

THE LEADERSHIP GAP IN EXTREMIS: CHALLENGES OF
OFFICER PROCUREMENT IN WORLD WAR II

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Military History

by

TREVOR C. WIEGERS, MAJOR, ARMY
B.A., Westminster College, Fulton, MO, 2009

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Trevor C. Wiegers

Thesis Title: The Leadership Gap in Extremis: Challenges of Officer Procurement in World War II

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Janet G. Valentine, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Harry S. Laver, Ph.D.

_____, Member
Robert L. Salvatorelli, M.S.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE LEADERSHIP GAP IN EXTREMIS: CHALLENGES OF OFFICER PROCUREMENT IN WORLD WAR II by Trevor C. Wieggers, 214 pages.

A leadership gap in extremis is a situation where the U.S. Army is challenged to expand the officer corps through other than traditional means. In World War II the officer corps was stressed to procure competent leaders beyond the commissioning capabilities of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Reserve Officer Training Corps, the Officer Candidate School, direct commissions, and the capacity provided by the Officer Reserve Corps and National Guard. This is a complex problem which modern Army planners are likely to face again. Based on Army history, future large-scale combat operations will necessitate the rapid expansion of the Army Officer Corps beyond its capability to supply leaders for the nationally mobilized army. Battles of attrition may be protracted, and severe, producing mass casualties requiring the Army to regenerate the Officer Corps while maintaining its combat strength. Between 1939-1945, the Army's Officer Corps grew from an active component of fifteen thousand to a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands. This research focuses on the leadership gap created at the outset of World War II and how the Army addressed challenges of officer procurement.

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ACRONYMS

AAF	Army Air Forces
AGCT	Army General Classification Test
AGF	Army Ground Forces
ASF	Army Service Forces
ASTP	Army Specialized Training Program
CMTC	Civilian Military Training Camps
MTCA	Military Training Camps Association
NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NG	National Guard
OCS	Officer Candidate School
ORC	Organized Reserve Corps
OTC	Officer Training Camp
PMP	Protective Mobilization Plan
RA	Regular Army
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Corps
SAT	Scholastic Aptitude Test
SATC	Students' Army Training Corps
USMA	United States Military Academy
USV	United States Volunteer
VOC	Volunteer Officer Candidate
WAC	Woman's Army Corps
WAAC	Women's Army Auxiliary Corps

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

During World War II the U.S. Army Officer Corps was stressed to procure competent junior leaders beyond the capacity of the traditional commissioning routes of the United States Military Academy, Reserve Officer Training Corps, Officer Candidate School, direct commissions, and the capacity provided by the Officer Reserve Corps and National Guard. To bridge the leadership gap, an active component of 15,000 officers was expanded in six years to a force numbering in the hundreds of thousands to lead the nationally mobilized army. Only with a historical survey can one appreciate how and why the World War II procurement system evolved and possibly anticipate how a procurement system might change under extreme circumstances or in extremis in the future.

This thesis explores the history of officer procurement, its changes and challenges, and ends by posing questions about future emergency plans to create an officer corps capable of leading a large conscript army. Flawed planning during the interwar years of peace resulted in a reactionary officer program that struggled at first to arithmetically keep pace with an exponentially expanding enlisted force, before struggling again to cope with the fast pace of war time change leading to an officer overload. It is the thesis here, that officer procurement is not an isolated activity. It must be tied to a realistic mobilization plan which is grounded in a national strategy and reinforced with credible manpower and materiel estimates. Only then can mobilization and officer procurement be aligned.

When General George Catlett Marshall took office in September 1939, America was about to enter a period of national emergency. At that time, America's professional army ranked nineteenth in the world, by size, between Portugal and Bulgaria. Six years later, America's Army had expanded to 8,300,000 personnel, while suffering 943,222 casualties. Cumulatively, the United States had mobilized 14,000,000 personnel for armed forces duty.¹ World War II had concluded, but only after the Army had fought through a crisis of evolution.

When he completed his third and final Biennial Report to the Secretary of War in July 1945, Marshall described in detail the severity of the conflict and the ultimate price of victory. He also summarized the precarious state in which the Army found itself before the emergency and the extraordinary measures taken to avoid catastrophe. At three intervals during the war, Marshall completed these biennial reports, or summations, of the war effort from the Army's perspective. Everything from the evolving strategic situation to the corresponding structure of the force was included, combined they are an excellent source of information because they were written by the man who led the Army, and cover three distinct periods of America's involvement; 1939-1941, 1941-1943, and 1943-1945. Following his lead, this thesis attempts a similar chronological approach: preparation and initial expansion from 1939 to mid-1941, preservation of the Army and

¹ George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 197.

the Victory Plan from mid-1941 to late-1941, mass expansion in 1942, further expansion and reduction in 1943, and finally summarizes 1944-1945 with the concluding remarks.²

In an attempt to articulate the challenges of officer procurement during this period, each chronological chapter of this thesis follows a descending path. The strategic situation in the war will be discussed first to frame the severity of events and the necessity for actions taken by senior leaders. Next, the strategic situation of the Army will be examined with specific regard to manpower. Material procurement is also discussed but only as it relates to the overarching issue of synchronizing mobilization. Finally, the Army's officer program is discussed. Each of these topics include particular challenges in officer procurement or describe events that cascade into second order problems.

Procuring officers in World War II was dependent upon several variables that consistently vexed planners, such as strategic direction, comprehensive manpower estimations, realistic material estimations, policy and procedures to name a few. World War II illuminates a relationship between strategy, mobilization, and officer procurement in two distinct time frames. First, between 1939-1941, a lack of strategic direction led to flawed planning, desynchronized mobilization efforts, and a struggling officer program that relied heavily upon its reserve capacity, while simultaneously not capitalizing on the in-house opportunity to expand. Second, between 1942-1943, strategic direction provided enhanced clarity and better direction, but only after a new mobilization plan was

² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, Forward, 193.

desynchronized, demanding the officer corps expand in extremis before stymieing its procurement to become more efficient.

Detailed information was also collected from the Army's Official History of World War II (also known as the Green Books) and Army Ground Forces (AGF) Studies. The former are volumes comprising thousands of pages of military history that were commissioned by the Army following the war and were written by historians and senior leaders. Comparatively, the AGF Studies were prepared during the war, and published as drafts and manuscripts immediately following. Both the Green Books and the AGF Studies provide intimate detail of the policies and procedures that fueled army mechanisms throughout the mobilization. Due to the wealth of primary source data available on the topic of officer procurement, this research is by no means exhaustive. Since the Army Air Forces no longer fall under the purview of the modern United States Army, I have chosen to focus this research on challenges primarily affecting traditional ground components.

CHAPTER 2

PROLOGUE:

THE EVOLUTION OF MOBILIZATION AND OFFICER PROCUREMENT

Officer procurement in the U. S. Army has a varied history since the time of the Army of General Washington. In the American Republic, leader selections evolved from old and established European patterns of elites selecting elites, to the more democratic but decidedly unprofessional process of good-old-boy networks, to the current system based on merit and ability. The best place to begin a discussion of officer procurement in the United States is with a document at the heart of the republic, the Constitution. As the early political structure changed, from colonies to states, and the words of the Constitution are interpreted, the process of officer procurement also evolved.

Revolutionary Army to Continental Army

The Revolutionary Army was America's first emergency in officer procurement. It is generally accepted that the U.S. Militia is based on the English model although the use of citizens (militia) is a common form of early community protection and not specific to England alone. The importance of this almost universal model lies in the cultural traditions conveyed from the English system that are now part of the U.S. Military establishment. Some borrowed traits include mobilization for weeks up to several months, unpaid service of citizens for local defense at least in mostly agricultural economies, and local control aside from appointed high officials.

Once colonies were established in America the English tradition of militia service became the norm for local defense.³ The early militia found its leadership, within the community for the lower offices and appointment by colonial assemblies for the higher ranks above colonel.⁴ Colonial militias were rarely called out en masse. Instead the militias served as a trained group from which volunteers were recruited.⁵ From a professional viewpoint the colonial militia lacked the martial spirit that energized the English Regulars in traits such as loyalty, discipline, subordination and regularity.⁶

Although the English colonies were similar in organization, that does not mean all were equally trained, for instance, the Massachusetts Bay militia organization was more efficient and the parent of the famous Minute-Man organization with a strong tradition of electing their own officers. But the Virginia Colony militia that claimed “the best people of Virginia” was typically made up of untrained, semi-equipped individuals, and allowed for the more affluent to hire substitutes if called to serve.⁷

³ Edward E. Skeen, *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812* (Lexington, KY: The University of Kentucky Press, 1999), 4.

⁴ Lawrence D. Cress, *Citizens in Arms, The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), 9.

⁵ Gary L. Wamsley, *Selective Service and a Changing America, A Study of Organizational-Environmental Relationships* (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1969), 17.

⁶ Peter Karsten, *The Military in America, From the Colonial Era to the Present* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1986), 49.

⁷ Charles E. Heller, and William A. Stoft, *America's First Battles, 1776 – 1965* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1986), 12; John Whiteclay Chambers II, *To Raise an Army: The Draft Comes to Modern America* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1987), 21-22.

Various aspects of the militia system served not only defense but to socially integrate the community in ways other institutions such as religion or education, could not. Elections for junior officers served to bind the unit together much the same way community parades and celebrations demonstrated local spirit and cohesion.⁸ This community unity was vital on the frontier but continued in the eastern areas even after the Indian threat no longer existed. Men pursued militia titles and rank, less from a sense of duty than infatuation with militaria. In addition to the upper-class social standing of militia officers was their connection to the political system. This is reflected in their ability to hold numerous offices in the civil administration of the colony or later state.⁹

Initially the officers selected for the national army by General Washington were through personal acquaintance or referral from a fellow officer or politically connected person leading to a direct commission. Washington disliked the old theory of appointing anyone if their only qualification was the ability to raise a company.¹⁰ This meant General Washington was often reduced to using the simple process of “trial and error” to find officers.¹¹ In this selection process George Washington agreed there was a place for amateurs with military aptitude. Unfortunately for General Washington the revolution did

⁸ Harry S. Laver, *Citizens More Than Soldiers, The Kentucky Militia and Society in the Early Republic* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2007), 40-45.

⁹ Allan R. Millett, and Peter Maslowski, *For the Common Defense, A Military History of the United States of America* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1984), 41.

¹⁰ Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States. Fourth Impression* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, War Department Document No. 290), 1917.

¹¹ Heller and Stofft, *America's First Battles*, 3.

not allow the time to find these willing and educated men. Instead, the war forced the Army to accept young men who were willing and educated but not from the higher social orders. In this respect the Revolutionary Army's need for junior officers permitted many young men to advance socially through military service.

Continental Army

Around the time of the Continental Congress a new military format was created called the "Confederation Model of temporary wartime multi-state forces," composed of paid, long-term enlistees. According to the Articles of Confederation, Congress was to requisition troops for defense and the state troops raised were to elect all officers below the rank of general. In 1786, during Articles of Confederation, the Army consisted of only thirty-seven officers. Up until the Civil War, newly commissioned officers were left to educate themselves about the responsibilities of the rank, professional military education and most often depended on the commanding officer.¹² Although short lived, the Confederation Model lasted until 1783, and was built around a central government with no money or the power to tax, therefore it relied on the states to supply and maintain units of a Continental Army in addition to its own short-term militia. This multi-state idea ran counter to the accepted idea of the patriotic citizen-soldier and eventually a more long-term, disciplined force of regular caliber was created.¹³ In an effort to enforce discipline, the new Continental Army at first limited, then ended the New England

¹² Edward M. Coffman, *The Old Army, A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 1784 – 1898* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1986). 29.

¹³ Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 21.

practice of electing officers, which continued on for years in the state militia organizations.

Other issues arose during the Confederation Model. It was unclear what the military establishment should look like, not to mention how to finance it. A much later issue but one that was ever present was the issue of conscription. A system of conscription was essentially democratic in practice but ran counter to the frontier ideal of the citizen-soldier and the larger issue of the state militia army versus a federal regular army. When the U. S. Constitution was adopted in 1785, the states lost the authority to make military appointments in the national army. This authority was transferred to the federal government within the office of the President of the United States.

Constitution and Commissioning

The political base for the U.S. military is in the U.S. Constitution in a series of clauses that are often short, such as in the Army Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause, whereas the Militia Clause is more detailed. The Army Clause (“The Congress shall have power – to raise and support armies”), grants to Congress many powers including the authority to “raise and support armies” which implies a standing army and the right of the government to appoint officers or grant commissions.

Where the Army Clause is vague the Militia Clause, Article I, Section 8, clause 16, is more specific on the subject of authority. Congress has the responsibility to govern the militia, especially in the area of officer procurement but the states have the authority to appoint officers. In addition to oversight for training and arming, and control when federalized, the constitution reserves “to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers.” Each state has the right to raise militia units and officers but does not specify

how state militia officers are selected and appointed. Left unstated is the relationship between officers of the national army and those appointed by the states.

Another clause that impacts the procurement of officers is the “Necessary and Proper Clause” in Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, which allows Congress “...to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.” Although not mentioned, this clause will allow future Congress’ to create new methods of officer procurement when it deems necessary.

These three clauses, the Army Clause, the Militia Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, united lead to a two-part military establishment in the U.S., made up of a small national army and individual state militias.¹⁴

Constitutionally, there is only one method noted to acquire officers and that is via the militias of the states. It is only implied under the Army Clause that the government can commission officers for the Army (“...for governing such part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States”). The details of this acquisition route changed over the years from Revolutionary Army through the Spanish-American War of 1898. For most of this time period, the basis or sole qualification for command was the ability to raise men. A hasty levy was acquired by giving a captain’s commission to

¹⁴ Gian Gentile, Michael E. Linick, and Michael Shurkin, *The Evolution of U. S. Military Policy from the Constitution to the Present* (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 2017), 7.

anyone enrolling a company of fifty-nine men and a colonel's commission for a regiment composed of ten of these companies.¹⁵

Under the Constitution, Washington transferred this task to the Secretary of War, at the time John Knox, and gave him the authority to issue commissions to worthy persons.¹⁶ Although a system was in place, it did not mean the "trial and error" selection process had changed. Through the War of 1812, the persistent problem of the U.S. Army was the lack of "well-trained officers."¹⁷ At the state militia level the same process applied, personal referral to the governor of the state or a personal acquaintance might secure a commission. Only a few qualifications, aside from raising men, existed in the revolutionary to post-revolutionary Army for a commission. Political clout was not a bad asset as most officers from 1786 to 1918 owed their commissions to political patronage, but basic knowledge of reading and writing was a minimal criterion in most cases.¹⁸ As the Secretary of War under Thomas Jefferson, Henry Dearborn illustrates that he sought out officer potential in men who had recommendations from gentlemen of known

¹⁵ Frederic Louis Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States, A History of American Land Forces from Colonial Times until June 2, 1915* (New York, NY: The Macmillan Company, 1915), 7.

¹⁶ Harry M. Ward, *The Department of War, 1781 – 1795* (Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburg Press, 1962), 32; William B. Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms, The Army Officer Corps, 1784 – 1861* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 16.

¹⁷ Millet and Maslowski, *For the Common Defense*, 128.

¹⁸ Coffman, *The Old Army*, 6.

character and little else.¹⁹ This system allowed for the “gifted” amateur to gain a commission and either sink or swim.

Historically, the use of direct commissions will have a checkered record in the Army. In a national emergency situation, it may be necessary to resort to commissioning civilians that, lacking any previous military experience, show an aptitude for leadership that should not be ignored. To claim otherwise by citing traditional military policy is to incorrectly assume the U. S. Army has always had a policy for or against it. Before the 1898 – 1945 period, the Army lacked coherent policies governing officer procurement.²⁰

Volunteerism

Another avenue available to enterprising persons of little economic or less political stature, was to “volunteer.” In American military tradition, the volunteer always held a position between the enrolled militia and the regular army.²¹ In the realm of officer procurement, a volunteer could become an officer if they were able to raise a regiment of men for state service in exchange for colonelcy of that unit. Officers gaining rank by virtue of Volunteerism have been a military reality in the U.S. Army since the Revolution and remained a feature until the Spanish-American War of 1898 and World War I.²²

¹⁹ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 25.

²⁰ Gentile, Linick, and Shurkin, *The Evolution of U.S. Military Policy*, 5.

²¹ Richard B. Winders, *Mr. Polk’s Army, The American Military Experience in the Mexican War* (College Station, TX: Texas A & M University Press, 1997), 25.

²² Chambers, *To Raise an Army*, 135-141, 153.

War of 1812

Officer procurement during the War of 1812 was another national emergency that produced an expanded army and officer corps. Like many others, the War of 1812 magnified the difference between a militia army and a regular army. If keeping militia in the field was arduous then dealing with some militia officers was equally difficult. The quality of the militia, the training, and the leadership led to a lack of professionalism that was a recurrent characterization of the militia. Where some thought the citizen-soldier led by the locally appointed officer was the salvation of the Republic, in reality it was the opposite.²³

By the time of the War of 1812 and up to the Spanish-American War most new junior officers were West Point graduates. However, the exigencies of war allowed the intake of officers from the NCO ranks and direct commissioning. This did not mean the graduates, or the direct commission were more professional than the men raised from the ranks. Commissions still depended on who you knew and political clout and unfortunately, at the state level, this affected who received commissions.²⁴

Part of the officer procurement problem was not just finding the right person to be an officer but holding out the promise of a career with upward mobility. This problem followed the Army until after the Civil War due to the lack of a retirement system. Such a system was not needed in the early Republic, but by the time of the Civil War it was long

²³ Skeen, *Citizen Soldiers in the War of 1812*, 61.

²⁴ Edward M. Coffman, "The Young Officer in the Old Army" (Lecture, The Harmon Memorial Lectures in Military History, Number Eighteen, United States Air force Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, March 8, 1976).

overdue and only the national emergency of sectarian war forced many over age officers to voluntarily retire. Otherwise, many remained on the rolls until death such as John de Barth Walback who died in 1857. On his death at ninety-one years, he was still the commander of the Fourth Artillery Regiment.²⁵ This led to “stagnation” as disabled or over age officers remained on duty even though unable to perform their duties and did not change until 1882 with the mandatory retirement age set at 64.²⁶ Even though it culled those over an age limit, it did little to identify and remove incompetence.

The Expansible Army Concept

Possibly the most innovative idea to come out of the disastrous War of 1812 was the Expansible Army Concept. The concept is possibly as old as the republic since its essentials, expanding a small army quickly when needed, were promoted by New York Governor George Clinton in 1783, and also in 1820 by the Secretary of War John C. Calhoun.²⁷ The genesis of the plan was to protect the frontier areas with regulars instead of relying on militia. In order to conserve on personnel and costs, Calhoun suggested reducing the size of a company in peace time but maintain the regular army structure. In time of emergency, the regular skeleton force could be quickly fleshed out to the authorized number and regulars could be the trainers and leaders of the larger army. Where the men were to be found in an emergency to quickly fill out the ranks is left

²⁵ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 215.

²⁶ Coffman, “The Young Officer in the Old Army.”

²⁷ Paul N. Kotakis, “Army ROTC at One Hundred,” *Military Review* (May-June 2016): 105.

unanswered. Congress in 1821 did reduce the size of the regular army by half but only reduced the officer corps by a fifth (680 to 540). Although this did not completely follow the Calhoun plan, it did appear to incorporate the idea of maintaining a larger than necessary leadership pool, thus acknowledging it takes longer to train an officer than an enlisted man.²⁸

Mexican-American War: 1846 to 1848

The Mexican War was the most serious crisis to confront the army since the War of 1812. This short-term war was a national emergency that called for a larger army and more officers than the West Point pipeline could supply. Therefore, junior officers were in great demand with only two routes to fill it, via volunteers or direct commissions from civilian life. From 1812 to 1850, the Army continued to grow and with it the officer corps from several hundred to close to nine-hundred in 1851.²⁹ Although the war was hard fought by Generals Taylor and Scott with a small regular army and smaller professional officer corps the bulk of the army consisted of militia and militia officers.

It was during this period that the officer corps started the trend toward becoming more professional. In 1839, applicants for a commission were required to pass an examination covering math, geography, history and government.³⁰ Not only more experience was required for commissions, but some form of competency examination

²⁸ Michael D. Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War, The Army National Guard, 1636 – 2000* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 86-87.

²⁹ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 134.

³⁰ Edward M. Coffman, “The Army Officer and the Constitution,” *Parameters* 17 (September 1987): 10.

was required for officer selection and entrance into the officer corps. The officer corps itself was becoming involved in its own perpetuation.³¹

The Civil War

Putting aside the important issues that led to the American Civil War, is the simple fact that it split the already small professional officer corps, making officer procurement a national emergency in extremis for both sides in the conflict. Hence both sides fell back on accepted recruitment techniques, the service academies, the volunteer system, and direct commissions.

The U. S. Army Volunteer system of recruiting regiments was accepted policy in 1861. According to the U. S. Constitution, the states were expected to provide the regiments and the officers to lead them and, if needed, the state regiments were then offered to the Federal government. As with any system called upon to suddenly come to life, the volunteer regiments were formed and, in that respect, they filled the requirement for men, but not always the best trained or worse, the best led. This important detail was left to the regular Army to rectify once the state units were federalized.

To fill the demand for junior leaders every conceivable method of procurement was tried. The full quota of West Point graduates was called up as were the Academy graduates who had retired or left the Army for financial, family, or personal reasons. In this category of Academy graduates is found one Ulysses S. Grant. The story is almost as well-known as Grant's rise to military fame. From West Point graduation to Jefferson Barracks, Missouri, to a far west posting where boredom and drink led to his resignation,

³¹ Skelton, *An American Profession of Arms*, 137.

to a failed farming venture outside St. Louis, to clerking in a Galena, Illinois family store. There the war found Grant and commissioned him a colonel of state troops.

Another method of officer procurement was the aforesaid traditional volunteer method whereby states offered command positions to the persons who could successfully recruit a regiment. The bulk of both Federal and Confederate brigades, divisions, and corps were composed of such units led by gifted amateurs or political generals. One Pennsylvania unit illustrates this method, the 61st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry was recruited by Oliver H. Rippey of Pittsburgh, a Mexican War veteran, he recruited a regiment for the state of Pennsylvania which appointed him the Colonel of the Sixty-First Regiment of Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. The unit was promptly offered to the federal government and transferred from state to national service.³²

An additional method of officer procurement was to commission talented persons from civilian life. Such was the origin of the gifted amateur Joshua Chamberlain. Later achieving fame with the 20th Maine Volunteer Infantry at Gettysburg, Chamberlain was a professor at Bowdoin College, Maine. About to embark on a sabbatical in Europe, he chose instead to join the Union cause. The governor of Maine happened to be forming a new regiment in 1862 and offered Chamberlain a commission as lieutenant colonel. It is assumed from that moment Chamberlain began an intensive schedule of self-education in

³² A. T. Brewer, *History of the Sixty-First Regiment, Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861 – 1865* (Pittsburgh, PA: Under the Authority of the Regimental Association, Pittsburgh, PA, 1911), 11. The author of this paper is the great-great grandson of Lieutenant Joseph H. Clark, of the Sixty-first PVIR.

how to command an infantry regiment. Chamberlain will later achieve general rank and lasting fame as an extreme example of the educated and gifted leader.³³

Period of the Western Indian Wars

The end of the Civil War spurred the beginning of an internal struggle to downsize the Army especially the officer corps after the first and largest total mobilization in contemporary U.S. history. The 54,000-man Army itself was split between two duties, one in the Reconstruction South and another on the Western Frontier. As the enlisted ranks shed regiments of volunteers, it was harder to reduce the hump of officers who were Regular Army (RA) or United States Volunteers (USV) with RA appointments. One consequence of the Civil War expansion was an equally large, corps of officers of “every grade, from major-general down to 2d lieutenant” was created overnight, in extremis. This was done within the normal rank structure, but toward the end of the war the rank of “brevet” became the normal way, lacking authorized medals for valor, to express the gratitude of a grateful nation to its heroes.³⁴

The Post-War Army was burdened with Regular Army officers who served in high ranking positions in the Volunteer Regiments of the various states and, once the war

³³ Glenn LaFantasie, “Joshua Chamberlain and the American Dream,” in *The Gettysburg Nobody Knows*, ed. Gabor S. Boritt (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1997), 33.

³⁴ James B. Fry, *The History and Legal Effect of BREVETS in the Armies of Great Britain and the United States from Their Origin in 1692 to the Present Time* (New York, NY: Van Nostrand, 1877), 224.

was over, they reverted to their original Regular Army ranks.³⁵ It was not uncommon for generals to revert to colonels, and majors to lieutenants but the root of the problem was the status of “brevet” ranks. Brevet rank had been used in the American Army since General Washington and the Revolutionary War. By definition it is “a commission conferring upon an officer a grade in the army additional to and higher than that which, at the time it is bestowed, he holds by virtue of his commission in a particular corps of the legally established military organization.”³⁶ In lieu of a means to reward acts of bravery the use of brevet rank was employed liberally throughout the war. The problem in the post-war army was that brevet rank was also used alongside political and military influence to gain coveted assignments often regardless of qualification.

This problem exacerbated the officer hump in part because many brevet promotions during the war were for meritorious staff duty instead of field duty in the face of the enemy. So many officers insisted in using their brevet rank that Congress moved to limit the system by requiring officers to dress and be addressed by their actual rank.³⁷ Many officers believed the rank should be abolished and “to substitute in its place some other mode of reward for special gallantry in action.”³⁸ Much to the benefit of the Army in the future and avoiding a future officer “hump” the practice of brevetting was deleted from regulations in 1922, although the practice had ended by the turn of the century.

³⁵ Robert M. Utley, *Frontier Regulars, The United States Army and the Indian, 1866 – 1891* (Lincoln, NE: Bison Books, 1984), 14 – 23.

³⁶ Fry, *The History and Legal Effect of BREVETS*, 2.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 231.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 226.

Another problem the Army faced and partially solved was the use of seniority in rank and advancement. Between the legislation of 1866, the establishment of the peacetime military of the United States, and 1870, the Army was reduced to half its 1866 size except for the officer corps. Promotion in the Army was based on seniority beginning at the regiment for lieutenant to captain, and then seniority in the arm of service for major to colonel, and through major general by presidential appointment. In human years this meant a lieutenant could look forward to twenty-plus years of service before reaching the rank of major. This burdened the Army with a large number of antiquarians and slow advancement, as Huidekoper phrased it, “promotion by senility”, waiting for someone above them to retire or die to open a vacancy.³⁹ The seniority system and brevet rank were not helpful to the Army and became apparent during this period of restructuring. Terminating the brevet system and instituting a retirement cap helped pave the way for the Army in a new emergency that called for total mobilization in World War I.

Additionally, in this period of Western Indian Wars, the role of reformers in the Army increased. Schooling without training, complicated Army plans for mobilization, a necessity recognized by reformers such as Emory Upton. Although Upton did not realize the army reforms he advocated in this lifetime, the case for the changes he promoted did find a champion in another era.

Upton’s postwar career writing on reform will earn him a prominent position in the pantheon of army thinkers. After five years as Commandant of Cadets at West Point, Upton was ordered by General Sherman on a worldwide trip of inspection, to survey the

³⁹ Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*, 538.

military establishments of the great powers especially the schooling systems used in Western Europe. He was greatly impressed with officer selection and schooling in Germany where future officers had to serve in the ranks and then attended one of several schools emphasizing mathematics, military engineering, and tactics prior to commissioning. The capstone of the German schooling system was the three-year long War Academy based in the capital. All promising officers were required to complete this course for higher appointment.⁴⁰ Many of his travel observations will find their way into his seminal work “The Armies of Asia and Europe and Military Policy of the United States.”

The Spanish-American War

War against Spain was declared on 25 April 1898. The U. S. Army was prepared to enlist up to 61,000 regulars and offer a 20% wartime pay raise for regulars and volunteers. According to the mobilization plan, this was adequate to subdue the Spanish in the Caribbean Islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico. What the Army did not expect was for President McKinley to succumb to political pressure and accept twice the number of volunteers the Army wanted, adding 75,000 men to the original 125,000. Increase in the volunteer force appalled General Miles, because the Army became too large for the supply depots. Mobilization planning now had to contend with issues generated by a far larger force, such as a shortage of supplies and trained men, and locations to train them.⁴¹

⁴⁰ David J. Fitzpatrick, *Emory Upton, Misunderstood Reformer* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017), 176.

⁴¹ Gary L. Wamsley, *Selective Service and a Changing America*, 99-104.

This led to mobilization problems of trying to feed, clothe, train, equip, move, and find slots for thousands of recruits the Army did not want.⁴² A stigma of incompetence was attached to the Army after the war with Spain, but in this case it was not the Army that was incompetent, it was simply overwhelmed with volunteers, and luckily the Spanish were just as incompetent for other reasons.

In the 1890s, the officer quota for the Army was filled by the United States Military Academy at West Point (USMA) if that institution graduated enough qualified lieutenants. Remaining vacancies in the Army were then filled by enlisted men and any remaining slots went to civilians who passed “appropriate examinations.”⁴³ According to regulations, any unmarried soldier, under the age of thirty, with at least two years in the Army could apply to take a comprehensive army-wide exam.

This situation, tapping the non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps for junior officers spurred a discussion within the Army. In 1907, a chief of staff asked the question “Does the present method of promoting men from the ranks benefit the Army?” Responses were pro and con, one claiming it drew lieutenants from an “acknowledged inferior source” while not rewarding those enlisted members with years of service who would have valuable experience at the company level but would retire prior to being field grade eligible.⁴⁴ Implying the inferior officer would not rise far enough to tarnish the higher intellects in the Army.

