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Analytical Study  
THEATER CHRONOLOGICAL CHARTS--WW II

Edward B. Bissell, Lt Col, Inf

5 June 1947

Theater chronological charts, WW II, by Lt Col E. B. Bissell. CGSC. 1946-47.

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## THEATER CHRONOLOGICAL CHARTS -- WWII

1. Problem: - To present in chronological chart form some of the major and minor activities of various headquarters and agencies in the North African Theater of Operations, the Mediterranean Theater of Operations, the European Theater of Operations, and the Central, South, and Southwest Pacific Theaters, and to compare the dates of conception of certain operations with the dates of execution.

2. Discussion: - a. To present a complete chronology of the selected theaters many volumes would be necessary, but the months of research required would be justified by the end product -- a planning yardstick for various operations under an assortment of diverse conditions. If we sample the activities of the major war efforts (Tabs B, C, and D) and bind them together with the succession of international conferences of Allied Chiefs of State (Tab A), we at once gain an insight into the continuity of World War II, both from a logistical and a tactical and a strategic viewpoint, and have a skeleton on which to build a complete analysis of the "plan -- execution" time lag.

b. No attempt is made here to delineate in detail the progress of the various campaigns in any theater -- such is not essential to the overall picture of the chronology of World War II; however it would be of no avail to draw detailed conclusions without considering the impact of apparently minor "front-line" problems on the logisticians and planners. Indeed several of these "minor" deficiencies and considerations changed the plans and schedules of Armies and a neglect or disregard of others contributed generously to near disaster.

3. Conclusions: - a. That the obvious, emphasized, and reemphasized principles and guiding basic conceptions as laid down in our service manuals were often overlooked or intentionally cast aside.

b. That when the "book was thrown away" operations succeeded only by the added drive, initiative, hard work, ingenuity and cooperation of capable men -- and fortunately they were usually at hand to solve the problems, even if in an



expensive, time-consuming way, necessitated by unorthodox planning.

c. That the Allies' strategic intelligence at the outset of World War II was either lacking concerning many vital spots or was not available to or disregarded by the planners concerned, e.g. North African transportation deficiencies; Hollandia, New Guinea port possibilities; Paris area rail capabilities; Philippine Island civilian and guerilla supply needs. Such lack of appreciation or nonavailability of intelligence renders all planning a nebulous trial and error effort.

d. The basic concepts and fundamental principles of the functioning of the lines of communications have not changed since pre-World War I doctrine. As in tactics, the only thing new in World War II logistics was the application of these concepts and the tailoring of the organization and operations to fit the terrain and to accommodate new implements of warfare. World War II planning time factors, tempered with a keen analysis of the capabilities of new war machines, will serve as a good guide for planning future operations.

e. In spite of the great variation in nomenclature of logistical organizations of the Pacific Theaters, there was no essential difference in the logistical support operations except those occasioned by the basic nature of island warfare and by the necessity for closer continuous cooperation between Army and Navy forces. Where the inter-service coordination assumes great magnitude, the time necessary for preparation also increases in direct proportion.

f. The time necessary to start execution of a plan for a major operation in World War II varied from three to eighteen months depending on many factors some of which were; size of force involved, state of progress of preparation for some other cancelled similar operation in the same area, degree of inter-service and inter-theater coordination involved, special supplies and equipment needed, intelligence concerning the objective area, degree of build-up in supporting bases and estimated duration of enemy resistance.

4. Recommendations: - a. That a detailed study and analysis of each theater and major campaign chronology be made in order to establish a gauge which, when viewed in the light of factors enumerated in par 3f above, can serve to time future planning and execution of operations.

b. That this gauge be continuously adjusted to correct for new methods and new implements of warfare.

## Analytical Study

## Theater Chronological Charts--WW II

## Annex A--International Conferences.

| Date            | Event   | Remarks   |
|-----------------|---|---|
| 11 Dec 41       | Germany and Italy declare war on United States                    |   |
| 1 Jan 42        | Allies Formally formed  | Twenty-six governments sign a pledge to cooperate in waging war against Axis and not to make a separate peace or armistices. Seven other governments signed by 1943.  |
| 6 Feb 42        | Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed by Roosevelt and Churchill.    | At first conference after Pearl Harbor Roosevelt and Churchill appointed Generals Marshall and Arnold, Admirals King and Stark, Field Marshal Dill, Admiral Little, Air Marshal Harris and Lt Gen Wemyss to plan the Anglo-American War effort and to advise them. USSR liaison was through Allied Military Mission to Moscow. Liaison with China through Allied Military Council at Chungking.                     |
| 19-30<br>Oct 42 | MOSCOW conference United States, Great Britain, and Soviet Union. | Preliminary plans to a combined offensive in Europe. Common policies framed to guarantee a democratic peace. An association of all nations to preserve peace conceived.   |
| 14-26<br>Jan 43 | CASABLANCA conference between Roosevelt and Churchill with CCS    | War situation of all theaters surveyed and world strategy planned:--Destroy enemy in Africa; conquer SICILY; extend our control over MEDITERRANEAN and eliminate ITALY; assist CHINA; simultaneous blows against Japs in South, Southwest and North Pacific in summer 1943. Ultimate acclaimed objective: Unconditional surrender of all Axis Powers. Chaing Kai-shek and Stalin were kept informed of discussions. |

