

# IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON NIGER FROM 2013 TO 2019

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
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by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON NIGER FROM 2013 TO 2019, by Major Aichatou Ousmane-Issaka, 95 pages.

Niger has faces serious security challenges since 2013. All of Niger's borders are exposed to conflicts occurring in neighboring countries. Seven terrorist groups operate along these borders. Western Niger is affected by the conflict in Northern Mali while Boko Haram-related violence spills over into southeastern Niger from northern Nigeria. Niger struggles with the aftermath of NATO operations in Libya. ISIS-WA, Boko Haram, ISIS, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam, Wal-Muslimin, al-Murabitun, Ansar al-Din, and the Liberation Front of Macina are terrorist groups affecting the Niger's borders and interior. Their attacks have destroyed lives, hindered democracy, and forced the Defense and Security Forces into protracted engagement against elusive enemies.

This study identifies terrorism's impacts in Niger by analyzing the human, national, and regional levels. It attempts to determine key problems and help government officials reduce the negative impacts in Niger. This research provides recommendations for fighting terrorism, and increasing links to civilians through creation of a civil affairs unit to improve cooperation between the military and communities.

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## ACRONYMS

AQMI	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
FDS	<i>Forces de Defense et de Securite</i> [Defense and Security Forces]
NAF	Nigerien Armed Forces
OMS	<i>Organisation Mondiale de la Sante</i> [World Health Organization]
UN	United Nations



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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The global incidence of terrorism has increased alarmingly since 11 September 2001. The concerted efforts by the international community to eliminate terrorism have hitherto proved inadequate. This increase is not unconnected with the balance of terror and the wave of global insecurity that shaped the beginning of the twenty-first century; it is the product of unresolved issues associated with the Cold War and the continuation of the ideological war between the West and Islamic fundamentalism.<sup>1</sup> Terrorism is a threat to human security; it undermines national development, and constitutes a real threat to national security. All societies should have a reasonable expectation of human security and favorable environments that afford opportunities for citizens to freely undertake daily activities and achieve their maximum potential in this contemporary world. The world's new threat is terrorism. According to Ban Ki Moon, "terrorism is a significant threat to peace and security for all countries."<sup>2</sup> The crisis is devastating and affects African societies to the core with lasting impacts at all levels of life (military, political, societal, and economical), that impede continental cohesion in Africa.

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<sup>1</sup> Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare, "Boko Haram Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin Region: Implications for Subregional Security," *Journal of International and Global Studies* 8 (2016): 2.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 5.

The Sahelian band is one of the poorest regions in the world. This land mass stretches from Mauritania to Ethiopia. A generally semi-arid climate, the region is mostly used for semi-nomadic livestock, small family farms, and perennial crops. The Sahel area is sparsely populated with a density of sixty-six million inhabitants spread over a land mass of over five million square-kilometers, which is nine times the size of France. The lack of opportunities and lack of state control in this vast region increases terrorism threats. This has several local effects: migrant groups strain state resources, family and village ties are adversely affected, and insecurity and economic disarray are increased in urban settings.




Figure 1. Map of the Sahel Region

Source: Barbara Cooper, "The Sahel in West African History," in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018), 3, accessed 12 December 2018, <http://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-167?print=pdf>.

With the fall of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011, the Sahel has become one of the largest areas of destabilization in the world with extreme violence characterized by attacks and abductions. Terrorist groups now view countries in the Sahel with a predilection for smuggling, violence, and training. These groups destabilize societies in weak African states with characteristically poorly prepared local militias. Gaddafi's fall removed a chief mediator in the region's conflicts, although Libya was as

much a source of instability as stability during his reign.<sup>3</sup> Today, terrorist activity has profoundly changed Sahel geopolitics and impacted all levels of life for inhabitants. In Niger, threats that affect national security are mainly related to terrorist groups operating in the Sahel.<sup>4</sup> Niger's wide and porous borders place the country at the center of the Sahel crisis. In Niger, deficient border control contributes to the spread of smuggling, drug trade, and circulation of jihadists in the Sahel. The military is forced to operate against numerous incursions that exhausts its capacity. Niger's soldiers face jihadists from Mali's border in the west and Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis in the southeast. On 3 March 2017, the United Kingdom's foreign travel office reacted to increased terrorist attacks in Niger's restive nature by decreeing a state of emergency in the eastern and western parts of Niger. Table 1 below shows the escalation of attacks from 2017-2018.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Stephanie Pezard, and Michael Shurkin, "Is There a Nigerien Model of Resilience?" in *Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 25, accessed 5 November 2018, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt15zc57q.12>.

<sup>4</sup> Salifou Mainassara, "Terrorism and National Security: An Appraisal of the Nigerien Armed Forces Counterterrorism Efforts" (Abuja, Nigeria: National Defence College Nigeria, 2016), 5, 58.

<sup>5</sup> Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2018), 33.

Table 1. Statistics on Attacks During 2017 and 2018			
Period	Terrorist Attacks/Categories of Terrorist Attacks	Region	Victims: Killed/Wounded
6/4/18	Bombers killed	Diffa	9+ /
10/21/17	Gunmen attacks	Tillabery (Ayorou)	13 Gendarms-5
10/4/17	Terrorist attacks on military patrol	Tillabery (Tongo Tongo)	9 (4 U.S. and Nigeriens soldiers)
7/2/17	Boko haram insurgents	Diffa (Ngalawa)	9 and 30 abducted
6/28/17	Suicide bombers	Diffa	NA

Source: Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2018), 33. Total number killed in Diffa is unknown, but at least nine people were killed.

### Niger's Fragility

Niger was a fragile state before the 2012 terrorist attacks associated with the Mali crisis. In the 1990s, Niger experienced insecurity, especially in the Agadez region in the north. Tuaregs, the historical inhabitants of this area, were the antagonists in this uprising. They attempted to justify their attacks in the region, claiming social and political inequities between the Tuareg and other ethnic groups in Niger. According to Jeremy Keenan's article, *Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellions Threaten Sahelian Conflagration*, the Tuareg rebellion was also the result of "competing imperialisms and sub-imperialisms, the associated interests of multinational mining companies; environmental threats, and the interests of international drug-traffickers."<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Jeremy Keenan, "Uranium Goes Critical in Niger: Tuareg Rebellions threaten Sahelian Conflagration," *Review of African Political Economy* 35, no. 117 (2008): 2.

