POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATION
FORCES (SOF) IN HOMELAND DEFENSE

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ABSTRACT

POTENTIAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE HUNGARIAN SPECIAL OPERATION FORCES (SOF) IN HOMELAND DEFENSE, by Major Gabor Antal, 117 pages.

In the last fifteen years, the Hungarian Defense Forces primarily developed SOF capabilities to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Demonstrating a full commitment to the Alliance, Hungarian SOF were tailored to meet NATO's essential requirements to achieve interoperability during those expeditionary operations. Although the deployments have provided a huge amount of experience, future conflicts require a new mindset on how to use Hungarian SOF in homeland defense. The annexation of Crimea and the Russian-backed uprising in Eastern Ukraine generated new security challenges. As the Russian-type hybrid warfare created a highly efficient precedent on how future wars are likely waged, Hungarian SOF must respond successfully in case Hungary confronts similar threats. With this thesis the author seeks answers about the future requirements for Hungarian SOF in support of homeland defense through the analysis of non-linear warfare and provides recommendations for Hungarian decision-makers on developing future SOF.

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ACRONYMS

COIN	Counter-Insurgency
DIME	Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy
HDF	Hungarian Defense Forces
HDF JFC	Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command
HDFC	Hungarian Defense Forces Command
IW	Irregular Warfare
MoD	Ministry of Defense
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NORSOF	Norwegian Special Operations Forces
R-SOCC	Regional Special Operation Component Command
SF	Special Forces
SFQC	Special Forces Qualification Course
SOATG	Special Operation Air Task Group
SOF	Special Operation Forces
SOFB	Special Operation Forces Brigade
TTP	Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
TPT	Tactical Psychological Operations Teams
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
UW	Unconventional Warfare

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

<u>Background</u>

Following the events of 11 September 2001, the United States (US), and the

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), deployed military forces to Afghanistan and

Iraq to fight against terrorist networks including Al-Qaida and the Taliban. In order to

fulfill their treaty commitment, the small countries of NATO also developed and

generated military forces and deployed them around the world to support the efforts of

the alliance, spread democratic values, and provide a safe and secure environment for the

vulnerable populations of failing states.[1] During the counter-insurgency (COIN)

operations in Afghanistan and in Iraq, Special Operations Forces (SOF) have been a lead

element of the coalition's fight against the Taliban resistance and different terrorist

groups. Moreover, SOF became the COIN experts of NATO, and are able to train, advise,

and assist local military and police forces.[2] Tailoring military capabilities to conduct

COIN has had a significant impact on all military forces, specifically and

disproportionately on SOF forces of small countries.

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[1] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "ISAF's Mission in Afghanistan (2001-2014) (Archived)," NATO, Last updated 1 September 2015, accessed 30 September 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.

[2] Sandor Fabian, "NATO Special Operations Forces: Even if It Is Not Broken Yet, It Needs to Be Fixed," *Special Operations Journal* 4, no. 2 (2018): 188-201, accessed 21 September 2019, https://www.tandfo.nline.com/doi/abs/10.1080 /23296151.2018.1511084?journalCode=uops20.

NATO SOF doctrine has three core missions: special reconnaissance, direct action, and military assistance. Throughout the last two decades, NATO SOF focused primarily on military assistance and implemented the necessary changes in doctrine, training, education, and equipment to combat the insurgency effectively. Because of the myopic focus of SOF, some small countries of NATO did not fully integrate their most elite forces into their national defense strategy, and did not maintain full spectrum capabilities necessary for near-peer competition. As Sandor Fabian, a former Hungarian Special Forces (SF) officer mentioned in his article, "NATO SOF has not encountered or more importantly have not developed effective theories against near-peer adversaries and their innovative concepts."[3]

<center>Contextual Framework</center>

Although there are many possible threats that small NATO countries have to consider, this paper intends to use the hybrid warfare, that culminates in the occupation of the targeted country, as baselines for the research. This paper does not focus on the whole spectrum of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), nor its conventional branch or service, but only addresses the possible modernization and development of the Hungarian SOF to meet these threats. As most of the time SOF require large conventional support, this paper may discuss some of those necessary enablers as well but recommendations for conventional forces are beyond the scope of this paper. Analyzing the above-mentioned threats, this paper focuses on the indispensable capabilities of the Hungarian SOF as they contribute to the requirements of future conflicts.

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[3] Fabian, "NATO Special Operations Forces," 188-201.

Another consideration is that most of the information that the author seeks is classified in details or unavailable in open sources, therefore, this paper will discuss the topic in general terms and does not intend to dive deeply into specific points. Although concerning the legal implications and background is vital for employing the Hungarian SOF within the border of Hungary, this paper does not discuss any legal considerations.

<div align="center">Problem Statement</div>

In the last eighteen years, small NATO countries, like Hungary, developed and employed their SOF to provide military assistance in order to fight against terrorism and advise counter-insurgency. As these elite units were massively and intensively deployed to these hotspots, the vast majority of their training and exercises focused on the above-mentioned missions, therefore, other core missions like special reconnaissance, direct action, and especially unconventional warfare (UW) were de-emphasized.[4] Although the conflicts of the last eighteen years have provided a huge amount of experience, the future struggle between near-peer states requires a new mindset and understanding of conflicts. Therefore, SOF also must adapt to the changing characteristics of war and to do so, must consider their role in new challenges.

Fighting an insurgency or terrorist groups in a foreign country requires a different mindset, capabilities, training, and education than supporting the stability, sovereignty, and integrity of the homeland, therefore, degraded the defense apparatus. But how will

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[4] Steven P. Basilici and Jeremy L. Simmons, "Transformation: A Bold Case for Unconventional Warfare" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2004), 3, accessed 11 October 2019, https://fas.org/man/eprint/bassim.pdf.

the Hungarian Defense Forces Command (HDFC) employ its most elite forces to counter hybrid threats effectively, or use them in an open armed conflict?

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study is to identify the role, possible core missions, and necessary requirements for the Hungarian SOF, and provide options for further development of these units in this complex environment.

Research Questions

To answer the question in the problem statement, more specific research questions need to be presented and answered.

The primary research question of the thesis is: What are the future capability development requirements for the Hungarian Special Operation Forces countering hybrid warfare or conducting unconventional warfare as part of homeland defense?

The four secondary questions below will provide a narrowed focus for answering the main research question:

1. How does the future operating environment look like?

2. What are the characteristics, phases, and critical assets of hybrid warfare?

3. What are the current capability gaps of the Hungarian Special Operation Forces countering hybrid warfare or conducting unconventional warfare?

4. What are the implications needed to enable the Hungarian Special Operation Forces for effectively supporting homeland defense?

<u>Definition of Terms</u>

As this paper mentions multiple terms related to special operations and hybrid warfare, it is necessary to define and understand their meaning. First of all, it is essential to determine how the US, NATO, and the HDF describe special operations.

Special Operations

The United States Armed Forces Joint Publication 3-05 defines Special Operations as operations that "are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, and are characterized by one or more of the following: time-sensitivity, clandestine or covert nature, low visibility, work with or through indigenous forces, greater requirements for regional orientation and cultural expertise, and a higher degree of risk."[5] At the same time, NATO defines Special Operations as "military activities conducted by specially designated, organized, selected, trained and equipped forces using specialized techniques and modes of employment."[6] In conjunction with the US doctrines, the NATO definition also highlights the possibility of an interagency and multinational approach, the occasional non-SOF support, and the likelihood of partnering with a surrogate force. Both doctrines also underline that Special Operations may support strategic or operational objectives with high risks involved. The Hungarian Special Operations Doctrine uses the same definition as the NATO and US

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[5] Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, Joint Publications 3-05, *Special Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), I-1.

[6] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3, *Allied Joint Doctrine for The Conduct of Operations*, C-1 (United Kingdom: NATO Standardization Agency, 2019), 1-19.

doctrine, and it consists of the same parts: specially selected, trained, equipped, and designed small units conduct special missions in a very sensitive political-strategical environment far beyond the capabilities of conventional forces, using non-traditional methods. Based on the politico-military objectives, the Hungarian doctrine characterizes these missions in three parts: overt, covert, and clandestine.[7] In summary, there is no real difference in the meaning of Special Operations between the three definitions used by the US, NATO, and the Hungarian SOF. By using similar fundamental terminology, it ensures the interoperability between US SOF, NATO SOF, and Hungarian SOF as has been demonstrated in the Global War on Terror.

While largely similar in definition of Special Operations, there are differences between the US, NATO, and Hungarian doctrines as it applies to SOF core missions. Based on the JP 3-05, US SF have twelve core activities: direct action, special reconnaissance, countering weapons of mass destruction, counterterrorism, UW, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, hostage rescue and recovery, counterinsurgency, foreign humanitarian assistance, military information support operations, and civil affairs operations.[8] At the same time, NATO doctrine AJP-3.5, states NATO SOF has three core missions: special reconnaissance, direct action, and military assistance.[9]

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[7] Honvédelmi Minisztérium, Honvéd Vezérkar [MoD General Staff of the Armed Forces], *Magyar Honvédség Különleges Műveleti Doktrína* [Hungarian Defense Forces Special Operations Doctrine] (Budapest, 2014).

[8] Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations,* II-3.

[9] NATO, AJP-3.5, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations*.

As the Hungarian Special Operation Doctrine is a mixture of US and NATO doctrines, it identifies four primary tasks and eight supporting tasks for the Hungarian SOF elements. The four primary tasks are: special reconnaissance and surveillance, direct action, military assistance, and UW.[10] As this paper intends to focus mainly on the primary missions for SF, it may highlight two additional tasks: counter-terrorism and support to information operations. Concerning the definition of each tasks, there is no significant difference between the US, NATO, and Hungarian meaning.

Irregular Warfare

Irregular warfare (IW) is an old form of conflict. As the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* defines "a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary's power, influence, and will."[11] At the same time, NATO defines irregular activity as "the use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to affect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority."[12] Based on these definitions, it is

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[10] Honvédelmi Minisztérium, Honvéd Vezérkar, *Magyar Honvédség Különleges Műveleti Doktrína*.

[11] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2007), 2, accessed 10 April 2020, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/iw-joc.pdf.

[12] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), AJP-3.4.4, *Allied Joint Doctrine for Counter-Insurgency*, A-1 (United Kingdom: NATO Standardization Agency, 2016), 1-2.

clear that the IW is a population centric conflict where both nation-states and their opposing groups target the citizens of a region or country and try to gain their support either to change the current political or ideological environment or maintain it. In IW, participants use indirect approaches to break their opponent's resiliency and target their critical vulnerabilities. Based on the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept,* IW includes multiple activities and operations such as UW, COIN, counterterrorism, and foreign internal defense.[13] These operations are also the core activities of the United States Special Operations Command.[14] From these operations, UW is not only a core mission of US Army SF but also the Hungarian SF too.

<center>Unconventional Warfare</center>

As a core mission for the US SF and the Hungarian SF, UW is the "activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area."[15] The United States has a relatively long history in conducting UW. The Office of Strategic Services (the predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency) supported the French and Yugoslavian resistance movements to fight against German occupation in World War II. US SF empowered the

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[13] Department of Defense, *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept*, 17-24.

[14] Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2016), accessed 11 April 2020, https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-uw-pocket-guide/.

[15] Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations,* xi.

Northern Alliance in Afghanistan against the Taliban regime in 2001.[16] Although UW is mainly a military activity, it requires a large amount of support from other governmental agencies like the Department of State and intelligence services such as the Central Intelligence Agency. The advantage of UW is the low-visibility and low-cost execution of limited military operations, especially in a very sensitive political environment where a small footprint of military forces is necessary. One of the main objectives of UW is to support and enable an opposing force, insurgency, or resistance to achieve a change in the current political system or disrupt an occupying force.[17] Therefore, SF require significant support of a resistance organization for conducting UW.

<center>Resistance Movement</center>

The resistance movement is a key element of the UW. Based on JP 3-05, a resistance movement is "an organized effort by some portion of the civil population of a country to resist the legally established government or an occupying power and to disrupt civil order and stability."[18] The resistance movement can carry out its activities combining violent and non-violent actions. Most of the time a resistance movement consists of three major elements: an underground movement, an auxiliary, and a guerrilla force. Guerillas are the fighting force of a resistance movement. Arguably, they are the force who may be able to overthrow the military power of the government or an

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[16] David Kilcullen, "The Evolution of Unconventional Warfare," *Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies* 2, no. 1 (2019): 61-71, accessed 30 March 2020, https://doi.org/10.31374/sjms.35.

[17] Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations,* II-9.

[18] Ibid., GL-10.

occupying force. Guerilla tactics focus on small-scale attacks including raids, ambushes utilizing the hit-and-run tactics. The underground movement is a cellular structure, covert element of a resistance movement. This organization conducts intelligence collection, espionage, sabotage, assassinations, and recruiting. Their main effort is also to influence the local population by producing and spreading resistance propaganda to the people. The auxiliaries are active supporters and sympathizers of a resistance movement. They are the active supporters of the resistance movement by maintaining safe houses and weapon caches, providing transportation, spreading the resistance propaganda, and providing medical support. They also manage not only courier systems to sustain the communication lines between different elements, but early warning systems for the guerillas to avoid government or occupying forces to conduct offensive operations against them. Furthermore, auxiliaries also recruit from the local population, mainly from those people who passively support the resistance movement. The auxiliaries are the combat service and support element of the resistance movement.

<div align="center">Insurgency</div>

Joint Publication 3-24 provides a narrowed, but clear definition of insurgency which "is the organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region."[19] At the same time, the *Guide to The Analysis of Insurgency* gives a broader understanding of the characteristics of the insurgency. Based on the guide, the insurgency "is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power

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[19] Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, JP 3-05, *Special Operations,* ix.

and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations. The common denominator for most insurgent groups is their objective of gaining control of a population or a particular territory, including its resources."[20] The main difference between the resistance movement and insurgency is that the resistance movement does not necessarily use violence to achieve its objectives. At the same time, an insurgency relies on and uses violent actions to intimidate and control the population. Based on the definition, the separatists of Donetsk and Luhansk are the current example of an insurgency.

Before this paper discusses the Hungarian SOF and their role in the HDF, it is necessary to identify and analyze the possible nature of future conflicts. At the same time, to understand the multinational security efforts carried out by different European countries, it is necessary to discuss the possible threats and the current security situation in Eastern-Europe. As NATO SOF, including the Hungarian SOF, have been focusing on combating terrorism and COIN operations around the globe and specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time new threat rose from the shadows of Russia and its hybrid warfare.

In the Spring of 2014, the world surprisingly realized that Russia took control of the Crimean Peninsula, using its conventional and unconventional capabilities. In the same year, separatists in the Ukrainian Luhansk and Donbas region started a "revolution" against the Ukrainian government and in a few months with the help of Russian SF, took

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[20] United States Central Intelligence, *Guide to The Analysis of Insurgency* (Washington, DC: United States Central Intelligence Agency, 2012), 1, accessed 10 April 2020, https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=713599.

control of these regions.[21] These events brought hybrid warfare to the world's attention and created a dilemma for NATO and especially for the Baltic States. Breaking international laws and agreements, Russia's actions generated an insecure environment in Crimea and Eastern-Ukraine. Moreover, Russia also ignited tensions between ethnicities in Ukraine and used the Russian minorities as a reason to occupy the Crimean Peninsula. As Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have also significant Russian minorities in their territory, the concern is that Russia may also use the same method to break the integrity and sovereignty of their countries. Second, these countries are NATO members, therefore, such an action would also undermine NATO and its basic principles of collective defense.

Russia conducted hybrid warfare in Georgia, 2008, and in Ukraine, 2014, and is now threatening the Baltic region. As Russia's hybrid warfare is a current threat not only to the Baltic States, but to the Eastern European region as well, it is highly important to mention the antagonistic actions executed previously using its diplomacy, information, military, and economy (DIME) as national instruments of power.

Russia, led by President Vladimir Putin, has used aggressive diplomacy to undermine the efforts of NATO and the European Union in many cases.[22] In the last

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[21] Michael Kofman, Michael, Katya Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, Andrew Radin, Olesya Tkacheva, and Jenny Oberholzer, *Lessons from Russia's Operations in Crimea And Eastern Ukraine* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), accessed 4 April 2020, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports /RR1400/RR1498/RAND_RR1498.pdf.

[22] Raphael S. Cohen and Andrew Radin, *Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe: Understanding the Threat* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2019), accessed 1 February 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1793.html.

couple of years, Russia has yet to recognize Kosovo as a sovereign and independent country. Moreover, Russia is continuously influencing Serbia to create tensions in the Balkan Peninsula and therefore, extends the need for Kosovo Force in the country.[23] As Hungary also deploys troops to contribute to the Kosovo Force and the fact that Kosovo is in the close vicinity of Hungary, a peaceful and stabilized Balkan region is extremely important to Hungarian foreign policy.

