THE SEARCH FOR STABILITY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA--AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

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ABSTRACT

Promoting Stability in Sub-Saharan Africa: An American Perspective By Major Anthony K. Crawford, USA, 65 pages.

The end of the Cold War changed the international security environment. It created an international environment plagued by wide spread human rights violations, the proliferation of violence, and an increase in the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, resulting in the increased involvement of the U.S. in the region.

U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa has consisted of humanitarian assistance operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, security assistance, Joint Combined Exchange Training, Combined Medical Exercises, International Military Education and Training (IMET), and Exercise-related Construction projects. This monograph measures the effectiveness of these programs against the degree to which they promote and develop stability in Sub-Saharan Africa.

IMET programs must be linked to the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Failure to do so will result in a waste of Department of Defense resources. This monograph (1) defines the geographical area and its challenges to the U.S. military; (2) identifies and discusses the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy towards Sub-Saharan Africa to include the identification of U.S. interest in the area; (3) provides a legislative overview of IMET programs; (4) identifies the combatant commands responsible for the region and what IMET programs they conduct; and(5) assesses the effectiveness of IMET programs in Sub-Saharan Africa.

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Chapter One: Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. military's focus has shifted from conventional military operations to stability and support operations. The shift in focus was contrived due to a change in the international security environment. The international environment is plagued by wide-spread human rights violations, the proliferation of violence, and an increase in the potential use of weapons of mass destruction, all of which are products of the end of the Cold-War.

The U.S. policy of "containment" and the Soviet policy of "expansionism" were instrumental in stabilizing Sub-Saharan Africa. Africans were too busy defending or promoting east-west ideology to actively pursue their ethnic differences.[1] Also, the U.S. and Soviet governments ensured that their "shadow" governments had both the economic and political survivability to withstand any attacks made by the other side. Economic, military, and political assistance were the means to the ends - the dominance of either communism or democracy in the region.

U.S. activity in Sub-Saharan Africa since the end of the Cold War has consisted of humanitarian assistance operations, peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, security assistance to include international military education and training (IMET), joint and combined exchange training, combined medical exercises, as well as exercise-related construction projects. In order to ensure future Congressional funding, the effectiveness of these programs must be measured against the degree to which they develop and encourage stability in the region. IMET programs must be linked to the National Security Strategy (NSS)and the National Military Strategy (NMS). Improper linkage may potentially result in short-term solutions for long-term issues.

First, this monograph will define the Sub-Saharan region by providing a regional overview of the area, identifying the combatant commands responsible for the region, and briefly discussing the challenges the geography creates for the U.S. military. An examination of the NSS and NMS from 1987 to 1997 may demonstrate that since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has not clearly articulated its national interest in the region. The identification of U.S.

national interests is necessary when attempting to prioritize the expenditure of limited resources in an area three times the size of the United States.

The monograph will review and synthesize U.S. interests in the region as advocated by leading Sub-Saharan area experts. This is in an effort to identify and formulate potential U.S. interest in the region and their linkage to future IMET programs. Finally, the monograph will focus on IMET programs to include a discussion of the legislative authorization governing IMET programs, Department of Defense implementation and execution, and an assessment of IMET programs in the region based on how well the programs may enhance U.S. security, promote prosperity in the U.S., and promote democracy in the region.

This monograph is based on one key assumption. The lack of a long term African Foreign Policy, a policy that produces the intended or expected U.S. purpose, has resulted in reactive military programs rather than proactive programs. Proactive programs and policies could assist the U.S. in helping to encourage (promote) the stability the U.S. seeks for the region. Civil-military relations is a

vital link to flourishing stability and IMET is "A Way" of facilitating a better understanding.

The significance of this monograph is that currently the U.S has four combatant commands responsible for the Sub-Saharan region each with varying levels of IMET involvement. Sub-Saharan Africa and its social-political issues will not disappear in the future. In fact, world events have shown that the military instrument of power has and will continue to be called upon to help "shape" Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, it is of paramount importance that during a time of global instability and decreased Department of Defense resources programs like IMET may help the combatant commanders and the U.S. produce the intended or expected result in Sub-Saharan Africa, encouraging long-term stability for Sub-Saharan Africa.

Chapter Two: Sub-Saharan Africa A Region In Turmoil

"Most of the festering regional crisis that torment the continent…are rooted in one way or another in the ill considered decolonization strategies driven by metropolitan interests."[2]

Regional Overview

Forty-eight of Africa's fifty-six independent countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa's population is approximately 600 million and is expected to double by

the year 2020. The increasing growth rates present emerging African governments with multiple and complex social and political issues that must be resolved. [3]

Environmental degradation, refugee control, and public safety are a few of the issues that Sub-Saharan African governments must address as they attempt to build African nationalism and stability in the region.[4] Another irritant to the governments' efforts is the ethnic and religious differences within Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan African populations do not share a common language, history (colonization is the exception), or religion. Africans practice indigenous religions alongside Christianity and Islam.

Due to the ethnic and cultural diversity of Sub-Saharan Africa there are few monoethnic "nation states". Colonial boundaries created competing multi-ethnic entities. Competing multi-ethnic entities contributed to ethnic awareness among Africans. Newly found ethnic awareness caused Africans to compete with others for economic advancement after independence, resulting in the formation of ethnic unions to promote group advancement and support in

urban environments. There was no longer a common ethno-cultural self.[5]

The origins of this issue can be traced to the European colonization of Africa. The 1884-1885 Berlin Conference accelerated European economic and political dominance in the region. The French, British, and Belgians were the primary colonizers of Sub-Saharan Africa. The French controlled the Central Africa Republic, the Congo, Mali, and Madagascar; Botswana, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe were British colonies; while the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi were Belgian colonies. [6]

European dominance of the continent forced both formal and informal movement of African societies. The movement created artificial boundaries that did not take into account African ethnic ties nor the African way of life. The Colonial powers' economic and political policies, with their dependence on wealth and racial consciousness contradicted the African way of life. This, coupled with the short-lived exposure to colonialism, caused the African people to not accept European norms or models.[7]

Post Colonial Sub-Saharan Africa

The results of recent independence movements were cataclysmic. Besides dealing with the issue of artificial boundaries, African states had to determine how to govern themselves. Contrary to what the European powers may have wanted, the Africans tended to take an autocratic approach to governing which was more aligned with their traditional values. Governments ruled by assimilated African elites concerned with the advancement of their own cause and the relationship with their former colonizer.[8]

In some cases the former colonizer attempted to maintain control of the state's economic infrastructure. "Belgium granted former Belgian Congo (now called Zaire) independence in 1960 but attempted to maintain control of the colony's infrastructure."[9] The result was chaos. There was no opposition to the government because opposition was oppressed.

Emerging African nations did not have the economic means to fully develop. Leaders lacked both economic and political strategies.[10] According to Dan Henk and Steve Metz, the authors of *The United States And The African*

Transformation Of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative And Beyond, "African strategies fail because African governments preserve the power of the individual and his constituents rather than promote African National Interests; African politics is flexible, personal, and dominated by informal methods and procedures; and finally African national security and foreign policy are driven by the desires of the regime and or leader".[11] These are the same issues that hampered the development of newly independent African countries. The newly independent governments inability to resolve these issues made them vulnerable to a new type of colonization - U.S. and Soviet strategies of containment and expansionism.