Niger has long history of exporting uranium and is currently the world's third-ranking exporter after Australia and Canada. Annual production is 3,300 metric tons, which accounts for around 72 percent of Niger's export revenue and approximately 10 percent of global uranium mine supply. The Office of Geological and Mining Research discovered the first uranium mine in 1957 near the current mining town of Arlit in northern Niger. Further discoveries were made at numerous sites in the adjoining Tamesna region during the late 1950s and 1960s, which led to the Air Mining Company's (Somair) open-pit mining operation near Arlit in 1971.<sup>7</sup> The Minière Company of Akouta (Cominak) began underground mining at the nearby Akouta deposit in 1974. Today, a consortium led by the giant French corporation, Areva, controls the two mines at Arlit and Akokan. Uranium concentrates, known as yellow-cake, are transported to France via Cotonou for conversion primarily at the Comurhex-Tricastin nuclear site. In 2003, the world embraced nuclear energy, which resulted in raising the price of uranium from scarcely \$10 per pound at the beginning of 2003 to \$45 per pound by mid-June 2006. Eventually, uranium set a record price of \$136 per pound in June 2007.<sup>8</sup> The average weekly price in 2007 was \$98.55 per pound. The average mid-range spot price per pound for 2017 was around \$24.50 and \$28.90 by 2019 when supply levels saturated the

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<sup>7</sup> Keenan, 7.

<sup>8</sup> Toby Archer and Tihomir Popovic, *The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on Terrorism in North Africa* (Töölö, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2007).



international market.<sup>9</sup> “Not surprisingly, foreign corporations have scrambled to acquire exploration rights and to expand uranium production in Niger, especially in northern Niger.”<sup>10</sup> The lead countries, France, China, Canada, Australia, South Africa, UK, and India, are all competing to profit from Niger’s reserves.”<sup>11</sup> Areva was the first company to sign a major agreement with the government in 2004 to expand its exploration. In 2006, Areva secured rights to develop the large deposit in Imouraren, about sixty kilometers south of Arlit.<sup>12</sup>

Additionally, in 2006, Niger awarded licenses to a group of Chinese companies led by the China International Uranium Corporation (Sino Uranium), a unit of China’s National Nuclear Corporation, to explore uranium at a number of sites in the Agadez-Tamesna region. Starting in 2007, Niger envisioned a three-fold increase in uranium production from 3,500,066 to 10,500,200 tons per year thorough 2010.<sup>13</sup> In 2007, the government granted close to ninety mining exploration permits for the northern desert region out of over 180 requests considered. Prior to the current Tuareg rebellion that began in 2007 (the earlier rebellion started in 1990), resistance to foreign corporate exploitation was directed almost exclusively at Areva and the Chinese National

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<sup>9</sup> Cameco Corporation, “Uranium price,” 21 March 2019, accessed 21 March 2019, <https://www.cameco.com/invest/markets/uranium-price>.

<sup>10</sup> Keenan, 455. France no longer has a monopoly on Niger’s uranium.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid.

Petroleum Company.<sup>14</sup> These activities attracted a particular band of Tuareg rebels called the *Mouvement National de la Jeunesse*, translated as “National Youth Movement” in English. On 8 February 2007, three heavily armed Tuaregs and a handful of followers attacked the village of Iferouane in northern Air, which started the current rebellion. Over the next three months, the new *Mouvement National de la Jeunesse* rebel movement distinguished itself with several small military engagements, including an attack on the French uranium company, Areva, at its compound in Arlit. Niger’s parliament responded with the approval of more than a \$60 million augmentation in security funding to confront insecurity.<sup>15</sup>

#### Problem Statement

Niger is located at the heart of the Sahel, which is the region with the most violent conflicts on the African continent. Crises in Libya, Mali, and Nigeria directly impact Niger’s internal security and introduce significant socio-political and economic challenges. Niger has faced terrorism since 2001 as a result of the crises associated with Libya and Mali. Attacks began to directly impact Niger after joining France’s Operation Serval in Northern Mali. AQMI, Al-Qaida, and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa destabilize western Niger along the vast border it shares with Mali. Southeastern Niger is plagued with attacks from various terrorist groups, especially Boko Haram. Increased attacks in the southeastern region of Niger are attributed to the

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<sup>14</sup> Keenan, 455.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

country's participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force that seeks to end Boko Haram's insurgency. From 2012 to 2018, 316 Nigerien soldiers died fighting terrorists in Niger. The Nigerien Armed Forces (NAF) and civilians are severely impacted by insecurity in the country. NAF encompasses the military and the gendarmery while the Defense and Security Forces encompasses the military, gendarmerie, police, national guard, customs, and the forest and fauna security. Despite Niger's effort to fight terrorism through strategic engagements, the country continues to suffer from terrorist threats.

The purpose of this research is to analyze the impact of terrorism on the NAF, socio-political level dynamics, and regional cooperation. From this analysis, the researcher will address the research questions and suggest recommendations that will collectively support Niger's ability to counter the effects of terrorism internally and in the region.

### Significance of the Problem

Terrorism in the Sahel, especially in Niger, has repercussions on internal and regional development. Persistent insecurity has changed the way of life in Niger and limited national development because of the conflict environment. Niger is engaged in the terrorism fight to prevent the continued destruction of social structures. Security threats are alarming and complex, and they have diminished the NAF's ability to effectively shoulder most of the security burden associated with highly trained enemies who know the terrain. The effects of terrorism are evinced by weakened regional economies and limited ability to recover while the current security challenges remain. Military cooperation with friendly countries creates synergy to work against the terrorists,

but this cooperation is insufficient to overwhelm systemic security challenges in the Sahel. To address current and future security threats, Niger must develop and employ an updated strategy that reflects on past performance, analyzes capability gaps, and improves its ability to engagement coherently with state and regional militaries.

### Purpose of the Research

The purpose of this study is to analyze how terrorism impacts all levels in Niger. This research will develop recommendations that support improving Niger's ability to reduce the impact of terrorism. Also, recommendations will address how the armed forces and regional allies can improve overall security in the region. This work will aid political science students who have an interest in the effects of terrorism on societies and an interest in developing strategies to assist states in a post-terrorism phase of recovery. With respect to military operations, this thesis will allow military leaders to reflect on problems associated with terrorism and society. Further military leaders can use the findings and recommendations to improve force capability required in the counterterrorism fight.

