

# Army National Guard Personnel and Training Readiness in the Past Century: Contingencies and Continuities

A Monograph

by

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2017

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# REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

*Form Approved*  
*OMB No. 0704-0188*

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. **PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.**

<b>1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY)</b> 04-13-2017		<b>2. REPORT TYPE</b> Master's Thesis		<b>3. DATES COVERED (From - To)</b> JUN 2016 – MAY 2017	
<b>4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE</b> Army National Guard Personnel and Training Readiness in the Past Century: Contingencies and Continuities				<b>5a. CONTRACT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5b. GRANT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER</b>	
<b>6. AUTHOR(S)</b> MAJ Paolo A. Sica				<b>5d. PROJECT NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5e. TASK NUMBER</b>	
				<b>5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER</b>	
<b>7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> U.S. Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SWD-GD Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2301				<b>8. PERFORMING ORG REPORT NUMBER</b>	
<b>9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)</b> Advanced Operational Arts Studies Fellowship, Advanced Military Studies Program.				<b>10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)</b>	
				<b>11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)</b>	
<b>12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT</b> Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited					
<b>13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES</b>					
<b>14. ABSTRACT</b> <p>Since the US Army's post-Vietnam War recovery and reorganization, it has increasingly relied on the Reserve Component (RC) to augment and supplant the Active Component (AC). At present, the Army National Guard (ARNG) faces an increasingly likely prospect of again participating in large-scale combat operations with unit integrity, in support of a right-sized AC. States' militias have relinquished much of their autonomy in exchange for federal investment. This discourse between states and the US federal government has resulted in a better manned, trained and equipped ARNG, as a component of the national reserve. However, the authority to recruit, commission, promote, and assign a militia's officers, remains exclusively with the state executive and the militia's commander-in-chief; the governor. This intrinsic 'dual control' feature of our federal system of governance shapes the ARNG values system and officer incentives structure, which in turn effects the prioritization of personnel and training readiness, and influences AC and ARNG approaches toward ARNG operational readiness. This case study is divided into five sections. The first section provides background information on the ARNG. The second, third and fourth sections cover the Interwar Period through World War II mobilization, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and the Global War on Terror and the Current Operating Environment. The fifth section synthesizes the preceding three historical case studies, identifies implications, and makes recommendations for action and further study, in anticipation of future conflict.</p>					
<b>15. SUBJECT TERMS</b> Army National Guard; dual control; operational readiness; training readiness; Interwar Period					
<b>16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:</b>			<b>17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT</b>	<b>18. NUMBER OF PAGES</b>	<b>19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON</b>
<b>a. REPORT</b>	<b>b. ABSTRACT</b>	<b>c. THIS PAGE</b>			MAJ Paolo A. Sica
(U)	(U)	(U)	(U)	65	<b>19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code)</b>

Monograph Approval Page

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Monograph Title: Army National Guard Personnel and Training Readiness in the Past Century:  
Contingencies and Continuities

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Army National Guard Personnel and Training Readiness in the Past Century: Contingencies and Continuities, MAJ Paolo A. Sica, Pennsylvania National Guard, 65 pages.

Since the US Army's post-Vietnam War recovery and reorganization, it has increasingly relied on the Reserve Component (RC) to augment and supplant the Active Component (AC). RC soldiers serve interchangeably with AC soldiers, as part of an expeditionary force engaged in ongoing limited wars. Over the past century, the institutional balance of power between the AC ('Regular') US Army and the Army National Guard (ARNG) has calcified, but the strategic context has changed. Unrelenting operational needs amidst a drawdown, the post-Global War on Terror (GWOT) routinization of rotational deployments, refutation of a post-GWOT 'strategic reserve' role by the ARNG and its professional association, and the terms of the latest post-war compromise between the AC and the ARNG all factor into an emerging paradigm. At present, the ARNG faces an increasingly likely prospect of participating in large-scale combat operations with unit integrity, in support of a right-sized AC. States' militias have relinquished much of the autonomy (e.g., determining tables of organization, training standards for enlisted and officer members) possessed prior to the Efficiency in Militia Act of 1903, in exchange for federal investment. This discourse between states and the US federal government has resulted in a better manned, trained and equipped ARNG, as a component of the national reserve. However, the authority to recruit, commission, promote, and assign a militia's officers, remains exclusively with the state executive and the militia's commander-in-chief; the governor. This intrinsic 'dual control' feature of our federal system of governance shapes the ARNG's values system and officer incentives structure, which in turn effects the prioritization of personnel and training readiness, and influences AC and RC approaches toward ARNG operational readiness. This case study is divided into five sections. The first section provides background information on the ARNG. The second, third and fourth sections cover the Interwar Period through World War II mobilization, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and the Global War on Terror and the Current Operating Environment. The fifth section synthesizes the preceding three historical case studies, identifies implications, and makes recommendations for action and further study, in anticipation of future conflict.

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## Acknowledgement

I wish to give thanks to the following individuals. Dr. Mark T. Calhoun for explaining, through my own trial and error, the difference between a dissertation and a thesis, and for assistance and encouragement far beyond the scope of his charge. Colonel Joseph A. Schafer for copious military instruction. Mr. Russell Rafferty and Ms. Elizabeth Dubuisson (Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library), Mr. Frederick F. Wham III (Mission Command Center of Excellence), Mr. Rodney C. Fortyk (US Army Heritage and Education Center), SGT Damian-Michael Jeffrey Smith and Mr. Charles B. Oellig (Pennsylvania National Guard Military Museum), Mr. Aaron McWilliams (Pennsylvania State Archives, Pennsylvania National Guard and Department of Military and Veterans Affairs holdings), Mr. Ryan Trainor (National Guard Educational Foundation), Colonel (retired) Scott C. Sharp (National Guard Bureau), and Dr. Michael E. Weaver, for research assistance. Major Adam R. Grove for lighting the way. Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. Jorgensen Jr. for demonstrating what an ARNG battalion commander is capable of accomplishing – “No Slack – No Excuse!” A trusted few mentors and colleagues for draft reviews. Dr. and Mrs. Sica for skepticism and curiosity. My wife for her unconditional support, and our boys for their constant and welcome interruptions. Pennsylvania ARNG members and their families for this monograph’s purpose.

## Acronyms

AG	Adjutant General
AO	Administrative Officer
AOA	Army Offsite Agreement
ABCT	Armored Brigade Combat Team
AC	Active Component
AGR	Active Guard Reserve
ARFORGEN	Army Force Generation
ARNG	Army National Guard
AT	Annual Training
AVF	All-Volunteer Force
BCT	Brigade Combat Team
COE	Contemporary Operational Environment
CUSR	Commander's Unit Status Report
DOMOPS	Domestic Operations
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FORSCOM	United States Army Forces Command
FTS	Full-Time Staff
GHQ	General Headquarters
GWOT	Global War on Terror
ID	Infantry Division
IDT	Inactive-Duty Training
NG	National Guard
NGAUS	National Guard Association of the United States
NGB	National Guard Bureau
OCO	Overseas Contingency Operations

OCONUS	Outside the Continental United States
ODS	Operation Desert Shield/Storm
OR	Organized Reserve
PME	Professional Military Education
PT	Physical Training
RC	Reserve Component
ROTC	Reserve Officers' Training Corps
SAMS	School of Advanced Military Studies
TO	Training Officer
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
TTHS	Trainees, Transients, Holders and Students
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
USAR	United States Army Reserve



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## Introduction

The great war army will come from civil life. They are the people that you gentlemen must learn to understand, and by knowing them you are the better prepared to serve with them or command them.

— Major General Creed C. Hammond, October 13, 1928 lecture to the Army War College

## Background of the Study

A little more than decade ago, citizen-soldiers reentered the public eye: “[t]he deployment of thirteen brigades to Iraq during 2004-2006 represented the greatest commitment of Army National Guard (ARNG) citizen-soldiers to combat since World War II.”<sup>1</sup> Guard members assisted in stabilizing a deteriorating security situation, and their exceptional commitment and sacrifice, combined with the Global War on Terror (GWOT) era’s high level of resourcing, generated an exceptionally high level of National Guard operational readiness. This is neither an unprecedented nor an assured post-war phenomenon; the large, infrequent ARNG mobilizations of the twentieth and early twenty-first century have borne diverse outcomes, owing to a perpetually dynamic strategic context.<sup>2</sup>

Despite frequent references to a ‘Total Army’ and the statutory integration of today’s Reserve Component (RC) in planning, preparing for and executing Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO), Active Component (AC) planners and strategists remain generally uneducated on the complex historical origins and present-day idiosyncrasies of the ARNG.<sup>3</sup> Ultimately, this

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<sup>1</sup> Michael D. Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau: Office of Public Affairs, Historical Services Division, 2008), 38, 47-48.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2003), 369-399.

<sup>3</sup> US Army War College, *How the Army Runs 2015-2016* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2015), 6-1; Joseph Anderson, Aundre Piggee, and Gwen Bingham, “Record Version Statement before the House Armed Service Committee Sub-Committee on Readiness, First Session,

lack of shared understanding, coupled with inculcated optimism and pragmatic mendacity, may support wishful exaggeration of ARNG readiness levels and consequent underestimation of adequate pre-mobilization (inactive duty) and post-mobilization training time and resources, and set the conditions for continued mismatches of expectations and outcomes following future conflicts.<sup>4</sup> This study seeks to increase shared understanding among US Army leaders and planners striving to increase ARNG preparedness for the next major conflict, leading to improved communication between AC and ARNG leaders and stakeholders throughout the routinized rotational deployments of the Sustained Readiness Model (see Figure 1).<sup>5</sup>

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115th Congress,” *U.S. House of Representatives Document Repository*, March 8, 2017, accessed March 11, 2017, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS03/20170308/105661/HHRG-115-AS03-Wstate-BinghamUSAG-20170308.pdf>, 3-4; John M. McHugh, "Army Directive 2012-08: Army Total Force Policy" (Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, September 4, 2012), 1.

<sup>4</sup> Leonard Wong and Stephen J. Gerras, *Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College Press, 2015), ix; Barbara Ehrenreich, *Bright-Sided: How the Relentless Promotion of Positive Thinking Has Undermined America* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2009), 147-176; Ronald E. Sorter, Thomas F. Lippiatt, and J. Michael Polich, *Planning Reserve Mobilization: Inferences from Operation Desert Shield* (Report, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), 10.

<sup>5</sup> “...[ARNG units will] hold readiness through the available year [i.e., don't change out commands].” Wendul Hagler, “Army National Guard Update” (lecture, US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 8, 2016).

# Sustainable Readiness Model Aim Point Strategy




Figure 1. Typical Sustained Readiness Model Aim Point Strategy. Pennsylvania National Guard, *Appendix 1 to Annex C to Operations Order 17-001*, Joint Force Headquarters (Fort Indiantown Gap, PA, 2017).

The ARNG began its current relationship with the US Army as a result of the Militia Act of 1903, which encouraged necessary standardization of training and force structure through the then-nascent, now-ubiquitous incentive of federal investment.<sup>6</sup> Prior to 1903, the states' military forces were more akin to the frontier and colonial-era militias of their parentage than to their AC counterparts. Over subsequent decades, this iterative process of reserve component integration continued; ARNG units' organization, equipment, and heraldry frequently changed to meet the

<sup>6</sup> James Webber Linn, *Washington's Lost Plan Revived* (Chicago, IL: National Guard Association, 1935), 15

force design needs of the AC.<sup>7</sup> Metamorphosing units would nevertheless recruit from the same geographic, and in many cases the same genetic pool of young men and women. Thus, throughout bouts of modernization, the ARNG's fundamentally telluric quality endured.<sup>8</sup>

The term *citizen-soldier* most accurately applies to Guard members and US Army Reservists, legally considered civilians whenever not in a duty status. While in a non-Title 10 active duty status (e.g., Title 5 or Title 32 active duty), Guard members remain outside of the purview of the UCMJ, and are instead subject to administrative actions, and relatively anemic, state-specific codes of military justice. In contrast, an AC soldier in an ordinary leave or pass status – at the lowest ebb of organizational control – remains a service member, subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). ARNG personnel don the same duty uniforms as their AC counterparts, and the tape over their left chest reads “U.S. Army,” but depending on what duty status they inhabit, the two are fundamentally dissimilar agents: their values shaped by the emergent rules of two separate, complex and adaptive systems.<sup>9</sup>

The National Guard (NG) consists of sovereign states' military forces (Federally recognized militias), funding largely by the federal government, and subject to mobilization into national service upon the order of the President.<sup>10</sup> This arrangement is rooted in Anglo militia tradition and feudal custom.<sup>11</sup> From the perspective of an effective national reserve, as noted in

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<sup>7</sup> John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York, NY: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1983), 230-231.

<sup>8</sup> Schmitt's fourth characteristic of the archetypical partisan (borrowed from Jover Zamora) is his telluric nature; the partisan is tied to the earth, specifically what he identifies as his patch of it. Carl Schmitt, *Theory of the Partisan* (New York, NY: Telos Press, 2007), 20.

<sup>9</sup> Robert Axelrod and Michael D. Cohen, *Harnessing Complexity* (New York, NY: The Free Press, 2000), 7.

<sup>10</sup> US Army War College, *How the Army Runs 2015-2016*, 6-2.

<sup>11</sup> W. E. Green, *The Territorial in the Next War* (Chatham, England: Mackays Limited, 1939), 20.