⁴² Edward M. Coffman, *The Regulars, The American Army, 1898 – 1941* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004), 5.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 123.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

An interesting reverse of this was brought forward by a Lieutenant Colonel who believed this practice would pad the junior officer ranks with overage NCOs who would probably be frustrated lieutenants and captains by their slim chances of promotion. Further, he suggested a long-term enlisted experience was actually detrimental to an officer. Instead he and others felt instead of two years Army service it should be changed to three and in the last year the candidate should attend a prep school. A thought-provoking discussion at the staff level but it was an exercise, and nothing changed.⁴⁵

In Secretary of War Root's annual report for 1902, the officer situation is dissected according to trained versus not trained officers and their origin. According to the report, in 1901, of the 2,900 officers-of-the-line, 1,818 were appointed since the war with Spain. Of the 1,818 only 276 were West Point trained. The other 1,542 came from various traditional sources, 414 from the ranks, 512 from civil life and 616 from the Spanish War and Philippine Insurrection. Root speculates more than one-half of the line officers had no systematic military education.⁴⁶

Outside of the Regular Army, the National Guard still elected its company grade officers and eschewed the discipline that regular line officers tried to instill.⁴⁷ To guardsmen, the rank of officer was bestowed on someone in the unit not because they

⁴⁵ Coffman, *The Regulars*, 124.

⁴⁶ Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*, 288-289.

⁴⁷ Gerald F. Linderman, *The Mirror of War, American Society and the Spanish-American War* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1974), 63.

were martinets, but worked a bit harder, knew a little more about the military, or had some natural leadership ability.⁴⁸

Volunteerism was another problem the Army faced in the Spanish-American War. Just as the Army did not want thousands of volunteers it did not have supplies for, it certainly did not want three volunteer cavalry regiments raised and led by well-meaning volunteer leaders like Theodore Roosevelt.⁴⁹ Although volunteers had to adopt the same organization as regulars, same pay and allowances as regulars these leaders tended to be politically connected therefore immune from Army discipline. For National Guard officers, whenever a militia company, battalion, or regiment enlisted as a unit, and became federalized its officers were given Volunteer Commissions equal to rank held in the militia and many of these were elected. Although the president appoints all Volunteer generals and staff officers, the president also had the right to prescribe qualifying examinations, which all Volunteer regimental and company grade officers, nominated by State Governors, had to pass before receiving commissions.⁵⁰

Militia Act of 1903

One major outcome of the Spanish-American War was the Militia Act of 1903 commonly referred to as the Dick Act which supplanted the antiquated Militia Act of 1792. It is viewed as the first time Congress chose to exercise its constitutional authority

⁴⁸ Linderman, *The Mirror of War*, 68.

⁴⁹ Ibid., 70-71.

⁵⁰ Wamsley, *Selective Service and a Changing America*, 93.

to organize the militia.⁵¹ This was another of the reforms that Root, as Secretary of War, promoted along with Congressman Charles Dick, the chair of the House Militia Affairs Committee and President of the National Guard Association, a powerful lobby for army change.

Although the Dick Act applied mostly to the National Guard, it had great ramifications for the U. S. Army also. For instance, it reorganized the militia into an unorganized militia made up of the general male population and an organized militia made up of the state militias. It allowed the states to use federal funds for regular training and allowed organized state militias to receive further federal support. It also permitted the Army to detail officers to service with organized militia units of the states.⁵²

Regarding the status of militia officers, the Militia Act made available federal funds to send Guard officers to Army schools. Persons no more than forty years of age were permitted to be appointed to the grades of first or second lieutenant in the Regular Army, on condition that their fitness was favorably approved by examining boards and that they take rank according to seniority.”⁵³ This was codified under the National Defense Act of 1903, that permitted the War Department to establish requirements for officer commissioning in the National Guard.

⁵¹ Patrick T. Mullins, Note: “The Militia Clauses, The National Guard, and Federalism: A Constitutional Tug of War,” *The George Washington Law Review* 57 (December 1988): 6.

⁵² Huidekoper, *The Military Unpreparedness of the United States*, 298.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 255.

National Defense Act of 1916

Unlike the Militia Act of 1782, the Militia Act of 1903, was amended and updated frequently, in 1908, 1916, 1920, and 1933, to mirror the times and advances of military establishments in other countries. The National Defense Act of 1916 is notable as it brought the National Guard closer to the standards set for the Regular Army.

With this Act, the expansible or expandable Regular Army as a concept is dropped and the role of the citizen-soldier is confirmed as the cornerstone of defense. The act permits the merging of the National Guard, now the Army's primary reserve force, the Army Reserve, and the Regular Army into a conglomerate, Army of the United States in wartime.

Of note for officer procurement, the Act of 1916 created an Officer's and Enlisted Reserve Corps and a Reserve Officers' Training Corps in Section 37. Based on the Morrill Act of 1862, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps in Section 40 of the Act established a commissioning route for educating officers destined not for immediate active duty but for reserve status in the state militia organizations or the Army Reserve.⁵⁴

The importance of the Spanish-American War cannot be understated for its impact on the Army and the officer corps. Victory in the war is owed as much to the ineptitude of the Spanish, as it was American Army aptitude. The mere 28,000 officers scattered throughout the west, no general staff or mobilization plan, made the lack of organization and training painfully obvious. Simply, the situation was so disorganized

⁵⁴ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Military Affairs, The National Defense Act, Approved June 3, 1916, as Amended to January 1, 1940, Inclusive with Related Acts, Decisions and Opinions, 76th Cong., Washington, DC, 1 January.

that the ideas of Emory Upton could not be ignored. Key reforms that Elihu Root as Secretary of War borrowed from Upton were the increased professional education of officers. Although not all of his reforms were acted on in restructuring the Army, the educated officer was a vital one.⁵⁵

If the Western Indian War period produced the great army officer and reformer Emory Upton, then the next episode of army history, the Spanish-American War, produced the great political army reformer Elihu Root. His impact was felt most in the Army while he served as Secretary of War from 1899 to 1904 under two presidents, McKinley and Roosevelt.

Fortuitously, the experienced lawyer and political organizer who readily admitted “I know nothing about war, I know nothing about the army” happened to be sent a copy of Upton’s forgotten manuscript “The Armies of Europe and Asia.”⁵⁶ Root took much of Upton to heart and made his reforms the culmination of what Upton had started in 1878. Achieving these reforms required a likeminded Secretary of War, and a politically savvy Washington insider. Root was both and because of those two qualities, in spite of his lack of military service, he managed to push through changes in staff assignments, examinations for promotion, founded the War College, restructured the National Guard, and created a general staff.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Stephen E. Ambrose, *Upton and the Army* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1964), 156.

⁵⁶ Phillip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, vol. 1 (New York, NY: Dodd, Mead, & Company, Inc., 1938), 215.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 242-243.

Plattsburg Camps

After the start of hostilities in 1914 some influential and pro-Allied Americans became concerned with the size of the U.S. Army and its ability to contribute to the European war if the U. S. entered it. Since congress consistently rejected any form of Universal Military Training, a movement began to circumvent this with a civilian effort. The accomplishment of this movement was the camp of instruction privately funded to train potential officers for the army.⁵⁸ Premier among these was the camp at Plattsburg, New York which lent the movement its name. Between 1915 and 1916, approximately 40,000 men underwent training in basic military topics including marksmanship and military discipline.

Plattsburg trainees were predominately from the upper social and economic class. The individual trainee paid the expense of the training which indirectly excluded working-class participation. This unfortunately brought the condemnation that the Plattsburgers were elitist and undemocratic. Undeniably though, the Plattsburg camps supplied the Army with a body of screened and prepped individuals ready to step into leadership positions in the American Expeditionary Forces when it entered a period of officer procurement in extremis.

With the end of World War I, the importance of the Plattsburg Movement did not end. The camp concept morphed into the Civilians' Military Training Camps Association. These camps continued to train volunteers up to the start of World War II,

⁵⁸ Robert K. Griffith Jr., *Men Wanted for the U. S. Army, America's Experience With An All-Volunteer Army Between the World Wars* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982), 6-7.

and only ended due to the opposition of General Marshall, who wanted a more egalitarian program for officer candidate training.⁵⁹

World War I

World War I called for a four-million-man army which required 200,000 officers. Beginning with 5,791 regular officers in 1917, a great deficit needed to be filled. After all sources had been used, accelerated West Point classes, National Guard officers and reserve officers; the Army established a series of Officer Training Camps (OTCs). At the end of the war this push for more officers created a spread of three percent regular officers, six percent Guard, eight percent commissioned enlisted members, and the OTCs furnishing forty-eight percent. The remaining thirty-five percent coming from direct or civilian commission program.⁶⁰

The Students' Army Training Corps

The Army did try one other avenue of officer procurement out of political concerns as much as necessity. The only government involvement in higher education up to World War I came when the government played a role as sponsor for thousands of college students in a quasi-military program on campuses nation-wide. The program was called The Students' Army Training Corps or SATC.

Prior to U.S. entry into the Great War, the National Defense Act of 1916 allowed for vocational and academic training for officers and men. The Reserve Officers Training

⁵⁹ Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U. S. Army*, 184.

⁶⁰ Coffman, *The Regulars*, 205.

Corps (ROTC) was an outgrowth of this act. But the World War I emergency need for officers, in extremis, caused the Army to bypass that avenue of officer procurement in favor of a totally different, but poorly thought out and administered program.⁶¹ After the U.S. entered the war, the Army established the Committee on Education and Special Training to assess specialized needs mostly in technical fields like chemistry, engineering, and automotive repair.⁶² Once the United States joined the war, the Selective Service Act of 1917 authorized President Woodrow Wilson to temporarily increase the size of the armed services and to raise a Students' Army Training Corps at qualified schools. The object was to, "utilize effectively the plant, equipment, and organization of the colleges for selecting and training officer candidates and technical experts for service in the existing emergency."⁶³

When the situation in France became critical, and the draft age was lowered to eighteen, the Army had to adapt the SATC program.⁶⁴ Unfortunately, it took the Army 18 months (to August 1918) to establish the new SATC program at institutions willing to host it. Colleges participating in the SATC were to admit men inducted into the Army as privates and selected to train in specialist occupations while in uniform. This put 142,000

⁶¹ Ronald Schaffer, "The War Department's Defense of ROTC, 1920 – 1940." *The Wisconsin Magazine of History* 53, no. 2 (Winter 1969-1970): 109.

⁶² Samuel P. Capen, "The Experiences of Higher Education in 1917-18," in *Higher Education and the War: a Report of the National Conference of College and University Presidents*, ed. Clarence Stephen Marsh (Washington, DC: American Council on Education Studies, 1942), 16-23.

⁶³ United States War Department, *Students' Army Training Corps Regulations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1918).

⁶⁴ Capen, "The Experiences of Higher Education in 1917-18," 21.

men in college classrooms at 517 institutions across the nation.⁶⁵ The Army goal had also changed: it became a limited program to identify future officers and technical specialists for the rapidly expanding army.⁶⁶ The Army objective was to convert campuses into reception and evaluation centers for future officers or technicians in what planners saw as a protracted war against Germany lasting into 1920. According to some estimates, the “government will need 100,000 more officers by next July [1919]” to fill demand in the traditional branches of the Army and Navy and new fields such as aviation and armor.⁶⁷ Contrary to what many in academia thought, achieving a college degree was not an Army goal for SATC students. The revised Army version of the SATC was to “fill the demand for men suitable to be trained as officers and for specialists along technical lines.”⁶⁸ Attendance at an SATC school only qualified one to be considered for an OTC, a Noncommissioned Officer Training school, or assignment to a technical school. Unfortunately, many college and university presidents did not understand the purpose behind the program. To many academics the SATC was a compromise system to train officers and keep students on campus leading to a degree. These cross purposes for the

⁶⁵ V. R. Cardozier, *Colleges and Universities in World War II* (Westport, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1993), 9.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁶⁷ “Dr. Hill Describes Plan for Training Students for Army.” *St. Louis Star and Times*, September 19, 1918, accessed 29 September 2017, <https://stltoday.newspapers.com>.

⁶⁸ William E. Kofmehl, “Non-Military Education and the United States Army: A History” (Ph.D. diss., University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 1972), 83-97.

SATC program led to problems later as campus expectations collided with Army reality and tainted the opinion of higher education working with the Army in the post-war years.

The SATC as a Future Model of Officer Training

Evaluating the SATC as a model for a new wartime marriage between the U.S. Army and Higher Education in 1942 left as many questions as answers for administrators and the planners in Washington. Many in academia felt the SATC had been a failure serving only to disrupt the educational process.⁶⁹ In 1941, the President of the University of Chicago told students, “The S.A.T.C. gave enough military training to destroy the curriculum, but not enough to produce good soldiers. Thus it was bad for education without being good for military training.”⁷⁰ But the Army felt the SATC was a success since it identified 8,642 men for officers’ training camps and 130,000 for further technical schooling.⁷¹ What the academics saw was the intrusion of the military into their domain by curtailing student activities, inserting courses into the curriculum, and sharing authority with Army officers who were possibly ill-tempered at being posted to a non-combat role.

What the presidents failed to appreciate was the goal of the SATC in its final form. To them the SATC was an economic driver for the salvation of the institution

⁶⁹ Schaffer, “The War Department’s Defense of ROTC, 1920 – 1940,” 111.

⁷⁰ Benjamin W. Venable, “The Army and Our Colleges in Wartime,” in *Higher Education and the War: A Report of the National Conference of College and University Presidents*, ed. Clarence Stephen Marsh (Washington, DC: American Council on Education Studies, 1942), 25.

⁷¹ Edward C. Smith, “The S.A.T.C. From the Military Viewpoint,” *Educational Review* 59 (May 1920): 419.

during the war years, they failed to see the SATC as an adjunct to the U.S. Army, an Army unit whose purpose was to win the war. “It was in no sense an experiment in education to determine whether military and collegiate training could be combined.”⁷² It was in actuality a situation where men volunteered “not to get a college education but to enter the military service on a favorable basis.”⁷³

The Interwar Years: 1921 to 1939

During this period the Army is outwardly at peace, in that there are no conflicts fighting Indians, Filipinos, Moros, or Mexicans. Internally, the Army changed dramatically through a series of legislative acts that required more professionalism through education. This drastically changed the ways and means officers were procured during peace time.⁷⁴

While the congress and Army were trying to work out a plan to create a larger officer corps, interested civilians with political clout entered the fray. The Civilian Military Training Camps (CMTC) was the current version of the World War I Plattsburg Movement. Although Chief of Staff Marshall favored the volunteer effort to train future officers, he eventually opposed the plan preferring to start an Officer Candidate School (OCS) program under Army control. Marshall was also politically tuned to President

⁷² Smith, “The S.A.T.C. From the Military Viewpoint,” 402.

⁷³ Charles H. Remmelkamp, *Illinois College, A Centennial History, 1829-1929* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1928), 498.

⁷⁴ Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U. S. Army*, 1.

Roosevelt's desire (no draft at the time) and for his own preference to see the Army grow and train at a rational pace.⁷⁵

During the Great Depression, Congress was under pressure to reduce the size of the Army and the officer corps. The 1933 military appropriations went so far as to eliminate up to 2,000 officers. This was hotly debated and General Douglas MacArthur, Chief of Staff, warned the House, "Skilled officers are products of continuous and laborious study, training and experience. There is no short cut to the particular type of knowledge and ability they must possess". He continued "...an army can live on short rations, it can even be poorly armed and equipped, but in action it is doomed to destruction without the trained and adequate leadership of officers." The Army dodged a bullet and kept the officers but lost in pay and allowances.⁷⁶

Another attempt to reduce the Army was the Officer Furlough plan. This plan would have affected between 3,000 and 4,000 officers by removing them from active duty and placing them on half pay. Once again, Chief of Staff MacArthur strongly opposed the plan, stating it would be better to discharge every soldier instead of these officers. The strong view to keep the officer corps intact reflected MacArthur's Uptonian concept of keeping a cadre intact to raise an army around.⁷⁷ The plan was defeated, but it adversely communicated to the Army a sense of uncertainty and doubt about the future.

⁷⁵ Griffith, *Men Wanted for the U. S. Army*, 184-185.

⁷⁶ Ibid., 120-122.

⁷⁷ Ibid., 127.

Reserve Officer Training Corps

One aspect of the increased emphasis on professionalism was the rise of the ROTC, which traces its origin to an educational effort founded at Norwich University in 1819 by Captain Alden Partridge, then to the Land Grant College Act of 1862 and the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920 which extended the reach of ROTC by allowing the creation of a Reserve Officer Corps.

A Reserve Corps fed by ROTC graduates enabled the Army to at least partially avoid the shortcomings of entering a war with the bare minimum of trained officers. A Reserve Officer Corps became a holding billet for ROTC graduates who wanted a college education and achieved that through ROTC but are not interested in an army career. Their value was in filling out the Army especially when in extremis.

CHAPTER 3

1939 TO MID-1941, PREPARATION AND INITIAL EXPANSION

The fundamental obstacle at the time was the fact that the American people were unable to visualize the dangerous possibilities of the situation.

—General George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*

Section I: 1939

Similar to the design of Marshall's first Biennial Report as Chief of Staff of the Army, this chapter covers the period from 1939 until the summer of 1941. Marshall referred to the whole period in two phases, the first between 1939 and 1940 as a period of uncertainty which was marked by the slow awakening of the American population toward the need for a stronger army. As was noted above, a primary challenge encountered by the army was the need for popular support to begin the process of expanding and assessing potential threats. What was necessary and suitable for the population at that time was a professional force that could maintain the country's territorial possessions in the Pacific and Caribbean. The American people did not feel the need for a large professional army before 1940. Events occurring in Europe, specifically the rise of Nazism, its subsequent invasion of Poland, and Japan's rampage through China, did not disrupt their day-to-day lives. Marshall's second phase began with the sudden shift of public opinion in 1940, which led to the peacetime mobilization of a large standing multipurpose force.⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 3-6.

In 1939, however, military leaders believed the need for modernization existed and planning for mobilization was at its high-water mark. The National Defense Act of 1920 set the strength of the total postwar army at 280,000 with a theoretical expansion of up to 2.3 million men.⁷⁹ Universal military training, which was a critical component of the rapidly expanding citizen-army design was left out of the legislation. Three challenges faced the Army in 1939, the first and most evident, was the question of how big the Army needed to be, which is typically dependent on a strategy. Without knowing what the exact threat to the U.S. was, planning to generate the force necessary for victory becomes a big problem, but not the most immediate.⁸⁰

To provide strategic context for mobilization planning in the interwar period, without a known threat, the Army reverted to assumptions in order to estimate likely political courses of action against different scenarios. Framing these problem sets allowed planners to focus and prioritize efforts hypothetically. Initially, each war plan aligned with a potential adversarial nation and given code names that differed by color. Later, in 1935, the plans evolved to include potential warfare against multiple threats and were

⁷⁹ Mark A. Stoler, *George C. Marshall; Soldier-Statesman of the American Century* (Boston, MA: Twayne Publishers, 1989), 46.

⁸⁰ Robert R. Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army, Study Number 4* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 2-3. Palmer was one member of the team of four historians who compiled and documented the history of the Army Ground Forces during the war.

appropriately code-named “Rainbow” war plans with a corresponding numerical identifier.⁸¹

The second and greatest challenge facing planners was the “timing of expansion.” The first immediate issue was how to synchronize manpower with materiel, so troops did not organize faster, than equipment became available in order to facilitate training. Without knowing how big the army needed to be, the production of equipment had a direct impact on the schedule of manpower induction, as it would take longer to mobilize industry during the initial phases of an emergency. The second aspect was how to synchronize the mobilization plan with strategic objectives so that troops became available in the necessary types and numbers, organized, trained, and equipped as operational requirements developed. Without a strategy, it was difficult to develop a mobilization plan that would yield the right force, at the right time, for the needed purpose.⁸²

The third and final challenge, was the apportionment of manpower. How much manpower was needed in the air arm versus the ground arm? How much should be split between combat and service forces? Further detailed still, how much between the respective branches such as field artillery or infantry? Within each branch and down to the lowest common denominator, how many machine gunners were needed for every

⁸¹ Mark Skinner Watson, Center for Military History Publication (CMH Pub) 1-1, *United States Army in World War II; The War Department; Chief of Staff: Prewar Plans and Preparations* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 103.

⁸² Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 4.

group of thirty soldiers? These were the questions and issues facing army planners in 1939 when Marshall became the Chief of Staff.⁸³

The answers to some of these questions, while not providing a definitive solution became the nucleus of a mobilization plan. A plan for mobilization was not a new concept. By virtue of its traditional defensive posture, which relied on militia forces to provide a citizen-army in times of crisis, the American military always had a vested interest in mobilization plans. In 1936, General Malin Craig, then the Army Chief of Staff, scrapped the mobilization plan of 1933, on the grounds that it was unrealistic and impractical. From 1936 until 1939, the Army General Staff put a concerted effort into a new plan designated as the Protective Mobilization Plan (PMP).⁸⁴ The plan was developed with haste and released in fragments to avoid a “planning hiatus.” The fear was that in the absence of direction, planning for the procurement of material (a process that takes years in peacetime), would halt in the planning interim, risking a delay during mobilization.⁸⁵

The first fragment of the PMP, the Initial Mobilization Program, was released in 1937 specifying the initial composition and mobilization timelines of force packages ranging from 400,000 to 1.5 million men. Essentially, it included the minimum amount of information necessary for concurrent War Department procurement efforts to continue.

⁸³ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 4.

⁸⁴ Appendix A depicts the full Protective Mobilization Plan.

⁸⁵ Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1989), 476.

Throughout 1937 and 1938, several revisions and updates to the Initial Mobilization Program were released as deficiencies in the original plan were identified. The final product was released in early 1939 and provided details for the creation of a moderately sized and balanced total force consisting of 1,254,357, including 74,062 officers, within a time span of 240 days that was initiated on Mobilization Day (M-Day).⁸⁶

The relationship between the composition of the army and its creation in nine months was fixed, due to that rate being the fastest the U.S. could mobilize while balancing manpower and material procurement efforts. To complete the plan, six key assumptions were made. First, that hostilities would not commence before M-Day plus one month. Second, that a projected three-to-four hundred thousand volunteers would enlist within that 30-day grace period. Third, that a total force of 400,000 enlisted men and 20,000 officers would be available for action at the end of the 30-day grace period. Fourth, that two months after M-Day, volunteers would lessen to 200,000. Fifth, that selective service would be functioning two months after M-Day, and finally that selective service would also begin to furnish inducted men to the field force three months after M-Day. One final consideration was that vacant positions within the NG and RA divisions would be filled by the Organized Reserve.⁸⁷

The drafters knew the plan was not perfect but intended to update it annually. Apprehension existed about the effectiveness of current tactical organizations in modern combat which, led to logistical flaws being discovered. However, where the plan failed in

⁸⁶ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 480-486.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 476.

terms of providing feasible solutions for a 1,000,000-man army, it did succeed in providing "...a system for the mobilization of men and equipment actually in existence."⁸⁸ In the most general sense, it provided the who, what, where, how, and most importantly, when events were to occur. As an example, the plan described in detail the locations of reception centers, unit training areas, and even which reception centers would provide reserve officer fillers to each National Guard (NG) unit and the partially filled Regular Army units.⁸⁹

Beyond mobilization planning, Marshall was also concerned about the readiness of the Army in 1939, and is evidenced by his noting that "As an army we were ineffective... [and reduced]...virtually to the status of that of a third-rate power."⁹⁰ The small professional interwar force, which was designed as the bedrock from which to build the mass citizen-army, only comprised of 188,565 men and 13,039 officers spread across 130 posts, camps, and stations.⁹¹ It had no field army, no corps troops, an Air Corps composed of only sixty-two tactical squadrons and a ground force composed of three and a half square divisions at fifty percent strength.⁹² On 1 July 1939, the Army received an increase to its authorized strength from 174,000 enlisted men to 210,000 men and 5,500

⁸⁸ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 492.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 3.

⁹¹ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 379.

⁹² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 3.

aircraft. This was a sizeable increase, but it was negated when considering ground force modernization, as the entire boost in personnel was consumed by the Air Corps and Panama garrison. However, eight days after Marshall became the Chief of Staff, President Franklin D. Roosevelt issued an emergency proclamation and authorized an additional expansion for the RA up to 227,000 and the NG up to 235,000.⁹³ The significance is that it allowed the Army to reorganize what Marshall called "...our pathetically incomplete square divisions into five new type triangular divisions..."⁹⁴ The RA would also establish one army corps, which granted the Army a capability to operate in large scale field operations, but only to a limited extent from the lack of heavy artillery, engineer, medical regiments, signal battalions, quartermaster truck trains, and so on. In terms of collective experience with large scale ground operations, the Army was also in a state of relative immaturity and not an immediately available combat force.⁹⁵

The weakness of the square division was that it was designed for the European battlefields of World War I and presumed ineffective in the current, fast-paced mechanized era of warfare. The new triangular division was the product of multiple years of study and allowed for increased mobility and firepower with less manning by adjusting the equipment-to-men ratio and reducing the number of maneuver formations within infantry units. The reduced strength also made it more compatible as an expeditionary unit, consuming less shipping space on transport vessels. Although five divisions were

⁹³ The proclamation was issued on 8 September 1939.

⁹⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 3-6.

⁹⁵ See Appendix B for the Army structure 31 JAN 1940.

modernized, it was only a step in the right direction, as the entirety of the NG's eighteen divisions remained "square" (four regiments). Force modernization that autumn also revealed a challenge in officer procurement the Army had not considered when developing the highly detailed PMP: Army expansion without an M-Day.⁹⁶

The PMP was predicated upon an event triggering M-Day, which would initiate a sophisticated series of actions to be followed by mobilization leaders. Some of these actions were the activation of NG units in a predetermined manner. Officer vacancies within Guard units were to be filled with personnel from the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC), whose individual activation was synchronized with each unit, for that purpose.

As RA manning increases were authorized in 1939, officers were instantly required to fill these new positions which, could not be filled by any means other than the early activation of ORC officers. These same officers were already designated for duty with a yet-to-be federalized NG unit and thus became incompatibly obligated for multiple roles. An unanticipated leader gap was created as a result, which threatened to disrupt the complex internal mechanism that held the PMP together. To address the issue once it was realized, the Army General Staff G-1 issued instructions to the force that stipulated all unanticipated assignments of the reserve officers was for peacetime placement only and would not alter their predetermined duty in the event of mobilization.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 566, 592.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 564-566.

Section II: The Officer Program, 1939

Officer corps selection standards continued to follow those established during the interwar period with little deviation until 1941. There were several methods for becoming an officer, but because there was still a large officer contingent serving from World War I and little demand for large increases in personnel, the Army officer corps continued to be highly selective. No emergency, no need for deviation.

The USMA at West Point was generally the only method of acquiring an RA commission during the interwar period and remained so into 1940. In 1939, the admissions process was largely unchanged from years earlier when the validation test was introduced. Competitive and non-competitive categories remained, and so too was the requirement for all applicants without college transcripts to take the validation test which, continued to be a major hurdle. Efforts were made to institutionalize the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) as a sole means of an entrance exam, but this simplification never materialized. The SAT was administered to all incoming cadets, but only as a measuring instrument against other elite eastern institutions. A universal entry standard was not established until 1944, with the West Point Aptitude Test. The issue of substandard non-competitive applicants acquiring congressional appointments and then failing the validation test continued to leave holes in the Cadet Corps. A mitigation for the yearly challenge of a sub-strength Cadet Corps was not enacted by congress until 1942, when the Secretary of War was granted the authority to fill gaps from an alternate

list of prospective cadets. Between 1939 and 1941, USMA graduated a total of 1,329 cadets, all of whom received RA commissions.⁹⁸

For technical and specialized fields like doctors and lawyers, the Army offered direct commissions straight from the civilian sector to fill capability gaps. Recognizing the need for skilled leaders, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson issued appointment guidance for these officers in October 1940.⁹⁹ The memorandum was vague due to the uncertainty of the time but gave procurement agencies a general direction when making the appointments. Above all, Stimson expressed his desire for the appointment of skilled civilians to resemble the manner they were absorbed during World War I.¹⁰⁰

Stimson's memo established four stipulations. First, that direct commissions were not to be offered for combat positions unless those officers had received combat training. Second, Stimson wanted combat training to be applied to non-combat positions in so far as it was applicable. Third, that commissions be given to individuals with specific qualifications for the position they were expected to perform. Additionally, if the Army had a uniformed soldier who already possessed the qualification, then priority for filling

⁹⁸ George W. Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York Since Its Establishment in 1802*, supplement vol. 9, 1940-1950, ed. Charles N. Branham, 978-1157, accessed October 27, 2018, <http://digital-library.usma.edu/cdm/compoundobject/collection/p16919coll3/id/22314/rec/10>; Arthur T. Coumbe, Steven J. Condly, and William L. Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars? An Analysis of Army Officer Testing* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2017), 112-113, 164-170.

⁹⁹ Secretary Stimson is a notable figure as he was also the Secretary of War in the years preceding World War I and even received a commission in the Army to fight on Flanders battlefields. Stimson was appointed Secretary of War for a second time on 20 June 1940.

¹⁰⁰ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 159-163.

the requirement would be internal through Army transfers before reaching into the civilian spectrum. Fourth and final, to avoid creating unnecessary redundancy Stimson urged careful scrutiny of each tentative appointment against the position that was needed before commissioning these officers. Within the purview of this guidance, the commissioning process for these fields into the RA remained roughly the same until early 1941 when the War Department extended the opportunity to officers from all components of the Army of the United States, to earn a RA commission.¹⁰¹

Army Regulation 605-8 (Appointment in Regular Army Except in Medical Department and Except Chaplains) governed the appointment of USMA cadets and direct commissions into the Regular Army, until suspended in late 1942.¹⁰² There were five arduous steps in earning a RA commission, which indicate the exclusive nature of the small-professional army. First, a preliminary step which was the administration of a general education exam covering a broad range of topics including U.S. History, Geography, Spelling, Grammar, Composition, Algebra, Plane Geometry, Natural Science, miscellaneous Logarithm problems and two specialized fields chosen by the applicant. The test itself took five and a half days to administer. Second, was a preliminary examining board that reviewed the military record of the applicant. Thirdly, the applicant was then examined physically, and the fourth step was an interview by the

¹⁰¹ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 159-163.