### Research Questions

To assess the impact of terrorism on Niger, this thesis will address the following primary and secondary questions.

Primary question: What are the impacts of terrorism on Niger?

Secondary questions:

1. How does terrorism affect the Nigerien Armed Forces?
2. How does terrorism affect the socio-political level?

3. How does terrorism influence the regional and international cooperation level?

### Assumptions

There are several assumptions that impact on this research. First, terrorism in Niger remains a marginally researched area. Another assumption is that the regional militaries will continue fighting against terrorism. The assumption that U.S. and France will continue supporting the fight against terrorism is essential to this thesis.

### Definitions

Terrorism: There is no universal agreement on the definition of terrorism. In the United States of America, for example, terrorism is defined in Title 22, Chapter 38 U.S. Code § 2656f as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. According to Jonathan Matusitz, terrorism includes the following:<sup>16</sup>

1. The use of violence or threat of violence in the pursuit of political religious, ideological or social objectives. It can be committed by governments, non-state actors, or undercover personnel serving on the behalf of their respective governments.

2. It reaches more than the immediate target victims and is also directed at targets consisting of a larger spectrum of society.

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<sup>16</sup> Jonathan Matusitz, *Terrorism and Communication A Critical Introduction* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).

3. It is both mala prohibita (i.e., crime that is made illegal by legislation) and mala in se (i.e., crime that is inherently immoral or wrong).<sup>17</sup>

Terrorism: Terrorism is also defined as the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological.<sup>18</sup>

Terrorist: According to the Scholar dictionary, a terrorist is a person who uses unlawful violence and intimidation, especially against civilians, in the pursuit of political aims.<sup>19</sup>

Terrorist Sanctuary: The terms “terrorist sanctuary” and “sanctuary” mean an area in the territory of the country that is used by a terrorist or terrorist organization to carry out terrorist activities, including training, fundraising, financing, recruitment; or as a transit point.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> Wikipedia, “Definitions of Terrorism,” 17 November 2018, accessed 17 November 2018, [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definitions\\_of\\_terrorism](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Definitions_of_terrorism).

<sup>18</sup> North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “AAP-6 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions,” 2013, accessed 21 November 2018, [https://www.academia.edu/10269177/AAP-6\\_NATO\\_Glossary\\_of\\_Terms\\_and\\_Definitions\\_2013](https://www.academia.edu/10269177/AAP-6_NATO_Glossary_of_Terms_and_Definitions_2013).

<sup>19</sup> *English Oxford Living Dictionaries* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2019), s.v. “Terrorist,” accessed November 2018, <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/terrorist>.

<sup>20</sup> Mark B. Atkinson, “Analyzing Sanctuary Management in the Sahel” (masters’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2013), 19.

Peace: State in which there is no war or fighting.<sup>21</sup>

Armed Forces: The armed forces or the armed services of a country are its military forces, usually the army, navy, marines, and air force.<sup>22</sup>

Threat: A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone in retribution for something done or not done; a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger.<sup>23</sup>

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI): AQMI is an Islamist militant organization founded in Algeria with the objective to overthrow the Algerian government and institute an Islamic.<sup>24</sup>

Al Qaida: Al-Qaeda (/æɪˈkɑːdə, ˌælkɑːˈiːdə/; Arabic: القاعدة al-Qāʿidah, IPA: [æɪqɑːʕɪdɐ], translation: “the base,” “the foundation,” or “the database,” alternatively spelled al-Qaida and al-Qaʿida) is a militant Sunni Islamist multi-national organization

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<sup>21</sup> *Merriam Webster's Advanced Learners's English Dictionary* (Springfield, MA: Merriam Webster, 2017), s.v. “Peace.”

<sup>22</sup> *Collins English Dictionary* (Glasgow, Scotland: HarpersCollins, 2018), s.v. “Armed Forces,” accessed November 2018, <https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/armed-forces>.

<sup>23</sup> *Oxford Living Dictionaries* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2019), s.v. “Threat,” <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/threat>.

<sup>24</sup> Ibrahim Garba Oumarou, *Une stratégie nationale de lutte contre le terrorisme au Niger comme contribution à la non-prolifération du fléau dans le Sahel* [A national strategy against terrorism in Niger as a contribution to the non-proliferation of the plague in the Sahel], CSEM2014 (Meknès, Algeria: Ecole Royale Militaire, 9 May 2014), 21.

founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden,<sup>25</sup> Abdullah Azzam, and several other Arab volunteers during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

It is a radical Sunni Muslim organization dedicated to the elimination of a Western presence in Arab countries and militantly opposed to Western foreign policy: founded by Osama bin Laden in 1988.

Boko Haram: Boko Haram, which in the local Hausa language means “Western education is forbidden,” and officially calls itself, “Jama’atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda’wati wal Jihad,” which means “people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s teachings and jihad.”<sup>26</sup>

Rebellion: The definition of a rebellion is a resistance against something, particularly the government, authority, or other controlling forces.<sup>27</sup>

Phenomenology: Can be referred to a philosophy or a research method. Phenomenology as a philosophy “is seen as a way of returning to and exploring the reality of life and living. It is referred to as a study of the ‘life-world’ or ‘lived

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<sup>25</sup> *Dictionary.com* (Glasgow, Scotland: William Collins Sons and Company Ltd.), s.v. “al-Qaeda,” accessed 23 April 2019, <https://www.dictionary.com/browse/al-qaeda>.

<sup>26</sup> Iulia-Simina Rautu, “Boko Haram au Nigeria: Une nouvelle forme de terrorisme ou un mouvement militant religieux? [Boko Haram in Nigeria: A new form of terrorism or a religious militant movement?]” (master’s thesis, University of Liège, Liège, Belgium, 2016), 30.

<sup>27</sup> *Merriam-Webster* (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Incorporated, 2019), s.v. “Rebellion,” accessed 14 February 2019, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/rebellion>.



experience’ and explores what an experience is like ‘pre-reflectively.’”<sup>28</sup> It is a way of describing phenomena as they appear to the person experiencing the phenomena. Phenomenology as methodology “describes understands and interprets participants’ experiences.”<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Dympna Tuohy, Adeline Cooney, Maura Dowling, Kathy Murphy, and Jane Sixsmith, “An Overview of Interpretive Phenomenology as a Research Methodology,” *Nurse Researcher* 20, no. 6 (2013): 1.

