

**IMPACT OF THE PROFESSIONALIZATION ON THE FRENCH ARMED  
FORCES ON CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC  
ASSESSMENT**

**BY**

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROMAIN BÉTHOUX**

A PAPER PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF  
THE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES  
FOR COMPLETION OF GRADUATION REQUIREMENTS

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED AIR AND SPACE STUDIES

AIR UNIVERSITY

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

**JUNE 2020**

## APPROVAL


The undersigned certify that this thesis meets master's-level standards of research, argumentation, and expression.

---

JAMES M. TUCCI (Date)

---

WENDY N. WHITMAN COBB (Date)



## **DISCLAIMER**

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author. They do not reflect the official position of the United States or France Governments, the United States Department of Defense, French Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, the French Air Force, or Air University.



## ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Lieutenant Colonel Romain Béthoux is a fighter pilot, with experience at the Headquarters of the French Air Force, as a former leader of *La Patrouille de France*, the French Aerobatic Team, and as commander of the French Fighter School. A 1999 graduate from the French Air Force Academy, Lieutenant Colonel Béthoux also holds a master's degree from the Air Command and Staff College with a certificate from the nuclear elective at the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies. He is the author of *Le Pari de L'impossible*, a first-hand account of service in *L'Armée de l'Air* and *La Patrouille de France*.



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am deeply indebted to the faculty, staff, and students at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS) for their dedication to ensuring my growth as a thinker and strategist. I could not have completed this project without the tremendous support and effort of my research advisor, Dr. James Tucci, and my reader, Professor Whitman Cobb. These exceptional professors always took the time to answer questions, review drafts of this work, and offer constructive critiques and encouragement without complaint. Additionally, I would be remiss if I did not thank the other outstanding SAASS instructors. Their critiques of my work throughout the year were instrumental in improving my ability to write, which in turn enabled me to complete this project.

I also want to thank my fellow strategists in SAASS Class XXIX for the friendship, the laughs, and for skillfully challenging my perspectives. I wish you the best in all your future endeavors.

Most importantly, I am grateful for the love and support of my beautiful wife and our wonderful children. I am forever thankful for the patience and understanding they exhibited throughout the academic school year.



## ABSTRACT

This study comprises an analysis of the historical impacts of the professionalization of Western democratic forces, more precisely of French military forces, that happened in 1996. The conclusions are that structural and cultural changes shaped the military apparatus, and profound political implications happened from this reform, too. The author also assesses Risa Brooks' theory about the civil-military politics of strategic assessment (SA) and applies it to the case of France. The results of this process demonstrate that France's strategic assessment was enhanced because of a significant improvement in information sharing between military and civilian leaders stemming from professionalization. These findings contradict a commonly held view, that the downsizing of the military through the end of a draft should have poor influence on political matters and national strategy. Professionalization reinforced military credibility among decision-leaders, inducing an equal dialogue, but without questioning civilian authority. France's strategic assessment was strengthened with the end of conscription.



## CONTENTS

Chapter	Page
Disclaimer.....	ii
About the Author.....	iii
Acknowledgements.....	iv
Abstract.....	v
Important Terms and Definitions.....	viii
1. Introduction.....	1
2. Professionalization .....	4
3. French civ-mil relations at the general public level.....	12
4. French civ-mil relations at the elite level.....	21
5. Risa Brooks theory.....	27
6. French strategic assessment.....	34
7. Conclusion.....	42
Bibliography.....	44

## ILLUSTRATIONS

### Tables

1. Demographics of military ranks in France in 1997 and 2003.....	6
2. Occupation versus institution model.....	8
3. Examples of International Implications of Strategic Assessment.....	29
4. The three distribution of power.....	31
5. Relationship between balance of power and preference-divergence.....	32
6. Inter-ministerial coordination in international crisis.....	35

7. Inter-ministerial pattern of the French global approach.....	36
---	----





## IMPORTANT TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

**Professionalization:** the transition from draft to all-volunteer force where soldiers are well trained, educated and more permanent than during the conscription.

**Jointization:** the process of shifting from military organization designed around services and a system of arms to a new system of forces that is more integrated. This joint integration encompasses all spheres of functioning in the military such as chain of command, organic structure, operations, and training.

**Strategic assessment (SA):** the process through which relations between a state's political goals/strategies and military strategies/activities are evaluated and decided.

**Military influence:** the balance of power represents the military's influence in a political leader's coalition.

**Preference-divergence:** the alignment, or non-alignment, of military and political preferences. Three main areas are concerned: the state's security goals, the country's military strategies and plans, and corporate issues.

**The Algerian Taboo:** The French armed forces attempted coups in Algiers in 1958 and 1961, which marked the birth of the Fifth Republic. In addition, the defeat coupled with military barbarism traumatized France. More precisely, the Algerian taboo designates the inherited structure of ordinary relations between high-ranking military officers and political leaders after the Algerian War.

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

*The answer to what constitutes vital national interest is found not so much on the cause, itself, but in who is willing to die for that cause.*

*Charles Moskos*

### The Central Question and its Significance

Following President Jacques Chirac's 1996 decision to professionalize France's armed forces, many political and military leader expressed concerns about its potential consequences on the armed forces and civil-military relations. Would the shift to an all-volunteer force weaken the armed forces or create a gap in civil-military relations? More importantly, would this shift undermine France's ability to perform strategic assessment? To some degree, the paper explores the strengths and weaknesses entailed by professionalization including misunderstanding versus credibility. Ultimately, the research demonstrates that professionalization, together with external factors, tends to improve French strategic assessment and reinforce the military advisory role.

Combat no longer appears to be the central feature of military engagement in the French public's eyes. For this reason, despite public approval of other missions, French military personnel seem to exhibit a low sense of morale among themselves. The end of conscription has accelerated the displacement of the army's "image of combatants" and has increased the perception that the military serves primarily a social role. This discrepancy seems to have spawned a gap in the relations between the military and society. Why is it important? This gap could have a much more strategic impact than just degrading military self-confidence; it could affect the nation's ability to conduct strategy. By using the theory model of Risa Brooks, Associate Professor of Political Science at Marquette University and author of *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*, I will study the strategic consequences of this possible gap. What are the implications of this tendency in the process of strategic assessment? Brooks argues that "civil-military relations affect how states engage in strategic assessment."<sup>1</sup> Inevitably, domestic relations between political and military leaders shape the

---

<sup>1</sup> Risa Brooks, *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2008), 2.

institutional processes in which leaders evaluate their strategies in interstate conflicts.<sup>2</sup> Those processes affect how leaders appraise their state's military options, plans, and the broader diplomatic and political constraints that bear on them. Consequently, she reports "poor strategic assessment can generate failure by undermining a state's estimates of its relative military capabilities."<sup>3</sup> Hence, my work is to evaluate if this theory applies to France, assess its balance of power, and, accordingly, examine the nation's strategic assessment level.

In addition to Risa Brooks' scholarship, the backbone of my work relies primarily on the scholarship of several key American and French professors who have written about civil-military relations. Samuel P. Huntington had a long career in academia and government service including serving as director of Harvard's Center of International Affairs and as the White House Coordinator of Security Planning for the National Security Council under President Carter. His most important civ-mil work, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and the Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, lays out his theory of objective civilian control, according to which the optimal means of asserting control over the armed forces is to professionalize them. In contrast, subjective control involves placing legal and institutional restrictions on the military's autonomy. Charles Constantine Moskos, Jr. was an influential military sociologist, well known for framing the "don't ask, don't tell" policy on LGBT persons serving in the military, and taught at the University of Michigan and Northwestern University. Moskos' article, "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organization" constitutes a cornerstone in the understanding of the military as a social organization. Bastien Irondelle was a research fellow at CERI-Sciences PO Paris and Deakin Fellow at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. His work was based on four pillars: international security, the EU, France's defense, and the military transformation. On the latter topic, his *magnum opus*, entitled *La réforme des armées en France* addresses the decision process to end conscription and the major role played by the Elysée. Bernard Boëne is an emeritus professor of sociology at the University of Rennes and former vice-president of the International Sociological Association's research committee on armed forces and conflict

---

<sup>2</sup> Brooks, 2.

<sup>3</sup> 16/10/2020 15:44:00

resolution. His publications, mostly on martial action and institutions in a comparative perspective, are very influential and useful for my thesis, especially *Shifting to All-Volunteer Armed Forces in Europe, 1994-2011*. Finally, Chéron Bénédicte, historian and specialist of military affairs, offers a pertinent insight on the relationship between French society and its armed forces. Notwithstanding the positive reputation of the military among the French people, there is a deep misunderstanding on military personnel values, and their core missions. Bénédicte sheds light on the complex relations existing inside France when it comes down to civ-mil.

First, Chapter 2 examines the impact of an all-volunteer force on the military apparatus, its structure, and its culture. At the beginning, I treat Western countries in general, then France in particular. My research emphasizes the consequences of the transition to professionalization on French civil-military relations at the public level in Chapter 3 and at the elite level in Chapter 4. Second, to understand the interdependence between military organization and national policy, Chapter 5 focuses on Risa Brooks' theory, which has made a significant contribution to the study of decision making and military strategy. Her studies demonstrate how pathologies in civil-military relations produce ineffective decisions in crisis. Third, the sixth chapter employs Brooks' model to analyze French strategic assessment before the change of professionalization and afterward. In the final chapter, I summarize my findings and conclude that the transition to an all-volunteer force has ultimately benefited French strategic decision making.

