

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT
POLICY FOR THEATER POSTURE PLANNING

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degree

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by

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ABSTRACT

A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL CONTRACT SUPPORT POLICY FOR THEATER POSTURE PLANNING, by Liz Anton, 121 pages.

Overseas posture is a fundamental enabler of DOD activities and military operations and the U.S. is largely dependent on commercial alternatives to military power to establish and sustain it. Commercial capabilities provide flexible options to combatant commanders to achieve strategic posture objectives by off-setting military force reductions, promoting readiness, enabling operational access, cultivating strategic partnerships in the international system, and expanding the competitive space to provide freedom of maneuver, provided they are properly integrated into strategic planning dialogues. However, current Operational Contract Support policy is largely focused on management, oversight, and commercial dependence risk at echelons below the GCC and does not provide guidance on integrating OCS within the APEX framework. Using Carol Bacchi's 'What's the problem represented to be?' method of policy analysis, this case study examined the problem representation that served as the basis for existing joint doctrine and policy development as a way to explore options for expanding the OCS framework to include strategic decisions on theater posture and campaign planning. Recommendations were made across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum as encompassed by the Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Framework.

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| BOS | Base Operating Support |
| BOS-I | Base Operating Support-Integrator |
| BPLAN | Base Plan |
| CAAF | Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force |
| CBA | Capabilities-Based Assessment |
| CJCS | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff |
| CJCSM | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual |
| CCMD | Combatant Command |
| COCOM | Combatant Command Authority |
| CCDR | Combatant Commander |
| CONPLAN | Concept Plan |
| CL | Contingency Location |
| CSL | Cooperative Security Location |
| CUOPS | Current Operations |
| DFARS | Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DODD | Department of Defense Directive |
| DODIG | Department of Defense Inspector General |
| DODI | Department of Defense Instruction |
| DAFL | Directive Authority for Logistics |
| DOTMLPF | Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, Facilities |
| DCR | DOTmLPF Change Recommendation |

| | |
|--------|---|
| FAR | Federal Acquisition Regulation |
| FDO | Flexible Deterrent Option |
| FWA | Fraud, Waste and Abuse |
| FCIB | Functional Capabilities Integration Board |
| FUOPS | Future Operations |
| GCC | Geographic Combatant Commands |
| GDP | Global Defense Posture |
| GFM | Global Force Management |
| GFMIG | Global Force Management Implementation Guidance |
| GOM | Global Operating Model |
| GAO | Government Accountability Office |
| GEF | Guidance for Employment of the Force |
| HCA | Head of the Contracting Activity |
| HN | Host Nation |
| ICD | Initial Capabilities Document |
| JFC | Joint Force Commander |
| JIPOE | Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment |
| JMET | Joint Mission Essential Tasks |
| JOPES | Joint Operation. Planning and Execution. System |
| JP | Joint Publication |
| JRSOI | Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration |
| JROC | Joint Requirements Oversight Council |
| JSCP | Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan |
| JSPS | Joint Strategic Planning System |
| LOGCAP | Logistics Civil Augmentation Program |

| | |
|--------------|---|
| MET | Mission Essential Tasks |
| NDS | National Defense Strategy |
| NMS | National Military Strategy |
| OPLAN | Operation Plan |
| OCS | Operational Contract Support |
| OCSIC | Operational Contract Support Integration Cells |
| OPLAN | Operational Plan |
| PARC | Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting |
| SCO | Senior Contracting Official |
| TPP | Theater Posture Plan |
| USAFRICOM | U.S. Africa Command |
| USCENTCOM | U.S. Central Command |
| USEUCOM U.S. | European Command |
| USINDOPACOM | U.S. Indo-Pacific Command |
| USSOCOM | United States Special Operations Command |
| USTRANSCOM | United States Transportation Command |
| UJTL | Universal Joint Task List |
| DASD(PS) | Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support |
| WRM | War Reserve Materiel |
| WPR | What's the Problem Represented to Be |

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified Operational Contract Support (OCS) as a core defense capability and identified key capability gaps requiring closure. Expanding the OCS framework into strategic planning is necessary to adapt current doctrine and policy to meet today's new threats and budgetary climate.

The Problem

Operational Contract Support is a fairly new and often nebulous concept. In many circles, "OCS" is thought to be a more robust way of looking at "contracting," which includes paying greater attention to requirements definition, acquisition planning and contract execution in support of DOD activities, as well as the subsequent management and oversight of those contracts. The problem with this interpretation, is that personnel executing OCS often are not part of the contracting workforce, whose responsibility it actually is, to perform those functions.

In smaller circles, "OCS" is a framework to encourage the early planning and integration of anticipated contract support for a specific operation, exercise, activity or engagement; similar to how it is represented in Joint Publication 4-10. In even smaller circles, "OCS" is considered to a discipline, a subject for planning that uses knowledge and subject matter expertise in contracting policies, procedures, practices, laws and regulations, to set conditions for contract execution in an area of operations (AOR). It can also be used to explore the influence of commercial capabilities on strategic objectives and create decision space for commanders.

The United States (U.S.) has spent the past two decades paying for conflicts in the Middle East with the closure of bases, reductions to the organic capability within the DOD and the outsourcing of a significant amount of support. U.S. National Security and National Defense policies are shifting focus to high-end fights with near-peer competitors while keeping ongoing campaigns to defeat violent extremism when most of U.S. our power projection and logistic support capabilities are no longer in the DOD organic force structure. With fewer forces forward deployed and reductions across the military services, Geographic Combatant Commanders must rely on commercial solutions to set conditions that enable rapid response to crises and contingencies.

U.S. global posture determines the Joint Forces' strategic advantage. Posture planning must incorporate commercial capabilities such as, infrastructure, services, and personnel, to ensure and expand partnerships, set the globe, and deter our adversaries. Theater Posture Plans (TPPs) assess three interdependent posture elements: forces, footprints, and agreements.

Current OCS policy and doctrine addresses the execution, management and oversight of contracts; the operational planning for commercial support to a specific operation; even the responsibility of the combatant commands to determine how contracts will be used in the region. When it comes to joint planning and strategic decision making, there is there is a gap. The current policy and doctrine do not address OCS in the context of strategic opportunities, such as leveraging commercial considerations to set theater posture.¹

This research will analyze the existing Department of Defense doctrine, policy, and guidance on leveraging commercial considerations through the lens of theater posture planning.

Significance of the Problem

The 2018 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's (CJCS) Risk Assessment on Contract Support, recognizes the National Defense Strategy (NDS) as the objective by aligning commercial support with the global operating model (GOM).² It identifies how commercial support can achieve strategic outcomes and highlights risks associated with using it. The DOD needs guidance to facilitate the integration of commercial support into plans and provides a means for assessing opportunities and risks of commercial capabilities both by the Joint Force and our adversaries. Since 2008, the Department of Defense has put forth a herculean effort in codifying guiding principles and tenets for the management of commercial support to operations. Still, room for growth exists in broadening the aperture to include opportunities that drive strategic posture discussions, such as what needs to be done to ensure geographic theaters are set to support contingency and crisis operations.

OCS Planners are business advisors to the commander. They have the skillset to support planning for commercial enablers, which includes research and analysis on economic, geopolitical, and societal factors in a region and understanding the commercial relationships between multinational and interagency partners in shared domains. The collaboration through the multinational and interagency community to develop plans to leverage the soft power of commercial agreements can be vital to buying influence and access to key terrain. OCS policy and doctrine, however, are focused on the management

and oversight of contracts, which is a service component's operational planning responsibility. There is a gap in guidance for planners at the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC), on how to analyze and integrate OCS considerations into strategic planning dialogues.

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to analyze the relevant doctrine and policy institutionalizing the OCS framework as a strategic enabler for the Geographic Combatant Commanders (CCDR) in support of theater posture planning. This study will determine if policy is needed to provide OCS practitioners with a framework to leverage economic, geopolitical, and societal factors in a region and commercial relationships between multinational and interagency partners in shared domains, to identify commercial support opportunities and risks as they relate to theater posture planning.

CCDR's define the role OCS plays in theater strategic campaign level planning as DOD initiatives require the standardization of this function through the force. The purpose of this study is to determine whether revisions are needed to assist OCS practitioners with integrating commercial support opportunities and risks into theater posture input to campaign planning. The research in support of this thesis will review available historical data, published articles, audits, and reports, and then analyze existing OCS policy and doctrine in the context of posture planning efforts. The study will explore the underlying assumptions inherent in current policy, doctrine, and initiatives to determine the root cause for the current policy direction. This will explain, whether a change to those underlying assumptions is needed to address current gaps or a new set of challenges need to be defined, before policy and doctrine revisions will reflect it.

Research Questions

Primary Question: How can joint doctrine and policy on OCS better support Theater Posture Planning?

Subordinate Questions

1. Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture?
2. What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?
3. How do the underlying assumptions about the practice of OCS contribute to gaps in current policy and doctrine?
4. Is new policy or doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into Theater Posture Planning?

Assumptions

This thesis makes the assumption that the joint force will continue to rely on commercial support to operations which will play a critical role in our ability to deploy, fight, and win our nation's wars. This requires the distinction that OCS is not contracting, and contracting is not OCS. Each of these functions have their own dedicated workforce, with explicit roles and responsibilities. This assumption requires the subsequent assumptions that there are no future plans or initiatives within the DOD to make either of them a function of the other and that OCS is not a subset of logistics. There is more utility to OCS than merely the procurement of supplies and services. This study focuses

on the utilization of information; the knowledge of commercial opportunities and risk, and how they impact strategic level decision-making.

The review and analysis of published articles and government publications, when combined with the personal experience of the author as an OCS planner on a Geographic Combatant Command Staff, can identify gaps in current policy and doctrine. This thesis also assumes that the above analysis can identify the causes of these gaps and offer recommendations to address them.

Definitions of Terms

The following list contains significant definitions required to understand this thesis that may not be common to all readers unfamiliar with the DoD. Unless otherwise annotated, these definitions are found in the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, published by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Education and Doctrine Division, J7.³

Agreement. A series of treaties, access, transit, support, and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and partners that set the terms regarding the U.S. military's presence within the territory of the host country, as agreed to with the host government. Agreements provide access, basing, lawful mission execution, protection, and relationships which allow the footprint to be established and forces to execute their missions. Examples are access agreements, basic ordering agreements, transit agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and treaties.⁴

Base Operating Support (BOS). Directly assisting, maintaining, supplying, and distributing support of forces at the operating location; also called BOS.⁵

Base Operating Support-Integrator. The designated Service component or joint task force commander assigned to synchronize all sustainment functions for a contingency base; also called BOS-I.⁶

Contingency Location (CL). A non-enduring location outside of the US that supports and sustains operations during named and unnamed contingencies or other operations as directed by appropriate authority and is categorized by mission life-cycle requirements as initial, temporary, or semi-permanent.

Cooperative Security Location (CSL). An enduring Global Defense Posture location characterized by the periodic presence of rotational US forces, with little or no permanent US military presence or US-owned infrastructure, used for a range of missions and capable of supporting requirements for contingencies. CSLs may feature a small permanent presence of assigned support personnel (military or contractor). CSLs typically consist of mostly HN infrastructure, and CSL real property is often not part of the US real property inventory). CSLs are a focal point for security cooperation activities and provide contingency access, logistic support, and rotational use by operational forces, and can support an increased force presence during contingencies of finite duration.⁷

Forces. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. (JP 1). 2. Forward-stationed or rotationally deployed forces, U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and units; assigned or allocated.⁸

Footprints. A network of U.S. foreign and overseas locations, infrastructure, facilities, land, and pre-positioned equipment.⁹

Global Defense Posture (GDP). The U.S. forces and capabilities forward stationed and rotationally deployed for defense activities in U.S. foreign and overseas locations, as

well as the network of bases and infrastructure and international agreements and arrangements that underwrite and support the stationing, deployment, and employment of these forces. It is the network of Host Nation (HN) relationships and agreements, activities, footprint, and forces that comprise forward U.S. military presence and capabilities to address current and future security challenges.¹⁰

Operational Contract Support. The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. Also called OCS.¹¹

Operational Contract Support Integration Cell. A cell established to coordinate and integrate operational contract support actions across all primary and special staffs for an operational area. Also called OCSIC.¹²

Posture plan. Planning document produced by Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to clarify the CCDR's posture status and identify gaps, risks, and required changes. Posture plans typically describe the forces, footprint, and agreements present in a theater.¹³

Scope and Limitations

This thesis will analyze the policy, doctrine, and DOD publications on Operational Contract Support Planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands and contains the following limiting factors: This review does not evaluate the doctrine, education, and training created by the military services or Defense Agencies; instead it focuses only on Joint and Department of Defense publications that apply to OCS Practitioners in strategic or joint planning billets.

The thesis analysis was limited to the integration of OCS in strategic discussions related to theater posture, by OCS Practitioners at the strategic level of warfare. It does not analyze OCS at the operational and tactical levels of warfare, or in the context of a service's title 10 responsibility in the execution of contracts. The title "Operational Contract Support" is a victim of its nomenclature. The DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms and Joint Publication 4-10 "Operational Contract Support" define Operational Contract Support as "The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. Also called OCS."¹⁴

The confusion between contracting and command authority contributes significantly to the challenges with existing policy, and that distinction is perhaps the biggest underlying theme in this thesis.

Contract authority is the legal authority to enter into and make binding contracts, obligate funds, and make other commitments on behalf of the U.S. Government. The Federal Government's authority to enter into contracts is implicit in the Constitutional power to make laws necessary to establish an army, a navy, or militias. This contracting authority is codified in U.S. Code Title 10, Section 1701 and is explicitly documented in the contracting officer's warrant. It flows from Congress to the President and then successively to the Secretary of Defense; Military Service or Agency head; Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA); Senior Contracting Official (SCO), also known as the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC); and then to the contracting officer; it does not flow through the Geographic Combatant Commander.¹⁵ Although it is

referenced throughout this study due to how current policy and doctrine are written, this study, does not focus on OCS as an extension of contracting in this capacity.

Command authority is the legal authority and responsibility for the employment of available resources and for planning the employment, organization, direction, coordination, and control of military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. The combatant commander exercises command authority, known as COCOM, provided directly from Goldwater-Nichols Act (Public Law 99-433) and the Unified Command Plan, codified in U.S. Code Title 10, Section 164. This authority provides combatant commanders lawful authority to employ forces, assign tasks, designate objectives; and give authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the assigned missions. It also includes directive authority for logistics (DAFL), which is gives authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. Combatant command (command authority) does not include the authority to make binding contracts or modify existing contracts for the government and geographic combatant commanders do not have their own contracting authority. The responsibility to organize, man, train, and equip the force is a military service responsibility, so the authority to execute contracts resides there.¹⁶

The combatant commander implements joint interdependence through directive authority for logistics and can assign tasks to provide common-user support to other services.¹⁷ The problem exists, in the overlap. While a GCC does not have contracting authority, the responsibility to integrate plans for the use of contracted support in the

employment of the armed forces to execute national defense strategies and respond to significant military contingencies, is implied in combatant command authority. This study focuses on that responsibility.

This study focuses on Geographic Combatant Commands exclusively. While functional combatant commands also produce posture plans, several functional combatant commands (USTRANSCOM, USSOCOM) have their own Title 10 authority to execute contracts. This study attempts to make the distinction between operational contract support as it relates to managing the execution of contracts, and operational contract support as it relates to leveraging the knowledge and expertise of commercial capabilities to fulfil strategic objectives, such as setting a theater. To avoid confusion, the functional combatant commands who plan for, integrate, and execute operational contract support in both aspects were not included in this study.

