A REVISED SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT FOR A HYBRID WORLD

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategic Studies

by

KEVRON WINT HENRY, MAJOR, JAMAICA DEFENCE FORCE
MSc, University of Leicester, Leicester, United Kingdom, 2016

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The twenty first century with its inherent complexities has redefined our collective understanding of conflict. It has also engendered a reevaluation of systems and operational constructs to test for relevance in the modern era. The general validity and utility of the current accepted models of the Spectrum of Conflict is one such construct subject to necessary review. The Spectrum of Conflict is a recognized conceptual planning tool with varied interpretations and as such has associated cognitive dissonance as to the relevant accepted categories and their associated parameters. As a result, the doctrinal viewpoint of the overall spectrum requires more in-depth study, analysis and codification. A 'Hybrid Model' is proposed and attempts to fill the gap in the current literature and ultimately aid in redefining the spectrum of conflict to highlight the current twenty first century and beyond conflict paradigm. This new understanding ensures full situational awareness and a unified standard for joint operations and inter-agency planning and preparation. It will subsequently facilitate an enhanced application of lethal/non-lethal responses in order to ultimately bring the identified environment/theater of disruption and conflict back to a level of stability.

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Name of Candidate: Major Kevron Wint Henry

Thesis Title: A Revised Spectrum of Conflict for a Hybrid World

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
DeEtte A. Lombard, M.A., M.S.

_____, Member
Kenneth E. Long, D.M.

_____, Member
Dennis R. Linton, M.A., M.S.

Accepted this 12th day of June 2020 by:

_____, Acting Director, Office of Degree Programs
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

A REVISED SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT FOR A HYBRID WORLD, by Major
Kevron W. Henry, 146 pages.

The twenty first century with its inherent complexities has redefined our collective
understanding of conflict. It has also engendered a reevaluation of systems and
operational constructs to test for relevance in the modern era. The general validity and
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of disruption and conflict back to a level of stability.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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ACRONYMS

DPRK Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea

HILEO High Intensity Law Enforcement Operations

IW Irregular Warfare

LSCO Large Scale Combat Operations

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PLA Peoples' Liberation Army

UN United Nations

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WW II World War II

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Introduction

The human interest in trying to understand the nature of conflict, its root causes, progression, intensity, relevance, validity and ultimate predictability has transcended time and has taken on immense significance in the modern era. The human race over that time has steadily progressed to its present-day understanding in areas of science, art, philosophy and social interaction. In tandem with this cognitive and interpersonal development, has been the corresponding development of the ability to engage in conflict with the utilization of a more efficient and effective understanding of coordinated violence. Throughout recorded history there are detailed accounts of individuals, tribes, kingdoms and nations involved in conflict. Their motivations, weaponry and tactical and operational actions, have been observed and recorded for posterity. On analysis, the reasons for conflict have ranged from the classic defensive and offensive actions in pursuit of limited objectives, to grand strategic designs seeking greater influence and power. The ultimate aim however, has been the defeat of the identified foe, whether by annihilation, subjugation and/or subordination. What has also been evident throughout, is that conflict and by extension war, are seemingly inevitable at some level. The study of conflict in general and warfare in particular, therefore takes on increased significance. Particularly, as it relates to the understanding of their frequency, varied constructs and dynamic interplay. This understanding, is perceived as being necessary in order to enhance general situational awareness and more importantly reinforce the mindset that if

conflict itself is inevitable then he who is best prepared for it, is best prepared to ultimately win.

War and warfare are often conflated but have different meanings. As defined by the philosopher of war Baron Carl Von Clausewitz, in his famous treatise "war is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will".[1] Whilst warfare is the actual "practice of war in a particular time; space and context."[2] This conflation has caused some dissonance and it has subsequently been posited that "war's fundamental nature is largely enduring, but it is not immutable. The essential elements are always present, but can and will be altered by ongoing social and technological changes."[3] This position runs seemingly counter to the edicts of Clausewitz who also posited that war in itself is immutable but the nature of warfare changes in concert with the zeitgeist of the age.[4] Conceptual foundations, culture, experience and overarching interests, tend to have a significant impact on which position is supported.

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[1] Carl Von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984), 87.

[2] John T. Kuehn, "War vs Warfare the Problems of Conflation," *H-War Blog*, 19 April 2019, accessed 19 October 2019, https://networks.h-net.org/node/12840/blog/hand-grenade-week/4072038/war-or-warfare.

[3] Frank G. Hoffman, "Squaring Clausewitz's Trinity in the Age of Autonomous Weapons," *Orbis* 63, no. 1 (Winter 2019), accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.fpri.org/article/2019/01/squaring-clausewitzs-trinity-in-the-age-of-autonomous-weapons/.

[4] Clausewitz, *On War*, 87.

<u>Significance of the Spectrum of Conflict</u>

The Spectrum of Conflict also referred to as the Continuum of Conflict, has been conceptualized in many forms throughout recorded history as philosophy, doctrinal edict, graphical representation or formulae. At the base level, in the study of conflict, the spectrum of conflict serves as a useful tool. It is a tool that provides planners, academics and practitioners alike with a visual representation of the categories of major conflict, their occurrence probability and the correlated level of violence associated with them. A simple graphical representation with its interplay of words and shapes has by apparent acclamation and continued use gained utility. This perceived utility is seemingly because it displays in graphic form the inherent complexity and intensity of the categorized acts of violence. This representation fosters greater understanding and subsequently becomes a part of the baseline thought process for further discussion, deliberation, planning and preparation prior to the utilization of the elements of state power.

<u>Definition of Terms</u>

A spectrum has been defined as that which is "used to classify something, or suggest that it can be classified, in terms of its position on a scale between two extreme or opposite points."[5] A conflict is defined as "a prolonged armed struggle or an incompatibility between two or more opinions, principles, or interests."[6] The military doctrinal definition of the spectrum of conflict states that "conflict can take a wide range

[5] Lexico, "Spectrum," Lexico, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.lexico.com /en/definition/spectrum.

[6] Lexico, "Conflict," Lexico, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.lexico.com /en/definition/conflict.

of forms constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved."[7]

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) further outlined that:

> International relations are characterized by complex interactions ranging from stable peace to high-intensity conflict. These characteristics overlap and merge and can be visualized as a spectrum. Conflict can now be seen as a blurring of the distinctions between adversaries and the way they use force to achieve political goals, generating a spectrum of conflict in which the level of violence increases from stable peace to high intensity conflict.[8]

These definitions are a deliberate effort to simplify and contextualize this interrelationship between conflict and its associated intensity in order to provide a foundation for further discourse. The relationship and overarching concept can then be defined as the range of situations of friction or actual violence going from one extreme to the opposite.

This research focuses in detail on the emergence of new categories of warfare and the definition and re-categorization of previously acknowledged operational constructs. Key definitions are as follows:

Cyber Warfare: Cyber warfare involves the actions by a nation-state or international organization to attack and attempt to damage another nation's computers or information networks through, for example, computer viruses or denial-of-service

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[7] Headquarters, Department of the Navy (HQDN), Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, *Warfighting* (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy, 1997), 2-6, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications /MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf.

[8] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Standardization Office, Allied Joint Publication 1, *Allied Joint Doctrine* (Brussels, Belgium: NATO Standardization Office, 2017), 2-14, accessed 19 October 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk /government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/602225/doctrine_nato_allied_j oint_doctrine_ajp_01.pdf.

attacks.[9] Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace (global domain within

the information environment) capabilities (A cyberspace capability is a device, computer

program, or technique, including any combination of software, firmware, or hardware)

where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. There are

three types of cyberspace operations: Department of Defense Information Network

Operations, Offensive cyberspace operations, and Defensive cyberspace operations.[10]

Gray Zone Warfare/Conflicts: Gray zone warfare/conflicts are defined as the

"deliberate multi-dimensional activities by a state actor just below the threshold of

aggressive use of military forces. In such conflicts, adversaries employ an integrated suite

of national and subnational instruments of power in an ambiguous war to gain specified

strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of overt conflict. Adversaries may

employ proxy forces to increase the level of military power being used without losing

deniability."[11]

High Intensity Law Enforcement Operations (HILEO): High Intensity Law

Enforcement Operations (HILEO) a new concept crafted by the author, to describe a new

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[9] RAND Corporation, "Cyber Warfare," RAND Corporation, accessed 30 October 2019, https://www.rand.org/topics/cyber-warfare.html.

[10] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-12, *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operation* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 1-2.

[11] Frank G. Hoffman, "The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: Protracted, Gray Zone, Ambiguous and Hybrid Modes of War," Heritage Foundation, October 2016, 26, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2019-10/2016_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength_The%20Contemporary%20Spectrum%20of%20Conflict_Protracted%20Gray%20Zone%20Ambiguous%20and%20Hybrid%20Modes%20of%20War.pdf.

conceptual construct for high intensity law enforcement. Within this construct, multi domain-based operations can be conducted in a domestic, regional or international based theatre of operations. These operations require a whole of government approach, particularly the continued involvement of paramilitary or traditional military forces in order to successfully counter the identified threat and return the disrupted environment to stability.

Hybrid Warfare: Hybrid warfare is defined as "the challenge presented by the increasing complexity of armed conflict, where adversaries may combine types of warfare plus nonmilitary means in order to neutralize conventional military power."[12]

Instruments of National Power and the Range of Military Operations: The ability of a government to advance its national interests is dependent on the effectiveness of that government in employing the instruments of national power to achieve determined national strategic objectives. The appropriate government entity coordinates these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military and economic). They are the tools by which a state applies its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography and national will. The military instrument of national power can be used in a wide variety of ways that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat intensity. These various ways can be understood to occur across a continuum of conflict ranging from peace to war. Mindful that the operational level of warfare connects the tactical to the strategic, and operations and campaigns are themselves scalable, governments utilize the construct of the range of

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[12] Sean Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare: So, What for the Future Joint Force?" *Prism* 8, no. 2 (October 2019): 87.

military operations to provide insight into the various broad usages of military power from a strategic perspective.[13]

Irregular Warfare (IW): Irregular Warfare "is characterized as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). In IW, a less powerful adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more powerful military force, which usually serves that nation's established government. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."[14]

Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO): Large-scale combat operations are at the far right of the conflict continuum and associated with total war. Historically, battlefields in large-scale combat operations have been more chaotic, intense, lethal and highly destructive. "Their conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty."[15]

Levels of Warfare: While the various forms and methods of warfare are ultimately expressed in concrete military action, the three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—link tactical actions to achievement of national objectives. There are no finite limits or boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders design and

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[13] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Service, 2017), xi.

[14] Ibid., x.

[15] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2017), 1-2.

synchronize operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command.[16]

Narrative Warfare: A Narrative is a crafted story that gives meaning to a set of facts, events or associated information expressed as but not necessarily the truth; Narrative Warfare by extension is defined as the war for information and influence over a targeted audience. In a war of influence, the object is to use all available means to target and subsequently trigger predictable behavior that will result in favorable reaction for the protagonist's side or version of events. States, non-state actors and individuals attempt to influence audiences to align with their perspective by employing specific influence-based tactics. As a result of the narrative/influence-based activities the target audiences that are not fully aligned to the directed view are influenced to at a minimum offer no opposition. The intent of narrative warfare is predictable influence and subsequent dominance over adversaries and competitors.[17]

Space Operations/Warfare: Space operations encompass "the degree of dominance in space of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations by the former and its related land, maritime, air, space, and special operations forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force."[18]

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[16] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, xi.

[17] Paul Cobaugh, "5-Point Strategy to Oppose Russian Narrative Warfare," Medium, 25 April 2018, accessed 20 October 2019, https://medium.com/@paulcobaugh /a-five-point-strategy-to-oppose-russian-narrative-warfare-56e0006aab2a.

[18] Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-14, *Space Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Services, 2017), GL-10.

Stability: Stability is regarded as a "set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable. Actions to maintain or reestablish stability first aim to lessen the level of violence. These actions also aim to enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. These actions encourage the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior."[19]

Traditional Warfare: Traditional warfare is characterized as a violent struggle for domination between nation-states or coalitions and alliances of nation-states. With the increasingly rare case of formally declared war, traditional warfare typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional forces and special operations forces against each other in all physical domains as well as the information environment (which includes cyberspace).[20]

Warfare: is not constant and continues to change and be transformed by society, diplomacy, politics, and technology. There are two basic forms of warfare—traditional and irregular. The forms of warfare are applied not in terms of an "either/or" choice, but in various combinations to suit a combatant's strategy and capabilities.[21]

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[19] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Service, 2019), 1.

[20] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, x.

[21] Ibid.

Purpose

The purpose of this study was to assess the general validity and utility of the current accepted model of the Spectrum of Conflict. On initial analysis it was believed that the spectrum of conflict should not be just a parking lot or veritable product bin for concepts that carry no meaning. Rather it should provide an accurate reflection of the various relevant categories of modern-day conflict and their dynamic inter play. The twenty first century with its inherent complexities has redefined our collective understanding of conflict and has caused some cognitive dissonance as to the relevant categories and their associated parameters. As a result, the doctrinal viewpoint of the overall spectrum requires more in-depth study, analysis and codification. This new understanding will ensure full situational awareness, a unified standard for joint forces and interagency planning and preparation. Also, for the correct application of lethal/non-lethal responses, in order to ultimately bring the identified environment/theater of conflict back to a level of stability.

This study proposes a new model that attempts to fill the perceived gap in the current literature and ultimately aids in redefining the spectrum of conflict to highlight the current twenty first century and beyond conflict paradigm. It is not a tautological exercise but rather a proposal for a radical shift in how aspects of conflict and warfare are perceived and prepared for and their subsequent implications.

Research Question

The primary research question posited was: Is the current Spectrum of Conflict model an accurate representation of twenty first century warfare and its associated levels

of intensity and dynamic inter relationships? In order to successfully articulate a response to the primary question two secondary questions were also formulated:

1. What are the emerging types of conflict that are not represented on the current model but because of their current and predicted probability of occurrence and intensity warrant inclusion on the spectrum? and,

2. What is an optimal representation of the spectrum of conflict?

Assumptions

The following assumptions were made during the conduct of this research:

1. The Spectrum of Conflict is critical to the understanding of modern-day conflict and in particular to the profession of arms; and

2. All major global military powers have interpretations of the spectrum of conflict that help to further their own national interests as they relate to the classification of certain conflicts and their relationship to legal and ethical based considerations. However, not all major powers and/or cultures view conflict in the same binary manner as some nation states have a more multi-dimensional and progressive interpretation.

Limitations

The researcher was limited by the time available to conduct the study and the ability to incorporate all the material on the subject area, in particular the significant material from historical sources. The researcher was also limited in access to more current military based information for a balanced view from countries such as the Russian Federation and the Peoples' Republic of China.

Scope and Delimitations

The researcher sought to assess the feasibility and general validity of the current accepted spectrum of conflict model and also propose the use of a new model that will incorporate some of the elements outlined previously. The researcher did not seek to redefine conflict in general, but rather how it is viewed, as an aid for understanding and planning in relation to the proposed model.

Significance of Study

The Spectrum of Conflict is a global planning tool with varied interpretations and as such has associated cognitive dissonance. A common understanding of the spectrum facilitates greater situational awareness, a unified standard for planning and preparation and a more effective application of lethal/non-lethal responses, in order to ultimately bring the identified environment/theater of conflict back to a level of stability. The researcher also sought to introduce new terminology into the collective military lexicon and ultimately provide a useful planning tool for joint forces and interagency planning.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter established a foundation for the study particularly as it related to a clear definition of the spectrum/continuum of conflict, its doctrinal significance and its utilization as a planning tool for both military and inter-agency-based planners. The chapter also served to highlight that the current global landscape is a virtual matrix of domestic, regional and international conflict-based events of varying intensities and complexities that involve the protracted use of military personnel and materiel. Chapter 2

outlines that these events and activities are not transient in nature and as a result the

overall spectrum required a more in-depth study, analysis and codification.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The purpose of this study was to ascertain the general validity and utility of the
current accepted doctrinal representation of the spectrum of conflict. This chapter sought
to identify what has been written on the nature of contemporary conflict including current
and emerging categories of warfare that should be represented as components of an
updated spectrum. It also examines the military related history and current precepts of the
United States (US), the Russian Federation, and the Peoples' Republic of China.

The study focuses on the US, Russia, and China as they are currently regarded as
the globe's tri-polar powers. All three powers are now major global competitors, with
distinct militaristic traditions and the commensurate state power apparatuses most
capable of conducting operations across the full spectrum. "All three rivals possess out-
size military establishments with vast arrays of conventional and nuclear weapons. China
and Russia have now joined the United States, even if on a more modest scale, in
extending their influence beyond their borders diplomatically, economically and
militarily."[22]

What is the Spectrum of Conflict?

Warfare fueled by human development and influenced by external variables, has
steadily evolved throughout time moving with alacrity through the ages of stone, bronze

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[22] Michael Klase, "Peril in a Tripolar World," War is Boring, 31 October 2018,
accessed 19 October 2019, https://warisboring.com/56610-2/.

and iron. Within that continuum "conflict can take a wide range of forms constituting a spectrum which reflects the magnitude of violence involved."[23] This spectrum of conflict then provides a focal point for possible understanding of the machinations of state craft and the elements of state power and how they interact and in a significant number of instances across recorded history have led to conflict and war.

This desire for common understanding has spawned theories, a plethora of scholarly articles, doctrinal edicts, representational diagrams and graphs of varying types and quality. A simple diagram-based representation with its interplay of words and shapes provides a snapshot capable of displaying the inherent complexity and intensity of the categorized acts of violence.[24] This representation fosters greater understanding and subsequently becomes a part of the baseline thought process for further discussion, deliberation, planning and preparation prior to the utilization of state power. Although multiple diagrammatic interpretations of the spectrum exist, most models follow the classic easy to follow line graph representation with x and y axes of level of intensity

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[23] HQDN, MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, 2-6.

[24] "A well-designed diagrammatic representation is better than a sentential representation, to support reasoning and problem solving. Diagrammatic representation has been found to help both the perceptual and conceptual processes in problem solving. In terms of the perceptual process, the diagrammatic representation helps people identify and recognize relevant items, because it groups all relevant information, thus avoiding a prolonged search for elements required for problem solving. In terms of conceptual process, the diagrammatic representation helps people generate and test hypotheses, because it provides a large number of perceptual inference cues, which are extremely easy for humans to use." Jill H. Larkin and Herbert A. Simon, "Why a Diagram Is (Sometimes) Worth Ten Thousand Words," *Cognitive Science* 11, no. 1 (1987): 65, quoted in Jinwoo Kim, Jimwoo Kim, Jungpil Hahn, and Hyoungmee Hahn, "How Do We Understand a System with (So) Many Diagrams?" *Information Systems Research* 11, no. 3 (September 2000): 284, accessed 19 October 2019, https://bi-gale-com.er.lib.k-state.edu/essentials/article/GALE%7CA99576748?u=ksu.

versus probability of occurrence. Pursuant to the foregoing, the James D. Watkins'

United States Naval Institute Proceedings model (see figure 1) was utilized as the base

model for this study.

