


MAIN IMPEDIMENTS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AFRICAN UNION STANDBY
FORCES' ABILITY TO COPE WITH CONFLICT SITUATIONS
THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT



A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

AKANDALL KOLAWOLE DE SOUZA, CAPTAIN, BENIN ARMY
Master, Royal Military Academy, Brussels, Belgium, 2009

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2019

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Name of Candidate: Akandall K. de Souza

Thesis Title: Main Impediments to the Effectiveness of African Union Standby Forces'
Ability to Cope with Conflict Situations throughout the Continent

Approved by:

_____, Thesis Committee Chair
Michael J. Burke, Ed.D.

_____, Member
Kenneth E. Long, D.M.

_____, Member
Roderick C. Jackson, M.S.

Accepted this 14th day of June 2019 by:

_____, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D.

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ABSTRACT

MAIN IMPEDIMENTS TO THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AFRICAN UNION STANDBY FORCES' ABILITY TO COPE WITH CONFLICT SITUATIONS THROUGHOUT THE CONTINENT, by Captain Akandall K. de Souza, 148 pages.

Security has been, for a long time, a major concern for Africans; from the founding of the Organization of African Unity through its newer version the African Union (AU). AU leaders have firmly resolved to ensure security by 2063. They created a mechanism, African Peace and Security Architecture, and its instrument, the African Standby Forces (ASF). However, this nascent system has proven to be ineffective in dealing with internal conflicts or terrorism.

This research is an analytical study and through a qualitative research design, based upon two-case studies (South Sudan and Somalia), it assessed ASF effectiveness in conducting peace operations, through the lens of U.S. Joint doctrine framework. To this end, this analysis uses four out of the seven joint functions: command and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, and protection.

This study has concluded that the main impediments faced by ASF include lack of doctrine, force projection, operational planning, strategic logistics, and force protection capabilities and its subsequent heavy reliance on external partners. Recommendations include the necessity for the AU to build capacities across levels (strategic and operational) for the different components of the ASF (military, police and civilian) in order to ensure success.

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ACRONYMS

AFISMA	African-Led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIS	African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AU	African Union
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
AQIM	Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COIN	Counterinsurgency Operations
CT	Counter Terrorism
C-VEO	Counter Violent Extremist Organizations
DDR	Demobilization Disarmament Reinsertion
DOD	Department of Defense
FC	Force Commander
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FMM/CBLT	Force Multinationale Mixte/Conférence Bassin du Lac Tchad
HCFA	Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
HN	Host Nation
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
JFC	Joint Force Commander
JRSOI	Joint Reception Staging Onward movement and Integration
JTF	Joint Task Force
MINUSMA	Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MRAP	Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle
PEO	Peace Enforcement Operations
PKO	Peacekeeping Operations
PSO	Peace Support Operations
SNA	Somali National Army
SOF	Special Operations Forces
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TNG	Transitional National Government
UN	United Nations
UNIBAM	United Nation Infantry Battalion Manual
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNSOA	United Nations Support Office for AMISOM

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I dream of the realization of the unity of Africa, whereby its leaders combine in their efforts to solve the problems of this continent. I dream of our vast deserts, of our forests, of all our great wildernesses.

—Nelson Mandela, Brainyquote

Overview

Africa, the birthplace of humanity, has struggled for a long time to rise from poverty and grant its children prosperity. Yet, constant conflicts endlessly hamper its efforts towards that objective. Leaders across parts of the continent have vainly faced the issues through diverse security mechanisms, but these efforts have not prevented tragedies like those that occurred in Rwanda, South Sudan, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and many more small-scale conflicts throughout the continent.

Following their respective independences, leaders solidified a sheer vow of unity and Pan-Africanism with the creation in 1963 of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), mostly in view to support liberation movement¹ in territories still under colonialism and apartheid. With the multiple shortcomings spurred by changing political, social and economic environment, especially with an increasing globalization that greatly struck the continent in its ability to keep competitive its economy and its security, the Heads of States of African countries resolved to the evolution of the existing OAU to an

¹ Encyclopedia.com, “Organization of African Unity (OAU),” 2018, accessed 17 November 2018, <https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/political-science-and-government/international-organizations/organization-african-unity>.

African Union (AU) in conclusion of an Extraordinary Session in Sirte (Egypt)² in 1999. The new union cherishes the vision of “*an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in global arena.*”³ The Constitutive Act⁴ adopted at the Lome Summit in 2000 makes a significant shift in terms of the institutional functioning, emphasizing on a right to intervene in member state, commonly referred to as the “non-indifference” status, in rid of the former “non-intervention,”⁵ that actually led the organization powerless in addressing the security challenges that arose. Noteworthy, it specified the cases in which that intervention without the consent of the Member State can happen, namely war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (article 4 (h) of the Constitutive Act). On a security standpoint, this shift bears huge consequences in terms of moral and even legal responsibility the organization now endorses in the prevention and management of conflicts throughout the continent. The Peace and Security Protocol (PSP) emplaced within the Constitutive Act established an “African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)” as an instrument of the

² African Union, “History: AU Reforms,” accessed 14 October 2018, <https://au.int/history/oau-and-au>.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), *Constitute Act of the African Union* (Adopted by the Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Lome, Togo, 11 July 2000), accessed 14 October 2018, https://au.int/sites/default/files/pages/32020-file-constitutiveact_en.pdf.

⁵ Marina Sharpe, *From Non-Interference to Non-Indifference: The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect*, International Refugee Rights Initiative, September 2017, accessed 13 September 2018, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/AU%20R2P%20-%20final.pdf>, 4.

Peace and Security Council (PSC) created therein by that Act to cope with crisis situations in Africa.

As a matter of fact, the nature of the conflict in Africa has been expanding significantly over the last several decades. Originally, they were mainly of three origins:⁶ territorial dispute over prescribed borders from colonialism, struggle to achieve freedom over a corrupt western supported leadership as a result of Cold War, and failed states ravaged by internal conflicts due to contesting elections over allegations of fraud, religion or ethnic hatred in background. However, in the increasingly challenging global environment shaped by terrorism and transnational criminal organizations (TCOs), current conflicts incorporate new tactics that African military forces are not quite trained to deal with. Their ability to cope with this new asymmetrical warfare is very limited, in respect to their doctrine, means or equipment, training, intelligence capabilities, organization, leadership and personnel. Previous paradigms used in these militaries are not valid anymore. New concepts and doctrines should be developed and assessment made based upon these changes. The present study thrives to compare the process of the African Standby Forces (ASF) in light of the U.S. doctrinal concept of Joint Functions.

The APSA⁷ is the way for the PSC to promote peace, security and stability on the continent as mandated by the Union within its Constitutive Act (article 3(f)). The

⁶ GSDRC, “Causes of Conflict in Africa,” 2015, accessed 14 October 2018, <http://gsdrc.org/document-library/causes-of-conflict-in-africa/>.

⁷ African Union Peace and Security Department, *African Peace and Security Architecture* (2010 Assessment Study, Adopted by the Third Meeting of the Chief Executives and Senior Officials of the AU, RECs and RMs on the Implementation of the MoU on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security, Zanzibar, Tanzania, 4-10 November, 2010), accessed 13 September 2018, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3->

components of the APSA are the AU Commission, a Panel of the Wise (POW), a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), the ASF and a Special Fund. A series of objectives has been specified, aside from the aforementioned, anticipate and prevent conflicts, promote and implement peace-building and post conflict reconstruction activities, coordinate and harmonize continental efforts in the prevention and combating of international terrorism in all its aspects, develop a common defense policy for the Union, and promote and encourage democratic practices, good governance and the rule of law, protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for the sanctity of human life and international humanitarian law. To perform this task, the PSC opted to rely mainly on the Regional Economic Communities (REC), already existing and numbered in 8, and the Regional Mechanisms (RM), numbered in 2.

Yet, the African Standby Forces, the actual defensive and military instrument of the APSA, suffers from the non-readiness of the regional brigades, endowed to be of use for the continental ASF. Out of the five regional brigades, the West African Brigade, prominently sets itself apart being very responsive to crises occurring within its area. The others are non-operational either due to inexistence of forces or hemmed in by internal leadership competition within Member States.

The current study will examine the ASF in terms of Joint Functions and provide recommendations at use for African leaders.

Primary Research Question

As stated earlier, many conflicts erupted amid tensions due to diversity of ethnics, cultures, languages and quest of power and of resources. The ASF of the AU have been deployed multiple times to restore peace. Yet, several deficiencies were noticed throughout the African Union's missions. The spectacle of the Jihad insurgents in northern Mali regardless the presence of African forces evokes some problems plaguing the organization.

There comes the primary research question: What are the main impediments to the effectiveness of African Standby forces to cope with conflict situations throughout the continent?

Secondary Research Questions

To answer this research question, it will be necessary to enlighten the reader on some very specific queries:

1. What is the state of those conflicts where AU forces have been or are deployed? (2003 to present day)?
2. What aspects of AU deployments have been or are effective? What aspects are less effective?
3. What are the reasons those aspects are less effective?
4. What can the AU do to overcome impediments and create effective forces?

Definitions and Terms

To better understand the content of this analysis, it is important to contextualize based on the meanings of those key words used throughout this paper. Some are specific

to the African Union framework, while others are actually borrowed from the lexicon of U.S. military words and acronyms. The definitions hereafter do indeed help get the substance of the paper in its problem statement, the presentation of various aspects and nuances of the organizations, their roles and functions, and the extent of the recommendations made at the end. The choice of the U.S. doctrine to conduct this study is based upon the scale of integration of diverse functions in the conduct of the planning process. The Joint Functions framework, in the opinion of the author, is a good model for planning of military operations.

Joint Doctrine: Is specifically a U.S. military term and consists of the fundamental principles that guide the employment of military forces in coordinated action toward a common objective and may include terms, tactics, techniques, and procedures.⁸

Assembly: Is the supreme organ and comprises Heads of State and Government from all Member States. It determines the AU's policies, establishes its priorities, adopts its annual program and monitors the implementation of its policies and decisions.⁹

African Union Commission: Is the Secretariat of the Union entrusted with executive functions. It represents the Union and protects its interest under the auspices of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as the Executive Committee. The AU Commission is made up of different portfolios. They are: Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and Energy; Social Affairs; Rural

⁸ African Union Peace and Security Department, *African Peace and Security Architecture*.

⁹ African Union, "The Assembly," accessed 18 October 2018, <https://au.int/en/assembly>.

Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources, Science and Technology; and Economic Affairs.¹⁰

African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA): Is the umbrella term for the main AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa.¹¹ Consisting of five organs¹² (Panel of the Wise, African Standby Forces, Peace and Security Council, Military Staff Committee, and the Continental Early Warning System), it's the main tool to address security issues throughout the continent.

Panel of the Wise (PoW): The Panel members are five selected from among highly respected African personalities of high integrity and independence (PSC protocol, article 11), who have made outstanding contributions to Africa in the areas of peace, security and development. They shall not hold active political office at the time of their appointment and during their tenure as Panel members. The purpose of this organ is to support the PSC and the Chairperson of the AU commission in the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa.¹³

¹⁰ African Union, "The Assembly."

¹¹ African Union, "The Peace and Security Council," accessed 18 October 2018, <https://au.int/en/psc>.

¹² African Union, "Chapter 1, Peace Support Operations: Strategic Context, Concepts and Directions," African Union Peace and Security, December 2013, accessed 20 October 2018, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/au-pso-doctrine-chapter-1-edited.pdf>, 2-5.

¹³ African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *African Union Handbook 2014* (African Union and New Zealand Crown, 2014), accessed 06 June 2019, <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/pdf/au/au-handbook-2014.pdf>.

Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) Is the veil system of the AU. Its purpose is to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts.¹⁴ (PSC protocol, article 12). For so, they monitor security situation across the continent within their member states and collect information on potential outbreaks of conflicts or tensions, on a daily or weekly basis. Those information, provided by field missions, liaison offices and early warning units of the Regional Mechanisms (RMs), are assessed 24hours a day in the Observation and Monitoring Centre of the Conflict Management Division, known as the ‘Situation Room’.

Regional Economic Community (REC): Is the building block of economic integration for Africa. In number of five, they play an essential role in working with the African Union in achieving peace and security objectives.¹⁵ As Regional Mechanisms that ensure the full operationalization of the APSA, they are tasked to promote initiatives aimed at anticipating and preventing conflicts and, in circumstances where conflicts have occurred, peace-making and peace-building function (PSC protocol, article 16 al, 1&2).

Peace Fund: Organ established by the PSC protocol (article 21, al.1) to provide financial resources for peace support missions and other operational activities related to peace and security. It’s a trust fund made up of financial appropriations from the regular AU budget; voluntary contributions from Member States, international partners and other

¹⁴ African Union, “The Peace and Security Council.”

¹⁵ United Nations Office of Special Adviser on Africa, “The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) of the African Union,” United Nations, accessed 14 October 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/africa/osaa/peace/recs.shtml>.

sources such as private sector, civil society and individuals, as well as through fund-raising activities.¹⁶

North African Regional Capability (NARC): Was established in 2007 as a regional mechanism of the Arab Maghreb Union for the African Standby Force. The NARC Secretariat coordinates the development of the Northern African capabilities for the Standby Force, consisting of military, police and civilian components.¹⁷

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS): African organization established by the Treaty of Lagos in May 1975 to promote economic trade, cooperation, and self-reliance. The organization seeks to harmonize agricultural policies and to facilitate the free movement of peoples, services, and capital between members.¹⁸

Military Staff Committee: Is composed of senior military officers from PSC member countries (PSC protocol, article 13 al. 9), the MSC is intended to submit relevant recommendations to the PSC chairperson on how Africa's peace support capacities can be enhanced. It is also mandated to advise and assist the PSC to ensure that policies and actions in the fields of conflict prevention, management and resolution are consistent with sub-regional mechanisms.¹⁹

¹⁶ African Union Commission and New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, *African Union Handbook 2014*.

¹⁷ African Standby Capacity (ASC), "ASC Partners," accessed 23 September 2018, https://africanstandbycapacity.org/wordpress/?page_id=38.

¹⁸ Encyclopedia Britannica, "Economic Community of West African States," accessed 23 September 2018, <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Economic-Community-of-West-African-States>.

¹⁹ Hallelujah Lulie, "Despite its crucial role in military and security matters, the AU MSC still has several challenges to overcome," Institute for Security Studies, 25 May

Joint Task Force (JTF): A U.S. doctrinal general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single Joint Force Commander (JFC).²⁰

Unity of effort: A U.S. doctrinal concept that means the coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, even though the participants are not necessarily part of the same command structure or organization, which is the product of successful unified action.²¹

Unified action: A U.S. doctrinal concept that means the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort.²²

Unity of command: A U.S. doctrinal concept that means all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a

2015, accessed 27 December 2018, <https://issafrica.org/iss-today/towards-a-functioning-military-staff-committee-of-the-au>.

²⁰ Headquarters, Department of the Army. Field Manual 1-02 (FM 101-5-1)/Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12A), *Operational Terms and Graphics* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, September 2004), accessed 29 December 2018, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/1-02/fm1-02.pdf>.

²¹ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf, para. 1-b, V-I.

²² *Ibid.*, para. 1-b, V-I.

common purpose.²³ Unity of command requires that two commanders may not exercise the same command relationship over the same force at any one time.²⁴

Command and Control (C2): A U.S. doctrinal term which is a function that encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned or attached forces to accomplish the mission.²⁵

Movement and Maneuver (M2): A U.S. doctrine's term that is a function that encompasses the disposition of joint forces to conduct operations by securing positional advantages before or during combat operations and by exploiting tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives.²⁶

Fires: A U.S. doctrinal term that is a function that encompasses the fires associated with a number of tasks, missions, and processes including conduct Joint Targeting, provide Joint Fire Support, countering Air and Missile Threats, interdict Enemy Capabilities, conduct Strategic Attack, Employ IRCs, assess the Results of Employing Fires.²⁷

Protection: A U.S. doctrinal term that is a function that encompasses force protection, force health protection (FHP), and other protection activities. Force protection

²³ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp1_ch1.pdf, para. 1-b, V-I.

²⁴ CJCS, JP 1-02, para. 1-b, V-I.

²⁵ CJCS, JP 3-0, para. 1-b, V-I.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, III-33.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

preserves the joint force's fighting potential by using active defensive and passive defensive measures, by applying technology and procedure, and using emergency management and response.²⁸

Intelligence: A U.S. doctrinal term that is a function that encompasses the joint intelligence process. The joint intelligence process consists of six interrelated categories of intelligence operations:²⁹ planning and direction of intelligence activities, collection of data, processing and exploitation of collected data to produce relevant information, analysis of information and production of intelligence, dissemination and integration of intelligence with operations, and evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence effectiveness and quality. Fundamental to joint operations, it helps to understand the operational environment and subsequently to opt for the appropriate operational approach.

Sustainment: A U.S. doctrinal term representing a function that is the provision of logistics and personnel services to maintain operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Sustainment provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) the means to enable freedom of action and endurance and to extend operational reach. Sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.³⁰

²⁸ CJCS, JP 3-0, III-35.

²⁹ Ibid., III-24,

³⁰ Ibid., III-42.

Limitations and Delimitations

References as for doctrine by AU on peacekeeping operations are really rare. Not much publications are available, restraining the plurality and the diversity of viewpoints on the matter. This constitutes a significant limitation on the conduct of this research. But this is mitigated as the author has considerable knowledge of the African military forces, from his interaction with these personnel and capabilities through seminars, UN missions, multilateral exercises conducted on the continent. As instructor in a peacekeeping school in his country, he also got the opportunity, in midst of visits to African countries, to be acquainted with the capabilities of other African forces deployed in several peace support operations throughout the continent.

With regard to the delimitation, this study will focus on two African Union missions: African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) to analyze the successes and the failures of the ASF in fulfilling their tasks. It will also exclude three joint functions: fires, information and sustainment function, considering time constraints and depth wished for this study. It will focus on the four retained functions (C2, intelligence, protection and M2).

Significance

First and foremost, there are few military-focused publications on the ASF. Existing publications are mostly written in general terms, evoking political, logistic and funding issues. This study that will be conducted through a very military analytical framework can add to the scholarly research and literature in the African peacekeeping operations domain in a very new way. Second, the study will help improve practice by the African political and military leaderships.

Plus, the United States seeks to advance its national interests by promoting a free world, peaceful and prosperous. An African continent strangled in conflicts and unable to overcome its security issues does not help advance these goals. Furthermore, a significant part of the Peace Fund of the African Union dedicated mainly to resolve security issues across the continent is allocated by the U.S. entities. Understanding the problem facing the African Union and the difficulties in building a robust defense mechanism against conflicts can help better support the efforts of African partners in reaching peace for their continent.

Also noteworthy, Africa is the continent of promise and of the future. Standing by the side of the African populations and their leaders in facing the present challenges is a blessed way to enforce its presence in Africa and guarantee the preservations of its national interests. African chancelleries are now courted by many, if not all, powers in the world with a view to access its resources and increasing market.

Additional reasons why this study is important relates to terrorism and mass migration.

Violent Extremist Organizations threaten U.S. interests in Africa as they create unsecure climate for trading opportunities and lead to failed states. With more and more sanctuaries being emplaced in sub-Saharan part of Africa as a result of the collapse of the Libyan regime in midst of Arab spring in 2011, there is a resurgence of terrorist attacks and a densification of the networks of terrorist activists with an easier passage from East to West and North to South. ISIS, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, and their affiliates operate on the continent and have increased the lethality of their attacks and expanded to new

areas.³¹ The multiplication of their activities that occurred in the years 2012 through 2015 involved a targeting of Westerners, among whom some Americans. Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) fearlessly settle in the “non-governed” territories in the Sahel region and conduct all kinds of illicit trafficking, with some networks directly coming from South America.

The other side of the coin of these terrorists is their link to piracy along the coast of Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. This part of Africa, usually referred to as the Horn of Africa, serves as passage to a significant part of the global trade. The last and current decade have particularly warned on the danger of having failed states due to radical movements being dominant and even ruling, as was the case in Somalia.

A very logical deduction of this instability in Africa is the mass migration being witnessed for years now at the doors of Europe. Numerous African population flee from areas where they are subject to insecurity and hunger because they cannot go to the fields and farm, or are simply murdered on their way to work stations, farms, schools, markets, and even parties. Hopeless, they resort to crossing the Mediterranean Sea in very untenable conditions and madding attempts. This mass migration threatens the stability of America’s allies in Europe. Another subsequent drawback of this phenomenon is the foreign terrorist fighters that perpetrate attacks in European cities as noticed recently in Paris, Brussels, and Berlin that took advantage of those mass migration to gain access to Europe.

³¹ U.S. President, *National Security Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), accessed September 2018, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf>.

Africa is now being a continent of promise and of opportunities. With its middle-class expanding at a very fast rate and its economies counting among the fastest growing of the globe, it becomes vital to ensure the seizure of promising opportunities presented to the exportation of American goods and services. With a greater presence through export but also through businessmen and American people on the continent, the U.S. will reinforce its influence as a global superpower while building real strong relationships with the Africans.

