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Make JFCC-ISR Great Again

by

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ABSTRACT

The global allocation process for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets is burdensome, antiquated and slow. It takes approximately one year for combatant commanders to determine what their intelligence requirements are, force providers to compile what ISR forces and assets can be offered to meet those requirements, and the administrative process to meld that information to present to the Secretary of Defense for approval. If world events change the Combatant Commander's requirements, the process is halted, corrections are made, and the subsequent updates are incorporated into the annual planning process.

With current and emergent threats to US interests globally, Combatant Commanders (CCDRs) rely heavily on space-based and air breathing platforms to better understand the battlefield and to develop plans to execute operations against our adversaries. This is due to space-based or air breathing ISR assets being able to provide near real time collection, focused on a combatant commanders intelligence requirement, with specialists trained to collect and process the data gathered from these platforms. This is doctrinally how the Department of Defense accomplishes the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment for Combatant Commanders.¹

Demand for these assets always exceeds capacity. If new tools were developed to assist decision makers and the Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP) process was reengineered to better support the CCDRs priorities without negatively affecting the force provider, the collection asset, and supporting personnel in the process, it could become an invaluable resource for the Intelligence Community (IC) instead of a burdensome, bureaucratic yearlong process.

Reinvigorating Joint Functional Component Command for ISR (JFCC-ISR) will require multi-domain personnel from other Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSCs) along with integrated IC sensors, networks, policy and tools to make ISR an indispensable contributor to our nation's defense enterprise. It will require moving the entire process out of the J-32 and back into a JFCC-type structure to ensure "honest brokering" between the force provider and end user. A senior General Officer will need to manage the operations and people involved in the global strategic allocation process. If the GFMAP process cannot be reinvigorated, regardless of the reason, then it should be replaced with a time sensitive ad hoc system to ensure CCDRs are able to have ISR assets when and where they are needed. A reinvigorated JFCC-ISR and GFMAP process can return the allocation of airborne, cyber and space ISR assets to an effective and efficient process, given the right mix of personnel, management tools, appropriate governance and organization.

INTRODUCTION

Throughout this paper, I will refer to JFCC-ISR as the entity that could oversee and manage the planning and execution of space-based and air breathing IC collection along with the support activities needed to support the Combatant Commander. The entity does not have to be named JFCC-ISR. I used JFCC-ISR based on what the division was called doctrinally in Joint Publications and senior level guidance. ^{2 3}

It is important to understand the establishment of JFCC-ISR (currently J-32), with its inherent roles and why this organization is so important to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF). In January 2003, President George Bush signed the Unified Command Plan (UCP) highlighting the significance of ISR assets and their contribution to finding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the defeat of Integrated Missile Defense systems, and

support to small units on the ground in combat zones. The UCP established JFCC-ISR and gave global responsibility and management of ISR assets to US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). Per the 2003 UCP, JFCC-ISR is responsible for developing strategies, plans and integrates DoD, national and international partners to satisfy combatant command, national and strategic intelligence requirements.⁴ USSTRATCOM was chosen as the Joint Functional Component due to having a 4-star General in charge of the command. This unique organizational construct was designed to provide senior leader advocacy and oversight to JFCC-ISR when confronted with 4-star combatant commander's dilemmas.

In January 2005, General Cartwright, USSTRATCOM/CC, authorized JFCC-ISR as the Coordinating Authority for the UCP-assigned ISR mission and gave Direct Liaison Authority with other JFCCs, components, services, CCMDs Joint Staff and Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence to support and enhance global ISR operations. He also directed JFCC-ISR to "represent the entire ISR enterprise to develop and synchronize strategy and planning that integrates all national, theater, and allied capabilities to provide timely and actionable intelligence to satisfy COCOM requirements". Additional tasks for JFCC-ISR included "synchronizing the use of DoD ISR assets with national assets", "integrating theater ISR resources with other collection activities" and "ensuring ISR collection data accessibility to end users". The UCP and additional USSTRATCOM/CC guidance was critical in establishing JFCC-ISRs organization, roles and authorities, allowing JFCC-ISR to be the planner, coordinator and honest broker for global ISR allocation.⁵

Background Perspective

Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 defines roles and responsibilities for deployment and redeployment operations in the DoD. Per this JP, the global allocation of all ISR assets rests with

the J-3 Operations Directorate. The J-3 is the Joint Force Coordinator responsible for developing recommended sourcing solutions for validated and contingency force requirements.⁶ Additionally, JP 3-35 identifies the J-3 as the Joint Deployment Process Owner, leading collaborative efforts to improve the allocation process and ensuring DoD assets can execute military force power projection effectively and efficiently.