*How The Army Runs*, the RC's purpose is "to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in time of war, national emergency or as national security requires."<sup>12</sup> From the perspective of a state's militia, the ARNG's purpose is domestic operations (DOMOPS). Typical applications include: natural disaster relief, security missions and, rarely in recent decades, quelling civil disturbances, including strikes.<sup>13</sup>

The US military is in the midst of the eighth major examination of the RC within the past hundred years. The preceding seven periods of scrutiny, reorganization and change followed World War I, World War II, the Korean Conflict, the Berlin Crisis, the Vietnam War, the brief post-Cold War period, and Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS). At the time of this writing, the ARNG exists in a post-GWOT era, following its unplanned and abrupt transformation from a strategic to an operational reserve.<sup>14</sup> In the wake of this paradigmatic shift, strategists are now contemplating what the next round of deployments may look like, and how best to generate ARNG operational readiness in the pre-mobilization period.<sup>15</sup> Substantive differences in organizational identity, systemic attributes, and combat readiness trends that existed between the NG and AC during the Interwar Period and subsequent periods of utilization retain relevance to the ARNG's present-day disposition within Army Total Force Policy.

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<sup>12</sup> US Army War College, *How the Army Runs 2015-2016* (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, 2015), 6-1.

<sup>13</sup> "State National Guard units are usually the first military responders to any incident." Army Doctrinal Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-28: *Defense Support of Civil Authorities* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2013), 1-13.

<sup>14</sup> James M. Dubik, "What Will We Call This 'Pre-Something' Period?," *ARMY* (January 2017): 8-10; Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, *Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, (Final Report to Congress and the Secretary of Defense, Arlington, VA: Commission on the National Guard and Reserves, 2008), 21.

<sup>15</sup> Mark G. Wiens, *ARNG Key Strategic Issues List AY 2017* (unpublished draft paper, Arlington, VA: National Guard Bureau, 2017), 2-3.

## Theoretical Framework (Methodology)

Absent an inter-service agreement on an appropriate level of integration between the AC and the ARNG, or even how to compare readiness levels, the ARNG's true operational readiness is difficult to assess.<sup>16</sup> Two measurable criteria used in the following analysis enable a test of the proposed answer to the research question, in order to determine its validity: personnel readiness and training readiness—each defined in current Army doctrine and policy.<sup>17</sup> Personnel readiness refers to “[t]otal available personnel strength divided by the required strength, available military occupational specialty qualified (MOSQ) strength by duty position divided by the required strength, and the available senior grade composite level determined by comparing the available and required strength in each of five senior grade categories.”<sup>18</sup> Training readiness equates to the percentage of a given unit's Mission Essential Tasks rated as trained to standard.<sup>19</sup>

Together, these two criteria establish a means of assessing operational (or combat) readiness. In evaluating the following case studies through the lens of these criteria, historical contingencies and continuities surrounding aspects of the ARNG's systems, processes, and organizational identity arise, as do contrasts with the AC.<sup>20</sup> The tension between these two criteria highlight the ARNG's unique values system, and commonalities between historical case studies reveal continuities within the US Army's current approach toward building operational readiness in the ARNG.

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<sup>16</sup> Stephanie Sanok Kostro, *Citizen-Soldiers in a Time of Transition* (New York, NY: Rowman & Littlefield, 2014), vii.

<sup>17</sup> Army Regulation (AR) 220-1: *Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010).

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 4–3.a.(1).

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 12, 4–3.a.(4).

<sup>20</sup> Continuities are patterns that extend across time. Contingencies are phenomena that do not form patterns. John Lewis Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002).

## Case Study 1: The Interwar Period through World War II Mobilization

After World War I, the nation did not support the resourcing of a large, standing (AC) army. Therefore, the ARNG, as a component of the national reserve, did not define itself largely by its relationship with a larger and better-resourced AC, as it does today. The US Army, and the ARNG with it, focused on the task of hemispheric defense during the Interwar Period (the period from 1919 to 1938). This task involved retaining control of the Panama Canal, while simultaneously counter-attacking against foreign incursions elsewhere in the Western Hemisphere.<sup>21</sup> The AC possessed, in theory, adequate combat power to repulse an initial attack against the Panama Canal, while the ARNG possessed the force structure needed to take primary responsibility for coastal defense.<sup>22</sup> In the event of a foreign attack, author James W. Linn, writing for the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), believed the US Army would have to expand its skeleton framework rapidly, and the “expansible, immediate line of military defense.... [was, in fact] the National Guard.”<sup>23</sup>

ARNG training readiness during the Interwar Period benefited from the National Defense Act (NDA) of June, 1920, which formally mandated “Regular officers and enlisted personnel; to serve as instructors for the other components of the National Army.”<sup>24</sup> By all accounts, the AC instructors and ARNG troops enjoyed a good relationship.<sup>25</sup> Cordiality mattered more than

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<sup>21</sup> Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1960), 7.

<sup>22</sup> Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 91; Stetson Conn and Byron Fairchild, *The Framework of Hemisphere Defense* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1960), 63.

<sup>23</sup> As noted in 1935 by historian James W. Linn, “in [the] whole country, from the northern tip of Maine to the southern tip of California, there [were] not sixty thousand ‘Regulars’ [AC soldiers].” Linn, *Washington's Lost Plan Revived*, 9, 14.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 16.

<sup>25</sup> War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916), 18, 46; Michael E. Weaver, *Guard Wars* (Bloomington, IN:



accountability, and whereas neither party had any incentive to find fault in the other, they cohabitated in tranquility—although isolated instructors occasionally shifted allegiance to their ARNG partners, and involved themselves in unit politics, to their own demise.<sup>26</sup>

NGB (National Guard Bureau) guidance for Interwar Period unit training plans, in their ideal form (see Figure 2), closely resembled today's.




Figure 2. Suggested Regimental (Brigade) Training Program from NGB, 1926. National Guard Bureau, *Notes on National Guard Training: 1925-1926*. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), 27.

Collective training took place from the squad to the platoon level. Staff training occurred separately, but staff responsibilities also included monitoring unit training and completing

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Indiana University Press, 2010), 67, 150; Edward J. Stackpole Jr., *Report of Field Training: 52nd Cavalry Brigade, 1934*, Report from the Commanding General, 52nd Cavalry Brigade to the Commanding General, 28th Division, July 28, 1934, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA, 4.

<sup>26</sup> Floyd Hatfield, *Some Helps for Officers of the Regular Army Who Are Detailed as Instructors with the National Guard* (Individual Research Study, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff School, May 12, 1933), 15-16.

administrative tasks. Other staff tasks included recommended quarterly observations by regimental and (subordinate) battalions of subordinate unit task proficiency tests (in December, March and June, with a break for summer camp and the fall harvest). Officer education, formalized in 1920, began with a four-course construct, similar to today's concept, but by 1940 had condensed into a single course, owing to budget constraints.<sup>27</sup> AC officers attended a nine-month course, whereas ARNG and Organized Reserve (OR) officers attended an abridged, three month version of the course: a 3:1 compression of AC curriculum.<sup>28</sup> On the whole, the average ARNG infantry battalion unit training plan from ninety-one years ago, compared to that of today, is similar in its overall concept, plateau, and (low) tolerance for training risk.<sup>29</sup>

Despite technological advances and rapid mechanization, physical fitness remained the essential quality of combat arms soldiers throughout the Interwar Period. The *1925-1926 Notes on National Guard Training* warned that "...it is necessary to go far beyond the sound body, particularly for junior officers and the enlisted men, and demand the developed and hardened body that systematic athletic training produces. None other can survive the hardships of field service in war."<sup>30</sup> The harsh experience of World War I was hardly a decade in the past. NGB therefore recommended that commanders commit a surprising large portion of the limited training time available to some form of physical training (PT) (see Figure 3).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> Robert R. Palmer, Bill I. Wiley and William R. Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops* (Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military History, 1948), 259.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 259.

<sup>29</sup> Field Manual (FM) 7-0: *Train to Win In a Complex World* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), F-2.

<sup>30</sup> National Guard Bureau, *Notes on National Guard Training: 1925-1926* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), 7.

<sup>31</sup> The National Guard Training Directive, in 1926, "...allot(ted) afternoons of the field-training period (summer camp) to athletics and recreational games," and provided a "suggested daily schedule" as an appendix. *Ibid.*, 7, 23.

APPENDIX III

A SUGGESTED DAILY SCHEDULE

Reveille.....	5.30 a. m.
Setting-up exercises.....	Following 15 minutes.
Breakfast.....	6.10 a. m.
Police of tents and streets.....	6.30 a. m.
Field training (last 15 minutes to be disciplinary drill).....	} 7 a. m. to 12 m.
Recruit training.....	
Dinner.....	12.15 p. m.
Mass athletics.....	} 1.30 to 3 p. m.
Recruit training.....	
Officers' school (company).....	
Baseball.....	} 3 to 4.30 p. m.
Boxing.....	
Swimming.....	
Group games.....	
Preparation for field meet.....	
N. C. O. schools.....	} 1.30 to 4.30 p. m.
Command post exercise or other staff training.....	
Ceremonies and retreat.....	5.15 p. m.
Supper.....	6 p. m.
Amusements.....	7 p. m.
Tattoo.....	9 p. m.
Taps.....	10 p. m.

Figure 3. Suggested Daily Training Schedule. National Guard Bureau, *Notes on National Guard Training: 1925-1926*, (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), 27.

Interwar Period ARNG units struggled, as they had before World War I, to fit all required tactical and administrative training into their 15-day annual training periods.<sup>32</sup> NGB's *1925-1926 Notes on National Guard Training* asserted that "...the field period (a fifteen-day summer encampment) is

<sup>32</sup> The Militia Bureau, as early as 1916, reported an "insufficiency of training periods.... It is a fact proven by long military experience that a period of not less than six months continuous training (comprising practically 1,000 hours of instruction) is necessary to train a recruit to take his place as an efficient soldier in the ranks of a trained organization." War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916*, 52.

too short to accomplish what we would all like to see done.”<sup>33</sup> PT was among the first training events to fall off the training calendar, if it had ever made it there in the first place.<sup>34</sup>

Disagreement over what constitutes adequate training time for ARNG units, generally evaluated by historians as such based on comparisons to AC unit training time, is at least as old as the modern (post-1903) ARNG itself. NGB’s *1925-1926 Notes on National Guard Training* quoted an anonymous AC corps observer who claimed that the ARNG would be “...effective for first-line duty with ninety days’ training.”<sup>35</sup> In 1928, Major Dwight D. Eisenhower, then a student at the US Army War College, concluded that, “the average [Guard member]...is about one month advanced in training...from every standpoint it is evident that the greater part of the National Guard should not be required to enter active campaign immediately upon declaration of war except in case of dire necessity.”<sup>36</sup> Later that fall, Major General Creed C. Hammond, Chief of the Militia Bureau, addressed Eisenhower’s class, and declared, with a number of caveats and provisos, that “[t]he aim of the National Guard has been and is to become ‘first line troops.’”<sup>37</sup> Seven years after Hammond’s lecture, NGAUS promised operational readiness after only six

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<sup>33</sup> National Guard Bureau, *Notes on National Guard Training: 1925-1926*, 15.

<sup>34</sup> In a 1934 report on field training of the 185th Field Artillery of the Iowa National Guard, the “periods of daily training” included only ten minutes during the “morning period” (5:30 a.m. to 7:30 a.m.) for “brisk setting-up exercises (calisthenics),” and two hours in the “evening period” (7:00 p.m. to 9:00 p.m.) for “entertainment and recreation.” Interestingly, this conflicted with Camp [Standing] Order No. 8, which directed that “... afternoons, except Saturday and Sunday, will be devoted to athletics... [and] a number of competitive events between organizations and individuals will be carried out.” Harry Ward, “Field Training of the 185th Field Artillery of the Iowa National Guard at Camp Ripley (Little Falls) Minnesota: August 5th to August 19th, 1934,” 1934, US Army War College Library, 1, 47, 52.

<sup>35</sup> National Guard Bureau, *Notes on National Guard Training: 1925-1926*, 19.

<sup>36</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, “An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army” (Master’s Thesis, US Army War College, 1928), 1, quoted in Benjamin Franklin Cooling, “Dwight D. Eisenhower at the Army War College: 1927-1928,” *Parameters* 5, no. 1, (1975): 26.

<sup>37</sup> Creed C. Hammond, *The National Guard as a Federal Force* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 1928).

months of post-mobilization training.<sup>38</sup> Based on remarks he made in late 1939, General George C. Marshall disagreed with NGAUS' self-assessment of immediate availability, saying that the National Guard would "...supplement the small standing army for the first phase of the defense of the country in the event of war."<sup>39</sup> Marshall believed the ARNG was a supplemental, not an immediate force. Throughout the Interwar Period, the proper role of the ARNG and what would constitute adequate post-mobilization training for ARNG units remained an unresolved, inter-service disagreement. Regardless, whether the War Department anticipated or acknowledged it, the ARNG would provide the first response to a national emergency for lack of viable alternatives. Shortages of men and equipment in the AC meant the bench was empty.<sup>40</sup>

The architects of the US Army, throughout the Interwar Period, sought to remediate the acknowledged deficiencies of World War I's unwieldy 'square' divisions through two complementary reforms: reducing the overall size of the divisions, while retaining some divisional structure during peacetime, in order to train the next war's division and corps commanders.<sup>41</sup> After World War I, the War Department organized the postwar Army into three field army areas, subdivided into nine corps areas.<sup>42</sup> (see Figure 4).

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<sup>38</sup> James Webber Linn, *Washington's Lost Plan Revived* (Chicago, IL: National Guard Association, 1935), 9.

<sup>39</sup> Larry I. Bland, Sharon Ritenour Stevens, and Clarence E. Wunderlin, Jr., eds., *The Papers of George Catlett Marshall* (Lexington, VA: The George C. Marshall Foundation, 1981), 126.

<sup>40</sup> John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1997), 117; Mark T. Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 204.

<sup>41</sup> Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: the Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, 73.

<sup>42</sup> "Each army area supported one Guard and two Reserve cavalry divisions, and each corps area maintained one Regular, two Guard, and three Reserve infantry divisions, all to be sustained by combat support and combat service support units to be perfected later." *Ibid.*, 87.



