defeat requires more than simply eight steps. Changing morale during times of defeat is also dependent on establishing discipline and a sense of unity within an organization, so Ardant du Picq's model provides the additional ingredients to enable victory.

In *Battle Studies*, du Picq asserts that "man is the fundamental instrument in battle" and an Army cannot function without understanding man's state of mind or his morale.[25] He further explains that man has an instinct towards self-preservation and to overcome this, leaders must instill discipline.[26] Discipline evokes fear of punishment or disgrace which dominates fear of

[22] Kotter, *Leading Change*, 21.

[23] Ibid, 143.

[24] Ibid, 157.

[25] Du Picq, *Battle Studies,* 39.

[26] Ibid, 51.

combat.[27] However, according to du Picq, discipline is not enough and morale also depends on unit cohesion. He provides the following metaphor to support this claim: "Four brave men who do not know each other will not dare attack a lion. Four less brave, but knowing each other well, sure of their reliability and consequently of mutual aid, will attack resolutely."[28] Unit cohesion produces faith in ability and support, which leads to courage that pushes humans to act in spite of their survival instinct. Success in battle requires men to overcome their fear of combat by improving morale through instilling discipline and establishing a sense of unity. Du Picq's ideas about discipline and unity fit into several steps of Kotter's model. Instilling discipline to support the change effort can help in creating a climate for change and institutionalizing the change. Communicating a clear vision, empowering subordinates, and celebrating short-term wins build unit cohesion by motivating the organization towards a common goal. Using a combination of Kotter's eight-step process and du Picq's theory, operational level leaders can change the defeatist attitude of their organization into a culture of victory.

Empirical Relevance

There are numerous historical accounts and battle studies on the North African campaign of World War II (WWII). Much of the literature focuses on the battle of El Alamein as the turning point in the war and even more pay homage to the leadership style of Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Although most biographies highlight Montgomery's successes and failures as a general, very few describe his method for rapidly changing morale during a military defeat. To fill that gap, Field Marshal Montgomery is analyzed using a combination of Kotter's model and du Picq's theory to transform the morale of the British Eighth Army in North Africa which ultimately led to victory over the German forces. Three hypotheses will test this thesis.

The first hypothesis is that when operational level leaders create a climate for changing

[27] Du Picq, *Battle Studies*, 94.

[28] Ibid, 110.

morale, they engage and enable change. Creating a climate for change sets the conditions for the improvement of morale. In *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein*, Jonathan Fennell claims that technology, firepower, manpower, environment, supplies, welfare, education, leadership, command and training influence the morale of a unit in combat.[29] Although Fennell states that morale was a key factor in the Eighth Army's victory in North Africa, he suggests that creating a climate for changing morale goes beyond just quality of leadership. Sufficient supplies, superior firepower, trust in the command, discipline established through training, and environmental conditions can positively and negatively impact morale.[30] What Fennell fails to consider is the operational level leader's ability to influence those factors that improve morale by creating a climate for change. Field Marshal Montgomery's memoirs is a primary source that outlines how Montgomery affected the variables that influence morale and prepared the Eighth Army to transform by creating a climate for improved morale. Once the conditions for change have been set, leaders can execute the change required to improve morale.

The second hypothesis states that when operational level leaders engage and enable change, then their organization's morale improves. Ronald Lewin asserts that Montgomery is the greatest and most controversial commander since Wellington and that Montgomery's leadership had a positive effect on the Eighth Army. Lewin's *Montgomery as a Military Commander* is primarily a battle-focused histography; however, it provides insights into Montgomery's leadership style.[31] Lewin describes how Montgomery engaged and enabled positive change in the Eighth Army throughout the battles for North Africa but he fails to mention the impact Montgomery had on morale and its influence on victory. Once an organization's morale has

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[29] Jonathan Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), v.

[30] Ibid, 10.

[31] Ronald Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander* (New York, NY: Stein and Day, 1971), 59-185.

improved, it is imperative to maintain high morale to achieve victory.

The third hypothesis is when leaders implement and sustain change, they maintain high morale which enables victory. In *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, Nigel Hamilton claims that Montgomery turned defeat into victory for the Eighth Army by focusing on leadership, training, rehearsals, and professionalism.[32] Hamilton's piece is incomplete because it does not study the impact Montgomery had on improving and maintaining morale nor morale's role in achieving victory after defeat. Montgomery's memoirs are a primary source that covers this gap, giving examples of how Montgomery's change initiative improved and maintained morale after Eighth Army's defeat.

The second case study is on General Matthew B. Ridgway's command of the American Eighth Army in the Korean conflict. Most of the literature on this topic studies Ridgway's leadership style and the positive effect he had on the Eighth Army. Several works are battle-focused histographies that provide tactical details on the battle of Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni.[33] Even though Ridgway's biographies focus on generalship traits that improved conditions in the Eighth Army, they fail to define a framework useful for improving morale and morale's influence on victory. To fill that gap, General Ridgway is examined using a combination of Kotter's model and du Picq's theory to transform the morale of the American Eighth Army in Korea which ultimately led to victory. Three hypotheses will test this thesis.

The first hypothesis is that when operational level leaders create a climate for changing morale, they engage and enable change. Creating a climate for change prepares an organization for the upcoming turmoil inherent to transformations. In *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*, Thomas Ricks claims that Ridgway turned the war

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[32] Nigel Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery* (New York, NY: Random House, 1987), 15-173.

[33] Kenneth E. Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 80.

around based on studying the terrain, visiting troops and relieving much of the current leadership within the Eighth Army.[34] Ricks' work touches on some ways Ridgway created a climate for change but it lacks the effect Ridgway had on morale. Matthew B. Ridgway's book, *The Korean War,* attempts to fill this gap by describing the methods he used to prepare his unit for change and the impact that had on morale.[35] Once the conditions for change have been set, leaders can execute the change required to improve morale.

The second hypothesis states that when operational level leaders engage and enable change, then their organization's morale improves. Max Hastings wrote *The Korean War* that establishes Ridgway's leadership as a key factor in improving the morale of the Eighth Army.[36] Even though this work includes Ridgway's effect on morale, it fails to offer a specific description of what Ridgway did to generate the change. Stephen Taaffe attempts to close that gap in his work *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, asserting that Ridgway improved morale by emphasizing an understanding of the terrain, replacing several subordinate commanders, and interacting with the Soldiers of the Eighth Army.[37] Once an organization's morale has improved, it is imperative to maintain high morale to achieve victory.

The third hypothesis is when leaders implement and sustain change, they maintain high morale which enables victory. In his work *The Savior Generals,* Victor Hanson provides a political, strategic and tactical focus on how Ridgway turned defeat into victory by restoring morale and extending Chinese lines of communication.[38] Hanson's piece excels at connecting improved morale to victory; however, it lacks the framework Ridgway uses to implement and

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[34] Thomas E. Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today* (New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2012), 170-190.

[35] Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1967), 79-91.

[36] Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 190.

[37] Stephen R. Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2016), 149.

[38] Victor D. Hanson, *The Savior Generals* (New York, NY: Bloomsbury Press, 2013), 166.

sustain the change in morale. Kotter's model and du Picq's theory fills this gap by providing an outline for leaders to follow to maintain high morale.

Summary

The lens of change management and the theories of John Kotter and Ardant du Picq determine how Field Marshal Montgomery and General Ridgway improved morale in their units and turned defeat into victory. The existing literature focuses on the leadership qualities and battle-focused histographies of Montgomery in WWII and Ridgway in Korea but fails to provide a specific framework for improving morale. This monograph aims at filling this gap by providing a step-by-step framework for operational level leaders to improve the morale of their organizations and turn a defeated unit into a victorious one.

Methodology

Introduction

This section presents the methodology used to analyze the British Eighth Army's North African campaign from August 1942 to December 1943 and the American Eighth Army's Korean Campaign from December 1950 to April 1951. It begins with explaining the structured, focused comparison approach, then introduces the historical case studies, followed by the research questions, and finally the expected outcomes. This method will test the hypotheses and confirm the thesis that operational level leaders can quickly improve the morale of their organizations during LSCO by creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change to enable victory.

Structured, focused comparison logic works by asking a standard list of questions for each historical case, concentrating on specific aspects of each example.[39] The North African and Korean campaigns compare leadership attributes across armies of different nations and within diverse time periods encompassing changes in leadership at the operational level during times of defeat in LSCO. The structure is based on ten research questions to provide qualitative analysis on whether the leadership enabled change in their organizations with a focus on positively effecting morale. Comparing two separate case studies validates the thesis and provides future leaders with a proposed framework to improve morale in times of defeat emphasizing Kotter's eight-steps and du Picq's theory as a basis for transformation.