¹⁰² Ibid., 145.

selection board. Finally, the selection board then compiled a list of acceptable appointees and forwarded it to the War Department for approval.¹⁰³

In contrast to the arduous RA appointment process, the National Guard was a state-maintained organization filled with officers appointed by each state's governor. In comparison with the NG, the Officers Reserve Corps (ORC) was an organized pool of trained officers appointed by the president as a federal force, but still holding a reserve commission similar to those in the Guard. Both elements were filled through the ROTC. In 1939, the NG included 21,000 officers and the ORC was composed of 110,000 officers. The ROTC produced 7,623 reserve officers during the school year 1939-1940 and planned the further commission of approximately 9,000 officers annually thereafter through select colleges scattered across the country. Attempting to spur reserve experience with a contemporary army, the Thomason Act of 1935 annually allowed 1,000 fresh ROTC officers to serve in an active capacity for one year with the RA. At the end of the year, fifty of these officers were allowed to convert from a reserve commission to RA, allowing a career continuation. The focus was on the majority of reserve officers who now had a years' worth of active experience. Between 1939 and 1941, however, 327 officers received RA commissions.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 139. The process for applicants from civil life was similar with the exception that they likely had no prior experience with the army.

¹⁰⁴ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 156; Arthur T. Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps, 1900-1990* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2014), 97-91; Keith E. Eiler, *Mobilizing America; Robert P. Patterson and the War Effort, 1940-1945* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 99; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 30-31.

The ROTC program was broken into two courses. College freshmen and sophomores were enrolled in the Basic Course, while those juniors and seniors selected to continue the program took the Advanced Course. Transitioning from the basic into the advanced course required students to achieve a 'C' average GPA.¹⁰⁵ Some institutions conducted interviews, but only as an internal institutional standard. It was noted that a correlation existed between students that were physically fit and those that performed well in the interviews, but a method to measure talent was never standardized beyond GPA.¹⁰⁶

Section III: 1940 and 1941

The focal point of shifting public opinion, was European developments in May and June 1940. The underlying American belief was that the French Army and its Maginot Line presented an invincible barrier against the German Army.¹⁰⁷ Marshall commented with his perspective:

The precariousness of the situation and its threat to the security of the United States became suddenly apparent to our people, and the pendulum of public opinion reversed itself, swinging violently to the other extreme, in an urgent demand for enormous and immediate increases in modern equipment and of the armed force.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ The C Average GPA remained the primary determining factor until 1943 when the Advanced Course was suspended.

¹⁰⁶ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 156-159.

¹⁰⁷ George Q. Flynn, *The Draft, 1940-1973* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1993), 17; Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 564-566.

¹⁰⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 6.

Within six weeks, the German Army, later joined by the Italian Army, had invaded and subdued Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and France. The British Expeditionary Force had been cornered and forcibly expelled at Dunkirk, forcing its withdrawal across the English Channel without most of its heavy equipment. The French Navy, fourth largest in the world, was mostly destroyed at Mers-el-Kebir that July, giving the British Royal Navy parity with German and Italian navies in Europe while protecting other interests of its empire. To Marshall, the "...invasion of Britain appeared imminent." To the American people, the war, which was not theirs, appeared much closer now.¹⁰⁹

Increasing national consensus on the severity of international events was the main characterizing factor in the second phase of Marshall's 1941 Biennial Report.

Acknowledging popular opinion is imperative for understanding the quickening evolution of the peacetime Army. In May 1940, the president sent two special messages to Congress requesting increases to the manning strength and budget of the military. The first, on 16 May, recommended the appropriation of approximately \$1 billion dollars (the equivalent of \$50 billion in 2018) for the Army and a strength increase of 28,000 (13,000 for the Air Corps) from 214,000 to 242,000 men for the RA. On May 28, Belgium surrendered to the Germans and Marshall immediately instructed the G-3 to begin planning for mobilization with three new manning goal considerations; a 500,000 man initial protective force ready for action by 1 July 1941, the full force of the PMP available for combat six months later in January 1942, and an augmentation above the PMP set between 1.5 and 2 million men, to be ready for combat in the following six months by

¹⁰⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 6.

July 1942. The second message from the President, on 31 May, recommended an additional \$1 billion in funding. In response, Congress passed a Supplemental Appropriations Act in June that went beyond the President's request and appropriated funds for an increase to 280,000 men for the RA.¹¹⁰

The concern of the Army at this point had two dimensions, based on the current situation. First, the danger of rapid over-expansion was a real possibility. Over-expanding the Army, as noted earlier, would be the result of generating a large and unbalanced force with little consideration for its ultimate requirement: to defeat a specific threat, at a certain time. It also meant procuring a large number of officers in response to an emergency, which might then create a "hump", as it was known after World War I to career officers. The hump in World War I was an influx of officers during the crisis that remained with the Army afterward and greatly inhibited the promotion of existing officers, while also limiting that opportunity for younger generations.¹¹¹

Of an officer corps of 12,000 in 1926, nearly half were commissioned between 1916-1918, preventing promotion and advancement of many until expansion began again.¹¹² In fact, in 1940, over 1,000 officers whose time in service qualified them for a grade equivalency of lieutenant colonel were still captains.¹¹³ How many emergency

¹¹⁰ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 570.

¹¹¹ Eiler, *Mobilizing America*, 102.

¹¹² Albert Wedemeyer, discussed in depth in the following chapter, was one of these officers who remained a lieutenant for seventeen years awaiting promotion.

¹¹³ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 269.

officers were needed in 1940 was a mystery for planners. The risky challenge was determining what to do with the new “hump” of officers if they were not needed. While addressing the Veterans of Foreign Wars in 1940, Marshall spoke about the risk stating “...we must not become involved by impatience or ignorance in an ill-considered, over-night expansion which would...leave us in a dilemma of confused results, half-baked and fatally unbalanced.”¹¹⁴

Concern for over-expansion aside, the Army still needed to expand. The possibilities along with the severity of corresponding potential outcomes meant the army needed to expand regardless of its experience base. As noted above, an army’s expansion involved manpower and material, both of which presented complex considerations. The best solution within the limits of the American military system was the development of an elaborate mobilization plan. The plan, however, was based upon an M-Day trigger, current events had yielded public support, but not the M-Day event itself. Weighing the problems of time against the possibilities, Marshall did not believe the Army required to meet the needs of the various contingencies could be obtained by voluntary enlistment alone. During large-scale maneuvers in May of 1940, the RA had proved it could not be considered an immediately available force capable of competing on a large-scale modern battlefield. The NG in June 1940 was “...sadly lacking in modern equipment and at less than 40 percent of its full strength...”¹¹⁵

¹¹⁴ Watson, CMH Pub 101, 247; Leonard L. Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), 247; Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps*, 11.

¹¹⁵ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 7. The posture of the Regular Army in August 1940 is offered in Appendix C.

Even without an M-Day initiation, public support for growth was widely accepted. A Gallop Poll revealed that sixty-one percent of Americans were against compulsory service in October 1939 (when Poland was subdued by Germany), while in July 1940 when France had fallen and the Battle of Britain ensued, the population was sixty-four percent in favor of it.¹¹⁶ Across the nation, eighty-seven percent of newspaper editors favored a draft.¹¹⁷ A survey published at the same time in *Fortune Magazine* stated that "...more than 93 percent of the people were in favor of spending whatever amount of money was necessary to build up the Army, Navy, and Air Forces."¹¹⁸ The public support for a policy that involved strengthening the army was now commonplace and resolved.

Section IV: Peacetime Draft

The Selective Training and Service Act was signed September 16, 1940, with the first NG units federalized on the same day.¹¹⁹ Speaking to the American people by radio that day, Marshall framed the problem by saying, "For the first time in our history, we are beginning in time of peace to prepare for the possibility of war....For almost twenty years

¹¹⁶ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 247.

¹¹⁷ Flynn, *The Draft*, 11.

¹¹⁸ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 247.

¹¹⁹ The authority to federalize the NG was actually given on 27 August 1940 under Joint Resolution 96 but postponed due to budget appropriations. This was also the legislation that authorized the Organized Reserve to be activated on an individual basis for a one-year period.

we had all of the time and almost none of the money, today we have all of the money and no time.”¹²⁰

With money now available, the Army used the draft for three general purposes; to enlarge and restructure the organization, adapt to modern weapons and tactics, and finally to carry out large-scale maneuvers in the summer of 1941. Under the umbrella of the peacetime draft, the Army merged all three components into the Army of the United States: the RA, the federalized National Guard, and the activated Organized Reserve. The result was the creation of a large standing all-purpose force, as Marshall called it, which meant an army that was not tailored for a specific purpose because there was no corresponding strategy.¹²¹

The act itself authorized an army strength of 1,400,000 men split among the RA with 500,000; the NG with 270,000; and a draft component of 630,000. To fuel the intake, General Lewis B. Hershey was chosen to lead the Selective Service System which drove induction into the military at large. Hershey believed it was “...an application of practical democracy” and built it around 6,443 local centers that held the power of deferment and classification for their fellow citizens.¹²² By 16 October 1940, over sixteen million Americans had registered at local Selective Service precincts. Twelve

¹²⁰ Stoler, *George C. Marshall*, 75.

¹²¹ Garry J. Clifford and Samuel R. Spencer Jr., *The First Peacetime Draft* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1986), 231.

¹²² George Q. Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey, Mr. Selective Service* (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 77; Flynn, *The Draft*, 12-13. The belief was that centralized control over the process would conflict with the “notion of social consensus’ which would hopefully be embodied in the local boards.

months later, the Army had requisitioned a total of 970,595 personnel and inducted 921,722 due largely to volunteers opting to enlist before their draft numbers were called. It is important to note that the purpose of the first draftees was not to create new units for the Army, but, rather, to fill vacancies primarily within existing NG divisions and the four partially-filled RA divisions.¹²³

Although the draft ceiling was set at 630,000, the Army was authorized to call out 900,000 draft registrants per year which at that time pertained to every male citizen between the ages of 21 and 36. Each man, after completing the year of compulsory service was to then be transferred to a reserve component (either the Organized Reserve or the NG) until either age 45 or upon reaching ten total years of service. In this manner, the army would become formidable in a fashion similar to that of the Prussian reserve system one hundred years earlier, by creating an abundant wealth of reserve forces that could be called upon in an emergency.¹²⁴

The Army, not including the overhead manning required to operate 550 posts, stations, supply depots, and ports of embarkation or the overseas garrisons or harbor defenses, consisted of four armies, nine corps, thirty-three divisions, and fifty-four air force combat groups by June 1941. Even with a manning of 308,000 between the armies, corps, and divisions, there were not enough personnel within the strength goal of 1.4 million to completely round out the higher-level structure. Two of the armies were left incomplete, along with five of the nine corps. The complete triangular RA and square NG

¹²³ Flynn, *The Draft*, 21; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 247.

¹²⁴ Flynn, *The Draft*, 18. The force that was authorized and subsequently created is depicted in Appendix D.

divisions were placed under the command of the fully functioning corps, and those fully manned corps, under the fully functioning armies.¹²⁵

The NG divisions were activated simultaneously with aligned organized reserve officers, and at intervals through 1940 and into early 1941. The period of their active service was to be for one year of training with the final guard division inducted on 5 March 1941. The Army established the training plan for divisions, which was split into three, four-month periods. Beginning with individual and small unit training, then moving to progressive combined arms training, and finally culminating with corps and army training to include field maneuvers. The divisions were activated in accordance with the activation schedule of the mobilization plan at respective training areas.

To process the inductees, twenty-nine Reception Centers were established across the country for clothing recruits, classifying them, and then routing them to the appropriate location for basic training. A portion of the classification process was the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), which measured the native abilities as well as any talents gained via schooling and social experience. The result was a numerical score that fell within one of five categories ranging from the best in category one to the bottom in category five. It was administered to all inductees and would become instrumental in the selection of OCS candidates.¹²⁶

¹²⁵ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 25.

¹²⁶ Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps*, 87-91; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 8-13; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 249.

Individual basic training was to be accomplished at twenty-one Replacement Training Centers run by each arm and service. The training centers, however, were not running at maximum capacity until June 1941, due to the time needed to acquire the land and construct the facilities. The training of raw privates then fell to the divisions, most of which had just been activated, and were training themselves. In accordance with the instructions of the PMP, cadres for the NG divisions were provided by ORC and RA officers who joined the divisions at the coordinated training areas.¹²⁷

The plan to provide a cadre, or a foundation, of leaders from the RA or fully mobilized divisions, had been a part of the mobilization plan for years. The concept was distasteful and demoralizing for commanders, because it involved detaching a sizeable portion of experienced leaders from the fully manned division, the “parent” of a unit that had just been activated. During 1940-1941, cadres were only cut from the RA divisions to fill partially manned divisions. The NG divisions were spared the shock of RA cadres in filling a National Guard unit in an effort to give them the best opportunity to achieve quality collective training. Backfills for vacancies within the NG units were provided by the ORC. Beyond 1941, NG divisions also became “parent” divisions for the draftee Army of the United States (AUS) divisions along with the RA.¹²⁸

¹²⁷ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 249. Appendix E and F depict the locations of Reception and Replacement Centers respectively.

¹²⁸ Bell I. Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, Study Number 12* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 18-19; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 8-13.

The merging of the National Guard into federal service provided challenges for the Army, unsurprisingly. The National Guard Bureau, as it was designed and established in 1920 served to coordinate the operation of the NG at the federal level.¹²⁹ One of those operations was to seek federal recognition for officers that had been appointed by state governors and not the president. An issue arose in 1939 when President Roosevelt issued an executive order on 6 September that stipulated all National Guard units match their Regular Army counterparts with federally recognized officers. By virtue of the Militia Act of 1903 and the National Defense Act of 1916, the federal government retained the authority to determine the organizational makeup of the National Guard, though it was maintained by the respective states.

In 1940, the RA was in a state of modernization, the Guard was not. Roosevelt's executive order immediately created a gap between NG officers that physically existed and the strength of the officer corps which states needed. Complexity grew with every guard officer that was physically inept, incompetent, or for various other reasons unable to serve on active service when federalization began. Once federalized, filling officer vacancies was continued from within the ranks of the NG itself because, at that time, reserve units were going to return to state control at the end of one year's active duty and would need Guard leaders to follow.¹³⁰ The result was a series of personnel actions for promotions and appointments within the NG as it attempted to compensate. Thus, the War Department found itself in 1940 and 1941 reviewing over 20,000 officer related

¹²⁹ Originally created by the National Defense Act of 1920 as the Militia Bureau.

¹³⁰ Eiler, *Mobilizing America*, 109.

personnel actions from the National Guard Bureau, each requiring federal recognition.

The table below depicts the number of officer personnel actions over a twelve-month period during the federalization..¹³¹

Table 1. National Guard Bureau Personnel Actions processed through the War Department from July 1940-June 1941

1940	Personnel Actions	1941	Personnel Actions
July	1089	January	3521
August	1281	February	3142
September	1500	March	3090
October	1870	April	1404
November	1553	May	573
December	1314	June	415

Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 29.

The challenge above with federal recognition leads to a similar issue with state appointed officers that were not part of the federalized force. One of the purposes of the National Guard is to subdue civil disturbances and preserve order. When the federal government inducts the National Guard, it essentially strips this capability from the states. An Act of Congress on 21 October 1940, was issued to preserve the states' right to raise and maintain local defense forces in the event any or all of a states' units are in active service. Three-quarters of the states then raised these internal forces under various names such as the "State Guard" or "Home Defense Force" in the tens of thousands

¹³¹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 29.

across the country. These units also had officers, appointed by the governor of each state, who were not beholden to the auspices of federal law and as such were not recognized by the federal government.¹³²

Section V: The Officer Program 1940 to mid-1941

The officer program through 1940 and 1941 was not expanded remarkably with the creation of the Army of the United States, but it was rapidly becoming more experienced at the enterprise level. Only one additional commissioning source was created, in 1941, the Officer Candidate School. Between 1940-1941, all of the NG's eighteen divisions were inducted into service along with its 21,000 NG officers. The ORC consisted of over 100,000 officers, but not all were activated at the same time. Some were already in active service prior to initiation of the peacetime draft, others were activated in sequence with the NG units, and still others remained inactive. By June 1941, about half of the ORC, or 55,000 officers, were in active service. The remainder were eligible and awaiting activation instructions.¹³³

The ORC presented the Army with one of the most valuable advantages in the pre-war expansion period. The Army maintained it during the interwar years for the very purpose of allowing the army to expand with relative ease compared to the World War I, and utilized those officers in every feasible manner. Not only were they assigned to NG units to fill leadership and staff roles, but they were also assigned to the zone of the

¹³² These "state" officers are not factored into any analysis in this research and should not be considered when the officer corps is discussed. Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 29.

¹³³ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 269-270; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 30, 88.

interior, for example, in administrative and garrison positions to lighten the burden on the RA. In another example, by June 1941, RA officers assigned to ROTC duty had been reduced by two-thirds by virtue of reserve officer availability. Every reserve officer who replaced an RA officer was one more qualified professional officer utilizable elsewhere for troop duty. Marshall commented on the availability of the reserve officer pool with extraordinary praise in each biennial report. Without them, he concludes "...the successful rapid expansion of our Army during the past year [1940-1941] would have been impossible."¹³⁴

While the reserve forces as a whole were performing admirably in fulfilling their mobilization duties, it became apparent to the War Department in late-1940 and early-1941 that many officers had not maintained their prowess as combat leaders. Some were incompetent and others physically incapable of performing the battlefield duties required of their positions. The challenge that was presented to the War Department was how to remove a large body of officers from the Active Duty List when there was no plan to replace them. Additional reserve officers in large groups could not be activated, because the PMP already synchronized their service with other units.

The procedure for removing officers varied across the components and presented an additional dimension to the challenge. By law in 1941, commissions for ORC reserve officers could be revoked at the discretion of the President. For the National Guard, they could be withdrawn upon the recommendation of a board appointed by the Secretary of

¹³⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 8-13, 30-31, 88; William A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army* (Ashton, MD: Eric Lundberg, 1964), 523.

War.¹³⁵ The real issue as it related to administratively removing officers, was actually with the Regular Army, where the law governing their removal, Marshall said, was “...so cumbersome as to make it totally ineffective during a national emergency.”¹³⁶ The process was known to be difficult as it was already in place during the interwar years to protect the individual officer of the small professional force. Under law, the only method of releasing unfit RA officers was to classify them as “Classification B” on fitness reports indicating that those officers were unfit for active service and “subject” to retirement.¹³⁷

To illustrate the issue, between 1936-1940, only sixty-one officers were classified in this manner with twenty-four restored to active duty through appeals and only thirty-seven actually removed. The entire process normally took between six months and one-and-a-half years, sometimes delayed an additional six months. By comparison, OCS in its 1941 infancy could produce up to eight brand new officers, one after the other, in the same amount of time it took to relieve one poor performer. Compounding further, until the poor performer was removed, the prospective replacement officer could not begin to train and forfeited valuable experience as a result. This is the root of the issue. A “zero-defect” mentality did not exist in the interwar army. Forgivable failures by officers in

¹³⁵ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 45; Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 263; and Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 319.

¹³⁶ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 16; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 316.

¹³⁷ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 241.

peacetime was accepted as a learning mechanism for creating better officers in the future.¹³⁸

One solution developed to deal with the pool of underperformers was legislation in the summer of 1941 to relax the cumbersome procedures that kept the army from replacing these officers and procuring acceptable leaders in their stead. Marshall insisted that, during mobilization, the interests of soldiers and the nation were primary considerations over those of the individual officer. For a rapidly expanding army, he said, “Such a purpose does not admit of delay.”¹³⁹ In response, Public Resolution 190 on 29 July 1941, gave dismissal authority to the Secretary of War in times of emergency. The “Removal Board” was then created to oversee the process, which later became known as the “Appointment Board” as more authorities were granted to the Secretary of War. This board continued to change through the war with various other names such as the War Department Personnel Board and finally the Secretary of War’s Personnel Board.¹⁴⁰ Between June and November 1941, the Army discharged or reclassified 165 RA officers, 269 NG officers, and 142 ORC officers.¹⁴¹

Fortunately for the Army, not all poor performers were sent to the Removal Board. Replacement Training Centers, which were reaching stages of completion in

¹³⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 16; Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 263; Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps*, 55-57.

¹³⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 16.

¹⁴⁰ Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope* (New York, NY: The Viking Press, 1966), 97.

¹⁴¹ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 263; Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps*, 35-38.

March and April 1941, also instituted retraining courses for underperforming officers as means of shaping the material at hand in lieu of dismissal. To further add mitigation for potential issues with newly recalled reserve officers, all reserve officers began to cycle through the training center refresher courses, before reporting to units.¹⁴²

Promoting officers offered a completely separate challenge. Promotion policy during the interwar years was based on seniority and not skill, performance, potential, or any other highly lucrative attribute. Officers possessing more time in one grade over another officer determined superiority. Mobilization Regulations, developed in 1939, along with the PMP, established policy for a promotion system that united all components of the Army of the United States under circumstances driven by war and mass expansion. Until war was declared though, the peacetime promotion system remained in effect and no system was codified to facilitate gradual army expansion, during an emergency that remained short of war.¹⁴³

While the Army slowly expanded in 1939 and 1940, the ratio of officers became disproportionate with the force that was authorized. Permanent officer authorizations remained relatively stagnant as legislation did not allow the officer corps to match enlisted strength. As an example, a 375,000-man army contained positions for 4,697 captains but only 2,483 were actually authorized in 1940. In the absence of war, the ORC remained inactive. Even after the peacetime draft was implemented, a large portion of the

¹⁴² Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 316; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 161; Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 267-268.

¹⁴³ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 249-269.

ORC remained inactive. Without the ORC, the RA was forced to compensate by placing junior grade officers in positions of higher responsibility.¹⁴⁴

National Guard and Reserve Officers were not subject to the same restriction as the RA during the peacetime draft. Because reserve units and personnel were planned to be returned to state control at the conclusion of one active year, temporary unit-based promotions were authorized to fill vacancies with qualified personnel. In September 1940, congress enacted the Selective-Promotion Act which stipulated, among other things, that performance and not just seniority be taken under consideration for RA promotions.¹⁴⁵

On 19 September 1940, Marshall issued a directive to implement the provisions of mobilization regulations which enabled qualified men to become officers through the OCS program. This avenue was to become the primary means of officer procurement in the event of an emergency and was partly the reason for ROTC and USMA not being expanded in 1940 or 1941. The other reason constraining the college bound avenues was fear of potential over-expansion in the officer corps.¹⁴⁶

Determining that OCS was to be the primary source of procurement in and of itself caused a dilemma for the Army. Officer Training Camps had afforded the Army a great capability in 1918 and many individuals and organizations such as Grenville Clark, the Military Training Camps Association (MTCA) and the Preparedness Movement at

¹⁴⁴ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 249-269; Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, 96.

¹⁴⁵ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 249-269.

¹⁴⁶ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 139. Appendix G depicts the locations of OCS facilities in 1941.

large, believed it should be reinstituted. Even Stimson was a past graduate of the Plattsburg Camps and had close relations with its supporters. Marshall believed the camps were a necessity in World War I and openly accepted their purpose then, but, also fervently believed reinstituting the camps would lead to a popular perception of a social elite that was drawn from civil life to lead the national army.¹⁴⁷

Marshall believed, therefore, that the camps would not be in the best interests of the United States or the Army in a coming war. He wanted the Officer Candidate School to be the primary procurement source because it was the democratic way of offering a fair opportunity and upward mobility to enlisted men. It also allowed the War Department to better allocate talent by deciding who within its organization became officers and where and in what capacity they would serve with proven leadership qualities. A third benefit was boosting morale within a largely inducted army, if the men who served in it knew there was a path to commissioning.¹⁴⁸

Grenville Clark and the MTCA agreed with Marshall. What worked well in the last war, placing civilians in training camps to make officers, may not be the best option twenty years later but still believed the civilian training camps were a necessity. In response, supporters of the Preparedness Movement proposed that new camps would last four weeks and provide a pathway to the Army's Officer Candidate School. Instructors of the camps would be reserve officers under the supervision of RA officers. The debate

¹⁴⁷ Clifford and Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft*, 18, 117; Stoler, *George C. Marshall*, 75; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 88; Eiler, *Mobilizing America*, 99-100.

¹⁴⁸ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 271; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 8-13; and Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 142; Clifford and Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft*, 18.

reached a fever pitch in August, 1941, when Marshall, discussing the matter with Stimson who was openly considering the proposal of the MTCA, stated “Very well, Mr. Stimson, I have done my best and I have my entire staff with me. They all see this thing alike....I tell you now that I resign the day you do it.”¹⁴⁹ The debate continued no further and the OCS was to be the primary method of officer procurement in the future war. In order to conserve and concentrate manpower on the training of combat forces, the Citizens Military Training Camps, which the Army had been tasked with running in the 1920 National Defense Act were suspended after the training of 36,151 citizens was completed in 1941.¹⁵⁰

Although Marshall authorized the admittance of enlisted men to OCS in September 1940, the schools themselves did not begin to admit candidates until July 1941. The delay in admittance was not for a lack of interest but because the schools were held in abeyance. The Army had a reserve officer pool, and, in accordance with the PMP and supporting mobilization regulations, was actively using it during the peacetime draft to lead the newly created force. There was no severe shortage of officers that required emergency augmentation via OCS and doing so risked the over-production of junior grade officers in the event war never came.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁹ Clifford and Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft*, 118.

¹⁵⁰ Eiler, *Mobilizing America*, 99-100; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 31; Clifford and Spencer, *The First Peacetime Draft*, 17, 116; Pogue, *George C. Marshall*, 102.

¹⁵¹ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 270; Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 611-613.

Against the opposition of his staff, who were concerned by the possible procurement issue, Marshall felt it necessary for morale purposes, especially among the inducted men, to initiate the program even at a reduced capacity. In June, 1941, OCS was established and located at ten locations across the country, producing officers at an average rate just over 600 every three months for the infantry, field artillery, coast artillery, cavalry, armored, signal corps, ordnance, engineers, quartermaster, and medical administrative corps.¹⁵² By the end of 1941, the combined schools had produced 1,389 officers.

Although enlisted men could pursue commissions through OCS, selection standards for the course remained high in 1941, with an educational standard that was in some ways similar to the interwar years. The baseline requirement for all applicants was a two-year college degree. The process was controlled but decentralized by the War Department, which set the quotas, or apportionment, for each of the services for admittance in a given course cycle and delegated the approval of applicants to the responsible commanders. Those commanders would appoint boards of officers to interview applicants and recommend the best qualified. The boards were guided through the selection process by several War Department regulations and circulars that changed sporadically throughout the war.¹⁵³

¹⁵² Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 611-613; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 8-13.

¹⁵³ William R. Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 2. Appendix H shows a listing by year of those publications.

Even with entrance criteria changing from time to time, the following areas were always considered in some variation; age, physical condition, military service, learning ability, leadership ability, citizenship, character, and education. Three areas, in particular, offered the most difficulty: learning ability, education, and leadership ability.¹⁵⁴

The first, learning ability, was difficult because a formal examination did not exist that was specifically designed to gauge applicants for an officer program. A written test for this purpose was proposed in 1941 but would not be universally implemented until 1945. The Personnel Research Section of the Adjutant General's Office developed the test, known as the Officer Candidate Test, and in the interim recommended the AGCT be utilized to measure learning purely as a method of expedience. The AGCT was adopted in June 1941 as the official test for entry into the OCS and served as the "principal instrument for selection."¹⁵⁵

The AGCT, even as a temporary measure, was advantageous to the army for two reasons: first, it was already a part of every man's military record and second, it proved to be a fairly good predictor of OCS grades. Numerical scores on the test were then grouped into one of five classes from I (best) to V (worst). The higher the score, indicated a higher mental facility, and categorized accordingly. A score of 110 was set as the minimum benchmark for consideration, which equated to classes I and II. The benchmark was set at

¹⁵⁴ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 2-25. The two studies were Number 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers and Number 31, Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Force Special Service Schools.

¹⁵⁵ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 2; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145.

110 for no objective purpose other than to ensure anyone selected for OCS was from the intellectual top third of selective service input.¹⁵⁶

The second area, leadership ability, was a source of consternation because no definition of leadership was ever established by the War Department. The mission of OCS was to produce platoon commanders for the field forces, but a test was never codified to measure a leader's qualities. This essentially left the selection boards to draw their own conclusions on what a standard was, while negotiating quota requirements imposed by the War Department. The final area, education, was a high standard for the majority of enlisted personnel but the army could afford to be selective in 1941 as the supply of officers was adequate and demand not pressing. It would not be until January 1942, when Stimson replaced the two-year degree requirement with an open-door policy that an educational standard became difficult to quantify. As both of these latter areas would present a complex set of challenges in 1942, they will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter.¹⁵⁷

Section VI: Conclusion

Public uncertainty coupled with a growing need to modernize a low rate and ineffective military framed the initial portion of this period. Without a democratic means of accelerating army modernization, military planners put forth great efforts into the detailed planning of force modernization in the event of war. Later, in 1940, public

¹⁵⁶ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145.

¹⁵⁷ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 2-25.

opinion shifted dramatically towards rearmament while military planners were apprehensive about the uncertainty of international events and the best way forward ever fearful of potential overexpansion. By the end of 1940, the Army was expanding at a rapid pace consistent with the will of the people and furnished with resources afforded to it under the auspices of a national emergency, but not war itself.

Unique challenges certainly afflicted the Army during this period. Expansion without an event to initiate M-Day disrupted the PMP, as did unanticipated lend-lease aid. West Point continued to educate sub-strength Cadet Corps despite the need to fill gaps created by the validation test.

