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BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: SECURITY AND DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

by

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In a historic decision on 23 June 2016, a majority of those voting in a referendum as to whether the United Kingdom should remain in the European Union or leave chose withdrawal. The process of British withdrawal from the EU, popularly known as Brexit, has defense and security ramifications. While Brexit has not changed the composition or activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU-specific collective security and defense institutions face significant changes, largely unstudied, when Britain becomes a "third country" vis-à-vis the EU. This thesis analyzes alternative options for the post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense relationship. After assessing several models, it concludes that the most advantageous option for the UK is to establish bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral relations with privileged EU member states while also supporting close and extensive EU-NATO cooperation.

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BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: SECURITY AND DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM

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ABSTRACT

In a historic decision on 23 June 2016, a majority of those voting in a referendum as to whether the United Kingdom should remain in the European Union or leave chose withdrawal. The process of British withdrawal from the EU, popularly known as Brexit, has defense and security ramifications. While Brexit has not changed the composition or activities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU-specific collective security and defense institutions face significant changes, largely unstudied, when Britain becomes a "third country" vis-à-vis the EU. This thesis analyzes alternative options for the post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense relationship. After assessing several models, it concludes that the most advantageous option for the UK is to establish bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral relations with privileged EU member states while also supporting close and extensive EU-NATO cooperation.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

BREXIT	British Exit from the EU
CARD	Coordinated Annual Review on Defense
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CoC	Committee of Contributors
CSDP	Common Security and Defense Policy
DG EXPO	Directorate General for External Politics
DSACUR	Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe
EDA	European Defense Agency
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EUGS	The European Union's Global Strategy
FPA	Framework Participation Agreement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PA	Participation Agreement
PESCO	Permanent Structured Organization
SDSR	Strategic Defense and Security Review
TEU	Treaty on European Union
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UK	United Kingdom

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I. BRITAIN'S WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION: SECURITY AND DEFENSE IMPLICATIONS

This thesis asks: What are the options for the United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) for security and defense partnership once the so-called Brexit—Britain's departure from the EU—takes effect? Following a 2016 referendum, the UK left the EU on 29 March 2019. As of this writing, no formal agreement exists, regulating the myriad relationships between the UK and the EU after Brexit becomes final at the end of this year—not even in such a pressing sector as collective security and defense. The UK has indicated that it wants to maintain defense and security cooperation with the EU after Brexit, but little scholarship or expert analysis has parsed how such an arrangement might proceed.[1] The Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), formed the pre-Brexit framework with Britain as a full member, but the other available status—"third country"—with its limited influence and subordinate role, is unlikely to appeal to the UK. Therefore, allowing the UK to secure greater decision-making influence and control of missions than is normally granted to third-country participation is essential for a future CSDP partnership.

A. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION

There is uncertainty regarding the likely impacts of Brexit on both the UK and EU defense and security institutions. There are questions about Britain's possible future contributions to EU defense and security missions and initiatives, as well as the ability of the EU to provide military support in the absence of UK military capabilities. The uncertainty extends to NATO, where some Allies are wondering whether Brexit signals a wider strategic retreat by the UK. It is clear that the UK's withdrawal from the defense and security structures of the EU has not been a central feature in the Brexit negotiations thus far. This thesis explores this gap.

[1] Patrick Wintour, "UK Offers to Maintain Defence and Security Cooperation with EU," Guardian, September 12, 2017, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/sep/12/uk-offers-to-maintain-defence-and-security-cooperation-with-eu-michael-fallon.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

The overall objective of this literature review is to shed light on the possible implications of Brexit in the under-researched area of security and defense. A brief view of publications shows that scholarly views are still far from any kind of consensus. On the one hand, experts argue that Brexit will not have major negative security and defense repercussions, especially in the short term. Richard Whitman argues, for example,

> that security and defense is an area in which the impact of a vote to leave the EU would be relatively marginal. Because cooperation in this area is intergovernmental, disentangling the UK would be relatively straightforward. And because of the limited impact that EU policies have achieved in this area, it is an open question as to whether Britain's global role would suffer, unduly as a result.[2]

On the other hand, scholars are also skeptical about any net security benefit for either Britain or the EU after Brexit. As Nigel Inkster concludes, "It is hard to identify any significant security advantage that the UK would derive from leaving the EU."[3]

Keohane et al. discuss the uncertainties of the EU's future after Brexit by exemplifying security crises, including Donald Trump's presidency, unpredictable Russia, terrorism, and migration flow.[4] They argue that these threats could not be undertaken alone and Europe needs allies for support especially in the burdening of militaristic aspects.[5] Thus, they stress the vital need for Germany, France, and the UK's cooperation on post-Brexit European security and defense.[6] In a similar view, Martill and Sus point out that since both the EU and the UK have matched capabilities and the current international environment includes several threats for each side, developing Post-Brexit security and

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[2] Richard G. Whitman, "Brexit or Bremain: What Future for the UK's European Diplomatic Strategy?" *International Affairs* 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 509–29.

[3] Nigel Inkster, "Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism," *Survival* 58, no. 3 (May 3, 2016): 29, https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1186974.

[4] Daniel Keohane, "Brexit and European Insecurity," in *Strategic Trends 2017*, ed. Oliver Thränert and Martin Zapfe (Zurich: Center for Security Studies, 2017), 55.

[5] Keohane, "Brexit and European Insecurity."

[6] Keohane.

defense policies are their particular interest.[7] Yet, establishing a new security and defense partnership will depend on several factors. For example, the EU should choose whether to slow down its further integration or not, and how it will determine the differentiated access to third countries and member states.[8] Thus, the process must answer broader questions in terms of reciprocity of interests and the possibility of different institutional agreements.

Bakker argues it is clear that in numbers of capabilities, knowledge, experience, and resources the EU will suffer in defense; however, it has to be kept in mind that the UK "is leaving the EU, not Europe,"[9] and that these capabilities will still be available to European security in NATO and coalitions-of-the-willing contexts.[10] On the contrary, Calcara sees Brexit as a win-win situation for the EU and the UK.[11] From Calcara's point of view, the defense-industrial partnership of the EU and the UK not need to be damaged.[12] Also, Brexit may force the EU to take major steps to increase armaments cooperation, and these steps will eventually lead to enhancing EU defense expenditures and may result in spillover impact in the UK.[13] Lain and Nouwens examine the consequences of Brexit on European security and defense and stress the UK's major contributions to European security, especially in counterterrorism through the CSDP.[14] In terms of the UK's contributions to CSDP missions and operations, they assert that if the UK withdraws from the European security structures after CSDP, both the EU and the UK lose enormously in

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[7] Benjamin Martill and Monika Sus, "Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or 'French Connection'?," *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 20, no. 4 (November 2018): 848, https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148118796979.

[8] Martill and Sus, "Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation."

[9] Anne Bakker, Margriet Drent, and Dick Zandee, *European Defence: How to Engage the UK after Brexit?* (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute, 2017), 22, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/Report_European_defence_after_Brexit.pdf.

[10] Bakker, Drent, and Zandee, 27.

[11] Antonio Calcara, "Brexit: What Impact on Armaments Cooperation?," *Global Affairs* 3, no. 2 (March 15, 2017): 10, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2017.1342555.

[12] Calcara, "Brexit."

[13] Calcara.

[14] Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens, "The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security," *Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies*, 2017, 6.

terms of defense capabilities and global prestige.[15] Thus, they advocate sustained cooperation in post-Brexit between these two parties as long as they share a mutual interest in securing European borders and citizens.[16] Therefore, it is in the interest of both parties to find formulas as to how the UK can be engaged in European defense and CSDP after Brexit.[17]

Major and Mölling examine Brexit in two ways.[18] On the one hand, Brexit will consume governmental energy in domestic conflicts and in bargaining between the remaining member states. On the other hand, Brexit will be a positive catalyzer to regenerate CSDP.[19] Correspondingly, Turpin also considers Brexit as "a potential catalyst for a renewed UK-EU defense relationship."[20] He argues the UK's involvement in European security and defense cooperation will be conditional in terms of domestic pressures.[21] Blagden addresses that in a complex domestic and international system that includes social, political, and economic drawbacks, "the interaction effects of seeking Britain's extraction from the EU will be numerous, bitterly contested, and often unexpected."[22]

Black et al. also mention the future security and defense relations between the EU and the UK after Brexit, and they argue both parties would have an interest in multinational military cooperation for their mutual political and operational advantages.[23] They outline

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[15] Lain and Nouwens, "The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security," 2017.

[16] Lain and Nouwens.

[17] Lain and Nouwens.

[18] Claudia Major and Christian Mölling, "Brexit, Security and Defence: A Political Problem, Not a Military One," *UI Brief*, no. 3 (May 2017): 3.

[19] Major and Mölling, 14.

[20] Lee D Turpin, "The Future of UK-EU Defence Cooperation Post-Brexit: A Neoclassical Realist Approach" (ECPR General Conference 2018, Hamburg, Germany, 201822-25 August), 25.

[21] Turpin, 37.

[22] David Blagden, "Britain and the World after Brexit," *International Politics* 54, no. 1 (January 2017): 25, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-017-0015-2.

[23] James Black et al., "Defence and Security after Brexit: Understanding the Possible Implications of the UK's Decision to Leave the EU -- Overview Report" (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7249/RR1786.1.

the future arrangements by which the UK could continue to involve in the CSDP as a non-member state such as Norway and Turkey, and suggest the UK might negotiate a new arrangement for its case by case involvement in CSDP missions/operations.[24] On the other hand, the UK might be disengaged from the security and defense activities and cut its contributions in several areas including battlegroup roster, Operational Headquarters, or maritime assets in the Mediterranean. Cutting its contributions would result in an enhanced contribution by the remaining EU states, or a reduction in CSDP capabilities.[25] Dalay signifies that Brexit would serve as a template for Turkey as the EU and the UK negotiate a new deal for the aim of forming a new relationship. He summarizes:

> The regional reshuffling created by Brexit provides new incentives for Turkey and the EU to contemplate alternative arrangements and overcome the anxieties and expectations created by the long-defunct and largely illusory membership process.[26]

Black et al. conjecture that even if the UK continues its involvement on a case-by-case basis, the EU's defense capabilities will be undermined seriously after the loss of the UK's military capabilities.[27] Also, they deliberate on the EU's actorness and the credibility of the CSDP by arguing that the Brexit vote could be a sign of political division within the EU.[28] The uncertainties that occurred after the Brexit vote might curtail the decision-making processes with increasing caution among EU states, and the economic decline due to Brexit could lead to a fall in defense budgets and abandonment of the 2-percent pledge on defense by the EU member states.[29] Martill and Sus claim that since the EU is resistant to give the UK a strong role in defining security policy, the most possible options for the future security and defense partnership are either a cooperation of the UK with NATO and

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[24] Black et al., 68.

[25] Black et al., 69.

[26] Gallip Dalay, *Turkey and Europe after Brexit: Looking beyond EU Membership* (Doha: Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, 2016), 2.

[27] Black et al., "Defence and Security after Brexit," 26.

[28] Black et al., "Defence and Security after Brexit."

