

# US Colored Troops: A Model for US Army Foreign Army Development and Organization

A Monograph

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## Abstract

US Colored Troops: A Model for US Army Foreign Army Development and Organization, by MAJ Adam L. Taliaferro, US Army, 45 pages.

Over the course of the Civil War, 186,000 former slaves and freedmen of African descent served in the Union Army designated as US Colored Troops. These black troops accounted for 10% of US forces. This was a unique experience in US military history, as the United States through unprecedented procedures, recruited, raised, trained, and organized a predominantly uneducated force for military service. The United States Colored Troops was a force built from a population considered second class inhabitants at best, property at worst. Besides the color barrier, the white populace, government, and military leaders questioned whether the black soldiers possessed the mental capacity, physical capability, and emotional determination to fight. Despite preconceived biases and prejudices, the War Department aligned political aims with military means to establish new systems to generate a new force from scratch. Similar comparisons exist in contemporary operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as the US military raised, trained, and developed foreign forces to questionable results. By examining the historical insights from the Civil War, the methods of recruitment, organization, training, and communication provide the US Army concepts applicable today for the development of foreign forces. The resulting troops would be a more effective force in supporting operations and transitions from a US military authority to host-nation forces.

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## Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ANSF	Afghan National Security Force
BG	Brigadier General
ETT	Embedded Training Team
FM	Field Manual
JP	Joint Publication
MG	Major General
MTT	Mobile Training Team
TRADOC	Training and Doctrine Command
USCT	United States Colored Troops

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## Introduction

A government is the murderer of its citizens which sends them to the field uniformed and untaught, where they are to meet men of the same age and strength, mechanized by education and discipline for battle.

—Henry “Light Horse Harry” Lee, 1756-1818

The US Army since its inception has raised and trained fighting forces. From its beginning to present day, the United States has received individuals from all levels of society and formed them into fighting men and women. Whereas in the past, due to small standing armies and societal norms concerning education, racism, and physical capability, the ability to quickly recruit, educate, integrate, and train soldiers was a critical capability. Today the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), has developed a sustainable domestic model developing soldiers. Today, the US military is the most educated and trained in the history of its existence. The US Army’s soldier selectivity towards more educated recruits removed training issues that plagued it in its past, such as illiteracy or recruits having limited education. Although the level of effort required recruiting new soldiers ebbs and flows due to the economy among other factors, the US Army and military at large have a diverse array of incentives to entice an available pool of people. This model has ensured a replacement of personnel who retire or leave the service. Societal issues in the military are largely inconsequential. Any US citizen can join the military regardless of sex, race, religion, or sexual orientation. With the inclusion of females having the opportunity to serve in the combat arms, barriers to service are not due to demographic stereotypes. The US Army as an institution is generally free of these issues that challenged it in the past. But the US Army in its capacity as an operational force, has struggled in its efforts to create, train, and advise foreign armies.

The US Army has struggled in finding effective methods in the development, organization, and training of foreign troops. For the past fifteen years in Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom and most recently with Operations Inherent Resolve and Resolute Support, a significant component

in determining mission success has been the establishment of capable and effective host nation troops.<sup>1</sup> The names have changed over the years from mobile training teams (MTT), embedded training teams (ETT), advise and assist, and security force assistance to name a few, but the concept remains relatively constant, to recruit, organize, and train foreign troops. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military even created high level commands to oversee the process. The US Army achieved mixed results despite fifteen years of effort. In Afghanistan and Iraq, reports of ineffective training programs and wasteful spending characterize the training organizations.<sup>2</sup> Moreover, US military trainers must mitigate their own preconceived notions and stereotypes on the ability of foreign troops. Even senior civilian and uniformed leaders have testified to the failures of local foreign troops. The characterization of US-created host nation forces are: uneducated, ill-trained, lack motivation, lack leadership or are unwilling to fight.<sup>3</sup>

The United States fights by and through coalitions and will continue to train and develop foreign men and women into fighting elements in support of US national military strategy.<sup>4</sup> Current Army doctrine retains stability as a major task in decisive action and an integral part of land combat.<sup>5</sup> Accordingly, Field Manual (FM) 3-07 elaborates on the development of security forces as

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<sup>1</sup> “Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan,” NATO Afghanistan Resolute Support, accessed 17 November 2016, <http://www.rs.nato.int/subordinate-commands/cstc-a/index.php>; “CJTF Campaign Design,” Operation Inherent Resolve, accessed 17 November 2016, <http://www.inherentresolve.mil/campaign/>.

<sup>2</sup> The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has published numerous audits detailing the concerns and failures of US’ programs to train and develop Afghan National Security Forces; see “Performance Audit Reports,” Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, last modified 27 October 2016, accessed 15 December 2016, <https://www.sigar.mil/audits/auditreports/index.aspx?SSR=2&SubSSR=11&WP=Performance%20Audit%20Reports>.

<sup>3</sup> *Situation in Afghanistan: General John A. Campbell, Commander United States Forces - Afghanistan Opening Remarks. Hearing before Committee on Armed Services*, 114th Cong., 2nd sess., 4 February 2016, 7.; Ash Carter, interview by Barbara Starr, *CNN State of the Union*, 24 May 2015, accessed 15 December 2016, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/24/politics/ashton-carter-isis-ramadi/index.html>.

<sup>4</sup> Martin Dempsey, *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2015), 8.

an essential task in stability operations to generate and sustain local security forces in support of a legitimate authority.<sup>6</sup> It is a fallacy to assume that training foreign troops is only relevant to counterinsurgency operations. Army operations must have effective methodologies and strategies to develop host nation forces for the transition of authority, regardless of the conflict. The joint phasing model makes this clear as stabilizing activities and planning is inherent throughout all phases of operations. Even in a potential future near peer force-on-force high intensity conflict, following hostilities, someone must remain to secure the peace.

If contemporary operations are the measure of the US Army's inability to effectively recruit, train, and organize foreign forces, what is the root cause? Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that the US military lacks proper training on conducting these types of operations.<sup>7</sup> The counter to that argument is the US Army's ability to create effective fighting troops, civilian to soldier in twelve weeks. The US Army has proven that it can create and train soldiers. Throughout its history, the US Army has attempted to raise, train, and develop foreign armies from culturally different people with differing levels of education and capabilities. The problem is more closely associated with the US Army's attempt to create foreign soldiers exactly in its image, discounting the socialization differences of US and foreign troops as seen in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Regardless of the era, military force training and development cannot separate from the societal and military norms of its era. There are many variables throughout history that limit the ability to craft a firm conclusion on the most effective processes to recruit, train, and organize foreign troops. While not precise, the US Army's experience in creating new

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<sup>5</sup> Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, *Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2016), iv, 3.

<sup>6</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2008), 6-14.

<sup>7</sup> Peter Spiegel, "Gates says NATO Force Unable to Fight Guerrillas," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 January 2008, accessed 19 November 2016, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/jan/16/world/fg-usafghan16>.

methods and organizational approaches to train the United States Colored Troops (USCT) suggest methods that are applicable to contemporary US Army's foreign training, advisement, and assistance operations.

Over the course of the Civil War, 186,000 former slaves and freedmen of African descent served in the US Army.<sup>8</sup> These troops accounted for 10% of the US forces. This was a unique experiment in US military history, as the Union recruited, educated, and trained a mostly uneducated and illiterate force for military service. The US Colored Troops was a force built from a population that was "foreign" to much of the general population, second class inhabitants at best, property at worst. Comparable the cultural issues and stereotypes faced by foreign troops, government and military leaders questioned whether the colored troops possessed the mental capacity, physical capability, and emotional determination to fight. To counter these barriers, the US government implemented new concepts to recruit, train, and organize black men into soldiers; overcoming prejudices, biases, lack of education, and previous training.

The establishment of the USCT was a political decision originating from President Abraham Lincoln. Secretary of War Edward M. Stanton gave the project strategic oversight, and the Office of US Army Adjutant General determined the operational approach. Numerous officers utilized flexibility in their operational and tactical approaches while nested under strategic and political goals. The operational approaches implemented at all levels of war and their outcomes suggest concepts that are applicable and relevant to modern US-led foreign military training and development operations.

From the onset of the Civil War, enterprising officers and those with abolitionist leanings did attempt to create colored troops, but the major expansion of USCT occurred with recruitment efforts in the South from 1863-1865. The 54th Massachusetts and its literate freedmen soldiers live

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<sup>8</sup> "Black Soldiers in the Civil War," National Archives, last modified 3 October 2016, accessed 5 October 2016, <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/blacks-civil-war>.

in the collective consciousness of America through memoirs published by abolitionist generals such as *Brave Black Regiment* by Luis Emilio, *Blue-Eyed Child of Fortune* by Colonel Robert Shaw, and the award-winning movie *Glory*. But Northern freedmen comprised only a small portion of the USCT that served in the US Army. Many troops were former slaves from the South.<sup>9</sup> The majority from the South were illiterate and uneducated.