Another primary governing document for the GFMAP process is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1301.01F.⁷ It directs how the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (GFMIG) and GFMAP are used to allocate DoD assets globally. The GFMAP falls under the GFMIG, the process by which CCDRs are allocated assets. ISR assets are allocated based on SECDEFs priorities and guidance and published in the Force Allocation Decision Model (FADM). The FADM prioritizes capabilities based on Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCC) intelligence requirements. Once each CCMD submits their intelligence requirements, JFCC-ISR vets them and the CCDRs anticipate receiving ISR assets to meet their requirements. Before the beginning of the fiscal year, the force provider submits the force offering, a list of available ISR assets and associated personnel for the upcoming fiscal year, to fulfill these intelligence requirements. The force offering shows asset availability, nuanced restrictions, platform requirements, and deployment duration.

JFCC-ISR follows SECDEF guidance, takes CCDR requirements, force provider offerings and outputs the result as a draft publication of the GFMAP. Once the SECDEF approves the GFMAP, Deployment Orders (DEPORDs) authorize force providers to task personnel and assets to support the CCMD. When initially established, JFCC-ISR and USSTRATCOM were responsible for the execution of all ISR assets globally. However, only the SECDEF can modify the DEPORD or change Operational Control (OPCON) of ISR assets and does so on an "as needed" basis outside of the initial signed GFMAP. Additionally, the Joints Chiefs of Staff (JCS) are the only legally authorized conduit between the CCMDs and the National Command Authority (NCA). This prevents JFCC-ISR from formally tasking or retasking ISR assets globally and is relegated to following and supporting GFMAP actions between JCS, CCMDs, NCA and SECDEF, offering Subject Matter Expert advice to CCDRs and force providers.

Current Dilemma

The allocation of high demand, low-density (HD/LD) assets is similar to the way fighter squadrons and Carrier Strike Groups are allocated to the CCMDs. CCDRs input their operational requirements and the force providers support those requirements by providing personnel and equipment. JFCC-ISR was designed to be the conduit bridging these two entities, providing a comprehensive executable plan for the allocation of ISR assets globally.

Often, the force providers do not have enough HD/LD ISR assets to satisfy the CCMDs requests. Competition for the HD/LD assets can be so contentious that CCDRs will seek to gain Operational Control in their Area of Responsibility (AOR). As a result, JFCC-ISR develops a plan to pull assets from one GCC to give to another with higher FADM priority, request an "overage" of ISR assets from the force provider, or denies the request altogether. If unresolved via JFCC-ISR and the GFMIG, 3-star and 4-star officer intervention will take place at very high-level meetings known as "Tanks". The expectation of Tanks is to resolve any allocation issue and, if needed, inform SECDEF of the change. Tanks normally make decisions quicker than the GFMAP process and can get ahead of the required coordination. For 16 years, while JFCC-ISR and the J-32 have played the role of honest brokers, demand for ISR assets has always exceeded

supply, making the current ISR allocation process contentious and ultimately falling short of the warfighter's expectations and needs.

Understanding the GFMAP process and JFCC-ISRs involvement brings us to the problem inherent in the system. First, this process only involves the "air-breathing, medium altitude" ISR platforms. Space-based and cyber assets are not allocated in the same way as airborne assets. Additionally, there is no guarantee the IC will be able to Process, Exploit and Disseminate (PED) the data collected by IC platforms. Currently, the GFMAP does not allocate all of the required PED when resources are allocated to a GCC. Often, data exists that can solve a CCDR's requirements but is not distributed to warfighters in a methodical, timely manner or in a useable format for the end user. This can result in lives lost or actions delayed in support of US interests. If the force provider cannot provide enough PED for the data that is being collected, JFCC-ISR should document that in the GFMAP. The Combatant Commander can choose to accept risk by collecting data that cannot be processed and disseminated in an acceptable time or usage of the collection asset should be metered to balance PED capacity with the data being collected. Since JFCC-ISR has PED experts in house, it could be the entity to offer practical solutions for this issue to the force provider and combatant commander as needed.