Personnel actions for officers produced a consortium of issues. Officers from the National Guard still had to be federally recognized after a presidential executive order spurring modernization creating a leader gap. Poor performing officers from each component had to be released from the active duty list which, caused potential issues for backfills and further illuminated the need to streamline the discharge process. Promotions on the other hand were driven by a peacetime system while the Army expanded during an emergency, ultimately creating a gap between the junior grade officers in existence and a growing number of higher responsibility positions.

Determining which officer procurement source was to be given primacy in resources caused significant debate at the highest levels of government, but by sheer will (and a threat of resignation) General Marshall steered the Army towards the democratically aligned Officer Candidate School. The choice to hold OCS in abeyance though, resulted from fears of officer overproduction but slowly began operating in 1941 as a means of troop morale. For those that were admitted to the OCS in 1941, entrance

criteria was high and remained so until the war kicked off. What baffled selection boards was the lack of clear objectivity in all criterion domains which, led to localized subjectivity later on.

A blessing in disguise can easily describe the effect of peacetime drafting in the year preceding America's entry into World War II. It can also be described as a most confounding period. An emergency existed but not a crisis. Detailed planning had been conducted ad nauseam but in insolation without firm strategic direction. Further, issues with the PMP and mobilization regulations had to be addressed, as they were identified because of the unanticipated nature of growing an army under the threshold of war. Uncertainty about the future only continued to billow as the American Public and military planners were respectively searching for the possibility of staying away from war while rearming for the probability of it.

CHAPTER 4

MID-1941 TO DECEMBER 1941

Section I: The Army

As the new army reached its peak strength of 1.4 million in mid-1941, it simultaneously courted the inevitable risk of disintegration via the very law that created it. The Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 stipulated that all reserve forces be inducted into active service for a period of one year only. The Selective Service System would continue to provide up to 900,000 fresh soldiers annually but the entirety of the National Guard, Organized Reserve, and all draftees inducted during the first year would soon begin demobilization, and return to their civilian lives. This placed the Army in a precarious position. As Marshall wrote on the developing international situation, the “...possibilities of a year ago have become dangerously near probabilities today...”¹⁵⁸ When the peacetime draft bill was passed, the legal limitations it imposed on mandatory active service were acceptable but now posed a great threat to the viability of the Army.¹⁵⁹

In terms of personnel, the Regular Army in mid-1941 consisted of twenty-five to fifty percent draftees and seventy-five to ninety percent reserve officers. Regular Army officers, having been scattered across the new Army of the United States, only counted 1,388 of their own between the nine complete RA divisions. Emphasizing the effect of disintegration beginning that fall, each of these RA divisions would soon lose 600 reserve

¹⁵⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 15.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

officers. Three separate personnel issues loomed for the National Guard. First, the NG divisions themselves would deactivate and return to state duty. Second, ten percent of the officers in these divisions were from the Officer Reserve Corps (ORC). Third, enlisted draftees now constituted fifty percent of the manpower in National Guard divisions.¹⁶⁰

Marshall did not want to allow the demobilization to occur, believing it would severely hinder the Army's development into an effective force that could immediately counter any foreseeable offensive threat. The current international situation from his perspective posed too great a risk to the nation, especially as each potential adversary was likely aware of the army's critical limitation imposed by the law. His fear was of a "...coldly calculated, secret, and sudden action that might be directed against us."¹⁶¹ The type of action he spoke of was one which might occur during or upon completion of the deactivation. Marshall, therefore, adamantly recommended removing the term limits on reserve forces and to discontinue advertising army mobilization schedules. In response to the fear of disintegration, the Selective Service Extension Act was passed as Public Law 213, of the 77th Congress on 12 August 1941, by a voting margin of 203 to 202.¹⁶² For a political body charged by the constitution with raising and maintaining the Army, there

¹⁶⁰ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 263-264; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 15; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 251.

¹⁶¹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 15.

¹⁶² Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 230; Eiler, *Mobilizing America*, 110.

can be no narrower margin. Through the extension act, the retention of officers was authorized for as long as they were deemed necessary by the War Department.¹⁶³

On 30 June 1941, 93,172 officers were on active service within the merged elements of the Army of the United States numbering well over one million.¹⁶⁴ The Air Corps, meanwhile had expanded by five hundred percent from 1939.¹⁶⁵ The strength of the National Guard had risen from 199,491 in 1939 to 303,027 in 1941.¹⁶⁶ On 22 September 1941, Congress approved Public Law 252, granting Roosevelt the authority to appoint officers from the citizenship at large. The law was essential, because, to that point, the expanding army had been constrained to maximum strength ceilings established and maintained by Congress. The law also granted the president's authority to make officer appointments without reference to a component (e.g. Regular Army, National Guard, or Officer Reserve Corps) or a particular branch of service or arm (e.g. infantry, cavalry, field artillery).¹⁶⁷

The international situation was volatile and critical. The German Army had overrun swaths of Russian territory while also maintaining a sizable force on the English Channel. German Kriegsmarine activities in the North and South Atlantic was equally

¹⁶³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 35; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 319-323.

¹⁶⁴ Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army*, 379; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 15, 69.

¹⁶⁵ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 24-27.

¹⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

¹⁶⁷ Coumbe, Condly, Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 160.

menacing and threatening. Italian forces were massing in North Africa, and the evidence of Japanese ill-intent was proven on 7 December 1941 at Pearl Harbor and rapidly followed by assaults against the Philippines and Malaysia.¹⁶⁸

The Army was now faced with a perplexing dilemma; how to expand the force well beyond the PMP's hemispheric defense force, on a scale never before seen, and as rapidly as possible. Not knowing how big the Army needed to be was a source of heavy angst for procurement planners and had a cascading impact throughout the military system. As an example, the Selective Service System call was derived from the projected size of the Army, if that strength was unknown then the call for obligatory service was largely an educated guess.¹⁶⁹ The challenge would prove especially trying for the officer corps as it completely inverted itself to a point where officers procured from civilian life outnumbered the pre-war professional officer at a ratio of 40:1.¹⁷⁰

Section II: Albert Wedemeyer and The Victory Plan

An initial grand strategy to prosecute the war was first agreed upon by the British and Americans at the Arcadia Conference between December and January 1942.¹⁷¹ Arcadia was the first of many strategic interactions between the Allied leaders Winston

¹⁶⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 34-35.

¹⁶⁹ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 94-96.

¹⁷⁰ Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, Center for Military History Publication (CMH Pub) 2-2, *United States Army in World War II; The Army Ground Forces; The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), 91.

¹⁷¹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 113.

Churchill and Roosevelt, and also the first of three to be held in Washington, DC. A defining premise of the strategy identified Germany, as the primary threat to be defeated first before concentrating offensive efforts toward the Pacific. Joint responsibilities were also agreed by the allies in the allocation of manpower and munitions, intelligence sharing, the coordination of communications, and the administration of captured areas.¹⁷² American contribution to the strategy itself was not developed at the conference, but in the months preceding, by a strategic estimate the War Plans Division provided, known as the Victory Program.¹⁷³

The Victory Program, or Plan, was developed out of necessity in the summer of 1941 to synchronize the mobilization of American industry with the mobilization of personnel for application to the war effort. Of the three primary challenges of mobilization, the second challenge, and most immediate, was the synchronization of manpower with equipment and then the synchronization of those efforts with a strategy. As a remedy, the Army developed the Protective Mobilization Plan to align the organization of personnel with the more tedious cultivation of material production. The completion of the Protective Mobilization Plan as a viable activation schedule was made possible by the Rainbow plans developed over the same period by the Joint Board. Each Rainbow plan made assumptions on future policy toward various threats to determine respective military objectives. The purpose of both products was to provide enough detail

¹⁷² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 113.

¹⁷³ Albert C. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* (New York, NY: Henry Holt & Company, 1958), 63-76.

to at least facilitate an initial response at the outbreak of war, while the strategic situation continued to develop and offer more clarity for plans to be refined..¹⁷⁴

By mid-1941, the strategic situation remained unclear, but it seemed more probable than possible that the United States would enter the war. Marshall wanted a more realistic strategic estimate from which to base the procurement program, for future expansion. Mainly because the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941, was unanticipated and completely disrupted the baseline requirements established by the Protective Mobilization Plan. As noted earlier, the mobilization plan provided for the complete procurement of a 1.5-million-man force but could also be modified to account for additional increases. Provisioning foreign powers with material aid in addition to the United States effort to expand its own military, shifted all procurement activities into the realm of unknown quantities. Manpower mobilization could no longer effectively be aligned with material mobilization, and both could not be projected into a viable strategy..¹⁷⁵

The missing variable of critical importance was the overall end-strength required for the Army to achieve victory. That estimate, in addition to the Navy's, was needed if industry was to keep pace with both armed force expansion and Lend-Lease activities; at minimum knowing one would illuminate opportunity or risk for the other. In January 1941, an American-British-Canadian "Conversation" was conducted in Washington, D.C.

¹⁷⁴ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 63; Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 104.

¹⁷⁵ Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 50-53; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 39, 196; Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 69.

that proposed a “Europe First” solution, but it was not until May 1941, that the War Plans Division assigned Major Albert C. Wedemeyer to generate the estimate.¹⁷⁶ Allowing leaders at the Office of Production Management, such as William Knudson, to coordinate the procurement of material was crucial and Wedemeyer became the central facilitating figure. The complexity of the task was far beyond a simple estimation of capabilities. Planners had to develop a complete statement of Army needs, not just for the following two years as was typical of a troop basis, “...but for the actual winning of a war not yet declared...”¹⁷⁷

Section III: Conceptual Planning

Wedemeyer’s ultimate task of determining the material requirements of the armed forces concerned, was an objectively simple task but intimately complex in detail.¹⁷⁸ To begin the task, Wedemeyer framed the overarching problem by identifying U.S. national objectives in a hypothetical war. This was essential to better define a military strategy that would accomplish these goals. In the absence of a pre-existing mechanism that established these national objectives, the team of planners relied primarily upon three methods. One was traditional research coupled with discussions on foreign policy with Marshall and Stimson. They also used the primary objectives established in Rainbow 5

¹⁷⁶ Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 397-399.

¹⁷⁷ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 16, 72; Watson, CMH Pub 1-1, 354, 359; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196.

¹⁷⁸ Although ultimately responsible for the end product, Wedemeyer was not alone in this endeavor. He was provided a staff of officers, private office with secretary, and had the support of fellow planners from each of the War Department components and General Staff.

which consisted of hemispheric defense, defense of outlying possessions, and the projection of task forces to possible locations including Europe, Africa, and the Mediterranean. Rainbow 5 was selected in lieu of Rainbow's 1 through 4 due to the underlying premise of those plans not supporting the current situation.¹⁷⁹ Finally, planners relied upon the tentative coordination established at the American-British-Canadian Conversations in January 1941, that identified Europe as the decisive theater while strategic-defense was conducted in the Pacific.¹⁸⁰

Wedemeyer's team determined that the ultimate goal of the United States was to "...eliminate totalitarianism from Europe and, in the process, to be an ally of Great Britain; further, to deny Japanese undisputed control of the western Pacific."¹⁸¹ Stimson approved the team's conclusion, which allowed Wedemeyer to continue adding structural depth to the conceptual portion of the estimate. There were three critical, measurable, components that affected a future war strategy: capacity of the enemy, capacity of the allies, and the capacity of America to furnish manpower.¹⁸²

To establish the strength, disposition, and intentions of enemy combatants, Wedemeyer turned to the Army G-2 Colonel Truman Smith who conveyed the extent of intelligence data known at the time. Of the four potential threats considered at the time,

¹⁷⁹ Plans 1 and 4 were premised on enemy neutralization of the British Fleet, prioritizing hemispheric defense. Plans 2 and 3 were premised on the primary threat being in the Pacific.

¹⁸⁰ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!* 17, 72; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 59-63.

¹⁸¹ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 63.

¹⁸² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196; Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 20, 65.

Germany, Italy, Japan, and Vichy France; Germany was considered the most dangerous. Vichy France was not considered likely because the French were primarily interested in a policy of passive collaboration with the Axis powers. Only one goal was distinguishable for the French and that was to retain their territorial possessions from any encroaching power. The Italians as likewise assessed did not have the capacity to expand militarily beyond the Mediterranean, were in danger of collapse, and would "...desert the German alliance at the first propitious opportunity."¹⁸³

The Japanese had greater territorial ambitions and the capacity to effect further expansion. The Army G-2 believed the Japanese would attempt to end the war in China to allow greater flexibility in the Pacific theater. With the Chinese neutralized, the Japanese would then promote strategic-defensive operations in China and Manchuria while projecting strategic-offensive operations to the south toward the Netherlands East-Indies. In a foreshadowing assessment, the G-2 also warned that the Japanese would likely occupy the Philippines. Simultaneously, the Japanese would conduct attacks against the periphery of American possessions in the Pacific, specifically Alaska and Hawaii, and as far east as Panama.¹⁸⁴

For Germany, the G-2 believed two potential military options existed in the intermediate to long term that would accomplish Nazi strategic objectives. One was offensive actions in the Middle East and the other was an invasion of Great Britain itself. In the near term, the Germans would focus combat power against the Soviets for a victory

¹⁸³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 66.

¹⁸⁴ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 66.

in late 1941. Following the Nazi envisioned collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assessed the Germans would require at least one year to reconstitute its military and consolidate gains in the conquered territory. The G-2's timeline reflected a fully reorganized and invasion-capable German Army by the spring of 1943 at which point the Germans would seek a negotiated peace with Britain. If peace failed, then Germany would invade the islands or eliminate British influence from North Africa via the Suez Canal.¹⁸⁵

To offer a metric for enemy comparison, Wedemeyer used the "division" as that was America's premier war-fighting formation. In 1941, the German Army was assessed at 350 divisions and Wedemeyer believed the number could potentially increase to 500 by July 1943, based on further assumptions listed below. The significance for detailed planning meant that any application of ground forces against the continent of Europe would be met by an eleven or twelve million man trained and equipped German Army.¹⁸⁶

With regard to allied capabilities, Russia and Britain were the only powers analyzed. According to the G-2, Britain would be forced to remain on a strategic-defensive footing to protect the main island and retain a lodgment in the Middle East as long as the Battle of the Atlantic ensued. From the G-2's perspective, Britain would not persevere in the long term due to the probable German ability to concentrate overwhelming force as soon as the Soviet Union collapsed. Moreover, British manpower reserves were quickly depleting against the tremendous cost of sustaining military

¹⁸⁵ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 65-66.

¹⁸⁶ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 66; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 82.

operations across an immense empire. Its industry strained to the breaking point under a wartime economy..¹⁸⁷

Russia became of paramount concern to the U.S. as the speed of possible Soviet collapse dictated the timeframe of American intervention. Soviet survival was viewed as the absolute best-case scenario, as that situation would keep the Germans from concentrating all force against one front or one ally. Wedemeyer's team, however, used a worst-case scenario of Soviet collapse for planning purposes. Therefore, the likely date for which Germany would be prepared to invade England was Spring 1943, and so it was determined that the U.S. would need to have mobilization complete by then. Allowing England to be defeated was a substantial risk for the United States, as that outcome would preclude any established and refined forward base to project power onto the European continent. An American industrial base would also be severely undercut as the military was forced to compensate for the numerical superiority of the German Army..¹⁸⁸ Following this line of reasoning, the survival of Russia was clearly an objective of national interest for the United States and any future ally.

A final element guiding the strategic estimate was to measure an American capacity to furnish manpower. During the interwar period it was assumed that the U.S., with its vast assortment of resource availability, could provide the necessary quantity to

¹⁸⁷ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 71-72.

¹⁸⁸ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 71-72; Maurice Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," in *Command Decisions* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 366.

meet any challenge.¹⁸⁹ For Wedemeyer to offer a realistic estimate, he had to know what that threshold was. In other words, how much manpower could the country expend for military pursuits, without compromising the strength of the U.S. economy and the industrial output that fueled the war effort? Here, a paradox of procurement exists, where over-expanding an army had real detrimental implications for the country that employed it.¹⁹⁰

In 1941, no tool existed to measure manpower capacity in quantifiable terms. To shed light on the problem, Wedemeyer searched the Library of Congress in detail, seeking to draw from the historical experiences of bygone societies. All conflicts as far back as the 1600s were researched for any relevant information that illustrated the point at which a country's economy suffered as a result of military over-manning. Resurfacing from the library, Wedemeyer concluded that approximately ten percent of a country's population could be inducted for armed service without significant economic and social life degradation.¹⁹¹

With the conceptual portion of his estimate complete, Wedemeyer now knew that the U.S. could furnish roughly ten percent of the populace, or roughly 14 million men based off total population estimates in 1941. Before apportioning military forces, the team opted to be conservative with their estimates and added an industrial buffer of two million, leaving the sum of twelve million men available for the armed forces. Therefore,

¹⁸⁹ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 366.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 367.

¹⁹¹ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 74; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 77-78; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196.

not degrading the national war production program meant that twelve million men was the maximum limit the United States could provide militarily to accomplish the three primary objectives of Rainbow 5, against a German Army assessed between 350 to 500 divisions in July 1943.

Favorable military odds, as viewed by the U.S. Army in 1941, was a ratio of 2:1. To achieve a 2:1 ratio matchup, the combined allied force would need to field at least 700 divisions. Wedemeyer used data from the G-3, to estimate the number of personnel that comprised a 700-division force and found it to be the rough sum of twenty-five million men. This number was not feasible for Britain and America combined, let alone just the U.S. It was clear that in addition to the strategic conditions required for the success of Rainbow 5, the Army organization would also need to be tailored for the "...coordinated employment of overwhelming forces, surprise and mobility supported by sufficient reserves..." in order to compensate for the numerical superiority of the enemy.¹⁹²

Section IV: Apportionment of Military Forces and Tailoring

In broad terms, the strategy proposed by Wedemeyer needed to be "...capable of controlling the sea lanes of communications in two oceans; to fight a major land, sea, and air war in one theater; and to be sufficiently strong to deter war in the other."¹⁹³ The planning teams first step in detailed planning was then to apportion forces across the domains of sea, air, and land. Based on the Rainbow 5 objectives to be completed, the

¹⁹² Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 83-84. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 66.

¹⁹³ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 76-77.

services were prioritized in an order that facilitated completing them sequentially to set conditions for the next (e.g. the Navy first secures sea lanes so the Army can then occupy forward bases and so forth).

Large shipments of tonnage were needed in both material and personnel, not just for task force deployment and sustainment but also for Lend-Lease, already underway. It was estimated that the merchant fleet, in 1941, was capable of transporting up to 50,000 men with their equipment and ninety days' worth of supplies. The significance is that, in order to project power outside the hemisphere, more time was mandatory to first build a more capable transport fleet and establish port facilities for embarkation and debarkation. The War Plans Division, which was tasked with developing this estimate, learned that to transport the amount of men and supplies under contemplation, one thousand vessels were required for the deployment, and an additional 500 vessels to sustain that force. To provide this fleet capacity, the Maritime Commission estimated two years. Two years coincided with Wedemeyer's earlier estimate on German capabilities and further reinforced the need for mobilization to be complete no later than mid-1943, to positively affect the war..¹⁹⁴

Therefore, securing the sea lanes against threats to the merchant fleet was the first priority, and the one to which all others were secondary. The Navy, in support of Wedemeyer's team, provided detailed estimates on the force it believed necessary to

¹⁹⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 72-73; Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 67.

accomplish the task, four million personnel.¹⁹⁵ For two reasons the Army's air component formed a close second in necessity. First, Wedemeyer placed a significant amount of faith in fighter aircraft to compensate for the numerical disparity between German and allied armies. During his studies at the German Kriegsakademie, Wedemeyer noted that the curriculum was overwhelmingly offensive oriented and only required him to plan two defensive operations out of sixty in his second year.¹⁹⁶ The practicum emphasized speed and the employment of mechanized and motorized forces in conjunction with close air support in every plan. To reinforce the significance of local air power in modern warfare, the Germans experimented with it during the 1939 war in Poland and continued perfecting the doctrine with great effect in 1940. It was clear to Wedemeyer that U.S. fighter aircraft were a necessity in both multiplying the effectiveness of mobile ground forces and also protecting those forces from enemy air support.¹⁹⁷

Another imperative for the air arm consisted of strategic bombing. Wedemeyer was familiar with the visions of Giulio Douhet and Billy Mitchell, who advocated for powerful air forces to target the enemies will, industry, and economy as a means of indirectly weakening military opposition. Planners at the War Department also believed strategic bombing was a means of directly attacking the enemy and gradually degrading

¹⁹⁵ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 79; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196.

¹⁹⁶ The "Kriegsakademie" was the German Army "War Academy" where Wedemeyer had studied for two years in the 1930s.

¹⁹⁷ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 49, 61-62.

its capabilities to conduct war, while the ground force was mobilized. In similar fashion to the Navy, the staff of the Air Corps provided their own data to Wedemeyer's team estimating just over two million men split between combat units and service units.¹⁹⁸

At the macro level, the Navy was apportioned four million men and the Air Corps two million. The remaining balance was six million men that Wedemeyer used to shape the ground force.¹⁹⁹ Wedemeyer distributed army ground elements by evaluating the Rainbow 5 objectives, which he called Missions, starting with the least manpower consuming and moving toward the most taxing. The first mission was hemispheric defense, primarily oriented toward the Atlantic in the event of Britain's sudden collapse. These garrisons would be minimally manned and included Newfoundland, Greenland, Jamaica, Bermuda, Antigua, St. Lucia, Curaçao, British Guiana, Aruba, and Trinidad. The total sum of units posted to these outlying garrisons was 32,144 and consisted primarily of service forces such as coast artillery for harbor defense and anti-aircraft for anchorages and airfields.²⁰⁰

The second mission was the defense of outlying possessions and was proportionally more significant, as ground combat units were added to reinforce artillery units, air corps squadrons, and naval investments. Hawaii was allotted 58,696 men including two triangular infantry divisions. The Philippines offered a challenging

¹⁹⁸ Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 75; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 75-76, 92, 101.

¹⁹⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196; Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 92.

²⁰⁰ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 93.

dilemma; however, having been stationed in the Philippines twice before, Wedemeyer was convinced the possession was indefensible in the event of war with Japan. The ports at Subic and Manila Bay, along with the air bases, were excellent for power projection. Politically, the Philippines were not to be relinquished. The islands had to be protected as long as possible, and therefore represented a strategic liability.

To complete the second mission, Wedemeyer assigned a force of 25,500 men including Philippine Scouts for the protection of the Philippines. In Alaska, he designated a force of 27,000 men, mostly light infantry. A force of 25,000 men was allotted to Puerto Rico's strategic garrison, including one triangular division, finally, a force of 31,000 men to Panama's strategic canal. Cumulatively, Wedemeyer's total distribution for both the first and second missions were approximately 200,000 men.²⁰¹

The third mission called for expeditionary task forces. The remaining balance of nearly 5.8 million men could not all be assigned combat roles. The ability to project those task forces outside of the hemisphere, required American forward bases from which to launch them. For this, Wedemeyer planned for the operation of several bases in four countries including Iceland, Scotland, Ireland, and England. Between combat units for securing the facilities and service units to make the bases function, 105,000 men of all qualifications were deducted for the task.²⁰²

Because the Army division was the premier warfighting ground organization, its base function was close combat, and its core was composed of fighting units. It also

²⁰¹ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 94-95.

²⁰² *Ibid.*, 95-96.

possessed organic service units that enabled it to be self-sustaining, provide organic indirect artillery fires, protect itself with antiaircraft artillery, and so on. The division was the unit that the army used to measure combat power. The challenge for Wedemeyer and his team was developing a suitable ratio between combat and service units which offered the most potential for sustained land combat against the German Army.

At the division level, the War Plans Division used a term known as the “Division Slice” when allocating manpower between the services and arms. The “Slice” indicated that only a portion of the pie did the fighting while the rest of the pie was enabling the fight. Depending on the type of division, the amount and types of service and support units would alternate, but generally remain around a 1:1 ratio for approximate calculations. The table below depicts the various ‘slices’ of a division pie.²⁰³

Table 2. Structure of a 15,000 Man Division ‘Pie’	
Men	Elemental Pieces of the ‘Pie’
1,500	Transportation of equipment, personnel, and supplies
650	Preparation of Food
700	Administration of Food and Supplies
600	Medical Related Duties
1,500	Communications
450	Repair and Maintenance
1,600	Other Specialized Services
8,000	Fighting

Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 96.

²⁰³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 96.

To calculate the division slice, Wedemeyer used the planning data from the Army G-3. The ratio was 1:1 which meant for a triangular division of 15,000 men, a reciprocal service force of around 15,000 comprised the remainder of the pie. Expanding the division slice ratio onto a macro scale, the planning team was able to generate an army force structure that nearly mirrored the same pattern. The combat forces of the army would be composed of 3.9 million men when adding the overhead of corps and army headquarters troops, while the service forces comprised 1.8 million men for a rounded total of 5.7 million men.²⁰⁴

Wedemeyer next designed five task forces and a strategic reserve. The task forces were broken down into a grouping of two that would be assigned to the Western Hemisphere, while the other grouping of three would be expeditionary in Europe. The former was comprised of one that would be stationed in Brazil numbering 77,000 to prevent enemy access into South American via Africa, while the second task force, numbering 34,000, was dedicated to the north-western corner of South America to protect the Panama Canal. These task forces could reinforce one another and were also considered part of the strategic reserve envisioned by Wedemeyer.²⁰⁵

The three expeditionary task forces were designated as the First, Third, and Fourth Armies. Their purpose was to conduct combat operations in Europe and were similarly structured around nine triangular infantry divisions and a striking force of armored and mechanized divisions. In total, each field army was composed of between

²⁰⁴ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 95-96.

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 95-98.

seventeen to twenty-one divisions and a respective complement of corps and army headquarters overhead, and varying amounts of separate artillery regiments and battalions, antiaircraft regiments, tank destroyer battalions, and cavalry regiments. In addition to these three field armies, there were also two inactive field armies that formed the strategic reserve. The Second and Fifth Armies would be activated only as needed, thereby providing a valuable capability, while also allowing the industrial sector to utilize the manpower as long as possible. While the active field armies comprised the majority of combat power, the strategic reserve retained a considerable warfighting capability with seventy-eight triangular divisions (mechanized and light), fifty-three armored divisions, eleven other divisions of various types, and more than one thousand battalions and regiments of parachute infantry, antiaircraft, tank destroyers, artillery, and separate tank battalions.²⁰⁶

²⁰⁶ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 97-100.

Table 3. The Victory Plan's Estimation of Total Army Forces

TOTAL ARMY FORCES	
Air Force Combat units	1,100,000
Air Force Service units	950,000
<i>Total Air Force</i> ⁴¹	<i>2,050,000</i>
Military Bases and Outlying Possessions	346,217
Potential Task Forces	2,199,441
Fixed Defenses & Zone of the Interior Forces	1,200,000
<i>Total Active Units</i>	<i>3,745,658</i>
Units in strategic reserve to be activated when situation required	3,000,000
<i>Total Army Ground Forces</i>	<i>6,745,658</i>
<i>TOTAL ARMY FORCES:</i>	<i>8,795,658</i>

Source: Charles E. Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: Writing the Victory Plan of 1941* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2011), 101.

The total force Wedemeyer proposed consisted of a powerfully capable army of 215 maneuver divisions and 273 Air Groups.²⁰⁷ Other possible outcomes were studied by the Joint Chiefs in 1942, but concluded with figures reaching over 300 divisions due largely because the underlying premise was simultaneous war against Japan and Germany while the Victory Plan contrasted in a sequential nature. The completed Victory Plan report, officially named the “Estimate of Army Requirements”, received concurrence from the War Department staff on 23 August 1941. By 4 September 1941,

²⁰⁷ Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” 366.

the Army G-4 was able to complete a calculation of total material needs, which would have been impossible “Without the basic strategic plan Wedemeyer had written...”²⁰⁸

Section V: Conclusion, The Plan and its Relevance to Officer Procurement

The Victory Plan was the Army’s contribution to a joint estimate. The Navy also provided an estimate named the “Victory Sea Forces”. These plans were combined and delivered to the Joint Army and Navy Board. In this manner, the Army’s “Victory Plan” evolved into the joint “Victory Program” thereafter. What remained a source of consternation for material procurement, planners were the requirements for Lend-Lease, especially in light of a British-American agreement to also aid Russia materially in October 1941. On the complexity of times, Marshall wrote, “In spite of our situation, it was vital that we help Russia and the United Kingdom for our own security....to be coordinated with our daily normal problem of meeting the demands of our own forces.”²⁰⁹

As with the PMP, the Victory Plan also had its faults. One of which was a void in casualty estimation.²¹⁰ Marshall characterized the practicality of offering an accurate estimation in 1941, as impossible because each component of the equation defied long-term planning.²¹¹ Wedemeyer cannot be faulted for failing to provide such an elusive

²⁰⁸ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 101.

²⁰⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 41, 75. Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 20.

²¹⁰ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 111-114.

²¹¹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 198. The components Marshall spoke of were the effectiveness of aerial bombardment, artillery, enemy morale, enemy fighting ability, to

figure but leaving it out of the total program, even as a variable, bore special hardship on the troop basis that were developed as a result of the Victory Plans ultimate strength.

Although the development of this plan was rooted in material procurement, its importance cannot be overstated as a manpower procurement device. Each component of the Victory Program was motivated by a need to establish material requirements for the nation's industry. What sets the Victory Plan apart from the Navy, or even the Air Corps, is that the Army's portion approached the problem from a strategic manpower perspective. To understand what material the Army needed, it first had to understand the size and composition of the Army destined to use it. To even reach this level of knowledge, Wedemeyer's team had to comprehend national objectives, analyze enemies, allies, and the manpower capabilities of the United States. Considering the strategic requirements of industry, the Navy, and Air Corps was also a unique feature of the Victory Plan, whose planners worked under a gradually lowering manpower ceiling to determine what the Army "slice" was.