Table 1. Total Number of Colored Troops in US Army Service by State.

<b>Region</b>					
<b>New England</b>		<b>Eastern Theater</b>		<b>Mid-Atlantic</b>	
Massachusetts	3966	Maryland	8718	New York	4125
Rhode Island	1837	Pennsylvania	8612	New Jersey	1185
Connecticut	1764	Virginia	5723		
New Hampshire	125	District of Columbia	3269		
Vermont	120	West Virginia	196		
Maine	104	Delaware	0		
<b>Mid-West</b>		<b>Western Theater</b>		<b>Trans-Mississippi Theater</b>	
Missouri	8344	Kentucky	23703	Louisiana	24052
Ohio	5092	Tennessee	20133	Arkansas	5526
Kansas	2080	Mississippi	17869	Texas	47
Illinois	1811	South Carolina	5462		
Indiana	1537	North Carolina	5035	State Unknown	5896
Michigan	1387	Alabama	4969		
Iowa	440	Georgia	3486		
Wisconsin	165	Florida	1044		
Minnesota	104				
Colorado Territory	95				

Source: *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 5, 138.

Like contemporary operations, there was a political necessity for the creation of black forces. Any plans to grow this new force had to account for and balance the political and societal elements leading up to the Civil War. The cultural biases and norms of the era were substantial and

<sup>9</sup> In reviewing the enlistment rolls by state, approximately 35,000 colored troops enlisted in northern free states. The majority of colored troops, approximately 138,000 enlisted from southern slave states or border states where slavery was still legal; see William A. Gladstone, *United States Colored Troops, 1863-1867* (Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1996), 120.

varied by region. The US Army's ability to overcome societal factors, adapt to political change, and utilize varied methods to recruit, organize, and train the USCTs offer considerations regarding the creation and training of foreign forces.

## Socialization of Whites as Relates to Blacks, 1800-1860

Blacks fighting for the United States was not a new idea in the 1860s. Soldiers of African descent had fought in every conflict since the American Revolution. The idea of former slaves and freedmen constituting a significant portion of the US fighting strength, however, was a new phenomenon. The societal norms concerning blacks' intellectual capacity in the 1800s provides clarity on how novel the idea was to raise and train USCTs.

Beginning with Samuel Stanhope Smith and his work, *Essay on the Causes of Variety of Complexion and Figure in the Human Species* in 1787, ideas, questions, and theories had existed about the intellectual capability of the black race in America. There have been many ideas and theories, primarily based upon the pseudoscientific theory of scientific racism that posited the innate and permanent inferiority of nonwhites. Scientific racism provided an intellectual theory to prove the racial superiority of whites. There was an evolution of thought starting in the late Eighteenth century beginning with environmentalism to more scientific reasons to prove the inferiority of blacks. For the United States, the physical and cognitive ability of man was a political matter. The justification of slavery, the extermination of Native Americans, and the expansion of American settlers required a hierarchy of races with Caucasians at the top.<sup>10</sup>

No less a prominent figure than Thomas Jefferson postulated an environmentalist hypothesis. Jefferson stated, "I advance it therefore as a suspicion only, that the blacks, whether originally a distinct race, or made distinct by time and circumstances, are inferior to whites both in

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<sup>10</sup> Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), 116, 137-38.

body and mind.”<sup>11</sup> Environmentalism theorized that the dark skin created differences in its ability to react to the effects of climate, the state of society, and manner of living. The environment explained the mental and physical differences.<sup>12</sup>

From environmentalism derived the colonization movement, which started in 1817. Colonization was an idea to send freedmen and emancipated slaves to Africa. The concept originated as an idea for Christians to influence more pious behavior throughout the North and remove the societal ills of freedmen. The colonization movement believed that freedmen increased the social costs of pauperism, vice, and crime and just as importantly, “contribute greatly to the corruption of the slaves.”<sup>13</sup>

The colonization effort did not overtly imply the physical inferiority of the black race. Writings of the era indicate that the colonization movement believed in some intellectual equality. Great African empires to include the Egyptians, Ethiopians, and Cushites had demonstrated human genius.<sup>14</sup> The colonization beliefs were derivative of environmentalism as it was the miserable conditions of African descendants in America that caused their inferiority. United States Representative for Kentucky, slaveholder, and member of the American Colonization Society Henry Clay explained that “the free people of colour are, by far, as a class, the most corrupt, depraved, and abandoned. It is not so much their fault as a consequence of their anomalous

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<sup>11</sup> Thomas Jefferson, “Notes on Virginia” in *Thomas Jefferson: Writings: Autobiography, Notes on the State of Virginia, Public and Private Papers, Addresses, Letters*, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Literary Classics of the US, 1984), 270.

<sup>12</sup> Winthrop D. Jordan, *White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1968), 533-53.

<sup>13</sup> George M. Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind: The Debate on Afro-American Character and Destiny, 1817-1914* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 8; William Lloyd Garrison, *Thoughts on African Colonization or an Impartial Exhibition of the Doctrines, Principles, and Purposes of the American Colonization Society* (Boston: Garrison and Knapp, 1832), 96, Google eBook.

<sup>14</sup> Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 13.

condition.”<sup>15</sup> The blacks in this period of America were slaves, and the color of their skin was a permanent sign to prevent acceptance as a social equal.<sup>16</sup>

The growth and influence of the abolitionist movement and its effect on the political discourse of the nation during the 1830s-1860s was instrumental in changing the portrayal of blacks and their capacity. Abolitionism did overtake colonization theory in the 1830s. Based in Christianity, abolitionists contrasted with the previous scientific theories for it viewed slavery and discrimination as sins. Abolition was the repentance and the sin of slavery would leave society.<sup>17</sup>

Although the abolitionist movement was relatively small and confined to New England, it did have an impact in influencing proslavery advocates to modify their argument for slavery. Now, a scientifically proven theory on the inferiority of the black race was the basis for countering racial equality. Philosophical and scientific authority proclaimed the doctrine of permanent black inferiority. Professor and President of William and Mary College, Thomas Dew theorized that the socialization of the population made emancipation incompatible to society, for “the law would make them freedmen, and custom or prejudice, we care not which you call it, would degrade them to the condition of slaves.”<sup>18</sup> United States Senator John Calhoun of South Carolina claimed that slavery was a positive good.<sup>19</sup> Black inferiority began as a belief and became an explicit ideology.

Even against the backdrop of the Civil War and its root cause slavery, Northerners were not prepared to accept blacks as equals, not legally or mentally.<sup>20</sup> Even Abraham Lincoln during the

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<sup>15</sup> Henry Clay, “An Address Delivered to the Colonization Society of Kentucky,” December 17, 1829, in *The African Repository and Colonial Journal*, vol. 6 (Washington: Dunn, 1831), 12, Google eBook.

<sup>16</sup> Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 17.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 30.

<sup>18</sup> Thomas Frederick Dew, *Review of the Debate of the Virginia Legislature of 1831 and 1832* (Bedford, MA: Applewood, 1832), 96, Google eBook.

<sup>19</sup> Richard K. Cralle, ed., *Speeches of John C. Calhoun, Delivered in the House of Representatives, and in the Senate of the United States* (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1853), 631, Google eBook.

<sup>20</sup> Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 323.



famed Lincoln-Douglas debates walked a fine political line by advocating the end of slavery while making clear the inferiority of blacks or their inability to have equal rights in the United States.<sup>21</sup>

Notable abolitionists and Republicans advocated the removal of the black population from the United States either through colonization or by its extinction due to its inferiority.<sup>22</sup>

Beginning in 1861 in locations North and South, Freedmen attempted to enlist and serve in the Union Army. Frederick Douglas, the famed abolitionist, wrote, “that this is no time to fight only with your white hand, and allow your black hand to remain tied.”<sup>23</sup> Places such as Providence, Cleveland, Cincinnati, and New York experienced freedmen training and preparing for war. Even in Louisiana, due to a shortage of men available to fight, Major General Benjamin F. Butler created the first officially sanctioned colored troop organization on 27 September 1862, the Louisiana Native Guards.<sup>24</sup> Politicians and military leaders generally rejected these advances. Governor David Tod of Ohio explained, “do you know that this is a white man’s government, the white men are able to defend and protect it.”<sup>25</sup>

Even as military necessity demanded the inclusion of black men fighting for the United States during the Civil War, racial prejudices remained. Black docility, passivity, and subservience

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<sup>21</sup> Harold Holzer, ed., *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates: The First Complete, Unexpurgated Text* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 185-87.

