

AU/ACSC/2019

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

ALL FOR ONE AND NONE FOR ALL:
CHINA'S RISE AS AN HEGEMON IN ASIA AND ITS EFFECTS ON
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS

by

Myles B. Headlee, Civilian Engineer, USAF (B.S.)

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Advisor: Fred P. Stone, Col. (ret.), PhD

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

February 2019

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the

United States government.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
DISCLAIMER	ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS.....	iii
ABSTRACT.....	iv
Introduction.....	1
Research Question.....	2
Research Methodology.....	2
Background and Literature Review	3
History of China’s EEZ.....	3
Current situation.....	4
Gradual Strategic Shift	4
Challenges to Sovereignty	6
Nonmilitarized Coercion	8
Bilateral Resolutions.....	9
Effects on U.S. Interests	10
Case Study: Comparing U.S. and Chinese Perspectives.....	11
Perspectives of the United States	11
Access to the Global Commons.....	11
Importance of Asian Allies.....	12
Chinese Developments for U.S. Attention	14
U.S. Perspectives on Cooperation	16
Chinese perspectives.....	18
History Shaping Behavior	18
Claiming Historical Rights.....	20
Sovereignty.....	22
U.S. Rebalance to Asia.....	24
Chinese Perspectives on Cooperation	27
Analysis.....	30
Insurmountable Differences?	30
Prospects for Cooperation	32
Cultural Factors	36
Conclusions.....	39
Recommendations for Future Study.....	39
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	41
<i>End Notes</i>	43

ABSTRACT

This paper researched the Chinese exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the South China Sea (SCS) and the effects it has had on U.S. security interests. The United States (U.S.) cares about this issue because it believes Chinese behavior within its EEZ threaten internationally recognized rights, allied sovereignty, and trade traveling the SCS. The paper used the case study methodology to explore how the EEZ affects U.S. interests and why there is disagreement between the United States and China regarding it. The key findings were that Chinese activities are impinging many rights of China's neighbors, many of whom are U.S. allies, as well as directly on some U.S. rights. Many of China's behaviors seemed motivated by historical experiences that translated into insecurities driving modern actions. Comparison of U.S. and Chinese perspectives revealed one area of convergence. Each desired to improve bilateral cooperative relations with each other. The paper's recommendations centered on future study on building foundations for possible cooperative bilateral relations between the United States and China. It also recommended studying the cultural aspects of the Sino-American dynamic that have led to past difficulties in the SCS and threaten the evolving process of normalizing bilateral relations.

Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) offers many economic opportunities. These economic opportunities include extensive natural resources and large volumes of trade passing through it. These opportunities include an estimated \$5 trillion in global trade passing through the SCS each year.¹ The SCS is believed to contain some of the world's largest hydrocarbon deposits, estimated at 11 billion barrels of untapped oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.² These resources along with the flow of trade represent attractive development opportunities to the nations of the Indo-Pacific. Consider that these opportunities could motivate some to press advantages in order to secure a greater share, even to the detriment of others.

China may be assuming this role. China has claimed 85-90% of the SCS by declaring a maritime demarcation line called the Nine-Dash Line.³ China has constructed 3,000 acres of artificial islands in the SCS; some are within disputed territories.⁴ It has improved and armed many of them with military grade runways, radar, missiles, military and paramilitary personnel.⁵ China has prioritized both the growth and modernization of its military. China has supported this initiative with 8.5 percent increases to its annual military budgets between 2007 and 2016.⁶ As China has developed its military assets, it has been emboldened to apply coercive strategies against neighboring countries to resolve maritime disputes. These may represent Chinese attempts to monopolize resources and seize territory from nations that are otherwise exercising internationally recognized rights. For example, Vietnam and the Philippines have both lost resources and territorial disputes to these Chinese strategies.⁷ Simply examining these behaviors would provide an inadequate investigation without exploring context. This research will provide a more complete perspective by exploring some reasons behind China's behaviors.

Research Question

This research paper explores how China's expanded EEZ in the SCS affects U.S. national security interests.

Research Methodology

This research paper will employ the case study research methodology. The SCS scenario is a complex issue involving more than the imposition of China's expanded EEZ there. It has significant ties to Chinese initiatives and strategies such as the One Belt One Road and similar behaviors in the East China Sea. Even after narrowing the scope to focus on China's SCS EEZ, other research methods designed to develop discrete solutions proved inadequate for the expanse and complexity of this topic. Case study will allow deeper examination of the unfolding scenario in the SCS, allowing better understanding of what is happening as well as why.

This research paper will begin by examining the background history of China's SCS EEZ. It will then describe the current state of information on the topic including Chinese behaviors and maritime disputes. The core of the case study will conduct comparisons of U.S. and Chinese perspectives regarding their views of the scenario. For exploring U.S. views, the case study will examine U.S. interests in the region and the importance of and U.S. commitment to its allies. Next it will discuss developing Chinese capabilities of interest and U.S. cooperative philosophies. The case study will then explore Chinese perspectives and factors that have shaped them. This exploration will begin with relevant history that shapes Chinese behaviors today. It will then investigate Chinese views on sovereignty, international law, and how these intersect with its claims to historical rights and the rights of others within its EEZ. The study then examines Chinese views on the U.S. rebalance to Asia and provides varied analysis on its efficacy. The case study concludes with investigation into Chinese views on potential for

cooperation. The analysis will follow with discussion on possible ways to shape positive behavior and recommendations will discuss possible directions of future study. The conclusion will close out the paper with the conclusions this analysis will draw as well as providing brief summaries of the background, case study, and recommendations.

Background and Literature Review

History of China's EEZ

China has benefited from the existing world order as evidenced by its rising status. This system includes international laws governing use global commons and establishing EEZs. China has profited by developing resources from its internationally recognized EEZ, as established by the provisions within the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).⁸ The UNCLOS established international law for recognition of coastal nations' EEZs, their size, and legal rights of the owners within the EEZs.⁹ UNCLOS also established international law for defining and recognizing territorial waters.¹⁰ China has profited further from trading opportunities provided by access to global commons. This is evidenced by China moving 60% of its trade across these commons.¹¹ Using this system, China has developed the second largest economy.¹² This would seem to indicate that this system has supported, or at least not hindered, China's interests.

China's expanded EEZ far exceeds international provisions regulating EEZs for coastal states established in the UNCLOS.¹³ China's EEZ overlaps most of the other regional nations' internationally recognized EEZs and many of their legal territories. China has justified these actions by claiming that China has historic rights it believes supersede international law.¹⁴ China has used this argument to flout international law and ignore court rulings that it did not favor.¹⁵

Given China's recent economic rise, this may indicate that China's EEZ expansion is not based on needs.

Current situation

China's current stance in the SCS appears to threaten stability of the Indo-Pacific. This is because China has claimed the majority area of the SCS within its expanded EEZ to the exclusion of others. Chinese officials and scholars also claimed that UNCLOS gives China additional international legal protections to enforce its security interests both within its EEZ.¹⁶ Under this language of legality, China has taken numerous actions to enforce this EEZ and disputed territorial claims. Many of these actions serve the dual purpose of projecting the image of legitimate sovereignty over the SCS. These Chinese enforcement efforts over its expanded EEZ are where much of the problem concerning the status of the SCS arises.

Gradual Strategic Shift

Robert Haddick characterized China's actions in the region as "salami slicing."¹⁷ This term represents a series of small changes that can result in large changes when gradually aggregated together. Considered singly, none have provided a case for war. Robert Haddick is a former Marine Corps officer with experience in Asia who consulted for Department of State and U.S. Central Command. He is a published author with 30 years of experience researching security issues in Asia. While his facts are accurate, he does seem to take more of an advocate's tone which may indicate bias. This paper uses Haddick primarily for his description of events and useful analysis of China's incremental strategies in the SCS.

Walter Mead had a similar interpretation on China's behaviors in an article about revisionist powers. He claimed that the revisionists, including China, preferred not to challenge the status quo directly, rather they attempt to "chip away at the norms and relationships that

sustain it.”¹⁸ This sounds similar to the salami slicing strategy of incremental changes without provoking conflict that Haddick described. Walter Mead is a published author on U.S. foreign policy, professor of foreign affairs, and serves on the Council on Foreign Relations. His writings take a broader view than some of the authors this paper uses. However, his many insights on how China interacts with the other revisionists and the West are useful in corroborating some of the other authors’ assertions in this paper.

Peter Dutton similarly noted that China calibrated activities to achieve objectives without provoking conflict.¹⁹ He called this China’s strategy of “nonmilitarized coercion.”²⁰ Although Chinese actions are generally indirect and incremental, this strategy could significantly alter the region’s strategic balance in China’s favor through the gradual accumulation of effects.²¹ This paper cites Peter Dutton because his materials are both scholarly and authoritative on the topic. He is a professor in the Strategic and Operational Research Department at the U.S. Naval War College whose research focuses on Chinese perspectives on sovereignty and international law and how geostrategic and historical factors shape those views. Dutton makes for a complimentary author to Robert Haddick, because Dutton explores more of the reasons behind Chinese behaviors. For this reason, along with his focus on Chinese perspectives, Dutton’s materials will help the paper interpret Chinese perspectives.

Haddick offered Woody Island, one of the Parcel chain China seized from Vietnam, as an example of this salami slicing strategy.²² China constructed Sansha City on Woody Island in 2012 and established it as the administrative center for its EEZ and territorial claims in the SCS.²³ China has garrisoned the city with military and paramilitary personnel and a 5,000 ton paramilitary patrol vessel.²⁴ Haddick argued that China was using Sansha City and its garrisons to establish the appearance of legitimate sovereignty over the area, while smaller rivals like the

Philippines and Vietnam lack the ability to maintain the same imagery.²⁵ This shows one way China is attempting to enhance its claims to legitimate sovereignty by portraying itself as a state that is managing its legitimate responsibilities over the SCS.