<sup>29</sup> Tuohy, Cooney, Dowling, Murphy, and Sixsmith.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Introduction

The literature review will cover topics related to terrorism that are pertinent to this thesis. Similar topics are grouped. This literature review will cover terrorism in Africa, how it affects the Sahel region, and explore available literature on terrorism specifically related to Niger. The literature review provides information on terrorist threats, terrorism in general, and means to counter this security challenge. The review will assist the researcher and readers in gaining familiarity with topics discussed in this research. Finally, the review provides a research foundation that facilitates exploring the impact of terrorism in Niger at the military, socio-political, and regional levels of cooperation.

#### West Africa

African countries have experienced relatively high levels of terrorism. Since 2000 it has become a target for terrorists. The low social, economic or political levels of perpetrators are usually cited as reasons. However, there are examples where terrorists are not poor or uneducated. According to Juliet Elu and Gregory Price, in *The Causes and Consequences of Terrorism in Africa*, “terrorism is not new to Africa.”<sup>30</sup> The work explores terrorism in numerous African countries and associated causes, including the

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<sup>30</sup> Juliet Elu, and Gregory Price, “The Causes and Consequences of Terrorism in Africa,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics*, ed. Celestin Monga and Justin Yifu Lin, vol. 1, *Context and Concepts* (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3.

lack of economic opportunities, education, and other factors. Understanding terrorism in a greater African sense assists in ensuring that the most important drivers of terrorism are considered in this thesis.

David Lotto in his article, *On the Origins of Terrorism*, increases understanding of the reasons for violence in Africa and the overall consequences. Lotto explains that social humiliation, shame, Muslim humiliation, and injury related to rage-induced narcissism experienced enduring by individual or group of individuals constitute factors favorable to outbreaks of terrorism. The article adds value to this research because it improves understanding of violence in Niger and other African counties that share similar cultures, politics, and traditions.<sup>31</sup>

According to Karim Bahgat and Richard M. Medina, authors of *An Overview of Geographical Perspectives and Approaches in Terrorism Research Source: Perspectives on Terrorism*, it is important to analyze terrorism from different geographic perspectives. This study approaches terrorism by area and explains how it is linked geographically. This approach provides a greater understanding of terrorism's effect on an area. Analyzing terrorism through a geographic lens affords a greater understanding of not only terrorist locations and their activities, but environmental processes, possible social network connections, social systemic operations, and changes in space and time.<sup>32</sup> The

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<sup>31</sup> David Lotto, "On the Origins of Terrorism," *The Journal of Psychohistory* 45, no. 1 (Summer 2017): 155.

<sup>32</sup> Karim Bahgat, and Richard M. Medina, "An Overview of Geographical Perspectives and Approaches in Terrorism Research," *Perspectives on Terrorism* 7, no. 1 (February 2013): 2.

impact of terrorist attacks is likely highly linked with the geographic context in which they occur. This work is a useful overview on the geographic impacts of terrorism.

*The West-African Special Operations Forces: Development and Integration in the Context of the Sub-Saharan Growing Threats* is written by Captain Demba Mou Mapeinda Gueye of the Senegalese Army, a former Command and General Staff College student. Captain Gueye discusses how the terrorism threat is a serious challenge in West Africa, specifically in the Sahelian region. To counter the threat, he embraces a multidisciplinary method approach, and believes in the methodology of “African solutions to African problems.”<sup>33</sup> The work concludes that unified action against terrorist threats in Africa requires close coordination with allied forces, especially Special Forces.

*The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism Initiative: The US War on Terrorism in North Africa* is a 2007 report from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. The authors discuss how worthy the Sahel region is of security assistance, and how the U.S. government is committed to working closely with this region’s partners and members to fight together against terrorism. This report is an important source for the regional cooperation that this thesis addresses in chapter 4. The report discusses the U.S. military’s presence in this region. Additionally, the report gives an overview on the Pan Sahel Initiative, which is one of the first initiatives in the Sahel region. The authors address the challenges the U.S. military faces as it in attempts to cooperate on security

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<sup>33</sup> Demba Mou Mapeinda Gueye, “The West-African Special Operations Forces: Development and Integration in the Context of the Sub-Saharan Growing Threats” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2016).

problems in a region that is largely influenced by political Islam and numerous non-state actors in the area.<sup>34</sup>

In the article, *Boko Haram in West Africa: Al Qaeda's Next Frontier?*, Jacob Zenn addresses the ramifications of associated with the relationship between Boko Haram and AQMI in West Africa. Zenn explains that “The expansion of these terrorists in West Africa, and the possibility of Boko Haram franchising, could present a future threat to Western business interests in the area and undermine the region’s fledgling democracies.”<sup>35</sup> This article assists in developing an efficient method for analyzing the impact of terrorism at political level that is addressed in chapter 4.

An article written by Subhayu Bandyopadhyay and Javed Younas, *Trade and Terror: The Impact of Terrorism on Developing Countries*, analyzes the work done by economists who have studied the impact of terrorism in developing countries. Their analysis links terrorism with vulnerabilities. The work explores the twelve most terrorism-plagued countries in the world. This work improves the researcher’s understanding of the links between terrorism and vulnerabilities in Niger. According to the authors, developing nations are more vulnerable to terrorism because they are unlikely to have the resources to adequately fight the threat. This problem is often compounded by corruption, poor governance, and failing judicial systems, which cannot

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<sup>34</sup> Archer and Popovic.

