

Deception Through Perception

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

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Deception is a means to create distinct advantage on the battlefield for the commander who employs it. A commander that utilizes deception operations can hide the disposition and size of forces at the tactical level of war. Deception also allows the deceiver to mask military and political intent at the strategic and operational levels of war. Executing deception properly requires understanding of the enemy's perceptions and the channels from which they receive information. This basis allows the operational artist to attempt to manipulate enemy through what he sees, his perception and the basis for his actions. In an age of information proliferation, deception is a powerful tool at the operational artist's disposal. History demonstrates that military deception is most effectively employed when the deception plan targets a theater-level decision maker or political decision-maker at the highest level of governance.

Decision-makers at the political/strategic or theater level have the authorities to make the decisions that achieve the goals of a deception plan. Two case studies provide evidence of this. Utilizing the criteria of "see, think, do": Operation FORTITUDE conducted by the Allies in World War II and Operation SPARK conducted by the Egyptians during the Yom Kippur War illustrate the relevance of the hypothesis. The evidence of Operation FORTITUDE demonstrates that Adolf Hitler was the appropriate deception target. The evidence also demonstrates that his perception of the Pas de Calais as an Allied deception landing site aided in the creation of the conditions that allowed the success of Operation FORTITUDE. Similarly, evidence of the Egyptian deception in Operation SPARK illustrated that the Egyptians targeted the correct decision-maker, Prime Minister Golda Meir. In addition to the selection of the correct deception target, Operation SPARK found further success in its exploitation of the Israeli belief that Egypt was unwilling and incapable to utilize war to achieve its political aims. The conclusion drawn from the case studies is that the authorities of the decision-maker are of primary importance to successful deception at the political/strategic and operational levels of war.

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Abbreviations

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
FM	Field Manual
GEN	General
IDF	Israeli Defense Force
LTG	Lieutenant General
MG	Major General
OKW	<i>Oberkommando der Wehrmacht</i>
SHAEF	Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence

Section I: Introduction

Bodies litter the beachhead. Earlier, the Greeks completed a successful joint landing operation with their naval force. The fight was fierce but enabled the Greeks to maintain a beachhead at Troy. Pushing inland, the army attempted to fight into a highly defended urban area. The Trojans utilized the terrain and primary reinforcing obstacles to great effect, which thwarted the Greek's attempt to breach the city walls. The Trojan's success enabled a counterattack to push the Greek army back to the initial beachhead. But prior to executing a killing stroke, the enemy's intelligence reported strange information. Conducting reconnaissance, the Trojans surveyed the beachhead. One feature provided a stark contrast against the scene: a giant, wooden, wheeled horse.

Homer elaborates in the *Odyssey* that the Greeks intended to deceive the Trojans and create an opportunity for the Greeks to breach the city of Troy. The Greeks meant to display defeat by leaving a peace offering to Athena and the Trojans, which the horse represented.¹ The Greeks gambled upon their knowledge of Troy and Trojan customs. According to the Greeks, the Trojans would bring the horse into the city, display their trophy and celebrate their victory.² Homer records that the Trojans witnessed the Greek ruse and accepted the implications of the information in front of them. The Trojans acted as the Greeks desired.³ The Greeks achieved the deception objective when the Trojans brought the horse into the city of Troy. Greek soldiers hidden inside the horse breached the city walls at night, allowing the Greek coalition to capture the city of Troy.⁴

¹ Homer, *The Odyssey* (New York: Penguin Books, 1996), 302.

² Ibid, 302.

³ Ibid, 303.

⁴ Ibid, 303.

Military deception is an ancient game that continues in the modern space of conflict. However, the components of military deception do not differ greatly from antiquity to the present day. The methodology that the Greeks applied for the employment of the Trojan Horse is still valid today.

Deception requires that several elements are present to achieve success. The key element is understanding what an adversary needs to see to induce a specific thought process that will lead to a favorable action or inaction by the adversary. The Greeks presented information that sold a story to the Trojans. The Greek deception, according to Homer's epic poem, relied upon a common cultural understanding of Trojan warfare and customs. The Trojans believed the story presented to them, thought the Greeks departed hastily in defeat and brought their trophy into the city of Troy. Even ancient deception operations incorporated the key aspects of "see, think, do."⁵

Modern deception employs the same logic. Joint Publication 3-13.4 Military Deception defines military deception as "actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military, paramilitary, or violent extremist organization decision-makers, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions or inactions that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission."⁶ Army Field Manual 3-13.4 Army Support to Deception describes military deception as both a process and a capability to elicit an action, reaction or inaction to support a military operation's success.⁷ The execution of successful military deception relies upon information, interpretation, and presentation. The adversary's inaccurate understanding of friendly information causes a response desirable to the friendly commander's operation.

The ability to manipulate the operational environment by and through understanding an adversary provides a marked advantage to a sovereign nation during times of war. Information

⁵ US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-13.4, *Army Support to Military Deception* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), 2-5.

⁶ US Department of Defense, Joint Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4, *Military Deception* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2006), I-1.

⁷ US Army, FM 3-13.4, 1-1.

gives sovereign actors some insight into today's world. Understanding provides sovereign actors with the ability to manipulate the military environment through the elements of national power. During a war, utilizing information to shape a theater for the successful employment of military forces is paramount. As such, modern US strategic and operational planners must understand how to employ military deception, create advantages for the friendly commander and enable mission accomplishment.

History demonstrates that military deception is most effectively employed when the deception plan targets a theater-level decision-maker or political decision-maker at the highest level of governance. Like the Greeks in the *Odyssey*, the deception story must target and deceive decision-makers who will think and act in a manner that is beneficial to friendly forces. Moreover, the deception target must have the authorities granted to make the decisions desired by the friendly commander. The theatrical rendition of the *Odyssey* depicts Priam in military counsel and making the final decision to bring the horse into Troy. If the deception operation does not target a decision-maker with appropriate authorities to direct action or inaction, a separate and surprising action may occur that hinders rather than assists in friendly mission accomplishment.

Two case studies analyzed from the doctrinal criteria of "see-think-do" demonstrate the use of military deception targeting strategic or theater-level decision-makers to achieve mission accomplishment.⁸ The first case is Operation FORTITUDE during World War II. The Supreme Headquarters Allied Expedition Force (SHAEF) understood that Hitler was the adversary decision-maker and deception target in 1944. The SHAEF intelligence community understood the appropriate information to present to the Nazi intelligence apparatus. Adolf Hitler perceived the information presented by Nazi intelligence and misallocated his combat power in western France prior to the execution of Operation OVERLORD. The SHAEF designed and executed a "cover plan," Operation FORTITUDE, to deceive Adolf Hitler into thinking that the Allies would land

⁸ US Army, FM 3-13.4, 2-5.

on Pas de Calais rather than Normandy.⁹ Adolf Hitler indeed kept the bulk of his forces and his operational reserve focused on Calais rather than the Normandy sector.¹⁰ This operation contributed to the success of Operation OVERLORD by causing the misallocation of enemy forces and delaying the use of German operational reserves against the landings at Normandy. Operation FORTITUDE also provides an example of how military deception is applicable in a war of absolute aims.

Similarly, after the Six Day War, the Egyptian government and military understood how to present information to the Israeli intelligence apparatus and Israeli government to elicit inaction. As such, the Egyptian military executed the military deception plan Operation SPARK.¹¹ Egyptian military exercises along the Suez Canal enabled the Egyptians to collect intelligence on Israeli responses to a crossing of the Suez Canal. This intelligence confirmed to the Egyptian government and military how long and where Israel would deploy her defense forces.¹² The exercises and political narrative enabled the Egyptians to achieve surprise in the timing of their attack across the Suez Canal.¹³ The Israeli Prime Minister did not properly interpret Egyptian intentions when Egypt and Syria initiated military operations. The misunderstanding delayed the employment of Israeli defense forces. The Egyptian military deception operation serves as an example of successful deception in a war of limited aims.

Both the SHAEF and Egyptian forces overcame operational dilemmas and achieved the rapid and continuous integration of their capabilities which created overmatch of the enemy and

⁹ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. *SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AND CHIEF OF STAFF, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND, OFFICE OF G-3 (Harold R. Bull): Records, 1943-46, Fortitude. Annexure II to Appendix "Y" to COSSAC (43) 28, Operation "OVERLORD" Camouflage and Concealment.*

¹⁰ William B. Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception* (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1993), 43-44.

¹¹ Christopher M. Rein, ed., *Weaving the Tangled Web: Military Deception in Large-Scale Combat Operations* (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018), 178.

¹² *Ibid*, 179.

¹³ Saad El Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez* (San Francisco: American Mideast Research, 2003), 242-243.

enabled multiple forms of attack. Both cases provide insight for deception operations in a modern military context. The insights assist a planner in exploiting an aspect of the human dimension of warfare. Application of these insights provide another means to dis-integrate the command and control apparatus of the adversary by affecting decision making and action.