Lieutenant Colonel Nobriga's Air War College research paper on reorganizing the ISR allocation process suggested three options for improving the GFMAP process. He offered that the DoD could create a Chairman's Controlled Activity giving JFCC-ISR OPCON and TACON authority for all ISR assets globally. He also suggested a Specified Combatant Command for Air Force ISR allocation or a Service Component Command under a Functional Component Command.⁸ I agree that while all three of the ideas are plausible and would likely improve the current process, none of these concepts take into consideration that combined operations, intel, cyber and space along with international partners must be brought under one umbrella in order to most effectively manage the entire DoD inventory of ISR assets effectively, as required of the J-3 in JP 3-35.⁹

It is imperative to remember that there are more resources than just medium altitude, airbreathing assets providing ISR to CCMDs. Space-based assets also contribute to SECDEF priorities. As technology and availability of space-based assets advances, they will have a greater contribution to the CCMDs requirements than ever before. Space-based ISR assets should be managed holistically as part of the IC, similar to air breathing assets using the GFMAP process. Having space operations personnel on the JFCC-ISR team will ensure space-based vehicles contribute to CCDR requirements appropriately and could eliminate duplication of efforts between air breathing and space-based assets.

The data "pipes" which move collected intelligence information off of IC platforms to the Air Operations Centers, DoD Intelligence Agencies and Distributed Common Ground System require bandwidth, protection, and dissemination of the data to the decision makers as quickly as possible. Having cyber experts in the collection and PED loop can have a significant impact on maintaining cyber superiority over the enemy and collection of information at our time and place of choosing. Like space operations personnel, cyber personnel must be added to the JFCC-ISR team to holistically focus all DoD ISR assets and supporting activities toward SECDEF's priorities.

Developing a mental model shared between CCMDs, force providers and JFCC-ISR would help diminish frustration over asset allocation and reduce the number of Tanks in resolving CCDR disputes. This cohesive understanding would be initiated with specific JFCC-ISR guidance and policy provided by SECDEF. General Cartwright's Implementation Directive could be used as a guide detailing authorities, tasks and resourcing.¹⁰ Once all players recognize JFCC-ISR as the nucleus of the ISR GFMAP process, deference would be given to them when problems arise. It is assumed that JFCC-ISR would be best suited to solve those issues with a resolution that may not be agreeable to everyone, but it would be legal, palatable to all, and would meet SECDEF's requirements. This would ease the burden on the IC and would be a step in reducing friction for all key players involved. As the CJCS's honest broker for ISR allocation, ensuring JFCC-ISR is part of all Tanks and final allocation decisions would significantly improve the effectiveness of the system and would ensure force providers and CCDRs recognize JFCC-ISR as the primary entity for oversight of the ISR allocation process.

WAY AHEAD

According to a June 2011 General Accounting Office (GAO) report on ISR Integration and Efficiencies, the broad scope of the ISR enterprise made it too difficult to have adequate oversight by the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence. This contributed to poor strategic investment strategies and capability gaps in the IC. The report recommended "an integrated ISR investment strategy" to aggregate ISR funding needs, establish goals and timelines for efficiency efforts and to give priority ISR collection activities.¹¹ While the DoD officially "partially agreed" with these recommendations, no significant strategic changes were made in the IC for years to come. This was likely a result of continued global overtasking of the IC, combined with multiple changes in Secretaries of Defense, and their priorities, from 2011 to 2017.

