ARMY MULTICOMPONENT UNITS: HOW ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CAN OPTIMIZE THE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE

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For twenty years multicomponent units (MCUs) have demonstrated their value across a broad range of branches and functional areas. However, after two decades many friction points exist that prevent MCUs from performing to their full potential. This research frames the current administrative environment of MCUs as a bridge between the active and reserve components, and this paper combines the Applied Professional Case Study methodology with a Capability Based Assessment (CBA). The author provides DOTMLPF-P recommendations to improve readiness, organizational flexibility, and operational capability of MCUs. These recommendations enable an end state where MCUs can quickly respond to operational requirements of CCDRs with units of action comprised of soldiers across the continuum of service.

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

ARMY MULTICOMPONENT UNITS: HOW ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE CAN OPTIMIZE THE CAPACITY AND CAPABILITIES OF THE OPERATIONAL RESERVE, by Major Edward M. Hughes, 150 pages.

For twenty years multicomponent units (MCUs) have demonstrated their value across a broad range of branches and functional areas. However, after two decades many friction points exist that prevent MCUs from performing to their full potential. This research frames the current administrative environment of MCUs as a bridge between the active and reserve components, and this paper combines the Applied Professional Case Study methodology with a Capability Based Assessment (CBA). The author provides DOTMLPF-P recommendations to improve readiness, organizational flexibility, and operational capability of MCUs. These recommendations enable an end state where MCUs can quickly respond to operational requirements of CCDRs with units of action comprised of soldiers across the continuum of service.

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ACRONYMS

AC	Active Component
AC/RC	Active Component/Reserve Component
ADOS	Active Duty Operational Support
ADCON	Administrative Control
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
AR	Army Reserve
ARNG	Army National Guard
AT	Annual Training
BOG	Boots on the Ground
CAR	Chief of the Army Reserve
CBA	Capabilities Based Assessment
CCDR	Combatant Commander
CDM	Chief Decision Maker
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CO-ADOS	Contingency Operation-Active Duty Operational Support
COCOM	Combatant Command Authority
CONUS	Continental United States
COS	Continuum of Service
CSA	Chief of Staff of the Army
DA	Department of the Army
DMDC	Defense Manpower Data Center
DMOSQ	Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified
DOD	Department of Defense

DODD	Department of Defense Directive
DOTMLPF-P	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
DUIC	Derivative Unit Identification Code
E DATES	Effective Activation Dates
FAA	Functional Area Analysis
FNA	Functional Needs Analysis
FSA	Functional Solutions Analysis
FTS	Full-time Staff
FY	Fiscal Year
FORSCOM	Forces Command
GRF	Global Response Force
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
HQDA	Headquarters, Department of the Army
ICD	Initial Capabilities Document
IDT	Inactive-Duty for Training Status
JCIDS	Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System
LSCO	Large Scale Combat Operations
MCU	Multicomponent Unit
MCU-C1	Multicomponent Unit – Regular Army flagged
MCU-C2	Multicomponent Unit – Army National Guard flagged
MCU-C2	Multicomponent Unit – United States Army Reserve flagged
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MOS	Military Occupational Specialty

NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OND	Operation New Dawn
PME	Professional Military Education
PPG	Personnel Policy Guidance
R1	Initial Personal Recommendations
R2	Informed Position
R3	Recommended Solutions
RA	Regular Army
RFPB	Reserve Forces Policy Board
ROA	Reserve Officers Association
RC	Reserve Component
SECARMY	Secretary of the Army
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
TAA	Total Army Analysis
TPU	Troop Program Unit
UIC	Unit Identification Code
USA	United States Army
USAR	United States Army Reserve
USARC	United States Army Reserve Command

USC	United States Code

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The United States Army needs an operational reserve, a force that is capable of projecting additional capabilities and combat power on short notice in support of the Active Component. The Army also needs a strategic reserve, a force capable of sustaining momentum and providing irreversible initiative to win the nation's wars. The opening paragraph of The Army Vision concludes by stating that one of the keys to the Army's 240-year successful defense of the Nation is our ability to adapt to and dominate a complex and continuously changing environment.[1] The Army is emerging from budgetary constraints of sequestration[2] to aggressively modernize its equipment, doctrine, and administrative systems. Both National Guard and Army Reserve have essential roles to fill as part of the Army Vision, but many legacy processes which are administrative and organizational in nature limit their potential. Integration and rapid mobilization of Active and Reserve component forces will become a critical factor in the strategic deterrence of near-peer adversaries. The speed, pace, and scope of multi-domain

[1] Mark T. Esper and General Mark A. Milley, "The Army Vision" (Washington, DC, 2019).

[2] Congressional Research Service (CRS), *The Defense Budget and the Budget Control Act: Frequently Asked Questions,* last updated September 30, 2019, accessed January 15, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov. The time period generally considered between 2011-2017 which began with the passing of the Budget Control Act of 2011 which set limits on defense and nondefense discretionary spending significantly below recent years prior to 2011.

operations will create requirements for Reserve Component support which will quickly surpass the tempo of these current processes and systems.

The multicomponent unit (MCU) force structure may provide the best vehicle for future operational reserve requirements. MCUs can easily be confused with multicomponent integration. Multicomponent integration is two or more non-organic units from two different components participating in the same training or operation. MCUs are distinct in that a single headquarters' Unit Identification Code (UIC) contains derivative UICs (DUICs) from two or more components. This parent relationship creates several benefits, but also multiple challenges. MCUs are organic and act as a permanent link between components by enhancing the readiness of strategic and operational level enablers. This relationship is what creates the unrealized potential for MCU force structures to act as the Operational Reserve bridge between the Regular Army and Strategic Reserve.

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the existing body of professional knowledge on MCUs, and then provide recommendations to improve their potential for expanded use. To achieve this, an understanding of current capabilities, organization, and operational limitations or constraints when employing MCUs in support of National Military Strategy must occur. The body of knowledge examined will center on six areas. Three are broader in scope as they are DOD or Army level topic areas that directly affect the entire Reserve Component. These areas are Total Force Policy, duty status reform, and continuum of service. The author will also examine three Army Reserve Component specific areas. These include large scale combat capabilities in the Army Reserve and National Guard, the Operational Reserve concept, and the Strategic Reserve concept.

Combined, these six areas directly impact MCUs today. Understanding these areas as they are now is necessary to correctly visualize how the recommendations found in chapters 4 and 5 could enable positive change to occur. This paper will provide recommendations in doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policies (DOTMLPF-P) format to overcome assessed gaps or shortfalls. The results of this study will recommend solutions the Army and DOD could implement to enhance MCUs' ability to be the force structure of choice for the operational reserve.

Multicomponent Unit Background

Multicomponent units have their roots in an August 1970 Department of Defense Directive (DODD), which required concurrent consideration of the Total Force, Active and Reserve, in planning, programming, manning, equipping, and employing Guard and Reserve Forces.[3] This new structure changed the Army. While not its direct intent, all three components would now be necessary if the President directed the projection of significant combat power overseas. This inter-component reliance would keep the American public aware when senior leadership was exercising the military instrument of national power.[4] Over the next three decades, the Army experimented with several different component integration initiatives to varying degrees of success. In September

[3] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2008), E-8.

[4] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, Final Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1999), 12.

1997, Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) William Cohen released a policy memorandum to reinvigorate the Total Force concept. This memorandum had four basic principles to achieve to make Total Force integration a reality:

> 1. Clearly understood responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by the senior leaders throughout the Total Force;
>
> 2. Clear and mutual understanding on the mission for each unit Active, Guard and Reserve in service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war;
>
> 3. Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions;
>
> 4. Leadership by senior commanders Active, Guard, and Reserve to ensure the readiness of the Total Force[5]

Eight months later, in June of 1998, Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA), General Dennis J. Reimer, released a White Paper titled, "One Team, One Fight, One Future: Total Army Integration. This paper took SECDEF Cohen's direction closer to reality by introducing multicomponent Army units as an experiment that could potentially reshape the military by serving as building blocks tailored to meet operational needs.[6]

Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) Policy Letter 220-98-1 is the first piece of MCU doctrine. This policy letter officially recognized MCUs as future Army organizations. It established identification of units, resource allocation, and effective activation dates (E Dates). Four objectives were the driving force of initial MCUs: enhancing Total Force Integration, improving the resource and readiness posture of Army

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[5] Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, Subject: Integration of the Reserve and Active Components (Washington, DC, September 4, 1997), 2.

[6] Bruce A. Resnak, "Multicomponent Units: A Worthwhile Endeavor?" (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2003), 3.

units, optimizing the unique capabilities of each component, and improving documentation.[7]

The creation of MCUs began in earnest and by the start of Fiscal Year (FY) 2001, there were 20 MCUs with each component owning one or more commands. FY 2004 would be the peak of the MCU, with 58 individual UICs commanding over 15,000 soldiers. However, MCUs began to see a sharp decline in overall units and total number of personnel in FY 2008. By FY 2011, only 38 units and 7,900 soldiers remained. These numbers held steady until the full effects of sequestration constrained the force, and in FY 2016, MCU numbers were down to 30 units and 4,600 soldiers. Today, the MCU cohort consists of 24 units still with approximately 4,600 soldiers. Since FY17, there were seven new MCUs created. This shows that leaders within Army force management still consider the structure when designing new units or modifying existing ones.[8]

[7] Resnak, "Multicomponent Units," 3.

[8] The author derived this paragraph's information from FMSWeb accessed January 26, 2020. The author created a comprehensive database utilizing FMSWeb data from FY02 to FY21 approved MTOEs. Numbers and calculations only used UICs beginning with "WN" as prescribed in AR 71-32. The data set from FY02 to FY21 contains only MTOE units. Some MCUs do have moderate to significant personnel in subsequent TDAs and AUGTDAs, but these are usually to account for civilian augmentation. This table is available upon request.



	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21
MCU Soldier Grand Total:	11,709	14,356	15,041	12,416	10,359	10,155	7,562	8,792	8,279	7,887	7,410	7,383	7,160	8,484	4,604	4,223	4,333	4,655	4,626	4,615
MCU Count:	44	54	58	55	50	51	42	43	41	38	36	38	35	37	30	21	23	24	24	24
MCUs Deactivated at End of Previous FY:	0	0	-4	-13	-10	-10	-13	-4	-4	-3	-2	-1	-3	0	-7	-12	-1	0	0	0
New MCUs Activated This FY:	44	10	8	10	5	11	4	5	2	0	0	3	0	2	0	3	3	1	0	0
FY MCU Net Gain or Loss:		10	4	-3	-5	1	-9	1	-2	-3	-2	2	-3	2	-7	-9	2	1	0	0
	FY02	FY03	FY04	FY05	FY06	FY07	FY08	FY09	FY10	FY11	FY12	FY13	FY14	FY15	FY16	FY17	FY18	FY19	FY20	FY21

Figure 1. Multicomponent Unit Timeline with Major Events

Source: Created by author using information derived from FMSWeb accessed January 26, 2020. The major events depicted on the timeline are discussed throughout the course of the paper.

All total, there were 111 MCUs created between 1999 and 2018 demonstrating a sincere effort by the Army to embrace the tenets expected within DoD Total Force Policy. Reviewing the data uncovers trends that may help improve the unit structure for the future. Of the 24 MCUs active today, 16 of them are at least 15 years old, with two being 'original MCUs' – 249th Engineer Battalion and 377th Sustainment Command. Ten of the 24 are intelligence commands, and 17 of the 24 require a security clearance of SECRET or higher.[9] All current MCUs have at least 90 soldiers, with 13 having 130 or greater. An area where data is one-sided is in the component mixture. Only four of the 24 units contain National Guard soldiers. Army Reserve commands five, and the remaining 15 are active component lead with Army Reserve DUICs. Legal complications stemming from posse comitatus between Title 10 and Title 32 authorities make integrated training a

[9] This inference is from three Information Operations units, one missile defense brigade, one space brigade, two signal commands, and ten military intelligence units.

more attractive option than the MCU model between National Guard and Active Component units.[10] Active Component and Army Reserve both share Title 10 federal status, which makes the foundation for authorities much more manageable. The data suggests MCUs which provide unique capabilities or missions have the best potential to endure. These capabilities are combat support, and combat service support in nature due to the division of component responsibilities resulting from the 1993 offsite agreement.[11]

Reserve Component Background

Congress created the United States Army Reserve Command (USARC) in 1990 to consolidate responsibility for manning, training, and equipping a force of over 700,000 soldiers.[12] Soon after the conclusion of Desert Storm in February 1991, senior Army leaders knew that the Army, as well as the other services, would be forced to reduce manning levels and create a force structure for the new post-Cold War Reserve Component. A group consisting of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUSA), Adjutant General Association, Senior Army Reserve Commanders Association, Reserve Officers Association (ROA), and Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) began regular meetings to create a mutual plan for meeting the Defense

[10] The four current units with an active component and National Guard mix are: 116th Military Intelligence Brigade, 2nd Battalion, 135th Aviation Regiment, 167th Sustainment Command, and 100th Missile Defense Brigade.

[11] Office of Army Reserve History, *Army Reserve: A Concise History* (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Reserve Command, 2013), 14.

[12] Ibid., 12.

Department's 200,000 soldier decrease over the next eight years.[13] Known as "the Offsite Group," their agreement was presented in 1993, and it included a plan for realigning the National Guard's focus to combat arms and divisional level combat support and the Army Reserve to specialize in combat support and service support at corps level and above.[14] This clean split of responsibilities remains in place today.

Duty Status Reform Background

"Duty status" has been a military term since the formation of the Army Reserve just before the United States entered into World War I. Currently, 30 distinct duty statuses exist. Nineteen statuses predate World War II, 25 existed by 1980, and in 2012, the newest two support Major Disaster/Emergency Response Call-up and Combatant Command Missions.[15] Recommendations to improve the current duty status system began in response to the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). It came from the 2002 *Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* and the 2004 Department of Defense Report to Congress *Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review*. Their duty status recommendations were two-fold: simplify duty statuses and make a 'day of duty' a 'day of duty' across all components. Duty status distilled to only three types: active duty, inactive duty, and full-time National Guard (Title 32) active duty status pay

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[13] Government Accounting Office (GAO), *Army Reserve Components: Cost, Readiness, and Personnel Implications of Restructuring Agreement* Report to Congressional Requesters (Washington, DC, 1995), 1.

[14] Office of Army Reserve History, *Army Reserve: A Concise History*, 14.

[15] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation*, Main Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 133.

was to be 1/30th of a month.[16] However, even after this initial momentum towards modernization, duty statuses remain as complex today as they were in 2001.

In 2008 the *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves* devoted 14 pages towards a duty status reform recommendation. Outlined in detail were results of both quantitative and qualitative analyses concerning issues exposed during the first seven years of high Global War on Terror (GWOT) Reserve Component utilization. The commission identified four primary problems with the current duty status construct: complexity, inactive duty training, appropriation and budgeting, and inconsistencies in compensation and recommended reduction of duty statuses from 29 down to just 2 (active) duty and off (active) duty.[17]

The 2012 *Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation* (QRMC) went even further in framing the duty status problem and providing a workable solution. Accurately defining duty status and its relationship to authorities, type of duty, mission, voluntary or involuntary duty, funding, and strength accounting provided the foundation for the most persuasive argument yet for reform.[18] The QRMC concluded their argument by proposing a new system with just six authorities and four duty statuses. The combination of new Duty statuses and authorities would include Title 10, Armed Forces -

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[16] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review*, Defense Department Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2004), 25-31.

[17] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21-st Century Operational Force,* 156-169.

[18] Personnel and Readiness, *The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation*, 133.

Active duty, Inactive reserve service, Federal service; Title 32, National Guard - Full-time National Guard duty, Inactive National Guard service; and Title 14, Coast Guard - Active Duty.[19] Duty status complexity remains today, but reform may be on the horizon. The 2018 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the DoD to reduce the number of statutory authorities to not more than eight authorities grouped into four duty categories.[20] In 2019, the DoD announced progress on this directive. Their proposal for duty status reform currently includes more than 485 separate changes to federal law, to include 21 titles of U.S. Code.[21]

[19] Personnel and Readiness, *The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation*, 141.

[20] U.S. Congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act 2018, Public Law 115-91, 115th Cong., December 12, 2017, H.R. 2810, 131 STAT. 1377.

[21] National Guard Association of the United States, "Pentagon Not Ready to Reveal Duty Status Reform Proposal," last modified April 2, 2019, accessed March 30, 2020, https://www.ngaus.org/about-ngaus/newsroom/pentagon-not-ready-reveal-duty-status-reform-proposal.

Authorities

Title 10, United States Code	Title 10, United States Code (continued)
1. Full mobilization	17. Aid for state governments
2. Partial mobilization	18. Enforce federal authority
3. Presidential reserve call-up	19. National Guard called to federal service
4. Major disaster/emergency response	20. Additional training periods
5. Preplanned combatant command mission call-up	21. Additional flight training periods
6. Captive status	22. Readiness management periods
7. Unsatisfactory participation (45 days)	23. Funeral honors
8. Unsatisfactory participation (24 months)	**Title 32, United States Code**
9. Disciplinary action	24. Required training and other duty
10. Annual active duty (up to 30 days)	25. Additional training and other duty
11. Additional training and operational support	26. Additional training periods
12. Duty at the National Guard Bureau	27. Additional flight training periods
13. Medical evaluation and treatment	28. Readiness management periods
14. Medical care (duty < 30 days)	29. Funeral honors
15. Retiree recall	**Title 14, United States Code**
16. Muster duty	30. Emergency augmentation

Duty Statuses

A. Mandatory Duty (Active Duty)	**F. Medical (Active Duty)**
1. Full mobilization	1. Evaluation
2. Partial mobilization	2. Treatment/care
3. Ready reserve call-up	**G. Insurrection (Federal Service)**
4. Disasters/emergency response	1. Aid for state governments
5. Combatant command missions	2. Enforce federal authority
6. Emergency augmentation	3. Interference with state/federal law
7. Captive status	4. National Guard called to federal service
8. Unsatisfactory participation	**H. Training (Full-time National Guard Duty)**
9. Disciplinary action	1. Annual training
B. Training (Active Duty)	2. Additional training
1. Initial entry training	**I. Training/Other (Inactive National Guard Service)**
2. Annual training	1. Monthly required training
3. Additional training	2. Additional training
C. Training/Other (Inactive Reserve Service)	3. Additional flight training
1. Required monthly training	4. Readiness management periods
2. Additional training	5. Funeral honors support
3. Additional flight training	**J. National Guard Missions (Full-time National Guard Duty)**
4. Readiness management periods	1. Field exercises
5. Muster duty	2. Voluntary duty
6. Funeral honors support	3. Homeland defense
D. Operational Support (Active Duty)	4. Challenge program
1. Voluntary duty	5. Drug interdiction
2. Retiree recall	6. Rifle instructors
E. Staff Duty (Active Duty)	7. Small arms competitions
1. Active Guard and Reserve duty	8. Army/Air Force schools
2. Seat of government	9. National Guard schools
3. Headquarters	
4. Reserve policy boards	

Figure 2. Current Authorities and Duty Statuses

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation,* Main Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), 133-134.