Case Studies

The British Eighth Army's experience in North Africa is an excellent case study because the unit suffered major defeats against Axis forces during the early summer months of 1942 and

[39] Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), 67.

after a change in command in August, regained the initiative that caused the Germans to surrender in March of 1943. In August 1942, Field Marshal Montgomery took command of the British Eighth Army, assessed his organization and determined their lack of fighting spirit caused the failures on the battlefield. Montgomery quickly established his action plan to improve morale which focused on leadership, equipment and training.[40] Several of his initiatives resemble Kotter's eight-steps and du Picq's approach to morale improvement, making Montgomery an ideal general to assess. Montgomery's command of the British Eighth Army in North Africa is a significant example to understand how operational level leaders transform their organizations to become victorious through morale improvement.

General Ridgway's command of the American Eighth Army in Korea is a second example of leadership changes during times of defeat that improved morale. In October 1950, China entered the war to support the North Korean effort and forced the United Nations (UN) ground troops to retreat south across the thirty-eighth parallel. General Ridgway assumed command of the Eighth Army after Lieutenant General Walton Walker died in a vehicle accident in late December. Immediately, Ridgway realized that the continual retreats had negative effects on the Eighth Army's morale and he implemented his improvement strategy focused on building confidence.[41] Ridgway is a relevant example for future operational level leaders confronting morale issues after retreats or withdraws because his change efforts mirrored Kotter's eight-steps and du Picq's approach.

Questions

Ten focused research questions drive data collection for the examination of the case studies and the findings and analysis section presents the results. The research questions that

[40] Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery* (Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword Military, 2007), 1925.

[41] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 101.

serve to confirm or contradict the hypotheses focus on generating change and improving morale. The first hypothesis asserts that when operational level leaders create a climate for changing morale, then they engage and enable change. The second argues that when operational level leaders engage and enable change, then their organization's morale improves. The third states that when operational level leaders implement and sustain change, then their organization maintains high morale and enables victory.

Relating to the first hypothesis, questions one through three ask how do operational level leaders instill discipline, establish a sense of urgency, and form a guiding coalition? The answer to these questions will determine if Montgomery and Ridgway created a climate conducive to changing morale. Questions four through seven refer to the second hypothesis and ask how do operational level leaders develop and communication their vision for change, empower subordinates to action their vision, create a sense of unity to enable change, and capitalize on short-term wins? These questions answer whether Montgomery and Ridgway engage and enable change with the intention of improving morale. The final three questions apply to the third hypothesis and ask how do operational level leaders consolidate gains towards their vision, institutionalize change, and what does improved morale look like? The answers confirm if Montgomery and Ridgway sustained morale improvement that led to future victories.

Expected Outcomes

The empirical evidence suggests that Montgomery and Ridgway did create a climate for change, engaged and enabled change, and implemented and sustained change that improved the morale of their organizations in times of defeat. This rapid transformation in fighting spirit contributed to future success on the battlefield. It is expected that Montgomery's and Ridgway's approaches to improving morale followed the steps of Kotter's model and du Picq's ideas regarding instilling discipline and establishing unit cohesion.

Summary

This section outlined the methodology used to qualitatively assess Montgomery's and Ridgway's approaches for implementing change to improve unit morale. Ten research questions develop the structure, focused comparison of the two historical case studies to prove the hypotheses. Kotter's eight-steps and du Picq's theory form the basis for data collection from primary and secondary sources. The next section examines the British Eighth Army in the North African campaign of WWII from August 1942 to December 1943 and the American Eighth Army in Korea from December 1950 to April 1951.

Case Studies

Introduction

This section includes two case studies and is divided into five subsections. The first case study is Field Marshal Montgomery's command of the British Eighth Army in the North African campaign of World War II (WWII). The second case study covers the command of the American Eighth Army in Korea by General Ridgway. The first subsection provides a general overview of the British Eighth Army in North Africa, followed by the structured questions for Field Marshal Montgomery's command. The third subsection delivers a broad overview of the American Eighth Army in the Korean War, followed by the structured questions for General Ridgway's command. The final subsection concludes with a summary and the evidence presented in this section forms the basis for determining the findings for analysis.

Overview of Case Study 1

The British involvement in the North African campaign of WWII began on June 10, 1940 when Italy aligned with Germany to form the Axis Powers and declared war on France and Britain, the Allied Powers. Italy's goal was to protect its Libyan colony and expand by invading Egypt while Germany hoped North Africa would be a spring board to controlling the entire Middle Eastern oil supply.[42] The Mediterranean Sea and Suez Canal were vital to Britain because they provided a strategic line of communication with India and Australia. The British Western Desert Force in Egypt, along with elements from the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, constituted the Middle East Command assigned to protect key terrain in the Mediterranean and secure the allies' Middle Eastern oil resources.[43]

Italy gained the initiative by invading Egypt on September 13, 1940 and advancing sixty-

[42] James Lucas, *War in the Desert* (New York, NY: Beaufort Books, 1982), 15.

[43] Glyn Harper, *The Battle for North Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2017, 8.

five miles to Sidi Barrani. However, the British force launched Operation Compass on December 9, 1940 and defeated the Italian Tenth Army in Libya, reaching El Agheila two months later.[44] With the Italians no longer a significant threat in North Africa, Winston Churchill sent half of the Western Desert Force to protect Greece from Axis invasion while Germany directed General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps to reinforce Italy in Libya. Between January and July 1942, Rommel conducted several offensives that drove the British forces east to their defensive line at El Alamein, Egypt (see Figure 2).[45] The Western Desert Force, now known as the British Eighth Army, suffered defeat, high casualties, and a retreat mentality that contributed to a morale crisis.[46] Additionally, the Eighth Army was a multinational force comprised of British, New Zealand, Indian, Polish, South African, and other Allied nations creating a lack of unity.[47] The British Eighth Army was in dire need of substantial changes to improve operations.



Figure 2. Rommel's Offensives Between 21 January and 7 July 1942. US Military Academy West Point, *World War II European Theater, Atlas* (West Point, NY: 1956), map 35b.

This first major change was when British Prime Minister Winston Churchill relieved General Claude Auchinleck from the Middle East Command and replaced him with General

[44] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 9.

[45] Lucas, *War in the Desert*, 19-29.

[46] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 68.

[47] Ibid, 16.

Harold Alexander, the current Eighth Army commander. Initially, General William Gott would take command of the Eighth Army but he died when his plane was shot down in August 1942 and Lieutenant General Bernard Law Montgomery took his place.[48] The focus is on Montgomery's command of the British Eighth Army between August 1942 and December 1943 with key events at the battle of Alam Halfa, the second battle of El Alamein, and the Battle of El Agheila. After the Eighth Army's victory at the Mareth Line in March 1943, the Axis Powers began withdrawing in April and the North African campaign ended once Tunis fell on May 13, 1943.[49]

Structured Questions

In his lecture on military leadership given in 1945 to the University of St. Andrews, Field Marshal Montgomery stated that "The biggest single factor making for success in war is morale. A high morale is based on discipline…".[50] The first research questions is how did Montgomery instill discipline? Montgomery instilled discipline in the British Eighth Army by delivering orders that imposed strict military control over Soldiers' behavior, fitness, and environment. As soon as Montgomery took command of the Eighth Army in August 1942, he noticed that officers tended to question orders from higher. To break this habit, he informed his subordinate commanders that "orders no longer formed 'the base for discussion,' but for action."[51] Montgomery stressed that he would not tolerate resistance to his authority. Secondly, he emphasized the importance of mental and physical fitness for his troops by issuing orders on September 14, 1942 demanding his troops become "really fit; ordinary fitness is not enough, they must be made tough and hard."[52] Montgomery also believed that mentally and physically fit Soldiers needed an environment

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[48] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 83-86.

[49] Trevor Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General* (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 84-85.

[50] Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, "Military Leadership" (lecture, University of St. Andrews, Fife, Scotland, November 15, 1945).

[51] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 98.

[52] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 112.

conducive to strict discipline. After capturing Tripoli on January 23, 1943, Montgomery was afraid of the Eighth Army "getting soft" from the luxuries provided by a big city; therefore, he "forbade the use of houses, buildings, etc., for headquarters and troops; all would live in the fields and in the desert."[53] Montgomery regulated the Eighth Army's living conditions, fitness, and behavior to maintain discipline through battle toughness and avoiding complacency.