Lastly, knowing more about the subject of this paper will avoid the U.S. to have to put boots on the ground as it can wisely assist its African partners in improving the capacities of their security services and mechanisms of counter-terrorism, human trafficking, and illegal trade of arms and natural resources.

On a more personal note, this work can help us to better explore ways to build our ASF and thereby enhance the security, stability, and development our continent needs.

Summary

Africa is struggling to provide security and peace to its inhabitants. It has been a sincere vow of the founding fathers of the African Union. Evolution has been noticed about the extent to which the organization will go to enforce respect of human life and provision of a peaceful environment conducive to the uplifting from poverty and the development of its nations. The African Standby Force, on which relies the organization to set this environment, suffers from many obstacles that this study will try to elucidate through the lens of the U.S. military's concept of Joint Functions. The methodology will consist of a qualitative analysis of existing references as theoretical framework and use of

a case study as method. The following chapter will set the stage in presenting the literature on the African Standby Forces and their operations.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

No one benefits from an empty jar; fill yourself first before pouring out to others.
— Unknown, *African Leadership Magazine*

Introduction

When it comes to the African Standby Forces and their operations throughout Africa, not much of military-focused publications are available. Strategic studies institutes and centers rather embrace the political and logistic aspects that leverage these missions than the military aspects of their conduct. Some of those publications are exposed later below.

Additionally, for the purpose of this study, other reference materials like doctrine for peacekeeping operations and counter-terrorism operations, fundamental documents of the African Union, treaties and memorandum between the African Union and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), joint publications for the Joint Task Forces (JTFs), and reports of African missions have been exploited. All combined, they are important to contextualize the actions of the African Union and of its Standby Forces. The reports, especially, would help identify the gaps and the main impediments in regard to the joint functions picked out of the Joint publications of U.S. doctrine. They will be discussed better in details in the findings in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Strategic Studies Institutes Publications

The first book that helped grasp some of the issues of the ASF is “*The future of African peace operations: from the Janjaweed to Boko Haram*” edited by Cedric de

Coning, Linnéa Gelot and John Karlsrud, and published in 2016 by Zed Books. Cedric de Coning revealed in the introductory chapter titled ‘*Towards an African model of peace operations*’³² that most of the peace operations to date are in fact performed by coalitions of the willing rather than being part of ASF mechanisms, meaning the ASF is not as functional as it should be, mired in political intrigues and significant capabilities issues. In face of the events of 2013 with the VEOs of North Mali, a new African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises (ACIRC)³³ was established to counter the lack of readiness of the ASF. In actuality, this force was never operationalized, as many influential member states and even some regional organizations showed concerns, pointing obstacles towards achieving a full operationalization of the ASF Rapid Deployment Capabilities.

Second, the International Journal of History and Cultural Studies (IJHCS), volume 3, issue 3 titled “*African Standby Force: A Song of Sorrow*” and published in 2017, gives a good picture of the challenges to the development of the ASF. Dr Ebere R. Adigbuo, senior Lecturer in the Department of History and International Studies at Abraka Delta State University of Nigeria, recognizes in this article that some ‘modicum’ progress has been made over the last decade to train and assemble troops but nothing is to be recorded in regard to the operationalization of the ASF. He points out financial

³² Cedric de Coning, Linnea Gelot, and John Karlsrud, eds., *The Future of African Peace Operations: From the Janjaweed to Boko Haram* (Creative Commons, 2016), accessed 22 December 2018, <http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:913028/FULLTEXT02.pdf>.

³³ Malte Brosig and Norman Sempijja, Africa Portal, accessed 14 December 2018, https://www.africaportal.org/.../saiia_spi_22_Brosig__Simpijja_21050729_MUfwl0k.pdf.

dependence, logistics problems, communication problems, and national interest with dual centre of authority as the four main issues of this organization. Taking the examples of AMIS and Burundi Mission, he showed that the AU lacks the necessary funding. For instance, out of the \$158 million for AMIS,³⁴ only \$63million was to be provided directly by member states. The balance would be provided by voluntary contribution. For the second example, just \$10 million out of the \$121 million could be raised by the troop contributing countries. This is in contradiction with the claim ‘African solutions to African problems’. Strategic airlift capability in rapid military deployment and linguistic, cultural, religious issues as well as values and traditions also challenge the ASF’s full establishment. Above all, the national interests challenge the legitimacy and the leadership of the AU Chairperson.³⁵

In the same line, Paul D. Williams, associate professor in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University made several remarks on African Union missions in multiple publications. Among his observations, one released in a 2013 publication of Africa Center for Strategic Studies entitled “*Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000*” touches the ASF and its functioning. In fact, he observed that the ends are not synchronized³⁶ with the means when it comes to

³⁴ Ebere R. Adigbuo, “African Standby Force: A Song of Sorrow,” *International Journal of History and Cultural Studies* 3, no. 3 (2017), accessed 13 January 2019, <https://www.arcjournals.org/pdfs/ijhcs/v3-i3/1.pdf>.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ Paul D. Williams, *Peace Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned Since 2000* (Africa Security Brief, No. 25, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 13 July 2013), accessed 13 January 2019, <https://africacenter.org/publication/peace-operations-in-africa-lessons-learned-since-2000/>.

performing mandates for peace operations in Africa. A point echoed by Major Luis Carlos Falcao Escorrega in his master thesis “*African Peace and Security Architecture: a strategic analysis*”. He stated that the ASF are the military means to fulfill the military ways traced by the APSA, but lacked mission planning capacity, interoperability, administrative, financial and human resources management, and CIS and logistics.³⁷ Which doesn’t contribute to the APSA ends of promoting and consolidating peace and security on the continent.³⁸

Furthermore, Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and Alex de Waal, in their report “*Peace Missions in Africa: Constraints, Challenges, and Opportunities*” subtitled “*Preliminary report to the African Union*”³⁹ published in march 2015 and supported by the World Peace Foundation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, remarked that the AU made tremendous efforts to set up political institutions and mechanisms but failed to operationalize the ASF. The brigades do not necessarily intervene in the framework set by the AU and countries that should provide these brigades go instead for “coalitions of the winning” (like the G5 Sahel and the Multinational Joint Task Force

³⁷ Luis Carlos Falcão Escorrega, “African Peace and Security Architecture: A Strategic Analysis” (Master’s Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, December 2011), accessed 15 January 2019, <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=700829>, 78.

³⁸ Ibid., 74.

³⁹ Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe and Alex de Waal, “Peace Missions in Africa: Constraints, Challenges, and Opportunities” (Preliminary Report to the African Union, World Peace Foundation, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Somerville, MA, March 2015), accessed 15 January 2019, <https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2018/02/Peace-Missions-in-Africa-Preliminary-Report-final.pdf>, 18.

(MNJTF) or Force Multinationale-Mixte de la Conférence du Bassin du Lac Tchad (FMM/CBLT)⁴⁰), enhancing western countries (like U.S. and France) bypass the AU framework and achieve their own agendas. The ASF is hampered by the ‘African Security Dilemma’ that they describe as the mismatch in terms of dependence on external resources to accompany the political will demonstrated by the AU. The case of the AMISOM dependent on UNSOA to have necessary logistics but restricted to Somali forces does not help the AU fully achieve its missions. In overall, these publications show that the ASF are faced with problems describable as funding issues, conflicting political agendas at strategic (continental) and operational (regional) levels, lack of strategic equipment like heavy lift aircraft, transport helicopter, and other mission support capabilities.

Other Reference Materials

On the other hand, as stated earlier, there are other doctrinal references and main documents to understand the peace operations doctrines. They are:

⁴⁰ The FMM/CBLT is a MNJTF composed of forces from 5 countries (4 countries of the Lake Chad region: Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria) and Benin, addressing terrorism issue (Boko Haram) in the region. Headquarters in Ndjamena (Chad). For more information see African Union, “Force Multinationale Mixte (FMM) de lutte contre Boko Haram,” accessed 20 December 2018, <https://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/fr/projects/force-multinationale-mixte-fmm-de-lutte-contre-boko-haram>. The G5 Sahel is a partnership of 5 African countries in the Sahel region (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger) hardly affected by terrorism that decided to mutualize their efforts to tackle the issue. Headquarters in Nouakchott (Mauritania). For more see Jennifer G. Cooke, “Understanding the G5 Sahel Joint Force: Fighting Terror, Building Regional Security?” Center for Strategic & International Studies, 15 November 2017, accessed 20 December 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/understanding-g5-sahel-joint-force-fighting-terror-building-regional-security>.

African Union Charter: The Constitutive Act

This founding document is a legal agreement that formally established the new African Union organization in 2001.⁴¹ This is important to link the activities of the ASF and its results with the ideals of the founding fathers. It also gives some clues on the impediments of the effectiveness of the ASF on a political standpoint.

African Standby Forces Doctrine

As the fundamental reference for this study, it is a document published in 2013 that serves as reference in the conduct of African peacekeeping operations by African Forces. Extensively pulled from the UN peacekeeping capstone doctrine, it outlined in its chapter 1 the Strategic Context,⁴² the Concepts and Direction to the Military Staff Committee in its planning process. It describes in its chapter 2 the Framework for Peace Support Operations in Africa.⁴³ It states the conditions for establishing the mandate and its content. Chapter 3 addresses the African Standby Forces,⁴⁴ its “raison d’être” which is security, the forces requirements in terms of delays for deployment and self-sustainment, the different components which are military, police and civilian. It also describes key aspects like mission support, rapid deployment capability, strategic headquarters, force generation, force employment and possible command relationships from different

⁴¹ Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the OAU, *Constitute Act of the African Union*.

⁴² African Union, “Chapter 1, Peace Support Operations: Strategic Context, Concepts and Directions.”

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

scenarios for the leadership of the mission. Chapter 4 is on Mission Planning,⁴⁵ depicting different scenarios of intervention as per the APSA framework, the planning process by component (military, police, civilian) and in all aspects (logistics, budgetary, ...) the integration of comprehensive domains (politics, human rights, rule of law, humanitarian affairs, DDR and SSR, gender, child protection/trafficking, electoral affairs, environmental affairs, NGOs, partners, ...) in order to achieve unity of effort and coherence. Chapter 5 specifically deals with the Conduct of Peace Support Operations,⁴⁶ the factors to consider, the essential requirements, and mission start-up process. Chapter 6 addresses the Support to Peace Support Operations with the Mission Support, the Human Resource Management, and the Management of the Mission Impact.⁴⁷ Each of those chapters is critical in understanding the functioning and analyzing the mission through the lens of the joint functions.

ASF Policy Framework⁴⁸

This is the main document establishing ASF functions, organization, principles and the scenarios under which the ASF can be deployed. This framework is of paramount

⁴⁵ African Union, “Chapter 1, Peace Support Operations: Strategic Context, Concepts and Directions.”

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ African Chiefs of Defense Staff, *Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee* (Adopted by Third Meeting of African Chiefs of Defense Staff, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 15-16 May 2003), accessed 19 October 2018, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/asf-policy-framework-en.pdf>.

importance as it helps view the ASF through the lens of the Joint functions as directed by the Military Staff Committee, military body of the ASPA.

African Union – RECs Memoranda⁴⁹

Provides an insight into how the regional organizations function and have been tasked by the AU within their areas to support the continental organization.

Understanding the assigned missions, the capabilities and the limitations of those regional organizations help understand some of the issues encountered by the tasking organization. However, this accord has not been adopted as so far.

Military Balances 2010 through 2018: Sub-Saharan Africa

Having some awareness of the capabilities and military strength of the African Armed Forces set the conditions for appraising the limitations of the regional forces in their role to support the African Union. As, the effectiveness of regional forces lies in the responsiveness of the individual troop contributing countries (TCCs).

Reports on African Union Peace Support Operations

There are different open sources references on the conduct of peacekeeping missions in Africa: they address the challenges and limitations encountered by the ASF in their duties. These sources expose both the merits and the deficiencies of these forces and

⁴⁹ African Union, Regional Economic Communities, and Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa, “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the Area of Peace and Security between the African Union, the Regional Economic Communities, and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa,” African Union, 2008, accessed 24 November 2018, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eng.pdf>African Union, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/mou-au-rec-eng.pdf>.

their leaderships. Exploiting these documents helps present the limitations as sought through this study and eventually suggest appropriate recommendations.

United Nations Charter

This charter is the main document defining the functioning of this organization with a purpose to maintain international peace and security. Containing 111 articles,⁵⁰ it describes the roles of the different organs of the UN and the different mechanisms to deal with insecurity and conflicts throughout the world. Three chapters specifically states the sets of actions to be conducted in those cases: Chapter VI, Chapter VII, and Chapter VIII. The charter also contextualizes the actions of the AU in the broader responsibility of the United Nations, the organization the whole world offered itself to prevent occurrences of scourges of death and sorrow of the People. Some of its principles actually help understand the limited actions conducted at some occasion by the African Union. As some even wonder about it: are those two organizations competing or complementing each other?

United Nations Peacekeeping Doctrine⁵¹

The ASF has been deliberately designed to function in the same way as United Nations peacekeeping forces. The doctrine, organization, training and logistics concepts

⁵⁰ United Nations, *Charter of the United Nations* (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), accessed 22 November 2018, <http://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/index.html>.

⁵¹ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (New York: United Nations, 2008), accessed 22 November 2018, https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf.

are borrowed from UN PSO doctrine. Part of the analysis to be conducted throughout this study will be elaborated based on the concepts and approach as observed by the UN in its peacekeeping missions, mainly for command and control and protection, and how they differ from AU operations.

U.S. Doctrine: Joint Publications – Joint Operations: Joint Functions

A Peace Support Operation (PSO) is mainly a joint operation in most cases. As such, the fundamental principles known as the Joint functions or Joint Functions are essential to analyze the ability and the effectiveness of the force to fulfill its mission as per the assigned mandate. The definitions of the U.S. doctrine of Joint Functions have been retained to conduct this study for the selected functions. The Joint Functions are: Command and control, Movement and maneuver, Intelligence, Fires, Protection, Sustainment and Information. However, the present study uses only four out of the seven joint functions,⁵² exception to fires, information and sustainment joint functions, to depict the success and the limitations of the ASF. For time and focus constraints, this study will stick to these four to enable depth in the analysis.

As per these delimitations, fires' function was excluded because in a peacekeeping operation, large numbers of lethal and non-lethal assets are not required to achieve specific effects on designated targets in support of the joint force commander's (JFC) objectives. Lethal weapons systems like the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions (DPICM), the Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), and heavy guns cannot really be used, considered

⁵² CJCS, JP 3-0, para. 1-a, III.

the restrictive environment, the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) and Directives of Use of Force (DUFs), and the principle of proportionality that prevail in the theaters.

Regarding sustainment, very limited tempo and operational reach are expected from the peacekeepers. Sustainment's principles across all phases of the operation with dynamic factors as in consideration in Large Scale Combat Operations (LSCO) are not fully present in PSO contexts. As contingents are deployed in different locations and usually directed to conduct area security and stability tasks, there is no need for greater sustainment operations with specific sustainment units' to be relocated or to be moving with maneuvering units at specific operational tempos. This is not to reduce the paramount importance of sustainment for peace support operations, but it is just an exposition of factors taken into consideration to delimit this function in the study, based upon the generally static and long-lasting characters of logistics entities throughout peace operation's theaters.

With respect to the information, even though it appears crucial to positivize the mission's overall impact on the local, regional and international audiences as recognized by the PSC in its "Report on the Ten-Year AMISOM Lesson Learned Conference" issued in March 2017, its aspects are quite complex and usually accompany the progress made on the ground. The purpose of this study is rather to focus on how to achieve those progresses to enable the mission's objectives to be reached.

For those four selected joint functions, the explanations on their utility to the present study are as follow:

Command and Control (C2): this function is important to understand the strategic and operational guidance lying under the African Union missions. Deeply linked to the

doctrine and the organization of the ASF, it drives the guidance and principles in use throughout a particular mission. Generally, for these types of peace operations, the command relationship will be Operational control (OPCON) or Tactical control (TACON). U.S. joint doctrine states that OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander exercising OPCON considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions, save administrative matters, discipline, logistics, internal organization, or unit training. Whereas TACON authority is more restrictive and limited to detailed direction and control of movements and maneuvers within the area of operation. It is usually exercised over an attached unit for a limited time and for a specific purpose. Control however helps to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's authority.⁵³ The command relationship as part of command authority differs from one mission to another.

Movement and Maneuver (M2): the main aspect of this joint function is the ability to move or deploy forces into an Operation's area or theater. There lies a significant challenge African Standby Forces face; as, in numerous cases, they wait and rely upon external partners to help them project forces into the theater of operations. Its tasks also include delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. Examples include counter-mobility, sanctions enforcement and embargos, conduct of blockades. These latter domains are particularly important for peace operations across very porous borders. Peacekeepers' abilities to counter these are important, especially in

⁵³ CJCS, JP 3-0.

countries like Somalia, South Sudan, etc. to ensure reduction of violence and prevalence of peaceful environment.

Protection: in U.S. doctrine, this function encompasses force protection, force health protection, and other protection activities. Relevant force protection's tasks in AU context include provide physical protection and security for forces and means, protection to civilians and contractors, conduct defensive countermeasures operations, counterpropaganda operations, establish antiterrorism programs, establish capabilities and measures to prevent friendly fire incidents, identify and neutralize insider threats, conduct identity collection activities, provide emergency management and response capabilities and services, etc.⁵⁴ As so, the ability of African peacekeeping forces to protect civilians under imminent threat of attack starts with their ability to protect themselves first against potential threats, especially from direct or indirect contacts. The set of measures deployed to counter potential attacks or actions of the threat or of the menace critically hints on the ability of the force to enforce the mandate and fulfills the mission. The high rate⁵⁵ of casualties reported in Mali in the early years 2013 and 2014 with numerous peacekeepers bombed by indirect fire or hit by IED suggests a careful look at the protection assets of the African Standby Forces.

Intelligence: it is essential for planning of a mission. Without appropriate intelligence, assumptions are not confirmed, priority and critical information

⁵⁴ CJCS, JP 3-0.

⁵⁵ British Broadcasting Corporation, "World's most dangerous peacekeeping mission," *BBC News*, 22 November 2015, accessed 22 October 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-34812600>.

requirements as well as essential information of friendly forces are not filled up. In fact, no understanding of the operational environment is enhanced. Updates on the threats activities are inexistent or irrelevant, and current and future operations planning are handicapped. It becomes then extremely difficult to direct appropriate tasks in an effort to achieve the operational and tactical objectives. Critical assets include Signal intelligence, Human intelligence, Geospatial intelligence, Counter-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.⁵⁶

The reason underlying the choice of these U.S. joint functions is that the UN Capstone doctrine on which the AU heavily lies upon is mainly driven by U.S. doctrine, as it is also for NATO doctrine. In fact, joint operations are planned and conducted through the Joint Functions framework. On another hand, joint functions are essential to the accomplishment of military objectives across campaigns. In the end, this is just a question of terminology. Military forces across the globe do have their own concepts and terminology to plan, prepare and execute missions. However, process-focused, critical planning tools or concepts are common to each and every one of them. Militaries will need to deploy into theaters, at home or abroad, and move throughout a given area of responsibility (movement and maneuver), under certain command relationships (command and control) to perform assigned tasks in order to achieve a set objective and effects (fires) with certain resources (sustainment), while protecting themselves and the civilians against any potential threats (protection). Along this process, they have to gain a deep and broad situational understanding (intelligence) that will enhance the

⁵⁶ CJCS, JP 3-0.

commander's visualization of the end state and subsequently their suitable operational approach. It is no way different to the ASF commanders and forces trying to deploy into a certain country to deal with a broken out conflict. There simply lies the true motive of choosing this U.S. doctrinal framework to apply to AU peace operations.

Summary

There are many open source references to help better understand the literature around this topic. The book "*The Future of African peace operations*" and the report "*Peace Missions in Africa: Constraints, Challenges, and Opportunities*" subtitled "*Preliminary report to the African Union*" as well as many other articles, documents and doctrinal references, whether from AU or other entities give a great insight into the ASFs and their mechanisms. Though, military-specific publications seem rare. For the purpose of the design of this study, some references have also helped opt for a particular methodology in order to keep objectivity, reliability and efficacy in reaching the targeted audience.

In overall, as take away of literature around peace operations in Africa, it can be retained that the ASF is rapidly evolving, continually achieving greater operational readiness. However, these efforts are mainly crippled by political agendas, funding and logistics issues.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

When you follow in the path of your father, you learn to walk like him.
—Ashanti Proverb, HowAfrica.com

Introduction

To achieve the objectives of this research, the author will conduct a qualitative analysis, based upon other research on this topic to include scholarly works, African Union reports on its peace operations and any other publications on these missions. The purpose is to answer the primary research question: “what are the main impediments to the effectiveness of an African union standby forces’ ability to cope with conflict situations throughout the continent?”