| Date                       | Event  | Remarks   |
|----------------------------|--|---|
| 1943<br>14-24 Jan          |  | A decision was made that the time had come to evolve schemes for a cross-channel operation. To plan this operation it was decided to appoint a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander (COSSAC) with a US-British Staff. Mission assigned COSSAC was to plan the cross-channel operation and to plan what should be done if the enemy should collapse. A Supreme Commander had not yet been appointed. COSSAC was organized into three branches: Operations; Intelligence; and Administration. |
| 11-24 Aug<br>1943          | First Quebec Conference<br>President Roosevelt and<br>Prime Minister Churchill<br>Other allies brought into<br>the planning. | Three decisions: hasten invasion of Italy; draw USSR into full concert with Allied powers; recognize French Committee of National Liberation (De Gaulle) as the representative of Free French People who were fighting the Axis.  |
| 22-26 Nov<br>1 Dec<br>1943 | CAIRO Conference<br>President Roosevelt,<br>Prime Minister Churchill,<br>and Generalissimo Chaing<br>Kai-shek                | Three Great Allies pledge: Unrelenting pressure against Japan; to strip Japan to pre-1914 size; to return MANCHURIA, FORMOSA & PESCADORES to CHINA; to make KOREA free and independent in due course.   |
| 28 Nov-<br>1 Dec<br>1943   | TEHERAN conference,<br>President Roosevelt,<br>Prime Minister Churchill,<br>and Marshall Stalin                              | Agreement as to the scope and timing of operations in 1944 against Germany.   |
| 9 Oct<br>1944              | Dumbarton Oaks conference<br>of representatives from<br>U. S., U S S R, United<br>Kingdom, and China.                        | Organization of United Nations planned.   |
| 1945<br>4-11 Feb           | YALTA Conference between<br>Roosevelt, Churchill,<br>and Stalin  | Final plans for military defeat of Germany. Policies for enforcing surrender terms. Occupation agreements. San Francisco conference of 25 April to draw up United Nations Security Organization announced.  |
| 13 Jul                     | Italy declared war on<br>Japan   |   |
| 17 Jul-<br>2 Aug<br>1945   | POTSDAM conference between<br>leaders of Britain, China<br>and the United States   |   |
| 26 Jul<br>1945             | POTSDAM ultimatum<br>delivered to JAPAN  | JAPAN offered another opportunity to surrender or be destroyed.   |
| 30 Jul<br>1945             | POTSDAM ultimatum<br>answered  | Premier Suzuki answered that the Imperial Government of JAPAN would take no notice of the demands.  |

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
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Theater Chronological Charts--WW II

Annex B--Chronology--NATOUSA, MTOUSA

| <u>Date</u>       | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------------|--|---|
| 1942              |  |   |
| 28 Oct-<br>3 Nov. | Battle of EL ALAMEIN   |   |
| 8 Nov.            | North Africa invaded at<br>three points.                                 | Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower<br>in command of North African<br>Theater of Operations as well<br>as Commander in Chief of The<br>Allies. At Algiers little<br>opposition. At Oran French<br>capitulated in 2 days. At<br>Casablanca Vichy French Navy<br>fought bitterly for 5 days.<br>Each Task Force carried 45-60<br>days supply. |
| 10 Nov.           | Mediterranean Base<br>Section established with<br>headquarters at ORAN.  | In support of Central Task<br>Force. Both MBS and ABS re-<br>ported directly to Theater<br>Hq. at ALGIERS. The theater<br>commander himself, therefore,<br>was directly responsible for<br>supply and administration.   |
| 17 Nov.           | Tunisian campaign<br>launched.   |   |
| 30 Dec.           | Atlantic Base Section<br>established with Headquarters<br>at CASABLANCA. | In support of Western Task Force.   |



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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--|---|
| 1943        |  |   |
| 13 Feb.     | Eastern Base Sect activated with Hq. at Constantine.   | At this time the TUNISIAN troops were several hundred miles away from bulk stores, were supported by no service echelon, and were dependent for supplies on a mediocre highway and an obsolescent railroad shared by the British. To alleviate this difficulty Gen. Larkin took personnel from Mediterranean Base Section and Atlantic Base Section and formed Eastern Base Section to serve as an advance section immediately behind the Tunisian front. |
| 15 Feb.     | SOS NATOUSA established with headquarters at ORAN.   | SOS NATOUSA was not given Com Z status--on administrative matters it was always necessary to consult theater headquarters. But despite this fault the coordinated effort of capable officers produced the desired result.   |
| 15 Feb.     | Gen. TB Larkin relieved from command of Mediterranean Base Section and assumed command of SOS NATOUSA. |   |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|---|---|
| 13 May      | Axis forces in Africa surrendered.                  |   |
| May         | Eastern Base Sect mounted out Sicilian invasion.    | This was the first true base section activity performed by Eastern Base Section.  |
| May         | First requisition to NYPE.                          | Not until this time could a real requisition be submitted on the port. In order to secure close coordination with NYPE a Liaison officer each month would fly with the requisition to the port of embarkation and remain there with the overseas supply division until relieved by the officer with the next month's requisition. |
| 11 July     | Sicily invaded.                                     | 15th Army Group (British Eighth and American Seventh Armies) under General Sir Harold Alexander Conquered Sicily in 38 days.  |
| 1 Sept.     | Island Base Section established at PALERMO, SICILY. |   |
| 3 Sept.     | Allies land in Italy.                               |   |
| 3 Sept.     | Italy unconditionally surrendered.                  |   |
| 1 Oct.      | NAPLES seized.                                      |   |
| 1 Nov.      | Peninsular Base Sect established.                   | Under command of Gen. Arthur Pence with headquarters at NAPLES.<br><br>Gen. Larkin completely decentralized responsibility  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--|---|
|             |  | and authority to his Base Sect commanders so as to avoid bottlenecks in his own headquarters of SOS.  |
| 30 Dec.     | Northern Base Sect set up on Corsica.                |   |
| 1944        |  |   |
| Jan.        | General Jacob L. Devers assumed command of NATOUSA.  | General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson placed in supreme command of the theater following Gen. Eisenhower's transfer to become Supreme Allied Commander in Western Europe.                               |
| Jan.        | Base Sections placed completely under SOS.           |   |
| 5 Jun.      | ROME falls.  | 1st European capital in history to be occupied by U. S. Army.   |
| 15 Jun.     | French forces capture ELBA.                          | Armed and equipped by SOS NATOUSA.  |
| 4 July      | Hq, SOS closed at ORAN and opened at CASERTA, ITALY. | Natousa moved from Algiers to Caserta shortly after. Atlantic and Eastern Base Sects consolidated.  |
| 15 Aug.     | Allied landing in Southern France (TOULON--CANNES).  | Seventh Army and French units under command of Gen. Alexander M. Patch. This invasion, for which the original date was 1 June was accomplished on theater Stocks alone plus two ship-loads from US. |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--|--|
| 1944        |  |  |
| 23 Aug.     | MARSEILLES taken.  | None of port's 121 piers nor its bridges were usable. Western entrance was blocked by seven sunken ships, the channel by four, and 65 other ships were sunk in the main harbor, and it was heavily mined. German PW's who had laid the mines agreed to locate them for clearance operations. Despite the extensive damage, the port convoy arrived 25 Aug. and went to work and 15 Sept. the first Liberty ship berthed. |
| 1 Sept.     | Costal Base Sect established at Marseilles (Renamed Continental BS).   | To support French and American armies in march up Rhine Valley.  |
| 15 Sept.    | Control of 6th Army Group (So. France) passed to SHAEF.  |  |
| 1 Oct.      | Continental Base Section displaced forward. Delta Base Sect. activated at Marseilles to relieve CBS and 6th Army Gp. Brig. Gen. John P. Ratay placed in Command. | Continental Base Sect. moved forward to Dijon and took over the role of advance section and at the same time Corsica Base Sect. moved in and took over the base duties at Marseilles. This seemingly   |