Challenges to Sovereignty

China is also directly challenging sovereignty of other nations. Haddick offered an example of China challenging sovereignty by detailing an incident involving mineral rights. His example involved a state-owned oil developer, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). CNOOC opened bidding to foreign energy development companies for blocks of the SCS that were inside Vietnam's EEZ.²⁶ Complicating matters, Vietnam had previously offered some of these blocks for lease.²⁷ Haddick contended that by attempting economic development in contested regions, China was again trying to reinforce the perception of sovereignty over the SCS.²⁸ Other examples of this Chinese salami slicing directed against the Philippines seemed to involve a different purpose. In these cases, the objectives appeared to be less about the appearance of legitimacy, but more about leveraging Chinese power advantages in order to seize territories from the Philippines.

One such incident in the Scarborough Reef involved a large number of Chinese maritime enforcement and fishing vessels and a few Filipino vessels in an extended standoff around the reef.²⁹ The Chinese vessels overwhelmed the Filipino vessels. As a result, the Philippines has lost control of the entire feature, access to its harbor, and the ability to protect the reef from Chinese poaching.³⁰ The Chinese have subsequently barred the reef and stationed law enforcement vessels to prevent Filipino fishing ships from returning.³¹

This territorial seizure appeared to violate the Philippines' internationally recognized EEZ. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague affirmed this by finding that aggressive

Chinese actions at Scarborough Reef violated the Philippines' sovereign rights since the incident occurred within its 200-mile EEZ.³² This illustrates how this encounter may have been more than a bilateral disagreement between parties with legitimate grievances. Evidence of this comes from the Permanent Court's ruling which favored the Philippines.

After the capture of Scarborough Reef, China moved its efforts to the Spratly Islands.³³ In this case, China sent a fleet of maritime enforcement, fishing, and naval ships to blockade Ayungin Island.³⁴ This is what Chinese General Zhang Zhaozhong called China's "cabbage strategy."³⁵ He said that these different vessel types were arranged in a pattern that "the island is thus wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage."³⁶ The purpose was to prevent resupply of the Filipino marines stationed there and provoke their withdrawal. This would leave the island open to Chinese occupation. General Zhang advocated further applications of this strategy in the capture of more small islands.³⁷ China's purpose appears to have been the seizure of legally held territory from the Philippines. China seems to have designed this strategy explicitly to usurp the Philippines' claims and exploit its weaknesses. China may not have completed this campaign.

Both incidents illustrate a pattern where China has shown itself willing to leverage its greater power to settle disputes. Under a power-based system, weaker states, like the Philippines, are in a poor negotiating position. Weaker states may find negotiating dispute resolutions with China to be futile. The close succession of both the incidents at Scarborough Reef and at Ayungin Island indicate that these may have been more than territorial disputes. Rather, they may have been parts of a planned campaign against the Philippines. As China saw success at Scarborough Reef, it may have been emboldened to press its advantages further. General Zhang's comments about island seizure seem to affirm this assertion.

Nonmilitarized Coercion

U.S. led deterrence has prevented China from resorting to armed conflict in maritime disputes since the late 1980's.³⁸ China has instead progressed by developing strategies that avoid armed confrontation with the United States while still reaching objectives.³⁹ China tends to avoid direct confrontations with the United States, except in rare occasions when the odds heavily favor them.⁴⁰ Since 2008, China has settled into a strategy that balances between the possible extremes of being either entirely institutional or fully military approaches.⁴¹ Dutton called this China's "power based approach of nonmilitarized coercion," which involved both direct and indirect applications of its national capabilities to move conditions at sea towards China's favor.⁴² The reason he referred to this as "*nonmilitarized coercion*" is because the core of this strategy is primarily comprised of maritime law-enforcement and other civilian vessels rather than naval vessels.⁴³ This may also represent China's attempt to present a more civil, perhaps legitimizing face to the strategy.

This strategy of nonmilitarized coercion does not mean that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) does not play a role. Civilian and maritime enforcement fleets form the core and outer face, but the PLA Navy still plays an indirect role.⁴⁴ While China acts below thresholds of armed conflict, this position almost forces anyone attempting to protect sovereignty, territory, or respect for international norms into the position of brinksmanship, if they want to counter Chinese maneuvers.

Dutton claimed PLA Navy was never far from incidents and, simply via proximity, often provided deterrence to prevent its opponents from choosing escalation.⁴⁵ PLA Navy's presence and growing capabilities apply psychological and political pressure against competing regional leadership that limits their freedom of action.⁴⁶ This means that leaders of China's rivals must

make decisions regarding maritime disputes under an implied threat of armed confrontation, even if China never makes explicit threats.

This paper has shown how China's power-based approach of nonmilitarized coercion worked well in the examples between China and the Philippines at Scarborough Reef and Ayungin Island. In these cases, China attempted to outmaneuver and outlast its rival rather than attempt any negotiations to settle the disputes. China, however, appears to believe that this power-based approach synergizes well with its preferred method of resolving maritime disputes, bilateral resolutions.

Bilateral Resolutions

Chinese academic, Han Yong, advocated for bilateral resolutions when he said "recent growth in military, economic and other forms of China's hard power will be put to best use in bilateral negotiations."⁴⁷ This meant that China will have so much leverage over rivals that the outcomes will overwhelmingly resolve in its favor.⁴⁸ These methods may not combine as effectively as China believes. This may seem counterintuitive, as it does seem as though the advantaged party would be in a better bargaining position than a weaker rival. However, these bilateral negotiations have gone nowhere over the past couple of decades because China generally demands more than its rivals are willing to surrender.⁴⁹ China appears to see this resolution method as leveraging its strengths and placing it in an advantageous negotiating position. However, if Dutton's claim is correct, China may be gaining little or nothing by pursuing bilateral negotiations in combination with nonmilitarized coercion. This would suggest that, despite what China believes is a strength, its negotiation strategies may not even be supporting its own interests.

Bilateral negotiations in the Chinese model favor stronger parties over weaker, yet appear to yield few gains for either party. This suggests that other dispute resolution methods could be more productive. However, China has generally rejected most institutional approaches to resolving disputes, like multilateral negotiations or arbitration.⁵⁰ An example of this occurred when the Philippines pushed back against China in these incidents by pursuing international arbitration over claimed economic sovereignty violations.⁵¹ Arbitration decisions would be legally binding under the authority of the UNCLOS, of which China is a signatory. Despite this, China refused to participate in the hearings and promised it would ignore decisions, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction.⁵² This reaction from China could have been predicted because the court lacks enforcement capabilities.⁵³

Effects on U.S. Interests

China's efforts to enforce and legitimize its SCS EEZ have affected U.S. national security interests. Some efforts have directly challenged U.S. rights under international law to freely navigate in international waters by interfering with maneuvers of U.S. forces operating within these waters. One example involved apparent Chinese interference with an U.S. aircraft operating over international waters. In this case, a Chinese fighter collided with a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft in 2001, leading to the loss of the Chinese pilot.⁵⁴ According to Admiral Michael G. Mullen, the United States conducted all of these types of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) flights beyond 12 nautical miles of any country's borders and within international airspaces as defined by the International Civil Aviation Organization.⁵⁵ Chinese interceptions of U.S. ISR flights were becoming increasingly aggressive in the months leading up to the incident, such that the United States believed that they were endangering the safety of aircrafts from both nations.⁵⁶

Another example of Chinese aggression behavior towards the U.S. military involved a near collision at sea. According to U.S. Navy officials, the USS *Cowpens* was lawfully operating in international waters near the SCS.⁵⁷ USS *Cowpens* was monitoring *Liaoning*, China's new aircraft carrier, which was performing trials.⁵⁸ This was when a Chinese PLA vessel escorting *Liaoning* moved in front of USS *Cowpens* in an apparent attempt to force it to halt.⁵⁹ This required USS *Cowpens* to take emergency maneuvers to avoid collision.⁶⁰

UNCLOS does not contain provisions granting coastal states special security considerations over their EEZs. However, China operates as though it believes it has these provisions. For example, China treats the airspace above its EEZ as a "special security interest."⁶¹ This could have effects for the United States that span most of the SCS

Case Study: Comparing U.S. and Chinese Perspectives Perspectives of the United States

The United States makes it simple to understand its perspectives and its economic, security, and political interests because it publishes them. This paper will later show how this contrasts with China's approach, which is more indirect. U.S. documents like the *National Security Strategy (NSS)* offer a more direct, if broad, view on various topics including U.S. positions regarding the Indo-Pacific region. The *NSS* should be read with the understanding that, while it does accurately reflect the strategies and interests of the United States, it also tends to frame the United States in the best possible light.

Access to the Global Commons

One declared U.S. security interests in the 2017 *NSS* is a free and open Indo-Pacific.⁶² Kenneth Lieberthal also affirmed the importance that the United States places on the area when

he said it sees this as “a vital region for its future.”⁶³ This paper uses Kenneth Lieberthal as a source for U.S. perspectives because he has consulted widely on Chinese affairs with the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce. In addition to this, he is a respected academic with publication in the area as well as being a former director of the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan.