## Chapter 2

### Professionalization

*The objective of a nation's civil-military relations is to maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values.*

*Samuel Huntington*

In this chapter, I will describe the structural effects induced by military professionalization on Western countries. As a reminder, professionalization means the transition from draft to all-volunteer force where soldiers are well trained, educated and more permanent than during the conscription.

### Transformations induced by professionalization

Professionalization of military forces is an old tendency in some countries, generalized in Europe by a new strategic context triggered by the end of the Cold War. It induces unexpected consequences: a limitation in military options for decision leaders and an increase in the internationalization of security. For instance, in 1960, Morris Janowitz coined the expression “armée de masse decline” which is based on Occidental industrialized countries’ observations.<sup>1</sup> He noticed a reduction of usefulness and legitimacy of force in international relations because of the fear of nuclear war, the technology revolution in military affairs, the incapability of conscripts to operate complex systems, and, finally, the disappearance of both a nation-state’s charisma and its citizenship’s sense of duty. Military service is no longer perceived as an honor or a male ritual but rather as a chore.<sup>2</sup>

As a result, European armies have become smaller, are in a permanent state of readiness, are highly rationalized, and constitute a system where individuals are not interchangeable anymore and in which reserves do not provide mass numbers, as they did in 1914 or 1939.

---

<sup>1</sup> Brenard Boëne, “La Professionnalisation Des Armées: Contexte et Raisons, Impact Fonctionnel et Sociopolitique,” *Revue Française de Sociologie* 44, no. 4 (2003): 650.

<sup>2</sup> Boëne, 655.

Henceforth, the military's role is to guarantee the viability of international relations, like a constabulary force, rather than as a war-making force focused on strategic decisive victory, which, with the advent of thermonuclear weapons, has become too hazardous.

### **Structural effects**

The first structural effect of professionalization is a reduction in the active military's size. It responds to a reduced need for large numbers of fighting forces. In all European cases, the average reduction is at least 40%.<sup>3</sup> Further, professionalization is not only the consequence of such actions, it is also the cause of further decreases in numbers, far more than initially expected. For instance, in France, some people envisage an army of 100,000 persons compared to 250,000, the current format.<sup>4</sup> The result is a tremendously smaller army than before, with a much-reduced impact compared to either the French Navy or the French Air Force. Professionalization, thus, could further reduce the discrepancy in numbers between the services. More recently, with an increase in the number of overseas operations far from home, the necessity for more agile, light, and mobile forces has accentuated this trend towards smaller numbers.

In addition to the attrition of the active force, a second effect profoundly impacts the reserve forces: no more conscripts fuel it and it has proved hard to recruit reserves, too. One solution is to force active duty members to spend several years in the reserves after leaving the service. Being a reservist becomes a second job after retirement. Inevitably, the cost to the state significantly rose because reservists' pay increased to be an attractive occupation. For example, a French army captain earns \$100 per day of reserve.<sup>5</sup> Another shortcoming for the reserve concerns its role. The reserve's job is no longer as a support to combatant units, but instead has become a selective supplement to the order of battle through highly qualified specialists which requires individual management. Consequently, a professional military, equipped with limited reserve forces to complete their small active duty numbers, are "a one-shot gun." When needed, their

---

<sup>3</sup> Boëne, "La Professionnalisation Des Armées: Contexte et Raisons, Impact Fonctionnel et Sociopolitique."

<sup>4</sup> Christopher Dandeker, "The Military in Democratic Societies," *Society* 38, no. September (2001): 16–24.

<sup>5</sup> SIRPA terre, "Réserve Opérationnel Dans l'Armée de Terre" (Armée de Terre, 2013).

ability to sustain action, or to cope with several conflicts at a time, is limited. It is hard to regenerate forces with scant relief troops.

Another structural effect of professionalization has been an increase in the number of military women as, previously, all conscripts were men. The absence of women, in addition to the reduction of total numbers, entailed a mechanical augmentation of female personal percentage. For example, 30 years ago, women were rare in the French military services, amounting to 1 to 2%, but today the percentage of females reaches 15.5%.<sup>6</sup>

A fourth structural result impacts the demographics of military ranks. The distribution among categories (enlisted, non-commissioned officers, officers) is striking. The number of NCOs is higher than the number of enlisted troops. Everywhere, the higher ratio of supervisor to subordinate, much greater than in the past, has impacted the traditional hierarchy dimension of the military sphere. Above all, it is no longer possible to discipline an enlisted member in a severe manner anymore, especially when you need to retain him. Accordingly, a negotiated order, similar to management practice, appears which differs from the previous military model. The following chart underscores that point in France.

**Table 1: Demographics of military ranks in France in 1997 and 2003**

	Armée de terre		Marine		Armée de l'air		Total Défense <sup>(2)</sup>	
	1997	2003 <sup>(3)</sup>	1997	2003 <sup>(3)</sup>	1997	2003 <sup>(3)</sup>	1997	2003 <sup>(3)</sup>
Officiers	18 000 <b>8 %</b>	16 000 <b>11,6 %</b>	5 000 <b>8 %</b>	4 500 <b>10,6 %</b>	8 300 <b>10 %</b>	6 800 <b>10,7 %</b>	37 500 <b>10 %</b>	34 000 <b>13,5 %</b>
Sous-officiers	60 000 <b>26,4 %</b>	51 000 <b>37,1 %</b>	32 000 <b>50 %</b>	29 500 <b>69,4 %</b>	43 000 <b>52 %</b>	37 500 <b>59,2 %</b>	140 000 <b>36 %</b>	123 000 <b>48,5 %</b>
Rang <sup>(1)</sup>	149 000 <b>65,6 %</b>	70 500 <b>51,2 %</b>	27 000 <b>42 %</b>	8 500 <b>20 %</b>	31 700 <b>38 %</b>	19 000 <b>30 %</b>	212 000 <b>54 %</b>	103 000 <b>38 %</b>
<i>Total</i>	227 000 <b>100 %</b>	137 500 <b>100 %</b>	64 000 <b>100 %</b>	42 500 <b>100 %</b>	83 000 <b>100 %</b>	63 300 <b>100 %</b>	389 500 <b>100 %</b>	260 000 <b>100 %</b>

Source : « Professionalisation », Boëne Bernard

<sup>6</sup> Boëne, "La Professionnalisation Des Armées: Contexte et Raisons, Impact Fonctionnel et Sociopolitique."

A fifth structural effect translates into a sensitive rise in military age. Two of its corollaries are the increase of married service members and their dependents. Because of young conscripts, the average age in the French military was 26 years old in 1990. In 2001, it jumped to 33 years old for men and 29 years old for the women.<sup>7</sup> This indicates that French service members in the all-volunteer force are serving at a later point in their lives, which complicates force utilization and costs.

Ultimately, professionalization affects salaries and the Ministry of Defense's (MoD's) budget. Cost per individual has soared. Consequently, running costs exceed equipment and research and development (R&D) spending. Those conditions have caused a dilemma: the services must either sacrifice the number of people recruited or technological investment including, possibly the maintenance of existing equipment.

## **Recruitment**

The main challenge of maintaining a professionalized military is to recruit voluntary enlisted forces in a sufficiently large number that is also high quality, including recruits with a technical education or a college degree. Appeal, select, recruit, adapt and train, move, retain, retire, are the key words of a process which has fundamentally changed. Force reduction or diminution, motivated by the initial decision to give up conscription or the later diminution allowed by the strategic context, all together negatively influence one's perception of military service as a promising career: base closures and regiment disbandment also deter potential recruits in both the short and mid-term. Additionally, the reduced visibility of the physical presence of forces tends to move the military away from public consciousness. Although an imperfect method, the level of social diversity offered by conscription is unlikely to be reached in the different categories of professional forces. If representativeness is an asset to gain legitimacy in the public and draw recruits, the lack of social diversity in an all-volunteer force may further disincentivize recruitment.

---

<sup>7</sup> Boëne.



### Towards an occupational model

Another important aspect of a tendency born from an all-volunteer force resides in the emergence of new economic concerns unknown among old armies that were based on conscription. Under conscription, few military members saved money. Labor from the lower ranks was abundant and cheap and the main expense was to equip them. Today, it is more difficult to find a driver than a car on a military base. In the United States, for example, sociologist Charles Moskos hypothesizes that the American military is moving from an institutional format to one more and more resembling that of an occupation.<sup>8</sup> The distinctions between the two models are summarized in the following chart.

**Table 2: Occupation versus institution model**

Variable	Institution	Occupation
Legitimacy	service; values, duty, honor, country	Marketplace/ economy
Role/ commitments	Primary commitment to organization	Segmental commitment to organization
Compensation	Much in non-cash form or deferred entitlements, pay partly determined by need	Salary system; cash-work nexus; pay directly related to skill level
Residence	Adjacency of work and residence locales	Separation of work and residence locales
Legal Jurisdiction	Broad purview over military member	Narrow purview over military member
Spouse	Integral part of military community	Removed from military community
Societal regard	Esteem based on motion of sacrifice	Prestige based upon level of compensation
Reference groups	“vertical” within organization	“horizontal” external to organization

*Source: “Institution versus Occupation: Contrasting Models of Military Organization” Moskos Charles*

Through this process, an institution is legitimated in terms of values and norms, i.e. a purpose transcending individual self-interest in favor of a presumed higher good. Members of an institution are often seen as following a calling. Inversely, the

---

<sup>8</sup> Charles C. Moskos. Jr, “Institution versus Occupation: Contrasting Models of Military Organization”, *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. 4, no. 1(1977), 3.

occupational model implies priority of self-interest rather than that of the employing organization. Traditionally, the military has sought to avoid the organizational outcomes of the occupational model. Nevertheless, even in the conventional military system there have been some accommodations to occupational imperatives. Reenlistment bonuses have been a staple incentive to retain highly skilled technical personnel and bonuses have been used to recruit soldiers into the combat arms.<sup>9</sup>

In contrast, an occupation is legitimated in terms of the marketplace, i.e. prevailing monetary rewards for equivalent competencies.<sup>10</sup> Supply and demand rather than normative considerations are paramount. Instead of a military system anchored in the normative values captured in words like “duty,” “honor,” and “country”, the United States’ Gates Commission Report from 1970 on the commission of the all-volunteer force argued that the primary reliance in recruiting an armed force should be on monetary inducements guided by marketplace standards. Armed forces are best viewed as another part of the labor market. This mind-set has contributed to moving the American military toward an explicitly occupational format.