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unnecessary double shift of organizations was effected rather than a leap-frog move in order to keep the most seasoned logistical troops directly behind the armies. Delta Base Sect, the largest in the ETO, took in about 110,000 sq. mi. or about one-half of France, an area equal in size to the states of New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. Distribution centers were established at Lyon, Nice, and Marseilles. Among the "special" problems were administering Biarritz American University, US Riviera Recreation Area and later a Redeployment Staging Area for 200,000 Troops.

1 Oct. SOS, NATOUSA re-designated COMZONE, NATOUSA.

1 Oct. Continental Base Section established at DIJON.

1 Oct. Delta Base Section established at MARSEILLES.

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|---|---|
| 23 Oct.     | Lt. Gen. J. L. Devers<br>relinquished command<br>of NATOUSA to assume command<br>of 6th Army Group (Seventh<br>US Army and First French<br>Army). | Lt. Gen. J. T. McNarney<br>assumed duties as Deputy<br>Supreme Allied Commander<br>Mediterranean Area and<br>Commanding General NATOUSA.  |
| 1 Nov.      | NATOUSA became MTOUSA   |   |
| 20 Nov.     | Hq. COMZONE, MTOUSA became<br>Hq. SOUTHERN LINE OF<br>COMMUNICATIONS, ETOUSA<br>with headquarters at DIJON,<br>FRANCE.                            |   |
| 20 Nov.     | SOLOC established. Gen.<br>Larkin assumed command.  | For support of the Southern<br>France campaign French ser-<br>vice troops were very scarce<br>(a large portion of the French<br>army was colonial troops<br>and unsuitable for service<br>missions, and all French<br>soldiers had only one prime<br>interest--shooting Germans).<br>30,000 Italian POW's were<br>formed into service units<br>and taken to France. |
| 1945        |   |   |
| 1 Feb.      | SOLOC abolished and<br>organized as Delta<br>Base Section and<br>Continental Advance Sect.<br>under ETO Com Z.                                    |   |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                                    | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|---|---|
| 1945        |   |   |
| 12 Feb      | SOLOC (MTO) AND COM<br>ZONE (ETO) consolidated. | Gen J C H Lee remained<br>in command of Com Zone,<br>ETO and Gen Larkin became<br>his deputy commander.<br>At this time the functioning<br>of the Com Zone was highly<br>centralized and the Head-<br>quarters of Com Z was<br>becoming a terrific bottle-<br>neck. This dangerous<br>situation was quickly<br>corrected by a concentrated<br>decentralization effort<br>and reinstating and<br>reaffirming command<br>channels. The "Guts<br>System" of staff action<br>was adopted and worked<br>well and section commanders<br>soon regained control and<br>authority. Only the<br>through services (motor,<br>rail, and pipeline trans-<br>portation) were centrally<br>controlled. |

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
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Annex C--Chronology--ETO

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1940        | Special Observer Group sent to England.   | Major Gen. James E. Chaney in charge.  |
| 1942        |   |  |
| 1 May       | Brig. Gen. Donald A. Davison appointed C-G, SOS, USAFBI.                                | USAFBI--U S Army Forces in the British Isles.  |
| 24 May      | Maj. Gen. JCH Lee assumed command SOS, USAFBI.  |  |
| 8 June      | European Theater of Operations established.   |  |
| 24 June     | Gen. Eisenhower assumed command of ETO.   | One Special Staff served both SOS and ETOUSA. Hq. ETOUSA in <u>London</u> ; SOS in <u>CHILTERNHAM</u> .  |
| 1943        |   |  |
| Feb.        | SOS began to prepare estimates of troop and supply requirements for operation OVERLORD. | Overall Log. Planning Echelon established in LONDON.   |
| 27 May      | ETOUSA G-4 Section and SOS consolidated.  | Commanding General, SOS appointed ETOUSA G-4. Administrative services grouped under Chief of Administration (formerly G-1); Technical Supply services were grouped under the Chief of Services (formerly G-4); G-2 and G-3 Sections consolidated under Chief of Training and Security. |