Originally this thesis was meant to be a case study on opportunities to leverage OCS in support of strategic basing for power projection; however, due to the COVID-19 response, this thesis had to be modified. While many of the documents in the review were unclassified, they reside on the SIPR portals. Fortunately, there was a sufficient amount of data to modify the thesis to a critical analysis of existing policy in support of theater posture planning rather than elements of the plans themselves.

Thesis Structure

This thesis will present the analysis of the research questions and the conclusions and recommendations using the following organization.

Chapter One is an introduction to the research subject, the problem, the research questions, the significance of the study, research assumptions, definitions of key terms, the scope and limitations of the thesis research, and the research approach.

Chapter Two is a review of the past and present literature, policy, doctrine, DOD publications, audits, and reports related to the research topic. This literature review will determine if previous literature supports the primary problem of the thesis and to what extent. This section will answer the subordinate research questions: What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning? Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture?

Chapter Three contains the research methodology used during this research. It provides a background and overview of OCS policy as it relates to theater posture planning in support of strategic objectives. A modified approach to Carol Bacchi's 'What's the problem represented to be?' (WPR) method of policy analysis was used. The WPR method uses six questions to identify and challenge the assumptions underlying existing literature in the process of conducting this research.

Chapter Four contains the results from the analysis of existing OCS policy and doctrine. It provides a background and overview of current OCS policy and doctrine and its effectiveness as a strategic enabler for theater posture planning efforts at the Geographic Combatant Commands. This section will answer subordinate questions: Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture? What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning? How do the underlying assumptions about the practice of OCS contribute to

gaps in current policy and doctrine? Is new policy or doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into Theater Posture Planning?

Chapter Five contains reviews of the finding of the underlying assumptions governing existing OCS Policy and doctrine. The resulting answers from the four subordinate research questions in chapter four will provide the basis for determining the answer to the primary research question of this thesis: How can joint doctrine and policy on OCS better support Theater Posture Planning? The analysis in this chapter will recap the analysis, outcomes, and the author's conclusions and recommendations to address the primary research question.

Significance of the Study

This thesis projects that the narrow focus of current OCS policy and doctrine inhibits the development of a requisite competency vital to the integration of commercial considerations into strategic planning activities, such as theater posture planning.

Commercial capabilities provide flexible options to help combatant commanders achieve strategic posture objectives; they can off-set military force reductions and promote force readiness, enable operational access, promote stability while impacting the human terrain, cultivate strategic partnerships in the international system, and expand the competitive space to provide freedom of maneuver and decision space for commanders; that capability does not presently exist at the GCCs. The responsibility of OCS planners in a GCC OCSIC according to current policy and doctrine, is to enable the service component's use of contracts in support of operations. Changes are necessary to widen the aperture and improve the effectiveness of OCS planners in support of strategic planning objectives. OCS policy and doctrine have been continuously evolving over the

past ten years to address tactical challenges, including a failure to adequately plan for the use of contractors at the operational and tactical levels of warfare, poorly defined or changing requirements, a lack of deployable contracting personnel with contingency contracting experience, and difficulties in coordinating contracts and contractor management across military services in joint contingency environments. Today, the existing policy, guidance, and training programs focus on eliminating those challenges. Given the success in codifying policy for the management of contractors and contracts in support of contingency operations, the DOD must now shift its focus to building a framework that also addresses the analysis of commercial partners and capabilities in support of strategic planning considerations. Retaining a singular focus on contract execution results in a gap in policy and guidance for the leverage of commercial opportunities and risks for strategic solutions, such as theater posture.

This thesis predicts that there is a requirement to modify or establish joint policy and doctrine that focuses on the opportunities for, rather than the management of, contract capabilities and how they can support theater posture planning.

¹ Maj Gen Rodney D. Fogg and LTC William Latham Jr., “Risky Business Commercial Support for Large-Scale Ground Combat Operations,” *Military Review* (July-August 2019): 19.

² Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, *Operational Contract Support Action Plan FY 2020-2024* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2019)

³ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, (Washington, DC: JCS, 2020), <https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf>.

⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, *Joint Planning* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2017), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3000.12,

Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture (GDP) (Washington, DC: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, 2017), 22-23.

⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 4-0, *Joint Logistics* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2019), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ JCS, JP 5-0.

⁸ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DODI 3000.12, 22-23.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DODI 3000.12, 22-23.

¹⁴ JCS, JP 4-10 (2019).

¹⁵ Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, *Defense Contingency Contracting Officer's Handbook* (Washington, DC: Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, 2015), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/Files/DVD/Chapter_2.pdf; JCS, JP 4-10 (2019).

¹⁶ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2018), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>.

¹⁷ Dr. Kenneth Gaines and Dr. Reginald Snell, "Setting and Supporting the Theater," *Army Sustainment* (November-December 2015): 10-12.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

This study analyzes the relevant policy and doctrine institutionalizing the Operational Contract Support (OCS) framework as a strategic enabler to Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) in support of theater posture planning, to determine whether or not revisions are necessary to help OCS practitioners integrate commercial support opportunities and risks in theater strategic planning.

There were three reasons for this literature review. The first reason was to increase the author's overall knowledge and understanding of origins of OCS planning policy and doctrine and to substantiate the validity of the problem statement of this thesis. The second reason was to answer subordinate research questions: Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture? What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?

The third reason for this review was to identify documents for use in selecting and analyzing OCS policy through the lens of theater posture.

Organization

For this thesis, the author researched literature pertaining to theater posture and operational contract support, starting with articles and papers written by senior leaders across the Department of Defense to set the narrative, and then reviewed various guiding documents and official publications, such as Joint Publications, DOD Instructions, DOD Directives, DODIG Audits, GAO Reports, Rand Reports. This chapter is divided into

three major sections: background literature pertaining to trends, operational contract support, and theater posture. In this review, the literature is categorized into two types: formal (official) and informal (unofficial). Formal literature was defined as any literature published by the Federal Government, such as the Government Accountability Office, the Department of Defense; under the authority of an organization within a DoD agency by an individual or organization acting in their official capacity, such as RAND, The Heritage Foundation. Informal (unofficial) literature was defined as literature published by individuals or organizations not in an official capacity, such as articles, papers, or theses.

Literature contained in this section was reviewed to assess DOD's progress against the existing policy, examine issues already identified by previous research, and provide supporting data in the context of "need" concerning theater posture planning. The literature in this section addressed subordinate research questions, "Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting global U.S. posture?" and "What underlying assumptions does the current policy and doctrine make about the practice of OCS?" The sources of the literature in this section were informal publications from DOD leadership, such as articles and talking papers, as well as official publications applicable to the U.S. government and DoD agencies.

Background Literature

Background literature on posture trends and general aspects of how Operational Contract Support is applied throughout DOD were reviewed to increase the author's knowledge and validate a relationship between the two topics that would highlight perceived gaps in the existing policy. The main sources of literature were informal

articles and papers by senior leaders in the DOD and formal reports published by government organizations such as the General Accounting Office (GAO), DOD Inspector General's Office, and the Defense Science Board. This literature emphasized the significance of a growing dependence on commercial support to U.S. global posture, resulting from reductions in organic capability, of the U.S. and our multinational partners, and the importance of strategic access to U.S. positional advantage.

Joint Doctrine and DOD Publications

Literature containing Joint Doctrine, DOD Policy, and authoritative data governing the Operational Contract Support framework was reviewed to determine the authoritative works pertaining to the subordinate research question: "What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?" The sources of this literature were official publications applicable to the U.S. government and DoD agencies.

Doctrinal literature for the purpose of this literature review was defined as Joint Publications containing guidelines for the application and integration of Operational Contract Support and Theater Posture Planning.

DOD Publications, as defined for this literature review, are any official publication of the Department of Defense that are not a Joint Publication, and which provide guidance on Operational Contract Support and Theater Posture Planning. Literature in this category comes from DOD Instructions and Directive, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manuals, or any memorandums from authoritative sources, such as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.

Operational Contract Support

The Department of Defense has relied on the use of contracted support to provide commanders flexibility and opportunities to extend their operational reach and gaps in organic capability in support of military operations, as far back as the Revolutionary War.

The use of contractors can be a force multiplier, especially when available resources are limited or constrained by host nation allowances. The 2011 National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States, highlighted the importance of integrating contracts and contractors into consideration of the Joint Force composition, mainly whether to ensure an “appropriate balance between uniformed, civilian, and contract professionals, and active and reserve components.”¹

In 2015 the National Military Strategy acknowledged the DOD’s resource-constrained environment, encouraging the use of contracted support when it best serves the mission and includes commercial partners in consideration of joint interoperability standards, to ensure continued operations in contested environments.²

Operational contract support (OCS) is defined as “the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of effective and efficient contract solutions to achieve operational outcomes and support for the whole of government and mission partners in contingency operations.”³

Over the past two decades, reductions in military force structure have increased the demand for contracted support to operations. In Iraq, commanders relied on it so much that at times contractor personnel outnumbered the U.S. military personnel 3:1. The establishment of Operational Contract Support policy and doctrine was to provide a framework for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all

phases of joint operations. That guidance, however, does not address the full potential of OCS planning's contribution to strategic effects.

Between 2009 and 2019, there have been over thirty audits by DOD agencies, to include the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), and the Defense Science Board, on Operational Contract Support. A review of these audits suggests a lacking differentiation and integration of the intent and utilization of OCS at the different levels of warfare. This research paper specifically seeks to identify the lack of understanding at the strategic level of warfare.

To achieve effects, commanders must integrate OCS early in the planning phase, starting at the geographic combatant commands, where strategic and operational OCS effects must link to campaign objectives.⁴ All too often, OCS is overlooked during strategic planning, because commanders and planners see it solely as a sustainment function, needed only after operations commence. When approached through the lens of opportunities provided by commercial considerations, and incorporated into the analysis of operational variables such as the political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information factors of the operating environment,⁵ OCS can be used to enable strategic decision-making related to forces, footprints, and agreements in a geographic theater.

The National Defense Authorization Acts of 2007 and 2008 provide the impetus for incorporating OCS as core competencies of the DOD. These laws required the development of joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting.⁶

Operational Contract Support Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) (July 2011), recognized that contracted support might enable operational outcomes using to support joint force commanders during contingencies, but that contracted support must be managed, maintained, and transitioned before, during, and after a contingency. Numerous GAO Reports identified the required capabilities to support OCS either do not exist or are deficient. The OCS community of interest identified non-materiel approaches to address specific shortfalls: policy and doctrine; organization and personnel; and training, leadership, and education. This ICD contains the initial guidance given to DOTMLPF change recommendations (DCRs) that resulted in the current Operational Contract Support policy.⁷

Joint DOTmLPP-P Change Recommendation (DCR) for Operational Contract Support (OCS), was developed by The Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support (DASD(PS)) to propose non-materiel solutions for the improvement and institutionalization of the Department of Defense's (DoD) operational contract support (OCS) capability. Six lines of effort were identified to advance the operational capability of OCS, These lines of effort included putting OCS planners at the GCC and Joint Task Force Headquarters, integrating contract requirements into global campaign plans, and system tools to improved contract management and visibility. There are also lines of effort aimed at developing the workforce, to include education and training opportunities, the incorporation of OCS in joint mission essential tasks (JMETs) and service mission essential tasks (METs), and the development of an OCS competency model to track the progress of workforce development.⁸

Following the publication of the 2011 ICD, several documents were issued to codify OCS into policy and doctrine. DOD Instruction 3020.41 Operational Contract Support (OCS), was published by the office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for OCS, including program management, contract support integration, and integration of defense contractor personnel into contingency operations outside the United States.⁹

CJCSM 4301.01 Planning Operational Contract Support, was published by the Joint Staff and guides integrating operational contract support (OCS) into established planning processes during deliberate, crisis action, and theater campaign planning to achieve the operational commander's objectives and desired effects.¹⁰

Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, was first published in 2008. It is the primary joint doctrine on Operational Contract Support and provides fundamental principles and guidance for planning, executing, and managing operational contract support in all phases of joint operations. This publication identifies that the OCS planning effort is initially driven by the theater posture plan, which identifies posture, footprints, and agreements, but refers readers to Joint Publication 4-04 for how the Combatant Commander manages the various functions of Base Operating Support.¹¹

Joint Publication 4-0, Joint Logistics, identifies operational contract support as a core logistics function and a critical component of total force readiness. It assigns the services the responsibility for understanding the business environment in a designated operational area and contract support integration when it comes to requirements development and post-award contract oversight in support of the joint force.¹²

The Operational Contract Support Joint Concept (October 2013), was one of the authoritative documents, meant to guide Operational Contract Support (OCS) capability development to achieve desired operational effects in the Joint Force during the 2020-2030 timeframe. The Joint Staff Vision on OCS capabilities outlined in the concept span the range of military operations from strategic to operational and tactical levels, and through all phases of operations (Phase zero through Phase four). It focuses on the development of OCS across the full spectrum of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) to establish a capability that optimizes the way the Joint Force trains, fights, plans, collaborates and communicates.¹³

The OCS Action Plan Fiscal Years 2020–2024 outlines required tasks against which OCS Capability in the DOD is assessed. The DOD OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB) issues the DOD OCS Action Plan every year to detail the current and future tasks necessary to strengthen OCS capability, highlight events, reforms, or issues that impact continued development of the OCS Capability, and ensure OCS complies with the law, strategy, policy, and joint doctrine.¹⁴

In 2014, A Defense Science Board Task Force report observed from an accountability standpoint a “lack of understanding as to who is in charge of fixing issues but there’s also a lack of understanding as to what the issues are.”¹⁵ Subsequent findings related to planning and enabling appear to be watered down by observations related to contract execution.

In reports by the GAO, between 2009 and 2018, observations were consistent regarding the lack of OCS capability throughout the DOD, specifically concerning

failures in the management and oversight of contractors supporting contingency operations overseas. These observations are reinforced by the inclusion of OCS as a sub-area under the category of “DOD Contract Management” in GAO’s biennial high-risk report, starting in 2013 through the present.¹⁶ The Joint Staff and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, address these observations in the OCS Action Plan, which establishes accountability for accomplishing key tasks by approved deadlines.¹⁷

The activities contained in joint policy and doctrine are, to this day, primarily execution in nature and do not directly address the responsibility of Combatant Commanders to set the theater and plan for all phases of military operations, or identify required minimum planning criteria, which would occur prior to contract execution.

Theater Posture Planning

Posture, readiness, and resources are used to determine the Joint Forces’ strategic advantage in terms of the combat power and other capabilities a joint force can generate. The global strategic environment demands increased strategic flexibility and freedom of action. The DOD recognizes three interdependent posture elements used to define, plan for, and assess U.S. foreign and overseas military presence: forces, footprints, and agreements.

