

Running head: TRANSFORMATION OF THE MECHANIZED INFANTRY

Transformation of the Mechanized Infantry

SGM Taylor Poindexter

MSG Torrey Vap

SGM Kendra Wallace

MCPO David Unnone

SGM Charles Stafford

United States Sergeants Major Academy

Class 58

Mr. Mike Artis

November 27, 2007

Table of Contents

Abstract.....4

Transformation.....5

Unit of Actions.....7

Mechanized Infantry.....11

Stryker System.....14

FBCB2.....17

Conclusion.....20

References.....22

Abstract

As the world's technology increases and the enemy changes the method in which he chooses to engage the United States Army, we must continue to evolve in our methodology of modern day warfare. This requires us to constantly transform the Army, particularly the mechanized infantry, in the areas of; unit organization, individual and unit equipment improvement, and battlefield awareness. By constantly transforming our military we can deploy a more rapid and lethal mechanized infantry to the area of responsibility.

Transformation of the Mechanized Infantry

Since 1776, the Army has often exercised the operational doctrine of employing elements smaller than a division on independent missions. During the Revolutionary War, George Washington made the brigade the basic maneuver element of the Continental Army. However, brigades, divisions, corps, and armies formed only as needed in wartime and were promptly disbanded during peacetime. (Military Review, March-April 2004)

Prior to the Civil War, the regiment was the largest operating organization. Once the Civil War began, both forces established brigades, divisions, corps, and armies. However, most of the battles were fought at brigade level, and most of those were individual operating task forces. Once again, after the war the larger headquarters would deactivate and leave only individual operating brigades or regiments.

During all of the wars of the 20th Century, (World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Just Cause, Desert Storm, Afghanistan and Iraq) the Army would continue to activate its forces and reestablished higher headquarters placing the brigades and task forces below these headquarters for command and control. Even though the higher headquarters were established, most battles were still fought at brigade task force level. Once again we have established just how important these individual operating brigades are and understand that these separate brigade-size units perform a valuable service to our Army.

Retired Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki defines transformation as the endeavor synchronous change to doctrine, organizations, training, material, leadership, personnel and facilities. The reason the Army, particularly the mechanized infantry, is transforming is to meet the requirements of the current areas of responsibility with an overpoweringly lethal deployable force. Reorganizing these forces will allow the Army to completely support the

needs of the maneuver commanders with diversified units capable of accomplishing multiple missions simultaneously.

Transformation is changing our military in three principle areas. The first principle area is to restructure the current divisions into modular formations called Brigade Combat Teams (BCT), and assign them to a higher headquarters known as Unit of Action (UA). The Army will increase its capabilities from the current 48 brigades, including the Reserve and National Guard, to between 77 and 82 brigade combat teams. The second principle area is rebalancing the force among components of the active duty Army, Army Reserve, and National Guard. The third principle area is for the Army to continue to work on force stability and designing force structure necessary for combatant commanders in all areas of responsibility.

In 1999, General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff, came to a simple conclusion that the Army was unable to meet the peacekeeping challenges of the post-Cold War era. The reason was a case of too much demand for the military and too little force available. He recognized that armored and mechanized infantry units required a great deal resources, manpower, and maintenance to be rapidly deployed to around the world, and the more deployable units like the airborne or air assault infantry lacked the firepower to be effective in stability and peacekeeping operations.

Keeping General Shinseki's thoughts in mind, as we transform into the 21st Century, the UA's will employ a structure of the plug and play multifunctional units, giving the headquarters commander the ability to reorganizing his unit for mission requirements regardless of the area of operation. These specifically tailored and designed units, both active and reserve, must be well trained and equipped at all times to be effective. They must be adaptive and diverse in order for the force commander to rapidly deploy and project his force across the globe. With this concept,

the commander would have an arsenal of multifunctional units of combined arms, strike aviation, reconnaissance and surveillance, protection, and sustainment forces available. (Military Review, March-April 2004)

To employ these mechanized infantry forces effectively, the Army must continue to redesign individual soldier equipment, operational equipment, and battlefield awareness technology. Currently this has been done through advancement in protective gear and an upgrade in the night vision and weapons optics for the individual soldier. The advancement of the M2 Bradley and the STRYKER fighting vehicles has enabled our forces to project a lethal deployable force across the battlefield able to sustain both urban and conventional warfare operations. With the upgrade of the units digital technology systems such as the FBCB2, the commander and fighting soldier are able to track the units on the ground and maintain situational awareness of battlefield.