Figure 1.　Spectrum of Conflict Model

Source: James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *Proceedings*, no. 112 (January 1986): 8, accessed 10 August 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings /1986/january-supplement/maritime-strategy-0.

Composition of the Spectrum

An analysis of the suitability of the spectrum would presuppose that the relevant

academics, political representatives and practitioners are acutely aware of all the

developments in the field, not so as argued by Dr. Frank G. Hoffman. Dr. Hoffman is a

United States Marine Corps' veteran who holds a PhD. in War Studies from King's

College London, and is currently a Distinguished Research Fellow at the National

Defense University in Washington, DC. Dr. Hoffman has researched and written

extensively on conflict, strategy, doctrine and defense policy, in particular the unique

nature and complexity of twenty first century conflict; he is regarded as a global leader in

the analysis of modern warfare and the subsequent implications for the spectrum/continuum of conflict. In his article for the *PRISM*, "Examining Complex Forms of Conflict," he posited that the national security community as a whole had a responsibility to be able to respond to numerous challenges across the full spectrum of conflict however, that response was contingent of the general acceptance of a well understood taxonomy describing the elements that constitute the continuum of conflict. He added that the community in general lacks this taxonomy despite its engagement in a spate of conflicts globally. As a result of this perceived conceptual challenge as to what exactly is war and how the different categories relate to each other, the United States and the Western powers collectively were falling behind in the overall preparation for the future.[25]

For a well-regarded expert in the field this perception could be possibly viewed as a bit alarmist as since the dawn of the twenty first century concepts of new and emerging warfare are well known and for the most part have been easily aligned with their relevant categories, where their relevance and potency could be appropriately deduced. However, other theorists such as Paul Scharre, a US Army veteran, senior fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security, who has also written extensively on the nature of modern warfare, seemed to agree with Dr. Hoffman's assessment. In fact, Mr. Scharre went even further when he outlined in his 2012 article for the Military Review 'Spectrum of What' that,

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[25] Frank G. Hoffman, "Examining Complex Forms of Conflict," *Prism* 7, no. 4 (November 2018): 30, accessed 20 October 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96 /Documents/prism/prism7_4/181204_Hoffman_PDF.pdf?ver=2018-12-04-161237-307.

whilst a decade of conflict had refined and expanded our understanding of war. Our lexicon didn't change. Operations . . . once thought to be "operations other than war" or "low-intensity conflict," are now understood as wars that may include intense combat. At the same time, sophisticated nation-state adversaries have expanded the spectrum of military operations by investing in advanced technologies designed to blunt U.S. power projection and thwart traditional U.S. advantages... U.S. defense planners refer to these new threats and U.S. concepts for countering them as counterinsurgency (COIN), anti-access/area denial (A2/AD), and "hybrid" warfare, respectively.[26]

The opinions posited however still seem to run contrary to the foundational perspectives that have transcended time that war is indeed war and the essence of it remains true no matter what category it is placed in.[27] In short, war's general nature is unchanging as "people fight today for the same fundamental reasons the Greek historian Thucydides identified 2,500 years ago: fear, honor and interest."[28]

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[26] Paul Scharre, "Spectrum of What?" *Military Review* (November-December 2012): 73-79, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20121231_art012.pdf.

[27] Kenneth Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries: Controlling the Use of Force in Contemporary Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), 7.

[28] H. R. McMaster, "The Pipe Dream of Easy War," *New York Times*, 21 July 2013, accessed 1 January 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/21/opinion/sunday/the-pipe-dream-of-easy-war.html.

Figure 2.   Number of state-based conflicts worldwide from 2002-2018, by region

Source: Erin Duffin, "Number of State-Based Conflicts Worldwide from 2002-2018, by Region Diagram," Statista.com, 19 July 2019, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/298151/number-of-state-based-conflicts-worldwide-by-region/.

The data presented in figure 2 was aggregated from a global battle-related deaths dataset, compiled by the Conflict Data Program at the Uppsala University Department of Peace and Conflict Research. It shows the number of state-based conflicts counted in regions of the world from 2002 to 2018. In 2018, for example a total of 59 state-based conflicts were counted worldwide.[29]

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[29] Erin Duffin, "Number of State-Based Conflicts Worldwide from 2002-2018, by Region Diagram," Statista.com, 19 July 2019, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/298151/number-of-state-based-conflicts-worldwide-by-region/.

Figure 3.   Number of armed conflicts worldwide from 2006-2016

Source: Erin Duffin, "Number of State-Based Conflicts Worldwide from 2002-2018, by Region Diagram," Statista.com, 19 July 2019, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.statista.com/statistics/298151/number-of-state-based-conflicts-worldwide-by-region/.

The data presented in figure 3 shows the number of armed conflicts worldwide

from 2006 to 2016, based on type of conflict. In 2016, a total number of 49 armed

conflicts were counted worldwide; including 22 conflicts over government control and 26

conflicts over territory.[30] It is evident by the figures presented that the global business of war and conflict is not a diminishing franchise by any stretch of the imagination.[31]

In reality war is ongoing and there will always be developments and innovation in warfare. As a result, there should be a concerted effort to ensure "the avoidance of the impact of short-term issues from swamping a sense of perspective on long-term continuities."[32] However, we must be mindful that a new century has dawned with increased globalization, observed power shifts and attendant technological, socio-economic and conflict-based innovations. As a result, there now has to be a reassessment of what exactly constitutes the spectrum of conflict. This is necessary in order to assist governments and forces in the development of suitable strategies and subsequent capacities. It will also require a rethinking of the appropriate balance between specialization and adaptation of means in order to counter the full warfare range likely to

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[30] Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 2017* (Sweden: Oxford University Press, September 2017), 26, accessed 18 January 2020, Sipri.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/yb17-summary-eng.pdf/.

[31] "Most contemporary armed conflicts involve a combination of regular armies, militias and armed civilians. Fighting rarely occurs on well-defined battlefields and is often intermittent with a wide range of intensities and brief ceasefires. The number of forcibly dis placed people worldwide at the start of 2018 was 68.5 million, including more than 25 million refugees. Protracted displacement crises continued in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Myanmar, Somalia, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen." Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), *SIPRI Yearbook 2019* (Sweden: Oxford University Press, 2019), accessed 8 February 2020, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2019-08/yb19_summary_eng_1.pdf.

[32] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*, 7.

be employed in combination by future adversaries."[33] This holistic effort will be needed

by states in order to ultimately protect their citizens and their respective national interests.

Components of the Spectrum

Stability

At the forefront of planning for any military based action is the efficient execution

of the plan and its ultimate end with a return to peace and stability. Stability is regarded

as a "set of conditions in which a local populace regards its governance institutions as

legitimate and its living situation as acceptable and predictable. Actions to maintain or

reestablish stability first aim to lessen the level of violence. These actions also aim to

enable the functioning of governmental, economic, and societal institutions. These

actions encourage the general adherence to local laws, rules, and norms of behavior."[34]

Stability whether in a particular localized area or the global commons is the overarching

aim of all security oriented or military based operations.

A stable environment ultimately provides the desired environment where the

citizens/inhabitants of a particular region "can conduct the activities of their daily lives

without fear of systematic of large-scale violence"[35] This confidence and the conduct of

the aforementioned daily activities subsequently generate the necessary economic activity

via which all nations are dependent on for sustainment and growth. An environment of

stability however, does not exist only with the absence of violent behavior as it may be

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[33] Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," 82-99.

[34] HQDA, ADP 3-07, *Stability*, 1-1.

[35] Ibid.

opined that this is a utopian ideal. However, the levels of violence within a stable society are noted as being within manageable levels that will not significantly disrupt the specific society's daily equilibrium or operation of the instruments of accepted governance. It is to be further noted that stability will have varying views and perceptions globally from region to region and state to state. It is therefore left to the locality in question to fully define its own accepted norms within this area of the spectrum.

Stability also encompasses those operational endeavors necessary to maintain it i.e. traditional law enforcement, classic military aid to the civil authorities or internal security type military operations (to include public health related operations such as escort, containment and quarantine enforcement) and humanitarian and disaster relief operations.

It is said that "history doesn't repeat itself but it rhymes".[36] unfortunately in the year 2020 as it related to pandemics, the rhyming of history was unfortunately the case. The lethality and pervasiveness of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) or COVID-19 pandemic, unfortunately bore similar traits to the 1918 'Spanish Flu' pandemic; particularly in the areas of infection rates and lethality.[37]

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[36] John A. Nagl, *Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice* (New York: Penguin, 2014), 62.

[37] "In December2019, a pathogenic HCoV, 2019 novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), was recognized in Wuhan, China, and has caused serious illness and death. The emergence of yet another outbreak of human disease caused by a pathogen from a viral family formerly thought to be relatively benign underscores the perpetual challenge of emerging infectious diseases and the importance of sustained preparedness. Catharine I. Paules, Hilary D. Marston, and Anthony S. Fauci, "Coronavirus Infections—More Than Just the Common Cold, Viewpoint," *Journal of the American Medical Association* (23 January 2020), accessed 3 April 2020, https://jamanetwork.com/journals /jama/fullarticle/2759815.

The global response to COVID-19 has been a significant, dynamic and ground-breaking study into crisis response, crisis management and the role of different agents of society. "While the trajectory of the outbreak was impossible to predict, effective response required prompt action from the standpoint of classic public health strategies to the timely development and implementation of effective countermeasures."[38] The pandemic response has been conducted globally primarily under a stability operations framework, where the military and security mechanisms, have all responded in aid of their respective governments in a unified effort to try and protect vulnerable populations whilst attempting to help control the spread of the virus. Primarily involved in sustainment related activities (health, logistics, protection and transportation) militaries globally have shown the efficacy of the mission set under the stability framework.[39] In the continental United States the National Guard were operationalized to conduct these activities in support of the states and federal government.

There is no one prescribed manner in which to respond to a crisis under the stability operations framework as each operation or crisis has its own unique traits and peculiarities. Depending on the nature of the crises or threat it may require a blend of operational activities and mission sets. However, what is most important is that the

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[38] Paules et al., "Coronavirus Infections—More Than Just the Common Cold, Viewpoint."

[39] "A whole of government approach guides the development, integration and coordination of all instruments of national power and integrates the collaborative efforts of the government departments and agencies to achieve unity of effort towards a shared goal." HQDA, ADP 3-07, *Stability*, 1-3.

frameworks and mechanisms for shared understanding are present, that ensure unity of effort in order to return the designated area back to stability.

Peace Operations

A broader category intrinsically linked with stability operations are peace operations. Peace operations are a unique type of construct in that they utilize the tools and skillsets that range the spectrum ostensibly not to prolong conflict but rather to pause or cease it all together. Peace operations are dynamic and are reflective of the "contemporary security environment where many threats occur at a point on the conflict spectrum where the armed conflict and law enforcement paradigms intersect and often overlap."[40]

Normally conducted under the purview of the United Nations and the ubiquitous blue berets of their deployed peacekeepers, peace operations are generally described as crisis response and limited contingency operations. They frequently include international military missions to restore peace and shape an environment in order to support reconciliation and rebuilding as well as to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance by actively seeking to contain conflict. Peace operations may be conducted under the sponsorship of the United Nations, another international organization, within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally. Peace operations strive to keep violence from spreading, contain violence that has occurred, and reduce tension among factions.

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[40] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*, 384.

Types of peace operations include Peacekeeping, Peace enforcement, Peacemaking, Peace building and conflict prevention.[41]

The scarred memories of the effects of total war in particular the significant loss of life forced the global polity in 1945, to collectively pause and reflect. Despite organizational failures with past attempts, in the aftermath of WWII it was finally realized that the global good could not be left to individual or national based self - regulation. There had to be a more coordinated approach to global dialogue that could possibly ameliorate disputes, contain conflicts and if necessary enforce the peace for humanity's greater good.[42] After introspection and analysis, it was mooted that a collective global effort akin to what had just occurred to combat the evil axis powers would also help to prevent the world from reliving the horrors of the century's two global conflicts. It was envisioned that this would be accomplished by the establishment of an impartial collective entity with a single-minded focus and vision for stable global cooperation.

With the ratification of the United Nation's Charter in 1945, the global polity was provided with a supranational entity where all nations were given a voice on the

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[41] HQDA, ADP 3-07, *Stability*.

[42] The League of Nations was an international organization, headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, created after the First World War to provide a forum for resolving international disputes between countries before they erupted into open warfare. Though first proposed by President Woodrow Wilson as part of his Fourteen Points plan for an equitable peace in Europe, the United States never became a member. United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, "The League of Nations 1920," US Department of State, accessed 29 February 2020, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/league.

international stage.[43] This international presence was uniformed no matter their

geographical size, socio-economic foundations, ideological leanings or military prowess.

That voice and presence has been translated post 1945 into the ability to fully integrate all

aspects of national power, which has been instrumental in providing a meaningful

restraint on the spread of war and strife. Since its first official mission in 1948 the UN has

strived to impartially navigate the fault lines of global conflict in order to restrain selfish

desires and also pacify the cultivation and spread of hostile intent.[44]

The efficacy of this global oversight initiative was tested in the Indo-Pacific

theatre just five years post 1945 when conflict broke out on the Korean peninsula. The

Korean War was active for three years and at its pause it remained territorially the same

as its beginning. However, what had been lost were thousands of lives of combatants and

non-combatants alike, in addition to the reliving yet again of the horrors of war. A

positive outcome however, was that it also highlighted the increasing role of the global

community of nations in collective conflict management. This was embodied by the

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[43] "In 1945, representatives of 50 countries met in San Francisco at the United Nations Conference on International Organization to draw up the United Nations Charter. The Charter was signed on 26 June 1945 by the representatives of the 50 countries. Poland, which was not represented at the Conference, signed it later and became one of the original 51 Member States. The United Nations officially came into existence on 24 October 1945, when the Charter was ratified." United Nations, "History of the United Nations," United Nations, accessed 29 February 2020, https://www.un.org/en/sections /history/history-united-nations/index.html.

[44] "United Nations Peacekeeping began in 1948 when the Security Council authorized the deployment of UN military observers to the Middle East. The mission's role was to monitor the Armistice Agreement between Israel and its Arab neighbors – Since then, more than 70 peacekeeping operations have been deployed by the UN. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of military personnel, as well as tens of thousands of UN police and other civilians from more than 120 countries have participated in UN peacekeeping operations." United Nations, "History of the United Nations."

actions of the nascent United Nations (UN) in its first major attempt at peace

enforcement. The UN was instrumental in confronting and later helping to restrain the

hostile intent of the aggressors, by ultimately utilizing military force to contain the

conflict pursuant to the agreed mandate for the enforcement of peace.[45]

The UN's recorded efforts have been in order to collectively contain where

possible violent belligerent action by coercion or enforcement.[46] The overall success rate

of the aforementioned operations is subject to significant variables that were not

discussed in this study. However, despite the often disregard shown to peace operations

by theorists and practitioners alike, the continued relevance of this category to modern

day conflict warrants their inclusion in any discussion of the spectrum of conflict.

Narrative Warfare

"What the population thinks, says and how it acts (behavior) is more important

than how many tanks and airplanes they have."[47] In the modern era "warfare is taking

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[45] United Nations Security Council, UN Resolution 82, *Complaints of Aggression Upon the Republic of Korea* (New York: United Nations, 25 June 1950), accessed 29 February 2020, http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/82.

[46] "Enforcement operations have their legal basis in Chapter VII of the UN Charter and are authorized by the United Nations' Security Council. They are actions of a military nature that can be conceptually subdivided into two broad categories: enforcement operations which can be characterized as sustained full-scale combat operations to maintain or restore international peace and security, and peace enforcement operations while potentially involving combat will not amount to full-scale warfare on a sustained basis against a state. Terry D. Gill and Dieter Fleck, eds., *The Handbook of the International Law of Military Operations* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2010), 81.

[47] Thomas Elkjer Nissen, "Narrative Led Operations: Put the Narrative First," *Small Wars Journal*, 17 October 2012, accessed 19 October 2019, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/narrative-led-operations-put-the-narrative-first.

place in multi-threat environments, ranging from heavily kinetic to subliminal fear-inducing strategies, in which state actors and non-state actors compete to extend their influence."[48] It is in the aforementioned realm of non-kinetic subliminal influence-based activities that narrative warfare exists. A narrative is a crafted story that gives meaning to a set of facts, events or associated information expressed as but not necessarily the truth. The concept of narrative led operations which later morphed into narrative warfare, at its base level is the war for information and influence over a targeted audience. "This form of warfare is all about influence, but it is not information warfare; rather it is warfare over the meaning of the information."[49]

In the twenty first century with the shrinking of the global commons and the rise of interconnectivity via the digital domain, the war of influence over the narrative has achieved a more robust presence. In a war of influence, the object is to use all available means to target and subsequently trigger predictable behavior that will result in favorable reaction for the protagonist's side or version of events.[50] States, non-state actors and individuals attempt to influence audiences to align with their perspective by employing specific influence-based tactics. At a minimum, as a result of the narrative/influence-based activities the target audiences that are not fully aligned to the directed view are

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[48] Ajit Maan, *Narrative Warfare* (Washington, DC: Narrative Strategies Ink, 2018), 9.

[49] Ibid., 10.

[50] Cobaugh, "A Five-Point Strategy to Oppose Russian Narrative Warfare."

influenced to at minimum offer no opposition. The intent of narrative warfare is predictable influence and subsequent dominance over adversaries and competitors.[51]

Narrative warfare seeks to link the cognitive realm to the physical realm by the direct impact of a particular crafted 'story' on the action or inaction of the target audience. The advantage gained from the utilization of a successful narrative can if required be acted upon in the physical realm by the use of lethal or non-lethal effects.[52] The narrative can therefore be categorized as the ways, the use of social or traditional media and inter personal interaction to deliver narrative based content as the means, with the ends being the facilitation of a distinct positional advantage by an opposing force.[53]

Despite the passage of time and its associated improvements war has remained largely a human endeavor and narratives are generally acknowledged as the way people understand any endeavor.[54] The essence of narrative warfare is about putting the narrative at the heart of the operational planning process and letting it inform the planning of both the kinetic and non-kinetic activities, in order to support the strategic intent articulated in the strategic narrative.[55] A well-crafted narrative strategy is therefore

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[51] Cobaugh, "A Five-Point Strategy to Oppose Russian Narrative Warfare."

