A Framework for Security Cooperation Planning

Aaron C. Taliaferro
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About This Publication
This work was conducted by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) under the Central Research Program (C6514). The views, opinions, and findings should not be construed as representing the official position of the United States Government.

For More Information:
Dr. Wade Hinkle, RSM, SFRD
whinkle@ida.org, 703-578-2895
ADM John C. Harvey, Jr., USN (Ret), Director, SFRD
jharvey@ida.org, 703-575-4530

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Kimerlee Conner, USAF Retired; Gary “Hale” Laughlin, USAF Retired; Patrick Goodman, USAF Retired; Ken Arteaga, USAF Retired; and Jeff Menasco, Colonel, USAF. They provided the inspiration and the ideas during our times of mutual service that stand behind this paper. Also, the author acknowledges the contributions and helpful review of Mr. Michael Murray of the United States Marine Corps’ Security Cooperation Group at Fort Story, VA. Finally, many thanks to my reviewers and IDA colleagues, Ms. Tina Patterson and Ms. Caroline Earle.

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Executive Summary

Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was issued. However, but for a few exceptions, the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to U.S. Combatant Commands have not prepared their people to be good or even adequate at planning for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation (SC) activities, which is the principal way the Department of Defense (DOD) builds partner capacity. Rather, the focus of military education and training primarily remains on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not useful for steady-state, peacetime SC planning.

SC planning presents vexing challenges. First, a myriad of authorities in the United States legal code govern different and specific aspects of peacetime military activity. Second, there is a constant need to calibrate partner nation objectives, capacity, and resources with U.S. policy objectives and resources. Finally, there is the requirement to understand and synchronize, as much as possible, both the U.S. interagency and DOD processes for providing training, advice, and equipment to foreign partners.

Although it has taken awhile, U.S. Joint Military Doctrine has caught up to DOD strategy and guidance. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, now reads, “DOD is tasked to conduct operations on a daily basis to aid in achieving national objectives. In turn Combatant Commanders (CCDRs)…conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement (i.e., security cooperation).” In other words, the Geographic Combatant Commands’ day-to-day operations mandate is to shape their Area of Operations (AO) with as much fervor as previously given to the preparation for and conduct of operational and contingency plans. Per DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, peacetime planning and execution is given equal weight to contingency and operational planning.

This is a significant change from the previous version of Joint Publication 5-0 (JP 5-0), which described peacetime planning as static campaign planning. However, planning to conduct SC activities in a peacetime environment is adaptive planning and execution. Only in the past three-to-four years has the DOD issued guidance and begun to

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train and educate its members on these ideas.

What Joint Doctrine still lacks is a framework for SC planning. The new JP 5-0 dispensed with the sequenced, Campaign Phasing Model of the previous version, but it did not replace it with something new. This paper proposes a framework for SC planning (as shown below) that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan, and resource security cooperation activities carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces on an ongoing basis.

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1. Strategy
2. Assessment
3. Plan
4. Resource
5. Perform (Engagement)
6. Attainment (Evaluation)
7. Transition

Security Cooperation Phasing Model – Adaptive Planning for Complex Adaptive Conditions

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1. Introduction

“In preparing for battle, I have always found that plans are useless, but planning is indispensable”

—Dwight D. Eisenhower

President Eisenhower’s point is a paradoxical truth. It is not only true in battle, but also true in peace when planning to conduct security cooperation (SC) activities.

For any plan, most people are interested in the execution, the part that answers the question, “How will we do what we are tasked to do?” However, when it comes to executing any plan, many things will happen that were not planned. This is because planners cannot precisely predict the future. The environment (politics, policy, events, terrain, weather, and people) will change and produce unforeseen effects. Given that, Eisenhower recommends,

“Take all the plans off the top shelf and throw them out the window and start once more. But if you haven’t been planning you can’t start to work, intelligently at least. That is the reason it is so important to plan, to keep yourselves steeped in the character of the problem that you may one day be called upon to solve—or to help to solve.”

Therefore, the most pertinent part of any plan is the desired future state, or end state. Only from known desired end states can resources be aligned in sufficient time to create impact. If articulated correctly, this will prepare the minds of those who must both plan and execute. It will also allow them to adapt to changes in the environment that will impose challenges to prior assumptions made during planning.

SC planning presents vexing challenges that may tempt planners to throw their plans off the top shelf. First, a myriad of authorities in the U.S. legal code govern different and

3 Security cooperation encompasses all Department of Defense interactions, programs, and activities with foreign security forces and their institutions to build relationships that help promote U.S. interests; enable partner nations to provide the U.S. access to territory, infrastructure, information, and resources; and build and apply their capacity and capabilities consistent with U.S. defense objectives. (Joint Publication 3-20, Security Cooperation, 23 May 2017).


5 Eisenhower’s wisdom is surely derived from his study of Helmuth von Moltke the Elder, the German field marshal regarded as the creator of a more modern method of directing armies in the field and is known for writing, "No plan of operations extends with any certainty beyond the first contact with the main hostile force.”
specific aspects of peacetime military activity. Second, there is a constant need to calibrate partner nation objectives, capacity, and resources with U.S. policy objectives and resources. Finally, there is the requirement to understand and synchronize, as much as possible, both the U.S. Interagency and Department of Defense (DOD) processes for providing training, advice, and equipment to foreign partners.

For the most part, historical defense planning processes have and continue to focus on contingency and operational planning. However, beginning with the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, defense guidance directed the combatant commands to shift their planning emphasis from contingency and operational planning based on wartime scenarios to steady-state, peacetime planning. In other words, plan more for peace than for war.