Continuum of Service Background

Continuum of Service (COS) is a term used to describe the concept of optimized resource allocation between components. This resource allocation includes missions, equipment, and personnel. A functioning COS implies that systems, processes, and procedures exist to support a seamless transition between components.[22] Discussion is

[22] LTG (Ret.) Dennis M. McCarthy, "A Continuum of Service," *Armed Forces Journal* (September 1, 2008), http://armedforcesjournal.com/a-continuum-of-service/. This is an excellent article that concisely lays out the COS concept and issues associated

within many of the same sources as duty status reform because changes to one almost always affect the other. Today, there is still not an official definition, but new systems such as the Integrated Personnel and Pay System – Army (IPPS-A) and duty status reform make achievement of the COS end-state possible.

The COS, not duty status reform, was the primary object of investigation by the 2002 and 2004 DOD Reports discussed earlier. Both reports concisely articulated the issue from the perspectives of the individual soldier and the Army institution. The reports' goals in support of the individual (soldier) focused on providing a smoother transition between active and reserve components; goals in support of the institution centered on simplifying rules for accessing, employing, and separating Reservists.[23]

The recognition of the criticality of COS as a concept was focused again in 2008 and 2012, but the high operational tempo of routine mobilizations to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) sidelined the need for immediate attention. Other RC initiatives such as compensation, health care, and transition assistance received significant attention during this time. 2008's *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves* built upon 2004's report and proposed reforms that took advantage of civilian skills of RC service members and promoted breaking down barriers to services that prevented further integration of active and reserve components.[24]

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with implementation. The article also argues that the COS inherently links the operational and strategic reserve continuum.

[23] Personnel and Readiness, *Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review*, 25

[24] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, 16.

The 2019 *Army People Strategy* refined the Army's focus on many important initiatives, one of them being COS. The Strategy's fourth Line of Effort added a distinct new element to the COS concept. "4c. Transition – Encourage service across the Total Force and create permeability to move between components when it benefits the Army and the individual."[25] The word permeability implies that the Army may be receptive to new approaches at managing the Reserve Component.

Operational Reserve Background

Reserve Components have undergone many changes in capability and perception between 1960 and today. The contemporary use of the term "operational reserve" began during operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm when over 100,000 RC soldiers mobilized to provide combat and combat service support.[26] This success underwrote the growing conclusion that the RC must be funded, equipped, and trained to be able to provide this similar level of support again. Since 2001, the RC has mobilized over 800,000 soldiers to conduct OCONUS missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, Egypt, Djibouti, the Philippines, Guantanamo Bay, and Central America.[27] This significant increase in

[25] U.S. Army, *The Army People Strategy* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, October 2019), 8.

[26] Office of U.S. Army Reserve History, *Army Reserve: A Concise History*, 14.

[27] LTC Kurt A. Rorvik, "Ready, Reliable, and Relevant: The Army Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve," (monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015), 23; Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Raphael S. Cohen, Molly Dunigan, Gian Gentile, Jaime L. Hastings, Joshua Klimas, Jefferson P. Marquis, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Bonnie Triezenberg, and Michelle Darrah Ziegler, *Sustaining the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Force* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), iii.

worldwide employment necessitated a re-examination of DOD and Army policy concerning the RC.

Using RC as an operational force inextricably ties to duty status and requires specific mobilization authority applied to a requisite level of military commitment. While the term "operational reserve" is still colloquial, the necessity of using RC forces to sustain and fulfill CCDR requirements is not. The DOD's current definition of the RC states that they are both an operational force and a strategic reserve.[28] The future operational environment will likely necessitate clarity, which creates an opportunity for the MCU force structure to demonstrate its potential capability.

Current Situation

The space that MCUs occupy in the total force is small. However, current MCUs provide critical warfighting function support to their higher headquarters.[29] Doctrine, policy, procedure, systems, databases, and United States Code are all primarily written around a clean delineation between active and reserve components. This separation has been necessary from the early 20th century to the present. The fused nature of MCUs creates a potential for issues when the mission and expected operational tempo of the unit differs from the existing limitations and restrictions of the administrative environment. These issues affect Combatant Commands and Army Service Component Commands because they directly affect MCUs' ability to support operational requirements.

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[28] Ibid., 5.

[29] Current MCUs are provide the Army unique capabilities in Information Operations, Space, and Missile Defense. MCUs are also the force structure of several units with Theater-level responsibilities in Military Intelligence, Signal, and Sustainment.

The GWOT contains many successful case studies of Army component integration, but it also exposed numerous issues regarding Reserve Component pay, benefits, and mobilization limits. Cycles of exposure, study, legislation, and implementation successfully solved these issues. The six areas discussed in the introduction differ in progress along the spectrum.

1. Army Total Force Policy: Considered successful. It still impacts decisions today.
2. Duty Status and Authorities Reform: DoD currently working towards a holistic solution as directed from NDAA 2018
3. Army Continuum of Service: A concept which has potential for a wide range of progressive force-shaping implementation
4. Critical large-scale combat capabilities in Reserve Component units: A reality which stems from the 1993 offsite agreement. Many theater opening capabilities reside almost entirely in the RC.
5. Strategic Reserve: Current debate over the definition of the term. Is it the Selective Service, the Individual Ready Reserve, traditional RC 'pure' units, or a combination of all three?
6. Operational Reserve: Definitions differ depending on the audience. Size, scope, scale, and purpose are currently in flux.

Reserve flagged MCU-C2s and MCU-C3s are particularly sensitive to these six areas because the preponderance of their formation are RC soldiers. Active commands that have subordinate Reserve MCUs expect them to execute operational missions at the implied requisite operational tempo to be successful. Responding to operational

requirements is difficult for Reserve MCUs due to additional legal, funding, organizational, training, and leadership constraints that exist concerning the six areas. The technical expertise required to manage a Reserve MCU effectively is high. Periods of personnel turnover for key full-time staff are complicated because of the sheer number of relationships, systems, timelines, and accesses needed for Reserve MCU administration. The figures below illustrate the current Army manpower and readiness environments. They display current gaps in readiness and operational capability and show areas that contain an opportunity for improvement.



Figure 3. Current Army Manpower Environment

Source: Created by author. Graphic's intent is to visually illustrate the current level and spectrum of soldier support from full-time Regular Army (365 days per year), to the traditional drilling reserve or national guard soldier (48 days per year). In between, there

is a wide spectrum of additional reserve support ranging from just a few extra days per year to full one or two year mobilizations both individual and unit. The "triangle of lost potential" is the author's assessment of where current policy, process, and other internal and external factors artificially limit the actual potential of Reserve component contribution to the Conflict Continuum as outlined in JP 3-0 Chapter V 3.(c).



Figure 4. Current Army Unit Readiness Environment

Source: Created by author. Graphic's intent is to visually illustrate the current level and spectrum of average readiness by component. From left to right the Active Component maintains the highest level of readiness. Army Manning Guidance dictates unit end strength by component. On the far right are the Reserve Components (both ARNG and USAR). Due to several different constraints the RC maintains a lower overall readiness posture. In the middle are MCUs. Because they are a combined force their readiness is largely determined by the sponsoring component. MCU-C1 are higher and have less RC forces, MCU-C2/3 have lower readiness. The generic unit icons illustrate the hard boundaries that confine units by component. Units are not able to move from one component to another.

Purpose and Significance of the Study

For twenty years multicomponent units have demonstrated their value across a broad range of branches and functional areas. Historically, an agile Reserve Component

has been a significant deterrent against foreign aggression whose expedient mobilization became a primary factor in victory. Today, the power of the Reserve Component remains a critical strategic influencer. However, after two decades of counterinsurgency warfare, many capabilities needed in large scale combat operations (LSCO) reside almost entirely in the Reserve Component. RC ownership of certain logistic, engineering, CBRN, and air defense capabilities has created a dilemma for the Army because near-peer conflict requires several of these LSCO capabilities within the first 30 days; faster than traditional Reserve soldiers and units can mobilize. The purpose of this thesis is to frame the current operational environment of MCUs and then provide an operational approach through refined recommendations that improves readiness, flexibility, and operational posture of MCUs. This paper will remain focused on the MCU framework and force structure, but some recommendations will have much broader applicability and potential impact on the Army and Reserve Components. The primary goal for this thesis is to help key stakeholders visualize an end state in which MCUs aggressively respond to operational requirements of CCDRs with units of action comprised of soldiers across the continuum of service.

Researcher's Qualifications

The author's qualifications are his knowledge and experience gained in two MCUs as an Army Reserve soldier in 1st Information Operations Command from 2006 to 2013, and 549th Military Intelligence Battalion (Operations) from 2017 to 2019. During his time in 1st Information Operations Command, the author served as an activated Reservist on over five different authorities/duty statuses to include inactive duty training (IDT), Active Duty for Special Work (ADSW), Operational Temporary Tours of Active

Duty (OP-TTAD), Contingency Operation Active Duty Operational Support (CO-ADOS), Operational Active Duty Operational Support (OP-ADOS), and Active Duty for Training (ADT). In 2013, the author became of member of the Active Guard Reserve (AGR) program. Between 2017 and 2019, the author was responsible for the management of all reserve soldier administration concerning active duty orders. Orders consisted of nine different fund code types with lengths varying from a few days to a full year. 549th MI BN (OPS) had 250 Army Reserve soldiers, with the majority performing active duty of multiple types several times per year. The author was a firsthand witness at the battalion level to MCUs' strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges.

Research Question

The central theme of the organization for this thesis are the six areas discussed earlier and illustrated in the figure below. Individually and collectively, they are much broader in scope, but this paper intends to discuss each of them in relation to how they specifically affect Army MCUs. The figure shows the interrelation of these six areas and the intersecting point of all of them – the Army MCU.



Figure 5. Army Multicomponent Units' Relationship with six key areas

Source: Created by author. The Venn diagram of Reserve Component factors sit inside of three broader Army/DOD areas to demonstrate the important interrelationships of the issues. From the largest scope, Total Force Policy is the border and foundation for all the other issues. Duty status reform is smaller, because its intent is to reform the Reserve Component, not the active component.

The primary research question is: Will changes in force management DOTMLPF-P factors increase Army multicomponent units' ability to provide scalable capability for military force employers?[30]

[30] In this context force employers include Joint-CCMD, Service, or Governor as further discussed in AR 525-29.

Secondary Questions

1. Have MCUs achieved original Army Total Force Policy objectives, and should pursuit of new objectives for MCUs occur?
2. What policies have the most considerable influence on MCU operational capabilities, and is the improvement of these policies feasible?
3. What units are best suited for MCU structure, and what criteria determine that assessment?
4. Where should Army MCUs fall on the spectrum between operational and strategic reserve concepts?

Assumptions

This research considers the following assumptions:

1. The United States is not entering a period where Army Reserve units will be in prolonged periods of full mobilization (major multi-theater LSCO).
2. Inefficiency exists within the application of Reserve Component resources and, new changes will not carry unintended negative consequences.
3. Increased Reserve Component integration is beneficial to the Army despite its inherent challenges.
4. The Army will not regress towards more traditional Strategic Reserve concepts with established mobilization timelines.
5. Changes to Title 10 USC must occur to achieve all the effects recommended throughout the thesis.

Biases

The following biases apply to the Initial Personal Recommendation (R1):

1. Requiring acceptance of soldiers who are not MOS qualified reduces MCUs' ability to support mission requirements.
2. MCU companies perform better when at least the company commander or first sergeant are full-time staff.
3. Lack of a dedicated finance corps Officer and NCO team at MCU brigade and higher commands degrades overall unit performance.
4. Lack of a formal MCU training course for incoming leaders and key development positions delays effectiveness in position during the first 180 days.

Limitations

This paper is comprised of UNCLASSIFIED information only. This limitation partially constrains discussion related to policy and policy recommendations. Duty status reform, a key area impacting MCU capability, is in progress, and if signed into law, would have a considerable impact on all Reserve Component forces.[31] However, the draft of this duty status legislation is not public, which limited scope and detail of policy recommendations. This research is qualitative in nature. Chapter 5 lists suggestions for further study, and many of them are quantitative ideas to confirm or deny conclusions reached within this thesis. The overall size of the problem set limited this research. The

[31] National Guard Association of the United States, "Pentagon Not Ready to Reveal Duty Status Reform Proposal."

total number of MCU soldiers and units limited the number of available sources that directly addressed MCU issues.

Scope and Delimitations

This research intends to identify opportunities for improvement within the DOTMLPF-P framework of Army MCUs. These areas for improvement have manifested as operational and administrative issues related to the integrated organizational environment inherent in all MCUs. Many of the issues identified are larger DOD and Army issues, and addressing them would have much larger intent and impact than just MCUs. However, the focus of capability gaps and recommended solutions will remain delimited to MCUs. Recommendations may apply to a wider range of Reserve Component forces, but this thesis does not intend to address those effects directly. It also does not address equipment issues that may be present in current MCUs. Literature showed similar patterns of recognition and recommendation for equipment issues associated with the RC. None of them appeared to affect MCUs enough to include as part of the analysis. Research and analysis will use the timeframe from when the Army MCU policy originated in 1998 until the present.

Initial Personal Recommendation (R1)

This thesis is an applied professional case study. Chapter 3 explains the research methodology. This section provides an Initial Personal Recommendation (R1) of changes needed in addressing the primary research question of "will changes in force management DOTMLPF-P factors increase Army multicomponent units' ability to provide scalable capability for military force employers." In 1QTR FY20, the author applied reasonable

professional judgment to his current understanding of the existing professional body of knowledge to design R1. The Author's Qualification section identified the author's experience and knowledge. To create a baseline, DOTMLPF-P formats discussion of R1 recommendations. Final recommendations in chapter 5 include stakeholders' concerns and additional professional knowledge discovered during research.

Policy

Policy is the last letter in DOTMLPF-P, but for this thesis, it is the principal factor affecting MCUs and their ability to provide manpower and operational support. Title 10 United States Code governs all branches and service components of the armed forces of the United States. Title 10 contains five Subtitles A through E. Subtitle E concerns Reserve Components of all branches. The most succinct change which would allow MCUs much greater flexibility in responding to operational requirements would be an amendment to Title 10 USC 12304b. Section 12304b reads as follows:

§12304b. Selected Reserve: order to active duty for preplanned missions in support of the combatant commands

(a) AUTHORITY.-When the Secretary of a military department determines that it is necessary to augment the active forces for a preplanned mission in support of a combatant command, the Secretary may, subject to subsection (b), order any unit of the Selected Reserve (as defined in section 10143(a) of this title), without the consent of the members, to active duty for not more than 365 consecutive days.

(b) LIMITATIONS.-(1) Units may be ordered to active duty under this section only if-

(A) the manpower and associated costs of such active duty are specifically included and identified in the defense budget materials for the fiscal year or years in which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty; and

(B) the budget information on such costs includes a description of the mission for which such units are anticipated to be ordered to active duty and the anticipated length of time of the order of such units to active duty on an involuntary basis.

(2) Not more than 60,000 members of the reserve components of the armed forces may be on active duty under this section at any one time.

(c) EXCLUSION FROM STRENGTH LIMITATIONS.-Members ordered to active duty under this section shall not be counted in computing authorized strength in members on active duty or total number of members in grade under this title or any other law.

(d) NOTICE TO CONGRESS.-Whenever the Secretary of a military department orders any unit of the Selected Reserve to active duty under subsection (a), such Secretary shall submit to Congress a report, in writing, setting forth the circumstances necessitating the action taken under this section and describing the anticipated use of such unit.

(e) TERMINATION OF DUTY.-Whenever any unit of the Selected Reserve is ordered to active duty under subsection (a), the service of all units so ordered to active duty may be terminated-

(1) by order of the Secretary of the military department concerned; or

(2) by law.

Figure 6. Title 10 USC 12304b

Source: Armed Forces, 10 US Code (2019) § 12304b: Selected Reserve: order to active duty for preplanned missions in support of the combatant commands, accessed September 28, 2019, https://uscode.house.gov/browse/prelim@title10&edition=prelim.

An amendment to section 12304b would need to authorize combatant command support for unplanned missions and would need to authorize order-to-active-duty of individual soldiers, not just units. All other parts could remain as they are currently. This amendment to 12304b would authorize CCDRs, and if delegated Service Component Commanders, discretion to request reserve component forces to support short duration operational requirements. This change, although seemingly small, would require appropriate policy changes at DoD and service branch levels to address procedures and limits on unplanned mission support. MCUs could finally leverage all their available forces in support of both operational and training missions.

A second impactful policy recommendation is that United States Army Reserve Command should prohibit will-train soldiers from transferring to MCU-C3s before they are Duty MOS Qualified (DMOSQ) in their new MOS. A large population of unqualified

soldiers is a particularly difficult issue in units with a preponderance of billets that require security clearances. The graph below shows that, on average, Top-Secret clearances are taking 12 months to adjudicate if they do not require intensive investigative fieldwork.



Figure 7. Security Clearance Timelines FY13 through FY19 Q2

Source: General Services Administration & the Office of Management and Budget, "June 2019 Security Clearance, Suitability/Fitness, and Credentialing Reform Update," Performance.gov, accessed September 15, 2019, https://www.performance.gov/CAP/security-clearance-reform/.

A will-train soldier cannot attend MOS reclassification school until his security clearance is complete. MCUs with large numbers of will-train soldiers become unnecessarily burdened with their administrative management. USARC should amend personnel policy regarding MOS reclassification into MCUs. Soldiers wishing to reclassify should remain in their current unit, where it is assumed, they are DMOSQ, and transfer to the MCU of their choice after graduating from their new MOS institutional

training. Keeping MCUs manned with only DMOSQ soldiers will improve readiness metrics, improve the unit's ability to respond to planned and unplanned missions, and reduce extra manhours required by full-time staff (FTS) to manage non-DMOSQ personnel.