[52] "The aim of narrative warfare is to influence selected actors' behavior through influencing their understanding, will and capability by creating effects in both the psychological and the physical domain through mutually supportive employment of all our means–both kinetic and non-kinetic, based on the strategic narrative. Nissen, "Narrative Led Operations: Put the Narrative First."

[53] Cobaugh. "A Five-Point Strategy to Oppose Russian Narrative Warfare."

[54] Maan, *Narrative Warfare*, 19.

[55] Nissen, "Narrative-Led Operations: Put the Narrative First."

critical to the success of any operation along the spectrum. However, for it to be successful it requires a radical shift in problem solving techniques and commander's visualization. It may also require the acceptance of planning parameters that are not objective driven and that in the execution of operations there may be a more significant acceptance of risk. All, to ensure that operations conducted are nested within the intent of the strategic narrative.[56]

High Intensity Law Enforcement Operations (HILEO)

The concept of HILEO outlines a new categorization of law enforcement-based operations that are defined as being significantly above the intensity and scope of traditional law enforcement. These operations require a whole of government approach, particularly the continued involvement of paramilitary or traditional military forces in order to successfully counter the identified threat and return the environment to stability. Although not yet categorized as a full branch of warfare HILEO are multi domain-based operations that can be conducted in a domestic, regional or international based theatre of operations. The operations can be conducted in partnership with traditional law enforcement and /or police elements or independently under special legal frameworks that facilitate the utilization of these forces in specially designated geographic (terrestrial/maritime) areas for a set time period. These operations are not Internal Security or stability-based operations in these operations the military/para-military arm of the state in question or other regional or international partners assume the primary role in

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[56] Nissen, "Narrative-Led Operations: Put the Narrative First."

combatting designated extreme quasi-criminal/ paramilitary threats but under strictly law

enforcement-based parameters and as a part of a distinct whole of government approach.

> Another kind of war within the context of a "clash of civilizations" is being waged in various parts of the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world. Some of the main protagonists are those who have come to be designated as first-, second-, and third-generation street gangs, as well as their various possible allies such as traditional Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs).[57]

HILEO operations exist within the abovementioned environments that are highly

volatile but have not yet crossed the threshold to a full breakdown of state-based control.

So therefore, whilst the Law of Armed Conflict parameters will provide overarching

regulatory behavior domestic and or regional juris-prudence will be paramount as the

desired end result is a return to normalcy by the effective utilization of the jurisdictional

criminal justice system.

The British Army's deployment in Northern Ireland (one of the four countries of

the United Kingdom) from 1969 to 2007 has been previously categorized as a

constabulary or Internal Security operation.[58] This operation was conducted in response

to the threat to the state posed by the activities of the self-styled Irish Republican Army

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[57] Max G. Manwaring, *A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2012), viii, accessed 20 October 2019, www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil.

[58] "Northern Ireland shall consist of the parliamentary counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone, and the parliamentary boroughs of Belfast and Londonderry, and Southern Ireland shall consist of so much of Ireland as is not comprised within the said parliamentary counties and boroughs. Self-government was however revoked in 1973." Her Majesty's Government, *Government of Ireland Act 1920*, accessed 16 February 2020, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1920/67/pdfs /ukpga_19200067_en.pdf.

and Ulster Defence Association. However, the conflict or the 'Troubles' as it was popularly known, was viewed externally largely as a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign. On further analysis this operation based on the aforementioned definition could also be categorized as a prime example of HILEO.

The issues relating to the question of governance in particular the right for unified local representation had plagued the Irish isles for decades. Throughout the early twentieth century there had been numerous incidences of violence in Northern Ireland directed at British and local government officials and then more significantly between factions wanting a united free Ireland and those wanting a maintenance of the status quo. By the late 1960's Northern Ireland's local government had urged the government of the United Kingdom to deploy military personnel to the country after sustained violence had surpassed the capabilities of the local police to contain.

The British Armed Forces were later deployed to quell the disturbances and Operation Banner as it became known was launched and subsequently lasted from August 1969 to July 2007. Throughout the life of the operation the British Armed Forces conducted operations across the low to mid-range area of the spectrum of conflict in support of the Royal Ulster Constabulary. Originally viewed by the population as being a stability force to keep the peace this perception changed in the early 1970s as the military force actively engaged in more dynamic operations against the identified threats. These operations were of a hybrid nature encompassing in some instances counter-insurgency and counter terrorism activities primarily against the activities of the Irish Republican Army and Ulster Defence Association and also various other splinter groups. Most

operations however, were primarily focused on the conduct of general stability and peace operations ostensibly in support of the local government and citizenry.

Operation Banner became the lengthiest continuous campaign in British military history.[59] It resulted in the deaths of "One Thousand Four Hundred and Forty-One (1,441) soldiers, seven hundred and twenty-two (722) of them attributed directly to attacks by threat forces."[60] The Troubles' officially ended with the signing of a constitutional agreement in 1998 however, the military based operation did not officially end until almost a decade later.[61]

The most significant identified utilization of HILEO in the modern era have been those conducted to counter extreme elements of transnational organized crime and third generational gangs, sometimes referred to as "non-state criminal paramilitary complexes."[62] Transnational organized crime is a significant global issue and is intimately linked to globalization. Transnational actors akin to multinational

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[59] "Over 300,000 British troops served in Northern Ireland during Op Banner, with more than 20,000 deployed at its peak." Simon Hunter, "Op Banner: Key Moments of The Army's Longest Continuous Deployment," Forces Net, 14 August 2019, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.forces.net/news/northern-ireland/op-banner-50-years-army-started-its-longest-continuous-campaign.

[60] Michael McHugh, Cate McCurry, and Georgina Stubbs, "Operation Banner: 50 Years Since British Army Campaign Started in Northern Ireland," *Belfast Telegraph*, 13 August 2019, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news /northern-ireland/operation-banner-50-years-since-british-army-campaign-started-in-northern-ireland-38400410.html.

[61] "Several attempts to find a political solution failed, until the Good Friday agreement in 1998, which won approval from all sides and led to the restoration of self-government for Northern Ireland, bringing an end to the troubles." Hunter, "Operation Banner."

[62] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundary*, 6.

corporations, utilize the same tools of global commerce in order to conduct nefarious activities. Examples of some of these transnational actors include Mexican drug cartels; organized crime in many newly independent Soviet states; criminal groups in Iraq, Brazilian favela-based syndicates and even Jamaican gangs operating at home and among the Jamaican diaspora in Toronto, New York and London;[63] Latin America and the Caribbean however provides a statistical locus for transnational organized crime and its associated appendages of disproportionate homicide rates, crime and corruption. Mexico and Jamaica stand out in the region for their intentional homicide rates and conversely their extensive efforts to utilize HILEO in order to return their nation states to stability.

Figure 4.   Homicide rates in Latin America and the Caribbean 2017

Source: Chris Dalby and Camilo Carranza, "Insight Crime's 2018 Homicide Round-Up," InSight Crime, 22 January 2019, accessed 1 January 2020, https://www.insightcrime.org /news/analysis/insight-crime-2018-homicide-roundup/.

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[63] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundary*, 6.

The Mexican state's protracted and robust use of the military in the identified counter drug and counter cartel/organized crime efforts provides a clear example of HILEO. Mexico's descent into its current state of instability and violence is not a recent manifestation as it has developed with the aid of various enablers over a protracted period of time. This instability is a result of a lethal combination of criminal based intent with insurgent like tactics directed at the government and governance structures within the country. This "combination of crime and insurgency however has a long tradition in Mexico".[64] this can be traced back to the late nineteenth, early twentieth century where the revolutionary zeal, long dormant since the annexations of formerly Mexican territory to the fledgling United States of America.[65] returned in the form of the declared criminal insurgency operations of the infamous Pancho Villa and his followers.

Pancho Villa's actions along the southern border of the United States (US) and within the US proper forced the deployment of a punitive military campaign against him by the US military in 1916. The quasi revolutionary and criminal based activities continued throughout the country for most of the twentieth century with the aid of the elected government. This corrupt arrangement however between the "national

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[64] Mike Fowler, "Mexico a Case of Hybrid Warfare," Academia.edu, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.academia.edu/12251948/Mexico_a_Case_ of_Hybrid_Warfare.

[65] United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, "The Annexation of Texas, the Mexican-American War, and the Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, 1845-1848," US Department of State, accessed 20 October 2019, https://history.state.gov/milestones /1830-1860/texas-annexation.

government and the cartels largely ended in 1977 as the Mexican government made the decision to crack down on organized crime and corruption."[66] The government was forced over a period to critically review its dealings with the cartels fueled largely by a more robust counter-drug and anti-corruption stance, helped in part by external diplomatic pressures.

Despite the more progressive and law enforcement stance the connections and relationships were not severed overnight; however, as government co-operation with the cartels decreased, they adopted quasi-insurgent tactics and started to go head to head against the state as part of a robust survival mechanism.[67] This insurgent type behavior developed throughout the late twentieth century as the cartels became bolder in their actions, the local police became outmanned and outgunned as the cartels procured "heavy weapons such as grenade launchers, AK-47 assault rifles, 50-caliber machine guns, sniper rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices, and anti-tank weapons. They ambushed military convoys, intimidated local officials and where intimidation didn't work assassinations were conducted."[68] In response to the clear threat to governance and stability the Mexican government employed a multi-prong whole of government approach to counter the identified threat, this involved policy measures aimed at countering corruption and the quasi state structures illicitly built over time by

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[66] Stanley A. Pimentel, "The Nexus of Organized Crime and Politics in Mexico: Mexico's Legacy of Corruption," *Trends in Organized Crime* 4, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 9, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications /abstract.aspx?ID=177807.

[67] Fowler, "Mexico a Case of Hybrid Warfare."

[68] Ibid.

the cartels. The other more significant aspect of the approach was the militarization of the counterdrug war in Mexico; where local law enforcement became sidelined and the military was subsequently utilized to target the cartels' leadership, whilst also providing security and stability for affected regions of the state.[69]

Lying of the southern coast of Cuba and astride the major sea lines of communications in the Caribbean Sea is the archipelagic state of Jamaica. An independent English speaking, nation state since 1962 with a population of approximately three million people, Jamaica is a paradox of democratic buoyancy, oversized socio-cultural global influence, socio-economic instability and significant and prolonged crime and violence. That last attribute particularly its intentional homicide rate, has unfortunately confined the nation state statistically within the notorious realms of being a violent locale. The incidents of criminal violence in the Caribbean and Latin American region are among the highest in the world.[70] In 1990 Jamaica recorded a total of 542 murders, twenty years later in 2009, that figure experienced a 210 percent increase in the murder rate when it recorded 1,680 murders.[71] Across the region homicide and robbery rates are 34 and 26 per cent higher, respectively, than in countries with comparable macro

[69] Fowler, "Mexico a Case of Hybrid Warfare."

[70] Glaister Leslie, "Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica," *Small Arms Survey* (September 2010): 5-9, accessed 20 October 2019, http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/B-Occasional-papers/SAS-OP26-Jamaica-gangs.pdf.

[71] Anthony D. Harriot et al., quoted in Glaister Leslie, "Confronting the Don: The Political Economy of Gang Violence in Jamaica," *Small Arms Survey* (September 2010): 5-9, accessed 26 March 2020, www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10745.8.

and socio-economic conditions.[72] Yet as displayed in figure 4, even in a recorded high violence region such as Latin America and the Caribbean, Jamaica in 2018 was in the top three countries for intentional homicides.

Homicide rates in selected Latin American and Caribbean countries in 2018 (in number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants)

Country	Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants
Venezuela	81.4
El Salvador	51
Jamaica	47
Honduras	40
Trinidad and Tobago	37.5
Belize	35.9
Mexico	25.8
Brazil	25
Colombia	25
Guatemala	22.4
Puerto Rico	20
Costa Rica	11.7
Uruguay	11.2
Dominican Republic	10.4
Panama	9.6
Peru*	7.8
Bolivia	6.3
Ecuador	5.7
Argentina*	5.2
Paraguay	5.1
Chile	2.7

Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants

Source
InSight Crime
© Statista 2019

Additional Information:
2018

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[72] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Latin American and the Caribbean Region of the World Bank, "Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean" (Report No. 37820, World Bank, March 2007), accessed 16 February 2020, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en /537301468231536879/pdf/378200LAC0Crim1white0cover01PUBLIC1.pdf.

Figure 5.   Homicide rates in selected Latin American and Caribbean countries
in 2018 (in number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants)

Source: Insight Crime, "Homicide Rates in Selected Latin American and Caribbean
Countries in 2018 (in number of homicides per 100,000 inhabitants)," Statista.com,
accessed 16 February 2020, https://www.statista.com/statistics/947781/homicide-rates-
latin-america-caribbean-country/.

Gang and organized crime violence in Jamaica have a long and storied history,

with numerous theories as to the origins of the gangs and what made them what they are

today. No one incident or circumstance can be highlighted as the sole reason for the rise

of garrison type communities, gang violence, narcotics and other illicit based trafficking,

the proliferation of automatic weapons of varying calibers and significant ammunition

stocks and their associated cases of extreme violence. In fact, in Jamaica "gangs have

always been tied to disputes over territory and resources. Historically, political party

allegiance was a key factor in gaining access to resources, such as jobs and housing,

leading to clashes between gangs that supported opposing political parties. Increasingly,

however, gangs are also in conflict over control of resources that come from other

criminal activities, primarily the drug trade, extortion, and exclusive control of garrison

type communities (enclaves).[73]

In the modern day however, Jamaica's criminal organizations have by way of

ambition and affiliation metastasized and have also "seemingly overwhelmed police and

legal systems and strained the state's capacity due to the sheer volume of their violent

activities. Further, their influence has only increased as they have acted as surrogate or

alternate governments in so-called ungoverned areas and have challenged the legitimacy

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[73] Michael Mogensen, *Corner and Area Gangs of Inner-City Jamaica* (Kingston, 2005), quoted in Luke Dowdney, ed., *Neither War nor Peace: International Comparisons of Children and Youth in Organized Armed Violence* (Rio de Janeiro: Viva Rio, 2005).

of the state in these areas."[74] With the continued increase in gang related intentional

homicides and shootings and the seeming inability of the Jamaica Constabulary Force

(police) to counter illicit activities, the Government of Jamaica in 2018 passed sweeping

security-based legislation. This new legislation packet was aimed at providing the

military a more robust legal framework for their law enforcement assistance to the police.

The military had intermittently since independence and from the late 1990s on a more

continuous basis, assisted the police with domestic law enforcement activities. This

assistance however, was strictly under the legal framework of Military Assistance to the

Civil Power where civil police retained legal primacy and the military provided enhanced

security in order to allow the police to conduct their duties unhindered.[75] This legislation

was officially referred to as;

> The Law Reform (Zones of Special Operations/ZOSO) (Special Security and Community Development Measures) Act'. *[is] an act to provide for special measures for upholding and preserving the Rule of Law, public order, citizen security and public safety within certain geographically-defined areas of Jamaica, or, in short, zones of special operations.* It allows the Prime Minister, on the advice of the National Security Council, to declare any high-crime area of Jamaica a zone for special security operations and community development measures. . . . *According to the memorandum of objects and reasons, the bill seeks to balance the need for security and giving the members of the Jamaica Constabulary Force and the Jamaica Defence Force certain essential powers that are required to address serious crimes, whilst upholding the rule of law and protecting the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens.*[76]

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[74] Leslie, "Confronting the Don."

[75] Government of Jamaica, Houses of Parliament, *Jamaica Constitution and Defence Act 1962*, accessed 1 January 2020, http://www.japarliament.gov.jm.

[76] Government of Jamaica, Houses of Parliament, *The Law Reform (Zones of Special Operations) (Special Security and Community Development Measures) Act 2017*, accessed 15 January 2020, http://www.japarliament.gov.jm/attachments/article/339

With its Zone of Special Operations strategy, utilized in tandem with the Emergency Powers Act, the Jamaican government decided to robustly and directly confront its own identified and suspected "non-state criminal paramilitary complexes."[77] This confrontation was in order to create the necessary disruption, disaggregation and dislocation of threat forces. This approach is critical to providing the necessary space in the affected communities in order to facilitate the work of government and civil agencies on critical social intervention programs. By the use of this whole of government approach with the military in a more focused and continuous manner within the boundaries of the state, Jamaica is able to utilize all ministries departments and agencies to conduct HILEO with the overarching aim of effectively countering the threat and subsequently returning the designated areas to stability. It must be noted however, that HILEO is not just conducted in response to traditional law enforcement and low intensity conflict related issues, it also encompasses other areas such as counter maritime piracy.

The Horn of Africa, is the easternmost extension of land from the African continent that abuts the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. Shaped like a proverbial rhinoceros' horn the area is home to the countries of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia.[78] The area in recent recorded history has been plagued by strife whether by conflict or famine. Of the four primary countries in the region Somalia's recent history

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/The%20Law%20Reform%20(Zones%20of%20Special%20Operations)%20(Special%20Security%20and%20Community%20Development%20Measures)%20Act,%202017.pdf.

[77] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundary*.

[78] Britannica, "Horn of Africa," Britannica, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.britannica.com/place/Horn-of-Africa.

has been the starkest; marked by an almost precipitous decline into anarchy aided by weak governance systems and internecine warfare between various parties.[79]

The world at large has often not paid much attention to the region and international efforts in the 1990s to stop bloodshed and create stability ended in a highly publicized peace enforcement mission failure. Afflicted by severe poverty, Somalia was subsequently left to its own devices by the international community barring the United Nations and other international non-governmental organizations focused on trying to help the local populace regain some semblance of stability. That international neglect changed however, when in 2005, the world started to witness a series of hijackings for ransom of large marine vessels off Somalia's coast and in the Gulf of Aden.[80] The attacks isolated incidents at first, steadily increased in frequency and lethality until they became an unwanted pattern that began to threaten a major international shipping lane. Vessels of strategic importance were subsequently taken, including those bearing arms and oil. In

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[79] "Although the Transnational Federal Government was established in 2003, with its capital in the southern city of Mogadishu, it remains fairly ineffective. De facto, Somalia is governed by a system of clans operating in three relatively autonomous regions–Somaliland in the northwest, Puntland in the northeast and Central Somalia in the central and southern regions." Raymond Gilpin, "Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy" (United States Institute of Peace Working Paper, 22 June 2009), accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/1_0.PDF.