The Effects Of The Cold-War

Most African states received their independence from their colonial rulers (during the height of the Cold War)in the late 1950s and 1960s. The Cold War, like colonization, would have both a stabilizing and destabilizing impact on the continent. During the Cold War the U.S. and Soviet governments used Sub-Saharan Africa to ensure that neither side would dominate Sub-Saharan politics. Sub-Saharan Africa served as a chessboard for the two superpowers while

Sub-Saharan African states served as their pawns. Both the U.S. and Soviet governments provided arms and aid to some of the region's most notorious villains for the sake of protecting their respective national security.[12] The U.S. government under former President Ronald Reagan supported the former and deceased Dictator of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko. Ronald Reagan referred to Sese Seko as "a voice of good sense and good will."[13] The United States supported Samuel K. Doe in Liberia while Britain's Former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher referred to Nelson Mandela's African National Congress as "a typical terrorist organization."[14] The Soviets attempted to transform Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia into Soviet puppet governments but instead turned them into the most violent states on the continent.

The Soviets trained, equipped, and supplied insurgent organizations with material, military technicians, and secret police advisors to Somalia and Angola. The Soviet Army operated a base in Mogadishu, Somalia, while the Navy operated ports in Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Angola, and Guinea. Cuba also sent troops into the region to assist the Marxist-Leninist regimes in Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.[15] The major impact of the U.S and Soviet

containment and expansionism policies was the arming of the Africans with modern weaponry. So why was Sub-Saharan Africa so important to these two superpowers?

Sub-Saharan Africa produces oil and contains important mineral elements, such as copper, bauxite, uranium, cobalt, platinum, manganese, gold, and diamonds. The most significant being oil and uranium. The need to control the sea lines of communication around the continent and the flow of these important materials in and out of the continent made Sub-Saharan Africa vital to the national security of both countries. In reality, the U.S. and Soviets saw Sub-Saharan Africa as a zero-sum game - where gains by one side were perceived losses to the other.

Botswana, Angola, and South Africa are the region's largest diamond producers; Zaire and Zambia maintain the largest copper reserves in the region, and Nigeria is the region's number one oil producer, accounting for more than half of U.S. imports from Sub-Saharan Africa. Nigeria is the second major oil supplier to the U.S. after Saudi Arabia.[16] "Nigeria was the principle supplier of crude oil to the U.S. during the Arab oil embargo of 1974-1975."[17] Sub-Saharan

Africa was important to the two superpowers because of its mineral wealth and geostrategic position.

U.S and Soviet policies toward the region will be covered later, however it is important to note that Sub-Saharan Africa's human resource potential, mineral wealth, and geostrategic position made it possible for the U.S. and Soviet leaders to justify involvement in the region, as long as it was linked to their respective policies, national security, and the balance of power in the region.[18] U.S and Soviet foreign policy and involvement in the region was just what the failed independent governments did not need.

Failing Sub-Saharan African governments used the economic and military aid received from the U.S. and Soviets to pay, train, and supply their military forces and paramilitary organizations. Military forces and paramilitary organizations were used by Sub-Saharan African governments to advance individual agendas and oppress the citizens of the state. During the Cold War civil disturbances were over ideological differences (democracy versus communism) and not of the ethnic hatred variety (Hutu versus Tutsi) variety as experienced in present day Sub-Saharan Africa. The U.S. and Soviets ensured that the

military and paramilitary organizations were paid, trained, and supplied as long as they were combating democracy or communism.

Containment and Expansion policies exacerbated the already unstable social and political issues facing the developing independent governments of Sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. and Soviet policies of containment and expansion failed to consider how their policies would impact on a U.S. and Soviet free Africa. Cold War economic and military aid camouflaged many of Sub-Saharan Africa's problems. Problems that would not surface until Sub-Saharan Africa was no longer vital to the national security of either side.

The end of the Cold-War and the problems it has created for emerging Sub-Saharan African states in many ways resembles post-colonial Africa. The end of colonial rule and the Cold War ushered in massive economic and social-political issues for emerging African governments to resolve. The ability or inability of emerging African governments to resolve these complex issues was and will remain the key factor between stability and chaos in the region. Post-colonial and Cold War Sub-Saharan governments would have to develop policies that address critical

economic and sociopolitical issues such as, international trade, industrial development, establishing a national identity as the basis for unity, population control, environmental degradation, and balancing ethnic loyalty and national unity. The inability of Sub-Saharan African governments to develop domestic and international policies that address these issues is the primary reason for instability in the region. Instability that started with the end of colonial rule, continued through the Cold War, and culminated with the U.S. victory over communism.

Sub-Saharan Africa And Its Challenges To The U.S. Military

The increase of ethnic hatred, human rights violations, governmental corruption, genocide, and military coup d' etat in Sub-Saharan Africa has increased the American military's operational tempo, number of deployments to the region, and has even forced the military to review and modify their doctrine. "The U.S. military committed forces to at least sixteen interventions in the region since 1990."[19] U.S. deployment rates and humanitarian assistance missions will continue to increase because Sub-Saharan Africa contains 24 of the world's poorest countries. Also, UN involvement in the region will increase due to the instability in places

like Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, and Zaire all of which are in dire straits.[20]

U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa, or lack thereof, presents political and economic challenges for the U.S. military. Events in Sub-Saharan Africa will impact on the U.S. military's budget, military force structure, readiness, and the allocation and prioritization of resources. Events in Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the world will force the U.S. military to prioritize its efforts because it does not have an infinite amount of resources. Therefore, the focus of the military's efforts and resources should go to where the U.S. has the greatest stakes and can make the largest impact.[21]

For Regional Commanders In Chief (CINCs) this will mean determining theater engagement strategies based on the NSS and NMS. Sub-Saharan Africa presents a challenge to the CINCs because the current administration has not identified nor articulated what the U.S. interests are in Sub-Saharan Africa. Failure by the administration to identify specific U.S. interests in the region sends mixed messages to the CINCs whom after all have to interpret the broad guidance in the NSS in order to develop strategic assessments and

engagement and priorities. The vastness of the region, the proliferation of Sub-Saharan Africa's underpaid, overstrength, unprofessional militaries, and other global requirements will require the U.S. to develop a Sub-Saharan Africa strategy that provides the CINCs with clear and unambiguous guidance in an effort to help them focus and manage valuable resources. The strategy developed and or adopted by the CINCs must address the development of these underpaid, overstrength, and unprofessional armies is vital to establishing long-term stability in the region.

Combatant Command's Area Of Responsibility(AOR)

Sub-Saharan Africa contains approximately forty-eight countries. It is bordered by the South Atlantic Ocean in the west and the Indian Ocean in the east (see Appendix A). To ensure that U.S. interests are protected the DOD has established four geographical commands to pursue vital U.S. interests and protect American citizens in the region.[22] The four geographical commands and their AORs are:

U.S. European Command (EUCOM) - Is responsible for 37 of the 48 Sub-Saharan African countries. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Central Africa Republic, Rwanda, Burundi, eastern Zaire, and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) - the Horn of Africa, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Somalia, and Seychelles.