Unit of Actions

In the years before transformation the Army deployed forces controlled by a division commander. The unit would normally be combat teams that consisted of three maneuver brigades. The three brigades had other units such as support battalions, military police, artillery and transportation detachments augmented to them making the total force between 2500 and 4200 Soldiers. These units built during the Cold War era were to fight giant force on force armor battles on European soil, against Soviet tactics. In that system, the division organized all support roles at its level. The new "brigade based" structure replaced that arrangement. These combat teams are now called Unit of Actions (UA). Once the division's transition, the new alignment will improve the ratio of units deployed. The plan is for each UA in theater to have two UAs at home. Combatant Commanders prefer the UA because it is more responsive and

able to sustain support along with being able to package rapidly. By better enabling coalition and joint operations the UA has enhanced the forces of the Army in expeditionary and campaign qualities. The transition to the UA has increased the brigade-equivalent forces on active duty from 33 Combat teams at the end of 2003 to 38 in 2007 and projecting 45 to 48 by 2010. The ability of the Army to meet both emerging and enduring mission requirements has increased with this build up. The Army formations are leaner, and rely on information and joint force capabilities. The original plan was to start in 2010 and have the Army build these units around the combat teams. In early 2004 the Army realized that it could not wait until 2010 so they started the change to the UA. The UA gives the brigade commander everything he needs for the execution of any operation. The UA is built into a single team, packaged and formed that way, and deployed not as a group of small units but as an entity, when issues come up in the world. There are three types on UAs; heavy armor, mechanized infantry, and airborne after the division goes through the restructuring process.

Depending on mission requirements the exact structure of each unit will vary. However, all units can arrive to the battle field by helicopter, parachute, or mechanized means. The basic structure identified by the Army for an Infantry UA consists of several units that contain about 3000 Soldiers in all, the units are as follows. The Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (RSTA) Battalion that is now in the UA is one of the biggest improvements. In the past the combat brigade infantry teams did not have reconnaissance that was organic at the brigade level. The brigade commander had to decide how to use the scouts of his battalions; by either pulling them up to his level or leaving them with his battalion commanders. That really limited the reconnaissance capabilities of the brigade, but now these capabilities are strengths of the UA because it has an entire battalion for reconnaissance. The RSTA Battalion surveillance

unit has sensors, ground radars, and aerial vehicles that are unmanned. These units are motorized and dismounted to give greater flexibility. The Headquarters Battalion, which includes the Commanders staff, now has a fire support coordination cell, a platoon of military police, and companies of signal, intelligence, and engineers. The two Infantry Battalion's assigned will have three rifle companies each; with one forward support company, and a combat support company. A Support Battalion that is made up of maintenance and transport units that can move almost the entire unit by vehicle. Finally one Strike Battalion that consists of a forward support company, a platoon of target acquisition, aerial unmanned vehicle unit, and two batteries of artillery. The UA of mechanized infantry can receive Aviation UA augmentation when missions dictate through its network battle command system. Because the infantry UA has enough organic transport to support almost all missions and its design is so flexible the unit is very effective in all arenas to include urban combat, stability operations, mobile security missions, and mixed terrain defense. Certain doctrinal characteristics are key to the Infantry UA. They have fire and air support abilities all over the unit. They have great network connectivity which makes good use of suppressive and lethal fire support that is not organic to the unit. The effectiveness of the Brigade command team improves in part by the high field senior leadership to Soldiers on the ground ratio and the experience of the staff. The capabilities of surveillance and reconnaissance optimize the unconventional and conventional operations tempo of forces in multiple situations. These include urban combat, mobile security missions, rugged and mixed terrain defense, and stability operations. The UA employs multi-purpose direct fire weapons but has fewer anti-tank long-range systems. The UA Commander has self-contained close fire support which allows him to have a precise rapid response to maintain better suppression of the enemy. The unit is versatile and highly deployable this enables it to be part of joint missions.