[80] "Clan militia made the transition to maritime crime by claiming to protect Somalia's territorial waters from poachers and polluters. 5 Under a number of names (including: The Central Somalia Coast Guard, the National Volunteer Coast Guard, and the Somali Marines) clan militia started by forcibly levying taxes and fines on ships they managed to board. This quickly evolved to hijacking." Gilpin, "Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy."

addition, hundreds of hostages were kidnapped and held for ransom for prolonged periods.[81]

The Somalia situation then became a wicked problem that marine operators at first tried to solve via insurance-based contingencies however, that proved unsuccessful. The issue was complex as there was no effective central government to lobby, to sanction or competent actor with which to interact with, Somali pirates had in fact brought back the hey days of piracy. "The nature and purpose of piracy in the past and piracy today are indistinguishable. The casual factors remain the same: large sea spaces that defy easy application of legal restraint, favorable geography, weak or compliant states that provide sanctuary, corrupt officials and political leaders who can benefit from and protect piracy, conflict and economic disruption that open markets for stolen goods, and the promise of reward from the proceeds extracted from the sales of rich cargoes or the ransoms paid for seafarers' lives."[82] Somalia therefore provided an ideal environment geographically, culturally, socially and politically for piracy to flourish as illustrated over the period 2003 to 2010 in figure 6.

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[81] United Nations Economic and Social Council Secretariat, *World Crime Trends and Emerging Issues and Responses in the Field of Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice*, Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 26th sess., Vienna, 22-26 May 2017, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/statistics/crime/ccpj/World_crime_trends_emerging_issues_E.pdf.

[82] Martin Murphy, "Somali Piracy: Not Just a Naval Problem," Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, April 16 2009, accessed 19 October 2019, https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/2009.04.17-Somali-Piracy-Not-Just-a-Naval-Problem.pdf.

Number of incidents of Somali piracy in the period from 2003 - 2010

Figure 6.   Attacks by Somali Pirates per year 2003-2010

Source: Henk Rengelink, "Tackling Somali Piracy," *Trends in Organized Crime* 15 (2012): 180-197, accessed 20 October 2019, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12117-012-9171-3.

The counter to these attacks initially was conducted in an ad hoc manner with nations initially opting to protect their own flagged vessels and those of the World Food Program. However, in 2008 it was determined that there had been enough loss of life and disruption to international trade and the freedom of the seas and subsequently the United Nations Security Council was asked to formally consider the matter of Somalia based piracy. This led to the subsequent promulgation of Resolution 1851 (2008) Adopted by the Security Council at its 6046th meeting, on 16 December 2008 it formally authorized

the use of international naval forces to support the "Transitional Federal Government

(TFG) to interdict, or upon interdiction to prosecute pirates or to patrol and secure the

waters off the coast of Somalia, including the international sea lanes and Somalia's

territorial waters."[83] Subsequent to this missive various maritime cooperation agreements

were drafted under the ambit of the UN Security Council and governed by the UN

Commission for the International Law of the Sea. Maritime task forces were

subsequently task organized amongst diverse global powers and deployed to the region to

conduct maritime based HILEO, of these NATO Operation Ocean Shield[84] and the

European Union's (EU) Naval Force Operation ATALANTA-Somalia were the most

robust.[85] These forces have conducted multi-domain operations in support of their

mandate to halt instances of piracy in the region.

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[83] United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1851, Adopted by the Security Council, 6046th meeting, 16 December 2008, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201851.pdf.

[84] "NATO's Op Ocean Shield operated with four main objectives to: deter and disrupt pirate operations at sea, coordinate international counter-piracy efforts, enhance the maritime community's capacity to counter piracy effectively and develop regional counter piracy capability." James M. Bridger, "Safe Seas at What Price? The Costs, Benefits and Future of NATO's Operation Ocean Shield" (Research Paper No. 95, NATO Research Division, NATO Defense College, September 2013), accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/169344/rp_95.pdf.

[85] "Operation Atalanta was launched on 8 December 2008 and is conducted in accordance with United Nations Security Council's resolutions. The Operation was extended by the European Council until December 2020with the following objectives: Protect vessels of the World Food Programme (WFP) and other vulnerable shipping. Deter, prevent and represses piracy and armed robbery at sea. Monitor fishing activities off the coast of Somalia. Support other EU missions and international organizations working to strengthen maritime security and capacity in the region." Union European Naval Force, "EU NAVFOR for Somalia," European Union Naval Force, accessed 20 October 2019, https://eunavfor.eu/.

Although the pirates adjusted to the presence of the task forces in the region by deploying to other areas, with stronger cooperation between task forces, shipping companies and other stakeholders the incidences of piracy dropped significantly, moving from a reported high of one hundred and seventy-six (176) in 2011 to one (01) case in 2019.[86]

With the coordination of the United Nations (UN) reinforced by the input of the European Union (EU) and NATO, the naval Task forces conducted maritime based HILEO focused on robust maritime interdiction, visit, board, search and seizure of vessels. By this approach they were able to detain Somalian nationals engaged in piracy (and handed them over for third party prosecution) and rescue identified hostages These operations kept vital shipping lanes open for freedom of navigation, effectively countered the threat and subsequently returning the designated maritime areas to stability.

Gray Zone Warfare

This is defined as "the deliberate multi-dimensional activities by a state actor just below the threshold of aggressive use of military forces. In such conflicts, adversaries employ an integrated suite of national and subnational instruments of power in an ambiguous war to gain specified strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of overt conflict. Adversaries may employ proxy forces to increase the level of military power being used without losing deniability."[87]

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[86] Union European Naval Force, "EU NAVFOR for Somalia."

[87] Hoffman, "The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict."

The scarred memories of the effects of total war in particular, the significant loss

of life forced global powers post 1945, to collectively pause and reflect. Total war was

undesirable in the new age of ideological and strategic nuclear standoff. It was also from

a capitalist and trade-based perspective, unprofitable and as a result there was a drive by

the great powers to limit their involvement in an all-out conflict. Conflict or war by proxy

then became a suitable alternative and gained popularity globally, as allies of the world's

main players fought bloody small wars and conducted a plethora of deniable military

based operations. The rise of deniable operations also saw the corresponding rise of

intelligence-based operations, as intelligence agencies of western and eastern powers

played out the great game on the global stage. Gray zone conflict therefore reflects the

maneuver in between the virtual seams of recognized international law and the

subsequent employment of nontraditional tools of statecraft to achieve gradual but

decisive results in the no-man's land between peace and war. The result is a pattern of

state rivalry that can substitute for traditional military aggression.[88]

In the Cold War era the ability to effectively utilize these sleight of hand

techniques were primarily the purview of global superpowers and their client states.

Additionally, the rise of global peer pressure via global institutions such as the United

Nations and other entities compelled global actors to comply with generally agreed upon

international law and other global best practices. However, with the end of the Cold War

and its associated encumbrances a new age beckoned. This new age was personified by

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[88] Michael J. Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding Gray Zone Conflict* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2015), 57-78, accessed 14 January 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12018.9.

the rapid growth in independent states, global dissemination of ideals, free trade and the rise of influential non-state actors set the conditions for an emergent multipolar global reality.

In this new modern reality change was far reaching and permeated global systems and traversed geographic expanses. During this period, gray zone warfare once the realm of global power players, agents of espionage and cold war protagonists also underwent change and became a free market. In this new paradigm non-state actors, criminal organizations and computer hacktivists all jostled, cajoled and tried to punch above their weight in order to influence global geo-politics and earn a profit. Operations within the gray zone also became an appetizing option for those who aspired to expand their influence and reach but were unable to do so before because of a power deficit.

Post 9/11 the global exemplars for gray zone operations have been the Russian Federation (Russia) and The Peoples' Republic of China (China). "For China, Russia, Iran, and others, operating in the gray zone allowed them to dampen the relative power differences between them and others. Gray zone strategies became a form of asymmetric tool, a sort of multi-instrument insurgency."[89] Whilst the United States and NATO were ostensibly engaged in the war against terror, they both started to set the foundations required to engage in significant yet deniable operations. This patient build-up manifested itself within the last decade as both Russia and China embarked on extensive gray zone activities within their geographical spheres of influence.[90] These activities largely

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[89] Mazarr, *Mastering the Gray Zone*, 57-78.

[90] "Russia used military forces operating without clearly identifiable national military markings as part of its illegal seizure and annexation of Crimea, deploying these forces while denying its direct military involvement. . . . Similarly China has deployed a

unchallenged by the global polity have served to reinvigorate both erstwhile global

powers and also set the foundation for further action at a possible higher level along the

spectrum.

<div align="center">Irregular Warfare</div>

A key aspect of a nation's power is their ability to defend the nation's strategic

interests whether at home or abroad, with the means at their disposal. IW is one such way

that is characterized as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy

and influence over the relevant population(s). In irregular warfare, a less powerful

adversary seeks to disrupt or negate the military capabilities and advantages of a more

powerful military force, which usually serves that nation's established government.[91] IW

favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of

military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and

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supposed fishing fleet of ships in the Western pacific that operates as a shadow maritime
militia. In both cases these forces allow Moscow and Beijing to pursue key national
objectives while simultaneously denying responsibility. Even if improbable, these denials
can complicate efforts to attribute their involvement and organize a response." Vayl S.
Oxford, "Countering Threat Networks to Deter, Compete and Win: Competition below
Armed Conflict with Revisionist Powers," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 95 (4th Quarter
2019): 79.

[91] Irregular warfare mission areas include but "are not limited to counterterrorism,
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense; counterinsurgency and stability
operations. . . . There is a distinct association of these mission areas and enabling
activities with the capabilities of special operations forces." Headquarters, Department of
the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-05, *Army Special Operations*
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Service, 2019), 1-8.

will. "Irregular warfare may be between states, between state and non-state actors, or between non-state actors with no state involvement."[92]

"In the post-September 11 world, irregular warfare has emerged as the dominant form of warfare."[93] However, irregular warfare is not a new construct and has been utilized throughout recorded history by small powers as well as empire. The irregular activities of highly codified warrior societies of history in Africa, the city states of Greece and Rome are noted as being utilized at times separate but in conjunction with the traditional methods of warfare. In these instances, unconventional methods have been utilized to subvert more traditional warfare methods. This is accomplished by utilizing a "a blend of political, informational, military, economic, and sociocultural approaches, in combination with rulers/governments, security forces, and populations."[94]

In the modern era, as the global Westphalian models continue to slowly splinter, there is a conscious effort by the global commons to self-regulate yet seek out advantages wherever there may be. This classic contradiction becomes more pertinent for small states and non- state actors who strive to adhere to set rules and norms whilst also trying to carve out increased benefits and relevance for themselves and their respective constituents. The realization that they cannot gain equal representation in areas of global

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[92] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, x.

[93] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Secretary of Defense, 2006), 36, accessed 20 February 2019, https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/Quadrennial-Defense-Review/2006.

[94] Kenneth C. Coons and Glenn M. Harned, "Irregular Warfare is Warfare," *Joint Forces Quarterly*, no. 52 (1st Quarter 2009): 97-103, accessed 19 October 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-52.pdf.

trade as a result of their lack of size and influence leads to considerations of maneuver in order to gain access to scarce benefits. However, the realization proceeds further as the inability to create leverage by negotiation or the threat or conduct of traditional based warfare against noted global powers, leads these minor players to develop asymmetric methodologies.

The foregoing further refines the understanding that irregular warfare in the modern era is focused not on the grand revolutions and rebellions of the recent past, but primarily on the significant subsets of terrorism and insurgency. Both directed against a particular state government or by extension a type of governance (i.e. western based democracy) as the target for subversion and usurpation; whilst being mindful of the factors of time and space, legitimacy and support.[95] It is at this point that there exists some dissonance as to the validity and merits of the irregular warfare construct as the methods are also the purview of non-state actors like trans-national terrorist and organized criminal organizations. In fact;

> Much of the confusion associated with terrorism and irregular warfare stems from the use of either value-laden or emotive language. The term 'freedom fighter' suggest heroism whilst 'terrorist' conveys cowardice, whilst the term 'guerilla' still evokes the romance and adventure of rebellion. There is also little agreement on what to call these types of violence: political violence, terrorism, irregular warfare, insurgency, military operations other than war (MOOTW), low-intensity conflict (LIC), peoples' war, revolutionary warfare, guerilla warfare, amongst others. Terrorism and insurgency are still viewed at best as a nuisance by many military professionals or a form of dirty war at worst. The line between

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[95] James D. Kiras, "Irregular Warfare: Terrorism and Insurgency," in *Strategy: In the Contemporary World*, 3rd ed., ed. John Baylis, James J. Wirtz, and Colin S. Gray (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 189.

combatants and non-combatants is unclear, objectives unclear, and the timeline for 'victory' unknown.[96]

Irregular warfare by its lineage, construct, adaptability and associated levels of violence validates its inclusion in any discussion surrounding the spectrum of conflict.

Cyber Warfare

Warfare in the modern era is a multi-domain construct with traditional command and control and hierarchical foundations. These foundations have been significantly reinforced and upgraded by a significant cyber framework with numerous networks, systems and sensors. Cyberspace operations and by extension cyber warfare are now an active component in the discussions regarding the composition of a revamped spectrum of conflict.

"Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. Cyberspace enables integration across physical domains by moving data along transmission paths through links and nodes in cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Cyberspace operations are the employment of cyberspace capabilities where the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace"[97]

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[96] Ibid., 187.

[97] HQDA, FM 3-12, *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 1-3.

Cyberspace is critical to modern day military operations as it enables and enhances the ability of military commanders to perform mission command.[98] However, what makes the cyberspace domain truly unique is that whilst it "coexists with the other domains, it is a separate domain. and pervades the land, air, maritime, and space domains through the electromagnetic spectrum and wired networks," thereby making them the true enablers of multi-domain operations.[99] As a result, the impact of cyber based disturbances and possible conflict has emerged as a significant area of concern for policy makers, academics and security practitioners alike.

Figure 7.   Cyber Warfare Operational Data Visualization

Source: Frank G. Hoffman, "Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges," *PRISM* 7, no. 4 (November 2018): 38, accessed 20 October 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism7_4/181204_Hoffman_PDF.pdf?v

[98] Ibid., 1-4.

[99] HQDA, FM 3-12, *Cyberspace and Electronic Warfare Operations*, 1-4.

er=2018-12-04-161237-307.

Cyberspace is critical not only to the effective conduct of security-based operations but access to its networks may also be considered as an intrinsic human right.[100] This may require some reordering of Maslow's hierarchy however, it also underscores the importance of the domain. Attacking the cyber domain and digitally connected infrastructure once required significant kinetic campaigns however, these same systems can now be impacted by cyber personas that are geographically distant from affected networks. As the global polity is seemingly more concerned in synching its collective electronic systems, lives and consciousness to the internet of things, they are increasingly vulnerable to disruption.

The issue however arises when it comes to actually trying to define what the rules are in cyberspace. Firstly, there exists the still unresolved debate over whether cyberspace constitutes a fundamentally new domain that requires fundamentally new laws to govern it or the existing global norms and common law practices should suffice. The Euro-Atlantic alliance led by the United States believes, that "activities in cyberspace require no new legislation, and existing legal obligations should suffice. However, a significant number of other states under an opposing alliance led by Russia and China, believe that

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[100] The Internet is 'a global pool of information and services, accessible locally through individual computer stations that are each part of a global system of interconnected computer networks." Stephen Tully, "A Human Right to Access the Internet? Problems and Prospects," *Human Rights Law Review* 14, no. 2 (May 2014): 175, doi:10.1093/hrlr/ngu011, accessed 20 October 2019, https://academic-oup-com.er.lib.k-state.edu/hrlr/article/14/2/175/615750.

new international legal instruments are essential in order to govern information security overall, including those expressed through the evolving domain of cyberspace."[101]

Further to the aforementioned legal framework considerations, was the question of what exactly condones legal action in cyberspace. Also, for a domain that is transnational in nature whose jurisdiction ultimately applies over actions therein? Further considerations of note were to what extent do the Law of Armed Conflict apply to hostile actions carried out through cyberspace, and what precisely constitutes an armed attack or gives validation for self-defense online.[102]

Governments have largely pursued their own cyberspace strategies which has led to the militarization and weaponization of a domain that was hoped to be developed for the collective benefit of all humanity. In fact,

> the architecture and offerings of the Internet developed without much steering by governments, much less operations by militaries; that made talk of "cyberwar" exaggerated, except in very limited instances, today that is no longer true. States and their militaries see the value not only of controlling networks for surveillance or to deny access to adversaries, but also of subtle propaganda campaigns launched through a small number of wildly popular worldwide social platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. This form of hybrid conflict – launched by states without state insignia, on privately built and publicly used services – offers a genuine challenge to those who steward the network and the private companies whose platforms are targeted.[103]

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[101] Keir Giles, *Prospects for the Rule of Law in Cyberspace* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, January 2017), xiii, accessed 13 January 2020, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1025366.pdf.

[102] Giles, *Prospects for the Rule of Law in Cyberspace*.

[103] Jonathan Zittrain, "The Unwelcome Militarization of the Internet has Arrived," The Bulletin, 3 September 2017, accessed 19 October 2019, https://thebulletin.org /2017/09/netwar-the-unwelcome-militarization-of-the-internet-has-arrived/.

Space Warfare

Space used to be regarded as a benign locale outside the reach and consciousness of most gravity bound terrestrial inhabitants, the purview of science fiction, adventurous astronauts, scientists, astronomers and superpowers with significant economic and military power. However, the decline of government funded space research supplanted by private sector entities focused on development, exploration and profit has moved space beyond the realm of space stations and satellites to a new domain for competition and inevitable conflict. In fact, it has been posited that "freedom to operate in space is not guaranteed and space is now a warfighting domain similar to the more familiar domains our men and women are fighting in today."[104] Concurrently significant development by the tri-polar powers in the ability to weaponize space has now impacted the global thought processes about what will conflict in space look like. The considerations have outlined more definitively that "we must assume future war on earth will extend into space and that we will need to 'fight through' attacks on our space assets and capabilities and continue to provide the space support our warfighters need and have come to expect."[105]

The space domain is defined as the area above the altitude where atmospheric effects on airborne objects becomes negligible. Like the air, land, and maritime domains, space is a physical domain within which military, civil, and commercial activities are

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Department of the Air Force, "Military Space Policy" (Presentation to the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, United States Senate, 17 May 2017), 2, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Wilson-Goldfein-Raymond-Greaves_05-17-17.pdf.

[105] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-14, *Space Operations*, 1-1.

conducted. The relationship between space and cyberspace is unique in that many space

operations depend on cyberspace, and a critical portion of cyberspace can only be

provided via space operations.[106]

Space is no longer however, only the domain of the tri-polar powers as other

global powers such as the United Kingdom, France, India and the European Union also

have significant stakes in the space domain. The reach of those combined powers

however, may soon pale in comparison to the private sector as companies such as SpaceX

and Virgin Galactic. These entities have invested billions of dollars in research and

development and fully intend to commercialize space exploration, utilization and

management, further complicating and crowding this important domain.