<sup>35</sup> Jacob Zenn, *Boko Haram in West Africa: Al Qaeda's Next Frontier?* Washington, DC: Jamestown Foundation, 2012.

uphold the rule of law. Such institutional shortcomings breed discontent in the population, which in turn can increase support for terrorism.<sup>36</sup>

Major Cortis B. Burgess compared two types of insurgencies in Nigeria and Algeria in his thesis, *Boko Haram's Strategy Deconstructed: A Case Study Comparison Between Boko Haram and the Algerian National Liberation Front*. The work explores how Niger is caught in a situation that replicates the types of threats Nigeria and Algeria face. It also addresses how complicated it is for militaries to deal with the insurgencies. The work is an important source of information, which helps understand the cause, origin, and locations where terrorism exists in Africa. This study increases understanding of the link between Niger and other countries in the Sahel.<sup>37</sup>

Mike Eshioke Okemi discusses the notion of terrorism, motivation, and activities in *Boko Haram: A Religious Sect or Terrorist Organization*. This work examines the term “terrorism” and the various tactics terrorist organizations use worldwide. It features a comparative analysis that includes Boko Haram and other well-known terrorist organizations. The study focuses on motivation, ideology, existence, grievances, and

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<sup>36</sup> Subhayu Bandyopadhyay, and Javed Younas, *Economic Development, Trade and Terror: The Impact of Terrorism on Developing Countries* (St. Louis, MO: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis), accessed 12 December 2018, <https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/fourth-quarter-2017/impact-terrorism-developing-countries>.

<sup>37</sup> Cortis B. Burgess, “Boko Haram’s Strategy Deconstructed: A Case Study Comparison Between Boko Haram and the Algerian National Liberation Front” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015). Boko Haram’s strategy deconstructed: a case study comparison between Boko Haram and the Algerian National Liberation Front.

tactics employed to address grievances. Although the work does not directly address Niger, it discusses concepts that are relevant to terrorism in Niger that helped the researcher develop data collection objectives for this thesis.<sup>38</sup>

### The Sahel

The Sahel is an eco-climate and biogeographic zone of transition in Africa between the Sahara to the north and the Sudanian Savanna to the south.<sup>39</sup> The name is derived from the Arabic word meaning “coast” or “shore” in a figurative sense (in reference to the southern edge of the vast Sahara), while the name Swahili means “coastal [dweller]” in a literal sense.<sup>40</sup> The Sahel region is vast. It stretches from west to east Africa, encompassing Mauritania and northern Ethiopia. From the north to the south, it includes southern Algeria, northern Nigeria, and parts of the Central African Republic Sahel Region.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Mike Eshioke Okemi, “Boko Haram: A Religious Sect or Terrorist Organization?” *Global Journal of Politics and Law Research* 1, no. 1 (June 2013): 1.

<sup>39</sup> Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. “Estimate G5 Sahel’s Force Conjointe des Etats du G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) [Estimate G5 Sahel’s Joint Force G5 Sahel States (FC-G5S)],” updated 15 February 2018, 12, accessed 16 February 2019, [http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File, 2](http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/default/assets/File,2); Barbara Cooper, “The Sahel in West African History,” in *Oxford Research Encyclopedia*, Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 2018, accessed 12 December 2018, <http://oxfordre.com/africanhistory/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190277734.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277734-e-167?print=pdf>.

<sup>40</sup> Cooper.

<sup>41</sup> J.G. Gilmour, “The Terrorist Threat in North-West Africa: Part One,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 14, no. 2 (2012): 1.

In Rodrigue Nana Nguassam's thesis on *Les défis du terrorisme au Sahel, AQMI, une menace stratégique* [The Challenges of Terrorism in the Sahel], the author outlines the Sahel region's evolution into an area with persistent terrorism. This research presents an accurate overview of the Sahel, and is an informative source on counterterrorism information about the Sahel, including Niger.<sup>42</sup>

*The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel* is an article that traces the presence of terrorism in the Sahel region. The authors, Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, discuss empirical evidence of violent Islamist activity and strategies. The work also highlights the structures of different groups operating in the Sahel region and further west in an area that has become known as "Africa's arc of instability."<sup>43</sup>

The book, *Sahel Jihad, Threats, Operation Barkhane, Regional Cooperation*, discusses the potential threat from terrorism and France's security cooperation. The authors, Olivier Hanne and Guillaume Larabi, address the cultural organization of societies in the Sahel and how terrorism expanded throughout the region. This work increases the author's understanding on how culture and terrorism interact.<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Cooper, 7.

<sup>43</sup> Caitriona Dowd and Clionadh Raleigh, "The myth of global Islamic terrorism and local conflict in Mali and the Sahel," *African Affairs* 112, no. 448 (July 2013): 500.

<sup>44</sup> Olivier Hanne and Guillaume Larabi, "Jihad au Sahel, menaces, operation Barkhane, cooperation regionale [Jihad in the Sahel, threats, operation Barkhane, regional cooperation]." *La Toupie*, 2015, 110. Accessed 12 February 2019. <http://www.toupie.org/Bibliographie/fiche.php?idbib=1604>.



Another source that addresses culture and terrorism is *Political Reform, Socio-Religious Change, and Stability in the African Sahel*, which is a product of the University of Florida's Sahel Research Group. This research analyzes socio-political factors affecting stability in six African countries across the Sahel, including Niger. The research finds that insecurity is increasing in Niger and the country is becoming a significant international concern. This research is important because it describes instability in the Sahel and includes relevant information on Niger that helps inform the researcher's analysis construct.<sup>45</sup>

The fight against terrorism in the Sahel is logically grounded to regional geopolitics according to Antonin Tisseron's article, *Enchevêtrements Géopolitiques Autour de la Lutte Contre le Terrorisme Dans le Sahara* [Geopolitical Entanglements Around the Fight Against Terrorism in the Sahara]. Tisseron highlights challenges to regional cooperation and poor governance over the security sector as key issues to overcome in the fight against terrorism.<sup>46</sup> The article is important to this research because it improves understanding of how international and regional cooperation affects militaries in the Sahel region.

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<sup>45</sup> Leonardo A Villalón, "Political Reform, Socio-Religious Change, and Stability in the African Sahel" (presentation, AFOSR Trust and Influence Program Review, Dayton Ohio, 14-17 January 2013), accessed 5 December 2018, [https://community.apan.org/wg/afosr/m/trust\\_\\_influence\\_program\\_review/121310/download](https://community.apan.org/wg/afosr/m/trust__influence_program_review/121310/download).

<sup>46</sup> Antonin Tisseron, "Enchevêtrements Géopolitiques Autour de La Lutte Contre Le Terrorisme Dans Le Sahara [Geopolitical Entanglements Around the Fight Against Terrorism in the Sahara]," *Hérodote* 142, no. 3 (January 2011): 2.

