

German Mobilization Strategies: Research for an Appropriate Concept for Collective & National Defense in the 21st Century

A Monograph

by

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Abstract

German Mobilization Strategies: Research for an Appropriate Concept for Collective & National Defense in the 21st Century, by LTC (GS) Sebastian Becker, 41 pages.

The importance of national defense and society's contribution are unpopular and often avoided topics in the German debate after two world wars in the 20th century. The achievements of 1989/90 and the expansion of a European community, supported by the security policy that Germany is surrounded by friends, leads to a perception of a security bubble in a fast-changing international environment and neglects the importance of military readiness to protect the heartland. Independent of NATO's concept for Collective Defense, the following monograph argues that Germany requires a training and mobilization concept, giving careful consideration of society's acceptance, to increase its readiness for national defense in times of increased global insecurity.

Under investigation of the reconstruction of a mass army prior to World War II and with focus on the rearmament process in 1956, this thesis identifies Germany's strengths and weaknesses of reserve and mobilization models in the past and uses traditional pillars for a new concept in the 21st century. Driven by the main criteria, to create an asymmetric advantage over an enemy with a faster mobilization of resources, under consideration of the tradeoff between freedom and citizenry duty, it describes why Germany needs two types of armed forces: a professional army with its own reserve positions for NATO's Collective Defense, and the Home Defense forces as a militia concept with professional short-term training on a federal state level. This is a concept rooted in Scharnhorst's ideas from 1806 to awaken the spirit of a nation for the defense of fatherland and freedom.

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Abbreviations

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
BAMA	Bundesmilitärarchiv (Military Archive of the German Federal Republic)
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
EU	European Union
FM	Field Manual
JP	Joint Publication
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OKW	Oberkommando der Wehrmacht
OKH	Oberkommando des Heeres
PR	Press Review
RSOI	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
RSUKr	Regionale Unterstützungskräfte (regional support units)
UN	United Nations
WWI	First World War
WWII	Second World War

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Introduction: A Surreal Bubble of Security within Germany?

Furthermore, we need to strengthen resilience throughout government and society in Germany and the European Union. Only in this way will we safeguard our open society and protect the freedom that is fundamental to our way of life.

— Dr. Angela Merkel, Federal Chancellor of Germany, *White Paper 2016*

Influenced by the Ukraine crisis, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) reemphasized the concept of Collective Defense and Deterrence in 2014. Based on the NATO 2020 strategy review, the Allies decided to establish a new command structure to counter Russian aggression and to increase the readiness of their forces as well as the capability to deploy first forces in divisional strength on the Eastern front within seventy-two hours. It was the birthplace of the Enhanced Forward Presence mission in the Baltic States and it has put strong pressure on the Western European Allies to reconsider their own security strategies for Collective and National Defense. Sweden, a non-NATO member, reintroduced military conscription in 2018 to adapt and meet their own requirements and concepts in a deteriorated security environment. In a renewed regional defense focus, Sweden's National Security Strategy underlined that national defense is a collective responsibility of Swedish society.¹ Problems of manning the force, retention of appropriate capabilities, and shared responsibility supported the decision of conscription in the event of a total defense.²

Driven by these events, Germany also adjusted its strategic security document, the White Paper, in 2016. It re-emphasized the importance of conventional national and collective defense for Europe in the same manner as out-of-area operations across the globe. Therefore, it formulates that the secondary strategic priority is the establishment of an adaptive defense posture within the

¹ Government Offices of Sweden – Prime Minister's Office, *National Security Strategy* (Stockholm: Gullers Grupp, January 2017), 26.

² Swedish Ministry of Defense, *A Robust Manning System of the Military Defense*, April 2017, accessed 12 September 2019, <https://www.government.se/articles/2017/03/re-activation-of-enrolment-and-the-conscription/>.

framework of NATO and the European Union (EU). The need for a total change of Germany's command structures – after two changes within the last ten years - was not preferred and definitely not intended. Based on the current threat perception at a strategic level, it underlines that German armed forces have to be more flexible, agile, and suitable to counter regular and irregular risks. The scenarios of a hybrid warfare on the periphery of Europe, such as what took place in the Ukraine, formulated the need for a change in thinking and renewed concepts. The time of peace dividends after the Cold War era was over. The defense of Germany's sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the worldwide protection of its citizens, is the primary mission for its armed forces.³

Following the strategic documents, the Ministry of Defense published new concepts for force development in 2018. Germany's military goal is to increase the personnel and material readiness of its armed forces by 2032. Aims of the new capability profile are, the modernization of existing abilities, the filling of "hollow structures", and the development of new abilities within the investment rates. Readiness target lines are the capabilities to employ three military divisions for ground operations, to establish four Air Task Forces, and to participate with twenty-five warships (frigates / corvets) and eight submarines in joint and combined missions with the United Nations (UN), NATO, and EU concurrently.⁴ However, this ambitious goal is based on a single set of forces for both out-of-area peacekeeping and classic defense operations, under the umbrella of NATO, European Union or United Nations.⁵

Strategic planners also identified that the operational environment for Collective and National Defense is not comparable to the Cold War era. Notwithstanding the traditional military

³ Federal Government of Germany, White Paper 2016 - *On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2016), 88 and 97.

⁴ Chief of Defense - Federal Ministry of Defense, *Neues Fähigkeitsprofil komplettiert Konzept zur Modernisierung der Bundeswehr*, September 2018, accessed 20 Sep 2019, <https://www.bmvg.de/de/aktuelles/neues-faehigkeitsprofil-der-bundeswehr-27550>.

⁵ German Ministry of Defense, *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Bundesdruckerei, 2018), 28.

threats to our territory by forces of other countries, the new type of warfare has already shown that diffuse and hybrid threats challenge German security across all domains. In addition, the identification of their origin and the assignment to a specific actor is more than difficult.⁶ Furthermore, Germany is no longer the front line for NATO's Collective Defense and the requirements for Germany with regards to NATO's defense planning are totally different.⁷ Based on the geostrategic situation, Germany is the logistics hub of NATO's Reception-Staging-Onward Movement phase with its seaports and airports, military camps and barracks, and power plants and IT infrastructure. Their destruction by external attacks would significantly inhibit NATO's effective response, making Germany's resilience a crucial factor in defending NATO's Eastern flank.

Another major problem for Germany is a "Clausewitzian" enmity within German society to support a higher readiness of forces or a possible war against an aggressive actor outside of Germany but inside the EU or NATO territory. The perception of threats, as well as the subjective reality for preemptive defensive preparations, is totally different between society and governmental organizations. A federal security and defense survey found in 2017 that more than fifty-seven percent of the German population considered the global security situation to be rather uncertain and unsafe but did not see a need for a bigger reserve force for national defense. The same survey conducted again in 2018 saw that percentage drop to forty-two percent.⁸ In order to counter this phenomenon, Germany's strategic documents are talking about "[...] the

⁶ Federal Government of Germany, White Paper 2016 - *On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2016), 49.

⁷ Phillip Lange, "Trendwende Gesamtverteidigung? – Zu den Erfordernissen von nationaler Verteidigungsbereitschaft und Resilienz", in *Clausewitz Jahrbuch 2018* (Hamburg: Clausewitz-Gesellschaft e.V., 2019), 186.

⁸ Markus Steinbrecher, Heiko Biehl, and Timo Graf, *Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitisches Meinungsbild in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland - Ergebnisse und Analysen der Bevölkerungsbefragung 2018* (Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr, 2017 und 2018), 45.

Bundeswehr also has to contribute to the resilience of state and society against external threats.”⁹ Regarding the Ministry of Defense, it is of central importance to establish relevant capacities for the early and preventive identification of vulnerabilities. This must be accompanied by a discussion on the limits of security and acceptable levels of risk for the state, the economy, and society throughout all levels. Beside the discussion, the new concept for force development will initiate action for security preservation across the pillars of personnel, material, and organizational structure, including action for the case of mobilization and reserve strategies.¹⁰

Currently, only forty-five percent of existing duty positions in Germany’s Territorial Reserve are actively manned, and their main focus is still disaster relief.¹¹ The duty of National Defense is unpopular, and its need is neglected by society. Furthermore, the German armed forces have no concept to mobilize and train a strong force from scratch for national defense. Prevailing Army concepts assume that modern technology can replace the tactical principle of human mass, without any consideration to handle longer training timelines for active and reserve forces.¹² During this time of increasing uncertainty in global security situations, there is an urgent need to think about the replacement and mobilization for National and Collective Defense under the circumstances of Germany’s societal rejection of military service as a common or aesthetic good.

Regarding this situation, the following thesis will answer the research question, how can the German military meet its obligations for military forces under National Defense when most conventional forces are tied into NATO’s Collective Defense at the same time? The methodology for the paper is a historical case study comparison with the final development of a possible COA

⁹ Federal Government of Germany, White Paper 2016 - *On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 2016), 57.

¹⁰ German Ministry of Defense, *Konzeption der Bundeswehr* (Berlin: Bundesdruckerei, 2018), 32.

¹¹ German Parliament, *Zur Aufwuchsfähigkeit der Bundeswehr im Kalten Krieg, in der Nachwendzeit und nach Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht* (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, 22 March 2018), 9.

¹² Department of the German Army, *THESENPAPIER I - Wie kämpfen Landstreitkräfte künftig?* (Berlin/Strausberg: Presse- und Informationszentrum des Heeres, 2018), 18.

for a German mobilization concept. The framework of reference for the research, after the review of current strategic guidance, is to look at German roots of mobilization, existing theories, and concepts.

