

MISSION COMMAND INSIGHTS FROM THE BOSTON CAMPAIGN
(1775-1776) DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR

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General Studies

by

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ABSTRACT

MISSION COMMAND INSIGHTS FROM THE BOSTON CAMPAIGN (1775-1776) DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY WAR, by Steven E. Robinson, 69 pages.

Mission Command is critical to decentralized execution from centralized intent. While establishing the first American colonies militiamen faced an overmatch enemy consisting of the British Army and Navy. During the French and Indian War and Boston Campaign, New England militiamen and the Continental Army utilized command and control with principles of today's mission command doctrine. Mission command principles and philosophy allows commanders to set the conditions for success during combat operations. Future wars will be multi-domain battle where most or all domains will be contested and directly affect command and control. Mission command must be understood and applied to win decisively in the future wars and in multi-domain operational environments.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Overview

Many of these adversaries also contest U.S. strategic resolve and commitment to allies and partners because of reduced U.S. forward presence and decreased Joint Force capabilities and capacities. These problems continue to increase as adversaries pursue ways and means to challenge U.S. forces at greater distances and restrict friendly maneuver across all domains in both operations below armed conflict and in armed conflict.

—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century

Purpose

The principles of mission command can be used to facilitate commanders framing of complicated, complex, and chaotic operational environments. Success in future operational environments will require timely and accurate command decisions. The Department of the Army acknowledges that the enemy capabilities will continue to challenge the ability of military forces to achieve military and political objectives. United States Army guidance and leadership believes that future warfare will be multi-domain battle. Multi-domain battle is a complex and chaotic environment where decisions are must occur in milliseconds; these decisions may be made without a commander providing immediate oversight. Is it possible to centralize commander's intent and guidance while facilitating operations in multi-domain battle?

An effective approach to mission command must be comprehensive, without being rigid, because military operations as a whole defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. Military operations are complex, human endeavors characterized by the continuous, mutual give and take, moves, and countermoves among all participants. The enemy is not an inanimate object to be acted upon. It has its own objectives. While friendly forces try to impose their will on the enemy, the enemy resists and seeks to impose its will on friendly forces. In addition, operations occur among civilian groups whose actions influence and are influenced by

military operations. The results of these interactions are often unpredictable—and perhaps uncontrollable.¹

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, acknowledges that understanding the principles of mission command can facilitate commanders leading more efficiently. Commanders must understand the ADRP 6-0, and the philosophy of mission command to best frame tactical, operational, and strategic problems. Mission command empowers agile subordinate leaders to conduct successful operations during unified land operations.² Comprehension of both joint and US Army doctrine on leadership allows leaders and subordinates the timely ability to make agile and adaptive responses for operational environment changes.³ Ideally, the balance between command and control is that mission command should not be rigid, but must be comprehensive, enabled by human interactions, and efficient to the lowest level.⁴ Leaders must utilize knowledge in leadership doctrine and experiential application to merge rigid detailed command with efficient mission command.

Issues

For the last nearly two decades of relative superiority during the Global War on Terror, leaders have become complacently reliant on timely and continuous tactical oversight. The future multi-domain battle will be some mix of irregular warfare and large-scale combat operations. President Donald Trump's guidance in the current National Defense Strategy demonstrates the understanding that future wars will likely be a hybrid of irregular warfare and large-scale combat operations. "We must sustain our competence on irregular warfare, which requires planning for a long term, rather than ad hoc, fight against terrorist networks and other irregular threats."⁵ Lieutenant General

Michael D. Lundy, Commanding General of Combined Arms Center addressed the operational challenges of future multi-domain battle.

The operational challenges our Army faces span the range of military operations across all domains, and they needed to be addressed. FM 3-0 is not optimized for any one type of operation or single threat, but rather benchmarked against the most potent adversary capabilities and methods that have proliferated worldwide, and account for what the Army is required to do- from large-scale ground combat to shaping the security environment through regional engagement, and all operations in between.⁶

Due to emergent complex and chaotic operational environments, leaders at the lowest level must apply and understand joint and Army doctrine on command and control and mission command doctrine. Enemy assets will contest the ability to command at all levels. The enemy will use its resources to contest and degrade friendly airborne sensors, armed over watch, continuous aerial cover, and impede communication systems. Clear commander's intent and trust is pivotal in conducting unified land operations. Ground forces geographically separated from operational and strategic leadership require the agility and adaptive character to conduct tactical operations with strategic impacts.

During the initial invasion of Afghanistan, from October 2001 through January 2002, Special Operations Forces (SOF) was the lead component. SOF elements from United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) used mission command successfully. "Mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose."⁷ Due to rigorous training, standards, and expertise SOF was given detailed strategic level guidance from President George W. Bush and General Tommy Franks with a specific military end state.⁸ SOF was provided clear command and control from the joint level while leveraging the principles of mission command at the tactical level. Task Force K-bar and Task Force Dagger were able to accomplish monumental tactical,

operational, and strategic successes using mutual trust, shared understanding, and clear commander's intent.⁹ It is imperative leaders understand mission command philosophy to assist in synthesizing the "art of command with the science of control" to successfully lead during future wars.¹⁰

Research Questions

Primary Question: Did General George Washington and New England militia leaders use mission command principles?

Secondary Question 1: What principles of the mission command from our current doctrine were evident during the Boston Campaign of the American Revolution?

Secondary Question 2: Did the knowledge of British techniques, tactics, and procedures enable New England militia leaders to utilize mission command philosophy?

Definition of Terms

Mission Command: ADRP 6-0 defines mission command as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations."¹¹ Mission command is one of the foundations of unified land operations. This philosophy of command helps commanders capitalize on the human ability to take action to develop the situation and integrate military operations to achieve the commander's intent and desired end state. Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This precept guides leaders toward mission accomplishment.¹² The six principles of mission command are; Build cohesive teams through mutual trust. Create shared understanding. Provide a

clear commander's intent. Exercise disciplined initiative. Use mission orders. Accept prudent risk.¹³

Command and Control: FM 6-0 defines Command and control as “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system.”¹⁴

Irregular Warfare: Joint Publication 1-02 defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s).¹⁵

Unconventional warfare: Joint Publication 3-05.1 defines unconventional warfare as “activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow an occupying power or government by operations through auxiliary, underground, and guerillas in a denied area.”¹⁶

Multi-domain operations: *The Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century* describes multi-domain operations as “how Army forces, as part of the Joint Force and with partners, will operate, fight, and campaign successfully across all domains—space, cyberspace, air, land, maritime—against peer adversaries.”¹⁷

Engagement: Joint Publication 3-0 defines engagement as “a tactical conflict, usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces.”¹⁸ This study is focusing on the engagements and raids during the French and Indian War with George Washington, New England militiamen in vicinity of Lexington and Concord. These specific engagements were part of a large series of battles and operations which had strategic effects.

Battle: Joint Publication 3-0 defines battle as “consisting of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer than engagements, involving larger forces, and have greater potential to affect the course of an operation or campaign.”¹⁹

Operations: Joint Publication 3-0 defines operation as “a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single of several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.”²⁰

Campaign: Joint Publication 5-0 defines campaign as “a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space.”²¹

This study will research how New England Militiamen and Continental Army Soldiers successfully operated against the British Army and Navy during the Boston Campaign. This study will focus on the four Colonial New England militias. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Providence, and Connecticut were established between 1620-1636. Their militias were comprised of military aged males within a geographical location. Initially the colonists served on behalf of a community, town, or province.

The research will focus on the Boston Campaign and several leaders who fought during the French and Indian War. The Boston Campaign was roughly eighteen months of strikes, engagements, and battles in and surrounding the Boston harbor. The Boston Campaign began on April 19, 1775, with the first armed conflict occurring on the Lexington Common.²² The campaign ended on March 17, 1776, with the withdrawal of British forces to Nova Scotia.²³ The examination is focused on tactical engagements,

battles, and operations during the Boston Campaign, specifically on Lexington, Concord, Chelsea Creek, and Bunker Hill. These are first engagements and main battles during the Boston Campaign. This study will research if Soldiers and fighting forces during the French and Indian War, the New England militiamen, General George Washington, and the Continental Army during the Boston Campaign used a rudimentary form of mission command philosophy and principles of mission command.

This examination will strive to verify if there were doctrinal developments from traditional command and control in British leadership who fought during the French and Indian War, and then additionally fought throughout the Boston Campaign. It will specifically look for instances of rudimentary mission command doctrine over usage of command and control by the British forces who fought in both campaigns. The research will analyze if there was usage of mission command doctrine to support centralized operations during the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign.

Limitations

Time available to conduct the study is limited to roughly seven months. The size and depth of the research will only address a few key engagements and battles. The engagements and battles will be from operations during the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign. These engagements and battles will provide insight to, if and what, rudimentary mission command principles were used during a peer v. overmatch combat campaign. The data, research, and analysis will show that a transition of British Army Soldiers fighting for Britain to Continental Army Soldiers fighting for sovereignty. Several leaders served in the British Army and transitioned to the Continental Army. Their experiences and primary accounts will allow insight to the usage of the principles

of mission command during both wars. The battle notes and letters are the primary means of understanding and framing mission command during the Boston Campaign.