Discipline and authority are also other domains impacted by the transition to an all-volunteer force. The overriding point is the general decline of vibrant military life on bases or in barracks because a majority of uniformed personnel now live outside of military camps and are commuting daily to their job’s location like civilian employees.

Another manifestation of recent organizational change departs entirely from the formal military organization. This is hiring civilians who are employed by private security companies being on contract to perform jobs previously carried out by active-duty servicemen.<sup>11</sup>

### **Political dimension**

The transition from a conscript force to a professional force induces two main concerns: first, civilians worry about the military’s social and cultural isolation,

---

<sup>9</sup> Moskos, “Institution versus Occupation: Contrasting Models of Military Organization.”

<sup>10</sup> Moskos.

<sup>11</sup> Grégory Daho, *La Transformation Des Armées: Enquête Sur Les Relations Civilo-Militaires En France* (Paris, France: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 2016), 127.

aggravated by insensitivity to the population's expectations; and second, uniformed personnel worry about society's indifference and lack of support.

The question regarding the relationship between politics and the military deals with autonomy within subordination and the conflict or harmony that comes with it. On the one hand, civilian control over the military is essential for democracy because military entities hold the monopoly of conducting warfare, and their actions are the ultimate tools of sovereignty.<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, professional autonomy is mandatory to guarantee efficiency. Military forces must be capable of expressing their viewpoints with the understanding that political leaders will take heed of their grievances, because politics are arbitrate between interests and values. Harmony supposes that the military culture accepts compromise, negotiation, and concession. In any case, there is an implicit balance, in which public opinion and audience regarding the military are crucial.

A common temptation would be to fear a radicalization (a potential threat to overthrowing a civilian government) of uniformed personnel through the all-volunteer force. However, this has not been the case in Europe with any professional national force. Ultimately, professionalization has also produced a problematic consequence by making military experience among contemporary political leaders quite rare. Chiefly, powerful and influential positions, heretofore occupied by generals, have instead shifted to the responsibility of high-ranking officials belonging to civil society.

### **Multinational ties**

The small number of soldiers in an all-volunteer force encourages close ties, not only among services but also among similar institutions from different countries. For example, multinational operations show Western countries working together in the same theatres, sharing the same burden, and gathering resources, equipment, and means. As a result, a common preference to avoid operating unilaterally has emerged (except perhaps in the US in short-term missions). Surprisingly, military institutions, mainly because of the scarcity of human resources, appear to be, on average, more pro-European than their respective populations.

---

<sup>12</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Soldier and the State* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).

To summarize this section, professionalization in Western countries had structural effects, including on numbers, genders, demography of military ranks, which together with cultural evolution towards an occupational model, have encouraged joint and multinational integration. Now, I can scope the analysis to France's case and finally focus on the all-volunteer force's impacts on French civil-military relations.



### Chapter 3

#### **French civil-military relations at the general public level**

*To confine soldiers to purely military functions while urgent and vital tasks have to be done, and nobody else is available to undertake them, would be senseless. The soldier must then be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a boy scout. But only for as long as he cannot be replaced, for it is better to entrust civilian tasks to civilians.*

*David Galula*

First and foremost, we should analyze how scholars have defined the expression “civil–military relation.” The common view, shared by sociologists such as Moskos, defines civil-military as the relationship between civil society as a whole (people, authority, government) and the military organizations. On the contrary, political scientists, such as Bastien Irondelle, are more inclined to focus and scope on general officers, or “military elites”, and their relationship with high-ranking political decision makers.

More precisely, there are three levels of analysis. The first level is about the relations between the military and society. Civil–military relations at this level of analysis can be assessed by surveys of opinions, values and attitudes. The second level deals with the military as an institution and its relations with other institutions including the media, courts, and the education system. The third level is about relationships between civilian and military decision makers. This chapter examines the first level.

#### **The general public perception**

Although civil–military relations in France since the Second World War have not been as harmonious as they are now, Pascal Vennesson argues that these relations are not as rosy as they may seem, even before the full professionalization of the armed forces. In the early 1960s, historians and social scientists agreed that, in the wake of major and traumatic wars of decolonization in Indochina and Algeria and the adoption of a defense strategy relying more on nuclear deterrence, civil–military relations were in a state of crisis. There was a wide gap between the French nation and the armed forces. The

military was isolated and estranged.<sup>1</sup> The population distrusted the military, which was perceived as highly treacherous after its unsuccessful coup in 1958. In addition, by being a symbol of authority, the entire military institution sank further in French public esteem during the mass social movement of May 68, the biggest protests and strikes in France's history, which led to De Gaulle's resignation.

The relationship between the military and the nation ("*lien armée-nation*") is a powerful political ideal, associated with conscription and nationalism. In France, the expression "*lien armée-nation*" is strongly related to the conscription system, but has been slowly demilitarized and depoliticized to become "defense and society" in the 1994 White Paper.<sup>2</sup> The traditional phrases "*lien armées-nation*" and "*esprit de défense*" ("defense spirit") are perceived as old fashioned. For this reason, this section seeks to answer more specific questions: What do civilians think of the military, of civilian control of the military, and of civil-military relations?

Here, I draw on the results of two official surveys. This work has been done annually since the 1970s by the Ministry of Defense's Communication Department (*Direction de l'information et de la communication de la défense, DICOD*) and provides fruitful information on society's perception of the military. Two surveys, "The French and National Defense" and "Image of the Armed Forces," have been conducted annually for 14 and 8 years respectively.<sup>3</sup>

One thing the French people know about their armies is that they suffer from a lack of money and a kind of unrest or uneasiness. This problem is not new. In the early 1970s, the media talked about a supposed malaise or an embarrassment of the military in general.<sup>4</sup> Then, in an active anti-militarist context, the common explanation hinged upon the defense model brought by the growth of nuclear deterrence. Conventional forces felt abandoned. Meanwhile, discussion about the military service's format contributed to this atmosphere, highlighting the struggle between its social role and its operational one. In the 1980s, the discontent regarding the latter kept growing, questioning the core vocation of the military and its place in society. Budget restrictions came, adding more tension.

---

<sup>1</sup> Pascal Vennesson, "Civil-Military Relations in France: Is There a Gap?," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 2 (2003): 4.

<sup>2</sup> Commission du Livre Blanc, "Livre Blanc Sur La Défense 1994" (République Française, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> Vennesson, "Civil-Military Relations in France: Is There a Gap?"

<sup>4</sup> Vennesson.

According to the survey, over the ten-year period from 1990 to 2000, the most important values among civilians were (in rank order) human rights, sense of justice, and individual freedom. The second group of values brings together democracy, courage, and a sense of honor. And, finally, the least important value was the EU. The results show that high school graduates, and people living in the Paris area believed more in democratic values and individual freedom.<sup>5</sup>

Considering citizens' top policy priorities, the rank order included social protection, employment, and the defense of peace. The second group of priorities included internal law and order, protection of the environment, the development of education and culture, and the democratic working of institutions. Finally, the lowest group of priorities included humanitarian aid, national independence, construction of Europe, military defense of French interests and military solidarity with other European countries.<sup>6</sup> These results demonstrate that several values and policy priorities traditionally associated with the military profession have the lowest rank among civilians in the survey. When respondents were asked to associate certain values to the military profession, these tended to be the values that were accorded less importance by society. Moreover, during this period, a sea change happened concerning the national service, which would impact civilians' opinion on the military.

On February 22, 1996, President Chirac decided, unilaterally, to professionalize the entire French military apparatus. Everyone was surprised at the time. Military leaders' preferences in favor of conscription's preservation were ignored. In 1994, a Presidential White Paper recommended replacing the draft with an all-volunteer force. Public opinion reacted positively to this decision, and surveys revealed support by approximately two thirds of the population. Moreover, young people who had reached the age of previously compulsory military service supported the President's decision overwhelmingly, backing him by up to 80%.<sup>7</sup>

However, many political and military leaders expressed concerns about the potential consequences of professionalization on civil–military relations. For example,

---

<sup>5</sup> DICOD, "Les Français et La Défense Nationale" (Baromètre 2000, 2000).

<sup>6</sup> DICOD.

<sup>7</sup> Boëne, "La Professionnalisation Des Armées: Contexte et Raisons, Impact Fonctionnel et Sociopolitique," 662.

National Assembly member (*député*) Bernard Grasset asked: “Can the disappearance of the links between the nation and its military be the ineluctable consequence of the professionalization of the armed forces and its corollary the suspension of the military service?”<sup>8</sup> As a consequence of Chirac’s 1996 reforms, is there now a gap between the military and the nation in France?