Qualitative Research Design as Methodology

For the purpose of this study, the author opted for a qualitative research design as an approach. As a matter of fact, in the realm of social sciences research, numerous methods exist to analyze information and provide them meaningful interpretations; they include quantitative, qualitative, and mixed methods approaches.

In a quantitative method, the purpose is to understand what factors and variables influence an outcome,⁵⁷ generally closed-ended questions. It involves the processes of collecting, analyzing, interpreting, and writing the results of a study. In a qualitative method, the purpose is to explore and understand the meaning individuals or groups

⁵⁷ John W. Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*, 4th ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 2014).

ascribe to a social or human problem.⁵⁸ The process involves open-ended questions, emerging approaches, text or image data. The mixed method combines or integrates both quantitative and qualitative data and research approaches to give more complete understanding of a situation.⁵⁹ The option for qualitative research design is mainly driven by the complex nature of the research question of this thesis, which is to identify the causes to the dysfunction of the ASF. Little research being done in a specific military-construct analytical tool like the Joint Functions framework regarding the assessment of ASF as a security tool, a qualitative approach appears to be better for exploring and understanding the nature of this problem.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the audience of this thesis is mainly political and military leaders at various levels, as well as scholars, organizations, and indeed citizens (Africans in particular). For most of these, an array of figures and data with their interpretation may not fully provide the insights they are seeking in reading such analyses of situations impacting them on a daily basis.

Data Collection

For the purpose of this study, data was collected through various open-source documents with an approach elaborated in three steps: first, the identification and compilation of numerous documents related to the topic; second, the screening by

⁵⁸ Creswell, *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ African Union, *The African Standby Force (ASF): Roadmap III* (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: African Union, 3 May 2010), accessed 20 December 2018, https://unoau.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/asf_roadmap_iii.

relevance of contents to the research question; third, the synthesis and analysis of the selected documents. This method seems appropriate to the research compared with other methods as there is not enough time to expand and detail very much and as a focused analysis should come out of this study. The different sources for this research include, but not limited to:

1. International and regional organizations websites; for instance, AU, ECOWAS, UN for official documents and reports;
 2. Scholar websites and online databases;
 3. Combined Arms Research Library (CARL), for books and online documentation including U.S. joint doctrine publications;
 4. Research organization websites for existing research papers;
- Other websites, for other documents including research methodologies.

Data Analysis Methodology

This methodology will analyze two African Union Peacekeeping operations, and analyze them in regards to Command and Control, Movement and Maneuver, protection, and intelligence. For each of these joint functions, the aim is to present whether the capabilities and functionalities expected within it is present but also effectively employed. A two-case study framework will be used to assess the data and expose more general findings about the ASF. To do so, African Union-led missions in Sudan and Somalia (AMIS, AMISOM) will be used together as setting to conduct the analysis with respect to the above chosen joint functions. It will synthesize the various aspects per designated joint function throughout all the case studies. It will make at times, when deemed necessary, some comparisons with those UN missions that succeeded it.

Those two missions are chosen because they are the only two that still remain under control of AU command at the time of this study. As a practice, AU deploys peacekeeping operations to impose peace and set conditions for much longer stabilization operations. The reason is, UN is not eager to deploy forces to every conflict situation that may be too risky, as non-African troop contributing countries (TCCs) generally evade it. On the other hand, AU does not have the capabilities to sustain long peace operation; a fair share of burden has thus been found and is becoming the rule.

Findings Recording and Interpretation

As stated above, this study will focus on four out of the seven Joint Functions (exception of fires, information, and sustainment), in reference to U.S. joint operations doctrine. For the record, it will sort out specific parameters embedded in these functions that enable its efficacy. The study will provide some evaluation criteria with weights ranging from poor through fair to good for the presence or the effectiveness of these parameters. This nests to the second research question as stated in the first chapter: *What aspects of AU deployment have been or are effective? What aspects are less effective?* For so, in each of the joint functions, it will look at following themes as deemed essential to perform the tasks therein:

Command and Control: type of the command authority (OPCON, TACON), communication systems technical features (i.e., ranges, encryption capabilities), the general sense of effectiveness of the commandership of troops. This function is important to understand the strategic and operational guidance driving African Union missions. Deeply linked to the doctrine and organization of the ASF, it impacts the guidance and principles in use throughout a particular mission. The command relationship as part of

command authority differs from one mission to another; this study will sort out the specificities in AU missions.

Movement (and Maneuver): movement of forces, delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. For this function, emphasis will be placed on movement rather than the maneuver. The reason is that usually peacekeeping forces do not adopt an offensive posture combining maneuver and fires to reach specific effects. Movement as the main aspect of this joint function is the ability to move or deploy forces into theater of operations.⁶¹ This study will examine this function across the case studies and determine the gaps. It will also have a closer look at the mobility of African forces within an area of operations to achieve a position of advantage over the threats or the insurgents. Specifically, it will look at all the mission area (contingent level but also within the Force) transportation assets and their ability to function (fuel, spare parts, etc.).

Protection: force protection, force health protection, and protection activities as mandated. In fact, as stated earlier in chapter 2, the ability of the African peacekeeping forces to protect the civilian under imminent threat of attack starts with their ability to protect themselves first against potential threats, especially from direct or indirect contacts. Additionally, health coverage of troops as well as protection of civilians (through defense of the mandate and civilian casualty mitigation while exploiting lethal assets). This study will point out the deficiencies of the ASF to be strong enough and in performing their core tasks.

⁶¹ CJCS, JP 3-0.

Intelligence: surveillance and reconnaissance assets, counter-intelligence and human intelligence capabilities, and geospatial intelligence.⁶² This study will focus on the intelligence collection system, especially in those challenging environments in which asymmetric threats operate. The bottom line will be to see how it is integrated in the planning process, as well as in the conduct of operations.

For the overall interpretation, the author will proceed by describing the results recorded. Higher value means the capability is enhanced and is color coded green, mean value means fair capability and color coded yellow and poor capability is coded red.

██████████ Case Study’s Assessment Base Model

Functions	Evaluation criteria AMIS/AMISOM	Level of effectiveness		
		Good	Fair	Less
C2	Type of the command authority			
	communication systems technical features			
	commandership of troops			
M2	Move or deploy forces,			
	Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formation			
Intelligence	Surveillance and reconnaissance assets			
	Counter-intelligence			
	human intelligence capabilities			
Protection	Force protection			
	Force health protection			
	Other protection activities			
Overall performance				

Source: Created by author.

⁶² CJCS, JP 3-0.

Summary

The intent with this methodology is to use open source references and conduct a thorough qualitative analysis of the ASF in four critical aspects defined as joint functions. By comparing two different missions directed and supervised by the African Union, the study will sort out the real achievements attained and assert capabilities gaps with respect to the UN as model.

CHAPTER 4

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

If you close your eyes to facts, you will learn through accidents.

—African Proverb, BellaOnline.com

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to expose the findings of the research based upon the two case studies that are Sudan and Somalia, where African Union intervened militarily and continues to do so, whether to degrade insurgents or oust terrorist groups threatening the peace and stability of the country and region. Those two missions were chosen because they are the only two that still remained under control of AU PSC.

As a practice, AU deploys peacekeeping forces to impose peace and set conditions for a much longer stabilization operation by the UN, as seen in the majority of other peacekeeping missions in Africa: Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire, Burundi, Mali, etc. The reason is that, on one hand UN is not eager to deploy forces in conflict situation that it finds too risky, as non-African TCCs generally evade it. On other hand, the AU does not have the capabilities to sustain longer peace operations. A 'fair' deal has thus been found and is becoming the rule, except in these two cases where AU continues its journey, however with assistance from the UN.

This analysis will start with an exposition of AU efforts to fulfill its mission of promoting peace and security across the continent. Then it will analyze through the lens of joint functions, the two case studies in the domains of C2, M2, intelligence and protection. It will be conducted with regard to the evaluation criteria retained for each of these functions, in reference with the methodology described in chapter 3. Using reports,

lessons-learned documents and publications on these missions, the author will try to depict the different achievements and failures recorded, attributing a code color (green as good, yellow as fair, and red as poor), and accessing the general outcome of this function. This process will be applied to the four retained joint functions.

Overview of African Union Military Interventions in Africa

In the collective memory, Africa is the place of civil wars, famine and diseases, especially after the Cold War. By 1990, there were about 20 wars going on simultaneously on the continent, with the majority being intrastate wars.⁶³ A radical change occurred by the 2000s with the creation of the African Union and the implementation of a new concept: the “non-indifference”, allowing the organization to intervene in its member states regardless of the consent, in case of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity. This enabled the AU to significantly reduce the number to 4-four conflicts by 2010. However, with the Arab spring of 2011, this number increased and reached six as of 2019. Since its creation in 2002, the African Union has deployed, starting from 2003, ten peace support operations across the continent,⁶⁴ in countries like Somalia (AMISOM), Central African Republic (MISCA), Burundi (AMIB), Sudan (AMIS, UNAMID), Mali (AFISMA), and Comoros (MAES, AMISEC). In these conflicts, the missions were in overall mandated to contribute to the protection of civilians and restoration of security and public order, stabilization of the country and restoration of the central government’s authority, support the preservation of national

⁶³ Brosig and Sempijja, Africa Portal.

⁶⁴ African Union, “The Peace and Security Council.”

unity and territorial integrity, ensure compliance of cease-fire agreement, reform and restructuring of the defense and security sector, reduce threats posed by rebels or terrorist groups, and creation of conditions conducive for humanitarian assistance delivery and return of refugees.⁶⁵ Also, they were often tasked to provide a safe and secure environment for incoming elections, monitor electoral process, and support reconciliation process. In some cases, those AU forces were tasked to supplement national security forces for security management of electoral process as in Comoros, or provide technical assistance for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as in Burundi.⁶⁶ The total number of personnel varied throughout those missions and generally constituted of military (including military observers), police and civilian components.⁶⁷ In sum, more than 54552 African peacekeepers have been deployed into 7 different countries. The AU mission in Somalia is by far the most manpowered with more than 22176 personnel deployed, though also the deadliest with more than 3,000 deaths. A table with all AU missions, strengths and troops contributing countries is put in appendix A of this study.

Many observers agree that the AU has contributed to peace and security across the continent. Significant successes have been recorded for AU's interventions in Burundi (2003-2004), Sudan (2004-2007) and Somalia (2007-present). However, various levels of evolution have been observed, in terms of readiness of institutions designed to set conditions for full operationalization. Members of the PoW have been appointed

⁶⁵ African Union, "The Peace and Security Council 2019."

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

regularly since 2007 for a term of three calendar years, even if rotation of the Chairperson does not occur as scheduled. The CEWS has been working in accordance with its mandate, convening periodic meetings with the RECs.⁶⁸ However, it has been told to not provide up-to-date information or propose courses of action. It also lacks qualified personnel and technical expertise to operate optimally,⁶⁹ and does not fully cooperate with the PSC to provoke and ensure adequate response.⁷⁰ Regional early warning systems, developed at various stage across the RMs, also contribute to hindering higher level operation.⁷¹ Regarding the planning element of the ASF, it lacks requisite training in planning for peace support operations, necessitating a Training Needs Analysis to identify specific gaps and develop training modules accordingly.⁷²

ECOWAS as a Model of Relative Success

Within the five regional brigades constituting the ASF, one particularly stands up, facing courageously the challenges posed from security issues of its region. Crippled in the 1990s by many conflicts in the sub-region (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau), this

⁶⁸ Madeleine Odzolo MODO, “African Union – Peace and Security 2010,” accessed 20 December 2018, www.misca.peaceau.org/en/article/academic-references.

⁶⁹ Security Council Report, “Audit of the African Union,” accessed 20 December 2018, <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/.../RO%20Audit%20of%20the%20AU.docx>.

⁷⁰ Amnesty International, *Counting Gains, Filling Gaps: Strengthening African Union’s Response to Human Rights Violations Committed in Conflict Situations*, 2017, accessed 20 December 2018, <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR0160472017ENGLISH.PDF>.

⁷¹ Escorrega, “African Peace and Security Architecture: A Strategic Analysis.”

⁷² African Union, *The African Standby Force (ASF): Roadmap III*.

regional organization shifted its framework of intervention from conflict management to conflict prevention.⁷³ Facing numerous challenges, ECOWAS created its Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as, it shifted to an intervention force that dealt with conflict situations and paved the way to further UN missions. Its peak moment was in 1994 when it reached around 20,000 personnel to provide peace and security in Liberia.⁷⁴ It has also the reputation of bypassing the non-inference principle as it did in 1994, in Liberia against opposition of the rebel group leader Charles Taylor, before the adoption of this principle later in 2002 by the whole African Union. Its brigade called ECOBRIG or WESTBRIG or simply ESF (ECOWAS Standby Force) consists of 1,500 soldiers deployable within 30 days.⁷⁵ (Task Force) that can be augmented to 5,000 soldiers deployable within 90 days (Main Body) if the situation requires it.⁷⁶ It actively intervened in recent years (Cote d'Ivoire in 2002 with 1,300 soldiers, Guinea Bissau in 2012 with more than 600 police officers and paramilitary, Mali in 2013 with 4300 soldiers, Gambia⁷⁷ in 2017 with 7,000

⁷³ Johan Tejpar and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, *Challenges to Peace and Security in West Africa: The Role of ECOWAS* (Studies in African Security, FOI, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Stockholm, Sweden, 2015).

⁷⁴ Mathieu Olivier and Natacha Gorwitz, "Cedeao: quel bilan pour le pompier de l'Afrique de l'Ouest ?" *JeuneAfrique*, 16 December 2016, accessed 20 December 2018, <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/383460/politique/cedeao-bilan-pompier-de-lafrique-de-louest/>.

⁷⁵ Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Secretariat, *Lessons from ECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990-2004* (Report of the ECOWAS Workshop, KAIPTC, Accra, Ghana, 10-11 February 2005), accessed 12 February 2019, <http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=A319114E2FF8D70C504C940C295C0ACA?doi=10.1.1.116.3580&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Elkanah Babatounde, "ECOWAS Intervention in Gambia: A Case Study of International Law on the Use of Force," *UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence* 6 (1

soldiers), enforcing and showcasing its commitment towards the promotion of peace and security, and respect of constitutional order within its sub-region. Even if in this last case, criticism arose, pointing the illegality of this intervention conducted for democratic and legal reasons.⁷⁸

As seen above, the WESTBRIG has been very active, even before the implementation of the ASF in 2003 and intensified its role throughout the years. However, many challenges have been noted and are related to the hegemony of Nigeria for force generation, for domination of military leadership tagged of barely listening to non-Nigerian commanders. Also several logistic shortfalls and finance issues hamper the ESF as showcased by the conflict in Mali. Finally, its intervention sometimes does not fit into the legal framework as observed in Gambia. These showed that ECOWAS is more effective in conflict prevention than in conflict management.

NARC as a Model of Failure

As one of the five regional brigades, the North Africa Response Capability (NARC) has come to life only on 28 May 2010 with the signature by the Executive Secretary, Major-General Ahmed Abdallah Aoun of the Memorandum of Understanding between the AU and Regional Economic Communities and the Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa, at the headquarters of the organization in

January 2017), accessed 12 February 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320464619_ECOWAS_Intervention_in_Gambia_A_Case_Study_of_International_Law_on_the_Use_of_Force.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Addis Ababa.⁷⁹ It was about seven years after establishment of the ASF policy framework. Despite some noticeable peacekeeping participations across the continent but under UN umbrella of some northern countries of Africa, they have not truly engaged on the continental effort towards establishing capabilities to face threats that arise up. Though disposing of substantial economic and military capabilities compared to their counterparts of sub-Sahara region, these nations have been crippled since a long time by internal dissensions around issues like Western Sahara, trade conflicts, regional hegemony, and poor integration, etc.⁸⁰ World Economic Forum qualified the region as one of the world's worst-performing trading blocs.⁸¹ Paradoxically, the region is tackled by instability in Libya and activities of extremist organizations like al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh), with Algeria seeking to balance its power among those states,⁸² given it is the first African nation in terms of military spending and has significant natural resources.⁸³ As so far, this regional ASF has never planned or conducted a training exercise.

⁷⁹ EuropeAfrica.net, "Joint Strategy," January 2012, accessed 13 February, 2019, <https://europafrika.net/jointstrategy/>.

⁸⁰ Wadia Ait Hamza, "The Maghreb Union is one of the world's worst-performing trading blocs. Here are five ways to change that," World Economic Forum, 1 June 2017, accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/06/five-ways-to-make-maghreb-work/>.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Andrea Taylor, "Algeria's Libya Problem," *MENA Source* (blog) *Atlantic Council*, 28 February 2018, accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/algeria-s-libya-problem>.

⁸³ Ibid.

EASF Battling to Exist

The East African Standby Force (EASF) was officially established in April 2005 after the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between members of former Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG). Originally counting all 13 countries of East Africa linked with the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD), it now just encompasses 10 member states.⁸⁴ (South Sudan given Observer status) after the departure of three countries (Tanzania, Madagascar, and Mauritius) that joined the Southern Africa Brigade.

This organization is located in a region that has long been plagued by diverse conflicts: Somalia instability, Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict, North and South Sudan conflict, Darfur genocide, Djibouti-Eritrea issues, as well as many other crises.⁸⁵ Expectations are therefore high to create a mechanism that helps enforce peace and promote security and stability in the regions. Yet, hegemonic competition between Ethiopia and Kenya, associated with funding issues, logistic problems, cultural diversity and interoperability issues prevent the organization from reaching its full operationalization.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF), “About EASF,” accessed 08 April 2019, <https://www.easfcom.org/index.php/en/about-easf>.

⁸⁵ Endalcachew Bayeh, “The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects,” *International Journal of Political Science and Development* 2 (October 2014): 197-204, accessed 08 April 2019, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/270816946_The_Eastern_Africa_Standby_Force_Roles_Challenges_and_Prospects,

⁸⁶ Ibid.

The organization has not started operating as a whole unit as intended. Rather, it deployed just technical teams in support of AU peace operations in Somalia and Sudan.⁸⁷ In AMISOM, it deployed team on the ground upon request of the AU to assess the necessity of deployment of AU forces into the country. Later on, it also worked with the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA) and collaborated with the AU to increase its capabilities in terms of operational planning, logistic planning and operations, training, medical support and assistance; as well as increase the manpower of the Force. In AMIS, it also helped in providing C2 assistance whereas in UNMIS it provided trained women police officers. AMIS and AMISOM are the two case studies that are studied below.

AMIS Case Study

Presentation of AMIS

The second AU Mission to promote peace and stability across the continent was the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004, the first being the operation in Burundi started a year ago in 2003. AMIS was launched in pursuance of the commitment to fulfill the AU's new mantra 'African Solutions to African Problems,' however bearing in mind the transition from a regional organization like the AU to the UN, as part of Chapter VIII principles of the UN Charter. The mission in Burundi was already challenging in terms of funding and logistical capabilities.⁸⁸ Yet the AU was determined

⁸⁷ Bayeh, "The Eastern Africa Standby Force: Roles, Challenges and Prospects," 197-204.

⁸⁸ Emma Svensson, *The African Mission in Burundi: Lessons Learned from the African Union's first Peace Operation* (Report, FOI, Swedish Defense Research Agency,

“Darfur” literally means the “Realm of the Fur.” It is located in the western part of Sudan, bordering four countries: Central African Republic, Chad, Libya, and South Sudan. This region covers an area of 493,180 square kilometers, representing roughly the size of Spain, and it is largely an arid plateau with various topographies: plains and hills in the east, desert and rugged terrain in the north, rocky relief in the west and cultivable plateaus in the south. There had been conflicts in the past opposing north and south, from 1955 to 1972 and 1982 to 2005 over regional, political and economic inequalities in Sudan’s colonial and post-colonial history.⁸⁹ Tensions also opposed pastoral nomads (camel owners) against sedentary farmers about animal routes and were settled by traditional arrangements and mediation mechanisms. Climate change, famine and competition over resources (trampled crops and grazing lands) worsened the situation already characterized by a marginalization of southern ethnic groups, mostly Africans, Christians or Animists by the northern ruling elite, mostly Arab and Muslim. “Arabization” of the Sahelian region comprising Chad and Sudan was spearheaded by the Libyan leader Muḥammad al-Qadhafi⁹⁰ who created and supported militant “Arab” groups in Darfur with the vision to overthrow the governments in those two countries; his efforts failed.

⁸⁹ Ahman Sikainga, “The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis’: Understanding the Darfur Conflict,” *Origins* 2, no. 5 (February 2009), accessed 12 March 2019, <http://origins.osu.edu/article/worlds-worst-humanitarian-crisis-understanding-darfur-conflict/page/0/0>.

⁹⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design - Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID,” *Human Rights Watch* 19, no. 15(A) (September 2007), accessed 15 March 2019, https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/909ABC44D390403585257359006FDB84-Full_Report.pdf.

