

The Seven Days

June 25 - July 1, 1862

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The Seven Days

Effective tacticians study battles fought throughout history, and they study the leader's plan for employment of his forces. This study provides a foundation for successful use of forces on future battlefields. Time does not alter the tactics of successful leaders. Tactics are a continuous study of the military. The world may never again witness the type of battle fought during World War I. The forces will not entrench themselves and fight over an extended period with one front. With the changes to the current world situation, leaders must focus on winning battles during short, limited conflict. This change in world situation and the technological advancements in equipment provide the focus of the Army's AirLand Battle concept.

The Army's mission in the defense of the nation is to fight the land battle. Future wars will use "new, powerful, devastating weapons of war, to include the use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons by both sides" (Malone 23). Having highly advanced, sophisticated weapons will not win wars for our Army. Malone says to win the critical, first battle, the leaders must employ the forces to shoot, move, and communicate effectively "soldier against soldier, company against company" (23).

Since the earliest times, the world has seldom experienced peace. History is rich with leaders employing their forces to conquer the enemy. One famous, successful leader is General Robert E. Lee. Many historians consider Lee to be a "daring" commander (Freeman 505). As Commander of the Confederate Forces

in the eastern theater during the Civil War, General Lee superbly employed his troops. The fighting that occurred around Richmond, Virginia between June 25 and July 1, 1862 became known as the Seven Days. Lee's audacity and strategic genius during the Civil War distinguished him as one of the world's great generals (Macdonald 40).

General Lee assumed his first important field command from the wounded General Joseph E. Johnston on June 1, 1862. At the time Lee took command, Johnston's demoralized troops had poorly fortified the Confederate capital of Richmond. A well-equipped Union Army commanded by Major General George B. McClellan outnumbered Lee's forces. The Union Army was only a few miles from Richmond. Macdonald states, "Lee responded to the crisis by taking an immediate and far-reaching grip on his troops, whom he named the Army of Northern Virginia" (40). In the three weeks following his assumption of command, Lee organized his forces and brought reinforcements to Richmond. He improved the equipment of the soldiers and made himself known to all his units. At this point, Lee formulated his tactical plan to remove the Union Army from the vicinity of Richmond.

The Commander of Coalition Forces during Operation Desert Storm was General H. Norman Schwarzkopf. His previous duty was the Deputy Task Force Commander during the invasion of Grenada (David 120). Following his success, the Army appointed Schwarzkopf Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command, headquartered in Florida. After Saddam Hussein's Iraqi Army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1991, Schwarzkopf moved his

headquarters to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. With the consent of the allies, Schwarzkopf assumed operational control of all coalition forces operating in Southwest Asia. He immediately organized these forces and began a massive build up of troops. He summoned all the latest arms and highly-sophisticated equipment. This gave his soldiers, "outnumbered two to one," the means to defeat what many military experts believed to be the "fourth largest army in the world" (Miles 6-10). He made himself known to the soldiers and leaders of the coalition forces. At this point, Schwarzkopf formulated his tactical plan for the removal of the Iraqi Army from Kuwait.

During the Seven Days, Lee developed a cunning and daring plan. The objective was to cut off McClellan's main Army, concentrated south of the Chickahominy River, from its supply base (Macdonald 40). Lee left a small force in Richmond's eastern defenses and moved most of his troops north across the Chickahominy. Here, he planned to overwhelm the Union troops stationed near Mechanicsville. The Union troops' mission was the protection of the main Federal supply base. Without resupply, Lee would defeat McClellan or force him to withdraw from Richmond.