Significance of Study

In future wars, whether large-scale combat or special operations low intensity conflict, all operations will be in a multi-domain and contested operational environment. If leaders fail to learn and understand how to best exercise authority and direction while utilizing principles of mission command, then unneeded risks will not be mitigated. In a contested operational environment where state and non-state adversaries can directly affect Army command and control systems, leaders and subordinates must have trained on and understand the emphasis of centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative.²⁴ ADRP 6-0 states that “mission command decentralizes decision making authority and grants subordinates’ significant freedom of action, it demands more of commanders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education.”²⁵ Multi-domain battle in a contested operational environment requires strategic level guidance disseminated to the lowest level; if untrained on how to best employ forces using degraded or nonexistent command and control systems mission failure could be exponentially higher. The research from the Battle of Lexington and Concord, the Battle of Chelsea Creek, and the Battle of Bunker Hill will show what and how command and control and any rudimentary mission command were used. The results could be used to improve military practices and leader effectiveness in framing full spectrum operations. The research will advance scholarship, learning, and facilitate understanding of mission command doctrine during the conduct of unified land operations.

Conclusion

“People are the basis of all military organizations, and military operations occur as human interactions. Commanders use the philosophy of mission command to exploit and enhance uniquely human skills. Commanders implement mission command through the balancing of the art of command with the science of control.”²⁶ Future wars will be conducted in highly contested multi-domain battle. US Army leadership believes that future wars will be multi-domain, large-scale combat operations, and without relative superiority. Joint and US Army, propose that the understanding and application of mission command doctrine is critical to fight and win. Future wars will see degraded sensor, communications, and support capabilities. I will review content on how New England militia forces commanded by General Washington were able to fight and win in the Boston Campaign. I will provide analysis and recommendations on future uses of mission command by examining the utilization of clear commander’s intent, trust, and accepting prudent risk.

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0, *Mission Command: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Army Publishing Directorate, July 2019), 1.

² Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, May 2012), 1-1.

³ Ibid., 1-2.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), I.

⁶ Michael D. Lundy, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations,” *Military Review* (November-December 2017): 16.

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- ⁷ HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 1-2.
- ⁸ Leigh Neville, *Special Forces in the War on Terror (General Military)* (Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2015), 25.
- ⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 1-3, Figure 1-1.
- ¹¹ HQDA, ADP 6-0, 1.
- ¹² HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 1-5.
- ¹³ HQDA, ADP 6-0, 2.
- ¹⁴ Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Field Manual (FM) 6-0, *Command and Control: Command and Control of Army Forces* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, August 2003), 1-1.
- ¹⁵ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 8 November 2010, As Amended Through 15 February 2016), 119.
- ¹⁶ Ibid., 249.
- ¹⁷ U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century*, version 1 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, December 2017), 1.
- ¹⁸ JCS, JP 1-02, 79.
- ¹⁹ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 17 January 2017, Incorporating Change 1, 22 October 2018), I-14.
- ²⁰ JCS, JP 1-02, 145.
- ²¹ Ibid., 27.
- ²² David Hackett Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 52.
- ²³ Victor Brooks, *The Boston Campaign* (Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1999), 230-231.
- ²⁴ HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 1-5.
- ²⁵ Ibid., 2-2.

²⁶ HQDA, ADP 6-0, 5.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Overview

Although the idea of competition is not new, the current and future operating environments require a holistic approach to campaigning that links activities short of armed conflict with the execution of armed conflict. Peer adversaries compete to separate alliances and defeat partners below the threshold of armed conflict and challenge the traditional metrics of deterrence by conducting operations that make unclear the distinctions between peace and war. Friendly military competition activities have two purposes. The first deters and defeats threat efforts to accomplish their objectives short of armed conflict while maintaining or improving conditions favorable to U.S. interests. The second creates favorable conditions by demonstrating the ability to turn denied spaces into contested spaces and to seize the initiative should armed conflict commence.

—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century

Purpose

“The current and future operating environments require a holistic approach to campaigning that links activities short of armed conflict with the execution of armed conflict.”¹ In the *Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century*, the Department of the Army views future environments as a blending of activities across the full spectrum of military operations. US Army leadership requires the creation of favorable conditions by turning denied spaces into contested spaces, this coupled with seizing the initiative is imperative to the mitigation of large scale combat operations.² US Military leadership relies on joint doctrine for command and control, US Army leadership utilizes mission command doctrine. The mission command doctrine supports joint command and control doctrine.

The subsequent chapter will review current US Army mission command doctrine to establish the base line. The primary focus of this research will be identifying uses and instances of any mission command doctrine during the Boston Campaign. First, current mission command doctrine will be reviewed. Second, the focus will change to engagements and battles during the French and Indian War between 1754 and 1763 and the Boston Campaign beginning September 1774 through March 1776. It is important to note that none of the authors were basing their works off a command and control or mission command doctrine lens. The review of their literature will be solely for leaders, pivotal engagements, and battles where current mission command doctrine could be codified.

Current Joint Mission Command Doctrine

Joint Publication 3-0 summarizes mission command as using mission type orders during the conduct of decentralized mission execution. “Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.”³ Both centralized and decentralized operations allow for the use of mission command. All operations require that subordinate leaders demonstrate methodical, competent, and dynamic initiative based on commanders intent. Founded on the unity of command and mission command philosophy, joint forces are organized for all operations.⁴ The operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander.⁵ A key component of the command and control joint function is mission command. The

joint level doctrine places a large reliance on command and control, while the US Army focus is on mission command.

Current Army Mission Command Doctrine

The Army uses three different publications to articulate the significance of mission command. “To comprehend the doctrine contained in this publication, readers must first understand the nature of unified land operations as described in ADP 3-0 and ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*.”⁶ The overall intent of Army mission command is to support joint unified land operations. “The Army’s primary mission is to organize, train, and equip force to conduct prompt and sustained land combat operations.”⁷

The May 2014 edition of Field Manual 6-0, focuses on *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations*, and is the largest of three mission command publications. The next publication on mission command is Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0. Change 2, ADRP 6-0 spans sixty-four pages and was also published in 2014. This publication is an extended dialogue on the overarching doctrinal guidance on command, control, and the mission command warfighting function. The ADRP defines how commanders, supported by their staffs, combine the art of command and the science of control to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and lead forces toward mission accomplishment.⁸

The final Army mission command publication is Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0. Similar to ADRP 6-0 Change 2, ADP 6-0 was refined and published in March 2014. The Change 2 focuses on “the Army’s guidance on command, control, and the mission command warfighting function.”⁹ The Army’s bedrock of command and control is mission command. “Together, the mission command philosophy and warfighting

function guide, integrate, and synchronize Army forces throughout the conduct of unified land operations.”¹⁰ These carefully crafted and doctrinally positioned words are the US Army’s way of stating that commanders, staffs, and subordinates must have knowledge on the doctrine of command and control. Additionally, that it is imperative to blend the doctrinal knowledge of command with the science of control. Leaders who do not know the doctrinal guidance cannot empower the staff to use the warfighting function; leaders who do not understand the situation cannot best lead their forces towards mission accomplishment.

The French and Indian War

Countless authors’ research and writings on the French and Indian War allows for nearly bottomless knowledge and data. Among that multitude of historians, four have written and analyzed with the highest regard in the last 150 years. Armstrong Starkey, John Grenier, Fred Anderson, and John Alden’s knowledge and examination make them highly regarded experts. Their study of the French and Indian War facilitates insight to the possibility of rudimentary mission command techniques. The review of their works is to validate leaders from the British Army that would eventually join the New England militia and Continental Army.

Armstrong Starkey, a History Professor at Adelphi University in New York, has extensively written on the French and Indian War. He has published books on European and Native American Warfare and History. His works focus on the military history and evolution of European warfare methods from the British perspective. One of his largest and preeminent arguments is that Europeans were more successful when they allied with Indians, and used an asymmetric way of war. “European success most often occurred

when they adapted themselves to the Indian war of war.”¹¹ Starkey additionally expounds;

American nationalist historians have long argued that European techniques were not applications to American conditions and they have linked the colonial adoption of Indian tactics with the American victory in the War of Independence. This view does not withstand close examination. First, it is clear that the Americans won their independence with a regular army organized on European principles and employing European tactics. Frontier warfare contributed only marginally to the outcome of the American Revolution. Secondly, Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were no strangers to irregular warfare.¹²

Two more facts that Starkey points out are that, “if we accept the fact the Europeans had experience in irregular warfare, the question remains of the validity of that experience”, and that “most of the burden of frontier war was born by colonial militias and volunteers rather than by professionals”.¹³ Starkey’s points bring to light that while Europeans had knowledge of irregular warfare, the breadth and depth of the British experiential validity may have not transposed well to the French and Indian War or Boston Campaign.

John Grenier, a retired US Air Force Lieutenant Colonel and previous Associate Professor of History at US Air Force Academy, has published two books on irregular and unconventional warfare tactics. He is a Distinguished Book Awardee for *The First Way of War* from the Society for Military History in 2006. His research and thoughts provide insight on the clear delineation on the European way of war and the vastly different war on the frontier.

He outlines where misunderstanding the enemy center of gravity enabled proxy and indigenous forces to achieve temporary relative superiority. Providing numerous instances of French and British commanders utilizing Indian and indigenous forces outlines the possibility of the first principle of mission command. Additionally, Grenier

points out that the state actors would have to not only accept but also adopt this principle. French and British commanders, and ultimately American militia commanders would adjust to non-traditional tactics.