More specific guidance was introduced by DOD through a new document, the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF), first published in 2008. Operational and contingency plans were listed as annexes to the main plan (referred to as the Theater Campaign Plan (TCP)) that focused on steady-state objectives and activities. For each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), the desired effect of the change was to develop strategic plans of action on a global and regional basis for steady-state activities, and to emphasize the important role they play in shaping conditions to prevent conflict or to weigh conditions in the United States’ favor if conflict is unavoidable.

Though it has taken awhile, U.S. Joint Military Doctrine has caught up to DOD guidance. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, now reads, “DOD is tasked to conduct operations on a daily basis to aid in achieving national objectives. In turn Combatant Commanders (CCDRs)…conduct their campaigns primarily through military engagement (i.e., security cooperation).” In other words, the GCC’s day-to-day operations mandate is to shape their Area of Operations (AO) with as much fervor as previously given to the preparation for and conduct of operational and contingency plans. Per DOD guidance and Joint Doctrine, peacetime planning and execution is given equal weight to contingency and operational planning.

Not only did traditional military campaign planning as described in historic U.S. military doctrine not focus on peacetime planning and execution, most members of the U.S. Armed Forces have not been trained or educated to conduct deliberate planning and execution during peacetime for things other than contingency operations. Previous versions of Joint Publication 5-0 described peacetime planning as static campaign planning, per the

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6 The GEF is the means the Secretary of Defense utilizes to transmit his global and theater-specific objectives to inform the theater campaign planning processes of the Combatant Commands.

7 A Theater Campaign Plan (TCP) may also be referred to as the Combatant Command Campaign Plan. For purposes of this document, TCP will be the term of use.

Joint Operational Planning and Execution System. However, planning to conduct security cooperation\(^9\) activities in a peacetime environment is adaptive planning and execution. Only in the past three-to-four years has the DOD issued guidance and begun to train and educate its members on these ideas.\(^{10}\)

For the most part, the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to the CCDRs have not prepared their people to be good or even adequate at adaptive planning and execution. Rather, the focus of military education and training remains primarily on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not useful for steady-state, peacetime activities that are a main focus of CCDRs TCPs. These plans are executed every day, which means they are proven (as Eisenhower says) both useless and indispensable every day. This paper’s intent is to propose a framework for SC planning that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan, and resource security cooperation activities\(^{11}\) carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces on an ongoing basis.

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\(^9\) Prior to the Publication of JP 3-20, there was not an official Joint Military definition of security cooperation. However, the DOD Directive on SC defined it as “activities undertaken by the Department of Defense to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. \textbf{It includes all DOD interactions with foreign defense and security establishments}, including all DOD-administered security assistance programs, that: build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities; develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations.” DODD 5132.03, October 24, 2008. This definition was updated with the revised DODD issued in December 2016 and is now, “\textbf{All DOD interactions with foreign defense establishments} to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to allied and partner nations. This also includes DOD-administered security assistance programs.” DODD 5132.03 accessed at http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/513203_dodd_2016.pdf on May 10, 2018.


\(^{11}\) The paper will not address how the Military Departments might deliberately organize, train, prepare, and assign well-trained adaptive planners to combatant commands and component Service commands.
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2. Influencing the Planned Security Cooperation Activities of Geographic Combatant Commands

All GCCs have an established theater campaign planning process that guides command activities toward accomplishing U.S. national and theater-specific strategic objectives. This process seeks to synchronize the actions of the combatant command’s (CCMD’s) assigned forces to pursue (as effectively and efficiently as possible) U.S. national, defense department, or command specific objectives within countries in the CCMD’s theater of operations.

All SC activities take place within a foreign country or involve personnel from foreign countries. SC objectives and programmed activities by country are listed in country cooperation plans or country security cooperation plans (the names change based on the command) that are subordinate to a TCP. Military Service component commands (including Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps Service components) receive guidance from the GCC, participate in the command’s planning process, and are assigned as the organizations of primary responsibility for specific activities within country plans. This process establishes a demand signal that the GCC (and its Service component commands) may or may not be able to resource within the personnel, funds, and legal authorities (i.e., programs) provided to the command.13

12 The word “campaign” is a cause for confusion. Historically, a military campaign referred to a series of military operations intended to achieve a particular objective, confined to a particular area, or involving a specific type of fighting. See Oxford English Dictionary. Accessed at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/campaign. More simply, a campaign was “an operation of an army in the field.” Accessed at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/campaign. Since the first GEF was issued, DOD has worked to expand the definition to include all operations and activities, not just operations involving fighting or armies in the field. CICSM 3130.01A, 25 November 2014, Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities, defines campaign as “A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space; all operations, activities, and investments within CCMD’s purview aimed at achieving objectives derived from the Secretary of Defense’s strategic direction.” Accessed at: http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Manuals/m313001.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-175658-163 on 10 May 2018.

13 For this paper, a program is a collection of money, personnel, and legal authority that enables activity. For example, the Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program is a DOD-managed program that provides money, personnel, and legal authority to train and educate foreign military forces in counter-terrorism strategies, tactics, procedures, etc.
These planning processes run on a continual basis as part of routine GCC planning. Throughout the year, command planning at the country level, where security cooperation activities mostly occur, may be influenced by external strategic adjustments, changes to priorities, the infusion of additional resources and by broad DOD or specific Military Department interests. However, significant lead time is required to influence and shape command planning because of the time required to resource plans through programing and budgeting processes.