Russia also conducts an enormous information campaign against NATO, European Union, and the Eastern European countries.[24] Russian disinformation campaigns already targeted Western European countries (Germany, France, and United Kingdom) and tried to influence their internal politics and the outcomes of national elections.[25]

In addition to the information campaign, Russia is building up tremendous military capabilities and forces as well. As Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula with its conventional and unconventional military forces, it also supported the illegitimate separation of the Donbas and Luhansk regions by unconventional means, creating

[23] Christopher S. Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" And What Can Be Done About It* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017), accessed 10 May 2019, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400 /CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf.

[24] Tomáš Čižik, Anke Schmidt-Felzmann, Shota Gvineria, Mykhailo Pashkov, and Dovilė Šukytė, *Information Warfare - New Security Challenge for Europe* (Bratislava: Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs, 2017), accessed 27 April 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322695565_Information_Warfare_-_New_Security_Challenge_for_Europe.

[25] Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" And What Can Be Done About It*.

internal friction in Ukraine.[26] Russia conducted large-scale exercises with its joint forces in the vicinity of NATO member's border like the "ZAPAD-17" field training exercise in Belarus, near the border of Poland in 2017. Furthermore, Russia has regularly tested the readiness, agility, and reactions of NATO by violating the airspace of sovereign allied countries and these Russian air violations create extra efforts from the alliance. For example, within the framework of Baltic Air Policing, NATO increased fighter detachments deployed to the Baltic States as a deterrence against further Russian aggression. The concept started in 2004 to safeguard the air space of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, but requires additional resources to fulfill this commitment from varying NATO countries. As the continuous security of the Baltic States is a common effort, Hungary also deploys aircrafts to these countries.[27]

The largest Russian influence over Europe comes from its' gas and oil resources. The majority of European countries including Germany, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Ukraine, and Hungary depend on Russia's natural resources. Utilizing this source of power, Russia continuously threatens the prosperity and social welfare of European countries, especially in the Baltic region and Eastern Europe.[28] The dependency on these basic needs makes the Eastern European countries extremely vulnerable and emboldens

[26] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Wales Summit Declaration," NATO, 5 September 2014, accessed 10 October 2019, http://www.nato.int/cps/en /natohq/official_texts_112964.htm? selectedLocale=en.

[27] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Hungary To Lead NATO's Baltic Air Policing, Joined by UK And Spain," NATO, 17 April 2019, accessed 7 December 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_165751.htm.

[28] Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" And What Can Be Done About It*.

Russian ambitions. Concerning the current situation, Russia tries to undermine the coherence and cohesion of NATO directly and indirectly, and poses an overall threat to Central and Eastern Europe. Using every aspect of DIME, Russia creates confusion, tensions, and dilemmas and tries to restore its global power. It seems that President Putin learned the historical lesson well: "Divide et impera" (Divide and conquer).

Hybrid Warfare

A leading scholar of Hybrid Warfare is Professor James Kenneth Wither, a retired British Army officer, and faculty member at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He is a Professor of National Security Studies and Director of the Senior Fellows Program. Since 2008, he has also been a member of the teaching faculty of the Program in Terrorism and Security Studies. His research and publications include a wide variety of topics from international terrorism to national security strategies. In one of his publications, "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare," Professor Wither describes and summarizes the different definitions and perspectives of this type of conflict.

From one perspective, the term Hybrid Warfare is not a new type of waging war and achieving political and military success. As Wither refers to the well-known historian, Peter R. Mansoor, based on his definition, the hybrid warfare is a "conflict involving a combination of conventional military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents, and terrorists), which could include both state and non-state actors, aimed at achieving a common political purpose."[29] From Mansoor's perspective, this type of warfare is not new.

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[29] Peter R. Mansoor, "Hybrid War in History," in *Hybrid Warfare: Fighting Complex Opponents from The Ancient World to The Present*, ed. Williamson Murray and

As Wither notes, the term hybrid warfare became common in the twenty-first century, when the violent non-state actors started to use more lethality and refinement, and the increasing cyber domain gained more significance. Although theorists did not come to a common definition, there were three different definitions which emphasized the combination of state and non-state actors and activities. First, Wither refers to Frank G. Hoffman who defines the hybrid warfare as "threats that incorporate a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder, conducted by both sides and a variety of non-state actors."[30] Second, Wither refers to the *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* created by the US Department of Defense that defines hybrid methods as "today's hybrid approaches may involve state adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce or intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states."[31] As Wither notes that for Western theorists hybrid means the diversity and combination of apparatuses and means used by

Peter R. Mansoor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 1-17, accessed 25 September 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication /264829129_Hybrid_Warfare_Fighting_Complex_Opponents_from_the_Ancient_World _to_the_Present_by_Williamson_Murray_and_Peter_R_Mansoor_eds_Cambridge_Camb ridge_University_Press_2012_329pp_1899_ISBN_978-1107643338_In.

[30] Frank G. Hoffman, *Conflict in the 21St Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars* (Arlington, VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007), accessed 21 September 2019, https://www.potomacinstitute.org/images/stories/publications /potomac_hybridwar_0108.pdf.

[31] Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2010), accessed 10 April 2020, https://archive.defense.gov/qdr/QDR%20as%20of%2029JAN10%201600.pdf.

Russia in the annexation of Crimea and separation of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine.

In his research Wither also reflects and refers to the Far Eastern approach to a new type of warfare which contains similar methods to hybrid tactics. Wither refers to two colonels of the People's Liberation Army of China, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, who argue about a very unusual approach to conflicts. In their paper, "Unrestricted Warfare," they wrote about a new type of struggle between states where a wide variety of methods and tactics are employed including both military and non-military means. Their approach to warfare contains cyber-attacks, creating chaos in monetary systems, terrorism, exploit the advantages of the media, and operating in an urban environment.[32] In their book, the authors describe this method, especially for China, to confront the technologically superior United States. Although this study gives guidance on how to conduct war against the United States, the unrestricted warfare theory contains multiple similar elements as the hybrid warfare: using terrorism, economic influence, and cyber capabilities in conjunction with military objectives.

Wither also highlights in his research, that the Russian terminology does not use hybrid warfare as it is a Western interpretation. Russian analysts use the term "new generation warfare" or "non-linear warfare". The idea of the new generation warfare originates from General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Russia, who emphasized that the changing methods of conflicts are "the broad use of

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[32] Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, *Unrestricted Warfare* (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House, 1999), accessed 21 September 2020, https://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf.

political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military means . . .

supplemented by civil disorder among the local population and concealed armed

forces."[33] Wither also refers to Janis Berzins, who exclusively defines the Russian

approach to new generation warfare:

> the main battlespace is in the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars are to be dominated by information and psychological warfare. . . . The main objective is to reduce the necessity for deploying hard military power to the minimum necessary, making the opponent's military and civil population support the attacker to the detriment of their government and country.[34]

Wither sums up his research with an obvious conclusion: either the hybrid warfare

is new by its nature, or it follows old patterns with more sophisticated means. By every

definition, the impact is clear. Non-linear warfare will generate significant challenges for

Western countries and NATO. Wither also notes that war has not changed, it will remain

as violent as it was in the history of mankind, and the goal of war also remains the same:

"to gain a physical or psychological advantage over an opponent."[35]

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[33] Mark Galeotti, "The 'Gerasimov Doctrine' and Russian Non-Linear War," *In Moscow's Shadows Blog*, 6 July 2014, accessed 15 December 2019, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/.

[34] Janis Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy" (National Defence Academy of Latvia, Center for Security and Strategic Research, Riga, Latvia, April 2014), accessed 6 October 2019, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Russia%E2%80%99s-New-Generation-Warfare-in-Ukraine%3A-for-B%C4%93rzi%C5%86%C5%A1/20509c9769cfc7920908f7b7e959ecdfd43ca2f4.

[35] James K. Wither, "Making Sense of Hybrid Warfare," *Connections: The Quarterly Journal* 15, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 73-88, accessed 15 September 2019, https://connections-qj.org/system/files/journals/connections/qj_spring_2016.pdf.

NATO defines hybrid warfare "where a wide range of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures are employed in a highly integrated design."[36] Overall, NATO's definition clearly shows, that hybrid warfare creates multiple dilemmas to the targeted country utilizing civilian, conventional and unconventional military assets.

It is important to understand that there is no common definition for hybrid warfare. Many of these famous researchers and theorists define hybrid warfare slightly differently. But every definition of hybrid warfare leads to the same conclusion: the new generation warfare blurs the line between competition of states and war. It uses less conventional, but more non-traditional ways and means to achieve the ends. It emphasizes the control of information domain to aggressively influence the population. Moreover, it ignores the international rules and ethical norms known so far.

Based on the different methods, the author of this paper thinks that hybrid warfare tactics are not limited to superpowers and prominent nations. As the unconventional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) gain more relevance in hybrid warfare, smaller countries do not necessarily have to maintain large, conventional forces to achieve their political goals. Small countries can also build up hybrid assets to deter near-peer adversaries or can use hybrid means to persuade other countries. These smaller countries with less political influence on the global system and with a low military budget can either defend themselves or achieve their strategic goals through the utilization of hybrid warfare.

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[36] NATO, "Wales Summit Declaration."

In the twenty-first century, hybrid warfare seems to be a low-cost, but highly efficient way of waging war. For example, conducting cyber warfare is relatively cheap comparing the prizes of computers and programs to the cost of tanks, airplanes, missiles, and cruisers. Also, not only hacking is a threat, but spreading fake news and propaganda is an excellent way to influence the population which costs even less. In another example, terrorism has become unfortunately cheap as well. In the last couple of years, terrorist groups committed attacks by easily accessible tools: knives, buses, and trucks on the streets of major European cities.[37] The use of low-cost means leads to the conclusion that the terrorist groups instead of pursuing explosives and weapons which are difficult to obtain, especially in Europe, they will use lethal, but trivial equipment to bring fear and chaos to democratic societies. As the relatively low-cost terrorism and cyber activities are components of hybrid warfare, targeted countries must be able to defend their people against these events.

In hybrid warfare, the population is the key to success. Either small countries, like Hungary, must understand that the will of a nation and the population's support are the most significant fundamentals of successfully countering hybrid threats. As long as the population is resilient enough to resist a massive information campaign and willingness to fight as one against the oppressors, they will have a chance to defend their country successfully.

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[37] Amanda Erickson, "Why Truck Attacks Are So Common in Europe, But Not the United States," *Washington Post*, 1 November 2017, accessed 5 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/01/why-truck-attacks-are-so-common-in-europe-but-not-the-united-states/.

The Preparation of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF)
for Future Challenges

For the purpose of this paper, it is relevant to mention how the Hungarian

Ministry of Defense (MoD) and the HDF identify and develop capabilities to meet future

challenges.

In 2014, during the NATO summit held in Wales, Hungary agreed to increase its

defense expenditure to 2 percent of the gross domestic product by 2024, using 20 percent

of this amount for modernization.[38] As a first step, in December, 2016, the Hungarian

MoD announced the launch of a military modernization program called "Zrinyi 2026"

which aimed to modernize the HDF by acquiring the newest military technologies and

equipment (weaponry, fixed and rotary wing aircraft, electronic warfare and cyber

capabilities) to face present and future challenges. The development program also aimed

to strengthen the civil-military relationships, re-organize an effective Territorial Defense

Forces, and provide increased salary to military servicemembers.[39] Within the framework

of the modernization, the Hungarian MoD contracted with different foreign companies to

purchase: 44 Leopard A2 main battle tanks, 24 Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelled

artillery guns, 8 transportation planes, 36 Airbus helicopters (20 H-145M light and 16 H-

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[38] Hungarian Government, "Defence Minister Presented His Annual Report," The official website of the Hungarian Government, 19 June 2019, accessed 5 November 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/defence-minister-presented-his-annual-report.

[39] Hungarian Government, "Zrínyi 2026 Programme To Begin," The official website of the Hungarian Government. 22 December 2016, accessed 5 November 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/zrinyi-2026-programme-to-begin.

225M medium helicopters.[40] The Hungarian MoD also bought the license from the

Czech CZ armament company manufacturing its small arms weapons in Hungary

including pistols, sub-machine guns, and carbines.[41] As part of the development program,

the MoD contracted with the Swedish SAAB company to buy CARL GUSTAV M4

multi-role weapon systems to enhance the firepower of infantry units within the HDFC.[42]

Furthermore, Hungary also joined the European Centre of Excellence for

Countering Hybrid Threats in December 2019. As Gergely Németh, the Hungarian

Deputy State Secretary for Defense Policy mentioned, it is highly important that

European countries consider and dedicate resources for a comprehensive and

multinational approach to counter hybrid threats. Németh also said that the Centre of

Excellence "is an essential element in the European toolbox as it serves as a network for

information sharing as well as best practices and it provides a central platform for

concerted efforts in the emerging security domains."[43]

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[40] Gábor Baranyai, "Ha Szükséges, Több Ezer Katona Indulhat a Határra [If necessary, thousands of soldiers can be deployed to the border]," Honvédelem.Hu [Hungarian Defense Force], 14 February 2019, accessed 5 November 2019, https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/ha-szukseges-tobb-ezer-katona-indulhat-a-hatarra/.

[41] Hungarian Government, "Új, Magyarországon Összeszerelt Fegyvereket Kaptak A Katonák [Soldiers received new weapons assembled in Hungary]," Hungarian Government, 11 December 2018, accessed 5 November 2019, https://www.kormany.hu /hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/uj-magyarorszagon-osszeszerelt-fegyvereket-kaptak-a-katonak.

[42] Hungarian Government, "Defence Spending to Break All Previous Records," The official website of the Hungarian Government, 11 June 2019, accessed 5 November 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/defence-spending-to-break-all-previous-records.

[43] Hybrid Coe, "Hungary Joins Hybrid Coe," Hybrid Coe, 10 December 2019, accessed 20 December 2019, https://www.hybridcoe.fi/news/hungary-joins-hybrid-coe/.

The modernization program also includes structural changes in the HDF—an increased number of active personnel, and a national Cyber Security Centre as a response to the increasing significance of cyber threats, and other institutions for defense education.[44]

In summary, the "Zrínyi 2026" modernization program will in many ways prepare the HDF for future threats. Though, the program communicated to the public does not disclose the implications and changes in the Hungarian SOF, there are corresponding changes.

<u>The Hungarian Special Operations Forces</u>

For better understanding of the Hungarian SOF capabilities and its role in the HDF, it is necessary to describe its background, deployments, training requirements, and the relationship with other national and international military organizations.

The 2nd Special Operation Forces Brigade (2nd SOFB) is the elite military organization of the Hungarian Army which has the authority and ability to execute special operations, in some cases, reinforced by other combat support elements of the HDF. The predecessor of the 2nd SOFB was designed in 2003 as the 34th Special Operation Battalion.

In 2003, the Hungarian Defense Forces Joint Force Command (HDF JFC) decided to develop the special operation capability. After forming a planning group from officers

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[44] Hungarian Government, "Next Year's Budget Will Be Budget of Security," The official website of the Hungarian Government, 11 July 2019, accessed 5 November 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/next-year-s-budget-will-be-budget-of-security.

who graduated from the schools of the United States, the HDF JFC initiated the necessary arrangements and designated the 34th Miklos Bercsényi Long Range Reconnaissance Battalion as the initial unit to develop special operations capabilities. The 34th Miklos Bercsényi Special Operations Battalion was established in 2005 with the support of one Mobile Training Team from the United States.[45] In 2006, the Battalion organized and conducted its first Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC) instructed by the members of the Mobile Training Team.[46] In the next years, the Special Operations Battalion grew in numbers of qualified SF operators and reached its initial operational capability, and later on, its full operational capability.

In 2009, the first Hungarian SF team was deployed to Afghanistan under the mandate of the International Security Assistance Forces. It was attached to Task Force-10 which was a multinational special operation element. Co-located and co-operating with US Army SF teams, the Hungarian SF teams conducted military assistance with the assigned Afghan National Police-Provisional Response Companies. The combat mentoring of the Afghan special police unit continued throughout the years with multiple Hungarian SF teams rotating through time. In 2013, the Hungarian SF took over the command of the Special Operation Task Group-East, as part of the Combined Special Operation Task Force-10, and became the lead nation for six months. This Special

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[45] Imre, Gerőcs, "A Magyar Honvédség Különleges Műveleti Képesség Múltja, Jelene [Hungarian Army's History and Presence of Special Operations Capabilities]," *Hadtudományi Szemle, Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem HHK* [Military Science Review, National University of Public Service HHK] 5 (2012): 293-299, accessed 21 September 2019, http://epa.hu/02400/02463/00012/pdf/EPA02463_hadtudomanyi_szemle_2012_1-2_293-299.pdf.