The second research question is how did Montgomery establish a sense of urgency? Montgomery drew attention to the Eighth Army's morale crisis by assuming command ahead of schedule, immediately changing policies, and threatening to relieve commanders that did not meet his expectations. Montgomery took bold measures to convey the seriousness of Eighth Army's problems when he assumed command two days early, against Auchinleck's wishes.[54] Immediately after he assumed command, Montgomery issued orders to every unit stating "there would be NO WITHDRAWAL and NO SURRENDER" and he summoned his staff officers for an urgent meeting to begin planning an offensive.[55] To stress the importance of the no withdrawal order, Montgomery sent "troop carriers seventy miles to the rear of the Alamein position," so if the Eighth Army wanted to retreat they would have to do so on foot.[56] Montgomery's third objective for establishing urgency was to remove what he called "dead wood."[57] He felt there "was an urgent need to stiffen the backbones of commanders" and he warned them that if they failed "they would be rapidly replaced."[58] In his first twenty-four hours in the desert, Montgomery shocked the Eighth Army into realizing how critical their situation had become. By

[53] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 140.

[54] Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General*, 65.

[55] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 35.

[56] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 87.

[57] Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander*, 62.

[58] Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General*, 72.

taking command immediately, reversing withdrawal orders, and pressuring commanders to conform, Montgomery convinced the Eighth Army that change was necessary to improve morale.

The third research question asks how did Montgomery form a guiding coalition? Montgomery replaced subordinates with trusted advisors and he made himself visible among the troops to gain commitment and establish buy-in for his change initiatives. Montgomery believed a "clean sweep was required…new Commanders had to be brought in; Commanders who would NOT be influenced by past events."[59] He did not want commanders that had served under Auchinleck's withdrawal orders because he feared those commanders would resist change and revert back to defeatist tendencies. Therefore, Montgomery flew two commanders out from England that he previously served with to command his Thirteenth and Thirtieth Corps, Lieutenant General Sir Brian Horrocks and Major General Sir Oliver Leese.[60] Although externally hiring Corps commanders from England "irritated the Commonwealth divisional commanders…who saw themselves as being passed over for promotion," they were still impressed by Montgomery's determination and zeal.[61] Even though the British Army did not have a chief of staff system, Montgomery appointed his old friend Brigadier Francis de Guingand as his "trusted Chief of Staff" and they quickly re-established their former close friendship.[62] Montgomery assembled a reliable group of subordinate commanders and coworkers that would support his change initiative but he also needed confidence from his troops.

Gaining commitment from the Eighth Army Soldiers required that Montgomery establish trust by building relationships. He knew that he must "show himself to them, get among them and let them see his face and hear his words" so that his orders would carry credibility.[63] He believed

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[59] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 44.

[60] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 96-103.

[61] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 96.

[62] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 89-90.

[63] Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander*, 61.

that "to obey an impersonal figure was not enough. They must know who I was."[64] He also made an effort to get to know his subordinates on a personal level since "he virtually knew everybody by name, down to the rank certainly of second-in-command of regiments and brigade-majors."[65] Developing personal relationships with the troops built their trust in Montgomery and caused Soldiers to endorse his new policies. This commitment was evident when his staff denied Auchinleck's request for planning defensive positions east of the defensive line one day after Montgomery had taken command.[66] The Eighth Army supported Montgomery's change in policy regarding no more withdrawals. Now that Montgomery had formed a guiding coalition of trusted subordinate commanders and troops inspired to follow his change initiatives, he needed to develop and communicate his vision.

The fourth research question is how did Montgomery develop a vision for change and communicate that vision to his subordinates? Montgomery's vision was victory over Rommel and the Axis forces in North Africa. He provided purpose, direction and motivation to the Eighth Army through his speeches, unit visits, and personal messages. In his inaugural speech upon taking command of the Eighth Army, Montgomery provided the troops a "sense of purpose and organization to an otherwise demoralized Eighth Army."[67] He believed that visiting his subordinate headquarters to provide verbal orders before and during battle was the most effective means for communicating his vision.[68] He would "assemble commanders down to the lieutenant-colonel level and explain to them the problem, his intention, his plan, and generally how he is going to fight the battle and make it go the way he wants" to provide direction towards his goal.[69]

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[64] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 101.

[65] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 90.

[66] Ibid, 47.

[67] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 89.

[68] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 82.

[69] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 81.

He knew that if all the Soldiers knew what was wanted, "when they see it coming to pass there will be a surge of confidence throughout the Army."[70] In his plans for the Battle of El Alamein, he scheduled two days "devoted to the most intensive propaganda as regards to educating the attacking troops about the battle, and to getting them enthusiastic."[71] Accomplishing tasks towards Montgomery's vision generated motivation for Soldiers to continue towards that objective. On the eve of the Battle of El Alamein, Montgomery sent out a personal message to the entire Eighth Army "reminding them that their mission was to destroy Rommel's men and that they were now ready to do it" elaborating that the battle would be the turning point in the war.[72] This not only provided direction to reinforce his vision of victory, it also motivated the men that their previous training had prepared them to achieve success. Montgomery developed and communicated his vision by providing purpose, direction and motivation to the Eighth Army via speeches, unit visits and personal messages.

The fifth research question inquires how did Montgomery empower his subordinates to action his vision? Montgomery began by entrusting his Chief of Staff, de Guingand, to make decisions on his behalf. In his memoirs, Montgomery describes, "I gave him [de Guingand] full powers. If he couldn't get a hold of me he would give a major decision himself, and I never once questioned any such decision."[73] This showed de Guingand that Montgomery trusted him which gave de Guingand the confidence and authority to carry out Montgomery's vision. This also gave de Guingand legitimacy and power over the rest of the officers in the Eighth Army because Montgomery insisted "that every order issued by de Guingand must be accepted as coming direct from the Army Commander and obeyed *without demur*."[74]

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[70] Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein*, 211.

[71] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 109.

[72] Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General*, 71.

[73] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 150.

[74] Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander*,64.

Montgomery not only empowered his Chief of Staff but he also granted his subordinate commanders freedom of action. During the Battle of El Agheila on December 13, 1942 Montgomery gave Thirtieth Corps commander his orders and then left "all the details in his capable hands" showing that Montgomery trusted his subordinate commanders to carry out his vision.[75] After providing guidance to his officer in charge of Eighth Army field artillery, Major General Sidney Kirkman, "Montgomery never had to speak to Kirkman again about the importance of field artillery in the coming battle" which demonstrates that Montgomery allowed his subordinates to exercise initiative to carry out his concept for victory.[76] Although Montgomery preferred to maintain a "firm grip" or a "tight leash" on operations, he did not believe in "interference, or cramping the initiative of subordinates; indeed, it is by the initiative of the subordinates that the battle is finally won."[77] Montgomery trusted his subordinates and empowered them by encouraging initiative, which enabled them to realize his vision of victory.

The sixth research question investigates how did Montgomery create a sense of unity? When Montgomery assumed command, he realized that the Eighth Army was fractured. There was "friction between the men of the various arms of service [that] had developed in certain cases into mistrust and hostility" and Montgomery's goal was to "weld them into a whole" who saw themselves as "men of the Eighth Army, equal partners in battle."[78] He also "put an end to the practices of mixing and matching units. 'Divisions would fight as Divisions', he said 'and they were not to be split up into bits and pieces all over the desert.'"[79] Keeping formations together ensured that Soldiers fought with commanders and other Soldiers that they trained with, which would build trust and cohesion among units. Additionally, Montgomery moved his headquarters

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[75] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 132.

[76] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 126.

[77] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*,75.

[78] Lucas, *War in the Desert*, 47.

[79] Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein*, 216-217.

next to the Desert Air Force so the Eighth Army staff could coordinate directly with their aerial counterparts. This synchronized close air support operations and provided improved relations between the Army and Air Force.[80] Some claim that Montgomery personally and physically separated himself from his troops and subordinate commanders, which had a negative impact on unifying the Eighth Army under his command.[81] However, this isolation was countered by Montgomery's personal messages and "his practice of wearing various unit badges on his headgear" showing his support for his multinational subordinate units.[82] Montgomery created unity across the Eighth Army by maintaining unit integrity during training and battle, collocating the Army and Air Force headquarters, and wearing multiple unit insignia.

The seventh research question is how did Montgomery capitalize on short-term wins? Montgomery knew that he needed a "clear-cut victory in his first battle" to ignite a morale fire in the heart of the Eighth Army; he could not afford another stalemate, or worse, a defeat.[83] The Battle of Alam Halfa on August 30, 1942 was a defensive battle against Rommel's Panzer Armee's attack in which the Eighth Army prevailed, giving the Soldiers the surge of confidence they needed. Alam Halfa "demonstrated that Rommel *had* been beaten once and could be beaten again."[84] Additionally, the victory at Alam Halfa "set the Eighth Army on the road to recovery from its bewilderment and from the many disasters of May through July 1942."[85] Not only did the defensive victory improve morale and build the Soldiers' trust in Montgomery as their

[80] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*,42.