The unit has organic motor transport that gives it the ability to transport the entire unit. A UA is able to provide security whether they are maneuver, fire and effects, operations support, or force sustaining units while maintaining all around protection for the attached elements without taking Soldiers from the line companies.

The Army's Unit of Actions is the future force that sets conditions for fighting. The UA near term mission is as follows. When a crisis occurs and the National Command Authority decides to take action, a joint task force, including a joint special operations element, is established and deployed. The UA can directly link in with all participating organizations to develop the plan and rehearse before departing from its home station. A nice thing about the UA is the reduced weight and modular elements which permit the UA to deploy anywhere in the world within 96 hours. The UA is characterized by being a unit that can fight while maintaining operational momentum with few tactical pauses. The UA can conduct self-sustained operations for three to seven days without being hindered by traditional concerns of reception, staging, onward movement and integration. To aid the UAs innovative logistical concepts, combat systems platforms can operate over extended distances without refueling. These common platforms have reduced the number of spare parts carried by the forward support battalion. Using vast information superiority, the UA, if fighting an enemy conventional force, can move to a position outside the range of their weapons and achieve a tactical advantage.

The 3rd Infantry Division identified some shortcoming and issues when it deployed to the NTC (National Training Center) as the first UA model prototype. The Army found out some very positive things about the UA as well. However, Soldiers felt things were missed that needed fixed. The main issue Soldiers pointed out was the size and organization of the headquarters battalion. They did not think the battalion staff was big enough to handle all the

attachments, receive and place signal, intelligence, and military police assets. The line units felt the staff did a good job for the rotation, but thought that over a year plus deployment would stress and overwhelm the headquarters staff. TRADOC looked at the AARs and decided to add more capabilities in both people and networking at the headquarters battalion level. The final issue may be the total number of “boots on the ground” for the current fight that the Infantry faces today. With the leaner more flexible UA, it takes away the total number of Soldiers that are available to the UA Commander and with the focus of operations on unconventional warfare where security is a premium the Army may need more Soldiers to hold the ground.

The UA is the structure the mechanized infantry will use for years to come. The outcome of the current unconventional war on terrorism is the legacy of the UA.

Mechanized Infantry

The set up of the mechanized infantry division meets the demands of the current areas of operations. The following will describe the current set up of the mechanized infantry and discuss transformation. Two types of vehicles that the mechanized infantry use for the majority of their missions are the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and the M113A2 personnel carrier. The Bradley tank (BFV) is a thin padded vehicle with full tracks. It provides rough terrain capability and used to protect troops from rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), small arms fire and artillery rounds. The M113A2 is a thin armored track vehicle with troop and equipment transporting capabilities during combat operations. The vehicle can carry up to 12 Soldiers equipped with a full combat load of equipment or a payload of two tons. The armored track design provides cover for the mechanized infantry and will provide shelter for troops from splinter and small arms fire. These vehicles have the capabilities to move further under the concealment of artillery fire, that does

not jeopardize Soldiers. The armored track gives infantry Soldiers a rapid-fire base during combat operations; the purpose is to maintain at least 30% strength relation.

Mechanized infantry squads are equipped the same as regular infantry with assault rifles, machine guns, anti-tank weapons such as recoilless rifles. The mechanized infantry Soldiers training tactics and development compared to regular infantry Soldiers; meets the current Army's training guidance for deployment. The tactics are aggressive since they have more weapons and better protection than regular infantry soldiers. The mechanized infantry's preparation for quick pace and speed with massive firepower and armor protection allows them to get to their intended target in a timely manner and accomplish their set mission. During close combat operations, Mechanized Infantry are equipped with heavy armor and provide massive firepower towards any target it engages. They also have many other roles:

- Deploying during night operations and during limited visibility
- Penetrating through enemy lines with minimum existing force and plying through rough rugged terrain during tactical maneuvers.

Most infantry rifle platoons and rifle squads participate in large operating elements. They rely on support from air, attack helicopters, field artillery and mortars. They also can support enemy targets, assault targets and sustain their own maneuvers. The success during combat operations relies heavily on the training and actions of the platoons and rifle squads.