Table 1. R1: Policy Recommendations

Chief Decision Maker	R1: Policy Recommendations
U.S. Congress	Amend Title 10 USC to recognize and define multicomponent units
U.S. Congress	Amend Title 10 USC to create a new section for short term mobilization in an active status for Reserve component members
CSA / ASCC CDRs	Create follow-on policies for appropriate short term operational use of Reserve component forces within MCUs
CAR	Create new will-train policy for soldiers wanting to transfer to MCUs. Become MOSQ first then process transfer

Source: Created by author.

Doctrine

MCUs are complex enough to warrant publication of an Army Techniques Publication (ATP). Soldiers and leaders of all three components need a one-stop reference for the unique processes, systems, procedures, forms, points of contact, and timelines relevant to multicomponent unit administration and operations. This ATP would reference many other Army Regulations and Pamphlets but could also serve as a consolidated collection of Army Reserve and National Guard policy. It could contain several tables showing differences in administrative processing timelines for the same

action based on components. Appendices would contain recommended templates for Regular Army soldiers having to design drill weekends and other reserve component training plans.

The format of the ATP would be a short opening chapter outlining the history of MCUs, defining key terms, and explaining the differences between MCUs. Follow-on chapters would be broken out by each staff section to make reference as easy as possible for incoming MCU soldiers. The chapter concerning S8 should be particularly robust as there are dozens of different micro-processes for distinct types of Reserve component funding. Appendices would contain lists of component-specific websites, tools, POCs for important offices, and templates for drill weekend design and mandatory annual training.

Table 2. R1: Doctrine Recommendations

Chief Decision Maker	R1: Doctrine Recommendations
CSA	Create an Army Techniques Publication (ATP) for Army multicomponent units (MCUs)

Source: Created by author.

Organization

Direct support to operational requirements by MCUs benefits from changes to four issues with the current MCU MTOE structure. MCUs must have at least one member of company leadership as full-time staff, will-train positions[32] must be removed,

[32] A "will-train" position are those positions where a non-DMOSQ soldier may occupy to be trained within that positions MOS at a later date. Generally, units attempt to schedule non-DMOSQ soldiers for reclassification training as soon as possible. In

a finance team presence at brigade level should exist, and creation of senior leader positions at DA G-3/5/7 for consolidation and centralization of MCU initiatives.

Decisions that MCU company commanders and first sergeants must make are not inherently different from any other company-level command in the Army, but the constraints affecting them are complex. Most company leadership positions in MCU-C3s exist as a Troop Program Unit (TPU) positions. When both leaders are only in uniform and present during battle assemblies or weekend drills, it complicates lines of communication between full-time staff, company leadership, and soldiers. MCU-C3s with high operational tempos create sub-optimal workarounds to this problem, usually by having the company commander delegate decision making authority to a member of their company full-time staff. For MCU-C2s and MCU-C3s to effectively operate and become a more viable solution to a wider variety of problem sets, one member of company leadership must be full-time staff. Depending on MTOE constraints, Regular Army, AGR, or 12304b mobilized personnel could satisfy this requirement.

A second organizational change that must occur before MCUs will be an attractive force structure is the removal of will-train coded positions. MCUs, especially those in direct support of an operational mission, must only have Duty MOS Qualified (DMOSQ) soldiers. Removing will-train codes from MCU positions would immediately alleviate a significant administrative burden on full-time staff. As discussed earlier, units which require additional administrative steps before ATRRS reservations or MOS qualification such as security clearances and professional certifications have their

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positions that require a security clearance, a clearance investigation cannot initiate until the soldier requiring one is occupying the position creating the need to initiate.

readiness impacted to a greater degree due to non-DMOSQ soldiers. Keeping MCUs closed to only MOS qualified personnel would provide a much clearer force pool to leaders and streamline full-time staff management of administrative requirements. This recommendation would also keep readiness metrics higher in other units, by retaining soldiers wishing to reclassify in their current units until their security clearances were complete.

A third MCU MTOE recommendation is a dedicated finance team at brigade-level echelons. MCUs have a high degree of financial complexity and require expertise in both Regular Army and Army Reserve resource management processes. Current MCU brigade-level MTOEs do not have 36-series finance branch positions. The preferred MTOE recommendation is for a 36A/36B team to be a full-time staff addition to MCU brigade echelon or above units. Current MCU constructs typically have financial responsibilities as an additional duty in the S-3 section. Creating a dedicated two-person team to manage weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual requirements would have a profound impact on the performance of MCUs.

A fourth organizational recommendation is the creation of an O-6 or O-7 billet at DA G-3/5/7 to act as primary multicomponent unit advocate for all Army multicomponent units. This billet would provide a senior advocate and point of contact for all MCUs. Duties and responsibilities would include briefing DA G-3/5/7 on all MCU initiatives and concerns and providing guidance and recommendations on how Army policy would affect MCUs. The preferred officer for this billet would be a post-brigade or higher echelon MCU commander.

Table 3. R1: Organization Recommendations

Chief Decision Maker	R1: Organization Recommendations
CAR	Remove will-train positions from MCUs
CAR	Make MCU company commander and first sergeant positions AGR
CAR	Add one finance officer and NCO to BDE level MCUs
CSA	Create new position at DA G-3/5/7 or OCAR G-3/5/7 for MCU development

Source: Created by author.

Leadership and Education

Leaders from both components need additional training early in their assignment to a multicomponent unit. MCUs have several unique organizational challenges. Regular Army leaders and Reserve component leaders both bring important skills and perspectives to an MCU, but these leaders need immediate insight into their knowledge gaps of the other component. Leaders will not be able to make informed decisions early in their tenure without better training. Training would incorporate all relevant DOTMLPF areas, which will affect their roles and responsibilities during their MCU assignment.

Table 4. R1: Leadership and Education Recommendations

Chief Decision Maker	R1: Leadership and Education Recommendations
TRADOC CDR	Create training program for CCDR and ASCC on MCU employment
TRADOC CDR	Create training program for MCU leaders on new policies and doctrine. Program also teaches appropriate procedures for employing different component forces

Source: Created by author.

Personnel

Changes to Personnel have the potential to increase the performance of MCUs. An additional skill identifier (ASI) for MCU service, like joint qualification service, should be created by Army G-1. This ASI would be available to any component and granted to those Soldiers in specific leadership positions that require the application of MCU management skill sets. This ASI would create visibility in HRC systems of leaders who already have experience or training in MCUs, allowing better manning decisions to occur at the HRC level. MCU leadership positions should only be available to MCU-ASI Officers and NCOs.

Army Reserve Careers Division (ARCD) should manage Army Reserve soldiers wishing to join a high operational tempo MCU. ARCD would validate Reserve soldiers' availability and understanding that higher activation frequency is likely at specific MCUs. This external layer of validation would ensure that MCU full-time staff are managing highly trained and motivated soldiers.

Table 5. R1: Personnel Recommendations

Chief Decision Maker	R1: Personnel Recommendations
CSA	Create Additional Skill Identifier for key development positions in MCUs
CSA	MCU leadership positions at battalion and brigade level should only be available to MCU ASI personnel - After appropriate timeframe of first recommendation
CAR	Reserve component assignment to MCUs should be managed by ARCD

Source: Created by author.

Definitions of Key Terms

Active Duty: Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. This includes members of the RC serving on active duty or full-time training duty, but does not include fulltime National Guard duty. For RC members it includes, but may not be limited to, all periods of service pursuant to sections 688, 12301(a), 12301(b), and 12301(d), 12302, 12304, 12304a, and 12304b of Title 10, USC. [33]

Active Duty for Training (ADT): Individual training is the primary purpose of ADT. Benefit to the organization conducting the training is incidental. ADT is not used to meet real or perceived manpower shortages to perform organizational missions or administration, or to augment the Active Army. [34]

[33] Department of Defense (DOD), DOD Instruction 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2017), 33.

[34] U.S. Army Human Resources Command (HRC), "Tour Information and Procedures: Definitions, Requirements, Application Procedures, Links," last modified

Active Duty Operational Support – Reserve Component (ADOS-RC): Voluntary active duty is performed for a prescribed period of time in support of Reserve Component projects or missions. ADOS-RC is not to be used to meet real or perceived manpower shortages and will not normally exceed 139 days. These tours are paid via Reserve Personnel Appropriations (RPA).[35]

Active Duty Operational Support (ADOS-AC): ADOS-AC is voluntary active duty performed for a prescribed time period in support of Active Army and Reserve Component projects or missions. Normally, ADOS-AC tours do not exceed 139 days. ADOS-AC tours are paid from Military Personnel Appropriations (MPA).[36]

Active Duty Operational Support (OP-ADOS): OP-ADOS is voluntary active duty performed by a member of the Army Reserve when strength accountability passes from the Army Reserve to the Active Army. Headquarters, Department of the Army may fill actual and anticipated Active Army vacancies with Army Reserve personnel. OP-ADOS tours are normally for three to six years.[37]

Capability Based Assessment (CBA): Identifies the capabilities and operational performance criteria required to execute missions within a specified threat environment;

June 3, 2019, accessed September 29, 2019, https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/Tour%20Information%20and%20Procedures.

[35] Ibid.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

identifies shortfalls in delivering those capabilities and the associated risks; and identifies possible solution approaches for the capability shortfalls.[38]

Capability Gap: The inability to meet or exceed a capability requirement, resulting in an associated operational risk until closed or mitigated. The gap may be the result of no fielded capability, lack of proficiency or sufficiency in a fielded capability solution, or the need to replace a fielded capability solution to prevent a future gap.[39]

Conflict Continuum: Defines the operating environment through which the range of military operations is conducted. From peace through war, national leaders decide which instruments of national power to use depending on location along the continuum.[40]

Contingency Operation: A military operation that (a) is designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which members of the armed forces are or may become involved in military actions, operations, or hostilities against an enemy of the United States or against an opposing military force; or (b) results in the call or order to, or retention on, active duty of members of the uniformed services under section 688, 12301(a), 12302, 12304, 12304a, 12305, or 12406 of title 10 USC, chapter 13 of title 10

[38] U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), TRADOC Regulation 71-20, *Concept Development, Capabilities Determination, and Capabilities Integration* (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 2013), 37.

[39] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CJCS Instruction 5123.01H, *Charter of the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2018), GL-7.

[40] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Incorporating Change 1, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2018), V-4.

USC, section 712 [1] of title 14, or any other provision of law during a war or during a national emergency declared by the President or Congress.[41]

Contingency Operations – Active Duty Operational Support (CO-ADOS): ADOS-AC in support of contingency operations is voluntary only and may be used to order Army Reserve Soldiers to active duty when the mission requires specialized experience or knowledge that they possess and which is unavailable in the Active Army. CO-ADOS tours are normally 31-139 days long.[42]

Contingency requirements: Those requirements that support SECDEF approved OPLANs, CONPLANs or War Plans.[43]

Continuum of Service: A human capital strategy that views active (full-time) and reserve (part-time) military service as two elements of valuable service that a qualified individual can provide. Some service members may provide exclusively active service from initial accession until discharge or retirement. However, many others will provide a mixture of active and reserve service.[44]

Emergent requirements: A request for forces submitted after the CCDRs' annual force requirements submission, or a modification to the original submission, and not

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[41] 10 U.S. Code § 101(a)(b)(13), accessed March 30, 2020, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/10/101.

[42] HRC, "Tour Information and Procedures: Definitions, Requirements, Application Procedures, Links."

[43] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 525-29, *Force Generation - Sustainable Readiness* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2019), 29.

[44] McCarthy, "A Continuum of Service."

identified in the rotational base GFMAP order. For the purposes of gaining approval of RC activation requests in support of emergent requirements.[45]

Standard emergent requirement: 120 days or greater from Secretary of Defense Orders Book (SDOB) approval date of the emergent requirement to required RC activation date.[46]

Time-critical emergent requirement: Less than 120 days from SDOB approval date of the emergent requirement to required RC activation date.[47]

Force Design Update (FDU): Usually, the FDU is the Army process used to develop new organizational requirements or changes to existing organizations and includes capabilities development, requirements approval and implementation decisions. It develops organizational design solutions to overcome identified capability shortfalls that cannot be accommodated by doctrine, training, leadership and education, or personnel solutions.[48]

Functional Area Analysis (FAA): FAA is the first analytical step of the CBA. The capabilities in the FAA must be defined (with associated tasks, conditions, and standards) using the common lexicon for capabilities established in the JCAs. The FAA

[45] DOD, DOD Instruction 1235.12, 34.

[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid.

[48] TRADOC, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, 74.

also identifies the joint interdependencies between other services and Army capabilities.[49]

Functional Needs Analysis (FNA): The FNA is the second analytic step in the CBA. It identifies gaps in the Army's ability to accomplish required capabilities at an acceptable level of risk. Validated baseline architectures can aid in providing input to support capability gap analysis. The FNA produces a prioritized set of gaps the Army should address or concludes that no pressing gaps exist.[50]

Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA): The FSA is the third analytic step in the CBA. It assesses potential DOTMLPF solutions and policy approaches to solving, or at least mitigating, one or more of the capability gaps identified in the FNA. The approaches identified should include the broadest possible range of joint/Army possibilities for addressing the capability gaps.[51]

Known requirements: Those requirements that have been either validated or ordered by an authorized employer of Army Forces. For Joint known requirements, the SECDEF, through the Joint Staff, orders Army units so support on-going operations and Joint Exercises to support CCDRs.[52]

Leadership and Education: The leadership and education DOTmLPF-P consideration consists of professional development of joint leaders that is the product of a

[49] Ibid., 57.

[50] TRADOC, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, 58.

[51] Ibid., 59.

[52] HQDA, AR 525-29, 29.

learning continuum that comprises training, experience, education, and self-improvement. The role of joint professional military education (JPME), as it is with non-joint professional military education (PME), is to provide the education needed to complement training, experience, and self-improvement to produce the most professionally competent individuals possible.[53]

Mobilization: The process by which the Military Services or part of them are brought to a heightened state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the RC as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies, and materiel. Mobilization of the Military Services includes but is not limited to these categories: full mobilization, partial mobilization, and Presidential Selected Reserve call-up.[54]

Multicomponent Unit (MCU): A MC unit is a unit organized with personnel and/or equipment from more than one COMPO. MCUs will integrate resources from more than one COMPO into a cohesive, fully capable Army unit, to the maximum extent within statutory and regulatory constraints.[55]

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[53] Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), *JCIDS Manual, Manual for the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2018), B-G-F-4.

[54] DOD, DOD Instruction 1235.12, 35. See this reference for additional detail on specific differences between mobilization types.

[55] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Regulation (AR) 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation Consolidated Policies* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, 2019), 60.

Multicomponent Unit Type 1 (MCU-C1): Nomenclature used within FMSweb to identify MCUs whose permanent order has been published by a Regular Army command. Regular Army is identified as the flag holder.[56] [57]

Multicomponent Unit Type 2 (MCU-C2): Nomenclature used within FMSweb to identify MCUs whose permanent order has been published by the Army National Guard. Army National Guard is identified as the flag holder.[58]

Multicomponent Unit Type 3 (MCU-C3): Nomenclature used within FMSweb to identify MCUs whose permanent order has been published by the U.S. Army Reserve. U.S. Army Reserve is identified as the flag holder.[59]

Organization: The organization DOTmLPF-P consideration pertains to a joint unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a common mission and directly provide or support joint warfighting capabilities.[60]

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[56] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Department of the Army Pamphlet (PAM) 71-32, *Force Development and Documentation Consolidated Policies*, (Washington, DC: U.S. Army Publishing Directorate, March 20, 2019. 62.

[57] In this case the term "flag holder" is used by regulation to denote the Administrative Control (ADCON) chain of command. MCU-C1s are ADCON through Regular Army appropriations; MCU-C2 and C3 are ADCON through National Guard and Army Reserve. Army Reserve ADCON chain runs from the unit to USARC to FORSCOM.

[58] HQDA, DA Pam 71-32, 62.

[59] Ibid.

[60] CJCS, *JCIDS Manual*, B-G-F-2.

Operational mission: Any employment of military resources to accomplish a task other than administration or training.[61]

Personnel: The personnel DOTMLPF-P consideration ensures that qualified personnel exist to support joint capability requirements. The DOTMLPF-P personnel function should not be confused with the organization function. The number or quantity of personnel is a function of organization, while the quality, type, or skills of personnel is considered in the personnel function.[62]

Policy: The policy DOTMLPF-P consideration consists of any DoD, interagency or international policy issues that may impact effective implementation of changes in the other DOTMLPF-P considerations.[63]

Reserve Component (RC): The Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve.[64]

Secretary of Defense Operations Book (SDOB): A regularly scheduled presentation to Secretary of Defense and CJCS to gain approval for GFMAP and modifications, deployment orders, execute orders, prepare to deploy orders, alert orders,

[61] DOD, DOD Instruction 1235.12, 36.

[62] CJCS, *JCIDS Manual*, B-G-F-5.

[63] Ibid.

[64] DOD, DOD Instruction 1235.12, 36.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization Force Preparation, activation of RC forces, and modification of CCDR authorities or previous Secretary of Defense decisions.[65]

Presidential Reserve Call-Up (PRC): The President has the authority to order any unit or individual assigned to the Selected Reserve to active duty for not more than 270 days, without the consent of Congress or the individual. These forces may be used to augment the active force for any operational mission other than during war or national emergency under Section 12304 of Title 10, United States Code. Not more than 200,000 members of the Selected Reserve may be on active duty under this authority at any one time.[66]

Stakeholders: those organizations with a direct interest and a clear equity in the capability document submitted for staffing.[67]

Chapter 1 Conclusion

This chapter introduced the reader to the MCU unit structure. The author provided context for the problem statement in the form of brief historical-to-current synopses of the major areas affecting MCUs, many of which are inherently Reserve Component issues. The author's background provided a reference point to the R1 recommendations made before the literature review. Chapter 2 will examine the existing body of knowledge

[65] DOD, DOD Instruction 1235.12, 36.

[66] HRC, "Tour Information and Procedures: Definitions, Requirements, Application Procedures, Links."

[67] CJCS, *JCIDS Manual*, A-A-17.

related to the primary and secondary questions of this thesis, which will then create informed and refined recommendations in chapter 4.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

The purpose of this research is to determine if changes in force management DOTMLPF-P factors increase Army multicomponent units' ability to provide a scalable capability for military force employers. Chapter 1 introduced the types of Army multicomponent units, background on the six areas which most affect MCUs, the current situation, and explained key terminology relevant within the thesis. Chapter 1 also identified primary and secondary research questions, assumptions, biases, limitations, scope, and delimitations. The author applied his professional experience and relevant expertise to create the Initial Personal Recommendation, identified as (R1) throughout the remainder of the thesis.