[81] Lucas, *War in the Desert*, 40.

[82] Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein*, 214.

[83] Lewin, *Montgomery as Military Commander*, 77.

[84] Lucas, *War in the Desert*, 41.

[85] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 112.

commander, it also allowed Montgomery to request more time from Prime Minister Winston Churchill to train the Eighth Army in preparation for its fall offensive.[86]

The eighth research question is how did Montgomery consolidate gains towards his vision? Some may argue that Montgomery failed to exploit his victory at Alam Halfa by choosing not to pursue and destroy Rommel's Panzer Armee.[87] However, Montgomery explains that "I refused to exploit our success as such action did not suit my long-term plans."[88] He knew that the Eighth Army was not ready for such offensive action and required training before it could annihilate the Germans in North Africa. Montgomery used his victory at Alam Halfa to buy him time from Churchill to properly train the Eighth Army for offensive combined arms operations in desert terrain.[89] Montgomery set conditions for success at the second Battle of El Alamein by ensuring his army had sufficient training, was adequately equipped, and had the confidence it needed to achieve victory.[90] Montgomery's goal was clear, stop Rommel's thrust at Alam Halfa, build the morale of the Eighth Army so that it could achieve his long-term goal of smashing the Panzer Armee at El Alamein.[91] Montgomery was able to show his Soldiers that the defensive victory at Alam Halfa, combined with proper training and improved morale could produce a capable Eighth Army that achieved a strategic victory at El Alamein.

The ninth research question is how did Montgomery institutionalize change? Montgomery was able to transform Eighth Army's culture from defeatist into triumphant by establishing a sense of belonging, increasing confidence, and continuing to secure victories in battle. The Eighth Army pursued the Axis forces west across Egypt, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and

[86] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 117-118.

[87] Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General*, 69.

[88] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 102.

[89] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 118.

[90] Royle, *Montgomery: Lessons in Leadership from the Soldier's General*, 69-71.

[91] Lucas, *War in the Desert*, 46.

completely destroyed Rommel's forces in Tunisia after linking up with the American First Army ending the war in North Africa on May 7, 1943 (see Figure 3).[92] Montgomery recalls in his memoirs, "we went from one success to another; the Eighth Army developed a crusading spirit, and the soldiers began to think it was invincible…they felt they were all partners in battle and that they themselves 'belonged,' and mattered."[93] The loyalty and team building began after their first victory at Alam Halfa and endured throughout the campaign. After Montgomery's reassignment to Twenty-first Army Group in Europe in December 1943, British Broadcasting Corporation correspondent Denis Johnston reported how Montgomery "turned the men of the Desert Army from the shoulder-shrugging cynics they used to be into the confident, self-advertising crowd they are now" demonstrating the sustained improvement in the Eighth Army's morale over a year later.[94] Montgomery's objective was "to make Eighth Army a winning team to which all his soldiers would take pride in belonging. He produced that feeling and it endures today, more than four decades removed from the desert battles" confirming that Montgomery's morale legacy persisted well beyond his time commanding the Eighth Army in North Africa.[95]



Figure 3. Eighth Army's Pursuit to Tunisia November 1942 to February 1943. US Military Academy West Point, *World War II European Theater, Atlas* (West Point, NY: 1956), map 38b.

[92] Montgomery of Alamein, *The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 149.

[93] Ibid, 150.

[94] Hamilton, *Monty: The Battles of Field Marshal Montgomery*, 201.

[95] Lucas, *War in the Desert*, 41.

The final research question asks what does morale improvement look like in an organization? Morale is difficult to quantifiably measure but easy to identify as low or high based on attitudes and beliefs of organization members. Upon meeting with Montgomery in August 1942, the Ninth Australian Division reported "general relief and satisfaction were felt…confidence and morale increase rapidly."[96] Winston Churchill witnessed the change Montgomery brought with him after meeting with several soldiers in Egypt, "Churchill sensed 'the reviving ardour of the Army.' He cabled to his War Cabinet on August 21 that 'a complete change of atmosphere has taken place.'"[97] It is evident that the Eighth Army soldiers and British politicians recognized morale improvement but a more difficult task is measuring increased or decreased morale.

Jonathan Fennell recommends quantifying morale by measuring desertion, sickness, and surrender rates.[98] Fennell's report reveals sick admission rates dropped after Montgomery took command and continued to decline throughout the campaign. In August 1942, the sickness monthly rate was seventy-five sick per one thousand soldiers and by November 1942 it was forty-seven sick per one thousand soldiers. By April 1943, the sickness monthly admission rate was as low as eighteen sick per one thousand soldiers. According to Fennell, "the incidence of surrender and desertion also dramatically decreased." During the summer of 1942, the rate of surrender or desertion was eighty-eight percent and that declined to seventeen percent after the second Battle of El Alamein.[99] If sickness, surrender and desertion rates are appropriate measures of morale improvement, then the Eighth Army's morale certainly improved after Montgomery took command.

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[96] Harper, *The Battle for North Africa*, 88.

[97] Ibid, 89.

[98] Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein*,10.

[99] Fennell, *Combat and Morale in the North African Campaign: The Eighth Army and the Path to El Alamein*,48.

Overview of Case Study 2

WWII expanded to the Pacific when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor in December 1941, bringing the United States into the war. After the United States dropped the atomic bombs on Japan in August 1945, Japan surrendered and gave up their occupation of Korea. To assist in Korea's independence, America and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the country at the thirty-eighth parallel. The United States wanted to sponsor a democratic government in South Korea under President Syngman Rhee, while the Russians planned to promote Communism in the North.[100] Although the United States and Soviet military occupations would end in June 1949, the fall of China to Communism and the Soviet's detonation of an atomic bomb that same year would ignite the Cold War backdrop for American involvement in the Korean conflict.[101]

The North Korean regime sought to unify the peninsula under Communist rule and, with the approval and material support from China and the Soviets, invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950. The South Korean military was no match for the invading force and within two days, the North Korean's took the capital of Seoul.[102] By this time, the United Nations (UN) Security Council passed a resolution for member nations to provide assistance to the Republic of Korea (ROK) with the United States in the lead, naming General Douglas MacArthur as the UN force commander.[103] American President Harry S. Truman authorized portions of the Eighth Army, commanded by General Walton H. Walker and garrisoned in Japan, to deploy to Korea in support of the UN cause. However, these troops were poorly trained, ill equipped, and unprepared to combat the Soviet-armed North Korean People's Army (NKPA).[104]

The NKPA had initial success and overwhelmed the fatigued UN and ROK forces,

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[100] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals,* 5.

[101] Lief A. Gruenberg, *Defining Moments: The Korean War* (Detroit, MI: Omnigraphics, 2004), 26.

[102] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals,* 8-9.

[103] Hasting, *The Korean War*, 60-61.

[104] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals,* 17.

pushing them to the south-eastern edge of the peninsula. The defeated Eighth Army defended the Pusan perimeter (see Figure 4) until reinforcements from Britain and the United States could arrive in late August.[105] General MacArthur launched the first UN offensive with X Corps landing at Inchon coordinated with an Eighth Army break out of the Pusan Perimeter that enabled the UN forces to liberate Seoul and expel the NKPA north of the thirty-eighth parallel by the end of September 1950.[106] Although the UN resolution's initial goal was met, the American Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized General MacArthur to pursue the NKPA north, completely destroy their offensive capability, and unify Korea under anti-communist government.[107] Unbeknownst to the Americans, this capitalist aggression provoked the Chinese Communists to enter the war.[108]

[105] Maurice Isserman, *Korean War*, ed. John S. Bowman (New York, NY: Facts on File, 2003), 47.

[106] Ibid, 45.

[107] Ibid, 61.

[108] Gruenberg, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 71.



Figure 4. Pusan Perimeter 10 September 1950. US Military Academy West Point, *The Korean War, Atlas* (West Point, NY: 1956), map 11b.

On October 19, 1950 the North Korean capital of Pyongyang fell and the ROK and UN forces continued to drive the NKPA north towards the Yalu River (see Figure 5).[109] The ROK troops were the first to encounter the Chinese in late October 1950 and General MacArthur dismissed the reports, believing the Chinese troops to be volunteer fighters and not the professional Chinese Communist Forces (CCF).[110] However, by November 1950 the Chinese had approximately 200,000 troops in North Korea and launched several offensives forcing the Eighth Army and X Corps to retreat 275 miles south back over the thirty-eighth parallel. The Eighth Army suffered from exhaustion, extreme cold weather, and defeat but the war was far from

[109] Hasting, *The Korean War*, 124.