Various movements arose, earlier peaceful (Darfur Development Front), then radical like the JEM (Justice Equality Movement) and the SPLM/A (Sudan People Liberation Movement/Army) resorted to demanding more economic development, greater autonomy and harmonization of the Sudanese society which excludes distinction based on religion ethnicity, language, gender and region. With greater influence of southern groups, a northern group, the National Islamic Front (NIF), was created and determined to promote Arabicism and Islamism, with as greater intent the construction of a Muslim world, starting by the Sahelian Africa. In 1989, a southern-influenced democratically elected government was overthrown by the NIF, which started a purge in the administration and population.

These uprisings were well known and carelessly handled by Khartoum that instead armed a Darfur's Arab rebel movement called the Janjaweed (in Arabic "bandits or outlaws operating with guns on horses") that they supported in waging wars against the southern African tribes (Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa). The violence aggravated in 2003 when a government's Air Force Base at El-Fasher,⁹¹ North Darfur, was attacked on 25 April by southern rebel movements. Since then, a devastating campaign of mass killings, rapes, and pillaging of non-Arab communities was launched, by the Sudanese government, supporting with air tactical assets the Janjaweed militias' raids. That situation led to the death of as many as 450,000 Darfurians and the displacement of 2.8

⁹¹ World Without Genocide, "Darfur Genocide," Mitchell Hamline School of Law, accessed 15 March 2019, <http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/darfur-genocide>.

million people as result of the conflict, according to the United Nations.⁹² The situation was qualified by some western countries as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Several peace talks were held, in 2003 in Abeche (Chad), in 2004 in Abuja (Nigeria) and continued through 2005, but through the AU involvement a ceasefire was reached in late March 2004 with establishment of an AU force to monitor the ceasefire and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

AMIS Overview

Following the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) of 08 April 2004, the AU deployed military observers to monitor and report on the ceasefire alongside the Ceasefire Commission (CFC) with a protection force. In view of repeated violations of the agreement by all parties, the AU evolved the mission and its mandate, flowing more peacekeepers to ensure protection of civilians. Starting with 300 peacekeepers in two infantry companies from Nigeria and Rwanda, it quickly evolved to 2,341 troops and the introduction of 815 police officers.

The mission established with initially six sectors including one in eastern Chad (Abeche) and eventually evolved to eight sectors, let alone eastern Chad's one. Sectors layout is as follow: sector 1 El Fashir which is also the FHQ, Nyala (sector 2), El Geneina (sector 3), Kabkabiyah (sector 4), Tine (sector 5), Kutum (sector 6), Zalinguei

⁹² Associated Press, "Hundreds Killed in Attacks in Eastern Chad," *The Washington Post*, 11 April 2007, accessed 15 March 2019, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/10/AR2007041001775.html>.

(sector 7) and El Daien (sector 8). As per the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), each sector was to consist of two MILOB Group Sites (MGS), which was to be composed each of four teams of 10 MILOBS each. Still with an evolution in the mission (AMIS II), an increase in strength was planned and was to impact both the military and the police components, especially with the double increase of MGS (from 15 to 29). With the new strength, the force structure then encompassed three Nigerian infantry battalions, three Rwandan infantry battalions, one South-African infantry battalion with FHQ Reserve and one engineer company, one Senegalese infantry battalion, one Kenyan Military Police Detachment and one Gambian FHQ company.⁹³

The force structure of the military component was as follows⁹⁴:

Force HQ;

1. One airmobile special forces company, which will constitute the military component reserve;
2. One explosive ordinance device (EOD)/de-mining platoon;
3. One light field engineer platoon;
4. One military police platoon;

⁹³ Seth Appiah-Mensah, "The African Mission in Sudan: Darfur Dilemmas," *African Security Review* 15, no. 1 (March 2006): 4, accessed February 19, 2019, <https://www.foi.se/report-search/pdf?fileName=D%3A%5CReportSearch%5CFiles%5C446ed7cf-ca10-457d-b584-d5f053b2bcda.pdf>.

⁹⁴ Henri Boshoff, "The African Union Mission in Sudan. Technical and Operational Dimensions," Institute for Security Studies, September 2005, accessed 16 March 2019, <https://oldsite.issafrica.org/topics/peacekeeping-and-conflict-management/01-sep-2005-the-african-union-mission-in-sudan.-technical-and-operational-dimensions-henri-boshoff>.

5. Military interpreter pool;
6. Eight sector HQs;
7. Four MILOB teams for each sector;
8. One enhanced infantry company in each sector; and,
9. One helicopter squadron in three selected sectors with six to nine (El Fasher) medium transport helicopters (these will eventually be civilian assets).

The opposing government forces, composed of uniformed military and Janjaweed rebels, were equipped with aircraft (helicopter gunships and Antonovs) with bombs and machine guns, light weapons and machine guns (AK47s, G3 and G4 assault rifles, and Dushka 12.7mm machine guns mounted on vehicles), Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers, land cruisers, camels, and horses.⁹⁵

The concept of operations⁹⁶ was as follows: Phase 1: M + 30 days consisting of reconnaissance and logistic development; Phase 2: M + 45 days focusing on developing military component HQ and the current operation; Phase 3: M + 60 days allowing initial establishment of sector HQs and team sites at sector center; Phase 4: M + 75 days allowing full establishment of sector HQs and team sites at sector center; and Phase 5: M + 120 days enhancing full deployment throughout the sectors.

⁹⁵ David C. Gompert, Courtney Richardson, Richard L. Kugler, and Clifford H. Bernath, “Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing” (Center for Technology and National Security, National Defense University, Washington, DC, July 2005), accessed 22 March 2019, <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a450148.pdf>, 13.

⁹⁶ Boshoff, “The African Union Mission in Sudan. Technical and Operational Dimensions.”

To fulfill its mandate, AMIS was assigned a plethora of tasks⁹⁷ from which the main were:

1. Monitor and verify the activities of all parties and the security situation in and around declared safe areas.
2. Monitor and verify the provision of security for returning IDPs and in the vicinity of existing IDP camps, through the GoS.
3. Monitor and verify the cessation of all hostile acts by all the parties.
4. Monitor and verify hostile militia activities against the population.
5. Monitor and verify attempts of the GoS to disarm government-controlled militias.
6. Protect AU personnel, equipment and installations.
7. Be prepared to protect civilians under imminent threat in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities.
8. Be prepared to protect both static and mobile humanitarian operations under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity, within capabilities.
9. Provide a visible military presence by patrolling and establishing temporary outposts in order to deter uncontrolled armed groups from committing hostile acts against the population.

The day-to-day business of AMIS consisted of patrols by military observers (MILOB) teams escorted by peacekeepers troops in the villages to verify respect of the ceasefire and assess humanitarian needs. This could have been better implemented if

⁹⁷ Boshoff, “The African Union Mission in Sudan. Technical and Operational Dimensions.”

expected MILOBS had actually joined the mission area, as troops were deployed in the mission area. The mission was tasked to ensure the respect of the ceasefire, bearing in mind the government would assume its primary duty of protecting its populations. Which was not truly the case, as it already sided with a part of the militia, the Janjaweed, and even continued with the exactions on the populations. With much consideration put onto the government and the exclusion of some rebel groups from the CFC, some rebel groups concluded of the partiality of the AU.

The mission also focused on building the capacity of the HN's police force in providing security and conducting investigation on allegations of crimes.⁹⁸ It provided security for women, girls and even men leaving the IDP camps to go collect firewood or for internally displaced women returning from markets⁹⁹ to prevent them from being attacked or raped by the Janjaweed or other rebels.

Plagued with persistent logistic shortfalls and vehemently criticized¹⁰⁰ for being unable to stop the killings and conflict-related sexual violence, AMIS was called in the UN resolution 1769 of 2007 to mutate to a hybrid AU-UN mission (UNAMID) with more heavy support package, meaning additional military personnel including military

⁹⁸ Arvid Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned," August 2008, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://www.foi.se/report-search/pdf?fileName=D%3A%5CReportSearch%5CFiles%5C446ed7cf-ca10-457d-b584-d5f053b2bcda.pdf>.

⁹⁹ Human Rights Watch, "Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design - Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID."

¹⁰⁰ David Smith, "A hit and Amis in Darfur," Global Policy Forum, 25 February 2007, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/206-sudan/39744.html>.

observers and liaison officers, and a civilian component composed of police personnel and mission support civilians.

UNAMID was unique at this time as no previous operation was both handled by the UN and the AU as it was. As a matter of fact, unlike other versions of this hybrid model, it established unified operational command over both the military and civilian components of the operation. The division of labor consists in the AU to run the day-to-day operations while the UN would handle the overall control of the mission.¹⁰¹

A particularity of this hybrid mission was the insistence of the Government of Sudan (GoS) for the mission to have an ‘African character’, implying more African troops and possibly more African assets. This was very difficult to achieve, as it posed difficulties in finding appropriate contingents across the continent.

Depiction from the Joint Functions Perspective

Command and Control

In terms of command structure, the contingents were put under Operational Control of the Force Commander upon arrival into theater, which ensured unity of command. Contingents were assigned locations with regards to manpower and population density. This later also defined the locations of the sectors for better response to crisis and

¹⁰¹ African Union Peace and Security, “The African Union releases the key findings and recommendations of the report of investigations on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Somalia,” last updated 21 April 2015, accessed 15 February 2019, <http://www.peaceau.org/en/article/the-african-union-releases-the-key-findings-and-recommendations-of-the-report-of-investigations-on-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-in-somalia>.

execution of the mandate.¹⁰² However national caveats persisted and commitment of the contingents vary from one to another. This was even remarked by the determination showed by the Rwandan contingent in protecting civilians under imminent threat of physical, as per the wish of their President Paul Kagame,¹⁰³ in opposition to the Sudanese government that reminded that the mission of AMIS was to protect itself and its MILOBS, the protection of the civilians remaining the duty of the national authorities. Even if, clearly the latter was not doing so, but worse. This portrayed the influence of national leadership in which the mission can be hemmed in face of the execution of the mandate, with Mission Leadership having sometimes little effective control over assigned units.

An internal AU assessment team pointed a weakness in command and control capabilities and logistics.¹⁰⁴ There was a patent lack of expertise in strategic and operational military planning capability and C2 within the deployed force and in the FHQ particularly. Various specialists from diverse domains such as intelligence, communications, logistic, and transport were not present in the staff. As noted, the

¹⁰² Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change - The African Union Mission in Sudan,” January 19, 2006, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2006/01/19/sudan-imperatives-immediate-change/african-union-mission-sudan>.

¹⁰³ Ekengard, “The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned.”

¹⁰⁴ Neethling Theo, “Regional agency and hybridization in African peacekeeping: revisiting the cases of AMIS and UNAMID in Sudan,” *The Central European Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities* 2, no. 9 (2017): 11-34, accessed 18 March 2019, <http://cejsh.icm.edu.pl/cejsh/element/bwmeta1.element.desklight-0aa231ca-3b1f-4780-a4dc-d7f05e9b0983>.

mission deployed too early, barely six weeks after the ceasefire was reached.¹⁰⁵ There was no apparent planning before troops were deployed, as even recognized by one AU official. There was no early in-depth planning aimed at providing a thoughtful integrated operational approach to the problem occurring in Darfur. The first MILOBS showed up to the mission and had no vehicles to perform their duty.

Additionally, the staff that populated the Force HQ was not really familiar with planning of such complex multidimensional mission, with military, police and civilian components. They were pulled from different countries and had no common proven standard operating procedures and experiences, on planning capacity above tactical level. However, as more and more non-AU staff flew in, this shortfall became mitigated. Language barrier also caused friction, especially between Civilian police (CIVPOL) officers.

In terms of communication, the mission was assessed to have poor communications.¹⁰⁶ at the beginning. However, this was resolved as additional assets arrived: five Thurayas, 467 VHF vehicle radios, 169 HF vehicles and base station radios, 1,206 handheld radios and VHF base stations and VSAT.¹⁰⁷ These helped coordinate actions between the FHQ and the sectors and between these and the subordinate commanders in the field. Part of this equipment was provided by the British Government.

¹⁰⁵ Abdul Mohammed, "A Tribute to AMIS," African Arguments, 13 December 2007, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://africanarguments.org/2007/12/13/a-tribute-to-amis>.

¹⁰⁶ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

The radios had been effective, also as a result of the execution of the mandate which directed to provide protection to civilians under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity. With this, the troops were not required to go farther to protect the civilians. Which did not let know the limits to the range of coverage of communications assets, even if it precluded from performing the core task of the mandate, which was the protection of the civilians. However, ad hoc arrangements had been made to go far and be in the vicinity of population under imminent attacks, thereby preventing from the atrocities of the rebel groups. Besides, the helicopters lacked of communication systems.¹⁰⁸ which would have made them force enablers and increase the effectiveness of the mission.

In terms of commandership, there was a lack of synchronization at the higher level in regard to the timing of the deployment of forces into the theater. Severe logistic constraints like the default of accommodation delayed the arrival of civilian police component into the theater.

Noteworthy, the mission's overall strength was insufficient according to James T. Quinlivan benchmark stabilization ratio. In a study published in 1996, he came up with a ratio of force to population size that he suggested to ensure an effective stabilization task in benefit of the population, which is a minimum of 3 per thousand people.¹⁰⁹ With the Darfur population estimated at the time to at least 6million, the required strength would be 18,000 troops. Which number had never been reached and was far from the 7,000

¹⁰⁸ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

¹⁰⁹ Ibid.

troops the Force had at its peak in 2007, three years after the establishment of the operation. The required number would have even been bigger if calculated upon the strength of the warring factions.

The mission also struggled in dealing effectively with the Sudanese government that it accused of participating on attacks of civilians and even AU camp in October 2005 alongside the Janjaweed rebels. Let alone, the numerous obstructionist attempts.¹¹⁰ (blocking of Visa delivery, long bureaucracy, delay on deployment of materials, restriction on night patrols, restriction on certain non-AU countries, etc.) made by that government with regard to the deployment and the conduct of the operation (attempt to perfdy for painting government vehicles in same white color as AMIS's).

Intelligence

As per human intelligence, the MILOBS were the primary source of information collection. Patrols and humanitarians also helped assess the operational environment and tailor the military action accordingly. Difficulties encountered comprised the default of common reporting formats coupled with a poor quality of these, as many of the MILOBS were not trained on performing such tasks. Additionally, repeating doubts persisted within the chain of command as reports produced proved more and more to be inaccurate and not depict the actual situation on the ground. There was also a distortion.¹¹¹ in the report as it went through the chain of command to Force headquarters, resulting to the FC

¹¹⁰ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

¹¹¹ Ibid.

to have doubt on internal AMIS reports. As a result, the organization lacked of trust in itself, essential to build more capacity and being able to tackle the different challenges.

The second intelligence collection asset was the helicopters reconnaissance used for monitoring the security situation and identifying areas under rebels' attacks. However, these assets' uses conflicted with other operational constraints (mainly transportation.)

In terms of counter-intelligence, it was mainly unfavorable to AMIS. Under the peace agreement leading to the deployment of the mission, rebel groups were also included as members of the CFC. Which turned out to be one of their means of information collection about opponents' activities and intentions,¹¹² rather than contributing to the de-escalation of the violence through top-leaderships coordination meetings. Conceding that AMIS also got benefit of the collaboration with the opposing groups in better refining its strategy, the overall gain went to the rebel movements that eventually end up attacking each other and even AMIS forces, having assessed its modus operandi.

Movement and Maneuver

As per the deployment to the theater, most of the TCCs have been airlifted by NATO.¹¹³ assets. A total of 31,500 African troops were airlifted during the mission till the merging with UNAMID. African Union had no strategic airlift capability to project

¹¹² Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

¹¹³ Ibid.

forces into Sudan. Generally, in terms of movement capability across the theater, the mission had three fixed-wing aircraft in total: 2 aircrafts An-26 and 1 An-24, that could take up to 40 passengers. Part of the funding was used to provide fuel for aviation transport. With less budget available to cover fuel expenses for the deployment of new forces, the arrival of these was delayed. Additionally, AMIS struggled with the GoS in contracting fuel providers to the forces. This was further worsen by the difficulties in pushing fuel from Khartoum the capital to the sectors and other locations. That restricted the ability of the forces to maneuver.

As per the maneuver aspect, the mission struggled at the beginning on disposing of vehicles. As a reminder, the first MILOBS that came had no vehicle¹¹⁴, just a Thuraya. As forces flew in, the land movement was mainly covered with four-by-four vehicles by the troops. Most of the pickup trucks for the bulk of mobility needs were unarmed, limiting the maneuvering capability of the forces. However, later on, partner nations provided considerable movement assets. British Government¹¹⁵ delivered up to 1000 vehicles via the contractor Crown. 105 AGVP (APCs) were provided by Canada, but GoS impeded rapid and total fielding to the forces. In addition, 25 helicopters Mi-8 medium transport were made available to AMIS by Canada and Netherlands.¹¹⁶ They were however unarmed and had no communications capabilities, preventing them from being force enablers that would provide tactical air support to African forces in the

¹¹⁴ Ekengard, “The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned.”

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change.”

execution of the mandate. Instead they were just used for transportation of goods and personnel. Overall, as the mission increased in size, the movement assets appeared scarce, even if those available truly served to conduct patrols, escorts and security tasks when needed.

Protection

With respect to the Force Protection, AMIS dealt with a difficult logistic situation. With less preparation before deployment into the theater, no prior arrangements were made for the troops. Initial contingents' protection capabilities were limited, as no suitable accommodations existed and less APCs were available. Which did not provide suitable protection against direct small-arms attacks. AU's partnership with US helped to provide camp construction, water and food, and laundry by an American contractor, Pacific Architectural Engineer (PAE).¹¹⁷ The sand bags as well as the watch towers built crescendo enabled the mission to be more secure and subsequently be able to perform its duty. However, the legitimacy of the force got reduced as it did not prevent several attacks on the population, especially with the caution observed after being targeted by rebel groups in Haskanita. The case of the alleged JEM rebels that killed two Nigerian peacekeepers along with two civilian contractors and held in hostage their following rescuers weakened the perception of the mission's ability to protect itself before

¹¹⁷ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

pretending to protect the civilians. In overall, 59 peacekeepers died during their duty in AMIS.¹¹⁸

Concerning the Protection of the Civilians, the general feeling is that AMIS failed to do so. Some government and rebels' attacks occurred in late August 2006 against the civilians. AMIS failed to prevent this or respond as a means to dissuade further attacks. Furthermore, violence exported into the IDP camps that were guarded by local police. In light of patent incapacity or will to protect the vulnerable displaced persons, AMIS resorted to deploy CIVPOL into the camps, with the intent to protect the civilians as well, build the capacity of the local police to do so and investigate on the crimes. Yet, the CIVPOL of AMIS that should be deployed to perform these tasks were delayed due to lack of accommodation. Such events contributed to decrease the confidence in AMIS and subsequently tainted its overall legitimacy.

However, in many instances, the Force proved to have been useful in anticipating the deployment of troops in some areas to protect civilians against atrocities of the rebels. With the mandate's restrictions to go far away to protect the civilians, ad hoc missions were conducted in the vicinity of the potential targeted villages to prevent rebel groups from entering in the camp and conduct mass killings, rapes, and burnings. The mission got credited for its special patrols conducted on roads to markets, and its 'firewood patrols'¹¹⁹ conducted to protect women leaving IDP camps to go search for firewood.

¹¹⁸ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

¹¹⁹ Human Rights Watch, "Darfur 2007: Chaos by Design - Peacekeeping Challenges for AMIS and UNAMID."

Such patrols prevented rapes and sexual violence from rebels, for risks were constant to women going near the IDP camps, as rebel groups constantly wandered around these. AMIS also succeeded in providing security along humanitarian supply roads. As a result, there was an increase of humanitarian actors in the theater. This enhanced cooperation with information sharing and joint planning through the Protection Working Groups. However, some humanitarian NGOs feared to be associated with the military (AMIS) and denied escorts and coordination meetings with AMIS, mindful of the conservation of their neutral's status.

AMIS also offered patrols to protect IDPs that returned to their homes. Through other patrols, AMIS conducted meeting with local leaders to collect information on potential threats. When unable to protect the civilians from the atrocities, these perceived its inability as being partisan. Yet, as demonstrated above with the Quinlivan's benchmark¹²⁰ stabilization ratio, the overall strength was not in favor of providing full protection to everyone in regard to manpower constraints.

Later on, the hybridization brought about additional forces and equipment through the light (advisors, GPS devices, night vision goggles, tents, and generators) and heavy support packages.¹²¹ (additional troops with military 2250, police 721, civilians 1136, including 300 Chinese engineering unit).

¹²⁰ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

¹²¹ United Nations Mission in Sudan, "Sudan: The United Nations delivers on its commitment to boost AMIS capabilities, hands over first batch of equipment to the African Mission," Press Release No. 002/07, Relief Web, 11 January 2007, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-United-nations-delivers-its-commitment-boost-amis-capabilities-hands-over-first>.