The 2017 *NSS* described various Chinese behaviors, like militarized outposts, as endangering the region because it believes that these behaviors threaten free flow of trade, sovereignty of others, and undermines regional stability.⁶⁴ In response, the United States committed to freedom of the seas and encouraged cooperation between nations to make this possible.⁶⁵ A free Indo-Pacific will require access to the global commons, especially seaways required for flow of trade and passage of military vessels required to maintain U.S. forward presence. The 2017 *NSS* affirmed the importance of this by making forward military presence a priority in order to provide U.S. deterrence and maintain capability of defeating regional adversaries.⁶⁶

Importance of Asian Allies

U.S. allies play enabling roles for maintaining this mandated forward military presence. U.S. bases in Hawaii and Guam lack adequate capacity to guarantee U.S. strategic influence over the region.⁶⁷ The United States depends on allied support and basing rights to supplement U.S. capacity.⁶⁸ The U.S. permanent basing model is changing for security reasons with, but it still requires allied ports for deployments.⁶⁹ This makes critical for the United States to maintain positive relations with friendly regional powers. The 2017 *NSS* acknowledged that both the United States and its Asian allies need each other to be successful. It claimed that many nations over the area look to the United States for leadership in building a collaborative response that

sustains international order in the region.⁷⁰ The 2017 *NSS* made this a priority for U.S. military and security actions by committing to strengthen established military relationships and helping develop a strong defense network with its allies and partners.⁷¹

Allied collaboration help the United States with another interest, related to the more direct security issues above. By helping allies develop their capacities, the United States gains forward basing and cost sharing for mutual defense. Cost sharing could help prevent the erosion of support at home. Mead claimed that the public in the United States has been questioning the benefits of the current world order, and believes that the United States should be able to pay less while getting more out of the system.⁷² I believe that cost sharing provides a way for the United States to reduce expenses and bolster public support while providing more effective and efficient deterrence.

Cost sharing will be increasingly important to the United States as it moves forward in its mission to rebalance toward Asia and the Pacific. President Barack Obama's 2015 *NSS* set the tone for this. His *NSS* talked about diversifying and modernizing U.S. security relationships and alliances in Asia.⁷³ The 2015 *NSS* further discussed enhancing allied abilities, so that they interoperate better and are prepared to respond to regional and global challenges.⁷⁴ This is an apparent contrast with the 2017 *NSS*, which speaks highly of cooperation with allies but does not directly discuss building partner capacity.⁷⁵ Dutton suggested allowing the United States to provide the majority of military deterrence, while regional partners devote more defense spending towards building coast-guard and other nonmilitary capacity to better resist China's strategy of nonmilitarized coercion.⁷⁶

Chinese Developments for U.S. Attention

Eleni Ekmektsioglou pointed out two related Chinese developments that the United States should consider security interests in the SCS. She talked about these developments and their differing purposes in shaping the strategic balance in the region. These developments are the growth in China's anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities and China's aircraft carrier fleet.⁷⁷ Both concerns relate to Dutton's assertion that China sees its EEZ as a special security interest. Both concerns additionally show that China's focus may not be limited to only securing its EEZ. Rather, both can affect the entire Indo-Pacific with their influence, while carriers could potentially extend it globally. This paper chose Ekmektsioglou to inform this subtopic because much of her research focuses security issues in East Asia, how states respond to new military technologies, and Chinese naval strategies. Kenneth Lieberthal also seemed to agree with Ekmektsioglou when he described China's investments in developing its force projection capabilities as a likely means towards extending its global reach while restricting U.S. military flexibility within the Western Pacific.⁷⁸

Ekmektsioglou believed China's carriers were less than a genuine attempt to reach maritime parity with the United States. Rather, she believed the true purpose of the carriers will be to shape regional perceptions of a strong Chinese presence in East and Southeast Asia.⁷⁹ Carriers could further enhance indirect support that the PLA Navy can lend to China's strategy of nonmilitarized coercion. Besides enhanced prestige for China on the world stage, these carriers could also provide an increased intimidation factor. This would leave rivals with more to consider, if China deploys carrier groups just over the horizon during maritime disputes. These fleets could apply additional psychological pressure to rival leadership while increasing China's assessment of the advantages that it can apply in strong-armed bilateral negotiations.

The West generally considers China's carrier fleet to be of little strategic importance.⁸⁰ I contend, however, that the United States should consider the psychological effects China's carrier groups may have on regional allies, not only on China's rivals in direct maritime disputes. This may imply that the United States will need to be prepared to supply greater assurances and support to its allies in order to keep them from changing allegiances. Dutton claimed that the East Asian maritime states that cooperate with the United States, do so because they benefit economically and politically.⁸¹ If it ever becomes more beneficial, or at least less costly, to cooperate with China, the United States may begin to see some allies align with China. The United States may find itself with an expanding problem in the region if these possible effects begin to compound with Ekmektsioglou's next concern regarding A2/AD.

China's growing A2/AD capabilities are probably the greater immediate concern to the United States. Lieberthal discussed the U.S. perspective on this issue by saying that U.S. military planners interpret Chinese aspirations and its expanding military and A2/AD capabilities as intended to deny U.S. forces access to and hamper its operations in the region.⁸² Some PLA writings support U.S. concerns by broadly asserting that the PLA intends to limit what other militaries can do there.⁸³ Essential in forming the U.S. perspective is that its observations seem to match China's proclamations on intentions.

China has an impressive array of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, tactical aircraft, and submarines that, in concert, could effectively deny access to U.S. forces.⁸⁴ The United States exhibits some of the responses to new military technologies like A2/AD that Ekmektsioglou described. The United States has conducted experiments with a number of possible responses to China's A2/AD strategies.⁸⁵ Without detailing each, the relevant takeaway is that Chinese behaviors are forcing the United States to reconsider doctrine, strategies, and technologies in

attempts to ensure it will be able to continue to operate in the area, should China ever attempt to deny access.

U.S. Perspectives on Cooperation

Cooperation between the United States and China is an enduring theme that arose from researching U.S. perspectives. President Bill Clinton set the precedent for attempted cooperation with China while his critics advocated isolating China until it improved human rights. In regards to the relationship between the United States and China, Clinton said he believed that “The emergence of a China as a power that is stable, open and non-aggressive...rather than a China turned inward and confrontational, is deeply in the interests of the American people.”⁸⁶ Clinton called this his policy of “constructive engagement,” which promoted both economic and political ties between the nations while still calling for reforms in China.⁸⁷ Clinton advocated constructive engagement because he thought it was the best way to simultaneously advance the interests of both nations.⁸⁸ He believed isolating China would be unproductive or dangerous.⁸⁹ This shows that Clinton was considering ways both nations could meet their interests while staying outside of traditional zero sum terms, where one must lose for the other to gain.

Both the *NSS* from Presidents Trump and Obama speak of U.S. aspirations for cooperative relations with China. In his 2015 *NSS*, President Obama called for a constructive relationship with China that promoted mutual interests, global security, and prosperity.⁹⁰ This sounds similar to how Clinton’s constructive engagement advocated advancing both national interests. Obama rejected inevitability of conflict with China, yet advocated dealing from a position of strength while calling for China to respect international law.⁹¹ Clinton engaged with China while pushing for similar reforms. Though decades apart, both presidents maintained a similar open invitation to China for cooperation.

President Trump's 2017 *NSS* continued to hold out invitations from previous administrations for cooperation with China.⁹² However, the 2017 *NSS* identified more problem areas than the 2015 edition did. In particular, the United States believed China intended to bend other states to its security and political agendas.⁹³ The 2017 *NSS* also identified problems that the United States believed were Chinese attempts to limit U.S. access to the region while threatening flow of trade, regional stability, and sovereignty of other states.⁹⁴ Even after identifying these problems, the 2017 *NSS* again committed to its cooperative vision for the Indo-Pacific and offered to exclude no nations from it. This included strengthening U.S. ties to established allies and partners, while reaching out to create new relationships with partners respectful of sovereignty, fair trade, and rule of law.⁹⁵ This plan included U.S. commitment to maintaining regional cooperation between the states for respecting international law, maintaining open seaways, open commerce, and peaceful dispute resolutions.⁹⁶ By excluding no one, this offer appeared to include giving China a place at the table in maintaining a stable order. This is both a place of respect and prestige that the U.S. is offering China. This may be the way the United States should approach this when proposing security and economic cooperation with China. China should also note the change to a sterner tone in the 2017 *NSS*. While the United States still showed that it preferred and offers cooperation, it also appeared to be taking a harder line towards China's behaviors that it believes are unacceptable to the international order. The U.S. military rebalance to Asia in the *NSS* shows evidence that the window of opportunity for China and U.S. cooperation may be narrowing.

This section on the perspectives of the United States discussed what the United States considers its national interests in the SCS. In particular, the United States considers the Indo-Pacific to be of high strategic importance and it intends to preserve the right of freedom of

navigation and maintain strong relationships with its allies. The section then went on to discuss Chinese developments that should concern the United States and finished with U.S. views on possible cooperation.

Chinese perspectives

History Shaping Behavior

This paper has so far reported on and analyzed current Chinese behaviors in the SCS. The case study began by examining U.S. perspectives on these behaviors. To remain balanced, this paper will examine Chinese perspectives on the SCS, its EEZ, international law, and U.S. behaviors. This will help inform the discussion on why China believes it should behave as it does in the SCS. This section is also intended to lead to areas for further exploration where the United States and its allies may be able to address some of China's legitimate concerns. This could lead to future initiatives between the United States, China, and the other nations of the Indo-Pacific.

