

#### **Runtime-Assurance for Al**

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## V&V of AI/ML: Machine Learning Simplified View



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# **V&V Machine Learning Challenges**

Computation not based on application logic (Trained ML)

- Neurons triggered by combined weighted input
- Weights "trained" in learning face

#### Computation changes at runtime (Evolving ML)

- As neural network learns it changes computation
- Behavior / Computation not known at design time





# **V&V** Approaches for Trained ML

Reluplex<sup>1</sup>

- Applied to the ReLu activation function:
  - -Y = max(0,x)
- Extends Simplex LP solver
- Encode the equations connecting input to outputs as constrains in LP
- Create new variables for active (non-zero) and inactive (zero) outputs
- Explore assignments that satisfy constrains
- Applied to ACAS

Verisig<sup>2</sup>

- For closed-loop Cyber-Physical System
- Transforms NN into hybrid system
  - Transform sigmoid activation into quadratic equation
- Use reachability tools (e.g. dReach) to verify output



<sup>1</sup>Katz, Guy, Barrett, Clark, Dill, David L., Julian, Kyle, Kochenderfer, Mykel J." Reluplex: An Efficient SMT Solver for Verifying Deep Neural Networks". Computer Aided Verification. 2017. <sup>2</sup>Radoslav Ivanov, James Weimer, Rajeev Alur, George J. Pappas, Insup Lee. "Verisig: verifying safety properties of hybrid systems with neural network controllers" HSCC '19



# **V&V** Approach for Evolving ML

#### Add Enforcer

- Watch for safety property  $\phi$
- Replace unsafe actions

### Formally: specify, verify, and compose multiple enforcers

- Logic: Enforcer intercepts/replaces unsafe action
- Timing: at right time
- Physics: verified physical effects

#### Protect enforcers against failures/attacks





# **Verifying Physics (Control Theory)**

Model physics using control theory

#### System includes

- Physical vehicle and environment
- Software controlling airplane

### Evaluate if combined system

- Behaves like a "cone" with setpoint at bottom
  - Theoretically known as Lyapunov function
- Enforcer periodically "samples" (monitors) for misbehavior
  - If between enforcer sample potential misbehavior
    - Theory verifies that system still in "cone" after misbehavior
  - Model also evaluates if enforcer recovery keeps system in cone





## **Analysis of Mission Progress**

Idea:

Provide a sequence of waypoints that represent a sequence of equilibrium points around which we define the Safe Set.



### Goal:

- Safety transition from one waypoint to the next one.
- Liveness (in the case of no errors)

## **Analysis of Mission Progress Enforcing Unsafe Behavior**

System model of a drone across mission

Safety "cone" in 3-D is a sphere

Evaluate misbehavior and enforcer recover



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### **Drone Experiment**



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## Are We Done Yet?

#### Scalable Verification

- Only verify safety-critical components
- Guarding unverified one

#### Trust

- Protect verified components
- Against attacks or bugs from unverified components



## **Enforcing Unverified Components**





### **Enforcing Unverified Components**



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## **Enforcing Unverified Components**





### But enforcer can be corrupted (bug or cyber attack)



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### **Add Memory Protection**



### **Trusted = Verified & Protected**

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# Are We Done Yet?

#### Timing can still be corrupted

- Guaranteed correct value
- BUT potentially at wrong time

#### Trusted timely actuation

- Tamper-proof time-triggering mechanism
- In sync with periodic controller
- In sync with expected untrusted



### **Periodic Execution Must Finish by Deadline**





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### **Periodic Execution Finish by Deadline**



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## **Real-Time Mixed-Trust Computation**



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## **Real-Time Mixed-Trust Computation**



# **Concluding Remarks**

#### ML Verification for Trained ML

- LP-Based
- Hybrid rechability for CPS

#### ML Verification for Evolving ML

- Enforcers to
  - Monitor and
  - Correct unsafe actions

#### Focus on key properties:

- Safety
- Security

#### **Combined Relevant Scientific Domains**

- Timing
- Logic
- Physics (Control)

Verification only effective if protected!

Verified Protection: Hypervisor