In fact, command SC planning is not going to be significantly shaped or influenced in the year prior to the execution of any SC activity. This is because the command will be focused on resourcing the next fiscal year’s already planned activities. Rather, a stakeholder in future command activities requires a strategy for what it wants to accomplish and it needs to be prepared to inject that strategy into command deliberations at least two fiscal years before the activities are scheduled to begin. This becomes particularly important if a Military Service Component (e.g., Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command (MARFORPAC)) is tasked as a lead agent by their Military Department for an activity involving a partner nation or foreign security force. The greater the lead time, the more likely there will be success in achieving a desired effect. If a stakeholder does not inject itself into the command’s campaign planning process at least two fiscal years in advance of when the final plan would be approved, then it is unlikely to see its views reflected in the activities of the command. Figure 1 illustrates this idea.

![Figure 1. Stakeholder Influence Timeline](image)

Military Departments and the forces assigned to the Service secretaries (such as members of the Air Force assigned to Air Force laboratories or members of the Army at

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14 For example, per DOD Directive 5100.01, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, the USMC is responsible to organize, train, mobilize, demobilize, administer, maintain, equip and provide Marines able to conduct amphibious operations. To do that, the Commandant of the Marine Corps will task or has tasked MARFORPAC to maintain security relationships with the Republic of the Philippines to gain and sustain access to training ranges in the Philippines for the USMC. This priority of the USMC may or may not be a priority of the PACOM commander. To effectively influence the PACOM TCP, MARFORPAC needs direction from the USMC about its priorities at least two years in advance of the year of execution.

15 At least two years is the benchmark because of how the DOD plans, programs, and allocates resources. Once the program plan is set, a stakeholder would have to get DOD leaders to change the already approved program to fund an initiative.
Army Training and Doctrine Command) also conduct security cooperation activities. These activities may support the objectives of the DOD, the theater campaign plan objectives of one or more combatant commands, specific departmental objectives, or a combination of any of the three. The remainder of this paper uses the United States Air Force (USAF) to illustrate how a Military Department and its Service component commands can relate to GCCs’ TCP processes.

That Combatant Commands and their Service Component Commands conduct SC activities in support of DOD and TCP objectives is a given. To illustrate how a Military Department also must plan and implement SC activities in its own interest, the following USAF SC examples are provided. These activities are carried out by members of the Air Force not assigned to the USAF component command of a GCC and serve Department of the Air Force objectives as well as DOD and TCP objectives:

- HQ USAF and USAF Major Command combined wargames and exercises (e.g., Air Force Space Command’s Schriever Wargame or Air Combat Command’s Angel Thunder Exercise)
- HQ USAF operator engagement talks
- Chief of Staff of the Air Force’s Counterpart Visit Program
- Departmental participation in international air and trade shows
- Training and Education of international students at the Inter-American Air Forces Academy
- Secretary of the Air Force Negotiation and Management of International Armaments Cooperation Agreements

The Air Force undertakes these activities for multiple reasons:

- In pursuit of fulfilling its objectives in accordance with the Air Force’s Title 10 United State Code (USC) requirement to organize, train, equip, and present ready Air Forces to the CCMDs for global operations.
- In support of the end states and objectives specified by the GCCs within their theater campaign plans.
- In support of global DOD objectives specified in the GEF.

Figure 2 conceptually displays how multiple end states can be met by the security cooperation activities of a Military Department and its Service component commands.

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16 All Military Departments organize, train, and equip Service Component Commands that are assigned in support of a Combatant Command. For example, Pacific Air Forces, Marine Corps Forces Pacific, U.S. Army Pacific Command, and Pacific Fleet Command all support the U.S. Pacific Command.
The Service’s Component Commands are the Military Departments’ force contribution to the combatant command. That is, the component commands are Service-specific, internal GCC stakeholders. As a component command, they answer to the combatant command and take actions primarily in support of combatant command objectives. At the same time, the components also bring the perspective of their Service to the CCMD, and have service priorities and interests to represent.

This specific military service perspective reflects knowledge of service strategy and priorities, and an understanding of what is required to develop service-specific military capabilities. Applied to the realm of security cooperation, service perspectives provided by the components assist in determining the time and the resources required to develop service-specific capabilities in partner air, land, and maritime forces. As external stakeholders to the GCC, a Military Department’s best advocate for injecting service-level strategy and guidance into GCC planning processes are the Service Component Commands, which are internal GCC stakeholders.

The USAF produces security cooperation guidance reflecting its view on how the USAF can actively shape the global environment through security cooperation activities designed to build partner nation air force capabilities that protect U.S. and partner nation interests. The guidance is authored and promulgated to enhance the development and execution of plans and programs focused on building enduring capabilities, such as air

17 This chart was developed in collaboration with Jeff Menasco, Colonel, USAF, when the author was on an active duty assignment in the Office of Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) and Colonel Menasco was assigned to Headquarters Air Force A5.
superiority; precision attack; air mobility; airspace awareness and control; airfield management and security; and airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities within the air forces of specifically named partner nations.

The focus of this guidance is on activities that can be undertaken by members of the USAF through the means of security cooperation. These activities are intended to proactively shape the international environment during peacetime to prevent conflict, deter adversaries, and provide the access necessary to posture Air Forces in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Specific USAF guidance also describes intent to build aviation capabilities in partner nations. This guidance may be the result of direction from the GEF or other DOD issuances (see Figure 2), it may be how the Air Force is responding to GCC Campaign Plan objectives (see Figure 2), or it may be an Air Force Strategy to build up partner nation capability in a part of the world where USAF resources may not be sufficient to meet the operational requirements of a commander. In other words, the USAF may conduct SC activities to augment its own Title 10 responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide Air Forces. By doing so, partner capabilities may increase the partner’s internal stability and provide broader, more robust access for USAF aircraft that may operate in foreign partner air space or need to use foreign partner airbase infrastructure.