<sup>22</sup> Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 156.

<sup>23</sup> Frederick Douglass, “Fighting the Rebels with Only One Hand,” *Douglass Monthly*, September 1861, vol. 4, issue 4, accessed 4 December 2016, <http://bit.ly/2nmOSOr>.

<sup>24</sup> James G. Hollandsworth Jr., *The Louisiana Native Guards: The Black Military Experience During the Civil War* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995), 15-17.

<sup>25</sup> John Mercer Langston, *From the Virginia Plantation to the National Capital* (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1968), 205.

were “characteristics of the race.”<sup>26</sup> Claims that slaves failed to rebel when their slave masters went off to war only reinforced these views.<sup>27</sup>

The historical racial context and socialization of white Americans concerning the mental and physical capacity of blacks during and prior to the Civil War were significant. For abolitionists and proslavery advocates, there was a consensus in the inferiority of the black race. Any consideration by the US Army to use freedmen or former slaves as soldiers had to account for the belief that blacks were inferior. There were complimentary and opposed theories regarding slavery and black ability through the 1800s, but the Civil War provided the crisis to transform the paradigm on black strength, intellect, and capability. Acknowledgment of the theories, stereotypes, and beliefs of foreigners is critical when raising and training foreign troops. It is only through recognizing internal attitudes and opinions that methods can overcome them or work within their constraints. Good.

### The Political Need for Black Troops

The creation of the USCT was not an altruistic endeavor, even though it had explicit effects on the social and moral fabric of America. Abraham Lincoln’s evolution on the institution of slavery transformed over time, but Lincoln was foremost a politician. The decision to arm black men as Union soldiers was primarily a political decision, not a moral one.<sup>28</sup> Lincoln’s policy would increase the number of men desperately needed to fight the Confederacy.

Lincoln had to maintain his Union coalition of northern states while fighting the Confederacy. The Union was not a monolithic block, but segments and regions with competing

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<sup>26</sup> Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 168-69.

<sup>27</sup> Fredrickson, *The Black Image in the White Mind*, 168-69.

<sup>28</sup> Eugene H. Berwanger, “Lincoln’s Constitutional Dilemma: Emancipation and Black Suffrage,” *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association*, 5, no. 1 (1983), accessed 5 November, 2016, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.2629860.0005.104>.

priorities and agendas. Whereas Massachusetts and New York had more abolitionist sentiment, other states like Delaware had racist segments and pro-slavery factions. Moreover, the Border States of Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri had large pro-slavery supporters. These slave states all had strategic importance to the Union, politically and militarily.

Maryland provided space and reaction time for the District of Columbia as it bordered Washington, DC on three sides. Additionally, telegraph lines and railways traveled through Maryland, connecting lines of communication from the north to military operations in the south. Missouri protected the Union's western flank and retained access to St. Louis and the Mississippi River. Kentucky, defined geographically by the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, gave the Union control of major waterways that would allow access deep into the Union.<sup>29</sup> These Border States linked economically and socially to the south and keeping them in the Union was essential to the war cause.

Lincoln, as he described in his speeches and letters, had to maintain the coalition of northern states while fighting to reunite the Union. Issues of abolishing slavery and arming blacks could risk the Union further fracturing with Border States seceding. As Lincoln said, "I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game."<sup>30</sup> To lose the border states would risk the entire policy of reunification.

The advancement of former slaves becoming soldiers in the US Army began with Congressional legislation to address the issue of slaves used against the United States. The First Confiscation Act on 6 August 1861, prohibited the use of slaves as military aid to the Confederacy and authorized the seizure of slaves as contraband of war.<sup>31</sup> The Second Confiscation Act passed a

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<sup>29</sup> William E. Gienapp, "Abraham Lincoln and the Border States," *Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association*, 13, no. 1 (1992), accessed 5 November 2016, <http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.2629860.0013.104>.

<sup>30</sup> Roy P. Basler, Marion Dolores Pratt, and Lloyd A. Dunlap, eds., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 3 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953), 344.

<sup>31</sup> Margaret E. Wagner, Gary W. Gallagher, and Paul Finkelman, eds., *The Library of Congress Civil War Desk Reference* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 760.

year later on 17 July, 1862, and expanded upon the First Confiscation Act. The Second Confiscation Act freed slaves of those owners who supported the rebellion and authorized President Lincoln “to employ as many persons of African descent as he may deem necessary and proper for the suppression of this rebellion.”<sup>32</sup> The Militia Act, passed on the same day on 1862 legally sanctioned slaves and freedmen into the military, an act that had not occurred since 1792.<sup>33</sup>

Despite the legislative acts, efforts for a full mobilization of newly freed slaves was not forthcoming. Lincoln had to balance criticism for not fully acting upon his new authority, the effect of the acts on upcoming congressional elections, and the effect on the border states.<sup>34</sup> Lincoln’s goal remained to maintain the Union, with or without slavery. Lincoln famously responded to the editor of the *New York Tribune* that “If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all slaves I would do it.”<sup>35</sup> Lincoln and his military commanders could not avoid the issue of diminishing manpower to sustain the war effort. The need for additional men became the catalyst for color troop expansion and recruitment.

By 1863, as the war prolonged and casualties mounted, white men who eagerly joined at the beginning of the war and reenlisted for additional terms became impatient. Additional volunteers dwindled and Congress on March 1863, instituted a draft, which increased opposition to the war.<sup>36</sup> Black enlistment provided an alternative to white conscription. Many politicians and

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<sup>32</sup> George P. Sanger, ed., *United States Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America*, vol. 12 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1863) 589-592, accessed 20 February 2017, <https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage?collId=llsl&fileName=012/llsl012.db&recNum=2>.

<sup>33</sup> Sanger, ed., *United States Statutes at Large, Treaties, and Proclamations of the United States of America*, vol. 12, 597-600.

<sup>34</sup> Hari Jones, “The Road to Emancipation: An Evolving Nation,” *Civil War Trust*, 2014, accessed 20 January 2017, [www.civilwar.org/education/history/emanipation-150/the-road-to-emancipation.html](http://www.civilwar.org/education/history/emanipation-150/the-road-to-emancipation.html).

<sup>35</sup> Basler, et al., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 5, 388-89.

<sup>36</sup> Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, and Leslie S. Rowland, eds. *Freedom: A Documentary History of Emancipation 1861-1867: Series 2: The Black Military Experience* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 8-9.

soldiers became pragmatic and saw the use of blacks as a healthy alternative to more whites dying. Sergeant Cyrus Boyd of the 15th Iowa was perfectly clear, “if any African will stand between me and a rebel bullet, he is welcome to the honor and the bullet too.”<sup>37</sup>

The context of policy and military necessity for additional soldiers framed the Emancipation Proclamation and other congressional acts that freed blacks and enabled their military service to the United States. Lincoln and his administration had to balance competing interests and narratives concerning black people, their utility in the war, and the political ramifications if Lincoln freed the slaves. It was not until military necessity demanded additional men that the political decision to arm slaves and freedmen was politically feasible.

### Organization: The Bureau for Colored Troops

The use of former slaves and freedmen in the Union Army remained piecemeal at the beginning of 1863. The Emancipation Proclamation declared former slaves “be used into the armed services,” but provided no explicit statement on arming and recruitment.<sup>38</sup> No federal plan existed for large-scale recruitment of black men. Some states were proactive in establishing colored regiments whereas others delayed. Some enterprising Union officers used former slaves as fighting forces although most officers were not in favor of black brothers in arms. The current operating environment of disparate activities led to the first of its kind organization for the control and recruitment of blacks in the Army.

States controlled who they recruited to fill their federal quotas and were under no obligation to recruit blacks. Additionally, Northern governors were resistant to expand the practice

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<sup>37</sup> Earl J. Hess and Cyrus F. Boyd, *The Civil War Diary of Cyrus F. Boyd, Fifteenth Iowa Infantry, 1861-1863*, ed. Mildred Throne (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 119.