DOD Instruction 3000.12 “Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture (GDP)” recognizes that these posture elements may be optimized by contractors and contracted support, when necessary or appropriate. As a result, the development of theater posture plans, should always consider the potential for using commercial contracts and contain an analysis of alternatives, to include risks and opportunities.¹⁸

The literature review identified trends in reductions across the organic force structure and a growing dependence on contract support to operations for the ability to provide flexibility, adaptability to unknown requirements, ability to adapt to change rapidly, surge capacity, access to experienced labor, and workforce continuity. The current atmosphere of fiscal austerity has forced senior leaders to accept risk within certain warfighting functions.¹⁹ With proper planning and management, OCS can mitigate these risks. Contractors can be force multipliers, affording access to an adaptable mix of unique skill sets that would otherwise be unaffordable or unavailable within a solely military and government civilian force. By increasing its reliance on contracted support to meet maintenance requirements, the Army has been able to retain only one-third of its force at acceptable levels of readiness, and even for units deployed globally.²⁰ When managed carefully, the OCS process balances organic capabilities with those external capabilities already existing within a given theater.²¹

Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, is a keystone publication reflecting current doctrine for conducting joint, interagency, and multinational planning activities across the range of military operations. It recognizes military forces alone cannot achieve national objectives and the reliance on commercial support that planners must consider in the development of planning products. Contracted support is included as a “non-DOD capability” in Force Planning and planners are encouraged to consider basing, access, and commercial support capabilities as integral parts of understanding the operational environment and the development of Theater Posture Plans to align basing and forces that ensure theater and global functional security, respond to contingency scenarios, and provide strategic flexibility.²²

Setting conditions in support of theater posture begins in Phase 0. The use of contracted support to manage and maintain contingency locations overseas where a standing U.S. military presence is not available or supportable, sustain operations, and maintain freedom of movement can be a force multiplier. Today, geopolitical considerations, host-nation restrictions, and extended lines of communication often limit the size and shape of military capability to support overseas operations. This provides an incentive for decision-makers to rely on civilians and contractors, whose presence typically does not count against force management levels.²³

Joint Publication 4-04, Contingency Basing, identifies operational contract support as a contingency basing enabler and incorporates contract support planning into the theatre basing strategy. This publication highlights the need for planning to address requirements for the use of contracted support for Base Operating Support-Integrator (BOS-I) and minor construction requirements at a Contingency Location (CL) once a contingency location has been established as well as strategies for right-sizing support as commanders plan to transition, transfer, or closes a CL.²⁴

The DOD's Global Operating Model (GOM) describes how the Joint Force will be postured and employed to achieve its competition and wartime missions.²⁵ During campaign planning, Geographic Combatant Commanders must consider their impact on posture globally, not just within their respective areas of geographic responsibility. Force posture is an essential maneuver-related consideration during theater strategy development.²⁶ It is the start point from which theater posture planners determine contingency basing requirements to support contingency plans and crisis response, which may be optimized through the use of contracts and/or contractors.²⁷

A modernized Global Operating Model of combat-credible, flexible theater posture enhances the ability of the DOD to ensure freedom of movement necessary to inform the decision-making process, in support of theater campaign and national strategic objectives.²⁸

OCS helps Commanders set the theater, sustain operations, and maintain freedom of movement in their theaters of operations. The concept of basing and how basing is currently used must adapt to support an integrated joint force in highly contested environments. A contested environment for basing presents a significant capability gap for sustainment forces. While distribution-based logistics has become the standard, the DOD still relies on enduring bases in a theater to support sustainment operations. These bases provide not only the logistics storage and distribution hubs, but also the security necessary to house and support the joint force. In the future, the DOD can anticipate the operating environment will be more contested than operational environments today and enduring and contingency bases are not guaranteed they have been in the past.²⁹

A GAO report in 2009 identified the responsibility to identify military capability shortfalls, potential contract capabilities necessary to meet these shortfalls, and the inclusion of these opportunities into combatant commanders' operational plans (OPLANs) and concept plans (CONPLANs), a function of planners on the GCC staffs. This observation, however, was made during an assessment of organizational approaches to requirements definition and coordination during military operations and did not take into consideration how that same information is used in a strategic context, such as theater posture planning.³⁰

DoD Instruction 3000.12, Management of U.S. Global Defense Posture (GDP), establishes policies, defines processes, and assigns responsibilities for managing U.S. GDP; provides a framework for the planning, resourcing requirements, and policy development in support of GDP issues; and provides recommendations, inputs, and expertise concerning GDP to key national strategy products.³¹

Rationale

The central argument of this thesis is that OCS policy and doctrine do not address strategic planning at the geographic combatant commands. As a result, Operational Contract Support Integration Cells (OCSICs) have been expected to execute responsibilities that are outside their purpose and authority, by audit agencies who conflate the functions of OCS at the Operational and Strategic levels and incorrectly apply policy and doctrine into their assessments and demands for lessons learned. This is evidenced in the lack of documentation on OCS at the Geographic Combatant Commands, and the assessments in recent audits and inspections, as discovered during the review of background literature and identified and analyzed for application at the Geographic Combatant Commands in Chapters Four and Five.

The policy on integrating Operational Contract Support into the planning processed has evolved over the past ten years but has focused mainly on the management of contracts and contractors at the operational and tactical levels of warfare. Although GAO reports acknowledge the importance of integrating OCS planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands, DOD guidance does not differentiate between Title 10 authorities to execute, manage, and oversee contracts in support of operations at the operational and tactical levels, and the leveraging of commercial opportunities that provide flexible and

agile capabilities in support of strategic planning considerations, such as theater posture planning.

According to Dr. Carol Bacchi, every policy contains an implicit problem representation. What we propose to do about something indicates what we think is wrong and what needs to change.³² The concept of problematization, which grounds this analysis, has been developed by several political theorists and with varying emphases. Dr. Bacchi's policy analysis tool, called "What's the problem represented to be?" (WPR) provides a guide for examining and disrupting problem representations. Her methodology suggests that to create real change, the characterization of a problem in policy and doctrine needs to change. The purpose of this study is to analyze what problem existing policy and doctrine institutionalizing the OCS framework attempted to address. This analysis identifies changes to policy to expand guidance to include how to integrate commercial considerations into long-range posture planning at a Geographic Combatant Command.

Summary

Joint doctrine charges Geographic Combatant Commanders with issuing guidance and procedures to integrate contracted support within their geographic area of responsibility. Commanders are also responsible for including the integration of contracted support and the associated personnel for all phases of military operations, as well as identifying required minimum planning criteria.³³ As part of the Joint Planning Process (JPP), Combatant Commanders are tasked to develop campaign, campaign support, contingency, and posture plans. According to current policy and doctrine, joint

planning relies on guidance and direction on the inclusion of operational contract support in planning.

The review of background literature pertaining to operational contract support in support of theater posture planning substantiated the assumption that there is insufficient guidance on the integration of operational contract support at the strategic planning level. While there are extensive policies and doctrine integrating operational contract support into planning and execution, its primary focus is on the management and oversight of contracts and contractors. There is a gap regarding strategic opportunities, such as how to leverage commercial considerations to set theater posture. Recent GAO audit reports recognize the necessity for integration in strategic planning in support of the joint force but do not suggest what that should look like. The limitations of current policy and doctrine will continue to perpetuate OCS planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands, to be focused solely on the management of contracts in a geographic theater, instead of how to maximize on opportunities they provide.

The following chapter contains the methodology used during this research to analyze DOD policy and doctrine on Operational Contract Support to identify gaps in current guidance and determine its root cause.

¹ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2011), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/UNCLASS_2011_National_Military_Strategy_Description.pdf.

² Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2015), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf.

³ GEN James Cartwright, “Operational Contract Support Initial Capabilities Document” (memorandum, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, DC, 2011).

⁴ MG Edward Dorman and LTC William Latham, “Operational Contract Support: The Missing Ingredient in the Army Operating Concept,” *Military Review* (November-December 2016): 55-56; JCS, JP 5-0.

⁵ Dorman and Latham, “Operational Contract Support,” 57-58.

⁶ JCS, *National Military Strategy* (2015); Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Operational Contract Support Joint Concept* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2013).

⁷ Cartwright, “Operational Contract Support Initial Capabilities Document”.

⁸ Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 3020.49, *Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution* (Washington, DC: DoD, 2009) 4-6.

⁹ Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.41, *Operational Contract Support (OCS)* (Washington, DC: Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2018), 10-45.

¹⁰ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CJCS Manual 4301.01, *Planning Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2017), B1-B8.

¹¹ JCS, JP 4-10 (2019).

¹² JCS, JP 4-0.

¹³ JCS, *Operational Contract Support Joint Concept*.

¹⁴ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, *Operational Contract Support Action Plan FY 2020-2024*.

¹⁵ Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations* (Washington, DC: Defense Science Board, 2014), <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a608736.pdf>.

¹⁶ Alicia Puente-Cackley, GAO 15-290, *High-Risk Series: An Update* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2015), 26-30; Christopher J. Mimh, GAO 16-480R, *High-Risk Series: Key Actions to Make Progress Addressing High-Risk Issues* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 19, 34; Debra Draper, GAO 17-317, *High-Risk Series: Progress on Many High-Risk Areas, While Substantial Efforts Needed on Others* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2017), 494-499; Christopher J. Mimh, GAO 19-157SP, *High Risk Series: Substantial Efforts Needed to Achieve Greater Progress on High-Risk Areas* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2019), 227, 232-234.

¹⁷ Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics, *Operational Contract Support Action Plan FY 2020-2024*.

¹⁸ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DODI 3000.12, 19.

¹⁹ John Pendleton, GAO 16-327, *Comprehensive Risk Assessment Needed for Planned Changes to the Army 's Force Structure* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2016), 14-20; Dorman and Latham, "Operational Contract Support," 8.

²⁰ Dakota Wood, James Carafano, Dean Cheng, Luke Coffey, Lisa Curtis, Helle Dale, Michaela Dodge, Nile Gardiner, Justin Johnson, Bruce Klinger, Daniel Kochis, Walter Lohman, Bridgett Mudd, James Phillips, Brian Slattery, John Venable, and Rachel Zissimos, *2017 Index of Military Strength: Assessing America's Ability to Provide for the Common Defense* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2017). https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/2018_IndexOfUSMilitaryStrength-2.pdf.

²¹ Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations*.

²² JCS, JP 5-0.

²³ Heidi Peters and Sofia Plagakis, CRS Report R44116, *Department of Defense Contractor and Troop Levels in Afghanistan and Iraq: 2007-2018* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2019), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/details?prodcode=R44116>.

²⁴ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 4-04, *Contingency Basing* (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, 2019), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>.

²⁵ Office of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), *Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

²⁶ JCS, JP 3-0.

²⁷ JCS, JP 3-0; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 6.

²⁸ SecDef, *National Defense Strategy*.

²⁹ MAJ Lindsey Maples, "Sustainment Considerations for the Multi-Domain Battle" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2018), 20-22.

³⁰ Linda Koln and John Hutton, GAO 09-114R, *Contract Management* (Washington, DC Government Accountability Office, 2008), 2-3, 7, 11, 12, 15, 24, 27.

³¹ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 5-16.

³² Carol Lee Bacchi, *Analyzing Policy: What's the Problem Represented to Be?* (Frenchs Forest NSW 2086: Pearson Education Australia, 2009), 54-96; Robert B. Pereira, "Using Critical Policy Analysis in Occupational Science Research: Exploring Bacchi's Methodology," *Journal of Occupational Science* 21, no. 4 (June 2013): 389-402.

³³ Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations*.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter discusses the purpose of the research, and details the methodology used to analyze Department of Defense (DOD) policy and doctrine on Operational Contract Support (OCS) as a strategic enabler in support of theater posture planning. The purpose of this study is to determine if a policy is needed, to provide OCS practitioners with a framework to leverage economic, geopolitical, and societal factors in a region and understand the commercial relationships between multinational and interagency partners in shared domains, to determine commercial support opportunities and risks in theater posture planning.

Organization

This chapter is divided into three major sections: the first section explains the methodology used to conduct the critical policy analysis and the rationale for using it. The second section outlines how the information was to address the primary and subordinate research questions. The third section discusses how the information collected was organized, analyzed, and synthesized.

Methodology

The primary method for the research of Operational Contract Support policy and doctrine at the Geographic Combatant Commands was a critical policy analysis using a modified take on Carol Bacchi's "What the problem represented to be?" or the "WPR" approach¹ to determine how joint doctrine and policy on OCS could better support Theater Posture Planning.

The WPR approach to policy analysis reveals the presumptions on which a problem has been formulated and was meant to provide a way to isolate failures in policy application. These problem representations are meaningful because they reflect how issues are conceived and managed by the audience.² In contrast to traditional policy analysis, the WPR method instead focuses on problematizations and the identification of their relationship between what policies achieve or do not achieve, based on the assumptions upon which they are predicated.

The concept of problematization, which grounds this analysis, has been developed by several political theorists and with variations in emphases. In her WPR method, Bacchi leans heavily on Paul-Michel Foucault's theory of problematization, Foucault's theory is a critical analysis by looking first and foremost at how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently about a problem, instead of what is already known.³

Information Selection and Organization

Dr. Bacchi's method uses six questions to analyze existing policies.⁴ The intent of this study was not to suggest current policy fails to address legitimate problems, but rather to analyze gaps by what has prevented the policy from evolving to address strategic planning issues, such as theater posture planning. A modified take on the WPR approach was used to determine how policy could be improved to expand on its applicability. The six questions were applied to literature containing joint doctrine, policies, DOD publications, and formal assessments, on Operational Contract Support, through the lens of strategic theater posture planning.

Analysis using the first two questions of Dr. Bacchi's WPR method, answered the subordinate research question: "What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?"

The first question in the WPR approach, is "What's the 'problem' represented to be in a specific policy?" This question is straightforward and creates the starting point for analysis. It is meant to determine, if the government proposed to do something, what it hoped to change, and recognize what problem is driving the need for change?

The next question is "What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 'problem'?" This question examines commonly accepted authoritative knowledge underpinning a specific problem representation. This question is less about the assumptions of the policymakers, but rather the assumptions of the consumers of policy and guidance, as to what problems the policy concentrates on. In this case, a review of assessments and audits provides the common understanding of the intent of OCS policy and the problems it intended to address.

Questions three and four answer the subordinate research question "What underlying assumptions does the current policy and doctrine make about the practice of OCS? How do they contribute to gaps in current guidance?" The third question in the WPR method, is "How has this representation of the problem come about?" There are two goals inherent in this question. The first is to trace the history, or the background, of the current problem representation in existing OCS policy and doctrine, to determine what contributed to its formation. The second is to identify what competing problem representations could have resulted in the policy being established differently. In doing this, the analysis explores the possibility for things to be different.

The fourth question is designed to ensure we do not abandon the original rationale for the analysis. Asking “What is left unproblematic in the current problem representation in OCS policy and doctrine? Where are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?” is not for the purpose of explore another approach to exiting issue, but instead to think about ways in which the current approach constrains the existing policy. In this case, it is looking at how the current approach, creates a gap regarding how OCS policy applies to strategic planning, for theater posture. The objective is to bring into discussion issues and perspectives that are silenced based on the way the problem was initially identified.

The WPR approach to policy analysis begins with the presumption that some problem representations create challenges for members of one group more so than another. Historically, the WPR method compares members of different social groups, however in this case, this method is being used to look at how the problem representations affect planners the different levels of warfare, particularly, planners at the strategic level of warfare. The fifth question asks, “What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’?” The intent is to identify the effects of specific problem representations so that they can be critically assessed to determine which aspects of a problem representation may need to be reconsidered.

The final question, “How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, disseminated, and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted, and replaced?” encourages consideration of problem representations that are received by their target audiences and how they are characterized in policy.

The last two questions answer the subordinate question, “Is new policy, doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into Theater Posture Planning?”

A ‘what’s the problem represented to be?’ approach to policy analysis looks at the problem representations it uncovers within. Dr. Bacchi argues that researchers have a responsibility to question problem representations, their origins, and their effects, as a natural starting point for policy analysis. For the purpose of this study, this methodology allows the researcher to reject the idea that the purpose of policy analysis is to address failures by supplying evidence to the contrary. This methodology was used to frame issues and determine the basis for research looking at the root cause of the gap in policy and doctrine that prevents it from evolving beyond an application in an operational and tactical context to support strategic planning as well.