Understanding what China believes are its interests is relatively complex because it generally does not publish documents like the *NSS* that clearly detail national interests. To gain insight into Chinese perspectives, one must often read more indirectly and consider China's historical perspective. Wang Jisi claimed that it was unclear if China had any such strategy to identify what the nations' core interests were, what external forces threaten those interests, and what leadership can do to protect them.⁹⁷ He pointed to evidence of well-coordinated foreign, defense, and domestic policies over the past several decades that seem to indicate China does have such strategies.⁹⁸ China has yet to publish comprehensive documents detailing these strategic goals or plans to achieve them.⁹⁹ Kerry Brown claimed that, without official publication, China's intentions can be read through its actions.¹⁰⁰ These factors seem to support

the need for researchers to determine Chinese perspectives indirectly. Though few official documents exist, interpreting a blend of Chinese rhetoric along with the context of current actions provides another way to read China's real intentions. This could offer researchers an increased understanding of why China does what it does. However, this does not offer the full picture. Much of what China says and does should also be considered through the lens of history.

Many of China's current behaviors in the SCS can be traced to its historical experiences. Jisi claimed Chinese leadership has a "persistent sensitivity to domestic disorder caused by foreign threats" based on their understanding of China's history.¹⁰¹ He supported this claim with many examples where ruling regimes were brought down by combinations of internal uprisings and external invasions.¹⁰² Jisi noted, perhaps ironically, the People's Republic was founded under the same mixture with an "indigenous revolution inspired and then bolstered by the Soviet Union and the international communist movement."¹⁰³ To Chinese leadership, this has been a repeated pattern of vulnerability. Wang Jisi offers an authoritative source for Chinese perspectives, as an academic with broad research and publication on the topics of Chinese and U.S. relations and U.S. foreign policy. His insight is also informed by his membership in the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of China's Foreign Ministry and he formerly served as the Director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies of the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Dutton also examined some historical perspectives that seem to affect Chinese evaluations of its maritime security situation. This offers some corroboration of Jisi's observations as well as additional insight on how China's history influences its decisions today. China had an historical tendency to approach its security environment on the continent through a

series of interior strategies.¹⁰⁴ These interior strategies involved the development of expanding rings of security around state territory, especially areas of strategic importance.¹⁰⁵ On the continent, these strategies included exerting influence or conquering surrounding regions to provide rings of security around the Han heartland.¹⁰⁶ Chinese leaders, however, failed to provide similar bands around maritime flanks, leaving China vulnerable to advances in sea power.¹⁰⁷ This left China vulnerable from the sea beginning with the British Opium Wars in 1840 to the Japanese mainland invasions through 1945.¹⁰⁸ Another of these great maritime embarrassments included the destruction of the Chinese Navy at the hands of the Japanese in the Sino-Japanese war of 1895.¹⁰⁹ For China, the sea has represented humiliation with repeated defeats at foreign hands trying to gain power over Chinese trade.¹¹⁰

Dutton contended that the failure of previous generations of Chinese leaders to secure the maritime environment and prevent the resulting invasions is what has motivated current leadership to extend China's strategic power over the near seas.¹¹¹ Much like its historical pattern of "rings of security" on the continent, China is similarly attempting to reduce what it still views as vulnerability from the seas by extending rings of maritime control around China's periphery.¹¹² These historical influences and China's perspectives on them provide feasible explanations for much of why China treats its SCS EEZ as a security interest, builds artificial islands, and engages in territorial disputes with neighbors.

Claiming Historical Rights

Some historical factors seem to have legitimately influenced modern Chinese security behaviors. China also uses historical arguments to justify some of its other behaviors and sovereignty claims. As stated earlier, China has used arguments for historical rights that it believes supersede or are justified under international law. For example, China has used some of

these arguments based on historical factors, that it believes prove China has sovereignty over a disputed territory, to ignore international court rulings.¹¹³ In a paper defending Chinese SCS claims, China said it can support sovereignty claims over the SCS with historical evidence.¹¹⁴ China claimed its rights over the SCS have a long history for many reasons that predate modern international law. First, China claimed to be the first nation to discover and name the SCS and its islands and provides historical written and cartographical evidence of this.¹¹⁵ China said it was the first to exploit the natural resources of the SCS like fishing and using the sea for transportation.¹¹⁶ China said it has governed the SCS and its islands since antiquity and that discovery of Chinese relics on the disputed islands and sea beds prove these claims.¹¹⁷ China then claimed that these historical rights preexisted international law, but then followed with cyclical arguments that international law also supports these historical claims.¹¹⁸ This source is an interesting read on its own, even though it is clearly agenda driven, and is not an unbiased source. However, the views appear to be genuinely held Chinese beliefs and help inform how China believes it can justify its historical claims to sovereignty. This makes it a valuable primary source for China's views on its historical rights.

China takes these claims seriously and actively invests in building a supporting body of archaeological evidence.¹¹⁹ In addition to building historic evidence, China appears to use these expeditions as a way to build domestic pride in China's golden age, while the PLA Navy uses scientific pretense as a means for conducting surveillance and enforcing claims.¹²⁰ This last use of the PLA Navy in archaeological expeditions could also tie in with China's use of nonmilitarized coercion discussed earlier, where the PLA Navy lingers near disputes.

Sovereignty

China has other views on sovereignty besides the historical factors discussed above that contrast with other international views. These can impinge sovereignty rights of neighboring states and international norms like freedom of navigation. Both affect U.S. interests, either directly or indirectly through its allies and partners.

Jarrett Stepman believed that China's actions like garrisoning islands in international waters are more than a rising nation showing strength, rather these actions are open challenges to international ideals of open seas.¹²¹ He said he believed China was using a theory called closed seas to fluidly extend the range of what it considers sovereign territory.¹²² This theory holds that nations can extend their sovereignty to anywhere it chooses to exert power, regardless of legal theories like international law.¹²³ He contended that the Chinese claim to sovereignty over the SCS are proof of China's employment of the theory.¹²⁴ China's own CNOOC corroborated some of Stepman's theory on how China views its sovereignty by calling its mobile oil platform a "mobile national territory."¹²⁵ Stepman claimed that the challenge for the United States will be to prevent China from using this fluid view of sovereignty to strangle critical trade routes, forcing others to travel them at China's blessing.¹²⁶ Considering Ekmektsioglou's earlier analysis on China's developing A2/AD capabilities, Stepman may have a valid point.

China's views on sharing global commons are related to its views on sovereignty and what it considers are threats to it. One area that China views unfavorably is using the global commons by the United States for ISR missions. A spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said "foreign aircraft on reconnaissance missions in the airspace above China's EEZ threaten China's security."¹²⁷ Chinese scholar Li Qin published an analysis of international law that claimed ISR missions over the EEZs of other nations are threats to national security and

violations of UNCLOS and other international laws.¹²⁸ This is probably a biased interpretation of law, but it shows that China is attempting to work within the framework of the law. Other Chinese military scholars argued that China's EEZ is subject to its sovereignty and serves as "an important strategic protective screen."¹²⁹ This corroborates Dutton's earlier historical analysis that China is attempting to build rings of security at sea.

Kenneth Allen agreed that China does not accept U.S. legal authority to conduct ISR missions near its borders; it believes they are barriers to positive military relations and violations of Chinese sovereignty.¹³⁰ General Chen Bingde, PLA Chief of the General Staff, said U.S. surveillance missions were hinderances to bilateral relations.¹³¹ An official with the U.S. embassy acknowledged that China views U.S. ISR missions as evidence that the United States sees China as an enemy, while China ignores its own ISR missions in the region and lack of military transparency.¹³² This seems to show that China desires positive bilateral relations and is holding the United States responsible for their absence, yet China's protests ignore their own similar actions. This could indicate that Chinese views on the commons are disingenuous, or that China does not view the activities with equivalence.

Chinese views on sovereignty and use of global commons can be detrimental to the United States. Chinese scholars expressed the view that freedom of navigation within the EEZ does not include foreign military and ISR activities.¹³³ If China acts on this interpretation in combination with its growing A2/AD capabilities, this could directly affect U.S. security interests because both sea and air power require access to maintain stability and reassure allies in the region. This also has global implications beyond the direct security interests of any one nation. Freedom of navigation supports the global economy by ensuring trade always has access to optimum routes, keeping transportation costs minimal.¹³⁴ Attempts to control the maritime

environment could impinge on this right and weaken the global economic order.¹³⁵ As so much global trade flows through the region, this shows why Chinese views on sovereignty should concern the entire community and not only one nation or region.

U.S. Rebalance to Asia

Part of the discussion on U.S. perspectives included U.S. dependence on allies and the U.S. military rebalance to Asia. China views U.S. activities, including the rebalance and its system of allies, as attempts at containment. In the past, China also viewed Western activities during the Cold War as attempts to contain China, preventing China from protecting its sovereignty, while rivals took the opportunity to “illegally” occupy Chinese territories.¹³⁶ China believes these Cold War actions by the West led to China’s current maritime disputes in the SCS. Chinese military academics have said that China views the U.S. rebalance to Asia as a new conspiracy to again contain China and cast it as the enemy.¹³⁷ On the official Chinese news agency Xinhua, China said it views the U.S. rebalance as a “carefully calculated scheme to cage the rapidly developing Asian giant by rallying U.S. allies and reinforcing U.S. presence.”¹³⁸ It called the U.S. ally system “hegemonic” and said it was designed to contain China.¹³⁹ It blamed this ally system for making U.S. allies more assertive and “pugnacious” and called on the U.S. to stop promoting China as a threat.¹⁴⁰ Although the United States has never declared the purpose of the rebalance to be containment of China, that is how China believes its rivals in maritime disputes perceive it.¹⁴¹ China believes this is causing its rivals to challenge Chinese claims with the assumption that the United States will support them.¹⁴² This seems to be a legitimate Chinese concern according to Michael Spangler who agreed that U.S. allies perceive the rebalance as being designed to allow them not to have to face China alone, while placing them in a stronger position when resolving disputes with China.¹⁴³ The Xinhua source is not scholarly

and does not cite official policy, however, as China's official news agency, its views are likely approved, if not authored by the CCP. Consider this a primary source for Chinese views on the U.S. rebalance, but be aware of the hyperbolic rhetoric it contains.