<sup>38</sup> The Emancipation Proclamation states, “And I further declare and make know, that such persons of suitable condition, will be received into the armed service of the United States to garrison forts, positions, stations, and other places, and to man vessels of all sorts in said service.” See Basler, et al., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 6, 28-31.

to non-whites. Exceptions did exist, for example, in Massachusetts, the abolitionist governor John A. Andrew initiated a robust program to create black formations, most famously the 54th Massachusetts.<sup>39</sup> For many Northern states, the difficulty in raising white soldiers and the movement of Confederate forces further north led Northern governors to accept the idea of freedmen into the ranks. Governor David Tod of Ohio who remarked that the Civil War was a white man's war, now in 1863, needed black men to fill his recruitment quota. Governor Andrew G. Curtin of Pennsylvania refused to accept black troops, but the battle of Gettysburg and the need for able-bodied men, regardless of color changed his mind.<sup>40</sup>

Many white officers and troops were not open to the idea of leading and serving with black troops. Officer biases on the inferiority of black troops and racism were all contributing factors. Major General William T. Sherman questioned the use of inferior black troops as he responded to his brother, Senator John Sherman. General Sherman contended that "they raised the cry that a negro man was as good to stop a rebel bullet as a white man. I thought a soldier was to be an active machine, a fighter."<sup>41</sup> Plus, there was the fear of freed slaves inspiring slave rebellions. US Army forces already had to contend with contraband camps, and more former slaves would increase the problem. Brigadier General Godfrey Weitzel in November 1862 declined a command that included colored regiments due to the risk of "servile" insurrection. Weitzel wrote, "I cannot command these negro regiments...Since the arrival of the negro regiments, symptoms of servile insurrection are becoming apparent." Weitzel correctly understood that if former slaves refuse to work, soldiers would subsume that work, reducing their combat capacity. Prophetically, Weitzel later observed

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<sup>39</sup> Basler, et al., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 6, 28-31.

<sup>40</sup> Hondon B. Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers in the Civil War* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1988), 81-83.

<sup>41</sup> Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, eds., *Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William Tecumseh Sherman, 1860-1865* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 628.

slaves without provocation refusing to work.<sup>42</sup> Additionally, the black response to service was tepid at best at the beginning of 1863. The black men's narrative despite the proclamation was fear, distrust, and mistreatment. Freedmen were cautious and hesitant to the military and the President's commitment to the new policy.<sup>43</sup>

Throughout the US Army, officers, some under guidance, others of their free will and initiative were recruiting and organizing colored troops. Major General Benjamin Butler had been recruiting and organizing black troops in Louisiana since 1862.<sup>44</sup> In South Carolina, Brigadier General David Hunter, commander of the Department of the South in March 1862, requested additional weapons from the Secretary of War to arm the "loyal South Carolinians."<sup>45</sup> Brigadier General James H. Lane recruited enough black men at Fort Leavenworth in July 1862 to form a colored regiment.<sup>46</sup> These generals understood earlier than most that former slaves were a readily available force who would fight for their freedom. Although these generals' actions went beyond the scope of Lincoln's administration, their actions provided precedence to the idea of black formations.

The Mississippi Valley proved to be fertile ground for recruiting and organizing black troops. Thousands of former slaves fled into Union lines and were available for service.<sup>47</sup> Contraband camps established by Union forces to house runaway slaves were overflowing. Colonel

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<sup>42</sup> United States War Department, *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, ser. 1, vol. 15 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1900), 171-72.

<sup>43</sup> Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers*, 76.

<sup>44</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 19.

<sup>45</sup> William A. Dobak, *Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862-1867* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 30.

<sup>46</sup> Dobak, *Freedom by the Sword*, 164.

<sup>47</sup> Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers*, 86-9.

Cyrus Bussey, 3d Iowa Cavalry, in Arkansas wrote his commander asking for answers in dealing with the numerous escaped slaves entering his camps and “was at a loss to know what to do with them, and would be pleased to receive some instructions from you.”<sup>48</sup> Generals received little to no guidance following the proclamation and the onslaught of newly freed slaves.

This operating environment plus the slow recruitment of white men led the President and Secretary of War to establish a federal program to recruit and organize black troops. Secretary Stanton and President Lincoln agreed on the need for a comprehensive plan for nationwide implementation. Additionally, the War Department would retain control of the new organization.<sup>49</sup> War Department General Orders Number (No.) 143 established the Bureau of Colored Troops. The Adjutant General of the Army would create and control this new organization responsible “for all matters relating to the organization of colored troops.”<sup>50</sup> Now, the federal army controlled recruitment, officer commissions, military education, and unit organization. To begin, the Bureau of Colored Troops conducted independent but mutually supported operations to recruit black men and organize black units.

The explicitness of General Orders No. 143 ensured that a regimented system would manage the development of black units. For example, the Bureau of Colored Troops established offices in the northern and western states to inspect and supervise organization. Review boards examined men seeking commissions to command the new black units. Permission to recruit black men was only with the explicit consent of the War Department. Recruitment depots provided muster and inspection locations. Formation of colored troops was systematic; company size formations built first, followed by battalions, and finally regiments.<sup>51</sup> All black organizations, from

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<sup>48</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 2, 39.

<sup>49</sup> Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers*, 88.

<sup>50</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 215-16.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*



previously organized to those in the future, would be officially a part of the US Army.<sup>52</sup> Whereas in the past, officers who recruited black men such as General Hunter and Butler were operating outside of military regulation and policy. Now the raising of black regiments would not be piecemeal or erratic. Most importantly, the organization of colored troops now aligned with military policy.

## Recruitment

Different recruitment strategies and organizations conducted in the north, south, and west accommodated the varied demographics, leadership relationships, and political sentiments in the area. In the North, abolitionist governors and those seeking to fill their conscription quotas quickly filled black regiments under General Order Number 143.<sup>53</sup> In the south, Secretary of War Stanton directed officers in Louisiana, Mississippi Valley, and Tennessee, to develop and implement black recruitment strategy and operations. These officers coordinated their decisions through the US Army Adjutant General and the Bureau for Colored Troops in some form or fashion to recruit in these states. These states were increasingly becoming US Army held territory, which would allow access to the recently freed former slave population. These three states in addition to Kentucky provided the majority of black recruits.<sup>54</sup>

The Border States received an exemption from the Emancipation Proclamation because Lincoln and his generals continued to balance recruitment needs while maintaining state loyalty to the United States. Leaders deviated from guidance from the Bureau and General Orders No. 143 at times, but in retrospect, flexibility was a critical tenet of the organization to allow leaders to adapt

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<sup>52</sup> Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers*, 104.

<sup>53</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 76.

<sup>54</sup> Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee provided approximately 62,000 or 35% of the total colored force. See *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 5, 138.

to the regional differences. More importantly, General Orders No. 143 operationalize the administration's policy on the use of black troops and its effect on the South. Whereas previous initiatives by officers risked fracturing what remained of the United States, this action was principally a political decision.




Figure 1. Major Mississippi Valley and Western Theater USCT Recruitment Areas. Data adapted from William Dobak, *Freedom by the Sword: The U.S. Colored Troops, 1862-1867* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2011), 157.

### General Thomas and the Mississippi Valley

Lincoln and Stanton selected Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas to conduct recruitment operations in the Mississippi Valley and as overall supervisor of the Bureau of Colored Troops. Thomas, also serving as the Adjutant General of the Army was known for his administrative and bureaucratic skills. Thomas received wide latitude and authority to implement his plan. Thomas reported directly to the War Department and had authority to act over the objections of the field commanders.<sup>55</sup> Thomas' plan would transform the fugitive and recently freed slaves in contraband

<sup>55</sup> Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers*, 89-92.

camps into soldiers. These new soldiers would deny the Confederacy slave labor and create a population loyal to the North.<sup>56</sup> Thomas' authority from the War Department to supersede the orders of the field commanders concerning the recruitment of colored troops risked disruption of unity of command. Thomas' interjected his authority into the normal chain of command, and he could essentially force these new soldiers into units without the consent or approval of the ground commander. Fortunately, unity of effort was more aligned as senior army commanders supported Lincoln's efforts. Major General Henry Halleck, US Army Commanding General, wrote to Major General Ulysses S. Grant and conveyed to Grant he should "use your official and personal influence to remove prejudices on this subject, and to fully and thoroughly carry out the policy now adopted and ordered by the government."<sup>57</sup>

Thomas' oratorical skills and frenetic pace was pivotal in raising colored troops in the Mississippi Valley. Thomas' ability to influence not only blacks but also the white troops that they would be serving alongside was critical. It was not enough for the administration and senior leaders to accept the new policy. The white soldiers had to understand the significance of the new policy and if not fully supportive, be at least receptive to the change. Thomas' methods were critical to gaining the white soldier tolerance.