This chapter examines the contemporary professional body of knowledge associated with MCUs. The literature reviewed during the thesis spanned 20 years. Studying Title 10 United States Code, DoD Policy, Army Policy, and Army Doctrine developed the foundation for informed recommendations. Congressional reports, professional studies, academic papers, and other online sources were all subjected to content analysis methodology to produce useable results for refining the author's professional recommendations. Literature subjected to content analysis was the result of a reduction derived from professional experience and thorough research gained from the study of seminal research projects' sources. This reduction divides sampling based on the type of source, the number of contributing authors, and rigor of peer review. DOTMLPF-P is the coding format used to organize the recommendations in sources. This format provides continuity throughout the thesis. This chapter will conclude with a summarized

table of recommendations in DOTMLPF-P format from the sources. Chapter 4 uses these source recommendations to create new R2 updated individual recommendations. The reviewed literature divides into four parts:

1. The first part examines process-related documents for different methodologies used to construct this thesis. These include research models, processes, and lenses used in the performance of the analysis. Discussed are military models of operational design, capabilities-based assessment, and the civilian model for organizational change by John Kotter.
2. The second part examines the critical foundation documents such as mobilization authorities, DOD Total Force Policy, Army Total Force Policy, and DODDs and DODIs, which address Reserve Component utilization. The current state of literature discussed here is necessary to understand R2 and R3 recommendations in chapters 4 and 5.
3. The third part examines literature from 2000-2008. This period captures the first decade of MCUs and the initial lessons learned and recommendations, which resulted from Congressionally directed commissions.
4. The fourth part examines literature from 2011 to the present. A natural divide between 2008 and 2011 appeared during research. Recommendations from these sources display a refinement based on the status and implementation of recommendations from the previous decade.

Parts 3 and 4 of the literature review is organized by a sub-division based on the following: individual analysis of Congressionally directed commissions and studies, and

summaries of Government-funded studies by professional entities, Academic papers, and professional articles.

Methodology and Process

This thesis is an APCS. The author used the book, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design* by John Creswell to inform the structure and process of this thesis. The case study method is a qualitative approach that explores real-life multiple bounded systems (cases) over time combining information and context from numerous types of sources.[68] This case study is also an *instrumental* case study due to its intended goal of understanding a specific issue or problem.[69]

The APCS is an evolution of the traditional case study method because of intentional design for presentation to a chief decision maker (CDM) as opposed to a simpler presentation of conclusions or assertions.[70] An Applied professional case study combines the researcher's personal experience with the professional body of knowledge (PBOK) to generate recommendations for improvement and a plan for implementation.[71] In order to understand the PBOK, the author relied on content analysis methodology to enrich his understanding of MCUs and the MCU operational environment.

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[68] John W. Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design: Choosing Among Five Approaches*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013), 97.

[69] Ibid., 98.

[70] Ibid., 99.

[71] Dr. Kenneth E. Long, "Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) Design," accessed January 22, 2020, https://cgsc.blackboard.com/webapps/blackboard/content/listContent.jsp?course_id=_8676_1&content_id=_688072_1&mode=reset.

The content analysis techniques used by the author followed the methodologies outlined in *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology (Third Edition)* by Klaus Krippendorff. The book's instruction on context units, contingency analysis, and contingency matrices proved a necessity when constructing and organizing the R1, R2, and R3 recommendations. The book also assisted in the construction of the literature review with its instruction on sampling. Sampling is the process of selecting a representative sample from a larger population of *Units* so that an analysis of the sample enables the researcher to draw conclusions about that population. The *Inference* involved is inductive – not deductive or abductive.[72] The author created two sets of context units unique to this thesis and used one pre-existing one. The author synthesized the six key areas in chapter 1 and the hierarchy of sources used in the evaluation matrix in chapter 4. This subject area is military in nature, so the context unit used for recommendations is DOTmLPF-P contained within a Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA).

A CBA provides a robust assessment of a mission area, or similar bounded set of activities, to assess the capability and capacity of the joint force to complete the mission or activities successfully.[73] The end state of a CBA is founded in an analytic base that gives legitimacy to the identified capability requirements and associated capability gaps.[74] The scope of the assessment is essential; it must use appropriate documents that

[72] Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013), 387.

[73] CJCS, *JCIDS Manual*, C-B-B-1.

[74] Ibid., C-B-3.

demonstrate the full spectrum of relevant operational situations.[75] DOTMLPF-P analysis accompanies all CBAs and usually generates one or more DOTMLPF-P Change Requests (DCRs) without needing an accompanying Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).[76]

Enclosure B of Appendix G to Annex F is the DOTMLPF-P guide for CBAs for use within the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). DOTMLPF-P is an acronym used to organize potential capability gaps within a given CBA. Not all CBAs will contain gaps within all areas of DOTMLPF-P. Annex F's intent is to ensure CBA authors address non-materiel aspects of a capability during requirement definition and capability development.[77]

The model used in chapter 5 for structuring the implementation recommendations for the CDM is Kotter's Change Model. His new 2014 model derives from his original 1988 book *Leading Change*. It still consists of an eight-step process which is intended to run concurrently and continuously while functioning in a network in conjunction with traditional hierarchy.[78] The eight steps are: (1) create a sense of urgency, (2) build a guiding coalition, (3) form a strategic vision and initiatives, (4) enlist a volunteer army, (5) enable action by removing barriers, (6) generate short-term wins, (7) sustain

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[75] CJCS, *JCIDS Manual*, C-B-B-1.

[76] Ibid., C-B-3.

[77] CJCS, *JCIDS Manual*, Annex F to Appendix G to Enclosure B, DOTmLPF Guide, B-G-F-1.

[78] Dr. John P. Kotter, *8 Steps to Accelerate Change in Your Organization*, accessed March 29, 2020, 8, https://www.kotterinc.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/8-Steps-eBook-Kotter-2018.pdf.

acceleration, and (8) institute change.[79] The author will nest recommendations provided in chapter 4 and refined in chapter 5 within different stages along the model.

MCU Foundational Documents

The origin for MCUs traces back to Operation Desert Storm. In the mid-1990s, the National Guard, and to a lesser extent, the Army Reserve, began to have institutional disagreements over how they were employed (or not employed) during Operation Desert Storm and the resourcing levels of subsequent years after the war. The 1996 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined these concerns in detail. One year later, the SECDEF issued a memorandum outlining a new Total Force Policy initiative. In 1998 CSA Reimer published his memorandum *One Team One Fight One Future – Total Army Integration*. In it, he stressed that the intent of Total Army Integration was about quality, having the best combination of forces to accomplish the mission.[80] In 1999, the first multicomponent units were established. It was the first time the Army had combined more than one component on a single MTOE.

In 2001, Department of the Army (DA) issued a policy titled *Establishing Multicomponent Units MTOE and AUGTDA Units*. This document created the guidelines for all future MCU nominations. It created objectives for MCUs that are still in place today. They are:

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[79] Kotter, *8 Steps to Accelerate Change in Your Organization*, 9.

[80] Edmund C. Zysk and Dennis J. Reimer, *One Team, One Fight, One Future* (Los Alamitos Joint Forces Training Base, CA: Headquarters, 40th Infantry Division (Mechanized), 1998), 5.

1. Enhance integration of the Army by using resources of more than one component to fill authorizations in units consistent with force packaging and tiered resourcing policies.

2. Improve the resource and readiness posture of Army unit.

3. Optimize the unique capabilities of each compo by encouraging the integration of Active Army and Reserve Component resources (personnel and equipment) in units while leveraging component strengths.

4. Improve Army documentation procedures by reducing the need to maintain separate MTOEs and AUGTDAs.[81]

The policy concluded by stating the end state of the MCU initiative is a fully capable Army unit that has integrated the personnel and resources of two components to the maximum extent possible. Moreover, many other Army regulations, policies, procedures, and systems are also likely to change in response to this new resourcing approach.[82]

The first seven years of the GWOT put considerable strain on the Army's Reserve Components. In October 2008, SECDEF Robert Gates issued DoDD 1200.17 *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*. The stated purpose was to establish the overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support the management of the RCs as an operational force.[83] The entire directive would play an important role in the formation of subsequent Army policy for the next ten years and is one of the first

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[81] Department of the Army, Memorandum, Subject: Army Policies and Procedures for Establishing Multiple Component Modification Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) and Augmentation Tables of Distribution (AUGTDAs) Units, (Washington, DC, July 27, 2001), 1-2.

[82] Ibid., 7.

[83] Department of Defense (DOD), DOD Directive 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force* (Washington, DC: DOD, 2008), 1.

DoD documents to codify and define the term "operational reserve." Referring back to chapter 1's complex Venn diagram of interconnected MCU areas, this DODD mandates implementation of a continuum of service which includes flexible service options[84], that the RC is supported by DoD policies to provide operational capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict[85], and that cross-component assignments should be integrated to the greatest extent practicable.[86]

The Army worked over the next three years to tailor the information contained in DoDD 1200.17 and in August of 2012 released ATFP to establish a directive for the integration of the Army's AC and RC as a "Total Force." MCUs performance became an indicator of Army Total Force Policy analysis in subsequent congressional reports and directed studies. The ATFP's intent designed resourcing around the Total Force supporting CCDR requirements as force packages tailored to achieve anticipated objectives.[87] The ATFP mandated integration between components to create an operational force capable of fulfilling national military needs.[88]

The authorities to meet these needs reside within the United States Code. Specifically, Title 10, Sections 12301, 12302, and 12304. These Sections detail different mobilization options available to the President, SECDEF, and CCDRs. These Sections

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[84] DOD, DOD Directive 1200.17, 6.

[85] Ibid., 3.

[86] Ibid., 6.

[87] Secretary of the Army, Memorandum, Subject: Army Directive 2012-08, (Army Total Force Policy) (Washington, DC, September 4, 2012), 2.

[88] Ibid.

outline the different Emergency Authorities and their correlation to levels of military commitment and RC level of mobilization. *Joint Publication 4-05: Joint Mobilization Planning*, updated in October 2018, is the doctrinal source for using RC forces for operational requirements. MCUs must understand the mobilization process and the planning which must accompany it. These actions are how they unlock their capabilities and provide combat power to a CCDR.



Figure 8. Levels of Military Commitment Joint Mobilization Planning

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2018), I-3.



Figure 9. Levels of Mobilization, Planning

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning* (Washington, DC: CJCS, 2018), I-8.

JP 4-05 is a companion to DODI 1235.12 *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)*. This 2017 DODI is a primary reference document for all services when a mission requires reserve forces. DODI's purpose is as follows:

> Reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1235.12 (Reference (b)) and incorporates and cancels DoDD 1235.10 (Reference (c)) to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and prescribe procedures for ordering units and members of the RC to active duty as an operational force to support the national defense strategy across the full spectrum of military functions. Such RC support includes, but is not limited to, sustained operational missions, emergent operations,

> contingency operations, and service during national emergencies or in time of war.[89]

MCUs must be equally familiar with this DODI because together with JP 4-05, it determines how accessible their unit is to a CCDR. The table of reserve access authorities found within this DODI provides additional context to the figures from JP 4-05.

[89] DOD, DOD Instruction 1235.12, 1.

Table 6. Reserve Access Authorities

Statute	Utilization Process	Intended Use	Requirements
Involuntary			
Section **12301(a)** of Reference (d) Full Mobilization	Congressional Declaration of War or National Emergency	Rapid expansion of Military Services to meet an external threat to national security	-No personnel limitation -Duration of war or national emergency plus 6 months -Applicable to all reservists (including inactive and retired)
Section **12302** of Reference (d) Partial Mobilization	Presidential Declaration of National Emergency	Manpower required to meet external threat to national security or domestic emergency	-Maximum 1,000,000 Ready Reservists on active duty -Not more than 24 consecutive months
Section **12304** of Reference (d) Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up	President determines RC augmentation is required other than during war or national emergency	Augment the active forces for any named operational mission, or to provide assistance for responding to an emergency involving the use or threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction, or a terrorist attack or threatened terrorist attack in the United States that could result in significant loss of life or property	-Maximum 200,000 members of Selected Reserve/Individual Ready Reserve on active duty -May include up to 30,000 Individual Ready Reserve -Limited to 365 consecutive days active duty -Prohibited for support of federal government or a State during a domestic serious natural or man-made disaster, accident or catastrophe -Prohibited for use in repelling invasions; suppressing insurrections, rebellions, domestic violence, unlawful combinations, or conspiracies; or executing U.S. laws
Section **12304a** of Reference (d) Reserve Emergency Call-Up	Secretary of Defense authority in response to Governor's request for federal assistance in accordance with section 5121 *et. seq.* of Title 42, U.S.C. (Reference *(aa)*); Presidential determination of major disaster or emergency required	Manpower required for response to a major disaster or emergency in the United States and its territories	-No personnel limitation -Limited to continuous period of not more than 120 days -Does not apply to National Guard or Coast Guard Reserve - Secretaries of the Military Departments may approve 12304a activations provided the orders are 30 days or less in duration.
Section **12304b** of Reference (d) Reserve Preplanned Call-Up	Secretary of Military Department authority to order any unit of the Selected Reserve to active duty for pre-planned and pre-budgeted missions	Augment AC for any preplanned missions in support of CCMD requirements	-Maximum 60,000 on active duty at any one time -Limited to 365 consecutive days -Manpower and costs are specifically included and identified in the submitted defense budget for anticipated demand -Budget information includes description of the mission and the anticipated length of time for involuntary order to active duty -Secretary invoking section 12304b of Reference (d) must submit to Congress a written report detailing circumstances of the call-up
Section **12301(b)** of Reference (d) 15-Day Statute	Service Secretary authority to order to active duty without consent of persons affected	Annual training or operational mission	-15 days active duty once per year; Governor's consent required for National Guard
Voluntary			
Section **12301(d)** of Reference (d)	An authority designated by a Service Secretary may order a RC member to active duty with consent of the member	Active duty in excess of annual training requirements. May be used for training, special work, operational support, etc.	-No set duration -Consent of the governor or other appropriate authority of the State concerned required for members of the National Guard

Source: Department of Defense (DOD), DOD Instruction 1235.12, *Accessing the Reserve Components (RC)* (Washington, DC: DOD, 2017), 16.

Multicomponent Unit Literature 2000-2008

Four pieces of literature had long term impact on the Reserve Component and, by proxy, MCUs. These include the 1999 *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, the 2002 *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense,* the 2004 DOD Report to Congress *Reserve Personnel Compensation Program Review*, and in 2008 the *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves*. Together, these four Congressionally directed seminal documents, and their recommendations created a body of work that included over a dozen professional studies and scholarly works. For this time period, the author reviewed recommendations from four primary sources, two professional think tank studies, and three academic papers from military institutions. This literature review will focus on the content analysis results of recommendations made from the four primary documents.

Reserve Component Employment Study 2005

Published in 1999, this study complied with direction from FY 2000-2005 Defense Planning Guidance. Homeland Defense, Smaller-Scale Contingencies, and Major Theater Wars were three key themes highlighted by the study.[90] With its broad mandate the study examined numerous issues across all services and all components. Recommendations that had a direct impact on MCU development are in the table below.

[90] Reserve Affairs, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, 1.

Table 7. Reserve Component Employment Study 2005 Recommendations

1999 - Reserve Component Employment Study 2005		
Recommendation	Page	DOTMLPF-P Category
Initiative 3-B. Publish a how-to handbook with recommended procedures for accessing and using the RC.	102	Doctrine
Initiative 9. Change the JSCP to direct CINCs to list required capabilities rather than specific units and allow the Services to source the units to provide the required capability.	107	Doctrine
Initiative 10. Expedite efforts to establish one pay and personnel system for all members of a Service.	107	Materiel
Initiative 24. Increase the opportunity for cross assignments of AC and RC members.	116	Personnel
Initiative 3-A. Standardize DOD-wide processes for gaining access to RC members and units. Establish common terminology, forms, and flows.	102	Doctrine, Policy
Initiative 13-A. Standardize mobilization and deployment administration among the Services and RC, to include simplification of forms, fund cites, and procedures.	109	Doctrine, Policy
Initiative 4-A. Create a DOD-level contingency fund that the CINCs could use to pay for RC active duty support.	103	Policy
Initiative 4-A1. (USSOUTHCOM) The CINC's should be permitted to convert O&M dollars to fund RC man-days.	103	Policy
Initiative 4-B. Establish for each CINC a pool of purple funds that the CINC could use to pay for RC personnel augmenting the unified command headquarters or joint activities.	104	Policy
Initiative 23. Make it easier for military personnel to transfer between the AC and RC and among the other Services.	115	Policy
Initiative 21-C. Publish a how-to guide on RC use for OSD and CINCs to improve the process by which missions are assigned to the RC.	113	Doctrine
Initiative 30. Modify legal and policy constraints to permit the use of full-time reservists on operational missions.	118	Policy
Initiative 33. Establish an education program at military educational institutions to teach AC officers and NCOs about the RC.	120	Leadership

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, Final Report (Washington, DC: Department of Defense), pages annotated in table.

Most of the recommendations or initiatives in this study would become implemented. Some, like initiative 10 (IPPS-A), are just now starting to be fielded within the force twenty years later. Others would be implemented over the next decade or refined and reinforced in subsequent Congressional reports before being approved. MCUs even received official acknowledgement by recognition of their establishment on page 24 and in Annex F 3.d.(4) as an assessed alternative worthy of further refinement to increasing the role of the RC in tempo relief and integration in general.[91] As discussed in chapter 1, MCUs would quickly stand up over the next three years, with 52 operating across the world when the next influential study released.

Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense

Published 15 months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks and three months before the invasion of Iraq, the Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense was the next Congressionally directed study with recommendations impacting MCUs. The objective of this review was to answer the question of how the RC can transform to meet the challenges set forth in the new defense strategy and to respond to a rapidly changing security environment.[92] Two central themes within this document were rebalancing the Total Force to enhance capabilities and creating flexibility in force

[91] Reserve Affairs, *Reserve Component Employment Study 2005*, Annex F, 1.

[92] Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), viii.

management.[93] While it did not directly address MCUs, the review did contain many recommendations which the MCU force structure is ideally suited to support.