[29] Black et al.

the CSDP-Plus, or cooperation with the French bilaterally.[30] Dumoulin states that after Brexit, the UK's relations with the EU and the U.S. might be affected, and also there could be a potential change in the European continent's landscape since the UK and the EU share a common history, geography, and culture.[31] He also warns about the consequences of Brexit in terms of their potential effects for both parties, and he argues that since both parties need each other, Brexit might open a door to create a better vision for the EU's foreign and security policies.[32] In a similar perspective, Dumoulin, Keohane et al. point out that the Brexit vote allows the EU to rethink its security and defense policies. In that regard, they illustrate the attempts of Berlin and Paris to strengthen common defense policies after the Brexit vote.[33] Oliver and Williams examine Brexit in terms of the relations between the EU-US and the UK-US.[34] They argue that the Brexit decision would not serve as a good outcome for the U.S., and they add that

> Some British Eurosceptics might dream of Britain becoming a North Atlantic Singapore or a 'Switzerland with nukes', neglecting the fact that Singapore and Switzerland play minor roles in regional politics and are ultimately subject to regional politics rather than shapers of it.[35]

While some scholars take an optimistic view about the effects of Brexit votes, some are pessimistic about it. McBride discusses the UK's hesitant relationship with the EU by stressing the UK's opt-outs from central EU policies such as common currency and the Schengen area.[36] With the increasing Euroscepticism, Brexit supporters reclaimed their national sovereignty and believed that the UK should deal with immigration by freeing

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30 Martill and Sus, "Post-Brexit EU/UK Security Cooperation," 849.

31 André Dumoulin, "Brexit and European Defence: An In-Depth Analysis," Centre for Security and Defence Studies, June 8, 2016, 2, http://www.irsd.be/website/images/livres/enotes/20.pdf.

32 Dumoulin, 4–5.

33 Daniel Keohane and et.al, Brexit and European Insecurity. In Strategic Trends 2017. Zurich: Center for Security Studies., 2017,p.57

34 Tim Oliver and Michael John Williams, "Special Relationships in Flux: Brexit and the Future of the US-EU and US-UK Relationships," *International Affairs* 92, no. 3 (May 2016): 41, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12606.

35 Oliver and Williams, "Special Relationships in Flux."

36 James McBride, "The Debate over 'Brexit,'" Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2016, 5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/196540/The%20Debate%20Over%20%27Brexit%27%20-%20Council%20on%20Foreign%20Relations.pdf.

itself from EU regulations. He argues that Brexit intimidates the EU's desires for a common security and defense policy.[37] Bew and Elefteriu deliberate on the UK's important advantage of its role in shaping events for its benefit and global image. The success of Brexit will be linked to the UK's deliberations on its global role in world affairs, especially in the following five years.[38]

C. ASSUMPTIONS

In light of the literature review, the first assumption of this thesis is that the UK is one of the two most capable security and defense actors in the EU, which ensures a special partnership between the UK and the EU after Brexit. To this end, the thesis analyzes the British government's decision to push for a special partnership in matters of security and defense in the early phases of the Brexit negotiations. The UK's offers unique contributions to European security and defense as well as the common interests between the UK and the EU. The primary method of research used to analyze this assumption will be the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Some analysts have suggested that Brexit could allow the EU to move ahead more easily with developing shared capabilities and undertaking military integration projects under the EU's CSDP.

The second assumption suggests the UK is one of the most reluctant supporters of EU defense integration; thus, Brexit will facilitate increasing defense cooperation in the EU. To this end, this thesis analyzes whether Brexit offers an opportunity and potential means for increased defense integration. The accuracy of this assumption is determined by an analysis of the expressed predictions for the future of EU defense, military capability, political influence, and economic strength. These predictions emerged in the ongoing debate following the referendum.

The final assumption is that the most important European defense organization is NATO. Therefore, Brexit hardly affects European defense. To this end, nothing since the end of the referendum has occurred that would question the role of NATO as both UK's

[37] McBride, "The Debate over 'Brexit.'"

[38] John Bew and Gabriel Elefteriu, Making Sense of British Foreign Policy After Brexit, Policy Exchange, 2016, p.2

and Europe's premier defense organization, at least in the narrow sense of territorial defense. The type of material used to analyze this assumption will be the Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015.

D. RESEARCH DESIGN

In view of the security and defense partnership of the EU and the UK, the thesis considers the history and prospects of EU-UK cooperation in defense and security matters in the new Brexit context. It does so by first examining a brief history of the CSDP and the structures and institutions that help enforce the policy making decisions. Then, it identifies the UK's position in the CSDP and the relationship between the EU and the UK. Next, it offers an analysis of the major issues requiring a solution in order for the UK to continue participation in the CSDP after Brexit. A close cooperation between the EU and the UK will largely depend on future negotiations and the EU's willingness to improve current CSDP frameworks. Lastly, this thesis explores possible effects of Brexit on the future security and defense relationship and provides recommendations for a partnership between the EU and the UK.

It does so by offering three potential models for a post-Brexit security and defense partnership: Civilian Power Europe, Framework Participation Agreement (FPA), or the UK as an Integrated Actor Model. These models are derived from the application of parallel agreements involving the Membership of the EEA, Membership of the European Free Trade Association, and the Free Trade Agreement. These options are assessed on their ability to provide the best option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship.

Throughout this analysis, this thesis relies on qualitative assessments of the information provided in published sources, including primary sources such as official publications by the UK and the EU, and such secondary sources as analyses by scholars and well-informed journalists. Sources published in the framework of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) are used in analyzing the defense integration of the EU. These sources provide information on development of the defense capabilities and cooperation of the European Union countries, as well as strengthening the defense industry.

The UK's *Strategic Defense and Security Review 2015*. provides a baseline of British policy before the referendum.

E. THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is composed of five chapters. The first chapter provides a general outlook of the thesis. It includes the purpose and delimitation of the thesis, research questions, literature review, and research methodology.

Chapter II briefly analyzes the CSDP and what structures it contains, and provides suggestions that would allow the UK to continue to participate in the CSDP after Brexit.

Chapter III assess the UK's stance on a future CSDP partnership and identifies the challenges from the UK's demands when considering an EU-UK CSDP partnership post-Brexit.

Chapter IV offers alternative models and provides recommendations for establishing a post-Brexit security and defense partnership.

Chapter V, the conclusion, draws the results together to establish the security and defense implications for the UK leaving the EU and offers insight into how the security and defense partnership between the EU and the UK could be shaped after Brexit?

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II. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY

This chapter focuses on the European Union's Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP), and the possible suggestions that would allow the UK to continue to participate in CSDP after Brexit. It starts with the history of the Common Security and Defense Policy. It continues with a detailed analysis of CSDP structures and institutions, including the history of operations and decision-making strategy within the CSDP. Relations within the CSDP are divided into two sub-sections on, respectively, the UK's position in the CSDP and the relationship between the UK and the EU. First and foremost, even though the UK is Europe's largest defense spender, technologically advanced, and equipped with global connections arguably exceeding those of any EU Member State, the UK was scaling down its involvement in the CSDP before Brexit.[39]

A. BRIEF HISTORY AND BACKGROUND OF THE CSDP

Since its establishment, the EU has developed as an international crisis management actor." Since 2003 the EU has conducted more than 25 civilian and military crisis management missions in the world during (dated to 2003 – 2013).[40] In light of the "EU's historical evolution, starting as a peace project based on economic integration in the 1950s, the development of the EU as an international crisis management and military actor is quite exceptional." An example of its evolution is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which focuses on peacekeeping, conflict prevention, and strengthening international security.[41] However, as a part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the CSDP has advanced into a stand-alone policy field with its own rules, procedures, and bodies."[42]

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[39] Black et al., "Defence and Security after Brexit."

[40] Julia Schmidt, "Panos Koutrakos. The EU Common Security and Defence Policy," *European Journal of International Law*, Book Review, 24, no. 4 (1260): 1257, https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article-lookup/doi/10.1093/ejil/cht075.

[41] Member States, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union," EUR-Lex, 2012, 34, http://data.europa.eu/eli/treaty/teu_2012/oj.

[42] Wessel, R., & Van Vooren, B. (2014). Common Security and Defence Policy EU External Relations Law: Text, Cases and Materials (pp. 400–437)

The reformed CSDP, originally launched as the ESDP in 1999, has been further developed based on the European Security Strategy (ESS), which grew out of the sharp divisions among EU member states on the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003. The ESS identifies strategic objectives to defend the EU's security and to promote its values. "In an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand... The first line of defense will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic... Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early."[43] According to the ESS, "US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at EU level."[44]

The CSDP has two main objectives. First, it is meant to establish a capacity to respond to crises in the European neighborhood and beyond, based on the extended Petersberg Tasks, which cover joint disarmament, military advice and assistance, conflict prevention and peace-keeping, as well as tasks of combat forces in crisis management. Second, it is meant to ensure that a member state is equipped with the necessary civilian and military capabilities to execute the Petersberg tasks in the context of an operation.[45]

B. STRUCTURE, INSTITUTIONS, AND MEMBERSHIP

The two main structures of the CSDP are the Political and Security Committee (PSC) and the European Union Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC is a preparatory body for the Council of the EU, made up of ambassadors from the EU member states. It keeps track of the international situation and helps to define policies within the CSDP; the committee also prepares EU responses to crises. The EUMC which is a body composed of the Chiefs of Defense of the Member States, the so-called permanent military representatives. This

[43] Council of the European Union. General Secretariat of the Council., *European Security Strategy: A Secure Europe in a Better World.* (LU: Publications Office, 2009), 6, https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2860/1402.

[44] "Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) Structure, Instruments, Agencies," European Union External Action Service, November 4, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp-structure-instruments-agencies_en.

[45] Tuomas Iso-Markku, "Europe's Changing Security Landscape: What Role Will the EU Play in Security and Defence?" (Helsinki: Finish Institute of International Affairs, December 2014), 8.

military body provides the PSC with recommendations and advice on military matters within the EU.[46]

In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was implemented, which further centralized many executive functions in the EU, a new structure was introduced to the CSDP: Permanent Structured Cooperation. “This mechanism can be used for capability development between member states within the framework of the EU. At the same time, the position of the High Representative has been strengthened, making it the chair of the Council of Ministers on foreign and security policy.”[47]

Participation in the CSDP can be direct (as an EU member state) and indirect (through third countries’ involvement). Indirect participation in the CSDP mainly occurs through forming a Framework Participation Agreement for CSDP missions and operations in general. Second, third countries can join the CSDP mission and operations by concluding a Participation Agreement for a specific mission or operation.[48] This latter approach also includes participation through the Berlin Plus arrangements and letters of exchange since these tools are used for missions or operations on a case-by-case basis. Article 42 of the Treaty on the European Union provides that the CSDP “shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civil and military assets... the Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.’’[49] Among CSDP missions, the EU refers to civilian CSDP activities, while operations concern military CSDP activities. Missions and operations are also discussed by, Thierry Tardy, who indicates that ‘‘In EU parlance, CSDP military activities are called operations while civilian activities are called missions.”[50]

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[46] European Union External Action Service, “Common Security and Defence Policy.”.

[47] Biscop, S. (2010). From ESDP to CSDP: Time for some Strategy Retrieved 11/04/2020, from http://www.diploweb.com/From-ESDP-to-CSDP-Time-for-some.html

[48] Thierry Tardy, “CSDP: Getting Third States on Board,” *European Union Institute for Security Studies*, March 7, 2014, 14, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/csdp-getting-third-states-board.

[49] Member States, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union,” 34.

[50] Thierry Tardy, *CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security?* (Paris, France: EU Institute of Studies, 2015), 17.

In EU jargon, a third country can be defined as a country that is not a member of the European Union. Consequently, after Brexit, the UK falls within the scope of this definition. Furthermore, participation in the CSDP by third countries has been measured by acceptance of either a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) with the EU, concluding a Participation Agreement (PA), or an agreement in the form of an exchange of letters in conjunction with the Berlin Plus arrangements. These options provide the political and legal foundation of outside cooperation in the CSDP.[51]

C. HISTORY, OPERATIONS, AND DECISION MAKING

In 2013, the European Council expressed three major priorities of the CSDP: "increasing the effectiveness, visibility and impact of common security and defense policy (CSDP); the development of capabilities; and strengthening Europe's defense industry."[52] After that, the European Parliament (EP) tried to encourage EU member states to make progress on managing capability resources effectively. The "EP resolution of 2017" expressed the need for further development of EU military and civilian capabilities. Thus, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) was established to command missions, and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defense (CARD) was created for compatibility of defense spending. According to Giovanni Faleg, "efforts by EU member states in the wake of St Malo (December 1998) and Cologne (June 1999) have resulted in the creation of Brussels-based bureaucracies. To manage the CSDP, permanent structures have been established since the Helsinki Council in 1999 through the outlines of Council documents and strategic guidelines provided by the European Security Strategy."[53]

According to the European Union External Action Service's factsheet, since 2003, the CSDP has launched 34 missions and operations in an extensive range of geographical

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[51] Thierry Tardy and France) Institute for Security Studies (Paris, *CSDP in Action: What Contribution to International Security?*, 2015.