The methodology for this paper is a comparative case study of two historical military operations that highlight the effects of deception through the lens of “see-think-do”. The two deception operations supported large-scale ground combat operations: Operation FORTITUDE for the Allied forces during World War II and Operation SPARK for the Egyptian military prior to the Yom Kippur War. The analysis compares the two deception targets of each military. The cases illustrate how the SHAEF and Egyptian military exploited their respective deception targets and measured the enemy’s responses to the deception activities. This comparative analysis demonstrates how the two commands utilized their knowledge of enemy response and intelligence systems to support the operational planning and objectives of Operation OVERLORD for the SHAEF and Operation BADR (named to commemorate the Prophet Mohammed’s first victory at the Battle of Badr) the Egyptian military.¹⁴ Finally, utilizing the Multi-Domain Operation concept of convergence, the cases provide an analogous modern viewpoint that demonstrates such convergence for SHAEF during Operation OVERLORD and Egypt during Operation BADR.

Research for each case study focuses on specific primary, secondary and tertiary resources. Primary sources supporting deception operations for Operation OVERLORD include SHAEF documents such as Annex II to Appendix “X” to COSSAC, Camouflage, and Concealment, and Annex III to Appendix “Y” to COSSAC, “Operation ‘Overlord’ Information to Participating Forces and Civil Authorities.”¹⁵ These documents provide direct insight into how

¹⁴ Shazly, *The Crossing of The Suez*, 38-39.

¹⁵ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. *SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AND CHIEF OF STAFF, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND, OFFICE OF G-3 (Harold R. Bull): Records, 1943-46, Fortitude. Annexure II to Appendix “Y” to COSSAC (43) 28,*

SHAEF planners deliberately incorporated deception to enable the success of Operation OVERLORD. Secondary sources such as Michael Howard's *Strategic Deception During World War II*, and William Breuer's *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception* provide context analysis for how the Allies gained an understanding of Hitler and the *Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)* that allowed the successful integration of deception throughout the European Theater of Operations which culminated with deception in Operation OVERLORD.¹⁶ Tertiary sources such as the CIA's "Deception Maxims: Fact and Folklore" and "Deception Failures, Non-Failures and Why" further illustrate why the deception was effective and how the deception goals supported the criteria for analysis.¹⁷

Primary sources for the deception operation in support of Operation BADR include General (GEN) El Shazly's *Crossing the Suez* enables understanding of the Egyptian planning considerations and execution of Operation SPARK as a deception activity Operation BADR.¹⁸ Conversely, Major General Avraham Adan's account *On The Banks of The Suez* provides a description of Israeli Defense Forces in immediate response to Operation BADR and the surprise attained by Egyptian forces through deception.¹⁹ Secondary sources Abraham Rabinovich's *The Yom Kippur War* and Aryeh Shalev's *Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War* provide contextual analysis of the Israeli decision-making apparatus and its perceptions during the deception operations as well as final reaction to the deception.²⁰ Tertiary sources such

Operation "OVERLORD" Camouflage and Concealment, Annexure III to Appendix "Y" to COSSAC (43) 28, Operation "OVERLORD" Information to Participating Forces and Civil Authorities.

¹⁶ Michael Howard, "Introduction," in *Strategic Deception in the Second World War* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995), ix.

¹⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *Deception Maxims: Facts and Folklore* (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1981), 1.

¹⁸ Shazly, "Introduction," in *Crossing the Suez*, 1.

¹⁹ Avraham Adan, "Introduction," in *On the Banks of the Suez* (Jerusalem: Edanim Publishers, 1979), x.

²⁰ Abraham Rabinovich, "Prologue," in *The Yom Kippur War* (New York: Shocken Books, 2017), 3.

as Abraham Ben-Zvi's "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks" and Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski's "Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur War" provide analysis that illustrates the effectiveness of the Egyptian deception in the face of Israeli decision making fallacies and political circumstances.²¹

Finally, current US Joint and Army doctrine, the US Army Training and Doctrine Command's Multi-Domain Operations concept and Daniel Kahneman's *Thinking Fast and Thinking Slow* provides the theoretical criteria to evaluate each case's effectiveness at achieving deception that enables mission accomplishment.

Current US Joint and US Army doctrine provides the appropriate criteria to evaluate each case study. FM 3-13.4 Army Support to Military Deception describes that "deception focuses on the decision making of the enemy" and that "deception must end in a decision to act or not act in a way that supports an operation."²² The case analysis utilizes the cognitive process of "see-think-do." This lens illustrates the deception operation's 1) ability to present information or indicators to the enemy, 2) provoke a thought process and, 3) elicit an action or inaction favorable to continuing operational planning and execution. This lens also draws similarities and differences that apply to deception in a war of absolute aims, as in World War II, and a war of limited aims, as in the Yom Kippur War.²³ A theoretical link is applicable through Kahneman's description of personal and cultural bias. Analysis in this light further illuminates how understanding enemy bias assists the viability of potential information presented during deception.²⁴ Recognition of

²¹ Abraham Ben-Zvi, "Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of Surprise Attacks," *World Politics* 28, no. 3 (Apr., 1976): 381-395, accessed November 28, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2009976>.

²² US Army, FM 3-13.4, 2-5.

²³ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 88, 92.

²⁴ Daniel Kahneman, "Introduction," in *Thinking Fast, and Slow* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux), 3.

these biases support and enable the “see-think-do” process outlined in FM 3-13.4.²⁵ The evidence of enemy action or inaction linking to SHAEF and Egyptian actions demonstrates the deception operation’s contribution to convergence within each context.

This monograph builds sections that elaborate on and analyze the concepts of deception put into context and action. Section 2 utilizes theory by Kahneman to illuminate organizational bias that translated into perception, then analyzes Operation FORTITUDE through the “see-think-do” criteria. The analysis describes how the SHAEF cover plan presented information to Nazi intelligence, causing Adolf Hitler to expect the Operation OVERLORD landings to occur in Calais. Further analysis describes the Nazi-directed action to focus on Calais, resulting in conditions favorable to the achievement of the Normandy objectives.

Section 3 analyzes the Egyptian’s understanding of Israeli thought through Kahneman’s bias theory. The analysis supports the development of the Egyptian deception plan, Operation SPARK to support the Egyptian offensive, Operation BADR. Analysis through the “see-think-do” criteria demonstrates the information presentation, initial responses and Operation SPARK’s influence Israeli thinking towards an Egyptian attack. The Israeli perception explains their lack of action or preparation for response to the Egyptian attack in October of 1973.

Section 4 draws conclusions from the first three sections and gleans lessons in deception for the modern strategic and operational planner. The conclusions demonstrate the need for deception in the modern information environment. The lessons advocate the importance of including military deception against an appropriate target decision-maker and the need for this target to be a political or theater-level decision-maker.

²⁵ US Army, FM 3-13.4, 2-5.

Section II: Operation Fortitude

Hitler remained convinced that the invasion was merely a feint whose purpose was to trick him into deploying his defensive forces wrongly The Navy, too, considered the terrain unfavorable for large-scale landings, he declared. For the time being he expected the decisive assault to take place in the vicinity of Calais – as though he were determined that the enemy, too, would prove him to have been right. For there, around Calais, he had ever since 1942 been emplacing the heaviest model guns under many feet of concrete to destroy an enemy landing fleet.”

—Central Intelligence Agency, *Deception Maxims: Facts and Folklore*

Operation FORTITUDE was one of several deception operations designed to deceive Hitler on the timing and place of the Allied invasion of Europe in 1944. Operation FORTITUDE specifically supported Operation OVERLORD, the invasion of Normandy. This deception operation targeted Hitler and his perceptions of Allied invasion sites along Europe’s western coast. Operation FORTITUDE exemplifies how deception during a war of absolute aims enables the Multi-Domain Operations concept of convergence.²⁶

Methodologically, identifying the appropriate decision-maker is key to the determination of the primary deception target. This allows the identification of the deception target’s perceptions at the time of the deception. By understanding the deception target’s perceptions, information is focused on the deception target that can reinforce an existing perception that benefits friendly military action.²⁷

Who was the German Decision-Maker?

For the purposes of this monograph, there were two distinct instances that define Adolf Hitler as a political/strategic decision-maker Third Reich as well as an operational decision-maker for the *Wehrmacht*. The first is highlighted in Operation BLAU during 1942. The second was Hitler’s direction of German forces prior to the invasion of Sicily in 1943. While the first instance

²⁶ US Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Pamphlet (TRADOC PAM) 525-3-1, *The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operation 2028* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2019), iii.

²⁷ Central Intelligence Agency, *Deception Maxims: Facts and Folklore*, 5.

marks a definite structural change, Hitler's decision-making prior provided profound lessons for SHAEF planners. First, using signals intelligence SHAEF determined Hitler's perceptions of southeastern Europe.²⁸ Second, intelligence revealed that Hitler would act based on deception operations. By acting decisively, particularly to Operations "CASCADE," "WATERFALL," and "MINCEMEAT," Hitler demonstrated his willingness to intercede directly with and frustrating German military operations.²⁹ Hitler revealed himself a suitable target for further deception.