Table 8. Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense Recommendations

2002 - Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense		
Recommendation	Page	DOTMLPF-P Category
Expand the use of reserves—through the use of mixed units—to augment the manpower assigned to weapon systems.	x	Organization
Accelerating the development and deployment of a single manpower, personnel, and financial system.	xv	Materiel
To address skills-based shortages, the Department should create deeper pools of either Active or Reserve component personnel depending upon the type of skill and the frequency needed.	x	Personnel
The Department could more effectively employ its force, both active and reserve, across the full range of operational requirements if it adopted a new availability and service paradigm—a continuum of service—as the basis for managing its Total Force.	xiv	Policy
Streamlining access rules and policies to simplify duty statuses and facilitate the combatant commanders' ability to use Guard and Reserve capabilities when needed.	xv	Policy
Simplifying pay funding categories to remove artificial barriers. Ensure funds are programmed to support expected usage of reserves.	xv	Policy
Incorporating more flexibility in personnel policies to enable service at any point along the continuum of service. Eliminate complexity, which will yield greater efficiency.	xv	Policy
Developing a sliding scale of benefits and entitlements that are consistent for all members and are commensurate with levels of participation.	xv	Policy
Guard and Reserve forces can shoulder a greater load as follows During transition phases, Guard and Reserve contribution can increase with lead-time and planning. In mature phases [of contingencies], Reserve components can lead stabilization efforts and exit strategy.	xiii	Doctrine, Training
Capitalize on Reserve components' military and civilian expertise in high-technology functions such as intelligence, information operations, space, and unmanned vehicle operations by expanding the use of "reachback"where highly skilled reservists perform functions in support of the warfighter without physically deploying to the area of operations.	xi-xii	Doctine, Organization
Develop alternative approaches to accessing Reserve component personnel with technical, state-of-the-art skills that are difficult to train and retain in the Active force.	xii	Personnel, Policy

Source: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, (Washington, DC: 2002), pages annotated in table.

[93] Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, ix.

This review is the first document to recommend the consolidation of duty statuses. It recommended a reduction from over 30 down to essentially 2, active and inactive based on Title 10, 32, or 14. It accurately captured the issue which still exists today, "personnel managers have been unable to access the reserve personnel they need because of constraints on the various duty statuses. The multiplicity of statuses and their adaptive use creates problems for personnel managers and leads to difficulty in budgeting and execution."[94] The review also had progressive views towards the "continuum of service" concept. The review's vision for a continuum of service was creating a RC model that allowed efficient access to RC members who desired to serve more than 39 days per year. Twenty years later, this model seemed to have been overcome by events with the rapid and continued mobilization of RC units in support of OIF and OEF. Flexible duty statuses and scalable support are not needed when whole units mobilize for 12 to 18 months. It would be six years before the next commission report, and it would continue to refine these original ideas.

Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves published this final report in January 2008. It combined six years of combat experience into a comprehensive reevaluation of the RC. In total, it contained six major conclusions, 95 recommendations,

[94] Reserve Affairs, *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*, 77.

and 163 findings.[95] Thirteen recommendations had the potential to impact MCUs directly. The six significant conclusions focused on the following areas:

1. Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve.
2. Enhancing the Defense Department's Role in the Homeland.
3. Creating a Continuum of Serve: Personnel Management for an Integrated Total Force.
4. Developing a Ready, Capable, and Available Operational Reserve.
5. Supporting Service Members, Families, and Employers.
6. Reforming the Organizations and Institutions That Support an Operational Reserve.[96]

This commission refined several of the recommendations, ideas, and findings from 2002's *Review of Reserve Component Contributions to National Defense*. The recommendations which had the most potential to impact MCUs are below:

[95] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, 1.

[96] Ibid., i.

Table 9. Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force Recommendations

2008 - Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force		
Recommendation	Page	DOTMLPF-P Category
DOD should develop a personnel management strategy for a modern military workforce that is diverse, technologically skilled, and desires flexible career opportunities. Key components of this strategy must include an integrated total force that provides opportunities for those who choose a civilian career, as well as ease of transition between differing service commitments.	18	Policy
The service Secretaries should ensure that active component officers are encouraged to serve in reserve component units and that such service is considered favorably when determining who is most qualified for promotion	45	Personnel
DOD should reduce the number of duty statuses from the current 29 to 2: on (active) duty and off (active) duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, with appropriate pay and other compensation. The 48 drills should be replaced with 24 days of active duty. A day's pay should be provided for a day's work without reducing compensation for current service members. The system should be sufficiently flexible to deal with service-specific training requirements.	24	Policy
During the transition to two duty statuses, DOD should uncouple existing statuses from pay and other compensation, substantially reduce the number of duty statuses, and standardize them across the services for ease of understanding and use.	24	Policy
DOD should develop a plan to implement these changes within two years of this report, and should complete their implementation within five years of the report's issuance.	24	Policy
Congress should cease to manage DOD manpower levels by using authorized end strengths. DOD should budget for—and Congress should fund—personnel, active and reserve, based on requirements and needed capabilities.	25	Policy
As a part of the process of simplifying duty status categories, Congress should phase out the ADOS category and designate long-term billets as either active duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates reserve members on full-time active duty tours.	25	Personnel, Policy

The services should disclose fully to all prospective members of units the expected number of training days required annually to participate successfully in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond the traditional 39 days per year should be based on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual agreement with the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation.	31	Doctrine, Policy
The two major divisions that should be established are The Operational Reserve Force, which will consist of present-day Selected Reserve units and individual mobilization augmentees and will periodically serve active duty tours in rotation supporting the total force. The Strategic Reserve Force, which will consist of two subdivisions: The Strategic Ready Reserve Force and The Strategic Standby Reserve	46-47	Doctrine, Policy
Congress and the Department of Defense should explicitly acknowledge the need for, and should create, an operational reserve force that includes portions of the National Guard and Reserves...Moreover, the traditional capabilities of the reserve components to serve as a strategic reserve must be expanded and strengthened.	11	Organization, Policy
The current reserve component categories should be reorganized. The total force manpower pool should be viewed as consisting of the full-time active components and the reserve components, which should be divided into two categories that support integration, a continuum of service, the operational use of the reserve force, and continuing strategic depth and the ability to surge when required. DOD and the services should effectively manage and resource both of the categories.	46-47	Organization, Policy
DOD and service leaders, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and combatant commanders, must carefully determine which portions of each reserve component's current Selected Reserve should be placed in the Operational Reserve Force and which should be placed in the Strategic Reserve Force.	47	Organization, Policy
Congress, with input from the Department of Defense, should adopt a new model to provide full-time support to the Army reserve components as part of an overall program to improve their military effectiveness and to more fully integrate the Army and its components into a total force.	30	Organization, Personnel, Policy

Source: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2008), pages annotated in table.

This report further outlined a plan for duty status reform, highlighting the need to separate duty status from the appropriation source. This report continued recommend ways to build and manage an Operational Reserve along a continuum of service. At the time of this report, 42 MCUs were displaying most, if not all, of the characteristics attributed to operational reserve units. This report would also be the last Congressionally commissioned report to devote major focus towards RC issues until 2012's *Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation* and 2016's *National Commission on the Future of the Army*.

2000-2008 Significant MCU Literature other than Congressional Reports

The first two reports helped inspire three academic papers and two think tank studies. Combined, these produced an additional 23 recommendations for MCUs or MCU related areas. In 2001, LTC Dallas Owens wrote a monograph that analyzed current Army integration programs and initiatives. He conducted a two-part analysis using both historical examples and future concepts.[97] A year later, LTC Thomas E. O'Donovan's Strategy Research Project was a case study on the 52nd Engineer Battalion. This battalion was the Army's first tri-component MCU. His case study documented the lessons learned, successes, challenges, and overall results from the battalion's first three years. He includes several recommendations in the DOTMLPF-P format and concludes that the MCU concept has the potential to address and solve many component integration

[97] LTC Dallas D. Owens Jr., "AC RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformation's Challenge" (Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2001), iii.

issues.[98] In 2003, another Strategy Research Project took a more macro look at the MCU experiment. *Multicomponent Units: A Worthwhile Endeavor?*, written by LTC Bruce A. Resnak, examined MCUs against the goals outlined in Army policy letter 220-98-1. His insights into component integration are likely why the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves consulted him for their 2008 report.[99]

Multicomponent Unit Literature 2011-Present

Five pieces of literature published since 2011 continue the reformations of the RC begun during the first period. These more recent documents include the 2011 *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component,* the 2012 *Report of The Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation*, the 2015 *Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission Final Report,* the 2016 Reserve Forces Policy Board report for the new administration *Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves*, and the National Commission on the Future of the Army's *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States*. Together, these five recent Congressionally directed documents and their recommendations spurned many additions to the body of knowledge concerning MCUs and the Operational Reserve. Think tank and academic work appeared to accelerate on these topics during this period. The author studied recommendations from the above mentioned five primary

[98] LTC Thomas E. O'Donovan, "The Multi-Component Concept, A Case Study of AC/RC Integration in Action." (Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2002), iii.

[99] Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves*, Appendix J-10.

sources, and additionally five professional think tank studies, six academic papers from military institutions, and five journal articles from field grade officers. This portion of the literature review will focus on the content analysis results of recommendations made from the five recent Congressional reports.

Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component

This report continued the work from 2008's report and provided over 100 recommendations consistent with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review. It was a collaborative effort of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and the Military Services.[100] The themes of the recommendations are not new, but the clarity and progressiveness had additional refinement. Component integration discussion is common throughout the document while not directly addressing MCUs. This report's dialogue on enabling differing methods of service within the RC on page 58 is the most professionally written argument for a more progressive take on the potential for a more comprehensive continuum of service.

> The work and life style patterns of the 21st Century provide current and future Reservists with a variety of different opportunities to serve the nation. Teachers, students, construction workers, and the self-employed often do not work and live in a 9-to-5, Monday-through-Friday world … These evolving employment patterns offer Reservists and Guardsmen many ways to continue a civilian career and serve the nation more often.[101]

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[100] Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component,* vol. 1, *Executive Summary & Main Report* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff/Department of Defense, 2011), 1.

[101] Ibid., 58.

The table of recommendations extracted from this report's complete list of 107 represents those that most affect MCUs; some recommendations were not adopted into law. This report carried considerable weight and was likely one of the primary influencers in Section 12304b's creation and inclusion in the 2012 NDAA.

Table 10. Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component Recommendations

2011 - Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component		
Recommendation	Page	DOTMLPF-P Category
2a: The Services, consistent with their unique requirements, should continue to partner their Active and Reserve forces as elements of a Total Force and thereby better realize the full potential of the U.S. Armed Forces, while meeting the operational needs of the Combatant Commands, both domestic and overseas.	86	Organization, Training
2c: When rebalancing the force to meet future national security challenges, the Reserve Component should be a "force of first choice" for those tasks for which they are particularly well suited, owing to their overall cost effectiveness and the skill sets that they can provide. Missions that follow a predictable operational schedule fall clearly into this category.	86	Doctrine, Organization
5a: To the extent possible, the Services should strive to use Reserve Component units, teams, and individuals for tasks for which they are particularly well suited and for which those units, teams or individuals can fairly be considered a "force of first choice" rather than the "force of last resort."	89	Doctrine, Organization
8b: Give first consideration to the Reserve Component due to their broad base in civilian acquired skills when expanding capabilities in areas such as cyber defense, intelligence, unmanned aerial system operations, medical, engineering, transportation, logistics , aviation, training and education.	90-91	Organization, Personnel
10a: Relying on the Reserve Component as a source when building force structure to alleviate shortfalls or preserve or expand capacity especially in cases where the Reserves are particularly well suited and cost is a consideration	92	Organization
10d: Establishing national or regional Reserve Component units staffed with personnel who are willing to serve on Active Duty more frequently or for longer duration than typically expected of reservists in order to facilitate their use for certain missions.	93	Organization, Personnel, Policy
10f: Increasing the level of integration of Active and Reserve forces into "blended units" to include ones that are predominately filled from the Active Component as well as others that are predominately filled by the Reserve Component.	93	Organization

11a: Developing enlistment or terms-of-service contracts that enable employment of Reserve Component personnel who are willing to serve on Active Duty for longer or more frequent periods than current practice.	94	Policy
11f: Simplifying incentives, pay, and allowances to include reducing the number of "duty status" designations.	94	Policy
14b: At a minimum, reducing the number of duty status categories to the following: (1) Title 10 Active Duty, (2) Title 10 Federal Service, (3) Title 10 Inactive (Reserve), (4) Title 32 full-time National Guard, (5) Title 32 Inactive (National Guard), and (6) Title 14 Active Duty (U.S. Coast Guard).	96	Policy
14g: Implementing the necessary policies to establish a continuum of service through which personnel can easily transition between varying levels of participation in the military to satisfy professional, personal, and family commitments, i.e., policies that allow seamless transition between Active and Reserve statuses as well as transition between Reserve categories.	97	Personnel, Policy
21a: Revise Title 10, U.S. Code, §12304 to enable responsive access to, and mobilization of, the Reserve Component to support force requirements in response to the National Security Strategy.	100	Policy
21k: Revise existing laws to enable shorter notice or more frequent or longer periods of Active Duty service by Reserve Component members who are willing to serve under such conditions.	102	Policy
21s: Establish rapid activation procedures that the Services and Combatant Commands can use to gain voluntary or involuntary access to Reserve Component units and personnel required to meet emergent or on-going mission requirements.	103	Policy

Source: Office of the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component: Volume I Executive Summary & Main Report*, (Washington, DC: 2011), pages annotated in table.

Report of the Eleventh Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (QRMC)

The QRMC's purview was the entire military, but it did devote three of its eight chapters to examination and recommendations for RC compensation and benefits. It acknowledged upfront the importance of the work which had come before and used both the review conducted by the 2008 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves and

the 2011 *Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Component*.[102] The QRMC's charter directed an evaluation on whether or not reserve compensation and benefits were consistent with current and planned RC utilization. Nevertheless, the QRMC recognized that the compensation system only aligned with the training associated with maintaining a strategic reserve.[103] The QRMC determined that for the RC to perform in an operational role the structure, simplicity, and flexibility of compensation and benefits had to evolve.

Table 11. 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation Recommendations

2012 - 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation		
Recommendation	Page	DOTMLPF-P Category
Reduce the number of authorities to order a member to duty from 30 to 6.	207	Policy
Transition reserve compensation to a "total force" pay structure: Pay Regular Military Compensation to reserve members for each day of reserve service, regardless of the type of duty. Augment with incentive pays to sustain and shape the force.	207	Policy

Source: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, *The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation*, Main Report, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2012), pages annotated in table.

Chapter 6 of the QRMC provides the best framing of the duty status problems which continue to affect the RC. This chapter likely had considerable influence on the

[102] Personnel and Readiness, *The 11th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation*, xi.

[103] Ibid., 129.

inclusion of directed duty status reform in the 2018 NDAA. In chapter 6's conclusion, the QRMC also noted that a simplified duty status system is what will set the conditions for a continuum of service and that without duty status reform, timely accessibility of the RC will remain a problem.

Report of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission

This report was also much larger in scope than just the RC, but it used one of its fifteen recommendations again to stress the need for RC duty status reform. Citing heavily from the reports previously reviewed within this thesis, this report's contribution to the argument was a concisely constructed set of tables that displayed which sections of USC required amendment.

Table 12. Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission Current Reserve Component Duty Statuses to be Amended/Repealed

	Legal Authority	Purpose of Duty	Applies To	Type of Duty	
Training	10 U.S.C. 10147	Annual Training/Drill Requirement	Reserve Only	AD/IDT	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12301(b)	Annual Training	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12301(d)	Additional/Other Training Duty	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Voluntary
	32 U.S.C. 502(a)	Annual Training/Drill Requirement	National Guard Only	FTNGD/ID	Involuntary
	32 U.S.C. 502(f)(1)(A)	Additional Training Duty Additional/Other	National Guard Only	T FTNGD	Involuntary
	32 U.S.C. 502(f)(1)(B)	Training Duty	National Guard Only	FTNGD	Voluntary
Support	10 U.S.C. 12301(d)	AGR Duty/Operational Support/Additional	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Voluntary
	10 U.S.C. 12304b	Duty	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	32 U.S.C. 502(f)(1)(B)	Preplanned/Preprogrammed CCDR Support	National Guard Only	FTNGD	Voluntary
	32 U.S.C. 502(f)(1)(A)	AGR Duty/Operational Support/Additional	National Guard Only	FTNGD	Involuntary
	Legal Authority	**Purpose of Duty**	**Applies To**	**Type of Duty**	
Other	10 U.S.C. 12503	Funeral Honors	Reserve & National Guard	ID	Voluntary
	32 U.S.C. 115	Funeral Honors	National Guard Only	ID	Voluntary
	10 U.S.C. 12319	Muster Duty	Reserve & National Guard	ID	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12301(h)	Medical Care	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Voluntary
	10 U.S.C. 12322	Medical Evaluation and Treatment	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Voluntary
	10 U.S.C. 688	Retiree Recall	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 802(d)	Disciplinary	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 10148	Unsatisfactory Participation (up to 45 days)	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12301(g)	Captive Status	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12303	Unsatisfactory Participation (up to 24	Reserve & National Guard	AD	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12402	months)	National Guard Only	AD	Voluntary
	10 U.S.C. 331	Duty at National Guard Bureau	National Guard Only	FS	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 332	Insurrection	National Guard Only	FS	Involuntary
	10 U.S.C. 12406	Insurrection	National Guard Only	FS	Involuntary
		Insurrection			

AD - Active Duty • CCDR - Combatant Command • ID - Inactive Duty • IDT - Inactive Duty Training
FTNGD - Full Time National Guard Duty • FS - Federal Service • PRC – Presidential Reserve Call-up

Source: Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission, *Report of the Military Compensation and Retirement Modernization Commission*, Final Report, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2015), 55-56.

The report concluded its recommendation by stating that without duty status reform commanders would continue to face increased difficulty when employing the RC in operational missions.

Improving the Total Force Using the National Guard and Reserves

This report's intended audience was the new incoming Administration of the 2016 national election. Specifically tailored towards the new SECDEF, it expressed the near term and long-term priorities of senior RC leadership. Four of the seven near term recommendations were relevant to MCUs: Emphasize a Total Force policy, formalize the Operational Reserve, Increase AC/RC integration, and enact duty status reform.[104] This report is also where the language begins to change slightly with continuum of service recommendations with the word 'permeability' in use several times. Its long term recommendations that would affect MCUs were Integrate the RC into the Force of the Future and enhance permeability, Prioritize and maintain RC readiness (with emphasis on funding routine operational missions), and including the RC in the Cyber Mission Force.[105] While not going into in depth detail on any of these topics, the report does reaffirm the importance of work completed by previous commissions. The report serves as another important "vote" on the inseparability between a continuum of service, duty status reform, and an operational reserve capable of meeting real-world requirements.

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[104] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, *"Improving the Total Force using the National Guard and Reserves," a Report for the Transition to the new Administration by the Reserve Forces Policy Board* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2016), 12.

[105] Ibid., 13.