Schwarzkopf's daring plan was very similar to that of Lee's. Hussein had most of his forces firmly entrenched along the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Hussein positioned the famed Republican Guard in the northwest corner of Kuwait just south of the Euphrates River. Hussein feared an amphibious assault on Kuwait would come from U.S. Marines stationed on ships in the

Persian Gulf. He stationed 6 of his 42 divisions on the Kuwaiti coastline (Time 72). Schwarzkopf had already eliminated Hussein's air force from the war. He severely crushed most of the Iraqi supply lines inside Kuwait. When the ground war started, Schwarzkopf planned to send 200,000 American, British, and French troops westward. Led by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), this force was to:

drive northward to the Euphrates River, cutting off retreat routes for the Iraqi forces in Kuwait -- and, incidentally, blocking any possible reinforcements from Saddam's units stationed near Baghdad. Another part of the allied force was to turn east and hit Republican Guard divisions along the Kuwait-Iraq border, taking them by surprise on their right flank. (Time 73)

When Schwarzkopf briefed his plan to his generals in the field, many thought he was crazy. Schwarzkopf felt that "if his own generals doubted it -- so would Saddam" (Time 73).

General Robert E. Lee's tactical plan used in the Civil War during the Seven Days Battle won a quick decisive victory; likewise, during Desert Storm, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, using a similar tactical plan for ground operations, proved victorious.

General Lee became the Commander of the Confederate Forces on June 1, 1862. The wounds General Joseph E. Johnston received at the Battle of Seven Pines relieved him of his command. At the time, many thought Lee's appointment to command was insignificant

(Batty 85). McClellan received word of Lee's appointment and reported to President Lincoln stating, "Lee is timid and irresolute in action" (Batty 85).

Lee ordered General John Whiting and two brigades to reinforce Major General Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. After this linkup, the brigades were to move rapidly on the right flank of the enemy north of the Chickahominy (Davis, J. 131). To observe the enemy and prevent him from learning of this approach, an order went to General J. E. B. Stuart. Lee ordered Stuart to "take a cavalry force and find out whether the enemy had works or defensive troops in position" (Davis, W. 119). Taking action and encountering slight resistance, Stuart moved completely around McClellan's right flank returning with the information. This venture made Stuart a hero and did wonders for the Confederate's morale (Davis, W. 119).

On June 23, Lee called a meeting with his generals and announced his plans for an attack. General John B. Magruder would command 25,000 men in the works to the east of Richmond. These men would defend Richmond if the plan of attack failed. Major Generals James Longstreet, Andrew Powell Hill, and D. H. Hill would mass their divisions on the Confederate's left; they would then strike the Union right. This attack at Mechanicsville would drive the enemy south. General Jackson's Army would do a secret march joining Lee's forces and strike the right, rear flank. Brigadier General W. N. Pendleton's orders were to use

the reserve artillery and resist any advance on Richmond (Davis, J. 134-48).

During the last half of June, McClellan hesitated during his operation to take Richmond. His misinformation about the superior forces in Richmond kept him from attacking the city. He requested more troops. McClellan's golden opportunity, unperceived and unused, came between June 18 and June 25. The Confederate works around Richmond remained weak (Ropes 133). McClellan's concern was opening another supply route from Harrison's Landing to the James River. This supply line would support his base on the Pamunkey River. McClellan's reluctance to attack gave Lee all the time needed to put his plan to work.

The Seven Days' Battle began on June 25 when McClellan conducted an attack against the Confederate's defense east of Richmond. On June 26, three of Lee's divisions conducted an attack on Mechanicsville. The attack was not to take place until General "Stonewall" Jackson linked-up with the Confederate Army, but Jackson was late making the linkup. General A. P. Hill could not wait any longer to begin the battle. Thinking Jackson was nearby, he conducted the attack.

The Confederates swept across the Chickahominy River and through Mechanicsville attacking Brigadier General Fitz-John Porter's lines behind Beaver Dam. The Confederates conducted frontal and flanking attacks but could not force the Federals from their defensive positions. The Confederates did exactly what Lee did not want to happen; they attacked the Federals in their prepared positions (Davis, W. 122). The Confederates

sustained heavy casualties, losing 1,484 men. The Federals lost 361 men. A contributing factor was that Jackson's troops did not arrive until five o'clock the same day.