As per the health protection, units relied on organic medical capabilities. However, donations were made to increase the overall mission's capabilities in terms of medical coverage, mainly net mosquitos,¹²² pharmaceuticals, etc. The Mi-8 medium transport helicopters were also used for medical evacuations.

Assessment of Air and Maritime Components Contribution

As per the maritime component, it was not applicable as Sudan has no sea. For the aerial however, the majority of the strategic airlift was performed by NATO partners; and no air asset was used to provide tactical air support to the forces on ground.

AMIS Summary

From this case study on African Union's mission in Sudan, it is to be noted that the mission actually provided protection to civilians, even if in very limited range. Special patrols conducted to secure roads to women collecting firewood or returning from markets prevented them from being killed and raped by the rebels. The security situation also was stable enough to enhance the delivery of humanitarian assistance to the populations settled in IDP camps. There also, an enhanced protection was provided by CIVPOL to prevent export of fighting into the camps. This positive assessment however can be relativized as most of the population left the villages to find safety in the camps, therefore leading to a seemingly peaceful recovery. Ultimately, there was a decrease in the mortality after the establishment of AMIS and its upsizing.

¹²² United Nations Mission in Sudan, "Sudan: The United Nations delivers on its commitment to boost AMIS capabilities, hands over first batch of equipment to the African Mission."

Yet numerous challenges plagued the mission, leading to its ineffectiveness and hybridization with a more resourceful UN mission. To start off, the mandate was assessed too weak and unrealistic in regard to the realities on the ground. There was a short time between the political decision and the arrival of first MILOBS. Too much tasks with so few human and material resources over a very huge area. The mandate also did not encompass the disarmament of the rebels,¹²³ especially the Janjaweed, leaving them free to attack again and again. It also appeared that AMIS was deployed too late, for the majority of the chaos and death already occurred before the establishment of the mission.

By warfighting function, regarding:

Command and control, troops were under operational control and directed as such by the Force Commander to ensure unity of effort. They were equipped with suitable communications equipment, even if they were restrained to be around populated areas more subject to targeting by rebel groups. Those two aspects were positive as they enabled the mission to be able to achieve its goals. The commandership however was not good, even if the mandate was not strong enough and was one of the main reasons that led to failure. This latter came from the unrealistic mandate established, restraining the use of force to protect the populations to very narrowed, difficult circumstances. Failure to achieve the mandate is attributable to the MSC and the PSC that failed to provide clear, feasible mandate. Passivity of the Force after attacks by government and rebel groups coupled with incessant hostages' situations of the military peacekeepers kidnapped discredited the capacity of the Force leadership to achieve tangible results on

¹²³ Ekengard, "The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): Experiences and Lessons Learned."

the theater. However, as the criteria retained were respected by the Command of the Force, a positive qualification is given for this function.

Movement and maneuver, troops were equipped with light vehicles but also APCs that enabled them to perform their duties. Most of the vehicles however were not armed, reducing the ability to react while maneuvering and provide enough fire power against the threat. The strategic transportation in and out the theater was provided by NATO airlift capability. Intra-theater was performed either by transport helicopter or by fixed-wing aircraft. As result, the movement aspect is assessed as poor while the maneuver aspect is assessed as fair.

Intelligence, the primary source of information collection was the MILOBS, through their motorized patrols. They also collected from helicopter reconnaissance. In terms of counter-intelligence, the warring factions got more benefit than the mission, as they took advantage of their presence in the Ceasefire Commission. Which enabled them to assess their adversary intent and activities. As result, counter-intelligence is assessed as poor while human intelligence is assessed as fair.

And protection, the force was protected crescendo with the construction of the camps with its defensive features. The troops also got enhanced protection through the use of APCs in very sensitive areas. The protection of the civilians was performed in a limited extent through the special patrols and the establishment of CIVPOL in the IDP camps. The force's health protection was enabled through organic capabilities even if donations occurred and increased their survivability. In sum, force protection is assessed as fair with the camp construction after deployment, while force health protection is

assessed as good. Protection of civilians on the other hand is assessed as poor in light of numerous attacks regardless the presence of the Force.

Apart from this, the AU mission in Sudan featured a singular problem, not addressed as so far by the Commission: how to deal with a HN government unwilling in the facts to allow the mission to complete? The sheer vow of the new APSA is to bypass national sovereignty in case of grave violations of human rights, namely genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. How far can the organization then go to ensure respect of the rights of all the citizens of the country, given a HN with considerable military capabilities and supported diplomatically by some member states? How far can the AU go to conduct peace enforcement mission regardless the actors, or should it always seek for consensual peace operation?

The overall assessment of the AMIS case study is as follow:

AMIS's Joint Functions Assessment

Function	Evaluation criteria	Level of effectiveness		
		Good	Fair	Less
C2	Type of the command authority	Good		
	communication systems technical features	Good		
	commandership of troops		Fair	
M2	Move or deploy forces,			Less
	Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formation		Fair	
Intelligence	Surveillance and reconnaissance assets		Fair	
	Counter-intelligence			Less
	human intelligence capabilities		Fair	
Protection	Force protection		Fair	
	Force health protection	Good		
	Other protection activities			Less
Overall performance		Fair		

Source: Created by author.

Impact of AMIS on Future AU Missions

From a lessons-learned perspective, African Union had the wisdom to introspect and scrutinize all its action in AMIS operation in an effort to better prepare its standby forces. By the holding of a seminar in Accra, Ghana, senior military and police leadership outlined the most critical shortcoming of AMIS. Among these are weak mandates, difficulties in handling host nation maneuvers, insufficient planning capabilities, insufficient logistic, sustainment and financial capabilities, weak command and control at strategic and operational levels, and heavy reliance on external partners in various critical domains.

Bearing in mind these lessons from AMIS, critical adjustments were envisioned and paved the way for the next AU mission, which happened three years later in Somalia. The first and foremost lesson is the adoption of a more proactive posture to enforce peace upon arrival into the theater. Yet, here the situation was very different and the threat much more deadly than ever thought. AMISOM, the AU mission in Somalia is the next case study of this thesis.

AMISOM Case Study

The African Union Mission in Somalia is the last attempt of multiple trials of international missions aiming to impose a peace upon a territory devastated by years of internal conflicts due to state collapse, clan factionalism, warlords and religious extremism.¹²⁴ As for background, Somalia is an eastern country that shaped the ‘horn of Africa’, bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. It’s large of 637,657 square kilometers and has 3,025 km of coastline.¹²⁵ As per the description of the operational environment (OE) central and south Somalia, the central has higher plains with mountains averaging 1,800 meters (above sea level) of altitude. The south consists of broad plateaus meandered by the country’s only two rivers (Juba and Shabeelle), valleys

¹²⁴ Sally Healy and Mark Bradbury, “Endless war: A brief history of the Somali conflict,” *Accord: Whose peace is it anyway? Connecting Somali and international peacemaking*, no. 21 (February 2010): 10-14, accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.c-r.org/accord-article/endless-war-brief-history-somali-conflictin>.

¹²⁵ Central Intelligence Agency Library, “African Union Mission in Somalia,” accessed 14 February 2019, <https://www.cia.gov/library/>.

and dry watercourses.¹²⁶ The region is filled up with broken mountain terrain that can restrict mobility of advancing units. Moving south to central, vegetation (semi-arid woodlands and grasslands) and cultivation areas make place to arid and sub-desert soils. The infrastructure contrasts in major populated areas and their blocs of buildings with the rear areas and their open and flats terrains, requiring urban operations in built-up areas like Mogadishu, Baidoa, Kismayo, etc., and full-scale conventional warfare in remote areas.

The political situation in Somalia since the 1990s has been characterized by perpetual gain-and-loss.¹²⁷ peace times upon agreements reached by internal (clans) and external (regional countries and international community or western governments) actors. It essentially emanated from the quest of power and control of a country made of different ethnics organized in four major clans. Periods of pure chaos reigned in the midst of clan-based warfare that plunged the country in catastrophe, with tens of thousands killed and millions either fled to neighboring countries or internally displaced.

Drought, clan cleansing and disruption of food supplies occasioned about 250,000 people to die from famine.¹²⁸ and around 1,000,000 Somalis to die from the conflict.

¹²⁶ Helen Chapin Metz, ed., "Terrain, Vegetation, and Drainage," in *Somalia: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office for the Library of Congress, 1992), accessed 13 February 2019, <http://countrystudies.us/somalia/35.htm>.

¹²⁷ Gain-and-loss due to the fact that agreements reached are not legitimate enough as they exclude the interests of some of the actors of the crisis, whether the Islamist dominated coalition or the federalist Darood and Ethiopian backed coalition.

¹²⁸ Healy and Bradbury, "Endless war: A brief history of the Somali conflict."

Many phases have been observed since the fall of Siad Barre.¹²⁹ 1991-1992 was the most intense period of the conflict with clans fighting for control of land and resources in southern Somalia. The years 1992-1995, was a phase marked by UN and US interventions with localized conflict around Mogadishu and relative stability; 1995-2000 was the post UN-US intervention and emergence of regional administration and continued dissolution of Somali state. The interval 2000-2006 was the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG) and later the Transitional Federal Government (TFG). Lately, 2006-2011 was notable as the era of the deployment of foreign forces, mainly Ethiopian forces, and more recently in 2007, AU forces.

As seen above, international efforts towards stabilization of Somalia started in 1992 with the first UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I from April 1992-March 1993).¹³⁰ and its subsequent mission (UNOSOM II from March 1992-March 1995).¹³¹ aimed at monitoring cease-fire in Mogadishu and providing a secure environment for humanitarian assistance. These resulted in a failure after a series of attacks against UN peacekeepers and eventual withdrawal of UN forces, again leaving the destiny of the people to themselves.

¹²⁹ Global Security, "Somalia Civil War," accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/somalia.htm>.

¹³⁰ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Operation in Somalia I (Draft)* (New York: United Nations), accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm>.

¹³¹ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Operation in Somalia II (Draft)* (New York: United Nations), accessed 13 February 2019, <https://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosom2b.htm>.

Al-Shabaab, the New Terror of East Africa

From that struggle between clans and the patent lawlessness climate, a legal and political organization of the sub-clan Abgal of the powerful clan Hawiye¹³² arose in the year 2000 through 2006 to emplace some rule-based governance. Called the Islamic Courts Union, its purpose was to ensure the Islamic law called “Sharia”, as the fundamental law and order, was restored. The population welcomed this gap filling by such an organization and lived under their rule. The organization ensured respect of their authority with militias maintaining order and enforcing the new laws. Amid these militias, a new organization from Al-Qaeda network, named Al-Shabaab, which means “The Youth”, singularized itself in assassinations, kidnappings, attacks on property, shootings, and suicide attacks when the ICUs were ousted from Mogadishu as many foreign jihadists were about to enter the country. These have as hidden agenda, the establishment of an Islamic State, which would threaten the regional stability. After the peace process held in Asmara (Eritrea) to which Al-Shabaab refused to participate and denounced a betrayal of other militias from the global jihadist agenda,¹³³ the group multiplied its radicalized actions, and seized the capital town of Mogadishu and its surroundings. The group’s strength accounted then between 6,000 and 7,000 operatives¹³⁴ in 2008 (around 9,000 in 2017) and was specialized in Improvised

¹³² Religioius Literacy Project, “The Islamic Courts Union,” Harvard Divinity School, accessed 18 February 2019, <https://rlp.hds.harvard.edu/faq/islamic-courts-union>.

¹³³ Center for International Security and Cooperation, “Al-Shabaab,” Stanford University, accessed 15 February 2019, <https://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/61>.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

Explosive Devices.¹³⁵ (IED) and devastating suicide attacks.¹³⁶ The group got affiliated to many other terrorist organizations across the world, including Al-Qaeda, AQIM, ISIL, etc, and publicly announced their allegiance unto. Their equipment consists of 155mm¹³⁷ artillery pieces, 82mm box, grenade launcher tubes, grenades, Sipper fusils, anti-tank bombs,¹³⁸ as well as small arms (AK, FN, pistols, ..), rifles, machine guns, missiles, etc. Considerable equipment also got into their hands after successful attacks their launched on government and AU forces' outposts.

Al-Shabaab's main source of revenue was from export of charcoal¹³⁹ (through Kismayo port) till the capture of the port by AMISOM troops in 2012. Part of the funding also comes from Al Qaeda foreign jihadists as well as Somalian diaspora communities.¹⁴⁰ However, various sources of revenue include trades of ivory and sugar.

¹³⁵ Daisy Muibu and Benjamin Nickels, "Foreign Technology or Local Expertise? Al-Shabaab's IED Capability," *CTC Sentinel* 10, no. 10 (November 2017): 33-36, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://ctc.usma.edu/foreign-technology-or-local-expertise-al-shabaabs-ied-capability>.

¹³⁶ The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, "To Al-Shabaab and back," accessed 15 February 2019, <https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/al-shabaab-back/>.

¹³⁷ African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), "Al-Shabaab weapons discovered in Bakara market," AMISOM Press Statement, September 2011, accessed 23 March 2019, <http://amisom-au.org/2011/09/al-shabaab-weapons-discovered-in-bakara-market/>.

¹³⁸ (AMISOM), "Al-Shabaab weapons discovered in Bakara market," African Union Mission in Somalia."

¹³⁹ The Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers, "To Al-Shabaab and back."

¹⁴⁰ Ibid.

It also got equipment from looting of various entities like the U.N., the NGOs, vanquished forces positions, also alleged African and Middle Eastern countries, for instance Eritrea.

In terms of geographic locations, the group is spread in multiple areas across southern and central Somalia, but also in neighboring countries like Kenya, Uganda, and Djibouti. Its tactic involves abstaining from engaging a superior conventional army; rather conduct guerilla operations against enemy supply lines and outposts.¹⁴¹

Establishment of an AU Mission

Following the Ethiopian's, United Nations-backed, intervention in 2006 which ousted the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), the AU was requested to establish a peace operation in Somalia, in face of an international community's unwillingness to deploy forces in the country. It was assessed too risky to send troops in the country, in view of previous experiences and developing instability. On 19 January 2007, the AU's PSC authorized deployment of AMISOM for a period of six months with the mandate to provide support to the TFIs in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia.¹⁴² It was initially to comprise nine infantry

¹⁴¹ Stratfor, "Somalia: Al Shabaab Leaders After the Battle for Kismayo," 28 September 2012, accessed 23 March 2019, <https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/somalia-al-shabaab-leaders-after-battle-kismayo>.

¹⁴² African Union, Peace and Security Council, "Communique of the 69th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council" (Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 19 January 2007),

battalions of 850 personnel each, supported by maritime coastal and air components, to which add some civilian component and a police training team. However, few years later, on UN Security Councils calls, this number significantly increased, reaching above 23 battalions.¹⁴³ as successes on ground incentivized other African countries to contribute.

The mission as noted was actually designed to be followed by a UN peacekeeping operation for a long-term stabilization of the country. This force, that would be an International Stabilization Force (ISF), however never went through, lacking the support¹⁴⁴ (only two countries willing to fund it, U.S. and Netherlands) and the will of countries to contribute in troops (none pledged for it).¹⁴⁵

AMISOM military forces have been drawn in crescendo, throughout the years, from five different countries.¹⁴⁶ namely Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti, deployed into six sectors covering southern and central Somalia (see map below). Sector 1 covers areas of Banadir and Lower Shabelle and is monitored by Ugandan troops. Sector 2 covers Lower and Middle Jubba with Kenyan forces. Sector 3 comprises areas

accessed 15 February 2019, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/communiqueeng-69th.pdf>, para. 8.

¹⁴³ Various references from AMISOM statements.

¹⁴⁴ Paul D. Williams and Hashi Abdirashid, *Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia* (The Heritage Institute for Policy Studies, Mogadishu, Somalia, February 2016), accessed 15 February 2019, https://www.academia.edu/22480059/Exit_Strategy_Challenges_for_the_African_Union_Mission_in_Somalia.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), “AMISOM Military Component,” accessed 15 February 2019, <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/military-component>.

of Bay and Bakool with its sub sector of Gedo, with Ethiopian forces. Djiboutian forces are responsible for sector 4 which areas comprises Hiiraan and Galgaduud. Burundian forces are in charge of sector 5 that covers Middle Shabelle region. Finally, sector 6 covers the region of Kismayo and is handled by Ethiopian forces. The Police Contributing Countries are six and are: Uganda, Kenya, Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, and Sierra Leone. Since then, the mission evolved in strength, and its cartography as of January 2015 was as follow:




Figure 2. African Union Mission in Somalia

Source: Andrei, “In Somalia, Stability is a Distant Promise,” 1 February 2016, Geopol Intelligence, <https://www.geopolintelligence.com/in-somalia-stability-is-a-distant-promise>.

Task Organization of TCCs

Most of the intervention forces built up their task organization around the UN infantry battalion organization model.¹⁴⁷ The total strength is 850 personnel comprising 3 to 4 Infantry Companies (with 3 to 4 platoons) and 1 Support Company. In a UN model, each battalion should have as weapons 21 APCs, 06 mortars, 04 MMG,¹⁴⁸ 04 AGL.¹⁴⁹ As equipment, it should have 158 vehicles (maneuvering and support), 04 GS radars, 01 UAV, 01 tracker. Certainly due to the re-hatting and subsequent reimbursement in intent, the TCCs have adopted this organization to the very low level. For instance, companies are required to have miniature UAV in a UN model. Which is found also with AMISOM troops on the ground in company level with Commercial-of-the-Shelf drones. The Ugandan contingent is organized into 3 battle groups comprising each 2 to 3 battalions. Burundian contingent consists of six battalions, same as Kenya. Ethiopian has up to 5 battalions while Djibouti has 1 battalion. Sierra Leone got also deployed but was replaced after by Ethiopian forces.

TCCs' Motives of Intervention

The intervention of Kenya in the conflict is driven by numerous reasons. The first is economic and is related to the decline in the tourism sector, as events, meaning the

¹⁴⁷ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Department of Field Support, *United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual*, vol. 1 (New York: United Nations, August 2012), <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/UNIBAM.Vol.I.pdf>United Nations.

¹⁴⁸ Medium Machine Gun.

¹⁴⁹ Automatic Grenade Launcher.

abduction of foreigners, the kidnapping, the murders, on the eastern border, seriously impact the tourist industry that represented 15.4% of its GDP¹⁵⁰ in 1999 and 8.8% in 2018. A severe decline has been observed since 2005 where it was still 13.6%. Also, instability threaten the trade in cattle and other commodities in the eastern area. There are therefore economic incentives to intervene and reestablish safety and confidence in the tourism market and the trade between populations. The second is political. Kenya Defense forces have been in the last years well-equipped, but has not yet faced war. With the desire to support own sub-clans in Jubaland,¹⁵¹ area bordering the Somali frontier, politicians and senior military leadership were thrilled to intervene. The third is social. Since, the break out of this conflict, Kenya (as well as other neighboring countries) has welcomed thousands of refugees, much more than the capacity allowed for the camp built for it. Along with this crisis come diseases like cholera that spread quite quickly across a country. Noteworthy, all this is played in a context of regional competition with Ethiopia and Uganda.

Considering Ethiopia, her main reasons are quite a bit different. First, those two countries share an uneasy tangled past¹⁵² related to their war of the Ogaden in 1982, over

¹⁵⁰ World Travel and Tourism Council, "Economic Impact of Travel and Tourism Report," accessed 4 April 2019, <https://www.wttc.org/datagateway>.

¹⁵¹ David W. Throup, "Kenya's Intervention in Somalia," Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 February 2012, accessed 04 April 2019, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/kenya%E2%80%99s-intervention-somalia>.

¹⁵² Napoleon A. Bamfo, "Ethiopia's Invasion of Somalia in 2006: Motives and Lessons Learned," *African Journal of Political Science and International Relations* 4, no. 2 (February 2010): 55-65, accessed 04 April 2019, http://www.academicjournals.org/app/webroot/article/article1381826680_Bamfo.pdf.

territorial disputes. Besides, Ethiopia is determined to have stability and security over its eastern border, as conflicts have always prevailed in Somalia, for a long time. With the clans fighting, the warlords conducting drug trafficking and maritime piracy, the Islamist-inspired insurgents growing rapidly and having more and more deadly capabilities with military explosive skill-sets, Ethiopia perceived a direct threat and was constrained to react and reestablish the balance and safety on its eastern border.

With respect to Uganda, security also comes officially as the main reason. However, some point economic and military benefits of participating with TCCs.¹⁵³ Allegedly, there was economic support for the domestic security sector. Political reasons like international prestige, external partnerships, commitment to African Union Pan-Africanist ideals also resonate as well. Burundi, Djibouti and late Sierra Leone also fit into this category.