U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) - Madagascar and the island states along the coast of the Indian Ocean.

U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) - Cape Verde, Sao Tome', and Principe.[23]

The above mentioned AORs do not include the CINCs European AOR. Combining the European and Sub-Saharan African AOR list demonstrates why it is necessary for CINCs to prioritize their resources based on the identification of vital U.S. interests in a particular region. For example, "EUCOM's total AOR, would encompass over 83 countries, cover an area over 13 million square miles, and serve as home to over 1 billion people."[24] Without some type of prioritization based on vital U.S. interests the CINC's resources would be depleted quickly.

Determining where the U.S. gets involved and who to engage is based on our vital national interests but it is debatable as to whether or not the U.S. has any vital national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. The question that U.S foreign policy makers and the CINCs have to answer is what are vital U.S national interests in the region. Answering this question will allow CINCs to better focus and manage scarce resources in a "region three times the size of

the U.S, comprising of some 53 distinct political entities, and one eight of the human race."[25]

Chapter Three: The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Military Strategy: Views Towards Sub-Saharan Africa.

"U.S Policy makers have tended to ignore the African continent until some sort of political-military crisis grabs their attention."[26]

U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) From 1987 to 1991

George B.N. Ayittey, an African Political Scientist in his article entitled "Maintain Aid to Democratic Countries", stated "the U.S. waits for African states to implode and then rushes in with humanitarian assistance and when it gets tough pulls out."[27] Mr. Ayittey's statement may appear to be correct in the context of Somalia but further review and analysis of U.S policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War and Post-Cold War indicates that U.S African policy failed to address an African continent free of U.S. and Soviet involvement.

From 1987 to 1991 U.S. policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa focused on containing Soviet expansionism in the region. The containment strategy consisted of a defense, economic, and political component. These three components were used to shape U.S. policy towards Europe, Japan, and

Africa respectively. The defense component focused on the forward deployment of troops and building a credible strategic force to augment the conventional forces; the economic component focused on western Europe and Japan; and the political component focused on South Africa and attempted to address decolonization and self determination. The political component also tried to lend support to emerging democratic African governments.[28]

In an effort to address critical global problems, such as, world debt and the narcotics trade, the Reagan administration identified two objectives that would shape U.S. Sub-Saharan Africa Policy: strategic mineral resources and Soviet containment in the region. The administration's NSS objectives ensured that the U.S and her allies maintained access to Sub-Saharan Africa's foreign markets and mineral resources.[29] The identification of these objectives was the administration's initial attempt at identifying U.S. interest in the region.

To assist in the achievement of these objectives the Reagan administration's policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa called for economic development and political stability. Economic development and political stability are important

factors in deterring human rights violations, poverty, ethnic friction, and Soviet and Cuba expansionism. Stabilizing Sub-Saharan Africa's economic and political situation was secondary to Soviet containment and resulted in little, if any, foreign commercial investment in the region.

By early 1988 the U.S. was well on its way to identifying its interests as well as the specific countries in the region where U.S. involvement was needed. The addition of a new U.S. NSS Objective calling for the advancement of democracy and human rights throughout the world allowed the U.S. to continue to justify its containment policy. Events such as the Iran-Iraq War reinforced the administration's belief that Sub-Saharan Africa's geostrategic importance as well as its mineral wealth made Sub-Saharan Africa important to U.S. national security. Basing rights, sea lines of communications, and mineral resources were identified by the Reagan administration as reasons why the U.S. could not let Soviet expansionism in the region go unchecked.

In 1988 believed that the Horn of Africa, Libya, Chad, South Africa, Angola, Namibia, Kenya, Zaire, and Somalia

were significant to U.S interests because of their strategic location, mineral resource wealth, and the level of Soviet/Cuban involvement in these countries. The stability of these countries was important to achieving the 1988 U.S. NSS Objectives of maintaining stability in the region and neutralizing Soviet efforts to influence the world.[30]

The 1987 and 1988 NSS linked U.S. involvement in the region to Soviet expansion, access to the region's mineral wealth, and troop basing. Countering Soviet expansionism was the driving force of U.S policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa. A review of these two documents reveals that there was no long-range Sub-Saharan African policy. U.S. involvement in the region was directly contributed to the Soviets. Without Soviet involvement in the region perhaps there may not have been any U.S. involvement.

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa could be termed reactive instead of proactive. Although Ronald Reagan accurately identified many of the issues that would propel the continent into conflict - critical shortages of food, a lack of health services, and the inability of African governments to provide for their peoples' basic needs - the administration

failed to develop a policy that assisted the Africans in fixing their real problems - economic and political development. This occurred because the U.S, in an effort to counter Soviet expansionism in the region, armed Africans with modern weaponry without providing them with the tools necessary to conduct conflict resolution in a post-Cold War environment. The effects of a short-range foreign policy aimed at arming the population to fight communism and the failure to consider the impact of conflict resolution procedures has and will continue to plague the region long after the Cold War.

National Military Strategy (NMS) 1986-1989

In addition to the NSS, the NMS also focused on containing Soviet Expansionism. Both documents highlighted the importance of transit facilities, and they both addressed the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa to the attainment of these objectives. The NSS spelled out the diplomatic ends while the military posture from 1986 to 1990 expressed the means by which the U.S would obtain its political end - defeating communism.

The military's interest in Sub-Saharan Africa stemmed from the need to prevent the Soviets and Cubans from

controlling the region. In 1987, the U.S. military estimated that there were 35,000 Cuban and 1,000 Soviet advisors in Angola and that there were both Soviet and Cuban advisors in Ethiopia. In less than a year these numbers grew to 37,500 and 1,200.[31] These facts forced the military to develop programs that countered Soviet and Cuban influence in the region.

The NMS, like the NSS, cited the transit facilities which might effect operations in the Mediterranean, Middle East, Southwest Asia, and the mineral wealth of Sub-Saharan Africa, as the reason for military involvement in the region.[32] The strategic location along important air and sea lines of communications, the excellent port facilities and strategic materials which were the basis for super alloys needed to produce advanced weaponry formed the basis of the military's interests in Sub-Saharan Africa, but the overarching reason for military involvement remained countering Soviet influence.[33]

The NSS had a profound impact on the NMS. "The U.S. military strategy during the Cold-War was defensive, sought to deter war while maintaining a secure environment within which the U.S., its allies and friends can pursue their

interests."[34] Therefore, the U.S military strategy focused on: freedom of the seas, air, and space; nuclear deterrence; force mobility; strong alliances; a strong central reserve; and good intelligence. To secure U.S interest in Sub-Saharan Africa the military instituted African Security Assistance Programs (SA).