Grenier also examines Rogers Rangers during the French and Indian War. Rogers Rangers were a provincial company of colonists from New Hampshire. From 1755, they were attached to the British Army and served as a proxy and supporting raid force during the French and Indian War.¹⁴ Rogers Rangers and ranger companies were filled with colonists competent on the backwoods and Indian approaches of combat. Rogers Rangers were not formally trained on the traditional rank and file, centralized, command and control European way of fighting. Grenier places emphasis on several Rogers Rangers commanders; Lieutenant Colonels Robert Rogers, James Rogers, William Stark, Israel Putnam, as well as John Stark. These commanders would continue to lead and fight during the Boston Campaign. These leaders would use first-hand experience and knowledge with continued service to the British Army, militia, or Continental Army.

Grenier in *The Historical Account of Expedition against Ohio Indians* clarifies that achieving a higher body count and winning by post operational metrics did not translate to winning. “Victories are not decisive, but defeats are ruinous.”¹⁵ His sentiment is however, that losing was catastrophic and caused various unfavorable second and third order effects. He also highlights that British and French leaders transitioned to embrace and adapt to the non-traditional and siege style tactical skirmishes that created operational reactions. The lessons learned during the French and Indian War were two-fold. Grenier points out that first, the European way of frontal and traditional war would not work in all operational environments. The second lesson learned was that the rudimentary use of

mission command principles and decentralized operations would be paramount in limited war.

Fred Anderson is an accomplished author and collaborator of several books on George Washington, the French and Indian War, and the War in America 1755-1766. His three most notable publications are on the war on the North American continent throughout 1755 to 1766. *Crucible of War: The Seven Year's War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754-1766*, is a narrative of the Seven Years' War. *The War that Made America: A Short History of the French and Indian War* is about the demolition of French power in North America via the British Army and Indian forces which set conditions for the American Revolutionary War. Both novels make available numerous accounts of George Washington's leadership during the war.

Anderson highlights the decentralized, non-traditional operations that George Washington enabled as a twenty-one-year-old British Major.¹⁶ On May 28, 1754, Washington was the commander during the Battle of Jumonville Glen alongside of Mingo sachem Tanaghrisson.¹⁷ Washington gleaned many lessons learned during the French and Indian War, which served him well later during the Boston Campaign and the American Revolutionary War. Anderson lastly states the war was a "triple effect agreement where France lost terrain in Canada, Great Britain retrained the North American gains and portions of Nova Scotia, and Spain regained Cuba."¹⁸ Anderson suggests that the nearly doubling of Britain's national debt because of the Seven Years' War forced new taxations on its colonies. The underlying issue was a growing resistance in the colonies and the enforcement of taxation by troops via Crown's authority, which led to start of the America Revolution.¹⁹

John R Alden, a history professor who taught at numerous universities, including Duke until 1976, wrote extensively on George Washington. Throughout Alden's work the character and leadership of Washington is exposed with a focus on his style of military leadership. Alden further indicates the level of Washington's agility and adaptability as a leader was superior. A key example is as a Lieutenant Colonel in 1755; Washington recommended that General Braddock split his forces into main and lightly equipped columns. The "flying column" tactic would enable non-traditional operations against the French.²⁰ Alden contends that Washington demonstrated lessons learned from the Battle of Jumonville Glen and how to implement emergent practices. Alden furthermore postulates that Washington was purposeful in leading, but to a point of hubris for personal gains. Washington's leadership and operational experiences during the French and Indian War would provide him some notoriety and infamy which facilitated his appointment to Commander-in-Chief.

The Boston Campaign (September 1774-March 1776)

Donald Barr Chidsey wrote more than 50 books with a focus on military history. He was writer and historian from Connecticut, and he eventually became a Democratic candidate for Connecticut House of Representatives. His book, *The Siege of Boston* details events leading up to the American Revolutionary War and throughout the Boston Campaign. The focus of the novel is first-hand account of leaders from letters and documents that focus on the tactical level. In this work, Chidsey examines the post French and Indian War into the American Revolutionary and ends with the evacuation of British to Nova Scotia. The author begins with the first-hand account of militiaman Captain John Parker in April 1775, on the Lexington common. Chidsey covers the new,

blended, American way of fighting war, and demonstrates the principles seen throughout the New England militiamen's first year of fighting. He concludes the narrative accounts with the evacuation of British force to Nova Scotia on March 17, 1776.

In 1849, Richard Frothingham Jr., a member of Massachusetts state legislature, Democratic delegate, managing editor at Boston Post, and mayor of Charleston wrote *History of the Siege of Boston, and the Battles of Lexington, Concord and Bunker Hill*. The work includes large collections of narratives, manuscripts, and first-hand accounts from on ground leadership with post skirmish, engagements, and battle assessments of losses. Frothingham also covers colonial politics, through Lexington and Concord, and ending with the establishment of the Bunker Hill monument. The author also examines letters and documents from the British, New England militiamen, and Continental Army leaders. These letters and documents study skirmishes, engagements, and battle orders from tactical through strategic levels. Frothingham also highlights the chaos of battle, and the criticality of leadership through official accounts with letters from militiamen, as well as General Gage communicating to Parliament. Frothingham provides detailed accounts of the British leaders and militia leadership, which lends itself well to perceiving elements of mission command and mission command principles.

Chidsey and Frothingham comprehensively revealed possible instances and uses of rudimentary mission command. Throughout the initial battle on Lexington commons, British retreat through Concord, and the conditions set which supported the Battle of Bunker Hill during the Siege of Boston examples of rudimentary mission command may be validated. Chidsey and Frothingham's books combine for nearly 500 pages of first-hand accounts, memoirs, and orders during both the pre-siege and Siege of Boston.

Richard M. Ketchum is an accomplished author and graduate from Yale University. He is the author of three Revolutionary War books, *Decisive Day: The Battle for Bunker Hill, Saratoga*, and *The Winter Soldiers*. For two decades he was the director of book publishing at American Heritage Publishing Company. Ketchum writes about the evolution of militiamen into the Continental Army led by General George Washington. The author places emphasis on Colonel John Stark. The prominence of Colonel Stark was as the commander of 300 men who conducted a low visibility infiltration and strategic operation to deprive the British forces of required resources and equipment staging locations.²¹ Ketchum's work provided tactical insight to the operations, leaders, and actions during the Battle of Chelsea Creek and the Battle Bunker Hill.

In 2002, Norman McCarthy authored an article for *America's Greatest Battles*. The topic of the article was the Battle of Bunker Hill in June 1775. The work is a short narrative that includes collections of narratives, and first-hand accounts from on the ground leaders. McCarthy explains the tactical fallacies by the British and Continental Army, including emplacing a defense on the wrong hill. "Bunker Hill, the first major battle of the Revolution, produced many heroes, but it also revealed incompetence and confusion in both armies. The Americans defended the wrong hill. The British attacked the wrong hill. The battle called Bunker Hill was, in fact, fought on nearby Breed's Hill."²² McCarthy vies it was astounding that militiamen could hold the hill as long as they did against experienced, disciplined regular British troops.²³ McCarthy does specifically note several instances of traditional command and control during the linear fighting portion of the battle. "As excitable militiamen began to return the distant fire, Colonel Robinson ran along the top of the parapet, kicking any muskets that were being

aimed. The unrelenting Redcoats moved forward. When they were within 40 yards, Prescott gave the order to fire.”²⁴ British leaders had learned a hard-strategic lesson while the militia and Continental Army began to learn adapt and possibly use an early version of mission command philosophy.

US Joint Publications and US Army doctrine display the clearly defined command and control, mission command philosophy and principles of mission command. Armstrong Starkey, John Grenier, Fred Anderson, John Alden, Donald Chidsey, Richard Frothingham, Richard Ketchum, and Norman McCarthy provide data and research on the regular and irregular warfare during the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign. Their collection of works provides broad and deep analysis, which facilitates further examination. Using the current doctrine as a baseline, then applying the above battle research will yield three case studies. The analysis of these case studies may show rudimentary mission command used during the Boston Campaign from leaders with experience fighting during the French and Indian War. The examination will provide further study to the criticality of mission command doctrine during multi-domain battle and winning future wars.

¹ TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*, 3.

² Ibid.

³ JCS, JP 3-0, II-2.

⁴ Ibid., XV.

⁵ Ibid., XV.

⁶ HQDA, FM 6-0, VI.

⁷ HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 1-4.

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- ⁸ Ibid., III.
- ⁹ HQDA, ADP 6-0, II.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., IV, Figure 1.
- ¹¹ Armstrong Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 39.
- ¹² Ibid.
- ¹³ Ibid.
- ¹⁴ Brian D. Carroll, “‘Savages’ in the Service of Empire: Native American Soldiers in Gorham’s Rangers,” *New England Quarterly* 85, no. 3 (September 2012): 383-429.
- ¹⁵ William Smith, *An Historical Account of the Expedition Against the Ohio Indians in the Year MDCCLXIV* (Philadelphia, 1765), ix.
- ¹⁶ Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 42-43.
- ¹⁷ Ibid., 51-59.
- ¹⁸ Ibid., 505-506.
- ¹⁹ Fred Anderson, “The Real First World War and the Making of America,” *American Heritage* 56, no. 6 (November/December 2005): 1-3.
- ²⁰ John R. Alden, *George Washington, a Biography* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996), 37.
- ²¹ Richard M. Ketchum, *Decisive Day: The Battle of Bunker Hill* (New York: Owl Books, 1999), 69; James L. Nelson, *George Washington’s Secret Navy: How the American Revolution Went to Sea* (New York: McGraw-Hill Professional, 2008), 18.
- ²² Ibid., 7.
- ²³ Ibid., 13.
- ²⁴ Ibid., 12.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Overview

Joint forces face a rapidly evolving operating environment in which highly adaptive and innovative adversaries have altered the battlespace and created resilient systems to support their strategies. The environment continues to change in four fundamental and interrelated ways: adversaries challenge U.S. forces in all domains, the battlespace is becoming more lethal, operational complexity is increasing globally, and deterring aggressive acts is becoming more challenging. Both adapting to and driving change in the operating environment, adversaries continue to alter the battlespace in terms of time, geography, and domains and by blurring the distinctions between peace and war.