[46] Ibid.

Operations element included one Hungarian SF team and a large portion of staff members who commanded and controlled multinational SF teams from the United States, Slovenia, and Estonia.[47] In December 2014, the Hungarian SF Contingent was relocated and re-tasked with the training, advising, and assisting the designated Afghan Special Operation Battalion. During the deployments, the Hungarian SF missions included numerous combat operations where Hungarian SF teams gained experience and knowledge about COIN environment.

In 2016, the HDF JFC created the 2nd SOF Regiment by combining the 34th Special Operation Battalion with the 88th Light Infantry Battalion. Based on the growing needs and requirements for a larger SOF capability, the HDF JFC expanded the Table of Organization and Equipment of the SOF Regiment in order to form a SOF Brigade. In 2018, the 2nd SOF Brigade was constituted. To ensure the integration and interoperability of the Hungarian special operation capability to the NATO doctrines and requirements, the HDF JFC created the 2nd SOFB to execute the four core missions: special reconnaissance, direct action, UW, and military assistance.[48]

To not only meet the HDF JFC's requirements, but the NATO standards as well, the Hungarian SF operators need to go through a relatively long training session

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[47] Ádám Draveczki-Ury, "Amerikai, Észt És Szlovén Különleges Műveleti Katonák Szolgálnak Majd Magyar Parancsnokság Alatt [US Estonian and Slovenian special operations soldiers will serve under Hungarian command]," Honvédelem.Hu [Hungarian Defense Force], 22 October 2013, accessed 10 November 2019, https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/amerikai-eszt-es-szloven-kulonleges-muveleti-katonak-szolgalnak-majd-magyar-parancsnoksag-alatt/.

[48] Honvédelmi Minisztérium, Honvéd Vezérkar, *Magyar Honvédség Különleges Műveleti Doktrína*.

compared to conventional soldiers. As in other foreign SOF units, the development of the SF candidates starts with a ten-day mentally and physically challenging selection where the SF instructors assess the abilities, basic skills, motivation, and physical fitness of the trainees. The candidates, who successfully complete the selection phase, have an opportunity to continue their SF basic training on the SFQC. The SFQC consists of five phases: Land Navigation phase; Small Unit Tactics phase; Specialization phase; Special Reconnaissance and Direct Action phase; and UW and Military Assistance phase. After completion of the SFQC, the newly graduated operators receive their assignment to the teams where they start their specified advanced training based on mission requirements. To achieve interoperability with the US Army SF, the structure of the Hungarian SF teams was designed based on US doctrine. Therefore, a Hungarian SF team mirrors a US SF team consisting of twelve operators: one team leader, one assistant team leader, one team sergeant, one intelligence sergeant, two weapon specialists, two engineer specialists, two communication specialists, and two medical specialists.

As the 2nd SOFB does not possess all the necessary combat support capabilities to execute missions, the SF teams and Special Operation Task Groups requires additional conventional assets. For example, the 86th Helicopter Base provides the rotary-wing assets for air transportation or Close Combat Attack; the 59th Aviation Base provides the Close Air Support, and there are also non-kinetic capabilities in support of the 2nd SOFB: the Civilian–Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Centre, which consistently contribute to the execution of the field training exercises with Tactical Psychological Operations Teams (TPT) and Civil Affairs teams. Although these capabilities enhance the effectiveness of the SF teams during the deployments to

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Afghanistan, the HDFC does not augment these assets to the SF contingents. To achieve better integration and to exploit the full use of these capabilities, the elements of the 2nd SOFB regularly conduct field training exercises with them. Additionally, the 2nd SOFB also has training relations with other governmental organizations and participates in multinational exercises as well as part of the security cooperation between nations.

The 2nd SOFB regularly conducts common training with the 86th Helicopter Base and the Civilian–Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Centre. The aviation teams, the members of the TPTs, and their staff members are not familiar with the TTPs of the special operations community. Most of the time, they lack the knowledge on the Hungarian Special Operations Doctrine, terminology, and basics of SOF operations. As an example, the members of the TPTs do not have the same tactical equipment (weapons, radios, uniforms, and helmets) as SOF teams, therefore, they are not interoperable with each other during an operation. Furthermore, the aviation teams are not always able to support the infiltration or exfiltration of the SOF teams because of specific circumstances: severely restrictive terrain, limitations of night air operations, other priorities. Even more, the 86th Helicopter Base is under the command of the Air Force Branch of the HDFC; therefore, they must follow additional regulations as well, which are not all the time well known by the SF teams. In summary, the 2nd SOFB has a good and satisfactory relationship, but further interoperability is necessary and inevitable to achieve the unity of effort. But the conventional forces are not the only partners with whom the 2nd SOFB tries to achieve common ground.

In the last fourteen years, Hungarian SF teams and staff members conducted numerous national exercises with the special purpose unit of the Ministry of Interior,

called the Counter-Terrorism Centre. Hungarian SOF elements also participated in multinational exercises with the US Army SF (for example, the Joint Combined Exchange Trainings), multiple field training exercises with the Polish SF (for example Field Training Exercise Cobra), and various exercises with other NATO members' special operation community. While Hungarian SOF fared well during these exercises, it was evident that specific skills had atrophied. The continuously extending and deepening military relationship with other European countries, and the current security situation in Eastern-Europe created the opportunity and necessity for further developing the Hungarian Special Operation capabilities and the creation of a new multinational SOF element in the region.

During the meeting of NATO Ministers of Defense, the Defense Ministers of Hungary, Croatia, Slovakia, and Slovenia signed a Memorandum of Understanding about the establishment of the Regional Special Operation Component Command (R-SOCC) on 25 October 2019.[49] Hungary will contribute to the R-SOCC as a lead nation and it will reach its initial operational capability in 2021 and the full operational capability in 2026. The NATO Deputy Secretary General Mircea Geoana also participated in the signing ceremony who emphasized the significance of this initiative: "As Special Operational Forces constitute a highly versatile tool in modern conflict, this signing ceremony takes an important step towards strengthening Special Forces in the region and increasing

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[49] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Four NATO Allies Establish A Regional Special Forces Command," NATO, 25 October 2019, accessed 7 December 2019, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_169958.htm.

cooperation and interoperability within the Alliance."[50] The Hungarian Defense Minister, Tibor Benkő stated earlier that "the R-SOCC will be tasked with ensuring that troops serving in central European countries maintain peace."[51] At this point, it is either classified, or not finalized yet, how the different nations and with what capabilities they are going to contribute to the R-SOCC.

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[50] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Four NATO Allies Establish A Regional Special Forces Command."

[51] Honvédelem.Hu [Hungarian Defense Force], "Benkő Tibor: Megállapodás Jött Létre Egy Regionális Műveleti Parancsnokság Magyarországi Létrehozásáról [An Agreement has been reached on the Establishment of a Regional Operations Command in Hungary]," Honvédelem.Hu, 14 February 2019, accessed 29 October 2019, https://honvedelem.hu/cikk/benko-tibor-megallapodas-jott-letre-egy-regionalis-muveleti-parancsnoksag-magyarorszagi-letrehozasarol/.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Russian-type hybrid warfare is the currently preferred tactic in the 21st century. Therefore, countries, who face external, and internal threats as well, must prepare their homeland defense plans according to this type of waging war. The following documents serve as baselines and frameworks for the research. First of all, it is necessary to determine how the future operational environment looks like from now, what the challenges will be, and which domains will grow significantly that might affect the nature of warfare.

The Future Operating Environment 2035

In 2014, in the same year when Russia conducted hostile actions against Ukraine, the MoD of the United Kingdom (UK) released an evidence-based publication called the *Future Operating Environment 2035*. The study provides an outstanding perspective on the characteristics of the operational environment in the future not only for military leaders but politicians and researchers as well. Although the study focuses mainly on UK's interests, it also forecasts general statements about the characteristics and challenges of the future around the globe. The publication has three main parts. The first chapter describes a strategic and UK context focusing on the broad statements and tendencies like urbanization, climate change, technology, relationship between states, and shift in the balance of power. The second chapter describes the characteristics of the operational environment in the future and how they will affect military forces and capabilities. Although the publication covers multiple topics and forecasts, for the

purpose of this paper the following statements may have an implication on the Hungarian homeland defense and the Hungarian SOF elements as well.

1. State and non-state actors: based on a thorough research, the publication explains that state actors will more likely to utilize terrorists, cyber-attacks, and proxy groups in conflicts. It also describes that in the future there will be more non-state actors in numbers including non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations as well. It also expresses that non-state actor extremists will have more access to the information domain and will use more innovative and violent tactics. Based on the publication, in the future it will be even more difficult to make a difference between criminal groups, terrorists, and other violent non-state actors on the battlefield.

2. Information, communication, cyberspace: militaries will have growing reliance on information and communication systems. Data bases will grow continuously and those will play crucial role maintaining critical national infrastructure. Therefore, technological surveillance will become more advanced and preferred method to collect information using sensors of different but linked systems. The value of cyberspace will rapidly grow in conjunction with cyber operations and awareness. As larger range of actors will gain access to cyberspace, it will be more vulnerable and contested by 2035. Hackers and malicious software will pose even more significant challenges not only to militaries but also governmental organizations and critical national infrastructure.

3. Urbanization: the urban environment will increase exponentially in the future. As more people will live in cities, the urban terrain will become an information-rich environment, it will represent a diverse physical and cultural hub for societies, and key centers for human activities. As future cities will be vertically and horizontally multi-layered with concentrated population, those will represent extraordinary challenges to armed forces. At the same time, cyberspace and electromagnetic spectrum will increase the complexity of built up areas by further widening the operational environment.[52]

As the *Future Operating Environment 2035* study forecasts a very challenging and complex situation in the future, it also provides recommendations to overcome these threats. For example, the study underlines the necessity of understanding each factors of the operational environment not only through technological assets, but through human sensors as well. As the significance of human terrain will increase based on the larger difference between cultures and values, military forces can gain a better understanding on the situation through subject matter experts and personal experiences. The education will play a key role to understand and assess the operational environment as well. The study also emphasizes the necessity for sharing information with partners and alliance to achieve a better situational awareness and it will enhance the success of allied forces in neutral or hostile areas.

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[52] Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, *Future Operating Environment 2035* (Shrivenham, UK: Ministry of Defence, 2014), accessed 3 March 2020, https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/future-operating-environment-2035.

Although the study describes the future operating environment from the United Kingdom's perspective, most of the forecasts also apply to Hungary. Based on the census from 2011, 70 percent of the Hungarian population live in cities and towns.[53] Hungary is also part of the developed countries and it has well-developed information systems including internet, media, and newspaper coverage. Therefore, the HDFC must inevitably focus on these populated areas in the homeland defense plan to protect, control, and in case, use them for intelligence collection operations. As the information warfare targeting the population is a key part of the Russian-type hybrid warfare, these areas are valuable ground not only for adversaries but for the HDF as well including SOF elements.

<u>Rácz's Views on Hybrid Warfare</u>

Dr. András Rácz is a Non-Resident Fellow of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at the International Centre for Defense and Security. He is also an Associate Professor at the Pázmány Péter Catholic University in Budapest, Hungary and Senior Researcher at the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies. Rácz has previously worked as Senior Research Fellow of the Finnish Institute of International Affairs between 2014 and 2016 and as Senior Research Fellow of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs until 2014. In one of his articles, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei" [The Hybrid Warfare and The Possibilities of Countering It], he stated in 2015, that based on the Gerasimov-doctrine, hybrid warfare has six stages: from igniting tensions and undermining the government in the targeted country to overthrow

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[53] Hungarian Central Statistical Office, *The Settlement Network of Hungary-Cities, Towns* (Budapest: Central Statistical Office, 2015), 13, accessed 3 March 2020, https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/mo_telepuleshalozata/varosok_falvak.pdf.

the legitimate government with utilizing hybrid threats: the regular and irregular forces, the terrorist groups, and the criminal organizations.[54] The aggressor state also exploits the support of political parties and proxy groups in the targeted country, who show common interest toward the offensive state.[55] He also notes that the country, which is using hybrid warfare, focuses on breaking the willpower of the targeted country in all domains of DIME to weaken or paralyze its resistance and defensive capabilities. The hybrid warfare also exploits internal tensions in the targeted country by intensifying these strains and aims to unleash an internal armed conflict in the targeted country.[56] At the last stage of hybrid warfare, when the targeted state's political system and ruling government breaks down and it is unable to maintain a safe and secure environment, those political parties take over the control of the government and will request the aggressor country to help restoring the law and order. As a result of the request, the aggressor country uses its regular military forces to "invade" the targeted country as "peacekeepers."[57]

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[54] Valery Gerasimov, "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations," *Military Review* (January-February 2016): 23-29, Originally published in *Military-Industrial Kurier,* 27 February 2013, trans. Robert Coalson, accessed 3 March 2020, https://jmc.msu.edu/50th/download/21-conflict.pdf.

[55] András Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei [The Hybrid Warfare and The Possibilities of Countering It]," Academia.edu, accessed 23 May 2019, https://www.academia.edu/35356672 /A_hibrid_hadviselés_és_az_ellene_való_védekezés_lehetőségei.

[56] Ibid.

[57] Ibid.

Rácz summarizes his paper that the Russian-type hybrid warfare does not intend to defeat the targeted country's armed forces directly, but through the exploitation of internal tensions and weaknesses in all domains, it degrades the targeted country's resilience, paralyzes its national decision-making systems, and defeats its will to fight. Rácz also notes that based on the Russian think tanks the non-linear warfare highly focuses on the information domain to break the will of the targeted country to resist. Therefore, the Russian-type hybrid warfare emphasizes the psychological or information warfare as the main domain to create confusions, disinform the population through the media or cyber space, and discredit the legitimate government of the targeted country.

Based on Rácz's assessment, to effectively utilize the hybrid warfare, six preconditions need to exist:

1. The country uses hybrid warfare must have a stronger and more capable military power than the targeted country.
2. The government of the targeted country must be weak, and its military must be low motivated.
3. There must be an internal tension between ethnicities or dissatisfaction toward its government in the targeted country.
4. There must be ethnicities from the aggressor nation in the targeted country.
5. Sustainment conditions: either ethnicities or groups who can logistically support the aggressor's unconventional warfare in the targeted country or the targeted country must have a common border with the aggressor country.
6. The aggressor country must have strong information power.[58]

Rácz also notes how targeted countries can defend themselves against hybrid warfare. Based on his research, the targeted countries must maintain a strong and unified government with a low presence of corruption.[59] It is also essential that the targeted

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[58] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei."

[59] Ibid.

country must maintain and develop a credible deterrence military force that can cause significant losses to the aggressor country in case of a conflict.

In his article, Rácz also points out that although Hungary is not bordered with Russia, and does not have significant Russian minorities in its territory, Hungary still can be an objective of Russia's hybrid warfare.[60] In Hungary, corruption is relatively high compared to western countries, the government is not united on many issues, and there is a significant reliance on Russian oil and gas resources. Moreover, there is also a general dissatisfaction at the eastern region of the country. All of these factors make Hungary vulnerable to any adversaries, especially to Russia, who might exploit these tensions within Hungary.

In their report, "The Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine," Rácz and Katri Pynnöniemi provide an analysis on how Russian disinformation campaign targeted Hungary in 2014, after the annexation of Crimea. As the authors describe, the first disinformation case started with an official letter from the Russian Duma and President of the Liberal Democratic Party, to the governments of Poland, Hungary, and Romania on 24 March 2014. The letter contained a proposal about a possible referendum in the Eastern, Northern, and Southern part of Ukraine. As a significant Hungarian minority still lives on the Eastern part of Ukraine, the letter tried to exploit the nationalist sentiments of the Hungarian population living in Hungary. As the letter sounded absurd, the Hungarian Government did not even officially react on it. Later on, a title of an interview with the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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[60] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei."

confusingly depicted the possible return of the Hungarian populated areas of Ukraine.[61] Although during the interview the spokesperson clearly stated that the idea is absurd, and Hungary does not have revisionist intensions, the title of the TV show created a diverse perception among the Hungarian population on the conflict in Ukraine. As Rácz and Pynnöniemi state in their research, the letter did not directly point out the divide of Ukraine, but it intended to play on the national feelings of the Hungarian population and created controversial views on Russia's actions as well.[62]

Based on the author's assessment, the second Russian disinformation case started with an article written by a known Russian supported Hungarian website in August, 2014. The article accused Hungary that it transported T-72s to Ukraine to support its war against the insurgency in the Donetsk and Luhansk region. The article also contained pictures of T-72 tanks staging at a railway station in Hungary, near the border to Ukraine. Immediately after the publication of the article, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confronted Hungary in an official letter and blamed the Hungarian Government violated the international regulations on arms exports. The Hungarian officials from the MoD and Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade denied the accusation and explained the movement of the armament from one military depot to another. During the examination, it turned out

[61] Hír TV, "Visszatérhet Kárpátalja Magyarországhoz? [May Zakarpattya return to Hungary]," Hir TV, 24 March 2014, accessed 5 December 2019, https://www.hirtv.hu/magyarorszageloben/visszaterhet-karpatalja-magyarorszaghoz-1217630.