[52] Jérôme Legrand, "Common Security and Defence Policy," European Parliament, November 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/159/common-security-and-defence-policy.

[53] Giovanni Faleg, *The EU's Common Security and Defence Policy: Learning Communities in International Organizations* (Basingstoke, England: Springer, 2016), 16.

areas.[54] Therefore, CSDP missions and operations could be regarded as the EU's collective effort to enhance its security and defense, and also it is a part of an international security arena that is changing rapidly.[55] As Tardy states, "CSDP missions and operations, therefore, need to be seen and evaluated as both a key component of EU efforts in the field of security and defense."[56] As Figure 1 reveals, both the civilian missions and military operations of CSDP have represented an increasing trend over the years; however, the number of civilian missions has outweighed the number of military actions.



Figure 1. Active EU operations and missions per year[57]

[54] "EU Missions and Operations As Part of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)," European Union External Action Service, November 19, 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en.

[55] Tardy, *CSDP in Action*.

[56] Tardy.

[57] Adapted from Danilo diMauro and Katerina Wright, "EU's Global Engagement: A Datbase of CSDP Military Operations and Civilian Missions Worldwide," European University Institute, 2017, https://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/research-project/eu-global-engagement-database/.

The goals of CSDP missions and operations can be analyzed from Figure 2. The security goal of CSDP missions and operations increased dramatically between 2011 and 2015. Also, the training goal was enhanced from 2014 to 2016. In comparing the security and training goals, the figure reveals that monitoring, border control, and reforming policy goals remained stable between 2015 and 2017.

Figure 2. Trend of active CSDP missions and operations by a goal[58]

The European Defense Agency (EDA), which was established by the Council of Defense Ministers in 2004, is one of the key components of CSDP. It manages crises and boosts the EU's defense capabilities. While CSDP participating countries create a common defense policy, it is largely dependent on the national capabilities of EU member states. Unanimity is needed in the Council's decision-making processes to participate in military engagements.[59]

[58] Adapted from diMauro and Wright.

[59] Zsuzsanna Csornai, *Evaluating the Effects of Brexit on the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy* (Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2017), 5.

The CSDP has since the 2000s evolved with new planning capabilities, structures, and procedures, based on operational experience with 34 missions and operations. Nevertheless, establishing CSDP operations has faced difficulties in the areas of force generation, common financing, enablers, intelligence, and logistics.[60] Also, the CSDP continues to be heavily dependent on the most capable member states and its institutions.[61]

Overall, the purpose of the CSDP does not point in a clear direction. The CSDP has never had a clearly defined strategy by which its actions have been guided; in reality, the CSDP has consisted of individual missions and operations launched on a case-by-case basis. The establishment of the CSDP has been characterized as a bottom-up project, executing separate missions and operations as it developed in response to events, without pursuing a common strategy. This is a reflection of the CSDP objective, which states that the EU should respond to crisis, thereby not establishing a comprehensive strategy. The effectiveness of the strategy is, therefore, slightly fragmented. The lack of a clearly defined strategy already suggests that the CSDP's effectiveness is not optimized.

The main drivers behind EU integration include economic, monetary, and fiscal factors. Integration among EU member states in economic matters, took place at a rapid pace, while the security realm seems to have evolved at a slower pace.[62] The emergence of the CSDP can be credited in part to EU integration in other areas. When integration takes place in one area, this is likely to spill-over to other areas as well. The CSDP consists of a bottom-up approach.[63] That is, a common defense strategy has been built up by undertaking missions and operations following the capabilities requirements and developments in the last decade without relying on a so-called 'grand strategy'. Missions and operations are gradually

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[60] Julian Bergmann, "Framing the EU Global Strategy: A Stronger Europe in a Fragile World, by N. Tocci," Book Review, Journal of Common Market Studies, May 2018, http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/jcms.12729.

[61] Laura Chappell, Jocelyn Mawdsley, and Petar Petrov, eds., *The EU, Strategy and Security Policy: Regional and Strategic Challenges*, Routledge Studies in European Security and Strategy (London; New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2016).

[62] European Commission and Directorate-General Communication, *The European Union: What It Is and What It Does.*, 2020.

[63] Biscop, S., & Coelmont, J. (2010). A strategy for CSDP: Europe's Ambitions as a Global Security Provider. Royal Institute for International Relations, Egmont paper 37.

developing, instead of relying fully on an existing strategy. Engaging in different missions and operations is expected to guide the EU towards a common CSDP strategy. In contrast, a top-down approach would suggest the foundation of a clearly defined common strategy, by which all missions and operations are guided with an overarching aim. Yet, the political implications may be much greater because Brexit requires a reconsideration of the governance model of the CSDP, which was created through a Franco-British summit. Hence, the UK was one of the main EU Member States driving the CSDP.[64]

To draw any substantial conclusions on if and how the UK will be able to continue taking part in the CSDP after Brexit requires an overview of EU-UK CSDP relationships before Brexit. The assumption is that past cooperation could provide information about behavior in future partnerships. In the initiation of the CSDP, the UK took an early leading role. In 1998, the Anglo-French summit led to an agreement between Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac to push for greater EU defense capabilities. These two countries, the strongest military powers in the EU, formed the starting point of what was soon to become the CSDP.

D. THE UK'S POSITION IN THE CSDP

Worré divides the UK's role in European defense since World War II into three stages.[65] The first period was between 1947 and 1969. In this period, the United Kingdom focused on establishing mutual relations with the United States and making decisions with the support of the American ally. This strategy resulted in tensions in Europe, specifically with France, particularly in the 1960s when President de Gaulle undertook France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military command structure. The second period occurred between 1970 and 1990. During this period of West-East dialogue and confrontation in the Cold War Britain decided to take part in several defense cooperation organizations in line with its national interests. The third period, which took place between 1991 and 2013, was defined by Worré as opposition to European integration initiatives. The British-French St Malo initiative in December 1998 was, to be sure, an important exception to Worré's observation. In other

64 Ibid.

65 Philip Worré, "The Consequences of a British Exit from the EU and CSDP: An Analytical Timeline," *International Security Information Service, Europe*, 2013, 7.

words, Britain would support only programs or initiatives that offered clear benefits to it.[66] Now, bilateral relations between the EU and the UK are going through a fourth stage which was defined by the Brexit vote.

Figure 3 shows that the UK has been behind large EU countries, including France and Germany, when it comes to taking designated leading roles concerning CSDP missions and operations.



Figure 3. EU personnel contributions to CSDP missions and operations (2003-2014)[67]

[66] Worré, 6.

[67] Adapted from Bakker, Drent, and Zandee, *European Defence*, 27.

In general, it could be argued that the UK's relationship with the CSDP has been weakening in recent years. Hence, despite the UK's early contributions to CSDP operations, for example during Operation Concordia, EUFOR Althea, and EUNAVFOR Atlanta, the UK has been decreasing its contributions to CSDP operations and missions and this began years before the Brexit referendum. In 2016, "the UK was the fifth-greatest contributor to CSDP military missions, after France, Italy, Germany, and Spain."[68] In terms of civilian missions, Britain scores seventh, after Germany, Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, France, and Finland.[69] According to Giovanni Faleg,[70] an associate reader at the Center For European Policy Studies, the UK contributes 4.2% of all EU personnel to CSDP civilian missions. With the UK seceding from the EU, the CSDP loses modest civilian and military contributions and a veto player. States such as Austria and Romania, small military powers, have contributed more personnel to CSDP missions and operations in the past than has the UK.[71] Therefore, the operational implications of Brexit for the CSDP could be considered minimal. Additionally, despite the UK's strong military, Faleg argues that "the EU has traditionally avoided engagement in expeditionary and high-intensity warfare, in which UK capabilities and know-how might have been decisive."[72]

E. THE CSDP RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UK AND EU

Despite the UK's leading role in the launching and development of the EU's CSDP, London has become a straggler. A comparison of the UK's size to its CSDP contributions show that the UK has made relatively minor contributions to CSDP missions and operations. The UK has tended to prefer activities and operations utilizing NATO in the

68 Giovanni Faleg, "The Implications of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy," *CEPS* (blog), July 26, 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/implications-brexit-eus-common-security-and-defence-policy/.

69 Faleg.

70 Faleg.

71 Bakker, Drent, and Zandee, *European Defence*, 27.

72 Faleg, "The Implications of Brexit for the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy," 2.

past. The UK has contributed personnel to most of the EU's Civilian CSDP missions.[73] Yet, the size of these contributions has been rather modest in comparison to the size of the UK. Moreover, the UK has had a limited designated leading role, which can be described as having "operational control or contribute the most personnel in missions with a military or police component."[74] Figure 4 outlines the number of designated leading roles in 2003–2016 by the three biggest EU states: France, Germany, and the UK.[75]



Sources: *SIPRI Armaments, Disarmament and International Security Yearbook 2004–2015*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. European External Action Service (2016), *CSDP Missions and Operation*, available at: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/.
Note: Designated lead states are those that either have operational control or contribute the most personnel in missions with a military or police component.

Figure 4. Number of CSDP missions and designated lead states (2003-2016).[76]

[73] Richard G. Whitman, "The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit: Integrated, Associated or Detached?," *National Institute Economic Review* 238, no. 1 (November 1, 2016): R43-50, https://doi.org/10.1177/002795011623800114.

[74] Whitman, 5.

[75] Whitman, 47.

[76] Adapted from Whitman, R43-50.

Even though recent years have shown a decrease in UK involvement in the CSDP, London remains interested in continued cooperation after Brexit in CSDP missions and operations.[77] The desire to continue to take part in the CSDP is largely political. On the one hand, continued UK CSDP involvement signals that the UK will continue to be a relevant and active security partner in Europe. Moreover, the UK's strategic interest in the continuation of a safe and stable Europe will remain after Brexit.[78] Indeed, participating in the CSDP may be crucial to the UK if it wants to stay committed to the defense and security of Europe.[79] At the Munich Security Conference in February 2018, Theresa May indicated two main reasons to continue cooperation in the framework of the CSDP. First, the UK wants to be able to continue taking part in major European diplomatic debates. Besides that, the UK wants to limit the consequences of Brexit on its internal defense, preserving access to the market of the EU and other projects surrounding the CSDP.[80] In this regard, May argued "that our security at home is best advanced through global cooperation, working with institutions that support that, including the EU."[81]

F. CONCLUSION

European security and defense are unique within the European Union's integration project. Unlike economic integration, CSDP integration within the EU is based on voluntary cooperation with all possibilities to keep national sovereignty when states decide to do so. The CSDP is therefore a cooperation framework with some issue's worth mentioning. There is also a level of voluntariness in the CSDP since each mission and operation requires the commitment of individual member states. Due to European

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[77] Federico Santopinto, *CSDP after Brexit: The Way Forward*, EP/EXPO/B/SEDE/FWC/2013-08/ Lot6/20 (Brussels, Belgium: European Parliament, 2018), 46.

[78] Sarah Lain and Veerle Nouwens, "The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security" (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, 2017), 39.

[79] Nick Wright, "Leaning in or Stepping Back? British Strategy towards CSDP Post-Brexit," European Leadership Network, November 4, 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/ commentary/leaning-in-or-stepping-back-british-strategy-towards-csdp-post-brexit/.

