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Operation Restore Hope vs. Operation Joint Endeavor

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ABSTRACT

This is an in depth study into Operation Restore Hope and Operations Joint Endeavor. In 1992, President Bush sent more than 24,000 troops to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope. This was a major commitment of US power, which was solely intended to put an end to a humanitarian catastrophe. A look into the reasons and circumstances that led to Operation Restore Hope will be discussed. In what is known as Operation Joint Endeavor, forces from the United States and its NATO allies deployed twenty thousand peacekeeping forces to Bosnia to implement the military terms of the Dayton Peace Accords. This operation represented the first “out-of-area” deployment of NATO forces and the first time that U.S. and Soviet soldiers were involved in a joint military mission (Fitzgerald, 2002). The purpose of Joint Endeavor was to provide peacekeeping forces to supervise the ceasefire that was organized by NATO in the Balkan civil war.

Thesis

I will compare two military operations; Operation Restore Hope and Operation Joint Endeavor. This paper will show what happens when there is not a clear understanding of the region and the culture in areas where military operations are being conducted. In conclusion, this comparison will show the reasons for one operations success and the failure of the other.

President Bush's decision in November 1992 to send more than 24,000 troops to Somalia in Operation Restore Hope ranks as one of the most intriguing foreign policy decisions that any president has made. While prosecuting the Gulf War will be remembered as President Bush's crowning achievement, clearly the US national interest dictated that Iraq has to be driven out of Kuwait. In contrast, the Somalia mission was not in the national interest. Somalia contained no significant natural resources, and the Cold War rivalry with the Soviet Union over the Horn of Africa has ended by 1992. Operation Restore Hope was a major commitment of US power, which was solely intended to put an end to a humanitarian catastrophe. As a consequence, President Bush's decision must be understood as an act of "idealism" (as opposed to "realism") and, more specifically, as the fulfillment of his commitment to a "New World Order."

As the national interest was not at stake in Somalia, a number of hypotheses have been posited to explain President Bush's decision to intervene. In addition to the president's idealism and his commitment to the New World Order, there is evidence that the views of President Bush and United Nations secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali converged over the need for US intervention. In opposition to idealist explanations are claims that President Bush acted for political reasons. After his defeat in the November 1992 presidential elections,

some observers asserted that President Bush was compelled to “do something” before he left office and that he wished to shore up his place in history. Others claimed that “CNN diplomacy,” which has become so effective during the Gulf crisis, the rescue of the Iraqi Kurds, and a succession of other humanitarian disasters, influenced both the American public and President Bush to see the need for US action (Copson, 1994).

Operation Restore Hope came about for a number of reasons, including compelling media coverage of the suffering in Somalia, congressional pressure for action following a number of visits to Somalia by members of Congress, and the impact of reports of deaths among Somali children on President Bush. After his defeat in the November 1992 election, President Bush may have felt freer to act than earlier, when any setbacks in Somalia would help to restore the administration’s reputation after the election and affirm President Bush’s reputation as an effective leader in world affairs (Bose & Perotti, 2002).

The combination of circumstances that led to Operation Restore Hope, in short, was highly unusual, and a similar combination may not soon recur. The operation itself cost the United States along \$750 million, far above initial estimates of \$200 million to \$300 million, and the follow-on UN effort will cost far more. But whether or not Operation Restore Hope is a precedent, the people of Somalia have benefited immeasurably from the restoration of order and the influx of international famine relief. However, the decision of the US-led forces not to try to disarm the contending Somali factions, despite appeals from UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali that they do so, later confronted UNOSOM II with an immense problem. US decision-makers calculated that efforts to disarm the factions would lead to violence, perhaps undermining public support for the US deployment, and hoped that the arms issue could be dealt with later as UN-sponsored reconciliation efforts moved forward. Aideed’s armed uprising in southern Mogadishu, which soon claimed the attention of most of

the UN peacekeepers in Somalia, began to threaten the rehabilitation and reconciliation program just a month after Operation Hope came to an end. Dissent broke out within the UN operation, as the Italian commander, backed by Rome, sharply questioned the policy of confrontation with Aideed. UN officials, backed by the Clinton administration, remained firm in their commitment to the success of UNOSOM II and pointed out the Aideed problem was affecting only one part of one city while the rest of the country was beginning a slow recovery. The crisis of early October 1993, however, brought Clinton's insistence on a March 31, 1994 US withdrawal from Somalia. Whether the international community will remain committed to Somali reconciliation and recovery after March 31 is not yet clear (Copson, 1994).