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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|---|---|
| 1944        |   |   |
| 14 Jan.     | General Eisenhower announced as Supreme Allied Commander.             |   |
| 16 Jan.     | General Eisenhower assumed command of ETO for second time.            | Staff sections of ETOUSA & SOS consolidated and CG SOS held additional position of Deputy Theater Commander. ETO commander and his chief of staff held same positions in SHAEF; the three headquarters were linked closely. FUSAC (First US Army Group) was placed under operational control of SHAEF but under ETOUSA in other respects. |
| 17 Jan.     | General Eisenhower arrived COSSAC to become Supreme Allied Commander. |   |
| 13 Feb.     | COSSAC became SHAEF.  | The commander was American, the deputy British; the chief of staff American, two deputy chiefs of staff British; the G-1, G-3 and G-4 American; the G-2, G-5 British. G-4 was not responsible for logistical support of the coming operations.  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                          | <u>Remarks</u>  |
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| Feb.        | Forward Echelon Com Zone organized.   | Organized to provide a staff to work with FUSAG in planning early phases of continental operations and to handle Com Z activities on continent until main headquarters could move over.<br><br>Organization of ADSEC also started.  |
| 6 June      | Allied forces land on NORMANDY coast. | Communications Zone with headquarters in the United Kingdom was organized into four Base Sections; Central, North Ireland, Western, and Southern. All of these were in the process of being closed out to become eventually districts of the United Kingdom Base Section.<br><br>For continental operations there were organized: Com Z Hq, Forward Echelon; Base Section Number 1; and Advance Section. Forward Echelon was the planning agency for continental Com Z operations. Advance Section was assigned to First Army and was to remain so until the theater commander assigned territorial responsibilities to the Com Z Commander. Because of shipping shortages, however, only |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>  |
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| 1944        |   | one-half of Adsec could go to the continent with the initial landings.  |
| 7 Jun.      | SOS redesignated<br>COM Z   | By renaming, emphasis was shifted from operating an extension of the Zone of Interior in the United Kingdom to providing logistical support for combat operations on the Continent. |
| 15 Jun.     | Robot Bomb Attack starts  | The Aerial barrage of 200 V-1's (Vengeance Weapon One) per day lasted eighty days and by 1 Sept. 44 had killed 5,479 people and wounded about 16,000 most of whom were in London.   |
| 16 Jun.     | Reconnaissance group and Advance Party of Com Z Forward echelon to continent. |   |
| 9 July      | All of Adsec and Forward Echelon operating on continent.                      |   |
| 14 July     | 1st U.S. Army Gp. became 12th Army Gp.  |   |
| 15 July     | Adsec reverted to Com Z control.  | Control of logistical support in the United Kingdom was not combined--British and Americans had separate supply organizations. On the continent The Supreme                         |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Events</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>  |
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| 1944        | <p>21st Army Group supported the British and Canadian Troops; Com Z supported the 12th Army Group; for the assault ADSEC had been attached to 1st U S Army; North African Theater of Operations supported 6th Army Group until 1 Nov 44.</p> | <p>Commander was responsible for coordinating logistical arrangements and for support of both US and British forces under his command. Plans for logistical support on the continent were well laid, but the execution of these plans was in many instances poor for two reasons: The German Defense had been overestimated; and the American Offensive power had been underestimated.</p> <p>There were four principal factors which contributed to the lag of supplies:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Unexpected rapid extension of our lines of communication.</li><li>2. The Rail lines west of PARIS from CHERBOURG were totally inadequate.</li><li>3. Pipelines suffered tremendous damage from sabotage.</li><li>4. Delay in capturing ANTIWERP. After ANTIWERP was usable, the PARIS bottle</li></ol> |

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| 1944        |              | <p>neck was avoided and the supply hauls were considerably shorter. There was a saving of 40% in ton miles. These factors resulted in the armies barely existing although there were sufficient supplies on the continent in the port and beach areas. No build up in the Advance and Intermediate sections was possible--supplies could not be echeloned in depth. There was an extensive lack of documentation and classification at all bulk storage points and all cargo points were glutted far above their cargo handling capabilities. There was therefore a conglomerate mass of supplies and no one knew where to look for specific items. The above failure emphatically taught three lessons:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"><li>1. Plan and organization must be flexible.</li><li>2. Supplies must be echeloned laterally and in depth.</li></ol> |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                                  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1944        |   | 3. Stock Control is invaluable.  |
| 18 July     | St. LO captured                               |  |
| 25 July     | Last offensive of Allies in NORMANDY opened.  |  |
| 25 Aug      | German garrison in PARIS (10,000) surrendered | de Gaulle entered city 26 Aug and on 30 Aug became president of the French Provisional Government.   |
| 1 Sept      | SHAEF established on the continent            | CG 21st Army Group had been the ground commander until this time. Now 12th and 21st Army Groups began operating under SHAEF and continued to do so, there being no intermediate commander.<br>The Supreme Allied Commander was also the ETOUSA commander. General Eisenhower maintained close liaison with MTO, but had no direct liaison with Russia until Jan 45. Prior to that coordination with Russia dealt through the Anglo-American Military Mission at MOSCOW who represented the Combined Chiefs of Staff. |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1944        |   | United Kingdom Base  |
| Oct.        | ETO Com Z consisted of four base sections, three intermediate and one advance sections. | Section<br>Normandy Base Section<br>Brittany Base Section<br>Channel Base Section<br>Seine Intermediate Section<br>Loire Intermediate Section<br>Oise Intermediate Section<br>Advance Section<br>Normandy Base Sect also handled US activity within the British controlled area adjacent to the CHERBOURG peninsula.<br>Channel Base Sect was organized to operate within the British controlled area around LE HAVRE. |
| 21 Oct      | AACHEN captured   | The first penetration of the German frontier in the west.  |
| 3 Nov       | ANTWERP freed.  |  |
| 1 Dec       | LOIRE Intermediate Section abolished.   | BRITTANY Base Section not having much to do, took over the LOIRE area and mission.   |