In spite of the GAO report and continued competition for OPCON of ISR assets in theater, JFCC-ISR was directed to be disestablished beginning in October 2011. This was a result of "SECDEF Efficiency Initiatives" to reduce expenditures in the FY2012 and FY2013 DoD budgets. All JFCC-ISR activities were realigned to the Joint Staff J-2 and J-3 directorates and those entities became responsible for developing an implementation plan for planning, operations and assessment of ISR functions.¹² Currently, the former JFCC-ISR resides in the J-32 division.¹³ Management of IC activities became more complicated with limited Joint Staff entities working on global management and operations of ISR assets.

So, in 2018, in an effort to re-focus IC efforts and develop a holistic IC plan for the future, Lt Gen Jamieson, Deputy of Chief of Staff for ISR, laid out a "Next Generation ISR Flight Plan" to nest with the National Defense Strategy (NDS). This concept was designed to reorient the ISR enterprise from a manpower intensive process to a human-machine team dynamic. It also highlighted the current state of ISR theater operations and the new concepts that will shape future ISR operations.¹⁴

The plan identified a new concept called Sensing, Identifying, Attributing and Sharing (SIAS). The goal was to modify the current use of industrial age air breathing medium altitude ISR platforms to update the collection of intelligence data using multi-domain, multi-intel, prototype and experimental technology.¹⁵ SIAS is designed to use the entire IC, to include government and commercial air-breathing, space based and cyber assets, along with the many facets of Publicly Available Information to achieve a competitive advantage over the enemy. SIAS was intended to use artificial intelligence and machine learning to reduce the human capital needed to process the data and allow the human IC specialists to "harmonize the data to decision quality at speed".¹⁶ Basically, the intent is to allow machines to do the menial work and allow the human's mental capacity to assess the data and provide it in a useable context to the decision maker and warfighter as quickly as possible.

However, in Lt Gen Jamieson's Flight Plan, there was no entity named to manage the multiple technologies, capabilities, global operations or oversight of this new methodology.

While the concept is intriguing, it must have oversight and control. If cyber, space and communication specialists were added to JFCC-ISR, along with appropriate authorities and oversight, it could easily become that entity.

Reorganization

The Air Force recently combined 24th Air Force (Air Force Cyber Command) with 25th Air Force (Air Force Intelligence Command) to become the 16th Air Force (Information Warfare Command). 16AF resembles what JFCC-ISR needs to become. It has Operators and Intelligence Officers from 25AF and incorporates cyber warriors from 24AF. Revamping JFCC-ISR, the entity with "global responsibility for ISR" and cyber could resemble the Information Warfare Numbered Air Force that was redesigned to better support the IC and CCDRs requirements. I am not suggesting the wholesale removal of ISR assets and personnel from 16AF. Rather, I recommend one entity be ultimately responsible for how the entire IC is planned, organized, managed and led. While 16AF is a great model to use, it currently does not have the bandwidth, personnel or expertise to holistically manage the IC.

In order to fix the GFMAP process, JFCC-ISR should be returned to USSTRATCOM, or as suggested in Lt Col Nobriga's paper, stand up a Functional Component Command (FCC) for ISR as an entity with General Officer oversight.¹⁷ Having USSTRATCOM, or an FCC, as the JFCC-ISR lead allows for honest brokering of ISR assets. As a Functional Component Command, USSTRATCOM does not have allegiances to any service branch, Geographic Combatant Command, or CCDR. A new ISR FCC could be the global coordinator for the entire DoD IC portfolio. Legal authority and control for the FCC would come from CJCS. Guidance should focus on the process of strategic planning, allocation, and oversight with specific consideration given to the interaction between force provider, CCDR and ISR coordinator.

Therefore, with senior General Officer oversight and support, JFCC-ISR could manage the entire allocation process from cradle to grave without undue influence from force providers or CCDRs.

PROCESSES, PEOPLE AND POLICIES

In order to achieve an improved process for allocation and management of ISR assets, I will briefly explore a few emerging techniques and policies that can significantly improve the way IC assets are used to meet CCDR's requirements. The goal is to offer a timely response with a tailored IC capability while ensuring the personnel and asset are only used when and where needed.