During the night on June 26, McClellan repositioned his troops near Gaines's Mills on the Boatswain's Swamp. The Confederates again attacked a well defended Federals' position. McClellan feared his supply line to the Pamunkey and his Army's safety was in jeopardy; he retreated to occupy a new position at James River.

The Confederates launched another attack against Porter's men on June 27; the Federals withstood this attack also. Jackson's orders were to attack the Federals' flank, but again he was late in his positioning. Jackson's troops should have been in position by early morning but didn't arrive until mid afternoon. The Confederates finally broke through the Federals' lines.

The Federals repositioned back to the James River to set up another supply base at Harrison's Landing. The loss was 8,750 Confederate casualties to 6,837 Union losses. "Lee finally won his first victory" (Davis, W. 122).

On June 28, Lee continued his pursuit of the Federals. His main effort was to cut off and destroy the Army of the Potomac. On June 29, Major General John B. Magruder received orders to go on the offense. Magruder moved his troops near the battlefield at Fair Oaks. From this position Magruder could attack the retreating Federals. Also, Jackson had the opportunity to attack the Union rear. Jackson maneuvered his troops around the left

flank allowing him the freedom to attack the Federals' rear. However, Jackson's execution was too slow to become decisively engaged. Magruder's troops had only a small confrontation with the Federals near Savage Station (Davis, W. 122). The Federals were repositioning so Magruder's attack did not have a significant effect on the Federals.

On June 30, Lee issued orders to continue the attack. His plan was to bring all his elements together to form one big battle. Again, Magruder and Jackson were slow and Brigadier General Benjamin Huger arrived too late to execute this plan. With their divisions, Generals A. P. Hill and Longstreet attacked the center of the Federal Army. Historians named the battles White Oak Swamp, Frayser's Farm, and Glendale.

During the battles of White Oak, Frayser's Farm, and Glendale, the Federals encountered a fierce fight from the Confederates; however, Union defenses held. General Lee believed that the Federals' position was still vulnerable so he sent Longstreet to check out the battlefield situation. Lee wanted to continue the attack. The Federals began to move, and Lee assumed they were withdrawing, so he ordered an attack. McClellan had managed to escape from the Confederates and repositioned his troops on Malvern Hill.

On July 1, Lee ordered his troops to assault Malvern Hill. Lee's troops soon found McClellan's men dug in positions with well coordinated artillery. Infantry fire lines dealt a vicious blow to the Confederate Army. The assault slaughtered many of Lee's troops who were fighting in three different locations. The

Union's lines withstood the attacks. This is the last position McClellan occupied before withdrawing to Harrison's Landing. The battle of Malvern Hill was the last of the Seven Days' Battles.

The defense Lee used was to station 25,000 men to the east of Richmond. Commanded by Generals Magruder and Huger, these troops would have to defend against the entire Union Army.

Lee's deception plan was to have General Magruder convince the Federals that the Richmond defense was still strongly manned. Magruder used the thinning of the lines method to deceive McClellan about the numbers of soldiers defending Richmond. Magruder moved men in and out of position to allow McClellan's observers to think there were more soldiers in Richmond. McClellan thought the Confederate defense was too strong to attack.

The weather caused most of the soldiers to become unhappy with their conditions. The temperature was hot and humid, and the swampy bottom lands exacerbated the conditions. The debris from the battlefield stank terribly, and many soldiers were sick. The weather had such an effect on the soldiers that the regimental surgeons felt some of the soldiers were malingerers (Catton 315).

The terrain consisted of rolling hills, woods, open fields, many streams with steep banks, and much swamp land. Continuous rain caused flooding and forced the rivers over their banks. In many places, soldiers stood in water and mud up to their knees. Wounded men had to be leaned up against trees or tree stumps to keep them from drowning (Catton 315). The storms either washed

out or flooded the roads; it prevented both armies from moving their heavy weapons and artillery to the battlefield. Heavy rains washed out the Chickahominy River bridge.