The first case study identifies methods and framework conditions utilized to restore a mass army within a short period of time, train it, and then deploy personnel during the interwar period and the beginning of the Second World War 1919-1941. The second case study focus is on the rearmament of Germany in 1956 and the development of its reserve strategy during the Cold War, identifying conditions for a more centralized approach to mobilization and replacement in case of National Defense under the umbrella of NATO with Germany as a front-line country. The first case study focus is greater on local recruitment and training concepts for replacements on the western and eastern front under an offensive strategy and an ideology in place. The second case study emphasizes National Defense for a short period of war in Germany with limited support for replacement training and limited societal resistance to the concept of federal armed forces. Both historical case studies provide options and identify strengths and weaknesses for mobilization, training, and replacement. A final step of the research project is the identification of possible frameworks for a new mobilization concept with special considerations to social acceptance in the current security environment.

The framework for the current state in this research is the described threat environment of hybrid war, or in Russian terms “New Generation Warfare”. Based on Hans Delbrück’s work and his strategy of exhaustion, the nation or coalition that can mobilize its human and material resources for war faster and longer, while still having the support of its society, will win the competition in a large-scale combat environment.¹³ His theory delivers the main evaluation criteria for the research. Firstly, the appropriate structure for recruitment and training results in

¹³ Gordan A. Craig, “Delbrück: The Military Historian.” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 351f.

the faster mobilization of the proper quality of reserve forces to create an asymmetric advantage in comparison to an opponent. The second criterion deals with societal acceptance of a national mobilization strategy, special emphasis will be on the perception of the tradeoff between freedom and citizenry duty, as well as on the circumstances for supporting an appropriate National Defense posture.

German Roots of Mobilization, Existing Theories and Concepts

The regionally oriented approach of mobilization and replacement concepts is not only the overarching umbrella strategy of German history, but also pursues the approach of sensitizing citizens for their own defense. The roots of the first German citizenry army go back to the old Hessian Landwehr at the end of the sixteenth century. With an increase of external threats and emergent wars, like the Huguenot wars in France, the Dutch War of Independence, and the Turkish Wars in the southeast, the landgraviate of Hesse-Kassel decided to train local farmers and workers in military defense issues, the so called “*Defensionswerk*.”¹⁴

Previous wars depended on mercenary groups led by external commanders, but they were very expensive, their loyalty was questionable, and they were too small to sustain upcoming wars. The identity of the citizen and the soldier, of course, meant the unity of the ancient citizen of the city, who secured his property and his land against hostile threats. The military leaders of the local defense force (“*Landesaufgebot*”) were professional captains of the landgrave and responsible for training in peacetime and commanding in war. With the beginning of the Thirty Years’ War, the efficiency of these forces was not high enough to fight against a longstanding army. The main reasons for failure were concerns about the peasants’ armament and military exercises in case of a possible uprising, as well as the nobility’s unwillingness to provide the local

¹⁴ Helmut Schnitter, “Die überlieferte Landesdefension - Vorformen der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht in Deutschland,” in *Die Wehrpflicht. Entstehung, Erscheinungsformen und politisch-militärische Wirkung*, ed. Roland G. Foerster (München: De Gruyter Verlag, 1994), 33.

authorities with a powerful military apparatus that would not be controlled by them.¹⁵ In 1733, Frederick Wilhelm I, the Soldier King, developed the system of civil responsibility for defense and created the *Kantonreglement* or “Canton Regulation” to meet the army’s requirement for wartime and to maintain the economic power in Prussia. Divided in geographical regions, the recruited native peasants received “[...] training for eighteen months to two years, and thereafter would be at home with their family and work for ten months of the year.”¹⁶ Because of limits in recruitment numbers per canton to maintain the economic growth of Prussia, there was still the need to hire foreign mercenaries. This recruitment and mobilization system worked and brought victory to Prussia throughout the eighteenth century but found its end with Napoleon’s defeat of the Prussian Army at Jena and Auerstadt in 1806.

In contrast to Prussia, Napoleon used the idea of conscription and citizen duty on a national level, based on the concepts of *Levée en Masse* from the French Revolutionary Wars beginning in 1792.¹⁷ The situation of insecurity and the need to protect the revolution’s achievements against external monarchs mobilized the French citizenry in a mass army. From a theoretical perspective, the need for physical survival is a basic need with regard to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, where further growth and the next higher step of motivation is not possible without satisfying the first steps. Furthermore, the personal will and passion to fulfill these “deficiency needs” get stronger the longer they are denied.¹⁸ In order to cover the basic needs, societies created, objectivized, and legitimized the role of institutions to share the common good

¹⁵ Holger Th. Gräf, “Landesdefension oder Fundamentalmilitarisierung? Das hessische Defensionswerk unter Landgraf Moritz (1592 – 1627),” in *Spießer, Patrioten, Revolutionäre*, ed. Rüdiger Bergien and Ralf Proße (Göttingen: V&R-Press, 2010), 39f.

¹⁶ Otto Büsch, *System and Social Life in Old-Regime Prussia, 1713-1807: The Beginnings of the Social Militarization of Prusso-German Society*, trans. John G. Gagliardo (Boston: Humanities Press, 1997), 8.

¹⁷ Mike Rapport, *The Napoleonic Wars: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56f.

¹⁸ Abraham H. Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1954), 39f.

of security and safe personal power for further self-development. From the perspective of external security, the armed forces of a state provide the basic coverage but its meaning and justification depends on the cognitive perception of its citizenry. Based on the institutionalization process by Berger and Luckman, armed forces seem to be a permanent institution of a society, but it is still possible to change or abolish it, depending on how much individual parts of society are allowed to direct the institution.¹⁹

With this fundamental idea in place, there is still the question, what drives a society to invest and maintain in the institution of armed forces? In combination of Maslow's theory with the idea of Clausewitz Trinity, a society's perception of security in terms of external threats drives the will of the citizenry to invest its own resources. Clausewitz decried the resulting subjective nature of war as an interplay between enmity (e.g. primordial violence), chance (professional quality), and reason (instrument of policy).²⁰ Consequentially, the Prussian military reforms under Scharnhorst and Gneissenu changed the old aristocratic character of officer corps, introduced the universal military obligation (*Allgemeine Wehrpflicht*), and created a new mobilization concept between 1807 and 1813, with the overall aim to increase the enmity along all social classes. All fit men over the age of eighteen had to serve several years in the infantry line, after which the conscripts were released for several years in the reserve. "Line" and Reserve together formed the standing army. After that, the compulsory military service belonged to the *Landwehr* for several years and then to the *Landsturm* until the age of forty-five, as a kind of local militia force. Untrained conscripts were either assigned as reservists to the replacement troops or incorporated into the *Landsturm*.²¹ It changed society's beliefs to fight for Prussia

¹⁹ Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York: Random House, 1966), 87 and 94.

²⁰ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89. With enmity being an integral tendency of war, it often leads to escalation and total destruction based on the political will of a nation.

²¹ Burkhardt Franck, "Mobilmachung seit 1815," in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 286.

against the French occupation forces and implemented an idea of nationalism to make personal sacrifices for “king and fatherland”.²² After Napoleon’s defeat and the restoration process with the Congress of Vienna, the whole mobilization planning and universal military obligation stopped in Prussia. The failed German revolution in 1848/49 revitalized and modernized the Landwehr system that became law in Prussia from 1850 to 1918 to set the basis for the German Wars of Unification.²³

The current concepts for recruitment and mobilization in Germany ties back to the Second German Empire. The recruitment regions of the armed forces, as well as their tactical training and organization in Germany, have changed in name and requirements over time, but the main idea goes back to Article 57 of the Reichsverfassung of 1871 and the Reichsmilitärgesetz of 1874.²⁴ The field army (Feldheer), replacement army (Ersatzheer), and occupation army (Besatzungsheer) established the overall structure of the army. The field army was responsible for the mobile deployment and had a peace strength of forty percent. Soldiers from the reserve forces and *Landwehr* filled up the vacant ranks in the case of war. The replacement army consisted of the spare troop parts left behind by the field army in the barracks with the task to train reserve forces and replace losses in war or to create new formations on order. The occupation army consisted of fully inactive *Landwehr*, or if activated *Landsturm*, forces with the task to conduct security operations in the rear area after activation. The decisive yardstick, which Moltke the Elder applied to the usefulness of troops, was their ability to conduct offensive action. For Germany, the implementation of the shortest possible offensive war was crucial, but the *Landsturm* was rather unsuitable for it. Consequentially, the activation of the *Landsturm* was an

²² Volker Schobeß, *Das Kriegshandwerk der Deutschen – Preußen und Potsdam 1717-1945* (Berlin, Germany: trafo Wissenschaftsverlag, 2017), 266-269.

²³ Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 130 and 151f.

²⁴ Graf Robert Hue de Grais, *Handbuch der Gesetzgebung in Preussen und dem Deutschen Reiche, Heer und Kriegsflotte* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1904), 12 and 31.

expression of the effort to delay an invading enemy as long as possible under the principle of People in Arms in an emergency, but the final war would be under the control of the military.²⁵




Figure 1. “Armeekorpsbezirke” (Army Corps Districts) of the German Imperial Army in 1914. German Ministry of Interior, “Anlage 1 zu § 1 der Deutschen Wehrordnung,” in: *Zentralblatt für das Deutsche Reich*, (Berlin: 2nd German Empire - Governmental Press, 1914), 141.