The *Wehrmacht* command structure in 1939 had two distinct organizations in relation to the German army. The first was the *OKW* and its purpose was to advise Hitler on all military matters in all theaters of war, allowing Hitler to issue guidance to this staff apparatus and, in turn, *OKW* planned and issued strategic and operational guidance to the services.³⁰ The second organization was *Oberkommando der Heeres* or the Army High Command. Its responsibilities were the operational planning and all other matters of sustaining ground combat action for the *Wehrmacht* in the Soviet Union and by 19 December 1941, Hitler assumed control of this organization.³¹ It is within these two organizations that Hitler emerged as both a military strategic and operational decision-maker.

This expression came to a head during Operation BLAU. For context, Operation BLAU was the codename for the approved summer operations on the Eastern Front in 1942.³² Despite strategic assessments of Russian resources and military strengths, Hitler maintained that seizing the Caucasus and holding along the Don river were attainable.³³ Hitler signed Directive 41 on 5

²⁸ Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, 89-92.

²⁹ Ibid, 92.

³⁰ Geoffrey P. Megargee, *Inside Hitler's High Command* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 56.

³¹ Earl F. Ziemke, *Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East* (Washington DC: Center of Military History US Army, 2011), 13.

³² Megargee, *Inside Hitler's High Command*, 176.

³³ Ibid, 176.

April 1942, initiating planning for Operation BLAU.³⁴ During the conduct of the operation, Hitler changed the concept of operations entirely, splitting his forces to seize both Stalingrad and the Caucasus rather than Stalingrad alone. Directive No. 45 of July 23rd, 1942 formalized this change assigning Army Group A to the southern push in the Caucasus and Army Group B to Stalingrad.³⁵ Despite objections among Hitler's commanders, Hitler would continue his style of directive decision-making during Operation BLAU.

On 7 September 1942 Army Group A began to stall and engaged Hitler's attention. In direct response, on 9 September 1942, Hitler assumed command of Army Group A.³⁶ By 1941 he occupied three distinct levels of command and authority within the *Wehrmacht*. Hitler now added a fourth as he occupied an operational level of command. From this position, Hitler continued to command and control strategic and operational activities. Adolf Hitler was firmly in control of all decision making on the Eastern Front.

Hitler's reputation for the personal direction of military operations was not limited to the Eastern Front. Hitler demonstrated this trait directly to SHAEF in the Mediterranean theater during the invasion of Sicily. In 1943, Afrika Korps under Field Marshal Erwin Rommel withdrew from the African continent. This opened the Mediterranean and exposed southeastern Europe to Allied invasion which placed the *OKW* into a strategic problem, "how important was the defence of Italy in the general context of the Mediterranean theater? And how important was the Mediterranean theater in the general context of the war?"³⁷ Hitler's own thoughts would determine this over the course of operations in this theater.

³⁴ Magna E. Bauer and Earl F Ziemke, *Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East* (Washington DC: Center of Military History US Army, 1987), 310.

³⁵ Ibid, 310.

³⁶ David M. Glantz and Jonathan M. House, *Stalingrad* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2017), 258.

³⁷ Michael Howard, *Grand Strategy Volume IV: August 1942 – September 1943* (Oxford: Her Majesty's Stationary Office, 1973), 462.

The decision-makers at SHAEF understood the problem that faced the Third Reich as well. At this time, the loss of Italy to Germany represented a dual problem, access to the south of France and the isolation of the Balkans.³⁸ If Italy fell then Germany faced isolation on the European continent. Italy represented the opportunity of opening the second front desired by Russia. Military operations in Italy also forced Hitler to make strategic resource decisions. Italy was a logical next move for the Allies, and the *Wehrmacht* also knew this as well. How then could the Allies exploit Italy as an opportunity?

Operations “CASCADE,” “WATERFALL” and “MINCEMEAT” provided an answer.³⁹ “CASCADE” was a deception operation designed to convince the *OKW* of an overinflated order of battle for the Allied forces and laid the foundation for “WATERFALL” and “MINCEMEAT.”⁴⁰ “WATERFALL” set the physical conditions through the use of real and “dummy” units and equipment to reinforce and support the fictitious orders of battle presented by “CASCADE.”⁴¹ “MINCEMEAT” would seek to feed the *OKW* information via fake operational orders which preyed upon German perceptions that the Allied focus of southern Europe was the strategic resource centers of the Balkans.⁴² As such, the deception objective was to convince the *OKW* that Greece, not Sicily, was the point of entry into Southern Europe threatening the resource-rich Balkans. If the *OKW* decided upon a defense of Italy, the Balkans were at risk. The desired effect was to convince the *OKW* to reallocate forces to the Balkans, leaving the defense of Italy under-resourced and as porous as possible.⁴³

³⁸ Howard, *Grand Strategy Volume IV: August 1942 - September 1943*, 462-463.

³⁹ Ibid, 266-270, 370, 463.

⁴⁰ Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, 93.

⁴¹ Ibid, 87-91.

⁴² Anthony Cave Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1975), 279.

⁴³ Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 279.

Hitler's own estimate was that the Italian peninsula "could be sealed off somehow" but "it is of decisive importance for us to hold the Balkans. Copper, bauxite, chrome, and, above all, security, so that there is not a complete smash there if the Italian matter develops."⁴⁴ And then, there was Hitler's sense of history. According to Major F.W. Deakin, a British agent in the Balkans, "the shadow of the Dardanelles and the Macedonian campaign (during World War I) lay heavily across (Hitler's) thinking."⁴⁵ The course of action that Churchill pursued in the First World War seemed extremely plausible to Hitler as a course of action for the Allies to act upon.

Operation MINCEMEAT provided plausible intelligence to the *OKW* by exploiting the German human intelligence agency, *Abwehr*. German human intelligence intercepted fake orders with designs for an Allied assault against Greece. Both *Abwehr* and *OKW*'s intelligence concurred that the information was valid. This reinforced Hitler's belief that the Balkans would be the primary aim of the Allies. As such he issued a directive on 12 May 1943 which specified that "Measures regarding Sardinia and the Peloponnese (Greece) take precedence over everything else."⁴⁶ Hitler now directed forces and energy towards the deception objective desired by the Allies. "Hitler himself regarded Greece as the most threatened area, and on 25 July sent Rommel in person to take command there."⁴⁷ The *OKW* determined that Kalamata and Cape Araxos were the two Allied landing sites and all immediate resources available in the theater were directed towards their defense.⁴⁸ The physical manifestation of German belief occurred between 9 March to 10 July 1943. During this time the *OKW* increased the combat divisions within the Balkans from 8-18 and in Greece from 1-8.⁴⁹ Only two divisions were sent to reinforce Corsica and

⁴⁴ Howard, *Grand Strategy Volume IV: August 1942 – September 1943*, 463.

⁴⁵ Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 278.

⁴⁶ *Ibid*, 288.

⁴⁷ Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, 91.

⁴⁸ *Ibid*, 91.

⁴⁹ *Ibid*, 92.

Sardinia and two depleted German divisions to reinforce Italy during this time.⁵⁰ The assault on Italy did not prompt any reassessment as Field Marshall Keitel elaborated in a memorandum to all German commands in the Mediterranean describing the 40 Allied divisions exceeded the necessary landing forces for Sicily or Sardinia and that a subsequent assault of the “mainland of Greece” was more “probable” than Italy.⁵¹

During this time, the Allies maintained the ability to monitor German communications which interpreted Allied deception and German reaction through signal intelligence (SIGINT) and double agents within *Abwehr*. First, Hitler would intervene in any matter he felt was of strategic importance. Second, through Hitler’s intervention, it became apparent through intercepted communications that Hitler was the approval authority for the use of operational resources to protect his perception of strategic interests. The deception operations in the Mediterranean also revealed a susceptibility to inflated orders of battle through Allied leaks. Operation MINCEMEAT demonstrated that information presented that supported Hitler’s current beliefs would prompt direct allocations of resources to that end. This confirmed that Hitler was the strategic/operational decision-maker and therefore the appropriate deception target.

Hitler’s Perceptions Prior to Overlord

History demonstrated that a cross channel attack was logistically possible and likely from a British perspective. The Dieppe Raid in 1942 allowed the Germans to draw conclusions about future British operations: Europe was not abandoned, the scale of such an invasion would require build-up, the build-up would prolong the actual invasion.⁵²

“German strategy and tactics were therefore based on one straightforward operational aim, to annihilate the invaders on the beaches. This was Hitler’s personal decision, his own

⁵⁰ Howard, *Strategic Deception in the Second World War*, 92.

⁵¹ Ibid, 93.