McClellan set up a supply base at Harrison Landing. This supply base had weapons, ammunition, food, and uniforms for the Federals' Army. In the Confederate Army, rations were sufficient, but of poor quality. The bacon was strong and the bread sour. Lee could not find one soldier whose pants were not worn-out in the seat (Catton 315).

Obtaining reinforcements was difficult for both armies. The Confederates received additional troops from Jackson's Army, and McClellan requested additional troops from President Lincoln.

Each army had artillery cannons, rifles, and swords; but the Federals also had naval support. Both armies used horses and mules. The mules pulled supply wagons and artillery pieces while the generals normally rode horses. Lee was unable to transport his 8-inch howitzers, 8-inch mortars, and 10-inch mortars to the battlefield due to the flooding; therefore, they were not a factor in the outcome of the war (Catton 323).

Lee cut McClellan's lines of communication to his supply base. Having been successful, Lee thought McClellan had only two options; he would either fight his way back to the York River or retreat down the peninsula to Fort Monroe (Jones 271). McClellan shifted his communication line to the James River.

In contrast, Operation Desert Storm allowed U.S. planners the opportunity to test their battle plans. Before the onset of the Kuwait invasion, Schwarzkopf developed a simulated potential

war scenario, taking place within Southwest Asia. This scenario later proved realistic. Anticipating such a conflict and being familiar with Saudi tactics, Schwarzkopf became the supreme commander for offensive operations. Though Schwarzkopf was the commander, any offensive action required consultation with the Saudi Government (Morrison 11). Schwarzkopf shared joint defensive command with Saudi military officials (Morrison 11). The decision to place all forces under a single, unified command was a major asset to the coalition forces.

Schwarzkopf's priority was to establish superiority in mobility and tank warfare (Morrison 11). Schwarzkopf requested a large land, sea, and air force to reduce time and casualties during this conflict. His offensive plan called for hard-hitting, deadly accuracy with a quick end. General Colin Powell's strategy, supported by Schwarzkopf, was to "cut them off -- then kill them" (Larson 22). Schwarzkopf further added that he wanted to hit command and communication centers, "cutting off the head," causing mass surrenders (Morrison 27).

The roots of Operation Desert Storm came from FM 100-5, Operations, the U.S. Army's operational manual (Eshel Desert 28). Eshel said the U.S. planners adopted an offensively oriented operational doctrine called the AirLand Battle. The concept "places a great deal of initiative with subordinate commanders in battle allowing greater flexibility and exploitation" (Desert 29). This concept is ideal for the modern, fast moving, combined-arms, battle operations.

The planners envisioned a force that retains the initiative, strikes deep, and decisively maneuvers; AirLand battle would dominate future wars. The AirLand battle doctrine destroys the ability of the opponent to fight an organized battle. "In the attack, initiative should be maintained so as to never allow the enemy to recover from the first shock" (Eshel Desert 29).

Hussein's mistake was stopping at the Saudi border when he invaded Kuwait. He should have seized the air base at Dhahran. Schwarzkopf thanked the American press for exaggerating the size and speed of the United States buildup (Barry and Thomas 39). "Saddam's second mistake was to defend Kuwait" (Barry and Thomas 39). He failed to protect himself in southern Iraq. He "threw away his offensive advantage" when he dug in his armor (Barry and Thomas 39). He reduced his tanks to stationary positions and underestimated his enemy, thereby cutting off his army from the rear.

Schwarzkopf developed tactics to cut off Iraqi troops in Kuwait and destroy command centers, communications, supplies, and reserve forces. By surrounding and cutting off their supplies, water, and reinforcements, Schwarzkopf hoped the Iraqis would surrender.

Schwarzkopf based his plan on the advantages of combined-arms combat and a thorough knowledge of the ground. The Iraqis expected the main allied effort from the front where they had constructed their strongest defense system (Eshel Checkmate 55). Schwarzkopf actually directed the main effort at the western flanks of the Iraqi forces. This "provided tactical

surprise to the allies and dismay to the Iraqis" (Eshel Checkmate 55).