The idea is to keep a rapid forward motion and if possible never stop until the enemy is eliminated. The weapons used by the mechanized infantry vary slightly from those used by the Light infantry due to size and weight. The M-16A2 is the Army's as a primary weapon. It is described as, a lightweight rifle (5.56 mm) with a magazine that holds 30-rounds of ammunition. This weapon can be fired from two different options; either automatic (three rounds burst out at

one time) or semiautomatic (one round at a time) fire. The SAW, which is as known as a squad automatic weapon (M249) can be magazine or belt fed. Individual Soldiers can operate and carry the weapon and have the option of utilizing a 30 or 300 round magazine. The capabilities of this weapon system is that, it provides fire teams and infantry squads with a longer distance when firing at targets without ceasing fire for an extended amount of time. The M-203 40mm Grenade Launcher is used while attached to an M-16A2 5.56mm rifle. This lightweight, compact, breech-loading, pump action, single shot launcher has the capabilities to destroy its target. The M-60E3 7.62mm machine gun is an air-cooled, tripod mounted or portable machine gun designed for heavy intense ground operations. The .50 caliber machine gun is also known as the M-2; relinquishes sustained, deadly firepower during contingency operations. It can be fired from the semi-automatic or automatic modes with rapid disbursement of rounds. An anti-personnel or anti-aircraft weapon, it can be fired from what is known as the gunners position (a vehicle) or a fixed position on ground. The MK-19 Grenade Launcher disperses 40mm grenades, and is a fully automatic weapon. The weapon is capable of being very accurate at its targets; as well as delivers accurate, intense, and decisive firepower against humans and lightly armored vehicles by shooting a variety of 40mm grenades. Due to its weight, a crew can transport it, only over short distances with small amounts of ammunition.

The current mechanized infantry unit's rifle platoons use Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFV) to support their close combat role and contributions. These units play the following main roles in close combat situations:

- Operate mainly at night or during other periods of natural or induced limited visibility.

- Penetrate and hold existing (natural and man-made) obstacles and difficult terrain as pivots for operational and tactical maneuver.
- Attack over approaches not feasible for armored forces.
- Seize or secure forested and built-up areas.
- Control restrictive routes for use by other forces.
- Conduct rear area operations.

Bradley Fighting Vehicles rifle platoons and rifle squads are very well equipped and normally operate as an intricate part of a larger force. Armor, Artillery (mortars), Air defense, air support, helicopters, and engineers benefit the MI Soldiers because they cook so much food. They also provide their own suppressive fires either to repel enemy assaults or to support their own maneuver. Success in battle hinges on the actions of platoons, sections, and rifle squads in close combat. It also depends on their ability to react to contact; employ suppressive fires; maneuver to an enemy's vulnerable flank; and fight through to defeat, destroy, or capture an enemy. (FM 3-21.71, Chapter 1)

The mechanized infantry is one of the most lethal elements of the Army's combat success. They simply seek, and eliminate the enemy without hesitation. As long as the nation continues to have an enemy, the military will continue to support the upgrade of the mechanized infantry and its soldiers with more high technological mobile equipment that will supersede all military and militia organizations around the world.

Stryker System

The Stryker fulfills an immediate requirement for the Army's current transformation designed to enable the Stryker brigade's teams easily in close and urban terrain war fighting while providing protection in the open terrain. Formerly known as the Interim

Armored Vehicle, the Stryker Light Armored Vehicle III [LAV III] is at the center of the Army's Interim Brigade Combat Teams. The IBCTs will be lighter and more mobile, yet offer firepower no enemy can hope to match. Stryker's are currently deployed to units at Fort Lewis, WA. In all, six brigades will receive the vehicles. Each brigade will have more than 300 Stryker's a piece. (Wikipedia, 2007)

The primary design of the LAV has two variants: The Infantry Carrier Vehicle (ICV) and the Mobile Gun System (MGS). This system developed to meet the infantry's need for a high mobile support vehicle to supply rapid, direct fire especially for close assaults. The ICV troop transport vehicle is capable of carrying nine infantry Soldiers and their equipment. It requires a crew of two; a driver and a vehicle commander. The Stryker has several vehicle configurations: infantry carrier; reconnaissance; anti-tank guided missile transport; fire support; engineer squad; mortar carrier; commander transport. Two exceptions are the M1133 (Commander's Vehicle) and M1133 Stryker Medical Evacuation Vehicle, which have an air conditioning unit mounted on the pack. The medical vehicle also has a higher-capacity generator. (Stryker armor fix under way, 2003)