[80] Claudia Major, "No 'Global Britain' after Brexit," *SWP*, no. 24 (June 2018): 9, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2018C24_mjr_orz.pdf.

[81] "PM Speech at Munich Security Conference: 17 February 2018," GOV.UK, 1, accessed October 6, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pm-speech-at-munich-security-conference-17-february-2018.

integration in other areas, it seems that CSDP missions and operations are launched in regions where some EU countries have economic or geostrategic interests or historic and cultural ties.

Ultimately, there is no clear direction in which the EU intends to steer the CSDP, except for the EU treaties and other high-level policy statements. The objectives of the CSDP and the legal treaty provisions lack clear guidelines as to whether a specific situation demands a response by the EU. However, the legal provisions can be interpreted to react to a situation with the CSDP when the member states find this relevant and appropriate.

The extent of the UK's participation in the CSDP after Brexit remains a question at hand. "After Brexit, the UK is to be considered as a third country." The EU welcomes post-Brexit British CSDP involvement due to the UK's military weight and diplomatic significance. However, the UK's call for a unique relationship that exceeds that of any other third country makes post-Brexit British participation in the CSDP not as straightforward as that of other third countries, such as Norway. In considering the EU's stance towards a post-Brexit CSDP framework, the UK will not have a seat at the EU decision-making, i.e., it will lose its veto power.

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III. FACTORS / ISSUES FOR POST-BREXIT COOPERATION

This chapter identifies the major issues requiring resolution in order for the UK to continue its participation in the CSDP after Brexit, specifically joining missions and operations in the CSDP through FPAs or PAs. Current agreements within the EU limit such participation by the UK to that of third-country status, which presently means that the UK will no longer have the same decision-making influence or control of missions involving its forces as members of the EU. Nonetheless, the UK has sent contradictory signals regarding its willingness to accept such status, while also seeking a "special partnership."

In general, the content of existing third-country agreements differs depending on the respective country involved. Yet, within all current means of third country CSDP participation, either utilizing an FPA or PA, the EU indicates that all partners endorse the EU's decision-making autonomy. In this regard, third countries are principally outside the decision-making procedures of the EU, meaning that they, to a great extent, must accept the procedures and timeline of the EU. Third countries are, therefore, often regarded as second-class stakeholders.[82] Tardy argues that "by nature, non-member states' participation in EU operations requires a certain degree of acceptance of EU practices, as well as a degree of subordination."[83] Third countries are invited to contribute to CSDP missions and operations ... at a late stage, and full access to EU documents is only accepted after approval by the PSC.[84] Once third countries are involved in CSDP missions and operations, the Committee of Contributors (CoC) is set up. Even though the CoC is supposed to function as a forum for information exchanges between contributing third countries, it has a subordinate role. According to Sophia Besch, the "UK will not want to accept the subordinate role that the EU currently assigns to non-EU troop-contributing countries."[85]

[82] Tardy, "CSDP: Getting Third States on Board," 4.

[83] Tardy, 4.

[84] Tardy, 4, 7.

[85] Sophia Besch, "EU Defence, Brexit and Trump," *Centre For European Reform*, 2016, 11.

This chapter begins with the UK's stance on a future CSDP partnership. It next identifies the challenges and feasibility of meeting the UK's demands considering the existing agreements for a possible EU-UK CSDP partnership post-Brexit. Lastly, the chapter presents the EU's stance on a post-Brexit CSDP partnership with the UK.

A. THE UK'S STANCE ON A FUTURE CSDP PARTNERSHIP

The UK's stance could be characterized as a degree of willingness to enter into past third-country mechanisms in the EU's CSDP. In September 2017, the British government published a document titled "The Foreign Policy, Defense, and Development: A Future Partnership Paper."[86] Within this document, the British government states:

> Given the shared values of the UK and EU partners, the capabilities we offer and the scale and depth of collaboration that currently exists between the UK and the EU in the fields of foreign policy, defence and security, and development, the UK seeks to develop a deep and special partnership with the EU that goes beyond existing third country arrangements.[87]

The document goes on to indicate that the fundamental aspects of this new special partnership between the UK and the EU post-Brexit should include several priorities:

1. The UK and the EU should have regular close consultations on foreign and security policy issues. This could include cooperation on sanctions listings, including by sharing information and aligning policy where appropriate.[88]
2. The UK would like to establish how best to utilize UK assets, recognizing the expertise and many military and niche capabilities that the UK contributes to the EU's military 'Force Catalogue'. This ambitious new partnership would provide the opportunity for the UK and the EU to work together in CSDP missions and operations.[89]
3. With this level of cooperation, the UK could work with the EU during mandate development and detailed operational planning. The level of UK involvement in the planning process should be reflective of the UK's contribution. As part of this enhanced partnership, the UK could

86 "Foreign Policy, Defence and Development - a Future Partnership Paper," HM Government, September 12, 2017, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643924/Foreign_policy__defence_and_development_paper.pdf.

87 HM Government, 2.

88 HM Government, 18.

89 HM Government, 19.

offer assistance through a continued contribution to CSDP missions and operations, including UK personnel, expertise, assets, or use of established UK national command and control facilities.[90]

4. As part of the deep and special partnership, the UK wants to explore how best to ensure that the UK and European defense and security industries can continue to work together to deliver the capabilities that we need to counter the shared threats we face, and promote our mutual prosperity. This could include future UK collaboration in European Defense Agency projects and initiatives. We could also consider options and models for participation in the Commission's European Defense Fund including both the European Defense Research Program and the European Defense Industrial Development Program.[91]

To realize the UK's ambitions concerning a new CSDP partnership, Theresa May, then the Prime Minister, May used the phrase "creative solutions" five times in her Florence speech in 2017.[92] Special emphasis was also given to "new thinking" and being "imaginative."[93] Her speech implied that the UK is particularly interested in addressing new means of CSDP participation post-Brexit. Similarly, the Directorate-General for External Policies of the European Union describes the priorities of the UK as seeking to "find a way of involving the United Kingdom, even partially, in the process of making decisions in the field of the CFSP/CSDP."[94]

Additional viewpoints on a post-Brexit UK-CSDP partnership can be found in the Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership document.[95] This document, as the name suggests, focuses specifically on post-Brexit security cooperation. Instead of advocating involvement in the decision-making procedure, the UK softened its stance, arguing "that the UK wants to reach a security partnership with the EU that promotes our shared security

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[90] HM Government, 19.

[91] HM Government, 20.

[92] "PM's Florence Speech: A New Era of Cooperation and Partnership between the UK and the EU," HM Government, October 12, 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-florence-speech-a-new-era-of-cooperation-and-partnership-between-the-uk-and-the-eu.

[93] HM Government.

[94] Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 46.

[95] "Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership," HM Government, May 2018, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/705687/2018-05-0_security_partnership_slides__SI__FINAL.pdf.

and develops our cooperation. It must respect both the decision-making autonomy of the European Union and the sovereignty of the United Kingdom."[96] This sentence implies that the UK recognizes that it will not be directly involved in the EU's collective security and defense decision-making after Brexit. Nonetheless, Federico Santopinto argues that the UK "still hopes to be able to access and influence it."[97]

The most recent document spelling out the UK's stance derives from "The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union," formalized on July 12, 2018.[98] In this document, the UK focused on five key principles regarding a future security relationship. First, the UK reaffirmed its commitment to respect the decision-making autonomy of the EU.[99] In contrast to Federico Santopinto, the British officials conceded that The "UK will play no formal role in EU decision-making and will make independent decisions in foreign policy, defence, and development."[100] As of this writing, judgements are still inconsistent.

Another key principle of the UK calls for "an institutional framework that delivers a practical and flexible partnership."[101] This would mean that the UK and the EU would work together in the event of a crisis. To achieve such a framework, the UK made several propositions for a tailored partnership with the EU:

1. consultation and regular dialogue on geographic and thematic issues and the global challenges the UK and the EU face;
2. mechanisms to discuss and coordinate the implementation of existing and new sanctions;
3. arrangements to enable cooperation on crisis management operations, including using civilian and military assets and capabilities to promote global peace and stability, where it is mutually beneficial;

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96 HM Government, 7.

97 Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*.

98 HM Government, *The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union*, Cm 9593 (London: Crown, 2018), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/786626/The_Future_Relationship_between_the_United_Kingdom_and_the_European_Union_120319.pdf.

99 HM Government, 29.

100 HM Government, 52.

101 HM Government, 52.

4. commitments to support a collaborative and inclusive approach to European capability development and planning;
5. commitments to continue to work together to address global development challenges, supporting a cooperative accord between the UK and the EU on development and external programming;
6. continued cooperation on EU strategic space projects, including their secure aspects; and
7. a Security of Information Agreement that facilitates the sharing of information and intelligence.[102]

Recognizing that the UK and the EU share a wide range of security threats, it is important that the UK is proposing shared capabilities with the EU in order to have the greatest effect in responding to challenges. Nonetheless, the UK only mentions that arrangements are needed to enable cooperation in the CSDP. The specific, operationalizable content of these arrangements remains unclear. The UK does indicate that future "foreign policy, defence, and development cooperation is likely to require a combination of formal agreements enabling coordination on a case-by-case basis."[103] Presumably, these agreements will be drafted with respect to the "sovereignty of the UK and the autonomy of the EU."[104]

Particularly when it comes to consultation and coordination between the UK and the EU, the UK proposes additional four principles:

1. consultation across all foreign policy areas, with regular dialogue between officials, ad hoc invitations to meetings, for example to the Political and Security Committee in informal sessions, provisions for discussion between EU27 leaders and the UK Prime Minister and at other political levels;
2. information and intelligence sharing, for example through the EU Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN), European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN), and EU Military Staff (EUMS);
3. reciprocal exchange of expertise and personnel in areas of mutual interest and collaboration, which would enable greater understanding between the UK and the EU and thus facilitate practical cooperation; and

[102] HM Government, 53.

[103] HM Government, 64.

[104] HM Government, 66.

4. cooperation in multilateral fora, such as the UN, G7, G20, IMF, OECD, OSCE and World Bank, and third countries, to enable the use of other foreign policy levers, including an option to agree shared positions and statements, joint demarches and jointly organized events, as well as cooperation on consular provision and protection.[105]

Britain's ambition is also shown by the statement that "no existing security agreement between the EU and a third country captures the full depth and breadth of our existing relationship."[106] The UK's proposals are ambitious and achievable. To achieve these propositions, the UK argues that "Much of this can be done within existing third country precedents in this area."[107] Such a suggestion by the UK could be perceived as an inclination to accept arrangements based on previous third-country mechanisms. Nonetheless, the UK specifically mentions that "There are opportunities to build on existing precedents for third country participation in EU operations and missions, for example through an enhanced Framework Participation Agreement."[108] The UK persistently pursues mechanisms that go beyond those of other third countries due to, as the British government describes it, the "unprecedented nature of the UK-EU security relationship, given its starting point, potential scale and the shared values and interests."[109] These types of mechanisms are essential when the EU and the UK are working closely together as partners around the world.

B. CHALLENGES OF REALIZING THE UK'S DEMANDS

Concluding an FPA allows the UK to support missions and operations by contributing personnel. However, it leaves no room for participation in the decision-making process, nor power to decide if and where the EU launches an operation or mission, including its execution.[110] Such decisions are made in the PSC, supported by the Civilian

[105] HM Government, 64.

[106] HM Government, "Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership," 7.

[107] HM Government, *The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union*.

[108] HM Government, 66.

[109] HM Government, 65.

[110] European Commission and Directorate-General Communication, *The European Union*.