[62] András Rácz and Katri Pynnöniemi, eds., *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and The Conflict in Ukraine* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2016), accessed 3 November 2019, http://www.sfpa.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/FIIAReport45_FogOfFalsehood.pdf.

that the Hungarian Government sold these tanks to a Czech company.[63] As the

explanation did not satisfy the Russian Government, a member of the Duma blamed

Hungary for delivering tanks based on the request of the US.[64] Although, there was no

sign of Hungarian T-72s fighting in the conflict in Ukraine, the Russian disinformation

cases provided the basis for rumors and mistrust not only among the Hungarian citizens,

but in the international community as well. As Rácz and Pynnöniemi conclude "this was

a tailored information operation aimed specifically against Hungary."[65]

Based on the steps and the future implementation of hybrid warfare, the possible

targeted countries like Hungary must use their instruments of power in all domains

(DIME) to defend the country, protect its people, and sovereignty. Therefore, based on

the National Military Strategy of Hungary, the MoD, and the Joint Force Command must

develop a cohesive strategic and operational plan to combat effectively against hybrid

threats if necessary.

Fabian's View on Small Countries Defense

Sandor Fabian is an independent defense consultant who is also a graduate

teaching assistant in the Political Science Department at the University of Central

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[63] Hungarian Government, "The Czech Authorities Knew About The T-72 Tank Transports," Hungarian Government, 29 August 2014, accessed 15 November 2019, https://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-defence/news/the-czech-authorities-knew-about-the-t-72-tank-transports.

[64] Lóránt Győri and Péter Krekó, "Russian Disinformation and Extremism in Hungary," Warsaw Institute, 16 October 2017, accessed 5 December 2019, https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-disinformation-extremism-hungary/.

[65] Rácz and Pynnöniemi, *Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of Deception and The Conflict in Ukraine.*

Florida. He served as a Hungarian SF officer, and was a key player in the establishment of the Hungarian SOF capability. He served sixteen years in the SF community, and fulfilled multiple positions from team leader to the Deputy Director of Force Readiness Directorate, NATO Special Operations Headquarters. His professional military education includes multiple schools in the US and he earned his Master of Science degree at the Naval Postgraduate School in 2012. He is an author of numerous articles and one book which focus on the defense strategy of small states and the future of NATO SOF.

In his thesis, "Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The Other Side of COIN," Fabian expresses his ideas about the alternative methods how small states could conduct their homeland defense facing with a conventional, orthodox military which has numerical and technological advantage.[66] During his research, he identified four major strategies that small countries historically have used, and still try to use, to deter their adversaries: imitating a major power's military capability; joining an alliance; assuming neutrality; or acquiring weapons of mass destruction.[67] Based on a thorough, historical analysis, he concluded that these defense strategies may not be feasible to every small state as they have multiple disadvantages and pitfalls that may lead to catastrophic failure. Through multiple case studies, Fabian concluded his research that a way of waging war and protect their homeland, small countries could turn to organize and sustain an irregular-based military. In his conclusion, Fabian states that "this research

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[66] Sandor Fabian, "Professional Irregular Defense Forces: The Other Side Of COIN" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2012), accessed 20 September 2019, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/7338.

[67] Ibid., 18.

intended to explore the possibility of another, more advantageous, way of homeland defense."[68]

As Hungary is a NATO member and the Hungarian SOF Brigade has a close connection to the NATO Special Operations Headquarters, one of Fabian's article also applies to the Hungarian SOF. In his article, "NATO Special Operations Forces: Even if It Is Not Broken Yet, It Needs to Be Fixed," Fabian writes about the changes of NATO SOF perspective and employment concerning the future possible conflicts. In his article, Fabian describes a couple of weaknesses and malfunctions of NATO SOF, but he also provides possible solutions to better prepare for future conflicts. For example, Fabian notes, that the NATO SOF has built up and designed its doctrines and manuals based on the experiences from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Africa, mainly conducting COIN and counterterrorism operations. Also, NATO SOF designed and developed its capabilities based on the assumption that future conflicts would require such proficiencies. He also highlights that in future conflicts with near-pear adversaries, NATO SOF may not have the same overwhelming dominance as it is in Afghanistan or in Iraq.

Fabian urges an inevitable change in the perspective of SOF missions, organizations, and training requirement. Although, he does not recommend one or two specific solutions, but rather he depicts a wide range of possibilities. For example, he recommends to analyze and study in details the organizational structure and history of NATO's near-pear adversaries special military units. As another option, he writes about "combining the organizational characteristics of terrorist groups, insurgent organizations

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[68] Fabian, "Professional Irregular Defense Forces," 160.

or old institutions like the OSS or the KGB [Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti]."[69]

Fabian also argues for a more covert and clandestine SOF perspective, where NATO SOF must employ infiltration and exfiltration techniques which have never used before. He also emphasizes the necessity of trainings focusing on difficult terrain and weather circumstances, the importance of cultural trainings and language education.[70] Although Fabian does not provide clear and detailed recommendations for further developing NATO SOF, currently there are many studies which depicts solution for SOF development facing new challenges.

<div align="center">The NORSOF 2025 Study</div>

Espen Berg-Knutsen and Nancy Roberts created the "Strategic Design for Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 2025" study in 2014 with the support of international officer students from Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States under the direction of Defense Analysis Department faculty.

The "Strategic Design for Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 2025" study identified four areas of future adversary development: the emerging "Asia-Pacific center of gravity," the revisionist Russia, the extremist/militant Islam movements on the Middle-East and North-Africa, and the extension of current threats: the proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, cyber threats, and terrorism.[71] Although the

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[69] Fabian, "NATO Special Operations Forces," 188-201.

[70] Ibid.

[71] Espen Berg-Knutsen and Nancy Roberts, "Strategic Design for Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 2025" (Technical Report, Naval Postgraduate

authors of the study identified Russian-type hybrid warfare as a key future challenge, it is

not only a threat to Norway but any other small states in the region as well.

The research focused on the possible development of the NORSOF to meet the

future's challenges, for example countering hybrid warfare. The study answered the

following question: "How might we design a Special Operation Force to best serve

Norway's security interest in 2025?"

The study recommends a solution with three major parts:

1. A new mission for SOF: the study recommends counter-hybrid warfare as a

    core task to Norwegian SOF and it also highlights that a full spectrum

    governmental approach is necessary to fight against hybrid warfare and threats.

    The study also highlights that SOF units should play a vital role in this

    environment and also emphasizes the importance of interagency cooperation.

    Based on the authors' research, they also recommend that SOF should establish

    a national interagency network working with international SOF networks. The

    study also highlights the key features of the SOF mindset: flexibility,

    integration, and innovation.

2. A new special operator: the study recommends the development of the new

    SOF operators personalized to successfully combat hybrid warfare and threats.

    The study refers to this type of operator as "warrior-diplomat" (Tucker and

    Lamb 2007), who is a highly-educated strategic thinker, excellent in political

School, Monterey, CA, 2014), 18, accessed 21 September 2019, https://calhoun.nps.edu
/handle/10945/47444.

and cultural understanding, realizes social relations, has clear communication

skills, and empathy.

3. A new organization: as part of the solution, the study recommends establishing

a new SOF unit that has direct authority to interagency coordination and the

strategic decision-makers, and able to fight against hybrid threats. The study

highly emphasizes the relation and direct connection between SOF units and

strategic level leadership. The short chain of command and the direct link to

other governmental agencies enable SOF units to plan, prepare and execute

their mission rapidly, as part of an integrated, cooperative effort. As a

secondary task of this SOF unit, it should also focus on training and preparing

the Norwegian Home Guard for guerilla warfare by utilizing the force-

multiplier capability of SOF.[72]

Besides the three major proposals, the authors provide additional

recommendations in the NORSOF structure and organization: NORSOCOM's

operational command over its forces; the establishment of a Research and Development

cell; the creation of a SOF reserve unit to support active duty SOF; the creation of a SOF

air group; and the establishment of a training detachment.[73] From the five proposed

changes, this paper highlights the creation of a SOF reserve unit to support active duty

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[72] Espen Berg-Knutsen, "From Tactical Champions to Grand Strategy Enablers: The Future of Small-Nation SOF in Counter–Hybrid Warfare," *Combating Terrorism Exchange* 6, no. 4 (November 2016): 61-68, accessed 10 April 2020, https://nps.edu /web/ecco/-/ctx-journal-volume-6-number-4?inheritRedirect=true.

[73] Ibid., 60.

SOF and the creation of a SOF air group as this paper discusses these topics later from the Hungarian SOF perspective.

Conclusion

The literature review discusses three different, but interrelated topics. First, it covers the characteristics of the future operational environment identifying multiple challenges that militaries will most likely face. It also identifies the growing significance of specific domains where militaries must have the capabilities to operate effectively and successfully to support the political-strategic goals as well. Second, this paper identifies the Russian-type hybrid warfare as the most possible threat in the future for Hungary and it also covers broadly its characteristics and its steps. Third, the literature review discusses the necessity for a change in the mindset concerning the Hungarian homeland defense. It also points out the necessity for a change in further developing the Hungarian SOF capabilities and their employment in homeland defense. The research also refers to an irregular approach as a possible course of action for the HDF in case of an external conventional threat.

Based on the literature review the author of this paper derives the following conclusions:

First, the Russian-type hybrid warfare separates the acts of war into two parts: an indirect and a direct approach to achieve strategical goals. The first four phases of the non-linear warfare focus mainly on non-military actions to disable the legitimate government and its abilities through information warfare, economic sanctions, and proxy groups. In these phases the primary military actions will include the creation of a resistance by adversary SOF in the targeted country and, as a deterrence, the conduct of

high-volume conventional exercises. In case the indirect approach does not achieve the desired conditions, the legitimate government is still in place, and the society is resilient enough, the aggressor may shift to the direct approach which is basically the fifth and sixth phases of the Gerasimov-chart. In these phases the targeted country focuses on the use of conventional military forces combined with unconventional assets orchestrating local armed resistance. Therefore, the conflict may lead to a limited war ending in large-scale combat operations from both countries.

Second, the Hungarian homeland defense plan should include the ability to counter the way and means of the Russian-type hybrid warfare. The homeland defense plan also needs to consider external and internal threats determined as adversary proxy groups, information warfare assets, unconventional, and conventional military elements. The HDFC must consider how it will employ Hungarian SOF as a response to the threats and phases of the Russian-type hybrid warfare. Facing that type of warfare will require different capabilities and employment tactics for the Hungarian SOF facing the adversary's indirect or direct approach. Based on the phases and steps of the Russian-type hybrid warfare, the Hungarian SOF need to possess additional capabilities, adapt to new requirements and hone extra skills to effectively fight hybrid threats.

Third, any adversary of Hungary following the steps of the Russian-type hybrid warfare will heavily rely on operating in the information domain. Those adversaries may use the information domain to create confusion and disinform the Hungarian population either to mask their original intent and purpose or intensifying frictions within the Hungarian population. As part of the information domain, cyberspace will gain exclusive significance not only for hostile actions, but also breaking into Hungarian governmental

systems to collect information, sabotage the systems, and disrupt official networks. Adversaries will also use cyberspace to influence the Hungarian population on social platforms and may also use this domain for covert information exchange through encrypted messages. Therefore, the HDF must have the capabilities to influence the information domain as well, protect the cyberspace, or use this realm for counter-attacks.

Fourth, the Hungarian population and society will play a key role in conducting a Russian-type hybrid threat or countering it. As influencing the population is a major part of the Russian-type hybrid warfare, either the Hungarian governmental organizations, either adversaries will try to fight for the overall support of the population. Therefore, as a preparation of the Hungarian homeland defense, the Hungarian government needs to support a resilient population and the integrity of the Hungarian society. The population will also be crucial as a ground for intelligence collection to identify the possible hostile proxy groups employed by adversaries of Hungary. To gain the support of the population, the HDF SOF must be able to inform and influence the Hungarian people to enhance resilience and cohesion within the society.

Fifth, the significance of urban terrain will increase in the Russian-type hybrid warfare. In an urban environment two vital conditions already exist: population and information networks. As the non-linear warfare primarily targets the will and mind of the population and uses the information domain as a mean to carry out psychological operations, the urban environment is key not only for the aggressor but also for the targeted country. Therefore, the Hungarian homeland defense plan also need to consider how to protect them and for SOF elements how to operate in these key areas. Hungarian

SOF may also need to consider these areas as possible defense postures in case of large-scale combat operations.

In summary, the HDF and SOF elements must develop requirements and capabilities to effectively face hybrid threats and in case of a conventional military invasion, must have the ability to operate in a large-scale combat environment. According to the phases of Russian-type hybrid warfare, the main effort seems to shift from non-lethal capabilities (information warfare, economic sanctions, proxy groups) to lethal assets (armed resistance, conventional military forces). Concerning the phases, the Hungarian SOF may need to identify and develop not only lethal capabilities but non-lethal capabilities and requirements as well to rapidly react to the escalating situation in Hungary in case it is needed.

Although the author of this paper does not determine Hungary as a primary target for a Russian-type hybrid warfare yet, the analysis of current researches, academic works, and recommendations will provide a better understanding of how Hungary may reorganize, develop, and employ SOF assets to fight future hybrid threats. Nevertheless, as this paper focuses on the employment of the Hungarian SOF in case of homeland defense, therefore, the author must consider the possibility of large-scale combat operations as those are also part of the conflict continuum and at the same time part of the non-linear warfare too.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research paper identifies SOF hybrid warfare requirements, corresponding capability developments, and the necessary changes by conducting a qualitative research method. Analyzing the future operational environment, possible threats, their characteristics, and the adversaries' operational framework provide a scope for answering the primary and secondary research questions.

Through the analysis of the steps and characteristics of the Russian-type hybrid warfare researched by NATO countries and non-governmental organizations, this paper identifies the likely implementation of methods and recommendations in countering non-linear warfare. This paper also intends to include examples from Ukraine, 2014, and what actions Russia carried out to achieve its strategical objectives. Using the results of the research, this paper intends to identify and consider valuable recommendations necessary to enable HDFC to use SOF units effectively as part of homeland defense. As interoperability is vital for effective, successful, and comprehensive NATO countermeasures against hybrid threats, Hungarian SOF must seek for implementing similar requirements and capabilities as other NATO countries. Overall, this paper intends to provide options for further developing capabilities and requirements for the Hungarian SOF to enable their effectiveness in support of homeland defense and to meet future challenges. The author of this paper also seeks to find organizational, training, and capability requirements and current methods to employ SOF elements in support of homeland defense.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS OF THE NON-LINEAR WARFARE

Background of the Concept

Non-linear warfare employs old forms and methods of Russian tactics and highly integrates them with non-military efforts, and tailors them to the characteristics of the 21st century. In 2013, General Gerasimov published an article in the *Military-Industrial Kurier* journal, "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight," about the changing nature of warfare and the new challenges for military forces.[74] In his article, General Gerasimov described a whole government approach to wage future wars and also emphasized the increasing significance of non-lethal capabilities to achieve strategical objectives. Based on his thoughts, military forces will become supplementary to other elements of national power, for example, information, economy, and diplomacy. He also predicts continuous, contactless, and prolonged struggles between states where high-mobile military units, primarily SOF, will conduct deep operations and target strategically important locations and critical infrastructure with high-precision strikes. He further argues that military and non-military actions will focus on defeating the enemy in his territory supported by proxy groups or insurgencies. Based on his forecast, frontal engagements of large conventional elements are obsolete and participants will seek asymmetric solutions to wage wars. He also argues that based on the lessons from the Arab Spring, future wars will focus on the growing significance of psychological operations to influence the public opinion as an effective way of shaping the operational environment and achieve strategical success.

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[74] Gerasimov, "The Value of Science is in The Foresight."