*Boko Haram Terrorism in the Lake Chad Basin Region: Implications for Sub Regional Security* is written by Abiodun Joseph Oluwadare. The author argues in his article that terrorism in the Lake Chad basin is a real security issue. Further, Oluwadare asserts that governments should consider taking actions to reduce the negative effects of the insurgency. One suggestion the author recommends is that governments at all levels should create an enabling environment for investment and industrial growth that prioritizes human security. Oluwadare's work increased the author's knowledge on how Nigeria deals with Boko Haram.<sup>47</sup>

### Niger

Niger has a long history of peace with a culturally diverse population that considers itself as one big family. Terrorism in Niger remains is a true threat that impacts national security. Niger constantly confronts at least seven terrorist groups operating in the Sahel. The Daily Post's article, *Boko Haram got Weapons, Training from al-Qaeda – Niger*, 26 January 2012, reports on how the NAF have struggled with persistent security threats. The Tuareg rebellion in 1990 and 2009 initiated a cycle of insecurity. In 2012, Niger refocused its attention on Boko Haram, AQMI, Al-Qaeda, and Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.<sup>48</sup> The article highlights the obvious nexus between development and security that is also applicable to Niger. Exploring this nexus assists the

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<sup>47</sup> Muhammad L. dan Suleiman, "Countering Boko Haram," *Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses* 7, no. 8 (September 2015): 22-27.

<sup>48</sup> Daily Post Staff, "Boko Haram Got Weapons, Training From al-Qaeda – Niger," *Daily Post*, 26 January 2012, accessed 15 January 2019, <https://dailypost.ng/2012/01/26/boko-haram-got-weapons-training-from-al-qaeda-%E2%80%93-niger/>.

author in understanding the depth of the security problems, and aids in the development of solutions that can reduce the burden on national security forces.

The *Country Report on Terrorism 2014* focuses on AQMI and the group's activities in the Sahel. The report explains that there is a concerted effort by regional militaries to reduce terrorist activities. These combined efforts are now part of the U.S.-sponsored Security Governance Initiative that focuses on the management, oversight, and accountability of the security sector at the institutional level. This multilateral effort to confront terrorism is consistent with this author's belief in the benefits of regional cooperation and the need for increased military capabilities required to effectively counter terrorists operating in Niger.<sup>49</sup>

#### Literature Review Summary

All the works reviewed in the literature review explore the horrid reality of terrorism in West Africa, the Sahel, and specifically Niger. The literature review categorized works in West Africa, the Sahel, and Niger. It explored geo-political and societal aspects of the terrorist problem. All studies showed that terrorism increased substantially after the collapse of Muammar Gaddafi's regime in Libya. The critical look at literature also emphasized how terrorism has evolved into a world-challenge that requires cooperation and increased military capabilities. The review indicates clearly that Boko Haram is the most significant armed group operating in West Africa and especially

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<sup>49</sup> Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism, *Country Report on Terrorism 2014* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2015), accessed 5 December 2018, <https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/>.

in Niger. Additionally, researchers covered how to counter this phenomenon of insecurity, and how the U.S. and France are committed to working closely with countries in the Sahel to counter threats.

This literature review increased understanding of how terrorism is a socio-political problem and how it plagues West Africa. Finally, the review showed there is an absence of information on terrorism in Niger available to researchers. This thesis intends to add to the limited body of knowledge on terrorism in Niger.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The objective of this research is to study the impact of terrorism in Niger by analyzing key areas affected by this phenomenon. These areas include exploring impacts from terrorism at the socio-political, regional cooperation, and military levels. This research will highlight how the effects of terrorism on Niger using the three areas noted above noted. The thesis will conclude with recommendations that will improve Niger's overall response to terrorism. In chapter 1, the author presented the background and context of terrorism traced from a worldwide to an African view. In chapter 2, the author reviewed literature related to terrorism searched for links to the Niger problem. Chapter 3 explains the researcher's methodology and how the thesis will address the primary and secondary research questions. The researcher will use qualitative methodology with a level analysis technique. Chapter 4 will analyze the data in preparations for responding to the research questions in chapter 5. Finally, chapter 5 will address the research questions, suggest recommendations, and indicate topics for future research. The rest of the chapter 3 is dedicated to a detailed discussion on the research methodology and design.

#### Qualitative Methodology

To address the primary and three secondary questions, the researcher adopted a qualitative methodology. This methodology is applicable to different studies and helps dissect studies into parts to facilitate observation and analysis. According to Alan Peshkin's research in *The Goodness of Qualitative Research*, the qualitative method helps to understand in depth the meaning of a complex socio-cultural phenomenon through

description, interpretation, verification, and evaluation.<sup>50</sup> According to Rocare Ernwaca, in *Extracts of Guides for Qualitative Research*, qualitative research is characterized by an approach that aims to describe and analyze the culture and behavior of humans and their groups from the point of view of those who are studied. Therefore, the qualitative method insists on the complete or “holistic” knowledge of the social context in which the research is conducted. It generates ideas and hypotheses that can help to understand how an issue is perceived by the target population. Additionally, the method assists in defining or identifying options related to an issue. Figure 3 below illustrates the iterative process of qualitative research.<sup>51</sup>

As a social worker in the field of human and social relations, the author is familiar with qualitative methods. The author’s work in the Nigerien Armed Forces utilizes social science approaches to study and assist soldiers and military families when they face societal problems. Additionally, the author also works to improve resiliency through military strategies and programs. She has significant experience in crisis situations gained from deployments in Mali as part of UN peacekeeping missions, and in Niger in areas that suffer from Boko Haram attacks.

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<sup>50</sup> Alan Peshkin, “The Nature of Interpretation in Qualitative Research,” *American Educational Research Association* 29, no. 3 (December 2000): 2.

<sup>51</sup> Mamadou Kani Konaté, and Abdoulaye Sidibé, “Excerpts from Guides on Qualitative Research,” Educational Research Network of West and Central Africa, accessed 15 January 2019, <http://www.ernwaca.org/panaf/RQ/en/definition.php>.




Figure 2. The Iterative Process of Qualitative Research

*Source:* Mamadou Kani Konaté, and Abdoulaye Sidibé, “Excerpts from Guides on Qualitative Research,” Educational Research Network of West and Central Africa, accessed 15 January 2019, <http://www.ernwaca.org/panaf/RQ/en/definition.php>.