SA objectives were concerned with assisting countries in preserving their independence, promoting regional security, obtaining basing rights, ensuring U.S. access to critical raw materials, and providing a means to expand U.S influence in the region. SA personnel were deployed in Zaire, Kenya, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, and Liberia during the Cold-War to counter Soviet advisors in places like Angola, Ethiopia, Congo, and Burundi. SA was the primary means of dealing with Soviet and Cuban involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa.[35]

The military effort just like the political effort during the Cold-War was reactionary and not proactive. It too focused on short-term solutions without regard to the long-range effects the policies would have on a communist free Sub-Saharan Africa. U.S policy lacked foresight and failed to address critical post-Cold War issues such as the

demobilization of military forces, forces which the U.S. equipped and trained, and the economic and political rebuilding of Sub-Saharan governments, some of which the U.S. both created and destroyed.

National Security (NSS) from 1990-1997

From 1990-1997 U.S. foreign policy shifted from Soviet containment to integration, resulting in the U.S. defining and categorizing their interests in the region. The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, the Gulf War, and the collapse of the nation-state had a profound impact on the development of U.S. foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa.

The 1990 NSS document laid the foundation for future U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. The Soviet reforms of 1989 increased the worlds' refugee population in places like Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. In response to these issues Former President Bush's policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa was based on institution-building, economic development, and regional peace.[36] Bush like his predecessors recognized the importance of Africa to the U.S but also failed to clearly articulate U.S. interests in the

region. This was a drastic departure from previous U.S. Presidents.

The Bush administration's focus was on "the prevention of any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian land mass."[37] This statement was made without recognizing that Africa was still a battleground for the superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet government acknowledged Soviet defeat and with it came a new role for the U.S., a role which would have a profound impact on its policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Sub-Saharan Africa was no longer important to the U.S., or so it seemed.

Africanists believed the U.S. would forget about Africa since it won the Cold War. However, U.S. policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that it did not forget about Sub-Saharan Africa but merely shifted its policy goals and objectives. U.S goals for Africa shifted from containment, a purely political oriented objective, to humanitarian assistance, a moral and value based objective. The shift occurred because of the economic decline of Sub-Saharan African governments, the increase in Acquired Immune Deficiencies (AIDs), and environmental degradation issues in

addition to the ethnic and factional violence in Rwanda, Burundi, Zaire, and Somalia.

U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1991 to the present is based on what is perceived as a moral obligation instead of a political obligation based on U.S. interests. During this time period the Cold War language that justified U.S. involvement began to disappear. Basing rights, strategic mineral wealth, and access to major sea, air, and space lines of communication were no longer cited as reasons for continued U.S. involvement in the region. The democracy crusades began. Post-Cold War rhetoric and foreign policy emphasized market reforms, free speech, judicial independence, and human rights.[38]

Post-Cold War foreign policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa called for military emphasis on humanitarian assistance operations in the midst of civil war and anarchy, support for improved civil-military relations, the promotion of peaceful settlement of disputes, and assisting allies improve their defenses. President Clinton in the July 1994 NSS document stated "U.S. African policy supports democracy, sustainable economic development, diplomacy, peacekeeping,

and conflict resolution and intends to identify the root causes of conflict and disasters before they erupt."[39]

Given the rapid decline of many Sub-Saharan African countries from 1991 to 1997, such as Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Ethiopia, and Zaire, the U.S. found itself in a political dilemma. How do you justify the expenditure of resources to the American people to fix Africa's issues, issues that appear to have been created by the same governments you once supported when you have not identified any vital or important U.S. interests in the region? "The Rwandan mission cost the U.S. an excess of 250 million dollars, and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia cost the U.S along with United Nations aid to that country 2.6 billion dollars."[40]

In response to militant nationalism and ethnic and religious conflict from within Sub-Saharan Africa, the U.S in 1994 added another U.S. interest entitled humanitarian, which is discussed in the next chapter.[41] The purpose for adding the new U.S. interest occurred as a response to the media and the public's outcry over the brutal and grotesque images of death and destruction in former pro-U.S. Sub-Saharan African countries. The addition of the humanitarian

interest replaced words like containment, geostrategic location, and mineral wealth.

Analysis of NSS documents from 1986-1997 indicate that the Cold War was the catalyst in changing the U.S. policy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Cold War Sub-Saharan policy was based on real identifiable and concrete U.S objectives and interests. Post-Cold War Sub-Saharan policy was ambiguous and based on America's morality, values, and new found global stature as the world's only superpower. The U.S Post-Cold War policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa would ask the military to be the primary executors of its new policy.

National Military Strategy (NMS) From 1990-1997

The NMS toward Sub-Saharan Africa and the military's role as the executor of the policy shifted from security assistance to humanitarian assistance. The language of NMS documents during this time-frame reflected the change in missions and focus. Sub-Saharan Africa was no longer considered vital or important to U.S. national security. NMS language, like the NSS, began to take on a moral and values based flavor.

In 1995, the Defense Department did something the State Department failed to do after the Cold War, it officially

stated that "the U.S has no vital or important interest in Sub-Saharan Africa and has very little traditional strategic interests in Africa."[42] DoD continued to believe that Africa's strategic location was still important. Therefore, its policy called for maintaining and sustaining the capacity to base U.S soldiers in Africa if required.[43]

To ensure that the military did not lose potential basing rights, DoD adopted the following focus in support of President Clinton's 1995 NSS Objectives:

- conflict prevention management and resolution
- humanitarian assistance
- democratic systems that respect human rights
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- AIDs
- environmental degradation
- population growth and uncontrolled refugee flows
- preventing the spread of terrorism, countering drug trafficking, and subversion by radical regimes.[44]

The shift in U.S. policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa brought with it changes in the military's mission focus and increased the number of military deployments to the region. The military has committed forces to at least sixteen interventions since 1990, has conducted at least twenty exercises per year under EUCOM and CENTCOM guidance, in

addition to three MEDFLAGs per year.[45] The addition of humanitarian assistance as a U.S interest is the primary reason for U.S. involvement in the region.

After the Cold War the military was no longer concerned with arming Sub-Saharan African militaries. DoD foreign military sales programs to Sub-Saharan Africa ceased after the Cold War and were replaced with programs like IMET and IMET-E which emphasize exposing African officers and governmental officials to democratic civil-military operations and cooperation. The DoD's 1997 NMS of shape, respond, and prepare requires the military to conduct peacetime engagement activities in the region in an effort to create conditions favorable for U.S interests and global security.[46]

Chapter IV: Defining U.S. Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

"I have yet to see a credible definition of US national security interests beyond the Israel-Egypt-Persian Gulf nexus."[47]

Herman J. Cohen
Former African Foreign Service Professional

Identifying U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa should have been easy during the Cold War because there was a credible threat in the region, Soviet and Cuban forces. However, this was not the case. In 1987, then President

Reagan identified specific U.S. interests by region. The 1987 NSS document cited the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Western Europe as places where the U.S. had vital interests.

"Maintaining regional stability, preserving the security of Israel, retaining access to oil on reasonable terms, and curbing state sponsored terrorism were identified as specific U.S. interests."[48] The Reagan administration did not identify any U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa in the 1987 NSS document. The American strategy of "containment" was the primary reason the U.S. became involved in the region.