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| <u>Date</u>     | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-----------------|--|---|
| 1944<br>16 Dec  | German Ardennes Of-<br>fensive opens   | 24 German Divisions<br>(Fifth and Sixth Panzer<br>army and Seventh Army)<br>Under Von Rundstedt.<br>Greatest penetration, more<br>than 50 miles, was reached<br>25 Dec 44. This showy<br>operation caused much<br>more concern on the home<br>front than it did in<br>SHAETF, which knew the<br>Germans were committing<br>their last reserves. |
| 1945<br>18 Feb. | BRITTANY Base Sect<br>abolished<br>NORMANDY Base Sect<br>took over old BRITTANY<br>Area and LE HAVRE |   |
| 23-26<br>Feb.   | Roer River crossed by<br>Ninth and First US<br>Armies  |   |
| 5-6<br>Mar.     | US First Army captured<br>Cologne.   |   |
| 23 Mar.         | Rhine crossing operation<br>begins   | Sixty-two bridges thrown<br>across the Rhine. Five of<br>these were railway bridges<br>taking an average of nine<br>days to build.  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1945        |   |  |
| 1 Apr       | RUHR, industrial heart of Germany encircled.        |  |
| 18 Apr.     | RUHR resistance ended                               | 400,000 prisoners taken in the greatest double envelopment in history.   |
| 27 Apr.     | Junction with Russia made.                          | Patrol of 69th Inf Div contacted patrol of First Ukrainian Army on Elbe River near Torgau.   |
| 4 May       | Junction with Fifth Army.                           | 103rd Inf Div contacted Fifth Army advancing from Italy at Vitipeno.   |
| 5 May       | German surrender starts.                            | Admiral Von Friedeburg surrendered to Field Marshal Montgomery all German Naval and land forces in Holland, Northwest Germany and Denmark.                                       |
| 7 May       | German High Command surrendered.                    | At REIMS France at 0230 Colonel General Alfred Jodl, Wehrmacht Chief of Staff, Lt Gen Walter Bedell Smith, General Ivan Susloparoff and General F Sevez signed act of surrender. |
| June        | Redeployment of American forces gets in full swing. | With headquarters at REIMS, France, The Assembly Area Command was established as a major command of  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--------------|--|
| 1945        |              | <p>European Theater Service Forces. This organization consisting of a headquarters and seventeen assembly camps in the vicinity of REIMS was superimposed on Oise Intermediate Section. To further complicate the command picture the 75th Inf Div was placed in general support of the assembly area operations--one battalion was placed at each of the 17 camps to assist the camp commander and his small staff in administering the redeployment. None of these three General's commands was subordinate to another. The result was obvious--confusion and inefficiency. Yet the mission was accomplished--chiefly through cooperation of commanders, and efficient operation</p> |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1945        |   | at camp level.<br>In the late summer Oise Intermediate Section absorbed the Assembly Area Command, the 75th Inf Div redeployed itself and disposal action was started on the 17 division size camps. The operation was expensive and short-lived, to say the least--perhaps it would have justified itself had not Japan surrendered so early. |
| 1946        |   |  |
| Jan.        | Oise and Seine Intermediate Sections consolidate to form Western Base Section with Headquarters in PARIS. | This was the first of a series of consolidation operations aimed at reducing overhead personnel and clearing US interests out of liberated countries and the United Kingdom. Normandy and Channel Base Sections consolidated to form Chanor Base Section UK Base Section,  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                         | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|--|
| 1946        |                                      | Chanor Base Section<br>and Delta Base<br>Section were ab-<br>sorbed by Western<br>Base Section in rapid<br>succession. |
| 1947        |                                      |  |
| April       | Western Base Section<br>deactivated. |  |

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COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