⁵² Haswell, *D-Day: Intelligence and Deception* (New York: Times Books, 1979), 23-24.

policy, and he would not deviate from it.”⁵³ This led to the creation of the Atlantic Wall, further constraining the German Forces in the Western Command. “Hitler had made up his mind that the Allied invasion would come somewhere between Dunkirk and the mouth of the Somme.”⁵⁴ Field Marshal Karl Rudolf Gerd von Rundstedt was convinced that Pas de Calais was the Allied landing sight which led to further reinforcement of Hitler’s predilection.⁵⁵

Rommel also reinforced Hitler’s ideas of where an attack would occur but also upon how. In contradiction to Frederick the Great’s maxim “He who defends all, defends nothing ... Little minds want to defend everything, sensible men concentrate on the essential,” Rommel recommended defense at the shoreline.⁵⁶ His choice in how to defend, a perimeter defense, was based upon his thoughts about Allied airpower. His counter to von Rundstedt’s argument of a mobile defense of concentrated forces away from the coast was that a concentration of this type was easily identified by aerial reconnaissance and without defensive air support, these mobile reserves would “never get up to the point of attack.”⁵⁷ This assessment was given to Hitler and it confirmed Hitler’s operational design. Rommel’s assessment of where the Allies would attack is outlined in a dispatch from Rommel to Hitler dated 16 January 1944:

The center of gravity of the enemy landings will probably be the sector held by the Fifteenth Army [Pas de Calais] It is quite likely that the enemy’s main effort will be directed against the sector between Boulogne and the mouth of the Somme [River], where he will derive maximum advantage from the support of his long-range guns, from the shortest crossing for the assault, and later supply operations.⁵⁸

Rommel, von Rundstedt, and Hitler concurred that Pas de Calais would be the central point of entry for the Allied forces if a cross-channel invasion was conducted. Rommel confirmed

⁵³ Haswell, *D-Day: Intelligence and Deception*, 24.

⁵⁴ Ibid, 34.

⁵⁵ William B. Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 43.

⁵⁶ Ibid, 44.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 43-44.

⁵⁸ Guilles Perrault, *The Red Orchestra* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1969), 178.

Hitler's vision of how the defense would unfold and where force concentration would occur while attempting to defend the coasts.

Hitler began to codify these assessments to allow *Oberbefehlshaber West* to prepare for defensive operations. The first point in an operational directive given to von Rundstedt was that "the decisive action was to be fought on the Atlantic Wall itself."⁵⁹ The second most likely derived from the confirmation of Hitler's own thoughts by Rommel, "The defence must be concentrated on the coast as the main line of battle, and this line was to be held at all costs."⁶⁰ The perception of where an attack would occur and how the attack would be repelled initiated within Hitler's own mind and were both confirmed as the most likely option by his most senior generals in Western Europe.

Hitler and the OKW also had perceptions about who would lead the cross-channel invasion. GEN George Patton was a clear choice.⁶¹ Patton distinguished himself in North Africa and Sicily using combined arms maneuver in a style like the German *blitzkrieg*. In fact, Patton and had previously been utilized for deception in the Balkans. Information about an attack against Trieste by the US 7 Army under Patton was allowed to leak to Hitler.⁶² This prompted the quick dispatch of Rommel to the Balkans to defend against him.⁶³ Hitler proved, during the MINCEMEAT deception, that he held both regard and concern for George Patton as commander in the field. If an Allied landing force were to be comprised largely of American forces that would seize a beachhead and then break out, Patton seemed most adept.

On Patton, the Allies were certain about his value within a deception operation. SHAEF planners confirmed the perception of where an attack would occur and the intent to defend it

⁵⁹ Haswell, *D-Day: Intelligence and Deception*, 38.

⁶⁰ Ibid, 38.

⁶¹ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 113.

⁶² Haswell, *D-Day: Intelligence and Deception*, 136.

⁶³ Ibid, 136.

through SIGINT intercepts. The dispatch sent by Rommel on 16 January 1944 was intercepted via SIGINT and decoded at Station X, outside of Bletchley Park in London.⁶⁴ To add knowledge to the intent, the British had intercepted the daily communications of von Rundstedt, Rommel to each other and to Hitler. They revealed force disposition and size, “often down to company levels.”⁶⁵ If nothing else were known, this would be enough to plan a reasonable deception operation against.

Making the Germans See

Planning documents of Fortitude illustrate that SHAEF planners understood these perceptions. As such, SHAEF designated specified areas to build deception forces to reinforce a landing at the Pas de Calais.⁶⁶ Annex II to Appendix “Y” of COSSAC 43 allocates the concentration of “visible preparations in South-Eastern and Eastern Commands (to) represent a direct threat to the Pas De Calais.”⁶⁷ The same document outlines naval buildup of “substantial assault forces” in the Dover area to “specifically threaten the Pas de Calais.”⁶⁸ SHAEF G3 ordered the building and communications of First United States Army Group (FUSAG) in specified locations that would directly message to Rommel, von Rundstedt, and Hitler that the Pas de Calais was the focal point of the invasion and that invasion would occur by the FUSAG.⁶⁹

The same annex also illustrated an understanding that German intelligence put great faith in its signals intelligence.⁷⁰ As such, information about a new command leaked, linking this

⁶⁴ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 44-46.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 47.

⁶⁶ Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Forces. *SUPREME HEADQUARTERS, ALLIED EXPEDITIONARY FORCE, AND CHIEF OF STAFF, SUPREME ALLIED COMMAND, OFFICE OF G-3 (Harold R. Bull): Records, 1943-46, Fortitude. Annexure II to Appendix “Y” to COSSAC (43) 28, Operation “OVERLORD” Camouflage and Concealment.*

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

command to the visible assembly areas via radio communications and other forms of media, to include the National Geographic. The command was the First United States Army Group and its commander was GEN George S. Patton. SHAEF planners also exploited open-source intelligence to facilitate the ruse. An issue of the National Geographic contained an article that depicted the unit patches currently in service during the buildup in England. Among those patches were the FUSAG headquarters and the divisions that composed the FUSAG.⁷¹ GEN Patton maintained a serious schedule of official engagements in London. In all he did, he advertised the existence and intentions of FUSAG in taking the Pas De Calais.⁷²

The Allies executed the deception operations to complete the picture for Rommel and Hitler. The Allies constructed camps and airfields to support the fictitious FUSAG forces.⁷³ The fictitious FUSAG Headquarters emitted radio regular radio communications to all levels of command, to include GEN Marshal in Washington, DC. The radio communications frequently contained troop strength, camp disposition, and routine. The Allies placed dummy equipment in marshaling areas, landing strips and ports. Replications of tanks and fuelers, airplanes, and naval troop and equipment transports became visible within staging areas along the English coast. The Allies also spared naval craft to conduct amphibious rehearsals for the “landings” at Calais. Known double agents in the employ of MI-6 “observed” this activity and reported the info through the German intelligence networks.⁷⁴ Despite the fiction, a very real, Allied army group, with a very real and flamboyant commander emerged.

⁷¹ US Department of the Army, *Military Deception Research Paper, 11-6233* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 4.

⁷² Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler: The Normandy Deception*, 114.

⁷³ Ibid, 114.

⁷⁴ Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 480-487.

Making the Germans Think

Rommel, von Rundstedt, and Hitler interpreted the deception information in an exact manner that the Allies desired. Reports and signals intercepts “confirmed” the orders of battle presented to Hitler. Hitler insisted upon retaining control of the operational reserve, causing a great source of contention between Rommel and Hitler.⁷⁵ Preparation efforts now focused primarily around Calais and the adjacent ports.⁷⁶ GEN Patton’s activities in London and around the FUSAG “staging areas” demanded that FUSAG was the priority of the Allied invasion. Montgomery’s 21 Army Group was now merely a diversionary force meant to distract the Western Command from the main effort. If Calais were the point of entry, where would be the next step?

This commanded the attention of limited German reconnaissance assets. Calais was no longer a question. The Germans “knew” that this is where the heaviest stroke would fall. But when and with what further intentions were now the key questions. And this thinking would occupy German planners and Hitler himself. If the Allies could be bled on the beaches that would buy time for a crushing blow from the reserves keeping the Allies pinned and preventing a breakout toward Germany in the North. All other deep-water ports, such as Cherbourg, seemed superfluous and a waste of material and manpower. Hitler was fixed upon Calais and directing all further attention to reinforce and defeat the Allied efforts there.

Making the Germans Do

Hitler’s own convictions about the Pas de Calais invited him to act. SHAEF found proof that the deception operations achieved their effect in German action. German coastal guns periodically shelled an “oil refinery” tied to FUSAG logistics infrastructure.⁷⁷ The Allies’ SIGINT intercepts confirmed that Hitler still retained release authority for the operational

⁷⁵ Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 623.

⁷⁶ Ibid, 358, 361.

⁷⁷ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler The Normandy Deception*, 117.

reserves, denying multiple requests from Rommel for control of the operational reserves.⁷⁸ In addition to maintaining control of the reserves, Hitler began directing efforts to reinforce Calais and the immediate vicinity. This achieved two Allied deception goals: Fortitude redirected combat power away from Normandy and created the conditions that would delay the employment of German reserves against landing forces.⁷⁹

Allied aerial control of the sky reinforced Field Marshal Rommel's perception that only at the coast could a defense be maintained. This forced the immediate defenses to maintain the Atlantic Wall and maintain the dispersion of forces inland.⁸⁰ With Hitler controlling the operational reserve far inland and in Northern France, a permeable defense was maintained at Normandy compared to a concentrated defense at Calais. The concentration of effort in Calais left the defenders at Normandy with negligible air support and only their organic fires. The dilemma confronting the Allied invasion force proved to be formidable by any stretch of the imagination. But the dilemma faced at Normandy was considerably less in terms of combined arms maneuver warfare in large scale combat operations. The deception facilitated an asymmetry of force concentration along the western coast of Europe. Hitler's decision to concentrate around Calais allowed the Allies to penetrate and exploit the German Atlantic Wall.