Officer procurement is more similar to material procurement in terms of its relationship with manpower mobilization. In the Army, the Soldier is equipped. Officer procurement is the equipping of groups of soldiers with capable leaders. Without knowing the size and type of the total Army, it is impractical to think an efficient officer program can be managed and expected to provide the right type of leader, at the right time, in the right place, for the right purpose. In this regard, the Victory Plan's role as an officer procurement device cannot be understated.

name a few. All of which had to be calculated in a three-dimensional war that had never been waged before.

CHAPTER 5

WORLD WAR II ANALYSIS, 1942

the black days of 1942 when the Japanese conquered all of Malaysia, occupied Burma, and threatened India while the German armies approached the Volga and the Suez. In those hours Germany and Japan came so close to complete domination of the world that we do not yet realize how thin the thread of Allied survival had been stretched....we were so completely unprepared.

—General George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945*

Section I: The War Situation and Strategic Direction

Where events in the summer of 1940 had solidified public support for expanding the Army, the attack on Pearl Harbor then steeled American resolve to enter into the war as a belligerent. On 8 December 1941, President Roosevelt delivered his famous speech to Congress asking for a formal declaration of war against the Empire of Japan. Four days later, Italy and Nazi Germany declared war on the United States with a reciprocal declaration by America on 11 December 1941. America was now in a situation that required an armed force above and beyond that which could provide for hemispheric defense alone.²¹²

The situation was grim. Marshall wrote that "...our entry into the war was marked by a succession of serious reverses."²¹³ The Pacific Fleet was crippled, the Philippines overwhelmed, and the Malaysian Archipelago engulfed. The German advance through Russia and North Africa jeopardized a strategic oil supply at Abadan, upon which allied

²¹² Wedemeyer, *Wedemeyer Reports!*, 42; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 68.

²¹³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 68.

forces in that theater depended. German submarines in the Atlantic also reaped an increasing toll on lend-lease shipping and American troop buildup.²¹⁴ It was clear that the situation required urgency. A challenge, which required America to develop its war-making ability to the extent that it could project power across oceans to sustain its allies and subdue veteran enemies.

On recognizing the urgency of the situation, Marshall commented that the greatest problem during this period was the fact that, in spite of material becoming available for the mass of troops in training, the U.S. was also trying to appease lend-lease allies with the same equipment.²¹⁵ To ensure new units had enough equipment to at least function during the train-up period, a policy was adopted to ensure those units were issued thirty-to-fifty percent of their authorization. When the training unit was three months from its deployment window, it would be filled to one hundred percent in personnel and equipment. Nevertheless, lend-lease activities continued draining equipment needed for U.S. expansion.

Adding structure to the estimate produced by the War Plans Division and the initial agreements of the Arcadia Conference, several other key meetings were conducted in 1942, that also bore heavily on U.S. strategic direction. In April 1942, President Roosevelt directed Marshall to meet with the British Prime Minister, his War Cabinet, and the British Chiefs of Staff in London. In the Arcadia Conference, the Allies agreed

²¹⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 68.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 41.

that Germany was to be defeated first. The purpose of Marshall's visit to London was to determine the strategy to accomplish that objective.²¹⁶

Analyzing the options available, both allies agreed in April 1942, that the final blow to Germany could only occur via an amphibious operation across the English Channel, followed by a drive eastward across the plains of western Europe. The operation was tentatively code-named "Roundup", and a tentative date was selected in the summer of 1943, as that was considered the earliest time at which the U.S. could amass the strength necessary to project adequate power into mainland Europe. The buildup of American combat power at staging bases in the United Kingdom was code-named "Bolero."²¹⁷

During the London meeting, Marshall and Churchill agreed to assist the Soviets to the greatest extent possible to prevent further withdrawal. To this end, a diversionary assault on the French coast was planned as early as the summer of 1942, if, as Marshall put it, "...such a desperate measure became necessary to lend a hand toward saving the situation on the Soviet front."²¹⁸ This operation was code-named "Sledgehammer."

Following Marshall's meeting in London, a subsequent conference between the British and American heads of state was convened in Washington, DC in June 1942. The meeting was largely the result of "interpolation" from the London meeting. At this

²¹⁶ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 83-85.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Ibid.

second Washington Conference, Prime Minister Churchill was accompanied by the Imperial General Staff and Marshall's counterpart, Field Marshall Sir Alan F. Brooke.²¹⁹

This conference was to further discussions on Operations Roundup and Sledgehammer as well as a possible operation in the Mediterranean. The main conference topics, however, were derailed as the British suffered "...a very black hour" in North Africa.²²⁰ Tobruk had been lost to the German Afrika Korps, led by Field Marshall Erwin Rommel and the British had retrograded to the El Alamein line. Illuminating the potential of a complete collapse of Allied integrity in the Middle East, if a massive Nazi dual pincer was to simultaneously attack through the British Army toward the Suez Canal while also assaulting the southern flank of the Soviet front toward the Abadan oil supply.²²¹

In July 1942, Marshall was again sent to London, this time accompanied by his naval counterpart, Admiral Ernest J. King. Discussions continued specifically to identify a means of relieving the beleaguered Soviet Army. The tentatively planned Operation Sledgehammer was ruled out as a possibility, due to the American shortage of available landing craft and deteriorating weather conditions along the English Channel. The one possible option remaining plausible, was an operation in the Mediterranean. While further from the German heartland, a Mediterranean attack still served a dual purpose of aiding the British in North Africa and providing a limited amount of relief for the Soviets.

²¹⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 83-85.

²²⁰ Ibid.

²²¹ Ibid.

Operation “Torch” as it became known, received approval from the allied heads of state and was to be executed as early as possible in 1942.²²²

The significance of this decision was three-fold in its effect on U.S. strategy and mobilization. First, Operation Torch consumed massive amounts of resources in both personnel and equipment from all services. The subsequent effect was a delay in combat power buildup in the United Kingdom for Operation Roundup in 1943, ultimately postponing the cross-channel invasion until 1944. Because of the Germany-First strategy, the delay of Operation Roundup also meant the continuation of strategic-defensive operations in the Pacific.²²³

Second, U.S. ground forces would be engaged with German ground forces in 1942 instead of 1943, when it could operate with optimal strength. Operations in North Africa bled resources from a direct, cross-channel approach against the Third Reich, but it also provided an opportunity for U.S. war planners to gauge strengths and weaknesses of the newly created Army of the United States. One of the main deficiencies of the Victory Plan, was that it did not estimate the requirement for replacements, because it could not be forecasted.²²⁴ Combat on the periphery of German Europe offered war planners a mechanism to measure the requirement for individual replacements in quantity and also modify procurement programs so that the appropriate types of personnel would be available to fill losses. Finally, it meant the current fast-paced activation schedule for

²²² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 83-85.

²²³ Ibid.

²²⁴ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 111-114.

AUS divisions was no longer necessary as the full weight of the National Army was not needed until 1944. This directly attributed to the highly confusing nature of multiple troop basis in 1942, with further implications in 1943.

The “Troop Basis” was a document used by the war department to essentially show a “...blueprint of the army, a budget of manpower, and a plan of mobilization.”²²⁵ It depicted the total authorized strength of the army in units and allotments of manpower, as of a specified date in the future, usually one year, but in other circumstances only months. It indicated the number and type of units to be mobilized (divisions, bomber groups, etc.) based on established objectives and major phases.²²⁶

Where the Victory Program set the overall strategic objective for the Army, troop basis documents established annual or phased benchmarks to be met in accordance with it. The activation schedule was in contrast, for major units, derived from the troop basis and marked incremental steps toward the accomplishment of troop basis objectives. The Protective Mobilization Plan best exemplifies an activation schedule that is composed of highly detailed blocks of information, which is revised in accordance with the circumstances of the moment. The purpose of the troop basis is nearly forfeit if revised multiple times throughout a given year. It was designed to be revised only in response to strategic necessity or extenuating circumstance.²²⁷

²²⁵ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 3; Robert R. Palmer, *Ground Forces in the War Army, Study Number 3* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 1-3.

²²⁶ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 3; Palmer, *Ground Forces in the War Army*, 1-3.

²²⁷ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 3.

Section II: The Army

Unprecedented growth in the Army characterized 1942. The troop basis in January 1942, established an end-of-year goal for the ground army at 3,600,000 and the Air Corps at 998,000 for a total of 4,598,000 troops. Accepted by the War Department, the model reflected an incremental step toward the overall end-strength established in the Victory Plan. The figure represented the maximum amount of combat power that could be procured, organized, and trained within that timeframe. Training which, was acceptable by virtue of necessity but horribly plagued by "...an acute shortage of officers."²²⁸ By the end of 1942, however, the total strength of the Army was at 5,397,674 personnel.²²⁹ An unanticipated requirement for service troops to prepare lines of communication and forward bases before the arrival of ground divisions caused the overage.²³⁰

Non-divisional service units were secondary to the development of combat arms divisions in 1942. Fully functioning divisions took longer to build, an entire year, due to a need for collective training to synchronize large multi-functional formations. Non-divisional units did not have a requirement at the same scale and scope. Therefore, the initial mobilization focus in 1942, was building the seventy-one divisions then authorized

²²⁸ Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, 13.

²²⁹ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 9; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 197.

²³⁰ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 31.

under the troop basis before shifting priorities to the service units, which took less time to create.²³¹

The result was a shifting demographic within the Army. The ground arms, which had represented fifty-two percent of the army in early 1942, had doubled in strength through the year but represented only thirty-six percent of the total force by the end of it. The service forces and Air Corps, on the other hand, had multiplied fourfold in strength. Marshall referred to the demand for these units as “insatiable.”²³² An unanticipated requirement for them in the troop basis equated to non-divisional units being created without authorization, which then contributes to an irregular, uncoordinated, and unwieldy activation schedule. To authorize these units, the troop basis was revised multiple times to address circumstantial necessities, even before the strategic shift to Operation Torch over Operation Sledgehammer or Roundup.²³³

By the end of 1942, with firm political and strategic guidance to execute Operation Torch, and peripheral operations in the Mediterranean, three variables continued to characterize the uncertainty of ultimate army strength: Russian survival, the success of strategic bombing, and the accuracy of casualty estimates.²³⁴ Nevertheless, a recommendation from the War Production Board in late 1942, submitted that a reduction

²³¹ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 9, 31; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 197.

²³² Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 9, 31; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 197.

²³³ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 31; Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, 12.

²³⁴ Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” 367.

in the troop basis was justifiable given the delay of the cross-channel invasion.

Specifically, it would take time to logistically stage additional units and equipment to forward bases in Europe, and likewise, time to develop the air component's capacity to inflict damage on enemy infrastructure. The recommendation was not to constrain the Army in light of the strategic variables already mentioned, but slow the diversion of manpower from the private sector when the induction could be temporarily avoided.²³⁵

The resulting troop basis in late 1942, set the goal for army strength in 1943 at one-hundred divisions for a total strength of 8,208,000 personnel.²³⁶

Given the massive expansion of the Army in 1942, it became necessary to fundamentally decentralize the Army, to avoid having the War Department embroiled in detailed decision making rather than focusing on broad policy. The decision's genesis was rooted in a War Plans Division recommendation in 1940, for a split between the respective air, ground, and service forces. In December 1941, the War Plans Division asked the General Staff to study the 1940 proposal, which resulted in the establishment of a committee to develop a plan for massive reorganization. Headed by Major General Joseph T. McNarney, the committee completed its plan in February 1942, calling for three major commands to be organized under the direct supervision of the Army Chief of Staff. The commands were designated the Army Air Forces ((originally the Army Air Corps) AAF), Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces ((originally the Services

²³⁵ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 368.

²³⁶ Ibid.

of Supply) ASF) to lead the air, ground, and service components respectively. The plan was approved by Marshall, Stimson, and Roosevelt and initiated on 9 March 1942.²³⁷

Under the newly reorganized army, responsibility for the training and organization of ground units now fell to Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, who commanded the AGF. Considering the challenges encountered by the Army in 1940-1941, when activating just eighteen NG divisions and bringing partially manned RA divisions to full strength, this was a monumental task. In 1942 alone, the Army of the United States expanded from an initial set of twenty-nine divisions to seventy-one divisions, not to mention the corps and army headquarters units necessary to control them. The forty units that were added did not have a pre-existing skeletal structure of professional leaders that constituted an easily “expansive” army. These new divisions were created from scratch, filled with draftees, and provisioned with a cadre from existing divisions.²³⁸

The Replacement Training Centers, now run by the major commands in lieu of respective arms and branches, were fully functioning by June 1941, with outputs reaching nearly 200,000 men per thirteen-week course cycle.²³⁹ The output, however, did not match the demand for activating draftee divisions in 1942, and would not until 1943. It was still necessary for divisions to train large contingents of brand-new recruits, while simultaneously training the organization to be effective as a fighting formation. The

²³⁷ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 255; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 68-69.

²³⁸ Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, 2-3, 5-6.

²³⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 23-27.

difference between this procedure in 1941 versus 1942, was the absence of experienced soldiers and leaders that rapidly indoctrinated recruits.²⁴⁰

To organize a new division, the first step was to provision a cadre, or nucleus, of trained personnel, that the division in its entirety was built around. In 1942, the only place where experienced leaders could be found was in divisions that already existed.

Experienced divisions were designated as “parents” and aligned with units that were to be activated in the future.²⁴¹ Marshall described the type of personnel required for this role as “high-caliber”, which indicates the predicament parent divisions encountered when forced to release quality and key personnel. The impact was worse in parent units in the final phases of training, when they had to seek new leaders from within the organization.²⁴²

There were two cadres, an enlisted and an officer component. The officer component consisted of roughly 200 men split among the infantry, artillery, engineer, medical, chaplain, signal, finance, special services, postal, general staff, and special staff elements. Of these positions, around 172-216 were drawn from the parent unit, which meant that an officer would become part of the cadre and drop from the division’s rolls.²⁴³ Other positions, such as regimental commanders, were designated by the

²⁴⁰ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 96.

²⁴¹ John S. Brown, *Draftee Division; the 88th Infantry Division in World War II* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky), 18-19.

²⁴² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 96-97.

²⁴³ The officer cadre from a division consisted of 172 in January 1942, increased to 185 in February, and again to 216 in March 1942.

commanding general of the AGF, or engineer company commanders who were designated by the Chief of Engineers; these types of positions would generally be filled from outside of the parent division, as personnel with that specification did not exist within the unit. As the mobilization progressed, parent divisions were required to generate two separate lists of cadres to keep sly commanders from placing the lowest performing on the cadre list while retaining the best performing. The creation of two lists meant one was selected at random and negated any real opportunity for divisions to ‘game’ the system.²⁴⁴

Officers for a new unit arrived at the division training site at four specified times, three of which were prior to the actual activation of the division. The commander and staff (twenty personnel), were the first of the cadre to arrive forty-three days prior to the activation, after attending a one-month course at the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth. The second element of officers (184 personnel), which formed the remainder of the officer cadre, arrived thirty-eight days prior, after attending a one-month instructor course at respective service schools (e.g. Infantry School, Field Artillery School, Engineer School, and so on). The third increment of officers was not cadre and arrived between twenty-two and nineteen days before the activation. This was the largest element with 471 personnel and did not come from a parent division but straight from their commissioning source. The final cohort was the “overstrength” who’s purpose was

²⁴⁴ Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, 8, 14-15; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 248.

to replace the new unit's future cadre. These officers began to arrive after the division had been training for approximately one month.²⁴⁵

Overstrength was a term for an allotment of personnel above the authorized combat level. There were several benefits for it, but primarily an overstrength was meant to fill vacancies without delay. Divisions in training, needed the surplus population of officers to offset the detrimental effect of losing experienced leaders for a cadre. Swiftly incorporating the overstrength, minimized experience gaps, facilitated the divisions continual focus on collective training, and permitted one hundred percent manning strength three months prior to deployment. The overstrength matched the type and quantity of officers that was expected to be relinquished by the parent division. Arriving one month after the division's activation allowed overstrength officers to develop a working knowledge of operations prior to the departure of the cadre, sometimes one month later. The overlap was intended to prevent an egregious capability gap that could not be overcome and also facilitated the early promotion of the overstrength officers.²⁴⁶ Be that as it may, the loss of critical personnel was a difficult proposition and some divisions, such as the 31st Infantry Division, were required to furnish multiple cadres before actually deploying.²⁴⁷

Between its federalization in November 1940, and its alert for overseas deployment in December 1943, the 31st Infantry Division trained a total of 39,980 men

²⁴⁵ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 96-97. Appendix I depicts a cadre timeline and organization for an infantry division.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 96-97.

²⁴⁷ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 248.

while it's authorized strength never changed from 13,469 men. In that thirty-six-month period, the 31st Infantry Division had actually trained a total of three divisions worth of combat power. Other examples were the 30th Infantry Division and 33rd Infantry Division. Later in the war, the 76th and 78th Infantry Divisions would share similar status as 'training divisions' that were repetitively stripped of leaders and retrained.²⁴⁸

The timeline of training for individuals and divisions alike followed a series of thirteen-week increments. Individuals were trained basic individual skills at Replacement Training Centers or within the Division's training site for the first thirteen-week block. Following this, inductees from the training centers were shipped to the division training site where the division was consolidated. The second thirteen-week increment focused on advanced tactics and techniques within the respective professions (artillery, infantry, engineers, and so on), gradually increasing in complexity from platoon to regimental levels. The third increment was divisional training where all components and specialties learned to function as a combined arms team. The final thirteen-week segment consisted of culminating maneuvers and field exercises where the division learned to operate as part of a higher headquarters (e.g. corps). Completing the fourth and final segment ended the universal training concept. In some instances, further training for eight weeks was conducted with multiple divisions consolidated at special training facilities in Tennessee, Oregon, or Louisiana where available land offered the opportunity to train for large-scale combat operations.²⁴⁹

²⁴⁸ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 250.

²⁴⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 97.

Section III: The Officer Program

In January 1942, War Department Circular Number 1, discontinued altogether the peacetime promotion systems for the NG, ORC, and retired officers on active duty. As planned in the Mobilization Regulations of 1939, a wartime promotion system was now in effect which applied to all officers of the Army of the United States equally.²⁵⁰ After entering the war, standards for earning a Regular Army commission were relaxed for some applicants. The rigid multi-phased entry exam was waived for those with a bachelor's degree but retained for those without. Nevertheless, the relaxation was short-lived as the regulation governing RA appointments (AR 605-8) was suspended in late 1942, due to the difficulty in administering the examination in hostile theaters. The appointment program would await the arrival of updated accessions policies following the war but guided in the interim by the 7 April 1943, War Department Circular 95. Appointments still occurred selectively in cases where specialists were needed such as the Judge Advocate General Department and USMA, but only appointed a total of 3,764 officers between September 1942 and 30 June 1945.²⁵¹

When considering the premier mode of officer procurement (Officer Candidate School), was almost exclusively reliant on the ranks; it's easy to imagine how an enlisted manning shortage can negatively impact the officer program. The activation of combat divisions outpaced the supply of inductees causing troop units to experience severe

²⁵⁰ Specifically, Appendix B, Special Promotion System, Mobilization Regulations 1-3.

²⁵¹ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145. 2,584 of those officers were USMA graduates.

shortage of manpower. That shortage created a rippling type phenomenon among the Officer Candidate Schools and throughout the Army officer corps that can only be described as a situation in extremis. An absence of inductees to fill officer quotas left the Army with two options; deplete the non-commissioned officer corps or leave the officer corps depleted.²⁵²

Even though the end-product of OCS, a competent officer, was ultimately purposed for the field force, the school experienced difficulty in receiving quality shares of manpower from the field units. Commanders did not want to give up their brightest and most promising enlisted men and non-commissioned officers. Marshall responded to the force simply with, “Blue chips only in the pot.” General Benjamin Lear, however, commander of the Second Army, wrote to Marshall on the severity of the subject, “We are decidedly short of the right material for noncommissioned officer leaders. We will pay dearly for this in battle.”²⁵³

Similar to a relaxation of standards, the Army took several actions to correct deficiencies in the officer corps. Some of the most challenging, however, emanated from sources beyond its control while others were self-induced. From the outset, the Army’s manning program was detrimentally affected externally, by the Navy and Marine Corps and internally, by its own Air Corps. As noted above, any manning problem the Army encountered, had a reverberating effect on the OCS and the officer corps by extension.

²⁵² William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 8.

²⁵³ Ibid.

The Selective Service System, as envisioned by Hershey, was not to repeat the mistakes of World War I where citizens were pulled into military service by all means, not just the conscription system. The premise of the World War II system was that the military establishment itself could best determine where talent should be utilized. That premise, however, became nullified as volunteerism and service recruiting continued by the Navy.²⁵⁴ The Navy obtained all of its manpower from volunteer and recruiting practices until 1942. The effect for the Army, was that quality personnel were stripped away from Selective Service, leaving the army with a cross-section of the American population that was inferior to those that entered the Navy.²⁵⁵

Another aspect of the Navy's recruiting campaign was very appealing for citizens of officer caliber. Where the Army opted to pursue the democratically virtuous OCS, the Navy in contrast appointed officers by virtue of their educational background, before attending any formalized military training. For many citizens, the decision between a fresh Naval commission and relegation to Army basic training was easy, causing many prospective army leaders to remain outside the reach of selective service.²⁵⁶ Moreover, because the Navy was an equipment based organization, simple math using the number of shipyards and the construction time of ships, enabled precision planning for naval manpower. Knowing how many officers were needed to officer the ships being built

²⁵⁴ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 94-96.

²⁵⁵ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 4; Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 8; Eiler, *Mobilizing America*, 111.

²⁵⁶ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 4.

allowed the Navy to capitalize on its own form of the Army Specialized Training Program (ASTP), the V-12 Program, to syphon even more quality men from Selective Service. Across the nation, at one hundred and thirty-one colleges and universities, untrained civilians in the tens of thousands were protected from the Army under the V-12 for the remainder of the war.²⁵⁷

Internally, the Army tormented itself with a dilemma in the apportionment of talent between the major commands. In January 1942, the Army Air Force informed the War Department that nearly half the men received in 1941, were inferior with regard to intelligence, which hindered their ability to perform the technical duties required. In response, the War Department mandated that at least 75-percent of all white inductees allocated to the air force possess an AGCT score of 100 or above. Both McNair of the Army Ground Forces and Lieutenant General Brehon B. Somervell commanding the Army Service Forces countered in mid-1942, that the “75-percent rule” jeopardized the officer corps, lowered the quality of the noncommissioned officer corps, and was not in the best interest of the whole Army.²⁵⁸

The 75-percent rule was rescinded on 18 July 1942, leading to another round of debate from General Henry H. Arnold, commander of the Army Air Forces, and subsequent counters from both McNair and Somervell. A temporary solution was imposed by the War Department on 7 September 1942, that stipulated the Air Force

²⁵⁷ Robert P. Wieggers, “The U.S. Navy V-12 Officer Training Program in Missouri” (unpublished article, 2019).

²⁵⁸ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 21-23.

receive monthly quotas of 50,000 men for September, October, and November scoring 100 or better on the AGCT and a Mechanical Aptitude Test. Ironically, the new preferential solution proved more favorable than the original 75-percent rule. Only a select population of inductees were able to achieve the desired score on both exams, which meant 75-percent of all inductees assigned to the Air Force in those months were from the top third of the Army's total induction.²⁵⁹

Another aspect of air force preferential treatment was in the form of retained pools. Even with the higher quality of personnel assigned to the air force, all were not successful, but all were retained, nevertheless. If an air force candidate failed flight school, as an example, he was not returned to the army at large to be reassigned to the Army Ground Force or Army Service Force, where he may have been perfectly suitable as a combat leader. Failures were reassigned within that command as enlisted personnel with more than a third remaining in the rank of private as messengers, orderlies, truck drivers, and assistant cooks.²⁶⁰ Hershey also complained toward the end of the war on a different type of manpower pool; air force cadets. He estimated that up to 200,000 young men had been stripped away from the Selective Service program and allowed to "...linger at home."²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 28-30.


²⁶⁰ James D. Trask, "United States Army Officer Development and Procurement during World War I and II: How the Army Grew its Officer Corps" (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 26 May 2016), 37.

²⁶¹ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 96.

Section IV: Officer Candidate School in 1942

The events of December 1941 created a dynamic that placed an extraordinary strain on the OCS. The United States needed a large army. The Army needed a competent officer corps to lead it. The fastest and most accepted method for creating those leaders was OCS. The OCS needed candidates, badly. The table below depicts the availability of officers in contrast with their skyrocketing demand in 1942.

Table 4. The Leadership Gap in Extremis: Disparity between Officers On Hand and Officers Required



Source: General George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 70.

Prior to 1942, any candidate of the OCS was required to possess a two-year degree. Recognizing the severity of the situation in January 1942, Stimson issued an open-door policy for the OCS that eliminated the requirement for a degree altogether. Any uniformed man possessing the minimum required score of 110 on the AGCT, could now apply for admission to the school and potentially receive a commission.²⁶²

Enrollment at OCS was controlled by the War Department which doubled its quota every three months in 1942. By the end of the year, OCS was producing twenty-three thousand officers per month, with 55,440 of those commissioned by the Army Ground Forces' schools alone.²⁶³ An exponential increase in 1942, was reciprocally marked by a trending decline of intellectual prowess among the candidates and likewise noted by observers from the Army Ground Force headquarters.²⁶⁴ The decline in candidate suitability was verified by an increasing academic failure rate across the schools, most notably within the armored, cavalry, and infantry. Armored school failures rose from just over three percent in February 1942 to nearly fifteen percent by December. The cavalry school reported academic failures just over one percent in July, increasing to nearly twenty-two percent in December. Finally, the infantry school failure rate rose from 1.8 percent in April to just over seventeen percent in November.²⁶⁵

²⁶² Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145-146.

²⁶³ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 8; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 139-145.

²⁶⁴ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 146.

²⁶⁵ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 9-10.

The effect is paradoxical in nature, the more the Army inducted, the larger it became; the larger it became, the more leaders it quantitatively needed as opposed to the qualitative number available for candidacy. McNair alluded to the need when responding to General Lear in late 1942, on the issue of NCO's being realigned as officers, "...we must not set up arbitrary standards and ignore the fact that we must have officers."²⁶⁶ The message was clear, the Army needed officers, period.

Institutional integrity of the OCS program offered a perplexing dilemma for OCS administrators in 1942, and became one of primary concern for the officer corps. Given the declining availability of intellectually competent candidates; while War Department quotas continued to increase, the challenge summed as a question was 'how do we preserve the integrity of the program?' To add depth to the dilemma, because OCS represented the primary means of officer procurement for the Army, 'how do we preserve the integrity of the officer corps while expanding it in extremis?'

As noted in Chapter 3, three areas continually presented OCS administrators with issues of objectivity, learning ability, education, and leadership ability. While a standardized entrance exam was in development (later known as the Officer Candidate Test), the AGCT was accepted as the interim tool to measure learning. Surveying multiple classes in 1942, the Army determined that candidates with a score of 110 or less on the AGCT sustained a failure rate of 61.3 percent while those from the same classes, with scores between 136 and 140, sustained only 17.4 percent failures.²⁶⁷ The

²⁶⁶ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 10.

²⁶⁷ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 329; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145-153.

significance is that while the AGCT might not have been the best mechanism for gauging candidate potential, it did indicate that candidates with higher scores fared better.

However, the Army at that time was not inducting better talent.

A formal standard for education was never established by the War Department after Stimson eliminated the college degree prerequisite. Collegiate degrees were still desirable but not mandatory. Guidance from the War Department is best described in paragraph six of War Department Circular 126, "...such education or civil or military experience as will reasonably insure...satisfactory completion of the course."²⁶⁸

Comparatively, leadership was difficult to measure as the War Department never codified a definition of it. Without defining the attributes and qualities of a leader, measuring leadership was not possible. In contrast to the 'learning' criterion, which at least had a test that was being developed and a temporary measure in the AGCT, 'leadership' never had a test developed to standardize it.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, a gauge for this criterion was attempted multiple times by the Army Ground Forces, which viewed it as an imperative over the other criteria. Specifically, five of those attempts at codification included a Life History Data Form, the Rorschach Inkblot Test, a Thematic Appreciation Test, a Preference Inventory, and a traditional pencil and paper Leadership Test.²⁷⁰ All of them, however, proved inconclusive or inadmissible considering the nature of the officer

²⁶⁸ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 2.

²⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 3.

²⁷⁰ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 154-155. See Coumbe for a more detailed synopsis of each measure.

gap. To gauge each candidate's leadership qualities the respective OCS selection boards were left subjectively asking themselves, "Would I be willing to follow this man in battle."²⁷¹

The absence of holistic measures and standards for the OCS program resulted in subjectivity by each selection board, as they were forced to develop internal metrics and measures to guide the respective programs.²⁷² Four methods were widely adopted by the Officer Candidate School as a means of "weeding out the undesirable and unfit, in order to maintain standards and protect the force"; retesting the AGCT and internally developed exams, intermittent screens during the course, preparatory schools, and the turnback policy.²⁷³

Retesting of the AGCT occurred at the beginning of the course as it was widely assumed by course administrators that the original exam was improperly administered. Additional exams were developed at some OCS locations. These localized exams were administered upon entry to the program and focused on the occupational specialty of that school. For example, the infantry school issued the Basic Education Test with emphasis on reading, grammar, spelling, and arithmetic. The Field Artillery School issued a similar exam used to screen out those with a low mathematical ability, while the Armored School's exam emphasized grammar, geography, and current events. Prevailing theory

²⁷¹ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 7; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 329.

²⁷² Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145-153.