Military Capabilities of the Troops Contributing Countries

The performance of the African countries deployed into Somalia widely depended upon their intrinsic military capabilities back home. To assess this, the Military Balance Reports along with various barometers of multiple sources, through the years 2010 to 2018, have been used to provide basics for grasping the actual readiness of those forces. From this, it can be retained that the majority of the TCCs had the necessary equipment (weapons, vehicles, communications assets, etc.) to defeat the insurgents. One aspect was challenging and was the counter-IED capability that was not extensively developed over

¹⁵³ The Conversation, “What Spurred Six Countries to Join the AU’s Mission in Somalia,” 1 February 2018, accessed 20 March 2019, <http://theconversation.com/what-spurred-six-countries-to-join-the-aus-mission-in-somalia-90757>.

the TCCs. For more information, a detail of the capabilities is put in a table in the appendix B.

AMISOM was credited to have made tremendous successes and brought stability in Mogadishu and its surroundings, winning the battle of the capital against Al-Qaeda-affiliated group Al-Shabaab, that was determined to contest TFG and AMISOM's authority over this region and in aftermath the country.

The overall perception of this intervention conducted by foreign countries is also tainted with inquiries of the actual roles and interests being pursued by these T/PCCs. Bearing in mind the usual principle of supporting national government and its forces, these TCCs have been entirely dedicated to protecting the fragile TFG and supporting subsequent Somali National Army (SNA) in their fight against other competing factions. However, it is to be noted that AMISOM exemplified the narrative of 'African Solutions to African problems' as the persistent initiative and the high price paid by the T/PCCs (more than 3,000 fatalities).¹⁵⁴ demonstrated the commitment, the ownership and shared values of Africans.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵⁴ African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), "Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Peace Operations Estimate – AMISOM/UNSOM/UNSOS," updated 25 April 2018, accessed 18 February 2019, [http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/\(180425\)%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Stability%20Operations%20Institute%20AMISOM%20UNSOM%20UNSOS%20Estimate.pdf](http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File/(180425)%20Peacekeeping%20and%20Stability%20Operations%20Institute%20AMISOM%20UNSOM%20UNSOS%20Estimate.pdf).

¹⁵⁵ Sabastiano Rwengabo, "AMISOM and African-Centred Solutions to Peace and Security Challenges," *Journal of African Solutions in Peace and Security* 7, no. 1 (July 2016): 91-137, accessed 18 February 2019. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/308898703_AMISOM_and_African-Centred_Solutions_to_Peace_and_Security_Challenges.

AMISOM is now a hybrid mission with two UN components: UNSOM and UNSOS. The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)'s mandate includes provision of policy advice to FGS and AMISOM on peacebuilding and state-building along with security sector reform and rule of law, coordination of international donor support, promotion of respect of human rights, women's empowerment, promotion of child protection and conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence,¹⁵⁶ etc. While the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) is mandated to support AMISOM, UNSOM, SNA, and SPF (Somali Police Forces) on joint operations with AMISOM.¹⁵⁷ Noteworthy, this support was only in non-lethal materials. The SNA¹⁵⁸ also received outside donor support in order to increase their overall capacity, from the European Union Training Mission in Somalia, the U.S., Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates,¹⁵⁹ to enable them operate resourcefully alongside AMISOM forces.

Depiction from the Joint Functions

Command and Control

As a reminder, the performances to be evaluated in this joint function are: type of the command authority (OPCON, TACON), communication systems technical features

¹⁵⁶ United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNISOM), "Mandate," accessed 18 February 2019, <https://unsom.unmissions.org/mandate>.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, "Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Peace Operations Estimate – AMISOM/UNSOM/UNSOS."

¹⁵⁹ Courtney Richardson, "List of African American Personal Finance Bloggers," My Money Chronicles, 2018, accessed 1 November 2018, <https://mymoneychronicles.com/list-of-african-american-personal-finance-bloggers/>.

(ranges, encryption capabilities), and the general sense of effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the commandership of troops.

As described above, AMISOM is a multinational operation led by the AU in support of the FGS and the SNA. The headquarters of the Force is located in Mogadishu where the Force Commander (FC) exerts an operational control authority (OPCON) over the subordinate sectors solely under responsibility of specific TCCs. As a consequence, each sector or country reports directly to the FC in this parallel structure type organization of the mission. AMISOM also operates in parallel with the Somali security forces.¹⁶⁰ The unity of command as per UN policy in design of multinational headquarters is sort of achieved with all sectors feeding information and serving a common purpose set by the Mission HQ in coordination with the military component leadership. This type of latitude given or passively provided by the Force Commander allowed contingent and battalion commanders to have a high degree of autonomy to pursue tactical objectives in their respective AORs.¹⁶¹

However, beside those intra-theater channels, as countries constitute solely the sectors, there were also extra-theater channels and they report and were tasked by their

¹⁶⁰ Walter Lotze and Paul Williams, “The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU’s Experience in Somalia,” International Peace Institute, 2016, accessed 15 December 2018, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2893349.

¹⁶¹ Matt Freear and Cedric de Coning, “Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,” *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 2 (2013): 1-11, accessed 08 March 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Lessons%20from%20AMISOM%20for%20Peace%20Operations%20in%20Mali.pdf>.

home countries.¹⁶² As seen above, participation of regional actors was also driven by national interests. Instability in Somalia has negative impacts in terms of security, economy and social life of populations of neighboring countries. As a result of this pursuance of individual interests, the unity of effort suffered and discredited the overall effort and intervention. There were difficulties in designing a mission-wide approach to joint planning and training.¹⁶³ Therefore, in terms of commandship, the AMISOM's FC does have command authority but actually just little effective control over their subordinate sectors, especially after the expansion outside of Mogadishu where its role was perceived as just of coordination as opposed to commanding.¹⁶⁴

This lack of unity of effort was also remarkable in the non-existence or poorly existing mutual support to one another by all the national contingents. In many of the attacks, like in Gedo region or with El-Adde, distressed soldiers did not get reinforcement from other national contingents, even days after the attack.¹⁶⁵ This clearly portrayed a

¹⁶² Peace Support Operations Division, Peace and Security Department, African Union Commission, *Report on the Ten-Year AMISOM Lessons Learned Conference* (Nairobi, Kenya, 9-10 March 2017), accessed 15 February 2019, <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/ll-eng-1.pdf>.

¹⁶³ Dawit Yohannes Wondemagegnehu and Daniel Gebreegziabher Kebede, *AMISOM: Charting a New Course for African Union Peace Missions* (African Politics, African Peace, Paper No. 6, World Peace Foundation, The Fletcher School at Tufts University, Medford, MA, June 2016), accessed 15 November 2018, <https://sites.tufts.edu/wpf/files/2017/07/6.-AMISOM-Yohannes-Kebede.pdf>.

¹⁶⁴ Lotze and Williams, "The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia."

¹⁶⁵ William Oluoch Ligawa, "Challenges Influencing Peace Building Strategies in Somalia: A Study of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)," *Open Access Library Journal* 4, no. e3249 (19 October 2017): 1-19, accessed 21 March 2019, <https://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=79704>.

lack of synchronization, of multinational-integrated approach at the Force Headquarters to the fight in Somalia. Every TCC faced its problems within its area by itself.

Furthermore, the AU military leadership failed to conduct successful consolidation operation of the territories outside of Mogadishu that were recovered. Due to the lack of effective control over subordinate forces, required tasks that can contribute to the achievement of the objectives are neither directed to them nor performed by them. Area security and stability tasks aimed to provide secure area in preparation of future offensive operations are poorly performed, enabling bypass or remnant terrorist fighters to harass AMISOM's supply routes through IEDs and ambush attacks or establish illegal roadblocks to ransom the local populations.¹⁶⁶

At a higher level, there seems clearly to be a disconnect in the lines of operations and lines of effort, essentially as to what direction give to the mission (peace enforcement or stabilization), which localities can be recovered from Al-Shabaab and how to achieve unity of effort with the whole-lot-of-government, in harnessing the tactical gains encountered. Though, initially, AMISOM was designed to be a military-led intervention or war-fighting mission, not a multidimensional stabilization one. However, efforts were to be made by the military leadership in coordination with the political leadership of Somalia in the early phase of planning to ensure that areas recovered are immediately filled with government entities for essential services, as a means to expand and recover government's lost control over its territory. AMISOM also faced a lack of Somali

¹⁶⁶ Ligawa, "Challenges Influencing Peace Building Strategies in Somalia: A Study of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)."

speakers.¹⁶⁷ that could help understand the local population and the National Security Forces (NSF) and better contribute to the consolidation of gains.¹⁶⁸ This lack of synchronization in the higher level planning played a role in the difficulty to bring ‘peace dividends’ to local population.

Another challenge AMISOM faced thereby was the limited strength of its force. Despite significant measures that consisted to increase the strength of military component as successes were obtained, AMISOM still lacked sufficient force to guard areas recovered through consolidation operation.¹⁶⁹ In fact, the military leadership encountered some challenges in readying NSF or be augmented with sufficient personnel to undertake increasing demands imposed by the expansion offensives. This was particularly reinforced by the fact that AMISOM troops were also deployed along the supply routes to provide security for UNSOM delivering logistic support to them. Which shrinks the available manpower to conduct actual combat operations. Beyond, it showed a logistic pitfall, in the sense that critical part of the troops transportation and supplies was still

¹⁶⁷ Neus Ramis Seguí, “The role of the African Union in Somalia: Where to go from here with the AMISOM peace operation?” (Policy Paper No. 8, International Catalan Institute for Peace, Government of Catalonia, April 2013), accessed 18 February 2019. http://icip.gencat.cat/web/.content/continguts/publicacions/policypapers/2013/arxiu/policy_paper_08_english.pdf.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid.

¹⁶⁹ Donatien Nduwimana, “AMISOM in Somalia: A Ray of Hope?” (Occasional Paper, Series 4, No. 4, International Peace Support Training Centre, Nairobi, Kenya, 2013), accessed 18 February 2019, http://ipstc.org/media/documents/Occasional_Paper_4-4.pdf.

done by roads with soldiers escorting the convoys. Many of these soldiers had been killed or permanently injured from IEDs attacks.¹⁷⁰

In terms of communication, AMISOM TCCs are equipped, through bilateral partnerships, with secure tactical radio networks that helped it prevail over Al-Shabaab. Additionally, the United Nations Support Office for AMISOM (UNSOA), predecessor of UNSOS, provided considerable communications capabilities to the mission and its forces. Since 2009, secure strategic communications network has been established between the Force Headquarters (FHQ) with the mission headquarters, enabling strategic guidance and directives to be passed down from the political leadership to the operational force. On the down level, UNSOA provided around 3,200 TETRA secure tactical radio systems, composed of handheld and mobile radios, down to the platoon level. Communications between the FHQ in Mogadishu and the Sectors Headquarters (SHQs) were enabled by Codan HF base stations, man-packs and mobile radios that were able of secured data transmission as well.¹⁷¹ Many other strategic locations had also been provided with these capabilities.

Furthermore, various services, like voice, data and video (like telephony, internet, e-mail, videoconferencing and access to enterprise systems) were also provided by the

¹⁷⁰ Ligawa, “Challenges Influencing Peace Building Strategies in Somalia: A Study of AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).”

¹⁷¹ United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, “Communication and Information Technology,” accessed 08 March 2019, <https://unsoa.unmissions.org/communication-and-information-technology>,

Communication Information Technology Services (CITS) using VSAT, microwave, fiber wired and wireless networks.¹⁷²

Another C2 issue reported in AMISOM was the repeated allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuses against the contingents by organizations like Human Rights Watch.¹⁷³ Some of these misconducts were alleged to have occurred even on some AMISOM bases in Mogadishu, while victim girls were seeking for water or medical assistance. Despite the strong denial by the AU, pointing unjustified and generalized conclusions drawn by the organization, as indeed just 2 out of the 21 allegations were proven, it is to be signaled the role the military leadership had to play, at least early enough, in preventing these acts from occurring.¹⁷⁴

For this function, the type of authority, OPCON, adopted with the latitude given to the subordinate commanders was effective and assessed as good. Communications systems were encrypted, were suitable, and enabled liaison between units at various levels and therefore assessed as good also. However, the Force staff did not have much authority over the contingents and could not direct them as wish, even when neighboring contingents were under attacks. It is therefore assessed as poor.

¹⁷² United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, “Communication and Information Technology.”

¹⁷³ Human Rights Watch, “The Power These Men Have Over Us: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by African Union Forces in Somalia,” 8 September 2014, accessed 02 April 2019, <https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/08/power-these-men-have-over-us/sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-african-union-forces>.

¹⁷⁴ African Union Peace and Security, “The African Union releases the key findings and recommendations of the report of investigations on Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Somalia.”

Intelligence

In this section, criteria to look for are surveillance and reconnaissance assets, counter-intelligence, and human intelligence capabilities. In terms of Counter-intelligence and human intelligence capabilities, AMISOM came up with a marked advantage over the other hybrid or UN missions. As a matter of fact, most of the TCCs, as stated above, used to conduct unilateral interventions inside the failed state of Somalia to degrade insurgents' capabilities, either in reaction to terrorist attacks perpetrated on their soil by these groups, or in prevention of potential attacks. Those countries, that share similar culture, languages, ethnics with Somali population, already got important intelligence products on the threats in Somalia that they also use within their respective sectors to plan and conduct their operations.

On another line, some TCCs like Kenya have a long history of fighting these insurgents, taking advantage of the clans' fractionalization in Somalia and leveraging on Somali refugees settled on their soil to operate against Al-Shabaab on both sides of the border. When this does raise questions in the Somali public opinion about the legitimacy of the interventions in Somalia by these countries, it is to be noted that those intelligence mechanisms do serve them one way or the other in their fight against the insurgents. However, their lack of extensive cooperation with the local population did not enable them to prevent some attacks on their posts. For this reason, the human intelligence is assessed as fair.

Additionally, AMISOM relies on Somali forces for local, human intelligence, although the reliability and quality of this intelligence was poor. Somalia is an arena where rival clans and militia compete for power, land, and resources. The foreign

intervention led by the AU did not please to some part of the population belonging or with deep ties to rival clans of seating FGS. Besides, Al-Shabaab along the years extensively infiltrated Somalia's intelligence services, and other security forces (NSA, SNP).¹⁷⁵ However, AMISOM was also believed to be very prudent about collaboration and integration of local security forces into their organization.¹⁷⁶ A situation that probably had one of its reasons amid Al-Shabaab's attack perpetrated on the Force Headquarters in Mogadishu that claimed the life of the Deputy Force Commander and other key staff in September 2009, and another one perpetrated by militants disguised as government security personnel in August 2012 that killed several members of the parliament.¹⁷⁷ AMISOM also faced a lack of Somali speakers that could help understand the local population and the National Security Forces (NSF) and better contribute to the consolidation of gains.

Keeping with the counter-intelligence capabilities, reports by Reuters¹⁷⁸ and "the Nation"¹⁷⁹ released in 2014 stated the U.S. deployed an intelligence apparatus, CIA

¹⁷⁵ Vanda Felbab-Brown, "Developments in Somalia," Brookings, accessed 08 March 2019, <https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/developments-in-somalia>.

¹⁷⁶ Williams and Hashi, *Exit Strategy Challenges for the AU Mission in Somalia*.

¹⁷⁷ Counter Extremism Project, "Al-Shabab," accessed 03 April 2019, <https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/al-shabab>.

¹⁷⁸ Phil Stewart, "Exclusive: U.S. discloses secret Somalia military presence, up to 120 troops," *Reuters*, 2 July 2014, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-somalia/exclusive-u-s-discloses-secret-somalia-military-presence-up-to-120-troops-idUSKBN0F72A820140702>.

¹⁷⁹ Jeremy Scahill, "The CIA's Secret Sites in Somalia," *The Nation*, 10 December 2014, accessed 02 April 2019, <https://www.thenation.com/article/cias-secret-sites-somalia/>.

likely, in Somalia in support of AMISOM,¹⁸⁰ which significantly increased the capabilities of the mission to assess threats across the theatre. This certainly provided communications' interception in support to the Force and proved to be effective.

Noteworthy, the TCCs shared a common platform for intelligence, the African Data Sharing Network (ADSN), a new (refurbished) satellite terminal acquired from the Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA).¹⁸¹ However, national interests did come into play and hinder the sharing, the larger exploitation and assessment of this products for better assessment of the operational environment and subsequent operational approach towards achievement of common objectives.

With respect to the UAVs, contingents were equipped with them and trained at home by partners,¹⁸² prior to deployment into Somalia. In mission, AMISOM was donated by the U.S. Aerostar UAVs that served for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. The system was used for detection and monitoring of armed groups' activities and strengthen the mission's counter-IED capability.¹⁸³ For logistics purposes, UNSOS also used Aerostar UAV for its mission.¹⁸⁴ Down to the company level, there are

¹⁸⁰ Stewart, "Exclusive: U.S. discloses secret Somalia military presence, up to 120 troops."

¹⁸¹ Justin Klatt, "U.S., Burundi share communications hardware best practices," United States Africa Command, accessed 03 April 2019, <https://www.africom.mil/media-room/Article/28301/u-s-burundi-share-communications-hardware-best-practices>.

¹⁸² AMISOM, UNSOM, UNSOS, "Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) Peace Operations Estimate – AMISOM/UNSOM/UNSOS."

¹⁸³ DefenceWeb, "Amisom gets UAVs," 28 February 2018, accessed 02 April 2019, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/aerospace/aerospace-aerospace/amisom-gets-uavs/>.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

miniature UAVs, commercial-of-the-shelf that were used mainly to detect enemy activity and possible IED. For this criterion, ISR and counter-intelligence are assessed as good, while human intelligence comes out with a fair code as assessment.

Movement and Maneuver

Criteria to examine are move or deploy forces, delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formations. The transportation of these African contingents from home to the theatre were primarily done TCCs in partnerships with some west countries like France, UK and the U.S. However, with the UNSOA and its follower UNSOS deployed into the mission, this task fell into their hands,¹⁸⁵ rotating some 72,869 personnel from 2011 to 2014. This criterion is therefore assessed as poor.

With respect to the maneuver, the majority of the TCCs were equipped back home with light infantry vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles, tanks (like T55), and diverse armored personnel carriers in which some Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, like the Mamba and the Casspir, to move across their areas of responsibility, deal with the threats and stop their movements. Many of these equipment could also be seen on the theatre as contingents moved as constituted units. Tanks have been very useful in urban operations, destroying strongholds and providing protection for advancing troops. Along with these, some special purpose units deployed by countries like Kenya and Uganda helped in achieving some successes against Al-Shabaab. Few years after deployment,

¹⁸⁵ United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, “MOVCON and Troop Rotations,” accessed 20 March 2019, <https://unsoa.unmissions.org/movcon-and-troop-rotations>.

most of the TCCs were donated additional armored vehicles like Acmat Bastion by partners like the U.S...¹⁸⁶

Noteworthy, most of the TCCs used to patrol on light infantry vehicles, very suitable to fight from street to street, in the meanders in pursue of fleeing insurgents. This conferred tremendous successes in the early stages of the mission, offering more support, recognition and legitimacy to the Force. Yet, IED threats had their tolls on the contingents as they went through significant casualties. As a mitigation, the mission opted more and more for safety by fielding MRAPs to the units. Though, these vehicles are heavier and unable to follow all the meanders in built-up areas. As a consequence, pursue became more difficult, aiding fleeing terrorists.

Aviation assets are largely absent within the mission. From 2007 to 2012, no single helicopter was deployed in the mission. With several attempts and calls to provide helicopters assets into Somalia, a few number has been sent by Kenya (three) and Uganda (six). Three out of the six offered Ugandan helicopters even crashed while en route to Somalia. As so far, the mission lacks this critical force multiplier that was very decisive against the terrorists,¹⁸⁷ in stopping their movements, delaying and destroying them in their hidings. In sum, light vehicles and MRAPs helped deal with the insurgents. Therefore, maneuver is assessed as fair. The helicopters needed for tactical and transport purposes were insufficient and are therefore assessed as fair.

¹⁸⁶ DefenceWeb, “AMISOM gets UAVs.”

¹⁸⁷ Lotze and Williams, “The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU’s Experience in Somalia.”

Protection

In this section, the study analyzes the mission with regards to protection of the force, to the health protection with medical support and preventive measures, and to the protection of the civilians with its humanitarian component.

Since its first deployment in March 2007, it was only in May 2013, six years after, that AMISOM adopted a mission-wide protection of civilians.¹⁸⁸ In the first mandates of AMISOM, not much of emphasis was put on the protection of the civilians, rather on the protection of the VIPs associated with the political reconciliation process. Focus was on protecting the TFG and its institutions as they sought to establish in Somalia. The fierce combats that ensued the arrival of the AU contingents (first Ugandans then Burundians) and the decisive battle for control of Mogadishu allowed less to take into consideration the needs of the civilian population, rather strive to oust the insurgents, thereby provide a safe and secure environment to the population.