It started out well enough with the agreement and ratification in the 1960s of the;

> the Outer Space Treaty (OST) also known as the International Agreement on
> Peaceful uses of Outer Space is officially called the Treaty on Principles
> Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
> Including the Moon and other Celestial bodies. Signed in Washington D.C.,
> London and Moscow on January 27,1967 it has served as the principal
> international legal mechanism and source of international political sentiment for
> keeping space demilitarized. The intent was to prevent participating countries
> from putting nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and
> that human uses of the moon and other celestial bodies would be for peaceful non-
> military related purposes.[107]

These however, were the early days of space exploration and although it had support of

the great powers at that time, there were no enforcement provisions included in the treaty.

As a result, world powers have relied on general goodwill and the spirit of partnership to

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[106] Ibid., viii.

[107] Bert Chapman, *Space Warfare and Defense: A Historical Encyclopedia and Research Guide* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2008).

abide by the treaty's provisions. With continued progress however, there have been cracks in the veneer of cooperation, as the original treaty and subsequent liability amendments strain to deal with the increased space-based activity. This provides further credence to the belief that in the age of great power competition general goodwill is a high priced and fleeting commodity when juxtaposed against positional domain advantage. It must be understood that "the space enterprise is no longer simply an enabler and force enhancer . . . it is an essential military capability and a key component of joint warfare," it therefore, should be regarded as a key component of any revised spectrum.[108]

Hybrid Warfare

It has been posited that "the term hybrid warfare has no consistent definition and is used primarily by Western based analysts, military professionals and academics in a variety of ways. Some use the term to refer to the utilization of a state engaged in conflict of irregular tactics, or to describe the range of irregular and conventional tactics used in the same battlespace; yet others use it specifically to describe the type of New Generation Warfare articulated by the Russian Federation's General Staff."[109] However, the most concise definition has been that hybrid warfare can best be described as "the challenge presented by the increasing complexity of armed conflict, where adversaries may

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[108] Department of the Air Force, "Military Space Policy," 4.

[109] Andrew Radin, *Hybrid Warfare in the Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), 5, accessed 19 October 2019, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_ RR1577.pdf.

combine types of warfare plus nonmilitary means to neutralize conventional military power."[110]

In the modern era the concept of hybrid warfare has subsumed the prior categories recognized as limited war or small-scale conflict. In the military based construct however, there has been more focus on the concept of a hybrid threat which is defined as the "general complexity of operational environments, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict."[111] However, within that same concept it further continues to articulate a form of warfare and not ostensibly just a classic or new threat. It further defined that a hybrid threat;

> is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefitting threat effects. Hybrid threats combine traditional forces governed by law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act without constraints on the use of violence. These may involve nation-states using proxy forces or nonstate actors such as criminal and terrorist organizations that employ sophisticated capabilities traditionally associated with states. Hybrid threats are most effective when they exploit friendly constraints, capability gaps, and lack of situational awareness.[112]

Hybrid warfare is not a new concept as it can trace its lineage under the broad ambit of irregular warfare and low intensity conflicts. This is where states again trying to maximize the utilization of all their instruments of national power in order to find areas of competitive advantage. General Charles C. Krulak the Commandant of the US Marine

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[110] Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," 82-99.

[111] Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Services, October 2017), 1-3.

[112] Ibid.

Corps; in 1997, "created the concept of a Three Block War to describe what he

envisioned as the typical twenty-first-century battlefield: It will be an asymmetrical

battlefield. Much like the Germanic tribes [who destroyed Varus's legions in 9 A.D.], our

enemies will not allow us to fight the Son of Desert Storm, but will try to draw us into the

stepchild of Chechnya."[113] This spoke to a clear understanding of the ability of modern-

day state and non-state actors;

> demonstrating the will and capability to undermine their adversaries' operational
> capability, resolve and legitimacy by blending conventional and unconventional
> forms of conflict, using both attributable and non-attributable methods. These
> include posturing, provocation and persuasion in the physical and virtual
> domains; subversion; and economic and cyber warfare, with or without the
> employment of conventional military forces. This 'hybrid' threat to the
> international rules-based order can be applied in a way that remains below formal
> military response thresholds.[114]

However, as a further distinction within the current paradigm hybrid threats may

be utilized by state and non-state actors in order to target the will of the people and the

associated decision-making ability of the government. Whilst hybrid warfare mainly

targets the effectiveness of the military to conduct successful operations. Each challenge

therefore demands different countermeasures and each has a distinct implication for

capability at all levels.[115]

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[113] Joseph J. Collins, "Afghanistan: Winning A Three Block War," *The Journal of Conflict Studies* 24, no. 2 (Winter 2004): 61, accessed 19 October 2019, https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index.php/jcs/article/view/204/361.

[114] British Ministry of Defence, Land Warfare Development Centre, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP), *Land Operations* (Bristol, UK: British Ministry of Defence Crown, March 2017), accessed 20 October 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk /government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/605298/Army_Field_Manual_ _AFM__A5_Master_ADP_Interactive_Gov_Web.pdf.

[115] Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," 82-99.

Figure 8.   Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare shown on a Continuum of Conflict

Source: Linton Wells II, "Cognitive Emotional Conflict," *PRISM* 7, no. 2 (2017): 6, accessed 16 October 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-7-2/Article/1401814/cognitive-emotional-conflict-adversary-will-and-social-resilience/.

In light of the foregoing hybrid warfare reflects a significant gap in our collective understanding of what constitutes warfare. This as most doctrinal precepts still refer to warfare as black or white extremities, in that there is a either a conventional threat with conventional based solutions or an irregular threat which requires unconventional solutions; in other words, "east is east, and west is west, and never the twain shall meet."[116] However, as seen in figure 8 above, modern day conflict is filled with nuance and many shades of gray, where new and emerging concepts have taken hold based on significant advances in technology and cognitive reflection. The term hybrid warfare has been utilized quite haphazardly in major conceptual discourse and in various fora. This

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[116] Rudyard Kipling, "The Ballad of East and West," Kipling Society, accessed 19 October 2019, http://www.kiplingsociety.co.uk/poems_eastwest.htm.

has served not to raise awareness of the complexity and immediacy of the concept, but rather to "degrade and undermine efforts to isolate, regulate and rule out large scale violent confrontation in the international system."[117]

The knock-on effect of this cognitive dissonance surrounding hybrid warfare, has resulted in the concept being relegated into theoretical spaces but not in the active discussions regarding the spectrum of conflict. Rather, the acceptance of hybrid threats and the general undertaking to utilize existing capabilities to combat them continues to be posited. All done while ignoring the unique perspectives and capabilities that will be required to deal with an effective proponent of hybrid warfare.

The Russian annexation of the Crimea and other operations in its near abroad are utilized as prime examples of hybrid warfare. The Russian view on warfare in the modern era and their recent military activities will be discussed later in this chapter. However, "the term hybrid warfare is not simply a reaction to the annexation of Crimea. It is a more sophisticated and enduring attempt to understand and articulate the ever-changing character of warfare. It is important because if understood correctly and included in revised understanding of the spectrum of conflict, it will allow for the development of a future force able to deter and defeat potential adversaries who seek new ways to win.[118]

<center>Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO)</center>

Often associated with the concept of total war, "large-scale combat operations are at the far right of the conflict continuum. Historically, battlefields in large-scale combat

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[117] Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," 88.

[118] Ibid., 84.

operations have been more chaotic, intense, lethal and highly destructive. Their conditions include complexity, chaos, fear, violence, fatigue, and uncertainty."[119]

World War II (WW II) can accurately be described as a catastrophic event that deeply impacted the viewpoints of survivors as to the true cost of total war. Commencing just two decades after the perceived end of the great war to end all wars (World War I), WWII can be argued to have been the first true exemplar of LSCO and also the only true global conflict. Its global reach can be validated by the fact that from the far reaches of the northern Aleutian Islands to the rugged southern landscape of Patagonia with most land and sea areas in between, the world from a geo-political perspective was fully involved either as allies, axis partners or neutral declarants in the combined arms spectacle of death. At war's end the nature of warfare had changed significantly and the scarred memories of the effects of total war in particular the significant loss of life forced the global polity in 1945, to collectively pause and reflect the global populace practitioner and victim alike was left scarred with cries of never again.

LSCO has been often utilized as a method to describe success in war as it usually by agreed convention ends in somewhat of a definitive point with a declared winner, in most cases. However, the clear-cut winner takes all at the end of a large-scale conflict scenario has only arguably played out twice post 1945, at the end of major combat operations for The Arab, Israeli War in 1967 and Operation Desert Storm 1991. In 1990 the Gulf crisis as it became known captivated the attention of the globe at every level and provided an insight on the manifestation of post 1945 events in warfare. Saddam Hussein

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[119] HQDA, FM 3-0, *Operations,* 1-2.

in his capacity as the President of the Republic of Iraq had displayed significant hostile intent by the military invasion and subsequent annexation of the neighboring Kingdom of Kuwait. He subsequently refused to have his troops leave even when implored to do so by the United Nations and many other diplomatic envoys.

In response the United Nation's highest decision-making body the Security Council passed a series of resolutions.[120] These resolutions authorized the deployment of coalition forces to the region in defense of other neighboring countries against possible further offensive Iraqi action and subsequently to conduct operations to restore the territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Kuwait.

Operation Desert Shield which later transitioned to Operation Desert Storm saw the deployment, coordination and utilization of hundreds of thousands of coalition military personnel to the region in order to enforce the UN Security Council resolution to combat Iraq's hostile intent. The coalition integrated men and women from various countries in the conduct of a multi-domain concept of operations that focused on defeating the enemy and returning the region to stability. This facilitated the complete and ordered destruction of the combat capability of the Iraqi forces in theatre as the "U.S.

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[120] On 2 August the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 660, condemning the invasion as a violation of the UN Charter and demanding Iraqi Withdrawal. . . . Four days later the UNSC passed Resolution 661 imposing a trade and financial embargo on Iraq. After these and nine subsequent resolutions had failed to end the Iraqi occupation the UNSC authorized members to use all means necessary to enforce previous resolutions if Iraq did not leave Kuwait by January 15 1991. Andrew Hardy, Jesse McIntyre III, and Bill Knight, "Desert Shield/ Desert Storm Case Study," Command and General Staff College, C500 Readings, 2.

military turned the fourth-largest army in the world into the second largest army in Iraq in a mere one hundred hours of ground combat."[121]

The success of this large-scale combat operation was as a result of the synchronization by coalition forces of technological innovation, professional conduct and mission command philosophy. It also served as a warning to global competitors that the United States dominated western alliance was not to taken on in a head to head fight. As a result, other methods of warfare rose to prominence in the post-Gulf Crisis world that persist to the current day and are prominent along the spectrum.

Nuclear Warfare

When George Washington, in his farewell address, warned us, as a new democracy, to avoid foreign entanglements, Europe then lay 2-3 months by sea over the horizon. The United States was protected by the width of the oceans. Now in this nuclear age, we measure time in minutes rather than months.[122]

With the detonation in 1945 of two nuclear bombs on the Japanese home islands the prolonged, brutal and obstinate severity of the Pacific campaign and WWII itself finally came to an end. These 1945 bombings of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, by the United States changed the global warfare dynamic, forever.

The dawn of the nuclear age was a triumph of scientific research, human endeavor and development. The splitting of the atom had an untold future for possible energy and other applications. However, it was the military application and the need for weapons of

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[121] Nagl, *Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*.

[122] Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power" (Remarks to the National Press Club, Washington, DC, 28 November 1984), excerpt of *The Weinberger Doctrine*, reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, *H400 Syllabus and Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 2019).

mass destruction that took prominence. "Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) are defined as atomic explosive weapons, radioactive material weapons, lethal chemical and biological weapons and any weapons developed in the future which have characteristics comparable in destructive effect to an atomic bomb or other weapons mentioned."[123] The military industrial complex that was built to sustain a global conventional war effort was retooled post-WW II for a new type of warfare, as part of the new Cold War. This Cold War pitted the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), who had their own nuclear weapon by 1949 and their eastern allies against the United States and their western ones.[124]

These erstwhile allied partners, superpowers united for a common cause against the declared evil of the then axis forces, were now undeclared enemies and caught up in a burgeoning space and nuclear arms race. The Korean War 1950 to 1953 was significant as it marked the Cold War's first significant clash of democratic versus communist ideologies and also had further significance as it marked the first major conflict of the nuclear age where the use of nuclear weapons to break the stalemate was actively considered, but it would not be the last.[125] The Korean War nuclear discussions and other

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[123] Christian Enemark, "Farewell to WMD: The Language and Science of Mass Destruction," *Contemporary Security Policy* 32, no. 2 (August 2011): 382, https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2011.590362.

[124] *USSR History Timeline-29 August 1949 Soviet Union Tested Atomic Bomb*, Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, *H400 Syllabus and Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 2019).

[125] "In January 1956, Life magazine published an article that purportedly explained how the Eisenhower administration had ended the Korean War. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles revealed that he had conveyed an 'unmistakable warning' to Beijing that the United States would use nuclear weapons against China if rapid progress toward a negotiated settlement was not made. He asserted that it was 'a pretty fair

considerations throughout the period later highlighted that "by the mid-1950s, the lack of success in disarmament negotiations and the growing awareness of the dangers of nuclear warfare had produced a change in approach to arms control . . . new arms control theorists intended to work within the prevailing system of nuclear deterrence rather than try to abolish it."[126] The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the premise of mutually assured destruction, sparked a bi-polar realization that hostile intent could not be countered in the post 1945 nuclear age in the same conventional manner.

During twelve days in October 1962 the world held its collective breath as it came very close during the Cuban Missile Crisis to a true nuclear based conflict. "As the superpowers edged back from the nuclear abyss after the crisis, both realized more than ever before that they had a mutual interest in effective crisis management."[127] Further, in the modern era, with the enhanced power of the atom and other weapons of mass destruction, the capability in destructive yield and stealthy and efficient delivery systems that nuclear capable powers possess were significant. Therefore, there was a need for a methodology dedicated to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and a necessity to

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inference' that this nuclear threat had worked. Dulles made this claim in defense of the notion that nuclear weapons were useful, indeed essential, tools of statecraft: When nuclear capability was combined with communication of intent to use it if necessary, deterrence- and even compellence-worked." Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War International Security," *International Security* 13, no. 3 (Winter, 1988-1989): 50, accessed 29 February 2020, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2538736.

[126] John Baylis and Mark Smith, "The Control of Weapons of Mass Destruction," in *Strategy in the Contemporary World*, 3rd ed., ed. John Baylis, James Wirtz, Colin S. Gray, and Eliot Cohen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 228.

[127] Ibid.

utilize all other facets of national power in order to enable conflict resolution and a

restraint on the possibility of the occurrence of a nuclear based conflict.

Figure 9.   The World's Nuclear Weapons

Source: ICAN, "The World's Nuclear Weapons," ICAN, accessed 19 October 2020, https://www.icanw.org/nuclear_arsenals.

Although nuclear war has not been as highly pertinent as during the days of the

Cold War, it remains a highly relevant area. Concerns regarding non-proliferation and

regulation persist and nuclear capable powers retain highly regulated capacities for

utilization at the far end of the spectrum. The nuclear age's ultimate success however, is

that the first utilization in anger of its weapons of mass destruction in 1945 were in fact to

date, their last use.

Peoples' Republic of China's view on warfare and
the spectrum of conflict

The first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing

forbidden."[128] Dominating the Asian continent, the People's Republic of China has had a

long and storied history stretching back to the Shang dynasty (first dynasty with written

records) in 1500 B.C. It has progressed through three major phases, the first period or

ancient China from earliest recorded times to approx. 722-481 B.C.E. The second period

or imperial China from 453-221 B.C.E. to 1839-1842 and the third period or modern

China from 1842 to the present day.[129] From its very inception armed conflict has always

played an important role in Chinese history. Most of China's imperial dynasties were

established as a result of success in battle. In the twentieth century the Chinese

imperialist ideal officially ended with the formation of the Republic in 1912. However,

this historical attribute continued later with the activities of the Nationalist Kuomintang

and later with the Communist regime.[130]

China has traditionally floated like many great empires between states of internal

stability and conflict. Of note however, is that "during periods when China was united

and strong, most military encounters took place along its periphery as the country's rulers

sought to assert their suzerainty over neighboring states and peoples. During periods of

division and civil war on the other hand, the locus of most military action was the densely

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[128] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA
Literature and Arts Publishing House, February 1999).

[129] Robin Hingham and David A. Graff, ed., *A Military History of China*
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 19.

[130] Ibid., 1.

populated heartland of China."[131] This was further reinforced in the twentieth century when China was forced to deal with first Western and later Japanese based aggression, that helped to end both the dynastic and republican ideals.

The Chinese way of war has always been touted as worthy of emulation primarily from a historical perspective. The writings of Confucius and Sunzi (Sun Tzu) have transcended time and space and facilitated a global insight into the essence of the Chinese warrior culture and methodology. In fact,

> Some authors pointing to the Confucian tradition and certain passages in Sunzi's Art of War, have argued that China's traditional grand strategy has emphasized defense over offense and displayed a preference for nonviolent solutions to security problems. Sunzi, after all tells us that the acme of military excellence is to subdue the enemy without fighting, while the Mencius, one of the core texts of the Confucian canon, maintains that the truly virtuous ruler, by means of his transforming influence, can bring his enemies to submit voluntarily without recourse to physical coercion.[132]

This strategic concept of non-violent solutions was however strongly tested as by the mid-twentieth century China was engaged in multiple conflicts at home and abroad. At home the Nationalist Kuomintang fought against a Communist based insurgency and also conducted large-scale combat operations against Japanese invaders, first alone and then in concert with other allied forces during WW II. In 1949 after a long internal conflict the Chinese Communist Forces defeated the western allied forces of the Kuomintang, whose survivors fled to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Peoples' Republic of China was subsequently declared. However, by 1950 before the new communist aligned government could relax, conflict broke out in the Pacific, when the

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[131] Hingham and Graff, *A Military History of China*, 4.

[132] Ibid., 13.

forces of the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (DPRK) attacked the forces of the Republic of Korea.

China at this point was a recently declared ally of the DPRK, and were by all indications seemingly content in conjunction with the USSR, in providing localized sustainment support and ideological mentorship for their ally and neighbor. However, with the ever-advancing multinational forces in close proximity to China's south western land border and seemingly poised to cross the Yalu river, China's Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) entered the Korean conflict in force in October 1950 in support of the DPRK.

The Korean War was a complex conflict with significant socio-political layers. It was the first real ideological based conflict of the Cold War that pitted west against east, it also involved the nascent construct that was the United Nations. Which was ostensibly established just a few years earlier as an impartial collective entity for global cooperation. However, by December 1950 that cooperation was nowhere in sight and the UN multinational force (US Eighth Army) at all echelons, was consistently harried, overrun and outfought all across the peninsula by the PLA and DPRK forces.