Based on the idea of the *Kantonregelment* from 1733, Germany was divided into eight *Army Inspections*. Each of them was responsible to train and man three or four *Army Corps* within its geographical region (see Figure 1). Each *Army Inspection* and *Army Corps* had their own mobilization and replacement planning staff, called *Gernalkommandos* and *Brigadekommandos*.²⁶ Within the area of an *Army Corps*, the *Brigadekommando* established its own *Landwehrbezirkskommandos*, as a kind of military-led civil administration office for a district. They had the peace time requirement to conduct screenings and medical assessments of

²⁵ Oliver Stein, “Ein ganzes Volk in Waffen ist nicht zu unterschätzen. Das deutsche Militär und die Frage von Volksbewaffnung, Miliz und vormilitärischer Ausbildung, 1871 – 1914,” in *Spießer, Patrioten, Revolutionäre*, ed. by Rüdiger Bergien and Ralf Pröve (Göttingen: V&R-Press, 2010), 82.

²⁶ Burkhard Franck, “Mobilmachung seit 1815,” in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 286.

all men within their districts, activated all conscripts in their districts based on the requirements of the Army Corps, and completed the mobilization preparations for all reservists.²⁷

After an initial experience in 1866, the standing army of the North German Confederation managed to triple the mobilization of 1870 within ten days. Generally, the decentralized and territorially organized responsibility for mobilization was one of the strengths of the replacement system in the German Army for World War I.

With regard to “Clausewitzian’s” enmity, the society’s middle class accepted the Prussian conscript army as the militarily superior form against external threats and opponents. It was even considered as the synthesis of the former antagonistic liberal and conservative ideals of war, based on the idea of the civil revolution in 1848/49, and interpreted as the nation’s participation in political action against external aggression.²⁸ Social democracy emerged as a new opposition against the existing military system of defense, but with the social laws of Bismarck, the objection to strengthening a militia system, rather than a standing army, disappeared into insignificance at the turn of the century.²⁹

One flaw in the system was the extended amount of time required to mobilize the *Landwehr*, around two to three weeks, with a total deployment time of four to five weeks for the field army.³⁰ After the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, the provisions allowed an army of only 100,000 soldiers and General Hans von Seeckt created a professional army based on voluntary

²⁷ Gerhard P. Gross, *The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger*, ed. by David T. Zabecki (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2016), 33-34.

²⁸ Frank Becker, “Bewaffnetes Volk oder Volk in Waffen? Militärpolitik und Militarismus in Deutschland und Frankreich 1870 – 1914,” in *Der Bürger als Soldat. Die Militarisierung europäischer Gesellschaften im langen 19. Jahrhundert: ein internationaler Vergleich*, ed. Christian Jansen (Essen: Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 2004), 158-174.

²⁹ Oliver Stein, “Ein ganzes Volk in Waffen ist nicht zu unterschätzen. Das deutsche Militär und die Frage von Volksbewaffnung, Miliz und vormilitärischer Ausbildung, 1871 – 1914,” in *Spießer, Patrioten, Revolutionäre*, ed. Rüdiger Bergien and Ralf Pröve (Göttingen: V&R-Press, 2010), 72.

³⁰ Burkhard Franck, “Mobilmachung seit 1815,” in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 287.

service.³¹ It was a repeal of the old mobilization concept but it served as superb cadre forces for a later buildup of the Wehrmacht between 1935 and 1939, demonstrated in the next chapter.

With the rearmament of Germany in 1955, the Bundeswehr re-used the regional approach for mobilization and distinguished between three main levels of the reserve after 1964: 1) *Alarmreserve* (reserve personnel with a part-time duty assignment for a fast response); 2) *Personalreserve* (former trained soldiers without an assignment); and, 3) *Ersatz- und Territorialreserve* (untrained personnel with the possibility to serve).³² At the end of the Cold War period, the German armed forces were able to mobilize up to 1,300,000 soldiers in the case of national defense. Immediately after reunification in 1990, the German government began to dissolve non-active troop units; however, the German Defense Policy Guidelines in 1992 underlined the need to maintain personnel, material replacement, and mobilization strategy. Following the decreasing threat in Europe and the agenda of peace dividend, Germany again abandoned the entire mobilization concept more than 135 years after its first implementation in 1874. With the 2011 decision of the German parliament to suspend basic military service, the Ministry of Defense adjusted and cut its reserve forces to 61,000 soldiers (*Territorial Reserve*).

The *Territorial Reserve* is under the lead of the Joint Support Service and consists of a *Territorial Headquarter (Kommando Territoriale Aufgaben der Bundeswehr)* with small liaison staff sections at the federal and district level, like the *Landwehrbezirkskommandos* in 1874. It reflects the regional approach of that time, but their main task is the support of homeland security and civil-military cooperation. Therefore, the Bundeswehr established twenty-five regional support units (*Regionale Sicherungs- und Unterstützungskräfte - RSUKr*), focusing on disaster

³¹ James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 29.

³² German Parliament, *Zur Aufwuchsfähigkeit der Bundeswehr im Kalten Krieg, in der Nachwendzeit und nach Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht* (Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Bundestages, 2018), 4-6.

relief and local security tasks.³³ The organizational structures of the RSUKr take account of regional conditions and consist of available reservists on a voluntary basis, most have 300 to 400 soldiers. The activation of these forces is driven by a specific case and will be supported by regionally assigned active units. Their previous main task, to screen available men and women for military service, to prepare for possible mobilization, and to secure the rear area for home defense, is neither conceptually planned nor personnel or material feasible.

Based on the lack of personnel in the territorial reserve and the pressure for replacements in the case of Collective Defense, the German Ministry of Defense published a new reserve strategy in October 2019. The primary purpose is to support active military units with required personnel to achieve the full status of personal readiness for deployment, as well as to protect key infrastructure for National Defense and provide Host Nation Support for NATO forces during their Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI)-process in Germany. The objective is to create the necessary training, material, and infrastructural prerequisites in the normal planning process of the Bundeswehr by 2032.

There is no change in the voluntary service status of the territorial reserve; but there is a new basic reserve obligation to ensure full quantitative and qualitative coverage. It means that all military servicemen and women, honorably discharged from the Bundeswehr, must serve in reserve for a period of six years after their active duty time.³⁴ Before soldiers leave the armed forces, they must decide whether they want to serve as a sort of replacement soldier in their active unit or in general duty for the territorial reserve. On a voluntary basis, each of the replacement soldiers should maintain previous military qualifications, otherwise he or she will be transferred to a general duty position in the regional support units after three years without training.

³³ German Ministry of Defense, *Konzeption der Reserve* (Berlin/Bonn: Köllen Druck+Verlag GmbH, 2012), 21.

³⁴ German Ministry of Defense, *Konzeption der Reserve* (Berlin/Bonn: Zentraldruckerei BAIUDBw, 2019), 25.

The approach to hold soldiers longer in reserve positions is not new in the German military organization, but it faces the same challenges in order to maintain their profession. After the war of 1870/71, many foreign countries adopted the Prussian mobilization system and a veritable mobilization race arose. In view of the looming two-front war, it was important for Germany to achieve a qualitative and quantitative mobilization advantage that would allow France to be defeated before Russia had ended its mobilization and employment of forces.³⁵ On the recommendation of the General Staff, against the resistance of the Ministry, inactive *Landwehr* regiments were increasingly used for the establishment of reserve divisions with previous conscripts but without the requirement of mandatory training.³⁶ This led to an inadequate maintenance of capabilities and to tragically collapsed replacement divisions at the beginning of the First World War.

As an intermediate conclusion, the traditional approach of the regional mobilization and replacement concept ties back to the idea of citizenry participation in national defense against an external opponent, but beyond the concept of People in Arm's – as a form of last resistance – in Clausewitzian terms.³⁷ It allows a decentralized approach to manage the specific requirements of a region as well as the individual requirement for replacements of local units under a general directive. The following chapter will analyze how the Wehrmacht was able to recruit, train, and maintain its capabilities in a very short timeframe and under the conditions of modern warfare. It will help to understand the requirements and structure for a credible and functional reserve force.

³⁵ Richard F. Hamilton, *War Planning, 1914*, ed. Holger H. Herwig (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 56.

³⁶ Burkhard Franck, "Mobilmachung seit 1815," in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 288.

³⁷ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1989), 479-483.

Mobilization from Scratch? – Buildup of the Wehrmacht for 1939/1940

The case study about the interwar period and the mobilization of German society in the beginning of the Second World War (WWII) will focus on the question: ‘How did Germany manage to multiply its troops tenfold in just four years and adapt them to the new challenges of modern warfare?’ The following study will look at the strategic and social framework, and then focus on three key factors – the recruiting, training and replacement process – that enabled a successful mobilization and establishment of the Wehrmacht during the years of 1939 to 1940.

With the end of the First World War (WWI), Germany’s government changed from the Second German Empire to the Weimar Republic under democratic principles, and the social-democratic bourgeoisie signed the Treaty of Versailles. The spring offensive in 1918, Operation Michael, showed new tactical innovations through the further development of the *Stoßtrupptaktik*, but didn’t achieve any level of strategic-operational success, because of materiel and personnel inferiority.³⁸ With the danger of the Western Front collapse, the Supreme Command (*OHL* – *Oberste Heeresleitung*) demanded that the government, newly formed under Prince Max von Baden, conduct peace negotiations with the Western powers. The German imperial forces continued to see themselves as undefeated in the field, and the republican-national currents described the resulting conditions under the peace treaty as unjustified – it resulted in the nationalist’s stab-in-the-back theory.³⁹ The German results of 1918/19 dictated the further development of the society and didn’t lead to a change in the mindset of its citizenry. The suffering under the reparations, and the internal problems escalated in the crisis year of 1923 and

³⁸ Timothy T. Lupfer, “The Offensive Tactics of 1918,” in *The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During the First World War*. Leavenworth Paper No. 4 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 50-55.