—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century

Purpose

The purpose of this thesis is to examine how to best cope with how “operational complexity is increasing globally, and deterring aggressive acts is becoming more challenging.”¹ Militia leaders adapted to a growingly complex situation of limited resources and equipment. Militia leaders and the Continental Army were able to bring lethal and nonlethal effects to bear in the multi-domain campaign in Boston harbor. A deeper examination will reveal if any rudimentary principles of mission command were used during the Boston Campaign.

The principles of mission command establish the overarching framework for qualitative research. The Joint Publication, Field Manual, Army Doctrine Reference Publication, and Army Doctrine Publication provide the current doctrine of mission command philosophy, principles, and as a warfighting function. George Washington’s experiences during the French and Indian War; the Battle of Lexington and Concord, the

Battle of Chelsea Creek, and the Battle of Bunker Hill will provide case studies of tactical operations.

Analysis of the four case studies will be via an explanation of the operation, key leaders, rudimentary mission command analysis, then conclusion of findings. The detailed research will highlight any rudimentary mission command during the French and Indian War and Boston Campaign. First, will be George Washington conducting both regular and irregular warfare during French and Indian War. Second, will be the Battle of Lexington and Concord with the use of irregular warfare between the British forces and New England militiamen in non-traditional and decentralized operations. Third, will be the research and analysis from irregular warfare during the Battle of Chelsea Creek. Lastly, will be the non-traditional and traditional centralized warfare of the Continental Army and the British Army and Navy during the Battle of Bunker Hill

Data

The collection of data will be from current Joint publications and Army doctrine, primary and secondary sources authors with extensive knowledge and research on the period. Armstrong Starkey, John Grenier, Fred Anderson, John Alden, Donald Chidsey, Richard Frothingham, Richard Ketchum, and Norman McCarthy work serves as a collection of raw data points. These authors and their in-depth research of the George Washington during French and Indian War, Battle of Lexington and Concord, Battle of Chelsea Creek, and the Battle of Bunker Hill provide critical data. Other primary and secondary sources provide additional letters, data, and research into the engagements and battles. The focus of the primary sources is from George Washington and the British leadership who fought in both the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign.

Primary and secondary sources from leadership on ground during the battles relevant research to the possible mission command philosophy and principles of mission command insights. The reports, letters, and verbal orders provided will clearly demonstrate elements of current mission command doctrine in application during regular and irregular, centralized and decentralized warfare. The secondary sources, provide first-hand accounts and sources from the battles. Remaining sources will be those found during primary and secondary source verification and additional researching.

Analysis

Analysis will show how the New England militiamen and the Continental Army fought and won. The data will be analyzed based on French and Indian War tactics, techniques, and procedures, which evolved during American Revolutionary War. The case study will analyze the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign to glean what mission command doctrine existed as defined in current joint and Army mission command publications. The methodology will be mixed; content analysis and case studies will provide the insight into the research. The analysis will focus primarily to answer the research questions from a relevant lens, while elaborating on and explaining differences between tactics, techniques, and procedures and doctrine specific to mission command. Analysis will show if George Washington, New England militiamen, and Continental Army used current mission command principles to fight and win.

Conclusion

The data and analysis of French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign will offer research into what and if any mission command doctrine was employed. Future

wars will not only be in a highly contested multi-domain but an asymmetrical operational environment. That operational environment will require the timely acceptance of prudent risk based on subordinate trust. Critical to winning in a multi-domain asymmetrical operational environment is correctly applying military force across the full spectrum of operations. “Operations in the Close Area are designed to create windows of advantage for maneuver to defeat enemy forces, disrupt enemy capabilities, physically control spaces, and protect and influence populations.”² These windows of advantage can only be maximized with the use of mission command doctrine.

The US Army will be engaged in a myriad or combination of large-scale combat operations, hybrid, and special operations low intensity conflicts. Multi-domain battle will force leadership to fully embrace the principles of mission command to set conditions for tactical, operational, and strategic victory. Degraded sensors capabilities, jammed lines of communications, and hindered support capabilities will impede immediate guidance and input from strategic and operational leadership. Data and analysis of New England militia forces and General Washington will show the how mission command doctrine was used to wins wars before it became doctrine. This analysis will offer insight to uses of the principles of mission command and a clear lens on how George Washington and New England militiamen evicted a superior force in 1776.

¹ TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*, 4.

² *Ibid.*, 10.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Overview

Six variables will challenge the Joint Force and its partners' ability to anticipate and adapt to change. First, accelerating information and technology developments are increasing the pace of change and allowing adversaries to leverage superior capabilities that could have a unexpected effects on future friendly force operations. Second, adversaries will increase complexity by combining regular and irregular forces with criminal and terrorist enterprises to attack the Joint Force's vulnerabilities while avoiding its strengths... Third, densely populated areas with constricting topography and poor infrastructure will make friendly vehicular and aerial movement more observable and easily disrupted for forces operating from or into these places... Fourth, globally networked and information-enabled populations will react to viral versions of events and ideas moving at the speed of the internet, complicating the ability to gain and maintain an accurate, up-to-date, intelligence-driven understanding of the situation, as well as control of the information environment. Fifth, adversaries, including super-empowered individuals and small groups, use access to cyberspace, space... Finally, the well-established need for U.S. forces to operate with joint, interorganizational, and multinational partners also presents challenges in this increasingly complex environment.

—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century

Purpose

The Army believes that future wars will be more expeditious, combined-arms maneuver, and require dispersed tactical operations to exploit advantages. Regardless of initial posture, forward based or expeditionary forces, Army cross-domain capable tactical formations will be capable of combined-arms maneuver. Multi-Domain Battle demands formations able to conduct semi-independent, dispersed, mutually supporting, combined-arms operations with capabilities deployed to or accessible at the lowest practical tactical echelon to generate and exploit some advantage over the adversary.¹

The command and control systems and mission command systems during multi-domain

battle will be not only contested, but likely degraded or inoperable. At the lowest tactical levels leaders must invest time, resources, and training into how to operate and conduct unified land operations absent of those command systems.

The understanding and application of doctrine facilitates operations. The philosophy of mission command with the art of tactical, operational, and strategic employment facilitates unified land operations. Unified land operations have become a battle defined by decisions made in milliseconds through multiple domains. “Windows of advantage are a requirement for maneuver in the increasingly lethal and complex operating environment where the enemy’s systems are organized to place friendly forces in multiple forms of lethal and nonlethal contact at extended ranges over prolonged periods of time.”² Mission command is the principal way the leaders empower subordinates to make timely, accurate, and competent decisions. When implemented correctly, the principles of mission command ensure teams built on mutual trust, working from a shared understanding, are provided with a clear intent, and can exercise disciplined initiative through mission orders while accepting prudent risk. “To mitigate these complexities and seize opportunities, resilient formations must operate under the mission command philosophy because of the uncertain durations and physical extents or intensities of many virtual, cognitive, and even physical effects.”³ That implementation of the mission command doctrine ensures that conditions are set for winning the nation’s future wars.

Organization

First, the introduction will be narrative and analysis of relevant battles and leadership from the French and Indian War. Second, the Boston Campaign will be analyzed through the Battle of Lexington and Concord, then the Battle of Chelsea Creek,

and lastly the Battle of Bunker Hill culminating with the emplacement of fortified cannons on Dorchester Heights. Analysis of the four case studies will be organized through an explanation of the operation, key leaders, rudimentary mission command analysis, then conclusion of findings. The current six principles of mission command will provide the baseline to verify practice during the Boston Campaign. A summary of all analysis will structure the findings and conclusions to support future recommendations.

French and Indian War

The French and Indian War was a nine-year war between Britain and France between 1754 and 1763. This war was a vastly different war from the traditional conflict in Europe and was geographically separated which constrained resources. It was fought with large amount of indigenous forces conducting irregular warfare on the North American continent. The traditional European style of fighting was rank and file, centralized, and used detailed command and control. Europeans did have knowledge on irregular warfare; however, it was experiential adaptation more than established professional military practice.

American nationalist historians have long argued that European techniques were not applications to American conditions and they have linked the colonial adoption of Indian tactics with the American victory in the War of Independence. This view does not withstand close examination. First, it is clear that the Americans won their independence with a regular army organized on European principles and employing European tactics. Frontier warfare contributed only marginally to the outcome of the American Revolution. Secondly, Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were no strangers to irregular warfare.⁴

British America and New France colonists shared sides of the St. Lawrence River and several Indian tribes as common terrain. The type of warfare was different from the traditional centralized traditional war between nation states. British America and New

France had either no or very small military contingents to maintain geographical locations and boundaries, trades, and enforce any imposed laws from their respective nation.