[110] Gruenberg, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 75.

over.[111] To add to this despair, Eighth Army's Commanding General Walker died in a tragic jeep accident on December 23, 1950. General MacArthur hoped that General Matthew B. Ridgway's appointment as the new commander would be Eighth Army's salvation.[112] The focus is on General Ridgway's command of the Eighth Army from December 1950 to April 1951 with emphasis on the Battle of Twin Tunnels, the Battle of Chipyong-ni, Operation Killer, Operation Ripper and Operation Rugged. In mid-April, 1950 General Ridgway replaced General MacArthur as the Supreme Commander in the Far East while the war continued for three more years.[113] Even though peace negotiations began in July 1951, it took two years for the North Korean and UN officials to settle on dividing the country at the thirty-eighth parallel by signing the armistice on July 27, 1953.[114]



Figure 5. United Nations Advance to the Yalu River 26 October 1950. US Military Academy West Point, *The Korean War, Atlas* (West Point, NY: 1956), map 13.

[111] Isserman, *Korean War*, 77-81.

[112] Hasting, *The Korean War*, 188-189.

[113] Matthew B. Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway* (New York, NY: Harper & Brothers, 1956), 220.

[114] Isserman, *Korean War*, 102.

Structured Questions

The first research question asks how did General Ridgway instill discipline? Upon his arrival to Korea, Ridgway visited units of the Eighth Army to gain understanding of their situation. During these inspections, he found division commanders that did not know the terrain, battalion commanders that were road bound, soldiers that were confused, and disorganized ROK units.[115] Ridgway corrected this by imposing orders to increase troop alertness, build pride in their units, and develop confidence in their abilities. Ridgway "would permit no jeep with the top up to operate in the combat zone" to increase troop vigilance because he believed riding in a closed vehicle "gives him an erroneous sense of warmth, of safety."[116] He also "bore down hard on the need for prompt launching of attacks, and for immediate reporting" to make sure that the Eighth Army avoided complacency.[117]

Ridgway also instilled discipline by fostering pride in the organization when he "insisted that soldiers be resupplied far more rapidly with warm clothing, hot food, regular mail service, and up-to-date weapons" as well as ordering new linen and tableware for the mess halls.[118, 119] He also ordered that "any man who lost or threw away or needlessly damaged any piece of equipment or property was going to be court-martialed" to impress upon the troops the importance of supply discipline.[120] Finally, he instilled discipline with the ROK soldiers by establishing "straggler posts" to regain control of the retreating ROK units during the first Chinese offensive near Seoul.[121] Ridgway was able to instill discipline, build unit pride and avoid

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[115] Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*, 181.

[116] Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 204.

[117] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 118.

[118] Hanson, *The Savior Generals*, 173.

[119] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 103.

[120] Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 206.

[121] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 94.

complacency by enacting orders to increase alertness, providing troops the resources they needed, and gaining control of retreating units.

The next research question is how did Ridgway establish a sense of urgency? Ridgway communicated the necessity for change by relieving commanders, rescinding orders, focusing on offensive operations, and building support for the war from the American public. After assessing his corps and division commanders, Ridgway told the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Joe Collins, "Let's be ruthless with our general officers if they fail to measure up" and he "replaced half of his division and corps commanders."[122] This let the remaining leadership know that they would be removed from command if they did not possess a command philosophy in line with Ridgway's change initiative. After Ridgway learned that corps commanders had ordered their divisions' positions held at all cost, he "ordered the immediate rescinding of that portion of the directive" and insisted that only he would give such a directive once he has personally reconnoitered the terrain.[123] This order revocation demonstrated that the command's emphasis had shifted from defensive, terrain focused to offensive, enemy focused.

Another method Ridgway used for establishing urgency for an offensive spirit is demanding his subordinates prepare plans for offensive operations. When visiting the Second Infantry Division headquarters, Captain William Guthrie remembers General Ridgway saying, "I don't want to hear your withdrawal plans – I want to hear your attack plans."[124] When addressing the Eighth Army staff, Ridgway explained "throw away all your defense plans, I'm not interested in listening to them, I'm not going to listen to them. We're through going backwards, and we're going to kill them right here" thus emphasizing the requirement for change from a defeatist attitude to an aggressive mindset.[125] Ridgway also believed Americans at home needed to possess

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[122] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 151, 162.

[123] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 90.

[124] Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 82.

[125] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 150.

this same aggressive mentality. He wrote to General Collins in Washington "urging the need to awaken Americans both in government and across the land to what was taking place in Korea, the demand for 'a toughness of soul as well as body.'".[126] Domestic support for offensive operations would assist in pressuring the Eighth Army towards an aggressive spirit. New commanders, revocation of previous orders, and an offensive mindset both at home and in combat established the sense of urgency Ridgway needed to initiate change.

The third research question asks how did Ridgway form a guiding coalition towards his change initiative? Ridgway developed his team to champion his new ideas by meeting with key leaders and placing those he trusted in command positions. Ridgway first met his subordinate commanders and his Chief of Staff to improve lateral communication and provide his intent.[127] Providing guidance to his subordinates enabled them to carry out Ridgway's goal of improving the Eighth Army's combat potential. After the ROK's disorganized retreat following the first Chinese offensive, Ridgway met with South Korean President Syngman Rhee to denounce the ROK troops' performance. This meeting "prompted Rhee to visit ROK troops at the front, along with Ridgway, and to launch his own 'housecleaning' of officers."[128] Ridgway's presence during the ROK leadership turnover enabled him to assist in selecting commanders that would support future offensive operations. Ridgway did the same with the US soldiers by working "subtly to create a more skilled leadership team that could wreak the kind of damage on the enemy necessary to achieve his objectives."[129] For example, at the corps level he replaced Major General Breitling Coulter with Major General Bryant Moore who served under Ridgway in WWII.[130] Additionally, he kept Lieutenant General Frank Milburn in command of First Corps

[126] Hastings, *The Korean War*, 190.

[127] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 85.

[128] Gruenberg, *Defining Moments: The Korean War*, 90.

[129] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 200.

[130] Ibid, 154.

because “Milburn was an old friend” even though Ridgway was disappointed in his performance during the Chinese New Year offensive.[131] Meeting with important American and South Korean leadership and placing those Ridgway trusted in command positions enabled him to form a guiding coalition to promote his change effort.

The fourth research question explores how did Ridgway develop and communicate his vision? Ridgway “made his views known to everyone from his senior commanders to the lowliest private, thus providing certitude that improved the Eighth Army’s effectiveness.”[132] In order to make his strategy of annihilation simple and easy for anyone in the Eighth Army to understand, “Ridgway summed it up by stating, ‘Find them! Fix them! Fight them! Finish them!’”[133] Although this motto provided an offensive spirit, it lacked purpose. Therefore, on January 21, 1951 Ridgway developed and published his “Why We Are Here?” directive to convey to every member of the Eighth Army their reason for being in Korea and their purpose for fighting (see Appendix A). Ridgway’s answer to “why are we here?” was based on the military’s loyalty to support governmental decisions. His answer to “what are we fighting for?” was based on not only fighting for the freedom of the South Korean Allies but also “a fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent national existence” against Communism.[134] Ridgway developed a vision that was simple to understand, provided purpose and motivation, and instilled nationalism. He communicated his vision either directly to the Eighth Army in written orders or indirectly through verbal communication with his subordinate commanders.

The fifth research question is how did Ridgway empower his subordinates to action his vision? Ridgway empowered Soldiers of the Eighth Army by having confidence in their collective ability and he enabled his subordinate commanders by giving them autonomy and

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[131] Taaffe, *MacArthur’s Korean War Generals*, 155.

[132] Ibid, 199.

[133] Taaffe, *MacArthur’s Korean War Generals*, 164.

[134] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 264-265.

authority. During the February battles of the Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni, Ridgway recollects in his memoirs "I never had the slightest doubt over the outcome of this battle…I felt confident they would hold. And I believe the troops shared my conviction."[135] Even though the Chinese outnumbered the UN forces, "he reminded them that their superior firepower and materiel could compensate for enemy numbers."[136] Ridgway believed in the Eighth Army's capacity to defeat the enemy and this certainty from the Commanding General empowered all Soldiers to have confidence in their abilities.