Although the conflict would end with an armistice and the UN forces seemingly with the upper hand, the conflict tested the new PLA on a significant level. Although they were not able to mass modern materiel on the frontline, they were able to match their strategic and tactical acumen against their erstwhile WWII allies. Chinese divisions out maneuvered and, in some cases, overran Eight Army formations and if not for the heroic inspirational deeds of key Eight Army leaders and formations, in tandem with air power, the war may have had a different outcome. Post the Korean conflict China generally

retreated within its boundaries and underwent a period of internal socio-economic and cultural turmoil. Whilst dealing with its own troubles, China kept an eye on the West and mapped out its own patient strategies that would result in its subsequent economic and military rise and regional dominance as the one true China.

The re-emergence of China began in the latter decades of the twentieth century and continued to the present day. Unencumbered by major conflict and internally stable under the Communist Party's unmoving leadership, China's modern age took a profitable turn. The term BRICS was first prominently used in a Goldman Sachs report from 2003, which speculated that by 2050 the economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa would be wealthier than most of the then current major economic powers.[133] The BRICS' thesis posited that China and India would become the world's dominant suppliers of manufactured goods and services, respectively, while Brazil and Russia would become similarly dominant as suppliers of raw materials. It is important to note that the Goldman Sachs' theory was not that these countries were a political alliance (like the European Union) or a formal trading association, rather that they possessed the potential to form a powerful socio-economic bloc. Of that grouping it was predicted that China would surpass the United States and become the world's largest economy by the year 2020.

China became very visible very quickly and their global posture switched from developmental and cultural assistance and outreach to commercial and security joint

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[133] Holly A. Bell, "Status of the BRICS an Analysis of Growth Factors," *International Research Journal of Finance and Economics*, no. 69 (2011): 19, accessed 20 October 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2340210.

ventures whereby economic benefits and political goodwill redounded to the benefit of China.

However, dealing with a prosperous and powerful China, is by no means a novelty in world history. China's increasing wealth and military power have been accompanied by an extension of its influence with other countries and within international organizations. Its combination of authoritarian government, strong national development and economic power may help developing countries negate the pressures they feel from leading western governments to follow a particular model. International alignments may change: as countries within Asia become increasingly entwined with China's economy, the balance of political influence will incline towards China.[134]

Intertwined with this economic rise was a militaristic outlook built on centuries of military tradition and an extremely long-term strategic outlook. This was built on a distinct understanding of global affairs and the nature of strategic competition. China believed that strategic competition was a natural state of affairs with each country within the global commons able to chart the course of its own path with partners friends instead of foes. They based this on a realist-based position where throughout "history competition rather than cooperation has dominated international relation."[135] However, it is understood that with that competition comes distress regarding positional advantage and influence however, the Chinese also believe that it presents a further opportunity for cooperation. As noted by "Hedley Bull cooperation is in a dialectical relationship with discord. Therefore, to understand cooperation one must also understand the frequent

[134] Chris Elder and Robert Ayson, "China's Rise and New Zealand's Interests: A Policy Primer for 2030" (Discussion Paper No.11, Centre for Strategic Studies, New Zealand Victoria University of Wellington, 2012), accessed 20 October 2019, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/30678440.pdf.

[135] Mark Boyer and John Rourke, *International Politics on the World Stage* (Boston, MA: McGraw Hill, 2002).

absence of or failure of it and it is for this possibility of failure that China has also prepared for.[136]

Since the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, China has issued eight strategic guidelines. These guidelines serve as the basis for China's national strategy and also serve as the core and collected embodiment of military strategy. In particular, it contains the program and principles for planning and guiding the overall situation of war in a given period. Those adopted in 1956, 1980 and 1993 represented major changes in China's military strategy, while the others have constituted minor changes.[137]

The 2015 Defense White Paper outlined new guidance for a shift of China's military strategy from winning local wars under the conditions of informationization to winning informationized local wars." The change in the strategic guidelines reflected an evolution of the existing strategy, Firstly the Chinese military posited that the form of war had changed and the corresponding application of information technology in all aspects of military operations is even more prominent. Secondly, China faced increased threats and challenges in the maritime domain, including over disputed islands and maritime jurisdiction in waters close to China as well as through the growth of interests overseas in waters far from China.[138]

[136] Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," in *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, ed. James Der Derian (New York: New York University Press, 1995), 279-307.

[137] M. Taylor Fravel, "China's New Military Strategy: 'Winning Informationized Local Wars'," *China Brief* 15, no. 13 (July 2015): 3-7, accessed 19 October 2019, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2626925.

[138] Ibid.

This strategic shift or pivot was not as significant as first posited as China had been adjusting its strategic outlook from the latter decades of the twentieth century. This pivot was focused on a reemergence of Chinese innovation and technological prowess in keeping with long standing traditions of Imperial China. In 1999 two PLA senior colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui published a treatise on Unrestricted Warfare that has gained some attention in the modern era, from military practitioners and scholars alike. The book proposes tactics for developing countries, in particular China, to compensate for their military inferiority vis-à-vis the United States during a high-tech war.[139] In essence it advocated for the blending of all instruments of state power to strike at their perceived enemies in an asymmetric manner, via all known domains. They outlined that in a unipolar world where active competition was discouraged, developing countries had to use whatever means necessary in order to win. This methodology involved remaining true to ancient precepts of the avoidance of head on conflict but to use non-attributable methods that would make Sunzi proud in order to achieve their strategic aims. These principles fit with their concept of military operations which involve the seamless blending of the instruments of national power with military capability in order to achieve desired effects.

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[139] Liang and Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare.*

Figure 10. Chinese Concept of military operations

Source: Frank G. Hoffman, "Examining Complex Forms of Conflict: Gray Zone and Hybrid Challenges," *Prism* 7, no. 4 (November 2018): 34, accessed 20 October 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism7_4/181204_Hoffman_PDF.pdf?ver=2018-12-04-161237-307Accessed 19 October 2019.

In the last decade China has managed to maintain its long-term strategic outlook by seamlessly matching its resurgent military capabilities with a comprehensive narrative of economic prosperity and shared partnerships with countries across the globe. It has also avoided peer to peer conflict with the United States and western Europe by effectively conducting non-attributable operations in the gray zone and attributable localized hybrid primarily maritime based operations in its South China Sea area of direct influence. All whilst building its conventional forces and power projection capabilities in preparation for possible large-scale combat operations and refining its full nuclear capabilities.

Russian Federation's view on warfare and the spectrum of conflict

With a long history reaching back to the twelfth century the Russian Federation, formerly known as the USSR, has had a long and eventful history. Spanning across two

continents it has played a significant role in geo-politics from the age of kings and empires to the present day. Its revolutionary upheaval during World War 1 changed its socio-political trajectory for good. This was further reinforced during WW II when after a brief flirtation with an Axis alliance, became a part of the alliance of united nations dedicated to the defeat of Nazi Germany and the Axis partners. WW II would have a scarring and long-lasting effect on the Russian landscape its people and psyche. However, Russia managed to end the war in a position of geo-strategic significance, with a significant stake in the reconfiguration of post war global affairs.

Global alliances forged by fire however, were quickly discarded in the post war 'peace' as global powers scrambled for relevance and influence in the new bi polar paradigm of the Cold War. This Cold War kept ostensibly frigid by the possession of nuclear weapons on both sides of the divide, pitted the USSR and their 'Eastern' allies against the United States and their 'Western' own.[140] Once allied partners united for a common cause against declared Nazi aggression, these two superpowers became undeclared enemies and thereafter caught up in a burgeoning space and nuclear arms race. There were numerous instances during the Cold War that had the potential of launching the world back into the throes of another global conflagration however, the concept of mutually assured destruction and communication kept war temperatures at freezing point. By the 1990s the USSR was on its proverbial last legs primarily as a result of socio-economic factors and by 1991 the USSR was no more. The Russian Federation re-emerged form the ashes of the USSR but the Russian bear taunted by economic and

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[140] Command and General Staff College, *USSR History Timeline-29 August 1949 Soviet Union Tested Atomic Bomb*.

societal upheaval particular a devastating 1998 economic crash, turned inward and hibernated.

By the year 2000 at the dawn of the new century, Russia had recovered from the 1998 financial crash that had caused it to devaluate the ruble and to default on its foreign debt commitment.[141] It was also able to stabilize and gain greater control over its internal socio-political structures via globally accepted methodologies and others that were not as well defined. The stabilization was generally welcomed as the country had experienced a chaotic political and economic decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union.[142] With its increased internal and economic strength and cohesion, Russia's early twenty-first century recovery helped to also stabilize its socio-economic, cultural, defense and foreign policies. The Russian bear had seemingly awoken from its malaise induced slumber and was surveying its place in the world.

Since the mid-2000s Russia's defense budget has steadily increased with its increased stability and relative prosperity. Although "the fall in world oil prices in 2014–2016, led to an economic recession in the Russian economy, Russian leaders continued with their distinct positions in foreign policy."[143] They subsequently reinforced those

[141] Robert W. Button, Karla J. Cunningham, Toy I. Reid, Irv Blickstein, Peter A. Wilson and Andreas Goldthau, "Russia's Near Abroad," *In Domestic Trends in the United States, China, and Iran* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 143, accessed 28 August 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg729navy.17.

[142] Button et al., "Russia's Near Abroad," 143.

[143] A. A. Shirov, M. S. Gusev, and I. E. Frolov, "Macroeconomic Effects of Russian Defense Expenditures: Retrospective Analysis and Forecast," *Studies on Russian Economic Development* 29, no. 4 (July 2018): 343-51, accessed 20 October 2019, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1134/S1075700718040159.

positions with definitive foreign-policy actions, by pushing its territorial and influence claims in Central Asia, Southern Europe and the Balkans. This has led to military and diplomatic adventures in its near abroad and subsequent geo-strategic tensions over the fate of Ukraine, Belarus, and Georgia. [144]

Russia's re-emergence on the global stage and competition in a new tri-polar world order has undergone significant analysis. However, what has undergone even more analysis are its views on conflict and how it operates in the realist Clausewitzian mold as it being an extension of its own policy initiatives. Russia reportedly views itself as great power from its emergence in the twelfth century to the modern era and as such undertakes to extend its influence within and without its borders. Its actions in Chechnya, Georgia, Ukraine, the Crimea and Syria over the last decade have seemingly been in lockstep with its New Generation warfare sometimes referred to as the Gerasimov doctrine or Russian Hybrid warfare.

Army General Valery Gerasimov is the current Chief of the Russian Defense Staff and First Deputy Defense Minister and his oversight of the longest period of Russian military rebirth since the Cold War has garnered attention, disdain and an intrepid following of primarily Western based journalists eager to be the first to opine on the greatest and latest from behind the Russian military curtain. In 2013 there "was an article written by General Valery Gerasimov in the *Voenno-promyshlennyi kur'er*, the *Military-*

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[144] Button et al., "Russia's Near Abroad," 143-148.

Industrial Courier," a Russian military professional journal.[145] It was subsequently

translated and interpreted by a recognized western Russian scholar Dr. Mark Galeoti, as a

clear articulation of new Russian doctrine. He coined the term Gerasimov Doctrine to

describe the thinking articulated by Gen. Gerasimov; of note he later regretted coining the

term due to the significant cognitive dissonance that it inspired as it related to attempts to

predict and analyze Russian actions based on their erstwhile codified doctrine.[146]

General Gerasimov in his comments articulated that essentially the rules of

conflict had changed and everyone had to adapt to a new paradigm if they were to be

successful in geo-strategic affairs. He outlined that "the role of nonmilitary means of

achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded

the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness."[147]

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[145] Mark Galeoti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War," *In Moscow's Shadows*, 6 July 2014, accessed 20 October 2019, https://inmoscows shadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/.

[146] Mark Galeoti, "I'm Sorry for Creating the Gerasimov Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, 15 March 2018, accessed 20 October 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018 /03/05/im-sorry-for-creating-the-gerasimov-doctrine/.

[147] Galeoti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War."

Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict According to General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff

Traditional Military Methods	New Military Methods
- Military action starts after strategic deployment (Declaration of War). - Frontal clashes between large units consisting mostly of ground units. - Defeat of manpower, firepower, taking control of regions and borders to gain territorial control. - Destruction of economic power and territorial annexation. - Combat operations on land, air and sea. - Management of troops by rigid hierarchy and governance.	- Military action starts by groups of troops during peacetime (war is not declared at all). - Non-contact clashes between highly maneuverable interspecific fighting groups. - Annihilation of the enemy's military and economic power by short-time precise strikes in strategic military and civilian infrastructure. - Massive use of high-precision weapons and special operations, robotics, and weapons that use new physical principles (direct-energy weapons—lasers, shortwave radiation, etc.). - Use of armed civilians (4 civilians to 1 military). - Simultaneous strike on the enemy's units and facilities in all of the territory. - Simultaneous battle on land, air, sea, and in the informational space. - Use of asymmetric and indirect methods. - Management of troops in a unified informational sphere

Figure 11. Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict according to
General Valery Gerasimov

Source: Jānis Bērziņš, *Changes in the Character of Armed Conflict according to General Valery Gerasimov. by Russia's New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy*, Excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, *H400 Syllabus and Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 2019), 774.

What Gen. Gerasimov articulated was in fact nothing new. In fact, it could be opined that there was "in fact very little in conceptual novelty in what the Kremlin did in the Crimea and the conceptual roots could be traced back to the early 2000s indicating from then a clear shift in their conceptual approach to war."[148] Gen Gerasimov had outlined this when he said that;

> the focus of applied methods of conflict has altered in the direction of the broad
> use of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary

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[148] Ofer Fridman, "On the Gerasimov Doctrine: Why the West Fails to Beat Russia to the Punch," *Prism* 8, no. 2 (October 2019): 102, accessed 16 November 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/prism/prism_8-2/PRISM_8-2_Fridman.pdf?ver=2019-09-17-231059-263.

measures—These days, together with traditional devices, nonstandard ones are being developed. The role of mobile, mixed-type groups of forces, acting in a single intelligence-information space because of the use of the new possibilities of command-and-control systems has been strengthened. Military actions are becoming more dynamic, active, and fruitful. Tactical and operational pauses that the enemy could exploit are disappearing. New information technologies have enabled significant reductions in the spatial, temporal, and informational gaps between forces and control organs.[149]

This new generational push was simply a progressive acknowledgement by the Russian government of how best to utilize the means at their disposal to further their interests within the global sphere. This was based on what they had observed in the early twenty first century with conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the ongoing conflicts with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State; also, the protest and regime change activities associated with the Arab Spring.

In the Crimea, the Russians were able to test this concept. They effectively utilized cyberspace and combined enhanced informational activities, with non-attributable asymmetric activities; based on a strategic narrative of support for ethnic Russian people. They then later transitioned ostensibly into peace enforcement operations in support of the newly annexed Crimea. All whilst conducting irregular and conventional based activities in other areas of the country. Gen. Krulak's hybrid stepchild had been seemingly brought to life in the Donbass in a most efficient manner, that left Western powers scrambling for a meaningful response.

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[149] Galeoti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War," 3.

Figure 12. The Gerasimov Chart

Source: Voeno-Promyshlennyi Kurier, "The Gerasimov Chart," accessed 16 October 2019, https://kkrva.se/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Bild110.png.

In the last decade Russia has managed to seamlessly match its resurgent military capabilities with a comprehensive narrative of a parental state for all ethnic Russian and Slavic peoples, within its near abroad or immediate geographic sphere of influence. It has also avoided peer to peer conflict with the United States and western Europe by effectively conducting non-attributable operations in the gray zone and attributable localized hybrid operations in the near abroad. All whilst rebuilding its conventional

forces in preparation for possible large-scale combat operations and refining its full

nuclear and power projection capabilities.

<div align="center">

United States' view on warfare and
the spectrum of conflict

</div>

It is noted that many actors have become skilled at operating below the threshold of military conflict—challenging the United States, our allies, and our partners with hostile actions cloaked in deniability . Our task is to ensure that American military superiority endures, and in combination with other elements of national power, is ready to protect Americans against sophisticated challenges to our national security. [150]

In 1776 an idea broke free from a centuries old foreign based institution and took

flight. In its early history that idea, the United States, mindful of malcontent regarding its

audacious enterprise, focused on consolidating gains continentally and subsequently

within the western hemisphere; forever minded of the socio-politic dangers that lay

across vast oceans to its east and west.

The US steadily began to assert themselves on the international stage in the 19th

century with the Western Hemisphere declared as within their distinct area of influence

that should be free of foreign interference. This was articulated most succinctly by

President James Munroe in what came to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. Where the

US essentially declared to the world that any interference in the western hemisphere may

be considered a hostile act against the US. [151] This was directed at European powers who

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[150] White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 3, accessed 16 November 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov /wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

[151] The Monroe Doctrine was articulated in President James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress on December 2 1823. The European powers according to Monroe were obligated to respect the Western Hemisphere as the United States' sphere of interest. James Munroe, "Message of President James Monroe at the Commencement

fresh off the battlefields of post Napoleon Europe were once again on the lookout for new opportunities for expansion of empire.

The US aware of the constant machinations of European power had to expand its economy and develop its professional military construct and strategic outlook on war, warfare and their role in it. In the nineteenth century the United States armed forces provided fertile and eager intellects for thinking on the Western Way of War and the then modern understanding of warfare. The formulaic principles of Swiss national, Baron Antoine -Henri de Jomini, took root in the collective American military psyche as they strived to further their military professional credentials. American tactical writers tended to follow Jomini, especially after the efforts of Dennis Hart Mahan, a keen advocate for the Jominian way of war, who after visiting and studying in Europe returned to the United States and assumed a leadership role at the United States Military Academy at WestPoint.[152]

It was from this position during the mid-nineteenth century with Jominian precepts embedded in the curriculum, that the philosophical and doctrinal molding of the US Army began. Mahan by his curriculum and extra-curricular discussion groups was able to fully indoctrinate future leaders of the US military who went on to fight on both sides of the American Civil War and beyond; with proficiencies necessary for military

of the First Session of the 18th Congress (The Monroe Doctrine), 12/02/1823, Presidential Messages of the 18th Congress, ca. 12/02/1823-ca. 03/03/1825, Record Group 46, Records of the United States Senate, 1789-1990," National Archives, accessed 8 February 2020, https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=23.

[152] Edward, Hagerman, *The American Civil War and the Origins of Modern Warfare: Ideas, Organization and Field Command* (Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988).

professionalism.[153] However, American military doctrinal thought nurtured in Jominian precepts had its most unlikely military advocate in the form of America's most preeminent naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan.