Committee; the EU Military Committee; the Politico-Military Group; the Civilian Planning, and Conduct Capability; and the EU Military Staff. Yet, the special partnership with the EU that the UK is seeking regarding the CSDP will be challenging to set up. Some third countries, for example, Turkey and Norway, currently contribute vast numbers of troops to CSDP missions and operations.[111] According to Federico Santopinto, Turkey and other third countries could be expected to demand equal treatment if the UK were to receive a special relationship.[112]

At the very least, the UK will expect a degree of influence in the decision-making procedures of the CSDP.[113] Yet, the European Commission's negotiators have followed several red lines throughout the negotiations, many aimed at resisting the UK's bid to influence the EU's security and defense decision-making autonomy.[114] The extent to which the UK will be able to "have representatives or permanent observers on the EU decision-making bodies" concerning the CSDP and CFSP, including their agencies, e.g., the PSC, EDA, and the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) is, therefore, uncertain.[115]

In addition, the European Treaties do not make any provisions for potential third-country attendance in the work of the European Council or the Council of the EU.[116] In other words, the UK will not have a formal voice in the security and defense realm. Following the Council's and the European Council's Rules of Procedure:

> a third state as a member of the delegation of a member of the Council should be ruled out, as it could be regarded by the other members of the

111 Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 11.

112 Santopinto, 19.

113 "Questions and Answers on the United Kingdom's Withdrawal," European Commission, November 16, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_20_104.

114 Alice Pannier, "Strategic Suspense: British Foreign and Defense Policy at a Crossroads," War on the Rocks, August 14, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/08/strategic-suspense-british-foreign-and-defense-policy-at-a-crossroads/.

115 Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 11.

116 Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. (2012). *Official Journal of the European Union*, 55(1), 1–391.

> Council as a factor which could affect the decision-making autonomy of the Council.[117]

Yet, when a session addresses matters concerning the CSDP, participation by a third country requires a unanimous decision of the Council of the EU. If the decision passes, the third country observer may give an opinion if invited by the Presidency of the Council, but participation in the discussions is out of the question. Additionally, the representative of the country concerned is obliged to leave the meeting room when requested.[118] Concerning the European Council, similar provisions apply. According to Article 4.2 of the European Council's Rules of Procedure:

> Meetings in the margins of the European Council with representatives of third States or international organisations or other personalities may be held in exceptional circumstances only, and with the prior agreement of the European Council, acting unanimously, on the initiative of the President of the European Council.[119]

Consequently, the EU is defensive when it comes to any outside influence. Yet, because the EU does not strictly rule out the participation of third-country representatives at the Council on all occasions, the UK currently perceives a potential opportunity on an ad hoc basis.[120]

C. THE EU'S STANCE

Before the 2018 Munich Security Conference, former Permanent Representative of Italy to NATO, Stefano Stefanini, and German diplomat Wolfgang Ischinger indicated that the UK's military capacity equals about 25 to 30% of the EU's total security and defense capacity. At the time, they argued that "it is too little for the UK to stand alone; it is too

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117 Council of the European Union. (2016). Comments on the Council's Rules of Procedure European Council's and Council's Rules of Procedure.

118 Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 21.

119 General Secretariat of the Council, *Rules of Procedure of the European Council* (Brussels, Belgium: General Secretariat of the Council, 2009), 79, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/rules_of_procedure_of_the_council_en.pdf.

120 Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 22.

much for the EU to do without it."[121] Nevertheless, the EU stance on a future CSDP partnership, according to Federico Santopinto, is vastly different from Britain's and, "as far as the EU is concerned, existential in nature."[122] One of the issues is that the EU Member States cannot allow the UK to shape their common policies after Brexit.

According to Ischinger and Stefanini, "The sphere of foreign policy and defense, including homeland and cybersecurity, will need to rely on strong and continuing EU-UK cooperation irrespective of Brexit. Trade can be transactional; security is not."[123] The key argument in offering such an exemption is based on the fact that the UK has a strong military, as well as great political influence globally.[124]

The main issue in this regard is "that the UK seeks to be involved in the decision-making process of the CSDP in one way or another."[125] In other words, the UK would have powers similar to those of EU member states in the CSDP. The EU has been fairly clear in its objection to this status. For example, "the European Parliament resolution on negotiations with the UK following its notification that it intends to withdraw from the EU," concludes with the following statement: "a state withdrawing from the Union cannot enjoy similar benefits to those enjoyed by a Union Member State, and therefore announces that it will not consent to any agreement that would contradict this."[126] Both statements are clear, and the EU is not likely to deviate from this stance. In general, cherry-picking which EU policies to take part in by any third country is out of the question. In the event,

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[121] Wolfgang Ischinger and Stefano Stefanini, "There Is More at Stake In Brexit than Just Trade," Security Conference, December 13, 2017, https://securityconference.org/news/meldung/monthly-m/.

[122] Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 14.

[123] Wolfgang Ischinger and Stefano Stefanini, "Brexit Is about More than Just Trade; It's Also about Security," Security Times, October 12, 2020, https://www.the-security-times.com/brexit-is-about-more-than-just-trade-its-also-about-security/.

[124] "CSDP after Brexit: A Narrow Window of Opportunity," European Leadership Network, November 16, 2020, https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/csdp-after-brexit-a-narrow-window-of-opportunity/.

[125] Mirja Gutheil, "The EU-UK Relationship beyond Brexit: Options for Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters," European Parliament, July 17, 2018, 110.

[126] "European Parliament Resolution on Negotiations with the United Kingdom Following Its Notification That It Intends to Withdraw from the European Union," European Parliament, March 29, 2017, 5, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2017-0237_EN.html.

article 50 of the European Council, states that "A future partnership should respect the autonomy of the Union's decision-making, taking into account that the UK will be a third country, and foresee appropriate dialogue, consultation, coordination, exchange of information, and cooperation mechanisms."[127]

At the Berlin Security Conference in November 2017, Michel Barnier drew five main conclusions regarding a post-Brexit UK-CSDP partnership:

1. The UK defense minister will no longer take part in meetings of EU Defense Ministers; there will be no UK ambassador sitting on the Political and Security Committee.
2. The UK can no longer be a framework nation: it will not be able to take command of EU–led operations or lead EU battlegroups.
3. The UK will no longer be a member of the European Defence Agency or Europol.
4. The UK will not be able to benefit from the European Defence Fund in the same way Member States will.
5. The UK will no longer be involved in decision-making, nor in planning our defense and security instruments.[128]

These conclusions have several consequences. At this moment, the Operation Headquarters of Operation Atlanta is based in Northwood (the UK), which, therefore, requires a transfer. Additionally, the Operational Command of Operation Althea currently held by the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) will have to be transferred. Because the position of DSACEUR is held by a British Officer. These rules apply during the transition period. According to Article 121 of the draft agreement on the withdrawal of the UK, "there shall be a transition or implementation period, which shall start on the date of entry into force of this Agreement and end on 31 December 2020."[129] Consequently, the transition period will last from the 29th of March 2019 until the end of

[127] "European Council (Art. 50) (23 March 2018)-Guidelines," European Council, March 12, 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/33458/23-euco-art50-guidelines.pdf.

[128] "Speech by Michel Barnier at 'The Future of the EU' Conference," Centre for European Reform, February 10, 2020, https://www.cer.eu/in-the-press/speech-michel-barnier-future-eu-conference.

[129] European Commission. (2018). Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community.

December 2020. Article 124[130] concerning specific arrangements relating to the European Union's external action indicates that:

> During the transition period, the United Kingdom shall not provide commanders of civilian operations, heads of mission, operation commanders, or force commanders for missions or operations conducted under Articles 42, 43, and 44 TEU [Treaty on European Union], nor shall it provide the operational headquarters for such missions or operations or serve as framework nation for [European] Union battlegroups. During the transition period, the United Kingdom shall not provide the head of any operational actions under Article 28 TEU.[131]

The European Parliament's resolution on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship[132] has reiterated the negotiation position of the EU. When it comes to the CSDP, the following statement indicates the limits, but also the possibilities for a post-Brexit partnership:

> The European Parliament notes that, on common foreign and security policy, the UK as a third country will not be able to participate in the EU's decision-making process and that EU common positions and actions can only be adopted by EU Member States; points out, however, that this does not exclude consultation mechanisms that would allow the UK to align with EU foreign policy positions.[133]

The possibility of consultation mechanisms leaves the UK with some leeway to influence CSDP structures. According to the European Parliament, such a partnership would be possible under the current forms of an FPA.[134] However, considering that the UK is requesting a partnership with scope that exceeds that of other third countries, this is unlikely to satisfy the UK. Adjusting the current mechanisms in place or creating an

130 European Commission. (2018). Draft Agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community.

131 Member States, "Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union," 34.

132 Gutheil, "The EU-UK Relationship beyond Brexit: Options for Police Cooperation and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters," 110.

133 "Motion for a Resolution on the Framework of the Future EU-UK Relationship," European Parliament, July 3, 2018, 8, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-8-2018-0135_EN.html.

134 European Parliament, "Motion for a Resolution on the Framework of the Future EU-UK Relationship."

entirely new mechanism for post-Brexit EU-UK CSDP cooperation, therefore, needs to be considered. As this research indicated, there are three tools for a future partnership, either based on concluding an FPA, ad hoc agreements, such as the PA, exchange of letters or Berlin Plus arrangements, and concluding a new and more ambitious framework. In any case, it should be taken into account that "Any future role will be that of a facilitator, rather than a leader."[135]

D. CONCLUSION

Figure 5 shows that there is some room for negotiation regarding the signing of an enhanced FPA. The EU has argued in the past that the current form of FPAs could be changed to allow for deeper involvement of third countries. Nonetheless, it should be considered that this option would not be created solely to meet the UK's demands. Instead, the creation of a new format would most likely apply to all third countries involved.

CSDP MISSIONS: THE UK'S DEMANDS	CSDP MISSIONS: THE EU'S RESPONSE
To influence the political decision-making process concerning the deployment of CSDP missions through a presence on the EU's decision-making bodies or the creation of new dialogue structures	No involvement in EU decision-making and no representatives on EU bodies. Only non-binding and non-systematic dialogue in forms still to be established will be considered.
To sign a unique and deeper FPA, allowing it to accede to the strategic direction of the operations in which it is prepared to engage. Other third countries would not enjoy the same conditions.	All FPAs could be amended to increase the involvement of third countries in missions. Access to command will, however, remain limited, although it could be more open to countries providing major contributions. No special FPA for the UK.
To make the Northwood HQ available to an EU mission and to be able to appoint a British national to head up its command.	No
To be able to continue to be a framework nation of the Battlegroups.	No

Figure 5. The UK's and EU's stance toward future CSDP mission[136]

[135] Laura Chappell and Andre Barrinha, "Committee Evidence," UK Parliament, February 5, 2018, http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-external-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp-missions/written/77879.html.

[136] Adapted from Santopinto, "CSDP after Brexit: The Way Forward," 35.

After Brexit, the UK will be considered as a third country in the eyes of the EU. Since the beginning it has become clear that it is possible for third countries to join CSDP missions and operations of the EU by means of concluding FPAs or PAs. The EU welcomes the UK's post-Brexit CSDP involvement due to the UK's military weight and diplomatic significance, allowing it to provide substantial amounts of expertise, troops, and hardware. Nonetheless, the UK's call for a unique relationship that exceeds that of any other third country makes post-Brexit UK participation in CSDP missions and operations less straightforward that that of an EU member. Current means of joining CSDP missions and operations through FPAs and PAs strongly emphasize that third country contributions should always "be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU."[137] Consequently, third countries are largely kept outside the decision-making procedures of missions and operations. The UK is unlikely to accept such a subordinate role within the CSDP. Therefore, allowing the UK to secure greater decision-making influence and control of missions than is normally granted to third country participation is essential for a future CSDP partnership. Close CSDP cooperation between the EU and the UK post-Brexit will therefore depend on future negotiations and the EU's willingness to reform current CSDP frameworks.