During the French and Indian War, George Washington was a company and field grade British officer.⁵ He led decentralized and centralized, non-traditional and traditional combat operations. Tasked with terrain denial and mitigation of French expansion in the Ohio Valley, Washington often used indigenous forces to conduct irregular warfare. Washington with Mingo sachem Tanaghrisson combined forces on May 28, 1754, in the Battle of Jumonville Glen.⁶ The Battle of Jumonville Glen was a decentralized from British command but centralized for Washington and was a non-traditional battle. The Battle of Jumonville Glen was the opening armed engagement of the French and Indian War. The Battle of Jumonville Glen was a fifteen-minute battle that had large-scale international ramifications.⁷ “Alerted by a noise, one of the Frenchmen fired a gun upon which Col. Washington gave the word for all his men to fire. Several of them being killed, the rest betook themselves to flight, but our Indians having gone round the French ... they fled back to the English and delivered up their Arms ...”⁸ Combining forces with Mingo sachem Tanaghrisson demonstrates an example of undeveloped building a team through mutual trust and necessity.

Mutual trust is shared confidence among commanders, subordinates, and partners. Effective commanders build cohesive teams in an environment of mutual trust. There are few shortcuts to gaining the trust of others. Developing trust takes time, and it must be earned. It is the result of upholding the Army values and exercising leadership, consistent with the Army leadership principles.⁹

George Washington had proven himself to be an adaptive leader. While a Lieutenant Colonel in 1755, George Washington recommended that General Braddock

split his forces into main and lightly equipped columns. The “flying column” tactic would enable non-traditional operations against the French.¹⁰ Washington was combat tested and proven throughout the French and Indian war, enabling key victories and suffering defeats. “Under Washington’s command, the 300-strong Virginia Regiment had defended 300 miles (480 km) of frontier against twenty Indian attacks in ten months.”¹¹

Washington had a keen ability to holistically assess the operational environment, frame the problem, and provide clear commander’s intent. George Washington was given and gave his men a clear commander’s intent, but not a clear method of execution.

Understanding the clear commander’s intent allowed George Washington to lead the “what” of the operation without directing the “how”. George Washington was given and gave mission orders while he exercised disciplined initiative by attacking at a point of relative superiority.

George Washington received military experience on command and control, however was forced to adapt during the French and Indian War. The empirical knowledge of how to lead, with the experiential knowledge of leading allowed Washington to use rudimentary principles of mission command. The comprehension that command and control and mission command are separate and distinct, but not mutually exclusive is critical. Washington was able to leverage the combination of command and control with the adaptation of mission command, and this understanding would serve him well during the Boston Campaign.

The Boston Campaign (April 1775-March 1776)

The Boston Campaign lasted eighteen months. I will break this campaign down into two phases; pre-siege, and the siege of Boston. The pre-siege of Boston encompasses

September 1, 1774, beginning with actions leading up to a surprise raid and removal of gunpowder and concludes on April 19, 1775, with the Battles of Lexington and Concord forcing the British retreat to Boston. The Siege of Boston began with the British forces retreating via North Bridge into Boston while surrounding communities blocked land access routes. The Continental Army officially assumed overall control of the militiamen outside of Boston on May 26, 1775.¹² The Siege of Boston is comprised of two battles, the Battle of Chelsea Creek and the Battle of Bunker Hill, and numerous small skirmishes resulting in limited casualties.¹³ The case studies include the Battle of Lexington and Concord, then the Battle of Chelsea Creek, and lastly the Battle of Bunker Hill leading into the emplacement of fortified cannons on Dorchester Heights. The Siege of Boston and the Boston campaign ended with the conditional withdrawal of British forces to Nova Scotia, and a strategic victory for the Continental Army.

The Battle of Lexington and Concord (April 1775)

The American Revolutionary War began in Lexington, a small Middlesex County town in central Massachusetts. After several product taxations, forcibly imposed laws, and instances of heavy-handed altercations, the colonials began actively resisting the British rule. After the Boston Tea Party in 1773, colonials began to form pockets of internal governance purposed to undermine the overbearing British rule. On February 9, 1775, the British government declared a state of rebellion, characterized by active resistance and armed conflict.¹⁴ General Gage ordered raids on powder magazine depots near Boston to begin resupplying the British Army while degrading the colonists' capabilities to resist.¹⁵ This caused an immediate and timely reaction from colonists, who

began moving supplies away from forts and powder magazine depots and into the countryside.¹⁶

Due to this overreach by General Gage, the colonials pushed back against the British Parliament through the Provincial Congress and Continental Congress.¹⁷ The Provincial Congress appointed five general officers to be in charge of the militias and “effectually opposed and resist” the British.¹⁸ The appointment of provincial representatives, a standing militia, and order to resist came to fruition when General Gage ordered a raid in central Massachusetts. The first direct armed engagement between the Britain regulars and Massachusetts militiamen occurred on April 19, 1775, in Lexington, Massachusetts. “That day will forever be known as the day that American militiamen stood against the British rule and won their first strategic level victory towards American independence.”¹⁹

Lexington was a farmland village, one of the oldest Massachusetts settlements, fourteen miles from the sea, with a population of roughly 100-120 able-bodied militiamen.²⁰ Concord is roughly six miles away from Lexington with two critical bridges along the primary avenues of approach. General Gage had provided Lieutenant Colonel Smith with guidance to search for and confiscate militia powder and military supplies in Lexington and Concord. The British soldiers began burning cannon supplies and household goods, which further aggravated the militiamen who began advancing on the British forces. Militia support from Acton, Concord, Bedford, and Lincoln advanced and then the Battle of Concord and engagement on North Bridge ensued.

There were a few key leaders for the militia and the British forces during the Battle of Lexington and Concord. At the company level, Captain John Parker, Major John

Buttrick, and Major John Pitcairn had a major impact on the outcome of the battle. Captain Parker, a veteran of Rogers Rangers during the French and Indian war, was in command of the roughly 45-man militiamen contingent.²¹ Major Buttrick was one of the commanders of the Concord militiamen. Major John Pitcairn was sent with six companies of light infantry to the Lexington common to “seize everyone they encountered.”²² At the more senior field grade level were Colonel James Barrett and Lieutenant Colonel Francis Smith. Colonel Barrett led his roughly 250 militiamen to a hill near North Bridge to provide tactical observation of British soldiers.²³ Lieutenant Colonel Smith led roughly 700 British soldiers into the center of Concord via North Bridge. These leaders and their men would fight from North Bridge in Concord through neighboring towns and tactically withdraw to Boston.

The first possible rudimentary use of mission command was from a Massachusetts militia commander; “Commander’s intent and mission orders provided through Captain Parker and Sergeant William Monroe authorized militiamen to make a regular and forcible resistance to any open hostility by the British troops.”²⁴ Sharing a common vision to repulse the British Soldiers and the British rule provided a clear commander’s intent. Going into the common both commanders provided their men the same or very similar orders to not engage unless they were engaged. Major John Buttrick during the Battle of Concord is recognized for yelling “Fire, fellow soldiers, for God’s sake fire”²⁵. The “shot heard round the world” happened and the Battle of Lexington and Concord would begin the American Revolution.²⁶ As the battle progressed and movement to Boston continued rudimentary principles of mission command emerged.

Due to lack in capabilities and numbers militia had to exercise disciplined initiative by avoiding decisive engagements on traditional frontal attack. The British leadership prior to armed conflict still relied heavily on a perceived overmatch and regimented command and control. “Lay down your arms, you damn’ rebels!”²⁷ Verbal mission orders from the British commanders to subordinates provided militiamen a chance to retreat or withdraw. This detailed and authoritarian order was directive to the militia and concurrently given for the British forces to not fire. This accepting of unwitting prudent risk that militia would not engage the British forces would not favor the British Soldiers.

The retreat from North Bridge to Boston would see many casualties due to the British retreat formation and militia non-traditional ambushes.²⁸ Captain Parker was able to exercise disciplined initiative between Lincoln and Lexington with persistent long-range fire and continuous non-traditional attack.²⁹ The inability to adjust from detailed command and control for the ability to engage militia forces at the pivotal moments forced the British to fire needlessly, inaccurately, and constantly send out flanking parties. One British officer stated, “There were very few men had any ammunition left, and so fatigued that we could not keep flanking parties out, so that we must soon have laid down our arms, or been picked off by the Rebels at their pleasure—nearer to—and we were not able to keep them off.”³⁰

The ability to conduct decentralized operations by having knowledge of non-traditional fighting tactics, and leaders with previous experience set the conditions for militia forces to utilize some rudimentary principles of mission command successfully. “General Gage directed several officers to station themselves on the roads leading out of

Boston, and prevent any intelligence of his intended expedition, that night, from reaching the country.”³¹ British forces started the Battle of Lexington and Concord with 700 soldiers, retreated to Boston with 1,500, and took 300 casualties. Militia forces started the Battle of Lexington and Concord with 477 militiamen, grew to 3,960 while forcing the retreat of British forces, and took 93 casualties.³² What began as a planned covert operation ended in a strategic American victory and began the Siege of Boston.

The Battle of Chelsea Creek (May 1775)

The Siege of Boston began with the British forces retreating via North Bridge into Boston while surrounding communities blocked land access routes. The Battle of Chelsea Creek was the first and critical victory during the Siege of Boston was the Battle of Chelsea Creek. The first battle during the Siege of Boston was the Battle of Chelsea Creek, it was fought on salt marshes and focused on removing resources from the British forces. British forces had been procuring hay, livestock, and resources from begrudging colonist in Boston Harbor.³³ Under the guidance from General Gage, British forces had begun massing hay, livestock, and increasing amounts of naval supplies on Noodle’s Island.³⁴ The first American victory during the Siege of Boston would be on May 28, 1775, and it further besieged both British soldiers in Boston and Royal Marines in the harbor of Boston.³⁵

The respective strategic key leaders and Commander-in chief’s during the Siege of Boston and overall Boston Campaign both served in the French and Indian War as British officers. George Washington was appointed and became the Commander-in-Chief of the Continental Army on June 15, 1775. On June 21, 1775, he set out from Philadelphia to join the Continental Army outside of Boston, where he arrived in

Cambridge July 2, 1775.³⁶ In January 1776, General Howe, the British Commander-in-Chief was promoted to full General.³⁷ There was a measure of mutual respect between General Washington, General Gage and General Howe.