Liu Feitao offered additional Chinese views of the U.S. rebalance when he said China believes the United States is using maritime disputes to divide Asian nations and set them against each other.¹⁴⁴ This seems to support the Xinhua assertion that claimed U.S. allies are becoming increasingly uncooperative and assertive with China.¹⁴⁵ This perception strengthens China's belief that the United States has no place in what China considers bilateral issues.¹⁴⁶ Rather than supporting regional peace and stability, Feitao contended that the rebalance was actually creating new "tensions and turmoil."¹⁴⁷ He did, however, acknowledge that U.S. politicians have never declared the rebalance to be an attempt to contain China and have never named any nation as a target for the strategy.¹⁴⁸ Since Feitao included counterpoints to his own contentions, he struck a more balanced tone than the Xinhua article. In addition to being an academic, this makes Feitao a stronger primary source for Chinese perspectives than many other unofficial options. His research also covers the relevant areas of U.S. and Chinese foreign and diplomatic strategies, as well as relations between major powers. This makes him able speak to Chinese views on the rebalance and possible areas for cooperation.

Feitao also claimed that China does not believe the U.S. rebalance is a credible strategy, because the United States military is stretched thin with too many other commitments abroad.¹⁴⁹ He believed deep federal cost cutting would compound the problem, predicting that U.S. defense budgets would take the majority of the cuts.¹⁵⁰ He predicted the U.S. rebalance to Asia would therefore shift its focus towards diplomacy and economics.¹⁵¹ This could indicate that China may not be taking the U.S. rebalance seriously, at least not enough to affect its behaviors in the

SCS. Spangler seemed to agree that the rebalance was not having desired effects in shaping the region and theorized that without new efforts it would be unlikely to do so.¹⁵²

Worse than being ineffective, U.S. policies may actually be multiplying China's insecurities, fueling aggression, undermining stability, and reducing the possibility of cooperation.¹⁵³ As evidence of this, China has become increasingly assertive in maritime claims and maintains high rates of military spending to project power into the region, despite, or possibly because of, the U.S. rebalance.¹⁵⁴ Spangler pointed to Chinese strategies that were designed to defeat the intent of the rebalance. He used the example of the "cabbage" strategy that General Zhang discussed for gradually seizing island territories and likened these and similar strategies to small incremental changes over time that validate Chinese sovereignty claims without triggering armed responses.¹⁵⁵ This observation ties in with Haddick's earlier discussion of what he called China's "salami slicing" strategies and provides insight that the rebalance may be undesirably shaping Chinese behaviors. If the rebalance is truly ineffective or incredible as these authors suggest, perhaps the United States should look for alternatives that will be able to meet its interests without provoking undesirable Chinese behavior.

Feitao suggested that the United States and China should join in delivering Asian security and build a new model for the cooperation of large powers based on respect for core interests.¹⁵⁶ This may corroborate Spangler's suggestion that the United States should consider recasting its rebalance in a different strategic direction.¹⁵⁷ He said previous progress on Sino-American issues has come from constructive and systematic engagement processes that addressed issues with flexibility, cooperation, and pragmatism.¹⁵⁸ This sounds like President Clinton's policies of "constructive engagement" for working with China. Like Feitao, Spangler suggested that the U.S. and China work together in building a cooperative bilateral security relationship.¹⁵⁹ This

would mean readjusting the rebalance to focus on catching up security cooperation to match the levels of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.¹⁶⁰

Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said the United States was avoiding the presumption that great powers inevitably fall into conflict.¹⁶¹ He used the example of Germany before each of the World Wars, saying that Germany “felt disrespected in global politics, felt that they were not given their due, felt like they were not given membership or a seat at the table” implying these German resentments may have contributed to initiation of both wars.¹⁶² These sound similar to grievances China has with the international order. Campbell said what is “very different about this particular period on global politics” is that the leading nations all want China at the table and are encouraging Chinese participation in economic, political, and strategic institutions.¹⁶³ This shows that these nations believe that by constructively engaging with China as an equal participant in decision making, that they believe conflict is not inevitable.

Chinese Perspectives on Cooperation

These ideals from Feitao, Spangler, and Campbell offer insights that suggest cooperation between the United States and China may be possible. Ideals for reshaping the U.S. rebalance to focus on security cooperation and offering China a larger role in decision making may sound idyllic because success presumes all parties will willingly participate. The key question then becomes do the Chinese show signs that they are interested in cooperative arrangements? There are mixed opinions on this topic. Kerry Brown suggested China wants all the prestige and respect that will come with the status of being a superpower, however China does not want all of the “trappings and responsibilities.”¹⁶⁴ That is, he said China wants to be a “house on the hill, which people appreciate and gaze with admiration without wanting to move in.”¹⁶⁵ Cooperation

in security and decision making will require a more active role from China than Brown suggested it is ready to provide.

Evidence indicates more positive cooperation with China may be possible. Chinese military leaders have said they believed the evolving U.S. rebalance has deemphasized military initiatives and focused less on China.¹⁶⁶ Kenneth Allen also provided more specific evidence that shows the PLA may be moving toward more cooperation. The PLA has participated in combined training exercises with foreign and U.S. militaries.¹⁶⁷ Allen claimed, these exercises have provided a cooperative breakthrough in relations between Chinese and U.S. militaries, and he used the example of a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) drill in Hawaii as evidence.¹⁶⁸ There are other examples like PLA participation in international HA/DR operations, organizing multilateral security conferences, and United Nations peacekeeping operations.¹⁶⁹ These examples all show areas where the PLA is moving towards becoming a more cooperative international player. This shows promise for Feitao and Spangler's recommended security cooperation. In addition to taking on responsibilities of an emerging super power, China will also be earning respect from its peers and neighbors that Brown said it desires. The United States cannot entirely discount past and recent acts of PLA aggression towards itself and allies. However, by interpreting Allen's examples, cooperation from the PLA is one side of the problem that seems to be positively moving towards bilateral security cooperation.

Bringing China to the table as a participant in shaping international order, as Campbell recommended, will require more than improving PLA security cooperation. Accomplishing this will require broader and higher-level cooperation from other government branches. There is evidence that this may also be possible. Following the 2013 summit between Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping, Chinese officials declared there were no longer fundamental, structural,

or irreconcilable differences between China and the United States.¹⁷⁰ Michael Swaine, senior associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, claimed the majority of Chinese elites prefer stronger bilateral relations with the United States rather than “hawkish, hegemonic ambitions.”¹⁷¹ The Xinhua article also hoped for government wide cooperation. It said the United States and China should work towards building mutual trust and improving bilateral relations, claiming interaction between the top two economies is one of the world’s most important bilateral relationships.¹⁷² These examples suggest that China’s elites may be ready to move more cooperatively into participating in the international order. By becoming a contributing member, China may find many interests and anxieties simultaneously sated, without falling into inevitable conflict. However, this still leaves the problem of China’s current aggressive and assertive behaviors unanswered.

Jisi believed that China’s more assertive international behavior was due in part to China’s recent growth in power and influence quickly outpacing expectations of its own leadership.¹⁷³ Jisi claimed China’s recent history has focused mostly on internal matters. Beginning in the 1980’s, economic interests were major drivers of China’s international behaviors, while balancing security interests and reducing Western influences remained important.¹⁷⁴ Even through today, Jisi said he believed China’s goals remain protection of sovereignty, security, and development, and that so long as nothing threatens the CCP or China’s unity that China will remain preoccupied with development, including within its foreign policy.¹⁷⁵ If Jisi is correct, this may suggest that leaving China alone and focusing on areas of cooperation is a feasible course of action for the United States despite the appearances of increased assertiveness. If Jisi is incorrect, inaction could mean China may use the opportunity of indecision from the United

States and others in the Indo-Pacific to continue making perceived gains in sovereignty over the SCS.

This section on Chinese perspectives began with history that shaped Chinese behaviors, including sensitivity to foreign influences. It then discussed China's views on sovereignty and how they are incompatible with U.S. views. Next, it examined how China sees the U.S. rebalance to Asia and its ally system as being designed to contain it. The section closed with examination of Chinese views towards cooperation with the United States. Both the PLA and government elites seem to show levels of interest in cooperative relations.

Analysis

Insurmountable Differences?

The above case study compared U.S. views regarding how the Chinese EEZ in the SCS affects its security interests with Chinese views on the situation. It found numerous differences in perceptions of the current situation, but also revealed some common areas that may offer an avenue to improving relations. This paper showed that China's enforcement of its EEZ seemed to be the root of many tensions. This assertion differed from how China perceived the situation. China viewed the U.S. rebalance to Asia as the cause of many tensions. China attempted enforcement because it regards its EEZ in the SCS as sovereign territory. Much of this stemmed from insecurities based on China's historical experiences. By being unprepared to defend itself at sea in the past, China suffered repeated foreign invasions. These perceptions and modern behaviors were partly shaped by what China perceived as centuries of humiliation at sea from foreign actors. China may be over correcting for past experiences by extending rings of security out to its near seas in a pattern similar to what it has historically done on the continent. Regardless of whether these are rational reactions to real or exaggerated threats, Chinese

behaviors are having real consequences on the United States, its Asian allies, and China's other neighbors. One consequence for the United States originates with how China perceives its sovereignty over the SCS EEZ. China does not recognize the right of foreign militaries to operate within it. The United States, in contrast, sees freedom of navigation as an internationally recognized right. This includes the freedom of navigation and ISR operations that the United States believes it depends on to maintain stability and military transparency in the region. Another consequence is Chinese encroachment on sovereignty of neighbors with various behaviors that can include: claims overlapping neighboring EEZs, economic development within those EEZs, or seizure of territory. From the U.S. perspective this threatens stability of the region, disrespects international order, and weakens allies. The United States sees both of these consequences as either direct threats to its security interests or indirectly so by affecting its Asian allies' interests.