[137] European Union, "Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro Establishing a Framework for the Participation of Montenegro in European Union Crisis Management Operations," EUR-Lex, March 2, 2011, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A22011A0302%2801%29.

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IV. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE EU-UK SECURITY AND DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP POST-BREXIT

The purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the possible effects of Brexit on the future security and defense relationship between the EU and the UK: first, by illustrating the possible alternative models for a security and defense partnership, and second, by offering recommendations for a possible post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership. Both parties will be affected by the Brexit vote. Thus, there is a vital need to find a new security and defense partnership to secure the borders of Europe. At present, there is a shortage of sources that deal with the possible security and defense models for the future EU-UK partnership. As a result, the following research models are based on future trade models.

There is a critical need for EU-UK cooperation in terms of security and defense after Brexit. Nonetheless, the EU will continue to outline its foreign, security and defense policies on its own. Furthermore, as of 31 October 2019, the UK has made the decision to remove themselves from current EU mechanisms. The lack of cooperation in justice and police affairs, intelligence exchanges, and as a result, the UK's withdrawal from CSDP will not only damage its national security but will have huge economic costs.[138]

The third-party agreements, such as Framework Participation Agreements and Administrative Arrangements which were ratified with Norway, Switzerland, and Canada, may not provide an adequate model for the future EU-UK security relations as the UK demands more privileged status.[139] As mentioned earlier, both the EU and the UK share a common concern with regards to security and defense relations. On one hand, the UK relies on the EU for its strategic capabilities and political power. On the other hand, the UK proposed its interest several times to participate in EU security and defense policies. The UK will remain as important security player in Europe outside the EU through its

[138] Malcolm Chalmers, "Brexit and European Security," *Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies*, 2018, 9.

[139] Chalmers, "Brexit and European Security."

membership in international organizations such as NATO the UN Security Council.[140] Ultimately, the UK should focus on strengthening this role outside the EU.

A. ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE POST-BREXIT EU-UK SECURITY AND DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP

Overall, the extent and degree of the UK's security and defense cooperation with the EU as a privileged partner will be clarified in the "final status" of the EU-UK agreement. There are three possible alternatives for the UK. In the first case, the UK as a non-member state will agree to the EU's foreign and security policy arrangements which will grant full participant rights. Alternatively, the UK may build a privileged partnership in specific areas in which bilateral interests are prone to be stable, yet the parties could pursue tactical bilateralism. Partnership through formal political dialogue arrangements seems to be the most advantageous for the UK. Lastly, the UK will be locked out and treated as a non-privileged state. Internal security issues will be dependent on the method of Europol and information sharing cooperation.

The UK's bilateral and trilateral relationships with current EU member states and states outside of Europe, will significantly be affected by Brexit. The future aim of these relationships should be focused on finding privileged partners for building bilateral or trilateral relations in the security and defense partnership outside the EU framework. Bilateral defense structures the UK established with EU member states exemplify this option. One of them is the Lancaster House treaties of 2010 between the UK and France which also established the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force for crisis management.

Finding a format for the future relationship involving the UK, France, and Germany will be a crucial task due to the political uncertainties that these states currently face at the present time. For example, France and Germany's mutual interests on a specific future agenda for the EU could clash with the UK's interests. Whitman argues "As the relationship between the UK, France, and Germany extends beyond EU issues (and with

[140] Lain and Nouwens, "The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security," 2017, 1.

existing collaboration on European and international security and global economic governance) a new trilateralism might be envisaged."[141]

Outside of the EU framework, while the Three may pursue a strong bilateral relationship, they will also face a dilemma in struggling to make their bilateral relations special. Pursuing privileged partnerships in which bilateral interests remain stable while pursuing tactical bilateralism if needed could be the strategy for the UK.[142]

B. CIVILIAN POWER AND THE NECESSITY OF PESCO FUNDING UK'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES

Since Brexit, France and Germany have redirected their attention to "permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) to increase their bilateral security and defense collaboration."[143] Since Brexit, the CSDP's military capabilities have been decreasing. As a result, the EU could seek to phase out the CSDP and create a "civilian superpower" because, without the presence and contributions of the UK, the EU will have to adjust its goals and aims to its capacities.[144] After the St. Malo agreement, despite the CSDP's Franco-British collaboration, "the UK and (to some extent) France have lost interest in a '*Europe-puissance*'."[145] In the post-Brexit partnership framework, the UK acknowledges that it could not play a leadership role in CSDP and also that it will lose its membership status in EDA in which the UK contributed with its military and defense-industrial capabilities.

While EUGS promotes a comprehensive approach for future security and defense strategies for France and Germany, it also signals a transition to a ''Civilian Power Europe." From the German perspective, this transition suits its new leadership role in the economic and political aspects of this outlook. Also, Ham argues that "Without British

141 Lain and Nouwens, "The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security," 2017.

142 Lain and Nouwens, 10.

143 Peter van Ham, *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe* (The Hague, Netherlands: Clingendael Institute, 2016), 27.

144 van Ham, 10.

145 van Ham, 27.

support, France is unable to instill *Realpolitik* in the EU's security discourse, which is now dominated by debates on humanitarian issues, dealing with climate change and intensifying cultural dialogue as key EU foreign and security policies."[146]

After Brexit, France and Germany will likely redirect their attention to Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in order to increase their bilateral security and defense collaboration. With this mechanism, France and Germany would make the EU's security goals much stronger before arriving at European Defense Union (EDU). Brexit encouraged both France and Germany to activate the PESCO mechanism for a European Defense Union to sustain close bilateral security and defense relations with the UK. Ham states, "it is in the UK's declared interest that the EU does not slip into its comfort zone as a 'civilian power', but that the EU instead maintains a high level of defense cooperation, and at the same time remains open to flexible arrangements with third countries."[147] However, Ham states "PESCO is now considered possible (and even necessary) to compensate for the loss of Britain's defense capabilities that were available to the CSDP."[148] New initiatives on PESCO may create a more ambitious vision for the European Defense Union. Ham argues that "The cold-turkey option (which assumes that Brexit will not be well managed and less than congenial) may apply to the first phase (one year or so) after Brexit."[149]

Brexit might transform the EU's Political Union into a completely federal Europe including a stronger and recalibrated security and defense element. Ham assumes that "although the UK has certainly not been single-handedly responsible for blocking the development of a more solid CSDP, Brexit has allowed the CSDP to become fully and organically incorporated within the process of federalizing the EU."[150] However, Eurosceptic voices in the EU could oppose this federal end-goal. Thus, the so-called "small power EU" along with its military power after Brexit could reorganize itself by turning to

[146] van Ham, 27.

[147] van Ham, 15.

[148] van Ham, *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe*.

[149] van Ham, 16.

[150] van Ham, 19.

a federal Europe with a CSDP. This stronger security element could be the real solution to keep the U.S. and NATO in Europe.

In terms of NATO and the UN, the EU and the UK could foster the implementation of EU-NATO cooperation to maintain peace and security. This cooperation should be backed by an EU-NATO Security Arrangement. In the absence of this arrangement, there would not be an exchange of important information and documents. Furthermore, the UK would also support the EU-NATO partnership through its membership in NATO with initiatives and working groups that deal with capability development, security and defense planning, and cyber-threats.[151]

In sum, if the Brexit negotiation process is regulated well, the EU will confront existential choices. These choices would (1) follow the Civilian Europe path while disregarding the CSDP, opting for the United States of Europe through a European Defense Union, or (2) to seek a more flexible and close security and defense cooperation that includes the UK within NATO.[152] This option for the EU harmonizes the federal European choice with a concrete CSDP/EDU to eliminate the risk of losing the U.S. and NATO. In this way, member states who traditionally held an Atlanticist view could grasp the CSDP/ EDU.

C. PARTNERSHIP THROUGH FRAMEWORK PARTICIPATION AGREEMENT AND PERMANENT OBSERVER STATUS

After Brexit, both the EU and UK must seek to develop an aspiring and distinct security and defense partnership while recognizing the UK's status as an individual player. The UK already is a key player and will continue to be one in EU international development assistance with its capable forces as a member of the UN Security Council and NATO. Willing member states would share their capabilities and military forces under the European Defense Agency using the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). They also could benefit from PESCO for creating multinational forces similar to NATO or an

[151] Richard G. Whitman, "The UK and EU Foreign and Security Policy: An Optional Extra," *The Political Quarterly* 87, no. 2 (April 2016): 14, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-923X.12249.

[152] van Ham, *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe*, 21.

EU mission/operation. The CFSP and CSDP are intergovernmental and recognize the sovereignty of each member state in foreign and defense policy. Thus, there would be mechanisms involving the UK willingness, minus a veto, directly in the EU security and defense matters with regards to the independence of the UK and the EU.

According to Blunt, mechanisms for the efficient arrangements for the EU-UK cooperation in security and defense after Brexit rest on the following formulas; "first, an Enhanced Framework Participation Agreement, second, Permanent Observer Status for the UK in the Political and Security Committee, and third, regular high-level political dialogue."[153]

When they agree on the conditions through framework agreements, non-EU countries could participate in case-by-case CSDP missions and operations. Several countries including Norway, Turkey, Canada, Serbia, and Ukraine have framework agreements in place. In addition to these, the U.S. also signed a Framework Agreement to attend crisis management operations led by the EU in May 2011. However, Framework Participation Agreements only accommodate controlled participation in the formulation and planning stages as illustrated in Table 1.

[153] Crispin Blunt, Post-Brexit EU-UK Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017, 5

Table 1. The UK's post-transition security and defense options[154]

UK level of engagement with EU	*Type of EU instrument*	*Conditions of instruments*	*Pros for UK*	*Cons for UK*
High	Bespoke Treaty	Legally binding & ratification by European Parl. & EU members	Reflects joint UK-EU interests & allow for some secondment and staff/exchange of classified material	Unlikely to allow UK nearer EU decision-making tables & others likely to demand similar rights if granted
High	Association Agreement	Legally binding & ratification by European Parl. & EU members	Highest level of formal dialogue and greatest chance to influence EU	UK must respect internal market, customs union and four freedoms
Medium	Strategic Partnership Agreement	Legally binding, ratification by European Parl. and EU members	High levels of dialogue that extend into home security cooperation	Normally accompanied by extensive trade agreement & not unique
Medium	Partnership & Cooperation Agreement	Legally binding and consent of Council and European Parl. needed	Less formal than Assoc. Agt. but still extensive dialogue	Designed primarily for EU's neighbouring countries & not unique
Low	Framework Participation Agreement	Legal framework for third party contributions to CSDP operations/ missions	Can be done on an case-by-case basis & demonstration of solidarity with EU	Inability to shape decisions on CSDP operation/ mission mandates & not unique
Low	Declarations/*ad hoc* alignment	Associate with declaration on bilateral basis	Allows for divergence when in UK interests	UK can only associate but not shape decisions & not unique

Through this partnership, countries decide on the scope and intensity of their relations with NATO, and through bilateral partnership documents, they express their aims within this bilateral cooperation. These established documents are including the "Individual Partnership and Cooperation Programme (IPCP); Individual Partnership and Action Plan (IPAP); [and] Annual National Programme (ANP)."[155] In 2014, the EOP was established at the Wales Summit to enhance NATO's cooperation with partner states

[154] Adapted from Crispin Blunt, "Post-Brexit EU-UK Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy,"

[155] Bakker, Drent, and Zandee, *European Defence*, 19.