The Battle of Chelsea Creek had one key operational leader, General Artemas Ward, and one key tactical leader, Major General John Stark. General Ward created an operational plan to further besiege the British forces. General Ward served as a major through colonel in the 3rd Regiment.³⁸ Prior to the Battle of Lexington and Concord, General Ward was appointed general and would serve as the commander-in-chief of the siege forces in Boston Harbor.³⁹ Major General John Stark, was a colonel during Battle of Chelsea Creek and the key tactical leader. Colonel Stark, the commander of 1st New Hampshire Regiment and his 300 men, acting on good intelligence that the supplies were unguarded conducted a low visibility movement, which was unnoticed by British forces.⁴⁰ Colonel Stark accepted prudent risk by conducting the infiltration during hours of limited visibility and was not noticed until the British schooner *Diana* noticed the smoke of burning hay.⁴¹ Colonel Stark exercised disciplined initiative when the battle became kinetic by continuing to drive the livestock inland while directly engaged with the Royal Marines.⁴² Due to the success and continued driving of livestock by Colonel Stark and his men the *Diana* would venture to far inland and require additional barges.⁴³ After the eventual abandonment of the vessel American forces were able to recover guns, these guns were likely used during the Battle of Bunker Hill.⁴⁴ The Battle of Chelsea Creek validates the application of a shared understanding and clear commander's intent. Colonel Starks' leadership displays a continued exercising of disciplined initiative and accepting prudent risk to decisively complete the mission. The outcomes from the Battle

of Chelsea Creek would embolden the American colonists and reinforce the Siege of Boston.

The Battle of Bunker Hill (June 1775)

In late May to early June 1775, British and militia forces from Connecticut, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts began to conduct small skirmishes, raids, and limited scale engagements focused on setting the conditions for controlling Boston Harbor. The first major battle of the American Revolution, produced many heroes, but it also revealed incompetence and confusion in both armies. The Americans defended the wrong hill. The British attacked the wrong hill. The battle called Bunker Hill was, in fact, fought on Breed's Hill.⁴⁵ The Battle of Bunker Hill was fought in June 1775 in Charlestown, Massachusetts and was responsible for more the ninety-three percent of all casualties during the Siege of Boston.⁴⁶

British forces were looking to fortify and control terrain of tactical advantage along the two necks of the Boston peninsula. Colonials had begun to siege the city of Boston by cutting off supply routes leading into North and South Boston via Bunker Hill and Breeds Hill. The British strength was 3,000 soldiers, while militiamen totaled ~2,500 while fortifying Bunker and Breeds Hill.⁴⁷ The results of the battle were both tactical and strategic. Tactically, the British won after several successfully repulsed attacks; the British eventually overwhelmed and captured Bunker Hill.⁴⁸ Strategically, the British sustained heavy casualties, losing over 1,000 soldiers including nearly 100 officers. The militiamen lost 450 men and demonstrated an unweathering resolve.⁴⁹

Several officers who served in Rogers Rangers were tactical leaders during the Battle of Bunker Hill. Major General John Stark, a lieutenant in Rogers Rangers, was a

colonel during Battle of Bunker Hill; Major General Israel Putnam, a major in Rogers Rangers, was a major general during Battle of Bunker Hill. The Colonial forces relied on the experience and ability of their leaders who had learned the art of soldiering in the French and Indian War.⁵⁰ Additionally, the Colonial forces had several officers who served during previous key battles. Colonel William Prescott was the Pepperell militia commander during the British retreat and famously stated, “Don’t fire till you see the whites of their eyes!”.⁵¹ Colonel John Robinson was a lieutenant colonel in Battle of Concord and a colonel in Battle Bunker Hill.⁵² This cast of essential leadership would enable the repulsing of several frontal attacks and inflict strategic amounts of leadership casualties to the British Army.

The two most critical leaders for the British were General Thomas Gage and General William Howe. Both were the Commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America. General Howe would replace General Gage after the Battle of Bunker Hill as the Commander-in-chief. During the Battle of Bunker Hill, General Gage deligated command to then Major General Howe. General Gage was very frustrated and in a letter to the British Parliament wrote, “this province is supported and abetted by others beyond the conception of most people, and foreseen by none.”⁵³

The Battle of Bunker Hill verified the requirement for directive, and detailed command and control during traditional centralized operations. Colonel Robinson and Colonel Stark would be instrumental at ensuring the Continental Army did not place themselves into a position of inferior tactical advantage. Numerous instances throughout the three British assaults show directive command and control with minimal mission command.

“As excitable militiamen began to return the distant fire, Colonel Robinson ran along the top of the parapet, kicking any muskets that were being aimed. The unrelenting Redcoats moved forward. When they were within 40 yards, Prescott gave the order to fire.”⁵⁴ Colonel Prescott ordered the timely volleys of fire to ensure minimal waste of ammunition and maximum casualty production. Another example of specific and directive command and control is from Colonel Stark defending the American left flank against General Howe’s light infantry companies and grenadiers.⁵⁵ “The colonials waited until the leading line was within 30 yards, then unleashed a sheet of musket balls into the ranks of Redcoats. The first volley opened some gaps in the British ranks. The second tore gaping holes that could not be filled. The third turned the American rebels into heroes.”⁵⁶ When the Redcoats passed the stake that Colonel Stark had placed in the sand, he gave order to fire. The first volley rang out as one shot. Entire ranks of light infantry fell.⁵⁷ The effectiveness of Colonist fighting lead by detailed command and control in a traditional fight produced minimal casualties during the fighting. The efficiency of the fighting and disciplined retreat allowed most of the wounded to be saved.⁵⁸ There was minimal, if any, usage of rudimentary principles of mission command during the armed combat of the Battle of Bunker Hill. General Washington learned about the Battle of Bunker Hill after he arrived in New York City.⁵⁹ The battle resulted in British forces loss of nearly 100 Officers and 973 soldiers as casualties due to the British frontal assaults.⁶⁰ The losses in excess of 1,000 officers and soldiers out of roughly 6,000 British forces created an obligatory political reaction. General Gage was recalled for England on October 11, 1775, and dismissed of his duties as Commander-in-Chief of British forces in North America.⁶¹

The Battle at Bunker Hill changed British way of centralized and frontal rank and file attacks. No longer were the leaders able to influence the battle simply by simply using overwhelming force during decisive engagements. The non-traditional nature and frontal attack from British forces was not conducive for mission command. Both the British and Continental Army used command and control from to regulate the tempo and engagements within the battle. Militia leaders and Continental Army forces were able to mass their relative combat power and experiential knowledge of warfare to affect the critical vulnerabilities of British forces.

By the end of January 1776, Colonel Henry Knox moved 60 tons worth of heavy artillery to Lechmere's Point, Cobble Hill, and finally on Dorchester Heights to support operations on March 4, 1776.⁶² General Howe made the strategic decision to retreat from Boston and the harbor of Boston after being unable to conduct a counterattack.⁶³ The generals must have had some manner of communication with each other, though neither of them would admit it, for it was perfectly understood that if "General Washington bombarded Boston from the heights of Dorchester the British would burn the city."⁶⁴ On March 17, 1776, the Siege of Boston would end with more than 120 ships comprised of more than 11,000 soldiers, marines, and loyalists on board headed toward Nova Scotia.⁶⁵ General Howe loaded up British soldiers and loyalists onto 170 vessels and evacuated to Nova Scotia. The Siege of Boston set the tone, conditions, and way forward for the American Revolutionary War.

Conclusion

The Continental Army defeated a large state actor in a multi-domain operational environment. The inclusive and supporting usage of command and control, rudimentary

principles of mission command, and experiential knowledge led to a strategic victory in the American Revolutionary War's first campaign. Several times during the Boston Campaign leaders did not know all the operational variables. George Washington learned of the Battle of Bunker Hill once he arrived in New York four days after the action, but did not arrive in Cambridge until two weeks after the fight.⁶⁶ The Continental Army's Commander-in-Chief was unwitting to the largest and most critical battle of the Boston Campaign which saw more than 1,500 casualties until more than ninety-six hours after its occurrence.⁶⁷ "Understanding the interconnected purposes of attacking each enemy system contributes to realizing mission command that allows the Joint Force and partners to shift efforts rapidly to retain the initiative."⁶⁸ Upon receipt information of the battle, George Washington ordered the reallocation of 60 tons worth of heavy artillery to retain the initiative and exploit a profoundly degraded British force. During the Global War on Terror commanders have been afforded and become accustomed to nearly continuous tactical and operational oversight. As seen with General Washington in a highly contested and geographically separated battle, this oversight and reliance on command systems may not be feasible in future contested multi-domain battle. The future of multi-domain battle will see the continued integration of combat power and new systems which seek to expedite friendly and degrade enemy commanders' ability to affect the operational environment.