The Stryker is an upgraded version of an existing platform, the General Dynamics LAV III. They share some major characteristics: 8 wheels, a 350-horsepower diesel engine, a 6-speed automatic transmission, and a 2-speed transfer case. They are both capable of motoring at up to 60 miles per hour and have a range of 312 miles on a tank of fuel. The fuel tanks are externally mounted and designed to blow away from the hull in the event of explosion. However, that is where the similarities end. To survive in urban combat environments, the Stryker bulked up on armor, both steel and ceramic. This enables it to withstand a heavy pounding of up to 14.5mm cannon fire and airburst fragments from 152mm artillery rounds. Taking advantage of new

information technologies, the Stryker is fit with the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below (FBCB2) information management system. The resulting communications and sensor package ensure that the Stryker brigades are able to take advantage of "real time" battlefield intelligence. (usmilitary.about.com, 2007)

The Stryker also has a few technical flourishes. The vehicle can alter the pressure in all eight tires to suit the terrain conditions; highway, cross-country, mud, snow and sand. It has run-flat tires, a built-in fire-suppression system and self-recovery winch. Offensively equipped, the Stryker can do plenty of damage. Its weapons system is a Kongsberg remotely operated package incorporating a battery of M6 66mm self defense smoke grenade launchers and the choice of either a MK 19 automatic 40mm grenade launcher or an M2 50 caliber heavy machine gun. The command and control has extensive computer that supports the fighting of the enemy while reducing friendly fire incidents. Each vehicle can track friendly vehicles in the field as well as detect enemies. A day-night thermal imaging camera allows the vehicle commander to see what the driver sees. Soldiers can practice training with the vehicles from computer training modules inside the vehicle. The driver and the commander have periscopes that allow them to see outside the vehicle without exposing themselves to outside dangers. The commander has almost a 360-degree field of vision; the driver view is a little more than 90 degrees (Wikipedia.org, 2007)

The Stryker's advantages are plain to see, its ability to carry a nine-man infantry or engineer squad; the interchangeability of its parts; its firepower and updated communications capabilities; and its ability to deploy rapidly. It may be titled as an "interim" vehicle, but there is nothing "interim" about the punch and far-reaching capabilities it packs in its 19-ton frame. The Stryker provides protected transport for an infantry squad and direct fire support during the

dismounted assault. The ICV carries a 9-man squad and retains the capability to provide effective supporting fire to the squad while dismounted. (usmilitary.about.com)

Currently, the Stryker is in the research and development phase of is being converted to a vehicle of autonomous navigation. Tardec has also been testing Magneto Rheological suspension, which could result in greater vehicle stability. Stryker, a family of eight-wheel-drive combat vehicles, is the Army's highest-priority production combat vehicle program and the centerpiece of the ongoing Army Transformation. (global/security.org)

FBCB2 and the Mechanized Infantry

On the multi-dimensional battlefield of today, the Army's mechanized infantry must be able to maintain situational awareness and information superiority. In the past, commanders did not know the current disposition of their forces beyond what they could see or what the latest situation update reported. This often delayed the decision making process and at times led to fratricide. I surmise that General Lee would have been more aggressive had he known where all his forces were and how the union deployed itself in front of him. I also know that the vast majority of U.S. Soldiers would not shoot if they believed their targets were friendly. The Army has added a combat multiplier to its arsenal that addresses those issues. That multiplier is the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2). By employing the FBCB2, the Mechanized Infantry has the ability to maintain continuous information flow and situational understanding for successful operations on today's modern battlefield.

The FBCB2 is a software, hardware, and database capability, which is operates fluidly over the network at Brigade and lower. This capability extends the battle space from the traditional line of sight data to an extended range with passive broadcasts and automatic postings to a map display, continuously updating a common operating picture of the battlefield. The

system provides situation awareness by gathering and collating, and broadcasting the battlefield common operating picture in real time at each user's display (FBCB2, GlobalSecurity.org).