Organization, Analysis and Synthesis

The research sample for this methodology was a combination of assessment data and authoritative governing documents for the establishment of current policy. Assessment data was reviewed through over thirty official reports assessing the integration of operational contract support in various contexts. These assessments were conducted by DOD agencies, such as the GAO, DODIG, and Defense Science Board. Additionally, the research sample included the DOD’s response to those assessments published by the Joint Staff, Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and a RAND Cooperation Human Capital Study, commissioned by the Joint Staff, to assess the total force staffing needs of the OCS planning and integration workforce. Formal documents pertaining to the

analysis of need by the DOD for formal policy governing operational contract support, from 2008 to present was also reviewed. This was used to paint a picture of how policy has evolved over the past decade, and to analyze if that during that evolution, the problem representation evolved with it.

The specific samples reviewed contained references to OCS Planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands. The review focused on identifying and categorizing any intersection between OCS planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands and theater posture planning.

Samples were collected through various online databases, to include the Government Accountability Office Online Reports and Testimonies query, the Department of Defense Inspector General's library of audits and evaluations, The Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Electronic Library, as well as historical documents provided by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, and the Joint Staff J4.

An inductive analytical approach was taken in reviewing the data to separate it into more manageable categories from which to identify patterns and gain insight, establish clear links between the research objectives and the summary findings derived from the raw data, and to develop a framework of the underlying structure of the establishment of existing OCS policy and the assessments of its application to strategic planning.

Once collected, the data was organized using a bottom-up approach to open coding. There was not a set list of categories or phrases pre-determined at the beginning of the research. Instead, through review and re-review of the data, words and phrases

emerged that contained the most common properties and characteristics suitable for analyzing OCS frameworks covered by existing policy. Those terms were: combatant command, operational contract support, operational contract support planning, strategic planning, posture, set the theater, presence, forces, footprints, agreements, global defense, and power projection. These terms were flagged in the research samples and provided the foundation for discovery of emergent relationships and patterns among the codes. The common overarching theme, “planning,” was divided into two categories: operational contract support (planning) and theater posture (planning). Once established, the data was re-reviewed and an analytical coding process was applied. This process required interpretation and reflection of the data contained in the various sources.

Inductive content analysis relies on reasoning in which themes emerge from the raw data through repeated examination and comparison. Using this method, Operational Contract Support was sub-divided into two subcategories: OCS planning for the management and oversight of contracts and contractors from a U.S. Code Title 10, Section 1701 responsibly for contract execution, and OCS planning for future opportunities to leverage contracts in support of strategic objectives from a U.S. Code Title 10, Section 164, command responsibility to set conditions in a theater of operations.

The Joint Staff manual for “Planning Operational Contract Support” (CJCSM 4301.01) identifies opportunities provided for OCS planners to expand their knowledge of, and access to, contracted capabilities in a geographic region, during campaign planning, in anticipation of future events, to include support of flexible deterrent options (FDOs). This is done through the collection and analysis of OCS-specific operational

environment data, such as the commercial business environment, market analysis, and theater logistics analysis, outlined in Appendix D of Joint Publication 4-10.⁵

Under theater posture planning, the data was sub-divided into the standard sub-categories of posture: forces, footprints, agreements, as they related to theater campaign planning.

The Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF) and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provide DOD-wide guidance for global defense posture to broad strategic themes for overarching posture and planning guidance, which informs geographic theater posture planning activities. Combatant commanders are required to submit their theater posture plans to Office of the Secretary of Defense (Policy), Office of the Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment), and the Joint Staff for review every two years.⁶ Posture plans align basing and forces to ensure theater and global functional security, respond to contingency scenarios, and provide strategic flexibility. Contracted support can be a significant force multiplier, and contingency basing enabler and requires planning to ensure it is appropriately integrated.⁷

Summary

The methodology for the review and analysis of formal documents governing current OCS policy and doctrine, and recent audit reports on the integration of OCS into combatant command planning was designed to answer the subordinate research questions: What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning? How do the underlying assumptions about the practice of OCS contribute to gaps in current policy and doctrine? Answers to these questions are essential for determining if planning for commercial support a necessary element of

setting theater posture? And how can joint policy and doctrine on OCS can better support theater posture planning? The next chapter contains the results of this critical policy analysis of existing OCS policy and doctrine in support of theater posture planning.

¹ Bacchi, “Analyzing Policy,” 54-92.

² Pereira, “Using Critical Policy Analysis in Occupational Science Research.”

³ Mats Alvesson and Jorgen Sandberg, “Generating Research Questions Through Problematization,” *Academy of Management Review* 36, no. 2 (April 2011): 247-221. JSTOR.

⁴ Bacchi, “Analyzing Policy,” 54-92.

⁵ CJCS, CJCS Manual 4301.01, A-14, A20, B3-B4; JCS, JP 4-10 (2019).

⁶ John Pendleton, GAO 09-706R, *Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Ability to Manage, Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives*, GAO 09-706R (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2009), 4, 8-11.

⁷ JCS, JP 4-04.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Chapter four contains the analysis of current Operational Contract Support (OCS) policy and doctrine in support of theater posture planning. This thesis analyzed OCS policy and guidance using detailed reviews of current guidance and government inspections and assessments conducted by, or on behalf of, the Federal Government. These included reports from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOD Inspector General (DODIG), the Defense Science Board, and the RAND Cooperation.

The analysis used Dr. Carol Bacchi's, "What's the Problem Represented to Be" (WPR) methodology, which relies on a six-question framework to identify gaps, by looking at the problem representation of the existing policy.

Purpose

The purpose of the analysis conducted during this research was to answer the subordinate research questions: "Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture?"; "What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?"; "What underlying assumptions does the current policy and doctrine make about the practice of OCS? How do they contribute to gaps in current guidance?"; "Is new policy, doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into Theater Posture Planning?"

The results of this analysis provided information necessary to make recommendations on how joint doctrine and policy on OCS can better support theater posture planning.

Findings

An analysis of official and unofficial documents pertaining to OCS in support of theater posture planning revealed documented gaps in the DOD's attempts to fully integrate OCS into contingency planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs), to include contract augmentation to organic forces and contract support to joint basing strategies. There was no direct correlation made, however, between OCS and theater posture planning.

This chapter presents findings based on an analysis of current OCS policy and doctrine, using Dr. Bacchi's six-question framework.

First, the literature was analyzed to answer the subordinate research question: Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture?

U.S. forward posture is fundamental to DOD activities, and in communicating U.S. strategic interests to our allies and international partners. The DOD defines posture in terms of three interdependent elements: forces, footprints, and agreements, which provide a framework to define, plan for, and assess overseas presence.

Combatant Commanders use the Theater Posture Plan (TPP) as the primary source document to support resource, basing, and oversight decisions, when planning for and managing geographic combatant command posture. The TPP aligns basing and forces to ensure theater security, facilitate response to contingency and crisis, and provide commanders with strategic flexibility required to enable CCDR end states and objectives. It proposes solutions to mitigate capability gaps, risks, and changes needed to meet national and theater strategy objectives and often, contracts or contractors may enable each posture element.¹

Planners use available forces and capabilities in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG), quarterly GFM apportionment tables, and existing data on commercial opportunities when planning theater posture.²

“Forces” are defined in DOD Instruction 3000.12 “Management of Global Defense Posture” as “forward-stationed or rotationally deployed forces, U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and units (assigned or allocated).”³

The DOD relies on contractors as part of the total joint force. Contractors have skills essential to support military operations and often deploy to the theater individually or with the military units they support.⁴ During mission analysis, planners assess forces required and capabilities necessary to accomplish the mission. The lack of readily available forces, or troop management limitations placed on the U.S. by domestic policy or host nation law may constrain the scope of the proposed operational approach, so planners evaluate existing or potential contracted capabilities to determine if solutions could meet the requirements.⁵

As a result of force reductions over the past decade, DOD lacks the organic capability to meet the requirements of every operation, exercise, security cooperation activity, or engagement for deployed forces. Force-structure limits on the U.S. military also inhibit the ability to address conflicts solely with uniformed personnel, thus inviting opportunities for operational contract support.⁶ Between fiscal year (FY) 2011 to FY 2018, the number of infantry battalions the Marine Corps’ active component was reduced from twenty-seven to twenty. The Marine Corps contends that it needs twenty-seven infantry battalions to satisfy the validated requirements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders; to date, funding has been received for twenty-four.⁷ To preserve combat

support and make the most of the available force, the Marine Corps relies on contract support to supplement logistics and maintenance requirements.

During the same period, the U.S. Army experienced similar reductions, with an authorized active-duty end strength reduced from 566,000 to 483,500. These force cuts were especially challenging since they occurred at the same time several NATO allies, such as the UK, France, and Germany experienced similar reductions in their defense budgets and force structures as well.⁸ If left unaddressed, these reductions would be detrimental to the support the U.S. needs in future conflict scenarios.

As the U.S. shifts its focus from counterinsurgency to large scale combat operations, the prospect of widespread damage to combat vehicles and helicopters on a scale not seen in Iraq or Afghanistan and its effect on the use of OCS to augment the force must be considered. The rapid repair capability for these vehicles now exists almost exclusively through contracted support, due to force structure reduction decisions to reserve military component combat support capabilities.⁹

The Bipartisan Budget Act of 2018 provided some force structure stability in 2018–2019. Still, a reemergence of a Budget Control Act (BCA) in fiscal year 2020 and beyond could undo hard-fought gains and renew threats to military readiness.

Incorporating planning considerations for opportunities provided by contracted support, provides commanders flexible options to extend combat power, amid force limitation concerns.¹⁰

Another facet of the flexibility and agility contract support opportunities provide to force posture, is capacity and institutional memory. Contractors are not subject to strict rotational deployment timelines and can remain in theater for long periods, serving as a

critical source of expertise for unit commanders and staffs who rotate in and out of the theater on tours of one-year or less.¹¹

U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), for example, has a massive area of operations (AOR) that spans 53 countries; however, they operate under a force sharing agreement with USEUCOM because they do not have assigned forces. They rely on contract support, such as the type found under the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), to augment current and programmed force structure, providing life support and sustainment services to the joint force and managing the GCC's contingency locations and cooperative security locations, across the continent.¹²

An audit conducted by the GAO in 2003 observed DOD's use of contracted support during deployments as a result of limitations placed on the number of U.S. military personnel assigned to a region due to law, executive direction, or agreements with host countries or other allies. Contractors are not included in force caps, so when authorized troop levels in the Balkans were reduced, the Army substituted contractors to perform functions that were initially performed by uniformed soldiers. However, GAO noted that while the DOD relied on contracted support in this manner, the contractor workforce was not integrated into the DOD human capital strategy.¹³

The Joint Staff developed guidance for regional combatant commanders on the use of contractors and provided a framework for addressing contractor support issues. Joint Publication 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, defined the regional combatant commander's responsibility to integrate contractors as part of the force reflected in the Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD), logistics plans, and operation plans.¹⁴

“Footprints” as defined in DOD Instruction 3000.12 are “A network of U.S. foreign and overseas locations, infrastructure, facilities, land, and prepositioned equipment.”¹⁵

Overseas basing is a fundamental element of operational reach and impacts combat power and other capabilities that a joint force can generate.¹⁶ The DOD relies on contracted support to conduct expeditionary movement and maneuver and rapidly deploy the joint force, on a global scale. OCS is often used to set the theater, sustain operations, and maintain freedom of movement.¹⁷

One of the primary ways this is accomplished is through prepositioning. U.S. Military dependence on globally prepositioned stocks and support requires significant contractor support, especially early on in a contingency. In 2001, during the onset of Operation Enduring Freedom, U.S. Air Forces Central Command’s War Reserve Materiel (WRM) support contractors, were credited as being vital to the success of the rapid deployment of U.S. forces into the AOR. Their presence at several forward support locations allowed them to construct tent cities, set up fuel farms and power plants and provide vital life support before the first units entered the theater. Those locations transitioned to forward operating locations that supported Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI), and operations.¹⁸

Since its establishment, USAFRICOM has increased its footprint on the continent to support the command’s missions of building African partner defense capabilities, responding to crises, and deterring transnational threats to promote regional security. USAFRICOM’s growing footprint has relied heavily on contractors to provide, logistics, transportation, and intelligence support to the command’s missions.¹⁹

In 2010, the GAO was asked by the House of Representative Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, to assess USAFRICOM on the planning, prioritizing, and implementation of the activities, missions, programs, and exercises they inherited when the GCC was established two years earlier. The GAO reviewed USAFRICOM's posture statements but made no observations regarding the use or planned use, of contract support to theater posture initiatives.²⁰

Observation

Theater posture plans are key elements of GCC's campaigns and strategies. They describe the forces, footprint, and agreements the commander needs to execute their theater campaigns successfully. As the global security environment becomes more dynamic and uncertain, the U.S. depends on an overseas posture to secure and protect strategic partnerships, respond to crises, and to deter conflict from happening in the first place. The GCC's theater posture strategy translates strategic and operational objectives into a physical presence that requires forces and footprints, which, today, are optimized by the use of contracted capabilities. To support the commander's decision-making process, planners must consider the integration of contract support, not just to capture management and oversight, but to assess the opportunities and risks it provides, and analyze the effects as it related to long-range strategic planning for the future posture sight picture.

Next, an analysis of the literature answered the subordinate research question, "What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing OCS Planning?" This analysis used the first two questions of Dr. Bacchi's "WPR" method: "What is the

problem represented to be in the specific policy? and “What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the problem?”

The first step in the WPR method is the starting point for an analysis of the current policy. It determines what the government intended to change with a specific policy and how the problem driving the need for change, was defined.

The DOD recognizes that contractors are a force multiplier and commanders often leverage contracts to support the prioritization of combat power in the deployment process, supplement the joint force to make up for shortfalls in organic capability, and ultimately extend operational reach, globally. For this to be effective, however, prudent planning and risk mitigation are necessary.

In 2003, the GAO found that the DOD lacked department-wide guidance to ensure the efficient use of contractors supporting deployed forces, and inadequate visibility of contractors by commanders. Contractors arrived in theater without the knowledge of commanders on the ground, preventing them from proper planning for base safety and security and base operating support estimates. In many cases, the government support required by contractors was not available and the number of personnel exceeded the planning factors used to build base security strategies.²¹

In their final report to Congress in August 2011, the Commission on Wartime Contracting attributed an increase in contracted services that were not accompanied by a proportional growth in the government’s capability for oversight and management, to a failure to plan for operational contract support. The decision to surge military personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan failed to take into consideration the extent of contractor support needed. As a result, commanders were unprepared to provide adequate housing and

workspace to the contractor workforce. Diplomatic missions lost programmatic control of major projects, and base commanders struggled to balance military requirements with contractors' needs for space, energy, and communications.²²

In October 2005, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics published DOD Instruction 3020.41, "Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces," which was amended in 2011 and renamed "Operational Contract Support." This DODI served as a comprehensive source of DOD policy and procedures on the use and management of contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces overseas. Specifically, it outlined requirements for theater entrance, medical and security, contractor visibility, and accountability procedures. It also required that combatant commanders develop contingency plans to ensure essential contractor services would continue, in the event of unforeseen circumstances, resulting in a loss of the contractors' ability to maintain performance.²³

DOD's guidance for contingency planning was revised in 2006 to provide greater detail on contract support to operations, and the capabilities contractors offered. Planners were required to include a new annex, known as the Annex W, outlining operational contract support in combatant command plans. Incorporating operational contract support into these types of plans addresses a critical need to plan for the use of contractors at the strategic and operational levels.²⁴

The Joint Staff first published Joint Publication 4-10, "Operational Contract Support," in 2008, which established joint doctrine and provided standardized guidance for assessing contract support and contractor management functions in support of joint

operations. It separated OCS into two principles, Contract Support Integration and Contractor Management.