The decisive combat element of Operation OVERLORD under General Eisenhower was the landing forces of the 21 Army Group commanded by Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery, which consisted of Lieutenant General Omar Bradley's US First Army and General Miles Dempsey's British Second Army.⁸¹ Hitler maintained that these ground forces were an Allied diversion from Calais during the invasion of Normandy. This caused Hitler to retain the reserves

⁷⁸ Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 623.

⁷⁹ US Department of the Army, *Supporting Documents to MILDEC Class: Operation Fortitude* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office), 3-6.

⁸⁰ Breuer, *Hoodwinking Hitler The Normandy Deception*, 43.

⁸¹ William M. Hammond, *Normandy: The Campaigns of World War II* (Washington, DC: Center for Military History, 2019), 12, accessed March 3, 2020, https://history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-18/CMH_PUB_72_18 (75th-Anniversary).pdf

for the Pas de Calais. Field Marshal von Rundstedt attempted to employ the 12 SS Panzer Division and Panzer Lehr to reinforce the Calvados Coast at 0430 on D-Day.⁸² But even as the invasion progressed, *OKW*, Jodl in particular, reprimanded this action and expressed that the “main landing was going to come at an entirely different place anyway.”⁸³ The *OKW* would risk no decision unless the decision came from Hitler himself. Colonel Roenne, chief of *Fremde Heer West*, the German intelligence section of *OKW*, assessed the invasion in much as Hitler perceived it. “Of the sixty large formations held in southern England only ten to twelve divisions including airborne troops appear to be participating so far ... Not a single unit of the First United States Army Group ... has so far been committed ... This suggests that the enemy is planning a further large-scale operation in the Channel Area which one would expect to be aimed at a coastal sector in the Pas de Calais area.”⁸⁴ This information coupled with Hitler’s own perceptions created a fact and would delay his decision to employ reserves. This achieved the second of Fortitude’s deception goals.

Conclusion

Operation FORTITUDE demonstrates the power of a deception operation when a strategic/operational decision-maker is the deception target. But the emerging theme of this case study is understanding the perception of the enemy and why they make decisions. When a planner grasps these aspects of a deception target, it is possible to influence the target’s actions in a manner beneficial to friendly operations. When the deception target is understood AND a strategic/operational decision-maker, operational art demonstrates asymmetry through enemy action.

SHAEF planners obliged Hitler to maintain control of the operational reserves for an attack that would not occur. They did by making Hitler see selective evidence in a manner that

⁸² Brown, *Bodyguard of Lies*, 658-660.

⁸³ Ibid, 659.

⁸⁴ Ibid, 668.

confirmed his own thoughts, exploiting his tendency towards confirmation bias. Hitler's own interpretations coupled with his willingness and authority to intervene in military operations, kept him focused on Calais rather than Normandy. Hitler was the correct deception target based upon his authorities of command, but also because the Allies understood his perceptions and how to reinforce these perceptions to create a desired action.

This case shows how successful deception during a war of absolute aims facilitates mission accomplishment. Hitler and *OKW* anticipated the Allied invasion of Europe and failed to make resource allocation decisions to prevent the invasion. But a military planner can also utilize deception to mask political and military intentions when the political object does not align with military means. In a war of limited objectives, such as the Yom Kippur war, deception properly executed creates similar conditions for success.

Section III: Egyptian Deception Prior to the Yom Kippur War

We looked on as Egypt prepared hundreds of roads and underwater passes on the Sweet Water Canal ... We said, "That's good; now it will be easier for us to cross it." We saw them prepare graduated slopes along the Suez Canal and we thought, "Now it will be easier to ascend the opposite bank." We watched them build high ramparts on which they established observation posts and firing positions to cover areas on our side previously obscured to them because of the sand barriers we had erected. Our reaction was, "Excellent, now we will know where their tanks are and where to concentrate our fire." We observed them practicing river crossing opposite Balah Island and breaching barriers with water jets, as they dropped amphibious equipment into the water to move armored vehicles, tanks, and other vehicles to the island. We noted: "They certainly have a lot of equipment – modern gear!" And we thought: "But the fact that they are training in our presence shows that they have no serious intentions."

—Avraham Adan, On the Banks of the Suez

Deception operations are not limited to wars of absolute aims. History presents several cases of large-scale-ground-combat-operations for limited political aims. One such case is the Arab-Israeli conflict of October 1973 noted as the Yom Kippur War in this study. The name is representative of Egyptian thought regarding their overarching political and military aims and

how to achieve them. It also represents a fundamental understanding of Israel as an enemy and Israeli perceptions of an Egyptian attack against them along the Suez Canal.

After the Six Day War, Egypt faced the realities of defeat by Israel in relation to their future political aspirations. In its own findings, two things were apparent militarily: Egypt could not match armor pure formations against Israeli armor, and they did not have an adequate solution for the Israeli Air Force.⁸⁵ The second deduction was that the Israeli over-reliance on air power and armored capability presented an opportunity for Egyptian forces.⁸⁶ Egypt sought asymmetry through the acquisition of tactical level anti-tank weapon systems and air defense systems as well as operational level air defense assets from the Soviet Union. Simultaneously, Egypt began deception operations that would lull Israeli national intelligence and hide military buildup along the Suez Canal. For political reasons, Egypt developed an overt plan to attack and seize key Sinai passes 30-40 miles east of the Suez Canal.⁸⁷ This operation was initially named Operation 41 and would transition to Operation GRANITE II and relied upon Russian capability assistance.⁸⁸ Covertly, the Egyptians simultaneously began planning military operations for limited aims. The initial plan began as Operation High Minarets and worked within the existing capabilities of the Egyptian armed forces.⁸⁹ The Egyptians socialized Granite II with the Russians, setting the political-military stage that Egyptian President Sadat played upon. Granite II also politically leveraged Syrian military commitment in support of reclaiming the Sinai.⁹⁰ However, in September, 1973, President Sadat issued the directive for “the actions and operations to be carried

⁸⁵ Peter J Schifferle, ed. *Bringing Order to Chaos* (Fort Leavenworth: Army University Press, 2018), 169-171.

⁸⁶ Ibid, 172.

⁸⁷ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 28.

⁸⁸ Ibid, 29-30.

⁸⁹ Ibid, 29, 31.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 36.

out by the armed forces within their own capabilities.”⁹¹ President Sadat approved Operation High Minarets as the directed course of action, which GEN Shazly renamed Operation BADR.⁹² The foundation of the deception to support Operation BADR were operational exercises by the Egyptian army and the overt political advertisement that Egypt did not possess the military capability, nor intended to initiate, combat with Israel to achieve the military aims outlined in Operation Granite II.

Who was the Israeli Decision Maker?

The Israeli Defense Force is composed of conscripts and professional officers. Backing these forces up are civilian reserve forces “trained to be soldiers in every respect and who demonstrated excellence ... by their ability to shift, quickly and efficiently, whenever called upon, from civilian to soldier status.”⁹³ This is supported by the Defense Service Law of 1949, which outlines the procedures for enrollment and enlistment in the regular forces as well as reserve forces.⁹⁴

Israeli Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s vision: “We will make war not with a local militia but with an army of rapid movement and heavy firepower, activating large formation, various corps ... in combined operations ... with uniform planning and command.”⁹⁵ Structuring a military in this manner requires careful precision and the efficiency to mobilize for an adequate defense of the nation.

⁹¹ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 38.

⁹² Ibid, 39.

⁹³ Uri Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First Years,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, no. 2 (Apr., 1995), 274, accessed November 28, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/179282>.

⁹⁴ The Knesset, *Defence Service Law, 5709 – 1949*, (Jerusalem: The Knesset, 1949), accessed December 7, 2019, https://knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns1_def_eng.

⁹⁵ Uri Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First Years,” 274.

The *Israeli Basic Law: The Government*, codified and signed on 13 August 1968 outlines the procedures for forming and enacting the government headed by an elected prime minister.⁹⁶ In matters of state security, paragraph 28.(a) relegates to secrecy any matter concerning “security of the state ... foreign relations of the state ... and any matters whose secrecy the Government regards as vital to the state, and which it has proclaimed, by order, for the purposes of this section.”⁹⁷ The Israeli Knesset passed and ratified this law in 1968. Under this law, it is ambiguous who mobilizes the Army for defense. Examination of previous laws that define the legislative and executive branches of the Israeli government provide similar conclusions. *Israeli Basic Law: The President, 1964*, does not mention mobilization of defense forces or declaring war within the legal powers of the president.⁹⁸ Similarly, *Israeli Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958*, does not bestow the authority to mobilize defense forces or declare war within the legislative body.⁹⁹

Prior to 1973, there was no formal law outlining the procedures undertaken to mobilize for defense. Officially all matters of state concerning national security were deemed secret and not vetted. Who then would be the target of Egyptian deception?