²⁷³ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 18.

was that although the tests varied in structure and were simplistic in nature, they were all directly related to a candidate's ability to function properly as a platoon leader. An entry level officer needed to be able to 1) extract meaning from field manuals, 2) formulate and issue orders, 3) conduct clear instruction, and 4) solve mathematical problems.²⁷⁴ The issuance of both types of the exam (AGCT and local) was done to ensure borderline candidates actually possessed the intellect to pass the course and preserve finite army resources.²⁷⁵ Failure of either test did not, in and of itself, constitute a cause for relief but did establish a foundation for the, "...disposition to unload at the earliest opportunity..."²⁷⁶

Screening was implemented locally and conducted roughly three times throughout the course. The purpose of the screening was meant to determine three respective types of candidates as early as possible; those that were largely unqualified, those that were obviously qualified, and those that were borderline. Understanding which officers fell into the above categories made it easier to cut candidates efficiently, and focus instructor attention where it was needed most. The first screening conducted between five and six weeks into the course was meant to relieve or turn back those that were failing academically. The second test was conducted between the twelve and thirteenth week and targeted those that were weak leaders. The final assessment, between the sixteenth and

²⁷⁴ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145-153.

²⁷⁵ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 18.

²⁷⁶ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 351; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145-153.

seventeenth week, served three purposes; to address disciplinary or academic issues since mid-course, to decide what to do with those on probation, and to make a final recommendation on those that were considered to be qualified for a commission.²⁷⁷

Not all candidates were challenged by poor education. Some were just too immature or inexperienced. In an effort to maximize the potential of these candidates, OCS preparatory schools were authorized in 1942, at Replacement Training Centers. The preparatory schools were four weeks in length, giving OCS facilities the capability to retain up to fifteen percent of the center for a given class. An additional benefit to the prep school, was that it offered equal footing for soldiers in an unfamiliar field (e.g. enlisted infantrymen could be expected to perform better than a field artillerymen in the infantry OCS, thus placing the artilleryman at a peer disadvantage).²⁷⁸ General Harold R. Bull, the commander of the Replacement and School Command commended the preparatory schools, observing that, "...men are better prepared to undertake the course, have a uniform background, and those weak in leadership are weeded out, thus protecting school capacity."²⁷⁹

Finally, the turn back policy was another instrument developed to squeeze the most from a pool of potential candidates. In 1941, and in early 1942, while capacity in

²⁷⁷ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 337; Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 7-18.

²⁷⁸ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 18-20.

²⁷⁹ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 20; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 352.

the OCS system was being expanded, students were not offered a second opportunity at the course if they failed. The turn-back policy was then incorporated to ensure that any candidate who showed a reasonable potential of being developed into a satisfactory officer was not discarded. Between July of 1942 and January of 1945, one out of six OCS candidates were ‘turned-back’ to attend the course again and potentially still become officers. In 1943 alone, twenty-three percent of antiaircraft candidates were turned back, twenty-two percent of field artillery, and more than two and a half thousand infantry officers.²⁸⁰

Despite the efforts of OCS leaders, preparatory schools, and the turn-back policy, the challenge of producing competent battlefield leaders remained uncurbed due to a requirement for such vast and rapid officer corps expansion. Further compounding the issue was the lack of objective entrance standards that made no distinction between officer quality and officer qualified. To protect the officer corps and provide the right type of leaders, selection boards were left to wading through an ocean of subjectivity. The quality of candidates continued to drop and new, non-traditional, methods were explored out of sheer necessity, including an expansion of the OCS mission and the Volunteer Officer Candidate Program.²⁸¹

Between 1940 and 1942, the accepted mission of the OCS was to produce platoon commanders for field force units, a standard which placed curriculum emphasis on

²⁸⁰ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 20-25; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 354.

²⁸¹ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 145-153.

combat over administration. The Army's focus on officer procurement had shifted from an interwar paradigm, where intellectually gifted junior officers were sought for future employment over those that could be used for immediate employment. One of the main benefits for OCS was that it pulled talent from the ranks where many including Marshall believed the best combat leaders could be forged, better than ROTC or even USMA.²⁸² By mid-1942, the army had a requirement for 59,000 officer positions in purely administrative roles, a gap enlarged by the requirement for all candidates to be battlefield leaders first and foremost. To alleviate this gap, the War Department assigned a second mission to OCS in June 1942, "...to produce good administrators from those who lack combat leadership qualities."²⁸³

The second, non-traditional method adopted in 1942, to boost the OCS programs output was the Volunteer Officer Candidate (VOC). The VOC was any citizen who was technically deferred from obligatory service, due to issues such as dependency, that still chose to volunteer for officer candidacy. These candidates were sent to OCS and in the event of their failure, were returned to citizenry rather than face a continuation of service in the enlisted ranks. The program was initiated in March 1942 and produced a pool of 38,134 officers by the end of that year.²⁸⁴

²⁸² Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 142-145.

²⁸³ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 8-10; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 108-109.

²⁸⁴ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 323; Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 8; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 108.

Section V: ROTC, Direct Commissioning, USMA,
and the Woman's Army Auxiliary Corps

In the midst of the officer shortage, a proposition to expand the ROTC was taken under consideration but declined. Prominent leaders such as McNair were opposed to the expansion of an academically based leader program which required time when the army needed combat leaders immediately. McNair believed the correct focus was on converting the mass citizen-army into a fighting force as a first priority, an effort which only necessitated the procurement of "...competent, if intellectually limited, platoon leaders."²⁸⁵ In short, McNair saw no correlation between a college education and leadership. The less time in school, the better.²⁸⁶

Conversely, while not expanding the ROTC, the program presented a pool of draft deferred leaders that the Army began tapping in 1942. Inducted ROTC students were sent to OCS to complete officer training. In total, 513 ROTC students were inducted and commissioned through OCS in 1942, with the majority, 307, assessed to the Infantry. Other schools with ROTC students included the antiaircraft (89), cavalry (38), coast artillery (9), and field artillery (70).²⁸⁷

Demand for technical and skilled officers was no different from the rest of the officer corps. Admiralty lawyers for the Judge Advocate General's Department or contract negotiators for the Army Air Forces, are just a few examples of skills needed in

²⁸⁵ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 157.

²⁸⁶ Ibid., 157-159.

²⁸⁷ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 106.

plenty.²⁸⁸ The Army granted commissions for 47,000 officers (not including chaplains, doctors, and former officers) between 1942 and 1943, on the merits of their technical prowess.²⁸⁹ In some instances, entire groups of technical officials that were requisitioned by virtue of their “affiliation” with private industrial organizations. These groups were given similar status of normal officers, the best examples of these groups were qualified automotive and maintenance technicians. Although their combined experience boosted the Army’s knowledge base, it also caused challenges ranging from “Farcical to Tragic” as one report called it.²⁹⁰ These groups were not required to be indoctrinated through military training, but were afforded the customs and courtesies due their rank and expected the same in return.²⁹¹

Former officers were sought for their prior experience, which was useful in the Zone of the Interior to release otherwise capable leaders for expeditionary duty. Authority was granted to the Secretary of War, for awarding these commissions via the Army Reorganization Act of 4 June 1920. Under the provisions of this act, the emergency officers (i.e. officers without an RA commission) of World War I, could be commissioned to augment the RA. Additionally, the act went so far as to specify that no

²⁸⁸ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 160.

²⁸⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 88.

²⁹⁰ Bell I. Wiley, *Problems of Nondivisional Training in the Army Ground Forces, Study Number 14* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 42.

²⁹¹ *Ibid.*, 42-43.

less than fifty percent of the officers commissioned from civil life, be those who served as officers in World War I.²⁹²

The ultimate challenge for this procurement source was competing agencies within the Army and throughout the War Department. Up to this point, all procurement from civil life into the Army was run by four types of entities including the Officer Procurement Branch of the Adjutant General's Office, the Army Specialist Corps, the Army Air Forces with its own recruiting program, and the various other arms and services. The mixture of active recruiting and procurement campaigns resulted in confusing practices and policies for both the Army and prospective civilian volunteers.²⁹³

Three recommendations were made to resolve the matter in October 1942, after Stimson appointed a board to investigate the issue. First, the Army Specialist Corps was to be abolished as it would be largely redundant with the following recommendation; second, organize a single office to 'serve' all agencies of the War Department (Army and Navy); and finally, reclassify the War Department Personnel Board to the Secretary of War's Personnel Board.²⁹⁴ On the latter recommendation, the reason for the name change was to make the single procuring office answerable only to the Secretary of War. Earlier procurement avenues that answered to multiple branches and services discovered competing interests to be a large distractor from the mission at hand. The new, single

²⁹² Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 233.

²⁹³ Officer Procurement Service, *Officer Procurement During World War II* (Headquarters, Army Service Forces, 1945), 1-2; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 159-163.

²⁹⁴ The prior Army Chief of Staff General Malin Craig was actually called back from retirement to lead the newly named Secretary of War's Personnel Board.

source office was christened the Officer of Procurement Services and established in November 1942. Continuing to broaden the procurement program throughout 1942 and 1943, the office reached its peak capacity of 3,000 technically skilled civilian-officers per month halfway through 1943..²⁹⁵

At West Point, efforts to increase the output of the academy were sought to provide a positive effect on the war effort, while also avoiding the poor outcome of World War I, where all cadets were commissioned in a relatively short amount of time. Congress enacted legislation in two key areas on 3 June 1942, that greatly impacted USMA's operation. First, congress authorized the cadet corps to expand by thirty-seven percent to a grand total of 2,496. To fill the increased corps, additional congressional nominations were authorized for districts and states..²⁹⁶ Second, the Secretary of War was authorized to bring the cadet corps to full strength using the alternate list. In previous years there had been a significant issue with non-competitive nominees failing the validation test, creating a gap in the cadet corps which, went unfilled. Now the cadet corps had the ability to move through the academic year at maximum capacity. Finally, the curriculum was reduced from four years to three years which went into effect with the class of 1943. The class graduating in May 1942, commissioned a total of 374 officers..²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵ Officer Procurement Service, *Officer Procurement During World War II*, 8-10; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 159-163.

²⁹⁶ One additional congressional nomination per district, territory, DC, Puerto Rico, Panama Canal Zone, and an additional two nominees from each state at large.

²⁹⁷ Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy*, 1157-1205.

Additionally, the academy began issuing aviation instruction in order to commission officers directly into the Army Air Forces.²⁹⁸

In an effort to release as many combat soldiers for duty overseas as practical, a final non-traditional avenue of officer procurement was developed in 1942, with great success, the Woman's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC). Established on 15 May 1942, the purpose was to utilize women wherever possible, to release already trained and qualified men from interior zones to fill combat-related duties abroad. Initially, the WAAC was authorized a strength of 25,000 but increased to 150,000 shortly after in November 1942. The first training center for these women was established at Fort Des Moines on 20 July 1942, and expanded to three additional facilities at Daytona Beach, Florida, Fort Oglethorpe, and Fort Devens.²⁹⁹

Women were counted equal to men when computing manning levels, so enlisting women served the additional benefit of delaying the induction of men from the industrial or agricultural sectors at a ratio of one-to-one. The program for all auxiliaries consisted of the same four-week basic course. The breakout of specialties was initiated following that training, where women with special talents were sent to specialists schools, while the majority were sent straight to their assignments in the field.³⁰⁰ Those with leadership qualities were selected during the basic course and sent to a six week OCS, to receive

²⁹⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 90-95; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 164-170.

²⁹⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 87-88.

³⁰⁰ Specialty schools included administrative specialists, radio operators, repairmen, photographic specialists, and so on.

more intense military instruction in discipline, procedure, administration, and command responsibilities.³⁰¹

Section VI: Conclusion

General Marshall's statement about 1942 being a dark period during the war is understandable from multiple viewpoints. Strategically, the war effort was not going well for the U.S. The Japanese had crippled American naval forces in the Pacific, and strategic outposts in the Far East were in dire straits. In Europe, the Nazi's continued to batter the Russians while threatening the British in the Middle East. Some estimates called for the U.S. Army to reach combat strengths exceeding 300 divisions.

To achieve unity of purpose, several key meetings and conferences were conducted throughout the year between the Allies, mainly the British and the Americans. The earlier engagements of 1942 determined the course of cooperation, and the necessity to keep the Russian state from collapsing. The latter engagements, ending in mid-1942, illuminated the stark need to have forces committed in the Mediterranean theater, immediately if the Russians were to stave off defeat.

In terms of mobilization, 1942 represented the first year of mass expansion whereas 1940 and 1941, were characterized by rapid expansion, but done so with limited goals. Force expansion of 1942 was in extremis as the Army attempted to achieve mobilization goals in the shortest time possible. Thirty-eight combat divisions had been activated by the end of 1942 alone, bringing the total in the Army up to seventy-four with

³⁰¹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 87-88.

seventeen of those divisions moved overseas.³⁰² The War Department was restructured into three major commands to decentralize control over the infrastructure that had been created during the peacetime draft. However, in spite of enormous planning and preparation, the system was heavily burdened to cope with the induction of soldiers in the millions. Struggles to find means, measures, and methods to compensate for the strain was a fundamental necessity at all echelons in the Army. There was not enough equipment, there were not enough troops, there were not enough leaders.

Where manpower issues existed, so too did challenges in officer procurement. The officer program was fundamentally based on the continual reallocation of enlisted talent into the Officer Candidate School. That dynamic was abruptly stymied while the schools were building capacity in early 1942. Activation of combat groups and ground divisions outpaced the induction of manpower into the Army. Units in training had to contend with severe enlisted shortages which hamstrung the Army's principle officer generating mechanism. Second order effects of this became the inextricable fact that capable leaders, both commissioned and noncommissioned, were in a perpetual state of absence, especially after the culling effect of cadre formation.

Third order effects included field commanders unwilling to relinquish their most capable leaders for OCS, and the adoption of non-traditional measures and methods to protect the officer corps. Non-traditional measures were subjective in nature, implemented locally for the most part, and resulted from an absence of War Department-level standards, that objectively defined desirable attributes for junior grade officers.

³⁰² Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 374; Wiley, *The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions*, 5-6.

These measures included localized exams, retesting the AGCT, periodic screening reviews, the turn-back policy, and preparatory schools. The non-traditional methods were diversions entirely from accepted policy and included the Volunteer Officer Candidate and a secondary mission for the OCS, allowing administrative quality candidates to pass the course.

Other challenges during this period specifically affected the direct commissioning source. The need for technically skilled people was so robust that entire groups of civilians were brought into uniform, without military training, officers included. Though a benefit to the Army ultimately, these “affiliated” soldiers were expected to operate in the capacity of traditionally trained service members and abide by the same customs and courtesies in return. More significant for the direct commissioning procurement source was the foundational realignment of procurement agencies. Prior to 1942, there were multiple agencies across the War Department that competed with one another for talent. In November 1942, the Office of Procurement Services was created to quell the competition and bring order from confusion as the sole mode of procuring officers from civil life.

The most challenging issues in 1942, were paradoxical in nature and this year best illustrates that fact in multiple variations. To use an analogy, if a glass ceiling separated the military from the rest of the nation’s manpower reservoir, then glass walls formed the room separating Naval, Air, and Ground components, while glass cubicle divides formed a barrier between the Army Ground Force and the Army Service Forces. Reallocating talent horizontally was arduous, but largely unnecessary as manpower drove continued

to descend the escalator. The issue of talent management becomes central in the following year as America's talent reservoir is proven to be finite.

CHAPTER 6
WORLD WAR II ANALYSIS, 1943

Section I: The War Situation

The strategic situation in 1943, increasingly brightened, but did so while the nation's manpower reserve continued to decline.³⁰³ In short, it was a turning point in the war. By the end of 1943, the allies in Europe no longer found themselves on the strategic defense. The British under Field Marshall Montgomery had defeated the Axis forces at El Alamein while an American led task force had landed in North-West Africa and maneuvered against Field Marshall Rommel's west flank. The Russians had successfully defended Stalingrad on the Volga River, and were the focus of two-thirds of the German army and one-third of the Luftwaffe. Combined, these campaigns had dislocated the dual pincers of the Third Reich, and encircled both Italian and German combatants in Europe by land and sea.³⁰⁴ In the Pacific, the Japanese had miscalculated the collapse of the Russian Army at the hands of the German Wehrmacht, and the prolonged defense of the Philippines had upset their timeline for sequential operations in the southwest Pacific.³⁰⁵

Materially, the U.S. war industry was booming and providing resources to the Chinese, French, British, Australians, New Zealanders, Canadians, Russians, and Latin American Republics. Considering just Russia alone, the U.S. had provided more than 3,000 airplanes, 2,400 tanks, 109,000 submachine guns, 16,000 jeeps, and 80,000 small

³⁰³ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 368-370.

³⁰⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 68, 114.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, 83.

arms..³⁰⁶ To sustain this massive undertaking and its own expeditionary forces, a network of 56,000 miles worth of supply lines spanning the globe was procured, constructed, resourced, and manned..³⁰⁷

Operationally, the U.S. Army was engaged in North Africa with the British and later in Sicily with Operation Husky. The Army Air Forces were engaging simultaneous threats on ten separate fronts, and by mid-July had 1,000 heavy bombers based in the United Kingdom alone..³⁰⁸ The effectiveness of daylight bombing raids caused the Germans to reallocate production toward fighter aircraft in lieu of bombers, and to shift additional fighters away from the Russian front along with their experienced pilots to protect German infrastructure. Marshall wrote that the combined effect of the strategic bombing campaigns in 1943, caused the Axis to forgo any sustained offensive that summer just to concentrate enough aerial combat power to oppose allied offenses in the west..³⁰⁹

In terms of mobilization, “We are reaching the end of our expansion...” Marshall wrote in his second Biennial Report. The Army, which had been described as a third-rate power in 1939, had expanded by five million personnel toward the end of 1943. Its officer corps had grown from 93,000 to 521,000. One-hundred and eighty-two thousand of those officers were in the Army Air Forces, with service units that had grown by

³⁰⁶ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 86. These figures represent what actually arrived in Russian ports, not the total sent.

³⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, 70-75.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 76-80.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 83.

twelve thousand percent since 1941. The air component itself had grown by three and a half thousand percent and the Army Corps of Engineers by four thousand percent. The Army had become a formidable force.³¹⁰

Still, the period of mass expansion for the Army continued and so did its struggle to acquire the best-suited fighting force for ultimate victory. Those struggles were abundant. First, the force flow of units from ports in the U.S. to forward bases across the Atlantic was restricted by a lack of shipping capacity.³¹¹ Secondary effects of this included the overcrowding of personnel and equipment at ports waiting for transport, which then led to a third order effect of units lingering at training centers awaiting movement to the ports. Other antagonizing issues were equipping the French in North Africa in lieu of American training units, the new B-29 program that consumed an additional 130,000 personnel, the requirement to provision individual replacements for combat units rather than filling newly activated training units, the Army Air Forces rotation program, and the ASTP.³¹² All of which combined to offer the Army a complex variety of issues requiring internal reorganization and prioritization.

However, as the strategic situation developed, so too did clarity on the troop basis. Early estimations had provided a blueprint, but one in which many assumptions were

³¹⁰ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 69.

³¹¹ Frederick C. Lane, Blanche D. Coll, Gerald J. Fischer, David B. Tyler, and Joseph T. Reynolds, *Ships for Victory; a History of Shipbuilding Under the U.S. Maritime Commission in World War II* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1951), 143-144.

³¹² Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 375-376; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 278.

made on the outcome of future events. Throughout 1943, everything from the size of the Army, to the capacity of the American population, to balance a fighting force with industrial output, to even the type and ratio of fighting forces needed, became measurable and known. Armed with data provided through numerous committees and investigations, the Army modified its strategic blueprint further in 1943. This act had defining ramifications for the procurement challenges it endured that year.

Section II: Strategic Direction

Two conferences were conducted in 1943, that were fundamental to understanding the strategic direction guiding the continued expansion of the Army, and any departure it made from original plans. The first was a ten-day meeting in January between Roosevelt, Churchill and the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Casablanca, which also lent its name to that conference. The timing of the event was due to the success of the recent Tunisia Campaign and the necessity to develop a plan for future operations. Determining that a direct assault against the German heartland remained untenable, it was agreed to conduct additional operations in the Mediterranean Theater. Sicily was then the intermediate objective for an eventual invasion of Italy proper. The operation was given the code name ‘Husky’³¹³

Other details of a wide-ranging variety were also hashed out at the conference. In the far east, an increase in supplies was to be shipped to China. Operationally, the foundation was laid for a series of actions in the Pacific, which would set the conditions

³¹³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 83-85, 114.

for further piecemeal objectives in the south-southwest Pacific.³¹⁴ Strategic logistical planning for global operations was a big topic and the most pivotal long-term aspect was the continued buildup of combat power in the United Kingdom. A target date, or even code name, for the cross-channel invasion, was not set at the conference but an enormous logistical undertaking was a critical component for an operation on this scale.³¹⁵

Strategic planning for the cross-channel invasion is significant for the Army and included three critical aspects. First, the possibility of catastrophe was high against a veteran German army postured in the defense. Therefore, the one component of the Army that could be applied in advance of an amphibious assault, the Army Air Forces, was to be applied en masse. Second, the earlier decision to launch operations in the Mediterranean in 1942, instead of a direct assault in the summer of 1943, meant additional troop units were needed to consolidate gains and secure interests in the reclaimed areas. Those “additional” units would be posted in North Africa, and non-supporting of any cross-channel assault occurring in 1944. Third, the Army knew large scale operations launched from forward bases were logistically intense, but only began to fully realize the scope of that endeavor in 1942, with the buildup for Operation Torch and its sustainment. The plan now envisioned, required the “...provision for transportation, shelter, hospitalization, supply, training, and general welfare of 1,200,000 men...”³¹⁶ An

³¹⁴ Specifically, Attu and the Aleutian Islands.

³¹⁵ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 83-85, 114.

³¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 114.

extraordinary commitment of service personnel and organizations were needed to support the mass of combat troops envisioned.

The other conference of significance in 1943, was code-named Trident. Of all the conferences and high-level engagements Marshall took part in during the war, he referred to this one in particular as being one of the most “...historic military conclaves...”

Trident was conducted from Washington, DC in May 1943, just preceding Operation Husky.³¹⁷ For the first time since America had entered the war, the strategic plans coordinated at Trident were codified into firm commitments from the British and Americans. Earlier conferences and conversations had determined the need to collaborate, coordinate efforts, preserve the Soviet Union, and defeat Germany first. The Trident agreements offered a strategic, sequential layout of intermediate objectives to be accomplished within the broader strategy. Those intermediate objectives included the expansion of allied influence throughout the Mediterranean until Italy was forced to withdraw from the conflict. Axis satellite countries would be defeated, and American bombers would attack strategic infrastructure as far east as Romania. The long-anticipated cross-channel invasion was the final objective leading to a German defeat and it was at Trident, that a target date for Spring 1944, was set with the code-name of ‘Overlord.’³¹⁸

The significance of Trident for mobilization and procurement cannot be overstated. A strategy with military objectives is the essence that gives a mobilization

³¹⁷ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 115.

³¹⁸ Ibid.

plan viability. The organization of trained units, filled to capacity with material and trained leaders is built upon the broader strategy that indicates the time forces are to be ready, intermediate conditions that must be set, enemy to be fought, and terrain to be fought upon. It is strategic guidance that gives military planners that capability to estimate within a reasonable certainty, the size and type of army needed. Before Trident, accurate estimates were impossible, thereby flawing any plans for mobilization in extremis.³¹⁹

After Trident, the Army had an idea of where it needed to be in time, space, and purpose. It was now possible for it to adapt in accordance with strategic necessity and apply precision planning practices. At the beginning of 1943, the troop basis was projected at 8,248,000 personnel, with 105 combat divisions believed to be necessary for victory. By the end of 1943, the troop basis was reduced significantly to 7,700,000 with ninety combat divisions, which was still viewed as acceptable.³²⁰ The Army Air Forces were similarly fixed at 273 combat groups.³²¹ The disparity in strength indicates a huge flux in procurement policies and practices that occurred throughout the year.

Lowering the strength of the Army was a matter of necessity, and not a decision happily accepted by the War Department, because doing so incurred more risk. The leaner the Army, the narrower the margin for error and potential catastrophe if tactical

³¹⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 196.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 197.

³²¹ *Ibid.* The groups consisted of five very heavy bombardment (B-29's and 32's), 96 heavy bombardment (Flying Fortresses and Liberators), 26 medium bombardment, 8 light bombardment, 87 fighter, 27 troop carrier, and 24 reconnaissance groups.

outcomes were not favorable. Trident allowed for the reduction of the troop basis, but there were several other factors compounding the strength variable within the few months between early to mid-1943.

A Joint Strategic Survey Committee concluded early in 1943, that the original Victory Plan used flawed metrics to determine the troop strength of the Army, largely because the data required was unknown at the time. The committee argued that proper consideration was, therefore, not given to the efficiency of U.S. forces, allied air superiority, the effect of the bomber campaign, Russian resilience, uncertainties with shipping, and the belief that it was easier to reduce an over-expanded army than it was to recover from the lack of a suitable army, among other factors. The committee produced two recommendations; first, that shipping capacity be the primary factor governing the mobilization of forces, and second, to continue placing primacy in allied material production over the ultimate strength of the military.³²²

To further distill the recommendations made by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, Marshall created a committee led by Colonel William W. Bessel, Jr. to recommend changes to the military program based on the strategic situation as it existed in Spring 1943. The main focus was to determine if there was an additive benefit in building foreign armies in lieu of the U.S. Army. The “Bessel Committee”, as it was known concluded in April 1943, that there was little benefit in aiding foreign armies beyond those of the United Kingdom and Russia, if the expense was incurred by the U.S.

³²² Maurice Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994), 115; Matloff, “The 90-Division Gamble,” 369-370.

Army. Additionally, Bessel found a correlation between the mobilization and production programs, and national policy and strategic planning which needed to be linked. The time it took to produce a fully functional combat unit, necessitated planning in advance that was only offered credibility through strategic guidance. A realistic military program depended upon that guidance. Bessel also recommended a maximum troop strength of 8,200,000 million, based upon manpower limitations and the full development of the ground army and air force within that ceiling.³²³

Between both committees, the findings were fundamental as each proposed a reduction in troop strength from the Victory Plan's estimate of 8,795,000. Reinforcing these proposals, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee found that it was conducive given the strategic situation, and the Bessel Committee found that it was necessary to continue building the U.S. Army for application overseas. Armed with this information, American strategic leaders were then able to capitalize on the Trident Conference in May 1943.

Emerging from the Trident Conference with firmly set strategic guidance, Marshall created the Committee on the Revision of the Military Program, led by Colonel Ray T. Maddocks. The committee's purpose was to examine two items in particular, the threat of over-expansion if the Army continued its current course toward 8,248,000 personnel and the possibility of decreasing that troop level further. Concluding in June, 1943, the "Maddocks Committee", as it became known, made three recommendations

³²³ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 370-371.

which served as the foundation for a new troop basis that lasted the remainder of the war.³²⁴

Examining data, which was not available to Albert Wedemeyer in 1941, the Maddocks Committee first recommended a further reduction from 8,248,000 to 7,657,000 officers and men. Within this proposed troop ceiling, Maddocks also proposed that the Army be restructured around the eighty-eight combat divisions then in existence, and to delay the activation of the remaining twelve divisions until 1944. Maddocks' final recommendation was to await the end of summer in 1943 before making a final determination on the troop basis. Proposing a pause allowed the U.S. to evaluate further the success of a Soviet offense then underway as well as the American bombing campaign in Europe. If the Soviet situation and bombing effort looked favorable then the committee's final estimate was between sixty to seventy combat divisions required to defeat Germany, with an additional thirty to forty for Japan, and a strategic reserve. By mid-June 1943, both Marshall and Stimson approved of the committee's recommendations and following allied operations that summer, the new troop basis was submitted to Roosevelt in October and approved in November.³²⁵

Section III: The Army

In view of the above, the Army in 1943, was faced with a similar but different type of manpower crisis. Induction into the Army had been reduced by half from the four

³²⁴ Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, 179-180.

³²⁵ Matloff, *Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare*, 179-181; Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 373-374.

million ushered in, the previous year. No doubt, two million is still a large figure and the Army continued to grow, but the mechanical infrastructure was largely in place to absorb the shock where it had not been previously. What haunted the Army, was a departure from the troop basis “blueprint” mid-year, which had not been expected. Tying strategy to mobilization was undoubtedly a benefit for precision planning, but to do so meant slowing the activation schedule and procurement sources that had been operating at maximum capacity.

One positive aspect for nearing the end of expansion in the latter half of 1943, was that Army units no longer had to watch as their enlisted men and leaders were siphoned off to form cadres, or as students for OCS, or as technical students. Other aspects having a positive impact included the lengthening of basic training and officer candidate schools to produce a better manpower product. Training installations that had been a mainstay of the Army system as it grew, were reduced in strength to maintain the Army’s edge in manpower.³²⁶

Moreover, based on experience thus far with mobilization and worldwide combat operations, most notably Operation Torch, the Army had been geared toward known requirements. Triangular type divisions had replaced the antiquated rectangular organization. Armored divisions had been split into combat groups, and motorized divisions completely eliminated. Units were being modified not only for an optimal combat configuration, but also to spare the ever-short amount of shipping space available on transports. Multi-functional assets, such as transportation, were now held in pools at

³²⁶ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 75.

higher echelons and applied in accordance with mission necessities. All non-divisional units were similarly organized into battalions and attached to combat formations when and where needed. Airborne divisions were established along with numerous other units including port battalions and petroleum distribution units to name a few. As an example of the training capacity that existed, the rate of pilot production in 1943, was 75,000 per year not including glider, liaison, observation, British, Dutch, Canadian, Chinese, or women pilots. In comparison, between 1922 and 1941, only 7,000 pilots had been trained.³²⁷

Strategy, however, was not the only reason the Army had to reduce induction. Selective service shortfalls and unanticipated replacement requirements also played a defining role.³²⁸ By mid-1943, a manpower shortage of eligible inductees was evident, to the extent that reaching even reduced manning goals was an issue of concern. By September 1943, the total number of registrants for obligatory service was 22,212,000, which also included those physically and mentally unfit for service, as well as other deferring attributes such as occupational status or dependency. For the period of September to December 1943, the Army estimated its draft call at 1,221,000. However, the Army only expected 494,000 citizens to actually qualify from a Class 1A pool of 988,000. A significant hurdle then arose as any derailment from manpower induction had

³²⁷ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 81, 82, 97.