The USAF cannot achieve the aims of its security cooperation guidance exclusively with its Title 10 forces or financial resources. It needs the airmen assigned to Air Force component commands to shape and influence the GCC theater campaign and country security cooperation plans. If the GCCs’ plans reflect Air Force guidance and priority, then the Air Force will benefit from more people and more money put into action to achieve Air Force aims, which in turn serve the aims of DOD and the United States.

However, to reiterate, if the Air Force or any Military Department or Military Service desires to influence a GCC TCP or subordinate country plans, then the stakeholder (whichever organization that may be) must inject itself into the GCC’s planning process at least two fiscal years in advance of when it would like to begin its activities. Not only is this required if the aim is to have GCC planned activities reflect the influence of Military Department guidance, it is also required to allow the GCC and its component commands the time to solicit and obtain resources to conduct planned security cooperation activities.
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3. Resourcing Planned GCC Security Cooperation Activities

For the most part, security cooperation activities intended to build the capacity of foreign security forces and institutions cannot be undertaken with Title 10 (USC) funds authorized and appropriated by the U.S. Congress for the DOD or the Military Departments. U.S. law and policy generally regards interactions between U.S. and foreign armed forces, in peacetime,\textsuperscript{18} as an aspect of U.S. foreign policy. To that end, the law states,

The Secretary of State is responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance, military assistance, and military education, and training, including determining whether there shall be a security assistance program and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad, and that the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby. (Section 622(c), Foreign Assistance Act, 1961.)

Therefore, a preponderance of U.S. taxpayer dollars made available for DOD security cooperation activities, especially those intended to build the capability and capacity of partner nations through train, equip, and advise activities, come from Title 22 (i.e., Department of State) appropriations. Furthermore, even those dollars not appropriated under Title 22 are still subject to the constraints of Title 22 regarding the provision of foreign assistance.\textsuperscript{19}

Having said that, program funds that enable security cooperation activities come from a variety of sources that can be broken down into three categories. Each of the programs listed below has policy guidelines that govern its use and most of the programs are managed and controlled by a single agency within the DOD or are limited to specific agencies within the DOD. Gaining access to the program funds is subject to a process specified by the Department of State or DOD organization that manages them. The lists are not exhaustive, but cover a large majority of the programs and the associated funds available to pay for and legally authorize security cooperation activities.

- Category 1: Resources appropriated and authorized under Title 22 (22 USC) that enable security cooperation activities, and are managed by either the DOD

\textsuperscript{18} Most security cooperation activities take place in peacetime.
\textsuperscript{19} There are a few exceptions (such as specified programs under Title 50 of United States Code), but these are very specific and well known by the agencies that may use them. Those few exceptions are not covered in this paper.
through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) and the implementing agencies of the Military Departments, or through the Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

- Foreign Military Financing
- International Military Education and Training
- Global Peace Operations Initiative
- Transfer of Excess Defense Articles
- Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Program
- Management and Execution of Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
- Special Defense Acquisition Fund (SDAF). The SDAF is a program that enables the Secretary of Defense to finance the acquisition of defense articles and defense service in anticipation of their transfer to eligible foreign countries and international organizations.

- Category 2: Resources appropriated under 10 USC that enable security cooperation activities, and are managed by the DOD and its Geographic Combatant Commands and Military Departments:
  - Traditional CCMD authority (TCA) for military-to-military engagement. This is money appropriated to the combatant commands for military-to-military engagement with foreign defense forces.
  - Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid (OHDCA). These funds are managed by DSCA and then allocated to the GCCs to reimburse them for expenses incurred for legally authorized military activities (as defined in various sections of 10 USC that authorize OHDCA actions).

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20 For example, the implementing agency of the USAF for Foreign Military Financing is the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs (SAF/IA) and the Air Force Security Assistance and Cooperation (AFSAC) Directorate.

21 FMS is authorized by 22 USC; funding to maintain the FMS enterprise is primarily paid for out of FMS administrative funds or FMS case funds. These are managed by Service-specific implementing agencies and DSCA.

22 The legislation that authorizes SDAF is in Title 22; however, capitalization of the fund may come from Title 10 funds or from FMS administration or other sources.

23 TCA for security cooperation activities is derived from U.S. Code, Title 10, and Sections 312-313. These authorities authorize the Secretary of Defense, through the CCMDs, to pay for seminars, conferences, subject-matter expert exchanges and staff talks between military forces.

24 For an example, see 10 USC, Section 401, *Humanitarian and civic assistance provided in conjunction with military operations.*
– Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program. These funds are managed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and are allocated to the GCCs or expended directly by DOD to educate and train foreign defense establishments to combat terrorism.25

– As authorized by section 332 of 10 U.S. Code, the Wales (formerly Warsaw) Initiative Fund, Defense Institution Reform Initiative, and Ministry of Defense Advisors programs are managed and directed by DSCA with the purpose of building the capacity to govern and manage armed forces within foreign ministries of defense, armed forces joint and general staffs, and other headquarters-type organizations.26, 27

– Paying for the training and exercise expenses of friendly foreign countries.28 The Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, and Military Departments are all authorized (within legal limits and as authorized by the Secretary of Defense) to pay for some partner nation expenses related to the conduct of combined training or exercises.

  o Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) with friendly foreign forces is a U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM)-specific authority that allows SOCOM-assigned forces to pay for the conduct of joint training with a foreign partner and to pay for the incremental expenses incurred by the foreign partner as a result of the training.29