Throughout his travels, Thomas spoke directly to the white regiments in the field and conveyed the importance of the mission. Thomas would have the troops conduct a pass and review and then announce himself with the full authority of the President of the United States. Thomas would invoke emotion and reason by discussing the substantial casualties the units had received. Thomas would offer the benefit of using black troops and the courage they had shown thus far. Thomas conveyed the strategic context of recruiting blacks, especially from the pool of slaves in

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<sup>56</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 116-117.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 144-45.

the south: “to take their negroes and compel them [Confederate Army] to send back portion of their whites to cultivate their deserted plantations.” Thomas explained that without slaves, Confederate soldiers either chose to leave the fight, reducing their fighting strength or create starvation in the South.<sup>58</sup> Thomas also appealed to the white soldiers’ ambition and how raising black troops would create more opportunity for promotions and leadership positions. On 8 April 1863, Thomas was unambiguous during an address at Lake Providence, Louisiana, “I am here to raise as many regiments of blacks as I can. I am authorized to give commissions, from the highest to the lowest, and I desire those persons who are earnest in the work to take hold of it.”<sup>59</sup> The math was clear, more regiments of troops equaled more officers. White sergeants would become lieutenants; lieutenants would become captains, and so on.<sup>60</sup> Thomas foreshadowed an expanding role for the black troops as the Union seized more territory which would benefit white troops seeking battlefield glory and success. The former slaves understood the terrain in the South, Thomas explained. The new colored regiments would eliminate guerilla forces currently harassing US forces. Former slave reconnaissance would allow the white troops to operate in the area “with impunity.” Every black regiment created enabled a white regiment to “face the foe in the field.”<sup>61</sup> Following his speeches, Thomas ordered the unit commanders to back brief himself and the troops. This method ensured that all understood the mission as well as allowing the troops to express their opinions on the matter.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Daniel Appleton, *The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events: Embracing Political, Military, and Ecclesiastical Affairs; Public Documents; Biography, Statistics, Commerce, Finance, Literature, Science, Agriculture, and Mechanical Industry*, vol. 3 (New York: D. Appleton, 1870), 26, Google eBook.

<sup>59</sup> Appleton, *The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events*, 26.

<sup>60</sup> Dudley Taylor Cornish, *The Sable Arm* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987), 118.

<sup>61</sup> Appleton, *The American Annual Cyclopedia and Register of Important Events*, 26.

<sup>62</sup> Michael T. Meier, “Lorenzo Thomas and the Recruitment of Blacks in the Mississippi Valley, 1863-1865,” in *Black Soldiers in Blue: African American Troops in the Civil War Era*, edited by John David Smith, (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 256-57.

Thomas used rousing speeches invoking religion, pride, and freedom to raise the emotion and passion of recently freed blacks and enlist them in service of the Union. A *New York Times* article captured the emotion on the ground as General Thomas spoke to a group of recently freed black people in Memphis, Tennessee on May 23, 1863. Thomas explained the similarities between him and blacks, “we are all men; the only difference between us, I have had greater advantages than you. Now you are free, you can learn.” Thomas evoked pride in discussing black soldiers at Vicksburg, “why, negroes, manning the big guns. And doing as well at handling them as the white men did. And I propose to arm you.” Thomas, using call and response, raised the passion of the audience, “President Lincoln has set you free – will you fight? Suppose I would give you guns, and you should see a party of guerrillas in the woods, what would you do?” The crowd replied wildly and enthusiastically, “Fotch ‘em all in, Massa Thomas.”<sup>63</sup>

By the end of 1863, Thomas, with the support of the generals in the area, had enlisted 21,000 black soldiers comprised of thirty regiments of cavalry, heavy artillery, and infantry.<sup>64</sup> Thomas provided key manpower to secure areas occupied by the Union forces, which allowed them to continue their advance through the south. Just as important, Thomas’ efforts were transforming the narrative of black troops and their ability to fight and support the Union effort in the south. Major General David Hunter, commander of the Department of the South, provided a broad review of these new soldiers to Secretary Stanton and not only have the troops “proved brave, active, docile, and energetic” but also “prejudices of certain of our white soldiers against these indispensable allies are rapidly softening or fading out.”<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> “Adj.-Gen. Thomas’ Advice to the Negroes.; His Speech to the Contrabands at Memphis,” *New York Times*, 7 June 1863, accessed 7 November 2016, <http://nyti.ms/2nmNnQD>.

<sup>64</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 117.

<sup>65</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 177-178.

## Generals Ullmann, Banks, and Louisiana

Within Louisiana, two generals, Brigadier General Daniel Ullmann and Major General Nathaniel P. Banks implemented complimentary and at times contentious colored troops recruitment operations. The generals had to contend with unity of command issues, personal biases, political influence, and local population sentiment. Despite these challenges, the generals supported the Union effort with additional colored troops. Louisiana differed from Mississippi in that there were many Union sympathizers who remained in Louisiana and sought Union protection of themselves and their slaves as the Union gained control of the region. Additionally, New Orleans was home to a substantial population of freedmen who worked as artisans, shopkeepers, and laborers.<sup>66</sup> Additionally, the 1st Louisiana Native Guards, an all-black unit created by Major General Benjamin Butler, existed and operated out of the city.<sup>67</sup>

Major General Nathaniel P. Banks assumed command of the Department of the Gulf in November 1862. A former politician, member of congress, and governor of Massachusetts, Banks was known as a political general. General Banks' first actions concerning black troops was the removal of black officers from the Louisiana Native Guards. Banks wrote to US Army Adjutant General, Brigadier General Lorenzo Thomas that he was replacing the black officers with white ones. Banks stated that black officers were "a source of constant embarrassment and annoyance" which "demoralizes both white troops and negroes."<sup>68</sup> Banks also sought to maintain the support of Louisiana's population by issuing Department of the Gulf General Orders no. 17 which banned the recruitment of blacks from plantations without Bank's consent.<sup>69</sup> During the summer of 1863,

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<sup>66</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 117-18.

<sup>67</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 2, 436.

<sup>68</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 46.

<sup>69</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. 15, 678.

Lincoln began the process of readmitting Louisiana back to the United States. Banks' order in spirit, if not by force, helped to limit recruitment operations that would risk a political victory.<sup>70</sup>

During the same period in early 1863, another general arrived to support black recruitment operations in Louisiana. The new Bureau of Colored Troops ordered General Ullmann to Louisiana to raise a brigade of black infantry.<sup>71</sup> General Ullmann, a lawyer and unsuccessful candidate for governor in New York prior to the war, had led troops and had been a prisoner of war briefly. Ullmann, who in a private conversation with Lincoln following his release from captivity, advocated for the arming of blacks as the most "direct way to crush the rebellion." Following this conversation, Ullmann stated that Lincoln asked if he would command black soldiers.<sup>72</sup>

Issues with authority, and miscommunication due to Ullmann and Banks operating in the same region conducting similar missions disrupted unity of effort.<sup>73</sup> Banks outranked Ullmann and was his ranking superior in the region, but Ullmann worked directly for the Bureau of Colored Troops and had a direct line of communication to the US Army Adjutant General. Additionally, Ullmann had a limited, but influential relationship with President Lincoln. Whereas Thomas had received substantial support from the operational commanders during his recruitment operations, Ullmann had to contend with Banks. US Army Commanding General, Major General Halleck did write to Banks directing Banks to afford Ullmann support to his mission and allow the recruitment of volunteers from every source, which conflicted with Banks' order prohibiting plantation

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<sup>70</sup> References indicate that Banks did not directly enforce the regulation and recruiters continued to recruit on the plantations. See Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 118-19.

<sup>71</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol.3, 100-04.

<sup>72</sup> Cornish, *The Sable Arm*, 100; Daniel Ullmann, "Address by Daniel Ullman, Before the Soldier's and Sailor's Union of the State of New York", *Library of Congress*, accessed 28 November 2016, <http://bit.ly/2mTAsrr>.

<sup>73</sup> "Unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization—the product of successful unified action." Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, *Mission Command* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012) 2-2.

recruitment.<sup>74</sup> In this instance, the War Department's decision to maintain organizational control of recruiting affected Banks ability to effectively command and control operations.

The issue of plantation recruitment continued through 1863 as Banks wanted to retain plantation owner support and Ullmann wanted access to a larger pool of potential recruits. Ullmann did not intervene as his recruiters continued to pull from the plantations. Plantation owners continued to complain as one absentee owner wrote directly to the US Army Adjutant General and despite "protection papers" issued by General Grant and Admiral David Porter, "our rights as loyal citizens have been rudely violated by certain parties who visited our several estates and forcibly removed nearly all the male negroes."<sup>75</sup> Compounding the issue was Banks establishing a new former slave force outside and in direct competition of the Bureau for Colored Troops and Ullmann. Banks' *Corps d'Afrique* would be based on his theories of organizing black troops with combined arms elements organized into smaller regiments based on French warfare theory.<sup>76</sup> Freedmen also complained of forced entry into the US Army because of dwindling volunteers. A group of free blacks residing in Baton Rouge wrote to the Provost Marshall of Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Daniel Pardee detailing the abuse that free men "are hunted up in the streets, marched off to the penitentiary, where we are placed with contrabands, and forced into service."<sup>77</sup>

It was not until after multiple protests from plantation owners and after the Treasury Department assumed control of abandoned plantations did Banks develop an organized system pertaining to the recruitment of freedmen and former slaves. Department of the Gulf General Orders no. 64 finally created a commission in the Department of the Gulf to regulate recruitment

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<sup>74</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 102-03.