Combined Multi-Domain Personnel

General Goldfein's Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) Focus Area #3: Enhancing Multi-Domain Command and Control¹⁸ fittingly identifies who should be on the JFCC-ISR team. Employment of the force across multiple domains highlights the cohesive effort required by operators, intel specialists, space experts and cyber warriors. Combining all these domains and professions would be a significant step for the IC in building a comprehensive plan to support SECDEF's priorities, instead of stovepipes of excellence for each CCMD AOR as has been done for the past 20 years. The Air Force has recognized the need for multi-domain experts when it established a new AFSC, 13O, for Multi-Domain Officers (MDOs). 13Os come from operations, intelligence, cyber or space and have already served at least seven years in their primary career field.¹⁹ The purpose is for 13Os to have the desire and ability to integrate their knowledge with others in the IC to form a cohesive cadre of MDO warfighters. The new AFSC, 13O, is a perfect example of what is needed at JFCC-ISR.

In addition to Air Force operations, intel, cyber and space personnel in JFCC-ISR, sister services and international partners must be added to the team. The Navy already has a significant

presence in JFCC-ISR, which ensures maritime collection activities are well represented. Expanding the Army and Marine presence would bring a fundamental understanding of those service's ISR capabilities to the mix.

Countries that possess similar capabilities to the US already participate in collection activities that align with US interests.²⁰ Therefore, direct international partner involvement with JFCC-ISR would allow access to assets that could be allocated via the GFMAP through international partnerships sharing agreements. The United Kingdom, Australian, and Norwegian officers would strengthen international participation in the GFMAP by allowing force providers to have additional ISR assets for the global offering.

Combat Cloud

"Victory in future combat" requires a "fully networked force where each platform's sensors are networked and connected".²¹ According to Gen Goldfein, all IC assets must be able to collaborate via networks and clouds. Air Combat Command recently introduced the Combat Cloud, where data can be gathered through sensors, humans, cyber and space to be made accessible to users.²² Warfighters needing information to execute assigned tasks will be able to pull data from the cloud and apply it to their operations. For this concept to succeed, IC assets must be interconnected, with easy access to data into and out of the Combat Cloud.

JFCC-ISR could champion the Combat Cloud to advance the use of collected intelligence. Cyber operators, algorithms and software could help ensure force providers are providing the necessary resources to meet CCDRs requirements. In-house PED experts could provide guidance and oversight to ensure the data collected is quickly disseminated to the warfighter. Airborne, space-based, and cyber IC systems must be interconnected in future wars. A single, integrated, specialized team that ensures all IC customers have access to the Combat Cloud is crucial to the success of the program. While JFCC-ISR would not manage the day to day maintenance of the Combat Cloud, they could ensure the Cloud is used to its maximum potential by IC producers and warfighters.

Joint All Domain Command and Control

The concept of using all service capabilities to link air, space, land, sea and cyber is known as Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). This idea is designed to bring the necessary people and equipment to bear on a specific threat. The goal was to eliminate the stove piped COCOM construct with allocated assets by holistically viewing SECDEF's priorities and allocating appropriate capabilities to address the issue.

In Dec 2019, a joint exercise between the services, using multiple capabilities, was executed to defeat a simulated threat to the homeland. Air Force F-16s, F-22s and F-35s along with Navy F-35s and destroyers, an Army ground launched missile site, and special forces, were coordinated, simultaneously, through a new system called Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS). This system was designed to test real-time warfighting communication between platforms and personnel, and to enhance decision making during combat. It was engineered to encompass all space-based and air breathing ISR assets, along with the flow of information to, from and between these assets to provide an efficient use of capabilities in real time while ensuring other global concerns are not forgotten. The test was overwhelmingly successful and will be repeated every four months to continuously improve execution of the system.²³

Additionally, the testing of the ABMS brought about an unintended benefit; educating new troops on joint operations and the culture of multiple branches of the military. One of the

most important factors that must be considered when bringing all services together to solve a single problem is to develop a commensurate culture to execute the joint plan. Regardless of the technology involved, JADC2 and ABMS cannot be successful without an understanding of joint operations by all parties involved. Therefore, those who manage ISR assets globally, must be familiar and comfortable with multiple services, assets and processes needed to execute globally integrated ISR ops. JFCC-ISR can be that entity. Navy, Marine and Air Force personnel already work in that division. Bringing in cyber, space and comm experts will only bolster an already proven organization and prepare it for JADC2 and systems like ABMS.