National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA)

The 2016 NCFA is the most recent Congressional report to address RC issues. It is also the first report to provide distinct recognition and recommendations for the improvement of MCUs. Compared to other reports, this Commission was only responsible for analyzing the Army. Therefore, it was able to take a more comprehensive look at all areas of previous focus from fifteen years of professional research. The commission formed at the direction of NDAA FY15 and given a year to present findings and recommendations. The commission conducted research and interviews for eight months in addition to 19 site visits across the world. Every combatant commander, numerous senior defense officials, associations of each component, the intelligence community, defense analysts, and other experts all contributed towards the commission's work.[106] The report's views on MCUs were positive, but it was careful to balance its endorsement with the understanding that several long-standing initiatives remain unresolved. The table of recommendations captures the additional details the commission presented to Congress.

[106] National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016), 1-2.

Table 13. National Commission on the Future of the Army Recommendations

2016 - National Commission on the Future of the Army		
Recommendation	Page	DOTMLPF-P Category
The Secretary of the Army should review and assess officer and NCO positions from all components for potential designation as integrated positions that would allow individuals from all components to fill positions to foster an Army Total Force culture and expand knowledge about other components.	65	Organization, Personnel
The Army should develop and implement a pilot program to assign Regular Army officers and enlisted soldiers to Army Reserve full-time support positions within one year of publication of this report and evaluated in two years to determine the effectiveness of such a program.	69	Organization, Personnel
The Secretary of the Army should develop selection and promotion policies that incentivize Regular Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve assignments across components and within multicomponent units.	65	Personnel
The Congress should expand 12304b authority to include operational requirements that emerge within the programmed budget timeline, including the year of execution.	66	Policy
The Army should budget for and the Congress should authorize and fund no fewer than 3,000 man years annually for 12304b utilization of the reserve components. The Secretary of Defense, in conjunction with the Army and the Office of Management and Budget, should also provide for the use of Overseas Contingency Operations and supplemental funding for reserve component utilization under 12304b.	66	Policy
The Secretary of Defense should update the January 19, 2007, memo "Utilization of the Total Force" to allow flexible involuntary mobilization periods in an effort to achieve common BOG periods for all components.	67	Policy
The Army must manage and provide forces under the Total Force approach.	65	Policy
The Army should add specific guidance on goals for future use of multicomponent units and related initiatives to the Army's Total Force Policy Implementation Guidance for fiscal year 2017.	68	Policy
The Army should continue using multicomponent units and training partnerships to improve Total Force integration and overall Army effectiveness.	68	Training, Policy

Source: National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President of the Congress of the United States* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2016), pages annotated in table.

2011-Present Significant MCU Literature other than Congressional Reports

The increase in RC related Congressional reports met with an equal increase in outside professional and academic research. Defense policy think tanks produced five studies, two as recently as 2019, with 21 total recommendations. Six Academic monographs and theses contributed 19 recommendations, and five articles written for journal or peer-reviewed military websites contributed another 19 recommendations. The think tank reports tended to revolve around improving Total Force Policy implementation and reviving component integration initiatives. The academic papers and articles focused more on support for an Operational Reserve and how and where MCUs would fit in an Operational Reserve environment. The upcoming 13th Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation will likely take into consideration most of these new additions to the body of knowledge when constructing their findings and recommendations.

Literature Review Conclusion

This literature review examined the MCU professional body of knowledge from 2000 to the present. The review centered around Congressional reviews and reports which contained recommendations affecting the RC and the MCUs contained within it. Recommendations from these reports serve as a central part of chapter 4's content analysis and evaluation criteria matrix. A complete list of all recommendations, including those from think tanks and academic papers, is an Annex included as part of this paper. The author created an informed list of recommendations (R2) by synthesizing information learned from all reviewed sources. This contributed to an increased understanding of the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter 3 outlines the research methodology for conducting an applied professional case study on Army MCUs' ability to provide a scalable capability for military force employers. A discussion presents the processes used during content analysis to remove bias from the FSA as well as models to represent the entire process visually.

Applied Professional Case Study

The goal of this study is to persuade the CDM that the recommendations in chapter 5 are suitable, feasible, and acceptable solutions that mitigate shortfalls by removing or reducing capability gaps within the current operational environment. The primary and secondary research questions are designed to answer whether MCUs can improve their ability to provide scalable capabilities. A CBA conducted across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum provides the best answer to these questions.

The author conducted an APCS methodology for this thesis. An APCS is qualitative research. Qualitative research is a process of understanding based on a distinct methodological approach to inquiry that explores a social or human problem by building a complex, holistic picture.[107] The APCS is a distinct approach because it combines the doctrinal construct of a CBA with the personal experience of the author to demonstrate a

[107] Creswell, *Qualitative Inquiry & Research Design*, Appendix A, 300.

rigorous refinement of recommendations to a CDM. The intent is to add credibility and validity to the final R3 recommendations. A model of this process is below:



Figure 10. Author's Use of the Applied Professional Case Study Model

Source: Created by author.

Content Analysis

To build the complex, holistic picture, the author researched and delimited the body of professional knowledge of the past 20 years down to two source types: MCU literature and Operational Reserve literature. The author continued to categorize the body of knowledge in the following manner:

1. USC, DOD Policy, and Joint Regulation as it pertained to the RC and Operational Reserve.
2. Army Policy and Regulation specific to MCUs and utilization of the RC.

3. USARC Policy and Regulation as it pertained to MCUs, force management, and personnel.
4. Reports to Congress such as Commission findings and Posture Statements which directly addressed RC, Operational Reserve, and MCU issues.
5. Professional Studies published by Defense and Security think tanks which presented findings and recommendations towards MCU-related areas.
6. Academic papers from military institutions such as the Army War College, School of Advanced Military Studies, and the Command & General Staff College which addressed MCU and RC integration experiences.

To better understand the primary and secondary research questions, the author went through several iterations of content analysis on sources discovered during research. Content analysis was a necessary addition to this APCS because it is a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts to the contexts of their use.[108] Many sources do not directly address MCUs, so it was necessary to make valid inferences from sources discussing operational reserve issues and recommendations because MCUs are inherently a part of the operational reserve. Examples of the author's different qualitative content analysis lenses are below:

[108] Krippendorff, *Content Analysis*, 382.

Qualitative Content Analysis by DOTMLPF-P

	MCU Foundation	Total Force Policy	Problem Framing	Doctrine	Organization	Training	Materiel	Leadership and Education	Personnel	Facilities	USAR Personnel Policy	USAR Mobilization Policy
Source 1												
Source 2												
Source 3												

Qualitative Content Analysis by Reserve Component Areas of Importance

	Year	Total Force Policy	Duty Status Reform	Continuum of Service	Strategic Reserve	Operational Reserve	LSCO Capabilities in USAR
Source 1							
Source 2							
Source 3							

Qualitative Content Analysis by Recommendation and DOTMLPF-P Category

	Source Type	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Source 1					
Source 2					
Source 3					

Figure 11. Qualitative Content Analysis Lenses Used during APCS Research

Source: Created by author with influence from Klaus Krippendorff's *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013).

Reading each source multiple times to conduct a different angle of content analysis enhanced the author's understanding of the subject areas contained within the primary and secondary research questions. This enhanced understanding allowed the author to refine his original R1 recommendations into an improved set of R2 recommendations presented in chapter 4.

Capabilities Based Assessment (CBA) and Kotter's Change Model

A CBA is a structured three-step process based on an identified operational need.[109] Its three steps are the Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), and Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA). In this thesis, the FAA

[109] TRADOC, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, 55.

consists of chapters 1 and 2, which go into detail on background information, the current operational environment, and the professional body of knowledge. The FNA is the second analytic step, and it identifies gaps in the Army's ability to accomplish required capabilities at an acceptable level of risk.[110] The R1 recommendations in chapter 1 constitute the author's initial understanding and perceived capability gaps. Through the study of the professional body of knowledge in chapter 2, the author refined their understanding of the operational environment and created evaluation criteria for use within an evaluation matrix to present an informed collection of R2 recommendations in chapter 4. The evaluation matrix enhances the R2 informed positions by ensuring the recommendations have undergone an unbiased examination where the literature and multiple perspectives became metrics. These informed positions and the discussion which accompanies them constitute the finished presentation of the FNA.

[110] TRADOC, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, 58.

Table 14. R2 Evaluation Matrix Criteria

MCU R2 Evaluation Matrix Criteria			
Impact to MCU	Recommendation Priority	Stakeholder Consensus	Recommendation Source
4 - Positive impact to daily operations	4 - Must do for MCUs to provide scalable capability for force employers	4 - Likely Unanimous support	4 - Multiple, at least 1 Congressional study, 1 funded study, and 2 academic or journal sources
3 - Positive impact, change to annual ops, no change to daily ops	3 - Should do for MCUs to provide scalable capability for force employers	3 - Majority support	3 - Multiple, at least 1 Congressional or funded study and 1 academic or journal source
2 - Important, but little tangible change	2 - Nice to do for MCUs to provide scalable capability for force employers	2 - Divided support	2 - Multiple, but only 1 Congressional or funded study and 1 academic or journal source
1 - Important, but no change	1 - Would not impact MCUs in a meaningful way	1 - Minority support	1 - Single source

Source: Created by author.

Table 15. Example R2 Recommendation Evaluation Matrix

Example R2 Recommendation Evaluation Matrix					
R2 Recommendation	Impact	Priority	Consensus	Sources	Total
Recommendation 1	3	3	4	4	14
Recommendation 2	3	2	4	2	11
Recommendation 3	2	2	3	2	9

Source: Created by author.

The FSA is the third and last step of a CBA. It assesses DOTMLPF-P solutions and policy approaches to solving or mitigating one or more of the identified capability gaps.[111] In chapter 5 the R3 recommendations constitute the FSA. These recommendations are a result of the author exposing the R2 recommendations to stakeholder priorities and timelines and then redrafting the recommendations for use by the CDM. To complete the FSA, Kotter's updated eight-step organizational change model provides structure to a proposed implementation plan and end state.

Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the applied professional case study and the application of its methodology in answering the primary and secondary research questions. A FAA

[111] TRADOC, TRADOC Regulation 71-20, 59.

consisting of history, background information, and literature review of the MCU operational environment laid the foundation for understanding the problem and the research questions. Content analysis methodology combined with an evaluation matrix, which included stakeholder perspectives, provided further insight into the capability gaps of a functional needs analysis ending with a new set of informed positions (R2). These recommendations are then redrafted for use by the CDM and organized within Kotter's Change Model. The result (R3) being a concise list of recommendations for action by the CDM to optimize MCUs' ability to provide a scalable capability for military force employers.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 3 described the qualitative methodologies required to create an informed position (R2) in chapter 4. This chapter features an analysis of the knowledge gained during the literature review and then subjects that knowledge to evaluation criteria. This rigor is what produces the R2 informed positions. There are 18 final R2 recommendations, distilled from an original informed list of 35.[112] Final recommendations did vary across echelons and key subject areas. The figure below is reintroduced from chapter 1 but shows the dispersion of recommendations across all six areas. It intends to show how all areas must continue to improve and evolve if the MCU force structure is to remain a viable option for force managers.

[112] An Annex includes the full list.



Figure 12. MCU Six Key Areas with R2 Recommendations

Source: Created by author.

R2 Informed Position Policy Recommendations

Table 16. R2 Informed Position Policy Recommendations

R2 Recommendation	Impact	Priority	Consensus	Sources	Total
1. MCU's Reserve Component Pay and Allowances funding must be able to support operational requirements during a soldier's 38-53 active duty status days per year.	4	4	4	4	16
2. Utilization of 12304b authority should include requirements that emerge within the year of execution to allow CCDRs the ability to use MCUs as a flexible deterrent option.	4	4	3	4	15
3. Codify the terms "Operational Reserve" and "Strategic Reserve" and create stratified resource models applicable to both.	3	3	3	4	13
4. Create new will-train policy for soldiers wanting to transfer to MCUs.	4	4	2	2	12
5. As defined in DODI 1235.12 MCU-C1 should be designed to respond to time-critical emergent requirements (<120 days), MCU-C2/3 to standard emergent (>120 days).	2	3	3	4	12
6. Use "man years" in NDAA when establishing end strength for all components to create a modular foundation for more dynamic force modernization.	3	3	2	4	12
7. MCUs aligned with a TPFDD need flexible appropriation which facilitates operational employment for unplanned emergent requirements.	3	3	3	2	11
8. Create pay incentive structure for Reserve Component soldiers based on unit optempo and other factors to make Operational Reserve units more attractive	4	2	3	2	11

Source: Created by author.

MCU's pay and allowances allowing operational support during operational missions was the only assessed recommendation with a perfect score. However, this policy recommendation, as with all MCU policy recommendations, is contingent upon more substantial changes to DOD, RC, and Army policy. This recommendation requires reassessment after a future NDAA codifies duty status reform. This recommendation captures the importance of appropriation reform. CCDRs could still experience difficulty in using RC soldiers even after duty status reform if appropriations still prohibit operational employment. TPU soldiers assigned to MCUs must be able to perform in an operational capacity using traditional battle assembly appropriation or a new appropriation using the same money but built for operational requirements.

The second recommendation with an almost perfect score was for 12304b authority modification. Recognition of the need for a new authority to support the operational requirements of CCDRs is what created Section 12304b. More recent literature from all echelons has indicated a need for the RC to increase its capability for rapid response missions. While the 12304b authority provides the best vehicle for this response, it is currently only authorized for pre-planned missions and not emergent requirements inside the same fiscal year. MCUs, as well as the entire RC, will benefit from an expansion of 12304b, which allows flexible use inside of a current fiscal year.

A larger theme which emerged from the literature was the near-unanimous support for the "operational reserve," but some disagreement over whether it should be a noun or remain a verb. In other words, there appears to be strong support in favor of distinctly separating the RC into "Operational" and "Strategic" components, with distinct missions, expectations, and resourcing levels. There was also support for keeping the RC

intact as it is today but creating a single unified definition of what it means to use the RC in an "operational capacity." Under this construct, the same unit could float between a strategic level of lower tempo and traditional training to being "operationalized" and expected to perform at higher tempos to include exercise support and operational mission support. This thesis supports the former and recommends a clear divide between operational units and strategic units with policy supporting this doctrinal and organizational change.

The fourth policy recommendation is unchanged from the R1 position. USARC must amend will-train policy for MCUs. This remains one of the changes able to provide an immediate positive impact to MCUs. Having to manage reclassification training pipelines in addition to all other administrative and operational requirements should not exist within MCUs. MCUs should be operationally focused, not force generation focused.

The fifth policy recommendation for a clean delineation in TPFDD requirements between MCU-C1s and MCU-C2/3s is to help prioritize resources of personnel, equipment, and funding in a new operational reserve model. MCUs that are currently misaligned based on component balance, such as an MCU-C3 expected to respond to time-sensitive requirements, sets the unit up for failure and the force requestor up for disappointment. Aligning an MCU-C1 with emergent missions, that inherently require action in less than 30 days, allows both components to be successful.

The sixth recommendation for a change in how the NDAA directs end strength is one of the most important recommendations for creating the foundation for future military reform. Switching from "whole persons" to "man-years" would allow a modular, flexible, RC to exist. TAA could then reassess MTOEs and TDAs based on how much

time within an FY does a position need to be active for a unit to still function as required. For example, some positions may only require active duty status for six months or nine months, with the remainder serving in an inactive status. The ability to tailor individual positions inside UICs could rapidly expand the overall capability and capacity of the Army without increasing cost.

The seventh recommendation pairs with a similar one for the operational reserve. When MCUs align against a TPFDD, the RC soldiers need a flexible appropriation, which can leverage current fiscal year funding. Presently, 12304b does not allow this because, within the POM, planning must occur at least 12 months in advance. Without this flexibility, MCUs are still reliant on the much larger RC mobilization vehicles such as 12304a, 12302, and 12301.

The policy recommendation is for the Army to create a pay policy that incentivizes RC soldiers who choose to serve in higher tempo units, or in Operational Reserve units similar to the earlier recommendation. Like jump-status, or foreign language incentive pay, a tiered incentive structure would attract those RC soldiers who have the time and motivation to contribute more in a given FY towards the defense of the nation.

R2 Informed Position Doctrine Recommendations

Table 17. R2 Informed Position Doctrine Recommendations

R2 Recommendation	Impact	Priority	Consensus	Sources	Total
9. Doctrine should define the purpose and types of missions for which MCUs are most suited and provide consolidated guidance on how and when to employ its mix of components' assets.	2	2	4	4	12
10. Doctrinally tie the Operational Reserve to Latest Arrival Date (LAD) times. Operational Reserve equals 15-45 days from mobilization to BOG at JRSOI, greater than 45 days equal Strategic Reserve.	3	3	3	3	12
11. Propose a new vision for MCUs – a force structure whose intent is to maximize capabilities which require unique force packages leveraging strength of both active and reserve components	3	2	3	3	11

Source: Created by author.

The first doctrinal recommendation is to review the capabilities that the MCU force structure provides, and then doctrinally capture the types of capabilities, missions, and operational requirements they are best suited to accomplish. This should begin by examining the current MCUs which have been in existence the longest, and then be refined further.

The second recommendation is broader in scope and ties to the earlier policy recommendation. A concept with defined metrics must separate the operational reserve from the strategic reserve. The most basic of these separations being LAD times beginning no earlier than 45 days for Strategic Reserve units. Capabilities should define the unit organization, and capabilities needed earlier than 45 days in an emergent

operational requirement should reside in the Operational Reserve. A graphic which first appeared in the *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves* report in 2008 is updated to reflect this recommendation. MCUs reside underneath full-time active duty on the far left, but with direct linkage to the Operational Reserve force.



Figure 13. Total Force Manpower Pool Concept with Operational and Strategic Reserve

Source: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2008), 348.

The MCU force structure needs new goals and revised intent. A revision should refocus MCUs on their role as a bridge between AC and RC and the force employment concepts required for MDO beginning in 2028. Using the MCU force structure where it is most effective, is worth capturing and codifying in doctrine and regulation.

R2 Informed Position Organization Recommendations

Table 18. R2 Informed Position Organization Recommendations

R2 Recommendation	Impact	Priority	Consensus	Sources	Total
12. Design MCUs around "units of action" comprised of no more than 10 soldiers	3	3	4	4	14
13. Company Command teams must have at least one full-time staff position.	4	4	2	2	12
14. Remove Reserve Component will-train positions from MCU MTOEs	4	4	2	2	12
15. TAA should assess units with capabilities and missions suited for MCU strengths (cyber, MI, Signal, Civil Affairs, other enabler units).	2	3	3	3	11
16. MCUs' UICs should be dynamic. A standing "mobilized UIC" should exist per company to allow rapid transfer of Reserve Component soldiers while maintaining chain of command.	4	3	3	1	11

Source: Created by author.