Some Chinese actions appeared designed to gradually change the strategic balance over time and project an image of legitimacy, while challenging sovereignty of others. It also appeared that China may have designed these strategies to work despite U.S. implementation of the rebalance to Asia. If true, this suggests that the U.S. rebalance may not be having the desired effects in the region. Some scholars suggested that the rebalance may actually be increasing regional tensions while also driving China's insecurities and behaviors. China showed evidence of this when it said it negatively viewed the U.S. rebalance to Asia as being intended to contain China. From the U.S. point of view, the rebalance has never been directed at any nation in particular and it plans to allow all regional states to participate in maintaining regional stability.

Dispute resolution is another area of wide disagreement between the United States and China. China has held to a power-based approach for bilateral dispute resolution that uses its

advantages to pressure rivals in maritime disputes. When international law does not fall on China's side, it has shown it is willing to ignore arbitration on matters it does not favor. The United States sees this approach as flawed and detrimental to its allies and international order. Rather than a bilateral power-based approach, the United States has urged peaceful multilateral resolutions where all parties stand on equal footing. This way all disputing parties will have equal footing in negotiations regardless of the strength of their instruments of power. The Chinese, however, believe these are local disputes in which the United States has no business. All of these seemingly incompatible views from both sides of the situation point to more differences than apparent similarities from which to begin working on resolutions. However, there were a few areas of commonality that offer hope for a different strategy going forward.

Prospects for Cooperation

In conducting this case study, I attempted to present both sides of the situation fairly without advocating for any party. This effort included finding voices representing both sides of issues that seemed to strike the most reasonable tones. Most sources are either official or scholarly. While a few sources bordered on the fringes of hyperbolic rhetoric, the beliefs appeared to be genuinely held, and each source usually offered constructive ideas for possible conciliation of the problems.

In examining these sources through the case study, there were some themes that arose that deserve further analysis. Perhaps most obviously, China and the United States appear to have many seemingly contradictory perceptions of the evolving situation in the SCS, misunderstandings of each other's intentions, and incompatible beliefs on important issues such as sovereignty and international law.

With that said, the purpose of this case study is not to solve all the problems in the SCS. Therefore, the purpose will be to direct future areas of research into this study's recommendations. However, through all of these sources, there are some insights that I have had based on the arguments they have presented.

This leads to the first and most hopeful insight. This is that both nations are showing signs of wanting to improve bilateral relations with each other despite the differences. If possible, this should translate into eased tensions in the SCS as both nations begin to believe their national interests are mutually supported. The United States has long held on to the ideal of a cooperative relationship with China. One could argue this was part of U.S. intentions going as far back as President Richard Nixon's 1972 trip to China, where both sides articulated their differences and moved towards normalizing relations after decades of isolation.¹⁷⁶ The paper showed this trend continued through Clinton's policies of constructive engagement with many of the same ideals echoing through to the last *NSS*. This showed the United States has long desired a cooperative relationship with China and has been extending just such an invitation. China has likewise shown that it may be moving towards increased cooperation. The paper earlier discussed how the PLA is participating in ways that show it is willing to accept more international responsibilities like peacekeeping and HA/DR operations, while also interfacing more with the U.S. and other militaries through exercises and conferences. This shows China may be willing to consider deeper engagement in providing shared security cooperation throughout the region. This study also showed signs indicating Chinese interest in cooperation may exist at higher levels, with a majority of government elites preferring positive bilateral relations with the United States. Some Chinese scholarship also suggested repurposing the U.S. rebalance to shift towards shared responsibilities for securing the region. These examples show

that Chinese military, government, and academia are beginning to move along similar lines of thought on the issue of possible cooperation. All are positive signs of progress from the Chinese side of the problem.

Future research could focus on benefits for each participant in potentially cooperating in shared security arrangements. For the Chinese, evidence suggests that China may not be achieving objectives with current behaviors. Mead said that part of China's objective is to limit U.S. influence in Asia, so it can reorder the region in its favor.¹⁷⁷ He contended that, even though China has the greatest capabilities of the revisionists, China remains the most frustrated among them in achieving its goals.¹⁷⁸ The reasons were that China's increased assertiveness has yielded little political progress, tightened bonds between the United States and its allies, and resulted in surging Japanese resolve and nationalism.¹⁷⁹ The harder China pushes, the more steadfast becomes its resistance. China seems convinced that it has more to gain from its current posture in the SCS than it would in respecting the international order. These points should be brought to light in negotiations with China regarding the SCS. When the realities of China's lack of progress are apparent, these can possibly compound with the growing Chinese interest in cooperation and improved bilateral relations. It may foster new ways of thinking about how to secure its interests while respecting the rights of others to do the same.

There are fiscal points that should appeal to both sides that may additionally assist in developing a cooperative settlement. For the United States, defense budgets are becoming constrained while being planned for decreased numbers and scales of engagements.¹⁸⁰ Mead suggested earlier that the United States wants to get more out of the international system while being able to pay less for it. One way the United States already does this is by cost sharing with its existing Asian allies through shared responsibilities. If China could be convinced to adopt a

cooperative stature, this could increase the size of the base that the United States can draw from in providing regional security and maintaining stability. With a less assertive and hegemonic posture, China would also not need to spend as heavily on sea power and A2/AD capabilities. This would reflect cost savings to all parties in the SCS while reducing risks for potential escalation in incidents such as with the USS *Cowpens*. China, however, will have to believe that it has more to gain by adopting this position. From China's particular point of view this will likely require going beyond fiscal matters, as insecurities lay at the root of many of its decisions.

If the international community could address many of these insecurities, China may see that it may not need to spend heavily or act aggressively to meet its interests. This will require a different way of thinking about the SCS problem. Mead claimed that shifting international relations away from zero sum issues towards win-win ones has been the most important objective of U.S. and EU foreign policy since the end of the Cold War.¹⁸¹ Unfortunately, this has not been the case for everyone in the Indo-Pacific. China and Japan are becoming more fixated on zero-sum competition as both initiate bilateral crises more frequently, while increasing military budgets and inflammatory rhetoric.¹⁸² This could relate to earlier analysis that posited that the U.S. rebalance might have been driving some Chinese behaviors, where the actions of one intensified the responses of the other. Similarly, interactions between neighbors in the Indo-Pacific could also be fueling tensions and driving unproductive behaviors.

This section of the analysis showed that both the United States and China have potential for and interest in cooperation towards shared security and improved bilateral relations. For the United States, the invitation for such relations has been long extended to China. For China, this proposition is only recently gaining interest, but China's officials and military are progressing in this direction. There are still obstacles to cooperation, such as how China views U.S. operations

within its EEZ as encroachments on sovereignty and as barriers to positive military relations.¹⁸³

The next section of the analysis will explore another barrier that likely exacerbates the previous example and many of the other apparent disconnects between the United States and China.

Cultural Factors

Another insight I have had in researching the Chinese and U.S. perceptions through the case study is that they often appear to have strikingly different interpretations of the same events and issues. I considered repeatedly during the research what must be at the root of such disparate observations. Much of this difference appears to be because both sides bring very different cultural factors into play when interpreting dialogue and events than a surface reading of events would indicate. These factors may amplify many of the misunderstandings. They are likely barriers to constructive dispute resolutions and eventual cooperation between the two nations. An entire research project would likely be inadequate to fully explore these cultural differences and how they affect communication and relations between the United States and China. As such, this part of the analysis will only point to some insights for further research in this area. By better understanding the cultures in play and the ways they interact, policy makers and negotiators should be able to better facilitate development towards cooperative bilateral relations.

Resolving disputes in the SCS appears to be at the core of the problems China is having with its neighbors and the United States. This may indicate that the parties are bringing different ideas about resolving disputes to their disagreements. Stella Ting-Toomey said one of these major cultural barriers to conflict resolution occurs when individualists and collectivists bring different ideas about what constitutes effective and appropriate practices to the process.¹⁸⁴ In this case, the individualists would represent the United States and the collectivists are Chinese. In general, the individualist is more outcome oriented and emphasizes effectiveness over

appropriateness, while the collectivist holds the opposite view.¹⁸⁵ The collectivists also bring concepts of face, which can be thought of as imputing or acquiring honor within the exchanges between people. Individualists tend to desire cordiality to follow effective dispute resolutions, whereas for collectivists this concept of face saving can be an elaborate process of appropriate behaviors that they believe must precede effective resolutions.¹⁸⁶ This is only one facet of the many significant differences in how these cultures communicate and resolve disputes with each other. The analysis provides this brief comparison to readers a glimpse into the complexity that will be involved in resolving disputes and attempting to develop cooperative bilateral relations.