Figure 4. Corps Areas in the United States, August 20, 1920. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1997), 88-89.

In 1932, US Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur reorganized all nine corps areas into four field armies (see Figure 5), the configuration in which the ARNG would later mobilize to serve in World War II.




Figure 5. Field Armies in the United States, 1932. John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1997), 118-19.

With this reorganization, MacArthur sought to avoid a fundamental error of World War I's difficult mobilization, during which headquarters elements had to establish themselves simultaneous with the formation of their constituent units.<sup>43</sup> MacArthur's field armies, did help somewhat in the command and control of mobilization, but they fell far short of achieving their intended purpose of providing ready wartime headquarters.<sup>44</sup>

On one hand, the field armies and smaller divisions offered greater opportunities for officers to practice maneuvering large units and leading combined arms operations.<sup>45</sup> On the other hand, the deliberate deferment of the organization and training of support units to an unspecified, later date meant that the maneuver training that took place did not occur in a realistic training environment, one which that prepared logistics organizations and their leaders for combat.<sup>46</sup> What resulted was an overabundance of large, unwieldy ARNG infantry and (especially) cavalry units, and a shortage of combat support and combat service support units.<sup>47</sup> This self-inflicted imbalance of arms persisted throughout the Interwar Period, despite NGAUS' raising of the alarm in 1935.<sup>48</sup>

The War Department's second full-scale expansion, training, and mobilization of the ARNG for major combat operations (the first being World War I) occurred toward the end of the

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<sup>43</sup> Martin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*. Washington, DC: US Army, 1952, 424.

<sup>44</sup> Bradley, *A General's Life*, 92.

<sup>45</sup> John Dickinson, *The Building of an Army* (Century Company: New York, NY, 1922), 331-332; "...[D]uring peacetime training, special care must be given to mutual support of the arms since their characteristics complement each other." Daniel J. Hughes, *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 154.

<sup>46</sup> John B. Wilson, *Maneuver and Firepower: the Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1997), 87.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 102-103, 95.

<sup>48</sup> "None of (the ARNG) divisional organizations... are complete.... all lack various parts essential to their employment in campaigns." Linn, *Washington's Lost Plan Revived*, 19; War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916*, 8.

Interwar Period, in anticipation of possible involvement in the growing conflict in Europe, now known as World War II.<sup>49</sup> This was not, according to the Chief of the NGB, an unanticipated, shock event; rather, in his own words, it was the “culmination of twenty years of effort,” and the third of three “significant periods in the history of the National Guard.”<sup>50</sup> In particular, long-serving but junior grade officers worked throughout the Interwar Period to prepare for another war, making mobilization far less problematic than it might have been otherwise. Historian Mark T. Calhoun described these extraordinary AC officers as dedicated regulars “...from the ground combat arms, who had studied and prepared for modern war, [and] recognized that the increasingly complex, mobile form of combat they were likely to experience in the future would require physical strength, endurance, and high mental capacity.”<sup>51</sup> Laboring in a resource-starved operational environment throughout the Interwar Period, these same officers endured glacial promotion timelines.<sup>52</sup> Unsurprisingly, many of them came to express frustration with an ARNG that had, in their view, diverted limited resources away from an underdeveloped AC and fledgling OR with the passage of the National Defense Act of 1920; the ARNG’s first major political victory against the AC, in what would become a typical post-war ‘fifth quarter.’<sup>53</sup> One of these chosen men, Lesley J. McNair,

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<sup>49</sup> National Guard Bureau, *Induction of the National Guard of the United States, 1940-1941, and Present Allotments to States* (Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1945), 3-9.

<sup>50</sup> Chief of the National Guard Bureau, *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau: 1941* (Annual Report, Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1941), 1.

<sup>51</sup> Mark T. Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2015), 205-206.

<sup>52</sup> Michael E. Haskew, *West Point 1915: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Class the Stars Fell On* (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2014), 99

<sup>53</sup> Michael D. Doubler and John W. Listman, Jr., *The National Guard: An Illustrated History of America's Citizen-Soldiers* (Dulles, VA: Brassey's, Inc., 2003), 68. “The National Guard has many effective contacts with Congress other than those established through the War Department, and wields a strong influence on National Defense legislation.” William P. Screws, “The National Guard as a Federal Force,” *Report of Committee No. 6: Course at the Army War College, 1928-1929, G1* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, October 25, 1928) 1-3, 2; Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 108.



finally earned promotion to Major General in 1940, upon his appointment as General Headquarters (GHQ) chief of staff.

It fell to McNair, responsible for organizing and training the US Army in World War II, to reshape the activated ARNG into a more usable form.<sup>54</sup> McNair trimmed top-heavy divisions, assigning excess personnel and units into a GHQ Reserve.<sup>55</sup> These abrupt amputations were necessary and life-saving procedures, despite NGB protests.<sup>56</sup> The War Department saw such reorganization as necessary to meet the constantly changing, theater-specific needs of the US Army, and to address chronic AC personnel shortages.<sup>57</sup> Post-mobilization reorganizations required by long-understrength units and overdue conversions from ‘square’ to ‘triangular’ divisions, combined with ongoing adjustments to tables of organization and equipment, contributed to low levels of individual and collective training readiness in the ARNG, and catalyzed inter-component frustration harbored by AC leaders.<sup>58</sup> The predictable effects of limited PT on a rapidly aging force unfortunately made the ARNG an easy target of criticism; reporting from the newly formed 82nd Airborne Division to the 28th Infantry Division (ID) in 1942, Major General Omar N. Bradley personally led remedial foot marches.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>54</sup> Wilson, *Manuever and Firepower: the Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades*, 159.

<sup>55</sup> National Guard Bureau, *Induction of the National Guard of the United States, 1940-1941, and Present Allotments to States*, 69.

<sup>56</sup> Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 569.

<sup>57</sup> Calhoun, *General Lesley J. McNair: Unsung Architect of the US Army*, 218; John B. Wilson, *Manuever and Firepower: the Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1997), 153; War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1916), 10.

<sup>58</sup> “... [T]he divisions we created from scratch and manned with draftees were in every instance superior to Guard divisions.” Bradley, *A General's Life*, 483.

<sup>59</sup> “Only a casual inspection is needed to impress on anyone with military training that the National Guard personnel as a body is lacking in PT; even those long in the service lack the

The 28th ID, cited herein as representative of a typical World War II ARNG division, had participated in several major pre-mobilization maneuvers from 1935 to 1940 before participating in the (post-mobilization) GHQ Maneuvers of 1941. For its members, these pre-mobilization maneuvers provided an opportunity for excitement and exertion, in addition to unsupervised frolic.<sup>60</sup> As the Army's bureaucracy expanded, so too did tedious administrative requirements.<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, the exigency and scale of post-mobilization collective training increased the incidence of soldier injuries and death in training, which the public acknowledged as tragic but tolerable.<sup>62</sup> From 28th ID leadership's accounts, these pre-mobilization maneuvers were an unalloyed success.<sup>63</sup> First Army's written critiques of the 1935 and 1939 maneuvers were non-accusatory and benign, despite now-apparent evidence of major shortcomings in large unit

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physique which should result from proper military training." War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916*, 33; "In the National Guard, with its limited hours of instruction, (PT) receives scant attention." National Guard Bureau, *Notes on National Guard Training: 1925-1926*, 7; "A high percentage of the junior officers were over-age and physically unfit." Bradley, *A General's Life*, 108; Haskew, *West Point 1915: Eisenhower, Bradley, and the Class the Stars Fell On*, 127.

<sup>60</sup> *The Pennsylvania Guardsman*, (September 1935): 19; *The Pennsylvania Guardsman*, (August 1939): 6; *The Pennsylvania Guardsman*, (July 1940): 6, 5, 12; *The Pennsylvania Guardsman*, (October 1940): 27; Allen G. Crist, "Between the Wars," in *The First Century*, by 28th Infantry Division (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1979), 145.

<sup>61</sup> Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 610; Palmer, Wiley and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 461.

<sup>62</sup> "Sixty-one soldiers lost their lives in the Louisiana and Carolinas maneuvers, and yet there was no public outcry." Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941* (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1992), 193; "...training was freed from the safety restrictions of peacetime and became dangerously real, and as supervision at all levels became more effective." Kreidberg and Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, 611.

<sup>63</sup> "The splendid spirit displayed at all times and the small number on sick report with practically 100% attendance made the Pennsylvania National Guard a most formidable little army." Edward Martin, "The Commanding General's Message," *The Pennsylvania Guardsman*, (October 1940): 6; Letter from Major General Edward Martin to Officers of the 28th Division Staff, December 3 1941, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg, PA, Box 1901124.

collective task proficiency.<sup>64</sup> Notably absent is the fierce AC criticism of ARNG combined arms maneuver commanders' competency, which erupted shortly after mobilization. As criticisms grew, ARNG officers confirmed their earlier, latent suspicions that promotion-starved instructors would snap up divisions' leadership positions – engendering enduring post-war suspicion.<sup>65</sup>

On the topic of ARNG field grade and general officer proficiency in the post-mobilization period, Bradley remarked that, “[a]lmost without exception, the senior commanders – the generals and colonels – were political appointees who were militarily incompetent.... [c]ompetent regimental and battalion commanders were almost impossible to find.”<sup>66</sup> Similar criticism had

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<sup>64</sup> “There is no intention here to criticize nor to condemn any individual or organization. I imagine all of us made mistakes some time during the exercises, and I am equally sure that we all learned much... The following general comments on the exercises are offered. They are nothing new. They apply to maneuvers we have all seen in the past: Deployments made in too close formations. Battalions and regiments almost invariably over extended. Attack and offense formations not in sufficient depth. Scouts too often too close in to offer any protection. Machine guns improperly sited and generally placed too far forward. The fear of losing the battle seemed at times to prevail over the will to win it. There is still too much time required to get orders down to assault units. The attack order was dictated at 4:30 P.M. Some battalions did not receive their orders until 5:45 next morning for the attack at 6:30 A.M.” James P. Marley, *First Army Critique*, (First Army Final Report, Plattsburg Barracks, NY: First Army, 1939), 1, 3; “...as I announced in the opening conference, we are here to learn and not to test. My remarks at this conference are intended in that spirit and not to criticize. (1) There has been marked improvement by the whole command over last year's maneuver.... (2) The spirit and conduct of the command are most gratifying and are superior. (3) The higher commanders and staffs have met their problems excellently.” Hugh A. Drum, "First Army Critique," *The Pennsylvania Guardsman*, (October 1940), 5.

<sup>65</sup> William H. Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy* (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1957), 114; A memorandum to McNair in 1942 describes the initiation of quarterly (officer) efficiency reports to root out unsatisfactory (ARNG) officers, which could avoid accusations of discrimination. “The best way to have a record in these cases would be to require a quarterly efficiency report. It would be bad policy to require such reports on National Guard officers and not on Regular Army officers. Anyone, so inclined, would have an opportunity to create a lot of unfavorable publicity concerning alleged discrimination.” Memorandum from GHQ Adjutant General Section to Brigadier General Lesley McNair, “Determination of Suitable Officers,” September 14, 1940, National Archives and Research Administration II, College Park, MD, Record Group 337, Box 14.

<sup>66</sup> Bradley, *A General's Life*, 108.

preceded the ARNG's mobilization for World War I.<sup>67</sup> McNair agreed, and echoed concern for what he called the "the National Guard problem," saying in 1942 that it had

...been a heavy trial for the War Department and General Marshall in particular. The National Guard Commanders—especially the high ones—lack the background for such large units. It is no reflection on their intrinsic ability as a rule, for they are the survival of the fittest [*sic*] and in most cases are selected men. However, these divisions, when commanded by National Guard officers, reach a ceiling fixed by the capacity of the commander, and that ceiling is too low for comfort.<sup>68</sup>

According to Bradley, McNair

...had to fire almost every officer in the Guard from major general through colonel, and a large percentage of the lower-ranking officers. The situation was so bad that in June 1941 Marshall himself felt compelled to write a 'frank' (but tactful) letter to all Guard division commanders.... Much later in a blistering memorandum to Marshall, drafted in the spring of 1944, McNair wrote that the Guard had "contributed nothing to National Defense," and its history since mobilization "was one of unsatisfactory training, physical condition, discipline, morale and particularly leadership."<sup>69</sup>

However, as McNair recognized, the problem of officer quality was by no means limited to the ARNG; the Great Depression had inflicted malnutrition on an entire generation of future leaders.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Writing about the ARNG in 1912, author Walter Merriam Pratt alleged that "(t)he greatest weakness of the system is the general officers.... they have spent a great deal of time in the military.... but a great deal of the time so spent, as already explained, has been devoted to the business, social and recruiting end of the game—a most important duty, it is true, but one that leaves little time to study tactics and field administration...." Walter Merriam Pratt, *Tin Soldiers* (Boston, MA: The Gorham Press, 1912), 49.

<sup>68</sup> "Memorandum from Major General John Milliken to Lieutenant General Lesley McNair," August 7 1942, National Archives and Research Administration II, College Park, MD, Record Group 319, Box 129; McNair "inherited a mess in the fall of 1940.... [after having been given] responsibility for the training of every ground soldier in the US Army in World War II." Omar N. Bradley, *A General's Life* (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 92.

<sup>69</sup> Bradley, *A General's Life*, 108; Excerpt from July 30, 1941 memorandum from Marshall to ARNG Division commanders: "It is apparent in the less advanced divisions that the younger officers have not had enough tactical training or general education to enable them to conduct instruction in an efficient or at least in an interesting manner; that noncommissioned officers suffer from these same deficiencies; that the standards of discipline are too low and reflect the unwillingness of leaders who knew their subordinates in civil life to hold them to a strict compliance with military orders." Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*, 95-96, 116.

<sup>70</sup> Palmer, Wiley and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 158.