### **A good opinion with a misunderstanding gap**

Today the general public’s opinion of the armed forces is good and has been improving over the past ten years. However, there are some indications of a gap between the military and some sectors of French society. In 2000, 80% of the French had a positive opinion of the military (18% “very good” and 62% “somewhat good”). However, this remarkably high positive figure should be tempered by the answers to other questions that put the military profession in a more personal context for respondents. For example, when asked if they would be proud if their son/daughter or brother/sister joined, 53% answered negatively and 42% positively.<sup>9</sup> Furthermore, good opinions of the military are not equally shared in society. The military’s rating is especially high among retired people, citizens who live in middle-sized cities, citizens without college degrees, and citizens 50-years old or more. Conversely, the military’s rating is lower among white-collar families, among inhabitants of the Paris region, among university graduates, and among citizens 34-years old or less. In other words, those who have the highest opinion of the military tend to belong to sectors of French society outside the active professional world.

This heterogeneity in perceptions might also become problematic because those who tend to have a less positive image of the military are also the ones who are most interested in international relations, in the European Union, and in the rise of new threats to France.

By and large, the public does not believe that the military is well integrated with society. In 2000, 73% believed that the lifestyle of military personnel was not known. Almost 50% considered that army personnel lived within civil society, and 32% that they

---

<sup>8</sup> Bernard Grasset, “Renforcer Le Lien Entre La Nation et Son Armée” (Assemblée nationale-Commission de la défense, 1999).

<sup>9</sup> DICOD, “L’image Des Armées” (Boulogne: Baromètre 2000, 2000).



lived on the margin of society. Some 85% of the general public believed that the officers are “loyal toward the state and the republic” and 79% viewed them as “good professionals.” But, at the same time, they were seen as not mingling with civilians (71%) and to hold an outdated conception of authority (57%).<sup>10</sup>

This apparent gap between the general public and the military is further demonstrated with a debate over the role of military leaders in the setting of strategic policy. Emmanuel Macron was elected President of France on May 14, 2017. Over the previous decade, the tendency in civ-mil relations has been an increase of civilian influence in the defense community. Following Macron’s election, the French Ministry of Defense became the Ministry of Armies, partly to reassert the central role of military professionals. Following the resignation of the former Joint Chief of Staff/ *Chef d’état-major des armées* (CEMA), Général De Villiers, President Macron reaffirmed that the CEMA’s role could only be operational and technical, rather than strategic, stirring up a debate about the political nature of the waging of the war.

While thinking about this question has started to change, the roots of misunderstanding about military commitment have not really evolved. Since the early 2000s, from economic crises to social ones, from debates about national identity to debates about France’s position in the world, political leaders have gradually considered armies not only through the lens of operational capacities, but also as a tool to assert their sovereign power. However, actions speak louder than words, and they did not increase the investment at the level of their ambitions. The lack of resources given to the military to achieve those ends is the first part of a misunderstanding existing in the French civ-mil relationship.

The second explanation for this misunderstanding focuses on the act of combat which characterizes military commitment. Warfare is full of painful memories for the French people and, consequently, it has been gradually erased from French popular imagination. Society as a whole forgot that its armies were combatants when soldiers were conscious of their identity. There is a discrepancy between the values that the entire nation believed about the military and the truth and reality behind the practice of the

---

<sup>10</sup> DICOD, “Les Français et La Défense Nationale.”

profession of arms. War has become a professional affair in France, separated from the civilian experience.

### **External operations and social role**

Even the idea of war has slowly evolved into the concept of “external operations” (Opérations extérieures, OPEX) rather than the combat-laden alternative term. Slowly the image of the soldier as a combatant disappeared with the increase of external operations, even when they were engaged in Iraq or Yugoslavia. Most of the time, the coalition factor influenced this perception of a non-combatant military, which played more of a peacekeeping role more than that of a real fighting force. When the Afghanistan conflict started, the public still considered the French soldier as a non-combatant. The rare actions of open fire contributed to this perception. Consequently, the French soldier has been seen as a good logistician and a humanitarian agent who becomes a non-combatant sacrificial lamb, whenever he dies in an operation.<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, the risk of combat is real but not accurately perceived by the public opinion. This misunderstanding contributes to the oversight of the combatant function of military persons, which gives sense to their actions. Because armies appear to be a strong rock in a shackled society facing multiple crises, political leaders and French citizens rely on them but expect them to play a social role that does not comply with their true vocation.

Being in charge of the military training of young voluntary civilians (“Service Militaire Volontaire” SMV or “Service Militaire Adapté” SMA) is an element of the overall military mission, but only a very marginal part. This was not always the case. There is a long history of the social role of armies to educate young Frenchmen. “Social role” as an expression was first used in 1891 by General Lyautey when he evoked the “social role of the officer in the universal service.” But this role was not separated from operational missions. Those engaged in education could also be employed in combat missions. This interweaving relation started to vanish in 1962. After the Algerian War, in which 15,000 conscript casualties had traumatized the entire nation, it was no longer tolerable to send conscripts on operational missions. In French society, memories of this

---

<sup>11</sup> Chéron Bénédicte, *Le Soldat Méconnu: Les Français et Leurs Armées: État Des Lieux* (Paris, France: Armand Colin, 2018).

military service were regularly detached from the primary utility of the military: fighting in combat. Then, most regular military forces comprised of draftees were prepared, with more or less conviction, for a war against the USSR, which never came. Consequently, military values acquired a sort of autonomous status, and we collectively forgot that honesty, loyalty, discipline, authority, bravery and tenacity are valuable qualities of the military because when the day of combat comes, soldiers' lives depend on them.

In 2001, as the last conscripts were leaving the force, a fresh question emerged: if military are professionals, who chose to join by themselves, and so they are state employees who must benefit from the same rights, does this include the right to form unions? This question erases the singular character of the military engagement, which accepts the risk of losing one's life in combat and, by so doing, creates a difference between soldiers and common state employees. As a result, professional military labor associations were raised even though the military establishment claimed that they were not syndicates. The French public believed that military professionals have the right to form unions, according to the *Revue française de sociologie* of 2003. That has contributed to feeding the misunderstanding.<sup>12</sup>

In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century, a new policy emerged called the “core of the job” (*le cœur de métier*). This expression emphasizes the essential part of the military activity: fighting. Politicians used this idea to reduce the military perimeter of influence in the Ministry of Defense with one objective in mind: budget cuts and rationalization. The goal was to focus military professionals on the essence of their core vocation: the profession of arms centered on waging war and conducting operations. Civilians should be in charge of everything else: financial services, JAG, human resources, and administrative management.

This new distribution had benefits such as the improvement of certain chiefs in their military skills by offering them more time to develop and sustain their operational expertise. To some extent, this reform reconciles military leaders with the tactical level. Unfortunately, it contributed to further blurring the line on the main sense of military engagement since combat inherently drives all the other supply components and gives them a purpose, a meaning. By isolating this core job, politicians separated MOD

---

<sup>12</sup> Bénédicte, 45.

employees and the French people from a global understanding, a comprehensive view, and, to some extent, from coherence. Human resources and administrative functions, the acquisition of equipment, and its anticipation and delivery are not dissociable from the military end. On the contrary, the only ones who have combat experience, engaging in life and death, are precisely the military professionals. Despite some civilians' competency advantage, the marginalization of military leaders in some executive or decision-making positions does not help the French people to understand the continuum of military service through arms, from budget votes to implementation of operational means to administrative management.

This policy has threatened the legitimacy procured by the profession of arms experience. In hindsight, economic savings spurred those reforms; it was not a military choice. Accordingly, arbitrary political decisions of the 1990s, especially social and pacifist ones, sowed the seed of misunderstanding and compromised the military tool, to an extent weakening the state and questioning France's place in the world.

The way the military is perceived by society is having an impact on service personnel. The 2017 High Committee of Military Condition report showed that retention is a critical issue: 81% of Navy, 72% Air Force, and 67% Army personnel could envisage leaving the military institution.<sup>13</sup> In these complex civil-military relations, appreciation and recognition are keys and need understanding and comprehension of the nature of military commitment.

### **A fragile return of a combatant identity**

France is the European country in which confidence in the military has improved the most in the past 20 years. However, only 15% of young French people (18-30 years old) recognize a need to be ready to sacrifice their own life for the nation.<sup>14</sup> The 2015 attacks on French soil did not influence society to rediscover military fighting either. What bolsters military engagement's value mission accomplishment and service to the country, even when it comes to fighting; to threaten an enemy's physical integrity incurs some risk of dying. This reality from 20<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> century French soldiers has little by little vanished.

---

<sup>13</sup> DICOD, "Haut Comité d'évaluation de La Condition Militaire. 11e Rapport. La Fonction Militaire Dans La Société Française" (Paris, France, September 2017).

<sup>14</sup> Bénédicte, *Le Soldat Méconnu: Les Français et Leurs Armées: État Des Lieux*, 19.

When people see injured soldiers only as victims, discounting their actions as combatants, it is like refusing their destiny's dignity, it is a lack of recognition of their ultimate sacrifice. Considering that the military specificity requires collective combat characteristics, injured soldiers can give sense to their sacrifice in the eyes of their fellow countrymen only if collective history and memory understand the meaning of their voluntary commitment.