– Partner Capacity Building activities. With the concurrence of the Secretary of State, 10 USC section 333 authorizes the DOD to provide (out of money appropriated by Congress to the DOD) training, equipment, articles, supplies, services, and small-scale construction to foreign security forces to build their capacity to conduct a variety of operations.30

– Joint Staff Exercise Program. This program is paid for out of defense-wide operations and maintenance appropriations. Its primary purpose is to maintain operational readiness of Title 10 forces assigned to the combatant commands. However, the commands can design their exercises to be

25 See 10 USC, Section 345, Regional Defense Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program.
26 Some Wales Initiative Funds are directly managed by U.S. European Command or U.S. Central Command and serve specific command interests.
28 See 10 USC, Section 321 and 322.
29 This authority comes from 10 USC, Section 322.
30 These funds are ultimately managed and executed in compliance with Foreign Military Sales processes. They are subject to the constraints of Title 22 restrictions on technology transfer, arms exports, and foreign disclosure and require approval by the Secretary of State before they can be used.
combined and use these funds to conduct combined exercises (foreign nations have to pay for their own participation unless the GCC has money and SECDEF authorization based on 10 USC, Section 321 to pay for partner nation participation).

– National Guard Bureau (NGB) State Partnership Program (SPP) Activities. Managed by NGB International Affairs and the Adjutants General of State National Guard forces who have established State Partnership Programs. SPP uses 10 USC, section 311-313 authority.

– Regional Centers for Security Studies. Provides forums for bilateral and multilateral research for military and civilian participants. Foreign participation may be paid for by other U.S. Government agencies or by DOD if the Secretary of Defense finds it is in the national security interest of the United States.31

• Category 3: Resources Appropriated under Title 10 that enable security cooperation activities and which are specifically managed by the Department of the Air Force.32

– Military Personnel Exchange Program. The funds that enable this program come from the USAF Operations and Maintenance (O&M) budget and are managed by SAF/IA.33

– Aviation Leadership Program. The funds that enable this program come from the USAF O&M budget and are managed by SAF/IA. This is a unique, specific, and limited authority that allows the Secretary of the Air Force to provide English language and pilot training to personnel of the air forces of friendly, developing foreign countries.34

– Inter-American Air Force Academy (IAAFA). The O&M funds that pay for the maintenance and upkeep of the Academy (at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas) come from the USAF budget and are managed by the USAF’s Air Education and Training Command. The USAF does not pay for Foreign Students to attend courses at IAAFA.35

31 See 10 USC, Section 342
32 This list is provided as an example of a Military Department’s programs. The Department of the Army and Navy also have their own programs.
33 Though funds come from the USAF, the authority that allows for the program comes from 22 USC, section 2270(a). Other Military Departments and the DOD may also use the same authority to establish exchange programs
34 See 10 USC, Section 348.
35 The authority to pay for the operating expenses of IAAFA, an institution dedicated to training foreign military students, is a unique, specific, and limited authority given to the Secretary of the Air Force.
International Armaments Cooperation Agreements. Air Force funds that enable the activities of SAF/IA, Air Force labs, and other air force entities to pursue and enter into international agreements represents an Air Force investment in security cooperation activities that benefits the GCCs specifically (e.g., increased NATO Airborne Warning and Control System and Strategic Airlift Capability in the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) area of responsibility) and globally (e.g., increased satellite communications bandwidth and capability). The DOD and other Military Departments may also use this authority.  

USAF Academy Exchange Program. The USAF may spend up to $1 million to support up to 100 foreign students to attend the USAF Academy. All Military Departments may establish an exchange program at their Service academy.

Air Force Exercises. Like the Joint Staff, the Air Force may design exercises to encourage combined participation; this is a security cooperation investment.

Regional Affairs Strategist and Political-Military Affairs Strategist Program. This is an Air Force–dedicated program to purposefully develop airmen for interaction with members of partner nations. Other Services also have specific occupational specialties for this purpose.

Dedicated Air Force training and education programs that provide specific training for USAF airmen or members of other services for interaction with members of foreign air forces.

For GCC planners trying to resource theater security cooperation and country-specific security cooperation plans, assembling the necessary program funds to resource planned activities is akin to piecing together a puzzle. Each puzzle piece is unique and has a specific place (based on law and program policy) where it must fit into a plan. Even with reforms to SC authorities enacted by the Fiscal Year 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, this is a complicated process that places a significant burden on security cooperation planners.

under Title 10, section 349. Expenses for students attending IAAFA are covered by their own nation or by a USG program such as the 22 USC International Military Training and Education program.

A range of authorized activities are described in Chapter 138 of 10 USC.

See 10 USC, Section 347.

All military services will have their own unique training and education programs.

Another still-relevant historical treatment of this complexity is IDA Publication D-4288, *Addressing Challenges to the Comprehensive Approach to Building Partnership Capacity*, June 2011, Caroline R. Earle and A. Martin Lidy.
To manage the workload, the GCCs typically divide the process into activity planning and resource planning. Figure 3 (which references the 2013 planning year) depicts a way that the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) conducted resource planning for the command’s theater security cooperation plans.

Planners throughout PACOM (at the headquarters, in component service command headquarters, and within the security cooperation offices (SCO) of U.S. Embassies in PACOM’s theater of operations) develop project submissions to obtain various security cooperation resources in support of existing and approved country security cooperation plans. Each project submission must be in accordance with rules, regulations, policies and procedures of the program from which the planners are requesting resources.

During the year, representatives from each PACOM area of responsibility SCO come to headquarters to present their latest country SC plans and to confer with SC providers. The capability development working group assigns resources to country SC plans and reviews the focus of theater objectives to determine whether capability development objectives should change. Country planning and assessment of theater SC

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40 Obtained by the author during interaction with PACOM J45 when he was on active duty orders with the USAF.
activities continue throughout the year. Through this process, the command puts together the GCC theater SC plan.