NGB did not dispute these previously unidentified training readiness shortcomings (primarily at the field grade and general officer ranks and regimental to division echelons), as begrudgingly acknowledged by the Chief of the National Guard Bureau in his 1942 Annual Report: “[...upon mobilization, the ARNG] had patriotic citizen leadership even though some of its officers might have been better suited for home town leadership than for hard field work. Its weekly drills and its annual 15 days of field training could not make its members into hardened soldiers and it should not have been expected that they would....”<sup>71</sup> Following the generally unsatisfactory General Headquarters (GHQ) Maneuvers and mere weeks before a Japanese fleet attacked at Pearl Harbor, all earlier estimates of what would constitute adequate pre-mobilization and post-mobilization training for the ARNG seemed blithely optimistic, if not negligent.<sup>72</sup>

The courageous and honorable performance of ARNG numbered brigades and divisions in World War II remains a point of pride for today’s identically numbered brigades and divisions. However, even the most Guard-friendly researcher will concede that these historical units, as organized and manned, are imperfect analogs of today’s ARNG-pure units. Some authors argue that World War II ARNG soldiers and units retained their state-specific character throughout the war, due to deep-rooted regional affiliation—even as those ARNG units become diluted with out-of-state or draftee replacements; Ship(s) of Theseus.<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> “...these [Guard members] have never pretended to be, and no one should expect to consider them to be, professional soldiers.” Chief of the National Guard Bureau, *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau: 1942* (Annual Report, Washington, DC: National Guard Bureau, 1942), 63.

<sup>72</sup> “...as an exercise in training the 1941 maneuvers ultimately did little to prepare the Army for war....” Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ Maneuvers of 1941*, 172-73, 187.

<sup>73</sup> “It seems certain that the National Guard divisions retained a distinctive tone and that they strove to preserve it... the historian of the 28th [Infantry] Division wrote throughout as if his division was pure Pennsylvanian.” Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 164.

Major Adam R. Grove, a Pennsylvania Guard member, devoted his School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) monograph to the remarkable recovery and reconstitution of the 28th ID in only thirty days, following the battle of the Huertgen forest and prior to the German Ardennes offensive. Grove determined the 28th ID indeed remained a ‘Pennsylvania outfit’ through and through, due to the retention of key leaders and staff officers throughout draftee turnover.<sup>74</sup> While the personnel replacement system provided a steady flow of new recruits to replace enlisted losses, this had little effect on the composition and character of the division’s staff, which retained key individuals. The division’s experience in large-scale combat operations is therefore heritable to today’s incarnation of the unit, and aspects of its pre-mobilization and post-mobilization experience, prior to combat, is therefore relevant to its current disposition.

Oposing authors argue that the US Army’s thorough reorganization of the 28th ID, throughout mobilization and during an unexpectedly prolonged, multi-year train-up period, had completely subsumed the division’s pre-mobilization composition and character.<sup>75</sup> Thus, its honorable record was not the result of accumulated IDT (Inactive-Duty Training) weekends and AT (Annual Training) periods. Rather, it was the work of part-time soldiers, but the work of an AC division manned, trained and equipped in accordance with AC policies and procedures. General of the Army (retired) Bradley, in a later recollection of his involuntary stint as the 28th ID’s commander, provided unintentional resolution to these two opposing arguments, by describing Marshall’s *modus operandi* on post-mobilization ARNG division manning:

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<sup>74</sup> Adam R. Grove, *Re-forging the Iron Division: The Reconstitution of the 28th Infantry Division between the Hürtgen and the Ardennes* (SAMS Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2015), 24-25.

<sup>75</sup> Michael E. Weaver, *Guard Wars* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2010), 258-259; Robert Sterling Rush, *Hell in Hurtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph of an American Infantry Regiment* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 96; The Battery Press, *28th Infantry Division in World War II* (Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1980), 29-30.

Marshall, sensitive to National Guard politics, had long ago decreed that there would be no wholesale substitution of Regular Army officers for Guard officers on the staff level. Even if there had been enough available Regulars, a wholesale substitution would have caused a counterproductive public furor in the home state, destroyed the 'state' character of the division and unfairly blocked the promotion of qualified Guardsmen to higher rank. The policy was for a Regular Army commanding general to move in with as few assistants as possible, find the qualified men in the Guard division and promote them into positions of responsibility...<sup>76</sup>

Marshall's systematic replacement of ARNG commanders by their AC peers, along select AC staff (as recommended by McNair), supported a qualitatively-necessary improvement in operational-level leadership, while avoiding an unravelling of the state-specific character that Grove justly credits with supporting the 28th ID's legendary unit cohesion. Bradley's recognition that ARNG division staffs remained essentially intact, despite individual replacements, unintentionally illustrates how, not if, the legacy units of World War II retained their state-specific character throughout the war, per Marshall's intent, and that they are therefore relatable to modern-day, synonymous ARNG units.

The AC general officers that stewarded the Interwar Period ARNG into an army of full mobilization were realists under unimaginable pressure, and not bigoted 'Guard-haters.' For their frank commentary concerning the operational readiness of the ARNG to be of historical value, the researcher must avoid dismissing it as a symptom of inter-component rivalry or prejudice, and place it within the context of the great generals' monumental tasks. McNair generously praised Guard officers and commanders who met training standards.<sup>77</sup> General Eisenhower assured Marshall that in matters on talent management, he "...always ignored differences between Regular Army, NG and OR [officers]."<sup>78</sup> To win an absolute war of final victory, these men needed a ready force; one

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<sup>76</sup> Bradley, *A General's Life*, 109.

<sup>77</sup> Palmer, Wiley and Keast, *The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops*, 102.

<sup>78</sup> Dwight D. Eisenhower, "The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower. The War Years. Volume 4. Part X: Victory; January 1945 to May 1945. Chapter 27: Should It Be Berlin? Page 2597." *Johns Hopkins University Press*. March 11, 2010, accessed December 10, 2016,

manned, organized and trained in a logical and efficient manner. The Interwar Period ARNG, despite its best efforts and pleadings for additional resources, was not that force. It did not possess a level of pre-mobilization operational readiness adequate to confront its future enemy without significant post-mobilization investment by the AC.

The emergent dichotomy of personnel versus training readiness had a deleterious effect on overall operational readiness, and the AC instructors assigned to the ARNG failed to raise the alarm, due to a classic principal–agent problem: the representatives of the principal (AC instructors and evaluators) were not sufficiently incentivized to find fault in the agent (ARNG units).<sup>79</sup> A protracted post-mobilization training period, key leader substitutions, and steady stream of draftees throughout WWII averted catastrophe.<sup>80</sup>

## Case Study 2: Operation Desert Shield/Storm (ODS)

The ODS mobilization was the ARNG’s first major call-up for large-scale combat operations since the Korean War, and for that reason is the second case study within this monograph.<sup>81</sup> A brief summary of the ARNG’s development over the preceding forty-six years is necessary. Less than a month after American’s declaration of war against Japan, forward-thinking leaders in the ARNG,

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<http://eisenhower.press.jhu.edu/volume4/part10/chapter27/2597>.

<sup>79</sup> Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005, 12.

<sup>80</sup> “This case study highlights a lack of preparedness for war in the Army and the National Guard that I find difficult to fathom.” Weaver, *Guard Wars*, 259.

<sup>81</sup> “For nearly half a century after the end of the Korean War, the reserves were called up in numbers only twice—once for the 1960 Berlin Crisis (and then never sent overseas) and then in 1990/1991 for Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm (and then for most reservists only for about half a year). In contrast, since the events of September 11, 2001, the reserves have been nearly continuously supplying very large numbers of service members, often for periods of well over a year. Jacob Alex Klerman, *Rethinking the Reserve* (Study, Arlington, VA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2009), 1.



recalling the NG's complete dissolution following World War I, were setting the conditions for post-war survival.<sup>82</sup> This turned out to be a very necessary safeguard.

The Gray Board, convened by Secretary of Defense James Forrestal in 1948 (a little more than a year after the War Department returned ARNG units' colors to the states), recommended the consolidation of the ARNG and United States Army Reserve (USAR) into a single, federally controlled RC, eliminating what some AC leaders considered the ARNG's fatal flaw: its system of 'dual control.'<sup>83</sup> The ARNG and NGAUS' response to the Gray Report was swift: *The National Guardsman*, the new (1947) monthly magazine published by NGAUS, declared "The Battle Is On!"<sup>84</sup> The combined lobbying power of ARNG leaders and NGAUS, led by Major General Ellard A. Walsh, led to the unequivocal defeat of the Gray Board's recommendations – a watershed moment. The balance of power in the post-war AC/ARNG negotiation of ARNG end strength, force structure and operational readiness (typically intertwined topics) now rested with the NG and its professional association.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> War Department, National Guard Bureau, *Annual Report of the Chief of the National Guard Bureau*, 59; Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 195.

<sup>83</sup> In Bradley's words, representative of the contemporary AC consensus: "Unfortunately, there was no hope (after World War II) of abolishing the National Guard. It was too deeply entrenched politically within the states and in the U.S. Congress. But something drastic had to be done. One justification for our small postwar standing Army was that we had a National Guard ostensibly ready to leap to arms." Bradley, *A General's Life*, 483. Dr. William H. Riker described the ARNG's system of dual control as "vastly different from that contemplated by the Constitution," and "...curious: a half-national, half-state force, financially supported largely by the nation, supervised and inspected by the Regular Army, yet commanded by the chief executives of the states." Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*, 100.

<sup>84</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 201.

<sup>85</sup> "...the Guard has retained and assured itself a permanent and unequivocal role in the defense system... in spite of the fact that important elements of the [AC] have distrusted the Guard and worked, whenever possible, for a national militia." Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*, 88.

Throughout the 1950s, the ARNG and USAR lagged in readiness, as it underwent a series of reorganizations simultaneous with protracted racial integration.<sup>86</sup> Secretary of Defense Marshall, according to the National Guard's history, "strongly urged Congress to supply the Guard with new weapons, not the 'cast-offs' of the Army, as had been the policy to [that] date," so that the Guard would "be healthy and strong, ready to take its place in the first line of defense in the first weeks of an emergency and not dependent upon a year or more of training before it can be conditioned to take the field against a trained enemy."<sup>87</sup> This was not to be. Guard members activated for the Korean War often found themselves deployed as individual replacements or to Europe, as the AC stripped ARNG units first of valuable equipment and second of experienced veterans, crippling operational readiness.<sup>88</sup>

A decade later, in 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara proposed a merger of the USAR into the NG; the opposite of the Gray Board's recommendations. Owing largely to his failure to consult Congress, but also to the lobbying power of the newly formed Reserve Officer Association, representing a nascent USAR, his proposals failed. Four years later, in 1965, McNamara attempted to carve an elite subset out of the ARNG and USAR, including approximately thirty percent of the ARNG's total strength. This Select Reserve Force (SRF), consisting of a menagerie of ARNG and USAR company to division sized units from across the country, received a stunning fifty percent increase in paid drill days, and theater-specific training

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<sup>86</sup> Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, 249; Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*, 113.

<sup>87</sup> National Guard, "December - Today in Guard History," *National Guard*, March 27, 2017, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Today-in-Guard-History/December/>.

<sup>88</sup> William Berebitsky, *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953* (Shippensburg, PA: White Mane Publishing Company, Inc., 1996); Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, 231-238; Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 208-209.

for service in Vietnam.<sup>89</sup> Despite such a drastic increase in pre-mobilization training days, the SRF dissolved within two years of inception, having never made it overseas, and the ARNG (with few exceptions) sat out the Vietnam War.<sup>90</sup>



Figure 6. The Evolution of the Post-Vietnam National Guard. Brigadier General Wendul Hagler, “Army National Guard Update” (presentation at a meeting with Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies National Guard students, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 8, 2016), 8.

As illustrated in Figure 6, the National Guard perceives five separate crisis (forcing function) events as preceding its current operating paradigm, “ARNG 4.0,” which exists wholly post-

<sup>89</sup> Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, *Historical Attempts to Reorganize the Reserve Components* (Report, Washington, DC: Library of Congress, October 2007), 12.

<sup>90</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 234.

Vietnam.<sup>91</sup> Two of these crisis events preceded the Persian Gulf War. The first crisis event was the creation of the All-Volunteer Force (AVF). The government sought to remediate the damage to the institutional Army that the Vietnam War had done by creating the AVF; however, it also served as a haven for those seeking a draft deferment, and relied heavily on on-the-job training to develop individual skills.<sup>92</sup> The next crisis event, in 1984, was the Reagan-era expansion of the military, and adoption of a tiered readiness scheme by NGB, that created a set of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’ amongst ARNG units. The Montgomery Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 prevented states’ militias’ commanders (governors) from blocking the overseas utilization of the ARNG, reifying its role as an indispensable part of the national reserve; one of the defeated Gray Board’s earlier proposals, now ratified.<sup>93</sup>

The Persian Gulf mobilization of USAR and ARNG combat support units was generally successful; however, the delayed mobilization of three ARNG ‘round-out’ combat brigades and their substitution with AC units, generated inter-service enmity over training and personnel readiness. The AC alleged that the ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) reported to mobilization stations at lower-than-previously-reported readiness levels.<sup>94</sup> Attorney and former AC officer Jeffrey A. Jacobs wrote that “[AC] officers’ ... formal evaluations of [RC units]

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<sup>91</sup> Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1962), 10, 67-75.

<sup>92</sup> Beth Bailey, *America's Army: Making the All-Volunteer Force* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009); Wendul Hagler, “Army National Guard Update” (presentation at a meeting with Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies National Guard students, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 8, 2016), 8.

<sup>93</sup> Doubler, *Civilian in Peace, Soldier in War: The Army National Guard, 1636-2000*, 290, 296; Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (New York, NY: Anchor Books, 1966), 89-92.