Precedent of declarations for mobilization and war provided the Egyptians with a reasonable assumption in this regard. As Ben-Eliezer contends, Israel is a “nation-in-arms.”¹⁰⁰ Israel enacted measures to increase civilian participation in military training and mobilization. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion spearheaded early to create a “Jacobian” nation where the populace

⁹⁶ The Knesset, *Basic Law: The Government*, (Jerusalem: The Knesset, 1968), accessed December 7, 2019, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1960-1969/Pages/Basic%20Law-%20The%20Government%20-1968-.aspx>.

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ The Knesset, *Basic Law: The President*, (Jerusalem: The Knesset, 1964), accessed December 7, 2019, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1960-1969/Pages/Basic%20Law-%20The%20President%20of%20the%20State.aspx>.

⁹⁹ The Knesset, *Basic Law: The Knesset*, (Jerusalem: The Knesset, 1958), accessed December 7, 2019, <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/MFA-Archive/1960-1969/Pages/Basic%20Law-%20The%20Knesset%20-1958-%20-%20updated%20translatio.aspx>.

¹⁰⁰ Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First Years,” 269.

engaged and supported constant defense activity. This led to a state of “constant mobilization” in which the population and government identified the advantages of “the special situation of ‘neither peace nor war.’”¹⁰¹

On 23 October 1955, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion recognized the “existence of positive militarism” and decided “that Israel must go to war.”¹⁰² The defense minister, Moshe Dayan, quickly followed and began preparations for Operation Detonation.¹⁰³ This initiated the Second Arab Israeli War. In this context, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion enacted policy that militarized Israeli society for common defense and exercised the authority which mobilized Israeli defenses against Egypt in the Sinai.

Preceding the Six Day War, Syrian forces attempting to “shame” Egypt for not supporting Syria militarily launched several military raids in the Golan Heights area, at the time a demilitarized zone. Simultaneously, Fatah an unconventional organization backed by the Syrian-Baath party began asymmetric operations against Israel. From 1966-1967 Syrian border skirmishes numbered 177 while Fatah sabotage operations numbered 75.¹⁰⁴ The signature of a military treaty between Syria and Egypt on 1 November 1966 only heightened Israeli fear.¹⁰⁵ The escalation of hostilities to air combat on 7 April 1967 prompted Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to mobilize the defense forces.¹⁰⁶ In anticipation of war, Israel understood that the conditions existed for a preemptive war.

The external strategic context prior to the Six Days War muddled the mobilization decision for Israel. David Rodman added the concept of “patron attitude” into Israeli decision

¹⁰¹ Ben-Eliezer, “A Nation-In-Arms: State, Nation, and Militarism in Israel’s First Years,” 280.

¹⁰² Ibid, 281.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 281.

¹⁰⁴ Guy Laron, *The Six-Day War: The Breaking of the Middle East* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), 36, 39.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, 41.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 42.

making.¹⁰⁷ His analysis of Arab-Israeli conflict in the years 1956, 1967, 1969-70, 1973 and 1982 identified the complexity of decision making based upon military patronage, primarily in the form of US (patron) military assistance to Israel (client). During the Six Day War, the Israeli Prime Minister first had to gain the approval of the United States prior to initiating a preemptive war against Egypt after Egypt mobilized to “avenge Damascus’ defeat and ... deter a full-scale attack on Syria.”¹⁰⁸ Indeed, Prime Minister Eshkol “was waiting on the green light from the United States.”¹⁰⁹ In meeting three days prior, the Prime Minister’s cabinet and Israeli Defense Officials scorned this position and demanded that war was initiated based upon the current intelligence of Egyptian forces.¹¹⁰ It was not until Meir Amit returned from diplomatic negotiations with the Americans on 3 June 1967 with assurances to Eshkol that “the Americans will hesitate to act against us and there is reason to hope that they will even support us,” that the Prime Minister made the decision to initiate war.

Ambiguity for who initiated war created a problem in deception planning based upon the legal documents governing this power. But in previous wars, the precedent for civilian-military relations gave the Egyptians a good assumption of which decision-maker would be the deception target. The Israeli Prime Minister in previous wars initiated the mobilization of the reserve forces and authorized IDF allocations for the defense of Israel. A capable military and Israeli intelligence apparatus presented the conduits to influence the Prime Minister. Egypt also understood the strategic context. They understood that their actions could possibly create a scenario for intervention, primarily from the United States. To deceive the Israeli Prime minister

¹⁰⁷ David Rodman, “War Initiation: The Case of Israel,” *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 20, no. 4, (Dec., 1997): 6, accessed November 28, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1080/10402399708437696>.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 6.

¹⁰⁹ Tom Segev, *1967: Israel, the War, and the Year That Transformed the Middle East* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2005), 323.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 323.

without alarming the international community, Egypt needed to understand the perceptions of their deception target.

Israeli Perceptions Prior to Operation BADR

The Prime Minister, Golda Meir, was the decision authority for mobilization and IDF movements. But she was not clairvoyant. The Prime Minister was informed by the Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan as well as the IDF General Headquarters. Within the General Headquarters was the Chief of Staff, LTG David Elazar, the Deputy Chief of Staff, MG Israel Tal, and Chief of Intelligence, MG Eli Ze'ira. Each of these professionals would advise the Prime Minister on the strategic assessment and likely hood of Egyptian war capabilities and intent.

More importantly, each of these advisors held their own biases from the Six Day War and the War of Attrition. Israel perceived a strategic and operational level dominance in the region after the Six Day War. This thinking led to “the concept” about Egypt and Egypt’s inability to wage large-scale war to liberate the Sinai. The illusion of the strategic depth that the Sinai also reinforced the concept of future Egyptian operations. Finally, Israel perceived intelligence dominance over the Egyptians that would allow for ample warning to mobilize and deploy. These perceptions were reinforced internally through organizational processes and thought. Intelligence assessments provided by the United States from the Six Day War until the Yom Kippur War that “Egypt had no military option” which echoed Israel’s own assessments.¹¹¹

Israel demonstrated during the Six Day War their capacity to defend themselves through a preemptive strike. The lessons of the war for Israel instructed that Israeli superiority in technology and competence in soldiering outmatched the Arab nations. Israeli air forces could easily dominate the air domain, simultaneously disrupting first echelon ground force fires while destroying operational reserves and disintegrating command and control. Israeli armored

¹¹¹ Aryeh Shalev, *Israel’s Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction* (Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2010), 157-164.

formations provided dominance on the land domain, exploiting the freedom of action provided by the air forces. Israeli military success led to their perception of Egypt in the next war.

The perceptions brought about “the concept” regarding future Egyptian operations. “The concept” provided two preconditions for Egyptians to resume hostilities against Israel. First, “Egypt would not go to war against Israel unless it first secured a regional capability to strike deep within Israeli territory, especially against Israeli primary airstrips, in order to paralyze the Israeli air force.”¹¹² The purpose of this deep strike capability was to enable Egypt to regain all of its lost territory in the Sinai. Second, “Syria would not launch a large-scale attack on Israel unless it was able to do so simultaneously with an Egyptian attack.”¹¹³ Simply stated, until Egypt reconstituted its air forces to compete with Israeli air forces, the probability of war with Egypt *or* Syria was very low. Israeli intelligence accurately estimated that Sadat understood that diplomacy alone would not return the Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty.¹¹⁴ However, Israeli intelligence inaccurately assessed how Sadat could utilize military action to achieve a political aim. Israel’s focus on the return of “*all* territory (Israel) conquered in 1967, not only the Sinai Peninsula” inclined its assessment towards a war of absolute aims to retake the Sinai and discredited the possibility of a war of limited aims to reinforce diplomacy.¹¹⁵ From the perspective of the Israeli intelligence analyst coming out of the Six Day War and the War of Attrition, the single largest indicator that Egypt could utilize war to a political end was the emergence of parity with Israel in the air domain and intelligence estimates indicated that this condition “would not be met for years.”¹¹⁶

¹¹² Shalev, *Israel’s Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction*, 34.

¹¹³ Ibid, 34.

¹¹⁴ Ibid, 35-36.

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 36.

¹¹⁶ Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski, “Intelligence Failure and the Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise,” *Political Psychology* 24, no. 1 (Mar. 2003), 83, accessed November 28, 2019, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3792511>.

Within the operational military, the illusion of strategic depth combined with a strategic capability gap to solidify Israel's sense of security. MG Avraham Adan describes this effect, "it was only natural that after the Six Day War, when Israel acquired better borders, that (Israel's) sensitivity to potential threats from across the border *should* diminish."¹¹⁷ If the enemy initiated with aviation, the outposts on the Bar-Lev Line would give warning enough to scramble air forces to interdict Egypt's aircraft. If the enemy initiated on the ground, the crossing of the Suez would slow the operational pace enough to alert active tank divisions to destroy and delay Egyptian ground forces, enabling the reserve to mobilize and respond while Israeli air conducted deep strikes on Egyptian fires and operational reserves. Wargames conducted between 1969 – 1972 supported this analysis.¹¹⁸ However, all assumptions, even those in the scenario of a surprise attack, were based upon "the concept" and its outline of Egyptian goals.