Although his thoughts became popular as the so-called "Gerasimov-doctrine," it is far from being a doctrine, but rather is more like an approach toward to future conflicts and a possible paradigm shift in the employment of the means to wage wars. Although General Gerasimov highlighted the significance of the information domain and integrated the information warfare with other domains, he was not the first Russian thinker to determine it as one of the most important battlefields of future wars and as part of new forms and methods of warfare.

As Andras Rácz refers to General Makhmut Gareev, who published his book, *If War Comes Tomorrow,* in 1995, Gareev discussed how technological development in the military domain changes the character of warfare.[75] He underlined that the development of computers and communication systems, precision weapons, and the integration of information warfare provided new means to fight wars. He also identified that future wars would decisively focus on placing psychological effects on the enemy to break its will. Moreover, he argued that the possible use of information domain to spread fake propaganda and disinformation is an integrated element of warfare to undermine the targeted country's armed forces and government.[76]

After General Gerasimov published his famous article, two retired high-ranking Russian officers, Colonel Sergey G. Chekinov and Lt. Sergey A. General Bogdanov also

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[75] András Rácz, *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist* (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2015), accessed 3 November 2019, https://stratcomcoe.org/andras-Rácz-russias-hybrid-war-ukraine-breaking-enemys-ability-resist.

[76] Makhmut Gareev, *If War Comes Tomorrow? The Contours of Future Armed Conflict,* trans. Yakov Vladimirovich Fomenko (Abingdon, London: Routledge, 1998).

argued the changing methods of warfare in their article, titled "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War." In their article, Chekinov and Bogdanov underlined the evolving significance of non-military methods in future conflicts and their implications to achieve strategic and political goals. They also argued that in some cases these non-military options can outreach the power of traditional weapons.[77] In this article one of their main statements is that the information domain and psychological warfare will dominate in the new-generation warfare. Furthermore, they clearly state that whoever dominates the information domain and gains information superiority, will be more successful in achieving his objectives. Therefore, no participants of any future conflicts can disregard the importance of information warfare and the necessary implications to dominate it. In accordance with exploiting the advantages of the information domain, they emphasize that in the new-generation of warfare opponents will mainly seek to enervate the targeted population, morally disorganize the enemy's armed forces through psychological operations in the information realm.[78] The main purpose is to target the psyche of the armed forces and the population to degrade their resistance until it completely erodes, then, conventional military forces can conduct a low-risk seizure of the targeted country. Furthermore, Chekinov and Bogdanov stated that "decisive battles in new generation wars will rage in the information environment."[79]

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[77] Sergey G. Chekinov and Sergey A. Bogdanov, "The Nature and Content of a New-Generation War," *Military Thought*, no. 4 (2013): 12-23, accessed 5 March 2020, https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/The-Nature-and-Content-of-a-New-Generation-War-Chekinov-Bogdanov/c8874593b1860de12fa40dadcae8e96861de8ebd.

[78] Ibid.

[79] Ibid.

But from the Russian perspective, these ideas are not completely new. During the Soviet era, the Kremlin preferred the use of subversive actions to influence its adversaries and the overall political landscape avoiding the use of large-scale conventional forces not only in Europe but around the globe. The Soviet Union financially supported pro-Russian socialist parties around the world, manipulated western media, and at the same time, its covert agents stole state secrets from targeted countries. Moreover, the Russian SF forces were trained to conduct sabotage actions in the enemy's deep area to disrupt command and control systems as part of the information operations in the Initial Period of War as well.[80]

The Gerasimov-Chart

As Rácz refers to the so-called Gerasimov-chart (figure 1.), it perfectly visualizes the phases of the Russian-type hybrid warfare, and the effects emplaced on the targeted country.[81] The chart highlights the connection between the military domain and the non-military actions against a targeted country and how they inter-relate to each other. As the chart depicts, the Russian-type hybrid warfare divides the military and non-military actions into six stages. It also shows how the situation escalates from an interstate competition to the large-scale occupation of the targeted country. In summary, the chart is a great visualization of how the aggressor country synchronizes the ways and means to achieve the ends. Although the chart does not reflect the risks, non-linear warfare is a tool

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[80] Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" And What Can Be Done About It*.

[81] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei."

to conduct low-risk operations below the threshold of war. As Eugene Rumer, a senior

fellow and the director of Carnegie's Russia and Eurasia Program, notes, Russia was able

to reduce risks by multiple advantages: the geographical proximity of Ukraine, the

presence of Russian minorities, and the fact that Ukraine is outside of Western countries'

security umbrella enhanced the success of Russian actions.[82] Although Russia effectively

exploited these advantages, the large-scale military presence in the vicinity of Ukraine's

border that brought its final accomplishment. The fear of a large-scale invasion of the

country enabled Russia to stun the Ukrainian government's reaction.[83] Therefore, a high-

volume military deterrence is also necessary to reduce risks and enable the success of

non-linear warfare.

The Gerasimov-chart shows that the aggressor country conducts continuous

information warfare during the entire conflict not only to erode the resilience of the

targeted country, but to support the activities of the resistance movement, proxy groups,

and criminal organizations. The information warfare not only intensifies tensions within

the targeted country but also deceives the population by creating a fake reality and

masking the true intent of the aggressor country. As part of the information domain, the

cyber space is also an excellent realm for information and intelligence collection. The

Russian-type hybrid warfare also exploits the expertise of hackers by breaking into

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[82] Eugene Rumer, *The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2019), accessed 4 February 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/06/05/primakov-not-gerasimov-doctrine-in-action-pub-79254.

[83] Ibid.

governmental networks, command and control systems, either to collect information or to conduct a cyber-attack.

Figure 1.   The Role of Non-military Methods in inter-state conflict resolution

Source: Valery Gerasimov, "The Value of Science Is in the Foresight: New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods of Carrying out Combat Operations," *Military Review* (January-February 2016): 28, Originally published in *Military-Industrial Kurier,* 27 February 2013, trans. Robert Coalson, accessed 3 March 2020, https://jmc.msu.edu/50th/download/21-conflict.pdf.

Although the steps and phases of the Russian-type hybrid warfare may seem new or extraordinary, it has many similarities in how the US Joint Publication 3-0 determines the conflict continuum (figure 2). Based on the author's understanding, there are many similarities, but also differences between the two approaches to the conflicts.

One similarity between the US and Russian strategy during the first stage of the conflict continuum is that both employ small-scale military actions to build a strong relationship with partners, improve their capabilities, and shape the operational environment. Another similarity with this stage is that both methods use other instruments of power like diplomacy or economy and other governmental agencies to support their national security strategy. But the main difference between the two approaches is the purpose: the United States operates in the conflict continuum to prevent the escalation of conflict, normalize the security situation, and create favorable conditions for promoting the democratic western values. At the same time the non-linear warfare intensifies tensions in the targeted country to shape the operational environment and create an environment where targeted countries become under the economic and diplomatic influence of Russia. Although the Russian-type hybrid warfare originally intends to keep the escalating situation below the threshold of war, in some situations it may amplify the tensions deliberately to open up an armed conflict.

Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

Peace ← Conflict Continuum → War

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Range of Military Operations

Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict continuum in a wide variety of operations and activities that are commonly characterized in three groups as this figure depicts.

Figure 2.   Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

Source: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), V-4.

Another difference between the two approaches is that while the US armed forces build partner capability with military organizations under a legitimate government, the non-linear warfare focuses on building relationship with and employing supportive proxies, political parties, or insurgencies. As the conflict escalates, Russia synchronizes its military operations with the actions of these organizations as part of deep operations to create internal tensions in the targeted country enabled by a well-orchestrated deception plan.

Information Warfare: Decisive Action or Critical Capability?

Dominating the information realm is the most important component of non-linear warfare. Furthermore, information operations have their separate, but cohesive line of effort in the Gerasimov-chart and those are contiguous during the entire campaign.

As a sub-element of the information warfare, the deception operations have been a major part of Russian military strategy in Ukraine, as they call it "maskirovka." The modern Russian tactics have relied on deception since World War II. The forms of deception included concealment, imitation, demonstration, disinformation, and simulation. The types of deception included optical, thermal, radar, sound, and activity masking from enemy recon assets.[84] The use and development of maskirovka continued during the Soviet era as well and disinformation gained a major focus. For example, Soviet Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti agents sent false letters to western journalists and that information was widely published in western media misleading the international community's perception.[85] As an example, how Russia used concealment during its campaign against Ukraine, when Russian supported "humanitarian convoys," consisting of white military trucks, departed from Russia to Eastern Ukraine to bring basic needs for the people of Luhansk and Donbas. Although the Russian government claimed the opposite, it was well known that the convoy was meant to deliver military equipment to the separatists.[86] Denying the accusations, the Russian government promoted itself as a protector and aide of Russian minorities in the region.[87] Nowadays the disinformation as a form of maskirovka has moved to cyberspace.

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[84] Charles L. Smith, "Soviet Maskirovka," *Airpower* no. 1 (1988): 29-39.

[85] Ibid.

[86] Lucy Ash, "How Russia Outfoxes Its Enemies," *BBC News*, 29 January 2015, accessed 13 February 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-31020283.

[87] Ibid.

The cyber domain is also key in non-linear warfare as part of the information environment. As non-linear warfare targets the will of the adversary population and key governmental capabilities, the easiest way to reach out to these targets is through the virtual network. Information on the internet and social media platforms create a rapid and continuous information exchange, the disinformation campaign targets the population through cyberspace. In the 21st century, the cyber realm is an inevitable factor as it surrounds not only the majority of the society, but also governmental agencies and key officials are present on the network. Therefore, targeting the decision-making nodes of the government and the population at the same time by disinformation, false data, and fake news is an excellent way of creating confusion, misunderstanding, and amplifying tensions within the targeted country.

The cyberspace domain also creates a great possibility for conducting deep attacks on adversaries. There are multiple reasons why operating in the cyber environment is a preferred method. First of all, operating in the cyber domain is relatively cheap and there are no geographical limits. Any aggressor can conduct cyber-attacks, hacking, spying, and stealing information on specific networks and social platforms thousands of miles away from their targets most times without attribution. Second, adversaries can also target critical governmental infrastructures as those are overtly connected to the cyberspace as well. Therefore, hackers can easily cause critical damages to systems resulting in temporary malfunctions in essential services or disruption in the high-level decision-making process. As deep strikes have always been preferred Russian tactics, in the 21st century these deep attacks moved to the cyber domain and supported its non-linear warfare against Ukraine in 2014.

Russia decisively employed tremendous strategic communication as part of the information warfare in 2014. The strategic communication targeted three major audiences: the domestic and foreign Russian population, the Ukrainian citizens, and the international community.[88] Using different narratives and messaging, Russia was able to create confusion and different perspective of the conflict in Ukraine.

After the impeachment of the pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovich, Russian politicians considered the newly elected Ukrainian government illegal and titled them as extremists, fascists, and dangerous to Russian minorities.[89] To gain the support of the domestic Russian population, President Putin also used government-centric media platforms to report differently about the situation than foreign correspondents. For example, *Russia Today* broadcasted news about hundreds of Ukrainian citizens titled as refugees waiting at the border of Russia. The Russian news stated that these refugees had to leave their homes due to the aggressive actions against minorities conducted by Ukrainian officials.[90] As another example, when Russian troops without any insignia occupied the Crimean Peninsula and isolated the military barracks, those "little green men" offered the Ukrainian military personnel to either pledge loyalty to the Russian

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[88] North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), "Analysis of Russia's Information Campaign Against Ukraine" (Executive Summary, NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, 2014), accessed 29 September 2019, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/analysis-russias-information-campaign-against-ukraine.

[89] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 2.

[90] Margarita Jaitner and Peter A. Mattsson, "Russian Information Warfare of 2014" (7th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Architectures in Cyberspace, Tallinnn, May 2015), 39-52, accessed 3 March 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/280564287_Russian_Information_Warfare_of_2014.

Federation or leave the peninsula.[91] The Russian news quickly interpreted this event as a

mass surrender of Ukrainian forces. All these narratives targeted not only the Russian

population, but Ukrainian citizens as well. Depicting a clearly negative picture of the

newly formed government and its military forces contributed to breaking the general

Ukrainian will to resist the Russian actions.

Moreover, the Kremlin constructed a legal framework for the annexation of

Crimea and the separatist movement in Eastern-Ukraine. As Janis Berzins notes,

President Putin requested the Russian Parliament to give permission for the use of

military force to protect Russian minorities in the territory of Ukraine and of course, they

permitted his desire. Second, Russia promoted the referendum of pro-Russian political

parties who legalized the incorporation of the Crimean Peninsula to the Russian

Federation. At the same time, Russia rejected all accusations for occupying Crimea by

military forces and determined that armed personnel as local self-defense forces.

Although the international community declared the referendum illegal, the Russian

leadership equaled the self-determination similar to Kosovo.[92] Russia also issued

passports in large quantities to pro-Russian, but Ukrainian citizens under the umbrella of

this legal framework.[93] All these lawful steps supported the Russian information

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[91] Jaitner and Mattsson, "Russian Information Warfare of 2014," 39-52.

[92] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 3.

[93] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014* (Tampa, FL: US Army Special Operations Command, 2015), 3, accessed 27 February 2020, https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-little-green-men/.

campaign targeting the perception of international audiences and at the same time depicted Russia as the protector of the Russian population domestically and abroad.

In summary, Russia weaponized its information warfare capabilities and effectively shot multiple targets. Through dominating in the cyberspace by hackers and propagandists, masking its original intent by legal statements and continuous rejection, and interrupting the Ukrainian decision-making system by kinetically damaging critical infrastructure, Russia was able to overwhelmingly control the information domain and gained an unbeatable advantage in the conflict. Therefore, the author of this paper can deduct the following conclusions: (1) the information warfare capabilities are not only critical, but play a decisive and mission essential role in non-linear warfare. (2) dominating the information space in a conflict exceedingly enhances the ability to create multiple dilemmas to the enemy, or as Clausewitz defined, the "fog of war."

As the information warfare is continuous through the entire campaign, other non-military efforts also start at the first phase of non-linear warfare such as economic or diplomatic pressure.

Phase I: Covert Origins

The first phase of the non-linear warfare focuses on the aggressor country's foreign policy, national security strategy, and historical background of previous conflicts. Therefore, this step considers the root causes of the tension between opponents and it can have a long history. During the Russian campaign, the main objective was to secure the periphery of Russia and deny Ukraine's developing relationship with Western countries. The ends are tied to Russia's security strategy, which have historical roots. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union expanded its influence over neighboring countries and

created a buffer zone that was necessary from the Soviet perspective. As Berzins notes Russia's military strategy relies on depth, by buying space and time to support successful defensive operations.[94] The idea of a buffer zone has historical background: Napoleon invaded Russia and reached Moscow in 1812, and the German Army penetrated deep into Russian territory in 1941. As a result of these actions, the Soviet Union's national security policy required a solution to avoid similar events against its territories after World War II. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was threatened by many adversaries, especially the western capitalist countries and NATO led by the United States. The fear of insecurity and the establishment of NATO initiated the Soviet Union to spread the socialist influence in its neighboring countries like Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgraria, Albania, East Germany, and Poland and set the condition for the creation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. As the Red Army invaded these countries during World War II, it was obvious for the Soviet Union to bolster the communist parties and build pro-Russian governments across its sphere of influence. Reinforcing the socialist influence, the Soviet Union also placed large conventional military units in these countries for the duration of the Cold War.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent European countries were born on the periphery of Russia: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Ukraine. As these states significantly moved away from the influence of Russia, they became open toward western countries. These actions represented a security challenge for Russia. Although the fall of the Soviet Union significantly weakened the Russian defense policy, Yevgeny

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[94] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy."

Primakov, who was the prime minister of Russia from 1998 to 1999, created a new national security strategy. He was also foreign minister from 1996 to 1998 and not surprisingly, served in the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti responsible for foreign intelligence.[95] The Primakov-doctrine still drives Russia's foreign policy and consists of five fundamental elements: View of Russia as an indispensable actor with an independent foreign policy; A vision of a multipolar world managed by a concert of major powers; Insistence on Russia's primacy in the post-Soviet space and the pursuit of Eurasian integration; Opposition to NATO expansion; and Partnership with China.[96]

In his principles, he emphasized that Russia cannot let the United States become the only major power in the globe and must ally with other great powers like China to weaken the influence of the US and create a multipolar world. Related to this point, he also highlighted that Russian foreign policy must weaken the transatlantic relations as those endanger the existing Russian influence over Europe.[97] He also underlined that the Russian foreign policy must deny NATO expansion as it endangered the security of Russia. Furthermore, he envisioned that Russia must maintain its dominance in the post-Soviet space, especially on the periphery of Russia. His concept was mainly built for providing an approach for Russia's international relations and shaped Russia's future

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[95] Dr. Sanu Kainikara, "Russia'S Return to The World Stage: The Primakov Doctrine–Analysis," Eurasiareview.Com, 11 May 2019, accessed 5 March 2020, https://www.eurasiareview.com/05112019-russias-return-to-the-world-stage-the-primakov-doctrine-analysis/.