Regarding the force protection, the TCCs are organically provided with engineering units that can perform limited protection construction. They also have MRAP vehicles to protect themselves against IED threats. Limited ADA units have been deployed, but their weapons mainly served in support of ground units for direct contact fight. However, the mission started in a very non-permissive environment. No preliminary installation was built to receive the incoming troops. No security arrangements were made prior to the landing of the deploying contingents, so that even

¹⁸⁸ Paul D. Williams, "The African Union Mission in Somalia and Civilian Protection Challenges," *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development* 2, no. 2 (2013): 1-17, https://www.academia.edu/4689934/The_African_Union_Mission_in_Somalia_and_Civilian_Protection_Challenges.

the aircraft that offloaded the troops was instantly destroyed and the troops automatically attacked at the airport.

However, across AMISOM, a great part of the protection of the facilities of the Mission, the FHQ, the SHQs and various services in strategic locations was provided by the UNSOA, in constructing the headquarters of these entities and emplacing security barriers for camp perimeters and facilities throughout the mission area. Defense stores including sandbags and razor wire were also provided to improve protection measures.¹⁸⁹ AMISOM also got some force enablers from United Kingdom for route clearance and logistic vehicles, including tractor trucks, bulldozers, backhoe, front end loaders and forklifts. All that helped clear the main supply routes and enhanced protection of the facilities.¹⁹⁰ For example, the armored bulldozers proved vital to the steady advance of the frontline and breaching Al-Shabaab trench systems in Mogadishu.¹⁹¹

Against these protective measures gradually put in place, AMISOM has suffered a heavy casualty loss since its start in 2007. According to Armed Conflict Event and Location Data project (ACELD) there are about 3,485 fatalities resulted from confrontation between AMISOM and Al-Shabaab, while Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) estimated that there were 13,348 battle-related fatalities in engagements between

¹⁸⁹ United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, “Facilities and Engineering,” accessed 08 March 2019, <https://unsoa.unmissions.org/facilities-and-engineering>.

¹⁹⁰ Defence Web, “UK Donates Route Clearance Logistics Vehicles to AMISOM,” 2 July 2018, accessed 08 March 2019, <https://www.defenceweb.co.za/land/land-land/uk-donates-route-clearance-logistics-vehicles-to-amisom/>.

¹⁹¹ Freear and de Coning, “Lessons from the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) for Peace Operations in Mali,” 1-11.

Somali authorities and Al-Shabaab from 2007 to 2014.¹⁹² It was unprecedented for an AU mission and even more for a UN peacekeeping operation, for this elapsed time period. AMISOM units are under constant risks of attacks. Al-Shabaab launched a plethora of attacks against all the TCCs' outposts and the Force HQ, killing Very Important Personalities (VIPs) and civilians as well. In some cases, they outran the posts, killing soldiers and seizing significant amounts of materiel. It also happened that some camps were abandoned days later, leaving open grounds for Al-Shabaab to recover territories they lost to the international force. Memorable, the year 2016, where a series of attacks killed several government officials in Bosasso, in Somalia's semi-autonomous Puntland region.¹⁹³ Just from October 2008 and August 2018, more than one hundred attacks were perpetrated by Al-Shabaab in Somalia, against AMISOM and Somali nationals.¹⁹⁴

Lack of coordination between TCCs of AMISOM had negative impacts on the mission. In fact, with the reduced strength, the expansion operation occasioned some gaps in security cover by those contingents, enabling Al-Shabaab fighters to find

¹⁹² Paul D. Williams, "Special Report: How Many Fatalities Has the African Union Mission in Somalia Suffered?" *Global Observatory*, 10 September 2015, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://theglobalobservatory.org/2015/09/amisom-african-union-somalia-peacekeeping>.

¹⁹³ Curiously, most in the vicinity of a restaurant.

¹⁹⁴ Counter Extremism Project, "Al-Shabab."

sanctuary in the boundaries between the TCCs' sectors.¹⁹⁵ In overall, this criterion proved to be poor in light of all the casualties encountered.

For the force health protection, contingents were deployed with organic medical units usually posted in the battalion support area, away from companies into contact. They deploy with troops and even conducted free medical consultation and provided free treatment to local populace.

However, AMISOM also heavily relies upon UNSOS that performed different medical tasks across the theatre. Infrastructure for medical facilities are provided by UNSOS including equipment. Throughout the mission, there were 32 Level I clinics and 6 Level II hospitals throughout South Central Somalia¹⁹⁶ that were supplied by UNSOS in medical drugs and consumables. Three medical helicopters performed intra-theatre aerial medical evacuation. Extra-theatre medical evacuations were performed by the contractor AMREF, from Somalia to Kenya (4 hospitals in Nairobi, 2 in Mombasa) or South Africa (1 hospital in Johannesburg). Further capacity-building trainings were conducted on a monthly basis and preventive measures were emplaced to ensure diseases like Dengue Fever and Ebola Fever do not incapacitate the readiness of the mission and its force. The capabilities were present, however far from the troops, extending the evacuation time. For this reason, the criterion is assessed as fair.

¹⁹⁵ Lotze and Williams, "The Surge to Stabilize: Lessons for the UN from the AU's Experience in Somalia."

¹⁹⁶ United Nations Support Office for AMISOM, "Medical," accessed 08 March 2019, <https://unsoa.unmissions.org/medical>.

Finally, with respect to other protection activities, emphasis will be put on the protection of civilians. As a matter of fact, AMISOM was primarily a warfighting mission aimed at defeating a resilient Islamist-inspired insurgency headed by Al-Shabaab. The result is definitely satisfying, as the operation ousted the insurgents that were perpetrating terror and sowing chaos in Somalia, particularly in the capitol Mogadishu. However, it was at a cost of civilian lives.

The protection of civilians in the midst of the fighting between the African Union forces with the SNA and the Al-Shabaab has been severely impacted. With respect to Quinlivan's benchmark stabilization ratio, the required force strength for an estimated Somali population of 12 million in 2012 would be 27,000 troops, a bit more than the 22,176 that it presently has. In the South and Central Somalia, in absence of AMISOM, the populations of Al-Shabaab-controlled areas suffered of targeted killings, assaults, repressive forms of social control, and brutal punishments under the Sharia Law.¹⁹⁷ Suicide attacks, public beheading, amputations, stoning of accused adulterers were also committed. Some opposition fighters spearheaded by Al-Shabaab unlawfully deployed in densely populated civilian neighborhoods and at times used civilians as "shields" to fire mortars at TFG and AMISOM positions,¹⁹⁸ and fleeing just after. In return, the fires launched against these insurgents only reached the innocent civilian population left in place. This was perceived as indiscriminate fire and criminalized the force. In sum, fear

¹⁹⁷ Human Rights Watch, *Harsh War, Harsh Peace: Abuses by Al-Shabaab, the Transitional Federal Government, and AMISOM in Somalia*, April 2010, https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia0410webwcover_0.pdf.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid.

still reigns in some parts of Somalia, as AMISOM and TFG forces are unable to cover the whole territory. The mission is also accused of turning blind eye on abuses committed by their allies (the other clan factions) on the ground as those fight against Al-Shabaab.

As advanced earlier, AMISOM didn't have a clearly stated mandate of stabilization. However, as part of its facilitation's role, it worked closed with the Host nation (HN), UN office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UN agencies and NGOs for a unity of effort and share of information. This helped resettle the Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) throughout the country. Troops have been deployed in rear areas to provide food, potable water, mosquito nets, medicine, free medical treatment while patrolling.¹⁹⁹ Although a protection tool, AMISOM went beyond the philosophy of winning the hearts and minds of the people in providing these services, which would have some benefits in terms of intelligence collection, and collaboration with civilian populations. AMISOM ultimately protected the Somali populations from exactions and other punishments from application of Sharia Law, yet many civilians died from suicide attacks as well as AU retaliation to insurgents' artillery fires. As a result, this criterion is assessed as fair.

Assessment of Air and Maritime Components Contributions

Somalia is faced with a high rate of piracy off, as well as illegal weapons traffics along its 3300km coastline in the Gulf of Aden. Even if counter-piracy is not directly part of AMISOM's mandate, this mission supports that struggle through capacity-building

¹⁹⁹ African Union Mission in Somalia, "Humanitarian Work," accessed 10 March 2019, <http://amisom-au.org/mission-profile/humanitarian-work/>.

and law enforcement support to the Somali Police Force by the African Union Police component. Apart from this, AMISOM used of maritime assets for the capture of the Port of Kismayo that served as main export point of charcoal to finance terrorist activities. Through a joint ground, naval and air assault, Kenyan forces aided of SNA succeeded in evicting Al-Shabaab insurgents from the port and its surroundings, and collaborated with an ethnic faction, “Ras Kamboni”, to consolidate the gains. However, this amphibious operation was a solemn intervention of Kenyan naval forces not part of AMISOM. The monitoring of traffics in this port has continued since then, showcasing the maritime dimension of this operation. Noteworthy, before the control of Mogadishu and the ports (air and sea), most of the supply came from the sea port of Mombasa in Kenya, mainly as of UN support.

Air component of TCCs mainly helped in deploying troops into the theater and providing home-country logistic support. They also actively contributed in evacuating wounded and killed soldiers either to home or Kenya or South Africa.

The overall performance of the ASF in AMISOM is as follow in the table below:

AMISOM Assessment from Selected Joint Functions

Functions	Evaluation criteria AMISOM	Levels of effectiveness		
		Good	Fair	Poor
C2	Type of the command authority			
	communication systems technical features			
	commandership of troops			
M2	Move or deploy forces,			
	Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formation			
Intelligence	Surveillance and reconnaissance assets			
	Counter-intelligence			
	Human intelligence capabilities			
Protection	Force protection			
	Force health protection			
	Other protection activities			
Overall performance				

Source: Created by author.

AMISOM Summary

During this case study, it was noted that the ASF’s intent of rapid deployment was respected. Ugandan troops volunteered in reference to the principle of solidarity and common security as vowed by the founding fathers. Even if the Regional mechanism IGASOM failed to deploy for lack of means, the commitment of individual countries like Uganda and Burundi permitted to stand against the insurgents and ensure peace and stability in the region. Other individual interventions mired by national interests contributed to pushing back Al-Shabaab militants that were reigning and sowing disorder, chaos and despair in Somalia.

Command and control was exerted through a passive mission command philosophy that allowed subordinate commanders to own their sectors and claim tactical victories. National interests and caveats also guided the commanders' decisions and commandership. The Force had secure communications assets that allowed tactical liaisons within subordinate battalion commanders and below, operational liaisons between the six sectors and the Force HQ at Mogadishu, and strategic liaisons between the Force and the Mission HQ, thanks essentially to UNSOA. However, there were few lacks of coordination that were fully exploited by the threats to hide, rebuild combat power and strike back AMISOM forces when they expected it less. This lack of control also prevented integrated planning among national contingents, which precluded mutual reinforcements in case of attacks, let alone commission of SEAs that tainted the image of the mission.

Intelligence was well exerted through the human intelligence as most of the countries share values and culture with the HN. However, this aspect needed perfection as it did not prevent several attacks on AMISOM posts from occurring. Counter-intelligence with collaboration with partners and ISR assets, like the ADSN, helped collect information across troops contributing countries which allowed shared understanding of the operation environment. These were useful to locate insurgents and detect IED, especially during convoy escorts. However, the mission lacked of many of these assets at the beginning and had to wait till their additional fielding years after by partner nations. This showed a substantial lack of ISR assets for the African forces while deploying.

As per movement and maneuver, the use of light infantry vehicles served well in combating the insurgents in the built-up areas and pursuing them in the very deep areas. The widespread use of MRAPs aided to reduce casualties encountered due to IED with light vehicles. However, the weight of these vehicles make them less maneuverable and thus ineffective for this type of mission. Another failure is also the heavy reliance on external partners for airlift capabilities to deploy into the theatre.

Finally, with respect to protection, the TCCs deployed into the theater as organic units of home, which allowed intra-contingent cohesion, rapidity in decision-making and adaptation. However, they heavily depended on the partners and the UNSOS, that provided to their facilities and camp perimeters the necessary protective measures to counter the Suicide Vehicle Borne IED (SVBIED) and direct attacks. The protection of the civilians was, reasonably, not included in the early phases of this warfighting mission, considered the initial character conferred to AMISOM, sparking all discourses on the carelessness of the mission to the lives of the population. With progress made, stability came into the heart of the mission, and is now being a crucial aspect of its conduct.

Ultimately, AMISOM's intervention, as so far, has been a success despite the challenges. Stability brought about in major cities, especially in the capital city of Mogadishu amply justifies the credit given to the mission by numerous personalities. Major General Fred MUGISHA, former AMISOM Force Commander 2011-2012, expressed that ²⁰⁰...*the history should remember African Union Force ... as a force that*

²⁰⁰ CGTN Africa, "Faces of Africa - AMISOM: Africans Save Somalia," YouTube Video, 4 November 2013, accessed 06 April 2019, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X4tMJxi3sDE>.

went in when everybody else had given up on Somalia, as a force that turned their prison around...”, backed by Richard Bailey former AMISOM’s Media advisor “... *they achieved what most people thought was impossible, they’ve achieved it with staggeringly few resources and little support. They’ve done it with intelligence and with courage and with a sustained degree of military integrity*”. The ASF mechanism worked politically and military.²⁰¹ by the sole will of Africans, and responded to the long-lasting crisis facing Somalia. Though, logistic capabilities are its Achilles heel.

From the two case studies, the overall assessment of the ASF²⁰² in regard to the selected joint functions is as follow:

²⁰¹ Jerry Rawlings, former president of Ghana, in CGTN Africa, “Faces of Africa-AMISOM: Africans Save Somalia.”

²⁰² Even if it was more a coalition of willing the AU had for this mission.

Overall ASF Assessment from Selected Joint Functions

Function	Evaluation criteria AMIS/AMISOM	Level of effectiveness		
		Good	Fair	Less
C2	Type of the command authority	Good		
	communication systems technical features	Good		
	commandership of troops		Fair	
M2	Move or deploy forces,			Less
	Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy formation		Fair	
Intelligence	Surveillance and reconnaissance assets		Fair	
	Counter-intelligence		Fair	
	human intelligence capabilities		Fair	
Protection	Force protection			Less
	Force health protection		Fair	
	Other protection activities			Less
Overall performance		Fair		

Source: Created by author.

Understanding Challenges Faced by the ASF

Multi-Domain Problems, But Essentially Theater Opening Deficiencies

As seen above, the ASF’s main struggle is the lack of capability to project forces into a theater, even for a short period, let alone a long-term stabilization mission. Many countries announced to participate in the effort, yet years later they were still at home, readying for the most or impeded by different issues. When the deployment occurred with the first Ugandan contingent and then Burundian, the level of non-preparation was very high. No accommodation settled, few vehicles at hand to jump in, few logistic supplies (ammunition, fuel, engineering equipment, food, water) to sustain the operation. The living conditions of the soldiers were quite precarious. That situation portrayed the

African Union's Achilles heel, which is the sustainment capabilities and particularly a thoughtful theater opening experience.

African Union lacks of critical assets to conduct the Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (JRSOI) and the Joint Forcible Entry. Whether with amphibious forces, airborne forces, air assault forces or Special operations forces (SOF) or any combination thereof,²⁰³ this forcible entry would have helped secured a definite perimeter around the point of entry (here airport as landing site) to reduce the threat while entering and enable the flow of new forces. As a matter of fact, the Reception would have helped disembark the equipment and personnel of AMIS and AMISOM arriving into the theater to start the in-processing formalities and better acquaint with the operational environment. The staging would have enabled reinstall the material uninstalled, regroup forces and ready them for use. The Onward movement would have helped securely move to the assigned sectors waiting for the reconstitution of the units therein, which would eventually be done in the Integration phase with the last deployed maneuvering equipment and personnel.

The reason of going through such process is that troops cannot be sent into a non-permissive environment without minimum prior arrangements, especially with regards to the security. The attack of AMISOM forces right after the 'go' to get out of the plane and the immediate destruction of that plane utterly proves this. Even though, some theaters may be very difficult to prepare, like this one in Somalia, critical minimal actions can be taken in order to alleviate the chaos that characterized the early phases of those

²⁰³ Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Joint Publication (JP) 3-18, *Joint Forcible Entry Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2017), viii.

operations. It was a difficult mission and troops were willing to pay the price to conduct the pacification mission, but their leaderships, both political and military, have failed to ensure that conditions are set for the fight that was to take place. Potential and obvious reasons are the economic shortfalls that plague the majority of the TCCs.

In fact, funding has been regularly called upon in reference to the financial burden on the TCCs and the sponsors. This lies mainly in the weak state of the economy and the resilience of the AU, and right behind of its African contributing countries. This did not allow them to afford more military capabilities and afford more funding to conduct the mission. For instance, with the second case study AMISOM, for a long time now, Ugandan authorities have been threatening to withdraw from the mission amid funding issues. At some point, even the morale of their force was also impacted, especially with soldiers working without payment for six months.²⁰⁴ Part of the conduct of the mission was therefore impacted, and along with the capacity and the mental state of the troops to react to the plethora of attacks launched on them by the insurgents, which resulted in considerable fatalities. Yet, complex reasons explain why things occur this way.

Africans Trapped in Heavy Dependence on External Partners

Throughout this study, it has been noted a heavy reliance on external partners to solve critical aspects of peace operation process, in particular the planning, the logistic, and the funding. All these issues combined pose a significant threat to the sovereignty, the security, the independence and the renown of the African countries on the

²⁰⁴ Catherine Byaruhanga, “African Union troops in Somalia not paid for six months,” *BBC News*, 27 June 2016, accessed 05 April 2019, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-36624520>,

international scene. For the first, military staff officers in a considerable number lack of complex, multidimensional missions' strategic planning experiences. The AU have franchised the necessity to dispose of an important pool of qualified, experienced and proven military and civilian planners for the resolution of the complex crises the continent faces. Continuing on such path would definitely stick the AU to an eternal position of assisted entity for the resolution of its own internal problems. The second issue related to the logistic is so patent in all the AU deployments. Starting with the force projection capability, the ASF mechanism is useless if forces cannot be deployed at the required time, or if they have to go through the assessment of external partners who will decide whether to engage in or not. Critical theater opening assets are inexistent, as well as basic life support capabilities for troops. As per the funding, the reliance on external donors to finance the operations, especially a vital line as the personnel cost for peacekeeping, embeds serious concerns in terms of true ownership of these missions.

Despite all the deficiencies described above, it seems not problematic to remain in such a position, rather it appears beneficial and economic in doing so. All it does however is showcasing complex relationships between the Africans and many of those donors, who also happen to be among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Over historic colonial links, geopolitical, economic, individualistic and lobbyist endeavors, the African "self-determination" ambitions seem just an empty promise sold to the African populations with mantras like "African Solutions to African Problems" or even "Silence the Guns by 2063". Reality-check, very few, if not nothing, are actually being planned and envisioned to provide the continent with the capabilities to deal without assistance with its security issues. The African Union organization does not have

the means of its ends as profound structural changes are not operated within its member-states. The organization could be the motor of this evolution in the relationships.

Recommendation to address this issue will be given in the next chapter.

From an AU-UN partnership stance, clear delimitations are not drawn as so far, as what are the missions of each of the actors and the expectations that line with it. The labor division as of now came along ad hoc negotiations rather than formal previously established legal framework. In sum, from the points above, the finding in this chapter is that these relationships with external partners are not truly conducive to having the ASF being fully operational to perform crises management across the continent.

Summary

Chapter 4 revealed that the ASF mechanism is working, despite all its challenges. The regional organizations on which it relies on are at various stages of development. The political will at the continental organization's level for an effective ASF mechanism is firmly present. The main impediments to the effectiveness of the ASF, as assessed through the lens of selected joint functions, concern essentially the deployment capabilities, the strategic and operational planning capacities, and the logistical and financial dependences. The following chapter draws all the conclusions of these findings and provide some recommendations.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Countrymen, the task ahead is great indeed, and heavy is the responsibility; and yet it is a noble and glorious challenge - a challenge which calls for the courage to dream, the courage to believe, the courage to dare, the courage to do, the courage to envision, the courage to fight, the courage to work, the courage to achieve - to achieve the highest excellencies and the fullest greatness of man. Dare we ask for more in life?²⁰⁵

— Kwame Nkrumah, Address to National Assembly, 12 June 1965

Introduction

This study has sought to assess those main impediments to the African Standby Forces (ASF)'s ability to cope with conflict situations across the continent, through a qualitative analysis of two case studies regarding AU peace operations: the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). This study was conducted based upon four U.S. joint functions: command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection, along specific criteria retained for each of these functions in order to enable deep analysis and pertinent conclusions, given the time constraints present. This study has tried to answer its primary question regarding main impediments, then the secondary ones regarding the state of conflicts and ASF interventions throughout the continent, aspects of those AU deployments that have been or are effective, aspects that are less effective, and the reasons underlying the subsequent

²⁰⁵ Daniel Dela Dunoo, "Top 10 Dr. Kwame Nkrumah Quotes Worth Your Time," The Royal Wordsmith, 21 September 2016, accessed 21 April 2019, <https://theroyalwordsmithgh.wordpress.com/2016/09/21/top-10-dr-kwame-nkrumah-quotes-worth-your-time/>.

findings. This last chapter will now address the last secondary question which is: what can the AU do to overcome impediments and create effective forces.