To enable his subordinate commanders, Ridgway described his command philosophy as "give them full authority for individual action, but check relentlessly to see they speed the main job."[137] This viewpoint was evident in Ridgway's selection of Brigadier General C. D. Palmer as traffic control officer of the Han River crossing. In his memoirs, Ridgway recounts, "[I] gave him full authority to act in my name, and made him personally responsible for the safety of the bridges."[138] Some critics may claim that Ridgway micro-managed battles when he frequented the front lines; however, Ridgway believed "I think the commander should be where the crisis of action is, where the going is the toughest. He is not there to trespass on the sphere of his subordinates. He is there to drink in, by his senses and all his experience, the actual situation, the human element above all else."[139] Although Ridgway was present on the battlefield, he empowered his subordinates to champion his vision by having confidence in their abilities and providing subordinates autonomy and authority.

The sixth research question asks how did Ridgway create a sense of unity to enable improved morale? Ridgway stressed cohesion not only within the Eighth Army but also with the

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[135] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 107.

[136] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 150.

[137] Ricks, *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*,187.

[138] Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 212.

[139] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 151.

ROK forces. On his first day in Korea, Ridgway sent a letter to Lieutenant General Chung Il Kwon, the Republic of Korea Army Chief of Staff, "reassuring our ROK Army allies that we were not going to pull out suddenly and leave them to cope with the Communist alone (see Appendix B)."[140] This letter conveys Ridgway's view of a united Allied Army with a single, common objective that established unity of effort. His next step was to unify the Eighth Army internally by changing the command structure, moving his headquarters, and racially desegregating his units. On 27 December, 1950 X Corps came under Eighth Army control by Ridgway's request and "for the first time in Korea all UN forces were under Eighth Army command in unified control" allowing Ridgway complete authority to orchestrate operations.[141] Additionally, Ridgway collocated the Eighth Army command post with the First Corps command post because he believed its previous location "tends to separate the headquarters men and the men in troop units – mentally as well as physically."[142] His final push for Eighth Army cohesion included "integrating African Americans in the Korean theater into previously segregated units under his command" which permeated throughout the Army and by the end of the war most US armed forces were desegregated.[143] Ridgway created a sense of cohesion across the Eighth Army by reassuring the ROK allies of the UN forces' commitment, aligning task organizations and command posts, and racially integrating units to generate unity of effort.

The seventh research question is how did Ridgway capitalize on short-term wins towards his change vision to improve morale? Ridgway celebrated the wins at Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni to improve the morale and combat effectiveness the Eighth Army needed to launch their own offensives. When his staff presented him with a withdrawal plan for the spring of 1951,

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[140] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 84.

[141] Roy E. Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1990), 13.

[142] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 97.

[143] Hanson, *The Savior Generals*, 177.

Ridgway knew "he needed a victory over the communists to show the rest of the U.N. forces and his own staff that the Reds were not supermen."[144] To portray the importance of the limited victory at the Twin Tunnels, "Ridgway presented the Presidential Unit Citation to the regimental headquarters, the 3d Battalion, and the French Battalion for their victory at Twin Tunnels. He also decorated Colonel Freeman with the Distinguished Service Cross."[145] Celebrating successes and rewarding leaders improves unit morale because their achievements are recognized. After the Twin Tunnels victory, Ridgway "had realized the 23rd Infantry Regiment was a unit that would stay and fight. He refused Almond's request [for withdrawal] and issued a direct order to the 23rd Infantry" thus initiating the Battle of Chipyong-ni.[146]

During the battle of Chipyong-ni, UN forces had driven back one of the strongest Chinese offensives and it represented "an important stage in the rehabilitation and revival of morale."[147] Morale improved because "it was the first time an Eighth Army unit had stopped an all-out Chinese offensive cold. Ridgway hoped it was a harbinger of things to come."[148] If the Eighth Army could do it once, they could do it again. To recognize their success and capitalize on their victory, Ridgway "endorsed Almond's promotion to lieutenant general."[149] Ridgway was inspired by these victories and refused to surrender the initiative, so he launched a series of broad-front offensives throughout March and April 1951.[150] Ridgway celebrated the wins at Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni to improve the morale and combat effectiveness the Eighth Army in order to prepare for additional spring offensives to consolidate gains.

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[144] Leo Barron, *High Tide in the Korean War* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2015), 63.

[145] Hamburger, *Leadership in the Crucible*, 127.

[146] Barron, *High Tide in the Korean War*, 136.

[147] Hastings, *The Korean War*, 196.

[148] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 172.

[149] Ibid, 172.

[150] Ibid, 174.

The eighth research question is how did Ridgway consolidate gains towards his vision of improved fighting spirit? Ridgway produced victorious synergy by planning systematic offensives to cross the thirty-eighth parallel and coerce the Chinese and North Koreans to negotiate for peace. Ridgway's offensive formula was simple, "careful, mutually supporting, and methodical advances that relied on massive firepower to overcome enemy defenses."[151] His intent was not to seize territory but to kill as many North Korean and Chinese forces as possible while preserving UN forces' lives.[152] Operations Killer (February 1951), Ripper (March 1951) and Rugged (March 1951) were great successes that pushed the Chinese back across the Han River, forced them to abandon the capital of Seoul, and "by early April, UN forces once again held territory north of the 38th parallel" establishing a defense along the Kansas line (see Figure 6).[153] These victories achieved Ridgway's goal of improving the Eighth Army's fighting spirit because they "had proved time and again that they could take the hardest blows the Chinese could deliver, and then strike back with devastating effect."[154] Even though these victories failed to immediately bring the Chinese and North Koreans to the bargaining table; the successes "had given the Truman administration a viable middle option between MacArthur's vision of a Sino-American conflagration or a humiliating withdrawal from Korea."[155] By methodically designing offensives to push across the Han River, recapture Seoul, and cross the thirty-eighth parallel, Ridgway consolidated gains towards his vision of improving the Eighth Army's fighting spirit.

[151] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 174.

[152] Barron, *High Tide in the Korean War*, 241.

[153] Isserman, *Korean War*, 89.

[154] Isserman, *Korean War*, 90.

[155] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 182.



Figure 6. The Kansas Line 30 April 1951. US Military Academy West Point, *The Korean War, Atlas* (West Point, NY: 1956), map 19.

The ninth research question asks how did Ridgway institutionalize change? It is difficult to imagine Ridgway having long-lasting effects on the Eighth Army considering he was only in command for approximately four months before General James Van Fleet assumed command on April 14, 1951. However, Stephen Taaffe claims "of the Eighth Army's three commanders during the war's first year, Ridgway was undoubtably the most proficient. He took over a beaten and retreating army, and through sheer will power, he got it fighting effectively in a matter of weeks."[156] After assessing the Eighth Army and continuing Ridgway's planned spring offensives, Van Fleet told Ridgway, "I am confident we'll hold" showing the new commander's faith in the morale of the organization.[157] Van Fleet was concerned about complacency and low morale while fighting defensive trench warfare so he initiated several limited offensives in the summer of 1951 that resulted in successes for the UN forces, but also high casualty rates. By November, the offensive ground to a halt and the UN would not launch another ground attack for the remainder

[156] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 215.

[157] Ibid, 191.

of the war.[158] Negotiations for peace began on July 10, 1951 and continued on for two years before both sides could reach an agreement. In the interim, static fighting continued along the Kansas line, while "the Eighth Army morale and public support for the conflict ebbed in the face of continuing communist intransigence at the peace talks."[159] Although morale dipped due to delayed negotiations, Ridgway recalled in his memoirs that the Eighth Army "had fought for General James A. Van Fleet, as valiantly as it had fought under my command."[160] While some may argue that Ridgway did not have an enduring effect on the Eighth Army's morale, the unit's fighting spirit remained lifted under Van Fleet until the postponed peace agreement subverted Ridgway's efforts.

The tenth and final research question is what does improved morale look like for the Eighth Army? A sense of pride, confidence, and aggressive spirit signaled to Ridgway that morale improved in the Eighth Army. By the end of January, Ridgway's pilot told him "You've certainly got this army fighting for you General," which caused Ridgway to reflect, "and they were indeed fighting again, but not for me. They were fighting for themselves, with pride rekindled, and with a determination that they would never again take the sort of licking they had accepted a month before."[161] In his memoirs, Ridgway writes "the American flag never flew over a prouder, tougher, more spirited and more competent fighting force than was the Eighth Army as it drove north beyond the Parallel. It was a magnificent fighting organization, supremely confident that it could take any objective assigned to it."[162] Ridgway was not the only leader that recognized improved morale in the Eighth Army, "the Seventh Division chief of staff Herb Powell noted, 'Our division is at its peak, with experienced confident officers and men with high

[158] Isserman, *Korean War*, 103-6.