"which are eligible to have a more exclusive, tailor-made relationship with the Alliance."[156] Additionally, in the following years, the Enhanced Opportunities Partners (EOP) could broaden its scope by adding other qualified partners who are interested in developing a partnership and contributing new capabilities. NATO's close cooperation "with five non-member allies such as Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan, and Sweden known as 'Enhanced Opportunity' partners may be regarded as a role model for the future EU-UK cooperation."[157] This cooperation between the EU and UK could be beneficial while considering possible models for political discussion and support after Brexit.[158] Blunt lists additional elements to foster strong and reliable institutional ties between the EU and the UK such as:

> An automatic right of first refusal to participate in initiatives and a defined role in development of mission concept and purpose through PSC and CMPD consultation. The possibility of seconding national experts to relevant directorates of the EEAS and relevant committees. Guaranteed inclusion in force generation conferences and committee of contributors. The possibility of hosting Operating Headquarters (the UK could retain Northwood for ATALANTA and put Northwood or other centres at the disposal of future operations). An agreement for the sharing of confidential intelligence and planning documents, as the U.S. has with the EU.[159]

Framework Participation Agreements (FPAs) have been used by non-EU states in attending CSDP missions; however, non-EU states cannot participate in processes such as organization, preparation, or commanding. After Brexit, the UK could suggest contributing to CSDP missions/operations with its vital capacities including strategic airlift or ISR. Also, for the future EU-UK security and defense partnership, arrangements on sharing intelligence will be important because of the UK's capacities and contributions in this area. Similarly, due to the UK's high-quality personnel capacities, its involvement in the civilian CSDP missions will be crucial for the EU. The UK's participation in the EU battlegroups

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156 Pauli Järvenpää, NATO's Truly Enhanced Partnership. Retrieved from International Centre for Defence and Security, 2016 website: https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/2016/Pauli_Jarvenpaa_-_NATO_s_Truly_Enhanced_Partnership.pdf, p.3

157 Crispin Blunt, Post-Brexit EU-UK Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy, House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2017. 5.

158 Blunt, "Post-Brexit EU-UK Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy."

159 Blunt.

should also be covered in such an agreement. Therefore, the EU could create a new FPA for a third-party country with vital strategic importance for CSDP.[160]

Since 2004, the UK has had a vital influence with regards to the European Defense Agency (EDA). For a country to become a participant of the EDA, that country must be a member of the EU. However, non-EU countries could join the EDA through Administrative Arrangements. For example, Norway, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Serbia have signed the Administrative Arrangements to this end. Administrative Arrangements enable countries' participation in the interaction process, projects, and voluntary personnel contributions.[161] However, these arrangements provide no rights to voting and automatic presence at any meeting. Therefore, the EU would need to reform a new approach for non-EU states who are interested in security and defense partnerships with high-level commitments.[162] These countries might participate in missions/operations and development processes and also EDF acts with the assumption of making financial contributions to the fund.[163]

For the future dialogue and close coordination of the security and defense issues, the UK could obtain a permanent observer status in the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The observer status would have detailed procedures and rules in terms of speaking rights and rights on agendas. The following cases should be rules: how the UK's positions will be recorded in terms of timing and documents as well as any time a UK representative is not present during discussions. Through a special partnership treaty governing the observer status of the UK, the speaking right for the UK's representative should be given in discussions. This rule would not open doors for other third countries such as candidates while preparing the treaty.[164]

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160 Bastian Giegerich and Christian Mölling, "The United Kingdom's Contribution to European Security and Defence," *The International Institute for Strategic Studies*, February 12, 2018, 13, https://dgap.org/en/research/publications/united-kingdoms-contribution-european-security-and-defence.

161 Giegerich and Mölling, 14.

162 Giegerich and Mölling, 14.

163 Giegerich and Mölling, "The United Kingdom's Contribution to European Security and Defence."

164 Giegerich and Mölling, 16.

The UK's government has declared its interest in participating specific European programs such as Horizon 2020 because making an appropriate contribution to these programs was seen reasonable in post-Brexit in terms of science and innovation. The Withdrawal Agreement allows this cooperation in European programs along with funding until the end of 2020 and in the post-Brexit era. So, negotiations would also include the future financing of these programs and arrangements.

D. THE UK AS AN INTEGRATED PLAYER, ASSOCIATED PARTNER, OR DETACHED OBSERVER

As noted, the UK will not participate of the Foreign Affairs Council, European Council, and Political and Security Committee after Brexit. However, the UK can still participate in the EU's security and defense structure with a special status under the form of EU+1 model.[165] Such an Integrated player model assumes that in terms of CSDP, while the UK remains outside the EU, it would stay inside the CSDP by sustaining its existing commitments to present civilian and military arrangements. Besides, the UK would also continue its commitments in terms of Battlegroups as deployable forces. Moreover, the UK would continue to participate on a case-by-case project by holding an associate membership status in the EDA. Furthermore, the UK would hold an observer status on the Agency's Steering Board while contributing to the EDA budget."[166]

The associated partner model demonstrates much looser EU-UK security and defense relationship than the integrated player model. This security and defense partnership would imitate the existing model of the EU and Norway. In this model, there would be two agreements. One, where the UK supports the EU's foreign policy actions, sanctions, and statements from the European Union, and two, while still outside the military planning in the EU's structures, the UK would decide to join implementation aspects. For this, the UK could sign a Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) in every CSDP mission they wish to join. Moreover, the UK may sustain its ongoing presence in an EU Battlegroup.

[165] Whitman, "The UK and EU Foreign, Security and Defence Policy after Brexit," R43-50.

[166] Whitman, 48.

Nevertheless, in the Associated Partner model, the UK would have no affect over the development of EU foreign, security, and defense policies.[167]

In the Detached observer model, the UK will be separated both politically and organizationally from the EU's foreign, security, and defense policies. Yet, the UK might prefer privileged bilateral relationships with EU member states. By doing so, the UK would use this as an advantage to control the EU's foreign, security, and defense policy other than seeking this aim with third party arrangements. While this model gives the UK the most independence, the UK's level of influence will shrink automatically in the EU's security and defense policy.[168] In terms of CSDP, the UK might imitate the model of EU-US practice. While the U.S. did not participate in CSDP military missions, the U.S. joined "in civilian CSDP missions on a case-by-case basis via a framework agreement on crisis management operations signed in 2011."[169]

Table 2. Post-Brexit participation levels of the UK in the areas of CFSP and CSDP[170]

	Battlegroups	European Defence Agency	Working Groups	Political and Security Committee	CSDP		Foreign Affairs Council Membership
					Civilian Operations	Military Operations	
Full EU membership	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Integrated player	YES	ASSOCIATE MEMBER	NO	SPECIAL STATUS (cooperation on selected agenda)	YES	YES	SPECIAL STATUS (in-Council cooperation on selected agenda)
Associated Partner	Permanent participation	Administrative Agreement	NO	NO	Framework Participation Agreement		NO (Norway model –foreign policy synchronisation on 'dialogue' basis)
Detached observer	NO	NO	NO	NO	Case-by-case basis	NO	NO

167 Whitman, R43-50.

168 Whitman, 7.

169 Whitman, 49.

170 Adapted from Whitman, 6.

Ultimately, options suggested by Mölling, Giegerich, and Whitman overlap in some ways. For example, through FPAs, the UK could continue to participate in case-by-case operations or missions in the CSDP. However, this option comes with some drawbacks in that the UK would not enjoy voting rights, automatic presence at meetings, or any leadership role in decision-making processes. The UK has expressed its intention as contradictory to this type of relationship. Also, establishing a bilateral/trilateral or multilateral cooperation between interested EU member states and the UK is another option. The UK could form privileged relationships with some EU member states such as Germany, France, or Poland. This thesis, however, argues that the most viable option for the EU and UK's security and defense relationship is that the UK create bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with willing EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation.

E. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE POST-BREXIT EU-UK SECURITY AND DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP

Brexit should represent an opportunity for the EU to rethink its integration process. If the European Defense Fund (EDF) is the EU's vital tool to advocate a security defense integration process, the EDF rule of law and budget should be secured by the EP. Whether or not the EU rebuilds its independence with the UK, the EU needs to define the future security and defense partnership with the UK.

The EU should deliberate on the UK's post-Brexit international posture before making final arrangements on the security and defense partnership, especially in the areas of CFSP and CSDP. Currently, the EU's wait and see strategy should transform to a more flexible one by not only obtaining the UK's interest but maintaining it as well. The future EU-UK partnership must be changeable, aiming to see the behaviors of each other and agree to rely on commitments. For this reason, the EU should not put a harsh treaty in security and defense areas.

The EU and the UK should create a framework for dialogue which is both formal and informal. The EU and the UK might draft an FPA that gives enough room for both parties by stating the terms and level of association of the UK to the individual operations.

The UK's cooperation through PESCO or EDA should be limited before proving itself in terms of willingness and behavior in the objectives of these policies. The level of cooperation would be changed during time.[171]

The EU and the UK should continue to work through NATO as a common dialogue platform to ensure the security of the European continent. The EU could replicate the United States' relation with 'Enhanced Opportunity' partners to build new security and defense relations. The UK would establish bilateral/trilateral or multilateral relationships with willing and interested member states.

F. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, declarations and agreements were analyzed to reveal the EU's responses to the UK's demand on establishing Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership. This chapter provided an overview of the negotiation process on specific security and defense areas, to include creating a Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership For this reason, this chapter was called Alternative Models for Post-Brexit EU-UK Security and Defense partnership and has presented several options for the EU-UK in terms of creating a post-Brexit partnership. Finally, recommendations for establishing Post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have been given as guidance for the incomplete process between the EU and the UK. This study envisages that the most viable option for future EU-UK security and defense relationship is that the UK will create bilateral/trilateral or multilateral partnership with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation. If both the EU and the UK continually express their red lines, which could slow down the process, this type of relationship could serve as a pragmatic option in dealing with the security of the European continent.

171 Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit*, 40.

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V. CONCLUSION

Brexit should represent an opportunity for the EU to rethink its integration process. The EU should deliberate on the UK's post-Brexit international posture before making final arrangements on the security and defense EU-UK partnership, especially in the areas of CFSP and CSDP. The EU and the UK should continue to work through NATO as a common dialogue platform to ensure the security of the European continent. Given the incomplete negotiating process between the EU and the UK, creating bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral partnerships with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation could be a viable option.

Overall, re-consideration of the present security and foreign policy concerning Brexit could lead to a more flexible and effective EU security and foreign policy involving the UK in precise areas. From the EU's perspective, Lain and Nouwens argue that EU member states can benefit from the security point of view by the British exit.[172] They hold that without the UK's traditional opposition to more integration in defense and security policy, EU member states could take more initiatives more easily and cooperatively without the blocking of the UK. While France is more interested in counter-terrorism arrangements and involved in missions in line with its national interests, Germany has tended to harmonize with the EU defense policies.[173] In addition to these threat assumptions, the EU could also reassess its existing CSDP arrangements. As an example, in 2016, the Paris and Brussels attacks showed deficiencies in these existing frameworks in terms of processing and using intelligence.[174] The UK may choose to form bilateral, trilateral, and multilateral alliances with EU member states while also supporting EU-NATO cooperation. In this cooperation on security and defense, the UK will have the opportunity to protect its national interests and to strengthen its position in the European and global arenas.

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[172] Lain and Nouwens, "The Consequences of Brexit for European Defence and Security," 2017.

[173] Charles Rault, "The French Approach to Counterterrorism," *Vol* 3, no. 1 (2010): 4.

[174] Letta Tayler, *Grounds for Concern: Belgium's Counterterror Responses to the Paris and Brussels Attacks* (New York, N.Y.: Human Rights Watch, 2016).

In this respect, the United States has always encouraged European Union states to boost their efforts for the security of their continent. Even if NATO is a framework for trans-Atlantic defense cooperation, U.S. administrations have supported the EU in organizing its Security and Defense Policy if the policies do not contradict those of NATO. Thus, the United States also supports the new post-Brexit security and defense partnership involving the EU and the UK for three reasons.[175]

First, to maintain a security balance, the United States endorses the 2 percent of GDP that the UK has contributed in part to a NATO-relevant security partnership. The UK and France are two states with strong defense capabilities and the UK (like all NATO Allies except Iceland) pledged to spend at least 2 percent of its GDP on defense measures. The UK's leaders have pushed other EU member states to contribute more. However, the UK's decision to leave the EU will only further decrease the EU's defense capacities.