³⁹ Right-wing demagogues formed the legend of the stab in the back theory. It described that the undefeated German army in the field only be betrayed and brought to his victory by the internal enemies - Jews, Communists and bourgeois democrats. See also: George S. Vascik and Mark R. Sadler, *The Stab-In-The-Back Myth and the Fall of the Weimar Republic: A History in Documents and Visual Sources* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), Chapter 7.

established the basis for nationalism and fascism in Germany.⁴⁰ With these tensions and the unchanged strategic environment, the newly reformed German Army, *Reichswehr*, maintained a possible defense of Germany in the middle of Europe under the sophisticated lessons-learned process of WWI.⁴¹

The challenging conditions of food shortages, a bad economic situation, and demoralized returning armed soldiers without a perspective formed the basis for political violence across a wide spectrum between the left-wing council movement and the right-wing putschists. The extremist movement also found support in a society with a history of using weapons and violence to fight for change. European social literature described the time between both world wars as *Entgrenzung or Totalisierung*, a dissolving of boundaries between the civilian and military spheres to win future wars under the impression of WWI and its use of an annihilation strategy.⁴² It described the total reorganization and mobilization of a society for the purpose of war, “[...] the preparation and use of military force was no longer a purely military act, but a highly complex, political, social, economic, and ultimately military process that affected the entire population.”⁴³

The restrictions of the Versailles Treaty not only caused revolutions and inner unrest in Germany, it also formulated that Germany could not have more than 100,000 soldiers, no General Staff and no heavy weapon systems like tanks or battleships.⁴⁴ As a former military representative

⁴⁰ Gerd Kummreich, “Der Ruhrkampf als Krieg: Überlegungen zu einem verdrängten deutsch-französischen Konflikt,” *Der Schatten des Weltkrieges* (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2004), 12f.

⁴¹ Hans von Seeckt initiated a lessons learned process between 1919 to 1921.

⁴² Ernst Jünger, “Die totale Mobilmachung,” in Krieg und Krieger, ed. by Ernst Jünger (Berlin: Junker und Dünhaupt, 1930), 13-14. Later also referenced by General Luddendorf in his book about the character of future warfare; Erich Ludendorff, *Der Totale Krieg* (München: Ludendorffs Verlag, 1935).

⁴³ Frank Reichherzer, “Totaler Krieg – totale Mobilmachung – totale Wissenschaft. Die Bellifizierung der zivilen Gesellschaft im Zeitalter der Weltkriege,” in *Spieß, Patrioten, Revolutionäre*, edited by Rüdiger Bergien and Ralf Pröve (Göttingen: V&R-Press, 2010), 364.

⁴⁴ Peace Treaty of Versailles, “Part V: Military, Naval and Air Clauses,” October 2014, accessed 12 October 2019, <http://www.versailles-vertrag.de/vv-i.htm>.

during the peace treaty and the last chief of the General Staff in 1919, General Hans von Seeckt created the Troop Office (*Truppenamt*), with the heart of the old *General Staff*. The Troop Office was to initiate a successful transition from the old German empire army to the new 100,000 professional soldier army – the *Reichswehr*.⁴⁵ His overall goal was to create an army that fulfilled two purposes: “It would act as Germany’s elite military strike force and it would be able to expand quickly to a twenty-one-division high-quality, professional army.”⁴⁶ General Seeckt formulated his idea of a new elite force between 1919 and 1921, but the situation of the Ruhr Crisis in 1923 made the necessity of a mobilization planning obvious. In order to deny a possible occupation in its south-west by French troops, Germany needed the possibility to expand its armed forces quickly beyond the level of local police and citizenry militias (*Freikorps*) from the former units of the empire army.⁴⁷

The first task of the newly developed *Truppenamt* was to conduct a deep research of the situation which led to the defeat of the German Army in WWI. General von Seeckt ordered his four section chiefs in the *Truppenamt* that each section, divided in committees, initiate in its specific branch:

Short, concise studies on the newly-gained experiences of the war and consider the following points: a) What new situations arose in the war that had not been considered before the war? b). How effective were our pre-war views in dealing with the above situations? c). What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new weaponry in the war? d). Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a

⁴⁵ Friedrich von Rabenau, *Seeckt: Aus Seinem Leben 1918-1936* (Leipzig: v. Hase & Köhler, 1940), 173-175.

⁴⁶ Jim Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 69. In 1923, high numbers of French forces were deployed to the German border region for the case that Germany will violate the restrictions of the peace treaty.

⁴⁷ Under the restriction of the peace treaty in 1919 and the pressure of the Kapp putsch in 1920, the German government demobilized its armed forces to a size of 100,000 and forbade the official armament of militias on the federal level to prevent a further internal escalation of the situation in 1921. See also: Rüdiger Bergien, “Mit Kreiskommissaren zur Volkswehr - Die preußischen Einwohnerwehren als Organ einer republikanischen Sicherheitspolitik, 1918 – 1920,” in *Spießler, Patrioten, Revolutionäre*, (Göttingen: V&R-Press, 2010), 133-135.

solution?⁴⁸

With regards to a mobilization process, they identified that the territorial replacement and training system, as well as the decentralized organization and cooperation with the civil administration, worked very well. However, the main shortfalls of the process were: a) its rigid link between mobilization and employment of forces did not permit crisis management after the decision to mobilize; b) the one-sided orientation of mobilization preparations towards the beginning of the war and the lack of preparation and training for a military mobilization during the war; and c) the insufficient preparation of an economic mobilization.⁴⁹ As a result, the *Truppenamt* created a new office for *Economic Mobilization (Wehramt)* in 1925 and published the first personnel mobilization plan in the same year.⁵⁰ The intention was to triple the seven active infantry divisions in three waves, with only a small participation of the active troops, within four weeks. In addition, the former soldiers of WWI should set up eleven border guard divisions as a kind of militia and their officers should commit themselves by honor to the service, weapons and material should be stored in secret places.⁵¹ Furthermore, the newly established governmental committee for “*National Defense*,” with representatives from all ministries, would be responsible for preparing economic mobilization and planning central transportation, air defense, civil security and evacuations in the event of a war.⁵²

⁴⁸ Jim Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 37.

⁴⁹ Burkhart Franck, “Mobilmachung seit 1815,” in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 289.

⁵⁰ Jim Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 37 and 70.

⁵¹ Jun Nakata, *Der Grenz-und Landesschutz in der Weimarer Republik 1918 1933, Die geheime Aufrüstung und die deutsche Gesellschaft* (Freiburg im Breizgau: Rombach Druck- und Verlagshaus, 2002), 218ff.

⁵² Rüdiger Bergien, “The Consensus on Defense and Weimar Prussia’s Civil Service,” in *Central European History 41 Jg. Nr. 2* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 185-190.

Although the Treaty of Versailles prohibited all mobilization preparations, the Reichswehr continued the decentralized process with regional area commands (*Wehrkreiskommandos*), previously the area of the *Army Inspections*, and with the re-organized *Landwehrbezirkkommandos*, formed a mobilization structure with 1500 former officers.⁵³ With the reactivation and modification of the recruiting system, the small size of the *Reichswehr* and the bad economic situation in the 1920s, local commanders were able to be very restrictive concerning physical and mental requirements in the enlistment of personnel, for the twelve-year service.⁵⁴ German interwar doctrine, *Leadership and Combat of Combined Arms Forces*, transitioned to the new *Heeresdienstvorschrift Truppenführung* (H.Dv 300/1) by General Fritsche and Beck in 1933, and noted the new requirements for duty in the armed forces:

Paragraph 10: The emptiness of the battlefield demands fighter (*Kämpfer*) who think and act on their own and can analyze any situation and exploit it decisively and boldly.⁵⁵

The emphasized character of the battlefield was not really new and tied back to the experience and observations before and during WWI, but started with the new emergent tactics in the German wars of Unification. The industrial revolution increased the destructive nature of weapon technology and changed the character of warfare. Increased firepower with higher accuracy, range and rate of fire by modern weapon systems required a change in command and control structure and tactics to achieve the required objective on the battlefield.⁵⁶ Moltke the Elder and his General Staff published, as a result of the Austrian-Prussian War, the “Instructions for Large Unit Commanders” in 1869. It emphasized that subordinates have to take the initiative and not to wait for orders to counter the challenges of the geographically growing battlefield, but

⁵³ Burkhart Franck, “Mobilmachung seit 1815,” in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 290.

⁵⁴ Volker Schobeß, *Das Kriegshandwerk der Deutschen – Preußen und Potsdam 1717-1945* (Berlin, Germany: trafo Wissenschaftsverlag, 2017), 447.

⁵⁵ Murray Williamson, “May 1940: Contingency and fragility of the German RMA,” in *The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050*, edited by MacGregor Know and Murray Williamson (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 162-164.

⁵⁶ Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 27.

seize the momentum by a higher tempo of operation in comparison to the enemy, later known as *Auftragstaktik*.⁵⁷ The revised Prussian drill regulation of 1906, as well as the *Heeresdienstvorschrift Truppenführung* (H.Dv. 300/1) of 1933, focused even more on the required conditions for subordinates' freedom of action on the modern battlefield to shape the situation in accordance to the purpose of the operation:

Orders given from rearward commands will easily be made obsolete by the events. Timely action is often only possible upon independent decision. The lower command units have to observe that they are destined to solve the tactical problem as intended by the higher commander.⁵⁸

Everyone, the highest leader as well as the youngest soldier has to constantly stay aware that forbearance and dereliction weigh heavier than mistakes in the selection of an action.⁵⁹

Therefore, subordinates have to understand the purpose of the operation, and then work to realization even if it means working against the actual orders. This kind of thinking followed the understanding of Scharnhorst and Clausewitz for a well-educated and trained military genius that can overcome frictions in war through decentralized initiative.⁶⁰ This basic idea in combination with Germany's need for a short and decisive victory formulated the new concept of a war of movement (*Bewegungskrieg*) to overcome the position or trench warfare of attrition during WWI.⁶¹

In addition to the tenants and requirements of *Auftragstaktik*, the professional army with only 100,000 soldiers must be able to extend to twenty-one Infantry Divisions in case of

⁵⁷ Helmut Karl Bernhard von Moltke, "Aus den Verordnungen für die höheren Truppenführer vom 24. Juni 1869," in *Moltkes Militärische Werke, Zweiter Theil, Die Tätigkeit als Chef des Generalstabs im Frieden*, edited by Preußischer Generalstab (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1900), 175-176.