While deceiving the enemy into thinking opposing forces would attack straight on, the Commander performed the "Hail Mary" (David 77). This coordinated, combined effort proved to be the downfall of the enemy. Schwarzkopf's "Hail Mary" was essentially a simple plan. It required complete coordination, timing, and communications. American, British, and French forces secretly shifted west along Iraq's undefended border. Iraq had no way to detect Schwarzkopf's preparations for his flanking maneuver around the fortified front lines (Barry and Thomas 38).

Allied forces launched an attack from the far west around Iraqi's lines, heading northeast toward Basra and the Republican Guards. Another element "penetrated the lines to tie up the second echelon and free allied forces to attack the Iraqi defenses from the rear" (Cary 30).

This maneuver caught the Iraqis by surprise. They defended in the wrong direction as the coalition forces moved in. The goal of "cutting off the head" and causing mass surrenders became a reality (Morrison 27). Hussein held his Republican Guard in reserve. The U.S. tanks caught them off guard and destroyed them. Hussein also had his reserve forces pointed in the wrong direction. Surprised from the rear with no escape route, the enemy surrendered.

From the invasion until the actual conflict, the Iraqis used time to entrench defensive positions. The men created heavy fortifications or berms to delay the opposing forces.

Additionally, mine fields proved very effective in stalling the inevitable. It required different material and methods to get past each obstacle. The coalition forces used time and competence to remove these obstacles.

"Iraq is superb in the defense. It's Army is well-equipped and trained to carry out mobile defense operations" (Barry and Thomas 38). The Iraqis constructed defensive barriers that lined the Saudi-Kuwaiti border leading westward to southern Iraq. The line was a 150 mile long "zigzagging network of trenches and foxholes with machine guns and anti-tank missiles, anti-tank ditches, anti-aircraft and artillery emplacements, and cement fortified tank positions" (Cary 29).

Typical of desert defenses, the fortifications were deep. Cary said the Iraqis had a 5 mile security zone and an obstacle course. It consisted of 2 miles of anti-tank berms and ditches, minefields, razor-wire fences, and high sand berms (29). The Iraqis mounted anti-aircraft guns in this area for firing on attacking armor. The Iraqis built forts behind these areas to hold artillery and anti-tank guns. A few miles back, reserve mobile forces were ready to reinforce the lines (Cary 29).

Iraq arranged its forces in Soviet style echelons. Cary said the first echelon, one corps of six 15,000-man divisions, manned the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The second corps of six divisions defended the coast and Kuwait City (29). The second echelon consisted of a corps of three mechanized and three infantry divisions. It was miles to the rear in Kuwait and southeastern Iraq to protect the supply lines and Basra. The

third echelon was a deep reserve, Republican Guard. It consisted of one infantry, two mechanized, and three tank divisions deployed to defend supply lines, Basra, and Iraq (Cary 29).

As in football, the opposing team must not understand your game plan. The U.S. Armed Forces kept the enemy in a blind state. While secretly building up forces to the southwest, other forces seemed poised to attack from the southeast. A heavy barrage from marine amphibious units practicing assaults proved very deceiving (David 76).

Part of this deception technique was the use of the news media system. The media's televised programming concentrated on converging war ships on the coast. It further televised marine assault units gearing for offensive, land-sea battle (David 77). This deception caused the enemy to concentrate on the southeast while the real force quietly infiltrated from the southwest.

Saudi troops and U.S. Marines drove through Iraqi lines into Kuwait making the enemy think this was the main assault. Coalition forces pounded the Iraqi lines with aircraft and artillery. Also, coalition forces generated smoke screens to mask the attack. Cary states, "they used smoke in more places than necessary to throw the enemy off and confuse them on where we're planning to breach (30).

Many environmental conditions posed initial problems. Rain, smoke, and dust played havoc on personnel, equipment, and employment of resources. "Heavy rains and thousands of vehicles had churned the desert into soup" (David 86). The conditions slightly limited the U.S. Forces, but did not hinder the mission.