Nevertheless, the protracted engagement in Afghanistan has facilitated a better knowledge of military capacity. Admittedly, thanks to military actions in Mali as well, it is possible that French society has reached the end of an indifference cycle about military action. Citizen perception of the army's sense of duty depends on the overall comprehension of wars waged in their name. The French people would understand in the long run the military's utility, only if the military's action sense is restored.

In a logical way, after the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks, a political consensus emerged on the very necessity of restoring the armed forces to their operational capacities.<sup>15</sup> People talk about extraordinary measures in order to make France's defense strong enough. Today, the recent national debate about the implementation of a new universal military service, *service national universel* (SNU), has reinvigorated the return of military values to the center of national life, with 80% of French people demanding mandatory military service.<sup>16</sup>

As shown above, the civil-military relationship in France has improved since professionalization occurred. The trust gap between the French nation and armed forces inherited from the 1960s has diminished and a fairly positive image in the minds of general public has spread widely. However, there is still a misunderstanding about military commitment; civilians tend to overlook the combatant function of military personnel and focus on their social or humanitarian role. Notwithstanding, a fragile return of combatant identity and sense of duty have spawned from recent protracted OPEX.

By the same token, as has been noted in political life, citizens perceive the military's influence on domestic debate as highly limited. Is it really the case?

---

<sup>15</sup> Bénédicte, 28.

<sup>16</sup> IFOP, "Sondage IFOP Réalisé Du 21 Au 23 Janvier 2015 Auprès de 1 051 Personnes," 2015.

## Chapter 4

### French civil-military relations at the elite level

*The key to healthy civil-military relations is trust on both the civilian and military sides of the negotiation: the civilians must trust the military to provide its best and most objective advice but then carry out any policy that the civilian decision makers ultimately choose. The military must trust the civilians to give a fair hearing to military advice and not reject it out of hand, especially for transparently political reasons. Civilians must also understand that dissent is not the same as disobedience.*

*Jim Mattis*

This chapter aims at describing the political-military relationship in France and its evolution since the birth of the V Republic.

### The Algerian Taboo

Started by members of the National Liberation Front (FLN) on 1 November 1954, the Algerian War led to a serious political crisis in France, causing the fall of the Fourth French Republic (1946–58) which was replaced by the Fifth Republic with a strengthened presidency. The planned French withdrawal from Algeria led to a state crisis that included various assassination attempts on President Charles de Gaulle as well as some attempts at military coups. Most of the former were carried out by the *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS), an underground organization formed mainly from French military personnel supporting a French Algeria, which committed a large number of bombings and murders both in Algeria and in the homeland, in an attempt to stop the planned independence.

Consequently, in people's minds, the military coup attempts in 1958 and in 1961 in the capital Alger were consubstantial to the birth act of the Fifth Republic. For this reason, Algeria is still, more than 50 years after the 1962 Evian Accords ending the conflict, the last grand traumatism of the French Army. This trauma did not only arise from the military defeat or the loss of the "empire jewel," or the revelation of France being more of a middle power rather than great power. It was fundamentally related to relations between the military upper hierarchy and political power. The notion of taboo

not only discredits certain practices and patterns of action—such as torture—or about decolonization wars in general, but also proscribes this relationship.

Military leadership was internally divided and had lost its social allies, while De Gaulle gained tremendous power, credibility, and a strong social base, all of which contributed to civilian political dominance. In terms of preference-divergence between civilian and military leaders, it was at the highest-level, considering the coup and assassination attempts. Henceforth, the political-military relationship became asymmetric and distrustful for many years. Samuel Cohen, a political scientist specializing in defense studies, notes that the balance of political-military relationship in favor of the President of the Republic lasted through the Cold War. In agreement with his analysis, this asymmetric bond comes from two historical facts: the heritage of Charles de Gaulle, and Army officers' relationships in Algeria and the nuclear deterrence towards the East.<sup>1</sup> In this sense, the hypothesis that the Algerian taboo eroded in the 1990s illustrates the rebalance in the political-military relationship to the benefit of general officers.

### **The end of the Cold War**

The French military budget grew from 5% per year from 1975 to 1990. Afterwards, it decreased between 1990 and 1995 4% each year. The fall of the Iron Curtain bred the dividend of peace. In addition, the number and cost of exterior operations (OPEX) surged, multiplying military expenses by four: there were deployments to Kuwait/ Iraq, Cambodia, Bosnia, Somalia, Chad, Rwanda, Djibouti, Benin, Togo, and Sierra Leone.<sup>2</sup> Under those circumstances, deep French military reforms happened, constituted by three different pillars: joint integration (jointization), interoperability, and professionalization.

On the one hand, joint integration ended the military organization designed by services and system of arms and benefitted a new system of forces more integrated and complementary. This jointization reached the organization's chain of command, organic structure, and operations such as planning, intelligence, and training.

---

<sup>1</sup> Samy Cohen, *La Défaite Des Généraux: Le Pouvoir Politique et l'armée Sous La Ve République* (Paris, France: Fayard, 1994).

<sup>2</sup> Daho, *La Transformation Des Armées: Enquête Sur Les Relations Civilo-Militaires En France*, 48.



On the other hand, interoperability entailed the ability to operate together with multinational forces, with integrated command and means. Ultimately, professionalization has had a tremendous impact on the military.

## **Present**

The relation between politics and the military does not permit the French people to perfectly comprehend the decision-making process when it comes to defense stakes nowadays. Because citizens' perceptions about their armed forces keep shifting, logically, their understanding of military influence in the political life moves as well. The 2018 election is the first since 1918 in which a military person was elected as representative. The military act adopted in 2018 authorizes active duty persons to be elected as county counselor. However, it remains an exception and armies are definitely still subordinated to the political power.

In 2008, two incidents had a critical impact on French political-military relations. On June 26<sup>th</sup>, Marine paratroopers used real bullets instead of blank shots during a public show, unintentionally injuring one soldier and 15 civilians, 4 children among them. Then, 10 French soldiers died during the Uzbinkh ambush in Afghanistan on August 19<sup>th</sup>. President Sarkozy blamed the military establishment and called military leaders "amateurs." Those two incidents have left their marks within the institution. For instance, during a lecture at Bordeaux on April 25, 2016, Alain Juppé, former prime minister and presidential candidate claimed, "a military is like a minister, it shuts its mouth up or leaves...if we let military criticize the government, there is no government anymore."

Furthermore, General Pierre de Villiers' resignation in 2017 —when he openly critiqued the inadequately small size of the military budget—exemplifies that politicians are not inclined towards free military speech, even in some areas where it is supposed to be that way. General de Villiers expressed himself, on social media, but also via official media channels. His texts were well received which demonstrates journalistic and French curiosity about this topic. The contemporary public impression of military leaders significantly contributes and strengthens the civil-military relationship. It allows people to have another perspective of the military rather than just sensational reports on TV depicting commandos going into action. The rare Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff



(CJCS) expressions in public are not contested, but they can fuel tension. One hundred years ago, when war was happening on our soil, military participation in public debate was more readily admitted and understood.

In a nutshell, citizens' perceptions of the profession of arms have changed with the all-volunteer force and the reorganization of the MOD centered on the core job. Successive political decisions and ministry choices have shaped and changed the interaction between the military in general and the nation. However, political leaders' discourse seems to mitigate the restoration of the military's appreciation. Does this seemingly military speech censorship in the public sphere engender a weak military leverage on France's strategic decision-making and international policy?

### **New military paradigm**

The specific context in space and in time described in this chapter together with the military's transformation induced significant changes, even a paradigm shift, in political-military relationships. The return to action together with a return in the decision prompted the "generals' revenge."

Return to action: The army officers' mobilization in favor of a return to action, hinges upon the erosion of the different dimensions of the Algerian taboo since the end of the Cold War. The first dimension of this heritage is political: the resistance of officers manifested itself through more active public speech participation. The taboo's influence over military speech freedom tends to disappear, especially due to the positive impact of New Information and Communication Technologies (NICT) and moreover thanks to the decompartmentalization of military organizations, spurred by professionalization in 1996. This reform required better communication skills in order to recruit and an improve public presence.

Return in the decision: Former 1991-1995 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Lanxade, explains the military reintegration into the decision process by reminding us how the situation was during the Cold War: "What I had witnessed in 1988 and 1989, is that military leaders were put aside from decision. We were living in a bipolar world at that time, France pulled out from NATO integrated command, and everything was focusing on nuclear deterrence, hence the status quo was granted. As a consequence, the

military implemented this strategy and except for small skirmishes and engagements in Africa and Lebanon, they were not part of the political-military decisions. The President and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were the big dogs in this fight and counted on no one else to make a decision.”<sup>3</sup> Most notably, in the 1990s, two factors played a decisive role in this reintegration of general officers (GO) into the strategic decision-making process. This incremental repositioning was mainly due to an increase in the number of military organizations at the core of new multinational operations and the multiplication and the complexity of peacekeeping missions.

The complexity of these new types of operations, like peacekeeping, sheds light on the cluster of constraints generated by new political norms of intervention (multinational, justice, humanitarian) impacting military units and the use of force. Complexity in dealing with these new forms of operations induced a conjunction at the central administration level: bureaucratization of procedures, novel organizational modes and professional careers. Accordingly, through the eyes of civilian elites, officers have gained the status of “military experts.” Correspondingly, the specific expertise of the officer, developed by prolonged education and experience, is in the “management of violence.”<sup>4</sup> In a word, the return of the military to the decision process is a consequence of its return to action.