⁵⁸ Preußisches Kriegsministerium, D.V.E. Nr. 130 *Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie* (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1906), 126.

⁵⁹ German Truppenamt, H.Dv. 300/1, *Truppenführung* (Berlin: E.G. Mittler und Sohn, 1933), 5.

⁶⁰ Martin Sonnenberger, "Initiative within the Philosophy of Auftragstaktik, Determining Factors of the Understanding of Initiative in the German Army 1806-1955" (master's thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2013), 20-22.

⁶¹ James Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 48; and, Robert M. Citino, *The German Way of War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 143-145.

mobilization. Based on this planning, each soldier had to be able to think and lead formations and units one or two levels above his original function to generate the required leadership for all new formations.⁶² This formulated the requirements for a physically and intellectually intensive and hard training in the Reichswehr. All recruits arrived to their local division after the annual fall exercise, and participated in a basic infantry training course over six months in a training regiment, followed by special training for their future assignments.⁶³ Non-commissioned officers (NCOs) had to serve three and a half years - after 1935, two years - in their branch of arms. Then, with the permission of their commanding officer, they could participate in a special NCO training program, first at the divisional level, later at the branch of arms school (*Waffenschulen und Unteroffizierschulen*).⁶⁴

The selection process of the officer cadets was under the responsibility of the regional area commander (*Wehrkreiskommandeur*) and division commanders.⁶⁵ The officer cadets participated in the basic trainings course together with other recruits and afterward, spent an additional nine months in their associated division to get their first leadership experience as an assistant instructor in the basic training program the following year. After passing different exams at unit-level, and with the final approval of their regimental commander, the promoted cadets participated in specific training programs at the branch schools and at the officer school in Potsdam.⁶⁶

⁶² Peter Keller, *Die Wehrmacht der Deutschen Republik ist die Reichswehr – Die deutsche Armee 1918-1921* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2014), 173-178.

⁶³ James Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1992), 71.

⁶⁴ BAMA ZA 1/1785. Personnel and Administration (Project 2b), Teil II: Generalmajor Helmut Reinhardt, *Ausbildung der Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften im deutschen Heer* (Königstein, 1948), 42-44 and, Christoph Rass, *Menschenmaterial: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2003), 229f.

⁶⁵ Volker Schobeß, *Das Kriegshandwerk der Deutschen – Preußen und Potsdam 1717-1945* (Berlin, Germany: trafo Wissenschaftsverlag, 2017), 448-449.

⁶⁶ Adolf Reinicke, *Das Reichsheer 1921 – 1934: Ziele, Methoden der Ausbildung und Erziehung sowie der Dienstgestaltung* (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1986), 310-13. The Branch schools were located as follows: For Infantry in Dresden and Munich, for Cavalry in Hannover, and for Artillery in Jüteborg.

With the announcement of the military sovereignty (*Wehrhoheit*) in 1935, Germany formally denied any further acceptance of the Versailles treaty and announced the introduction of compulsory military service.⁶⁷ The structure and style of the law of compulsory service (*Wehrgesetz*) of 1935 in combination with the governmental announcement argued that military service is a fundamental right of each person to defend its country and his own family, it returns freedom to the German men, which was lost by external restrictions in 1919.⁶⁸ Based on NSDAP propaganda, the population supported rearmament to rebuild and secure economic power destroyed by the *Triple Entente* after WWI, especially after the experiences of inflation and the *Great Depression* in the 1920s.⁶⁹

The military law introduced, in addition to compulsory military service, the general service obligation for the improvement of infrastructure under governmental control. The regulation reactivated the traditional differentiation between the four classes of service: active troops, the reserve, the *Landwehr* and the *Landsturm* (see figure 2).⁷⁰ Compulsory military service existed between the age of eighteen and forty-five, and included training in the armed forces for two years of active service in peace-time. The administration offices for recruiting (*Wehrkreisersatzamt*) were responsible for the general collection and examination (*Musterung*) of all men in their districts of the *Wehrbezirkskommando*.⁷¹ Afterwards, the *Wehrmacht* carried out

⁶⁷ BAMA ZA 1/1778, Personnel and Administration (Project 2b), Teil I: Generalmajor Helmut Reinhardt, *Das Rekrutierungssystem der deutschen Wehrmacht in Frieden und im Kriege* (Königstein, 1948), 31-34.

⁶⁸ Reichsministerium des Inneren - Reichsgesetzblatt Teil 1, *Wehrgesetz* (Berlin, 22. Mai 1935), 609, accessed 15 October 2019, <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=dra&datum=1935&page=751&size=45>; and, *Ibid*, 10-11.

⁶⁹ Jürgen Kocka, "Ursachen des Nationalsozialismus," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Beilage zu Das Parlament*, No. 25 (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 1980), 7.

⁷⁰ Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 5/1 und 5/2 – Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereiches* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), 729.

⁷¹ A *Wehrkreiskommando* consisted of four to twelve *Wehrbezirkskommandos*, corresponded to the former *Landwehrbezirkskommandos*, and had one or two administration offices for recruiting, mobilization and replacement planning and execution. The Generalkommando, formerly the *Armee Inspektion*, coordinated the work of the *Wehrkreiskommandos* with regard to the needs of the *Wehrmacht*.

training on weapons and tactics (*Aushebung*) for all able-bodied or conditionally fit men in the ages of twenty to twenty-two.⁷² All men without compulsory military service, based on lack of physical and mental conditions or the need for industrial and agricultural services, served in the second class of reserve for the Replacement Army, *Landwehr* or *Landstrum*, activated in the case of national defense.⁷³




Figure 2. “Recruiting Regulations of the Wehrmacht” (*Musterungsverordnung*). Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit. *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 5/1 und 5/2 – Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereiches*. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), 729.

Based on the regional recruiting system, every soldier got his future assignment for a specific branch of arms and unit by the *Aushebung*, assigned by the administration offices for

⁷² The annual order of the High Command of the Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, OKW) regulated the necessary numbers for training and recruitment within the requirements of the Army. BAMA ZA 1/1778, Personnel and Administration (Project 2b), Teil I: Generalmajor Helmut Reinhardt, *Das Rekrutierungssystem der deutschen Wehrmacht in Frieden und im Kriege* (Königstein, 1948), 11-13.

⁷³ Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 5/1 und 5/2 – Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereiches* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), 729.

recruiting.⁷⁴ One reason for the direct assignment of home units was that it shortened the familiarization process for each soldier with his future post in peace and war time, as well as increased the relationship between his future comrades. Additionally, each leader and company commander were responsible for the training and education of his own troops, this fact led to a deeper understanding and increased passion for professional training of his soldiers for a possible future war scenario.⁷⁵ Basic training took fifteen weeks, started with two cognitive and physical test days, and ended with a personal inspection of each soldier by the battalion commander to evaluate the achievement of the training goals and to continue with the team training. Based on the specific skills and previous education or jobs, the company commander selected soldiers for special positions, like driver or signal soldier, in accordance with the required war time positions in his unit.⁷⁶

In wartime and after mobilization, the armed forces differentiated only between two main types: the Field Army (Feldheer) and the Replacement Army (Ersatzheer), connected to and under replacement responsibility of each area command (*Wehrkreiskommando*). Opposite to WWI, the army was no longer responsible for national security in wartime after the creation of the *Schutzstaffel* in 1933.⁷⁷ In addition to the requirement to fully charge four divisions with personnel in case of mobilization, each *Wehrkreiskommando* had the additional task of rebuilding four new divisions as part of the Replacement Army in Germany. The basic training for new soldiers after 1939 was shorter, with only two months, and took place at the general training units of the *Wehrkreiskommandos*. Afterwards, the new units or groups of soldiers moved to their

⁷⁴ BAMA ZA 1/1785. Personnel and Administration (Project 2b), Teil II: Generalmajor Helmut Reinhardt, *Ausbildung der Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften im deutschen Heer* (Königstein, 1948), 20-21.

⁷⁵ Christoph Rass, *Menschenmaterial: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2003), 146.

⁷⁶ BAMA ZA 1/1785. Personnel and Administration (Project 2b), Teil II: Generalmajor Helmut Reinhardt, *Ausbildung der Unteroffiziere und Mannschaften im deutschen Heer* (Königstein, 1948), 24.