While Operation Restore Hope did have some success in Somalia, any benefits these SF soldiers contributed in carrying out their missions faded into the background. Somalis will be remembered by the firelight in October 1993 involving Task Force Ranger, resulting in 18 US soldiers killed and more than 30 wounded; enemy losses were estimated at more than 1,000 (Bose & Perotti, 2002).

Violence persistent in the country and peace-keeping services became reluctantly concerned. Many of UN soldiers were killed and, beneath international demands vital of its procedures, the UN force was withdrawn in 1994 (Fitzgerald, 2002).

In mid-1994, the final of the US troops left Somalia, being unsuccessful in their undertaking. Warring Somali clan leaders has been incapable to discover any ordinary ground for conformity, and international relief organizations were enforced to dangle operations because of pervasive prowling.

As shortly as the support agencies began pulling away, Somali rule and order bust down and the warlords continued their incomplete warfare. An enormous chase was for the warlord General Aideed was instigated, and several American fatalities were sustained.

In the long run, US President Bill Clinton deserted the chase for Aideed and come across for political resolution. However, Somalia, while it had received some food to lighten the famine, in result lingered without an administration (Copson, 1994).

Operations Joint Endeavor

In what was known as Operation Joint Endeavor (from December 5, 1995, to December 20, 1996), forces from the United States and its NATO allies deployed twenty thousand peacekeeping forces to Bosnia to implement the military terms of the Dayton Peace Accords. This operation represented the first “out-of-area” deployment of NATO forces and the first time that U.S. and Soviet soldiers were involved in a joint military mission (Fitzgerald, 2002).

The purpose of Joint Endeavor was to provide peacekeeping forces to supervise the ceasefire that was organized by NATO in the Balkan civil war. As soon as the Dayton accords were signed on December 14, 1995, the United States deployed its 1st Armored Division to Bosnia – Herzegovina. The functions of the Implementation Force (IFOR) were to enforce the ceasefire, establish boundaries for the zone of separation between the hostile parties, and ensure that their troops withdrew to barracks and moved their heavy weapons to storage sites. IFOR was also designed to supervise democratic elections in the country. Although there challenges in this military force by the antagonists, the operation successfully enforced the Dayton military protocols (Martel, 2007).

The Dayton Accords, signed in Paris in December 1995, by the Bosnian Federation and the Bosnian Serbs, brought a hope for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Operation Joint Endeavor enforced the military aspects of this peace by providing a stable environment in which the civil aspects could proceed. Operation Deny Flight, begun in 1993, then came to an end. President Bill Clinton called up reserves to participate in Operation Joint Endeavor (Pushies, Griswold, & Tomajczyk, 2002).

In the early stages of Joint Endeavor, SOF's flexibility and specialized capabilities were used to ensure that NATO forces arrived in the right place at the right time. SOF's major contributions included: SOF's enabling forces were in place on time; SOF aircraft (capable of flying in the most difficult weather) ensured timely SOF deployments into Bosnia-Herzegovina despite weather that grounded all other aircraft; SOF aircraft flew the IFOR commander through adverse weather to reach meetings and ceremonies; SOFIFOR provided a quick reaction force; and SEALs supported the bridging of the Sava River (Martel, 2007).

Civil Affairs forces likewise had important missions for Joint Endeavor. The CA forces coordinated the reconstruction of the civil infrastructure and organized relief efforts of more than 500 UN, government, and non-government organizations. Civil Affairs personnel, assigned to the Combined Joint Civil Military Operations Center (with CA task forces assigned to each multinational division), assisted in restoring basic services such as public transportation, public works and utilities, public health, and commerce, as well as helping with elections and setting up new national governments. CA specialists worked with organizations like the World Bank and the International Police Task Force to facilitate the delivery of their services. CA soldiers also helped to develop plans for, and coordinated the

repatriation of refugees. PSYOP forces had the important task of disseminating factual information to the populace inside the former Yugoslavia (Fitzgerald, 2002).

Operation Joint Endeavor officially ended on 20 December 1996 and the IFOR gave way to Operation Joint Guard's Stabilization Force (SFOR).

With the completion of the IFOR under Operation Joint Endeavor, the US military forces then remained in Bosnia to serve as the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Operating Joint Guard (December 20, 1996 – December 20, 1998). Like the IFOR before it, SFOR was to supervise the activities of the military forces in Bosnia and to contribute to stability in the country (Martel, 2007).

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