Figure 4 depicts a U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) process. It is a more linear depiction than PACOM’s process, but still requires the command to piece together planned activities at the country level with available SC resources to get to executable country SC plans.

Figure 4. An AFRICOM Process for Resourcing Security Cooperation Plans

Funding is only half of the resource equation. The other half consists of people. Plan execution requires people. Without going into too much detail, people can be provided through:

- Assigned CCMD forces
- The Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) process
- Temporary Duty (TDY) forces in support of a specific program

Military Departments have people assigned at headquarters and major command levels who can be tasked to carry out SC activities that the Military Department may direct. For example, Headquarters USAF uses assigned forces to conduct operator engagement talks (paid for by HQ USAF Operations and Maintenance funds and authorized by 10 USC,

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41 Obtained by the author from AFRICOM J5 while he was on active duty orders with the USAF.
Section 312 – the same authority enables GCCs and their Service Component Commands to conduct similar activities) with the headquarters staff of friendly foreign air forces. Likewise, GCCs and their components can use assigned forces, match them with program funding, and direct them to conduct security cooperation activities.

At the GCC level, however, there are never enough people assigned to the command to meet all the demands of planned security cooperation activity. Even in EUCOM and PACOM (theaters with a significant number of assigned units), there are still not enough to meet all the activity demand. Therefore, the GCCs also rely on the GFMAP process to request forces from throughout the DOD to meet activity demand. Finally, some SC programs will provide armed forces, civilians, or contractors via TDY orders to conduct SC missions on a short- or long-term basis. For example, the USAF Air Force Security Assistance Training organization or the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization42 may direct personnel to form a mobile training or mobile education team and send them TDY to conduct training in support of objectives set by the SC office within a U.S. Embassy. These TDY activities are typically resourced as part of a larger foreign military sales case paid for by sovereign nation funds or by U.S. taxpayer dollars appropriated for the various and specific 10 USC and 22 USC programs that authorize the training of foreign military personnel.

To summarize, there are funds from both 22 USC and 10 USC programs that can be used to provide equipment, supplies, articles, goods, services, or training to a foreign nation, and there are program funds to pay for foreign participation in U.S. Military training exercises. However, each program has its own requirements for gaining access to its funding. Therefore, once a security cooperation activity is planned, it must be matched to a program able to legally resource the activity, and people must be found to use the program’s funds. This process of activity and resource planning is akin to fitting together a puzzle—a puzzle that changes every year as the planned activities and resources change.

For those who plan and conduct security cooperation activities, it is prudent to make sure the proper legal authority accompanies the funds to enable the activity. For example, imagine if a component USAF command (e.g., Air Forces Southern Command) planned an event to train members of a foreign air force to conduct air surveillance of coastal waters. Assume that the objective of the training was to build the partner’s counter-narcotics capability. To pay for the training, Air Forces Southern Command uses Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) funds. This would make the execution of the event illegal because CTFP funds must serve a counterterrorism, not a counter-narcotics, purpose.

42 Or the Naval Education and Training Security Assistance Field Activity organization.
4. Phasing Security Cooperation

This chapter proposes a framework for phased SC planning intended to address the adaptive planning process gap highlighted in the introduction.

JP 5-0 describes phasing as:

“… a way to view and conduct a complex joint operation in manageable parts. The main purpose of phasing is to integrate and synchronize related activities, thereby enhancing flexibility and unity of effort during execution.”\(^{43}\)

JP-5-0 describes phasing in the context of the operational design of a complex operation or campaign. Joint doctrine does not describe security cooperation as an operation or campaign. Rather, SC is described as activities that occur within the phases of an operational campaign or across the range of military operations.\(^{44}\) However, given the complexity of planning and resourcing SC, phasing is a helpful way to plan for the conduct of SC activities that must be integrated and synchronized to accomplish an objective or end state. This is true for all reasons that SC may be undertaken.\(^{45}\)

If the end state of a security cooperation plan is to build the capacity of a foreign armed force for self-defense, then it will require multiple efforts sequenced and resourced over time. In this respect, SC that focuses on building partner capacity should be thought of as a campaign – a capacity building campaign. Furthermore, this will be an adaptive campaign, as circumstances will change continually as the campaign is executed. On the other hand, if a GCC is tasked to maintain strong relationships with a given country or to increase USG access to airfields and infrastructure in foreign nations, then the SC planner should still phase SC activities over time and plan to continually adapt them to accomplish and sustain his or her objective.

Another reason that phasing SC is useful is that in many cases, an SC objective will not have a termination point. Maintaining relationships or gaining access will only cease to be objectives if U.S. policy with respect to the partner nation or its global military posture changes. Otherwise, these are open-ended objectives. Therefore, the SC planner has to


\(^{45}\) JP 3-20 defines three purposes for SC: 1) Build security relationships that promote U.S. security interests; 2) Develop partner nation capabilities for self-defense and multi-national operations; and 3) Provide U.S. forces with peacetime contingency access.
conceive of SC as a set of continuous, integrated and synchronized activities – in other words, *phased*.

As described earlier in the paper, security cooperation planning requires planners to match desired activities with legally available resources. Before activity planning, there is ideally a documented *strategy* that guides activity planners, and an *assessment* to determine where action might best achieve strategic objectives. If a *plan* of action is approved, it must be *resourced*. If it is resourced, it should be *performed* and then there should be an *evaluation* of whether planned objectives were or are being *attained*. Finally, there should be a determination of whether security cooperation efforts should *transition* to a different objective within an SC campaign involving the same partner or to a different partner.