Israel's intelligence service added to the perception of strategic depth when it guaranteed advanced warning of Egyptian mobilization. On 18 April 1973 General Ze'ira stated that in the event of a canal crossing, Israeli intelligence would know about it ahead of time and give warning at the operational level "a few days ahead of time."¹¹⁹ In a second statement, MG Ze'ira addressed the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Security Committee on 18 May 1972, stating "I can promise warning with regard to a crossing."¹²⁰ The assumption underlying these claims was that it was "unlikely that Egypt would start a war without clear indication in Egyptian military communications."¹²¹ This trickled down into operational military thought as well. GEN Adan relates, "we relied totally on the belief that our Intelligence Corps would provide a strategic

¹¹⁷ Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 72.

¹¹⁸ Shalev, *Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction*, 29-32.

¹¹⁹ Shimon Agranat, *Report of the Agranat Commission*, Vol. 1 (Jerusalem: The Knesset, 1974), 149.

¹²⁰ *Ibid*, 150.

¹²¹ Shalev, *Israel's Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction*, 122.

warning of *at least* 48 hours.”¹²² The indicators of emergent air power, combined with mobilization by Egypt would give the necessary warning and allow a prudent decision regarding Israeli mobilization.

Daniel Kahneman claims that a measure of groupthink is when “the team converges on a decision ... (where) public doubts about the wisdom of the planned move are gradually suppressed and eventually come to be treated as evidence of flawed loyalty to the team and its leaders.”¹²³ At this point the leaders were subservient to their own view of Israeli might, strengthened by previous military successes and their own claim to understand Egyptian intentions. This is the perception that Israel maintained prior to 6 October 1973. It ignored the possibility that Egypt would evaluate its past performance and play upon Israel’s perceptions of Israel and Egypt.

Egyptian Cross-Examination

Egypt also gained its own unique perceptions from the Six Day War. The difference between the two nation’s perceptions came from failure-driven introspection by the Egyptians. Their lessons focused them in very different directions, but never eclipsed the possibility of war to regain the Sinai. Egypt learned that its military training was inefficient at all levels and reform was necessary. Egypt also recognized that its deficiency in the air domain would prevent a sustained offensive to the border of Israel. It also understood that any type of offensive would likely face the “blitzkrieg” style counterattack with minimal time to establish a bridgehead.¹²⁴ To execute a crossing with armor in the lead would be sacrificial. Egyptian fires would not be able to hold off the armored thrust without reliable air defenses, preferably in the form of trained pilots. Again, the lynchpin fell upon air parity, and there were no conventional means available to the Egyptians to gain parity in the air domain soon.

¹²² Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 77.

¹²³ Kahneman, *Thinking Fast, and Slow*, 264.

¹²⁴ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 26.

These factors led GEN Shazly, the Egyptian Military Chief of Staff, to this conclusion:

It was impossible for us to launch a large-scale offensive to destroy the enemy concentrations on the Sinai or to force the enemy withdrawal from the Sinai and Gaza Strip. All that our capabilities would permit was a limited attack. We could aim to cross the canal, destroy the Bar-Lev line and take up a defensive posture. Any further, more aggressive moves would then need different equipment, different training, and a lot more preparation.¹²⁵

This perception matched Israel's own "concept" of future Egyptian operations. However, the Israeli intelligence did not assess that this was a feasible option, particularly without a reliable air force or air defense system. The establishment of a hasty defense would be all that could be accomplished, and according to Israeli wargames, this defense could not withstand an Israeli counterattack.

The Egyptian political and military apparatus were of one mind and determined to shorten the gap. To do so, they would rely upon Russian arms and training. They would also reform the system for recruitment, training, and mobilization. Finally, the Egyptians would rely heavily on exercises focusing not only on crossing the Suez but attacking to seize designated points in the Sinai mountain passes.

Ultimately, through internal and external political pressure, the Egyptians abandoned their plans for full liberation of the Sinai that was planned and socialized with the Russians to outline the resource constraints that the Russians would need to fill in favor of a war of limited aims.¹²⁶ But in preparing for a war of absolute aims with limited means, to achieve the surrender of the Sinai by Israel, the Egyptians laid the foundation of their deception plans. Their annual exercises and mobilization procedures would create the conditions necessary to lull the Israeli intelligence services and prevent a timely mobilization of the IDF gaining time and space for Egyptian operations to unfold.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 24-25.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 179-183, 197-199.

¹²⁷ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 205-207.

Making the Israeli's See

Militarily, the Egyptians initiated their reforms with exercises. “From autumn 1968 the General Headquarters of the Egyptian Armed Forces began annual strategic exercises.”¹²⁸ The exercises lasted a week and focused on the strategic operational level to cross, establish a bridgehead and exploit these gains.¹²⁹ Under the code name “Tahir”, the Egyptians conducted at least one exercise per year always focusing on the same objectives.¹³⁰ GEN Shazly claimed that each iteration of the exercise was conducted on “an increasingly elaborate scale” and would amount to a “climax shortly before its ending on October 7.”¹³¹ Conducting the exercises allowed the Egyptians to maintain routinely five infantry divisions at the canal in a strictly defensive posture throughout the year which maintained assembly areas for the other units that would mobilize for the exercises.¹³² These divisions also helped to facilitate reception and staging of equipment for the exercises which increased substantially over the years. The exercise in October of 1973 maintained the appearance of normalcy regarding Egyptian strategic exercises.

Egypt also maintained a robust mobilization schedule, particularly in 1973. Up to September of 1973, the Egyptians mobilized twenty-two times, varying the number of soldiers mobilized, duration of mobilization and unit types.¹³³ The final mobilization occurred on 27 and 30 September 1973 with 7 October 1973 specified as the date for the demobilization of those soldiers who mobilized on 27 September.¹³⁴ Egypt released 20,000 soldiers prematurely on 4 October 1973 during the middle of the “exercise.”¹³⁵ Additionally, the Egyptian Minister of

¹²⁸ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 17.

¹²⁹ Dani Asher, *The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2009), 94.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 94.

¹³¹ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 206.

¹³² Ibid, 207.

¹³³ Ibid, 207.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 207.

¹³⁵ Ibid, 207.

Defense Ismail Ali issued guidance for soldiers to receive permission to go on pilgrimage to Mecca, which the Egyptian press reported as well.¹³⁶ The release of this information and the demobilization maintained the normalcy of past scheduled military exercises and messaged that Egypt did not seek war.

Politically, the Egyptians exploited media and public engagements by both political and military officers to disseminate false information that indicated Egypt did not desire war.¹³⁷ President Sadat also reduced his political rhetoric endorsing war and instead promoted, through various media, “the efficacy of the oil weapon as a means of pressuring Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories.”¹³⁸ Egyptian officials maintained their diplomatic schedules, traveling abroad to America and hosting diplomats in Egypt.¹³⁹ Egypt targeted the Israeli media with this information to reinforce the Israeli perception that Egypt did not see war as a means to political aims within the region during this time.

Making the Israeli’s Think

The Israeli’s interpreted this information to confirm their perceptions of Egypt embodied within “the concept.” Former Director of Israeli Military Intelligence, Aharon Zeevi offers that the political and diplomatic “stratagem contributed to the Israeli conception that the Egyptians had abandoned the path to war, and preferred to solve the conflict via political and diplomatic efforts.”¹⁴⁰ This combined with President Sadat’s decreased rhetoric reinforced the Israeli assessment that Egypt did not have the capacity for war.¹⁴¹ This assessment was shared not only in Israel but also in the United States as it argued against any type of Israeli preemptive strikes

¹³⁶ Asher, *The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War*, 92-94.

¹³⁷ Ibid, 92.

¹³⁸ Aharon Zeevi, *Ma’arachot*, Vol. 338, 8.

¹³⁹ Ibid, 9.

¹⁴⁰ Asher, *The Egyptian Strategy for the Yom Kippur War*, 93.

¹⁴¹ Abraham Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War* (New York: Schocken Books, 2017), 35.

against Egyptian forces up through 6 October 1973.¹⁴² US intelligence maintained “the concept” until the outbreak of war with the CIA expressing that the “whole thrust of President Sadat’s activities since the spring had been ... in tacit acknowledgment of Arab unreadiness to make war.”¹⁴³ The convergence of intelligence between Israel and the United States confirmed the political outline of “the concept.”