Contract Support Integration is the function of defining contract requirements, such as in the statement of work or performance work statement, contract development, contract execution, and contract closeout.

Contractor Management focused on the integration of contractor personnel into operations as part of the joint force, once the commander decided to use contracted support in place of, or, to augment organic capability.²⁵ The section on contractor management included checklists to ensure that plans and orders addressed the integration of contractors into current operations and their management and oversight, including a requirement to develop risk mitigation plans for contractor provided, essential services, in the event loss of service occurred.

In 2014, Joint Publication 4-10 was updated, adding a third OCS principle, “Contracting Support,” breaking OCS into three functional areas: Contract Support Integration, Contracting Support, and Contractor Management (see Figure 1).²⁶




Figure 1. Operational Contract Support Description and Subordinate Functions

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2014).

The principle of Contracting Support encapsulates the activities covered by the legal ability to obtain supplies or services from commercial sources to support joint operations. Adding this principle codified Title 10, Section 1701 authority to enter into and make binding contracts, obligate funds, and make other commitments on behalf of the U.S. Government, into the overall OCS framework.

This update also attempted to integrate and synchronize OCS considerations into strategic planning. The addition of Appendix G, “Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment,” provided a standardized framework for incorporating OCS estimates into the joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) process.

In 2017, the Joint Staff published Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 4301.01 “Planning Operational Contract Support.” The manual addresses integrating OCS into established planning processes within the context of the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) during deliberate, crisis action, and theater campaign planning, to achieve the operational commander’s objectives and desired effects.

The most recent update to Joint Publication 4-10, in 2019, updated phasing and planning-related guidance, to reflect revisions to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Planning. This revision demonstrated the greatest shift towards the delineation between operational and strategic OCS planning activities, emphasizing that the strategic theater-level focus of OCS is a holistic view spanning the entire area of operations, not just on a single operation or joint operational area. Greater detail on the responsibilities in determining the overarching contractor integration and management for operations in the geographic area of responsibility was provided for all directorates across a combatant command staff to facilitate horizontal integration of planning considerations. A standardized baseline of tasks for the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC) at a GCC illustrates a focus on OCS planning, operations oversight, reporting, and training, on how the use of contractors in support of operations across a geographic theater (see Figure 2).

Geographic Combatant Command Operational Contract Support Integration Cell Tasks

- Integrate OCS matters across all primary and special staff members.
- ICW the Service components, CSAs, and lead contracting activity, collect, analyze, and disseminate shaping OCS-related analysis of the operational environment information.
- Coordinate with the J-2 to identify and analyze business environment-related JIPOE information.
- Coordinate with the J-4 to synchronize theater logistic analysis and OCS-related requirements efforts.
- Plan for and coordinate OCS actions for shaping operations.
- Plan and support OCS matters in GCC-directed exercises.
- Coordinate OCS training and education for selected staff members (to include OCSIC staff) and subordinate commands.
- Coordinate, develop, present, and assist in resolution of CLPSB OCS matters.
- Develop, promulgate, and oversee the implementation of GCC-directed, OCS-related policies, plans, directives, and instructions, to include theater business clearance guidance, as applicable.
- Plan and coordinate the establishment and training of subordinate joint force OCSIC.
- Maintain direct contact with subordinate OCSICs and, when directed, detach personnel to augment and/or provide an LNO to same.
- Coordinate OCS issues directly with the Joint Staff J-4 [Logistics] and OUSD(A&S) staff, as required.
- Support national strategic OCS forums, lessons learned programs, and capability development actions, as appropriate.
- Maintain and update CCMD OCS Website information.
- Assist in stabilize and enable civil authority OCS transition planning and integration with USG departments and agencies, OSD, and multinational partners.

Legend

| | | | |
|-------|---|-----------|--|
| CCMD | combatant command | LNO | liaison officer |
| CLPSB | combatant command logistics procurement support board | OCS | operational contract support |
| CSA | combat support agency | OCSIC | operational contract support integration cell |
| GCC | geographic combatant commander | OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| ICW | in coordination with | OUSD(A&S) | Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition and Sustainment) |
| J-2 | intelligence directorate of a joint staff | USG | United States Government |
| J-4 | logistics directorate of a joint staff | | |
| JIPOE | joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment | | |

Figure 2. Geographic Combatant Command OCSIC Tasks

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).

The 2019 update was the first acknowledgment of a relationship between OCS planning efforts and theater posture. In stating OCS planning efforts are “initially driven by the theater posture plan,” it suggests, that first, a TPP must exist, emphasizing the management of contract support rather than consideration of how commercial opportunities could inform posture decisions.

The newest update makes the most progress in shifting focus to include the OCS framework as a means to explore the potential in long-range planning for strategic objectives like setting theater posture. The guidance contained in Appendix D, Analysis of the Operational Contract Support Aspects of the Operational Environment, provides recommendations for organizing OCS aspects of the operational environment (OCS aOE). The OCS aOE assists planners with creating a holistic view of OCS impacts on the operational environment, supports course of action development and synchronizes activities across the joint force. The analysis of OCS related data is incorporated into J2 led, JIPOE efforts, used to inform the commander's plans, orders, and policies and prompt OCS planning by other staff elements (see Figure 3).




Figure 3. Operational Contract Support Analysis of the Operational Environment Information Construct

Source: Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).

Observation

OCS policy is continuously evolving to institute standardized mechanisms to manage contractors and eliminate barriers to the efficient use of commercial support to operations. A paradigm shift is necessary if the perception of OCS as a planning tool is to change, to include consideration of how economic, geopolitical, and societal factors in a region can be influenced by and through commercial support opportunities and risks, to inform strategic decision making in setting theater posture.

The second step in the WPR method examines the commonly accepted knowledge, underpinning the problem representation in a policy. Rather than looking at the intent of the policy's authors, it analyzes the assumptions of the consumers of policy and doctrine.

OCS is the process of planning for and obtaining supplies and services from commercial sources in support of joint operations. Audit agencies, such as the Government Accountability Office, have identified long-standing issues in the DOD's use of contractors. Over the years, recommendations for integration of operational contract support through policy, planning, and training have attempted to address these issues by improved oversight and management of contracts in support of current and future contingency operations.

The oversight of technical performance under a contract is the responsibility of the requirements owner; however, the overall responsibility for ensuring contractors meet all specified and implied requirements outlined in the contract belongs to the contracting officer who awarded it. In the case of contracts in support of deployed or deploying forces, the contracting officer is not always located at the place of performance, which makes management and oversight difficult. This has led to several issues that adversely impact operations, such as increased costs due to poorly defined requirements and failure to estimate contractor support requirements into base operating estimates, poor performance and schedule issues, and increased risk of fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA). This is especially common in contingency environments, where a high rate of personnel turnover results in a lack of continuity, limitations in properly trained, qualified and

supervised personnel, and unique challenges presented by the local business environment, result in inadequate oversight.

The problem representation, observed in a review of audits and assessments conducted by government agencies such as the GAO, DODIG, and the Defense Science Board, or on behalf of the U.S. government by independent organizations such as the RAND Cooperation and the Congressional Research Service, is that OCS policy aims to improve the management and oversight of contractors in support of contingency operations. These improvements were to address Congressional legislation on contractor accountability; requirements definition, program management, and contingency contracting during combat and post-conflict operations; and risk mitigation for commercial dependence.

Contractor Accountability

Nineteen assessments addressed an overall lack of specific guidance on how to account for contractor personnel comprehensively and the challenges it presents with the inability to provide commanders with an accurate account of who is supporting operations. Given the extent to which contractors make up a large percentage of the total force, contractor accountability is especially important.

In recent U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, contractors at times accounted for more than sixty percent of the total DOD presence. At its peak, the ratio of contractor personnel to military forces in Iraq reached 3-to-1. In 2015, as U.S. Armed Forces were drawing down in Afghanistan, and contractors replaced uniformed military, the ratio soared to 4-to-1.²⁷ A commander's inherent responsibility to provide for, and protect the force, includes contractor personnel. When commanders do not have accurate

data on the number of contract personnel performing in their AOR, they cannot plan accordingly for support services and force protection measures.²⁸

Current OCS policy and doctrine, Joint Publication 4-10, DODI 3020.41 and CJCSM 4301.01, all contain guidance on how to incorporate contractor accountability, to include the roles and responsibilities across various staff functions.

Requirements Definition, Program Management, and Contingency Contracting

The integration of OCS begins at the GCC, where planners must link strategic and operational effects to campaign objectives in the theater campaign plan, operation plans, and related support plans. In all operations where effective use of contracted support is anticipated, the supported CCDR must ensure it is addressed in plans and orders. The Annex W, “Operational Contract Support,” is the primary means for planning staff to integrate OCS in the commander’s planning documents. Several GAO audits observed that Annex Ws restated broad language from existing guidance on the use of contractors, but lacked necessary details needed to support planning for the types and quantities of contractors required to execute various command plans. As a result, commanders are at risk of not fully understanding the extent operations rely on contracted support and, therefore, were unprepared to provide the necessary management and oversight.²⁹

The current joint doctrine charges Combatant Commanders with issuing guidance and procedures for planning operational contract support, including identifying the minimum planning criteria for the integration of contracted support and the associated personnel into all phases of military operations. However, combatant commands do not

have the authority to make equipment and resourcing decisions; those decisions fall under the Title 10 responsibility of the Military Services to train and equip their forces.

The use of commercial contracts is essential to successful operational execution and is, therefore, current operations (CUOPS) and future operations (FUOPS) focused. These activities enable operational execution of contracts in support of current or future operations, of which parameters already exist. While OCS policy and doctrine mention the importance of accurate contract data into JOPES, the focus is on the movement of contractor personnel and their equipment, indicating an existing decision to use contracts in support of a specific operation.

In their response to a 2010 GAO report on “Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support,” DOD recognized the need for improvements in the synchronization between operational requirements and contractor activities.³⁰ The 2014 update to Joint Publication 4-10 provided clarity on options for in-theater contracting organizational structures in support of joint operations to ensure effective and efficient use of contracts and to coordinate common requirements with designated contracting agencies.³¹

Risk Mitigation

The increased employment of contractors over the past two decades has raised concerns with the risk of commercial dependence of essential support; fraud, waste, and abuse; and the potential for providing U.S. funds to our enemies, through DOD contracts.³²

The DOD understands the intrinsic risk of relying on contracted support, especially during crises and contingencies. In November 1990, DOD Instruction 3020.37

“Continuation of Essential DoD Contractor Services During Crisis,” was issued, later superseded by DODI 1100.22, “Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix.” It required the services to identify contracts that provided essential support and establish risk mitigation plans in the event support could not continue. Thirteen years later, however, the GAO observed in a 2003 audit that the services were not in compliance. To promote better planning, guidance, and oversight, the GAO recommended the development of DOD-wide guidance and doctrine on how to manage contractors that support deployed forces.³³

The procurement of supplies and services in support of military operations overseas can be susceptible to fraud, waste, and abuse due to several factors, including lack of continuity as a result of frequent turnover, lack of personnel trained in proper oversight procedures, and the pressure to meet mission requirements. Contingency contracts have evolved from providing logistics enablers such as transportation and base support services to more complex support such as cybersecurity and satellite communication, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, and personnel recovery/medical evacuation support services.³⁴

A 2014 Defense Science Board study on “Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations,” found little evidence that Combatant Commanders ensure that OCS is integrated into plans and exercises across their staffs, reducing the potential for fraud, waste, and abuse.³⁵

A total of nine assessments completed by the GAO, DODIG, and Defense Science Board, between 2013 and 2019, identified a lack of procedures for the vetting of contractors to ensure compliance with the 2013 “Never Contract with the Enemy” Act.

The Never Contract with the Enemy Act requires federal agencies to prevent money from federal contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements from going to people and entities who actively oppose U.S. forces.³⁶ Several GAO audits found a lack of comprehensive guidance on foreign vendor vetting and recommended clarification of the requirement for combatant commands to institute a foreign vendor vetting process to determine whether potential vendors actively support any terrorist, criminal, or other sanctioned organization.³⁷

OCS policy and doctrine updates have attempted to address these risks. Joint Publication 4-10, DODI 3020.41 and CJCSM 4301.01 all contain provisions to assess the risk and plan for premature loss of mission-essential contracted support, to ensure that critical capabilities are maintained, and require CCDR's to implement procedures to vet vendors, ensuring that DOD contracts do not violate the "Never Contract with the Enemy" Act. Joint Publication 4-10 and CJCSM 4301.01 both contain recommendations for integrating proactive approaches to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in planning products.

Observation

The activities captured in existing OCS policy and doctrine, are all functions associated with the Military Department's Title 10 responsibilities and authorities to organize, train, and equip the force. The OCS responsibilities designated for Combatant Command planning staffs, are to provide operational guidance to service components and Defense Agencies who will execute contracts in support of operational tasks assigned to them in GCC orders or plans. The expectation is that combatant commanders will issue policies and guidance on the management of contracts and contractors; such as policies

and procedures for vetting prospective contractors for intelligence, counterintelligence, and force protection threats; establishing procedures for contractor accountability and reporting in accordance with GCC Personnel Status Report requirements; and defining requirements will be coordinated and synchronized across the entire AOR for efficiency.

Next, an analysis of the literature answered the subordinate research question, “How do the underlying assumptions about the practice of OCS contribute to gaps in current policy and doctrine?” This analysis used the next two questions of Dr. Bacchi’s “WPR” method: “How has this representation of the problem come about?” and “What are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?”

“How has this representation of the problem come about?” has two objectives. The first is to trace the history of the current policy; the second is to identify competing problem representations that could have changed the policy focus.

History

Starting in 2008, OCS has been a Congressional special interest item and one of the topics in the GAO’s biennial “High Risk” updates; as a result, several audits, studies, and assessments have been conducted. The assessment outcomes have helped shape OCS policy and doctrine.

In 2003, two years after the U.S. deployed Armed Forces to the Middle East and Central Asia, in response to the September 11th attacks, the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support asked the Government Accountability Office to assess the DOD’s efforts in planning for contract support to deployed forces. Specifically, the GAO focused on the following: the extent of contractor support for deployed forces; the extent to which contractors are considered in DOD

planning, including whether DOD has backup plans to maintain essential services to deployed forces in case contractors can no longer provide the services; and the adequacy of DOD's guidance and oversight mechanisms in managing overseas contractors efficiently.³⁸ At the time, there were no standard clauses or provisions related to the deployment and support of contractors authorized to accompany U.S. forces overseas, found in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) or the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS). For example, Army policy required all contractors to follow all general orders and force protection policies of the local commander; however, these requirements were not always reflected in contracts, making enforcement difficult and, in some cases, resulting in increased costs.