In addition, the sequence of political cohabitation in France (1986-1988, 1993-1995), equivalent to a divided government in the US, provided exceptional conditions for allowing reinforcement of the military expertise and the re-balance of political-military relations. By the same token, the lack of immediate threat to national security also explains the political pull back. Importantly, the reinforcement of military participation in foreign policy decision-making was a steady evolution, not only observable amid the national political arena (Elysée, foreign affairs, inter-ministries meetings), but also in multinational structures (UN, EU, NATO). For instance, the attendance of certain officers during crisis meetings at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed this trend.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> Daho, *La Transformation Des Armées: Enquête Sur Les Relations Civilo-Militaires En France*.

<sup>4</sup> Suzan Nielsen and Don Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations, The Soldier and the State in a New Era* (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2009).

<sup>5</sup> Daho, *La Transformation Des Armées: Enquête Sur Les Relations Civilo-Militaires En France*, 121.

Finally, this reintegration process is the fruit of officers' qualities—culture, education, training—who have developed a more sophisticated and deep knowledge about civilian actors participating in crisis management and in OPEX. The socialization of the civilian milieu eases the officers' relations with civilian authorities and facilitates communication.

To conclude this part, a new military paradigm has arisen, reinvigorating officers' credibility. Now, we need to study the implications of this trend on the strategy of the state and on international relations. As mentioned in the introduction, Risa Brooks' theory will prove to be the backbone of this analysis. Subsequently, in the last chapter, the principles scrutinized in chapter 5 will be applied to France.



## Chapter 5

### Risa Brooks' Theory

*Civil-military relations affect the information about military capabilities and plans available to leaders in formulating their strategies.*

*Risa Brooks*

In this chapter, I will first define what strategic assessment is and why it matters, then I will exploit Risa Brooks' theory and lexicon to categorize the different types of strategic assessment and how they are connected to the configuration of civ-mil relationships.

#### Strategic assessment

Military personnel are charged with protecting the security of the country. As a consequence, officers are conditioned to believe that the world of politics is exclusively a civilian arena when warfare is uniquely a military one. Yet, in many democracies, we find many instances in which military organizations have engaged in activities that are indisputably political.<sup>1</sup> In order to describe how the military influences policy outcomes, this section investigates the work of Risa A. Brooks, professor of political science at Marquette University. In *Shaping Strategy*, she develops a novel theory of how states' civil-military relations affect strategic assessment during international conflicts. Brooks' insights constitute the framework of this chapter.

Strategic assessment is the process through which relations between a state's political goals/strategies and military strategies/activities are evaluated and decided. Brooks explains how "variation in the balance of power between political and military leaders and the intensity of their conflicts shapes this competition over process and effect strategic assessment. Why are some leaders able to assess their capabilities and reconcile their political and military objectives? Why are others prone to poor estimates and disintegrated politics? In sum, why do some states excel at strategic assessment while others fail? A major reason is the nature of a state's civil-military relations."<sup>2</sup> They have a significant and consistent effect on the processes through which political leaders engage

---

<sup>1</sup> Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations, The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, 213.

<sup>2</sup> Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*, 3.

in strategic assessment in international disputes. Civil-military relations and international relations interact through leaders' information about their military capabilities. Estimates of military capabilities are central to the probability of battlefield success, failure, or stalemate. They influence a state's assessments of what they can expect to win and lose in the event of armed conflict, a critical component in the calculation of power that informs interstate bargaining both before and during war.

### **Why is it important?**

According to Brooks, poor strategic assessment can generate failure by undermining a state's estimates of its relative military capabilities. In crises and wars, leaders compare their military capabilities with their adversaries' and allies' resources. "They rely on these estimates to judge the likely outcome of armed confrontation, and, therefore, also to evaluate the utility of alternative political strategies they might adopt in the dispute," she observes.<sup>3</sup> When states misjudge their military power, they put themselves at risk of war.

In addition, Brooks points out "poor strategic assessment can create problems in anticipating the political constraints that govern the use of force in an international dispute."<sup>4</sup> A state's process of strategic assessment can also compromise its ability to translate political goals into supportive military strategies and activities.<sup>5</sup> Inevitably, Brooks avers that there is a clear correlation between the quality of strategic assessment, the incidence of well-informed and well-executed strategy, and international success or failure.<sup>6</sup>

The pathologies in how states evaluate and choose their strategies should help to understand the sources of conflict and stability in the international arena.

---

<sup>3</sup> Brooks, 8.

<sup>4</sup> Brooks, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Brooks, 9.

<sup>6</sup> Brooks, 9.

**Table 3: Examples of International Implications of Strategic Assessment**

Nature of Strategic Failure (due to poor strategic assessment)	Potential adverse international outcomes
Overestimating/underestimating the state's military capabilities	Bargaining failures that lead to crisis escalation and war; failure to terminate war Or appease adversary with unwarranted concessions
Adopting military strategies and activities that neglect diplomatic and other constraints posed by the international/regional environment	Inciting external hostility and intervention in conflicts by third parties
Failing to modify military capabilities in support of political objectives	Defeat in war; long and costly wars Commitment problems (e.g., poor capacity to commit to war effort, alliance, peace treaty) leading to failed international agreements, crisis escalation, and war
Obscuring signals sent to others of the state's preferences (due to ambiguities in the state's internal authorization process)	Bargaining failures due to misread by adversaries of the state's preferences, crisis escalation and war

*Source: "Shaping Strategy" Risa Brooks*

Brooks explains why failures occur and discusses the conditions under which we are likely to get a better strategic assessment. Her approach emphasizes the effects of “distributional conflict” on how institutions emerge and evolve.<sup>7</sup> One central premise is that institutions are the product of actors’ seeking to create routines and processes that advantage their preferred policies. Together, an actor’s power and the intensity of its preference-divergence shapes the properties of the policymaking environment that emerges from their interactions. Preference-divergence explained in detail later, means the possible discrepancies between political and military viewpoints and perspectives on different matters. As long as political and military leaders’ priorities are aligned annotates, Brooks states, “both sides have an interest in maximizing the availability of information to ensure that they attain the best possible outcome.”<sup>8</sup> In other words, she argues that where distributional conflict is absent, sharing information is relatively conflict free. However, where it persists, she notes that each side has an incentive to

---

<sup>7</sup> Brooks, 17.

<sup>8</sup> Brooks, 17.

selectively share information and its implications for the efficacy of a proposed course of action it is proposing.<sup>9</sup>

Two variables are essentials in Brooks' theory. First, she writes "the intensity of preference-divergence over corporate, professional, or security issues, determines military and political leaders' underlying incentives to contest processes essential to strategic assessment." Second, the balance of civil-military power, shapes how these conflicts are resolved.<sup>10</sup>

### **Preference-divergence**

Brooks characterizes three main areas in which military and political preferences could diverge: first, the state's security goals; second, the country's military strategies and plans; and third, corporate issues.<sup>11</sup> The latter includes military budgets, conscription, professional norms and other demographic issues. For clarity, Brooks defines two levels or intensities of divergence: low and high preference-divergence. "Preference-divergence is low when the historical or contemporary record reveals little evidence of recurring, systematic cleavages over security goals, military strategy/ policy, or corporate issues."<sup>12</sup> On the other hand, "Preference-divergence is high when deep, enduring cleavages over issues related to security goals, military policy, or corporate issues are observed."<sup>13</sup>

### **Balance of power**

The balance of power depends on the military's influence in a political leader's coalition – and on how unified the military leadership is and central its position is relative to other social groups that provide a leader support for his or her position in office.<sup>14</sup> As a consequence, Brooks demonstrates that the more influential the military in the coalition, "the more power its leaders exercise over their political counterparts in deciding how they share information, coordinate with one another, and make decisions at the apex of the state." To sum up, Brooks' analysis recognizes that the military's power

---

<sup>9</sup> Brooks, 17.

<sup>10</sup> Brooks, 4.

<sup>11</sup> Brooks, 27.

<sup>12</sup> Brooks, 25.

<sup>13</sup> Brooks, 25.

<sup>14</sup> Brooks, 27.

in the state depends on its capacity to cultivate and maintain social allies or influence mass opinion.<sup>15</sup>

By the same token, she delineates three particular distributions of power - *political dominance, military dominance, and shared power*- each of which provides leverage on explaining variation in strategic assessment.<sup>16</sup>

**Table 4: The three distribution of power**

Political Dominance	Shared Power	Military Dominance
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political leader has expansive social base</li> <li>- Military lacks social allies</li> <li>- Military leadership internally divided</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political leader has independent civilian support base</li> <li>- Military leader unified</li> <li>- Military has social ties/esteem</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Political leader lacks civilian support base/ or base is factionalized</li> <li>- Military leadership unified</li> <li>- Military has social ties/esteem</li> </ul>
Military influence limited	Military influence significant, but not dominant	Military influence substantial

Source: “*Shaping strategy*”, Risa Brooks

## Findings

Different configurations of military and political power and preferences yield different policymaking environments reveals Brooks: “these types create alternative logics that shape strategic assessment.”<sup>17</sup> What civil-military relations are most likely to produce the best environment for strategic assessment (SA)? She claims that results fall into one of the four following hypotheses.

- Hypothesis 1: (Best SA) The best environment for strategic assessment is observed when preference-divergence is low and political leaders are dominant. These civil-military relations are most conducive to the emergence of functional structures that facilitate the sharing and analysis of information and authoritative decision making. They facilitate healthy dialogue and debate between political and military leaders. These states are best equipped to evaluate their relative capabilities and integrate political and military considerations in their strategic choices.
- Hypothesis 2: (Worst SA) When military and political leaders share power and preference-divergence is high, strategic assessment is highly dysfunctional.