The son of Dennis Hart Mahan, Alfred Mahan, produced one of the seminal treatises on the nature, complexity and logic behind sea power and naval conflict.[154] Mahan's theories on naval warfare have been regarded as the foundation of modern western naval strategic thought since they were compiled.[155] With the work of the Mahans, the US Military Academy and others, breached the classical warfare barriers and transcended into the new paradigm. At that point it was believed in the young nation that "correct theories, founded upon right principles, sustained by actual events of wars, and added to accurate military history, would form a true school of instruction for generals."[156]

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[153] *Clausewitz*, excerpt reprinted in US Army Command and General Staff College, *H100 Syllabus and Book of Readings* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: USACGSC, 2019).

[154] "Mahan's reputation as a historian rests chiefly on his two books The Influence of Sea Power upon History 1660-1783 and the Influence of Sea Power upon the French Revolution and Empire 1793-1812 . . . and from Baron Jomini he learned the few principles of land warfare applicable by analogy to war at sea." Phillip Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 450.

[155] "These three ingredients of Jomini's art of War-the principle of concentration, the strategic value of the central position and interior lines and the close relationship between logistics and combat were to be borrowed by Mahan to form the framework of his own system of naval strategy." Crowl, "Alfred Thayer Mahan: The Naval Historian," 457.

[156] Antoine Henri de Jomini, *The Art of War. a.k.a The Summary of the Art of War* (Kingston, Ontario: Legacy Books, 2008), 246.

The United States entered the twentieth century prosperous and growing ever more diverse, with a firm eye of its own affairs and not those of the distant lands of Europe, World War I at its commencement in 1914 sought in the fields of battle to settle decades old continental disagreements amongst kings and courtiers. It was believed at that time somewhat optimistically, to have been the war to end all wars and so a generation of young idealistic men enthusiastically went off to war filled with ritualistic fervor and hopes for medals and glory. Their hopes however, were quickly tempered and then discarded as "the war's political objects- were forgotten, political restraints were overwhelmed and politics were reduced to a mere justification of bigger battles, longer casualty lists and overflowing human misery."[157] The US did not want to get involved and Americans reading about the carnage unfolding overseas were mostly content that they were not involved. There was however, a feeling of inevitability and with a rapid change in situations by 1917 the US became fully involved on the battlefields of Europe. It would be there that the American strategic mindset would be exposed to the harsh realities of large-scale combat and would begin to sow the cognitive seeds that would germinate during the inter-war years and bloom during WW II.

WW II was another catastrophic event that deeply impacted the viewpoints of survivors as to the true cost of total war. However, the US emerged from the ashes of the conflict as a global superpower with significant power, influence and now military strength and prowess. WW II had also however, facilitated a significant cognitive revolution within the American armed forces as to the concepts of combined arms,

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[157] John Keegan, *History of Warfare* (New York: Vintage Books, 1993).

amphibious warfare, special operations, airborne operations, carrier operations, and submarine warfare; all of which were formulated, practiced and perfected. It also facilitated a formalization of its defense apparatus in order to better formulate strategy, integrate and wield their significant instruments of national power. The US had now become in the space of two decades, without centuries of experience, the world's leading subject matter experts on warfare.

Despite this cognitive and theoretical foundation, the US defense establishment went through a period of atrophy following WWII. It engaged in limited conflicts globally and placed most of its focus during the Cold War on being able to stand toe to nuclear toe with the USSR, with the ever-present fear of mutually assured destruction. The US defense establishment believed that as one of the world's superpowers, outside of conflict with the USSR everything else could be handled. This belief was subsequently proven to be invalid by the Chinese and North Koreans in Korea and the Vietnamese in Vietnam.

The Vietnam conflict in particular, erased the hubris that had set in and exposed the American way of war as unadaptable and failing. This became even more apparent to the American defense establishment in the aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The weaponry, strategy, innovation, mission command systems and combined arms philosophies on display by both sides, cognitively rocked the US defense establishment. After significant needs analyses, restructuring and procurement were conducted, the American military was revamped but with nowhere to test these new precepts, that is until Iraq decided to invade Kuwait in 1990.

Operation Desert Shield, which later became Operation Desert Storm saw the deployment, coordination and utilization of hundreds of thousands of coalition military personnel to the region in order to enforce the UN Security Council resolution to combat Iraq's hostile actions. Utilizing new doctrinal precepts and new systems, the coalition under US leadership, integrated men and women from various countries in the conduct of a multi-domain Air Land battle concept of operations that focused on defeating the enemy and returning the region to stability. This facilitated the complete and ordered destruction of the combat capability of the Iraqi forces in theatre as the "U.S. military turned the fourth-largest army in the world into the second largest army in Iraq in a mere one hundred hours of ground combat."[158]

The success of this large-scale combat operation was as a result of the synchronization by coalition forces of technological innovation, professional conduct and mission command philosophy. It also was as a result of the efforts of the United States government who coordinated a global coalition under the aegis of the United Nations. The United States also exercised significant restraint by not trying to take on Iraq on its own. This was not because of the ability to not so do, as the United States at that moment at the end of the Cold War was emerging as the sole global superpower of note. The United States however, showed a deep understanding of the socio-political zeitgeist and demonstrated the effective utilization of all elements of national power by seeking the backing of the UN for diplomacy, sanctions and then subsequently resolutions for action, via the efforts of a broad-based coalition.

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[158] Nagl, *Knife Fights: A Memoir of Modern War in Theory and Practice*, 19.

Post Op Desert Storm there seemed to be a building contentment and relief within the American defense establishment, that LSCOs had resurfaced and were here to stay. There would be no more Vietnams or thinking about minor threat profiles or warfare components as it was not worth it and they would not be able to do it anyway; hubris had returned. However, the words of Gen Krulak seemed prescient when he had reminded the US defense establishment in 1997 that "our enemies will not allow us to fight the Son of Desert Storm, but will try to draw us into the stepchild of Chechnya."[159]

In the aftermath of the dastardly events of 9/11 the American strategic mindset shifted to the Global War on Terror in order to deal with the Chechnyan stepchild that had presented itself; with its associated sub components of counter terrorism, counter insurgency and stability operations. This led to almost twenty years of counter insurgency and stability operations and a further loss of focus on the full spectrum. There however was a slow realization that whilst the US was busy in Afghanistan and Iraq, Russia and China were also carrying out their own strategic objectives. Further, their untracked capacities had grown exponentially over a ten-year period to being near peer competitors and then by the end of the decade potentially peer competitors.

The 2017 *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* strived to address that failing. It outlined that a contest for great power between nation states was not a unique concept with numerous instances, their antecedents and results codified throughout history. It outlined that the US government operating from a conceptual position of 'principled realism' identified that the activities of the Russian Federation,

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[159] Collins, "Afghanistan: Winning A Three Block War," 61-67.

Peoples' Republic of China and Violent Extremist Organizations pose the greatest threat

to the US, its allies and interests.[160] It added that the US military needed significant

investment in order to maintain a full spectrum force and superiority against identified

adversaries.[161] However, in spite of this articulation there was and still has not been any

unified concept of what a holistic US based spectrum of conflict looks like. Figure 10

offers a conceptual viewpoint of the US' view of a spectrum or continuum of conflict.

Within the US' armed forces the perception of the spectrum is generally service or

organization based. Even at the joint level it is kept intentionally vague focusing

primarily on the range of military operations that may be conducted.[162] The reasons for

this may be attributed to the need to keep options open based on scale however, by

keeping flexible it also dilutes focus and preparation.

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[160] White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States*.

[161] Button et al., "Russia's Near Abroad," 143-158.

[162] "The range of military operations (ROMO) is a fundamental construct that provides context. Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingencies operations as varying from crisis response and limited contingency operations to major operations and campaigns." Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Services, 2017), xvii.

Figure 13. Heuristic Construct for Conflict

Source: Frank Hoffman, "Heuristic Construct for Conflict," *PRISM* 7, no. 2 (2018): 6, accessed 16 October 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism /prism7_4/181204_Hoffman_PDF.pdf?ver=2018-12-04-161237-307.

In the last decade the US has been involved in small scale conflicts of varying categorizations and intensities on multiple fronts. It has subsequently started the processes to fully extricate its forces from identified areas and pivot to focus on the peer threat and large-scale combat operations. It has been able to respond to crises globally however, the current atmosphere of competition (benign or active), serves to remind the establishment that it needs to be prepared not just for the emerging but the conceptual as well. These activities often conducted within the gray areas of the spectrum of conflict, provide a complex problem set and environment within which the US must utilize all aspects of its national power and in concert with its allies, maintain a full spectrum capability in order to not only counter the perceived threats but also facilitate an enduring stability and associated mutual prosperity.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter provided a review of relevant literature that was necessary to provide answers to the research questions of the study. This chapter sought to identify what has been written on the nature of contemporary conflict, also, identified current and emerging categories of warfare that should be represented on an updated spectrum. It also examined the military related history and current precepts of the United States, the Russian Federation, and the Peoples' Republic of China. Chapter 3 will focus on the methodology that is used in the study.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to assess the general validity and utility of the current accepted models of the Spectrum of Conflict. In this chapter the methodological approach used to answer the primary and secondary research questions is discussed.

Research Methodology

The research was conducted utilizing a qualitative combination of exploratory and descriptive research organized in accordance with a variation of the Creswell Model.[163] See figure 14.


Figure 14. Modified Creswell Model

Source: Modified by author. John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2014).

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[163] John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2014).

The exploratory research was conducted in order to provide insights into the nature of conflict, background into the spectrum and emerging concepts of warfare. The descriptive research was conducted in order to ascertain new perceptions of conflict from a multiple geo-strategic perspective. The method for data collection was documentary research (secondary analysis). This involved analysis of literature and related data focusing on the global perceptions and codifications of the spectrum of conflict and the main elements of conflict as articulated in the Literature Review. Criteria for inclusion were non-fiction books, scholarly articles or reports, written in or approved translation to English, National Security Strategies, National Defense Strategies, military doctrinal publications. This data was gained primarily from library and internet resources. The research did not involve dealing with any human subjects and as such no interviews, focus groups, questionnaires or other form of purposive sample was utilized. Relevant ethical concerns were however, considered, such as ensuring that non-western based-centric information was also presented for consideration.

<u>Research Questions</u>

The primary research question posited was: Is the current Spectrum of Conflict model an accurate representation of twenty first century warfare and its associated levels of intensity and dynamic inter relationships? In order to successfully articulate a response to the primary question two secondary questions were also formulated. The two secondary research questions will be addressed in a sequential manner.

1. What are the emerging types of conflict that are not represented on the current model but because of their current and predicted probability of occurrence and intensity warrant inclusion on the spectrum?

The research has gathered data on the current and significantly emerging forms of conflict/warfare that fit the question profile. These types have primarily emerged as significant offshoots from the limited war category. Securitization theory will be used to assess the types of conflict and their merit for inclusion.[164] See figure 15 of securitization process.

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[164] "The Copenhagen School of Security Studies conceptualizes security as a process of social construction of threats which includes securitizing actor (mostly political elite), who declares certain matter as urgent and a posing threat for the survival of the referent object, that, once accepted with the audience, legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures for neutralization of the threat." Information Resources and Management Association, ed., *National Security: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice* (Hershey, PA: IGI Global, 2019).

Figure 15. Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

Source: Roxanna Sjöstedt, "Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis," Oxford Research Encyclopedia, accessed 16 October 2019, https://oxfordre.com/politics/view /10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-479.

2. What is an optimal representation of the spectrum of conflict?

The research has noted that the optimal representation for the spectrum of conflict, is a visual diagrammatic based representation. In keeping with the foregoing and prior scholarship, the James D. Watkins, US Naval Institute line graph model depicted in figure 16 below is the base model for this study.

Figure 16. Spectrum of Conflict Model

Source: James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *Proceedings*, no. 112 (January 1986): 8, accessed 10 August 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines /proceedings/1986/january-supplement/maritime-strategy-0.

The derived line graph as seen below (figure 17) will be the baseline graphical construct for this study with the relevant categories correlated between the variables of probability of occurrence and level of intensity. Similar to the study's base model the probability of occurrence will be presented on the y axis and intensity of the conflict along the x axis, as shown in figure 17.

Probability of Occurrence

Level of Intensity

Figure 17. The Hybrid Spectrum of Conflict Model Baseline

Source: Created by author.

An enhancement to the base model was conceptualized, by the incorporation of the joint operational planning phases (Phase 0-Shape, Phase I-Deter, Phase II-Seize Initiative, Phase III-Dominate, Phase IV-Stabilize, Phase V. Enable Civil Authority), into the model.[165] See figure 18.

[165] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, V-8.

Figure 18. The Spectrum of Conflict-Hybrid Model Baseline
with joint planning phase-lines

Source: Created by author.

Building upon the preceding steps, the method for assessing the intensity ranking of the identified categories will be determined by utilizing the Terminology of Intensity Levels model.[166] See table 1.

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[166] "There are five universal levels of conflict intensity, which are defined according to the stage of physical violence: dispute, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited war, and war (see Table 1). Disputes and non-violent crises are classified as "low intensity," whereas limited and outright wars are classified as "high intensity." Heather Cooley, Kristina Donnelly, Mai-Lan Ha, and Jason Morrison, *Water as a Casualty of Conflict: Threats to Business and Society in High–Risk Areas* (New York: UN Global Compact, June 2012), accessed 18 January 2020, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/full_report39.pdf.

Table 1.   The Terminology of Intensity Levels Model

Intensity Level	Terminology	Level of Violence	Intensity Class
1	Dispute	Non-violent conflicts	Low Intensity
2	Non- Violent crisis		
3	Violent crisis	Violent Conflicts	Medium Intensity
4	Limited war		High Intensity
5	War		

Source: Heather Cooley, Kristina Donnelly, Mai-Lan Ha, and Jason Morrison, *Water as a Casualty of Conflict: Threats to Business and Society in High–Risk Areas* (New York: UN Global Compact, June 2012), 4, accessed 18 January 2020, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/full_report39.pdf.

The final step in the process would be the correlation of noted level of violence and intensity with the corresponding joint phase of operation in order to determine final category placement, on the proposed model, as seen in table 2.

Table 2.   The Hybrid Model Correlation Table

Level of Intensity	Operational Planning Phase
Level 1-Dispute	Phase 0-V
Level 2-Non-Violent	Phase 0-V
Level 3-Violent Crises	Phase 0-V
Level 4-Limited War	Phase 0-V
Level 5-War	Phase 0-V

Source: Created by author.

Summary and Conclusion

Chapter 1 of the study provided the background to the formulation of the research question and scope of the problem. Chapter 2 contained the literature review that provided a detailed investigation as to the nature of warfare, the existing and emerging categories and also the viewpoint of China, Russia and the United States on conflict and the spectrum of conflict. This chapter outlined the methodology that was utilized to gather the relevant data in order to be able to answer the primary and secondary research questions. The next chapter focuses on the analysis of the collected data.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

The Spectrum of Conflict has been deemed as critical to the understanding of modern-day conflict and in particular to the profession of arms. The purpose of this study was to assess the general validity and utility of the current accepted doctrinal model of the Spectrum of Conflict. In this chapter the previously presented literature was analyzed with the purpose of answering the research questions. The primary and each of the secondary questions were considered in relation to the process outlined in the modified Creswell model.

Is the current Spectrum of Conflict model an accurate representation
of twenty first century warfare and its associated levels
of intensity and dynamic inter relationships?

In short, the answer to the primary research question was no. Firstly there was found to be no single internationally accepted doctrinal model for the spectrum of conflict, as even within the United States' armed forces there were multiple interpretations amongst the services. Further, the other current members of the tri-polar world order, Russia and China had a different non-binary, conceptual outlook on the nature of conflict and warfare, which differed from the Western construct. The nations in question however, were consistent in viewpoint that warfare has evolved but exactly what it has evolved to remains an undefined question, hence a gap in the agreed position regarding the composition of the spectrum.

It was found that nation states in the modern era view war and conflict in general as firmly intertwined with policy. Therefore, assigning a broader definition to what conflict or warfare actually is, gives policy makers more maneuver space to conduct activities below the threshold of outright war, which serves to further their identified interests. This is not a new or emerging position, but an essential reinforcement of the Clausewitzian precept that "we have to see that war is not merely an act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on with other means."[167] It has also been viewed that "a defining characteristic of the contemporary security environment is that many of the threats occur at a point on the conflict spectrum where the armed conflict and law enforcement paradigms intersect and often overlap."[168] Military forces therefore conduct broad operations under the ambit of various articles of international law and best practices to include, the Law of the Sea and various other international counter terrorism based legislation.[169] This is contrast to domestic action conducted under the ambit of state's interest. In essence by adhering to the principles of the Law of Armed Conflict but leaving the spectrum deliberately ambiguous a state

[167] Clausewitz, *On War*.

[168] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*.

[169] "The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea lays down a comprehensive regime of law and order in the world's oceans and seas establishing rules governing all uses of the oceans and their resources. It enshrines the notion that all problems of ocean space are closely interrelated and need to be addressed as a whole. United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, *United Nations' Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982*, accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm.

creates more legal leeway for their maneuver.[170] Thirdly, there is also the traditionalists

view that "war is war and the nature remains the same regardless of how it is

categorized."[171]

In general, on observation, most western based models follow the general

methodology of this study's base line model (see figure 19 below). These models

generally posit a definitive correlation between the probability of occurrence and level of

violence in order to determine the category's relative position along the line.

Figure 19. Spectrum of Conflict Model

Source: James D. Watkins, "The Maritime Strategy," *Proceedings*, no. 112 (January 1986): 8, accessed 10 August 2019, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings /1986/january-supplement/maritime-strategy-0.

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[170] "The law of armed conflict is the "that part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. It is also called the law of armed conflict. The law of armed conflict is also referred to as the law of war (LOW) or international humanitarian law (IHL)." United States Army Judge Advocate General's Legal Center and School, *Law of Armed Conflict Deskbook,* 5th ed. (Charlottesville, VA: Judge Advocate General's Legal Center, 2015), accessed 20 October 2019, https://www.loc.gov /rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/LOAC-Deskbook-2015.pdf.

[171] Watkin, *Fighting at the Legal Boundaries*.

However, most of the models do not show a general interaction between the categories leaving a perception that they are unique separate and siloed entities with no dynamic interplay. Further, that the same types of warfare/conflicts that were being dealt with in the immediate post WW II era and late twentieth century are still holistically relevant in the present day. This failure to conceptually launch, can be attributed to a noted cognitive reluctance by military professionals to deal with the blended matters at the lower end of the spectrum. Where rigid legal frameworks and non-state actors dominate the conversation instead of the more preferred actions of rogue nations and the associated calculations of effects on target.


Figure 20. Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare shown on a Continuum of Conflict

Source: Linton Wells, "Cognitive Emotional Conflict," *PRISM* 7, no. 2 (2018): 6, accessed 16 October 2019, https://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-7-2/Article/1401814/cognitive-emotional-conflict-adversary-will-and-social-resilience/.