<sup>94</sup> US General Accounting Office, *National Guard: Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades for War* (GAO Report: NSIAD-91-263, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1991), 3-4.

deliberately sugar coat[ed]... shortcomings,” due to political risk.<sup>95</sup> The ARNG replied that mediocre readiness levels were unavoidable, given a second-class resourcing and continued erosion of training time, and that an unnecessarily hesitant AC had unjustly refused to deploy the ARNG BCTs.<sup>96</sup> The RAND Corporation authored numerous post-mortem reports on this systemic failure, one of which explicitly acknowledged the challenges of RC units training “complex tasks (with) minimal time available.”<sup>97</sup> The last of these reports concluded that an ARNG combat brigade would need a little over four months to prepare for combat.<sup>98</sup> The post-mobilization training time previously estimated as adequate for the ARNG, was again not. The availability of ready AC BCTs, and a shockingly abrupt defeat of the enemy averted catastrophe.

The third crisis event occurred shortly thereafter, from 1992 to 1993: the Army Offsite Agreement (AOA). Pursuant to this unprecedented trilateral meeting of the AC, USAR, and ARNG and their respective professional associations, the parties agreed upon new roles and end strength caps, in support of a major post-Cold War restructuring. The ARNG would consolidate all RC combat capability, and the USAR would consolidate all RC combat service support capability.

In the long aftermath of the ARNG’s ODS mobilization, AC authors were quick to avenge the ARNG’s relatively gentle treatment during the early 1990s’ ‘peace dividend’ drawdown, by

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<sup>95</sup> Jeffrey A. Jacobs, *The Future of the Citizen-Soldier Force: Issues and Answers* (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 1994), 137-138.

<sup>96</sup> James T. Brady, *Ready to Serve? The 48th, 155th and 256th Brigades and the Roundout Concept During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College, 2007); Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufmann, *US Army Guard & Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks* (Study, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 98; Thomas B. Sharratt, "The Reserves: Full Partners at Last, but How Ready?" *ARMY* 29 (June 1979): 43; Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 47.

<sup>97</sup> RAND Corporation, *Post-Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1992), 4.

<sup>98</sup> RAND Corporation, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993).

capitalizing on the ARNG's alleged deficiencies.<sup>99</sup> Consequently, ARNG officers were so thoroughly chastened as to earnestly propose limiting the National Guard's role to that of civil support and disaster response, and relinquishing its combat role (and combat units) altogether.<sup>100</sup> Colonel Philip Brehm and Major Wilbur Gray, both Guard members, proposed a set of non-combat, "Alternative Missions for the Army," in an eponymous 1992 study for the Strategic Studies Institute.<sup>101</sup> AC officers throughout the post-ODS, pre-GWOT period continued to question the utility of ARNG combat units, especially ARNG divisions. In 1996, Major Eric G. Clayburn argued that "the force structure of the National Guard [was] improperly allocated," and whereas a "...shortage of CS and CSS units... [had] been identified by the recently completed Total Army Analysis... some of the force structure of the National Guard divisions should be converted and assigned these missions."<sup>102</sup> This theorizing continued into the new millennium, ending only after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.<sup>103</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> Lieutenant Colonel Charles J. Dunlap Jr. captured the zeitgeist with a pot-shot, set in dystopian future fiction: "...political pressures exempted the Guard and the Reserves from the harshest effects of the budgetary cutbacks of the early 1990s. The First Gulf War demonstrated that modern weapons and tactics were simply too complex for part-time soldiers to master during their allotted drill periods, however well motivated. Still, creative Guard and Reserve defenders contrived numerous civic-action and humanitarian assignments and sold them as 'training.' Left unexplained was how such training was supposed to fit with the military strategies that contemplated short, violent, come-as-you-are expeditionary wars. Nice-to-have Guard and Reserve support-oriented programs prevailed at the expense of critical active-duty combat capabilities." Charles J. Dunlap Jr., "The Origins of the American Military Coup of 2012," *Parameters* 22, no. 4 (Winter 1992-1993): 2-20, 19.

<sup>100</sup> Philip Drew, "Taking the National Guard Out of Combat," *National Guard* (April 1991): 38.

<sup>101</sup> Philip Brehm and Wilbur Gray, *Alternative Missions for the Army* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute), 1992, vi.

<sup>102</sup> Eric G. Clayburn, *Re-Looking Sacred Cows: the Eight National Guard Divisions* (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: US Army Command and General Staff College), 1996, iii.

<sup>103</sup> "The challenge facing the National Guard is that it cannot be all things to all people. With the limited number of training days available, the National Guard cannot be a full spectrum force and support a dual state mission and expect to be fully prepared at all times. The roles and missions for the National Guard must be firmly defined in order to allow Guard units to focus their

## Case Study 3: The Global War on Terror and the Current Operating Environment

On April 18, 2016, Staff Sergeant Erich Friedlein and Captain Robert Killian surpassed one hundred competitors to become the first National Guard team to win the Best Ranger competition.<sup>104</sup> Infantrymen epitomize an army, and the elite, light infantrymen in the Rangers represent the best of their branch—thus, this victory confirmed the validity of the official NGB statement: that Guard personnel from Pennsylvania and Colorado together formed the “best two-man team in the entire United States Armed Forces.”<sup>105</sup> Less than a month later, on May 6, a North Carolina ARNG tank crew beat tank crews from every other Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in the US Army, to win the 2016 Sullivan Cup.<sup>106</sup> Six months later, on October 21, Sergeant Saykham Keophalychanh and Sergeant Nicholas Mitchell, both Michigan Guardsmen, won the 16th annual International Sniper Competition, besting forty-two two-man teams from around the world.<sup>107</sup> This series of championships represented the ARNG’s GWOT training

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training efforts to achieve the levels of proficiency necessary to meet the expectations of the nation and foster an atmosphere of trust and confidence with the AC.” Mark K. O’Hanlon, *The Army National Guard: Force Multiplier or Irrelevant Force* (SAMS Monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), 3.

<sup>104</sup> David E. Grange Best Ranger Competition, “Best Ranger Competition.” *Best Ranger Competition*, May 1, 2016, accessed November 27, 2016, <http://www.bestrangercompetition.com/>.

<sup>105</sup> D. Richard Salzer, “Army Guard Soldiers win Best Ranger Competition for first time in competition history,” *National Guard Bureau*, April 19, 2016, accessed November 27, 2016, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/734547/army-guard-soldiers-win-best-ranger-competition-for-first-time-in-competition-h/>; War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916*, 11.

<sup>106</sup> Kenneth O. Preston, “Army National Guard tank crew team wins 2016 Sullivan Cup,” *AUSA*, July 13, 2016, accessed December 4, 2016, <https://www.ausa.org/articles/army-national-guard-tank-crew-team-wins-2016-sullivan-cup>.

<sup>107</sup> Michigan National Guard, “Michigan National Guard wins 2016 International Sniper Competition,” *National Guard Bureau*, October 24, 2016, accessed December 4, 2016,

dividend; a high-water mark in citizen-soldiers' individual and crew proficiency that demonstrated the result of extraordinary individual devotion to excellence. However, soldiers do not fight modern wars as individuals; that is the work of organized units, led by trained and proficient commanders and staffs.

The fourth crisis event within the ARNG's paradigm (see Figure 6) is the GWOT, 2001 to 2007. The GWOT brought the ARNG unprecedented access to personnel (through a wellspring of generous recruitment and retention incentives), training and equipment, along with increased combat utilization. In Iraq and Afghanistan, Guard members and units earned the admiration and respect of AC field commanders for their conduct of both counter-insurgency and stability and support operations.<sup>108</sup> Hyperbole ensued: over time and after the war, the ARNG's acclaimed success within the GWOT blurred into generalized, partially informed claims of total parity with the AC—claims made, ironically, as the ARNG's involvement in OCO dwindled.<sup>109</sup> This newfound veneer of equality appeared to vindicate ARNG leaders' commitment to Total Force policy, and

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<http://www.nationalguard.mil/News/Article/984229/michigan-national-guard-wins-2016-international-sniper-competition/>.

<sup>108</sup> “Guardsmen performed a full spectrum of operations from defeating insurgents to promoting civic action.” Doubler’s choice of metaphor in describing the ARNG’s operational success is misleading; according to contemporary US Army doctrine, “[f]ull spectrum operations require[d] continuous, simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil support tasks,” whereas the “full spectrum” Doubler described was largely centered on stability and civil support tasks, against an irregular enemy, and in missions that rarely surpassed the tactical (battalion and below) level of war. Doubler, *The National Guard and the War on Terror: Operation Iraqi Freedom*, 48; Field Manual (FM) 3-0: *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 3-1.

<sup>109</sup> US Senator John McCain (R-AZ), Chair of the Senate Armed Services Committee, was quoted by NGAUS as claiming that “National Guardsmen have shown the nation during the war on terrorism that they are the equal of active-component members. ‘There is literally no difference,’ [McCain] said...” John Goheen, *NGAUS Washington Report: McCain: Guardsmen have ‘Proven Themselves,’* March 14, 2016, accessed March 18, 2017, <http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/news/mccain-guardsmen-have-%E2%80%98proven-themselves%E2%80%99>.



paved the way for continued, post-GWOT operationalization of the ARNG.<sup>110</sup> Unfortunately, proficiency in one of the two grammars of war (regular and irregular) does not often translate well into the other.<sup>111</sup>

The essence of the RC is the part-time aspect of its service, together with a presumption of greater cost efficiency.<sup>112</sup> Indeed, prior to GWOT, RC recruiters had solemnly assured prospects' concerned family members that a great call-up would occur as an exception and in a time of national emergency; the President would mobilize the RC only as a last resort – not as cut-rate labor.<sup>113</sup> Post-GWOT operationalization of the ARNG resonates with contemporary corporate approaches to the reduction of operating expenses, such as the substitution of expensive, salaried employees by part-time or contract workers—reminiscent of McNamara's later attempts at increasing efficiency in the RC. While GWOT's routinization of rotational deployments benefited those states motivated to retain end strength and force structure through demonstrated readiness and continued relevance, it also stressed the ARNG's moral contract with its members, their quasi-military families, and war-weary private employers.<sup>114</sup> The change in the ARNG's role and AC

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<sup>110</sup> National Guard, "About the Guard: Army National Guard," *National Guard*, February 2, 2017, accessed February 2, 2017, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/Army-National-Guard/>.

<sup>111</sup> Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations* (London: Faber & Faber, 1971); "...[F]orces involved in protracted stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks require intensive training to regain proficiency in offensive or defensive tasks before engaging in large-scale combat operations." Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0: *Operations*, 3-3; Antulio J. Echevarria, "American Operational Art, 1917-2008," in *The Evolution of Operational Art: From Napoleon to the Present*, edited by John Andreas Olsen and Martin van Creveld, 137-165 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

<sup>112</sup> Klerman, *Rethinking the Reserve*, xii-xiii.

<sup>113</sup> Stephen Palazzo, "Capital View: Righting a Wrong," *National Guard: The Official Publication of the National Guard Association of the United States* (March 2017): 12.

<sup>114</sup> David Rohall, "Book Review: Deployed: How Reservists Bear the Burden of Iraq, by Michael Musheno and Susan B. Ross," *Contemporary Sociology Vol. 38, No. 5*, 2009: 477-478.

expectations exacerbates the tension between what Dr. David Rohall characterized as "...the expectations of an all-volunteer reserve force that is supposed to make military service compatible with a separate civilian career and home life, and the Total Force policy that treats the reserves like an active duty force that can deploy with little notice."

Concurrent with the conclusion of Operation New Dawn and withdrawal of US ground forces from Iraq in 2010, a flurry of scholarship and professional discussion concerning the future of the RC ensued.<sup>115</sup> This collegial dialogue came to a halt following the pinch of the Budget Control Act of 2011, and the brief era of good feelings degenerated into partisanship by early 2014. Seeking retrenchment, the AC asked too much of the ARNG, attempting to strip it of valuable aviation assets, including AH-64 attack helicopters; of questionable suitability in the execution of DOMOPS, but critical to states seeking to retain relevance and resources needed for possible future federal mobilizations.<sup>116</sup> AC and ARNG leaders anchored themselves to by-now familiar post-war themes.<sup>117</sup> ARNG leadership claimed that ARNG BCTs were interchangeable with AC BCTs, and AC leadership vehemently disagreed.<sup>118</sup> In what some RC leaders characterized as a craven,

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<sup>115</sup> John A. Nagl, Travis Sharp, *Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves*, September 28, 2010, accessed January 15, 2017, <https://www.army.mil/article/45819/operational-for-what-the-future-of-the-guard-and-reserves/>.

<sup>116</sup> Brendan McGarry, *Lawmakers Curb Army's Plans to Transfer Apaches from Guard* December 3, 2014, accessed March 27, 2017, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2014/12/03/lawmakers-curb-armys-plans-to-transfer-apaches-from-guard.html>.

<sup>117</sup> US Department of Defense, Defense Casualty Analysis System: Home > Conflict Casualties > OCO Casualty Summary by Service Component, February 2, 2017, accessed February 2, 2017, [https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report\\_sum\\_comp.xhtml](https://www.dmdc.osd.mil/dcas/pages/report_sum_comp.xhtml); Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "National Guard Commanders Rise In Revolt Against Active Army; MG Rossi Questions Guard Combat Role," *Breaking Defense* March 11, 2014, accessed October 2, 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/03/national-guard-commanders-rise-in-revolt-against-active-army-mg-ross-questions-guard-combat-role/>.