As Schwarzkopf stated, "God loves the infantryman, and that's just the kind of weather (rain, dust, black smoke) the infantryman likes to fight in" (David 86).

The desert is torturous and unique in its terrain features. The heat and sand can sap the strength of men and machines. Blowing sand can jam guns, wear down machines, and corrode parts. The desert is mostly flat, which means "maneuvering is almost unrestricted" (Cary 26). This unrestricted maneuverability in the desert was a distinct advantage for the coalition forces.

Officially, the ground war started February 23 and ended February 27, 1991. It involved the U.S. Armed Forces as well as 29 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries. This massive combination of forces caused some logistical problems. Coordination of support was extremely important.

A major consideration, from the onslaught of the ground war, was the availability of only one good road. This road, the Saudi Route, was the primary route for bringing forward all logistical support. Adding to the logistical nightmare was Schwarzkopf's insistence on moving west a full 60-days "worth of food, water, and ammunition" (David 86).

Initially, there was a lack of spare parts. This caused some problems in certain areas. The environmental conditions proved to be challenging, especially for computerized equipment (Morrison 12). The sand, normally from sand storms, made the equipment malfunction. Improved maintenance and protection solved this short-term problem. Supply vehicles followed closely behind the main force, minimizing further logistical problems.

High-technology equipment was a distinct logistical advantage. The equipment, such as the tanks, required less maintenance support and were self-sufficient; this enabled the United States to strike first and to strike hard.

Desert Storm required the forces daily to move the following: 5,000 tons of ammunition, 555,000 gallons of fuel, 300,000 gallons of water, and 80,000 meals. "We leapfrogged a lot of supplies to the front" (Barry and Thomas 42). Trucks moved day and night to transport supplies. Schwarzkopf set up forward-based refueling areas ahead of advancing troops (Barry and Thomas 42).

Logistics in the desert is life itself. Desert warfare is "a tactician's dream but a logistician's nightmare" (Cary 29). Maneuvering freely in the desert is the key to winning battles. Distance from fuel and water can be critical. "One division of 350 M1 tanks can consume 600,000 gallons of fuel a day" (Cary 29). Trucks carried most of the supplies.

These same factors caused the Iraqis to limit their resupply to road networks. By destroying these highways, Schwarzkopf limited Iraq's resupply capability.

Due to the type of conflict and the multitude of forces, experts estimated that 10,000 U.S. casualties would result (Morrison 27). Within this casualty estimate, experts further believed that twenty percent, or 2,000, would die (Morrison 27).

For clearing a path through mine fields, the United States used M1 tanks with mine clearing devices. To breach ditches and berms, the engineers used the M728 Combat Engineer Vehicle; they

also used the M60 Armored Vehicle Launched Bridge that has a 60 foot long bridge attached to the top. The coalition forces used the Bradley armored vehicle to clear out the infantryman, foxholes, and trenches (Cary 30).

"Iraq had 4,200 tanks versus 3,360 per the allies, 545,000 men versus 530,000, and 3,100 artillery pieces versus 3,600 for the allies" (Budiansky 32). Iraq's equipment was just as good or better than the allies. Iraq upgraded many of their tanks and they had some smart weapons.

A positive footnote to the logistical problem was that communications proved very efficient. Rapid, clear information between subordinate and NATO elements was consistent throughout the battle. Schwarzkopf kept a portable, high-technology communication system with him at all times. This portable system allowed instant communication with the White House, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and NATO Forces Commanders.

By destroying Hussein's communications with his commanders, "the allies beheaded the overcentralized Iraqi Army" (Barry and Thomas 39). Eye-in-the-sky aircraft looked behind enemy lines. "A communication system that acts like a cellular phone network allows the troops to talk to each other (Barry and Thomas 42).