Figure 20 depicts a somewhat modern adaptable viewpoint of a spectrum of conflict. However, it was not a United States military or government model and its focus

is primarily that of the current concepts of gray zone, hybrid warfare and their associated constructs. Therefore, it misses the impact of emerging types of warfare, particularly the areas of space and cyber and therefore is not fully representative of the current conflict zeitgeist.

The data presented in chapter 2 of the study on the current and significantly emerging forms of conflict/warfare highlight the types of warfare that fit the question profile. These types have primarily emerged as significant offshoots from the limited war category. The main categories of warfare highlighted in chapter 2 can be identified in two groups the constants (codified forms agreed throughout the literature as 'valid' forms of warfare) and the persistent emergent (emerging and current concepts of warfare that have been acknowledged as valid forms but still require general scholarly acceptance as to how to deal with them) with the addition of outliers. In the case of the study the constants are identified as irregular warfare, large scale combat operations and nuclear warfare. Separate from this but within the constants 'sphere of influence, is the category of stability which is the desired end state of all conflict-based operations.

In consideration for the lack of incorporation of the aforementioned persistent emergent modes of warfare and the outlier of HILEO, in current models, the purpose of the study remains valid, as they are neither up to date nor of the desired level of conceptual utility. This study therefore proposed a 'Hybrid Model' that attempted to fill the perceived gap in the current literature and ultimately aid in redefining the spectrum of conflict to highlight the current twenty first century and beyond conflict paradigm.

What are the emerging types of conflict that are not represented
on the current model but because of their current and predicted
probability of occurrence and intensity warrant inclusion
on the spectrum?

All major global military powers have interpretations of the spectrum of conflict

that help to further their own national interests as they relate to the classification of

certain conflicts and their relationship to legal and ethical based considerations. However,

not all major powers and/or cultures view conflict in the same binary manner as some

nation states have a more multi-dimensional and progressive interpretation. However, as

outlined there are certain categories of conflict that have persisted and evolved over the

latter decades of the twentieth century into the twenty first.

Securitization theory was subsequently utilized to assess the types of conflict and

their merit for inclusion.[172] Securitization involves securitizing agents, who are defined

as actors (political leaders' bureaucracies, governments, lobbyists and pressure groups)

who securitize issues by declaring something, a referent object and existentially

threatened.[173] As outlined in figure 21 below, it is essentially a process-oriented concept

of how an identified issue is transformed by a recognized actor for e.g. the state, into a

matter of security.

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[172] "The Copenhagen School of Security Studies conceptualizes security as a process of social construction of threats which includes securitizing actor (mostly political elite), who declares certain matter as urgent and a posing threat for the survival of the referent object, that, once accepted with the audience, legitimizes the use of extraordinary measures for neutralization of the threat." Information Resources and Management Association, *National Security: Breakthroughs in Research and Practice.*

[173] Holger Stritzel, "Securitization Theory and the Copenhagen School," in *Security in Translation New Security Challenges Series* (London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 11-37.

Figure 21. Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

Source: Roxanna Sjöstedt, "Securitization Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis," Oxford Research Encyclopedia, accessed 16 October 2019, https://oxfordre.com/politics /view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-479.

Stability exists in a dual paradigm as a desired outcome and an actual category. It is however, not an area devoid of conflict rather, it encompasses normal law enforcement measures, humanitarian and disaster relief operations and peacekeeping operations. It therefore exists on the spectrum as the desired base or peace level. Irregular warfare, large scale combat operations and nuclear warfare are already known conflict standard bearers and are consistent in both traditional and emergent conceptual thought, they therefore retain their place on the spectrum. Hybrid warfare, gray zone conflict, narrative

warfare, cyber warfare and space warfare are concepts that are already in conceptual existence and practical application. They are however, normally subsumed under other categories, such as show of force, use of force or low intensity conflict/limited war, or referred to by other nomenclature. The evidence for their inclusion in the spectrum was outlined in preceding chapters. Particularly as it relates to the activities of the tri-polar powers over the last decade in these specific areas. Their inclusion as new independent categories on the spectrum, is therefore validated.

HILEO is a new concept crafted by the author, to describe an area of the spectrum for high intensity law enforcement. Within this construct, multi domain-based operations can be conducted in a domestic, regional or international based theatre of operations. Further, these operations can be conducted in partnership with traditional law enforcement and /or police elements or independently under special legal frameworks that facilitate the utilization of these forces in specially designated geographic (terrestrial/maritime) areas for a set time period. This category although linked with stability is not focused on traditional stability-based or deliberate internal security-based operations. Rather, in these operations the military/para-military arm of the state in question or other regional or international partners assume the primary role in combatting designated extreme threat, manifested in various forms such as organized quasi-criminal/ paramilitary or piracy threats. These activities are however, conducted under strictly law enforcement-based parameters, with specific legislative provisions as a part of a distinct whole of government approach. Although the terminology and conceptual grouping is new, the activities subsumed therein are not. As indicated in the literature review nations across the globe are conducting operations within these aforementioned parameters at an

increasing level. Therefore, in keeping with the securitization process its inclusion as a holistic grouping for the designated terrestrial and maritime operations is therefore validated and included on the spectrum.

<div align="center">

What is an optimal representation
of the spectrum of conflict?
</div>

The research has noted that the optimal representation for the spectrum of conflict, is a visual diagrammatic based representation. In keeping with the foregoing and prior scholarship, the James D. Watkins, US Naval Institute line graph model was used as the study's base model; with the hybrid model line graph as the derived baseline graphical construct. The line graph model facilitated a quick and accurate reflection of the various relevant categories of modern-day conflict and their dynamic inter-play. This construct with the relevant categories correlated between the variables of probability of occurrence and level of intensity, was utilized for the study. The hybrid model as proposed has the probability of occurrence presented on the y axis and intensity of the conflict along the x axis. The joint operational planning phases (Phase 0-Shape, Phase I-Deter, Phase II-Seize Initiative, Phase III-Dominate, Phase IV-Stabilize, Phase V. Enable Civil Authority), were further incorporated into the model.[174] Phases 0, 4 and 5 are co-located as they encompass activities undertaken during stability or peacetime operations, whilst phase I-III indicate an associated increase in the intensity of violence therefore requiring an associated increase in the range of capability that would be applied to address the category of conflict. As seen in figure 22.

[174] Joint Chiefs of Staff, JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.

Figure 22. The Spectrum of Conflict-Hybrid Model Baseline
with joint planning phase-lines

Source: Created by author.

The validation of the categories was previously discussed in this chapter and the

literature review. However, as a result of the foregoing the methodology for assessing the

intensity and as a result the position of a particular type of conflict along the spectrum

comes in to question. Precisely,

> where on the spectrum to place a particular conflict as it depends on several
> factors. Among them are policy objectives, available military means, national
> will, and density of fighting forces or combat power on the battlefield. In general,
> the greater this density, the more intense the conflict. Each conflict is not
> uniformly intense. As a result, we may witness relatively intense actions within a
> military operation other than war or relatively quiet sectors or phases in a major
> regional conflict or general war.[175]

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[175] Headquarters, Department of the Navy, MCDP 1, *Warfighting*, 2-6.

The inter relation and placement on the proposed new model was subsequently determined via the use of the Terminology of Intensity model and the Hybrid model correlation table. The terminology of Intensity model outlines that "there are five universal levels of conflict intensity, which are defined according to the stage of physical violence: dispute, non-violent crises, violent crises, limited war, and war." Disputes and non-violent crises are classified as "low intensity," whereas limited and outright wars are classified as "high intensity."[176]

Pursuant to the research design, the completion of the Terminology of Intensity Model (see table 3) will therefore assess category intensity in order to discern their placement suitability on the hybrid model.

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[176] Cooley et al., *Water as a Casualty of Conflict*, 4.

Table 3.   The Terminology of Intensity Levels (complete)

Intensity Level	Terminology	Level of Violence	Intensity Class
1	**Dispute- Stability, Narrative Warfare, Cyber, Space Warfare**	**Non-violent conflicts**	**Low Intensity**
2	**Non-Violent crisis-Stability, Narrative Warfare, Cyber, Space Warfare & Gray Zone Conflict**		
3	**Violent crisis-, Gray Zone Conflict, Narrative Warfare, Cyber, Space Warfare, HILEO, Irregular Warfare & Hybrid War**	**Violent Conflicts**	**Medium Intensity**
4	**Limited war- Gray Zone Conflict, Narrative Warfare, Cyber, Space Warfare, Irregular Warfare & Hybrid War**		**High Intensity**
5	**War- Narrative Warfare, Cyber, Space Warfare, Hybrid War, LSCO &-Nuclear War**		

Source: Heather Cooley, Kristina Donnelly, Mai-Lan Ha, and Jason Morrison, *Water as a Casualty of Conflict: Threats to Business and Society in High–Risk Areas* (New York: UN Global Compact, June 2012), 4, accessed 18 January 2020, https://pacinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/full_report39.pdf.

As a result of the above-mentioned results from the Terminology of Intensity Levels model, the following can therefore be discerned. Stability's associated intensity levels are 1-2. Gray zone conflict's associated intensity levels are 1-4, HILEO 's associated intensity level is 3. Irregular warfare's associated intensity is 3-4, Hybrid warfare's associated intensity level is 3-5. LSCO and Nuclear Warfare's associated intensity levels are 5, with nuclear warfare being an extreme intensity outlier. Narrative, Cyber and Space however, are associated with all levels as they are all encompassing and do double duty as both domains for operation as well as categories of warfare. Pursuant to the research model, matching of the levels of intensity with the operational planning phases was completed (see table 4).

Table 4.   The Hybrid model correlation table (complete)

Level of Intensity	**Operational Planning Phase**
Level 1-Dispute	Phase 0, IV & V
Level 2-Non-Violent	Phase 0 & I
Level 3-Violent Crises	Phase II
Level 4-Limited War	Phase II & III
Level 5-War	Phase III

Source: Created by author.

With the x axis set, the probability of occurrence for the y axis was contemplated, in order to complete the base model. With a similar 0-5 scaling with 0 being least likely and 5 being most likely to occur, based on the researcher's preceding review of the categories the following would qualitatively hold true. Stability is the category with the highest probability of occurrence which will become less likely as conflict intensifies and trend downwards on the model. HILEO as a more intense version of law enforcement, would be the next category most likely to occur just outside the parameters of stability. It will adopt similar behavior and trend downwards as it evolves into more intense violence. Irregular warfare straddles the midpoint of probability and violence intensity levels. Hybrid warfare as per data collected in chapter 2, can exist as a singular entity, as well as synergizing means for other defined categories in order to create desired effects. This gives credence to the supposition that hybrid warfare is the face of modern conflict. Gray zone has a high occurrence rate that places it in tandem with stability and similarly is present throughout other categories of the spectrum in a quasi-symbiotic relationship. It is mostly focused on non-attributable operations rising in intensity and scope pursuant to the protagonist state/entity's declared interests. However, at the higher end of the spectrum as violence intensifies, enhanced sensors and interagency support mechanisms make the possibility of non-detectable, non-attributional activities less probable. As per figure 3 (Number of state-based conflicts worldwide from 2002 to 2018, by region) in chapter 2, Nuclear War would be the least likely to occur preceded by LSCO (only 6 incidents of interstate conflict in the 12-year period under review 2002 to 2013). The aforementioned analysis is graphically represented with a base model integrated with category interplay, as seen in figure 23.

Figure 23.   The Hybrid Spectrum of Conflict Model Baseline
with phase-lines and categories

Source: Created by author.

In figure 24 the inter-relationships between all categories in relation to the x & y variables and operational planning phases is evident with a clear transition from a high probability of occurrence, low violence intensity category of stability; to a low probability of occurrence but with a high violence intensity category outlier of nuclear war. As discussed earlier, hybrid warfare subsumes the Irregular warfare and LSCO constructs but all three still remain distinct entities.

Figure 24. The Spectrum of Conflict-HYBRID Model

Source: Created by author.

In figure 24 Narrative, Cyber and Space Warfare constructs have now been added and complete the quasi-Venn diagram superstructure. All three categories have a cyclical level of probability of occurrence and can therefore exist throughout the spectrum encompassing the categories as they ascend into stability and correspondingly descend into intense violence.

Summary and Conclusion

This chapter provided the necessary analysis of the literature, which was used to answer the research questions. The chapter considered the existing spectrum of conflict model, validated the current and emerging categories of warfare and examined their inter-relationships. The chapter also ranked the categories according to their intensity and

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likelihood of occurrence. The spectrum of conflict Hybrid Model was then formulated as an optimal representation of the spectrum of conflict. Chapter 5 will provide a conclusion and present a recommendation.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

The primary research question posited for this study was if the current Spectrum of Conflict model was an accurate representation of twenty first century warfare and its associated levels of intensity and dynamic inter relationships. In order to successfully articulate a response to the primary question two secondary questions were also formulated. Based on the research conducted and the data unearthed during this study the answer to the primary research question was ascertained and the secondary questions were also answered.

The answer to the primary research question was no, as the research indicated that there was fundamentally not a globally accepted model or conceptual understanding of the spectrum of conflict. It further indicated that all current variations of the model, based primarily on the tri-polar world order stakeholders' world view, were not all encompassing. The China and Russia models focused more attention on hybrid and indirect concepts when compared to US (which has several models amongst the joint force) or NATO based constructs. These models have evolved over time, from conventional through counter terrorism and counter insurgency to a re-pivot towards LSCO. However, most of the identified US based models were related to operational execution vs theoretical understanding, effectively sidelining the understanding of what the category entails and negating the opportunity to provide cognitive stimuli for simple shared understanding.

The research also showed that that there had to be a reassessment of what exactly from primarily a western based perspective constitutes the spectrum of conflict, as there were just too many identified gaps that had a deleterious effect on shared understanding. The revised spectrum was therefore necessary in order to assist government entities, (interagency and the joint force) in the development of suitable strategies and subsequent capacities. It would also assist in reassessing the appropriate balance between specialization and adaptation of means in order to counter the full warfare range likely to be employed in combination by future adversaries.[177]

In relation to the emerging categories of conflict and their possible inclusion on the spectrum, various categories were identified and subsequently the securitization theory was utilized in order to validate their inclusion. The types identified were Stability, LSCO, Nuclear warfare, Narrative warfare, Cyber warfare, Space warfare, Gray Zone conflict, Hybrid warfare and HILEO. All of the aforementioned with the exception of HILEO were existing categories that stood independently or were normally subsumed under other broader categories for planning and reporting processes. HILEO was crafted by the author but was also comprised of pre-existing elements.

In search for what was an optimal representation of the spectrum of conflict, the research identified a seeming disconnect in how most examples of the spectrum were presented. Observed models presented a non-existent or even passive interplay between categories along the continuum, which in reality is not an accurate reflection of the dynamism and zeitgeist associated with modern-day conflict. The Spectrum of Conflict is

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[177] Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," 95.

not a siloed construct, rather it is critical to the understanding of modern-day conflict and in particular to the profession of arms. War is a fundamental unchanging human endeavor that violently pits opposing forces against each other as a result of "fear, honor and the pursuit of interest."[178] Within this construct combatants of opposing forces play a high stakes cognitive chess game along the spectrum, each searching for an advantage that will enhance their own probabilities of success.

Although war is constant and unchanging, warfare is evolving. That evolution subsequently heightens its unpredictability and the ability to isolate particular characteristics and quantify success. Joint force and interagency planners, should therefore abandon the seeming binary based choice between pure peace and conventional war with a sprinkling of conjecture in between; adopted in most iterations of the 'conflict continuum.' The choice that faces all of us is no longer either one of preparing for long-term stability operations or high intensity conflict but rather a myriad of challenges. We should therefore consider a more hybrid view as a better focal point for considering alternative joint force postures.[179]

The Hybrid model is not intended to be just another diagram or model, to sit on a shelf pending doctrinal review; as it seeks to also stir the conceptual debate regarding what is and what isn't when it comes to conflict categorization. In the current era and for the foreseeable future there will only be a joint fight with sister services, multinational and interagency partners. If every service, partner or agency turned up for joint planning

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[178] McMaster, "The Pipe Dream of Easy War."

[179] Monaghan, "Countering Hybrid Warfare," 93.

with a different conceptual understanding of the operating environment, the threat and the interrelationships, then there would not be a coordinated effort, which leads to unnecessary complexity and unfortunate loss.

This study subsequently crafted a 'Hybrid Model,' of a line graph baseline construct with the categories correlated between the variables of probability of occurrence and level of intensity. This model was proposed in an attempt to fill the identified gap in the current literature and ultimately aid in redefining the spectrum of conflict to highlight the current twenty first century and beyond conflict paradigm.

<div align="center">Recommendations</div>

Twenty first century governance and national interest management are noted as challenging for governments across the globe. This challenge is in part due to the nature of modern-day wicked problems and the associated complexity involved with the holistic incorporation of all elements of national power in order to solve them.[180] However, when it comes to dealing with issues relating to conflict the spectrum of conflict provides some degree of clarity and general situational awareness.

In attempting to discern the appropriate construct for the spectrum, it is noted that, there may not be a general desire to accept a more defined and uniformed outlook on the spectrum and by extension the definition of conflict. This reluctance to ascribe to uniformity may be in the best interest of some major global powers for it to remain broad and conceptual. However, the need for understanding and cooperation persists in the face of ever more dynamic and persistent threats. The hybrid model is not posited as a

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[180] Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power."

proverbial silver bullet that will immediately enhance the mental acuity of all planners and policy makers, that view its lines. Nor will it make a multi domain battlespace benign for a combatant. It can however, aid in general situational understanding and provide a conceptual basis for further planning, cooperation and partnerships.

It is therefore recommended that the hybrid model be considered for utilization in the joint planning processes. Its unique construct, particularly the correlation and integration with the operational planning phases, provides planners, policy makers and practitioners alike from the joint force and interagency, with an enhanced start point for visualization and shared understanding. This conceptual enhancement will help to inform subsequent decisions regarding, planning and preparation for conflict, to include sustainment and the full integration of the elements of national power. It also provides a baseline for contingency planning and most importantly designing a holistic plan in order to recover from hostilities and return the impacted area to stability.

<u>Further Research</u>

It is suggested that further research be conducted on the spectrum of conflict in general and the Hybrid model in particular. This is in order to further assist policy makers and practitioners alike with their understanding of modern-day conflict. This may involve a more quantitative look at the categories, possibly regarding their validity for incorporation (casualty figures, personnel and materiel involved), to their frequency of occurrence and positioning in relation to the other categories. Ultimately, it is believed that this further effort will assist in the continued development of a whole of government approach to confronting the wicked conflict related problems of our time. It will also allow states to prepare for conflict in one of its forms and if unable to avoid it, pursue the

necessary alliances, that will ensure that their particular interests and overall stability are maintained.

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