Conclusions

From the sheer vow to solve African problems with African solutions, the ASF mechanism of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) has come a long way in coping with conflict situations across the continent. The following conclusions address the strategic level with the politicians and the military leaderships (Military Staff Committee or MSC), both at AU Headquarters and the operational level with the Force Headquarters (in-mission military staff). Discrepancy exists between the regional and continental levels.

First, the Peace and Security Council (PSC), under the African Union Commission (AUC) guidance, has launched about ten operations since establishment of the ASF framework in 2003 to bring about peace in its member states. Missions even in the size of tens of military personnel were launched to ensure prevalence of peace in countries that needed it. These deployments have revealed the existence of a strong political will at the strategic level within the AUC and the PSC to deal with security situations across the continent. The Continental Electronic Warning System (CEWS) works as per its mandate, providing information on potential and ongoing situations, even if these are found not reliable or up-to-date for exploitation.

However, regional competitions due to hegemonic ambitions and geopolitical differences hinder this political will of the AUC and the PSC. Four out of the five regions have made significant progress, while the last one, North Africa, is still at the stage of institutional framework development.

On another line, host nation (HN) government's actions also appear to complicate the actual conduct of peace operations within its territory. At a certain point, there arises the sensitive issue on how far can the AU go to ensure peace and stability in a country against the HN government, and beyond what powers to give to the AU to enable it to ensure the realization of the ideals of its founding fathers.

Regarding the aspects that have been effective or less, there are numerous points. The MSC issued unclear and weak mandates that could not be implemented, especially with regard to the protection of civilians. Besides there is an unclear delimitation of roles between AU and UN. There is no clearly established legal framework, as per the division of labor between the two organizations. In the changing framework of peace operations, where it is becoming more peace enforcement (warfighting) than peacekeeping (stabilization), the two organizations seem to play sleight of hand regarding command and control of the mission across phases. However, the tendency seems to be that the UN has overall command while the AU has actual control of forces, for hybrid operations on African soil.

Also there is a deficiency in preparing or setting the conditions for establishment of an AU mission and the deployment of forces, as the strategic level does not adequately negotiate details of these security features with the HN, well in advance. No accommodation and security arrangements are made with the HN to ensure smooth flow of forces and gradual build-up of combat power in the theater, especially with some very difficult theaters like Somalia.

At the operational level, the reasons why those aspects were ineffective can be described as follow: on command and control, the ASF mechanism suffers multiple

deficiencies: ability to conduct strategic and operational planning, Joint Reception Staging Onward Movement and Integration (JRSOI) capability, Joint Forcible Entry and integrated multinational planning and synchronization. As a matter of fact, most of the military staff in the Force Headquarters lack the capacity to plan complex multidimensional missions and the ability to conceive an effective operational approach that takes into consideration all the components of the mission (military, police and civilian) to achieve unity of effort and/ or unity of command. This study has also revealed critical deficiency in projecting forces across the continent and readying them to fight with the safest existing security arrangements. Either forces arrive and have nowhere to stay or material and equipment are still in route or at home, thus being unusable by the Force. Contingents are liable to have to sustain themselves for 30, 60 or even 90 days (mostly settled in tents) according to the requirements of ASF policy (as per ASF doctrine, chapter 3), but they cannot subsist more than that in precarious conditions. Also, forces in the theater are automatically subject to attacks by insurgents upon their arrival.

Along with that deficiency there is a lack of capability to conduct Joint Forcible Entry. ASF forces seem not prepared to conduct such operations and are vulnerable to attacks immediately upon entering into the theater. The Ugandan plane destroyed on the second day of the deployment of forces is a case in point. Additionally, Force headquarters often fail to integrate all participating countries into their planning. As missions are based on a coalition of the willing, there is a tendency to operate solely and not interact with each other to obtain the benefit from contributions of those other forces. There should come the role of the FHQ in tailoring and channeling the efforts of all contingents toward accomplishment of the mission. Military leadership sometimes fails

to harness all the resources assigned to it in order to achieve success. In line with this, this lack of coordination often gets exploited by the insurgents and they harm the force.

Apart from that, national caveats affect the use of contingents by Force commanders, precluding achievement of unity of effort. That is a direct result of a coalition of the willing instead of truly integrated multinational ASF. However, the contingents are usually under operational control and given latitude to achieve tactical objectives within their sector areas. As setback, Force leadership suffers from effectiveness as no or little control is held by the FHQ staff over contributing contingents. Language also hinders understanding within the TCCs and communications' coverage is challenged during long range patrols.

Finally, a huge dependence on external partners and the UN tends to create “capacity-substitution” instead of “capacity-building” across ASF organizations. Staff officer positions with challenging planning requirements (operations and logistics) are sometimes filled by external partners, instead of being paired with African staff. UN partnership in this domain is particularly disadvantageous in the sense that human resources are not paired with AU personnel with the intent of empowering and preparing them for future operations. These deficiencies, over the long term, will take their toll on the ASF mechanism to sustain its own operations across the continent.

As per the intelligence function, the main impediment concerning ISR capabilities is that the TCCs do not have enough quantity information-gathering equipment. The majority of these use commercial-of-the-shelf UAVs with limited ranges as per UN infantry battalion organization policy. Helicopters that could also substitute and perform aerial reconnaissance are, in many cases, nonexistent or in very few number, prior to

donations. A huge dependence on external partners is also noted there. Human intelligence seems also to suffer in some point, even if TCCs share similar culture/ language and therefore are able to interact with local populations. Numerous attacks that occurred on camps in Sudan and Somalia show a necessity to reinforce cooperation with local populace to improve this line. In terms of counter-intelligence, African forces are at a huge disadvantage, compared to the opposing force. Also there is that dependence on external partners as noted before.

Concerning movement and maneuver, the main impediment is the lack of strategic airlift capability to deploy forces into theater. Many African countries lack air transportation assets and have to wait for external contributions to move from home. Another issue is the tactical air support capability that is also in very limited numbers. Combat and transport helicopters are lacking in the mission area and have to be provided by external partners. In addition, ground tactical movement assets with protection capability like Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles are in insufficient quantities and are often provided by external partners. As a consequence, forces are not able to move as often as they should and therefore fail to protect civilians or execute their mandate. Fuel and spare parts, necessary to ensure readiness of their vehicles into and within the operational area, is also lacking. As a result, delays in the deployment of forces occur and transport assets are grounded.

With respect to protection, the main impediments are related to non-existence of camp construction (accommodation and camp perimeters defense) capability as in the UN, and as stated above, of prior security arrangements with the HN. Force health protection suffers of limited level II and level III intra-theater medical evacuation

systems. The majority of critical cases are flown back home or to a neighboring country with suitable medical infrastructure. Furthermore, due to the nature of required operations such as peace-making missions, the protection of civilians is less enabled as a direct result of the interpretation of unclear and weak mandate. Lack of mortar detector radars within TCCs equipment also precludes the protection of civilians if used as a shield by the insurgents in firing upon AU forces. Finally, limited interaction of AU forces with local populations contribute to being less effective in collecting vital information about the threats, coordinating mission's actions with their expectations and eventually contributing to providing them adequate protection.

Beyond the initial findings of this study, the heavy reliance on external partners revealed above also pinpointed additional impediments: complex relationships between the TCCs and many external partners and ever-increasing financial issues for both the TCCs and AU. Many African countries maintain a close relationship with western countries, especially their former colonial powers, but these relationships often results in sustained dependence upon the latter to subsist and defend itself. This sets time conditions unfavorable to real self-reliance for management of its own affairs. This situation that seems beneficial in the short term, impedes Africans militaries to lift themselves from dependence and fulfill their destiny. A correlated aspect is the financial challenges that plague TCCs in developing their military capabilities and subsequent assigned ASF units, and the AU with the Peace Fund for its peace operations. All these impediments play diverse roles in the ASF's ability to cope with conflict situations across the continent.

Recommendations

In light of previous conclusions that described the main impediments to effectiveness of the ASF, here below are some recommendations to manage those issues.

First, the AU should endeavor to control regional competitions as a way to enable development of each regional brigade. Significant diplomatic efforts must be particularly employed in North Africa to increase integration among those countries to provide them with effective military tools to counter existing and future threats in the region. Given the current trend, considering the failed state of Libya and the continuous inflow of VEOs from the Middle East, this region is a powder keg for the whole stability of the African continent. Mali, along with many sub-Saharan countries (Burkina Faso, Niger, etc.), have been paying the price of instability that erupted after the collapse of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime in 2011. Eight years later, chaos still reigns in the country led by two antagonist governments and there seems no end in sight. That alone shows the necessity of a regional force able to step in decisively and cope with such crises. More binding agreements should also be put in place between the AU and the RECs/RMs to ensure their deployments in time of crises.

African Union should seek for more power and become a supranational entity able to defend the interests of the overall continent, against domestic and external threats and turmoil. With such power and authority, it would have more leverage on some member states' governments unwilling to cooperate with the organization to address difficult situations, especially conflict situations. However, check and balance measures must be put in place to prevent any authoritarian drift of this organization. In the same

line, Force Commander should be allowed to freely use peacekeeping forces placed under his/ her operational control as to enhance effective employment of forces.

A clear delimitation of the AU's roles, in face of the UN, during conflict resolutions across the continent must be made to ensure mutual understanding and prevention of false hopes. A new agreement, formally established, should lay down the prerogatives of each of the entities in different scenarios (tip: start with the 6 scenarios of the ASF) and through different phases thereof (prevention, enforcement, stabilization, and transition). Additionally, AU should strive to acquire the transfer of competence from the UN, especially in strategic planning, logistics, and CITS. Particular emphasis must be placed on the civilian component to gain substantial knowledge on strategic logistic management and working in combat situations, as required by current peacemaking missions. Attractive remunerations along with Pan-Africanist mobilization would induce Africans to volunteer and dedicate themselves to such a new work field.

The AU should endeavor opting for a specific doctrine for missions across the continent and enforce its use by all troop contributing countries. This can be based on an Anglo-Saxon or French system, a newly developed African version, or any other existing doctrine. Regionally oriented professional operational framework, training and professional development, in and out of all African Union-led operations would contribute to this new doctrine and its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) across the continent. As well as enhance deep knowledge of the capabilities of other TCCs and therefore facilitate its integrated use by future Force and Sector Commanders. Regional military schools dedicated to educating African officers, as well as pools of officers who

attended renown military colleges can provide natural constituency for developing new operational framework with an African perspective on conflicts management.

The MSC should endeavor to provide a clear and feasible mandate, along with realistic rules of engagement (ROEs) and Directives on Use of Force (DUF), to armed mission personnel to enable maximum latitude in the execution of the mandate and protection of civilians. HN government should not be automatically regarded as capable of protecting its populations, the government must prove that it can protect its citizens. Additionally, the MSC and regional brigades' staff officers should be provided with strategic and operational planning capacities regarding complex multidimensional missions, whether given by AU-designated external partners or the UN. With this in place, MSC and planning elements (PLANELMs) of the regional brigades would be able to plan well in advance of any peace operations, in an anticipatory measure, based on information about potential conflict situations as provided by the CEWS. In this way, any operation launched by the AU would ultimately include a refined and updated concept of operation for that issue. Subsequent efforts must be made to plan and conduct all shaping activities (security arrangements, operational contract support, basic life services, accommodations, etc.) pending the deployment of forces into the theater. This would prevent any chaos or disaster, as witnessed at the launch of some AU missions.

Additionally, the MSC should endeavor to develop a Pan-African coalition lessons-learned database designed to share common insights across national boundaries, among military professionals as a means to set common grounds within African militaries.

AU should also strive in providing with its member-states and organizations, such as the Peace Fund, to contract for substantial quantities of equipment which could be stocked at its logistical bases for future use. On this note, establishment of the AU Continental Logistic Base²⁰⁶ in Douala, Cameroon in January 2018 is a significant step forward that enables Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) to be readied for quicker deployment across the continent. Along with the five Regional Logistic Depots (RLDs)²⁰⁷ located in the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs), they can provide enhanced logistic capabilities for African-led peace operations. Mission capabilities of various kinds for command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, sustainment, fires, protection, and information can be stocked in these Logistic Depots and decrease reliance on external partners. Strategic airlift assets particularly can be handled by AU-trained staff recruited across the continent and accommodated in the Logistic Depots for deployment all over Africa. Same for ground vehicles and MRAPs prepositioned in the regional depots.

Ultimately, these efforts should be pursued and elude solutions like “net-capable African Force”²⁰⁸ in which Africans provide manpower for fighting and other donors

²⁰⁶ United Nations Office to the African Union, “African Standby Force Continental Logistics Base Inaugurated in Cameroon,” 16 January 2018, accessed 22 March 2019, <https://unoau.unmissions.org/african-standby-force-continental-logistics-base-inaugurated-cameroon>,

²⁰⁷ African Union, “4th African Logistics Forum (ALF) concludes with strong commitment to strengthen Logistics for crisis response operations across Africa,” ReliefWeb, 1 May 2017, accessed 22 March 2019, <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/4th-african-logistics-forum-alf-concludes-strong-commitment-strengthen-logistics-crisis>.

²⁰⁸ Gompert et al., “Learning from Darfur: Building a Net-Capable African Force to Stop Mass Killing.”

provide support and Command and Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and Special Operations Forces (SOF). This latter system inevitably results in African militaries with a total inability and heavy dependence upon external partners to manage own African crises, let alone sovereignty and long-term national and continental interests' issues.

As many of these recommendations required to develop a robust ASF effectiveness are costly, it is advised that the AU performs intensive preventive measures to avoid deployment of larger forces to restore peace. African countries should no more engage in armed conflicts they cannot sustain, mainly because the continent does not have the means to deal with them. Therefore, the AU must tailor its efforts toward eradicating conflicts at their early stages, with minimum of forces readied by the regional brigades and quickly projected into the theater or country to avoid higher expenses to the AU. The case of ECOWAS intervention in 2017 in the Gambia perfectly portrayed this approach. This intervention required less troops and less cost; waiting longer might have resulted in a longer conflict and higher expenses to the ASF.

The AU should also develop a more proactive strategic communication theme and vision of "African solutions to African problems" while striving to explain to the African citizens and the world its efforts toward promotion of peace and stability throughout the continent. The ultimate sacrifice of thousands of African soldiers for the sake of peace, security and prosperity on the continent, and for the world, should be magnified and recalled to incentivize the Pan-Africanism spirit in the hearts and minds of its populations. So that, governments would have more political support and leverage to fund, equip and ready their parts of the African Standby Forces. AU should even be more

proactive in this realm while conducting its operations against violent extremist organizations (VEOs) determined to plague the continent and sow chaos and death. With every child, every woman and every man dying, dies also a future genius, a visionary, a prosperous entrepreneur, a talented artist, an eminent scholar, a dedicated medical practitioner, a strong worker that could impel the continent in a bright future. AU should endlessly strive to letting that know to everybody, especially the African people.

To sum up, this study has provided conclusions of the research on the main impediments to the effectiveness of African Standby Forces' ability to cope with conflict situations throughout the continent, as well as provide some recommendations to improve these deficiencies. The first were related to the lacks of strategic logistic and operational planning, lacks of critical capability regarding force projection and subsequent heavy dependence on external partners. The second have laid out the necessity of the organization to establish more binding agreements to ensure actual participation of the regional brigades to the resolution of conflicts across the continent, the necessity to train and skill staffs to conduct strategic logistic and operational planning, the necessity to ensure contributions to the Peace Fund in order to reduce external dependence, and the necessity to conduct more preventive actions to limit the expenses of ASF interventions.

This whole study was based on four of the seven joint functions: command and control, intelligence, movement and maneuver, and protection. It is suggested that another study lay on the three remaining functions: fires, sustainment and information, and analyze them with any method as seen fit.

APPENDIX A

MILITARY EQUIPMENT OF AMISOM TCCS

Countries	Weapons	Combat Vehicles*	Helicopters	ADA systems	Artillery	Aircraft	Ships
Ethiopia	AT-3 Sagger, AT-4 Spigot, B-10, B-11, D-44, AK	T-54, T-55, T-62, BRDM, BMP, BTR-60, BTR-152	Mi-24, Mi-35	SA-2, S-125, SA-3	2S1 Carnation, 2S19, ZIS-3M-1942, D-30, M-46, M-29, M-1937, ZSU-23, M-1944, 82mm,	MiG-21, MiG-23, Su-27, Su-25T, C-130B, DHC, Y-12	N/A
Uganda	MG 14.5mm, ZPU-1/ZPU-2/ZPU-4, M-1939	T-90S, T-54, T-55, T-72, PT-76, ZTZ-85-IIM, Eland, Ferret, BMP-2, BTR-60, Buffel, Mamba, OT-64, Casspir, RG-33L	Mi-17, Mi-24, Bell 412	SA-7, SA-15	SP 155mm ATMOS 2000, ZIS, M-30, G-5, M-839, BM21, RM-70, L16, M-43, Soltan,	MiG-23, MiG-21, Y-12	N/A
Kenya	AK, H&K G3, M4A1, FN, FN MAG, PKM, IMI Negev, IMI Galil, RPG-7, Browning Hi-power,	M3 Panhard, MK3, BOV M11, PUMA M26-15, Steyr, WZ551, Saracen, AML 60/90, UR-416	MD500 Defender, Hughes, Harbin Z-9, RQ-11 Raven, AH-1F Cobra, Mi-171, Bell 205,	20mm, Oerlikon, s70 TCM-20, 40mm 13L/70 Oerlikon; ε70 TCM-20; 40mm 13 L/70, AGM-65 Marverick, AIM-9 Sidewinder	SP 155mm 2+ Nora B-52, 105mm, L118 Light Gun; Model 56 pack howitzer MOR 62: 81mm 50; 120mm 12 Brandt	F-5E/F Tiger II, DHC-5D, DHC-8, Y-12 (II), SA330 Puma,	Patrol and coastal: 1 Jasiri 76mm, Nyayo, Harambee, Skujaa, Archangel, Amphibious: Galana
Burundi	RL-83 Blindicide, RCL 75, AK	BTR-80, BTR-40, M3 Panhard, RG-31 Nyala, Walid, AML 60, AML 90, BRDM, S52	Mi-24 Hind,	SA-7, S30 9K32 Strela	MG14.5mm, ZU-23, ZPU-4	Cessna	N/A
Djibouti	M-40A1, AK	BTR-80, BTR-60, VBL, AML 60, Ratel	Mi-25, Mi-17, Mi-8, AS3556 Dauphin, AS355F Ecureuil II	M-693, ZU-23, L/70	D-30, MOR 81mm, 120mm, Brandt	Ecureuil II, Mi-17, Cessna, Mi-24	PBF, PB

Source: Created by author using data from “Sub-Saharan Africa,” in *Military Balance*, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011-2018, <https://www.tandfonline.com/toc/tmb2/current>. NOTE: * Mix of tanks, APC, Reconnaissance, AIFV, etc. (Save trucks)

APPENDIX B

AFRICAN UNION'S MILITARY MISSIONS SINCE 2003

N°	Name of mission	Country	Date of start	Strength of force (actual strengths)	Main African Troops contributing countries	Main task
1	AMIB	Burundi	2003	3500	South Africa, Ethiopia, Mozambique	Peacebuilding
2	MIOC	Comoros	2004	41	South Africa	Observation of electoral process
3	AMIS (Re-hatted later as UNAMID)	Sudan	May 2004	3320	Nigeria, Rwanda, Egypt, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya	Peacekeeping/POC*
4	STF	Burundi	2006-2009	750	South Africa	VIP protection
5	AMISEC	Comoros	21 March 2006	1260	South Africa	Monitoring of election
6	AMISOM (Joint AU-UN)	Somalia	2007	22176	Ethiopia, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Djibouti, Sierra Leone	Protection of government, counter-insurgency
7	MAES	Comoros	09 May 2007	1500	South Africa, Tanzania	Election support
8	UNAMID (Joint AU-UN)	Sudan	December 2007	7905	Nigeria, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Egypt, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Gambia, Kenya	Peacekeeping/POC
9	Operation Democracy	Comoros	2008	1350+450 Comoros	Tanzania, Sudan	Enforcement
10	AFISMA	Mali	25 January 2013	6300	Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Senegal, Burkina Faso and Chad	Stabilization/POC
11	MISCA	Central African Republic	19 July 2013	6000	Rwanda, Egypt, Zambia, Cameroon, Mauritania, Burundi, Morocco	Peacekeeping/POC

Source: Created by author with data from African Union Peace and Security Council; United Nations Peace Operations; Arthur Boutellis and Paul Williams, *Peace Operations, The African Union, and the United Nations: Toward More Effective Partnerships*, International Peace Institute, 2013, accessed 02 April 2019, <https://elliott.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2141/f/downloads/faculty/williams-p-ipi-peace-ops.pdf>. NOTE: *POC = Protection of Civilians

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