<sup>75</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 146-47.

<sup>76</sup> Hargrove, *Black Union Soldiers*, 98; *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. 15, 717; Dobak, *Freedom by the Sword*, 103.

<sup>77</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 159-60.



and enrollment of black men.<sup>78</sup> Banks followed with General Orders no. 70 which invoked conscription of all able-bodied black men, in contradiction with the Bureau of Colored Troops and Lincoln's previous injunctions on the idea of a black draft.<sup>79</sup> Following more outrage from plantation owners to President Lincoln, Thomas overruled Banks and reinstated the suspension of plantation recruitment.

This type of disorganization and the failure to create a formalized process of recruiting in Louisiana continued until 1865 when Thomas suspended black recruitment. Despite the inefficiency, Louisiana supplied 24,000 black troops to the war effort, more than any other state.<sup>80</sup> The issues between Banks and Ullmann revealed the continued need for unity of command to ensure operations operated under one intent. The politico-military dialogue must be continuous and resolve issues to ensure consensus among the political leaders, their desired objectives, and the military means to achieve those objectives.

### **Andrew Johnson, Majors Stearns and Mussey, and Tennessee**

Tennessee also differed from Mississippi and Louisiana due to its unique political and military situation. Tennessee was a slave state with divided political loyalties. Many slaveholders had remained loyal to the Union and were willing to allow the federal government to employ their slaves.<sup>81</sup> Civil War battles in Tennessee through 1862 resulted with Union forces in control of West Tennessee. Senator Andrew Johnson was the de facto political leader of the Tennessee population that was loyal to the Union. Johnson's position gave him significant political influence with Lincoln

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<sup>78</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. 26, 704.

<sup>79</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 1, vol. 26, 741; Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2*, 120.

<sup>80</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 5, 138; Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2*, 121.

<sup>81</sup> A letter sent to the Secretary of War signed by twenty Tennessee slaveholders in September 1863 recommended a strategy of responsible enlistment of black men with the assurance of pay and freedom to win the black man's gratitude and service. Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 174-75.

in regards to black enlistment. In March 1863, Lincoln wrote to Johnson, upon hearing that Johnson was proposing to enlist blacks. Lincoln wrote that a man of Johnson's status, a slave-holder in a slave state to propose arming black soldiers would send a convincing message to the Confederacy. Lincoln thought that "the bare sight of 50,000 armed and drilled black soldiers upon the banks of the Mississippi would end the rebellion at once."<sup>82</sup> Lincoln appointed Johnson as military governor of Tennessee with specific responsibilities to take charge of and employ all abandoned slaves.<sup>83</sup> Secretary of War Stanton attempted to reduce command friction by restricting General Thomas' black recruitment operations to western Tennessee counties outside of Johnson's control.<sup>84</sup>

Johnson views differed from Lincoln on the employment of former slaves. Johnson placed blacks into labor positions believing that the need for laborers was greater than soldiers. Additionally, Johnson held racial biases against blacks. Johnson believed that labor was preferable to soldiering due to the risk of blacks quitting if they were idle. Johnson was also concerned about the white population's perception of black troops operating in Tennessee and stated that "it is exceedingly important for this question to be handled in such a way as will do the least injury in forming a correct public judgement at this time."<sup>85</sup> Stanton, who grew impatient with Johnson's delay of arming blacks, sent Major George L. Stearns to support the recruitment effort in Tennessee in July 1863.<sup>86</sup> Stearns was an abolitionist who had previous success recruiting for the 54th and 55th Massachusetts. Stearns found that Johnson opposed raising black troops and was not able to implement his recruitment plan until September 1863.<sup>87</sup> Stearns received complete control from

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<sup>82</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 103.

<sup>83</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 122-23.

<sup>84</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 123.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>87</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 4, 762-68; Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 123; Dobak, *Freedom by the Sword*, 261.

Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, which allowed him to implement recruitment operations with limited military interference. Stearns' plan, based on monetary incentives, paid recruiters for each successful enlistment. Stearns received funds to support his operations by philanthropic abolitionists from the north. Stearns brought the agents he used in the north down south to operate. Through public meetings, personal appeals, and using black assistant recruiters, Stearns filled an entire regiment in less than a month. By November, Stearns had organized four additional regiments.<sup>88</sup>

Differences continued between Johnson and Stearns on the employment of black troops. Johnson's ability to appeal to Lincoln and Stanton resulted in Stearns removal from Tennessee. Stearns' deputy, Major Reuben D. Mussey, replaced him as coordinator Tennessee's recruitment efforts. The Bureau of Colored Troops retained overall control of black recruitment except for Tennessee. Mussey continued many of the recruiting practices established by Stearns, but Johnson retained employment authority.<sup>89</sup>

It was military operations that eventually superseded Johnson's political ability to influence black recruitment and employment. As Union forces expanded into Georgia in 1864, the extending lines of communication demanded black forces to secure and defend them. As the Union armies seized more territory, more freed slaves were available for recruitment. Mussey indicated that he received assurance from General Sherman and his subordinates for permission to recruit.<sup>90</sup>

Political considerations and the failure of Johnson and Stearns to align their efforts disrupted any unity of effort. Notwithstanding the challenges, Tennessee provided 20,000 black soldiers to the war effort through a sound recruitment strategy. Stearns and later Mussey received

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<sup>88</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 4, 762-768.

<sup>89</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 876; Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Ser. 2: The Black Military Experience*, 124-25.

<sup>90</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 4, 769; Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Ser. 2: The Black Military Experience*, 125.

authority from the overall military commander in Tennessee, Rosecrans to implement their recruitment strategy, which reduced military friction. Stearns utilized non-governmental organizations funding to enhance the effectiveness of his recruiting operation to increase the incentive for success. Stearns used black assistant recruiters to help influence the narrative of fighting for freedom. Mussey remained cognizant of military operations and coordinated with other commands to support his recruitment efforts. Tennessee provided the third largest number of blacks to the Union and the strategy was indicative of that success.<sup>91</sup>

The Bureau of Colored Troops established a system of recruiting and organizing blacks into the Union Army. Although the operations in Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee revealed different strategies for the recruitment of blacks, there was finally a mechanism of regulation, reporting, coordination, and deconfliction that did not exist before 1863. The arming of blacks was a political decision, and most importantly, General Thomas and his subordinate officers brought energy and commitment to the operation.<sup>92</sup> Recruiting operations were not perfect or seamless; these officers accomplished something completely new and unique in the US Army. Whereas Thomas had more autonomy and higher level support in Mississippi, other officers struggled with chain of command authority and political influence. The flexibility afforded to the officers allowed them to operate within their spheres and adjust tactically to accomplish their mission. The officers charged with recruitment were successful as they provided thousands of colored troops needed to sustain the Union's war effort.

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<sup>91</sup> Tennessee supplied 20,133 black troops, third only to Louisiana and Kentucky. See *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 5, 138.

<sup>92</sup> Meier, "Lorenzo Thomas and the Recruitment of Blacks in the Mississippi Valley, 1863-1865," in John David Smith, ed., *Black Soldiers in Blue*, 268-69.

## The Selection of White Officers to Lead Black Troops

The decision to have white officers command black troops served two main purposes. As a military and political decision, the use of white officers leading these new Union forces helped diminish the fears and concerns of the white population. Secondly, black soldiers were mostly uneducated and lacked the individualism and independence found in white soldiers. As Historian Dudley Taylor Cornish explained, these reasons were why black regiments required the best white officers, “men who could mold the raw clay into the forms of military efficiency.”<sup>93</sup> Moreover, there remained biases on the cognitive ability of blacks. White officers would compensate for the black intellectual shortfalls.<sup>94</sup> The exclusive use of white officers validated black regiments and their expansion. The steps the War Department took to select and train white officers who would lead black regiments made the idea of black troops serving palatable to whites and blacks.

Major General David Hunter, Commander of the Department of South, who in late 1862 developed black regiments, wanted only the “most intelligent and energetic of [white] non-commissioned officers” to turn into officers to lead his troops.<sup>95</sup> This theme continued throughout the Union as officers and political figures sought to find white officers of a certain temperament. Captain Thomas Higginson, an abolitionist, when raising a black regiment, wanted officers “who were sympathetic to the plight of blacks” and chose the “finest, sharpest men” he could find.<sup>96</sup> Additionally, officers with successful prior command experiences were preferable. Governor Andrew of Massachusetts desired exceptional men to command the 54th Massachusetts, “young

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<sup>93</sup> Cornish, *The Sable Arm*, 225.