<sup>15</sup> Brooks, 29.

<sup>16</sup> Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*.

<sup>17</sup> Brooks, 42.



Intense political-military competition undermines all four attributes of strategic assessment.

- Hypothesis 3: (Poor SA) Strategic assessment is poor when political and military leaders are effectively sharing power and preference-divergence is low. Weaknesses in strategic coordination and the authorization process are pronounced.
- Hypothesis 4: (Fair SA) Strategic assessment exhibits competing strengths and weaknesses when preference-divergence is high, but political leaders dominate in relations with the military leadership. Information sharing is relatively fluid, the authorization process is clear, and improvements are possible in structural competence. Pathologies nonetheless occur in strategic coordination.<sup>18</sup>

**Table 5: Relationship between balance of power and preference-divergence**

Balance of power				
		<i>Political Dominance</i>	<i>Shared Power</i>	<i>Military Dominance</i>
Preference Divergence	<i>High</i>	FAIR (oversight mechanisms weaken strat. coordination)	WORST (competition undermines assessment's four attributes)	FAIR (military autonomy weakens strat. coordination)
	<i>Low</i>	BEST (low incentive/capacity to compete over inst. Processes allows emergence of four functional attributes)	POOR (shared power undermines authorization process and strat. coordination)	

*Source: "Shaping strategy", Risa Brooks*

To summarize, domestic relations between political and military leaders influence the institutions in which leaders engage in strategic assessment during international conflicts. The quality of debate between political and military leaders is the best measure

<sup>18</sup> Brooks, 48.

of the healthiness of civil-military relations. Civil-military relations affect the information about military capabilities and plans available to leaders in formulating strategies. Where that information is poor and analysis weak, leaders are more likely to select political strategies at odds with their actual capabilities or international constraints. Through their effects on strategic assessment, civil-military relations ultimately condition interstate interaction.



## Chapter 6

### French strategic assessment

*War is too important to be left to the generals.*

*Clemenceau*

*A belief in the greatness of statesmen puts in jeopardy theories built on descriptions of social forces or institutions, or systemic explanation such as 'rational choice'.*

*Eliot Cohen*


In this chapter, I integrate the findings of Chapter 4 about the French civ-mil relationship between elites within Risa Brooks' theory in order to discover the impact of professionalization on French strategic assessment.

#### **The Generals' Revenge**

In brief, the return of action plus the return in the decision described in Chapter 4 are the pillars that support the “generals' revenge” which has transformed the ordinary political-military balance in the V Republic. At the end of the 1990s, the ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Ministère des Affaires étrangères*, MAE) played a central role in international crisis management and had the major coordination responsibility in this matter. The following chart highlights the powerful position of the MAE compared to the Ministry of Defense.

**Table 6: inter-ministerial coordination in international crisis**

**Schéma 12. Coordination interministérielle de gestion des crises internationales**



Source: « *La transformation des armées* », Grégory Daho


However, crisis management has shifted from inter-ministerial coordination to a more comprehensive approach, rebalancing power and influence between Ministries to the advantage of Defense. The comprehensive approach, which seeks to improve relationships between a variety of actors and organizations in international crisis management, was first addressed in a 2013 White Paper.<sup>1</sup> The comprehensive approach is simply an “update” of public policy in international security matters. It is a coordination tool tailored for the state’s actions abroad to respond to the complexity of international crises. Admittedly, a common feature of all interventionist nation-states is the rivalry between ministries around classical stakes like administrative cultures, financial issues and action.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, the principal characteristic of the comprehensive approach is its large international and inter-ministerial flow. The three pillars bearing the security-development nexus encompass the responsibility of the Ministries of Defense, of Foreign

<sup>1</sup> Daho, *La Transformation Des Armées: Enquête Sur Les Relations Civilo-Militaires En France*, 308.

<sup>2</sup> Daho, 306.

Affairs, and of the Economy. This new design rebalancing military influence in crisis management and foreign policy is displayed in the following chart.

**Table 7: inter-ministerial pattern of the French global approach**



Source: « *La transformation des armées* », Grégory Daho

Thus, in terms of the civilian-military decision makers' relationship, there is definitely a rebalancing of political-military relations in the V Republic to the benefit of military officers. The Algerian taboo erosion, the return to action, the return of senior military members to the decision process, and the new inter-ministerial organization for crisis management, have all contributed to strengthen the position of military officers in French society and increase their credibility. The relationship's improvement allows better communication and trust. As a consequence, France's strategic assessment has been impacted as well.

## French strategic assessment

Again, using Risa Brooks' model offers an effective tool for evaluating France's strategic assessment.

First and foremost, France's balance of power has always been dominated by the political since the birth of the V Republic. By design the military is subordinate to civilians and this is no longer questioned. France's pattern of civilian control over the military corresponds to Huntington's objective control concept.<sup>3</sup> "Under objective civilian control explained Huntington, the officer corps agrees implicitly to serve the state and thus to serve whatever civilian group attains legitimate authority within the state."<sup>4</sup> This system minimizes "the political influence of the military because it becomes, voluntarily, politically neutral."<sup>5</sup> Within objective control there is a division of authority whereby military leaders would concentrate on the art and science of managing violence and would abstain from participation in civilian politics. In France, prohibition of partisan activity and proscription of openly political behavior are in force. Huntington argued that "professional officers will seek a pattern of objective control because it is most compatible with the ethos of their profession."<sup>6</sup> In fact, there is a good balance under objective control between what he called the societal imperative and the functional imperative that shape the military.<sup>7</sup> The first encompasses the social forces, ideologies, and institutions, which are dominant in the society. The latter reflects the motivation to protect and the need to defend the state and its way of life. He concluded that objective control is best for two reasons: "civilian control is more secure because the military is politically neutral, and the state is more secure because the military's professionalism, and hence its effectiveness, is maximized".<sup>8</sup>

Second, French preference-divergence has evolved through time, which in turn led to different qualities of strategic assessment. Retrospectively, we can delineate two periods of time in the V Republic with contrasted preference and divergence level. The first

---

<sup>3</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

<sup>4</sup> Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations, The Soldier and the State in a New Era*.

<sup>5</sup> Nielsen and Snider.

<sup>6</sup> Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*.

<sup>7</sup> Huntington.

<sup>8</sup> Huntington.

period goes from the Evian Accords to consequences of the all-volunteer force around 2003.

### **1962-Professionalization consequences c2003**

Before the so-called generals' revenge, analytically, the French case resembled a situation of high preference-divergence and political dominance. Consequently, during this period, France's strategic assessment was supposedly assessed as fair, in accordance with Risa Brooks' theory. A fair SA describes a high preference-divergence combined with a domination of political leaders over military leadership.

In this case, despite a fluid information exchange, together with a clear authorization process and possible improvements in structural competence, Brooks suggests that "pathologies nonetheless occur in strategic coordination."<sup>9</sup>

France did not suffer from a fair SA during the Cold War. However, with the advent of civil-military operations, overstretch became one of the main pathologies of French SA. A high preference-divergence induces weaknesses in communication and the *can do attitude* of military forces stresses this tendency. At that moment, strategic orientations were solely driven by the president whereas officers' contributions remained limited. In this context of total subordination, a risk of inconsiderate use of force occurs. This excess leads to an excessive militarization of foreign policy, i.e. the systematic employment of force to cope with any kind of crisis. For instance, the military was reluctant to engage in Chad during Operation Manta, as part of the First Gulf War or in the former Yugoslavia, as part of NATO operations there, but they had no choice. France intervenes often in the conflicts of others, but without a consistent rationale, without a clear sense of how to advance France's interests, and sometimes with unintended and expensive consequences. In 1990, General Fricaud-Chagnaud denounced the "proclivity that made us shift from an overarching deterrence model to a quasi-automatic interventionism in crisis management." Colonel Jean-Louis Dufour argues that this penchant sprouted from our President's interventionist zeal.<sup>10</sup>

---

<sup>9</sup> Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*.

<sup>10</sup> Bastien Irondelle, "Démocratie, Relations Civilo-Militaires et Efficacité Militaire," *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 15, no. 1 (2008): 129.

### **Post professionalization consequences c2003**

After professionalization, with the return of action and the return in the decision as we saw earlier, preference-divergence has become low. As a result, the French SA has improved to Brooks' best strategic assessment. As reported by Brooks, these transparent civil-military relations facilitate healthy dialogue and debate between political and military leaders. The state is best equipped to evaluate its relative capabilities and integrate political and military considerations in its strategic choices.<sup>11</sup>

A compelling example highlighting this behavior is France's opposition to the Second Iraq War in 2003. At that time, France believed any decision on military force should be made by the UN Security Council and only after UN inspectors have reported on their findings of hypothetical weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. President Chirac was in favor of dialogue and negotiation before employing the force. His multipolar vision of the world was shared by the military apparatus but there were alleged factors that could have influenced this decision against war. First, as M. Kenneth R. Timmerman observed, the economic ties between Iraq and France, not only on oil supply but also on French military equipment exports played a role.<sup>12</sup> Second, France's position was probably driven by the willingness to detach the EU from the transatlantic influence. According to M. Braundberger, France perceived this crisis as a good occasion to strengthen the EU through a united vision in the security domain and gain autonomy from the US.<sup>13</sup> On France's security goals, the CJCS in 2003, General Henri Bentégeat shared the political preferences, and no cleavages existed, which made the preference-divergence low.<sup>14</sup> He warned President Chirac that the United States could cut military cooperation with France in case of a French veto at the UN against a military intervention in Iraq. By the same token, he urged the President to send French special operation forces to Afghanistan in exchange to ease the negotiation with the Americans.<sup>15</sup>

---

<sup>11</sup> Brooks, *Shaping Strategy*.