The 1987 NSS document's failure to identify U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and synonymous use of the words "policy" and "strategy" to describe U.S. interests became the standard for subsequent NSS documents. Albeit a poor standard. Subsequent NSS documents would continue to fail to make the distinction between policy, strategy, and interests resulting in the current debate over whether the U.S has any interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. To fully understand the origins of the debate, consideration of how U.S. policy makers have defined the word "interests" is required.

The 1994 NSS document was the first to clearly define vital and important U.S. interest. The 1994 document like all of its predecessors did not identify any U.S interests in Sub-Saharan Africa but did recognize that the U.S had enduring interests in the Middle East, Southwest Asia, and Israel. President Clinton attempted to define the word "interest" through the use of words such as "vital" and "less important" but the damage was already done. According to these definitions, finding a U.S. interest in the region would prove to be quite difficult.[49]

During the Cold War, U.S. policy inferred that the geostrategic location and mineral resource wealth of Sub-Saharan Africa were important to the U.S. However, analysis of the region in relationship to the Middle East, Israel, and the Persian Gulf confirm why Sub-Saharan Africa is important for basing rights and for securing the sea lines of communication.[50] During the Cold War basing rights, maintaining access to strategic minerals, and control of the sea lines of communication formed the basis of U.S. strategy for the region.

Post-Cold War events and political analysis of the region led President Clinton to redefine important interests

and add an additional category - humanitarian assistance.[51] The addition of the humanitarian assistance category provided the administration with the justification it needed to explain the expenditure of resources in the region. Prior to this official acknowledgment by the President, the U.S. had used the military to intervene in Sub-Saharan Africa crisis at least sixteen times. President Clinton, like other Presidents before him, did not identify U.S. interests in the region. Rather, he made the issue more confusing by failing to identify to the American people and the military concrete U.S. interest in the region.

Although U.S. foreign policy remained firm in its identification of vital U.S. interests in Europe, the Persian Gulf, Israel, and the Middle East, the policy on Sub-Saharan Africa continued to remain elusive. European stability, the security of Israel, and unrestricted access to the Persian Gulf oil were stated U.S. interests.[52] The 1997 NSS document refers to Africa as having the greatest impact on future global environmental and security concerns because of its potential transnational threats, increased terrorist safe havens, drug trafficking connection, and potential for the proliferation of weapons of mass

destruction on the continent.[53] Despite acknowledging these realities, the administration refused to state that the U.S. had vital or important interests in the region.

The evolutionary process of the NSS and NMS exhibits a distinct change in rationale for U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa. U.S. involvement in the region shifted from concrete political reasoning based on identifiable threats to U.S. national security, as was the case during the Cold War, to a more morality and values based line of reasoning after the Cold War.[54] The shift in reasoning without identifying and communicating concrete U.S interests in Sub-Saharan Africa has not only confused the American people but also the military instrument of power - the Department of Defense. Due to the lack of clear guidance from the White House concerning Sub-Saharan Africa, DoD has reverted back to the Cold War reasons for remaining engaged in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The DoD in 1995 acknowledged that the U.S. had no vital interests in Africa but did agree that the U.S had some limited interests. According to DoD "the U.S has ***significant*** political interests, ***limited*** economic interests, and ***minimal*** security interests."[55] The definitions of the

terms *"significant"*, *"limited"*, and *"minimal"* could not be located in any NSS documents. The use of these words by DoD is significant because it shows that a disconnect exists between U.S. policy makers and the military in defining U.S. interests. Consequently, this disconnect impacts on the military's perception of its role in Sub-Saharan Africa. This perception, in turn, impacts on the way the military allocates resources and determines what countries to engage. The disconnect between the military and the White House has occurred because the national policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa is vague and ambiguous.

The DoD cites Sub-Saharan Africa's basing potential, oil reserves, and security as the major reasons for U.S. involvement in Sub-Saharan Africa but has not coined them U.S. interests. Noted Africanist Kent H. Butts agrees with the DoD's assessment of Sub-Saharan Africa's importance to the U.S. In his articled entitled "The Department of Defense's Role in African Policy", believes that Africa is important for several reasons: it provides the U.S. with the ability to project power rapidly into the region and it ensures access to strategic minerals. Former Secretary of

Defense Dick Cheney's remarks in the 1992 Annual report to the President and Congress made it clear that:

> Access to facilities in the nations of Sub-Saharan Africa made an important contribution to the Coalition effort during Operation Desert Storm, both for the United States and for other Coalition Forces. Such access would have been even more important had the conflict prolonged.[56]

A strong argument can be made that supports the need to ensure access to Sub-Sahara Africa's oil and minerals. According to the Department of Energy, Petroleum Supply Monthly, Africa "provides some 20 percent of U.S. petroleum import supplies and an additional 40 percent reaches the U.S. via the Southern Cape Route."[57]

Why was access to Africa's strategic minerals so important to the U.S during the Cold War but not today? The Soviets wanted to deny the U.S the mineral resources needed for weapons production. Cobalt, chromium, platinum, and maganese are essential for weapons production. Zaire has 75 percent of the world's cobalt production with no alternative sources of supply that could substitute for Zaire's production should it be lost; South Africa accounts for 82 percent of the world's chromium reserve base, 75 percent of the world's maganese reserve base, and 90 percent of the

world platinum reserve base.[58] These statistics support the military's view that the U.S has more than humanitarian interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. This places the military in disagreement with U.S. policy makers.

The significance of this disagreement will come to a critical juncture when the government and CINCs can no longer justify to the American people why, despite the fact that the U.S. has no interests in Sub-Saharan Africa the American military conducts some 20 exercises per year in Africa under the guidance of EUCOM and CENTCOM.[59] President Reagan, during the Cold War era, once stated that "to be effective, U.S. strategy should be fairly rooted in broad national interests and objectives… and integrate all relevant facets of national power to achieve our national objectives".[60] However, post-Cold War policy appears to have forgotten these insightful words.

Chapter V: International Military Education and Training Program (IMET) Overview and Assessment

"Since 1950, IMET Programs and its predecessor have trained over 500,000 foreign officers and enlisted personnel in areas ranging from professional military education (PME) to basic technical skills."[61]

Legislative Background and Overview

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the International Security Act of 1976 allowed the 94th Congress

to grant assistance to countries unable to purchase U.S. military training under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Act to meet their needs. Congress' intent was two-fold:

(1) to encourage effective mutually beneficial relations and increased understanding between the United States and foreign countries in furtherance of goals of international peace and security; and

(2) to improve the ability of participating foreign countries to utilize their resources, including defense articles and defense services obtained from the United States, with maximum effectiveness, thereby, contributing to greater self-reliance by such countries.[62]

There have been two significant legislative changes to the original program:

(1) In 1978 the First Amendment expanded the initial purpose of IMET, to include increasing international human rights awareness of participating countries; and

(2) The 1991 Second Amendment modified the scope of the program. The Amendment expanded the focus of IMET to include: military justice systems in democracy, political/military cooperation to include civilian control over the military, and better understanding of internationally recognized human rights.[63]