The first recommendation for smaller "units of action" is the reinforcement of an already successful TTP throughout most of the Army Reserve. Due to their combat support or combat service support role, many Army Reserve units tend to task organize around team or squad sized elements. This task organization is particularly useful in MCUs where leaders can group soldiers by several different metrics depending on the mission requirements. The higher command remains successful if the capability requested from the MCU fits the "unit of action" it can deliver. Friction develops when suspense dates for multiple teams or entire company-size elements exceed the capacity of MCU full-time staff due to RC administrative requirements.

Organization recommendation number two, for having at least one company leader as full-time staff, has not changed since the R1 position. Literature was not robust concerning this topic because most of it remained at the strategic and operational levels. Company leadership is a tactical level recommendation, but one that is essential to MCUs regardless of type. The DUIC nature of MCUs does create additional administrative requirements. In MCU-C2s and MCU-C3s, short suspense tasks require company and battalion leadership to constantly be working to maintain readiness status and availability of TPU soldiers. MCUs without a least one member of company leadership as full-time staff have much higher potential to fail during times of high operational tempo.[113]

Similar to the previous recommendation, removing RC will-train positions from MCUs is an R1 recommendation with little verbiage change. While it may be controversial to some RC leaders, if MCUs are to be successful in an operational capacity, the burden of additional force generation requirements that come with traditional TPU commands cannot exist. MCUs must have a ready pool of soldiers from which to create units-of-action. As stated in chapter 1, the training pipeline for MOSs that require security clearances can be upwards of three years. The Strategic Reserve is the appropriate place for the task of force generation for the Operational Reserve.

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[113] This observation is from the author's experience. Lack of company level full time staff creates many issues, but the most significant one is the degradation of the chain of command. If a company commander or first sergeant is not in the office and able to quickly communicate with soldiers, then it will naturally devolve to battalion staff communicating directly with soldiers in order to fill taskings and mission requirements. MCUs supporting operational missions almost never have time to wait for a TPU company command team because there are too many soldier-level administrative tasks to complete after identifying who will complete the task. After this situation happening several times, company leadership becomes detached from the administrative status of their TPU soldiers.

Once the administrative environment becomes more conducive to MCU success, annual TAA should review Army units from all components for consideration of conversion to MCU force structure. Priority could align with units that have shown success as MCUs in the past. However, after duty status reform and other force management changes occur, there may be new units or missions which would also be good MCU candidates.

The last organizational recommendation the 12304b mobilization authority is unique to this paper. The 12304b authority mobilizes a UIC and not individual soldiers. This creates additional complications for MCUs that need to internally mobilize small teams to meet operational requirements instead of entire formations. There is additional administrative work, and there can be additional administrative issues with the creation and management of a "MOB UIC." As discussed earlier, many Reserve units task organize below the company UIC level. Transferring soldiers from multiple companies into a different MOB UIC, with a different chain of command, creates the potential for readiness-tracking, accountability, and UCMJ problems. To solve this, assuming the 12304b process is not changing, is for MOB UICs to be pre-built for all MCUs which perform operational missions. A standing UIC would allow rapid internal transfer of soldiers identified for extended periods of active duty, and it would allow soldiers to remain within their existing chain of command.

R2 Informed Position Personnel Recommendations

Table 19. R2 Informed Position Personnel Recommendations

R2 Recommendation	Impact	Priority	Consensus	Sources	Total
17. Create an "Operational Reserve" Contract option with 50-75% base pay and allowances based on annual active duty status requirements, TRICARE Prime and a no-PCS homestead option. Restrictions on leadership positions and promotion potential would apply.	4	3	2	4	13
18. Incentivize MCU positions for Active Component NCOs and Officers and make them competitively selected.	3	2	3	4	12

Source: Created by author.

The first personnel recommendation may seem radical, but the literature has increasingly supported a more aggressive approach to the continuum of service and component permeability concepts. A “hyper-flexible” reserve contract for both officers and enlisted soldiers would enhance the potential for both the operational and strategic reserve concepts. This new contract would also take advantage of duty status reforms, by matching a soldier’s availability for active duty status with a unit’s operational tempo. While this research did not explore the quantitative side of this recommendation for cost savings or increases, it would be a close comparison. Cost increases from a larger pool of RC soldiers serving at least 180 days of active duty with full health care benefits offsets with a reduction in PCS costs and an increase in operational continuity.

The second recommendation incentivizing MCU positions pairs with the earlier policy recommendation for creating a dynamic RC pay structure based on operational

tempo. MCU positions warrant incentivization because of their unique challenges, cross-component organizational environment, and high visibility nature of their missions. Incentives do not have to be monetary. In this case, a favorable recommendation in DA PAM 600-3 would keep the quality of soldiers in MCUs higher, which is what is required for them to be successful in maintaining both components' soldiers.

Conclusion

Chapter 4's analysis demonstrated the effect of the current body of knowledge on the R1 initial recommendations. Through literature review and several months of reflection, an improved, informed position coalesced in the form of R2 recommendations. These R2 recommendations underwent neutral evaluation criteria, which caused the strongest recommendations to rise above others. These R2 recommendations are presented in chapter 4 with additional discussion to inform stakeholders and the CDM on the linkages between the research questions, the literature, and the recommendations themselves. A chapter 1 figure reintroduced the interconnected relationship of the six key areas with MCUs. All factors and informed positions then serve as the base for the final R3 recommended solutions for the CDM.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Chapter 4 was an analysis of literature, stakeholder positions, and the author's original R1 recommendations, which combined to produce an improved Informed Position (R2). Chapter 5 uses the R2 recommendations and refines them further to create the Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA), the final step of the CBA. In the APCS methodology the Recommended Solution (R3) position is the FSA written for the CDM. Discussion of the R3 within the Kotter Change Model helps shape CDM expectations. The thesis concludes with a re-examination of the research questions posed in chapter 1, recommendations for further research, and the author's lessons learned.

Recommended Solution (R3) for Chief Decision Maker

The CDM for these recommendations is the CSA. The CSA has the authority to direct action on many of the proposed solutions. Recommendations that require DOD or Congressional approval have a higher likelihood of success if supported by the CSA. The table below is the consolidation of all R3 recommended solutions organized by MCU key area in short-term, medium-term, and long-term timeframes.

Table 20. R3 Recommended Solutions Table to the CDM

Key Area	Short Term: 1-2 Years	Medium Term: 3-5 Years	Long Term: 6-10 Years
Total Force Policy	Draft new vision and goals for MCUs. Align the draft with Total Force Policy and the Operational Reserve concept.	Use TAA to identify new units for MCU conversion underneath new MCU vision.	Leverage new end strength computation to further refine balance between personnel, resources, and capabilities.
Duty Status and Authorities Reform	Draft recommendations for changes to 12304b and operational use of RC pay and allowances appropriation.	Submit recommendations to DOD for staffing and inclusion into future NDAA.	Use new flexibility to provide faster, tailored capabilities to force requestors.
Continuum of Service	Recommend new research into continuum of service options.	Build new Army service contracts for new continuum of service initiatives.	Combine new continuum of service options with new end strength computation methods to produce modular MTOEs.
RC Large Scale Combat Operations Support	Direct research on successful MCUs task organization for inclusion in future doctrine and policy.	Expand MCU-C1 force structure use to mitigate risk within 17-Gap analysis.	Align MCUs with TPFDDs once improvements in operational appropriation are complete.
Operational and Strategic Reserve Components	Direct removal of will-train and non-DMOSQ soldiers from MCUs. Direct Research into dividing the Army's RC into Operational and Strategic Components.	Doctrinally align MCUs based 1235.12. Direct that all MCU company command teams have 1 FTS position. Present recommendation on OR/SR concept to DOD.	Implement changes to Army RC based on approved NDAA.

Source: Created by author.

Implementation Plan and End State of Recommended Solution

MCUs require update and inclusion in Army Total Force policy, which in turn should align with the operational reserve concept. The CDM should approve new goals

and a new vision for the MCU force structure within the next two years. This updated vision will help drive decision making within TAA in preparation for duty status reform, updates to authorities, and MDO implementation.

The CDM should direct a DA level operational planning team to draft recommendations for changes appropriations for DOD staffing within the next four years. These recommendations should consider anticipated duty status reform as well as the future use of the RC as an operational entity in support of CCDR requirements.

The CDM should recommend the DOD support further research into the continuum of service alternatives to full-time active duty. Based on the results of this research, the Army should build new service contracts that take advantage of these new service opportunities and use force management to modify MTOEs and TDAs around anticipated approval dates.

The CDM should direct case study research into MCUs that have managed to exist for greater than 15 years. The results of this research should drive the new vision for MCUs and also provide best practices for inclusion in doctrine. Exploration of MCU-C1 force structure should occur as an option that could expand combat support and combat service support capabilities which previously only resided in the RC. This analysis would then drive a TPFDD review to ensure Army capabilities were still nested as needed within CCDR requirements.

The CDM should direct removal of will-train positions and transfer of non-DMOSQ soldiers from MCUs within 12 months. The CDM should also direct an Army level planning team to renew research into dividing the RC into operational and strategic components. Within three to five years, all MCUs could doctrinally align as RC units

capable of employment as an operational reserve unit, as defined in DODI 1235.12. The Army should present its research on the new reserve component division to DOD for further refinement at the DOD level. Also, within three years, the CDM should direct that TAA includes modification for one member of MCU company leadership to be FTS from any component or funding source.

The end state for all R3 solutions is an Army that optimizes its resources to meet operational requirements based on modifications to an existing policy, doctrine, force structure, and personnel guidance. The figures below show a graphical representation of the end state after the implementation of R3 solutions. These figures show the change from the current state of the same figures from chapter 1.



Figure 14. End State of Army Manpower Environment after R3 Solution

Source: Created by author.



Figure 15. End State of Army Unit Readiness Environment after R3 Solution

Source: Created by author.

Status of Research Questions

Primary Research Question

The primary research question was: Will changes in force management DOTMLPF-P factors increase Army multicomponent units' ability to provide a scalable capability for military force employers? The literature and recommendations create an optimistic answer to this question. However, the number of obstacles and the changes needed within future legislation suggest that the earliest MCU force structure could see wider adoption would be in the next 5 to 10 years.

Secondary Questions

The first secondary research question was: Have MCUs achieved original Army Total Force Policy objectives, and should pursuit of new objectives for MCUs occur? The answer to this question is yes. The Army has done a commendable job at implementing all seven facets of the original policy. This success is why setting new goals for even better component integration will continue to keep the Army ready to win the Nation's wars.

The next secondary research question was: What policies have the greatest influence on MCU operational capabilities, and is the improvement of these policies feasible? Statutory RC limitations constrain MCU operational capabilities. The literature demonstrated the most important policies that influence employment of RC forces are *Title 10 Subtitle E. Reserve Component*, DODDs, and DODIs which specifically address use of the RC.[114] These Statutes and DOD-level documents affect all services and take many years to change. The most effective means of change for these documents is a recommendation from Congressionally directed committees or changes to policy found in updates to the National Defense Strategy. Current and retired General Officers chair these sizeable strategic-level publications, and their final products are the cumulative efforts of thousands of hours of collaborative research. Even then, they will often need third party help in conducting quantitative studies on a specific initiative such as the Blended Retirement System. However, change is possible, and literature also showed that many ideas which committees research begin as recommendations within military academic

[114] Specifically, DODD 1200.17, DODI 1215.06, and DODI 1235.12.

papers and journal articles. Furthermore, if an idea is valid enough, its recommendation will continue to resurface even if not adopted the first time, such as the 20-year journey of the Duty Status Reform initiative.

The next secondary research question was: What units are best suited for MCU structure, and what criteria determine that assessment? The literature suggested, and study of the FMSweb database confirmed that under current conditions, the units best suited for MCU force structure are CS and CSS units. They possess unique missions that can task organize in small units-of-action. Specifically, military intelligence, air defense, theater sustainment, theater signal, and space and information operations commands are the most successful at providing operational capabilities within the limits of the current operational environment. The recommended changes will make these units even more capable, and widen the aperture of new units to take advantage of the MCU force structure.

The last secondary research question was: Where should Army MCUs fall on the spectrum between operational and strategic reserve concepts? The literature and subsequent analysis recommend MCUs perform as operational reserve units. MCU-C1s already operate as active component units because, in most cases, over 90% of their personnel are active component. MCU-C2s and MCU-C3s, in contrast, rarely have more than 30% of personnel as FTS, but many have high operational tempos comparable to AC units. The literature has demonstrated, and analysis has recommended, that MCUs can and should be operational entities, but authorities must allow an MCU the ability to provide operational support at the speed CCDR's require.

Recommendations for Further Research

While authoring this thesis, there were many ideas, scopes, and methodologies that interested the author, which time did not allow for continued exploration. The MCU force structure requires further research in the form of comparative case studies. A case study evaluating multiple MCUs using interviews from current leaders and AARs from exercises and deployments would refine the recommendations of this research.

Quantitative studies for the continuum of service recommendations are needed to move this initiative to the next stage of approval. Scoping this study would be a massive undertaking, but perhaps the best place to start would be a study utilizing a survey of RC soldiers from all services. A DOD-wide survey to create visibility, likely for the first time, of RC availability would give DOD leaders a reference point to base future decisions. If there is a large population of RC service members who would serve greater than 50 days a year, then exploring options to harness this hidden service potential is worth legitimate consideration.

Lessons Learned

The author learned an immense amount during the process of creating this thesis. Professionally, the author gained a new appreciation and understanding from learning the life cycle of a military idea, which begins as a recommendation and ends as an approved part of an NDAA. While not discussed in this paper, observing this cycle play out for changes such as Reserve Component compensation, the creation of 12304b authority, the Blended Retirement System, and Duty Status reform showed the author that the professional community is always in contact with the academic community.

The author learned much about the process of research itself. This new knowledge included how solving large problems requires rigor and validation from multiple different methodologies. The author also learned from studying the bibliographies within the body of knowledge for this thesis how the academic community builds upon itself over time. From reading many distinct parts and sections of Title 10, the author discovered the origin of many pieces of RC common knowledge. This research exposed the author to several areas of Joint policy and doctrine that were not part of the regular curriculum of the Command and General Staff Officers' Course but will be of benefit in the future.

The idea for this thesis began as a desire to improve a force structure. It ends with a collection of synthesized recommendations capable of achieving this improvement. The author hopes that this thesis provides a refreshment of older ideas and an introduction of new ones as service members all strive towards the same goal of defending the Nation while being stewards of the profession of arms.

APPENDIX A

MCU VENN DIAGRAM OF CRITICAL FACTORS



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APPENDIX B

ARMY MANPOWER ENVIRONMENT AND UNIT READINESS FIGURES



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

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

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

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APPENDIX C

MCU DUTY DAY FIGURES



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

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

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APPENDIX D

CONTENT ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION MATRICIES FROM METHODOLOGY



Source: Created by author with influence from Klaus Krippendorff's *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, 2013).

MCU R2 Evaluation Matrix Criteria			
Impact to MCU	Recommendation Priority	Stakeholder Consensus	Recommendation Source
4 - Positive impact to daily operations	4 - Must do for MCUs to provide scalable capability for force employers	4 - Likely Unanimous support	4 - Multiple, at least 1 Congressional study, 1 funded study, and 2 academic or journal sources
3 - Positive impact, change to annual ops, no change to daily ops	3 - Should do for MCUs to provide scalable capability for force employers	3 - Majority support	3 - Multiple, at least 1 Congressional or funded study and 1 academic or journal source
2 - Important, but little tangible change	2 - Nice to do for MCUs to provide scalable capability for force employers	2 - Divided support	2 - Multiple, but only 1 Congressional or funded study and 1 academic or journal source
1 - Important, but no change	1 - Would not impact MCUs in a meaningful way	1 - Minority support	1 - Single source

Source: Created by author.