Resilient mission command systems integrate preparation, planning/execution, and duration timelines to converge capabilities, such as dedicated ground and sea-based lethal and nonlethal fires, manned and unmanned aircraft operating from operational and strategic distances, ground maneuver forces, maritime combatants and amphibious forces, and offensive cyberspace to suppress enemy defenses and open windows of advantage in the Deep Maneuver Area.⁶⁹

Training and Doctrine states that mission command is required in a highly contested environment, specifically that “capability to exercise mission command at all echelons in all conditions including denied and/or degraded conditions, such as disruptions to satellite, line-of-sight, and beyond-line of-site communications, and PNT data to command and control dispersed operations.”⁷⁰ In the Boston Campaign, Militia leaders and George Washington’s intent was not always known. A critical piece to meeting the military end state is a clear understanding of the operational environment and how to best achieve strategic victory.

Framed by twenty years of data, numerous primary and secondary sources, case studies with research questions, there is evidence that the rudimentary mission command principles were used during the Boston Campaign. The data and analysis ensure understanding in resilient formations must operate under the mission command philosophy because of the uncertain durations and physical extents or intensities of both regular and irregular warfare.⁷¹

¹ TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*, 24.

² *Ibid.*, 25.

³ *Ibid.*, 26.

⁴ Starkey, *European and Native American Warfare, 1675-1815*, 39.

⁵ Anderson, *Crucible of War*, 42-43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 51-59.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 53-58.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 55.

⁹ HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 2-4.

¹⁰ Alden, *George Washington, a Biography*, 37.

¹¹ John C. Fitzpatrick, "Washington, George," in *Dictionary of American Biography*, edited by Dumas Malone (New York: Scribner, 1936), 511-512; James Thomas Flexner, *George Washington: the Forge of Experience, (1732–1775)* (New York: Little, Brown, 1965), 138; David Hackett Fischer, *Washington's Crossing* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 15-16; Joseph J. Ellis, *His Excellency: George Washington* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 38.

¹² Richard Frothingham, Jr., *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill* (New York: Little and Brown, 1886), 429.

¹³ Mark Boatner, *The Encyclopedia of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia: McKay, 1966), 10.

¹⁴ Great Britain House of Commons, *Journals of the House of Commons*, vol. 35 (London, UK: H. M. Stationery Office, 6 February 1775), 99.

¹⁵ Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 52-64.

¹⁶ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 38.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 40.

¹⁸ Donald Barr Chidsey, *The Siege of Boston : An on-the-scene Account of the Beginning of the American Revolution* (Boston, MA: Crown, 1966), 6, 47; Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 320-321.

¹⁹ Chidsey, *The Siege of Boston*, 11.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 18.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

²² Arthur B. Tourtellot, *Lexington and Concord* (New York: Norton, 1959), 152.

²³ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 63.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁵ Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 214.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 214.

²⁷ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 137.

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- ²⁸ Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 232.
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 410.
- ³⁰ Lt. John Barker, The King's Own Regiment, "Diary of a British Soldier," *Atlantic Monthly* 39 (April 1877): 39.
- ³¹ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 56.
- ³² Chidsey, *The Siege of Boston*, 6, 47; Fischer, *Paul Revere's Ride*, 320-321.
- ³³ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 108.
- ³⁴ Nelson, *George Washington's Secret Navy*, 18.
- ³⁵ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 110.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 214.
- ³⁷ James M. Hadden and Horatio Rogers, *A Journal Kept in Canada and Upon Burgoyne's Campaign in 1776 and 1777 by Lieut. James M. Hadden* (New York: J. Munsell's Sons, 1884), 375.
- ³⁸ Charles Martyn, *The Life of Artemas Ward, the First Commander-in-Chief of the American Revolution* (New York: Kennikat Press, 1921).
- ³⁹ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁰ Ketchum, *Decisive Day*, 69; Nelson, *George Washington's Secret Navy*, 18.
- ⁴¹ Nelson, *George Washington's Secret Navy*, 18.
- ⁴² Ketchum, *Decisive Day*, 69.
- ⁴³ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 109.
- ⁴⁴ Ketchum, *Decisive Day*, 91.
- ⁴⁵ Norman McCarthy, "Turning of the Tide at Breed's Hill," in *America's Greatest Battles, 1775-2002* (2002), 7.
- ⁴⁶ Boatner, *The Encyclopedia of the American Revolution*, 10.
- ⁴⁷ Chidsey, *The Siege of Boston*, 104, 122.

⁴⁸ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 191.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 151.

⁵⁰ McCarthy, "Turning of the Tide as Breed's Hill," 13.

⁵¹ J. L. Bell, *Who Said, 'Don't Fire Till You See the Whites of Their Eyes'?* (Boston, 1775).

⁵² Daniel P. Lacroix, *A Brief History of Westford's Role During the Revolutionary War* (Westford, MA: Westford Historical Society, 2004), 2.

⁵³ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 42.

⁵⁴ McCarthy, "Turning of the Tide as Breed's Hill," 12.

⁵⁵ Ketchum, *Decisive Day*, 152.

⁵⁶ McCarthy, "Turning of the Tide as Breed's Hill," 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

⁵⁸ Ketchum, *Decisive Day*, 181.

⁵⁹ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 213-214.

⁶⁰ Chidsey, *The Siege of Boston*, 104.

⁶¹ Ketchum, *Decisive Day*, 213.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 214-217.

⁶³ Brooks, *The Boston Campaign*, 230-231.

⁶⁴ Beckles Wilson, *The Life and Letters of James Wolfe* (New York: Dodd Mead & Company, 1909), May 20, 1758, 365.

⁶⁵ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 309.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 213-214.

⁶⁷ Chidsey, *The Siege of Boston*, 104.

⁶⁸ TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*, 37,
47

⁶⁹ Ibid., 39.

⁷⁰ Ibid., 53.

⁷¹ Ibid., 26.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Overview

The world is changing rapidly, and the operating environment is becoming more contested, more lethal, and more complex... These changes are not new endeavors, but how we wage war, the speed and violence of armed conflict, and its global impacts are beyond anything we have seen in the past. Over the last 20 years, our potential adversaries have studied our capabilities and developed the means to counter once-guaranteed domain overmatch. They have demonstrated asymmetric capabilities that deny our access to theaters, challenge the unity of coalitions, and negate freedom of action at the operational and tactical levels... Looking to the future, we will be contested in all domains and must be able to open windows of advantage for other domains from the land domain.

—U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,
Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century

Purpose

Mission command must be clearly written in doctrine, explained in purpose, and applied in operational environments. The art of competent leadership at the tactical, operational, and strategic level requires flexibility. The utilization of direct, indirect, and systems-based leadership necessitates comprehension of mission command.

Multi-Domain Battle entails collaboration and integration of comprehensive effects and enablers. The rapid pace of modern conflict requires a mission command construct for executing Multi-Domain Battle that includes common networks, tools, and knowledge products. It also necessitates mission orders, shared understanding and visualization of the battlespace, and subordinate commanders executing operations with disciplined initiative within the senior commander's guidance that is empowered from above. Command and control is only a component of that philosophy.¹

The employment of mission command facilitates operations. In operational environments where cyber, space, ground, sea, and air are all contested, the victory is defined by decisions made in milliseconds. Given the paradox of large-scale combat

operations, hybrid of state and non-state threats, and instability of violent extremist organizations logic and precision are pivotal to winning. Clarity in intent and vision allows subordinates holistically the ability to influence strategic problems with tactical victories. The correct application of mission command doctrine enables success in the conduct of unified land operations. Rudimentary principles of mission command enabled a small, initially untrained, and poorly outfitted unprofessional force to defeat the British Army during the Boston Campaign.

Summary of Findings

The summary of findings will address the research questions. This will best show the application and adaptation of current mission command doctrine from 1755 through 1776. The French and Indian War was a state versus state, irregular war fought with decentralized operations and proxy forces. The Boston Campaign saw irregular and regular forces, who fought decentralized and centralized, given leadership direction via command and control and rudimentary principles of mission command.

Both, the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign saw conventional, irregular and unconventional warfare, regular and irregular use of forces, during centralized and decentralized operations. The French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign were wars of eighteenth-century multi-domain battle. The primary and two secondary research questions with the above research serve as a confirmation of specific examples of rudimentary principles of mission command.

Primary Research Question

Did General George Washington and New England militia leaders use mission command principles? The short answer is yes. The first armed engagement of the American Revolution was the Battle of Lexington and Concord. Two separate small engagements where the regular British forces fought irregular New England militia forces in both traditional and non-traditional battle. Both engagements at Lexington and Concord were initially centralized traditional battle with detailed command and control. The battle evolved into irregular and decentralized warfare with rudimentary mission command throughout the British Army retreat to Boston. The Battle of Chelsea Creek, first battle of the Siege of Boston, was non-traditional, decentralized warfare with rudimentary mission command. Battle of Bunker Hill, the major battle during the Boston Campaign was the regular and generally traditional warfare fought with centralized forces, commanders and their leadership. The Battle of Bunker Hill was a clearer example of detailed command and control. Throughout the Boston Campaign, there is examples of the mutual inclusivity of command and control with mission command through experiential knowledge and adaption.