In 1993, legislation expanded the participation population to include civilians, officials in the legislative branch who deal with military matters, and nongovernmental agencies having defense related interests.[64]

IMET programs are a component of the Security Assistance Program and are responsible for providing foreign military

officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilians with professional military education (PME). FMS remains responsible for providing the technical training relating to the maintenance, operation, and management of equipment purchased from the U.S.[65]

IMET, the smallest component of the Security Assistance Program, is an instrument of national security and foreign policy. It is the least costly but most effective program for maintaining U.S. influence in foreign countries. LTG Thomas G. Rhame, Director, DSSA, in his congressional testimony in support of the FY 1998 Security Assistance Budget request, stated "the CINCs of unified commands have consistently identified IMET as the key tool for enhancing political/military relations with various countries in their regions."[66] For example EUCOM provides IMET staff assistance training to 31 African countries. EUCOM staff assistance training exchanges are frequently the only form of military assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa and provide the CINC and his staff access to senior African leadership.[67] Access to senior political and military African officials assists the CINCs in shaping the region through engagement.

According to the Defense Security Agency Statistics of 1997, the Army reported "that it has graduated 5,330 foreign students from 110 different countries; 23 have become Heads of State; 280 Ministers, Ambassadors, or Legislators; 241 Chiefs of Staff; and 1965 flag officers and general officers."[68] The United States Army Command and General Staff (CGSC) International Officers Program (IO) supports the DSA's figures. According to CGSC IO statistics they have trained 5962 IOs from 140 countries; 23 Heads of State; 299 Ministers, Ambassadors, and Representatives; 279 Chiefs of Staff (Armed Forces or Services); and 2246 General Officers. Historically, 39 percent of the graduates attain one of these positions.[69]

What these statistics fail to show is the linkage of IMET training to U.S. interests and its impact on the allocation of IMET allocations. Review and analysis of the linkage between U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and IMET implementation shows that although IMET programs appear to be quite successful there is still a significant gap between IMET policy and implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The Army's CGSC IO Program substantiates this premise and a closer look at the CGSC International Hall of Fame shows that Sub-Saharan Africa does not share the same degree of success as other countries because of the low density of African attendees. The CGSC IO Hall of Fame has recognized 180 IOs from 53 countries. The number of Sub-Saharan African inductees is a dismal 3.8 percent.[70]

If the Department of State and the DoD truly want to proactively shape Sub-Saharan Africa a couple of paradigms must be reevaluated. The denial of U.S. interests in the region and a shift in IMET focus are a start. If the CINCs truly believe that IMET programs are important and are their primary tools for shaping Sub-Saharan Africa then why does Europe lead the way in IMET FY 1998 funding request? Analysis of the FY 1998 IMET funding request indicates that Europe (Central Europe) will continue to receive the preponderance of the $50 million IMET budget. Also, Department of State will add 28 countries to IMET allocations for FY 98, primarily Central European countries, while also adding 570 more students world-wide of which the majority will come from Central Europe and the New Independent States (NIS).[71] Europe, NIS, Latin America, and

the Caribbean states received more IMET funding than Sub-Saharan Africa for Fiscal Years 1996 and 1997.[72] FY 1998 proposals continue to show Sub-Saharan Africa lagging behind Europe and Latin America. The Clinton Administration's failure to develop and articulate coherent U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa is a major reason for the apparent inconsistency between IMET policy and implementation.

The CINCs face a dilemma because they are required to "shape" Sub-Saharan Africa based on the administration's morale criteria while at the same time linking their engagement to concrete U.S. interests to justify resource expenditures. This helps to explain why there are 39 Sub-Saharan African countries competing for the $50 million FY 1998 budget request and four combatant commands involved in the region. Are all 39 countries vital or important to U.S. national interests?

IMET Implementation and The Linkage to U.S. Interests

President Clinton's Objectives for Sub-Saharan Africa as stated in the *U.S. Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, calls for:

- promoting peace by preventing, managing, or resolving conflict;
- providing humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering and hunger;

- fostering democracy and respect for human rights; and
- supporting economic growth and sustainable developments.[73]

From these objectives the DoD developed its priorities for Sub-Saharan Africa. DoD's number one priority is conflict prevention, management, and resolution. In essence the Clinton Administration gave the military not only the policy objective (the end), stability in the region, but also dictated the primary means by which to achieve the end, the military instrument of power, and the ways, humanitarian assistance programs. There are two problems with this approach which prevent it from being effective in "shaping" Sub-Saharan Africa: the policy is tied to the enhancement of the democratic crusade which is not linked to quantifiable U.S. interests and it replaces the economic and diplomatic instruments of power with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and the military instrument of power. This also creates a potential dilemma for the military because it is being asked to either accept the ambiguous rhetoric concerning U.S. interest in Sub-Saharan Africa or identify U.S. interests and protect those interests which may be in conflict with the administration's intent. By misunderstanding the administration's intent the DoD runs

the risk of not being able to assist the administration in proactively "shaping" Sub-Saharan Africa.

For instance, enrollment of African countries in the IMET program based solely on democratic pluralism and their human rights records while ignoring their economic, environmental, and strategic importance to the U.S. interferes with the State Department and DoD's ability to "shape African militaries to more efficient force structures aligned with legitimate security requirements that make them responsive to democratic values".[74] Current IMET policy precludes the CINCs from enrolling participants from Angola, Nigeria, Uganda, and Eritrea despite three of the four countries containing ***important*** U.S. interests.

Africans are not accustomed to democracy. Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni increased the country's economic growth rate by 10 percent despite tribal struggles from the north and with only one political party. Robert Kaplan, author and noted African traveler, in his article, entitled "Was Democracy Just a Moment", introduces the idea that multi-party systems harden and institutionalize established ethnic and regional divisions.[75] To use the development of

American democracy as the standard by which to determine enrollment into the IMET program is absurd.

There are some unique difference between Sub-Saharan Africa and America which brought about the development of U.S democratic ideas. The most important being the U.S. had an existing middle class. Sub-Saharan Africa does not. "Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class."[76] This is the pattern in the Pacific Rim and the southern cone of South America. Chile was under military rule during the 70s and 80s and has created a middle class society and stable government.[77] Countries like Rwanda, Mali, and Algeria are reminders of what happens when African governments are forced to accept multi-party systems and elections before they are ready.[78] Does this mean that Uganda, Nigeria, and Angola should not be allowed to participate in the IMET program just because they do not have multi-party governments or fail to meet the U.S. expectation of democracy? Will accountable and honest African governments ever be enough?

Sub-Saharan Africa Trends and The IMET Program

Although the latest trends in Sub-Saharan Africa politics indicate that more than 23 countries are considered

to be transitioning democracies, up from only five in 1989, Gambia, Nigeria, Angola, and Niger remain under military rule. However, the peace process in these countries continues despite civil unrest. Uganda, while under military rule, has solved its civil conflicts. Ethiopia, Nambia, Mozambique, and South Africa have done the same.[79]

Should the U.S. continue to deny Angola, Nigeria, Liberia, the Central Africa Republic (formerly Zaire), and Somalia access to IMET programs because they are not democratic or because the U.S. has no vital or important national interests in these countries?[80] These countries' political systems and human rights records prevent them from receiving IMET funding and training allocations. Countries like Argentina, Belize, El Salvador, and Russia participate in the IMET program despite their human rights violations record, political freedom records and archaic judicial process.