<sup>94</sup> Joseph T. Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle: The Civil War Alliance of Black Soldiers and White Officers* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), 35.

<sup>95</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 2, 30.

<sup>96</sup> Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle*, 37.

men of military experience, of firm anti-slavery principles, ambitious, superior to a vulgar contempt for color, and having faith in the capacity of colored men for military service.”<sup>97</sup>

The Bureau for Colored Troops created a formalized process for civilians and current serving officers seeking positions in the new black units. The Bureau established a multi-layered system. Applicants would write to apply for a commission. The Adjutant General would review the applicants and determine which candidates would appear in front one of the Bureau’s examination boards throughout the United States. Applicants submitted mandatory letters of recommendation attesting to the applicant’s character. Moreover, applicants had to pass a test demonstrating knowledge of military tactics, history, and geography.<sup>98</sup> Those applicants who passed the examination transferred to a black command as per the Bureau.<sup>99</sup> This system was revolutionary, for not only did it remove the states governors who traditionally appointed officers through patronage, it created a new process for federal commissions outside of those typically granted through West Point.<sup>100</sup>

The US Army’s desire for high-quality officers combined with a strict selection process created the perception that leading colored troops was prestigious and exclusive. The editors of *Chicago Tribune* wrote in 1864 that “none but first class officers are accepted, and the examination is just as rigid.”<sup>101</sup> Newly USCT commissioned officer 2nd Lieutenant Henry Crydenwise wrote, “any one if he has money can get a position in a white reg’t but not so here.” The colored troop

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<sup>97</sup> Secretary of the Commonwealth, *Public Documents of Massachusetts: Being the Annual Reports of Various Public Officers and Institutions for the Year 1863*, vol. 2 (Boston: Wright & Potter, 1864) 55, Google eBook.

<sup>98</sup> Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle*, 44.

<sup>99</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 215-16.

<sup>100</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 407; *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 5, 661.

<sup>101</sup> Editors, “Commissions in Colored Regiments,” *Chicago Tribune*, 18 January 1864, accessed 3 December 2016, <http://trib.in/2mkPMKL>.

officers were “better class of men, more moral, more religious, better educated and understand their business better than those in white reg’ts.”<sup>102</sup> For those who pursued higher pay, increased promotion, had abolitionist leanings, or a strong desire to serve, leading black units provided these opportunities. The combination of appealing to personal benefit and serving the greater good reduced the stigma of serving with black soldiers.

The selectiveness of the program and its rigorous examination created the problem of not producing enough officers to command black troops. By December 1863, of the 1,051 candidates who appeared in front of the board, only 560 passed, a 53% graduation rate.<sup>103</sup> The solution was to create the Free Military School for Applicants for Commands of Colored Troops. Based out of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the Free Military School employed experienced officers and academic professors to “instruct applicants in infantry tactics, army regulations, mathematics, and thoroughly prepare them for a successful examination.”<sup>104</sup> The course was thirty days long broken into four different levels that corresponded with a tactical formation starting with the individual soldier level at week one and culminating with the brigade level at week four.<sup>105</sup> Instruction occurred six days per week to include: drill, maneuvers, and tactics. Upon successful examination, students would move to the next tactical instruction level.<sup>106</sup> Upon graduation from the Free School, candidates had the preparation and education to pass the Bureau of Colored Troop's examination. This school provided the education and instruction to white civilians and enlisted soldiers who had the

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<sup>102</sup> As quoted in Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle*, 39.

<sup>103</sup> Cornish, *The Sable Arm*, 217.

<sup>104</sup> John H. Taggart, *Free Military School for Applicants for Command of Colored Troops* (Philadelphia: King & Baird, 1864), 7, Google eBook.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 26.

<sup>106</sup> Glatthaar, *Forged in Battle*, 46-7; Taggart, *Free Military School*, 18-25.

temperament and passion for becoming army officers but would have failed the Bureau's rigorous examination.

Once these highly-selected officers led and served with the black troops, their reports and letters back home shaped a new military and political portrayal of black troops being quality soldiers and men. Captain Elias D. Strunke wrote following the Battle of Port Hudson that his colored troops "did not swerve, or show cowardice. I have been in several engagements, and I never before beheld such coolness and daring."<sup>107</sup> Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas testified to the Senate Committee on Military Affairs in 1864 that black troops "proved a most important addition to our forces." When discussing battles at Memphis, Milliken's Bend, and Vicksburg, Thomas asked the committee, "what troops could have done better?"<sup>108</sup> General Ullman, one of the earliest believers in the use of USCTs, remarked sarcastically about the many supporters who previously did not believe in the cause.

It was pleasing to see how rapidly the foulest mouthed revilers became enthusiastic and patriotic admirers and laudators; how jaundiced eyes were cleared to see Colored Troops only in rainbow tints... None but men of earnest conviction are willing to meet the opprobrium of its support, but when, by their determined energy, it battles its way to power, no one can count the number of those who were always its friends.<sup>109</sup>

Although the decision to select white officers to lead the new colored troops was based upon biases and political sentiment, it was the right decision that guaranteed its success. The War Department committed to the idea of black units and undertook steps to ensure its success. An unprecedented new system selected men who could seize the opportunity and handle the burden of leading black troops. The examination process made becoming an officer desirable and highly

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<sup>107</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 529.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.*, 531.

<sup>109</sup> Daniel Ullmann, "Address by Daniel Ullmann, L.L.D., Before the Soldier's and Sailor's Union of the State of New York, on the Organization of Colored Troops and the Regeneration of the South, delivered at Albany, 5 February 1868," *Library of Congress*, accessed 4 December 2016, <http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.rbc/lcrbmrp.t2302>.



sought after. The examination and subsequent officer training school created officers believed to be more trained and highly qualified relative to their peers. The units proved themselves in battle and gained the support of their sister units and higher commanders. Those officers led troops into combat then wrote to tell about the courage and fidelity of black troops. These sequential effects help to increase support for Lincoln's political decisions and reduced preconceived notions of black soldier inferiority during the Civil War.

## Analysis

Starting in late 1862 through 1865, the War Department implemented an unprecedented program of raising and organizing troops. The system integrated commands at all levels of war and throughout the multiple theaters of operations. There are significant differences between building a USCTs in the Civil War versus contemporary foreign security force assistance operations, most recently seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. In some cases, contextually, the similarities provide a framework to examine why building the US Colored Troops were so successful. Based on sheer numbers, there was an 186,000-soldier force compared to the US-led coalition that built an 183,000-man army in Afghanistan and a 193,000-soldier army in Iraq.<sup>110</sup> In both eras, the US military created specific organizations to oversee, direct, and supervise the training and organization of these troops. Policy drove the creation of new troops. The troops' subsequent failures or successes had strategic and political significance that affected their respective overall war efforts and progress. It is through the aforementioned concepts that the past provides ideas to design future viable foreign force development models.

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<sup>110</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, "Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)," last modified June 2013, accessed 13 December 2016, <http://bit.ly/18JhdGQ>; "Iraqi Forces by Numbers: Who has the Biggest Army?" *The Telegraph*, last modified 12 June 2014, accessed 13 December 2016, <http://bit.ly/2nxPsbu>.

As described in the sixty years prior to the creation of colored troops and thereafter, there was a fundamental belief in the inferiority of the black race. For pro and anti-slavery proponents, there was a consensus that blacks were inferior to whites. This is not to condemn previous generations, but to recommend that current and future planners acknowledge and examine their preconceived biases and prejudices of foreign men. To deny predispositions is to deny secondary socialization.<sup>111</sup> Planners and leaders must examine their individual and group ideas of foreign force culture, religion, education, and capability to separate fact from opinion. Some of the most renowned Union generals started the war as racists, bigots, or slaveholders whose beliefs changed during the war. General Sherman in 1863 wrote, “with my opinions of negroes, and my experience, yea prejudice I cannot trust them yet.” Sherman even banned black recruitment in Georgia in 1864.<sup>112</sup> General Grant owned slaves in Missouri before the Civil War; Grant later wrote to Lincoln that he gave “the subject of arming the negro my hearty support...they will make good soldiers.”<sup>113</sup> The crisis of low white recruitment which led to an unpopular draft led to the military necessity to employ blacks in the army. It was through black troop performance in operations and in battle that reduced stereotypes and fallacies. It is unknown if the future will allow a crisis of that magnitude to eradicate biases of foreign forces, but we can evaluate ourselves and how we see others to determine effective organizational constructs, officer selection, and training programs for creating foreign forces.

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<sup>111</sup> Secondary socialization is any subsequent process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors of the objective world of his society. See Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1967).

<sup>112</sup> Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin, eds., *Sherman's Civil War: Selected Correspondence of William Tecumseh Sherman*, 454; Meier, “Lorenzo Thomas and the Recruitment of Blacks in the Mississippi Valley, 1863-1865,” in *Black Soldiers in Blue*, 229.