Because multiple SC activities will be occurring sequentially in pursuit of the same objective, they should be *phased* to enhance *flexibility and unity of effort during* (both planning and) *execution*. Figure 5 presents a proposed model for Phasing SC that incorporates the elements described in the previous paragraph. The model is depicted linearly; however, it should loop in steps one through six until there is a planned or forced transition to something different.46

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**Figure 5. Security Cooperation Phasing Model – Adaptive Planning for Complex Adaptive Conditions**

This model can be used at every level at which security cooperation activities are planned and conducted (global, departmental, theater, and country). For example, the USAF can develop an SC strategy and assess where the strategy may be best applied through SC activities to achieve desired ends. The USAF can then plan to undertake SC activities in support of the strategy with the forces that it directs. The Air Force may resource the plan, subject to those programs that it may legally include in its budget and program objective memorandum (POM), or, subject to those Title 22 or Title 10 programs that the USAF does not control but can gain access to, the USAF may resource the plan.

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46 There are numerous reasons to transition. First, most SC activities occur with a PN during peacetime and have an objective of deterring or preventing conflict. If deterrence or prevention fails, then U.S. Armed Forces may transition to combat operations. Another reason to transition is if existing SC objectives within the PN have been accomplished; however, the USG wants the DOD to remain engaged with the particular partner. In this case, there will be a transition to a new objective or set of objectives. Finally, transition away from a specific PN may be required due to lack of interest by the PN, policy guidance issued by the DOD, or Congressional restrictions on activities with the PN.
Once resourced, the plan can be executed and evaluated for transition or continuance, subject to ongoing assessment and changes in strategy.

For forces that the Department of the Air Force does not direct but desires to influence, such as Air Forces assigned to a Service Component Command, this process can enable the Air Force to produce guidance for those Air Forces and inject the guidance into the GCC planning process with enough lead time (as depicted in Figure 1) to influence GCC security cooperation planning. Figure 6 illustrates this idea.

**Figure 6. How Military Department Planning May Influence GCC Security Cooperation Planning Process**

The Air Force cannot direct GCC planning and will have to respond to both DOD and TCP objectives (see Figure 2). However, if the Department of the Air Force (the blue part of Figure 6) wishes to influence the actions of a GCC (the purple part of Figure 6) then it can do that by providing its guidance to the Air Force Service Component Command (illustrated by blue circle in Figure 6) assigned to a GCC.

Finally, because the preponderance of SC activities within a GCC’s theater of operations takes place at a country level, Air Force Service Component Command members may use guidance provided by the Department of the Air Force, as influenced by the strategy of their geographic combatant commanders, to influence specific country SC plans that may be the focus of departmental strategy and guidance. This is depicted in Figure 7. Collectively, Figure 6 and Figure 7 depict how a Military Department may influence GCC security cooperation plans and activities. In the same way, a GCC will also influence the Country Cooperation Plan – also shown in Figure 7.
Regardless of where a planner sits, the process should be the same. Individual phases within that process may differ, however, and information from one phase may feed or influence another. Arguably, the most critical phase in SC planning and execution is assessment. It is the step where information from one phase flows between and informs and influences the others.
5. The Preeminence of Assessment in SC Planning and Execution

Unlike operational planning, which may produce a Concept Plan (CONPLAN) or Operation Plan (OPLAN)\(^47\) that sits on a shelf until an execution order is given, security cooperation plans are being executed every day. Furthermore, the targets of security cooperation activities (individuals within the armed forces and defense institutions of sovereign nations) are not static entities; rather, they are people whose willingness to cooperate is a necessary ingredient to successful plan execution. Also, people are variable. Their behavior is not constant. As a result, there is a constant stream of feedback for ongoing security cooperation activities to inform current assessment and ongoing planning. Therefore, the assessment phase is an ongoing, never completed process that continually informs and influences strategy, and guides future planning, resourcing, engagement, the evaluation of attainment and considerations for transition.

No matter what level (national, theater, or country team) of planning and assessments are taking place, an assessment of the willingness of individuals (or individuals within the organizations of nations) to cooperate with the United States must be taken into consideration, both prior to and during planning and execution of SC activities. This means that SC planning is an adaptive planning and execution enterprise that will not proceed according to centralized planning and decentralized execution. Rather, it will be decentralized planning and decentralized execution at each level of planning and execution. And at each level, the planners must be able to refer to a baseline assessment and have a means to reassess and adapt based on complex, adaptive conditions to create and execute plans to affect multiple environments and domains simultaneously (e.g., defense ministries, maritime security, aviation enterprise, ground force security, armed forces professionalization, etc.).

In conclusion, the preponderance of security cooperation activities are undertaken according to GCC-directed country security cooperation plans. These activities all take place within the foreign partner nation or with individuals from a specific partner nation. Therefore, country-level assessment and data should inform all other assessments and inform strategy and planning at higher levels. The Security Sector Assistance Presidential Policy Directive\(^48\) states as much: “Security Sector planning at the country level will…serve as the core

\(^47\) See JP 5-0 for the definition of CONPLAN and OPLAN.

organizing document for United States Government Security Sector Assistance Activities, promoting unity of effort and a more proactive, strategic, and efficient approach to meet Security Sector Assistance objectives.49 Country assessment feeds theater, departmental, and national assessment, and national assessment in turn affects policy, strategy, plans, resources, and evaluations from the national strategic level to the departmental to the theater to the country level. Figure 8 is a way of conceiving of this feedback loop, informed by assessments,50 which should operate at the grand strategy level and all lower levels.