Eliminate the GFMAP?

CJCSM 3314.01A provides DoD guidance for Intelligence Planning. It details how CCMDs, Joint Staff and Force Providers should conduct collaborative intelligence planning to support CCDRs campaign plans, contingency plans and orders.²⁴ This document highlights the multiple processes that are required to meet the supported CCDR's requirements. It provides strategic tools and assessments to identify IC knowledge gaps and to prevent shortfalls in collection of intel. However, because the document is strategic in nature, it does not specifically identify how to manage the allocation and execution of ISR assets in support of CCDRs requirements, leaving implementation and oversight of collection activities up to interpretation by multiple entities in the IC. Additionally, the CJCSM allows a very long lead time with multiple steps in the planning process. As a result, it does not account for time sensitive, ad hoc requests by CCDRs, leaving force providers and CCDRs with insufficient guidance for appropriate allocation and prioritization of assets based on the current environment.

Therefore, being able to plan, organize and execute the asset allocation, with sufficient oversight and personnel may not be enough for a single entity like JFCC-ISR to produce

effective solutions for the force providers and warfighters. Current GFMAP allocations are projected for the next two fiscal years. Emerging threats can impact SECDEF's priorities before any planned GFMAP allocation is executed, resulting in significant, unexpected changes for force providers and uncertainty for CCDRs.

The current allocation process cannot keep up with global dynamic requirements and should be modified in favor of an ad hoc structure. The GFMAP process should either have a shorter time horizon or be eliminated altogether. If eliminated, the SECDEF should give the legal authority to JFCC-ISR to adjudicate allocation of ISR assets in accordance with FADM priorities and the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). The FADM and GEF would be the governing documents driving the allocation of ISR assets and associated activities globally.

If an ad hoc style of allocation is approved by SECDEF, JFCC-ISR as lead coordinator, could become the de facto primary POC for emerging requirements and be responsible for global re-allocation and deployment of assets through force providers. JFCC-ISR as a "one stop shop" could coordinate between all IC players, all branches, and international partners, in resolution and adjudication of SECDEFs priorities. JFCC-ISR General Officer oversight could also deny CCDRs requests that do not meet FADM criteria or fail to meet SECDEF's intent. This would allow for timely resolution to CCDRs requests and provide solutions to prevent overtasking the force providers. All IC players, to include air, space, intel, and cyber, must be part of the process or an ineffective solution is likely.

CJCS, the Global Integrator

Title 10 U.S. Code § 153 states that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is responsible for "Global Military Integration". Specifically, "in matters relating to global military strategic and operational integration", the CJCS is responsible to the President and Secretary of

Defense as the global integrator on "the allocation and transfer of forces among geographic and functional combatant commands, as necessary, to address transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional threats".²⁵ With the CJCS as the Global Integrator, all military personal and assets could be allocated based on SECDEF priority with a global view instead of the geographic or functional paradigms that currently exist.

Allocating ISR assets and capabilities globally via JFCC-ISR would benefit from having only one adjudicator rather than a group of geographic commanders focused on their specific Area of Responsibility. The low number of space-based and air breathing ISR assets along with the insatiable demand for these platforms would be optimized by providing overarching "integrator" guidance to the CCDRs and force providers and ensuring the assets and personnel are being utilized efficiently to address the requirement instead of the current time-based model that provides assets to a specific CCDR for a specific period, regardless of the status of the problem. JFCC-ISR could develop the global allocation plan, then use the CJCS Global Integrator model to enforce and approve execution and revisions.