<sup>12</sup> Gaëlle Briguet, "Grands Etats Européens Dans La Guerre d'Irak: Raisons et Justifications" (euryopa, Institut européen de l'Université de Genève, 2004), 22, <https://www.unige.ch/gsi/files/4714/0351/6356/briguet.pdf>.

<sup>13</sup> Briguet, "Grands Etats Européens Dans La Guerre d'Irak: Raisons et Justifications."

<sup>14</sup> Briguet.

<sup>15</sup> Bruno Rieth, "Petit histoire de la grandissante emprise des USA sur notre armement militaire," News, Marianne, August 31, 2019, <https://www.marianne.net/politique/petite-histoire-de-la-grandissante-emprise-des-etats-unis-sur-notre-armement-militaire>.



Similarly, Operation Harmattan, the codename for the French participation in the 2011 military intervention in Libya was a consensus and an agreement between political leaders and military advisors. Admiral Edouard Guillaud, CJCS 2010-2014, notes that the President Sarkozy as a former lawyer, always insisted on the respect of international law. Consequently, he needed a paper from the UN to justify intervention. Admiral Guillaud explained that he was totally in line with the President even if this process complicated his job. Finally, in 2008, a military operation to save French hostage captured by Somali pirates on their boat underscored the sane and truthfully dialogue between politics and military leader. During the discussion about a potential military intervention, President Sarkozy responded to his CJCS General Georgelin, “If there are casualties during the action, it will be my responsibility. If it happens during the positioning, it will be yours.”<sup>16</sup> When the system works properly, both sides work to alleviate distrust or suspicion. Even if the civilians refuse to make an effort from their side, however, the military leadership must not resist passively by constricting information or failing to communicate fully, or by slowing implementation of policy or decisions. Such behavior would inevitably produce bad policy and bad decisions. Thus, while the responsibility for an effective partnership rests on both sides, ultimately it is the military that must make the relationship work, as is the case in France. Senior French military leaders have a professional duty to teach their civilian superiors and to shape the relationship, just as all professionals with those they serve. Officers are the long-term stewards of national security; they are the ones who, as a matter of professional responsibility, must think about and practice civil-military relations on a continuing basis, and recognize its study as necessary to fulfill their role in society effectively.<sup>17</sup>

The civil-military relationship should be guided by a principle of “equal dialogue, unequal authority.”<sup>18</sup> Unequal authority reaffirms the primacy of democratic civilian political control over a subordinate military. Most valuably, however, the term equal dialogue is a reminder that civil-military interactions are both vigorous and respectful, based on each side’s trust in the other’s competence and intentions. This equally makes it more likely that civil-military relations will produce strategically effective choices.

---

<sup>16</sup> Jean Domerchet, “L’amiral Edouard Guillaud s’est Confié à l’Opinion,” *L’Opinion Journal*, 2019.

<sup>17</sup> Nielsen and Snider, *American Civil-Military Relations, The Soldier and the State in a New Era*, 287.

<sup>18</sup> Nielsen and Snider, 293.

In essence, by applying Brooks' theory to France, we acquire the confirmation that the military, through its relationship with civilians, shaped French strategic assessment and consequently contributed to its foreign policy. Moreover, professionalization played a role in this balance. Actually, the final analysis painted earlier concedes that France turned from a fair strategic assessment to a best SA due to a significant improvement of preference-divergence entailed by its post-Cold War professionalization. A trustfully information sharing allows an accurate evaluation of France's capabilities, which in turn, drives the country towards less interventionism, at least more justified. In a word, professionalization has created the conditions for an equal dialogue in France and better strategies.



## Chapter 7

### Conclusion

The conclusions reached in this thesis are diverse. The primary finding from this research demonstrates the various impacts of professionalization on military structures (size, gender, ranks, cost); the profession of arms' culture (values gap with civilians, joint and multinational integration, occupational model); and political ramifications. The second finding is the particular case of France which highlights the singular relationship existing between the military and society. On the one hand, the French people trust and support their military. On the other hand, they misunderstand their role and commitment, creating a military trivialization (the perception of soldiers as non-combatants) that frustrates the armed forces. As a result, citizens perceive military's influence as weak and insignificant on public life and political debates.

The final finding is the utility of Risa A. Brooks' theory that explains why states and their leaders are good or bad at strategic assessment. Drawing insights from her book *Shaping Strategy*, we have learned that good strategic assessment depends on civil-military relations that encourage an easy exchange of information and a rigorous analysis of a state's own relative capabilities.

The final finding is the application of Brooks' theory to France. How well will French political and military leaders craft and implement strategic and operational plans to ensure that a particular use of force meets national purposes? Although political leaders have the ultimate authority and responsibility in these areas, in France, the effectiveness with which they interact with the leaders of the military professions across the entire range of civil-military relationship will be vital to success.<sup>1</sup> Today, France operates in a strategic environment different from the Cold War, relying heavily on the military instrument of national power. In this context, civil-military relations will remain significant. The end of the draft was a sea change inside the military, but more importantly beyond. Surprisingly, it is one of the main factors that contributed to improving French strategic assessment, precisely by diffusing a positive image of the military in the general public opinion, reinforcing political dominance and diminishing preference-divergence between officers and political leaders. When managed well, these

---

<sup>1</sup> Nielsen and Snider, 10.

relations can safeguard the country's democratic values while enabling the development of effective military institutions and wise strategic policies. A civil-military relationship that can successfully accomplish these ends, however, cannot be taken for granted.

### **Further investigation**

"Each age has its own strategy," observed Clausewitz.<sup>2</sup> The recent years have materialized major upheavals in terms of threats and risks. We are facing rising instability and unpredictability, fueled by the military assertiveness of a growing number of established powers in troubled regions. International frameworks are being challenged and compromised with the emergence of near peer competition. In this context, further investigation would be interesting to evaluate the consistency of professionalization to cope with those trends.



---

<sup>2</sup> Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret, First Paperback Printing (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 141.

## Bibliography

- Bénédicte, Chéron. *Le Soldat Méconnu: Les Français et Leurs Armées: État Des Lieux*. Paris, France: Armand Colin, 2018.
- Boëne, Brenard. "La Professionnalisation Des Armées: Contexte et Raisons, Impact Fonctionnel et Sociopolitique." *Revue Française de Sociologie* 44, no. 4 (2003): 647–93.
- Briguet, Gaëlle. "Grands Etats Européens Dans La Guerre d'Irak: Raisons et Justifications." euryopa, Institut européen de l'Université de Genève, 2004. <https://www.unige.ch/gsi/files/4714/0351/6356/briguet.pdf>.
- Brooks, Risa. *Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2008.
- Clausewitz, Carl von. *On War*. Edited by Michael Eliot Howard and Peter Paret. First Paperback Printing. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989.
- Cohen, Samy. *La Défaite Des Généraux: Le Pouvoir Politique et l'armée Sous La Ve République*. Paris, France: Fayard, 1994.
- Commission du Livre Blanc. "Livre Blanc Sur La Défense 1994." République Française, 1994.
- Daho, Grégory. *La Transformation Des Armées: Enquête Sur Les Relations Civilo-Militaires En France*. Paris, France: Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 2016.
- Dandeker, Christopher. "The Military in Democratic Societies." *Society* 38, no. September (2001): 16–24.
- DICOD. "Haut Comité d'évaluation de La Condition Militaire. 11e Rapport. La Fonction Militaire Dans La Société Française." Paris, France, September 2017.
- . "Les Français et La Défense Nationale." Baromètre 2000, 2000.
- . "L'image Des Armées." Boulogne: Baromètre 2000, 2000.
- Domerchet, Jean. "L'amiral Edouard Guillaud s'est Confié à l'Opinion." *L'Opinion Journal*, 2019.
- Grasset, Bernard. "Renforcer Le Lien Entre La Nation et Son Armée." Assemblée nationale-Commission de la défense, 1999.
- Huntington, Samuel. *The Soldier and the State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985.
- IFOP. "Sondage IFOP Réalisé Du 21 Au 23 Janvier 2015 Auprès de 1 051 Personnes," 2015.
- Irondele, Bastien. "Démocratie, Relations Civilo-Militaires et Efficacité Militaire." *Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée* 15, no. 1 (2008): 117–31.
- Moskos, Charles C. "Institution versus Occupation: Contrasting Models of Military Organization." *Armed Forces and Society* 4, no. 1 (1977).
- Nielsen, Suzan, and Don Snider. *American Civil-Military Relations, The Soldier and the State in a New Era*. Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2009.
- Rieth, Bruno. "Petit histoire de la grandissante emprise des USA sur notre armement militaire." News. Marianne, August 31, 2019. <https://www.marianne.net/politique/petite-histoire-de-la-grandissante-emprise-des-etats-unis-sur-notre-armement-militaire>.
- SIRPA terre. "Réserve Opérationnel Dans l'Armée de Terre." Armée de Terre, 2013.
- Vennesson, Pascal. "Civil-Military Relations in France: Is There a Gap?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* 26, no. 2 (2003): 29–42.