In October 2005, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics published DOD Instruction 3020.41, "Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces," which was amended in 2011 and renamed "Operational Contract Support." This DODI initiated standardized guidance on the use and management of contractor personnel authorized to accompany the U.S. Armed Forces overseas. DOD's guidance for contingency planning was revised in 2006 to provide greater detail on contract support to operations, and the capabilities contractors offered.³⁹

The Army was the DoD Executive Agent for contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2006, Secretary of the Army Pete Geren established the "Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations" led by Dr. Jacques Gansler, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The commission reviewed lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan and provide

recommendations to assist the Department of the Army in ensuring procurements in support of future joint operations achieved greater effectiveness, efficiency, and transparency. Some of their observations were not uncommon to contracting, such as failure to adequately translate a commander's requirements into a statement of need that would serve as the basis for the solicitation and award of a contract, and poor contract management and closeout. However, the commission identified new challenges with the lack of integration and synchronization of requirements across the joint force and interagency. The commission noted that General Petraeus, Commander of the Multi-National Force-Iraq, only had visibility of approximately fifty percent of contracts awarded in-theater. The lack of integration of contracting activities and no clear designee responsible for the overall integration, quality, management, or oversight in a joint operation of this magnitude created concern from accountability, performance, and life-cycle support perspective.⁴⁰

The National Defense Authorization Acts of 2007 and 2008 provided the impetus for formalizing OCS and including it as a DOD core competency. These laws required the DOD to develop joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting.⁴¹ To support this requirement, the OCS community of interest (COI) conducted a capabilities-based assessment (CBA) and generated the required outputs. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) codified the results in a 2011 Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), across the DOTmLPF-P spectrum, with recommendations for policy and doctrine; organization and personnel; and training, leadership, and education. In total, fifty OCS tasks and shortfalls across four functions: Institutional/Capacity Development, Program Management; Contingency

Contracting; and Requirements Definition, were identified from the law, strategic guidance, policy, doctrine, reports, and lessons learned from operations and exercises. Additionally, eighteen issues and topics were identified that required incorporation into policy and doctrine.⁴²

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Section 848, tasked the DOD to conduct a study on contractor logistics support of contingency operations. In March 2012, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics directed the Defense Science Board to conduct the study. The Defense Science Board's Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations issued their final report in 2014, concluding that there is a lack of clarity across the DOD, as to who is in charge of policy, doctrine, resourcing, training, planning, and execution for OCS. The report emphasized the vital importance of effective policies, doctrine, and processes for operational contract support. It contained six key findings related to the use of contracted support as a critical component of combat readiness.⁴³

A 2010 GAO report acknowledged the steps DOD had taken to integrate OCS planning into military operations but had not institutionalized OCS planners in joint policy or doctrine, as part of DOD's organizational approach to improving requirements definition. The report noted that neither DODI 3020.41 nor Joint Publication 4-10 addressed the roles and responsibilities of OCS planners.⁴⁴ In 2011, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy completed revisions to include broad language in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force requiring that the combatant commands integrate contract support and contractor management into planning for all phases of military operations.⁴⁵

The outcomes and recommendations of these assessments have helped mature OCS policy to its current state, focused predominantly on improving management and oversight of contracts at the operational level.

In 2018, the JROC endorsed the OCS Joint DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR). The DCR identified current capability shortfalls and recommended solutions to institutionalize OCS across DOD, strengthen DOD's ability to perform OCS, and ensure OCS effectively and efficiently contributes to all phases and ranges of joint military operations. The changes in the DCR, however, focused only on the planning and execution of contracts.

Competing Problem Representations

Between 2010 and 2013, the GAO conducted three audits with the specific intent of assessing DOD's incorporation of OCS into contingency plans. In each audit, the GAO reviewed combatant command plans, but their findings reflect operational challenges, not strategic opportunities.

One of GAO's findings in a 2013 report was titled, "Combatant Commands did not plan for the potential use of contractors." The gaps identified in this report, however, were not about the opportunity contractors provide in strategic plans, but rather an expansion to the use of contract support for more types of services than just logistic enablers.⁴⁶

When the GAO's 2010 report titled, "DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations," was assessed, the author was hopeful that an audit finally addressed the potential for OCS to inform strategic planning decisions, such as the impact of commercial support to theater posture planning.

However, the findings focused on the inadequacy of Annex Ws to provide information on existing contracts, for consideration in operational planning. Several combatant command officials interviewed by the GAO stated that that information contained in an Annex W was insufficient to identify the extent to which an operation depended on commercial support. Another finding reflected planners' belief that the size and capabilities of the military force must first be known to plan for the amount of commercial support required. This finding is the only finding, in over thirty reports, investigations, and assessments, that lends itself to the future exploration of OCS as an opportunity, not a dependence.⁴⁷

Observation

With the limited organic capability to support campaign end states, the use of commercial support, if considered and planned for, offers commanders options to expand operational reach, in the face of resource and capability limitations. While the DOD and combatant commands have taken steps to advance OCS concepts in the planning process, the focus continues to be on management, oversight, and dependence on contracts, rather than opportunities and potential to impact strategic objectives, such as theater posture.

Dr. Bacchi's WPR method historically compares the perspectives of members of different social groups and the impact of social biases on a policy. A modified approach to the question, "What is left unproblematic? What are the silences? Can the problem be thought about differently?" instead, focusing on the perspectives of members at different levels of warfare. This question considers how the current approach to a problem representation constrains policy and explores issues and perspectives that are silenced, based on the presentation of the original issue.

The 2015 U.S. National Military Strategy demonstrates the importance of commercial partners to DOD activities, striving for resource and fiscal stewardship in a resource-constrained environment, by using contracted support when it best serves the mission.⁴⁸ Additionally, it includes commercial partners in U.S. endeavors for joint interoperability standards to ensure continued operations in contested environments.⁴⁹

DOD acknowledges that contractors will continue to play a significant role in support of future operations. Current OCS policy and doctrine provides guidance to ensure this support is executed effectively and efficiently. However, planners at the GCCs should not be concerned with contract execution; that is a service component responsibility. Planners at the GCCs should be concerned with broad, long-range strategies that include capabilities and objectives and link national strategic guidance and joint planning. One example is the Base Plan (BPLAN), a branch of the theater campaign plan that addresses potential threats, catastrophic events, and non-crisis contingencies. The level of detail in a BPLAN establishes the combatant commander's concept of operations, to include essential tasks, assumptions, force structure, anticipated timelines for mission completion, and a discussion of the operations by phase.⁵⁰

Current OCS policy and doctrine do not provide guidance on the incorporation of OCS into combatant command strategies, focused on their specific capabilities and missions, to link national strategic direction to theater strategies and joint operations.

In a 2010 audit, GAO found that the BPLANs reviewed lacked any reference to OCS implications, which hindered DOD's ability to estimate OCS requirements for future operations. Combatant Command officials responsible for writing BPLANs and Operation Plans (OPLAN) told GAO auditors that references to OCS in planning

documents were limited to designating component command responsibilities for command and control of contracting efforts. Similarly, officials at another combatant command told auditors the extent to which OCS is discussed in BPLANs often does not go beyond the word “contracting” in the section describing logistics and administration responsibilities.⁵¹

The GAO noted several deficiencies in planners’ knowledge of how and when to incorporate OCS data into plans and annexes. The lack of OCS in BPLANs is an important observation because BPLANs do not require Annexes; they serve as the foundation for developing annexes to subsequent planning documents. While Concept Plans (CONPLAN) and Operation Plans (OPLAN) include Annexes, failure to reference OCS in the main body could result in it going unnoticed during a review of the base plans and a select few Annexes.

DOD Instruction 3020.37, canceled and replaced with DODI 1100.22 in 2010, establishes policy and procedures for determining the appropriate workforce mix to provide DOD with ready forces. This policy includes contractors as part of the effective mix of the Total Force and emphasized the importance of planning for contractors to the same level of detail as military forces.⁵² Despite this, two audits conducted in 2010 found combatant command plans failed to address contractors as a resource capability. In one audit, the section of the base plan, which described friendly forces that the commander anticipated relying on to execute the operation, lacked any mention of contracted support, despite DOD policy that includes contractors as part of the total force.⁵³ In another audit, a review of over thirty Annex Ws found generic language restated from existing DOD

guidance on the use of contractors to support deployed forces without any explicit details on contract support required to execute a specific plan.⁵⁴

The intent of this thesis was not to suggest current OCS policy and doctrine fails to address legitimate issues within the DOD's use of contract support. Instead, it was to determine how policy and doctrine can better support the use of OCS to inform strategic planning to set theater posture, in addition to the operational challenges associated with the use of contracts.

A paradigm shift is needed, from strategic facilitation of the management, oversight, and commercial dependence in support of operational objectives; to a strategic analysis of how to capitalize on the opportunities of commercial capabilities to provides geographic combatant commanders with flexible options in setting theater posture and extending operational reach.

The emphasis on improving BPLAN, OPLAN, and Annex W input, noted in several GAO audits, could reasonably accommodate an expansion in planning guidance to include strategic considerations, provided caution is taken not to disrupt the current utility.

Tactical and operational planning efforts share Title 10, Section 1701 authority to write contracts and obligate funds on behalf of the government. Therefore, there is little difference between OCS planning at those levels. OCS planning at a geographic combatant command, however, focuses on data to inform planning efforts in support of theater strategies, which are the sole responsibility of the combatant commander.

Observation

A review of Joint Publication 4-10, DODI 3020.41, and CJCSM 43010.01 did not reflect specific guidance on how OCS practitioners incorporate commercial considerations into strategic planning at the combatant commands.

While GAO's observations did not directly attribute their findings to impacts on theater posture, they are connected. Specifically, where GAO noted shortcomings in defining the forces that a combatant commander anticipates would be available to execute mission tasks. The availability of forward-positioned or rotationally available forces is one of the three interdependent elements of theater posture. These findings confirmed the presumption of a gap in policy and guidance for how to leverage commercial opportunities to optimize theater posture planning efforts.

Finally, an analysis of the literature answered the subordinate research question, "Is new policy, doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into theater posture planning." This analysis used the last two questions of Dr. Bacchi's "WPR" method: "What effects are produced by this representation of the problem?" and "How/where this representation of the problem has been disseminated? How could it be replaced?"

The most significant effects produced by the problem representation underpinning OCS policy and doctrine, are the measures taken to institutionalize OCS as a core capability in the DOD.

OCS policy and doctrine has matured significantly and continues to evolve. Thirty-four studies, reports, and assessments contributed to this study. They reflect long-standing problems with the oversight and management of contractors supporting

deployed forces. Over the past eight years, seven audits revealed inadequate planning for contract support in operations, and three audits contained similar findings on the DOD's ability to accurately assess and mitigate risk based on a dependence on contracted support. These findings inform actions taken to institutionalize OCS across the DOD.

The 2011 OCS Initial Capabilities Document contains four appendices that list recommended actions across DOTmLPPF-P to fill in identified capability gaps.

Appendix F of the ICD contains a list of seventeen issues and topics, to codify in policy and doctrine. These topics are contract execution-centric and do not address guidance for OCS as a strategic enabler. The best example of this is the creation of measurable tasks for OCS functions in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).⁵⁵ The UJTL is a list of tasks that serve as the foundation for joint operations planning across the range of military and interagency operations. It is used by the DOD to conduct joint force development, readiness reporting, and the development of joint training and education. As of December 2019, there were six primary and eleven ancillary UJTL tasks for OCS. All seventeen tasks focused primarily on the execution, management, and oversight of contracts. There were no UJTL tasks addressing strategic analysis of commercial capabilities or how to apply that to joint planning or plans development.

Appendix H addressed training, leadership, and education audiences and issues. The list contains business disciplines, such as program management, contracting, quality assurance, and commercial companies and their personnel; absent is any reference to joint planning or joint planners, or a requirement to provide joint planning education or training opportunities.

In 2018, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support (DASD(PS)) developed Joint DOTmLPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR), proposing non-materiel solutions to improve and institutionalize OCS capability within the DOD.

The DCR outlines a capability on the combatant command staffs to integrate contracted capabilities in plans and orders and set the AOR for OCS and to update policies, procedures, and reporting requirements. This DCR update gets closer to shifting the focus of OCS at the strategic theater level, to provide a capability that informs long-range, strategic plans.

The focus of the DCR is still on what combatant commanders must do to enable contracting activities at the service components to execute contracts in support of their operational tasks. Typically, this will include Combatant Commander provided policy and guidance on issues such as theater entrance requirements for contractors, procedures for deployment, authorizations for care and feeding, legal status of contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF), and vendor vetting, and any other GCC specific requirements pertaining to contractors.

The DCR does not make a full pivot from OCS in the context of contract execution, management, and oversight, to OCS in the context of strategic analysis of commercial considerations to provide combatant commanders options and flexibility in extending operational reach, in resource-constrained environments. Still, it is a step in the right direction. This DCR includes tasks to conduct and maintain the analysis of the OCS Aspects of the Operational Environment (AOE); inform CCDR Assessments and

Guidance (Intent/Objectives); establish and manage risk, opportunity, resources, communications, transitions, and improvements.

The problem representation of DOD's failure to appropriately manage the use of contracts in support of deployed forces has been reflected in joint doctrine, DOD policy, multiple audits, assessments, reports, and even articles written by senior leadership in the acquisition, contracting and sustainment workforce. Over the years, this feedback has helped shape the policy and doctrine that governs OCS.

In 2010, the GAO believed that the DOD's one-size-fits-all approach to Annex Ws created inconsistent expectations, between GCC planners and Senior DOD leadership, on the content requirements. Without improvements to the integration of OCS into GCC planning products, GAO felt combatant commanders would be unable to estimate operational dependence on commercial support accurately.⁵⁶ In 2017, the Joint Staff provided detailed guidance for the creation of the Annex W, to include a template, in the Chairman's manual, CJCSM 4301.01.⁵⁷

"Contracting" is the legal process of purchasing, renting, leasing, or otherwise obtaining supplies and services from non-federal sources. The use of contracted support to military operations pre-dates the civil war. The use of a formalized OCS framework to plan for, and obtain supplies and services through contracting, in support of CCDR-directed operations, is just over ten years old.

During military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the DOD relied extensively on contracted support, catching the attention of the Secretary of Defense and Congress. For this study, I reviewed thirty-four assessments conducted by the U.S. Government or on behalf of the U.S. Government, between 2003 and 2019, on the integration of OCS

into planning, management, and oversight activities. Six of those assessments were part of GAO's biennial "High Risk" series, which captures areas where GAO, by Congressional direction, determines substantial efforts are needed to achieve greater progress.

The policy and doctrine, governing OCS practices, is continuously evolving; recommendations and outcomes from these assessments have helped shape it. To date, however, the guidance has maintained an operational focus, despite efforts to attribute the OCS framework to strategic planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands.

If appropriately planned, OCS can be a force multiplier, providing commanders with flexible and agile resource options across a broad spectrum of skill sets, often unavailable solely within military organic force structure.

U.S. global posture determines the strategic positional advantage of the Joint Force. According to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide (CJCSG) 3130, "Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Overview and Policy Framework," strategy-driven and resource-informed planning relies on the readiness and availability of the force and the capacity and capability of the logistics and transportation systems; this includes contract support. Strategic planners at the GCCs make assumptions when identifying a preferred workforce-mix. The degree to which they can craft appropriate planning assumptions regarding force posture improves the feasibility of a plan.⁵⁸

If GCC planners identify commercial opportunities across the theater of operations, it can inform posture planning decisions, where commanders must find a balance between available organic capabilities and posture requirements to set the theater to enable operational achievement of strategic end states.

Conclusions

The policy, laws, and regulations that have always guided government contracting have evolved with the introduction of OCS. Now, there is a greater emphasis on the responsibility for requirements definition and the inclusion of acquisition and contracting personnel into planning discussions. A lack of clarity still exists, between requirements to be supported by contracts, and opportunities contracted capabilities provide. What has yet to evolve, is the way planners think about commercial support when looking forward, during long-range strategic planning; before requirements are developed, before operations have been declared and tasked to service components, before the decision on where to establish U.S. footprints and presence. Currently, OCS practitioners are inserted into planning discussions to talk about “the contract.” At the operational and tactical levels, that may be an appropriate place, at the geographic combatant commands, however, it is not. If OCS planners wait to get involved until discussions on contract support begin they will have missed an opportunity to use their knowledge, skills, and expertise to inform strategic discussions, such as where to establish a forward presence, what capabilities are available or needed to support lines of effort, or where the prospect of government contracts buys the U.S. the most influence. In today’s resource-constrained environment, combatant commanders need that input; it is vital to posture development, which supports their ability to extend operational reach; support lines of operation; enable the generation of combat power; and support the operational, protection, and sustainment requirements of deployed forces.