⁷⁷ Burkhard Franck, "Mobilmachung seit 1815," in: *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 290.

original divisions and continued to train in the rear area with their new units before marching to the front. Replacement training was different than before, but led to the same cohesion of the armed forces, because of the training time in the division's consolidation areas along the front-line. It also generated the additional value that the current experiences could be passed on and new tactics could be rehearsed.⁷⁸

The *3rd Empire Defense Law* of 1935 gave Hitler the right to order the status of defense and mobilization in three different ways: 1) advance measures, 2) mobilization with public proclamation, or 3) without public proclamation, based on the experience of 1914 to generate a strategic advantage against an opponent and deny an escalation of force in a vicious circle.⁷⁹ It was tested with the employment of troops and the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1938. Each regional command had to organize the materiel and equipment of its reserve personnel prior to mobilization. The objective of the High Command of the Armed Forces (*OKW*) was a seventy-five percent mobilization of its Field Army within forty-eight to seventy-two hours to continue with the deployment of troops. The occupation of Austria hit the army completely unprepared and the army failed in the activation as well as deployment of the reserve personal to its original units. The lessons of the mobilization of 1938 led to the development of a hidden mobilization concept with deception in 1939. Two months prior to the attack on Poland, the *Wehrmacht* ordered the mobilization of reserve personal, only for the Field Army, to celebrate the twenty-fifth *Battle of Tanneberg* and deployed them to East Prussia to shorten the timeframe of conscription and preparation for war.⁸⁰

Until the 1st of September 1939, the *Wehrmacht* mobilized 4,556,000 men for service under the major challenges of a wide variety of equipment and training between units. Therefore,

⁷⁸ Christoph Rass, *Menschenmaterial: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2003), 147.

⁷⁹ Bernd Mertens, *Rechtssetzung im Nationalsozialismus* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), 23-24.

⁸⁰ Richard J. Overy, "Mobilization for total war in Germany 1939-1941," in *The English historical review*, 103 No. 408 (Oxford: University Press, 1988), 615-624.

the *Higher Command of the Army (Oberkommando des Heeres, OKH)* decided to structure the divisions in four different waves.⁸¹ The first wave consisted of seventy-eight percent active personal, whereas the second wave had only six percent active and eighty-three percent reserve soldiers, formerly trained by the Reichswehr. Veterans from WWI and nine percent of the active soldiers formed the third and fourth waves, and trained the men without any service experience in a shorter time frame and deploy later to the western and eastern theater as a kind of rear area security in 1939/40.⁸² General of the *Panzer* troops, Herman Balck, mentioned in his memoirs that the success of the Wehrmacht in the first year was only possible through experienced soldiers from the First World War, as well as the conceptual development of the war of movement by General Hans von Seeckt. However, he also recognized that the weak foundation of tactical training in the Replacement Army prevented an even more effective use of mission command tactics throughout the war.⁸³

As a kind of second intermediate conclusion, the success of mobilization in 1939 had its roots in the concept development of a professional army from 1921 onwards, as well as the idea of regional and commander responsibilities for replacement and training. Furthermore, it requires a combined understanding of warfare with professional trained leaders two levels up to enhance initiative, teach skills and knowledge to unexperienced recruits in short timeframes, as well as to shape the uncertainty of a battlefield in the intent of higher commands mission and create multiple dilemmas to the opponent by increasing the operational and tactical tempo.

⁸¹ BAMA RH 2/1184, OKH - GenStAbt IIIB, *Die Mobilmachung und das Kriegsheer – Vortrag an der Kriegsakademie am 14. Januar 1939*.

⁸² Bernhard R. Kroener, Rolf-Dieter Müller, and Hans Umbreit, *Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg, Band 5/1 und 5/2 – Organisation und Mobilisierung des deutschen Machtbereiches* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1988), 710.

⁸³ Hermann Balck, *Order in Chaos – The Memoirs of General of Panzer Troops Hermann Balck*, ed. David T. Zabecki and trans. Dieter J. Biedekarken (Lexington, KY: University Press, 2015), 169 and 380-383.

Infantry Forces for National Defense – Germany’s Answer to the New Operational Environment at the Beginning of the Cold War Period

If we like to save the Federal Republic permanently from the same fate that many states of Eastern and Southeastern Europe and Asia have suffered after 1945, because of the military preponderance of the Soviet Union, appropriate countermeasures must be taken in good time by a responsible government.⁸⁴

The attack on France in 1870, the modified Schlieffen Plan in 1914, and the Planning for Operation Barbarossa in 1941, in each case the preparation for an offensive war always influenced the mobilization planning and dictated the requirements of personnel and materiel replacement systems. However, the post-1945 situation had changed with the growing fear of a nuclear confrontation between the eastern and western bi-polar world. In the 1950s, Konrad Adenauer knew he could achieve Germany’s sovereignty and long-term reunification with national participation in the established security architecture of 1949 – this meant rearmament under the lead of NATO and the Western Allies. In the following section, the thesis will focus on strategic ideas and planning assumptions about National Defensive Operations of the German armed forces (*Bundeswehr*), as well as its mobilization concept under the newly emerged nuclear threat in middle Europe.

The *Himmeroder Denkschrift* in 1950 and the first study on National Defense in 1955 formulated the biggest concerns for a rapid rearmament: “The German economy no longer has its own defense industry. [...] Even the German people have undergone a decisive change on the path to pacification, the mental and physical resilience of our youth is much lower than before.”⁸⁵ The challenge for Adenauer to rearm was not so much at the foreign policy level, much more the domestic pacifist idea after two world wars and the fear of a possible *Brother War* (*Bruderkrieg*)

⁸⁴ BAMA BW 2/1817, Militärischer Führungsrat, “Rede von General Heusinger zur Verteidigung Deutschlands,” in: Gedanken zur deutschen Verteidigung, Organisation, Ausbildung und Führung des Heeres (Bonn, Ministry of Defense, 1956), 132.

⁸⁵ BAMA BW 2/1818, Militärischer Führungsrat, *Studie Nr. 1: Gedanken zur deutschen Verteidigung, Organisation, Ausbildung und Führung des Heeres* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 6 and 10.

had to be overcome.⁸⁶ More than three-quarters of the German society was against a rearmament before 1950. However, the military defeat of US troops in the first year of the Korean War, the fear of a Soviet attack and a possible lack of protection by the Allied forces in Germany increased society's passion for a German rearmament. In particular, the discussion about the NATO strategy of Massive Retaliation (MC14/1), after the successful testing of the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities, led Germans to rethink the strategy of shield and sword to contribute to block the Red Army as far east as possible. The fear of total destruction of its own territory resulted in the necessary enmity to rearm German citizens ten years after the Second World War.⁸⁷

With the creation of the Bundeswehr in November 1955, the reactivated Lieutenant General Adolf Heusinger took the position of Chairman of the newly established Military Council on November 22. The council had served as an advisory body for informing the civilian leadership of the also new Federal Ministry of Defense, and is still the highest military committee in Germany.⁸⁸ The first idea on national defense in the bi-polar world after WWII was obvious to the German generals - Germany should take all economic and military measures to remain an interested partner with the Western powers and create an unpredictable risk for a Soviet attack over the inner German border.⁸⁹ Under the enveloped military capabilities of nuclear warfare and the increased speed in technology development, the new studies about future warfare saw the

⁸⁶ *A Brother War*, or fratricidal war, describes the armed conflict against a state with the same national roots, but divided in two parts after WWII. Horst Afheldt, *Verteidigung und Frieden: Politik mit militärischen Mitteln* (Munich: Dtv Verlag, 1976), 21; and Wolfgang Krieger, "Adenauer und die Wiederbewaffnung," in *Rhöndorfer Gespräche Band 18* (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 2000), 11-24.

⁸⁷ Klaus Nauman, "Strategisches Denken," in *Zeitschrift der Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr*, Heft 14 (Hamburg: FüAkBw – Reflexin, 2011), 8-10.

⁸⁸ Martin Rink, *Die Bundeswehr 1950/55-1989*, (Potsdam: Zentrum für Militärgeschichte und Sozialwissenschaften der Bundeswehr und Walter de Gruyter Verlag, 2015), 27-29.

⁸⁹ BAMA BW 2/1818, Militärischer Führungsrat, *Studie Nr. 1: Gedanken zur deutschen Verteidigung, Organisation, Ausbildung und Führung des Heeres* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 2.

experiences of WWII as outdated and recommended the rethinking of conventional weapon and leadership principles, as well as the inclusion of a *Push the Button Strategy*.⁹⁰

With the Paris Agreement of 1955, the Federal Republic, limited by Allied reservations, obtained the right to create armed forces within the security system of the Western European Union, but without the right of nuclear - biological - chemical capabilities. The Militärischer Führungsrat assumed hydrogen bombing would be possible until the East and West blocs reached a nuclear balance. Furthermore, the single concentration in atomic armament could be illusory, because of the eastern strength in conventional forces as well as the inability to block the enemy without conventional obstacles and forces.⁹¹ Instead, for the case of national defense, they saw the main need for decentralized infantry divisions – with light armored vehicles, high firepower, operating under joint and combined principles – to deny the Russian opponent access to the German area after the *Nuclear Storm*. Based on these considerations, the German army focused on the development of elastic structures, agility and decentralization of forces on the battlefield, as well as the interoperability between reconnaissance, effects, and support.⁹²

NATO's defense planning focused on halting the advance of Soviet forces as far east as possible, northeast of the Rhine. The fortification and defense of the industrial areas of Kassel, Frankfurt and Würzburg was under special focus of the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe (SACEUR).⁹³ The concept of operation was the establishment of a deep defense line with thirty divisions, divided into four armies and covered by five to six regiments ahead along the internal German border, ready for defense six hours after the Soviet's attack and enabled to fight up to

⁹⁰ BAMA BH 1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 102.

⁹¹ BAMA BW 2/1818, Militärischer Führungsrat, *Studie Nr. 1: Gedanken zur deutschen Verteidigung, Organisation, Ausbildung und Führung des Heeres* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 8.

⁹² BAMA BW 2/1819, Militärischer Führungsrat, *Studie Nr. 2: Gedanken zur deutschen Verteidigung, Organisation, Ausbildung und Führung des Heeres* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 19-22.