APPENDIX E

RECOMMENDATIONS FROM LITERATURE NOT INCLUDED IN CHAPTER 2 AND USED IN EVALUATION MATRIX COMPUTATION

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Owens, Dallas D., Lieutenant Colonel, USA. "AC/RC Integration: Today's Success and Transformations Challenge." Monograph, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2001.	2001	Research is needed to determine if there is greater effectiveness, in terms of integration, efficiency, readiness, etc., from particular combinations of echelons, branches, and component headquarters than from others. Further research should determine if MCUs produce better results, using the same norms, than more traditional and less invasive affiliation programs.	O	49
		A Cross-component Migration Program has also been proposed to allow relatively easy movement of personnel from one component to another, without damaging careers. There are clear integrative advantages of such a program, but there are significant personnel management obstacles to overcome before it would be practical.	P,Po	51
		If [component] integration remains a goal, making any mission exclusively RC should be avoided. Requiring specialization to cross component boundaries will help, but not guarantee, the prestige of the mission and avoid the return to "separate but not equal" components.	D,Po	51
O'Donovan, Thomas E., Lieutenant Colonel, USA. "The Multi-Component Concept, A Case Study of AC/RC Integration in Action." Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2002.	2002	Incorporate effectively into guidance and doctrine	D	25
		Increase full-time manning	O	22
		Align MC units with MC chains of command	O	24
		Reduce the number of components [in an MCU] to two	D,O,Po	22
		Align AC/RC experience in both command and staff positions	O,P	24
		Reduce the geographic footprint	F,Po	22
		Clarify the objectives of the program	Po	24
		Establish the definitive endstate	Po	24
		Rotate the component for selected leadership positions	P	23

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Resnak, Bruce A., Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. "Multicomponent Units: Worthwhile Endeavor?" Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2003.	2003	Units requiring short or no notice mobilization and deployment should not be considered candidates for MCUs.	O,Po	14
		Future employment should look at MCUs at the company level that require short duration, limited capabilities operations	O,Po	14
Wormuth, Christine E., Michele A. Flournoy, Patrick T. Henry, and Clark A. Murdock. *The Future of the National Guard and Reserves: The Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Phase III Report* . Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2006.	2006	The military services should give priority to developing a much broader range of programs to implement the continuum of service concept.	P,Po	A-6
		Authorize the Service Secretaries to offer flexible compensation schemes in support of Continuum of Service initiatives.	P,Po	A-7
		An outside panel of expert should conduct a detailed, comprehensive, cross-Service review of Active and Reserve Component manpower requirements.	Po	A-2
		The Department of Defense needs to propose a new set of mobilization authorities to Congress to enable routine but judicious use of the Reserve Component as part of the operational force.	Po	A-3
		Reduce and rationalize the number of Duty Status subcategories.	Po	A-7
		The Reserve Component should remain multi-mission capable, but does need to broaden its focus to include irregular warfare and preparing for catastrophic or disruptive challenges, just as the active duty military is doing.	D,T	A-1

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Thie, Harry J., Roland J. Yardley, Peter Schirmer, Rudolph H. Ehrenberg, and Penelope Speed. *Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military Units* . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007.	2007	First, adapting what works within a service to other functional areas in the service is a better near-term workforce integration strategy than replicating forms of integration across services. In essence, the goal should be "adapt within rather than force organizational selection from without." For example, if the Army is comfortable with multi-component units, finding more instances where they could be used appears more desirable than mandating use of associate units.	O,Po	40
		Second, moving toward the future, during their force structuring (organizational design) processes, the services should provide policy guidance that makes workforce integration (e.g., multi-component and associate units) a consideration given certain factors	O,Po	41
		Third, the services should consider performing more evaluation of workforce integration against the objectives for it...Increased understanding of the actual effects of workforce integration within units can lead to greater emphasis on the respective strengths of the workforces and more efficient use of resources.	O,Po	41

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Ellis, John D., Colonel, USAR and Laura McKnight Mackenzie, Colonel (Retired), ARNG. "Operational Reservations: Considerations for a Total Army Force." Report, Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle, PA, 2014.	2014	Define with clarity and certainty: what "OR" means; the mission(s) of the AC and RC; and the ultimate "demand signal" of the AC to mobilize reserve elements. Specify what missions can be accomplished solely by the AC, which require RC assistance, and in what time frame.	D	50
		Determine if (or when) it is feasible to require identical standards of readiness and professional development as called for by ATFP	D	51
		Clarify the mission command of RC units with respect to alignment, allocation, and apportionment to AC and geographical combatant commands.	O	50
		Complete a comprehensive, apples-to-apples cost-benefit analysis to determine the real costs of an OR with respect to the levels of proficiency desired.	O,T,Po	50
		Develop personnel, communications, supply, maintenance, training, and readiness tracking systems that are identical (or at least complementary) for all components. Make service in each component "interchangeable" to facilitate the continuum of service.	M	51
Rorvik, Kurt A., Lieutenant Colonel, ARNG. "Ready, Reliable, and Relevant: The Army Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015.	2015	The Army RC should continue its role as an operational reserve in support of future operational requirements.	D,O,T,Po	64
		Continuing the use of the Army RC as an operational reserve requires the implementation of a new mobilization authority, one that will be more lasting, functional, and suitable for the current operating environment.	Po	64

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Harwell, James P., Lieutenant Colonel, USA. "Building a Better Force: Regular Army / Reserve Components Integration in the Army Chemical Corps." Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2016.	2016	The Army should fully resource wartime capabilities utilizing additional ready reserve personnel.	O,P,Po	38
		The Army should increase the development of multicomponent headquarters and assign forces from across the components based on force allocation in support of Combatant Command requirements.	O	36-37
		The Army must move beyond the existing Total Force Policy to a new policy approach that leverages multiple tools to increase the integration of all components.	Po	48
		In multi-component organizations, the Army should fill personnel requirements using ADOS-AD. While these personnel would meet RA manning requirements, they would represent RCs interests at all levels from battalion to the Department of the Army.	Po	42
		The Army should build all RA CBRN battalions and brigades as integrated multi-component headquarters. These headquarters should be staffed with sufficient RA and Active Guard and Reserve personnel to execute Training and Readiness Authority (TRA) or Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) of assigned subordinates and execute the first ninety days of contingency operations.	O	38
		ADOS-OC should be moved from OCO funding to the base budget and captured in the Army Program Objective Memorandum to support force generation requirements in support of combatant command Theater Campaign Plans and emergent requirements.	Po	42-43

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Fernandes, Benjamin. "Multicomponent Units and the Future of the Army." *War on the Rocks* , February 15, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/02/multicomponent-units-and-the-future-of-the-army/.	2016	MCU approaches should be focused where they are most likely to succeed, such as cyber or military police units likely to benefit from civilian occupations, and with fewer substantial large-unit collective tasks	O	6
Leib, Eric J. Captain, USAR. "The Role of the Reserve Component as an Operational Reserve." *Military Review* (March-April 2016): 99-104. https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20160430_art019.pdf.	2016	Fully implement Army Total Force strategies, concepts, and policies	Po	100-101
		Create additional MCU headquarters to better utilize capabilities inherent to each component	O	103-104
		Integrate geographically colocated AC and RC forces	T,F	101-102
Briand, Chris Marie, Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. "Operational Army Reserve Sustainability Fact or Fiction?" Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA, 2016.	2016	A new stratified readiness model could target and prioritize the resourcing of RC units based on Total Force readiness requirements and mission objectives.	O	22
		Identified gaps can serve as the foundation for establishing a three tiered stratified readiness model that would specify pre-mobilization readiness levels and the duration of the post-mobilization preparation period before deployment.	O	22
		Tier One (T1) could consist of early-entry capabilities that are continuously maintained at a high level of readiness and are deployable in under 30 days after mobilization to meet contingency force requirements. Tier Two (T2) could consist of rotational follow-on or theater engagement forces that would have the ability to mobilize within 90 days of an alert order followed by only an additional 30-60 days of post mobilization	O	23

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Gobrick, John, Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. "Cultural Changes Required in the Army to Truly Achieve a Total Force." Research Report, Air War College Air University, 2016.	2016	Reorganize the Title XI support to the Army Reserve by disestablishing the active Army's training support structure and harvesting those positions into operational multicomponent units and embedded positions throughout the Army Reserve.	O	iv
		Re-implement the exchange of Command Selection List (CSL) designees for battalion and above commands between components.	P	v
		Make active Army Soldier assignments to Army Reserve or operational multicomponent units competitively selected.	P	13
Striegel, Brad, Lieutenant Colonel, USAR. "Maintaining the Operational Reserve." *Small Wars Journal* , January 2016, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/maintaining-operational-reserve.	2016	RC forces should continue to serve as an operational reserve	Po	1
		Deemphasize the terms "Strategic Reserve" and "Operational Reserve" and just use the term "Reserve." It is irrelevant if we label the term "Reserve" with descriptive adjectives because the RC will be called on as needed by NCA regardless.	D	7
		MCUs should be heavily scrutinized with a critical eye before they are implemented as a force structure	O	5
		Multi-Component Units should be analyzed and developed with caution as there are several limiting factors to them that can inhibit their effectiveness.	O	7

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Barno, David and Nora Bensahel. *The Future of the Army: Today, Tomorrow, and the Day After Tomorrow* . Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2016.	2016	Expand personnel reforms and definitions of service by insitutionalizing permeability and lifelong service	O,P,Po	40-41
		Organize the total force by deployment timelines by designating a Rapid Response Force, an Operational Response Force, and a Strategic Response Force	O	25-26
		Redesign the structures of the operational and institutional Army by pursuing modularity at the battalion level	O	39-40
		Reconstitute capabilities for rapid expansion by the practice of standing up new units and building an Army	O,Po	21-23
		Fully integrate the Army's Active and Reserve Components by creating hybrid BCTs, sourcing predictable rotational missions from the RC first and increasing the Army's focus on homeland defense	D,O,Po	12-16
Pint, Ellen M., Christopher M. Schnaubelt, Stephen Dalzell, Jaime L. Hastings, Penelope Speed, and Michael G. Shanley. *Review of Army Total Force Policy Implementation* . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.	2017	Monitor types of operations designated for RC units under this [12304b] authority, and the contributions of these missions to relieving stress on AC forces and maintaining an operational reserve	Po	100
		Develop goals and metrics for these [MCU] programs and adjust policies and practices as necessary to meet those goals	O	99
		Monitor whether MCU assignments will have negative effects on promotion opportunities	P	101
		Assess the status of the regulatory changes required by the ATFP and set a firm timeline to publish the remaining changes	D	98

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Schnaubelt, Christopher M., Raphael S. Cohen, Molly Dunigan, Gian Gentile, Jaime L. Hastings, Joshua Klimas, Jefferson P. Marquis, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Bonnie Triezenberg, and Michelle Darrah Ziegler. *Sustaining the Army's Reserve Components as an Operational Force* . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017.	2017	Continue operational employment of the Reserve Components	Po	115
		Consider amending the One-Year mobilized time limit	Po	118-119
		Embrace nonstandard force packages	O,Po	120-121
Behrman, Robert A. Major, PhD, USA. "Reserve Component Employment in Strategic Competition." *The Landpower Essay Series 19-4* . AUSA Institute of Land Warfare. (December 2019). https://www.ausa.org/sites/default/files/publications/LPE-19-4-Reserve-Component-Employment-in-Strategic-Competition.pdf.	2019	The Office of the Secretary of Defense should develop policies and processes for requesting mobilization of critical reserve component capabilities under 10 U.S.C. § 12304 as a flexible deterrent option (FDO) to provide the president additional options prior to authorizing 10 U.S.C. § 12302	Po	4
		Combatant commanders should plan FDOs for the early mobilization of blunt, surge and homeland layer requirements, especially forward-stationed forces, early deploying enablers, mobilization capabilities for assigned forces, required headquarters augmentation or homeland defense forces.	Po	4
		The Office of the Secretary of Defense should develop processes to allow CCMDs, through their respective component commands, to develop requests for forces and budgets for their assigned reserve component forces for mobilization under 10 U.S.C. §12304b authority.	Po	4
		The Office of the Secretary of Defense and joint staff should treat as operational missions shaping operations in support of global campaigns not covered by the enduring 10 U.S.C. §12302 authority for operations against violent extremist organizations.	Po	4
		The secretary of defense should develop and propose, and Congress should approve, a legislative change to 10 U.S.C. §12304b expanding the authority to missions budgeted in the defense budget materials or overseas contingency operations appropriations.	Po	4

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
McAllister, John J., Major, USA. "Assessment on the Multi-Component (MCU) Concept: How Achieving True Total Force Integration (TFI) can Increase Army Lethality." White Paper, Report to the Department of the Army, 505th Military Intelligence Brigade (Theater), Camp Bullis, TX, 2019.	2019	The concept of MCUs and Total Force Integration needs to be articulated in Title 10 to facilitate the Army's continued development of the Total Force. A clear definition of MCUs, with a Task and Purpose, needs to be created and added to both the Regular Army and Reserve sections of Title 10.	D,Po	7
		DA needs to look at one major overhaul; the creation of a new USAR MCU Branch Manager Section at HRC that assigns COMPO III Soldiers to MCUs.	O,P	7
		Require COMPO III Soldiers assigned to MCUs to meet qualifications prior to MCU assignments	P	7
		A USAR MCU status similar to TPU status except the Soldier's task and purpose would be to conduct operations during their duty days.	Po	4
		Move previously appropriated training funds along with TPU Soldiers to the newly created MCU appropriation which would fund operational support	Po	5
		Title 10 USC needs to specifically address Reserve Soldiers who are assigned to MCUs. This will enable USAR Soldiers who are assigned to MCUs to do their 38-53 days per year in a way that best supports their unit's mission without being mobilized.	Po	7

Source	Year	Literature Recommendations	DOTMLPF Category	Page
Linick, Michael E., Igor Mikolic-Torreira, Katharina Ley Best, Alexander Stephenson, Jeremy M. Eckhause, Isaac Baruffi, Christopher Carson, Eric J. Duckworth, Melissa Bauman. *A Throughput-Based Analysis of Army Active Component/Reserve Component Mix for Major Contingency Surge Operations* . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019.	2019	Focus investments on maintaining readiness in the types of RC units that must or should deploy early	O,T	65
		Consider re-creating the WARTRACE and CAPSTONE-like process of matching specfic units (at UIC level) to the TPFDD demands to better focus peacetime and post-mobilization training	O,T	65
		Focus on deploying smaller, quicker-to-train RC units in the earlier periods of a conflict, and defer the larger, more-complex RC formations to later stages of major operations and transition or stabilization operations	D,O,Po	64
Rohn, Laurinda L., Agnes Gereben Schaefer, Gregory A. Schumacher, Jennifer Kavanagh, Caroline Baxter, and Amy Grace Donohue. *Integrating Active and Reserve Component Staff Organization: Improving the Chances of Success* . Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019.	2019	Ensure that the planned organizational structure is consistent with the vision for the integration	O	100
		Establish Unity of Command to the greatest extent possible in the integrated organization	O	106
		Communicate the vision for the integration regularly	L,Po	98
		Work to develop a total force culture in the integrated organization	L,Po	101
		Articulate the need for change and adopt a clear vision for the integration	O,Po	97
		Explicitly consider statutory barriers and potenital work-arounds	O,Po	107

Source: Created by author.

APPENDIX F

APPLIED PROFESSIONAL CASE STUDY RECOMMENDATION

TABLES FROM R1, R2, AND R3

R1 Recommendation	DOTMLPF Category
Amend Title 10 USC to recognize and define multicomponent units	Policy
Amend Title 10 USC to create a new section for short term mobilization in an active status for Reserve component members	Policy
Create follow-on policies for appropriate short term operational use of Reserve component forces within MCUs	Policy
Create new will-train policy for soldiers wanting to transfer to MCUs. Become MOSQ first then process transfer	Policy
Amend Global Forces Manning Integration Guidance to authorize CCDR utilization of Reserve component members in an active status regardless of Reserve unit mobilization status	Policy
Create an Army Techniques Publication (ATP) for Army multicomponent units (MCUs)	Doctrine
Remove will-train positions from MCUs	Organization
Make MCU company commander and first sergeant positions AGR	Organization
Add one finance officer and NCO to BDE level MCUs	Organization
Create new position at DA G-3/5/7 or OCAR G-3/5/7 for MCU development	Organization
Create training program for MCU staff on correct procedures for employing different component forces	Training
Create training program for CCDR and ASCC on MCU employment	Leadership
Create training program for MCU leaders on new policies and doctrine. Program also teaches appropriate procedures for employing different component forces	Leadership
Create Additional Skill Identifier for key development positions in MCUs	Personnel
MCU leadership positions at battalion and brigade level should only be available to MCU ASI personnel - After appropriate timeframe of first recommendation	Personnel
Reserve component assignment to MCUs should be managed by ARCD	Personnel

Source: Created by author.

R2 Recommendation	DOTMLPF Category	Impact to MCU	Priority	Stake-holder Consensus	Source	Total
MCU's Reserve Component Pay and Allowances funding must be able to support operational requirements during a soldier's 38-53 active duty status days per year.	Policy	4	4	4	4	16
Utilization of 12304b authority should include requirements that emerge within the year of execution to allow CCDRs the ability to use MCUs as a flexible deterrent option.	Policy	4	4	3	4	15
Codify the terms "Operational Reserve" and "Strategic Reserve" and create stratified resource models applicable to both.	Policy	3	3	3	4	13
Create new will-train policy for soldiers wanting to transfer to MCUs.	Policy	4	4	2	2	12
As defined in DODI 1235.12 MCU-C1 should be designed to respond to time-critical emergent requirements (<120 days), MCU-C2/3 to standard emergent (>120 days).	Policy	2	3	3	4	12
Use "man years" in NDAA when establishing end strength for all components to create a modular foundation for more dynamic force modernization.	Policy	3	3	2	4	12
MCUs aligned with a TPFDD need flexible appropriation which facilitates operational employment for unplanned emergent requirements.	Policy	3	3	3	2	11
Create pay incentive structure for Reserve Component soldiers based on unit optempo and other factors to make Operational Reserve units more attractive	Policy	4	2	3	2	11
Doctrinally tie the Operational Reserve to Latest Arrival Date (LAD) times. Operational Reserve equals 15-45 days from mobilization to BOG at JRSOI, greater than 45 days equal Strategic Reserve.	Doctrine	3	3	3	3	12
Propose a new vision for MCUs – a force structure whose intent is to maximize capabilities which require unique force packages leveraging strength of both active and reserve components	Doctrine	3	2	3	3	11

R2 Recommendation	DOTMLPF Category	Impact to MCU	Priority	Stake-holder Consensus	Source	Total
Design MCUs around "units of action" comprised of no more than 10 soldiers	Organization	3	3	4	4	14
Company Command teams must have at least one full-time staff position.	Organization	4	4	2	2	12
Remove Reserve Component will-train positions from MCU MTOEs	Organization	4	4	2	2	12
TAA should assess units with capabilities and missions suited for MCU strengths (cyber, MI, Signal, Civil Affairs, other enabler units).	Organization	2	3	3	3	11
MCUs' UICs should be dynamic. A standing "mobilized UIC" should exist to allow rapid Reserve Component soldier transfer to and from.	Organization	4	3	3	1	11
Create the 3/4 Contract Option. Pays 75% base pay and allowances in exchange for full health care coverage and homestead ability. Restrictions on leadership positions would also apply.	Personnel	4	3	2	4	13
Require Reserve Component soldiers to be MOS qualified prior to MCU assignment.	Personnel	4	4	2	2	12
Incentivize MCU positions for Active Component NCOs and Officers and make them competitively selected.	Personnel	3	2	3	4	12

Source: Created by author.

R3 Recommendations			
Key Area	**Short Term: 1-2 Years**	**Medium Term: 3-5 Years**	**Long Term: 6-10 Years**
Total Force Policy	Draft new vision and goals for MCUs. Align the draft with Total Force Policy and the Operational Reserve concept.	Use TAA to identify new units for MCU conversion underneath new MCU vision.	Leverage new end strength computation to further refine balance between personnel, resources, and capabilities.
Duty Status and Authorities Reform	Draft recommendations for changes to 12304b and operational use of RC pay and allowances appropriation.	Submit recommendations to DOD for staffing and inclusion into future NDAA.	Use new flexibility to provide faster, tailored capabilities to force requestors.
Continuum of Service	Recommend new research into continuum of service options.	Build new Army service contracts for new continuum of service initiatives.	Combine new continuum of service options with new end strength computation methods to produce modular MTOEs.
RC Large Scale Combat Operations Support	Direct research on successful MCUs task organization for inclusion in future doctrine and policy.	Expand MCU-C1 force structure use to mitigate risk within 17-Gap analysis.	Align MCUs with TPFDDs once improvements in operational appropriation are complete.
Operational and Strategic Reserve Components	Direct removal of will-train and non-DMOSQ soldiers from MCUs. Direct Research into dividing the Army's RC into Operational and Strategic Components.	Doctrinally align MCUs based 1235.12. Direct that all MCU company command teams have 1 FTS position. Present recommendation on OR/SR concept to DOD.	Implement changes to Army RC based on approved NDAA.

Source: Created by author.

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