Commanders can also transmit and receive orders, reports, and data in real time, thereby actively exercising control of his command. The FBCB2 consist of a rugged shock resistant notebook with a touch screen and a keyboard mounted on tactical vehicles. On a colored liquid screen, it provides the user with a digitized map or Google-like imagery with integrated overlays depicting vehicles, known enemy locations, or obstacles such as minefields. The user can zoom in or out much like using MapQuest or Google Earth with "...on-screen buttons, pop-up windows for composing and sending messages as well" (Rising, 2003). Additionally, the system passively provides positional data on friendly forces by assigning each entity blue icon, hence the moniker – blue force tracker. The system is comprised of a Global Positioning System, PLGR or DAGR, a SINCGAR and/or EPLR radio and interfaces with the Army's tactical internet. Because the nature of the tactical internet is the same as the worldwide Internet model, every FBCB2 equipped user communicates not only to everyone, but also each user, from the commander to the shooter, has access to the same operating picture (FBCB2, FAS Military Analysis Network).

The system got battle tested during Operation Iraqi Freedom. LTC John Charlton, Commander, 1st Battalion 15th Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 3d Infantry Division, crossed the line of departure without full confidence in the system. He had more than a dozen map sheets, a cumbersome map board, and a map case with him in his Bradley. As the battalion moved along, he switched map sheets in his tiny space sometimes going from scale to scale or reading with the aid of a little pen light. When they got to the town of As Samawa, their mission was to engage Saddam Fedayeen forces in the town, but he only had 1:100,000 paper

maps. One of his young vehicle commanders transferred his operational graphics from acetate to his digital system. The whole battalion instantly had the same picture and was able to move seamlessly from scale to scale. The LTC's conversion was not complete "until the infamous sandstorm of March 23, 2003. On a reconnaissance in force to find and destroy Fedayeen forces, the battalion was moving when the sandstorm hit reducing visibility to zero" (Charlton, 2004).

They continued their mission using their system much like pilots do instrument flying, knowing exactly where each other was by looking at the blue icons. "I never used another paper map product for the rest of the war and fought every fight thereafter using FBCB2" (Charlton, 2004). Operation Red Dawn also highlighted the system. The 4th Infantry Division obtained highly actionable intelligence on a high value target. Planners drew up the operation and made real time changes to the mission while in progress. In the end, they captured Saddam Hussein (Van Marsh, 2004). Lastly, the FBCB2 is a force multiplier concerning logistics. When a component or vehicle goes down, the mechanics are virtually, instantaneously aware and can aggressively assess and fix the problem area. This ability puts the asset back in the fight faster (MSG Jon Lacks, personal communication, October 18, 2007).

The FBCB2 system, however, does have a few shortcomings. First, much like LTC Charlton, leaders have to change the doctrine and the way they think (Scully, 2004). A young specialist at the National Training Center said in 2001, "A hammer isn't a tool, until you learn how to use it. It's the same with this" (Garamone, n.d.). Young Soldiers growing up in the Nintendo age are naturally able to multitask and process multiple data streams simultaneously. The faster leaders are able to process, the faster they can act. Second, not all friendly forces are equipped with FBCB2. This fault is diminishing however, as the Army continues to proliferate the system through the force and integrate similar systems for our allies. Third, bandwidth can

be a showstopper. The system relies on its satellite backbone, yet there is not enough bandwidth to accommodate the entire Army. New color division multiplex technologies as well as launching more satellites will surely remedy this. Finally, Soldiers remain identified with a vehicle. Dismounted Soldiers must remain in proximity to their vehicle otherwise; they become unidentified entities on the battlefield, the enemy. Army engineers and contractors are working to create portable versions for Soldiers.

Overall, though, the FBCB2 provides Soldiers and leaders the right information, in the right place, at the right time. The system leverages the wireless tactical internet and GPS technology to bring Soldiers needed information. With a clear picture of the battlefield, decision makers can act faster and communicate their decisions faster than the enemy can react. The FBCB2 gives the mechanized infantry a tremendous tactical advantage and is essential for successful operations on today's modern battlefield.