Wang Jisi and Kenneth Lieberthal discussed similar differences in the styles and practices of both nations they believed increase difficulties each has in building strategic trust with the other.¹⁸⁷ These observations are more specific to the scenario between the United States and China, but display the individualist and collectivist trends that Ting-Toomey discussed more generically. They said Americans believe that trust should be built on solving practical problems together.¹⁸⁸ This seems to corroborate Ting-Toomey's assertion that individualists place effectiveness (solving problems) as the first priority, and the cordial relationship (trust) can follow resolution. For U.S. decision makers, this means they want China to be more willing to cooperate on practical problems like nuclear proliferation, intellectual property rights, and climate change before they consider Sino-American relations to be a constructive strategic partnership.¹⁸⁹ This is like telling China to show the United States its actions before it trusts China's intentions. Jisi and Lieberthal then noted how sharply China contrasts the U.S. view on cooperation by considering that the relationship should be clearly developed before the nations are able to properly engage and cooperate on practical issues.¹⁹⁰ This echoes Ting-Toomey's statement about China generally considering appropriate interactions more important than

proceeding directly to effective ones. According to these assertions, China wants to build the relationship and the foundational trust that supports it based on both personal and national interactions before it is willing to work on effective resolutions.

Another example of the cultural barriers that hinder the Sino-American potential for cooperation and improved relations is that Americans generally appreciate candor when discussing difficult problems and may interpret the more indirect Chinese approach as insincere.¹⁹¹ In contrast, the Chinese may interpret American candor as inappropriate, if not intentionally arrogant or insulting.¹⁹² This example also reaffirms Ting-Toomey's explanation that the Chinese collectivist values appropriateness more highly than effectiveness. Meanwhile, the American individualists' penchant for candor, or "telling it like they see it," again shows their preference for effectiveness by driving quickly to identify roots of problems and developing solutions with less thought about how appropriate the collectivist may perceive this approach.

Both examples show that the United States and China have different priorities for establishing the cooperative relationship and bring different perceptions about each other's communication styles. Both can further impede the clear resolutions needed for building trust in bilateral relations. Ting-Toomey recommended that the parties should consider the cultural and personality factors that contribute to each of their individual approaches in resolving disputes in order to be successful in constructively resolving conflicts.¹⁹³ Future research into developing a cooperative relationship with China and the United States should consider delving into the cultural aspects of these nations to increase mutual understanding and thereby improving the potential for this type of relationship.

Conclusions

The intent of this research paper was to explore how China's expanded EEZ in the SCS affected U.S. national security interests. In so doing, it first evaluated the background and current status of the situation. However, another interesting prospect kept arising while conducting this portion of the research. This was not only how the EEZ affects U.S. interests, but why this scenario has been unfolding as it has. The case study focused in on this aspect by examining differences in how the United States and China perceive the situation in the SCS. Both seemed to have claims that each believe are justified by law or historical precedent, yet their conclusions were usually divergent. One of the interesting takeaways from comparing the perceptions of each was that they usually interpreted the same issues very differently. These differences appeared to cause of many of the problems. The case study also revealed evidence showing that some elements from both parties have interest in developing cooperative relations. The analysis then examined reasons each nation may benefit from cooperation. However, factors contributing to the differences in perceptions in the case study seemed to simultaneously threaten this possibility.

Recommendations for Future Study

Recommendations for future study are based on the assumption that cooperative relations are possible and on finding ways to overcome the related barriers to accomplish these relations. In fulfillment of this hypothesis, recommend that future study focus on the areas of commonality between the United States and China which could provide a possible basis for developing cooperative bilateral relations. The benefit in pursuing this avenue of research could find that cooperative relations will likely ease tensions between the United States and its Asian allies and China. Increased security cooperation will also reduce costs and risks of maintaining regional stability. As a subcomponent of this potential cooperative relationship, recommend further

research into making China a more active contributor towards the sustainment and contents of international law. This recommendation may help bring China into voluntary compliance with international law by giving it a voice such that it believes its interests are respected. The possible negative side to pursuing these courses, could reveal insincere Chinese intentions. In this case, China could possibly use the appearance of cooperation and legal respect as a delaying tactic, while quietly reinforcing or expanding maritime claims. Further research should attempt to predict likelihood of either occurrence.

Recommend further study of the cultural aspects of Sino-American interaction dynamics. If not the core of the problems in the SCS, they are at least amplifiers of them. They also stand as possible hinderances to communication and dispute resolutions in general and offer many opportunities for misunderstandings and offense based on how each perceives the words and deeds of the other. The benefits of this study vector could improve direct communications and smooth the path to potential cooperative relations. They would also facilitate sustainment of the cooperative relationship by encouraging deeper understanding and more effective and appropriate communications between the representatives of each party. One possible negative aspect of this avenue of research could be overemphasizing cultural differences to the extremes of excusing otherwise objectively uncooperative or malicious behaviors. To reduce this likelihood, this avenue of research should focus on deepening understandings of the culturally based factors contributing to how each approaches the process of resolving disputes. This may help ensure that the differing cultural factors will not also be the deciding factors in resolving these disputes.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Allen, Kenneth W. "Assessing China's Response to U.S. Reconnaissance Flights," *China Brief* 16, no. 11 (September 2011): 8-12. <https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-chinas-response-to-u-s-reconnaissance-flights/>.
- . "Growing PLA Transparency as a Means of Employing Soft Power Part 2: PLA External Signaling since the 18th Party Congress." *China Brief* 12, no. 16 (August 2016): 7-10. <https://jamestown.org/program/growing-pla-transparency-as-a-means-of-employing-soft-power-part-2-pla-external-signaling-since-the-18th-party-congress/>.
- Brown, Kerry. "China's Quest: To Be a Status Super Power." *The Diplomat*, 12 March 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-quest-to-be-a-status-super-power/>.
- Center for Strategic and International Studies. "How much trade transits the South China Sea?" *China Power Project*. Last modified October, 27, 2017. <https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/>.
- Cable News Network. "Clinton Defends Constructive Engagement of China." *CNN online*. Last modified October 24, 1997. <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/>.
- Dutton, Peter. "Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones in Non-sovereign Airspace." *American Journal of International Law* 103, no. 4 (October 2009): 1-19. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a631477.pdf>.
- . "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas." *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 7-18. <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/2/>.
- . "The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row." *East and South China Sea Bulletin*, no. 10 (15 March 2013): 1-9. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162590/CNAS_Bulletin_Dutton_TheSinoPhilippineMaritimeRow_0.pdf.
- . "Viribus Mari Victoria? Power and Law in the South China Sea." Paper presented at the Center for Strategic and International Studies Conference, Washington D.C., June 2013. https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/attachments/130606_Dutton_ConferencePaper.pdf.
- Ekmektsioglou, Eleni. "US Navy Tries Bow and Arrow: The US Military Is More Worried about China's Anti-Access Capabilities than Its New Aircraft Carrier." *The Diplomat*, 30 June 2011. <http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/us-navy-tries-bow-and-arrow/>.
- Fabi, Randy and Aizhu, Chen. "Analysis: China unveils oil offensive in South China Sea

- Squabble.” Reuters, 1 August 2012. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinesea-china/analysis-china-unveils-oil-offensive-in-south-china-sea-squabble-idUSBRE8701LM20120801>
- Feitao, Liu. “Obama’s Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific.” *China Institute of International Studies Journal*, 4 September 2013. http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-09/04/content_6272923.htm.
- Haddick, Robert. “America has no answer to China’s Salami-slicing.” *War on the Rocks*, 6 February, 2014. <http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-to-chinas-salami-slicing>.
- Hao, Su. “China’s Positions and Interests in the South China Sea: A Rational Choices [sic] in its Cooperative Policies.” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 September 2011, 1-12. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china’s-positions-and-interests-south-china-sea-rational-choices-its-cooperative-policies>
- Jisi, Wang. “China’s Search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way.” *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (March-April 2011): 68-75. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2011-02-20/chinas-search-grand-strategy>.
- Johnson, Jesse. “Tribunal rejects Beijing’s claims to South China Sea; Japan braces for reaction.” *The Japan Times*, 12 July 2016. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/12/asia-pacific/tribunal-rules-chinese-claims-south-china-sea/#.WxC56WeWxAh>.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth, and Wang Jisi. “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust.” *John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series*, no. 4 (March 2012): 1-65. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf.
- Mead, Walter R. “The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers.” *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 3 (May-June 2014): 69-79. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-04-17/return-geopolitics>.
- Mulrine, Anna. “USS Cowpens: Why China Forced a Confrontation at Sea with the US Navy.” *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 2013. <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1213/USS-Cowpens-Why-China-forced-a-confrontation-at-sea-with-US-Navy>.
- Nielsen, Nicolai Fogth Gjøde. “How China Avoids War in the South China Sea.” *The National Interest*, 15 January 2019. <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-avoids-war-south-china-sea-41677>.
- Obama, Barak H. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2015. <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>.

Spangler, Michael. "Rebalancing the Balance." *Parameters* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 11-21. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Issues/Summer_2014/5_Spangler_Article.pdf.

Stepman, Jarrett. "How China Plans to Dominate the South China Sea: Copy Great Britain." *The National Interest*, 8 April 2017. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-plans-dominate-the-south-china-sea-copy-great-20080>.

Ting-Toomey, Stella. *Communicating Across Cultures*. (New York: Guilford Press, 1999).

Trump, Donald J. *National Security Strategy*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 2017. <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2017.pdf>.

Yushan, Deng. "Dynamic Asia needs U.S. to reshape anachronistic policy." *Xinhua News Agency*, 23 April 2014. http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2014-04/23/content_32178642.htm.

End Notes

¹ Jesse Johnson, "Tribunal rejects Beijing's claims to South China Sea; Japan braces for reaction," *The Japan Times*, 12 July 2016. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/07/12/asia-pacific/tribunal-rules-chinese-claims-south-china-sea/#.WxC56WeWxAh>

² Nicolai Fogth Gjode Nielsen, "How China Avoids War in the South China Sea," *The National Interest*, 15 January 2019, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-china-avoids-war-south-china-sea-41677>

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Robert Haddick, "America has no answer to China's Salami-slicing," *War on the Rocks*, 6 February, 2014. <http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/america-has-no-answer-to-chinas-salami-slicing>

⁶ Nielsen, "How China Avoids War."