[96] Rumer, *The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action*.

[97] Ibid.

attitude toward international affairs.[98] Although Russia could not prevent the Baltic States from joining NATO in 2004, their actions against Ukraine were successful. Specifically, Russia occupied the strategically important Crimean Peninsula with its key naval bases and prevented Ukraine's ability to develop deeper economic and military relations with Western countries.[99]

But the covert origin phase can also include using other instruments of national power, such as diplomacy or economics. The aggressor country can also influence the targeted country by promoting the advantages of closer economic or military relationships. The main purpose of these offers is to create financial, economic, and trading bonds between the nation-states in order to reduce the necessity of military involvement as a larger footprint in the conflict.

Before the escalation of the conflict with Ukraine, Russia also made diplomatic and economic steps to exploit the fiscal vulnerability of Ukraine. For example, Russia offered a 15 billion dollar loan to Ukraine and discounts on imported gas.[100] These actions served two purposes. First, it fits into the Russian propaganda messaging the financial benefits of the cooperation. Second, with these offers, Russia tried to avoid the necessity of involving military forces to achieve the strategical ends by other means. Although these proposals gained the support of Yanukovich's government, they did not

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[98] Rumer, *The Primakov (Not Gerasimov) Doctrine in Action*.

[99] Chivvis, *Understanding Russian "Hybrid Warfare" And What Can Be Done About It*.

[100] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014*, 53.

obtain the interest of the pro-Western citizens of Ukraine. As the popular resistance against Yanukovich increased, Russia realized that it would not be able to drive a peaceful solution to influence Ukraine. Therefore, Russia made steps to secure its interests and pursue using other means under the tenets of the Primakov-doctrine.

Phase II: Escalations

The second phase of the non-linear warfare starts if the diplomatic and economic influencing does not achieve the defined objectives and the targeted country still resists the will of the aggressor country. In this phase, the aggressor country covertly deploys its SF to establish an armed resistance deep inside the targeted country's territory. Their task focuses on building-up and enabling the elements of a resistance movement. For example, Russia infiltrated its SF into Crimea in late February 2014, to facilitate the foundation of civilian unrest and revolt in the region.[101] Russia's main goal was to create favorable conditions and gain the support of the Russian minorities for the annexation of the peninsula. Russian agents bribed key political Russian ethnic leaders as well to earn the assistance of the civilians.[102] The presence of the Black Sea Fleet in the Crimean ports greatly enhanced the ability to infiltrate Russian SF covertly into the peninsula and avoid any detection by the Ukrainian counter-intelligence.[103]

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[101] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014*, 54.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 7.

The aggressor country also focuses on enabling the supportive political parties inside the targeted country's political system and shifts to a more aggressive bilateral diplomacy and narratives between the two countries. Although the main effort in this phase focuses on diplomatic measures and strategic communication, non-linear warfare also threatens the economy of the targeted country by sanctions, deepening internal political tensions, and leaking false information to mislead the targeted country.[104] At this stage, the aggressor country does not conduct kinetic operations yet, but employs a massive information campaign as part of a larger strategic communication plan. The aggressor country also organizes large-scale military exercises as part of the strategic deterrence and also to deceive the targeted country.

At this point in the conflict, Russian narratives targeted the pro-western protestors in Kyiv determining them fascists and racists who endanger Russian minorities in the territory of Ukraine.[105] At the same time, Moscow empowered the nationalism of Russian ethnicity in Crimea through diplomatic messaging. As a result, a Crimean member of the Parliament, Vladimir Klychnikov called for an amendment and a poll for the status of Crimea and suggested that the Russian Federation should oversee the rights and status of Crimea. Volodymyr Konstantinov, another parliament member also stated if the situation escalated further, Crimea might separate itself from Ukraine.[106] At this stage

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[104] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 6.

[105] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 54.

[106] Ibid., 55.

of the conflict, the Russia concentrated on shaping the operational environment in Crimea and facilitated the non-violent occupation of the peninsula, the Russian campaign affected Eastern-Ukraine in the following phases of non-linear warfare.

<u>Phase III: Initial Conflicting Actions</u>

As Rácz notes, in the third phase, an internal armed conflict breaks out between the resistance movement and the law enforcement elements of the targeted country.[107] The aggressor country mobilizes internal opposition such as armed resistance or weaponless demonstrators deep inside the targeted country's territory with the support of its SF. These irregular forces may receive sympathizers as external support from other regions to increase the opposition by numbers or capabilities.[108] The aggressor country also increases the pressure by organizing more intense field training exercises and arranges its conventional forces near the border of the targeted country. The sanctions and political pressure continue simultaneously with mobilization of military troops to intimidate and isolate the targeted country. In this phase, the targeted country bribes governmental and military officials to disable the quick governmental reaction of the targeted country.[109]

As the situation escalated in Kyiv and the demonstrators impeached President Yanukovich in late February 2014, protests broke out on the Crimean Peninsula. At the

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[107] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei."

[108] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 55.

[109] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 6.

same time, Russia continued its enormous information campaign against the pro-western protestors in Kyiv and declared the impeachment illegal.[110] As part of the diplomatic narratives and in support of the protests in Crimea, Moscow also identified the new government as extremists, who threatened the Russian minorities. As part of the military measures, Russia also more openly prepared its military forces for deployment from the Southern District.[111] While pro-western political parties grasped the victorious moment against oppressing Yanukovich-era, the Kremlin finalized its plan for securing its interest in the Black Sea region.

In Eastern Ukraine, the conflicting activities started in March and continued through April. At this point in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia, the situation already achieved its turning point in Crimea where local militias with the support of Russian SF isolated the region. The massive information campaign achieved its goal further escalating the tensions between Russian ethnic groups and Ukrainians determining the new government racist. The events in Crimea gave also an extra push to the separatism in the Donbas region. In Eastern Ukraine, the open conflict commenced with demonstrations against the new government. Russian intelligence agents and special operatives orchestrated these mass activities.[112] The demonstrations quickly escalated into the occupation of governmental buildings, storming law enforcement facilities, and

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[110] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 2.

[111] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 55.

[112] Ibid., 58.

seizing weapon storages. The demonstrators also forced key government officials such as the chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Donetsk to resign from their positions.[113] Moreover, pro-Russian militias and unarmed crowds also interdicted the movement of Ukrainian military convoys demanding the handover of their armament. In most cases, Ukrainian military troops surrendered without any resistance to these groups.[114]

The newly formed Ukrainian government showed more responsiveness against the separatist activities in the Donbas region than in those Crimea. Kyiv ordered the launch of anti-terrorist operations to retake key political infrastructure and defeat the separatist movement. Although governmental armed forces were more successful in fighting against the uprising, Russian combatants used non-traditional methods in the conflict. For example, ignoring the known international rules of engagements, Russian SF used unarmed civilians as human shields to disarm Ukrainian military and law enforcement patrols.[115]

As an attempt to secede from Ukraine, separatists announced the birth of the People's Republic of Donetsk and Luhansk and declared their wish to join the Russian Federation based on an overwhelming poll. In support of the break-away regions, Russia cut natural gas transportation to Ukraine claiming the lack of payment for previous

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[113] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 59.

[114] Ibid.

[115] Ibid., 60.

shipments.[116] Nevertheless, Russia continued to supply the separatists with armament to cement the achieved results. The clash between the Ukrainian government and the separatist movement led to the shootdown of Malaysian Airlines Flight-17.[117] That event was only the beginning of a deeper crisis in the region.

Phase IV: Crisis

As Rácz states, during the fourth phase, the struggle between countries becomes an open conflict when the aggressor country employs multiple armaments destroying critical infrastructures of the targeted country to degrade its defensive abilities and support the resistance movement.[118] Although the aggressor country's conventional military forces do not cross international borders, they use high precision weapon systems, long-range artillery fires, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber-attacks. In support of the military activities, the aggressor country also employs economic blockades on the targeted country and break off the diplomatic relations between the two countries.[119] The aggressor country continues its belligerent information campaign to increase the confusion and deepen internal anxiety among the targeted population.[120] In

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[116] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 60.

[117] Robert Lewis, "Malaysia Airlines Flight 17," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Last modified 2017, accessed 4 April 2020, https://www.britannica.com/event/Malaysia-Airlines-flight-17.

[118] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei," 8.

[119] Ibid., 9.

[120] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 6.

summary, the aggressor's country creates a mass effect using a whole government approach to disable the targeted country's government and its armed forces' command and control system by corruption and deception. Based on the author's view, all of these offensive activities can serve two purposes. In support of an unconventional approach, these efforts increase the ability of the resistance movement to overthrow the actual government. Second, if the resistance movement fails to defeat the actual government and its armed forces, these efforts can shape the operational environment for a large-scale conventional occupation by the aggressor.

In Crimea during the crisis phase, military forces without any insignia and along with paramilitary units began operations to seize critical Ukrainian infrastructure such as ports, airfields, and isolated key military bases on the peninsula.[121] At the same time, Russia isolated the region by blocking sea lines of communications and jamming naval transmissions channels as well.[122] In support of the annexation, other military assets arrived in the region including helicopters and infantry fighting vehicles. In preparation for legitimizing the occupation on the political level, Russian SF supported by local militias took over governmental buildings such as the parliament in Crimea.[123] To

[121] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 56.

[122] Margarita Jaitner, "Russian Information Warfare: Lessons from Ukraine," in *Cyber War in Perspective: Russian Aggression Against Ukraine*, ed. Kenneth Geers (Tallinn: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2015), 91, accessed 3 March 2020, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/291086368_Russian_Information_Warfare_Lessons_from_Ukraine.

[123] Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, "Russia And Hybrid Warfare: Going Beyond the Label" (*Aleksanteri* Papers, University of Helsinki, Finland, 2016), accessed 25

dominate the information environment, the unidentified paramilitary forces occupied key media outlets, television and radio stations.[124] Moreover, Russian military assets disrupted, jammed, and kinetically attacked command and control systems to deny the rapid reaction of Ukrainian law enforcement and military forces.

Integrating other aspects of DIME to achieve success, Russia increased the diplomatic and economic pressure on Ukraine. For example, on the political level, President Putin legitimized the intervention by requesting the Federal Assembly to authorize the use of the armed forces to safeguard Russian interests. The legitimization process also included the replacement of Sevastopol's mayor and nominated Sergey Aksyonov as prime minister of Ukraine. Both Russia and the de facto leadership of Ukraine denied any negotiations with the new Ukrainian government. In support of the diplomatic pressure, the Russian energy company, Gazprom threatened Ukraine to suspend further services due to its accumulated debt.[125]

In summary, by achieving speed, surprise, and creating multiple dilemmas for Ukrainian decision-makers, Russian military forces seized the peninsula without a shot being fired. The surgical accuracy of Russian operations paralyzed the Ukrainian government in the most vulnerable period, as they lacked proper situational awareness

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March 2020, https://www.stratcomcoe.org/bettina-renz-and-hanna-smith-russia-and-hybrid-warfare-going-beyond-label.

[124] Rácz, *Russia's Hybrid War in Ukraine: Breaking the Enemy's Ability to Resist,* 60.

[125] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 57.

and reacted slowly to the events. Although Russian operations went smoothly in the case

of Crimea, the military actions became more violent in Eastern-Ukraine.

In Eastern Ukraine, the conflict continued with a more robust and fierce

opposition to Kyiv. Armed militants blockaded the major cities and Russian armored

personnel carriers, artillery, and air defense armament infiltrated into the region in

support of the separatist movement.[126] Although the Kremlin continuously denied the

official presence of their forces on the battlefield, active Russian involvement was

obvious for Western countries and politicians. Combat activities continued with heavy

losses on both sides and a protracted struggle developed in the region.

Phase V: Resolution

Based on the Gerasimov-chart, the struggle between the armed forces and the

resistance movement reaches its peak and, in this phase, the conflict is highly intense and

violent. The aggressor country designates no-fly zones over the targeted country further

incapacitating its responsiveness and effectiveness.[127] The armed resistance movement

supported by the aggressor country's special operatives overthrows the legitimate

government and takes control over the governmental organizations.[128] In this phase, the

aggressor country continues to use its coercive efforts through the diplomatic, economic,

and information domains to legitimize the resistance movement and bolster their claim to

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[126] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 61.

[127] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 6.

[128] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei," 8.

power.[129] Therefore, the overthrown government faces a total defeat and they may need to leave the country as a government in exile.

In case the resistance movement is not able to change the actual political leadership, the aggressor country can further attrite the resiliency of the targeted country's armed forces and deepen tensions within the population. The aggressor country continues to use its long-range assets such as electronic warfare capabilities, high precision weapon systems, and artillery fires. Simultaneously with these kinetic actions, it continues to decrease the resiliency by targeted messaging through the information domain.[130] The suppressive measures also continue in the economy, diplomacy, and information domains. The combination of these military and non-military activities continues until the resistance movement can overpower the government. Although in Ukraine, the Russian operations did not intend to take over the whole country, its activities were enough to achieve Russia's pre-determined limited objectives in Crimea and the Donbas region.

In Crimea due to the absence of any military opposition, Russian troops combined with local militias isolated every military installation and forced the government-led Ukrainian units to surrender without any violent actions. To secure the achievements on the political level, the Crimean parliament announced separation from Ukraine and desire

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[129] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei," 8.

[130] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 6.

to merge the Russian Federation based on a disputable referendum.[131] President Putin supported the vote and legalized the request. The resolution phase in Crimea ended up with the exodus of Ukrainian officials and troops from the peninsula.[132]

Although both Russian and Ukrainian representatives signed a cease-fire agreement in September 2014, the violent clash continued between the governmental forces and the separatist movement in Eastern Ukraine. In support of the Ukrainian government, the US and NATO forces conducted peacekeeping exercises in the western part of the country.[133] Further escalating the tensions, the rebels in Donetsk and Luhansk carried out an election simultaneously with the Ukrainian elections. By November, the cease-fire agreement collapsed and Russian tanks rolled into the oblasts.[134] The appearance of heavy Russian armament indicated a possible invasion as the enemy's most likely course of action.

Phase VI: Reestablishment of Peace

In the sixth phase, the aggressor country consolidates the gains and the newly formed government aims to stabilize the internal security situation. To achieve the

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[131] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 57.

[132] Ibid., 58.

[133] Peter Apps, "U.S., Allies to Stage Exercises in West Ukraine As Battles Rage in East," *Reuters*, 2 September 2014, accessed 24 March 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-exercises/u-s-allies-to-stage-exercises-in-west-ukraine-as-battles-rage-in-east-idUSKBN0GX23Q20140902.

[134] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 62.

reconciliation of the country, the new government requests military assistance from the aggressor country through diplomatic channels. In support of the appeal, the aggressor country sends conventional troops to normalize the situation and conduct peacekeeping operations.[135] The peacekeeping campaign involves the elimination of the remaining opposition against the regime change using lethal engagements, artillery fires, and precision air bombardment.[136] Furthermore, the campaign focuses on reducing tensions in society through proper narratives.

In Crimea, this phase included the restoration of stability by Russia sending more military troops and offering financial aids to quickly integrate the region into the Russian economy.[137] While the situation settled down in Crimea, there was no real reconciliation in Eastern Ukraine. A frozen conflict formalized between Ukraine and the Russian-backed separatists and Ukrainian politics continues to communicate the possible threat to the international community.[138] As the struggle seems to be far from being over, the Kremlin may patiently wait for Ukraine's domestic instability as a window of opportunity. Until this point, Russia will most likely pursue its strategic objectives behind the curtains.

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[135] Rácz, "A Hibrid Hadviselés és Az Ellene Való Védekezés Lehetőségei," 9.

[136] Berzins, "Russian New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian Defense Policy," 6.

[137] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 58.

[138] Ibid., 62.

<u>Conclusion</u>

Although non-linear warfare may seem like a new type of struggle in future wars, it closely parallels US conduct of UW. UW consists of almost the same phases as non-linear warfare: preparation, initial contact, infiltration, organization, build-up, employment, and transition.[139] UW employs the same means such as SOF to carry out covert and clandestine activities to overthrow a regime or an occupying force (figure 3). UW also aims to gain the support of the population and often includes a cohesive interagency effort using other domains of DIME as well.[140] Based on the author's view, Russian strategists successfully integrated the highly centralized, non-military elements of power to achieve an overwhelming unity of effort. The non-linear warfare also decisively dominated the information environment by using cyber-warriors, propagandists, and targeted messaging. The narratives also mobilized multiple proxies and foreign fighters in support of Russian operations such as the Wolves' Head Battalion who also fought on the Russian side in the Georgian conflict.[141]

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[139] Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide.*

[140] Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-05.130, *Army Special Operations Forces Unconventional Warfare* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 4-2.