Figure 8. National Grand Strategy in Action Model51, 52

49 Presidential Policy Directive 23 defines security sector assistance as those policies, programs, and activities the United States uses to: Engage with foreign partners and help shape their policies and actions in the security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people; and enable foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common security challenges.


51 The quote by Harry Yarger in the chart is from Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy (accessed at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=641). In that book, Yarger writes, “Strategy is subordinate to policy. Political purpose dominates all levels of strategy. Policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims in an acceptable manner. However, the development of strategy informs policy; policy must adapt itself to the realities of the environment and the limits of power. Thus, policy ensures that strategy pursues appropriate aims, and strategy informs policy of the art of the possible.”

52 Credit for this chart goes to G. Hale Laughlin, USAF retired. Mr. Laughlin first developed the chart while assigned to HQ Air Force Special Operations Command A8. He and the author of this paper were asked to prepare a short seminar on security cooperation planning in 2013 for what was then the Air Advisor Academy at McGuire AFB, NJ.
6. Conclusion

Using Figure 9 (an illustration of a EUCOM planning hierarchy), we can summarize the key points of the paper. EUCOM security cooperation planning starts with information derived from the end of the process (assessments).\textsuperscript{53} Assessment informs national policy and strategy and theater planning. Informed by policy and strategy, EUCOM drafts its theater campaign plan and breaks that plan into three parts, one of which is regional cooperation plans that further decompose into country cooperation plans. Once these plans are complete, available resources are aligned in support of security cooperation activities. These activities are then assessed, both upon completion and on an ongoing basis.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{EUCOM_Planning_Hierarchy}
\caption{A Depiction of EUCOM Planning\textsuperscript{54}}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} The proposed SC phasing model in this paper refers to this as evaluation, but the idea is the same.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Obtained by the author from USAFE/A5 while he was on active duty orders with the USAF.
\end{itemize}
Though the timelines are not depicted in Figure 9, the theater campaign plan looks at least two years out and there is a separate resourcing effort that also is looking at least two years out. Planned activities and resources must match up in the year before execution (i.e., the budget year) to enable the command to put together its country cooperation plans and undertake activities in the execution year. Military Departments that wish to shape and influence planned SC activities within a given GCC must plan to inject their perspective at least two years in advance of the execution year. Because the Military Departments are external stakeholders to the command, the best way to inject their perspective is through the Service component commands, which are internal command stakeholders.

Finally, there are some implications for the DOD to consider given the importance now assigned to the SC enterprise and the complexity of planning, resourcing, and implementing SC. These are:

- SC planning should be recognized as a separate discipline from operational planning.
- SC planning and execution should be conducted via a phased and adaptive process, per the proposed model in Figure 5.
- Individuals responsible for SC planning need to be deliberately trained and educated for their duties; they need to be steeped in the character of the problems they must consider, which are different than those considered by planners writing CONPLANs or OPLANs.
- The objectives of SC have long-term time horizons. Building capacity, maintaining relationships, and gaining and keeping access to critical infrastructure are not objectives that can be accomplished in the typical time span of a GCC’s TCP.
- Given all of the above, is it reasonable to expect a GCC, already responsible to prepare for war and other contingencies, to also have the capacity and span of control to integrate and synchronize peacetime (SC) activities to build capacity, maintain relationships, and gain and maintain access for peacetime and contingency operations?
Appendix A.
Illustrations

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Appendix B.
References


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3130.01A. *Campaign Planning Procedures and Responsibilities*. November 25, 2014.


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## Appendix C. Acronyms

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<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFRICOM</td>
<td>U.S. Africa Command</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>CCMD</td>
<td>Combatant Commands</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>Concept Plan</td>
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<td>CTFP</td>
<td>Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
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<td>Defense Security Cooperation Agency</td>
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<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>U.S. European Command</td>
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<td>Foreign Military Sales</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Geographic Combatant Command</td>
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<td>GEF</td>
<td>Guidance for the Employment of the Force</td>
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<td>GFMAP</td>
<td>Global Force Management Allocation Plan</td>
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<td>IAAFA</td>
<td>Inter-American Air Force Academy</td>
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<td>JCET</td>
<td>Joint Combined Exchange Training</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>Joint Publication</td>
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<td>MARFORPAC</td>
<td>Marine Corps Forces Pacific Command</td>
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<td>NGB</td>
<td>National Guard Bureau</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHDCA</td>
<td>Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operations and Maintenance</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
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<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
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<td>POM</td>
<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<td>SAF/IA</td>
<td>Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force for International Affairs</td>
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<td>SC</td>
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<td>SDAF</td>
<td>Special Defense Acquisition Fund</td>
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<td>State Partnership Program</td>
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<td>TCA</td>
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<td>Theater Campaign Plan</td>
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<td>Temporary Duty</td>
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A Framework for Security Cooperation Planning

Building partner capacity has been a key component of U.S. defense strategy since the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was issued. However, but for a few exceptions, the Military Departments of the U.S. Armed Forces that have responsibility to organize, train, equip, and provide forces to U.S. Combatant Commands have not prepared their people to be good or even adequate at planning for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation activities, which is the principal way the Department of Defense (DOD) builds partner capacity. Rather, the focus of military education and training primarily remains on contingency and warfare planning. While useful in those contexts, it is not useful for steady-state, peacetime security cooperation planning. Not only are people poorly prepared, the DOD lacks a framework for security cooperation planning. This paper’s intent is to propose a framework for security cooperation planning that helps the DOD and its Military Departments understand how to adaptively influence, plan, and resource security cooperation activities carried out in various foreign nations and with members of foreign security forces.
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