⁷ Haddick, "America has no answer."

⁸ *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 10 December 1982, 43. http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf

⁹ Ibid, 43.

¹⁰ Ibid, 23.

¹¹ Center for Strategic & International Studies, "How much trade transits the South China Sea?," *China Power Project*. Last modified October, 27, 2017. <https://chinapower.csis.org/much-trade-transits-south-china-sea/>

¹² Ibid.

¹³ *United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea*, 10 December 1982, 43.

¹⁴ Peter Dutton, "The Sino-Philippine Maritime Row," *East and South China Sea Bulletin*, no. 10 (15 March 2013), 4.
https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/162590/CNAS_Bulletin_Dutton_TheSinoPhilippineMaritimeRow_0.pdf

¹⁵ Jesse Johnson, "Tribunal rejects Beijing's claims,"

¹⁶ Peter Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 14. <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/2/>

¹⁷ Haddick, "America has no answer."

¹⁸ Walter R. Mead, "The Return of Geopolitics: The Revenge of the Revisionist Powers," *Foreign Affairs* 93, no. 3 (May-June 2014): 74.
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2014-04-17/return-geopolitics>

¹⁹ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 10.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Haddick, "America has no answer."

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Dutton, "Sino-Philippine Maritime Row," 2.

³⁰ Ibid, 1.

³¹ Ibid, 2.

³² Jesse Johnson, "Tribunal rejects Beijing's claims."

³³ Haddick, "America has no answer."

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 11.

³⁹ Ibid, 10.

⁴⁰ Mead, "Return of Geopolitics: The," 74.

⁴¹ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 11.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Quoted in Peter Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas," *Naval War College Review* 67, no. 3 (Summer 2014): 11. <http://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol67/iss3/2/>

⁴⁸ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 11.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Johnson, “Tribunal rejects Beijing’s claims.”

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Kenneth W. Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to U.S. Reconnaissance Flights,” *China Brief* 16, no. 11 (September 2011): 9. <https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-chinas-response-to-u-s-reconnaissance-flights/>

⁵⁵ Ibid, 8.

⁵⁶ Quoted in Kenneth W. Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to U.S. Reconnaissance Flights,” *China Brief* 16, no. 11 (September 2011): 9. <https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-chinas-response-to-u-s-reconnaissance-flights/>

⁵⁷ Anna Mulrine, “USS Cowpens: Why China Forced a Confrontation at Sea with the US Navy.” *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 2013. <https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/2013/1213/USS-Cowpens-Why-China-forced-a-confrontation-at-sea-with-US-Navy>

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Peter Dutton, “Caelum Liberam: Air Defense Identification Zones in Non-sovereign Airspace,” *American Journal of International Law* 103, no. 4 (October 2009): 14. <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a631477.pdf>

⁶² Trump, *National Security Strategy*, 46.

⁶³ Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” *John L. Thornton China Center Monograph Series*, no. 4 (March 2012): 22. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/0330_china_lieberthal.pdf

⁶⁴ Trump, *National Security Strategy*, 46.

⁶⁵ Ibid, 47.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Dutton, “China’s Maritime Disputes in,” 9.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Michael Spangler, "Rebalancing the Balance," *Parameters* 44, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 11. https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/parameters/Issues/Summer_2014/5_Spangler_Article.pdf

⁷⁰ Trump, *National Security Strategy*, 46.

⁷¹ Ibid, 47.

⁷² Mead, "Return of Geopolitics: The," 77.

⁷³ Barak H. Obama, *National Security Strategy*, Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2015, 24. <http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf>

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Trump, *National Security Strategy*, 47.

⁷⁶ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 10.

⁷⁷ Eleni Ekmektsioglou, "US Navy Tries Bow and Arrow: The US Military Is More Worried about China's Anti-Access Capabilities than Its New Aircraft Carrier," *The Diplomat*, 30 June 2011. <http://thediplomat.com/2011/06/us-navy-tries-bow-and-arrow/>

⁷⁸ Lieberthal, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," 22.

⁷⁹ Ekmektsioglou, "US Navy Tries Bow."

⁸⁰ Ibid.

⁸¹ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 10.

⁸² Lieberthal, "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust," 22.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Ekmektsioglou, "US Navy Tries Bow."

⁸⁵ Ekmektsioglou, "US Navy Tries Bow."

⁸⁶ "Clinton Defends Constructive Engagement of China," *CNN* online, Last modified October 24, 1997. <http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/1997/10/24/clinton.china/>

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Obama, *National Security Strategy*, 24.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Trump, *National Security Strategy*, 46.

⁹³ Ibid.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 47.

⁹⁷ Wang Jisi, "China's search for a Grand Strategy: A Rising Great Power Finds Its Way," *Foreign Affairs* 90, no. 2 (March-April 2011), 68.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Kerry Brown, "China's Quest: To Be a Status Super Power," *The Diplomat*, 12 March 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/chinas-quest-to-be-a-status-super-power/>

¹⁰¹ Wang, "China's search for a," 68.

¹⁰² Ibid.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Dutton, "China's Maritime Disputes in," 7.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, 8.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ Christopher Woolf, "China Goes Undersea to Justify Its Claims to Disputed Waters and Islands," *PRI's The World*. <https://www.pri.org/stories/2013-12-05/china-goes-undersea-justify-its-claims-disputed-waters-and-islands>

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Dutton, “China’s Maritime Disputes in,” 9.

¹¹² Ibid, 7.

¹¹³ Johnson, “Tribunal rejects Beijing’s claims.”

¹¹⁴ Su Hao, “China’s Positions and Interests in the South China Sea: A Rational Choices [sic] in its Cooperative Policies,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, 12 September 2011, 1. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/china’s-positions-and-interests-south-china-sea-rational-choices-its-cooperative-policies>

¹¹⁵ Ibid, 1-2.

¹¹⁶ Ibid, 1.

¹¹⁷ Ibid, 2-3.

¹¹⁸ Ibid, 2.

¹¹⁹ Woolf, “China Goes Undersea to.”

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Jarrett Stepman, “How China Plans to Dominate the South China Sea: Copy Great Britain,” *The National Interest*, 8 April 2017. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-china-plans-dominate-the-south-china-sea-copy-great-20080>

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Ibid.

¹²⁴ Ibid.

¹²⁵ Randy Fabi and Chen Aizhu, “Analysis: China unveils oil offensive in South China Sea squabble,” Reuters, 1 August 2012. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-china/analysis-china-unveils-oil-offensive-in-south-china-sea-squabble-idUSBRE8701LM20120801>

¹²⁶ Stepman, “How China Plans to.”

¹²⁷ Dutton, “Caelum Liberam: Air Defense,” 14.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Ibid, 16.

¹³⁰ Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to,” 9.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Dutton, “Caelum Liberam: Air Defense,” 16.

¹³⁴ Ibid, 18.

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Hao, “China’s Positions and Interests,” 4.

¹³⁷ Spangler, “Rebalancing the Balance,” 14.

¹³⁸ Deng Yushan, “Dynamic Asia needs U.S. to reshape anachronistic policy,” *Xinhua News Agency*, 23 April 2014. http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2014-04/23/content_32178642.htm

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

¹⁴¹ Liu Feitao, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the Asia Pacific,” *China Institute of International Studies Journal*, 4 September 2013. http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2013-9/04/content_6272923.htm

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ Spangler, “Rebalancing the Balance,” 13.

¹⁴⁴ Feitao, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the.”

¹⁴⁵ Yushan, “Dynamic Asia needs U.S.”

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ Feitao, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the.”

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Spangler, “Rebalancing the Balance,” 13.

¹⁵³ Ibid, 15.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, 13.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, 15.

¹⁵⁶ Feitao, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the.”

¹⁵⁷ Spangler, “Rebalancing the Balance,” 20.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Haddick, “America has no answer.”

¹⁶² Ibid.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ Brown, “China’s Quest: To Be.”

¹⁶⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶⁶ Spangler, “Rebalancing the Balance,” 14.

¹⁶⁷ Kenneth Allen, “Growing PLA Transparency as a Means of Employing Soft Power Part 2: PLA External Signaling since the 18th Party Congress,” *China Brief* 12, no. 16 (August 2016): 8. <https://jamestown.org/program/growing-pla-transparency-as-a-means-of-employing-soft-power-part-2-pla-external-signaling-since-the-18th-party-congress/>.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 8-9.

¹⁷⁰ Spangler, “Rebalancing the Balance,” 14.

¹⁷¹ Mulrine, “USS Cowpens: Why China.”

¹⁷² Yushan, “Dynamic Asia needs U.S.”

¹⁷³ Wang, “China’s search for a,” 68.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid, 69.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid, 70.

¹⁷⁶ Richard Nixon Foundation, “The Opening of China,” nixonfoundation.org, 18 January 2017.
<https://www.nixonfoundation.org/exhibit/the-opening-of-china/>

¹⁷⁷ Mead, “Return of Geopolitics: The,” 74.

¹⁷⁸ Ibid.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid 74-75.

¹⁸⁰ Feitao, “Obama’s Rebalancing to the.”

¹⁸¹ Mead, “Return of Geopolitics: The,” 69.

¹⁸² Ibid, 76.

¹⁸³ Allen, “Assessing China’s Response to,” 9.

¹⁸⁴ Stella Ting-Toomey, *Communicating Across Cultures*, (New York: Guilford Press, 1999), 71.

¹⁸⁵ Ibid.

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Lieberthal, “Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust,” 38.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid.

¹⁹¹ Ibid.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Ting-Toomey, *Communicating Across Cultures*, 72.