Militarily, the gap outlined by the “concept” still existed between military capacity and political intent. When Egypt expelled the Russian advisors on 18 July 1972, Sadat was aware that this action sent the message that Egypt was unwilling to pursue war. “The Soviet Union, The West, and Israel misinterpreted my decision to expel the military experts and reached an erroneous conclusion which in fact served my strategy ... that it was an indication that I had finally decided not to fight my own battle.”¹⁴⁴ Israel considered Soviet assistance in airframes and air-defense architecture as integral to Egyptian military capability. Upon the departure of Russian advisors, Israeli intelligence assessed this capability gap as Sadat described. Israeli intelligence assessed that hostilities, “even hostilities on a limited scope,” was “less likely” as Egypt recognized “the weakness of the Egyptian military.”¹⁴⁵

Despite the return of Russian assistance between 17 July and 1 August 1973, the military exercises did not raise alarms for Israeli decision-makers.¹⁴⁶ There seemed to remain a significant lack of air parity displayed in the exercise. Israeli intelligence upheld its views that the Egyptian military exercise was just that. According to “the concept,” because Egypt would not attempt war without first achieving air parity. The information presented about the exercise and the consistency with past exercises reinforced that Egypt had not acquired the necessary air forces to

¹⁴² Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 80.

¹⁴³ Henry A. Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), 464.

¹⁴⁴ Anwar el-Sadat, *In Search of Identity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 230.

¹⁴⁵ Shalev, *Israel’s Intelligence Assessment Before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction*, 137.

¹⁴⁶ Shazly, *The Crossing of the Suez*, 198-199.

launch a war and that their ultimate intent was a war of absolute aims to re-conquer the Sinai, not one of limited aims.

Making the Israeli's Do

Israel was not able to react in a timely manner because of their reliance upon their perceptions of Egypt. As the Egyptian deception operations converted to offensive operations the Israeli defense decisionmakers were still attempting to make sense of their new reality. There was confusion about if war was evident in Egypt's action. Ultimately, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir did not make the decision for any type of mobilization until 0900 on 6 October 1973.¹⁴⁷ She also resorted to diplomatic action, informing the US Ambassador to "warn Egypt and Syria against opening hostilities."¹⁴⁸

The deception also played to Israeli beliefs about its own conventional capabilities against Egypt's weakened military. Prime Minister Meir entertained the opinions of Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan and IDF Chief of Staff LTG Elazar. The topic of argument was the scale mobilization and the use of a preemptive strike.¹⁴⁹ After hearing the arguments, Prime Minister Meir decided in favor of Minister Dayan's against a full mobilization and trusted his assessment that any preemptive air strike carried the perception of Israeli aggression as the initiator, particularly within the United States.¹⁵⁰ Prime Minister Meir decided on mobilization of two divisions and trusted that "even if things came to the worst, the IDF could control the situation with the regular army alone."¹⁵¹

The deception activities created conditions of uncertainty while forcing Israel to make hasty decisions without truly reassessing Egypt's intentions. Israel's decisions created overmatch

¹⁴⁷ Adan, *On the Banks of the Suez*, 80.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid, 80.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid, 80.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid, 80.

¹⁵¹ Ibid, 80.

strategically and operationally for the Egyptian military. The timing of Israel's decisions enabled Egypt the unrestricted use of all its capabilities against a diminished Israeli force.

Conclusion

The case study exhibits the power of targeting a strategic level decision-maker and an understanding of a complex strategic environment. The Israeli's belief in their dominance coming out of the Six Day War and the War of Attrition with the Arabs bolstered their belief that air supremacy was the key to military power in the region. But the power of their confidence came at the price of mental agility. For Israel, there was one indicator of war to achieve political ends and it was the establishment of air parity. Conversely, the Egyptians understood their limitations but did not rule out the possibility of a war of limited aims to achieve political ends.

The deception enabled the Egyptians to hide their political intentions through military force. They accomplished this by reinforcing Israeli beliefs and conditioning Israeli perceptions. This case highlights the effects of conditioning information when tied to an existing idea.

Israel was unable to respond effectively because the Egyptians utilized military exercises and political rhetoric to condition the Israeli's beliefs about how and why Egypt would utilize war to achieve political aims. This created the conditions for Egyptian surprise and reactive Israeli decisions in response to Egypt's offensive operations. The reactive decisions made by Israel did not employ the full capability of the IDF to repel the Egyptian forces. As a result, Egypt was able to retain the initiative and achieve overwhelming success at the outset of the Yom Kippur War.

Section IV: Conclusion

The thesis of this monograph is that history demonstrates that military deception is most effectively employed when the deception target is a theater-level decision-maker or political decision-maker at the highest level of governance. The SHAEF planners chose Hitler as the deception target of Fortitude because he held the authority for deployment of the Atlantic wall and commitment of the operational reserves. The Egyptian planners chose Prime Minister Golda

Meir as the deception target because she held the authority to mobilize the IDF reserves in support of the IDF regular forces along the Suez Canal. The Allied and Egyptian deceptions caused their enemies to react in a manner favorable to their own offensive operations. If the Allies or Egypt selected different deception targets, the authorities possessed by these targets would inhibit the attainment of the deception objectives.

But the case studies also present information that requires an amendment to the thesis. Selecting the appropriate deception target is vital to successful deception. But the deception information presented must exploit the perceptions of the deception target. Without this component, deception information is strictly noise and may elicit no action by the enemy. Deception operations become hopes of success in this context rather than accurate manipulation for a desired result.

That is the compelling theme that ties both case studies together. In the case of the Allies, the SHAEF planners understood where Hitler expected an invasion of Western Europe to occur. Previous deception operations informed the Allies that Hitler also sought confirmation of his opinions. This allowed SHAEF planners to directly plan and execute a deception operation that targeted his perception and exploit his confirmation bias. SHAEF presented a deception story that reinforced Hitler's perceptions and reinforced his desire to make the military decisions in response to the deception. In this case, the coupling of decision authority and perception resided in one individual, Adolf Hitler. The Egyptians presented information of normalcy regarding an operational level exercise and political discourse to reinforce Israel's perception that Egypt was unprepared and did not desire war. But Egypt also projected this to exploit the institutional views of the IDF which influenced the political decision-maker, Prime Minister Golda Meir. This allowed Egypt to hide its intention and preparation for a war of limited aims. The exercise conditioned Israel to continue to search for viable airpower as an indicator for war, reinforcing the Israeli military and intelligence perceptions, while the political rhetoric added additional information aimed to confirm the political decisions of Golda Meir in reference to "the concept."

Presenting information outside of either perception would yield different results for both the Allies and Egyptians. But it was the accurate targeting of the perceptions of each deception target that enabled the success of both deception plans. In this light, the amendment to the thesis must include an accurate understanding of a strategic/operational decision-maker's perception of capabilities and intentions to successfully employ deception operations.

This is relevant in understanding deception operations within the context of the concept of Multi-Domain Operations. Information encompasses every domain. Action in any domain sends direct messages to our adversaries based upon their perceptions of American capability and intention. Conversely, inaction also sends powerful messages about the same.

The Yom Kippur War case study demonstrates that all information is relevant for military use and the articulation of this information in context is important. The Allies sought an absolute aim during World War II. In a sense, this made the deception objective simpler because military aim and political aim matched. However, in a war of limited aims, the coordination of political and military messaging must hide true intentions on both levels. The operational artist must be deliberate in the negotiation and employment of military means to utilize deception to achieve political aims. The availability of information compounds the difficulty of coordinating means within the current operational environment. In information abundance, understanding the enemy's perception of American intent and how the enemy arrives at this perception will make the difference between "noise" for noise-sake and relevant information that elicits enemy action. Layering information that displays intent.

Neither case study provides a concrete method to achieve the concept of convergence. But both cases display how successful deception operations create surprise for enemy forces and how this surprise affects appropriate decision-making. Hitler and OKW did not appreciate the possibility of the Normandy landings because their perception fixed upon the Pas de Calais. As such, Hitler did not release the operational reserves. Prime Minister Meir and the IDF command structure did not fully appreciate the relevance of the Egyptian attack within the context of a

successful penetration of Syrian forces into the Golan. Their confusion about Egyptian intentions, given a clear assault from Syria, hindered their decision to mobilize against Egyptian forces in the Sinai. The decision to hold operational reserves and not fully mobilize the IDF reserves enabled the Allies and Egyptians to gain and maintain the initiative, respectively. In a modern context, this may not achieve convergence, but it does create asymmetry in the allocation of combat power with an advantage towards the deceiver. This asymmetry may create an operational window for convergence by dis-integrating enemy command and control through decision-making and enabling freedom of action in the relative domains through surprise.

Selecting a strategic/operational level decision-maker as a deception target and understanding their perceptions of friendly intentions leads to successful deception. The Greeks employed the same methods, targeting Priam's perception and prompting a fateful decision to accept the wooden horse into Troy. This represented the achievement of the deception objective and allowed the Greeks to infiltrate and destroy Troy. The result of Operation FORTITUDE focused Hitler on the wrong port and contributed to the Allies' success on D-Day. The Egyptians utilized this method of deception to gain the initiative and achieve success against the IDF along the Suez Canal which also demonstrated Israel's vulnerabilities. The fundamentals of successful deception remain the same, whether upon the beaches of Troy or in a Multi-Domain Environment.

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