The DoD understands the importance of Sub-Saharan Africa to the U.S. which is why they believe that the U.S. does have "limited" economic interest in the region. The truth of the matter is, because the U.S. has become fixated on the moral high ground (democracy), countries like Angola,

Nigeria, the Central Africa Republic, the Congo, and Eritrea, where the U.S. has important economic interests, will continue to be ignored by the IMET program resulting in reactive engagement and shaping.

The economic importance of Eritrea, Angola, and Nigeria has been well documented. Eritrea's geostrategic location and substantial offshore petroleum reserves and U.S. trading base makes her ***important*** to the U.S. Angola is America's third largest trading partner, as well as the source of seven percent of the U.S. oil imports. U.S. business investments in Nigeria's petroleum sector alone exceed $4 billion with over $1 billion in oil exports.[81]

Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, in her December 1997 trip to Angola, stated "the U.S. has ***important*** national interests in helping Africans make progress on all fronts."[82] She later stated that "the Export-Import Bank of the U.S. was finalizing nearly $90 million in loans to develop new oil fields in Angola and is discussing a further $350 million package to support the purchase of American equipment.[83] Why is it that the State Department is willing to engage Angola but the DoD will not allow Angola to participate in the IMET program. Conflicting actions like

this send the wrong message to Sub-Saharan African countries as well as to the American public.

Evaluation of IMET Programs

When assessing IMET programs it is important to realize that the CINCs have to balance the moral as well as the concrete, quantifiable interests when determining which countries should participate in the IMET program. Therefore, the evaluation criteria must be moral and value based as well as linked to concrete U.S. interests. Failure to do this will result in the assessor becoming fixated on the number of personnel trained instead of focusing on the long-range trends and movements.[84]

An assessment of the IMET program must consider how well it is nested with the NSS and NMS. Currently, IMET programs are nested with the NSS and NMS because of the catch-all phrase, "humanitarian assistance". However, when it comes to agreement between the DoD and the Clinton Administration on engagement based on vital and important U.S. national interest, nesting ceases. This hinders the CINCs ability to proactively "shape" Sub-Saharan Africa because the countries who will ultimately decide the fate of

Africa are not being allowed to participate in the IMET program.

In order to answer the research question as to whether the DoD IMET programs promote and develop stability in the region, the programs must be assessed using the following criteria:

- how well is it linked to protecting U.S. vital and important U.S. interests;
- how well do they improve the balance of power between the political and military instruments of power;
- how well has the program helped deter human rights violations; and
- does it ensure U.S. access to Sub-Saharan facilities;

The use of this criteria is "A Way" of ensuring that IMET programs enhance U.S. security, promote prosperity in the U.S., and promote democracy. Current trends in Sub-Saharan Africa indicate that many African countries are trying to improve their political, economic, and social programs. IMET programs were instrumental in many cases but more can be done to improve the program's implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Serious consideration must be given to the process used to determine IMET school and fund allocations for Sub-Saharan Africa. Is it necessary to have 38 Sub-Saharan

African countries enrolled in IMET programs? Also, the school allocations should be compared to the size of the army and the number of personnel already trained. Comparing these figures will afford other countries the opportunity to attend while not increasing the total budget. For example 80 percent of Botswana's officer corps is IMET trained but yet they are allocated 39 IMET slots for FY 98. Is it not time to make room for Angola, Central Africa Republic (formerly Zaire), and Nigeria? Economic growth without improved political/military cooperation will result in continued political oppression, increased refugee problems, environmental degradation, international crime, and the spread of infectious disease. The IMET program should provide developing Sub-Saharan Africa economic tigers the opportunity to enroll in the program. The money being invested in places like Angola and Nigeria belongs to U.S. banks and businesses. This shows that the U.S. has significant economic interests in the welfare of these countries.

Chapter VI: Conclusions

Review of the U.S. policy towards Sub-Saharan Africa indicates that the U.S. does not have a coherent Sub-Saharan Africa policy that is linked to vital and important national interest. Failure to link U.S. involvement in the region to vital and important national interest is the major contributing factor for IMET participation in over 38 Sub-Saharan African countries and the commitment of four regional commands to the area.

The need to justify the expenditure of resources in Sub-Saharan Africa and America's democratic crusades are the primary reasons for the addition of the humanitarian assistance interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the Clinton Administration humanitarian assistance is the only U.S. interest in the region and this places the administration at odds with regional CINCs. The DoD and the Clinton Administration are in disagreement as to what interests the U.S. has in Sub-Saharan Africa. This disagreement places the CINCs in a vicarious position because they have to accept the ambiguous language from the White House concerning U.S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa while also identifying and protecting strategic U.S.

interests in the region, which may be in conflict with the administration.

Enrollment of Sub-Saharan African countries in the IMET program is closely linked to two criteria, democracy and human rights records, while ignoring their economic, environmental, and strategic importance. The use of this criteria as the basis for enrollment ignores the fact that Africans are not accustomed to democracy and, therefore, it will take time for the Africans to understand these foreign concepts. Consequently, the U.S. may need to recognize that perhaps democracy will not take hold. Realizing that democracy is something foreign to most Africans, the best that the U.S. can hope for are accountable and honest African governments that recognize that economic and political/military cooperation are the keys to success.

Countries like Rwanda, Mali, and Algeria are reminders of what happens when African governments are forced to accept multi-party democratic governments before they are economically ready. Current IMET policy precludes the CINCs from enrolling participants from Angola, Nigeria, Eritrea, and Uganda despite all four countries containing ***important*** U.S. interests. Should Angola, Uganda, and Nigeria be

denied participation in the IMET program because they do not have multi-party governments or fail to meet the U.S. expectation of democracy? Will accountable and honest African governments ever be enough?

IMET programs were instrumental in helping Sub-Saharan African governments improve their political, economic, and social programs; however, more can be done. Serious consideration must be given to improving the process used to determine IMET school and fund allocations for Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, school allocations should be compared to the size of the army and the number of personnel trained. Finally, the IMET program must be linked to vital and important U.S. interests instead of purely moral and value based issues. Failure to consider these points will result in potential Sub-Saharan Africa economic tigers being left out of the IMET program. Potentially, this could result in lost opportunities for the DoD in "shaping" Sub-Saharan Africa.

ENDNOTES

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[12]Tony Thomas, "Sub-Saharan Africa: So Little Done, So Much To Do," The Economist, September 1996, p.3.

[13]Ibid.

[14]"Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States—Part II," U.S. Department Of State Dispatch, January 1996, p. 3.

[15]Ibid. p. 2 and Tony Thomas, "Sub-Saharan Africa: So Little Done, So Much To Do," pp.4-16.