³²⁸ Appendix J depicts casualty figures between 1941 and 1943, and illustrates the ratio between officer and enlisted casualties.

a corresponding impact on the activation schedule for units and officer procurement sources.³²⁹

Despite the forecast manning shortage of mid-1943, Hershey believed the Selective Service System could still furnish the newly reduced strength of 7.7 million personnel for the Army (not including 3.6 million for the Navy) by July 1944. To do so, Hershey issued instructions to local draft boards to prepare for the induction of fathers (who had previously been deferred) to meet calls for the two million men needed to cover the manning gap. Hershey's move was not viewed favorably by the public, causing politicians to complain and some draft boards to resign. The last three months of 1943, failed to meet Hershey's induction quotas for three reasons; first, ongoing congressional debate over the exemption of fathers, second, local draft boards became confused (largely because of the debate), and third, due to persevering heavy rejection rates at reception centers. The resulting derailment of selective service induction, left the army at ninety percent in manning strength from where it was supposed to be under the revised troop basis.³³⁰

Replacements offered another type of challenge for the Army in terms of battlefield loss fillers, and fillers for the Army Air Forces rotation plan. The replacement system itself was new, in that it was based on the individual, not the unit as in past wars. Under the individualized system, unit casualties were replaced rapidly with individuals from a rear area. The system was similar for both the Army Ground Forces and Army Air

³²⁹ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 270.

³³⁰ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 100.

Forces. Keeping front line units as close to full strength as possible, without having to withdraw them was the main goal in this type of system, in order to sustain protracted land combat at the tactical level. Doing so allowed the Army many benefits as it moved from campaign to campaign with a larger army, but fewer and fewer planned combat divisions. First and foremost, the United States did not have a huge population advantage over the Germans, and therefore did not have the wherewithal to reconstitute entire divisions or aerial combat groups. A second benefit of similar importance was that fewer combat divisions meant fewer service type units that were required to maintain them. This aspect gave the War Department an ability to field essential combat units, while also building massive naval and shipping programs, and mitigate negative effects on national production.³³¹ Limiting the number of divisions on the battlefield, and keeping them engaged, however, increased the risk of exhaustion which led to carelessness, which also meant an increase in casualties.³³²

In 1941, when the original Victory Plan was created, an estimate of replacements was not submitted. Marshall stated that doing so was essentially impossible, because the methods by which an army could be depleted of manpower in three-dimensional warfare was incalculable. Those primary factors affecting the attrition equation "...defied long-range calculation."³³³ Yet, Marshall also recognized the need for accurate estimation,

³³¹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 198-199.

³³² Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 475.

³³³ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 198.

preferably a year in advance, to ensure the right quantity of personnel were on hand and in the right specialties.³³⁴

A good understanding of the replacement situation did not exist until 1943, by virtue of the 1942 lessons the Army had learned over the skies of northern Europe and in the deserts of North Africa. Operation Torch in 1942, allowed the Army to modify its fighting formations in time for subsequent operations in Sicily and Italy. As an example, the Army learned that armored formations accumulated heavy casualties in North Africa. Therefore, the replacement system was modified to ensure the availability of additional armored crew replacements before Operation Husky. However, the terrain in Sicily and Italy differed from North Africa. These operations made the armored crew pool, largely useless and left field commanders struggling to compensate for a lack of infantrymen needed to fight in rugged terrain.³³⁵ Where armor had been the primary focus at training centers at the outset of 1943, suddenly became secondary to more infantry, a modification that hindered the Army again, as it fought through northern Europe in 1944.

In the air, the Army learned several different lessons which also contributed to the strain on replacements. In Europe, while the Eighth Air Force was heavily engaged in daylight bombing missions, the Army found it prudent to replace mission casualties the same day or risk the emotional and mental integrity of crews. Relief crews had to be provided in sets of three per aircraft to reduce stress further, and the entire crew was rotated back to the United States after twenty-five missions. By comparison, crew

³³⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 198.

³³⁵ Ibid.

rotations occurred after fifty missions flown in the Mediterranean Theater where fatigue was lighter. In the Pacific, similar issues persisted with the isolation of airfields and reduced numbers expedited the need for aircrew relief. Due to terrain, however, separate issues emerged, which affected ground maintenance crews, who worked through the night during hours when disease-carrying insects were abundant. The result was unanticipated levels of non-battlefield casualties sustained by service personnel.³³⁶

The pipeline, so to speak, of manpower flow from the respective training centers to combat zones was time-consuming, extensive, and another variable that was not accounted for in the 1941 Victory Plan. From the corps area reception centers, inductees then received basic training from the replacement training centers of the major commands. In 1943, with the height of expansion passed, basic training programs (and OCS) were expanded to seventeen weeks to provide a more polished soldier for the veteran unit to absorb. Upon completing basic training, the replacement soldier was allowed a period of furlough before reporting to an overseas replacement depot for transit. Once in a combat theater, the replacement was sent to the rear area of the army group he was ordered to. Once in the army group, replacements descended a pyramid of replacement depots from the army group, to the army, then to the corps, and finally, to the division's replacement depot or regimental reserve position for assimilation. The time span from start to finish was a half year in most cases, and closer to one year for officers.³³⁷

³³⁶ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 198.

³³⁷ Ibid., 199. An expanded list of Replacement Training Centers in 1943 is provided in Appendix K.

The timing of the troop basis reduction in 1943, also hindered the Army's effort to tailor its force. Realizing the significance terrain played in replacement planning, the Army then had to work within reduced manning ceilings to cultivate just the right force to be applied against enemies in terrain ranging from desert to woodland, mountain to jungle, in the air and on the ground.

As discussed with Selective Service above, a significant conundrum for the Army was the dwindling supply of induction eligible personnel. In January 1943, the War Department G-1 warned that manning goals over eight million, which the 1941 Victory Plan envisioned, would approach the limit of total personnel available, and recommended the Army internally restructure to become more efficient. In response, Marshall created the War Department Manpower Board, before departing for the Casablanca Conference. Led by Major General Lorenzo D. Gasser, the board's purpose was to explore options for reducing the number of troops in the zone of the interior (essentially the continental United States). In April 1943, just before the Trident Conference, the War Manpower Commission reinforced the warning of the G-1 in January, estimated only 1.5 million men available for induction in 1944, and emphasized the importance of scrutinizing manpower apportionment. Further still, the joint estimate in 1943, for army and navy replacements needed in 1944, was 971,000 men. The cumulative effect of these assessments is that unless the Army underwent significant internal economization, the manpower shortage would continue into 1944, to a point where not only individual replacements, but the strategic reserve, would be endangered.³³⁸

³³⁸ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 374-380; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 200; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 276.

Fortunately for Marshall and the Army, General Gasser's team "...achieved remarkable results." Having traveled to every service and training command, Gasser's board produced several recommendations for the redistribution of personnel, most notably identifying a total of 345,000 physically fit personnel to be sent forward to combat zones, or retrained where possible, for service branches in demand (i.e. infantry).³³⁹ Other economies included policy shifts that allowed personnel disabled in war zones and civilians to replace able-bodied personnel. Further emphasis was applied to the Women's Army Auxiliary Corps, while Headquarters staffs and other various overheads were reduced to allow up to an eight percent increase in fighting soldiers within combat divisions.³⁴⁰

Section IV: The Officer Program

Seemingly in contrast to the Army's manpower shortage issue, the officer corps reciprocally entered a phase of surplus. A surplus which, spawned from the reduction of the troop basis in 1943, was unexpected for procurement planners who developed these programs months in advance. Magnifying the issue was a moral dilemma for the Army pitting potential enlisted talent against groups such as the Voluntary Officer Candidates (VOC) and ROTC. In the midst of a reduction, not everyone could be officers, so the

³³⁹ Of the 345,000: 143,000 from AGF training installations and commands, 65,000 from the Army Air Force, 25,000 from the Service Ground Forces, 12,000 from Defense Commands, and 100,000 from Theater Communication Zones. Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 200.

³⁴⁰ Palmer, *The Mobilization of the Ground Army*, 32; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 200.

Army had to determine where it placed priority, in the morale of the Army or in the obligation given to collegiate cadets and deferred candidates.³⁴¹

As described earlier in this chapter, combat in 1942, had revealed several opportunities for the Army to adjust its force structure. As such, some fields that had been assumed necessary for the Victory Plan, were no longer critical or needed. The antiaircraft field is a prime example. In 1943, antiaircraft personnel were being trained at a similar rate as in previous years, but the anticipated need no longer existed. Enemy air power was not as powerful and threatening as had been believed, largely because the combined allied air powers were so successful in quelling the threat. The result was a growing pool of units and officers without a defining purpose.³⁴²

The Army was adjusting to the threat, albeit non-efficiently which might be expected of an enterprise on this scale. Reducing the troop basis though, was largely unanticipated and one reason necessitating an aggressive economy program. Working with guidance to seek out inefficiency, General Gasser's report (followed by the Army Inspector General), noted several areas that were excessive. By December 1943, tactical antiaircraft units were carrying an officer overstrength of one hundred forty-one percent on their rosters. The antiaircraft surplus pool numbered up to 10,000 officers. Across the Army at large, the Inspector General found an excess of 51,000 officers. It was clear then that the Army had inadvertently entered the arena of officer overproduction which caused

³⁴¹ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 10.

³⁴² *Ibid.*, 16-18.

some critically short branches like the infantry, to suffer while surplus officers were located, retrained, and moved forward.³⁴³

Another challenge regarding unutilized officers were the actual pools designed to furnish rapid and ready replacements. Reclassification proceedings were so cumbersome that it was easier for units to continually rotate poor performing officers from the unit to the pools, back to a different unit, and so on. The adverse effect of this unofficial procedure was an ineffective replacement program. Needing quality replacements and not receiving them from the “pool” where they allegedly existed, led the War Department to authorize an overstrength in training units above and beyond the cadre allotment. Doing so offered new leaders experience in tactical units before getting shipped overseas as individual replacements, but also meant the 18,500 replacement officers needed in 1943, came from tactical units, not the replacement pools.³⁴⁴

Officer Candidate School

The War department first attempted to slow the production of officer procurement in December 1942, to avoid an eventual surplus and issued a directive on the fifteenth, cutting the infantry OCS by fifty percent or 2,200 per month. The AGF disagreed, as a reduction threatened the overstrength in training units which served many purposes in providing experienced officers for a variety of positions. The cutback was sustained in December, preceded by another significant reduction of 1,705 total officers per month

³⁴³ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 16-18; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 321-322.

³⁴⁴ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 321-322.

occurred the following May in every AGF branch, except the antiaircraft.³⁴⁵ Still, the overproduction of officers continued in 1943, and further illuminated the need for long-term planning practices when dealing with officer procurement.³⁴⁶

Continuing the drive of 1942, to decentralize the Army and maximize detailed decision making by subordinate commanders, the War Department also delegated the control of the OCS program to the respective major commands on 16 March 1943. Prior to this, the numbers of candidates to be trained monthly was similar to a rheostat. The War Department controlled the flow by setting a quota by branch and left subordinate commands to figure out how best to fill them. Therefore, in Spring 1943, the optimal number of candidates needed for the Army was then selected by the major commands.³⁴⁷

For the Army Ground Forces, this caused immediate issues as it had no significant pre-existing experience in managing this type of personnel business. The AGF had to assemble vast sums of detailed data on the status of the entire officer corps, in order to develop a mathematical formula to determine the appropriate quota each month.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ Failing to reduce the antiaircraft allotment within the troop basis is one reason unutilized pools of these officers existed by December.

³⁴⁶ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 112-113. Appendix L depicts the locations of OCS facilities in 1943.

³⁴⁷ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 10-13.

³⁴⁸ Appendix M depicts this formula. Examples of the data required to populate the equation included the number of officers in AGF pools and overstrength in units, the number of officers on loan to the Army Service Forces and Army Air forces, the number of officers currently in OCS, other surplus officers within the Defense and Theater Commands. Time was also a planning factor, for example officers were to be available ninety days prior to a division's activation, and so on. Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 10-13.

Acknowledging that the AGF did not have the ability to set quotas immediately, the agreement with the War Department, was that the AGF would set its first quota independent of War Department oversight in May. Quotas were published three months in advance, so the AGF's first quota in May, was developed for July of 1943.

The challenge of overproduction in the OCS was realized in July, when the War Department released the new troop basis that detailed a reduction of twelve divisions and other slimming alterations to headquarters and overhead. Of the hundreds of thousands of troops cut from the mobilization plan, 30,000 of them were officers the AGF was planning for. The quota for July indicates a shock to the procurement system as the OCS program attempted to compensate within the new force structure. Field artillery and tank destroyer officers were reduced by sixty-seven percent, antiaircraft officers by seventy-five percent, cavalry, infantry, and coast artillery were cut by fifty percent. Because quotas were produced months in advance, the heavily reduced July quota did not begin to affect the procurement of officers until August of 1943.³⁴⁹ Every subsequent quota until June of 1944, was less than 1,500 officers per month in the AGF, and even dropped to just 390 per month in October and November 1943.

Substantially reducing admissions was undesirable but allowed major commands to compensate for overproduction. One benefit of the reduction was that it allowed the OCS program to become more selective as the challenge of finding quality candidates continued that year. In January 1943, an Inspector General inspection of nine OCS facilities revealed a persisting theme from 1942, concluding that "...there has been a

³⁴⁹ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 12.

definite decline in the quality of candidates [in recent months].”³⁵⁰ Several recommendations were made, notably raising the AGCT entrance score to 115 and substantiating examinations similar to USMA.

Extending the OCS to six months was another proposal submitted by the Army Service Forces and War Department G-1, believing there was no emergency for officers at that time and an opportunity to increase educational prospects for candidates was at hand. As in December 1942, with the War Department and the Inspector General in January 1943, the AGF again opposed any heightened restrictions for fear of depriving the Army of combat leaders. In the end, raising the AGCT score was not implemented, but OCS was extended from thirteen weeks to seventeen weeks in May 1943. Given the already reduced posture of the OCS program in 1943, had the AGF continued filling quotas at the late-1942 rate of more than 6,000 per month, the benefit-to-cost factor is questionable for the purpose of creating “competent” leaders.³⁵¹

A final challenge for the OCS program in 1943, was the ASTP, which developed technically skilled soldiers in scientific, engineering, medical, and linguistic fields. The program, essentially army internal college deferment, was announced in September 1942, and initiated that December, but did not operate at full capacity until Spring 1943. The targeted pool of applicants were men, twenty-two years of age and younger who had a minimum score of 110 on the AGCT and had already completed basic training. The

³⁵⁰ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 146.

³⁵¹ Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools*, 25; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 146.

ASTP program in total was composed of 150,000 soldiers that attended more than 200 select colleges and universities over a two-year period. Upon completion of the academic requirement, soldiers were transferred to the respective commands for utilization in skilled positions.³⁵²

The challenge for the Army was trying to balance long term requirements with short term needs. The purpose of the ASTP was to prevent the absence of technically skilled soldiers in the event of a protracted war lasting into the late 1940s. In this respect, the ASTP was to furnish a continual source of soldiers to fill that requirement. In the short term, however, the program was seen by many, including McNair and Hershey, to have negative consequences as the most promising men were diverted away from OCS, and by extension, combat units. Author George Flynn writes that Hershey, essentially the face of selective service, was an adamant critic of the program because it harbored what he considered draft dodgers. Hershey thought it, “destructive of public morale.”³⁵³ The ASTP with its “diversion” of 150,000 men in the midst of a manning crisis was a program that Hershey said had to be established, “over my dead body.”³⁵⁴ The source of his angst was that while the Selective Service System was forced to draft fathers, the

³⁵² United States War Department, *Essential Facts About; the Army Specialized Training Program* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1943), 2-3; Louis E. Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes; The Story of the Army Specialized Training Program in World War II* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, Inc. Publishers, 1988), 51-53, 62-63, 66-73; Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 273; Brown, *Draftee Division*, 15.

³⁵³ Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 99.

³⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

ASTP accepted perfectly capable young men, and in essence, shielded them from combat for years.³⁵⁵

Reserve Officer Training Corps and the Volunteer Officer Candidates

Even dropping OCS quotas into the mere hundreds by late 1943, the Army was still producing more officers than needed to avoid future surplus.³⁵⁶ The reason was morally rooted and emerged as the number of prioritized candidates for OCS began to outweigh the number of trainee slots available. One category of candidate was the enlisted troop, which Marshall had long prioritized for the preservation of morale throughout the Army. A second category was comprised of personnel the Army felt obliged to commission, and included, among others, the VOC and ROTC. Although the deferred status of fathers had been dropped in the latter half of 1943, the VOC quota for candidates continued through the tumultuous period of congressional debate in that autumn. The VOC program was ended later in 1943, but not before presenting the Army with an obligation to commission those that were selected as prospective officers.³⁵⁷ A third group was OCS candidates that had to be returned from overseas assignments where a forward located OCS facility had yet to be established.³⁵⁸

³⁵⁵ Brown, *Draftee Division*, 15; Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 164-169; Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 99.

³⁵⁶ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 12-13.

³⁵⁷ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 323.

³⁵⁸ Great Britain and Australia each possessed an OCS facility that was not controlled by the AGF, ASF, or AAF. All other overseas locations returned OCS candidates to the United States.

The Reserve Officers Training Corps offered the most complexity due to its size. Inductions of advance course ROTC students had increased in 1943, to a level numbering more than 5,000.³⁵⁹ These students fell into three groups. Group one was the senior class of 1943, which had completed all four years of the basic and advanced courses, but not the culminating summer training exercise. Group two were also college seniors, but from the class of 1944, because their studies had been accelerated. This group was scheduled for graduation in late September. The final group was composed of accelerated college juniors (class of 1945). This group was unable to graduate before induction but had completed one year of the advanced course.³⁶⁰

The belief held by the Army was that an obligation to commission was owed to these inducted students, who had freely contracted with the ROTC. The heart of the issue was finding a way to push students through the OCS program when they became available, in bulk, at set periods throughout the year. A study was initiated in May 1943, to determine a mitigating solution for OCS intake, but evaporated quickly once the troop basis reduced candidate requirements to a point where it was not possible to appease all categories of potential officers. The issue was now a hot administrative topic for the War Department as one priority had to outweigh the other.³⁶¹

³⁵⁹ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 13-14.

³⁶⁰ Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 116-118.

³⁶¹ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 13-14. Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 118.

An ideal solution was never found, and students were incrementally pushed through OCS, which in part contributed to the overproduction issue. Group one (Senior, '43) from above was placed into pools and filtered into the OCS system between June and September. Group two (Senior, '44) was filtered in between September and November. Group three (Junior, '45) was the most irregular; this group was inducted in December 1943 and sent to replacement training centers for basic training. The deviation to basic training was because they had neither completed the second year of advanced ROTC, nor completed the basic training requirement expected of all other candidates. They were, however, offered the opportunity for selection to OCS upon passing leadership and intelligence-oriented exams. Most were able to attend OCS between December 1943 and May 1944. Some were even offered the opportunity after basic training to apply for the heavily reduced ASTP, and to return to their academic institutions..³⁶²

Not wanting to abandon the enlisted personnel and close the figurative door for their advancement, quotas for the troops were set at the absolute minimum believed necessary to uphold morale. During this period, July to December 1943, only two thousand enlisted candidates attended OCS. In September 1943, the ROTC advanced course was suspended, leaving the basic course functioning at select colleges and universities to restart the program after the war..³⁶³

³⁶² Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 13-14.

³⁶³ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 156-159; Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 13-14.

Direct Commissions and USMA

Civilians offered direct commissions, fit into every field of the Army by 1943. Engineers were sent to all theaters to accompany troops, assist, and observe mechanical operations. Arguably, the most prominent civilian awarded a direct commission was William S. Knudson, who oversaw the production efforts of the War Department from 1942-1945, as a lieutenant general. By mid-1943, the Office of Procurement Services had reached its peak with three thousand officers from civil life, commissioned every month. Thereafter, as with every other procurement source, the program was heavily reduced and heightened scrutiny of each applicant observed.³⁶⁴

Likewise, a battlefield commission was a type of direct commission not controlled by the Office of Procurement Services. These commissions were awarded by division or higher-level commanders in combat theaters for noteworthy performance on the battlefield. In February 1943, as the reduced troop basis was being contemplated, theater commanders were instructed to appoint officers from within their own ranks using this method to avoid gaps in battlefield leadership.³⁶⁵ By December 1944, appointments made on the battlefield amounted to one thousand officers per month.³⁶⁶

Unlike other sources of officer procurement, the USMA was able to continue its rigorous, albeit shorter, system throughout 1943, and the remainder of the war. Fueling

³⁶⁴ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 89-95; Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 162.

³⁶⁵ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 142.

³⁶⁶ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 327; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 154.

this unique capacity was the patriotic fervor of some applicants, a means of avoiding the draft by others, and an avenue to a taxpayer-funded elite education by the rest. For the first time in 1943, the corps of cadets both reached historic strength at 1,100 enrolled and also felt the impact of the previous year's congressional decision to reduce the curriculum. Two classes graduated in 1943, the first in January after a total three and a half years at the institution and the second in June after only three years of course work. The total of both classes this year equaled nine hundred and fourteen, an increase of five hundred and forty-nine from 1942's single class.³⁶⁷

WAC and General Officers

Recognizing the potential of the Woman's Army Auxiliary Corps, Roosevelt signed legislation on 1 July 1943, that transitioned the corps from an auxiliary force into a component of the Army. The significance is that the 65,000 women serving across the world on two hundred and forty posts, camps, and stations now had rights to army responsibilities and benefits where they had no standing previously. The appeal of the new Women's Army Corps was heightened and a further 40,000 women officers and enlisted joined the corps within the following twelve months.³⁶⁸

General officers offered a different type of challenging opportunity for the Army. In 1941, the number of flag officers was three hundred forty-three across the total army. By June 1943, that number had increased to one thousand and sixty-five serving in

³⁶⁷ Coumbe, Condly, and Skimmyhorn, *Still Soldiers and Scholars?*, 164-170; Cullum, *Biographical Register of the Officers and Graduates of the U.S. Military Academy*, 1205-1309.

³⁶⁸ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 87-89.

command and high-level staff positions. Over eight hundred of them were temporary assignments at the general officer grade, but still made the determination of who was best qualified a complex ordeal for the Army. One contributing factor for army boards selecting these officers was the ever inflated and erroneous Officer Efficiency Report.³⁶⁹

As an example, by 1938, only five percent of the officer corps received ratings “below excellent”. The point of frustration is that when ninety-five percent of the officer corps is somewhere above “excellent”, it becomes difficult to separate those truly capable of higher responsibility from those that do not. To reinforce the example, expansion in 1940, created an instant requirement for fifty general officers. Four thousand were eligible by grade and experience, and two thousand were rated “Superior”. Marshall and the selection boards in 1940, then had to rely principally on their own judgment and personal knowledge of the officers themselves to make decisions about who would lead the Army.³⁷⁰

Section V: Conclusion

An improving strategic situation coupled with the shortening of America’s manpower supply are two great characterizations of 1943. War for the allies had transitioned from strategic defense to offense after the Russians and British emerged victorious from the battles at Stalingrad and El Alamein. Strategic direction became clearer than after conferences in Casablanca and Washington, DC affirmed, in much

³⁶⁹ Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 89. Appendix N offers a depiction of the General Officer breakout on 30 June 1943.

³⁷⁰ Coumbe, *A History of the U.S. Army Officer Corps*, 181-194.

greater detail than previous years, how and when the allies were to continue the war.

Greater detail emanating from these conferences, combined with the U.S. Army's recent experience in North Africa, and refined information on the nation's declining manpower reserve, allowed planners to reduce the troop basis that year.

Economies were required, though if the Army was to stay within the newly lowed troop limit. However, several events occurred throughout 1943 which heightened demand for some categories of Army personnel, where it was not expected or created surpluses in other army fields no longer necessary. Continually gearing the Army toward a more effective fighting formation, force structure modifications were made that reduced the need for some specialties, or eliminated them altogether, from where they had earlier been in high demand. Antiaircraft units are a prime example, a capability that was forecast to be paramount was largely nonessential by virtue of growing allied air superiority. Another issue was Selective Service falling behind on its planned induction, an aspect that was further complicated by moral debate in congress, over the essential service of a specific deferred class, fathers. Finally, the replacement and rotation program began to raise hurdles for continued expansion. Terrain on one battlefield, necessitated greater ratios of armor, where in others, infantry was required in abundance, a phenomenon that caught the replacement program off guard due to the lack of strategic guidance in future operations. The Army Air Forces' rotation program necessitated heightened relief crews in theaters, where combat was heavy such as Europe or the environment took its toll on ground maintainers.

Within the Army's officer program, the reduced troop basis was unexpected by the major commands that had just assumed control over the respective OCS programs.

Lingering officer pools formed, as a result of continual force restructuring and had to be located by specially formed committees and the Inspector General. Officers within the replacement pool itself were poor performers, placed there time and time again by commanders that found reclassification procedures too cumbersome. Without a properly functioning replacement pool, overstrength authorizations on training units bore the brunt of training individual replacements in 1943.

Officer Candidate Schools began overproducing officers in the latter half of 1943 for two reasons: an inability to reduce the monthly quota for months after receiving the new troop basis, and a moral obligation to continue commissioning special categories such as the Volunteer Officer Candidates and inducted cadets from the Reserve Officer Training Corps. Further constraining the quality of potential, available for the OCS was the Army Specialized Training Program that consumed 150,000 for protracted academia.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Section I: The Nature of Manpower Challenges in 1944 and 1945

War continued in Europe, and so too did manpower challenges and related officer procurement hurdles. The challenges for officers were fundamentally different in this period from previous years. By significance and quantity, the issues faced by the Army's officer program were minimal by comparison. The officer corps continued to evolve as the Army dynamically adapted, but was foundationally solid by this time, only tweaking where necessary to meet the Army's current need.

As a cumulative result of the Army's manning shortage by the end of 1943, the manpower toll for a B-29 program, personnel expenditures for the rotation and replacement programs, and other factors, the Army was forced to restructure once again.³⁷¹ To meet these various needs and provide the force necessary for Operation Overlord, the challenge this time, required the Army to scrap the plans it had for activating additional combat divisions just to stay below the manning threshold established by the 1943 troop basis of 7.7 million men and women.³⁷²

In February 1944, General Hershey told the House Agricultural Committee that the nation was "...scrapping the bottom of the manpower barrel."³⁷³ The Army had not

³⁷¹ Appendix O shows Selective Service Calls in comparison with actual induction from September 1943 to April 1944. Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 274.

³⁷² Flynn, *Lewis B. Hershey*, 100; Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 374-376.

³⁷³ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 274.

yet reached the zenith of its power, but was rapidly cresting the paradoxical point separating industrial might from military formidability. Internal economization of manpower then continued to be a matter of extraordinary priority in 1944. One example of an extreme measure taken by the Army was scaling back the ASTP by 120,000 students.³⁷⁴

Later in 1944, the Army's final manpower crisis arose out of a surprise Nazi offensive in the Ardennes Forest. At that time, the risk for the Army was the lack of strategic depth. Continually cutting combat divisions from the troop basis meant depleting the strategic reserve and limiting any options the Army had, to deal with unanticipated issues such as a massive winter offensive on the Siegfried Line. Ultimate army strength, as estimated in the 1941 Victory Plan was remarkably close to the actual army in existence by the end of the war.³⁷⁵ However, where Major Wedemeyer's plan called for a strategic reserve numbering in the millions, the Army had two divisions in the continental United States in early 1945. Those two divisions, the 86th and 97th Infantry Divisions were deployed to the European Theater of Operations in early 1945, after which, the Army had no organized forces remaining in reserve.³⁷⁶

³⁷⁴ Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 376.

³⁷⁵ Victory Plan strength was estimated at 8,795,658. At the close of operations in the European Theater, the Army was at 8,300,000. The 600,000 personnel overstrength was a result of 400,000 under hospitalization, 100,000 in process of discharge, and a further 100,000 en route as replacements.

³⁷⁶ Kirkpatrick, *An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present*, 100-101; Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 198-201; Matloff, "The 90-Division Gamble," 376-380.

Tweaking the officer program during this period, revolved primarily around finding ways to generate new officers, rapidly, in the hostile theater. Control over the OCS system was given back to the War Department by the major commands. By and large, however, the Army was already deployed by this time. The major components of the Army (AGF, ASF, AAF), continued to produce leaders, but from a maintenance point using the elongated replacement pipeline. Problems encountered by the officer program in hostile theaters related to the need for immediate leader fills. Battlefield commissions were already commonplace in 1944, but several issues hindered its potential as a procurement method.³⁷⁷ Commanders did not want to release quality men for two reasons: first, a belief that sending OCS candidates away from the battlefield they were already on, was not in the best interest of the Army and second, because the replacement for every man released for OCS might not offer an equal return on investment. From the perspective of some potential candidates, the pay was not worth the weight of an officer's responsibility.³⁷⁸

The compromise, so to speak, was developing forward based OCS facilities. In 1943, the first non-continental OCS facilities were opened in the United Kingdom and Australia. On 31 January 1945, the European Theater of Operations established the first OCS facility on the mainland continent itself at the 9th Reinforcement Depot. This course catered to three classes of officers and officers-to-be. First, enlisted men selected for appointment were sent to receive twelve weeks of training prior to commissioning. A

³⁷⁷ Appendix P depicts the overseas appointment of officers from September 1942 to February 1944.