### Levels of Analysis Approach

Levels of analysis is a qualitative technique used political science and international relations research. International relations are an integral part of political science, and encompass issues such as globalization, international security, economic development, and terrorism.<sup>52</sup> The levels of analysis approach according to Taku Tamaki, author of *Levels of Analysis of the International System*, makes the study of the international system easier by dividing international components into small levels. The

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<sup>52</sup> Henry R. Nau, *Perspectives on International Relations*, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009).

author states in his work “that one useful, and conceptual, tool in analyzing international politics, is the levels of analysis approach.”<sup>53</sup> This approach supports reviewing causes of an event through the lenses of power, ideology, and institutions. Terrorism is a phenomenon that establishes the individual as a player in the international system either as an individual or part of a collective group of players. This thesis involves individuals as actors and participants in the international system.<sup>54</sup>

The levels of analysis approach for this research will assist in reviewing and analyzing different levels within the society. This study will investigate the human, national, regional, and international levels. The approach will effectively transform this complex problem to an easier one, deconstructed by levels. This transformation allows the author to not only understand the phenomenon, but also to produce results that can be used to solve the issues under study.

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<sup>53</sup> Taku Tamaki, “Levels of Analysis of The International System,” in *Encounters with World Affairs: An Introduction to International Relations*, ed. Emilian Kavalski (Farnham, United Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2015), 87, accessed 23 January 2019, [https://www.eksendia.com/tm/school\\_book\\_print.aspx](https://www.eksendia.com/tm/school_book_print.aspx)

<sup>54</sup> Ibid.



Applying Levels of Analysis to Niger

Table 2. Levels of Analysis Research Indicators	
Level	Criteria Factors
Human level	Health Education Human Rights
National Level	Politics Military
Regional and International level	Cooperation in the region Cooperation with military

*Source:* Created by author.

The first step is collection of information and documentation. The preponderance of information and documentation found in this study is derived from primary and secondary sources. Time constraints prevented direct engagement on the ground, which would have included interviews and focus groups. The study will, however, observe and review existing documentation related to terrorism. Most of the data collected is accessible at the Combined Armed Research Library. The study also uses media and electronic data sources collected from accredited research sites. The documentation formats include media, books, theses, newspaper reviews, and terrorism documentaries televised nationally in Niger.

The research will analyze collected data and stratify it into levels. Level I is the human level, and will encompass all the impacts of terrorism on humans or civilian and military citizens of Niger. This area is further subdivided into areas of interest. Level II is the national level, which deals with collective actions at the state-level. The author will

discuss selected relevant areas. The last level of analysis is Level III, the regional and international level. In this level, the author will explore regional cooperation. Research indicators for each level are outlined at table 2 above; these will assist in assessing the impact of terrorism in Niger at the three levels reviewed. The author will review each level and summarize the key takeaways. This will essentially yield summaries of each of the three levels. Stated differently, this categorical analysis will highlight the key takeaways of impact at the human, national, and regional levels. These salient points will assist in answering the primary and secondary questions. The illustrative diagram below at figure 3 summarizes chapter 4’s approach to analysis and addresses the research questions.



Figure 3. Level of Analysis of Impact of Terrorism in Niger

Source: Created by author.

### Summary of Chapter 3

The researcher will use a qualitative methodology with a levels of analysis approach. The analyzed levels include the human, national, and regional levels. Chapter 4 will analyze the different levels in detail with selected research indicators. The analysis will support answering primary and secondary research questions, and lead to recommendations that Niger can implement that will reduce the negative impacts of terrorism.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

The purpose of this thesis is to research the impacts of terrorism in Niger. This research uses levels of analysis to develop recommendations that can reduce root causes of terrorism, improve counterterrorism efforts, and improve societal resilience. Chapter 4 will give an overview of terrorism in Niger. Next it will conduct the analysis as outlined in chapter 3.

#### Introduction

An overview of Niger and terrorism in the initial part of this chapter will provide readers with context on the persistent terrorist phenomena in the country. This overview focuses terrorist groups involved in Niger from 2013-2019.

Niger is a West African, landlocked country. It shares borders with Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Algeria, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Benin Republic. It has a total land mass of 1,267,000 kilometres and a population of 22,311,375 in 2018.<sup>55</sup> The population of Niger consists of 98.6 percent Muslims, 1.4 percent of Christians, and other believers.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Worldometers, “Niger Population (2019),” accessed February 2018 <http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/niger-population>.

<sup>56</sup> Mainassara, 37.

In January 2012, at a regional security summit in Mauritania, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Mohamed Bazoum, declared that the threat of terrorism in Niger is real.<sup>57</sup> The country currently struggles with terrorists at three of Niger's borders.



Figure 4. Niger Political Map and Neighboring Countries

Source: Fact Monster, "Niger," 2019, accessed 12 November 2018, <https://www.factmonster.com/atlas/africa/niger>.

<sup>57</sup> Daily Post Staff.

### Origins of Terrorism

According to psychologist David Lotto, terrorism is a consequence of humiliation following narcissistic injuries and vengeful hatred. This condition drives victims towards greater violence and perpetration of terror to quench a thirst for revenge.<sup>58</sup> According to the author, this humiliation of Muslims by Western powers is the main factor driving jihadist or terrorist movements today.<sup>59</sup> Other sources also mention the close link between terrorism and narco-trafficking organizations. In short, terrorism is linked to the social and political concerns of countries ranging from ethnic issues to religious ideologies in unstable political regimes in many Third World countries.<sup>60</sup>

### Evolution of Terrorism in Niger

Niger witnessed its first and only Tuareg insurrection in 1990. This insurrection was contained and eradicated through concentrated political and military engagement. From this initial insurrection, Niger has continued to wrestle with terrorism. According to the *Global Terrorism Index 2016*, Niger is one of two countries with the most serious deteriorating situations from the spillover effects of Boko Haram.<sup>61</sup> “The country went from a very low level of terrorism to one of the top ten countries in the [Global Terrorists

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<sup>58</sup> Lotto, 12.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

<sup>61</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, *Global Terrorism Index 2016: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism/Institute for Economics and Peace* (Sydney, Australia: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2016), 18.