[16]Joseph E. Harris, Africans And Their Heritage, p.257.

[17] Peter Duigon, "Promote Trade, Not Aid," Insight On The News, November 1994, p. 22.

[18] Dan Henk and Steven Metz, "The United States And The Transformation Of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative And Beyond", p.11. These include Operation Sharp Edge (NEO from Liberia); Operation Eastern Exit (NEO from Somalia); Operation Quick Lift (NEO from Zaire); an unnamed NEO evacuation from Sierra Leone; Operation Provide Transition (election support in Angola); Operation Restore Hope (humanitarian operations in Somalia); Operation Provide Relief (humanitarian operations in Somalia); Operation Distant Thunder (NEO Rwanda); Operation Support Hope (humanitarian operations Rwanda); Operation United Shield (support to U.N. withdrawal from Somalia); Operation Quick Response (NEO Central Africa Republic); Operation Assured Response (NEO Liberia); Operation Guardian Assistance (humanitarian operations in central Africa); Operation Guardian Retrieval (preparation for NEO from Zaire); Operation Noble Obelisk (NEO from Sierra Leone; and Operation Assured Lift (operations in support of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia).

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[29] National Security Strategy of The United States, January 1988, p. 6.

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[37] National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991), p.10 and National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, January 1993), pp. 1-3 for an explanation on U.S Objectives that infer that the U.S recognizes that it has a morale obligation as the victor of the Cold War to lead the world in a collective response to the world's crisis.

[38]National Security Strategy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994), p.26.

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[41]Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy For Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 3 and p. 23.

[42]Ibid. p. 1.

[43] Ibid. p. 7.

[44]Dan Henk and Steven Metz, "The United States And The Transformation Of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative And Beyond", p.11 and Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy For Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 16.

[45]National Military Strategy 1997, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, September 1997), pp. 1-11.

[46] Herman J. Cohen, "US Policy Towards Africa", Foreign Service Journal, June 1995, p. 38.

[47] National Security Strategy of The United States, January 1987, p. 3.

[48] National Security Strategy of The United States, July 1994, p. 10. Defines U.S. vital interests "as those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, security, and vitality of or national entity, are at stake." Less immediate threat is "target areas that most affect our national interests. I.E. areas where there maybe a substantial refugee flow."

[49] National Security Strategy of The United States, January 1988, p. 32.

[50] National Security Strategy of The United States, February 1995, p. 12. Important interests are "those interests at that do not affect our national survival, but they do affect importantly our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live." Humanitarian assistance interests are those "where the resources we can bring to bear by using unique capabilities of our military rather than on the combat power of the military."

[51]National Security Strategy 1996, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1996), p.
30 and National Security Strategy 1997, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997), p. 21.

[52] Ibid. p. 28.

[53] Karl P. Magyar, Africa's Realignment and America's Strategic Interests in the Postcontainment Era, (Maxwell Air Base, Alabama: Air University Press, February 1992), pp. 19-26 and Dan Henk, "U.S. National Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa", Parameters, Winter 1997, pp. 94-104 for a detailed discussion on the debate over U.S. interests between the conservatives (minimalists) and the liberals (maximalists). .

[54] Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy For Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 3 , p. 23 and p. 1.

[55] Dick Cheney, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992, p. 16.

[56]Department of Energy, Petroleum Supply Monthly, (Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1990), p. 20-22.

[57]U.S Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summaries, 1991and "Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States-Part II", U.S Department of State Dispatch, January 1996, p.4.

[58] Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy For Sub-Saharan Africa, p. 16.

[59] National Security Strategy of The United States, January 1987, p. 1.

[60]Spiro C. Manolas and Louis J. Samelson, "The United States International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program", DISAM Journal, Spring 1990, p.1, see p. 7 for detailed discussion.

[61] John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: An Assessment, Mc Nair Paper 44, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, October 1995), p. 5.

[62] Ibid. pp. 6-7.

[63] Robert J. Kasper, Jr., Direct Training and Military-To-Military Contact Programs: The CINCs Enablers, (Newport, R.I: Naval War College, June 17 1994), p. 6.

[64] John A. Cope, International Military Education and Training: An Assessment, Mc Nair Paper 44, pp. 6-7.

[65]DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, (Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH, Spring 1997), Vol 19, No. 3, p. 65.

[66]" United States European Command Support to U.S. Policy in Africa", in United States European Command , [database on-line]; available from htttp://www.eucom,mil/africa/publications/EUCOMSPT.HTM; Internet; accessed March 3, 1998.

[67] James J. Kratsas, International Military Education and Training: A Force Multiplier With Relevance For The 21st Century, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Monograph, March 1, 1997), p. 9 and John F. Morton, "IMET: A Bargain Investment with A Long Term Payoff", Asian Defense Journal, September 1991, pp. 28-29 for a discussion on the number of students trained by IMET funds and follow-on assignments.

[68] United States Army Command and General Staff College, "CGSOC: The Army's Center for Leadership and Leader Development Briefing", [database on-line]; available from htttp://www-cgsc.army.mil/dsa/iosd/ppt/sld004.htm; Internet; accessed March 3, 1998.

[69] United States Army Command and General Staff College, "CGSOC: The Army's Center for Leadership and Leader Development Briefing", [database on-line]; available from htttp://www-cgsc.army.mil/dsa/iosd/ihofctl. htm; Internet; accessed March 3, 1998.

[70] DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, p. 65 and The Secretary of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1998, (Washington, D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office, March 1997), pp. 119-127 and pp. 590-627.

[71] DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management, pp. 40-43. All figures include FY 96, FY 97, and FY 98 (estimated) totals. Europe and the NIS figures including FY 1998 (estimated) = 46.2 million; Latin America and the Caribbean including FY 1998 (estimated) = 27.6 million; and Sub-Saharan Africa including FY 1998 (estimated) = 21.3 million.

[72] Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy For Sub-Saharan Africa, p.4

[73] Ibid. p.7.

[74] Robert D. Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", The Atlantic Monthly, December 1997, p. 60.

[75] Ibid. p. 61.

[76] Ibid. pp. 58-61.

[77] Robert D. Kaplan, "Was Democracy Just a Moment?", The Atlantic Monthly, p. 58. In 1992 Rwanda was forced by Washington to establish a multi-party system. The new political organizations were homes to some of the most violent militias and governments. Elections in Sierra Leone and Mali were marred by killings and riots. In Mali voter turnout was 20 %.

[78] The Secretary of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1998, pp. 255-257.

[79] Congressional records indicate that from 1950-1996 Angola, Liberia, Nigeria, have not had IMET funds programmed or training slots allocated. Somalia and Zaire had their funding cut in 1990 and 1992 respectively.

[80] The Secretary of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations Fiscal Year 1998, pp. 253-335.

[81] United States Department of State, "Remarks At Chevron's Takula Oil Drilling Platform", [database on-line]; available from htttp://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/971212.html; Internet; accessed March 7, 1998.

[82] Ibid.

[83] Robert J. Kasper, Jr., Direct Training and Military-To-Military Contact Programs: The CINCs Enablers, p. 23.

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Appendix A

Africa



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