<sup>113</sup> Ulysses S. Grant, *Memoirs and Selected Letters: Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant, Selected Letters 1839-1865* (New York: Literary Classics of the United States, 1990), 1031; “Slavery at White Haven,” National Park Service, accessed 13 December 2016, <https://www.nps.gov/ulsg/learn/historyculture/slaveryatwh.htm>.

A critical component of the success of black troops was due to the leadership of white officers. A viable option for future consideration is US officers and NCOs initially leading the newly developed foreign troops. Current doctrine, notably FM 3-24, indicates that the “host nation doing something tolerably is better than us doing it well.”<sup>114</sup> Political and social constraints may not allow the time required for host nations to operate tolerably and independently. The fact that white officers led black regiments in the Civil War is relevant to current operations. First, it would not have been socially acceptable to create black officers because of historical prejudices against blacks. Any failures of black-led forces would have confirmed biases of black ineptitude. Furthermore, blacks were socialized to take orders from whites. In the vein of ADP 6-22, there was shared understanding and more mutual trust between white senior commanders and white officers.<sup>115</sup> The white officers owned the responsibility for the success of the black troops, which helped create acceptance at large. The white officers who led those troops changed the collective idea of blacks as they promoted the competency of black troops. White officers identified and promoted black talent, which further legitimized black troops and led to black NCOs. Whites validated the performance and capability of blacks, which was most important. Today, US forces advise but do not lead host nation troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The success of those advisory programs is debatable. During the Civil War, those white officers who led those troops, their careers, reputations, and in some instances their lives were in the hands of those forces they trained and led.

Officer selection is critical to ensure that the right US officers lead foreign troops. During the Civil War, the War Department created a unique program to identify and select white officers to lead black troops. Men who were ambitious, intelligent, high-quality, empathetic to the black

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<sup>114</sup> Field Manual (FM) 3-24, *Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2014), 7-2.

<sup>115</sup> ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command*, 1-2.

predicament, or even had abolitionist leanings screened for selection. The Bureau of Colored Troops actively recruited and sought men in and out of uniform to find the men who became colored troop officers. The Bureau only selected 50% of those applicants who made the initial cut. The selectivity of the program gave it exclusivity, made it more desirable, and reduced the stigma of working with blacks. At the highest levels of the War Department to lower tactical commands, the US Army assigned the individual officers to specific organizations. The officers directed to recruit in Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana were all purposely placed by either the Secretary of War or Adjutant General. These were not normal assignment rotations used in current US Army assignment processes or traditional political patronage seen during the Civil War era, but the precise matching of personnel and their talents to the assignment.

A one size fits all approach may not work in complex, socially diverse countries when creating a foreign force from scratch. Even in the predominantly white society of the United States, the Bureau's recruiters tailored their recruitment strategy to their assigned United States' region. The Bureau of Colored Troops centrally controlled recruitment but allowed decentralized execution. In Tennessee, Mississippi, and Louisiana, the flexibility given to the recruitment officers was necessary to accommodate the unique political, social, and military environments. There was not a one size fits all approach. Recruiting freedmen troops in northern states was different than recruitment in border or slave-holding states. In addition to the recruiters, newspapers and journals advertised recruitment opportunities for blacks and whites in the USCTs.




Figure 2: Response by the Editors of the *Chicago Tribune*, “Commissions in Colored Regiments, 18 January 1861, accessed 3 December 2016, <http://trib.in/2mkPMKL>.

The alignment of political ends and military means should align when building foreign forces. Once decided, leaders should communicate and disseminate the plan for military ways and means to achieve the policy aims for concurrence and support at all levels. During the Civil War, ambitious military leaders tried to get ahead of a policy decision to arm blacks, but it was not until Lincoln decided that the idea was politically feasible and acceptable could it proceed in mass. Correspondence between Lincoln and his senior commanders demonstrated the dialogue between policy and military to ensure shared understanding and concurrence.<sup>116</sup> The dialogue between senior military commanders to the theater and corps commanders revealed commanders who provided their intent and guidance for execution. Commanding General Halleck wrote to General Grant supporting the new policy of arming blacks. Halleck went further explaining that regardless of officer’s opinions, “it is the duty of everyone to carry out the measures so adopted” and he expected Grant to “use your official and personal influence to remove prejudices on this subject.”

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<sup>116</sup> Lincoln wrote to Grant concerning a planned expedition on Mobile, AL. Lincoln informs Grant of Thomas’ operation of raising colored troops in his area of operations. See Basler, et al., *Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, vol. 6, 374.

Halleck went on to explain the changing character of the war, and the need for the new policy was due to new circumstances.<sup>117</sup>

Tactical commanders also promoted the idea of black soldiers and demonstrated ethical behavior as it related to integrating blacks into the US Army. US Army Adjutant General, Brigadier General Thomas remarked on the officers of all ranks fully endorsing the new policy of black soldiers. Thomas singled out Brigadier General John A. Logan, a division commander in Mississippi whose “eloquent remarks... not only indorsed my own remarks, but went far beyond them.”<sup>118</sup> Letters, reports, and correspondence of the US Army leadership during the Civil War presented commanders who created shared understanding up and down their chains of command, gave guidance as needed, and supported the mission publicly and privately.

## Conclusion

The US Army was successful in its methods to create a new force, uniquely different from its majority white organization. The organizational approach and training methods used to raise the USCTs provides methods that apply to contemporary US Army’s foreign training, advisement, and assistance operations. Despite racism, political fears, and uncertainty, the US Army created a black force of 180,000-soldiers that was capable, legitimate, and battle-tested. However, following the end of the Civil War, history shows that the acceptability blacks gained through the Civil War were short lived.

Following the Civil War, racism and prejudices against blacks remained and in some cases intensified. Although blacks gained civil liberties through Reconstruction, state and federal governments slowly removed those political rights. The late nineteenth century saw the passage of Jim Crow laws that segregated blacks from whites. The Civil Rights Act of 1965 finally

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<sup>117</sup> Berlin, et al., *Freedom, Series 2: The Black Military Experience*, 143-44.

<sup>118</sup> *Official Records*, ser. 3, vol. 3, 121.

enabled the voting rights of blacks that the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 allowed. Regardless of proven black fighting ability, the US military did not desegregate until 1948, eighty-two years after the disbandment of USCTs. Blacks could not be equals before the Civil War and unfortunately were not equals after.

The racism and hatred that preceded and followed the Civil War demonstrate how remarkable the creation of black troops was during the Civil War. The immense racism, biases associated with black people, and sustained institution of slavery before the Civil War would indicate that blacks were incapable, lacking the ability to be a fighting force. The racism and segregation following the Civil War would lead to believe that blacks never fought at all. The performance of the USCTs did not bring about permanent societal change, but that was not its mission.

For a moment in time, the US Army either worked through or overcame substantial issues of race and opportunity. The War Department and the Bureau of Colored Troops implemented unprecedented systems to organize and recruit black soldiers. Most importantly, the Bureau's methods to recruit and select white officers with the capability and racial sensitivities to lead these new military formations offered better chances at mission success and societal acceptance.

The US Army has proven its capability in creating and raising foreign armies, but not in developing capable and independent foreign forces. The methods shown in the United States Colored Troops provides an additive method in contemporary train, advise, and assist missions. The deficiency in foreign army advisement is due to a line of effort not included in the train, advise, and assist operations. Adding a *lead* line of effort modifies foreign army operations from train, advise, and assist to train, lead, advise, and assist operations. Replicating the Civil War method, a US Army program to select and train US Army officers and NCOs to lead foreign armies at their initial creation would provide a different course of action to build competent and

capable host-nation forces able to conduct independent operations. Before a transition to advisement operations, US Army officers lead the forces in combat as they build their capability and validation in the eyes of the US and local populations. Continuous operations allow the US Army leaders to assess foreign personnel with the technical, tactical, and leadership abilities to replace US officers to facilitate an effective and sustainable transition. Similar to the Bureau of Color Troop's process, the selection of US Army officers must be deliberate to ensure leaders have the right leadership attributes to lead foreign forces.

Future conflict may not resemble the Civil War, but the need for capable, competent, and legitimate foreign armies to support US military land operations has endured. A transition of authority between US forces and a competent authority cannot happen if host nation forces are unable to take the lead from US forces. The ideas developed through the Bureau of Colored Troops could apply to US Army foreign army advisement operations to include: tailorable recruitment strategies, a vetted leadership process, and the selection of leaders considered legitimate to the populace are relevant to contemporary operations. The US military can win the war, but only a foreign army created, lead, and advised effectively can secure the peace.



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