[141] US Army Special Operations Command, *Little Green Men: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconventional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014,* 59.

Public component activities
Armed component activities
Underground activities

Negotiated settlement

International strategic communications

Large-scale military and paramilitary actions

Minor military and paramilitary actions

Shadow governance activities

Overt
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Clandestine

Shadow governance activities

Increased political violence, terror, and sabotage

Negotiations with government representatives

Intense sapping of morale of government, administration, police, and military

Increased underground activities to demonstrate strength of revolutionary organization

Sabotage and terror to demonstrate weakness of government

Overt and covert pressures against government; strikes, riots, and disorders

Intensification of propaganda, increase in disaffection, psychological preparation for revolt

Expansion of and coordination among resistance networks

Establishment of formalized resistance elements; appeal to extraterritorial support infrastructure

Spreading subversive organizations into all sectors of life in a country/region

Penetration into professional, social, and political organizations and into all parts of society

Recruitment of like-minded individuals and others; indoctrination and use of these for organizational purposes

Infiltration of foreign agents and agitators, and foreign propaganda material, money, weapons, and equipment

Increased agitation, unrest, and disaffection, infiltration of administration, police, and military and national organizations, and slowdowns and strikes

Assassination, forming favorable public opinion (advocating national cause), creation of distrust of established institutions

Creation of atmosphere of wider discontent through propaganda, lies, and political and psychological effort: discrediting government, police, and military authorities

Dissatisfaction with political, economic, social administrative, and/or other conditions; national aspiration (independence) or desire for ideological and other changes

Preparation of revolutionary cadres and of masses for revolution

Figure 3.   Activities of an Insurgency or Resistance Movement

Source: Special Operations Command, *Unconventional Warfare Pocket Guide* (Fort Bragg, NC: United States Army Special Operations Command, 2016), 9, accessed 11 April 2020, https://publicintelligence.net/usasoc-uw-pocket-guide/.

Moreover, Russia enjoyed multiple advantages in the conflict against Ukraine. First, the Russian minorities provided an excellent base for establishing an armed opposition against the new Ukrainian government and also accommodated the easy integration of Russian SF into society. Second, the geographical vicinity and common border in Eastern Ukraine also provided relatively effortless supply routes for the separatist movement and supported the covert infiltration of Russian special units into the region. In Crimea, the presence of the Black Sea Fleet in the port of Sevastopol served the same purpose in the conflict. Third, Russia's large armed forces and its high-volume field training exercises near the border also hampered the timely decision-making and firm reactions of the new Ukrainian government. Moreover, the dependence on Russia's natural resources export was a handicap for Ukraine which the Kremlin greatly exploited. Nevertheless, the fact that Ukraine was not part of any military alliance that could have provided a security umbrella also favored Russian success.

In summary, the non-linear warfare is an old form of conflict dressed in a new costume. Russia greatly converged new tools such as cyber warfare into the conduct of UW and Russian planners understood the evolving significance of the information domain to engage targeted audiences decisively in the 21st century. Nevertheless, the Kremlin integrated all non-military and military means with plausible deniability on the political level, unashamedly broke international laws, and masterfully implemented deception operations.

However, the Russian campaign in Ukraine and how it employed different capabilities should not be underestimated. Based on the author's view, the Russian campaign in Ukraine established an example of how countries can achieve limited

strategic goals operating under the threshold of war with low-cost means. The Russian campaign also presented a dangerous method for future struggles between competing nations. As a lesson learned, the conflict showed that the non-linear warfare should not necessarily aim to overthrow a ruling government in the whole country. But rather that aggressor countries can achieve success by cutting off strategically important territories from a targeted country, and further diminish the opponent's power in the domains of DIME. Focusing on limited, but well-defined objectives, Russia denied Ukraine's attempt to become a NATO member, occupied the strategically important warm ports of Crimea, and manifested its interest over the region to western countries.

Although there is nothing new in the use of the elements of hybrid warfare, the Russia's non-linear warfare's strategic and operational objectives are different than previous conflicts. Russian thinkers understand the evolving characteristics of the operational environment, especially the inter-relation between the DIME domains, and instead of conducting bloody and costly force-on-force battles, non-linear warfare focuses on creating an inner decay in the targeted country. Moreover, non-linear warfare uses enormous strategic communications to break the will of the population and leaves the targeted country extremely vulnerable to foreign threats. Therefore, non-linear warfare is a low-cost highly efficient way of waging undeclared wars against nation-states where even minor internal conflicts already decrease the integrity of the society.

Based on the events happened in Crimea and how Russia employed its means, the author can derive the following conclusions:

First, new generation wars will focus on destroying the resiliency of the targeted government and its supportive population instead of annihilating opposing armed forces.

As any type of IW aims to influence the population and the perception of societies, the fundamentals of non-linear warfare are not modern. Based on the author's view, Russian masterminds reformed the UW with the characteristics of the 21st century, effectively combined the non-military and military efforts with large deception operations, while Russian politicians were hiding behind legal statements and plausible deniability. The author assumes that non-linear warfare is an effective way of struggle for countries who can highly centralize and control its non-military means, such as Russia, or even China.

Second, dominating the information environment on the strategic, operational, and tactical levels are crucial to wage non-linear warfare effectively. Russia decisively used its information warfare capabilities for three purposes: its assets targeted mission-critical communication systems to paralyze the Ukrainian decision-making process, amplified tensions between Ukrainians and Russian minorities through messaging its narratives and created multiple dilemmas for Ukraine by deception. Therefore, ruling the information environment is mission essential for both participants of the struggle. Through the information domain, opponents can easily shape the perception of society and influence their populations. In the 21st century, both the aggressor and the defender rely on cyberspace as it provides multiple possibilities in future wars. Most importantly, it is the easiest way to reach out to the population via social platforms, websites, and viral news. Aggressor countries can also attack critical governmental infrastructure through the cyber domain degrading the decision-making process or credibility of the government.

Third, the targeted country's military leaders must understand the time as a critical factor in non-linear warfare. The first three phases of non-linear warfare (covert origins, escalations, initial conflicting actions) require long preparation times. In these

phases, the aggressor's actions are covert and mainly focuses on coercive measures in other domains: economic offers, diplomatic messaging, and less hostile strategic narratives. Although the aggressor country's special operatives covertly infiltrate into the targeted country, their activities may not be visible yet. In summary, the first three phases will most likely include prolonged and careful measures from the aggressor. From the targeted country, this phase requires intelligence capabilities and information sharing between government agencies to maintain situational awareness. Intelligence agencies must identify indicators of hostile non-military and military actions both in the physical and cyber domains. They also must detect adversary groups and organizations in the home country and abroad. Law enforcement units must maintain a safe and secure environment, and early target adversaries domestically. Military forces must maintain their readiness, conduct field training exercises as part of deterrence, and support other government agencies if needed. Strategic communication must protect society, maintain its integrity, and degrade the impacts of the aggressor country's information warfare.

During the fourth phase of non-linear warfare, the security situation may rapidly change and the aggressor's non-military and military actions may accelerate. As the aggressor country tries to achieve mass shocking effect in every domain of DIME, the targeted country's rapid reaction, especially the spearhead of armed forces (counter-terrorist and SOF units), is mission essential like in Crimea. This phase requires flexibility, rapid decision-making, and responsiveness. During the fifth and sixth phases (resolution, restoration of peace), the targeted country needs to prepare for a possible protracted conflict where the illegal, newly placed government will try to concrete its position in power with the help of the aggressor country's military units. These phases

require patience and endurance from the expelled government and its supporting population.

Fourth, Russian strategists successfully analyzed the Ukrainian center of gravity and exploited its critical vulnerabilities. On every level of war, Russian thinkers identified three elements of combat power as Ukrainian weaknesses and the elimination of them greatly enhanced success: leadership, information, and mission command. Through coercive measures such as bribing, intimidating, or blackmailing, Russian special operatives neutralized a responsive leadership and their timely decision-making. and responsiveness of the. These coercive measures targeted politicians in the Ukrainian government, local police officers, and military leaders both in Crimea and Donbas. Russian SF and hackers interrupted the easily accessible Ukrainian communication lines. Russia used soldiers without any insignia on their uniforms to deceive locals and Ukrainian armed forces. Russia overwhelmed the information environment with aggressive propaganda, fake news, and cyber-attacks. All these activities further complicated the clear understanding of the situation, further obscured the "fog of war," and hampered Ukraine's reactions. The possible lack of mission command philosophy also stunned the initiative of tactical-level commanders to engage the weaponized pro-Russian opposition led by special operatives. Based on these lessons, targeted countries must maintain high-level information security, disciplined in operational security, and sustain encrypted communication channels. To achieve high-level responsiveness, military forces must decentralize its command structure, practice mission command philosophy, and delegate the lawful right to a certain level where tactical commanders can react on the threats of non-linear warfare.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

The purpose of this study is to provide recommendations for the Hungarian MoD and HDFC decision-makers on how to use SOF capabilities in defense of the homeland against threats such as Russia's non-liner warfare. The primary research question focused on the future requirements for Hungarian SOF against these threats as characterized. Throughout the research, the author analyzed past and current studies on the topic, described the characteristics of the future operating environment, found recommendations from other authors concerning SOF contribution to homeland defense, and recognized non-linear warfare as the most likely struggle between opponents in the future. In chapter 4, the author analyzed the phases, the main effort, and key components of the Russian-type hybrid warfare and its implications in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014. In chapter 5, the author describes the key findings, general implications, and provides recommendations. Although a whole government approach is necessary to triumph in these conflicts, the author focuses on the military domain, especially the requirements of Hungarian SOF countering the threats of non-linear warfare. Based on the outcome of the research, the author derives the following key conclusion.

Interpretation of Results

This part of the Conclusion and Recommendations chapter explains the key findings from the analysis, provides an explanation about the results, and identifies fundamental implications for the recommendations.

Key Findings

Russia's success and effective use of all of its national elements of power in Ukraine created a precedent for future conflicts. Russia's use of non-linear warfare provides advance warning to small countries with limited resources how to develop their offensive national military strategy concerning ways and means to achieve a defined end state objective. Moreover, non-linear warfare represents a low-cost and highly efficient struggle between nation-states. The Gerasimov-chart serves as a fundamental line of effort to integrate non-military and military tools.

The research identified that the future operating environment will be heavily contested and military operations will continue to focus on population centers and urban terrain but for different purposes than the past twenty years of Iraq and Afghanistan. These areas will provide base ground for intelligence and psychological operations for future struggles that focus on influencing the population by gaining their overall support, or creating divisions among them to decrease their resiliency. Urban terrain will also represent high-value/high-payoff targets in the physical, information, and cyber domain as well. As key governmental installations, police offices, and military installations are all located inside or in the vicinity of the urban environment, adversaries will try to exploit vulnerabilities and attack those objectives. Russian operations also focused on these areas incapacitating the Ukrainian armed forces and influence public perspective.

This paper identified information warfare and adversary SOF as the main efforts of non-linear warfare. The information domain gains an exclusive significance in a future struggle. Therefore, competing nations will try to achieve supremacy over it. This action will serve multiple purposes: using the cyberspace, opponents will try to influence

population through social platforms by targeted messaging and false narratives; hackers will steal classified information and disrupt critical governmental institutions; special operatives will disrupt command and control systems in the electromagnetic spectrum and paralyze decision-making. Strategic communication will also play a crucial role shaping the operational environment: aggressor countries will legitimize their offensive actions against targeted countries, mislead their domestic populations and the international community. Simultaneously, the aggressors' narratives will discredit the targeted countries' governments further deepening tensions and creating multiple dilemmas.

Special operations will have a decisive role as well, especially during the early phases of non-linear warfare. Intelligence agents and highly trained operatives will infiltrate covertly into the targeted countries, link up with proxy groups and criminal organizations, establish an armed resistance, and coordinate its efforts to overthrow legitim governments or control valuable territories. The SOF will covertly organize and support uprisings exploiting internal tensions and targeting capability gaps of armed forces. Furthermore, intelligence agents will bribe, coerce, and intimidate key political and military leaders to incapacitate the targeted countries' timely decision-making and rapid reactions. These agents will also infiltrate into key governmental organizations and conduct sabotage against critical infrastructure, or they may assassinate key leaders as high-value targets. In the following phases of non-linear warfare, aggressor countries may conduct UW in targeted countries, support the resistance with armament, training, long-range weapon systems, and coordinate their efforts until the uprising overthrows or significantly disable the targeted government. In support of the resistance, aggressor

countries may employ unmarked, highly mobile military and paramilitary forces who storm key governmental offices and urban areas and export foreign fighting groups who share a common interest with the invaders. In support of the unconventional military operations, aggressor countries may use terrorism to discredit the targeted countries' government and intimidate the population as well. In the last two phases of non-linear warfare, aggressor countries use their conventional forces to invade targeted countries using high-precision and long-range weapon systems. The invasion may not depend on the resistance movement's combat effectiveness but it will most likely happen in a non-linear format. The aggressor country will support its military operations with non-military tools such as economic sanctions, strategic communication, and diplomatic coercion. These offensive activities will significantly focus on deep operations inside the targeted country's territory to degrade the targeted countries' resiliency, create favorable conditions for invading conventional forces, and win the war in the early phases of the conflict. Concerning the integration and coordination of all these hostile efforts, targeted countries will face multiple problems.

Implications

Therefore, the author states that adversaries of Hungary will primarily use an indirect way to achieve their strategic objectives and will try to create an inner decay inside the Hungarian political system, governmental organizations, and the overall society. Adversaries of Hungary will try to discredit the government and its armed forces and decrease the population's support. The main target will be the resiliency of Hungary and adversaries will try to dominate the information environment to mislead, deceive, and influence the general perception of Hungarian citizens.

To protect the sovereignty, democratic values, and citizens, Hungary must maintain a high-levels of resilience within the government-led organizations and the society overall. Therefore, the homeland defense plan must focus on a cohesive, intergovernmental approach to achieve unity of effort. As non-linear warfare focuses on employing highly coordinated military and non-military methods, Hungary's conventional military units will not be the first line of defense, especially in the early phases. Despite this, the MoD and HDFC must develop their armed forces to contribute effectively to the whole government approach from the first phase to the last phase of non-linear warfare. Based on the analysis, Hungary needs to employ its SOF differently in each phase of non-linear warfare.

In the early phases of non-linear warfare (covert origins, escalations, conflict actions), responsiveness, flexibility, situational awareness, and rapid reaction are critical to counter hybrid threats in time, and deny the enemy's ability to further escalate the situation and strengthen its status. Moreover, national intelligence agencies, law enforcement units, and SOF units should be the main effort to counter hybrid threats. Hungarian MoD can use SOF units to support law enforcement and intelligence services to identify and target pro-adversary proxy groups, criminal organizations, and separatists in these phases. SOF elements can have a supporting role to the Ministry of Interior, but during the follow-on phases, this role may change significantly.

During the fourth phase (crisis), the resistance movement supported by the aggressor country's special operatives, SOF can be the main effort to engage high-value targets, especially in the separatist-controlled territories. Hungarian SOF can conduct covert and clandestine operations such as special reconnaissance, direct actions, or

conduct psychological operations to disable and discredit the resistance movement. The Hungarian SF can focus on collecting intelligence and targeting the aggressor country's special operatives and intelligence agents, while Ranger Task Groups can conduct raids and ambushes to destroy supply lines, and key weapon systems. However, SOF elements should also focus on the indirect aspect of non-linear warfare, therefore, MoD can use Hungarian SOF units for less kinetic, but more non-kinetic tasks. SF units can blend into the separatist movement, map their capabilities and understand their networks, while gather intelligence for targeting. This evidence on the aggressor country's SOF will allow to feed the information domain and strategic narratives. Supporting other domains with military activities is inevitable and as the aggressor country tries to cover its actions with plausible deniability. Furthermore, the military capabilities can also focus on supporting the information environment and strategic communication.