Summary

The analysis of current OCS policy and doctrine found a consistent problem representation, of OCS to address inadequate contract management and oversight, and a lack of planning for contract requirements in support of operations. This analysis answered the subordinate research question, “What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?”

The analysis presented in this chapter also provided an answer to the subordinate research questions: Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture? How do the underlying assumptions about the practice of OCS contribute to gaps in current policy and doctrine? and Is new policy, doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into Theater Posture Planning?

The next chapter will utilize the assessment of existing OCS policy and doctrine to conclude the cause of the gap in current policy and doctrine. This review will be followed by the conclusions for the subordinate research questions, a conclusion to the primary research question, and recommendations for further study.

¹ JCS, JP 5-0; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 6, 19; JCS, JP 4-04.

² JCS, JP 5-0.

³ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 23.

⁴ Neal P. Curtin, GAO 03-695, *Contractors Provide Vital Services to Deployed Forces but Are Not Adequately Addressed in DoD Plans* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2003), 6-8, 35-37.

⁵ JCS, JP 5-0.

⁶ Brian Nichiporuk, Peter Schirmer, Molly Dunigan, Michael Schwille, Samantha Cherney, and Katherine Hastings, *Human Capital Needs Operational Contract Support*

Planning and Integration Workforce (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Cooperation, 2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1847.html.

⁷ Wood et al., *2019 Index of Military Strength*.

⁸ IHS Jane's, *World Armies: France*, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, last updated October 10, 2016, <https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence>; IHS Jane's, *World Armies: Germany*, Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment, last updated October 10, 2016, <https://www.janes.com/military-threat-intelligence>; Laura Hughes, "Defence Cuts Mean Military May Not Have the Personnel to Operate New Equipment," *The Telegraph*, October 2015, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/industry/defence/11939458/Defence-cuts-mean-military-may-not-have-the-personel-to-operate-new-equipment.html>; Ministry of the Armed Forces (France), *French White Paper on Defence and National Security* (Paris, France: Ministry of the Armed Forces, 2013); Vince Chadwick and Cynthia Kroet, "Germany Plans Military Expansion after Decades of Downsizing," *Politico*, last updated May 10, 2016, <https://www.politico.eu/article/germany-plans-military-expansion-after-decades-of-downsizing-defence-army/>.

⁹ Nichiporuk et al., *Human Capital Needs Operational Contract Support Planning and Integration Workforce*.

¹⁰ Wood et al., *2019 Index of Military Strength*.

¹¹ Nichiporuk et al., *Human Capital Needs Operational Contract Support Planning and Integration Workforce*.

¹² Cary B. Russell, GAO 16-105, *Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Manage, Account for, and Vet Defense Contractors in Africa* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2015), 38-42.

¹³ Curtin, GAO 03-695, 15-16.

¹⁴ JCS, JP 4-0.

¹⁵ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 23.

¹⁶ JCS, JP 5-0.

¹⁷ Dorman and Latham, "Operational Contract Support"; JCS, JP 5-0.

¹⁸ Robert S. Tripp, Kristin F. Lynch, John G Drew, and Edward W Chan, *Lessons From Operation Enduring Freedom* (Washington, DC: RAND Project Air Force, 2004), https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1819.html.

¹⁹ Russell, GAO 16-105, 5, 37.

²⁰ John Pendleton, GAO 10-794, *Defense Management: Improved Planning, Training, and Interagency Collaboration Could Strengthen DOD's Efforts in Africa* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 8, 31, 56.

²¹ Curtin, GAO 03-695, 33-35.

²² Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks, Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan Final Report to Congress* (Washington, DC: Commission on Wartime Contracting, 2011). <https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cwc/20110929213815/http://www.wartimecontracting.gov/>.

²³ Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 3020.41, *Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Force* (Washington, DC: DoD, 2005), 4-18.

²⁴ William M. Solis, GS 10-472, *Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2011), 36-38; Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2014), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>.

²⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2008), <https://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine>.

²⁶ JCS, JP 4-10 (2014).

²⁷ Peters and Plagakis, CRS Report R44116.

²⁸ John Pendleton, GAO 13-293, *Defense Headquarters: DOD Needs to Periodically Review and Improve Visibility Of Combatant Commands' Resources* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 33-37; Timothy J. DiNapoli, GAO 12-1026, *Operational Contract Support: Sustained DOD Leadership Needed to Better Prepare for Future Contingencies* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2012), 4-5; William M. Solis, GAO 10-829T, *Warfighter Support: Cultural Change Needed to Improve How DOD Plans for and Manages Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 4, 12.

²⁹ DiNapoli, GAO 12-1026, 4-5; Solis, GAO 10-829T, 4, 12.

³⁰ DiNapoli, GAO 12-1026, 4; Solis, GAO 10-829T, 12-13.

³¹ JCS, JP 4-10 (2014).

³² Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations*.

³³ Curtin, GAO 03-695, 12-13.

³⁴ John F. Sargent Jr., Christopher Mann, and Moshe Schwartz, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report R44010, *Defense Acquisitions: How and Where DOD Spends Its Contracting Dollars* (Washington, DC: CRS, 2018), <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R44010.pdf>.

³⁵ Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations*.

³⁶ Never Contract with the Enemy Act, Public Law 113-216 S. 675, 113th Cong., (2013).

³⁷ Christopher Mihm, GAP 19-37C, *Operational Contract Support: Actions Needed to Strengthen DOD Vendor Vetting Efforts* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2018), 21-32; Puente-Cackley, GAO 15-290, 26-30; Russell, GAO 16-105, 37-39.

³⁸ Curtin, GAO 03-695, 11, 16.

³⁹ William M. Solis, GAO 07-145, *High-Level DOD Action Needed to Address Long-Standing Problems with Management and Oversight of Contractors Supporting Deployed Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2006), 35-39; Solis, GAO 10-829T, 36-38.

⁴⁰ Gansler Commission, *Urgent Reform Required : Army Expeditionary Contracting, Report of the "Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/contingency/reports/docs/gansler_commission_report_final_report_20071031.pdf.

⁴¹ JCS, *Operational Contract Support Joint Concept*.

⁴² Cartwright, "Operational Contract Support Initial Capabilities Document."

⁴³ Defense Science Board, *Task Force on Contractor Logistics in Support of Contingency Operations*.

⁴⁴ Solis, GAO 10-829T, 29.

⁴⁵ Cary B. Russell, GAO 13-212, *Warfighter Support: DOD Needs Additional Steps to Fully Integrate Operational Contract Support into Contingency Planning* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2013), 8, 14, 24-25.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 25-26.

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- ⁴⁷ Solis, GAO 10-829T, 4, 15, 36.
- ⁴⁸ JCS, *National Military Strategy* (2015).
- ⁴⁹ JCS, *National Military Strategy* (2015); JCS, *National Military Strategy* (2011).
- ⁵⁰ JCS, JP 5-0.
- ⁵¹ Solis, GAO 10-829T, 4-11.
- ⁵² Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 1100.22, *Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix* (Washington, DC: DoD, 1998), 12-16.
- ⁵³ Solis, GAO 10-829T, 22-24.
- ⁵⁴ William M. Solis, GAO 10-551T, *Warfighter Support: Continued Actions Needed by DoD to Improve and Institutionalize Contractor Support in Contingency Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Accountability Office, 2010), 25-27.
- ⁵⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), *Universal Joint Task List (UJTL)* (Washington, DC: JCS, 2019), www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Training/UJTL.
- ⁵⁶ Solis, GAO 10-829T, 12-15, 17-24.
- ⁵⁷ CJCS, CJCS Manual 4301.01, D-A-1 to D-A-3, D-B-1 to D-b-24; JCS, JP 4-10 (2019).
- ⁵⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), CJCS Guide 3130, *Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Overview and Policy Framework* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019), A6-A7.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Chapter One of this thesis established the importance of expanding the OCS framework into strategic planning, to adapt current doctrine and policy to meet today's new threats and budgetary climate. This study also analyzed the effectiveness of relevant doctrine and practices institutionalizing the OCS framework at geographic combatant commands to determine if revisions are necessary to assist OCS practitioners with the integration of commercial support opportunities and risks in theater campaign planning.

The central argument of this thesis is that OCS policy and doctrine do not address strategic planning at the geographic combatant commands. Guidance to OCS planners emphasized the facilitation of contract management, oversight, and commercial dependence in support of operational objectives but lacks guidance on strategic analysis of how commercial considerations affect strategic decisions, like theater posture.

Purpose

The primary purpose of this research was to analyze the relevant doctrine and policy institutionalizing the OCS framework as a strategic enabler for the Geographic Combatant Commanders in support of theater posture planning to examine how OCS policy and doctrine can better support theater posture planning.

Research Conclusions

The conclusions for this research are presented as answers to the subordinate research questions identified in Chapter One. They are:

1. Is planning for commercial support a necessary element of setting theater posture?
2. What is the focus of current DOD policy and doctrine governing Operational Contracting Support planning?
3. How do the underlying assumptions about the practice of OCS contribute to gaps in current policy and doctrine?
4. Is new policy, doctrine needed to help OCS practitioners integrate OCS considerations into Theater Posture Planning?

Commercial Support in Posture Planning

U.S. forward posture includes the forces, footprints, and agreements established overseas, and is fundamental to the Department of Defense (DOD)'s success in carrying out its mission. U.S. Armed forces are employed globally in support of activities across the full range of military operations. In addition to major combat operations, the U.S. military supports regional engagements, non-combat contingencies, and crisis response, humanitarian, peacekeeping and security force assistance, strategic deterrence, and support to civil authorities and U.S. diplomacy.¹

Combatant Commanders are responsible for setting conditions to enable military service components to execute tasks assigned to them in the theater campaign plan and subsequent contingency plans and orders. The Theater Posture Plan (TPP) is the primary source document to implement direction provided in the Guidance for the Employment of the Force (GEF), reflecting resource, basing, and oversight decisions, of the combatant commander. These decisions can have broad implications. Posture plan development requires integrated planning and a comprehensive approach to basing and capacity

considerations, taking into account not only the needs of the military but our unified action partners as well.

The U.S. depends on a reliable overseas posture to secure and protect strategic partnerships, respond to crises, and deter conflict from happening in the first place. The global security environment has become more dynamic and uncertain. Limitations and reductions in military capability, as well as legal and diplomatic restrictions to force management levels, challenges the U.S. to maintain the necessary posture through purely organic means. The concept of OCS has utility beyond the mere execution of contracts to support specific requirements. The potential alone for infusing a region with funding from U.S. contracts is enough to pique the interest of host nation leaders who are otherwise indifferent, persuading agreements for U.S. strategic needs, such as basing, access, and overflight permissions.

When regional leaders are concerned with the perception associated with an excess of uniformed military personnel, the use of contracted support to augment the force while maintaining the appropriate level of support and presence must be part of the total force decision.

There is a difference between planning for Title 10, contract support, for validated requirements by the service component or units on the ground; and planning for ways in which commercial opportunities buy influence and extend operational reach, in situations where the U.S. organic capability is limited by law, diplomacy, or capacity.

Each GCC is required in joint doctrine to have OCS planning capability on staff, as part of the Operational Contract Support Integration Cell (OCSIC). This same doctrine, however, provides guidance, shapes policy, and creates training and exercise

injects for planning scenarios in support of using contracts to support operations, but not opportunity planning. As there is a gap in the education, training, and guidance needed to institutionalize OCS in support of strategic planning tasks, like planning theater posture.

OCS Policy and Doctrine

Joint doctrine defines OCS as, “the process of planning for and obtaining supplies and services from commercial sources in support of joint operations.” Thirty-four assessments on OCS within the DOD conducted by the U.S. Government or on behalf of the U.S. Government between 2003 and 2019, were reviewed for this thesis. The majority of the findings and recommendations reflect long-standing problems with the oversight and management of contractors supporting deployed forces. In recent years, audits have expanded their focus to include requirements determination and planning for contract support in specific operations, and the DOD’s ability to accurately assess and mitigate the risk of dependence on contracted support. These findings and recommendations have shaped OCS policy and doctrine, into what it is currently is today.

OCS policy and doctrine have matured significantly and continues to evolve to institute standardized mechanisms for the management of contractors and the elimination of barriers to the efficient use of commercial support to operations. However, a paradigm shift is necessary before the perception of OCS as a planning tool in a strategic context is widely understood and accepted across the DOD, without replacing obligations of OCS Planners on a GCC staff, to continue tasks that support strategic facilitation of operational execution.

The responsibilities of OCS planners at the GCC to write combatant command policy on how contractors must operate and are managed in the theater are still valid. While the audience of such policies are at the operational and tactical levels, the GCC typically retains the authority to issue policies on behalf of the Combatant Commander, for things like theater entry requirements, authorizations and statuses, vendor vetting, and reporting requirements and procedures according to Commander critical information requirements (CCIR.)

For those issues, the existing policy and doctrine provide sufficient guidance on the responsibilities and expectations. To date, however, the guidance has maintained a singularly operational focus on the risk of commercial dependence to operations, and management and oversight challenges, such as vendor vetting and contractor accountability.

Joint Publication 4-10, DODI 3020.41 and CJCSM 4301.01 all contain provisions to assess the risk and plan for premature loss of mission-essential contracted support, to ensure that critical capabilities are maintained, and require CCDR's to implement procedures to vet vendors, ensuring that DOD contracts do not violate the "Never Contract with the Enemy" Act. Joint Publication 4-10 and CJCSM 4301.01 contain recommendations for integrating proactive approaches to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in planning products.

The activities captured in existing OCS policy and doctrine are all functions associated with the Military Department's Title 10 responsibilities and authorities to organize, train, and equip the force. This observation supports the assumption made at the beginning of this study, that current OCS policy and doctrine is singularly focused on

activities at the operational and tactical levels of warfare, pertaining to requirements definition and contract execution.

Underlying Assumptions and Gaps

In 2003, the GAO conducted an audit in response to a request by Congress to highlight the extent to which the DOD was using contracts to support contingency operations. At the time of the audit, there was a lack of standardized policy, provisions, regulations, or guidance for contractors accompanying U.S. Armed Forces into areas of active hostilities, such as Iraq and Afghanistan. Since then, several audits, investigations, and assessments have been conducted, and the outcomes, findings, and recommendations shaped and matured OCS policy and framework to its current state.

In addition to three updates to Joint Publication 4-10, the issuance of a DOD Instruction and the publication of a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Guide on OCS Planning, the DOD identified OCS as a core defense capability and identified key capability gaps in the 2018 DOTmLPP-P Change Recommendation (DCR). The changes in the DCR focused on the planning and execution of contracts. There is little difference between OCS planning at the operational and tactical levels of warfare, who share Title 10, Section 1701 authority to write contracts and obligate funds on behalf of the government. The significance between OCS at the strategic level of warfare, however, is significantly different.

If appropriately planned, OCS can be a force multiplier, providing commanders with flexible and agile resource options across a broad spectrum often unavailable solely within military organic force structure. With the limited organic capability to support campaign end states, the use of commercial support, if considered and planned for, offers

commanders options to expand operational reach in the face of resource and capability limitations. While the DOD and combatant commands have taken steps to advance OCS concepts in the planning process, the focus continues to be on management, oversight, and dependence on contracts, rather than impact of the opportunities and capabilities on strategic objectives, such as theater posture.