<sup>118</sup> Gordon R. Sullivan and Daniel P. Bolger, "Front & Center: A Question of Balance," *ARMY*, May 2014: 17-18; Chief of Staff of the US Army General Raymond T. Odierno "told the Press Club that Guard units were 'not interchangeable' with active-duty counterparts, which have 'a higher level of readiness' because Guard units only train '39 days a year.'" Sydney J. Freedberg Jr.,

internecine ploy, AC planners abruptly replaced RC units on the Headquarters Department of the Army/US Army Forces Command (HQDA/FORSCOM) patch chart (contingency deployment schedule).<sup>119</sup>

In response, throughout the spring and summer of 2015, NGAUS lobbied furiously. In August 2015, General Mark A. Milley replaced General Raymond T. Odierno as US Army chief of staff, and by November Milley began to seek a diplomatic reset.<sup>120</sup> The National Commission on the Future of the Army (NCFA) published its findings on January 28, 2016, which from the ARNG's perspective provided the AC with a framework to make broader and more inclusive force structure and manpower decisions, and an argument for more resources from Congress. The AC and ARNG had reached a new *détente*, one founded on the ARNG remaining 'operational.'<sup>121</sup>

Tension between personnel and training readiness is not esoteric to the ARNG, however it is extraordinarily pronounced, due to differing incentives among FTS and traditional (M-Day)

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*Breaking Defense: Army, Guard On Brink Of War: NGAUS Fires First Salvo* January 15, 2014, accessed March 12, 2017, <http://breakingdefense.com/2014/01/army-guard-on-brink-of-war-nga-us-fires-first-salvo/>.

<sup>119</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., *Breaking Defense: Active vs. Guard: An Avoidable Pentagon War*, June 28, 2013, accessed February 16, 2017, <http://breakingdefense.com/2013/06/active-vs-guard-an-avoidable-pentagon-war/>.

<sup>120</sup> Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., "Guard Cheers Army Chief Milley: Budget Civil War Seems Over," *Breaking Defense*, September 12, 2016, accessed November 19, 2016, <http://breakingdefense.com/2016/09/guard-chiefs-army-chief-milley-budget-civil-war-seems-over/>.

<sup>121</sup> National Commission on the Future of the Army, *Report to the President and the Congress of the United States, January 28, 2016* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016); "Since 1903 the formation of public policy on the militia has recurrently followed this pattern: The militia, or the National Guard as it was finally officially named in 1933, has sought additional funds from the United States.... This conflict between the Guard and the Army has usually resulted in a compromise that, typically, has this pattern: The Guard gets money and, to allay its fears that the Army might destroy it, it gets also a Congressional declaration that the National Guard is a first line reserve. On the other hand, the Guard has had to give up some of its self-control and submit to additional supervision by the Regular Army." Riker, *Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy*, 57.

Guard members.<sup>122</sup> FTS include Active Guard Reserve, Active Duty Operational Support (formerly Active Duty Special Work), Federal Technician, and state workers. Adjutant Generals (AGs) are governors' senior military advisors, responsible for executing service functions for the Army and Air Force organizations assigned to their states. AGs are cabinet appointees, paid by the state government. They hold assigned positions in the state National Guard Joint Force Headquarters for periods of military duty, just like any other traditional (M-Day) soldier.<sup>123</sup> AGs can be well liked—even beloved—figures, who divide their time between soldiers, airmen, families, veterans and survivors (regardless of component) within their state. They typically enjoy far longer tenures than their AC rank-equivalent peers, and occasionally earn promotions to state ranks exceeding their federally-recognized rank.<sup>124</sup> As a cabinet member, they have broad legislative responsibilities at both the state and federal level, and the job in some ways resembles that of a large corporation's chief executive officer.

In contrast to an AC division or corps commander, there is no expectation for an AG to deploy in command of ARNG troops.<sup>125</sup> The exemption of the state's senior military official from overseas deployments extends back to World War I, and for good reason: the states' governors should not be relieved of their militias' commanders in times of war. Additionally, under the system

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<sup>122</sup> M-Day (NATO) is the day on which mobilization commences or is due to commence. It is also used to refer to traditional Guard members, who are not FTS.

<sup>123</sup> Except for in the District of Columbia National Guard; Thomas E. Schuurmans, *Should Army National Guard Force Structure Be Based On The Federal Warfight Mission Or The Emerging Home Land Security Mission?* (Strategy Research Project, Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 2002), 3.

<sup>124</sup> Colonel Laura A. McHugh, Facebook message to author, March 28, 2017; Matthew Albright, "Outgoing Guard leader Frank Vavala honored in rare ceremony," April 1, 2017, accessed April 2, 2017, <http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/local/2017/04/01/national-guard-ceremony/99905590>.

<sup>125</sup> Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard*, 157.

of ‘dual control,’ unlike any other RC (i.e., the USAR), the AG is vested with the authority to hire, fire, and promote officers in a non-federal duty status.

One must grasp where rank-equivalent ARNG (FTS and traditional) and AC leaders’ values and incentives differ in order to understand stakeholders’ motives in any discussion of personnel versus training readiness. Inasmuch as a viable government agency sees it as an essential, Hobbesian task to perpetuate itself, states’ departments of military affairs must secure and accrete their administrative domains.<sup>126</sup> The amount of federal investment a state receives annually, in exchange for manning and administering authorized end strength and force structure, can yield more than a 4:1 return on investment.<sup>127</sup> High assigned strength serves as a leading indicator that a state will be able to produce the units the federal government pays it to recruit, organize, administer, train and maintain until mobilization—and the inverse is equally true. Therefore, since an army’s national reserve exists to produce available soldiers and units in the event of a national emergency, NGB makes decisions that will support that end. A high level of personnel readiness (high available strength) ranks among a state’s best defenses against the possible loss of end strength or force structure whenever National Guard Bureau (NGB) considers changes to the same, and therefore states must maintain their personnel readiness.

The ARNG has achieved remarkable success in maintaining high levels of personnel readiness, throughout recent years.<sup>128</sup> Recent comments by Brigadier General Wendul Hagler (Vice

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<sup>126</sup> “The influence of domestic politics on reserve forces is markedly different from that bearing on active forces.” Martin Binkin, *U.S. Reserve Forces: The Problem of the Weekend Warrior*, Staff Paper (Washington, DC: Brooking Institution, 1974), 25.

<sup>127</sup> Non-attributable source, telephone conversation with author, March 30, 2017.

<sup>128</sup> Following mobilizations in support of GWOT, ARNG leadership successfully increased medical readiness from a low of 26%, in 2007, to a high, exceeding 85% (surpassing the Department of the Army standard of 85%), beginning in 2014. Headquarters, Department of the Army, “Army National Guard Medical Readiness,” *Stand-To!*, June 9, 2014, accessed December 6, 2016, [https://www.army.mil/standto/archive\\_2014-06-09/](https://www.army.mil/standto/archive_2014-06-09/).

Director, J-3/7, NGB), in a December 2016 lecture to a group of Command and General Staff College students assigned to the NG, offer insight into how this feat was accomplished:<sup>129</sup>

[1.] FTS exist to administer, organize and equip the traditional force.

[2.] We cannot do much more, as FTS, than set the traditional force for training.

[3.] We [FTS] must have the [traditional] force ready to accept training.

[4.] I encourage commanders to focus [IDT] weekends on the [CUSR] P[-level, personnel readiness] / S[level] / [and]R[-level] tasks. [Commanders should] then add in Individual/Squad/Crew [training] tasks.

Notably absent is any mention of FTS responsibility for training readiness. Hagler's comments, made to a predominately FTS ARNG audience, contrast sharply with those of Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, made several months later. Anderson testified to the House Armed Services Committee, Sub-Committee on Readiness that certain ARNG ABCT and Stryker Brigade Combat Team units "...must be available immediately..." and proposed to support this level of (training) readiness through an incremented increase in pre-mobilization training days, along with an inferred decrease in onerous mandatory training requirements – the latter a heartening but ultimately empty concession, in that it does not relieve commanders of responsibility for any deliberately untrained tasks.<sup>130</sup>

When laid side by side, Hagler and Anderson's statements on the appropriate allocation of risk and responsibility, concerning ARNG training readiness, make the case for an emergent stakeholder gap concerning ARNG training readiness. The AC considers collective training readiness the ARNG's responsibility, and expects an increasingly large proportion of it to be generated during units' inactive duty training periods. ARNG FTS considers collective training readiness outside the purview of FTS duties; perhaps it is the responsibility of M-Day

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<sup>129</sup> Hagler, "Army National Guard Update."

<sup>130</sup> Anderson, Piggee, and Bingham, "Record Version Statement before the House Armed Service Committee Sub-Committee on Readiness, First Session, 115th Congress," 3-4.

(“traditional”) leaders, or more likely it is something to defer altogether until post-mobilization, making it the AC’s task. Three quarters of a century after the Interwar Period, McNair would recognize this logic, Bradley would anticipate its likely outcome, and Marshall would understand its origins.

A small cadre of FTS administer ARNG units on behalf of the units’ commanders, on a day-to-day basis: usually three NCOs to a company, two officers and eight NCOs to a battalion. Through their daily involvement in units’ business, FTS exert power and influence beyond that commensurate with their military rank, and typically perform functions one level up from their pay grade; an E7 Readiness NCO substitutes for an O3 company commander, an O3 Training Officer (TO) substitutes for an O4 S3, and an O4 Administrative Officer (AO) substitutes for a O5 battalion commander. No evidence exists to prove that they are more or less scrupulous, hardworking, or otherwise imbued with virtue than their AC counterparts. They are, however, rules-based agents, pursuing improved conditions through adaptation, and acting within bounded rational choice.<sup>131</sup> As such, they are responsive to the incentives and disincentives (rewards and punishments) that exist within their particular system—whether through deliberate design or the phenomenon of emergence.<sup>132</sup>

In most states, ARNG initial AGR officer hires are Captains, with a mandatory retirement date far enough into the future to finish a twenty-year term of active federal service. These officers usually serve in the preferred ‘on-ramp’ AGR job for a traditional, M-Day ARNG officer: battalion TO. Once assigned to a battalion, the young AGR TO serves simultaneously as an M-

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<sup>131</sup> James G. March, *A Primer on Decision Making: How Decisions Happen* (New York, NY: The Free Press), 1994, 9.

<sup>132</sup> Henry Mintzberg, *The Rise and Fall of Strategic Planning*, (New York, NY: The Free Press), 1994, 24-25.

Day officer within the same unit (e.g., company commander, assistant S3), and is supervised by the battalion's AO, often the only other officer assigned to that battalion.

The battalion's AO serves as the unit's surrogate commander between periods when the unit's commander serves in a duty status. The AO's work centers on personnel readiness, and to a far lesser extent equipment & supply readiness; one FTS colonel estimates that "...in the 10-hour day of an AO, they will spend 6 of it on personnel readiness, 2-3 on supply, and 1-2 on training [readiness]."<sup>133</sup> This allocation of effort evidences the ARNG's institutional subordination of training readiness to personnel readiness, given the typical career progression of ARNG AGR officers, wherein the duties and responsibilities of the senior FTS officer at the lowest echelon (battalion and squadron) center on personnel readiness, and junior, subordinate FTS officers focus on training readiness.

Following centuries-old customs, ARNG commanders at every echelon are responsible for their units' strength.<sup>134</sup> Peacetime RC commanders (ARNG and USAR alike) are accountable for both retention and recruiting, and evaluated in part based on their ability to keep their units at high levels of assigned and available strength.<sup>135</sup> In comparison, AC commanders are similarly responsible for managing their 'non-deployable' population and meeting retention goals, but are not responsible for recruiting.

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<sup>133</sup> Non-attributable source, email message to author, April 4, 2017.

<sup>134</sup> Early twentieth century ARNG commanders were "forced to use the greatest diplomacy in handling their men in order than they might be able to keep a full enrollment, for an officer, to obtain rigid discipline and courtesy, must be diplomatic or he will lose his men or have a class of men in his company not wholly desirable." Pratt, *Tin Soldiers*, 35.

<sup>135</sup> "...the personnel policies of an organization have the greatest impact on demonstrating and teaching the values of an organization to its members." William F. Bell, "The Impact of Policies on Organizational Values and Culture" (paper presented at the 21st annual meeting of the Joint Services Conference on Professional Ethics, Springfield, VA, 28-29 January 1999), 2-3, accessed March 23, 2017, <http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE99/Bell99.html>.



Assigned strength provides an incomplete measure of a unit's personnel readiness; thus, staffs always present assigned strength in tandem with available strength. A soldier can be assigned to a unit but unavailable for mobilization (non-deployable), for a litany of reasons, some more easily obscured than others.<sup>136</sup> If a unit reports enough soldiers as 'non-available' on the unit's Commander's Unit Status Report (CUSR), it will decrease the unit's P-level. Several emergent dilemmas complicate the ARNG commanders' task of balancing personnel and training readiness, described below.

ARNG recruiters' independent production (number of new recruits per month) is the single greatest determinant of a unit's assigned strength (followed by the unit's soldier retention). The recruiting commander manages recruiter talent within the unit's geographic catchment area. Neither the recruiting commander nor the recruiters themselves are in the affected unit commander's incentive structure (evaluation rating chains). The unit commander may attempt to obtain influence over recruiters in their armories' catchment areas, but this has little effect given that the commander has only an average of ten CUSR reporting cycles to obtain a desired level of personnel readiness. Frustrated by their limited ability to influence the number of new recruits assessing into the unit, ARNG commanders may shift efforts toward retaining those soldiers already assigned to keep the armory full, and to sustain their potential for a future command. This imperative may encourage actions or inactions inimical to a unit's training readiness.

The ARNG alone lacks a Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students (TTHS) account (an accounting category, in lieu of a unit of assignment, for soldiers in the training pipeline).<sup>137</sup> Lack of

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<sup>136</sup> Army Regulation (AR) 220-1: *Army Unit Status Reporting and Force Registration – Consolidated Policies*, 34-35.