During the fifth and sixth phases (resolution, restoration of peace), MoD and HDFC can employ Hungarian SOF units as a stay-behind force in the occupied territories. This idea is not new though as the Baltic States also prepare their special elements to remain behind enemy lines, create a resistance movement from locals and territorial defense forces, and degrade the Russian forces' capabilities while setting up the stage for a NATO counterattack.[142] The Hungarian SOF should also conduct UW in case any adversary occupies the territory of Hungary. They can enable a resistance movement to degrade the adversary's capabilities with Territorial Defense Force units, organize and

[142] James K. Wither, "'Modern Guerrillas' and the Defense of The Baltic States," *Small Wars Journal*, Last modified 2018, accessed 20 April 2020, https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/modern-guerrillas-and-defense-baltic-states.

coordinate their effort, and create favorable conditions for a large-scale conventional counterattack. As such the Hungarian MoD can use its SOF assets in a wider array of options as well.

In their thesis, Benjamin R. Bringhurst, Espen Christoffer Ulvebne, and Addison J. Whitsell, offer a more proactive option for NATO SOF in case of a conflict with Russia. They recommend proactive use of SOF and tasking them to destabilize Far-East Russian territories such as Siberia, or its territories in Central-Asia.[143] Therefore, Hungarian SF units can covertly infiltrate deep into the aggressor's country, collect intelligence, conduct sabotage activities, destroy supply nodes, and establish an uprising. Moreover, Hungarian SOF can use Russian SOF methods behind enemy lines such as bribing, intimidating, or coercing key officials to create negative effects on adversaries' critical governmental institutions. In summary, besides conducting UW in the domestic environment, Hungarian SOF units' tasks can include these non-traditional methods as well.

In summary, the Hungarian MoD needs to maintain an asymmetric approach and capabilities to fight effectively against an adversary using the Russian style of hybrid warfare. As SOF elements are the best trained to conduct or counter UW, therefore, they should be the spearhead element of the MoD to counter non-linear warfare. But after the last ten years of conducting COIN in multiple NATO deployments, it is necessary to

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[143] Benjamin R. Bringhurst, Espen Christoffer Ulvebne, and Addison J. Whitsell, "Countering the Hybrid Threat: The Role of Special Operations Forces in NATO's Strategy" (Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2018), accessed 24 March 2020, https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/61316.

reorganize the Hungarian SOF elements to increase their effectiveness in homeland defense, therefore, structural changes concerning the 2nd SOF Brigade are inevitable.

Recommendations for Action

Structural changes

The author recommends that the Hungarian MoD should elevate and reorganize the 2nd SOFB under its direct command. As Berg-Knutsen and Roberts recommend in their thesis, SOF elements should be a national level tool to fight against hybrid threats. There are two reasons why the Hungarian MoD must integrate SOF under its direct command. First, based on the lessons learned from Ukraine, non-linear warfare exploits the weaknesses of a stretched, multiple-layered command structure. Multiple levels of command structure can hamper not only timely decision making, but adversaries can disrupt command and control systems, inject false messages into the communication channels, and paralyze the flow of information between commands. Adversaries of Hungary can also bribe, coerce, or intimidate key military officers as Russian agents did in Ukraine, therefore, decisions made on MoD or HDFC level cannot reach the 2nd SOFB in time or accurate form. The longer the chain of command is, the chance of failure is higher for the rapid mobilization of SOF elements.

Second, SOF, as the primary military asset to counter hybrid threats, should have the ability to coordinate with other government agencies directly. As a whole government approach is key to fighting hybrid threats effectively, Hungarian SOF should have the Direct Liaison Authority to coordinate with other governmental organizations outside of the MoD umbrella. The coordination and cooperation should focus on high-tier law enforcement elements such as the Counter-Terrorism Center and the Hungarian

intelligence agencies such as the Military National Security Service and Special Service for National Security. The high-level cooperation and coordination will provide the 2nd SOFB the ability to receive up-to-date information about criminal organizations, terrorists, and extremist groups related to adversaries of Hungary. The coordination with these elements will also enhance the situational awareness and understanding of the 2nd SOFB to increase its responsiveness. However, to increase the mobility and reaction of the 2nd SOFB, other additional capabilities needed.

<div align="center">The Hungarian Special Operation Air Task Group</div>

To improve the readiness, agility, and effectiveness of the 2nd SOFB, HDFC must develop a Special Operation Air Task Group (SOATG) that can directly and exclusively support SOF missions. Developing the SOF aviation capability will contribute to every core mission (special reconnaissance, direct action, UW, and military assistance). Furthermore, it will highly enhance SOF elements' abilities in hostage rescue, counter-insurgency, and disaster relief operations as well. Developing and maintaining this capability will increase the speed of maneuvers and will decrease the reaction time of SOF units in the domestic environment. When the SOATG achieves full operational capability and gains experience in supporting SOF operations, it can deploy to different NATO missions to support multinational SOF units, therefore, strengthen and represent the Hungarian commitment to the alliance. Moreover, the "Zrinyi 2026" development program is a great opportunity to create the SOF aviation capability implementing the H-145M and H-225M helicopters.

The H-145M is a multipurpose rotary-wing air asset, which "offers a wide range of tactical options for battlefield roles."[144] The most important feature of the H-145M is the variety of uses during operations. The helicopter can deliver troops up to ten soldiers who can infiltrate to, or exfiltrate from the battlefield, and they can embark/disembark through both sides and the rear clamshell doors. The crew can equip the aircraft with multiple weapon systems to provide close air support or to destroy designated targets. The aircraft's range is three hundred and fifty nautical miles and the mission equipment packages include a fast rope system, cargo hooks, and hoists. The SOATG can employ the H-145M platform for intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance operations as well, supporting the commander's critical information requirements.

The H-225M helicopter is a combat-proven multi-role aircraft. This helicopter is a tactical transportation platform that can carry up to twenty-eight soldiers in cabin seats. Its range is seven hundred nautical miles which can be extended with air-to-air or hover in-flight refueling capabilities. This type of Airbus helicopters can support special operations, combat search and rescue, and medical evacuation missions as well. The crew can equip the aircraft with different weapon systems: from machine guns for survivability and self-defense to guided ammunition firing through electro-optical systems.[145] Both types of these aircraft are NATO compatible and multiple alliance members employed these in different hotspots like Iraq and Afghanistan.

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[144] Airbus, "H145M," Official website of Airbus, accessed 15 April 2020, https://www.airbus.com/helicopters/military-helicopters/light/h145m.html.

[145] Airbus, "H225M," Official website of Airbus, accessed 15 April 2020, https://www.airbus.com/helicopters/military-helicopters/heavy/h225m.html.

Therefore, in the frame of the military development program, the author recommends dedicating a couple of these modern aircraft to support SOF operations. Employing these new air assets to support SOF operations can highly enhance the flexibility, rigor, interoperability, and success of these units. Although Hungarian SOF units could utilize these assets even if those are not under the command of the 2nd SOFB commander, to significantly boost up SOF capabilities, it is inevitable to create a SOATG.

The SOATG's mission is to provide air support to special operations under difficult circumstances, in adverse weather, in darkness at a low level, over mountainous terrain, and in a non-permissive environment. The SOATG must be able to conduct and support multiple activities: covert insertion and extraction during special reconnaissance missions and direct actions, close air support for short duration strikes, and transport troops or resupply bundles if necessary. Moreover, they have to be able to conduct combat search and rescue as well. In that case, SOF units will not need to request aviation assets from the conventional forces, who usually have limited experience and operational capabilities concerning SOF missions, but the 2nd SOFB is going to have its aviation capability with specially trained and selected pilots and crews.

Having an organic aviation capability will reduce the reaction time and readiness of SOF units which can highly enhance the success of missions. Moreover, this capability will enhance every War Fighting Function. Air assets can support the intelligence by collecting information about the enemy, terrain, and civilians with their built-in intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance systems; they can support movement and maneuver by inserting and extracting troops from and to the

battlefield; they can support the fires function by providing close air support for the troops on the ground and destroy adversary light rotary-wing air assets; they can support protection by guarding convoys as part of the force protection plans; they can transport resupply bundles and be utilized as a casualty evacuation platform, and they can enhance the command and control function by acting as a relay station of communication networks or as a mobile aerial command post during operations. In summary, this capability provides flexibility, readiness, and enhanced air mobility to the 2nd SOFB. Although the development plan "Zrinyi 2026" does not describe how the HDFC will utilize and disseminate the new aircraft between units, it is a great opportunity to develop the SOATG capability within the frame of the program.

Psychological Operations

Although kinetic operations will represent a major part of SOF operations, they should have the ability to support information warfare too. If SOF serves as the primary military element of homeland defense countering non-linear warfare, they must have the ability to influence the perspective of the Hungarian citizens and support the narratives of the Hungarian government's strategic communication. SOF should use psychological operation assets throughout each of the phases of non-linear warfare. As the 2nd SOFB does not have organic PSYOPS teams, it is necessary to extend the size of the brigade and implement this capability to each Special Operation Task Group as a minimum requirement. As non-linear warfare is a population-centric conflict, Psychological Operation teams must be able to reach out to the Hungarian citizens. In addition, these teams must convince the population to maintain their social resiliency, degrade the adversaries' will and morale, reduce their efficiency, and break their support from locals,

especially in the early phases of non-linear warfare. These teams can also assist to form the strategic communication plan, create narratives and messages, and translate and transfer them to the locals. Furthermore, they can conduct key leader engagements to gather intelligence and better understanding of the environment, and feed the intelligence network. In summary, they greatly improve the psychological, moral, and social aspects of special operations, and represent a valuable tool for the 2nd SOFB commander fighting hybrid threats.

<div align="center">Training</div>

The 2nd SOFB must maintain high standards and selection criteria to face threats of non-linear warfare. Based on the analysis of non-linear warfare, the author recommends two major areas where further SOF training program should focus and establish a wide array of lessons and exercises. First, to counter the adversaries' unconventional, paramilitary, criminal, and separatist threats in the first four phases of non-linear warfare, the 2nd SOFB must tailor its training and exercises to support law enforcement operations. If the 2nd SOFB must support law enforcement operations in the early phases of the conflict, then the SOF training program should implement TTPs used by special police units. SOF operators must understand the differences between the domestic environment and the deployments in Afghanistan. Not only is the environment different, but the rules of engagement vary as well. SOF operators must know the legal aspects of domestic operations even if they are "only" the supporting effort to law enforcement units in this point of the conflict. Besides, SOF and Counter-Terrorism Center must establish a shared understanding, TTPs, and systems to achieve interoperability. Counter-Terrorism Center representatives can train SOF operators on the

legal aspects and police TTPs during domestic operations while SOF operators can teach counterterrorism units on the characteristics of adversaries' special operations, especially UW. The main purpose of this cooperation and coordination is to establish common understanding and interoperability between high-tier police and military units and enable their success in countering the threats in the first four phases.

Second, Hungarian SOF must deepen its relationship with the intelligence services, such as the Military National Security Service and Special Service for National Security. A tighter relationship serves two functions: information sharing and combined training. First, sharing intelligence is crucial in each phase of non-linear warfare. Intelligence services can feed the situational awareness and can identify targets for SOF units. Second, closer cooperation with intelligence services will enhance SOF units to conduct UW effectively in the fifth and sixth phases of non-linear warfare. At this stage of the conflict, the adversary occupies the territory of Hungary. As preparation for UW in the occupied territories, intelligence agents can improve the knowledge and expertise of SOF operators to conduct clandestine operations in civilian attire as part of reconnaissance or kinetic actions. Also, these entities must closely work together during UW, therefore, establishing common TTPs and shared understanding is fundamental.

Moreover, the SOF training schedule should heavily focus on practicing related tasks to UW during field training exercises. These training events must emphasize covert operations in the urban environment, deep operations in the adversaries' territory, and enabling resistance movement. In Ukraine, Russian operations mainly focused on critical governmental institutions located in built-up areas and primarily targeted population centers such as Sevastopol or Mariupol. Occupying these key terrains provides control

over the key lines of communication, activities of targeted citizens, and provides access to governmental networks. As non-linear warfare is also a population-centric conflict, the urban environment will signify key terrain for aggressors and defenders as well. Also, based on the analysis of the future operating environment, urban terrain will gain exclusive significance in non-linear warfare. Therefore, Hungarian SOF units must master their skills in fighting an adversary's forces and executing surveillance missions in built-up areas. In summary, the SOF's training plan must enhance the effectiveness in COIN and UW missions combating the threats from the early phases of non-linear warfare.

<center>Education</center>

Education must be an integral effort to further develop Hungarian SOF elements. Berg-Knutsen and Roberts also argue for an increased focus on the professional development of SOF operators. Based on their recommendation, SOF operators must become strategic thinkers through education, skills, and attributes.[146] They recommend personalized education programs to achieve designated competencies and increase the knowledge and expertise in the SOF community. They also suggest that selection criteria should focus on interpersonal skills, independence, and cognitive abilities.[147]

As non-linear warfare heavily relies on deception, misleading information, and fake data, operators even at the lowest levels must be critical thinkers. As SOF operations

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[146] Berg-Knutsen and Roberts, "Strategic Design for Norwegian Special Operations Forces (NORSOF) 2025," 46.

[147] Ibid., 48.

bolster strategic assessment and decision-making, especially if the 2nd SOFB becomes an organic element of the MoD, their evaluation will exceedingly impact high-level decisions. Furthermore, they may make crucial decisions during operations which can have serious consequences on the strategic level causing failure or success for the entire campaign.

Therefore, the author recommends adding high school graduation as one selection criteria for future SF applicants or ensure an educational development program upon completion of the qualification course. In addition, SOF leadership must encourage 2nd SOFB members to participate in academic level scholarship as well. To further enhance intellectual development, Hungarian SOF members must learn new languages besides English. For example, if 2nd SOFB operators must conduct clandestine operations deep in the adversaries' territory, then they must have the ability to communicate with local population. Learning new languages will also enhance the cultural understanding of SOF operators in specific areas and regions. Therefore, MoD and HDFC must set the conditions for the educational development by organizing language courses, financially support operators to participate in mid-level or academic-level graduation programs, and inspire them for follow-on intellectual development programs to achieve expertise, competency, knowledge, and skills. In summary, Hungarian SOF commanders, staff members, and operators must pursue participation in educational programs to enable a broader mindset within the SOF community. Therefore, Hungarian SOF operators can become strategic thinkers and evolve into a smart weapon asset of the Hungarian MoD.

Information/Operational Security

As non-linear warfare uses an indirect approach to degrade the critical capabilities of the targeted country, the MoD and HDFC must maintain a high level of information and operational security related to Hungarian SOF. From the Hungarian homeland defense perspective in the early phases of non-linear warfare, the 2nd SOFB is a key military asset and its operations are critical capabilities of the MoD. It is most likely that any adversaries of Hungary will try to strike, degrade, or sabotage the Hungarian SOF unit physically or in the cyber domain. Therefore, MoD and HDFC must protect any data related to SOF members, their operations, and capabilities. Moreover, that information must be highly classified and carefully shared with other governmental agencies. The MoD and 2nd SOFB must maintain a highly classified cyber network to deny the adversaries' attempts to exploit the physical or viral vulnerabilities.

Moreover, during the selection process, a detailed and thorough background check of SOF applicants is crucial to avoid the possibility of sabotage, espionage, and leakage of classified information. As the adversaries of Hungary may infiltrate their special agents into the SOF community, counter-intelligence agencies must maintain a high standard of attention during the selection of possible SOF operators. With a detailed examination of personal credentials, counter-intelligence assets can deny the adversaries' attempts to hinder, subvert, or undermine SOF missions.

Summary

The author examined multiple, but highly interrelated topics during research. During research, the author primarily focused on the changing nature of the war between nation-states and what the implications are for further developing the Hungarian SOF

capability. First, this paper identified a need for change in the Hungarian SOF perspectives after a long COIN/combating terrorism environment. Second, the author described the aspects of the future operating environment and presented the perspectives of current research on countering hybrid warfare. Although there are many other possibilities of future conflicts, the author used the Russian-type hybrid warfare as a most likely model for upcoming struggles. Furthermore, this paper analyzed the strategic environment and multi-domain aspects of non-linear warfare and added the examination of its characteristics, steps, and critical assets referring to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2014. Third, the author summarized his findings and provided recommendations for further developing the Hungarian SOF to support the homeland defense effectively.

Answering the primary research question, the author states that the Hungarian SOF must focus on developing a strategic military asset capable of accomplishing multiple objectives. In the early phases of non-linear warfare, they must be able to counter hybrid threats in support of law enforcement units, while during the later phases they must adjust to conduct UW. For these broad mission sets, the SOF development programs should concentrate on indirect capabilities such as TPTs to enhance responsiveness and support of the information warfare; special operation aviation capability to achieve rapid reaction and flexibility; education programs to enhance critical thinking, and interagency cooperation to gain situational awareness and achieve unity of effort.

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