The second reason is that the United States relies on its traditional ally and special partner in the EU defense coordination. If the United States does not perceive the EU defense structures as undermining the U.S. relationship with Europe and NATO, UK governments have consistently preserved the importance of NATO while cooperating in defense issues to strengthen the European Union forces.

Third, the UK also cooperated willingly and ably with the United States both in the 2003 invasion of Iraq through a coalition of the willing and the 2001 occupation of Afghanistan. However, coordination in the Middle East is a complex process through the EU, the UK, or NATO. Thus, there is a need for broader cooperation between the EU, the UK, and NATO. If the UK cooperatively acts with the EU, it can easily access broader markets and have a larger budget and political voice.[176] While pursuing EU interests, the UK's foreign policy is referred to as soft power. Nevertheless, with the decision of the UK to leave the EU, the credibility of EU foreign policy in the Middle East would be decreased. The EU's voice will be less influential in the Middle East without the UK's security and defense capacities and experience in foreign policy. Ultimately, the United States seeks a

[175] Miller Vaughne, "Leaving the EU," *House of Commons* 13, no. 42 (2013): 8.

[176] Vaughne, 83.

partnership between the UK and the EU to avoid confrontation with the EU, a more likely occurrence with the absence of Britain, one of the oldest U.S. allies.

The vital need for continued security and defense cooperation between London and Brussels was recognized in the UK's 2015 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) and the EU's 2016 Global Strategy by focusing on the shared threats.[177] UK leaders argue that without a new security treaty ensuring the post-Brexit security relations, the EU-UK cooperation on confronting terrorism and criminal issues will lack the present-day capabilities.

In the White Paper, the UK government examined the UK's position in relation to the EU as follows:

> It has worked with all Member States to develop a significant suite of tools that supports the UK's and the EU's combined operational capabilities and helps keep citizens safe. ... The UK will no longer be part of the EU's common policies on foreign, defence, security, justice, and home affairs. Instead, the Government is proposing a new security partnership that maintains close cooperation because as the world continues to change, so too do the threats the UK and the EU both face.[178]

For these purposes, the UK government envisioned a new security partnership based on the following terms and conditions:

> One, sustainment of capabilities of both parties to secure citizens' lives and requiring police to reveal sensitive data and information to confront dangerous criminals and terrorists. Two, joining the agencies such as Europol and Eurojust to share information. Three, decide on the coordination of foreign policy, defense, and development areas to confront international challenges and ensuring the deployment of the UK's important assets, intelligence, and capabilities for the European values. Four, ensure a joint capability development which composed of operational effectiveness of militaries and increasing competitiveness of the European defense industry to face the global challenges. Lastly, developing wider cooperation to confront illegal migration and through strategic dialogue, cooperating on

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177 Great Britain et al., *National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United Kingdom.*, 2015.

178 Great Britain and Department for Exiting the European Union, *The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union*, 2018, 9, https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100062857375.0x000001.

> the issues of cybersecurity and terrorism, health security, and civil protection.[179]

The future EU-UK security partnership will have to secure the citizens of both the EU and the UK. Thus, there should be a comprehensive and single security partnership to tackle terrorism threats, instabilities in the neighborhood, managing migration, and using data. To deliver the visions mentioned earlier, the security partnership should align with the following objectives:

> be notified by the shared security context; conserve the law and cooperation capabilities in criminal areas through sharing the sensitive data and information and ensure the cooperation in fighting terrorism through the Europol; continue cooperation on foreign policy, defence, and development, including consultation on the global challenges that the UK and the EU face, coordination where it is more effective to work side-by-side, and capability development to deliver the means to tackle current and future threats; and joint action on wider security areas such as illegal migration, cybersecurity, terrorism, civil protection, and health security.[180]

The White Paper acknowledges that "the world is becoming more complex and volatile. These complex and overlapping challenges are likely to remain security priorities for the UK and the EU over the next decade. To respond effectively will require a transformative approach, using the widest possible range of capabilities at the disposal of the UK and the EU."[181]

The transition period aims to let citizens and businesses in Britain maintain the benefits negotiated by the EU for its members. During this period, the UK must comply with the European Union treaties. Also, it will pay its budgetary contributions to the EU. Yet, participation in the decision-making processes and political representation in the EU were not granted to the UK as a third country.[182]

To begin with, the participation of third countries in CSDP institutional structures is a difficult task; if the UK is granted many privileges, such as having power and voting

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[179] Great Britain and Department for Exiting the European Union, 10.

[180] Great Britain and Department for Exiting the European Union, 53.

[181] Great Britain and Department for Exiting the European Union, 54.

[182] Santopinto, *CDSP after Brexit,* 17.

rights in projects or future strategic plans, other countries in the same position (non-EU European members of NATO) such as Turkey and Norway will demand the same rights.

The EU's Framework Participation Agreements (FPA) are mentioned in the Withdrawal agreement for the involvement of non-EU countries in the CSDP's civilian and military missions and operations. Presently, 18 FPAs (one of them was with the US) have been signed. However, FPAs do not assure a guarantee of involvement in the operations. Third countries can also participate through Battlegroups without a position as a framework nation. In addition to the Framework Participation Agreements, Administrative Arrangements (AA) also let the European Defense Agency (EDA) cooperate with third countries. Nevertheless, these conditions will not suit the UK if it seeks a more special relationship. The EU's strategy on this issue is to leave the door open for possible future projects with the UK and also to define a more precise agreement in which involvement of the UK in activities is set.[183]

The possible future of the UK's participation in the EU's PESCO or EDF remains to be seen. Yet, the possible contributions to missions and operations as a third country were not envisioned within the European Union Treaties. Santopinto argues that "the conditions for third countries to access the EU's decision-making procedures may well be tougher than those of NATO."[184] so that, "no third country may refer matters to the European Council."[185] Despite all the problems that the UK faces in this time of uncertainties, various solutions are under consideration.

Following Britain's vote to leave the EU, both the UK and the EU have sought ways to build a new security and defense partnership. The White Paper, *The Future Relationship Between the United Kingdom and the European Union*, reflects the UK's commitment to such a partnership and acknowledges the common threats that both parties face. Also, the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, which establishes a transition period until the end of 2020, outlines the proposed partnership with the UK.

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[183] Santopinto, 23.

[184] Santopinto, 21.

[185] Santopinto, 146.

From the EU's side, there have been several attempts to enhance European security, including the establishment of the CSDP, the EDA, the EDF, PESCO, and close cooperation with NATO. Also, despite the fact that is timing and publication were overshadowed by the Brexit vote, the new EU Global Strategy (EUGS) of 2016 articulated the EU's new strategic goals. However, these efforts also included some limitations.

From the UK's side, its intention to enhance the EU's autonomous decision-making along with its military capabilities in the St. Malo Declaration was remarkable. On the one hand, the UK has contributed to CSDP missions and operations in terms of finance, military equipment, expertise, and personnel. However, the UK, especially in military operations, limits some aspects of CSDP by opposing the expansion of the EDA and the creation of a permanent EU military operational headquarters. Rather, it has chosen to participate in capacity-building projects based on civilian missions. On the other hand, both parties acknowledge the importance of NATO in their security and defense relations. Thus, NATO could act as a bridge between the EU and the UK in a post-Brexit security and defense partnership if both the EU and the UK attach an essential role to NATO for collective defense.

The future position of the UK in world affairs will also have an impact on the EU. Thus, there is a vital need to develop a new security and defense partnership to secure the borders of Europe if reducing cooperation will not be a logical or intended option for both parties.

Alternative models for post-Brexit EU-UK security and defense partnership have been presented in this thesis. These include partnership through bilateralism and trilateralism, civilian power Europe-PESCO, partnership through a Framework Participation Agreement and Permanent Observer Status, and the UK as an integrated player-associated partner, or detached Observer.

It is important to stress that signing an FPA is a minimum criterion for a non-member state's participation in EU-led missions and operations. The UK's possible participation formula would rely on signing an FPA as a detached observer. These options could also serve as guidance for other non-EU countries such as Turkey that are interested

in establishing security and defense partnerships with the EU. This thesis concludes that the most adventurous option for the future EU-UK security and defense relationship would provide for the UK establishing bilateral, trilateral, or multilateral partnerships with privileged partners such as France, Germany, or Poland while also supporting close and ambitious EU-NATO cooperation.

After Brexit, the UK will be considered a third country in the eyes of the EU. According to EU policy, third countries can join CSDP missions and operations of the EU through FPAs or PAs. Almost every CSDP mission and operation initiated by the EU thus far has involved third countries. Despite marginal UK contributions to CSDP missions and operations in recent years, the UK is said to be committed to continuing its involvement in the CSDP. The EU welcomes post-Brexit CSDP involvement due to the UK's military weight and diplomatic significance, allowing it to provide substantial combinations of expertise, troops, and hardware. Nonetheless, the UK's call for a unique relationship that exceeds that of any other third country makes post-Brexit participation in CSDP missions and operations exceptionally complex. Current means of joining CSDP missions and operations through FPAs and PAs strongly emphasize that third country contributions should always be without prejudice to the decision-making autonomy of the EU.

Consequently, third countries are largely kept outside the decision-making procedures of missions and operations. The UK is unlikely to accept such a subordinate role in the CSDP. Therefore, determining whether the UK will be able to secure greater decision-making influence and control over missions and operations than is normally granted to third-country participation is essential for a future CSDP partnership. Given the EU's stance toward a post-Brexit CSDP framework, the UK will not have a voice in the decision-making, i.e., it will lose its veto power. Moreover, the EU is determined not to disrupt the EU's relationship with other third countries. Hence, a post-Brexit CSDP partnership is unlikely to be truly "special."

Therefore, any future role in CSDP missions and operations by the UK will be that of a facilitator rather than a leader. Current frameworks to join CSDP missions and operations through concluding an FPA or PA are likely to result in limited UK involvement in the CSDP post-Brexit. This research has shown that an enhanced FPA would allow the

UK to continue to participate in CSDP missions and operations post-Brexit in a manner deemed more fitting. The EU has indicated its interests in creating a mechanism for closer and more constant coordination with third countries involved in CSDP missions and operations. This research suggests reviewing in greater depth and detail the EU's current CSDP partnership arrangements. There are several ways for the UK and other third countries to obtain greater influence in CSDP missions and operations than is granted to them today.

In this regard, third countries such as the UK could be granted greater influence and access to the decision-making process, depending on the political and strategic importance of a specific third country, as well as its commitment and involvement in CSDP missions and operations. Additionally, the current format of the CoC lacks political influence and significance. By upgrading the CoC to meet at a more senior level, third countries could be able to secure greater influence over CSDP missions and operations. Moreover, the UK could try to seek permanent observer status in the PSC. However, considering the EU's current reluctance to accept this idea, this option seems unlikely to succeed. Nonetheless, the EU has indicated its willingness to seek specific dialogue with the UK in CSDP matters after Brexit. In this regard, the UK could negotiate regular consultations at the ministerial and strategic level without a formal decision-making role.

In general, the EU's willingness to grant third countries more influence will always be limited, due to its sacrosanct decision-making autonomy. Close CSDP cooperation between the EU and the UK post-Brexit will therefore depend on future negotiations, and the EU's willingness to reform current CSDP frameworks. By doing so, the EU could benefit from the British exit without the UK's traditional opposition to more integration in defense and security policy, and this could lead to a more flexible and effective EU security and foreign policy involving the UK in precise areas. Also, the UK would have the opportunity to protect its national interests and strengthen its position in both European and global arenas.

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