Secondary Research Question 1

What principles of the mission command from our current doctrine were evident during the Boston Campaign of the American Revolution? A brief restating of the six principles of mission command; 1. Build a cohesive team through mutual trust, 2. Create a shared understanding, 3. Provide a clear commander's intent, 4. Exercise disciplined initiative, 5. Use mission orders, 6. Accept prudent risk. From the beginning of authorization from creation of the militias, cohesive teams where being built. The shared

understanding was provided by leaders who served as British Army officers during the French and Indian War. The shared understanding extended to the lowest level via the comprehension of the British Army overmatch, and that initial decisive engagements would result in failure. Providing clear commander's intent was not always conducted as a result of decentralization and geographical separation. The overarching commander's intent was generally known as the Boston Campaign would be a limited and attritional war. Exercising disciplined initiative was seen continually throughout the Boston Campaign. Militia leaders engaging in limited, continuous, small skirmishes ensured the British Army and Navy attrition. There were constant usages of written and verbal of mission orders. Primary examples of the initial order for militia creation and defense criteria to the restriction of bombing Dorchester heights elaborate on the scope of mission orders. Accepting prudent risk was a constant theme throughout the Boston Campaign. This is directly seen from the Lexington and Concord purposeful non-traditional fighting from wood line defensive positions. During the Battle of Bunker Hill and throughout the Siege of Boston this principle is demonstrated during limited attack and allowing the British to advance until terms of armed conflict were favorable for the militia and Continental Army. Throughout the Boston Campaign examples of rudimentary and specific principles of mission command can be seen.

Secondary Research Question 2

Did the knowledge of British techniques, tactics, and procedures enable New England militia leaders to utilize mission command philosophy? This question implies a large body of assumptions; the first being that militia leaders knew mission command doctrine, which is invalid. A better framing is that New England militia leaders and

Continental Army officers with knowledge of British techniques, tactics, and procedures simply had more experiential knowledge of warfighting. Adaptation and survival techniques were learned during non-traditional decentralized operations during the French and War Indian War, this experiential knowledge coupled with military education on the traditional British Army warfare is more likely the root of success.

Interpretation of Findings

The results of this research and analysis show that during the French and Indian War and the Boston Campaign elements of current mission command doctrine were used. While there was no mission command doctrine, elements of the current mission command doctrine were used. The research and analysis lend itself well to the criticality of understanding both joint command and control doctrine and US Army mission command doctrine. The President of the United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Training and Doctrine Command, and the US Army expect that the future wars will be fought in multi-domain battle where overmatch cannot be the expectation. Given that multi-domain battle is inherently decentralized and non-traditional, the grave consequence would be to not invest leadership time and development into knowing the application of US Army mission command doctrine in the joint warfighting operational environment.

Recommendations

I recommend similar case study analysis on battles during the Global War on Terror. Specifically, the analysis on Operation Enduring Freedom- Afghanistan (OEF-A) invasion, October - December 2001; OEF-A post invasion, January 2002 - December 2014; followed by Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS), January 2015 – May 2019. This

would provide numerous irregular and regular battles conducted both centralized and decentralized, over the span of nearly twenty years, and in the same geographic combatant command. The same case study analysis is recommended for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) invasion, March – April 2003, and OIF post invasion, May 2003 - December 2011, including the taking and retaking of Fallujah. Lastly, I would recommend case study analysis on Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR), June 2014 – March 2019. The OIF and OIR would provide similar geographical location with different non-state sponsored enemy.

A case study analysis from the British leadership perspective on the Battle of Lexington and Concord, the Battle of Chelsea Creek, and the Battle of Bunker Hill would facilitate insight to any adaption of command and leadership methods after the directive at Bunker Hill. Sequentially, the Post Boston Campaign- Pre-Battle of Cowpens (March 1776-January 1781) or Post Cowpens- Battle of Saratoga (January 1781 – October 1777) could be analyzed for command and control, mission command doctrine, and tactical adaptation to support military end state.

Lessons Learned

When I started Command and General Staff College (CGSOC), I knew that I wanted to earn a master's degree and develop myself as an organizational leader, while expanding my professional doctrinal knowledge. The Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) program facilitated that growth for ten months. While being a CGSOC student, and not having a history background, also never having done a thesis, the MMAS was a tall task. The MMAS program and my committee enabled both personal and professional

development which will provide the American tax payer an operational yield throughout the remainder of my career.

Personally, I learned three key things that I will carry forward and use continuously. The first is how to conduct scholarly research, from primary and secondary sources that are accredited. The gained knowledge of where and how to find scholarly materials will pay dividends in future planning and projects. Second, is how to refine and articulate large volumes of information clearly with enough breadth and depth to provide legitimacy. Lastly, a much better and clearer understanding of the Boston Campaign and George Washington. Conducting hours of scholarly research on the experiences of George Washington and three key battles during the Boston Campaign expanded my aperture for lessons learned from non-traditional warfare against a state actor nearly 250 years ago.

Professionally, there were six pivotal things that will be used in the future and bestowed upon future subordinates. First, is a greater understanding of the French and Indian War's history which facilitated the first American way of war. Second, is a full comprehension for the history of the Boston Campaign. The third and fourth learning points were joint and Army doctrine on leadership, operations, terms, and command systems used to facilitate operations. The fifth and sixth areas of study were on multi-domain battle and the strategic level lens on future wars given probable operational and environmental challenges. The all-inclusive professional development is all linked and nests well for being future positions of tactical, operational, and strategic assignments.

Summary

We must understand the future battlespace, and then we can begin to assess command and control relationships and how we will execute multi-domain mission command.² New England militia and Continental Army leaders were able to adapt and overcome a large state's professional armed force. George Washington during the French and Indian War, militia leaders at Lexington and Concord, American colonists under Colonel Stark during the Battle of Chelsea Creek, and Continental Army forces at the Battle of Bunker Hill, understood the need to adapt and adjust warfighting to win in contested operational environments. These leaders understood that command needed to be rigid, but that control must be delegated to the lowest tactical level. Nearly 250 years ago information and intelligence moved by word of mouth, by couriers, or in written form; the information and intelligence moved slowly. The current operational environments have large volumes of data transmitted nearly simultaneously, providing timely and accurate reporting. In a contested multi-domain battle without overmatch, the transmission of information, intelligence, and requests for clarity instantaneously will simply not happen.

The enemy can attack strategic, operational, and tactical targets simultaneously throughout the battlespace with capabilities from multiple domains to overwhelm existing mission command practices and systems and make friendly forward-deployed forces fight isolated, domain-centric battles without mutual support.³ Leaders must mentally adjust their expectations and reduce risk aversion. Instantaneous information feeds, unrealistic expectations of operational control, and risk aversion has manifested into leadership by concept of operation slides or missions conducted only by assets availability. This

mentality must change to match the pace and reality of plausible casualty volume during peer multi-domain battle. If and when friendly forward-deployed forces fight isolated, without domain overmatch, command systems will be tested, stressed, and possibly overwhelmed. Leaders at all levels must be stewards of the profession and know how to match the command system to the operational environment.

We must as a force, continue to understand command and control while refining mission command doctrine to enable victory in future wars. We must conduct rigorous training and education on when, why, how, and what command systems to use. It is imperative to understand that joint and combined operations are predicated on command and control; in the Army mission command is the preferred doctrinal method. It is critical to understand that command and control is apparent in all operations, while mission command allows freedom of action but requires more competency. Equally important, is that mission command cannot exist without command and control, and they must be nested to win future wars. Failure to properly comprehend both the systems and principles of each degrades the ability to control operations and will facilitate mission catastrophes.

Command and control can and does occur without principles of mission command. Field Manual 6-0 states, “the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders perform command and control functions through a command and control system.”⁴ This means that inherent to all operations some command and control system must exist. Understanding the operational environment establishes how the command may be delegated and what control is required. Some operations and

operational environments require detailed command and centralized control, with no ability to utilize mission command. Leaders must know the doctrine and understand the operational environment to best support the delegating and decentralizing of operations.

Mission command cannot be properly employed without knowledge, training, and education on the art of command with the science of control.⁵ ADRP 6-0 states that “mission command decentralizes decision making authority and grants subordinates’ significant freedom of action, it demands more of commanders at all levels and requires rigorous training and education.”⁶ A leader cannot successfully use principles of mission command if they do not comprehend command and control or their operational environment. When a leader fails to cognitively grasp doctrine or the operational environment, then they cannot properly employ their forces. The understanding of what to control, centralized and decentralized, with how to employ command systems, at the lowest tactical level facilitates decentralized operations. Multi-domain battle will be comprised of decentralized operations against highly adaptive and innovative adversaries that will constantly alter the battlespace and operating environment.⁷

Mission command emphasizes centralized intent and dispersed execution through disciplined initiative. This principle guides leaders toward mission accomplishment.⁸ The greatest employment of command systems in any operational environment is the combination of command and control with mission command. The future of multi-domain battle will force decentralized and dispersed execution on multiple domains, simultaneously. At all levels, leaders must instill in their subordinates that self-study, professional military education, and personal betterment are critical to furthering the American capabilities to win in future wars. The American resolve to win was best

articulated in General Washington’s address on July 4, 1775, “I only emulate the virtue and public spirit of the whole province of Massachusetts Bay, which, with a firmness and patriotism without example in modern history, has sacrificed all the comforts of social and political life, in support of the rights of mankind, and the welfare of our common country.”⁹

¹ TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*, I.

² *Ibid.*, II.

³ *Ibid.*, 18.

⁴ HQDA, FM 6-0, 1-1.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1-3, Figure 1-1.

⁶ HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 2-2.

⁷ TRADOC, *Multi-Domain Battle*, 4.

⁸ HQDA, ADRP 6-0, 1-5.

⁹ Frothingham, *History of the Siege of Boston and of the Battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill*, 215.

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