Vignette

Russia's desire to seize and secure territory near its borders has become more deliberate over the past few years. The annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the increased strategic military activity at Kaliningrad highlight the importance of the region on a global scale.²⁶ The US and its allies must ensure current, appropriate intelligence is being collected on this area in order to protect nations like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from Russian missile strikes or invasion. Currently, the IC assets being used to collect this data are managed by multiple entities. SPACECOM, CYBERCOM, EUCOM, for example, all have OPCON of IC assets being used to develop the Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.²⁷ That data is used to assist war planners with developing executable courses of action during wartime or contingency planning. With multiple agencies coordinating their own intelligence collection, there is a high likelihood of overlap of collection by multiple collecting assets, gaps in collection and biased results from the data collected. The collected data is normally sent in different formats, at different times, to different senior level decision makers who can have an influence on SECDEF and Presidential decisions. The result can be overwhelming and frustrating for senior level officials as the data may seem contradictory, delayed, or incomplete when needed. If a significant activity occurs in this region of the world, US actions may be hindered by a burdensome IC collection and management process that could have been improved with updated tools and policies.

When faced with a challenge like Crimea or Kaliningrad, concepts like MDC2, Combat Cloud and ABMS should be utilized to improve intelligence collection, dissemination and management of data collected by space-based and air breathing assets from all services to include our international partners. The methods used today, while effective, are slow, unwieldy and cause angst amongst CCDRs. We possess the capability to execute ISR operations at a time and place of our choosing, but the processes that govern those assets and their allocation need to be revised. JFCC-ISR can become the nucleus of those much-needed changes.

Conclusion

Revamping JFCC-ISR is vital to the future of the IC. Reinvigorating the role for "global responsibility of ISR" would reduce the contentious nature of ISR planning, execution, allocation and oversight. Incorporating PED allocation, space asset management, cyberspace expertise, and communication specialists along with updated policies into the JFCC-ISR portfolio would bring unprecedented access to global ISR, making the IC more effective. All branches, along with our

international partners, must be involved to ensure the process is running at maximum efficiency and to solidify a combined front of true global ISR asset management.

In order to maintain a competitive ISR advantage, cumbersome processes like the GFMAP must be modified or eliminated. Harnessing artificial intelligence and machine learning can not only help us to collect intelligence data more efficiently, it can help us plan and allocate the assets and personnel more effectively, allowing us to do more with the limited LD/HD IC assets in the DoD inventory. JFCC-ISR manages the GFMAP process, so it is appropriate that they develop a system which allows the CCDR to get what is appropriate to satisfy his intelligence requirement, while balancing what the force provider can sustain without squandering vital IC capabilities.

Incorporating operations, intel, cyber, space and comms under one umbrella can provide oversight and monitoring of this daunting task. JFCC-ISR will not be tasked to provide the tactical data that comes into each end users' terminals, but strategic oversight of the process, feedback from the war planners and end users, and a focus on a structured collection of data from multiple sources can make JFCC-ISR a linchpin in the IC.

New concepts like the Combat Cloud, JADC2, and Global Integrator provide a roadmap to achieving a more holistic approach and can be used to reduce or eliminate much of the outdated processes and guidance for ISR allocation. That would allow JFCC-ISR to become more agile, addressing CCDRs requirements more effectively with less stress on the IC. A leaner, more effective IC will ensure our nation's priorities are achieved, allies are protected, and American interests are defended with a renewed focus from those in the IC.

Notes

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⁶ "Deployment and Redeployment Operations." Accessed September 24, 2019. <u>https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_35.pdf</u>.

⁷ "JOINT INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION PROCEDURES." Accessed September 24, 2019. <u>https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/1301_01.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-</u>175004-953.

⁸ "GLOBAL INTEGRATED ISR A BETTER ORGANIZATIONAL CONSTRUCT FOR AF LD-HD ISR." Accessed September 24, 2019. https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ISR/student-papers/AY16-17/GI%20ISR---A Better Organizational Construct for AF LD-HD ISR.pdf.

⁹ "JP3-35" Accessed March 20, 2020. https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_35.pdf.

¹⁰ Cartwright, James E. Joint Functional Component for Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JFCC-ISR) – Implementation Directive, 24 January 2005

¹¹ "Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise." Accessed February 2, 2020. <u>https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319163.pdf</u>.

¹² "Actions Are Needed to Increase Integration and Efficiencies of DOD's ISR Enterprise." Accessed February 2, 2020. <u>https://www.gao.gov/assets/320/319163.pdf</u>.

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