[159] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 198-199.

[160] Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 222.

[161] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 106.

[162] Ridgway, *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*, 219.

morale.'"[163] Indeed, by the end of March 1951 Ridgway and others noticed the increased sense of pride, confidence and aggressive spirit that spread throughout the Eighth Army representing its improved morale.

Summary

This section presented a general overview of the case studies followed by evidence for the structured research questions on Field Marshal Montgomery's command of the British Eighth Army in the North African campaign of WWII and the command of the American Eighth Army in Korea by General Ridgway. The data offered forms the basis for determining the findings and analysis, which will compare the results of the two case studies and apply those results to the three hypotheses.

[163] Taaffe, *MacArthur's Korean War Generals*, 190.

Findings and Analysis

Introduction

This section is a structured-focused comparison of the Field Marshal Montgomery and General Ridgway case studies and is divided into two subsections. The first subsection is findings that compares the empirical evidence in response to the research questions. The second subsection is analysis of the data to test the three hypotheses. The goal of this section is to determine the validity of the thesis by demonstrating whether Field Marshal Montgomery's and General Ridgway's change initiatives improved morale.

Findings

The first research question is how do operational level leaders instill discipline? Both cases found that the commanders established discipline through implementing orders that changed unit behavior. Montgomery mandated that his units become physically and mentally fit to encourage toughness while Ridgway directed that no jeep would drive with its top up in order to increase alertness and avoid complacency. Montgomery also demanded that no one question his orders to deter insubordination and required all troops to live in tents instead of buildings to harden their spirit. Alternatively, Ridgway inspired pride in the American Eighth Army by ordering new tableware for the mess halls and insisting on supply discipline. He also regained control of the retreating ROK units by establishing straggler posts. The two commanders' approach to instilling discipline is similar because toughening their soldiers, regaining control over their units, and evoking confidence in their organizations set conditions for improved morale.

The second research question asks how operational level leaders establish a sense of urgency? Both cases found that relieving commanders and canceling existing withdrawal orders emphasized the need for change. Montgomery also drew attention to the necessity for change by

assuming command two days early and moving all vehicles to the rear of his formations to support his order of no withdrawal. Ridgway reinforced his urgency on the home front by gaining domestic support for offensive operations through messaging to Washington. A sense of urgency was required to shock the defeated organizations into the realization that change was necessary. The steps Montgomery and Ridgway took to convey the seriousness of their situation to their troops created an offensive mindset that enabled their change initiative.

The third research question explores how operational level leaders form guiding coalitions? Both cases found that replacing subordinates with trusted agents and fostering relationships with key leaders developed groups that supported the commanders' change efforts. Montgomery not only gained commitment from his subordinate commanders, but he also established trust with all soldiers in the British Eighth Army by making himself visible and developing personal relationships with the lower enlisted. Ridgway's close relationship with South Korean President Rhee allowed Ridgway to assist in selecting ROK commanders that supported offensive operations. Relationships are key to building trust and creating an alliance of subordinates committed to a commander's vision of improved morale.

The fourth research question asks how operational level leaders develop and communicate their vision for change? Both cases found that the commanders used verbal speeches, written messages to troops, and physical visits with units to communicate purpose, direction and motivation towards their vision of victory through improved morale. Montgomery gathered leaders down to lieutenant colonel to describe his intent before each battle. Ridgway produced verbal orders that were easily understood down to the lowest level and inspired nationalism. Distributing verbal and written orders that outline purpose, direction and motivation ensures soldiers understand why they are fighting, how they should fight, and what they are fighting for which induces confidence and improves morale.

The fifth research question inquires how operational level leaders empower subordinates to action their vision? Both cases found that the commanders relied on confidence, autonomy and

authority to empower their subordinates. Montgomery gave his chief of staff full control to make decisions in Montgomery's absence, allowed his Corps commanders freedom of action, and supported initiative within the commander's intent. Ridgway consistently told units he had confidence in their ability to hold against the Chinese forces and gave his subordinate commanders authority to act while checking on them continuously to ensure their actions aligned with his vision. Subordinates will feel empowered to action a commander's vision if they know the commander is confident in their ability, they are allowed independent action, and their control is legitimized across the organization.

The sixth research question is how operational level leaders create a sense of unity to enable change? The first case study found that Montgomery maintained organic task organizations, moved the Eighth Army headquarters near the Royal Air Force for synchronization, and wore multiple unit insignia to represent his multinational force structure. The second case study found that Ridgway emphasized the Eighth Army's commitment to the ROK army, unified his command structure and headquarters, and racially desegregated his forces. These actions established cohesion by ensuring unity of effort and shared understanding of the common mission.

The seventh research question asks how operational level leaders capitalize on short-term wins? Montgomery used a defensive victory against the Axis forces at Alam Halfa to improve morale, increase soldier confidence in their equipment and training, and buy time for an offensive. Ridgway, on the other hand, used offensive operations at the Twin Tunnels and Chipyong-ni to celebrate success by recognizing units with awards and leaders with promotion. Whether a defensive or offensive victory, commanders must exploit success by emphasizing achievements over mistakes.

The eighth research question investigates how operational level leaders consolidate gains towards their vision? The first case study reveals that Montgomery deliberately delayed his offensive at El Alamein until his organization was properly trained, adequately equipped, and

mentally ready to achieve victory. Ridgway chose a methodical approach to gradual offensives first crossing the Han River, followed by recapturing the capital of Seoul, and ultimately pushing the Chinese north across the thirty-eight parallel. In order to consolidate gains towards their vision, commanders must develop a systematic method to achieving victory one step at a time.

The ninth research question explores how operational level leaders institutionalize change? Montgomery's morale improvement initiative endured because he developed a sense of belonging that permeated throughout the British Eighth Army and increased his soldiers' confidence in their ability to achieve success. Ridgway only had four months in command to institutionalize changes in the American Eighth Army and, although the fighting spirit persisted under General Van Fleet, the prolonged peace negotiations subverted morale efforts. Improving morale in a defeated organization can happen quickly; however, the long-term effects are vulnerable to future operations and political decisions.

The tenth research question asks what does morale improvement look like? The first case study found a sense of relief, satisfaction, confidence and change in atmosphere indicated improved morale in the British Eight Army. Additionally, dramatic decreases in sickness, surrender, and desertion rates suggest enhanced fighting spirit under Montgomery's command. Ridgway described improved morale in the American Eighth Army expressed as pride in the organization, confidence in leaders and soldiers, as well as an aggressive spirit focused on offensive operations. An organization that is prepared to fight, is enthusiastic about their future, and confident in their unit's ability is evidence of high morale.

Analysis

The first hypothesis asserts when operational level leaders create a climate for changing morale, then they engage and enable change. The empirical evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. Once Montgomery and Ridgway assumed command, it was necessary to regain control over the defeated organizations, demonstrate a necessity for change, and gain

commitment from the unit to adapt. Accomplishing these actions set conditions for the units to accept new policies and trust the new commander's change efforts. Organizations are inherently resistant to change but upholding standards for acceptable behavior, convincing individuals that the status quo is debilitating, and building relationships that support innovation creates an environment open to a new approach to morale.

The second hypothesis claims when operational level leaders engage and enable change, then their organization's morale improves. The evidence suggests that this hypothesis is supported. Morale improved in both the American and British Eighth Armies once Montgomery and Ridgway communicated their vision of victory, empowered their subordinates to champion this vision, created a sense of unity around the vision, and celebrated short-term success towards the vision. Both commanders' visions were simple and communicated written and verbally to provide purpose, direction and motivation for their units. The easily understood visions afforded subordinate leaders the confidence, autonomy, and authority required to engage their fighting spirit. Unity of effort and cohesion enabled change by establishing trust across the organization while capitalizing on short-term victories demonstrated that improved morale was possible.

The third hypothesis states when operational level leaders implement and sustain change, then their organization maintains high morale enabling victory. The empirical evidence suggests a mixed result for this hypothesis. Although both Montgomery and Ridgway improved morale and achieved victory, Montgomery's was the only change effort that endured. Montgomery focused on significant training objectives to build confidence before offensive operations, while Ridgway concentrated on building trust in leaders' ability to care for soldiers. While both approaches successfully improved morale, Ridgway's efforts were undermined by political decisions regarding peace negotiations. This suggests that sustaining improved morale in combat may be out of the operational level leader's control and influenced by external factors such as dynamic political aims and domestic support.