Analytical Study

Theater Chronological Charts - WW II

Annex D - Chronology - Pacific

| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--|--|
| 1941        |  |  |
| 7 Dec       | US Pacific Bases attacked<br>by Japan  |  |
| 13 Dec      | Plan "X" (Establishment of<br>US Army Forces in Australia)<br>began                      | This command (USAFIA)<br>was charged with deliver-<br>ing supplies to General<br>Mac Arthur in the Phili-<br>ppines. Discharge of this<br>mission began 13 Dec 41<br>with arrival of US<br>troops and supplies in<br>Brisbane. During first<br>two months of war, for<br>every ship that ran Jap<br>blockade, two were lost. |
| 17 Dec      | Maj Gen George H. Brett<br>designated commander of<br>all US activities in<br>Australia. |  |
| 25 Dec      | Hong Kong fell   | Last major port to free<br>China closed.   |
| 1942        |  |  |
| 1 Jan       | Maj Gen Brett arrived<br>Australia to assume<br>command.                                 | Supplying Philippines was<br>a day-to-day make shift<br>operation from a planning,<br>operational and control<br>standpoint.   |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                               | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--|---|
| 1942        |  |   |
| 22 Jan      | War Dept published general overseas plan.  | Emphasis was on local procurement in Australia.   |
|             | Pacific Ocean Area (POA) established.      | Admiral Nimitz placed in command.   |
|             | Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) established. | General Mac Arthur placed in command.   |
|             |  | Under General Mac Arthur's General Headquarters were US Army Forces in Australia, US Army Air Forces, and US Army Ground Forces operating on the same level and reporting directly to GHQ. US Army forces in Australia (USAFIA) was the Service of Supply and was organized into seven base sections along the east coast of Australia. |
|             |  | Later USAFIA became US Army SOS SWPA but the supreme administrative headquarters was still GHQ (US Army Forces in the Far East).  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                         | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--------------------------------------|---|
| 1942        |                                      | Shipping, being the most critical service, was controlled by G-4 of GHQ. The transportation officer assigned to SOS, therefore, had operational responsibility but no direct control of theater shipping. This situation quite naturally was a source of much confusion and inefficiency. |
| 23 Jan      | Battle of Makassar Strait.           | First major Sea battle between Allies and Japan--four old American destroyers at night played havoc with Japanese invasion fleet.   |
| 15 Feb      | SINGAPORE surrendered.               | "The greatest disaster to British arms which history records"--Prime Minister Churchill.  |
| 6 Apr       | TONGATABU Task Force sailed from XI. | This force was under command of Brig Gen  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--|---|
| 1942        |  | Benjamin C Lockwood<br>and consisted of 1 Inf<br>Regt 1 AA Regt and the<br>necessary service<br>troops--a total force<br>of 310 officers 6890<br>EM and 52 nurses.<br>Since this was the<br>first task force to<br>sail from the MI it<br>furnished an excel-<br>lent proving ground<br>for a multitude of<br>detail arrangements<br>from packing rations<br>properly to order<br>writing in the War<br>Dept. |
| 9 Apr       | Bataan surrendered   |   |
| 13 Apr      | Gen Mac Arthur assumed<br>role as Commander in<br>Chief SWEA |   |
| 18 Apr      | Doolittle raid on Tokyo                                      |   |
| 26 Apr      | Burma Road cut by Japan                                      | CHINA isolated.   |
| 6 May       | CORREGIDOR fell.   |   |
| 7-8 May     | Battle of the CORAL SEA                                      | "The first major<br>engagement in naval<br>history in which sur-<br>face ships did not<br>fire a single shot"--<br>Admiral King.  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1942        |   | Japanese attempt to cut Australian supply line checked.  |
| 3-6 June    | Battle of MIDWAY  | US regained balance in naval power and initiative.   |
| 19 June     | Vice Admiral Robert Ghormley assumed command of South Pacific Area and SP Force |  |
| 7 July      | US Army Command South Pacific Area established.                                 | Maj Gen Millard F Harmon designated commander and charged with commanding (under the War Dept) Fiji, New Caledonia, Tongatabu and Bora Bora task forces. |
| 7 Aug       | US forces land on Guadalcanal   | This started the first major offensive by the US in World War II--the Solomons campaign. The campaign ended with the capture of Bougainville in Mar 44.  |
|             |   | The Solomons Campaign had a three-   |

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1942

Remarks

fold purpose--to halt the Japanese advance toward New Caledonia and New Zealand; to protect the tenuous lines of communication with Australia; and to provide bases for future offensive operations.

Operations and Logistical Support for the campaign were under the commander of South Pacific Area and South Pacific Force. Support and service forces were inadequate as well as assault forces.

18 Oct Vice Admiral William F. Halsey assumed Command of South Pacific Area and SP Force.

Nov SOS US Army Forces in South Pacific Area organized.

1943 Buna fell to Australian and

2 Jan American forces.

During the New Guinea Campaign Tactical forces were relieved of supporting themselves logistically

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Date

Event

Remarks

1943

during amphibious as-  
sault operations. This  
was accomplished by  
sending an SOS "Task  
Force" in shortly after  
the initial assault to  
establish a supply base  
which later became a  
new base section. The  
Engineer Special Bri-  
gade was an integral  
part of the SOS "Task  
Force". Between 30  
Jun 43 and 30 Jun 44  
the 2nd Engineer Bri-  
gade participated in  
20 landing operations,  
amassed 2,000,000 boat  
miles, transported  
550,000 personnel  
without loss, and  
landed over 490,000  
tons of cargo.  
Although Plan "X"  
remained unchanged  
during the New Guinea  
Campaign, each New  
Guinea base was  
developed rapidly to  
receive shipments  
direct from the US.

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                             | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--|--|
| 1943        |  | Finschhafen became the major base. It was planned to develop Hollandia into a second major base, but the shallow harbor caused this plan to be abandoned. One of the most important logistical advancements made during the campaign was "block loading"--ships were loaded in the US and unloaded offshore as requirements demanded. This floating warehouse experiment was first conducted at Hollandia and, although quite expensive and undesirable from a transportation viewpoint, proved an effective means of supporting assault troops. |
| 23 Jan      | Samauanda fell                           |  |
| 9 Feb       | CUADALCANAL ours                         |  |
| 20 May      | Joint Logistics Board<br>SPA established | Membership of this board was: CG, SOS  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u> | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--------------|--|
| 1943        |              | <p>US Army forces in South Pacific Area; Commander Service Squadron; CG Sup Service 1st MAC; Commander fleet Air, Noumea.</p> <p>Under this Joint Logistics Board were a Joint Working Board to implement the decisions and a Joint Purchasing Board to exploit local markets and Australia. During this period of the Solomons Campaign the acute logistical shortages were compensated for in part by the expeditious roll-up of rear areas and propulsion forward. Navy was responsible during this phase for overall planning, coordination and base development in the South Pacific Area. That the Navy was better equipped for logistical support</p> |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1943        |   | is indicated by the following comparison:<br>In the SPA in Sept 43 there were 40,000 Naval construction personnel to serve 175,224 shore based Naval and Marine personnel. There were 11,000 Army service personnel to serve 192,732 US Army and Allied Personnel.   |
| July        | Preparation of detailed plans for invasion of the GILBERT and MARSHALL Islands. | Execution of these plans: Dec 43--Jan 44. During the planning phase of this operation a new and huge problem arose-- coordination with the Navy in an operation in which the Army and Navy would each furnish part of the landing force. To add to the difficulties there was an inadequate knowledge of the troop basis and the objective to be accomplished. The course of action finally adopted was that the Army would determine the requirements for both services |