<sup>137</sup> “[Concerning the Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account;] USAR has it, we don't. With the additional [proposed] end strength, we'd [overdrive units] that are earlier in the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) cycle.” Hagler, “Army National Guard Update”; RAND Corporation, *Assessing the Structure and Mix of Future Active and Reserve Forces: Final Report to the Secretary of Defense*, 9.

a TTHS account narrows an already slender margin between assigned soldiers and available soldiers, sometimes to the point where it is mathematically impossible for a commander, within the scope of their influence, to bring a unit at 100% assigned strength, or to muster the required 80% or 85% of assigned soldiers required by US Army regulation to train certain tasks satisfactorily.<sup>138</sup> In this way, a retained soldier is quantitatively better than a recruited soldier, even if the retained soldier is qualitatively marginal.

Finally, when a unit assigns Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) or Early Commissioning Program cadets to a Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) duty position (typically a double-slot against a qualified platoon leader), the cadet counts toward assigned strength, but remains non-available until the completion of the Basic Officer Leadership Course, which can take years. Due to the lack of a TTHS account, ARNG commanders' personnel readiness paradoxically suffers because they facilitate one of the earliest and most critical opportunities for junior officer development and mentorship, in an organization historically criticized for the overall quality of its officers.

Tension between personnel and training readiness can create unintentionally opposing values and agendas between highly motivated M-Day (part-time) ARNG commanders, who are generally intent on training, and their FTS. Per one FTS Lieutenant Colonel, higher headquarters excoriate FTS commanders "[sometimes] daily... [and a]t least bi-monthly" over their units' assigned and available strength; the two key measures of personnel readiness.<sup>139</sup> Training readiness is associated with no such interest or agony, due to the perennially exculpatory issues of limited time and resources. As classically-conditioned FTS rotate into M-Day command positions within

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<sup>138</sup> Headquarters, G3/5/7, Department of the Army, *Leader's Guide to Objective Assessment of Training Proficiency* (Unpublished Coordinating Draft, Not for Implementation, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February, 2017), 22.

<sup>139</sup> Non-attributable source, email message to author, March 24, 2017.

MTOE units, they bring their values with them, and in the absence of a strong-willed M-Day commander at a higher headquarters, personnel readiness may become the preeminent priority of their command.<sup>140</sup> In terms of complexity and systems thinking, the ARNG's predilection for personnel readiness is an emergent property of a complex system, demonstrating characteristics of a reinforcing feedback loop.<sup>141</sup> By the time a traditional ARNG officer assumes battalion command as a lieutenant colonel, the cognitively dissonant rules of the game are reflected in the stoic refrain: 'the [CUSR] P[-level] is mightier than the T[-level].'

The scarcity of available maneuver training space, along with the difficulty of getting the unit's personnel and equipment to and from it act as a habitual challenge to training readiness, most acutely felt by ARNG combat units. AC units retain priority in range scheduling of AC training areas, meaning that proximity to ARNG armories does not equate to feasibility for ARNG trainers. An ARNG annual training period—planned for over two years and representing the culmination of the preceding training year's worth of progressive individual and collective training—can be derailed in an instant by any priority unit, for any reason, with no recourse for the affected ARNG commander.

Interwar Period maneuvers relied on the ample use of private lands and local training areas, a successful practice which persisted through ODS, but one which modern bureaucratic concerns over potential environmental impacts and exposure to litigation has severely curtailed. Outside of the Army's two combat training centers (the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, CA and the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, LA), large-unit (e.g., BCT) training areas do not exist in the continental United States, and are only rarely available to ARNG units, and on a

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<sup>140</sup> Bell, "The Impact of Policies on Organizational Values and Culture."

<sup>141</sup> In systems thinking, "...a circle or loop of cause-effect relationships... is called a 'feedback process.'" Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art & Practice of the Learning Organization* (New York, NY: Doubleday, 2006), 74.

tightly regimented schedule. ARNG training areas supporting mounted live-fire exercises at the platoon level, such as multi-purpose range complexes (MPRCs) with four lanes to enable simultaneous training of four combat vehicles, exist in only six states. In addition, ARNG commanders may be indirectly discouraged or directly prohibited from training on neighboring states' NG training sites, for reasons of states' economic self-interest; historic rates utilization, measured in man-days, influence training sites' annual funding.<sup>142</sup>

While it is not impossible for a traditional ARNG combat unit (e.g., a Stryker infantry battalion) to achieve platoon-level proficiency in a traditional training year, doing so may require a highly unorthodox massing of IDT periods [see Appendix], to garner efficiencies, which carries its own risks related to community support.<sup>143</sup> For this reason, units sometimes innocuously demote mandated platoon-level collective training proficiency to a 'stretch goal' status, late in the year, and settle for squad-level proficiency; much more reasonably attained.

An almost immediate divergence in AC and RC officers' relative levels of technical proficiency, at every professional military education (PME) step past basic officer education, indirectly contributes to RC collective training readiness challenges. The Command and General Staff College (CGSC) ('staff college') at Fort Leavenworth teaches senior AC captains and newly promoted AC majors the science of detailed operational planning, over eleven uninterrupted months, with the option to apply for an additional eleven months of training in more conceptual planning at SAMS; a possible total of two years of graduate study in an idyllic campus setting, accurately billed as 'the best year of your life.' A CGSC student's year at Fort Leavenworth features spacious new homes, access to a modern research library, ample leave opportunities, and

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<sup>142</sup> Angela King-Sweigart, *Pennsylvania's Fort Indiantown Gap No. 1 for training in 2015*, December 28, 2015, accessed March 26, 2017, [https://www.army.mil/article/160410/Pennsylvania\\_s\\_Fort\\_Indiantown\\_Gap\\_No\\_\\_1\\_for\\_training\\_in\\_2015/](https://www.army.mil/article/160410/Pennsylvania_s_Fort_Indiantown_Gap_No__1_for_training_in_2015/).

<sup>143</sup> 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team Headquarters, *OPORD 15-001 (FY15 Unit Training Plan)*, 56th Stryker Brigade Combat Team Headquarters (Horsham, PA, March 5, 2014), 11.

on-post amenities like a contract chiropractor at the health clinic, horse stables, and private pilot licensing. Most RC majors do not have the opportunity to attend CGSC; out of the CGSC 16-01 class of 1,172 students, only forty-three were Guard members; <4% of the class cohort, in a Total Army that relies on the ARNG to produce 40% of its maneuver force (see Figure 7).




Figure 7. Army AC/RC Mix. Office of the Secretary of Defense, *Unit Cost and Readiness for the Active and Reserve Components of the Armed Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 11.

RC majors instead complete their intermediate level education over two weeks of classroom training (often in lieu of AT), followed by ten months of IDT weekends, followed by a final two weeks of classroom training; a 9:1 compression of the AC curriculum, measured in personnel-days. This quantitative comparison does not begin to consider questions of quality or efficacy (i.e. distance learning at home on nights and weekends versus daytime classroom

instruction in a full-time academic setting). In addition, RC majors must often complete ILE simultaneously with their first key developmental assignment (similar to those AC majors not selected for resident CGSC), for the same reason that many ARNG battalion commanders attend their Pre-Command Course at Fort Leavenworth only after they've assumed command; limited schools funding, and a relative lack of predictability in future assignments.

One final crisis event bounds the ARNG's paradigm of organizational evolution (see Figure 6): the Current Operating Environment (COE), which entails an era of declining resources, ongoing limited wars, and the increasing potential of large-scale combat operations against near-peer threats. Within this COE, the ARNG's current institutional perspective, prioritizing personnel readiness over training readiness, will continue to manifest itself in small leader decisions that gradually coalesce into larger, enduring trends.<sup>144</sup> These trends effect a transfer of risk (from potentially inadequate training readiness) from the most senior level of organizational command, down to the individual soldier, upon M-Day.

ARNG and AC leaders are both aware of the civilian skillsets that Guard members bring to bear on complex problems; an ARNG rifle platoon squad leader may also be a master carpenter or a licensed clinical social worker, either of which might benefit a unit engaged in stability operations.<sup>145</sup> Concurrent with the United States' withdrawal from Iraq in 2010, this unique capability became a major talking point for NGB leadership.<sup>146</sup> Unfortunately, barring mercenary work, there are no civilian occupations or allied trades that complement the increasingly technical

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<sup>144</sup> War Department, Militia Bureau, *Report of the Acting Chief of the Militia Bureau, Relative to the Organized Militia and National Guard of the United States: 1916*, 10; Dietrich Dorner, *The Logic of Failure* (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1996), 10.

<sup>145</sup> Nagl and Sharp, *Operational for What? The Future of the Guard and Reserves*.

<sup>146</sup> Jim Greenhill, "US Army: Guard chief tells force to prepare for prolonged overseas role," August 9, 2010, accessed March 20, 2017, [https://www.army.mil/article/43493/Guard\\_chief\\_tells\\_force\\_to\\_prepare\\_for\\_prolonged\\_overseas\\_role/](https://www.army.mil/article/43493/Guard_chief_tells_force_to_prepare_for_prolonged_overseas_role/).

killing work demanded of an infantryman, artilleryman, or tanker, engaged in large-scale combat operations.<sup>147</sup> Combat multipliers in stability operations become combat divisors in large scale combat operations.<sup>148</sup>

Beginning with the AOA, and taking several factors into consideration [increased likelihood of enemy contact within large-scale combat operations, questionable suitability of the Infantry branch's skillset for the ARNG (as presently resourced), perishability of Infantry branch-specific skills, (neither reinforced nor complemented by most civilian careers), and increasing lethality in the anticipated operational environment], an ongoing and perhaps unintentional concentration of risk in ARNG combat units becomes evident. This is objectionable from any perspective (e.g., that of a Guard member's spouse or parent) presuming that a combat unit's training readiness should be paramount among a combat unit commander's concerns, and that within the Total Army, soldiers should be equally well-trained before they to face America's enemies.

## Conclusion

As retired Generals Bolger and Sullivan sagely warned, "modern war is a not a part-time affair." A lack of combined arms maneuver repetitions ("reps"), or their realistic simulation, has a compounding effect over time that has historically reached a crisis point at the battalion level and above, and among both senior enlisted and officer ranks.<sup>149</sup> In the words of one ARNG battalion commander:

The nature of the Guard, where people stay in the same units, enhances mission command. The problem with the Guard is that unless you are lucky, you will never maneuver anything

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<sup>147</sup> Freedberg Jr., *Breaking Defense: Active vs. Guard: An Avoidable Pentagon War*.

<sup>148</sup> Klerman, *Rethinking the Reserve*, 7-12.

<sup>149</sup> Sullivan and Bolger, "Front & Center: A Question of Balance," 18; Carl von Clausewitz, Peter Paret, and Michael Howard, *On War, Indexed Edition*, ed. and trans. by Peter Paret and Michael Howard (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 90-123.

larger than a platoon. That caused some serious problems early on in GWOT when you have battalion and brigade commanders with zero experience beyond Ranger School.<sup>150</sup>

Army leaders, both ARNG and AC, surely do not want to see such problems repeated, especially within the context of “persistent conflict” (see Figure 6), a dystopian forecast so uncontroversial it is now cliché.<sup>151</sup>

Certain heuristics arising from the previous three case studies will not reliably apply to the anticipated future. The idea of an SRF, ‘tiered readiness,’ the AC’s recurrent post-war yen for ‘immediately’ available RC units, and the ARNG’s willingness to barter self-determination for resources are not new, but the strategic context is. Unlike the ARNG’s mobilization into World War II, the operational tempo will not facilitate years of post-mobilization training by large units, and an increasingly partisan political atmosphere may not support the dispassionate, rapid relief of unsatisfactory tactical and operational leaders that was commonplace through World War II.<sup>152</sup> It is also highly improbable that the American public will countenance a draft or full mobilization, absent a credible, existential threat. Unlike the ARNG’s mobilization for ODS, the next opponent will likely not surrender in 100 hours, nor are there AC BCTs eager to substitute for their ARNG counterparts; the bench is now empty, all the players are on the field. And unlike GWOT, the next opponent will maneuver companies, brigades, and divisions against ours. He will have his own

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<sup>150</sup> Non-attributable source, email message to author, December 19, 2016; “[Concerning the value of unit cohesion in enhancing mission command,] I compare serving in a state guard to serving in a British Regiment. One will have a variety of assignments, but still be a part of that group.” Brigadier General George M. Schwartz, telephone conversation with author, April 12, 2017.

<sup>151</sup> In former Congressional budget staffer and best-selling author Mike Lofgren’s view, the “(2014) Quadrennial Defense Review’s definition of vital interests... implies that the United States will be in a condition of war, cold war, or near war in perpetuity.” Mike Lofgren, *The Deep State: The Fall of the Constitution and the Rise of a Shadow Government* (New York, NY: Penguin Random House, 2016), 98.

<sup>152</sup> Ricks, Thomas E. *The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today*. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2012.



close air support and close combat attack. He will not lack air defense, artillery, precision guided munitions, or any other defining feature of a modern combined arms maneuver force.<sup>153</sup> His combat vehicles will meet, and possibly overmatch our own. We will not ‘own the night.’ Perhaps most counterintuitively, when employed in an intensive rotational capacity, the RC may not, in fact, be less expensive than the AC, even before taking future unfunded requirements (e.g., VA disability entitlements and medical treatments) and intangible costs (opportunity costs, repeated family traumas, and lost wages from stunted civilian careers) into account.<sup>154</sup> As Eisenhower first observed in 1935, “[burgeoning] isolationist sentiment.... [and] dollar constraints” tend to support the facile appeal of a less-expensive RC, in lieu of a large AC.<sup>155</sup> AC and ARNG commanders, planners and strategists must apply critical and creative thinking to setting the conditions for the ARNG’s anticipated future, beginning with a more holistic view of the contingencies and continuities present throughout its past.