The research indicates hypotheses one and two are supported, while hypothesis three has

a mixed outcome. Therefore, Montgomery's ability to create a climate for change, engage and enable change, and implement and sustain his change efforts resulted in improved morale and British victory in North Africa. Ridgway also created a climate for change and engaged and enabled change to improve morale for the American Eighth Army but he failed to sustain his change efforts due to delayed peace talks. Montgomery's and Ridgway's approaches to improving morale followed Kotter's eight step change model and du Picq's theory of instilling discipline and establishing unit cohesion to change their organizations from defeated to victorious. This validates the thesis that leaders quickly improve the morale of their defeated organizations during large scale combat operations by creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change.

Conclusion

Leaders can manage the adverse reactions LSCO has on morale by transforming their organizations during times of defeat and ultimately achieve victory. The lens of change management and the theories of John Kotter and Ardant du Picq determine how Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery and General Matthew B. Ridgway improved morale in their units and turned defeat into victory. The extensive literature review highlighted a gap in providing a specific model for improving morale. This monograph filled the gap by providing a systematic framework for operational level leaders to improve the morale of their organizations. The empirical evidence and analysis validated the thesis that leaders can quickly improve the morale of a defeated organization during LSCO using Kotter and du Picq's methods by creating a climate for change, engaging and enabling change, and implementing and sustaining change to achieve victory.

This study used a structured, focused comparison of the British Eighth Army's North African Campaign from August 1942 to December 1943 and the American Eighth Army's involvement in the Korean War from December 1950 to April 1951. Kotter's eight-steps and du Picq's theory formed the basis for data collection from primary and secondary sources. Ten research questions compared the change initiatives implemented by Field Marshal Montgomery and General Ridgway to prove the three hypotheses. The first and second hypotheses that if leaders create a climate for change and engage and enable change, then their unit's morale will improve were supported while the third hypothesis that if leaders implement and sustain change, then they will maintain high morale and achieve victory revealed mixed results.

The analysis is relevant for future operational level leaders because it provides a methodical approach to improving morale at the tactical level to achieve victorious strategic results. The first step is creating a climate for change which involves establishing trust and gaining acceptance from subordinates to set conditions for transformation. Montgomery and

Ridgway achieved this by instilling discipline, establishing a sense of urgency, and forming guiding coalitions. The second step is initiating and facilitating the change effort by providing purpose, direction, and motivation aligned with a vision to produce unity of effort. Montgomery and Ridgway engaged and enabled change by developing and communicating their vision, empowering subordinates, fostering unit cohesion, and capitalizing on short term wins. The third step is sustaining lasting change by training to produce confidence in ability and building trust that leaders are concerned for Soldiers' welfare. Montgomery implemented and sustained high morale to produce future victories while Ridgway's efforts were sabotaged by political decisions beyond his control. The three aspects that were constant throughout the two case studies were establishing trust, coordinating unity of effort, and building confidence in leader and Soldier abilities.

Although this descriptive framework for improving morale fills a gap in US Army doctrine, there are opportunities for future research. Improved technology in the twenty-first century can have detrimental effects on morale that were not experienced in the Second World War or the Korean War. Social media provides increased access to information and potential for fake news to undermine morale improvement efforts. Improved weapons technologies with long-range precision targeting inflict higher casualties and induce a psychological effect on Soldiers when they do not know where or when they may be attacked. Unmanned drones, vehicles and robotics remove the human element from combat which could potentially eliminate the need for morale improvement completely. Therefore, future research is needed on the effects technological advancements have on morale. Additionally, future research in efforts to improve morale in counter-insurgency, security cooperation, crisis response, and limited contingency operations would provide the Armed Forces with a robust approach to enhancing Soldier well-being across the conflict continuum. Finally, further studies on the impact of a comprehensive training program that focuses on developing Soldier's mental, emotional, spiritual, and physical welfare in combat operations could identify additional areas of emphasis not present in the Kotter/du Picq

combined approach to morale improvement.

Montgomery's command of the British Eighth Army in North Africa and Ridgway's command of the American Eighth Army in Korea offer a framework for leaders to improve morale in times of defeat. This systematic model for cultivating an organization's fighting spirit at the tactical level to achieve successful strategic results fills a gap in US Army doctrine. Surveying the existing literature on both conflicts enabled the development of a theoretical basis for examining the case studies built on a combination of Kotter's change model and du Picq's theory for morale improvement. Next, the structured, focused comparison of the case studies provided the empirical evidence for the analysis of the hypotheses. The results yielded two supported hypotheses while the third returned mixed results. Ultimately, leaders that establish trust, develop unity of effort, and produce confidence in abilities will improve morale and likely achieve future victory as long as the political environment supports continued combat operations.

Appendix A

Why We Are Here? Directive[164]

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)
Office of the Commanding General

21 January 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: Corps, Division, Separate Brigade or RCT Commanders, and Commanding General, 2d Logistical Command

SUBJECT: Why We Are Here

1. In my brief period of command duty here I have heard from several sources, chiefly from the members of combat units, the questions, "Why are we here?" "What are we fighting for?"

2. What follows represents my answers to those questions.

3. The answer to the first question, "Why are we here?" is simple and conclusive. We are here because of the decisions of the properly constituted authorities of our respective governments. As the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur said publicly yesterday: "This command intends to maintain a military position in Korea just as long as the Statesmen of the United Nations decide we should do so." The answer is simple because further comment is unnecessary. It is conclusive because the loyalty we give, and expect, precludes any slightest questioning of these orders.

4. The second question is of much greater significance, and every member of this command is entitled to a full and reasoned answer. Mine follows.

5. To me the issues are clear. It is not a question of this or that Korean town or village. Real estate is, here, incidental. It is not restricted to the issue of freedom for our South Korean Allies, whose fidelity and valor under the severest stresses of battle we recognize; though that freedom is a symbol of the wider issues, and included among them.

6. The real issues are whether the power of Western civilization, as God has permitted it to flower in our own beloved lands, shall defy and defeat Communism; whether the rule of men who shoot their prisoners, enslave their citizens, and deride the dignity of man, shall displace the rule of those to whom the individual and his individual rights are sacred; whether we are to survive with Gold's hand to guide and lead us, or to perish in the dead existence of a Godless world.

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[164] Con Crane and Jacqueline E. Whitt, "Ridgway's Memo: 'Why We Are Here?'" Dusty Shelves, War Room, US Army War College, October 27, 2017, accessed on January 30, 2020, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/wp-content/uploads/Box_17-095-Ridgway-Why-We-Are-Here-Memo-Transcribed.pdf.

SUBJECT: Why We Are Here 21 January 1951

7. If these be true, and to us they are, beyond any possibility of challenge, then this has long since ceased to be a fight for freedom for our Korean Allies alone and for their national survival. It has become, and it continues to be, a fight for our own freedom, for our own survival, in an honorable, independent national existence.

8. The sacrifices we have made, and those we shall yet support, are not offered vicariously for others, but in our own direct defense.

9. In the final analysis, the issue now joined right here in Korea is whether Communism or individual freedom shall prevail, and, make no mistake, whether the next flight of fear-driven people we have just witnessed across the HAN, and continue to witness in other areas, shall be checked and defeated overseas or permitted, step by step, to close in on our own homeland and at some future time, however distant, to engulf our own loved ones in all its misery and despair.

10. These are the things for which we fight. Never have members of any military command had a greater challenge then we, or a finer opportunity to show ourselves and our people at their best—and thus be an honor to the profession of arms, and a credit to those who bred us.

11. I would like each command to whom this is addressed, in his own chosen ways of leadership, to convey the foregoing to every single member of his command at the earliest practicable moment.

M. B. Ridgway
Lieutenant General, United States Army
Commanding

A true copy
//signed//

Appendix B

Letter to Lieutenant General Chung Il Kwon[165]

HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH UNITED STATES ARMY KOREA (EUSAK)
Office of the Commanding General

11 January 1951

To General Chung Il Kwon
Chief of Staff
Republic of Korea Army

Now that I have had sufficient time to see the situation as it now exists, to view the terrain, and personally to talk to the principal Commanders, I deem it opportune to share my personal basic conclusions with you.

First, there is here but one ultimate objective – freedom for your people. To attain that objective, there is only one force – our combined Allied Army.

Second, there is but one single common destiny for this combined Allied Army. It will fight together and stay together whatever the future holds.

I would like you to feel free to convey to all ranks this simple statement which I send to you with complete sincerity and all the emphasis I can command.

Sincerely,
M. B. Ridgway
Lieutenant General,
United States Army,
Commanding

[165] Ridgway, *The Korean War*, 263.

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