The addition of a new annex, Annex W, “Operational Contract Support” to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Planning Formats, in 2006 was a forcing function to incorporate OCS into combatant command planning products. However, the content continues to be assessed as generic restatements of existing policy on contract execution, without explicit details on contract support required to execute a specific plan. Additionally, reviews of GCC contingency plans and orders found insufficient details on the planning and forecasting of contracted support to current or future operations.

While GAO’s observations did not directly attribute their findings to impacts on theater posture, they take a step in the direction of potentially one day, exploring how well combatant command planners analyze commercial opportunities to address posture needs in the region.

Policy, Doctrine, and Theater Posture Planning

The most significant effects produced by the problem representation underpinning OCS policy and doctrine, are the impacts they have on measures taken to institutionalize OCS in the DOD.

The OCS ICD outlines needs and gaps that must be filled to declare success on establishing OCS as a DOD core competency. It defines and summarizes major OCS

functions and identifies the following: specific issues and topics to be addressed in revisions to policy and doctrine, organizational and personnel solutions that require resourcing and manning, training and leader education programs and venues, and metrics to evaluate successful implementation.

A DCR issued in 2018 captures validated requirements from the OCS ICD and emerging capability requirements developed through the OCS action plans, lessons learned, ongoing studies, and DOTmLPF-P capability analyses. The DCR states what combatant commanders must do to enable contracting activities at the service components to execute contracts in support of their operational tasks. The DCR does not address how combatant commanders can use their OCS planners to enhance strategic planning efforts for things like theater posture.²

U.S. global posture determines U.S. strategic positional advantage. The joint force must be able to quickly execute a wide range of activities in support of national interests and GCC objectives. To do this, planners at the GCCs cannot wait until a contingency or crisis happens to set the theater. The process of theater posture planning must be continuous to ensure critical capabilities are in place to facilitate crisis response before it is needed. Planners at the GCCs make assumptions during theater posture planning, on items such as preferred locations for contingency basing or preferred workforce-mix. Various commercial considerations can influence these decisions. The feasibility of a plan depends on the detail and accuracy of the assumption used as its basis.

DOD's current view on OCS core functions constrains the possibilities for which commercial considerations can inform and influence decision making in ways not limited to contract execution, management, and oversight.

The current definition of OCS in Joint Publication 4-10 is the basis for measurable tasks in the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL).³ Because UJTL tasks are tied to the principles of OCS in joint doctrine, they contain an operational focus. There was one UJTL task to “assess the composite military capability and limitations of forces,” measured against standards such as the percentage of committed forces available with the generation time in an OPLAN, and the percentage of support units participating in annual exercises.⁴ Included as part of the UJTL task, is an optional, ancillary task that an assessment of OCS capabilities to support the plan or operation, may be included. This provides insight into how future, strategic tasks, for OCS planning in support of theater posture, may look.

The current OCS policy and doctrine serves the purpose of addressing long-standing issues with contract management and oversight in the contingency environment. It does not cover a transition to research and analysis on the opportunities and potential that commercial considerations provide, and how to integrate that data into strategic dialogue. Revisions are necessary to widen the aperture of OCS planners and delineate the differences between activities done at the combatant commands to enable contract execution at lower echelons and activities to inform strategic planning and provide combatant commanders with options for strategic outcomes, such as setting theater posture.

Recommendations

The conclusions made for the subordinate research questions and the analysis of the above possible solutions to the primary research problem, support the following conclusion to the primary thesis question: For OCS policy and doctrine to better support

theater posture planning, a paradigm shift is necessary from the existing perception of OCS as merely a planning tool for strategic facilitation of the management, oversight, and commercial dependence on contracts in support of operational objectives; to a framework for the strategic analysis of opportunities and risks for the use of commercial considerations to achieve strategic outcomes, providing geographic combatant commanders with flexible options in extending operational reach. The following recommendations seek to make that shift:

Recommendation 1 (Doctrine): Revise Joint Doctrine to clarify the functions and competencies needed for OCS planning at the Geographic Combatant Commands

Joint Doctrine on OCS is too myopic. Revisions to multiple Joint Publications are necessary to define the additional responsibilities and expectations of OCS planners on a GCC staff.

Joint Publication 4-10 “Operational Contract Support:” As demonstrated by the results of this study, the original problem representation, driving OCS policy and doctrine, were inadequacies in the management and oversight of contracts and contractor personnel, supporting deployed forces. The use of contractors in recent operations has steadily increased over time. Although DOD’s reliance on contract support will vary by both operation and time contractors are, and will continue to be, a significant portion of the total deployed force. The DOD must recognize the impact of outsourcing capabilities to buy down the effects of force reductions, operational readiness, and its relationship to joint/strategic planning. Operational decisions have strategic implications in globally integrated operations. One example of that is DOD posture. Commercial capabilities are a key consideration in theater posture planning. They must be continuously assessed and

dynamically managed to determine opportunities in setting the theater and ensuring access and ability to support operations. Joint Publication 4-10 does not currently address leveraging commercial considerations to project power and achieve strategic outcomes. Recommend adding a fourth pillar, or “OCS subordinate function” of “Integrating Commercial Capabilities into Campaign Planning” to delineate between planning for OCS in terms of contract support and using OCS to explore the commercial influence on strategic objectives, such as posture planning, to expand the competitive space to provide freedom of maneuver and decision space for commanders (see Figure 4).

The functions of a Combatant Command to provide policy and guidance for the use of contracts in theater currently outlined in Joint Publication 4-10, would remain the responsibilities of the combatant commands and are appropriately captured under “Contract Support Integration.”

These changes would also need to be reflected in Joint Publication 4-0 “Joint Logistics,” Joint Publication 4-04 “Contingency Basing,” Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” and Joint Publication 5-0 “Joint Planning.”




Figure 4. Operational Contract Support Analysis of the Operational Environment Information Construct

Source: Created from Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2019).

Recommendation 2 (Training and Education): Establish a minimum qualification requirement for OCS Planners at the Geographic Combatant Commands

Joint Doctrine currently characterizes “OCS Planners” as having “experience in logistics and other OCS matters.” GCCs are already staffed with dedicated Logistics Planners; what they lack are trained, qualified, subject matter experts, with extensive backgrounds in government contracting, who understand the joint planning process and can differentiate between contract requirements and contract execution; and using the knowledge of contracting procedures, policies, and laws, to create campaign level concepts, and inform plans for the employment of all elements of national power in U.S. security interests. To be an OCS Planner on a GCC staff, individuals should have

completed advanced planning/warfighting education, such as School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS), School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW), Joint Advanced Warfighting School (JAWS), Maritime Advanced Warfighting School (MAWS) or an equivalent.

The competencies needed to succeed as a joint/strategic planner are not currently included in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) education and training standards and requirements for civilian and military acquisition and contracting professionals. The recommendation for establishing a minimum education and experience requirement for OCS Planners at the Combatant Commands is a forcing function that drives the change in perspective and competency needed by the workforce who will carry out these responsibilities.

Recommendation 3 (Organization): Co-locate OCS Planners in the GCC J5

The preponderance of contracted support has typically been for logistics services, the OCS Planners on the GCC Staff have typically resided within the J4, Logistics Directorate. Theater campaign and theater posture planning, however, is led by J5, Plans Directorate. After ten years of OCS doctrine's narrow-focus on facilitating contract execution, the majority of non-logistics staff see OCS as an operational support function that is leveraged after a crisis is designated. To change the dynamic and ensure commercial considerations are fully integrated into long-range campaign planning, co-locating the OCSIC, or at least one OCS planner, in the J5 would be instrumental in changing the perception that OCS is a planning function, not a logistics function.

Recommendation 4 (Policy): Require mandatory inclusion of commercial considerations in the base document of any contingency plan, when posture is addressed.

Update Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX) Planning Formats to ensure OCS is included in base language of GCC contingency plans (BPLAN, CONPLAN, OPLAN). Recommend OCS is addressed in the base document of all contingency plans wherever posture (forces, footprints or agreements) are discussed. This should include any discussions on RFF/RFS where capability gaps are identified/anticipated.

Recommendations for Future Study

The subordinate conclusion of this research suggests that to validate the findings of this thesis, a case study on the decision-making process for the establishment of strategic basing to set the theater for a geographic combat command, and in support of U.S. global power projection is required. The study should assess how well DOD leverages soft power through commercial arrangements, to buy influence in a particular region.

Another recommendation for further study resulting from this research is an analysis of workforce and training for OCS planners at the combatant commands, which explores whether the need for a formal education and training requirement, specifically for personnel assigned to combatant commands. The Army currently has an OCS Additional Skills Identifier (ASI) for OCS; however, the curriculum is geared towards contract actions, not strategic planning considerations of contracts. It would be worthwhile to include an assessment of the education, experience, and background of personnel currently conducting OCS planning tasks at the GCCs, to determine whether the appropriate level of education and expertise are represented.

Summary

The Department of Defense is highly reliant on commercial support for power projection, and there are many opportunities to maximize the benefits of its use. Overseas posture, defined as forces, footprints, and agreement, is a fundamental enabler of U.S. defense activities and military operations. Commercial capabilities provide flexible options to help combatant commands achieve strategic posture objectives; they can off-set military force reductions and promote force readiness, enable operational access, promote stability while impacting the human terrain, cultivate strategic partnerships in the international system, and expand the competitive space to provide freedom of maneuver and decision space for commanders. Unfortunately, the full scale of OCS utility is not appreciated across the joint force. The issues and challenges that served as the basis of existing joint doctrine and policy on OCS did not include a representation of the challenges of commercial dependence on strategic outcomes, and therefore, have not shaped a community that understands its full potential. The DOD needs to refresh the way it views commercial considerations in joint planning, to capitalize on the opportunities it provides.

¹ Wood et al., *2017 Index of Military Strength*.

² GEN Paul Selva, “Operational Contract Support Joint DOTmLPPF-P Change Recommendation (DCR)” (memorandum, Department of Defense Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Washington, DC, 2018).

³ JCS, UJTL.

⁴ *Ibid.*

GLOSSARY

Agreement. A series of treaties, access, transit, support, and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and partners that set the terms regarding the U.S. military's presence within the territory of the host country, as agreed to with the host government. Agreements provide access, basing, lawful mission execution, protection, and relationships, which allow the footprint to be established and forces to execute their missions. Examples are access agreements, basic ordering agreements, transit agreements, status-of-forces agreements, and treaties.¹

Base Operating Support (BOS). Directly assisting, maintaining, supplying, and distributing support of forces at the operating location. Also called BOS.²

Base Operating Support-Integrator. The designated Service component or joint task force commander assigned to synchronize all sustainment functions for a contingency base. Also called BOS-I.³

Base Plan (BPLAN). A type of operation plan that describes the concept of operations, major forces, sustainment concept, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission without annexes or time-phased force and deployment data. Also called BPLAN.⁴

Combat Service Support. The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of all operating forces in theater at all levels of warfare.⁵

Common-User Item. An item of an interchangeable nature that is in common use by two or more nations or Services of a nation.⁶

Component. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force.⁷

Concept Plan (CONPLAN). An operation plan in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into a complete operation plan or operation order. Also called CONPLAN.⁸

Contingency Basing. The life-cycle process to plan; design; construct; operate; manage; and transition, transfer, or close a non-enduring location supporting a combatant commander's requirement.⁹

Contingency Location (CL). A non-enduring location outside of the US that supports and sustains operations during named and unnamed contingencies or other operations as directed by appropriate authority and is categorized by mission life-cycle requirements as initial, temporary, or semi-permanent.¹⁰

Contingency Plan. A branch of a campaign plan that is planned based on hypothetical situations for designated threats, catastrophic events, and contingent missions outside of crisis conditions.¹¹

Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG). Secretary of Defense written guidance, approved by the President, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which focuses the guidance given in the national security strategy and Defense Planning Guidance, and is the principal source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.¹²

Contracting Support. The planning, coordination, and execution of contracting authority to legally bind contractors in support of military operations.¹³

Contractor Management. The oversight and integration of contractor personnel and associated equipment in support of military operations.¹⁴

Contractors Authorized to Accompany the Force (CAAF). Contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are authorized to accompany the force in applicable contingency operations outside of the United States and have afforded such status through the issuance of a letter of authorization. Also called CAAF.¹⁵

Cooperative Security Location (CSL). An enduring Global Defense Posture location characterized by the periodic presence of rotational US forces, with little or no permanent US military presence or US-owned infrastructure, used for a range of missions and capable of supporting requirements for contingencies. CSLs may feature a small permanent presence of assigned support personnel (military or contractor). CSLs typically consist of mostly HN infrastructure, and CSL real property is often not part of the US real property inventory). CSLs are a focal point for security cooperation activities and provide contingency access, logistic support, and rotational use by operational forces, and can support an increased force presence during contingencies of finite duration.¹⁶

Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL). Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans, optimize the use or reallocation of available resources, and prevent or eliminate redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands.¹⁷

Enduring Location. A main operating base, forward operating site, or cooperative security location designated by the Department of Defense for strategic access and use to support United States security interests for the foreseeable future.¹⁸

Flexible Deterrent Option (FD). A planning construct intended to facilitate early decision making by developing a wide range of interrelated responses that begin with deterrent-oriented actions carefully tailored to produce a desired effect.¹⁹

Forces. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. Forward-stationed or rotationally deployed forces, U.S. military capabilities, equipment, and units (assigned or allocated).²⁰

Footprints. A network of U.S. foreign and overseas locations, infrastructure, facilities, land, and prepositioned equipment.²¹

Global Defense Posture (GDP). The U.S. forces and capabilities forward stationed and rotationally deployed for defense activities in U.S. foreign and overseas locations, as well as the network of bases and infrastructure and international agreements and arrangements that underwrite and support the stationing, deployment, and employment of these forces. It is the network of Host Nation (HN) relationships and agreements, activities, footprint, and forces that comprise forward U.S. military presence and capabilities to address current and future security challenges.²²

Global Force Management (GFM). Processes that align force assignment, apportionment, and allocation methodologies in support of strategic guidance.²³

Head of Contracting Activity (HCA). The official who has overall responsibility for managing the contracting activity. Also called HCA.²⁴

Host Nation (HN). A nation which receives forces and/or supplies from allied nations and/or North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory.²⁵

Lead Service or Agency for Common-User Logistics. A Service component or Department of Defense agency that is responsible for execution of common-user item or service support in a specific combatant command or multinational operation as defined in the combatant or subordinate joint force commander's operation plan, operation order, and/or directives.²⁶

Operation Plan (OPLAN). A complete and detailed plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment list.²⁷

Operational Contract Support. The process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of combatant commander-directed operations. Also called OCS.²⁸

Operational Contract Support Integration Cell. A cell established to coordinate and integrate operational contract support actions across all primary and special staffs for an operational area. Also called OCSIC.²⁹

Posture plan. Planning document produced by Combatant Commands (CCMDs) to clarify the CCDR's posture status and identify gaps, risks, and required changes. Posture plans typically describe the forces, footprint, and agreements present in a theater.³⁰

Pre-position. To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the point of planned use, or at a designated location, to reduce reaction time and to ensure timely support of a specific force during initial phases of an operation.³¹

Requirements Development. The process of defining specific contract support requirements and capturing these requirements in procurement-ready contract support requirements packages.³²

Requiring Activity. A military or other designated supported organization that identifies the need for contracted support during military operations.³³

Senior Contracting Official (SCO). The staff official designated by a Service head of a contracting activity to execute theater support contracting authority for a specific command or operational area.³⁴

¹ JCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 22-23.

²¹ JCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, DoDI 3000.12, 22-23.

³¹ JCS, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.

³² Ibid.

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