## Implications

AC commanders must understand how Guard members see themselves and understand their organizational history, if they are to understand how to reliably generate operational readiness in the ARNG. Too often, authors reduce the ARNG’s complex, multi-dimensional identity to a single axis. In 1939, W. E. Green (a British author, writing on Britain’s Territorial Army) theorized that “...in practice, the history of the Militia [is] a history of ups and downs, short periods of

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<sup>153</sup> Strategic Initiatives Group, *Imagining Defeat in 2030: Mitigating Strategic Surprise to the US Army by Envisioning the Worst* (White Paper, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, July 25, 2014).

<sup>154</sup> Klerman, *Rethinking the Reserve*, xv.

<sup>155</sup> Eisenhower, "An Enlisted Reserve for the Regular Army", 1; Bradley, *A General's Life*, 483; James Hoyer, "Chairman's Message: A Solution," *National Guard: The Official Publication of the National Guard Association of the United States* (March 2017): 10.

comparative efficiency at times of crisis alternating with much longer periods of apathy and decadence when no immediate danger impended” (see Figure 8).<sup>156</sup> This is an oversimplification of a much more nuanced, multi-dimensional organizational identity.




Figure 8. Green’s Model of Militia Operational Readiness.

Influenced by leadership, mission variables, operational variables, strategic context, and above all, resourcing, Guard members express their identity across time in terms of both purpose and character (see Figure 9); whether the ARNG is fundamentally a state militia or a component of a national reserve.<sup>157</sup>

<sup>156</sup> Green, *The Territorial in the Next War*.

<sup>157</sup> Raphael S. Cohen, *Demystifying the Citizen Soldier* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 6.




Figure 9. Proposed Visual Model of ARNG Organizational Identity.

For the ‘civilian in peace, soldier in war,’ today’s unending, limited wars do not reconcile with a persistent, anachronistic concept of service and self.<sup>158</sup> The mythology of World War II ARNG infantry divisions that consisted purely of hometown units led exclusively by their home station officers, which prevailed in large-scale combat operations against a near-peer threat, is selective and hazardous fiction.<sup>159</sup> For example, legislative leaders may construe the ARNG’s performance during WWII or GWOT as historical proof of militiamen’s pluck and enthusiasm compensating for a lack of hard-earned experience in training.<sup>160</sup> It also encourages understating the level of resourcing required to reach a level of operational readiness that observers may judge, post-facto, as adequate. The Interwar Period ARNG as a whole required significant reorganization and

<sup>158</sup> National Guard, *About the Guard: I Am the Guard*, March 28 2017, accessed March 28, 2017, <http://www.nationalguard.mil/About-the-Guard/I-am-the-Guard/>.

<sup>159</sup> Sullivan and Bolger, "Front & Center: A Question of Balance," 17-18; Gaddis, *The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past*, 136.

<sup>160</sup> “The American militiaman, when he is properly led, is the finest soldier who ever wore shoe leather.” Letter from Colonel John H. Parker, Commander, 102nd Infantry to Brigadier General James G. Harbord, March 16, 1918, National Guard Bureau Historical Services Division.

prolonged post-mobilization collective training before deploying to combat in WWII; preconditions that were either unanticipated or unaddressed by stakeholders beforehand.

Neither the ARNG nor the Interwar Period are academically glamorous topics; military scholars tend to overlook them both.<sup>161</sup> Yet the study of their nexus, and its resonance throughout this study's subsequent case studies, yields clear and potentially vital observations concerning the present security paradigm. By establishing that the World War II ARNG legacy divisions retained their state-specific character, and were not, in fact, adulterated beyond recognition, their experience throughout the deployment cycle remains relevant. A factually complete narrative, centering on these legacy divisions' experience throughout the deployment cycle, may prove useful in illuminating continuities between the Interwar Period and today, for the AC division, corps and army planners and commanders whom ARNG brigades (and, far less likely, divisions) will deploy under. Such a suitable narrative could be included some portion in the CGSC or SAMS curriculum, thus expanding AC officers' understanding of the ARNG. Similarly, McNair's and Bradley's prescient concerns over NG operational readiness throughout the Interwar Period, subsequently vindicated during post-mobilization to the point of recommending the ARNG's post-war dissolution, are germane to the next war.<sup>162</sup>

## Recommendations and Areas for Further Study

Proposing to tailor the post-war scope of the ARNG's role or composition to more closely resemble its proven capabilities, or to more comprehensively re-assess its dual role, is not the

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<sup>161</sup> George Schwartz, "Commentary & Reply: On 'Rightsizing the Army in Austere Times'," *Parameters* 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016-2017): 119-120; James Webber Linn, *Washington's Lost Plan Revived* (Chicago, IL: National Guard Association, 1935), 9.

<sup>162</sup> Bradley's autobiography, published posthumously in 1983, left little to question concerning his opinion of federalized ARNG units: he wrote "World War II... prove(d) without a scintilla of doubt that the National Guard was virtually useless in a national crisis." Bradley, *A General's Life*, 483.

direction of the present discourse; the ARNG's role as provider of combat units is expanding.<sup>163</sup> A planned increase in IDT training days, warfighters, and CTC rotations for select ARNG units, in accordance with the ARNG's Enhanced Readiness Posture is a familiar, linear solution to a complex problem.<sup>164</sup> The addition of IDT periods will not alter the ARNG's incentive structure, an emergent property of the system of dual control. ARNG unit commanders, as presently incentivized, will continue to prioritize what is urgent for a state's peacetime militia [e.g., AR 350-1 human dynamics training and retraining over successive IDT periods, or medical screenings and re-screenings] over what is important for a unit in combat (i.e., developing mental and physical toughness and technical competency through tough, realistic training), so long as they remain in an IDT status. Proposed increases in training days should be comprehensively examined across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF), along with their projected impact on families, employers, and communities, conditioned over a century to 'one weekend a month, two weeks in the summer.'

The delta between ARNG and AC officer technical proficiency widens at every PME step, and will not sufficiently narrow through incremental increases in pre-mobilization training days. If the US Army is serious about treating ARNG tactical and operational units as AC equivalents, the number of ARNG officers attending resident PME courses should increase significantly. Similarly, effective utilization of M-Day ARNG officers during IDT (weekends) deserves serious

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<sup>163</sup> Ryan Burke and Sue McNeil, *Investigating the Benefits and Drawbacks of Realigning the National Guard under the Department of Homeland Security* (Strategic Studies Institute Special Report, Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2016), 38.

<sup>164</sup> "The only way I know how to ensure [ARNG] readiness and reduce the response time is to increase the amount of training days for the National Guard on the front end,' [Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley] said." Matthew Cox, *Army Plans to Double Training Days for Guard Units, Chief Says*, December 14, 2015, accessed March 17, 2017, <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2015/12/14/army-plans-to-double-training-days-for-guard-units-chief-says>; Michelle Tan, *Defense News: Army National Guard's Brigade Combat Teams Face Tougher Training*, October 2, 2016, accessed April 6, 2017, <http://www.defensenews.com/articles/guard-bcts-face-tougher-training>.

reconsideration. At the battalion level, planning (training) for the upcoming training year or annual training period in conjunction with FTS is a common diversion from tactically focused, externally evaluated staff exercises. Unfortunately, planning training (FM 7-0) is not training planning (ADRP 5-0). In 'out' years (those training years without a staff training plan that culminates in an externally evaluated Command Post Exercise), ARNG staff officers may be better developed through eighty uninterrupted hours of study, synthesis, and externally evaluated writing assignments; i.e., a more rigorous distance learning portion of ILE, or something similar to the Maneuver Center of Excellence's Maneuver Self Study Program. Alternately, officers could serve as additional observers for AC unit maneuvers, or simply shadow a senior mentor in an AC unit, like the ROTC Cadet Leader Training Program.

Any latent expectation that the RC is exempt from the most immediate, intense, and casualty-producing large-scale combat actions of the future is unsupported by the three preceding case studies and the current state of affairs.<sup>165</sup> Moreover, the nature of three-block warfare, involving a near-peer threat, will reward the mobile and multifarious, and punish the slow-moving specialist, or those otherwise unequipped to cope with battlefield misery.<sup>166</sup> Therefore, PT must become a priority during inactive duty training. Reframing PT as a retention (personnel readiness)

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<sup>165</sup> According to a field-grade US Army officer working in NGB's Readiness and Plans division, coordinating forces to meet FORSCOM's requests, "...[it's] one fight, one Army. With 28 BCTs, we fill the gaps where AC cannot cover.... so in essence, we are doing the same job. For Sustainers, enablers, etc....it's the same battlefield." Non-attributable source, email message to author, January 26, 2017; Prior to 2003, it seemed feasible to circumscribe the ARNG's future utilization within the range of military operations. O'Hanlon, *The Army National Guard: Force Multiplier or Irrelevant Force*, 55, 58; Schuurmans, *Should Army National Guard Force Structure Be Based On The Federal Warfight Mission Or The Emerging Home Land Security Mission?*

<sup>166</sup> David Fisher, *Morality and War* (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4; Gates Brown, "The Army's Identity Crisis," *Parameters* 46, no. 4 (Winter 2016-2017): 7-12, 11-12; Rick Maze, "Radical Change Is Coming: Gen. Mark A. Milley Not Talking About Just Tinkering Around the Edges," *ARMY* (December 2016): 35-36; Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power* (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2011), 47; The Guardian, "Russia and China pose largest security threats, says US military report," July 1, 2015, accessed January 18, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/01/russia-china-us-military-national-security>.

activity, (e.g., ‘come to drill, stay in shape’) and reinforcing its importance in the US Army’s Performance Triad (a G1 initiative) will coopt personal readiness to support of a training readiness objective. ARNG armories housing combat units generally have a large, indoor area (drill floor) and equipment (Class IV construction material, tires, litters) suitable to capitalize on Generation Z and millennial fitness trends; Crossfit™ training, Tough Mudder™ type adventure courses, and combatives in winter months. In addition, and worthy of consideration, is the British Army’s “Adventurous Training” program.<sup>167</sup> According to Major Andrew Breach, a British SAMS student, this program features “opportunities for [both AC and RC] soldiers to go scuba diving and mountain-climbing.... [i]t is about taking [soldiers] out of their comfort zones and getting them to operate when [they are] scared.”<sup>168</sup> Physician’s assistants and medics are ideal candidates for the Army’s Master Fitness Trainer course, and could complement their routine work by coordinating with nearby Army Wellness Centers and similar facilities, for soldier outreach programming.

The three case studies herein illustrate that if the ARNG is to approach a level of operational readiness truly comparable to the AC, there is a historically prohibitive price to pay. Dr. Michael E. Weaver, concluding his study of the 28th ID in WWII, concluded that this price “...must be paid either through peacetime training or through greater battlefield casualties during wartime.”<sup>169</sup> Paradoxically, the ARNG and its professional association have secured the ARNG’s short-term survival and relevance through claims of cost savings and promises of increased utilization. The addition of a handful of pre-mobilization training days does not address the inactivated ARNG’s systemic neglect of training readiness in favor of personnel readiness. In the words of one ARNG infantry battalion commander, “[i]f we want the Guard to change to an

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<sup>167</sup> British Army, *Training and Education: Adventurous Training*, April 13, 2017, accessed April 13, 2017, [http://www.army.mod.uk/training\\_education/26596.aspx](http://www.army.mod.uk/training_education/26596.aspx).

<sup>168</sup> Major Andrew Breach, email message to author, April 12, 2017.

<sup>169</sup> Weaver, *Guard Wars*, 260.

operational force where it moves into a ‘space’ between its historical purpose and the federal military, then perhaps we need to revisit the laws underpinning the system....”<sup>170</sup>

ARNG leaders should critically engage with their organization’s proud history; its continuities and contingencies. What is profoundly evident throughout this study is that ARNG combat arms units should focus their limited training time on developing an ability to kill an enemy swiftly. Mandatory annual training of a prophylactic or garrison nature, and any other such distraction from a combat arms unit’s essential function, must wait.<sup>171</sup> On the next M-Day, as in the past, responsibility for an ARNG unit’s level of training readiness will transfer from the state to the AC at the strategic level, but not where it matters: at the tactical and operational unit level. Unlike an AC commander, a commander in the ARNG, by virtue of their membership within the unit’s surrounding community, remains indefinitely, tangibly accountable to that unit’s stakeholders. To the extent that a leader takes care of their people, it is therefore the moral responsibility of every ARNG tactical and operational combat unit leader to behave courageously, irrationally – in fact, counter-culturally – to champion training readiness and insist upon tough, realistic combat-focused training. It is likewise the responsibility of ARNG strategic leaders, regardless of political cost, to demand of higher headquarters the training resources, in the pre-mobilization period, which they believe are truly commensurate with the level of training readiness presumed by our elected leadership and the public. By doing so, ARNG leaders at all levels will responsibly steward the ARNG’s most valuable resource: our citizen-soldiers and their families.

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
<sup>170</sup> Non-attributable source, email message to author, December 19, 2016.

<sup>171</sup> “A leader must always act according to core morals, preserve his integrity, and be willing to pay the price. It is essential to view each and every position as if it were the last, disregarding career considerations.” Gal Hirsch, *Defensive Shield* (New York, NY: Gefen Publishing House, 2016), 440.




# Appendix

## 1-112th Infantry Battalion (PA ARNG) 2014 Yearly Training Calendar<sup>172</sup>



<sup>172</sup> 1-112th Infantry Battalion, Tab I to Appendix 1 to Annex C of FRAGORD 1 to OPORD 13-011, 1-112th Infantry Battalion Headquarters (Cambridge Springs, PA, 2017).

# 1-112th Infantry Battalion (PA ARNG) 2014 Annual Training Concept<sup>173</sup>



<sup>173</sup> 1-112th Infantry Battalion, *Tab B to Appendix 1 to Annex C of FRAGORD 5 to OPORD 14-002*, 1-112th Infantry Battalion Headquarters (Cambridge Springs, PA, 2017).

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