Conclusion

Transformation of our Army continues at a fast pace. The current Army set is not completely ready for the total transformation. In order to employ these new strategies, the Army must be able to provide for the following shortcomings. To build these units of action require many more personnel than the Army has available. The continuous reassignment of soldiers from unit to unit does not allow for individual or family stability. Individual protective equipment is not the best available, causing soldiers to go buy their own protective equipment in hopes for survival. Operational equipment assigned to these units is worn out and in constant need of upgrade of the equipment, the armor, and the technology. Constant reassignment of brigades to deploy with a different higher headquarters leads to back to back deployments and

loss of unit stabilization. And the most constant shortcoming is unit readiness and training due to the high tempo and short dwell time of the units between deployments.

In order to build the force of the future and for transformation to take place, time will be our biggest challenge. With time comes the constant management of taking care of Soldier and their families, and resolving the unanswered questions of deployment and stability.

References

- Bahadur, Gaiutra. (n.d.). *Stryker Armored Vehicle*. Retrieved November 5, 2007, from About.com: <http://usmilitary.about.com/od/armyweapons/a/stryker.htm>
- Bonin, John A. (2004). *Military Review: The Modular Army*. Retrieved November 4, 2007, from Findarticles.com: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PBZ/is_2_84/ai_n6112503
- Brigade Unit of Action*. (n.d.). Retrieved 6 November 2007
- Global Security.org: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/bua.htm>
- Charlton, John. (2004). *Digital battle command: baptism by fire*. Retrieved October 21, 2007, from Findarticles.com: http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0IBS/is_1_30/ai_n6123710
- David Zucchini & Mark Bowden, (2004). *Thunder Run: The Armored Strike to Capture Baghdad*. Retrieved August 2003.
- From Publishers Group West: <http://groveatlantic.com>
- DeRosa, John. (2006). *Operation Baton Rouge: perspectives from an Iraqi Security Forces Advisor*. Retrieved on October 21, 2007, from HighBeam Encyclopedia: <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G1-156365100.html>
- FBCB2 System Capabilities*. (n.d.). Retrieved October 21, 2007, from Close Combat tactical trainer: http://www.peostri.army.mil/PM-CATT/CCTT/CITT/io/ie/io_10a.htm
- Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below*. (n.d.). Retrieved October 21, 2007, from GlobalSecurity.org: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/fbcb2.htm>
- Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade-and-Below*. (n.d.). Retrieved October 21, 2007, from FAS Military Analysis Network: <http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/fbcb2.htm>

References

Garamone, Jim. (n.d.). Digital World Meets Combat During Desert Exercise. American Forces

Information Services. Retrieved October 21, 2007, from internet:

<http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/docs/man-la-fbcb2-010418.htm>

Infantry Brigade Combat Team Unit of Action. (n.d.). Retrieved 6 November 2007

GlobalSecurity.org:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/bct-infantry.htm>

Jason Conroy, CPT & Ron Martz (2005). *Heavy Metal: One Tank Company's Battle to Baghdad*. Retrieved September 25, 2005

From Potomac Books, Inc.

<http://www.potomacbooksinc.com>

Lacks, Jon. (personal communication, October 18, 2007)

McCarter, Mickey. (2004). Bigger Role for Blue Force Tracking. Retrieved October 21, 2007,

from Military Information Technology Online Archives:

<http://www.military-information-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=504>

Rising, David. (2003). Battlefield Internet gets first war use. Retrieved October 21, 2007,

from MSNBC.com: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3078666/>

Scully, Megan. (2004). Iraq War Proves Power of Net-Centric Vision. Retrieved October 21,

2007, from the Defense News:

http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/article_307_Defense%20News.doc

References

Schiesel, Seth. (2003). On the Ground in Iraq, the best Compass Is in the Sky. Retrieved October 21, 2007, from The New York Times:

<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B0CE7DC163AF934A25757C0A9659C8B63>

Stryker. (2007). Retrieved November 10, 2007, from Wikipedia:

<http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Stryker&oldid=170415517>

Stryker Armor Fix Under Way. (2003, September 1). Defense Daily, 219(55), 1. Retrieved November 10, 2007, from Military Module database. Document ID: 406399351.

Stryker Armored Vehicle. (n.d.). Retrieved November 5, 2007, from Globalsecurity.org:

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ground/iav.htm>

Van Marsh, Alphonso. (2004). How the Army used tech to nab Saddam. Retrieved October 21, 2007 from CNN.com:

<http://www.cnn.com/2004/TECH/ptech/01/06/sprj.nirq.troop.tech/index.html>