³⁷⁸ Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers*, 11.

second class consisted of those lieutenants already in possession of battlefield commissions and lasted for three weeks in duration. The final class was comprised of non-infantry officers that were selected for retraining in order to become infantry leaders as a matter of economy in the theater.³⁷⁹

Section II: Critical Linkage of Strategy with Manpower Mobilization and Officer Procurement

The scope and complexity of World War II illuminates the defining role, strategic direction has on officer procurement. As noted in Chapter III, three primary mobilization challenges existed, each disrupted by strategic uncertainty, which then affected every officer procurement source. The first challenge was synchronizing the components of mobilization (manpower and material), to ensure troops were not organized faster than equipment, since material generally took longer to procure. To meet the needs of synchronization in emergency mobilization, the Protective Mobilization Plan was developed. There were two major issues with the PMP as a beacon of mobilization. For one, the plan was developed as an initial measure to meet the needs of hemispheric defense and lay the cement for follow-on plans, hopefully with better strategic guidance by that time. It, the PMP, was not a plan that incorporated the total capacity of the nation's resources. Further, the PMP's *raison d'être* was completely disrupted when increasing lend-lease operations desynchronized materiel from manpower procurement, essentially voiding any of its guiding properties.

³⁷⁹ Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army*, 327; Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 152-154.

Developing and codifying the Victory Program in 1941, was then a matter of national interest. Of the three primary mobilization challenges, the second was apportionment of forces, from the very top all the way to the bottom. By mid-1941, the nation did not have an approved list of supreme objectives for a hypothetical war against the Axis. Rainbow plans offered military objectives based on assumed future policy. Determining the ultimate strength for military forces to accomplish political goals is impossible without first understanding what those goals were. Only then could Major Wedemeyer's team understand how the military instrument of national power fit into American broad strategy.

Synchronizing the mobilization plan with strategic objectives is the final challenge. After 1941, the Victory Plan provided the needed context for "how" the Army achieved national objectives, "what" that force needed to consist of, "when" it needed to be available for combat, and "where" it was going to be employed. Synchronization was accomplished with blueprints being drafted in the form of troop basis which then led to further distilled activation schedules.

However, the "where" component of the Victory Plan only identified theaters of operations whereby expeditionary forces achieved their ultimate purpose. Military objectives were needed to refine campaign planning and focus tactical operations. Initially, the foremost military objective within American strategy was the cross-channel invasion developed as a result of Marshall's visit to London in April 1942.

Challenges of procuring officers existed well before mobilization planning was synchronized in 1942. Between 1939 and 1941, the procurement of officers was a purely reactionary endeavor created by an army that was modernizing in extremis. Absence of

national policy led to detailed and symptomatically flawed mobilization planning. While the Army was combining components of the Army of the United States and developing a capacity for mass mobilization, the officer program was left scrambling to just lead the Army. Fixation on the threat of officer overproduction, a byproduct of World War I scar tissue and lack of strategic direction, had stymied officer procurement planning. As an example, peacetime mobilization had the long-term benefit of generating a large repository of trained soldiers, ready for recall at the nation's behest. What was the plan to provide officers to lead this force had it been recalled in 1945?

Between the disruption of the PMP in 1940 and the approval of the Victory Plan in 1941, a void was created where the Army used its reserve officer population to the fullest extent, as it was intended, but did little to expand the officer corps beyond its capacity in 1939.³⁸⁰ Policies such as those guiding promotions or the capacity of the cadet corps were not affected until the nation was at war. Officer Candidate Schools were established but only began training officers in 1941, to the extent where enlisted morale would be endangered. Many standards and policy for provisioning an officer corps capable of leading a mass-citizen army, were likewise not affected until the nation was at war. Some procedures, such as objective entry criteria for OCS, were never truly defined. Finally, the absence of strategic purpose for the military caused detrimental competition between the Navy and Army, as both sought leaders from the same talent pool. Without refined purpose, allocation for manpower between the Army and Navy could not be

³⁸⁰ Appendix Q illustrates the rapidly expanding gap between exponential enlisted growth and arithmetical officer growth in the manpower crisis of 1942.

determined and essentially led to a ‘free-for-all’, with regard to potential junior grade combat leaders and prospective technically-skilled personnel.

Second order effects on the officer procurement program emerged when issues with the mobilization plan began to occur in mid-1942. Potential Russian collapse and British defeats in North Africa, caused the plan for accomplishing military objectives to be expedited by one year. Postponing the cross-channel invasion in July 1942, then caused a realignment of military objectives so that operations in Africa commenced that November. Adding further military objectives in the Mediterranean at the Casablanca Conference (i.e. Sicily), while simultaneously building up combat power in the United Kingdom caused further disruption to mobilization efforts. Final determination on multinational strategy was affirmed at the Trident Conference in May 1943 but tempered with new estimations on the declining ability of America to furnish manpower. Essentially, the decision to conduct operations in North Africa and the Mediterranean, while building combat power in the European Theater of Operations, desynchronized the mobilization plan from procurement and strategy once again.

Not only was troop basis reduction in 1943, unanticipated by officer procurement managers, the decision to delay the cross-channel invasion was also unpredicted. When the U.S. entered the war in December 1941, the need for officers skyrocketed because the army had not cultivated a population of new leaders capable of leading the droves of enlisted men being called into service. By the end of 1942, officers were being produced in the tens of thousands per month, forcing procurement sources to develop non-traditional approaches along the way to find talent in limited supply, while also culling the herd to weed out the masses who were subjectively determined undesirable. The

cross-channel invasion delay meant slowing the activation schedule, and it also led the Army to reorganize its force, based on its experience in Africa.

Slowing the activation schedule after expanding at a breakneck pace in 1942, modifying the force structure of the Army after Operation Torch, and finally reducing the troop basis by 30,000 officers in 1943, all had a cumulative effect on the officer corps. Reducing the ultimate strength of the 1943 troop basis by hundreds of thousands did not, in and of itself, solve the problem of applying the mobilized force, when and where it was needed within the strategy. Planned combat division activations were scrapped at the end of 1943 to make room within the 7.7 million troop ceiling. Again, priorities shifted to accommodate features of the Army which were not planned for such as the B-29 program, the Army Specialized Training Program, inductions shortcomings, and a replacement program predicated on the individual. Reverberating effects on the officer program can best be described as ebbing and flowing in reaction to the current situation rather than efficiently and steadily expanding capacity. What began as a severe shortage in officers became a surplus mired with non-utilized, lingering pools and a retraining program realigning low-use, high-density specialties into those like the infantry with critical shortfalls.

Strategic direction is critical for mobilization planning and execution. Undisputedly, international events occur which are unexpected and require alterations of the plan. However, a failure to adequately plan for the maximum utilization of the military instrument of national power has a resounding impact on subservient organizations to adjust. In this instance, an initial failure to provide national objectives in the event of war, a realistic estimation of national manpower capacity, and prioritization

of efforts before an emergency led to flawed planning and stymied preparation. During the emergency, a significant amount of time elapsed between the unviability of the PMP, and the development of the Victory Program causing a subsequent lull in futuristic preparation of the officer corps. Once the U.S. entered the war, further obstacles had to be hurdled by planners, as the situation in general became less murky. Hurdles which may have been unnecessary at that point in the war had strategic direction and realistic estimates been provided earlier on.

Section III: Officer Procurement Challenges

Procurement challenges existed in abundance over the course of World War II, with twenty-nine of those issues being discussed through the chapters of this research. Each challenge can be categorized into one of three groups. Those that resulted from flawed planning, those that were self-imposed and within the purview of the Army to contend internally, and finally, those that were external and therefore outside of the Army's control. For the sake of brevity, eighteen of the challenges are discussed within the framework below.

Category one is comprised of plans, policies, and paradigms. By virtue of its traditional defensive and isolationist posture, the Army placed a premium on mobilization planning in the interwar years. Some of the issues encountered during initial expansion in 1939 and 1940 and later during the peacetime draft, were so unanticipated that the plans designed to synchronize materiel and manpower mobilization, became obsolete. The first issue arose from gradual expansion without an M-Day which disrupted the Protective Mobilization Plan. A second issue affecting the PMP, was lend-lease agreements which fully desynchronized the plan and largely contributed to the need for a Victory Plan. In

terms of policy, Mobilization Regulations produced in 1939, detailed how the promotion system was to operate under conditions of war. There was no procedure to account for a needed promotion system under emergency conditions, which led to the disproportionate ratio between officers and enlisted men in 1941.

A final flaw in planning concerns a paradigm shift that occurred only after the nation was at war for over a year. Prior to 1943, mobilization plans and estimations were generated using a certain lens, which can best be described by a question, “what should the Army look like to fit within a strategy?” The fallacy is that in the absence of strategic direction or a full understanding of America’s manpower capacity, the final product is then predicated on the Army’s ability to generate the force to meet the requirement. After 1943, with better direction and data, the questions became, ‘what army can we create? And what strategy can we develop for that army to fight?’

Category two is comprised of challenges the Army worked through internally, some emanating from external origins and some resulting from the status quo of interwar operations. Prior to the war, two issues grew into challenges once expansion became a necessity. First, the Officer Efficiency Report was highly inflated which led to selection boards having to rely on personal knowledge of officers, in some circumstances, to ascertain fitness for increased responsibility. Second, the mental and physical fitness of some officers to perform as battlefield leaders were not adhered to in the “lean” years. Each component contributed in this regard, so no single component (National Guard, Officer Reserve Corps, or Regular Army), can be singled out as worst. The effect of not enforcing standards in peacetime was that during the expansion, instead of molding the

mass-citizen army, these officers were sent to refresher courses or had to be discharged, further lengthening the time it took to fill vacancies and lead troops.

In 1940 and 1941, the War Department spent considerable time federally recognizing officers from the National Guard. Processing these personnel actions grew from a larger issue with the state of maintenance the Guard was in, while the Regular Army modernized itself at an increasingly faster rate. Even though Congress established the requirement for Guard forces to match the Regular Army in the 1903 Dick Act and 1916 National Defense Act, the actual modernization of Guard divisions lasted months, even after the peacetime draft was initiated in 1941.

On the topic of Officer Candidate Schools, commanders were reticent to send qualified men to these schools from 1942 until the end of the war. In 1942 and 1943, it was related to the need for men to fill ranks and noncommissioned officers to lead them. From 1943 thru 1945, it was because releasing capable candidates meant losing a battlefield leader whose replacement might not be the same caliber.

While the air component was a part of the Army, its core function was different from that of the ground-based forces. Requiring intellectually superior personnel, led to the seventy-five percent rule and other means of preferential treatment. By 1943, the issue was largely abated, but not before the Army Air Forces had consumed vast quantities of top performers during 1942, when the Army expanded most, something the ground-based commands were unappreciative of.

Battlefield experience in concert with the troop basis reduction in 1943, caused the Army to reorganize its force for maximum effectiveness. Efficiency was lacking, due to the officers who lingered in pools, while economizing measures were a priority. Pools

of non-utilized officers were found to exist in replacement pools and where organizational specialties, such as antiaircraft, were heavily reduced. The replacement pools had a secondary flaw of note, due to their being filled with poor performers. Reclassifying the officers was too laborious for field commanders, who found it easier to simply repopulate the replacement pool with the same poor performer.

Officers with direct commissions through “affiliation” and the Army Specialized Training Program are the final issues of the second category. Affiliated officers received minimal or no training in military customs and courtesies, as their primary function was related to the technical skill they possessed, and not battlefield leadership. To the angst of career professionals, these officers were afforded the right to those same customs and courtesies while not managing civilian organizations in the military manner in some circumstances.

Soldiers, not students, were selected for the Army Specialized Training Program. Up to 150,000 of the most highly capable men were released to pursue academia under this program while the Army’s officer corps struggled to find quality candidates for OCS. Ultimately reduced by 120,000 on 18 February 1944, these same soldier-scholars found themselves in the foxholes of Europe, as enlisted men where they may have made excellent officers had the program not diverted them to begin with.³⁸¹

External challenges, comprising the third category were any issues brought about by the War Department or adjacent services like the Navy. Chronologically, the first challenge was a sub-strength West Point Cadet Corps. The academy which filled the

³⁸¹ Keefer, *Scholars in Foxholes*, 168-169.

Regular Army with trained professional career officers began the school year with vacant cadet positions because of the arduous validating test. The test was developed in the early 1930s as a means for the institution to protect itself from sub-standard cadets that received a congressional nomination. Until 1942, the Secretary of War did not have the congressional authority to fill these vacancies.

In 1940, the debate over the Army's main officer procurement source, reached tempered levels between supporters of the Military Training Camps Association and General Marshall. Supporters of the MTCA advocated for a return to civilian training camps while Marshall remained adamant about merits of a democratic system known as Officer Candidate School. Only by the threat of resignation, did Marshall quell the controversy and lead the Army's officer corps into a system that sought talent from the broadest reaches of trained enlisted men.

Another issue involving an act of Congress, was the threat of army disintegration in 1941, when the one-year active status of Guard units and reserve officers would begin to expire. By mid-1941, reserve officers greatly outnumbered professional officers. Allowing disintegration to occur meant leaving over 600,000 annual draftees plus the regular enlisted force in the hands of an understrength officer corps augmented only by the Organized Reserve Corps, itself annually rotating.

The most significant challenge of officer procurement during the war was the enlisted personnel shortage that manifested in 1942 and continued through 1944. Out of necessity, the Army in 1942 created combat divisions and aerial combat groups at a rate that outstripped the officer corps' ability to create leaders for them. Lack of infrastructure was a limiting factor for OCS initially, but the real issue was the lack of candidates to fill

the facilities once they were running optimally. Without a dearth of personnel in the ranks, allowing the primary mode of officer procurement to function properly, then became a significant issue for the officer corps at large.

To exacerbate matters with filling OCS rolls, was the declining suitability of candidates toward the end of 1942 and through 1943. Fulfilling its primary mandate of providing combat leaders for the field force in quantities required, meant the OCS had to gradually reduce the standards of entry. While the War Department controlled OCS quotas and stipulated monthly enrollment, the major commands implementing the OCS were required to cull the candidates subjectively, as many qualitative objective standards were not established.

One hurdle that offered a competitive challenge for the Army's officer corps was the recruiting practices of the Navy, which did not require military training for commissioning. Technically, the Navy was not supposed to run recruiting campaigns while selective service was running, but they continued accepting volunteers into 1943 anyway. Reaping prospective leaders before selective service inducted them, as in the V-12 program, was an effective method of keeping talent beyond the reach of the Army. Non-traditional means and measures of economy were adopted to capitalize on talent the Army did have, and the Volunteer Officer Candidate, induction of Reserve Officer Training Corps cadets, and the Women's Army Corps are just a few examples.

Direct commissioning offered the Army a great source of civilian inspired talent but was hindered until 1942 by multiple competing agencies and services across the War Department in search of the same skills. A single source agency that managed all procurement from civil life was directed by Secretary Stimson in October 1942, to be

answerable only to his personnel board. The Office of Procurement Services was established the following month effectively ending competition and recruiting confusion.

Troop basis reduction in 1943, is suitably the final challenge as it created conditions that drove the Army into officer overproduction, where the officer corps had only known deficit previously. Timing for the reduction was based on strategic events, refined estimates, and therefore extenuating circumstances. The reduction of forces was unanticipated by the major commands, which had only recently learned the process of calculating the monthly quota. In mid-1943, the quotas were forecast months in advance, which meant months had to elapse before the OCS system began, to slow in accordance with the troop basis.

Section IV: Is there relevance?

We can be certain that officer procurement was an issue before World War II. We can also be certain that it was an issue during World War II. The ultimate question, future military planners should be asking is “what will the officer procurement challenges be in the next national emergency?” The following list is an abridged version of relevant questions relating to any future national emergency that spawned from this research.

- 1) Is there a strategic estimate that accounts for available manpower and material needs?
- 2) Is there a mobilization plan that links manpower and materiel within the context of strategy?
- 3) How fragile are our mobilization plans and how adaptable is the modern expansion system?
- 4) What will the primary junior grade, non-skilled procurement source be?

- 5) Will Selective Service be the single source of Joint induction?
- 6) Are there mobilization regulations that prohibit service recruiting and citizen volunteerism while a draft is underway?
- 7) Will technically skilled citizens be recruited and directly commissioned? Is there a single agency responsible for the identification and recruitment of skilled talent?
- 8) What is the modern risk of disintegration if a full mobilization is authorized?
- 9) What mechanisms will the Army use to identify and reallocate officers lingering in pools?
- 10) Are Reserve and National Guard officers maintaining requisite fitness levels during peacetime inactivity?
- 11) Does the Army promotion system account for extenuating circumstances short of war? Is promotion policy standardized across all components of the United States Army?
- 12) What is the definition of a “competent leader”? What attributes should a leader possess for commission consideration in extremis? Can that standard be objectively applied to the mass of potential leaders required and pinpoint true potential?
- 13) What is the impact on a modern army if officer suitability declines? Can leaders function as envisioned in a fast paced, technologically enabled, and contemporary operating environment? Can the training course for officer candidates be extended without disrupting mobilization schedules?
- 14) In a national emergency, should ROTC be continued?

15) In a national emergency, should service academies be continued?

16) In a national emergency, should officer volunteers be allowed?

Mobilization occurred in extremis and by extension, so did expansion by the officer corps, in extremis. Of critical importance is understanding that officer procurement was similar to materiel procurement, and that officers were not produced overnight. A myriad of commissioning avenues were available. When considering the amount of time it took to move an officer through just the OCS avenue, from the beginning with induction to the end after moving through the replacement pipeline, over half a year has elapsed. Material is procured to equip the soldier. Officers are procured to equip groups of soldiers. Officer procurement, not just material procurement, must be synchronized with the organization and training of troop formations.

In summation, military history is riddled with information useful to future generations. Concluding his final biennial report, General Marshall wrote,

We can be certain that the next war, if there is one, will be even more total than this one. The nature of war is such that once it now begins it can end only as this one is ending, in the destruction of the vanquished, and it should be assumed that another reconversion from peace to war production will take place initially under enemy distant bombardment.³⁸²

Fortunately, we can be certain that World War II will not be repeated; however, Mark Twain once said, “History does not repeat itself, but it does rhyme.” Succeeding Marshall seventy-one years later, Army Chief of Staff, General Mark A. Milley remarked that the threat of large-scale ground operations remained, and that nation states are almost

³⁸² Marshall, *Biennial Reports*, 214.

guaranteed to fight each other in the future.”³⁸³ The circumstances under which the Army found itself in World War II, may be incredibly similar to the Army of tomorrow and the next national emergency. “When senior political and military leaders design Army force structure, they should not permit their thinking to be constrained by such historically loaded terms as traditional military policy.”³⁸⁴ The same caution can be applied to officer procurement especially in time of national emergency or in extremis.

³⁸³ Meghann Myers, “Milley: Future wars will be long, they’ll be fought on the ground, and spec ops won’t save us,” *Army Times*, July 2017, accessed 27 May 2019, <https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2017/07/27/milley-future-wars-will-be-long-theyll-be-fought-on-the-ground-and-spec-ops-wont-save-us/>; Mark A. Milley, “Dwight David Eisenhower Luncheon” (lecture, Association of the United States Army, 4 October 2016), accessed 27 May 2019, <https://www.ausa.org/events/ausa-annual-meeting-exposition/sessions/eisenhower-luncheon>.

³⁸⁴ Gentile, Linnick, and Shurkin, *The Evolution of U. S. Military Policy*, 5.


APPENDIX A

THE PROTECTIVE MOBILIZATION PLAN

The Protective Mobilization Plan															
Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan															
The Initial Protective Force															
1	2	3	4	(See note 5)											
				To be procured (note 9)											
				Available for use by—											
Units and individuals				M-30M											
				O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM	O	EM
UNITS				Figures are cumulative											
1	1	1	1	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
2	2	2	2	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
3	3	3	3	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
4	4	4	4	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
5	5	5	5	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
6	6	6	6	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
7	7	7	7	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
8	8	8	8	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
9	9	9	9	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
10	10	10	10	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
11	11	11	11	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
12	12	12	12	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
13	13	13	13	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
14	14	14	14	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
15	15	15	15	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
16	16	16	16	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
17	17	17	17	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
18	18	18	18	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
Grand total (Initial Protective Force), RA and NG.				17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444
The protective mobilization plan															
Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan															
UNITS (NOTE 11)															
1	1	1	1	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
2	2	2	2	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
3	3	3	3	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
4	4	4	4	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
5	5	5	5	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
6	6	6	6	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
7	7	7	7	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
8	8	8	8	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
9	9	9	9	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
10	10	10	10	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
11	11	11	11	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
12	12	12	12	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
13	13	13	13	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
14	14	14	14	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
15	15	15	15	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
16	16	16	16	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
17	17	17	17	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
18	18	18	18	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
Grand total (Initial Protective Force), RA and NG.				17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444
Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan															
UNITS (NOTE 11)															
1	1	1	1	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
2	2	2	2	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
3	3	3	3	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
4	4	4	4	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
5	5	5	5	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
6	6	6	6	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
7	7	7	7	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
8	8	8	8	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
9	9	9	9	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
10	10	10	10	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
11	11	11	11	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
12	12	12	12	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
13	13	13	13	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
14	14	14	14	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
15	15	15	15	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
16	16	16	16	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
17	17	17	17	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
18	18	18	18	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
Grand total (Initial Protective Force), RA and NG.				17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444
Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan															
UNITS (NOTE 11)															
1	1	1	1	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
2	2	2	2	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
3	3	3	3	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
4	4	4	4	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
5	5	5	5	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
6	6	6	6	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
7	7	7	7	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
8	8	8	8	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
9	9	9	9	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
10	10	10	10	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
11	11	11	11	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
12	12	12	12	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
13	13	13	13	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
14	14	14	14	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
15	15	15	15	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
16	16	16	16	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
17	17	17	17	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
18	18	18	18	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
Grand total (Initial Protective Force), RA and NG.				17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444	17,777	88,888	256	64,444
Remainder of the Protective Mobilization Plan															
UNITS (NOTE 11)															
1	1	1	1	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
2	2	2	2	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
3	3	3	3	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
4	4	4	4	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
5	5	5	5	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
6	6	6	6	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
7	7	7	7	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
8	8	8	8	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111	5,555	16	2,111
9	9	9	9	1,111	5,555	16	2,111	1,111							


Source: Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), 485.

APPENDIX B STRUCTURE OF THE REGULAR ARMY, 31 JANUARY 1940




Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 5.

APPENDIX C STRUCTURE OF THE REGULAR ARMY, 15 AUGUST 1940




Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 7.

APPENDIX D STRUCTURE OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, 30 JUNE 1941




Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 9.

CORPS AREA RECEPTION CENTER LOCATIONS IN 1941



Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 11.

APPENDIX F REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTER LOCATIONS IN 1941



Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 12.

[illegible]

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APPENDIX H
WAR DEPARTMENT REGULATION AND
CIRCULARS GOVERNING OCS SELECTION

8. The principal WD publications governing officer candidate selection and training are as follows:

1941

WD ltrs AG 352(4-10-41)M-M-C, 26 Apr 41
AG 352(4-10-41)MT-M-C, 9 May 41
AG 352(5-8-41)MT-M-C, 29 May 41
AG 352(5-21-41)MT-M-C, 6 Jun 41
AG 220.63(7-30-41)RB, 30 Jul 41
AG 352(8-27-41)MT-M-A, 30 Aug 41
AG 352(8-23-41)MT-C-M, 30 Aug 41
AG 352(8-27-41)MT-M-A, 9 Sep 41
AG 210.31 ORC(9-9-41)MT-A, 13 Sep 41
AG 352(9-13-41)RB, 13 Sep 41
AG 210.3(9-11-41)EA-C, 16 Sep 41
AG 352 MT-M-A, 8 Oct 41
AG 352(11-17-41)MT-A-M, 26 Nov 41

WD Cirs No 109, 6 Jun 41, Sec VI
No 245, 26 Nov 41
No 266, 24 Dec 41, Sec II

1942

WD Cirs No 48, 19 Feb 42
No 65, 5 Mar 42, Sec VI
No 75, 13 Mar 42, Sec II
No 86, 24 Mar 42, Sec III
No 98, 3 Apr 42, Sec III
No 102, 7 Apr 42, Sec I
No 126, 28 Apr 42
No 128, 30 Apr 42, Sec III
No 131, 2 May 42, Sec IV
No 187, 13 Jun 42, Sec II
No 205, 25 Jun 42, Sec IV
No 221, 10 Jul 42, Sec II
No 247, 28 Jul 42, Secs V & VI
No 358, 28 Oct 42, Sec III

AR 625-5, 26 Nov 42

1943

WD Cirs No 11, 6 Jan 43, Sec II
No 266, 23 Oct 43

1944


WD Cirs No 150, 15 Apr 44, Sec IV
No 261, 26 Jun 44, Sec V
No 319, 1 Aug 44, Sec I
No 367, 9 Sep 44, Sec IX

WD Memo 625-44, 29 Nov 44

AR 625-5, 12 Sep 44

Source: William R. Keast, *Training of Officer Candidates in Army Ground Forces Special Training Schools* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 35-36.


CADRE TIMELINE FOR AN INFANTRY DIVISION



Source: George C. Marshall, Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 96-97.


APPENDIX J

CASUALTY FIGURES FROM 7 DECEMBER 1941 THROUGH 30 JUNE 1943



Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 95.

APPENDIX K REPLACEMENT TRAINING CENTERS IN 1943



Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 98.

ICER CANDIDATE SCHOOLS
17 weeks duration)

AUTHORIZED CAPACITY C
(Courses are

MAHARD UNIVERSITY
Branch No. of Candidates
Air Corps 450

FORT MONMOUTH
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 600

TOORWOOD ARSENAL
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT WASHINGTON
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT MONROE
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT MONROE
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT MONROE
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

CAMP DAVID
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

MAINE BEACH
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

GREEN PINE GROVE
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

CAMP LEE
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

DUKE UNIVERSITY
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT BENNING
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

NEW ORLEANS
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT CUSTER
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT KNOX
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

FORT BELL
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

CAMP BARRELEY
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

CAMP HODD
Branch No. of Candidates
Signal Corps 500

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APPENDIX M

QUOTA FORMULA DEVELOPED AND USED BY THE ARMY
GROUND FORCES TO DETERMINE MONTHLY OCS CALLS

The following formula was developed by G-1, AGF, for calculating minimum quotas for officer candidate schools:²⁰

Add:

- Officer requirements to meet new activations (1943 Troop Basis)
- 2 percent annual attrition loss on above.
- 4 percent annual attrition loss on established units.
- Estimate for overhead expansion and for arms and services with AAF.
- War Department requirements for overseas loss replacements.

Deduct:

- Surplus officers currently in units (in U.S. and overseas).
- Surplus officers in pools.
- Candidates currently in schools.

Increase resultant figure by 20 percent to cover failures in OCS.

Divide by number of OCS cycles remaining in 1943.

This calculation was made for each of the seven arms and quasi-arms in the Ground Forces.

Source: William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers* (Historical Section, Army Ground Forces, 1946), 12.

APPENDIX N

GENERAL OFFICER BREAKOUT AT 30 JUNE 1943 AND

GENERAL OFFICER INCREASES FROM 1941 TO 1943

<i>General officers—June 30, 1943</i>					
	Generals	Lieuten- ant generals	Major generals	Brigadier generals	Total
Regular Army:					
Active	3	22	238	647	910
Retired	2	2	19	24	47
Subtotal	5	24	257	671	957
Reserve			2	16	18
National Guard			12	68	80
Army of the United States		1		9	10
Total	5	25	271	764	1,065

Rank	July 1, 1941	June 30, 1943	Net in- crease
General	1	5	4
Lieutenant general.	8	25	17
Major general.	89	271	182
Brigadier general	245	764	519
Total.	343	1,065	722

Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 89.

APPENDIX O

INDUCTION CALLS VERSUS ACTUAL INDUCTION RATES

FROM SEPTEMBER 1943 TO APRIL 1944

Month	Call ¹	Inducted ¹	Percentage of calls filled	Cumulative shortage
<i>1943</i>				
September.....	175,000	121,652	69.5	53,348
October.....	160,000	113,001	70.6	100,347
November.....	175,000	117,563	67.2	157,784
December.....	165,000	110,840	67.2	211,944
<i>1944</i>				
January.....	160,000	118,456	74	253,488
February.....	160,000	² 31,370	19.6	282,118
March.....	160,000	132,652	82.9	409,466
April.....	160,000	125,499	78.4	443,967

¹ Source: WDASF Monthly Progress Report, sec. 5, "Personnel," 31 July 1944, p. 6.
² Not comparable to prior months. Induction process changed from a 3-week furlough *after* instead of *prior to* induction.

Source: Leonard L. Lerwill, *The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), 272.

APPENDIX P


OVERSEAS APPOINTMENTS FROM SEPTEMBER 1942 TO JUNE 1945

<i>Overseas Appointments of Male Officers, September 1942–June 1945</i>			
Year and Month	Number Appointed	Year and Month	Number Appointed
1942		1944	
September.....	79	March.....	171
October.....	118	April.....	499
November.....	633	May.....	439
December.....	1,010	June.....	642
1943		July.....	884
January.....	392	August.....	833
February.....	148	September.....	171
March.....	811	October.....	374
April.....	543	November.....	291
May.....	1,305	December.....	268
June.....	180	1945	
July.....	941	January.....	591
August.....	1,090	February.....	994
September.....	907	March.....	228
October.....	937	April.....	200
November.....	283	May.....	464
December.....	239	June.....	475
1944		TOTAL.....	
January.....	508		18,584
February.....	936		
<i>Source: The Adjutant General's Office, Machine Records Branch, 26 September 1945.</i>			

Source: Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast. Center for Military History Publication 2-2, *United States Army in World War II; The Army Ground Forces; The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Fort McNair: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1991), 154.

APPENDIX Q

COMPARISON OF ENLISTED AND OFFICER EXPANSION RATES DURING THE MANPOWER CRISIS OF 1942



Source: George C. Marshall, *Biennial Reports of the Chief of Staff of the United States Army to the Secretary of War: 1 July 1939-30 June 1945* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), 39.

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