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| <u>Date</u>  | <u>Event</u>                                     | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|--------------|--|---|
| 1943         |  | and then furnish all the support it could, then the Navy would furnish everything that the Army was incapable of supplying.   |
| 20-25<br>Nov | MAKIN AND TARAWA taken                           | Tarawa was one of the bloodiest assaults in American History.   |
| Dec 43-      |  |   |
| Jan 44       | GILBERT and MARSHALL ISLANDS Campaign.           |   |
| 1944         |  |   |
| 1 Feb        | 7th Inf Div landed on KWAJALEIN                  |   |
| 12 Mar       | Plan for invasion of SAIPAN, TINIAN, GUAM issued | Initial logistical planning accomplished by CG US Army Forces in Central Pacific Area. Early in the operation (1 July 44) the logistical and administrative planning agency was transferred to Central Pacific Base Command. This command was then assigned the responsibilities of logistical support of all Army forces in the CPA and all logistical planning for the CG, POA. |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--|---|
| 1944        |  |   |
| 23 May      | Operational project for Operation Stalemate arrived in ASF Hq. | "Stalemate" was divided into two phases - - Phase I, PALAU; Phase II YAP. On 4 June 44 a theater representative for Stalemate arrived in Washington. 1 July was set as the deadline for material to arrive at the port of embarkation. SWPA's operation against MOROTAI was being planned concurrently. |
| 15 June     | SAIPAN invaded by 4th Marine and 27th Inf Divs.                |   |
| 9 Jul       | Organized resistance on SAIPAN ended.                          | After 25 days of extremely heavy fighting. On loss of SAIPAN the Cabinet of General TOJO resigned and drastic changes in Japanese Army and Navy high command were made.   |
| 21 Jul      | American forces landed on GUAM.                                |   |
| 1 Aug       | South Pacific Base Command formed.                             | Mission: To support all ground and air force troops in South Pacific Area.  |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>                               | <u>Remarks</u>  |
|-------------|--|---|
| 1944        |  |   |
| 2 Aug       | TINIAN fell                                | After 9 days of fighting.   |
| 10 Aug      | Resistance on GUAM ceased.                 | This marked the first recapture of US territory previously lost to Japan.   |
| 13 Sept     | JCS informed of weakness in LEYTE defenses | As a result of this newly discovered weakness in the Japanese defenses on LEYTE, JCS called off STALEMATE II and SWPA's MINDANAO operation and ordered the two forces scheduled for these operations to strike LEYTE on 20 Oct - the original schedule for the LEYTE strike was 20 Dec. Mac Arthur was also charged with the enormous task of supporting both forces, one from his SWPA and the other from POA. SWPA shipping could not handle the support of POA's XXIV Corps so POA, already prepared to support it in the cancelled YAP operation, furnished the logistical support. |

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>  | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|---|--|
| 1944        |   |  |
| 28 Sept     | PALAU landings  |  |
| 21 Oct      | LEYTE invaded   |  |
| 30 Oct      | Base development require-<br>ments to support northern<br>PI operation to WD for<br>approval. | Detailed requisition<br>submitted to WD  |
| 13 Dec      | Northern PI Requisition<br>approved WD  |  |
| 15 Dec      | Troops landed on MINDORO  |  |
| 26 Dec      | Japanese resistance on<br>LEYTE ended   | With the capture of LEYTE<br>(ACCUMULATION Area) the<br>first big labor and<br>guerilla support project<br>presented itself - The<br>supply of 65,000 natives<br>had not been properly<br>planned for. The immediate<br>Class I and II problems<br>were solved by adding<br>65,000 to the theater<br>troop list. Later as the<br>Philippine situation<br>firmed, labor and guerilla<br>troops were supplied on<br>the same basis as were the<br>Regular Philippine Army<br>Troops. |
| 1945        |   |  |
| 9 Jan       | Sixth Army landed on<br>LUZON   | The LUZON operation was<br>favored logistically over<br>the competing FORMOSA<br>invasion plans principally  |

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Date

Events

Remarks

because the open-sea line of communication was shorter and much more sorely-needed dependable native labor would be available. Full scale Formosa invasion dependent on Germany defeat.

The LUZON operation was the most extensive action yet attempted in the Pacific. Both the Central Pacific and the Southwest Pacific commands were intimately involved--and there was no overall commander. A reasonable and sufficient degree of cooperation was attained under the FILBAS agreement, but the results probably were not as satisfying as they would have been had an overall command been established. Many major special logistical problems presented themselves in the Northern Philippines after American forces were firmly established, a few of which were: the establishment of an Ordnance Center and an Engineer District; and the

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| <u>Date</u> | <u>Event</u>   | <u>Remarks</u>   |
|-------------|--|--|
| 1945        |  | provision of large amounts<br>of water supply equipment.                                     |
| 19 Feb      | IWO JIMA invaded   |  |
| 1 Apr       | OKINAWA invaded  |  |
| 25 Apr      | Western Pacific Base<br>Command established                                | Charged with complete<br>logistical support for<br>army in Marianas, Palaus<br>and Iwo Jima. |
| 5 Jul       | Gen Mac Arthur announced<br>that the entire<br>Philippines were liberated. |  |

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Analytical Study

Theater Chronological Charts--WW II

Annex E


Lecture on Communication Zone  
by Maj Gen T. B. Larkin, QM General,  
to the Service Class & Command Class, C&SC, 17 May 46

E X T R A C T

# #

We won the war and that is that. In summing up, I should like to emphasize certain key points in the hope that you may never have to learn them the hard way in handling communications zone functions:

1. Get the best possible staff members and subordinate commanders.
2. Decentralize or delegate to them all possible responsibility plus authority to go with it. If they cannot carry responsibility, get someone who can--that is the reason for getting the best in the first place. If you try to run everything yourself you may as well not have a staff or subordinate commanders.
3. Organize along simple orthodox lines. Remember it took years to produce the book and the authors won some pretty big wars. Think more than twice before treating it lightly.
4. Keep your own headquarters as small as possible. Dead wood contributes less than zero.
5. Use command channels. Extra spoons muddy up the soup --once you have capable subordinate commanders do not permit them or their people to be harassed.
6. Weigh everything you do or propose to do in the light of the characteristics of the key people concerned. You cannot issue an order that human nature will change and expect it to stand up.
7. Deal closely with the commands you support. They cannot get your ideas into their tactical plans unless you tell them what they are. Think what a spot you would be in if the field forces went blithely on without advice from you and wound up with empty guns, gas tanks and bellies.
8. Use imagination. If you haven't what means you need, beat the bushes and improvise. A strong back means a stevedore whatever his nationality. Ships' dunnage and tarpaper will build as good a temporary warehouse as S 4 S seasoned lumber.
9. Give the combat forces what they need and withhold in your own establishments what they don't need. Imagine what a combat commander would think of you if he received a shipment of ski boots in mid-summer.
10. Think and plan far ahead at all times. Remember that you cannot order things from the corner grocery or hardware store--they must come all the way from production lines in the United States.



## Analytical Study

## Theater Chronological Charts--WW II

## Annex F

| Date               | Africa--Europe   | Pacific  | International                          |
|--------------------|--|--|--|
| <u>1941</u><br>Dec |  | Japan Attacked U. S.   | Germany and Italy declare war on U. S. |
| <u>1942</u><br>Jan |  | POA & SWPA formed<br>MAKASSAR Straits.                       | Allies formed                          |
| Feb                |  | SINGAPORE surrender  | Combined Chiefs of Staff appointed     |
| Apr                |  | BAATAN surrendered.<br>TONGATABU by U. S.<br>Doolittle raid. |  |
| May                | SOS, USAFBI formed   | CORREGIDOR fell.<br>CORAL SEA battle                         |  |
| Jun                | ETO established,<br>Gen Eisenhower assumed command.  | Battle of MIDWAY   |  |
| Jul                |  | U. S. Army Command,<br>SPA established.                      |  |
| Aug                |  | U. S. land GUADALCANAL                                       |  |
| Oct                |  |  | MOSCOW conference.                     |
| Nov                | Victory EL ALAMEIN.<br>N Africa invaded.<br>Mediterranean Base Section established.<br>TUNISIAN campaign launched. | SOS, U. S. Army Forces in SPA organized                      |  |
| Dec                | Atlantic Base Sect established   |  |  |
| <u>1943</u><br>Jan |  | BUNA recaptured.<br>SANANANDA "                              | CASABLANCA conference.                 |
| Feb                | SOS, NATOUSA established.  | GUADALCANAL ours.  |  |
| May                | Axis in Africa surrendered.  | Joint Logistics Board, SPA formed                            |  |
| Jul                | SICILY invaded.  | GILBERT & MARSHALL detailed plans started.                   |  |
| Aug                |  |  | QUEBEC conference.                     |
| Sep                | ITALY invaded.<br>ITALY surrendered.   |  |  |
| Oct                | NAPLES seized.   |  |  |

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| Date        | Africa--Europe   | Pacific  | International                |
|-------------|--|--|------------------------------|
| Nov         | Peninsular Base Sect established.  | MAKIN and TARAWA taken                                     | CAIRO conference             |
| Dec         |  | GILBERT and MARSHALL campaign opened                       | TEHERAN conference           |
| <u>1944</u> |  |  |                              |
| Jan         | Gen Devers assumed command of NATOUSA. Gen Eisenhower announced as Supreme Allied Commander. |  |                              |
| Feb         | COSSAC became SHAEF. FECZ organized.   | KWAJALEIN invaded  |                              |
| Mar         |  | PLAN FOR SAIPAN, GUAM, TINIAN issued                       |                              |
| May         |  | Plan for STALEMATE arrived Hq. ASF.                        |                              |
| Jun         | ROME falls to Allies. French take ELBA. NORMANDY landings                                    | SAIPAN invaded.  |                              |
| Jul         | ST LO captured.  | SAIPAN fell. American forces land on GUAM.                 |                              |
| Aug         | Operation ANVIL. PARIS liberated.  | TINIAN fell. GUAM retaken.                                 |                              |
| Sept        | Costal Base Sect established MARSEILLES. SHAEF on continent.                                 | STALEMATE started  |                              |
| Oct         | AACHEN captured.   | LEYTE invaded.   | DUMBARTON OAKS conference    |
| Nov         | NATOUSA became MTOUSA. SOLOC formed. ANTWERP freed.  |  |                              |
| Dec         | German ARDENNES offensive.   | MINDORO landing. LEYTE surrendered.                        |                              |
| <u>1945</u> |  |  |                              |
| Jan         |  | LUZON invasion.  |                              |
| Feb         | SOLOC (MTO) and COM ZONE (ETO) united  | TWO JIMA invaded   | YALTA conference.            |
| Mar         | COLOGNE captured. RHINE Operation.   |  |                              |
| Apr         | RUHR encircled. RUSSIA contact.  | OKINAWA invaded. Western Pacific Base Command established. |                              |
| May         | GERMANY surrendered.   |  |                              |
| July        |  | Entire PHILIPPINES liberated.                              | ITALY declared war on JAPAN  |
| Aug         |  | HIROSHIMA & NAGASAKI A- bombed.                            | RUSSIA declared war on JAPAN |

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