⁹³ BAMA BW 17/44, Militärischer Führungsrat, *Studie Nr. 3: Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zum deutschen Beitrag für eine kollektive Verteidigung der NATO* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 72.

thirty days (M-Day+30) in the central corridor of Europe.⁹⁴ Eight additional divisions in a first wave, five divisions in a second wave, as well as five divisions as a strategic reserve, created the follow-on force package for SACEUR planning. The total estimate of enemy forces was eight comma eight million soldiers of the Warsaw Pact, forty-five Soviet divisions could be used for a possible attack on Germany. The American plan was to concentrate and guide the enemy into Germany's deep area by combined arms warfare, to destroy him with nuclear weapons in favorable areas and within a short period of time.⁹⁵

The German military leadership didn't share this opinion and underlined the necessity for conventional forces, primarily to provide the political leadership different opportunities and options for decision making. Independent of nuclear or conventional defense, they understood that German's armed forces had to be able to integrate itself in the context of NATO's defense planning within the next three years. Based on the Paris Treaty, Germany could and should arm 500,000 men, divided into land forces, tactical air force, air defense and light naval forces. Five Tank and six Mechanized Infantry Divisions, as well as one Airborne and Mountain Infantry Brigade, were the first assigned German contribution to NATO's defense land forces in central Europe in 1957/58.⁹⁶

Germany's national defense planning also envisaged the establishment of separate home defense units (*Heimatwehr*) alongside the NATO subordinate forces, under national command and without the possibility to be withdrawn from the territory of the Federal Republic by NATO.⁹⁷ The planning assumptions of the Army were that with a Soviet attack 1) the Lines of

⁹⁴ The overall defense in Europe was divided in three sectors: Command Land North – Center – South; the depicted numbers are only relevant for Command Land Center.

⁹⁵ BAMA BW 17/44, Militärischer Führungsrat, *Studie Nr. 3: Grundsätzliche Überlegungen zum deutschen Beitrag für eine kollektive Verteidigung der NATO* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 75.

⁹⁶ BAMA BW 2/1817, Militärischer Führungsrat, "Rede von General Heusinger zur Verteidigung Deutschlands," in *Gedanken zur deutschen Verteidigung, Organisation, Ausbildung und Führung des Heeres* (Bonn, Ministry of Defense, 1956), 137-142.

⁹⁷ BAMA BH 1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 102.

Communication and access to the North and Baltic Sea could be interrupted without any warning; 2) industrial and military hubs would be destroyed or occupied; 3) NATO's logistical support during the first phase of National Defense could be hampered.⁹⁸ Under the Soviet's nuclear attack, command centers of civil administration would not be working any longer and Germany would disintegrate into organizational islands of different sizes, all of which must be able to act independently of each other.⁹⁹ Consequentially, the Army's chief planners recommended a decentralized command and control structure, called *Home Defense Districts (Landesverteidigungsregionen)*, for emergency support, force mobilization and deployment, as well as for all military engineering measures in home defense operations (see figure 3). Because of the peripheral location along NATO's defense line, the Army did not consider the adoption of other national defense plans. Instead, the newly established political system after WWII required a civil lead for all regional defense planning activities in advance and a close cooperation with the territorial commander in chief, as his military advisor.

After WWII, Germany continued the old *Territorial Command* structure for recruiting and training in its six regional area commands (*Wehrkreiskommandos*). However, preparation and implementation of home defense in the new democratic system was the joint responsibility of the Ministries of Interior and Defense. It meant that the existing six *Wehrkreiskommandos* had the task to recruit and train the required men in accordance with the Conscription Act of 1956 in peacetime.¹⁰⁰ But the replacement training in war, for German units under NATO's command, was no longer part of it because of the assumption about a short war and the local requirements for Home Defense. Consequentially, the administration's independence led to less use of

⁹⁸ BAMA BH 1/29212, *Mobilmachungsanweisung des Heeres Nr. 1/29219* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1957), 7.

⁹⁹ BAMA BH 1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 78.

¹⁰⁰ BAMA BW 2/6849, *Handakte zu den Mobilmachungsplänen im Führungsstab der Streitkräfte* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1958 bis 1960), 49-51.

available men for military services and to a small reserve as direct replacements. The same mistake as in 1870, 1914 and 1939 occurred again with the lack of planning for a longer war and its consequences for society and industry in terms of mobilization.¹⁰¹




Figure 3. “Concept of Home Defense Districts” (*Landesverteidigungsregionen*). BAMA BH 1/29212, *Mobilmachungsanweisung des Heeres Nr. 1/29219* (Köln: Department of the Army, 1957), 8.

With the assumption of destroyed lines of communication, the mobilization concept focused on the activation of military trained personnel within the radius of fifty kilometers in a Home Defense district.¹⁰² The first priority would be that all mobilized personnel would fill open positions within a German unit for NATO defense, all others would form the body for home defense tasks within a district (see figure 4).

¹⁰¹ Burkhart Franck, “Mobilmachung seit 1815,” in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 293.

¹⁰² BAMA BW 2/843, *Studie zur Mobilmachung der Bundeswehr* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1958), 14-15.




Figure 4. Possible Structure of Home Defense Districts (*Landesverteidigungsregionen*). BAMA BH 1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 87.

The different districts would form a base-like defensive position with the vision of slowly expanding them into atomic field fortifications; each district would establish one division with ten battalions under the lead of the regional area commands and additional depots for active and

reserve forces.¹⁰³ The organizational body of a Home Defense Battalion would serve as permanent soldiers for a home defense district to maintain materiel and personnel readiness.

In the long-term, the Ministry of Defense planned to split the conscripts into two parts, one for NATO defense with eighteen month of service and the others for Home Defense with six months of basic training and an additional three years as stand-by reserve with periodical training events.¹⁰⁴ The basic training requirements for Home Defense units and their connectivity to NATO's defense units were under the responsibility of the Chief of the Army, in a double headed function. Between 1957 and 1964, the Department of the Army and the Territorial Command developed the first training concept for Home Defense Battalions, as a militia force, and established two Infantry units, called *Grenzsicherungsbataillone*, close to the border in Bavaria and Schleswig-Holstein.¹⁰⁵

For the establishment and training, both *Grenzsicherungsbataillone* got additional support by the active brigades within their area of operation, and its structure followed the basic structure of a Mechanized Infantry Battalion in the German Army. Main efforts of training were the observation of the border, preparation of obstacles and barriers, and linear defense operations against attacking Soviet forces from field fortifications.¹⁰⁶ The basic purpose was the familiarization with the area through previous training exercises and the early buildup of field fortifications. However, within the federal government and in discussions with individual federal states, there was no unity of effort to acquire the necessary areas or even militarize them through

¹⁰³ BAMA BH 1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 104-106.

¹⁰⁴ BAMA BW 17/70, Persönliche Dokumente von General Heusinger, *Notwendigkeit und Dauer einer Allgemeinen Wehrpflicht* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1956), 12.

¹⁰⁵ BAMA BW 2/4868, *Erfahrungsbericht zur Übung des Jägerbataillons 211 und 617 - Abschrift von 1963* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1964), 105; and, BAMA BH1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 144.

¹⁰⁶ BAMA BW 2/4858, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, *Aufstellung von Grenzsicherungsbataillonen auf milizartiger Grundlage* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1962), 26.

expropriation.¹⁰⁷ Therefore, the materiel and basic organizational body of Home Defense units were attached to existing army battalions near the border and the training of its soldiers took place at the existing training areas.¹⁰⁸ Another challenge was the requirement for experienced officers and non-commission-officers to apply the concept of Mission Command also for Home Defense and to prevent the use of different leadership principles within the same armed forces. The last shortfall was the gap of materiel to equip each soldier. Both units used vehicles and weapons from the active partnering unit for training, which would not work under conditions of active Home Defense.

Under the pressure of continued materiel shortages and the need for a long-term replacement strategy in the active forces – based on NATO’s requirement to replace one hundred percent of wounded and killed soldiers in the first three months – the Ministry of Defense started to revise its previous planning about military mobilization in 1963.¹⁰⁹ The idea of short-term trained militia forces was terminated and the focus of Home Defense Districts changed to the establishment of a qualified tracking system of previous regular conscripts who completed their training, dating back to the creation of the Bundeswehr. The Chief of Defense emphasized the conduct of qualified reserve exercises under the lead of the regional area commands, as well as the increase in size and quality of the materiel depots within a Home Defense District. The Reserve concept – as mentioned in section two of the thesis – was the output of the revision in 1963/64 and led to Germany’s main mobilization strategy for the Cold War period.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ BAMA BH1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 151.

¹⁰⁸ BAMA BW 2/4868, *Erfahrungsbericht zur Übung des Jägerbataillons 211 und 617 - Abschrift von 1963* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1964), 105.

¹⁰⁹ BAMA BW 2/3349, *Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, Lagebild zur Mobilisierung der Streitkräfte im Mobilmachungsfall* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1963), 13-19.

¹¹⁰ German Parliament, *Zur Aufwuchsfähigkeit der Bundeswehr im Kalten Krieg, in der Nachwendzeit und nach Aussetzung der Wehrpflicht* (Berlin: Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Bundestages, 2018), 4-6.

As an intermediate summary of section three, the impossible bridge of Germany's rearmament would not have been possible without the Korean War and the increasing fear about total destruction within its citizenry. Furthermore, the militia concept for Home Defense was only used as long as insufficient military personnel were available and they were to be replaced by professional trained reserve soldiers to "prevent the horrible mistakes of the *Volkssturm*."¹¹¹ Third, the German government continued to use a regional approach for recruiting, and created local centers of reserve forces to benefit from the habitus and cohesion within a district for Home Defense.