A comparison of the two U.S. generals, Lee and Schwarzkopf, revealed many similarities. Both were graduates of West Point. Lee graduated number two in his class (Freeman and McWhiney 19). Schwarzkopf has an IQ of 170. In his class at West Point, he graduated 43d; but, he could have done much better. Instead, he spent his time wrestling and playing tennis and football (David

119). A classmate of Schwarzkopf's, retired General Leroy Suddath stated, "he read widely on war ... He saw himself as a successor to Alexander the Great, and we didn't laugh when he said it. He was just assured he would be an outstanding success." (qtd. in Time 122)

Lee had a very mathematical mind and could communicate in Greek, Latin, French, and Spanish (Freeman and McWhiney 115). Lee studied history extensively. He especially enjoyed reading of Napoleon, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar (Freeman and McWhiney 116). Schwarzkopf was fluent in German and French, and studied history extensively (David 115).

Both men had a deep belief in God. Lee read his Bible and prayer book daily (Freeman and McWhiney 115). Schwarzkopf's "Bible by his camp bed in the desert was well thumbed" (David 115).

From the above descriptions, it is evident both generals faced many similar circumstances. Their tactical plans for success were similar. The enemy outnumbered both generals approximately 2 to 1. This was a major consideration in the development of the battle plan. They could not simply overwhelm their enemy. They had to develop a superior plan to outthink and outmaneuver the enemy, thereby taking the enemy by surprise.

Both generals faced an experienced, battle tested force. McClellan's Union Army had been very successful in many battles during the Civil War. Hussein's Iraqi Army, especially the Republican Guard, had recently ended a long, successful war with Iran.

Both generals recently assumed command. Lee only assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia three weeks before the Seven Days. Schwarzkopf assumed command and control of all coalition forces after Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

Both generals recognized the importance of cutting off the enemy's supply lines. Lee used the tactics he learned in Mexico to perform a "left hook" around the enemy (Earle 24). This effectively cut off their supply lines and took the enemy by surprise. Lee hoped the enemy would then withdraw from Richmond. Schwarzkopf recalled the tactics he learned at West Point and implemented the AirLand Battle doctrine (Time 73). He called the victory a "textbook operation" (Miles 7).

Both generals used the art of deception and military intelligence to their fullest, thereby altering enemy intelligence reports. This caused the enemy to use tactics that ultimately caused their defeat.

Lee convinced McClellan that the Confederate Army had heavily fortified Richmond. McClellan intended to attack Richmond the same day that Lee began his attack. McClellan received erroneous information that Jackson was approaching and an enormous Rebel force of 200,000 would confront him (Macdonald 40). Based on this intelligence information, McClellan cancelled his assault.

Schwarzkopf used deception to make Hussein believe there would be a frontal attack. With the success of the air campaign, Schwarzkopf severely limited Hussein's intelligence gathering capabilities, "Saddam had no eyes" (Time 72). Schwarzkopf

directed Task Force Troy, a phantom marine division, to have loudspeakers patrol the Saudi border; this move gave the impression that coalition forces were massing for a frontal attack directly on the Iraqi fortified positions (Time 72). Schwarzkopf had 17,000 Marines "conspicuously" practice amphibious landings. This gave the Iraqis the idea the initial thrust of the coalition forces would come from the sea. Maps recovered from the Iraqis after the war confirmed the success of these tactics.

The tactical plan developed and used by Lee during the Seven Days was both daring and cunning. Lee cut off the enemy's supply lines, prevented reinforcements, and used the surprise, "left hook" flanking movement. This allowed the outnumbered Confederate Forces to defeat the Union Forces.

Over 100 years later, Schwarzkopf used the same tactics for ground operations. He superbly employed the coalition forces for a quick, decisive victory during a short-term, isolated conflict.

Though over 100 years apart, Lee and Schwarzkopf had similar ideas, tactics and battle plans. Severely outnumbered, both leaders "outthought" the enemy with daring and cunning plans, proving their tactical genius for ground operations. Both became victorious. Their actions live in history for future leaders of the Army to use for victory on the next battlefield.

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