Conclusion: Decentralized Militia Forces and Replacement Planning by Active Forces – Concept for Future Collective and National Defense?

With the changed requirement for National Security, the German government adapted its strategy, but did not shape the information environment to garner public support, as mentioned in section two of this thesis. The unanswered question for a possible internal European conflict and war is, how can Germany prepare its mobilization and gain citizenry's support for two efforts at the same time? First, Germany must be able to fight along its Allies against external aggression outside of its own country and, second, protect its critical infrastructure to maintain the fighting armed forces and prevent internal civil unrest as well as deep strikes of possible opponents. In the following conclusion, I will explain a possible concept for Germany's current dilemma using the successful elements of the nation's past concepts, as explained in both case studies.

As mentioned in section two, the current coordination concept for reserve and national defense is based on a central coordination approach under the lead of the Territorial Command in Berlin and decentralized organization offices as an interface to the regional and federal state civil disaster authorities in separate districts. Each federal state has its coordination offices with active

¹¹¹ Martin Rink, "Das Ungeheuer von Loch Ness und andere Wiedergänger - Milizkonzeptionen und Bundeswehr," in *Spießler, Patrioten, Revolutionäre*, ed. Rüdiger Bergien and Ralf Pröve (Göttingen: V&R-Press, 2010), 396.

soldiers in separate districts and its own regional support units (*RSUKr*) with reserve soldiers.¹¹²

The new reserve concept also includes the requirement that each soldier has a 6-year commitment in the reserve forces after he or she left the armed forces to provide the required replacement body for a large-scale combat environment ('*six-year stand-by reserve*' concept).¹¹³

In combination with the results of both case studies, four main elements shaped Germany's approach to national defense in the past, 1) the regional mobilization with local reserve forces, 2) the commander's responsibility for recruiting and training, 3) the combined understanding of warfare with training for a higher command position (two levels up), and 4) society's fear about a basic need for security forces to contribute to national security and protection concepts.

Firstly, the main elements for German's success in mobilization and replacement was the regional decentralized organization, based on the idea of the *Kantonreglement* of 1733. As mentioned in section three and regarding the protection of domestic infrastructure, civil responsibility for home defense denied the military lead in a region, as it was in WWII. Its coordination is still the responsibility of the different federal state administrations or, if more than one federal state is involved in the crisis, under the lead of the Ministry of Interior.¹¹⁴ Independently, in any situation, the Ministry of Defense is always in a supporting role for Home Defense and Security. Therefore, the existing regional support units need the ability to expand to the required number for local security and support measures, since it is no longer efficient in its current function as a coordinating element.

¹¹² Each federal state has one or two company size elements for object security or disaster relief support in case of emergency; each unit has 350 – 450 local reserve soldiers.

¹¹³ German Ministry of Defense, "Konzeption der Reserve" (Berlin/Bonn: Zentraldruckerei BAIUDBw, 2019), 22-28.

¹¹⁴ German Ministry of the Interior (Bundesministerium des Inneren), *Rahmenrichtlinien für die Gesamtverteidigung* (Berlin: Neue Presse Coburg, Dezember 1989), 5-6.

In the old concept for *Home Defense Districts* of 1957, it was envisaged that 10,000 soldiers would take over the security for every one million inhabitants, divided into divisions with subordinate battalions.¹¹⁵ It was the requirement in numbers for Germany as a front state, but under the new strategic conditions and as a part of NATO's consolidation area for RSOI, it only needs twenty percent of them for rear area security. Consequentially, for the new home defense approach, Germany's seventy-nine million inhabitants need 158,000 soldiers in home defense tasks, and only 25,000 are available presently (deficit of more than eighty-four percent). The current construct of the home defense organization, with the Territorial Command and its subordinated liaison offices to the different German districts, must be transformed into regional area commands with subordinated district area commands and its own home defense units. Each of the units need a permanent body with local depots and training facilities, materiel readiness and to organize specific training events for district defense forces. Local men and women in the ages of eighteen to twenty can form the required forces, recruited through an additional monthly salary during the training and standby period as an extrinsic motivation. The stand-by period should not be too long to allow more flexibility after the age of twenty-five. Basic training could follow the old concepts for area security, the acquired skills can be maintained by a two-week summer training camp and a weekend exercise every six weeks during the standby period.¹¹⁶ Additionally, equipment and infantry weapon systems for *Home Defense* must meet the same requirements as for active forces to allow interdependency and enable mutual exchange.

Secondly, the responsibility of the commander in WWII was to train and plan replacements in the field army to ensure high quality replacements on the eastern and western front. Today, the smaller number of forces, as well as the increased amount of specialized training

¹¹⁵ BAMA BH1/593, *Grundprinzipien der zukünftigen Verteidigung* (Bonn: Department of the Army, 1956), 103.

¹¹⁶ BAMA BW 2/4858, Führungsstab der Streitkräfte, *Aufstellung von Grenzsicherungsbataillonen auf milizartiger Grundlage* (Bonn: Ministry of Defense, 1962), 26.

on complicated weapon systems in a professional army, denied the approach of a local replacement system connected to the home location of the different units.¹¹⁷ In Germany, most soldiers apply for a specific position or unit, regardless of where they were born or grew up, and more than sixty percent do not live in the region in which they serve.¹¹⁸ But with regard to the strategic requirements and current concepts, the conventional forces have the task to plan their own temporary reserve positions to replace soldiers in the case of a deployment or long-term sickness of an active duty soldier.

During the Cold War, the German Ministry of Defense planned to replace thirty percent of the entire army as a substitution for killed or wounded soldiers in NATO defense operations over a period of three months.¹¹⁹ In combination of these facts, the new concept requires that the local brigade headquarters must plan the necessary replacements from its own *six-year stand-by reserve*. It means that a Brigade is responsible to track and train their own replacement cadre; all soldiers who are not attached to the replacement cadre of a brigade after his or her retirement from the army, form the basis of the district defense cadre.

Thirdly, each soldier's training to understand the requirements and procedures two levels higher than their own position allowed the armed forces to be expanded in a very short time, as mentioned in section three. Germany's traditional concept of mission command required a well-educated and independently acting military leader across all levels of command. The current command doctrine and training concepts of the professional army set the basis to maintain this advantage, but it also requires the appropriate leadership culture within the Bundeswehr to enforce it. Deployments to Afghanistan or Mali, as well as enhanced information technology in

¹¹⁷ Stephen Biddle, *Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 28, 64, and 190.

¹¹⁸ German Parlament, *Zahlen zu Bundeswehrrekrutinnen und Bundeswehrrekruten und Angehörigen der Bundeswehr nach Bundesländern* (Berlin: Bundestag Drucksache 19/4253, 2018), 8.

¹¹⁹ Burkhart Franck, "Mobilmachung seit 1815," in *Truppenpraxis Bundeswehr – Die Zeitschrift für den Offizier*, 31. Jahrgang 1987 (Bonn: Herford Verlag, 1987), 293.

headquarters, changed the culture within the forces; in response, the leader's ability to accept risks and mistakes must change to enhance the freedom of action in subordinated levels.¹²⁰ Furthermore, the application of mission command – in terms of *Auftragstaktik* – also requires that soldiers of *six-year stand-by reserve* maintain their skills in periodic exercises or training in their home units at a minimum of once a year for a two-week period.

The mentioned concept of militia forces doesn't have the time to educate and train its soldiers in the mission command skills and behavior. Therefore, it is more important to implement an experienced military leadership level in Home Defense units, and the main body in the headquarters and battalions should be active duty positions. For units on the ground, retired military leaders, or educated reserve officers with two years of active training, should fill these positions at the officer- and NCO-level during their *six-year stand-by reserve* period. It assumes that they are not double-headed and also intended for the replacement reserve in their previous brigades.

Fourthly, a national security concept that interferes with the freedom of its citizens requires their support in a democratic society. Based on Clausewitz's trinity, the enmity of the people must support a protracted war to provide the necessary resources for the chosen strategy of war.¹²¹ The case study of Germany's rearmament has also shown that personal fear for one's own basic security is one of the best motivators to contribute to public security concepts. Therefore, Germany's current discussion about one year of compulsory duty, which would be a building block for an active civil society, could be used to provide a realistic picture for internal and external security in the current strategic environment.¹²² The current debate about adapting

¹²⁰ Eitan Shamir, *Transforming Command: The Pursuit Of Mission Command In The U.S., British, and Israeli Armies* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 165-168.

¹²¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 1989), 89.

¹²² German Parliament, *Zur Frage der Existenz einer allgemeinen Wehr- und Dienstpflicht in anderen Ländern* (Berlin: Bundestag Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, 2018), 1-2; and German Parliament,

Germany's strategic culture to international security realities has not taken place very far outside of the expert's circle and must be transferred to the public.¹²³ Otherwise, Germany's pacifist culture will not change in terms of national security, which is based on the historical experiences of two world wars and changed socialization after 1945 and 1968.

In final summary and as a recommendation, Germany's future concept for military mobilization and replacement includes two types of armed forces, the professional army with its own reserve positions for NATO's Collective Defense, and the Home Defense forces as a militia concept with professional short-term training for local security in the different districts at the federal state level.

Einführung einer allgemeinen Dienstpflicht - Initiativen und Standpunkte in den letzten 15 Jahren (Berlin: Bundestag Wissenschaftlicher Dienst, 2016), 5-8.

¹²³ Jana Puglierin, "Rolle rückwärts - Deutschland droht ein sicherheitspolitischer Ansehens- und Vertrauensverlust," in *IP – Die Zeitschrift für Internationale Politik* No.5, September – October (Berlin: DGAP, 2018), 8-13.

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