Index].”<sup>62</sup> On 3 March 2017 in Diffa, Niger’s National Assembly decreed a state of emergency for the seven departments in the regions of Tahoua and Tillabery.<sup>63</sup>

Niger is exposed to terrorism because of its long porous borders, ethnic ties, and mineral resources. The vast desert of Tenere in northern Niger is a preferred location for establishing terrorist bases. Terrorists target Niger’s population with seductive claims associated with the establishment of an Islamic state as part of a greater caliphate, and implementation of sharia law. Niger’s rich reserve of mineral resources (gold, uranium, petroleum, coal, and phosphates) has attracted Western powers and generated increased terrorist attacks in Niger.

#### Terrorist Groups Operating in Niger

Terrorist groups are organizations or groups of individuals who have socio-political ideologies that they seek to implant or institutionalize into a society by inflicting terror on targets to achieve their goals. There are seven known reported terrorist groups operating regionally and in Niger. These groups are:

1. Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
2. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the Great Sahara (ISIS-GS)

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<sup>62</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, 15.

<sup>63</sup> Savannah de Tessières, *At the Crossroads of Sahelian Conflicts Insecurity, Terrorism, and Arms Trafficking in Niger* (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, January 2018), 72, accessed 15 January 2019, <http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-SANA-Report-Niger.pdf>; Savannah de Tessières, *Measuring Illicit Arms Flow – Niger*, (Sydney, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, 2017), accessed 15 January 2019, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10637>, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10637>.

3. Boko Haram
4. Islamic State of Iraq and Syria West Africa (ISIS-WA)
5. Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam Wal-Muslimin (JNIM, a derivative of AQMI)
6. al-Murabitoun, Ansar al-Dine
7. Liberation Front of Macina<sup>64</sup>

Out of eighteen terrorist groups in the region, one-third of these operate in Niger. In general, all seven terrorist groups advocate for the establishment of an Islamic state as part of a greater caliphate and implementation of sharia law. In order to achieve their goals, the groups use terror including murder to force their ideology on communities. Besides the reign of terror, these groups force local males to serve in the terrorist groups or risk execution. Research indicates that some of the terrorist groups, like Boko Haram, have achieved some success in recruiting followers. Chukwuma O. Ani reports, “It has been confirmed that Boko Haram recruits some of its members from neighboring countries like Niger Republic.”<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>64</sup> Bureau of Diplomatic Security, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2017* (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2018), 32.

<sup>65</sup> Chukwuma O. Ani, “Combating Terrorism: A Case Study of Nigeria Against Boko Haram Terrorist Group” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2014), 65.



## Analysis by Levels

### The Human Level of Analysis

#### The Nigerien Population

In 2018, Niger had a population of 22,891,331 (see figure 6). The population is divided into eight ethnic groups spread throughout the country:

<b>Ethnic Group</b>	<b>Percentage</b>	<b>Regions</b>
Haoussas	55.4%	Maradi, Tahoua, Zinder, and Dosso
Djermas	21.0%	Tillabéri, Dosso, and Niamey
Touaregs	9.3%	Agadez, Tahoua
Fulani	12.5%	Niamey Dosso Maradi Tahoua Diffa Tillaberi, and Zinder
Kanuris	4.7%	Diffa and Zinder
Toubou	0.4%	Diffa and Zinder
Arabs	0.3%	Tahoua, Diffa, Agadez, and Zinder
Gourmantché	0.4%	Tillabéri

*Source:* Christopher Muscato, “Niger Ethnic Groups,” Study.com, accessed date 3 May 2019, <https://study.com/academy/lesson/niger-ethnic-groups.html>.

More than 90 percent of the population claims adherence to Islam, making it Niger’s dominant religion. Christianity is the next largest religion, and a small number of Nigeriens (10 percent) claim adherence to ancestral beliefs. French is the official language (Niger is a former French colony); however there three other national languages spoken by the most citizens. These three languages are Hausa, Jerma, and Fulani.

## Health and Terrorism

According to the World Health Organization, health is a state of complete physical and mental well-being, but this does not mean a total absence of disease. Health is a key factor of individual fulfillment. In a Third World country like Niger, access to health services is reduced because of terrorism. The advent of terrorism and armed conflict, specifically in the northern part of the country, has reduced the frequency of individuals visiting health centers to receive basic services. Health workers, according to studies, are reticent to serve in locations where terrorism is involved, and health facilities are almost non-existent in the western, northern, and southeast parts of the country where terrorists are most active.<sup>66</sup> This is especially harmful to Niger where health coverage has always been limited. Diffa, a small city in southeastern Niger, illustrates the access problem vividly where the population has never had over 41 percent of access to medical services, including the period before the Boko Haram crisis began.<sup>67</sup> Citizens subject to dangerous travel routes and ungoverned spaces prefer to remain at home instead of seeking needed medical attention at the risk of personal harm or even death. Likewise, medical staffs are encountering similar challenges to reach those in need.

Undeniably, lack of access to basic health services is becoming a threat to the general well-being of most Nigeriens. In 2016, security measures in Tahoua and Tillabery

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<sup>66</sup> Observations from the author's mission throughout locations in the country.

<sup>67</sup> Humanitarian Response, *2019 Plan de Réponse Humanitaire* [2019 Humanitarian Response Plan] (New York: Humanitarian Response, December 2018), 7, accessed 1 February 2019, [https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ner\\_hrp\\_2019\\_3.pdf](https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ner_hrp_2019_3.pdf).

led to the closure of sixteen markets, and health and educational structures experienced operational difficulties in areas where access is limited.<sup>68</sup> According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, from January to August 2018, three health centers were attacked by Boko Haram, and nine additional centers were attacked in 2017.<sup>69</sup> These continued attacks have forced the closure or reduced operations of much of the medical services apparatus in the country, which reduces Niger's overall national development efforts.

In addition to limited access to medical services, terrorism affects Nigeriens psychologically. Terrorism induces individuals into a state of stress, insecurity, and fear that is the result of forced adaptation to unpredictable violence. The combined effects of limited access and psychological complications negatively affect personal health, harmony, productivity, and limit the overall long-term advancement of the society and the state of Niger.<sup>70</sup>

According to Pierre-Nicolas Carron, Philippe Reigner, Bertrand Yersin, and Stefan Vetter, in *Individual and Community Psychological Consequences of Terrorism*,

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<sup>68</sup> United Nations Population Fund, *Evaluation du 8ème Programme de Pays UNFPA/Niger 2014-2018* [evaluation of the 8th UNFPA/Niger Country Program 2014-2018], Final Evaluation Report (New York: United Nations, June 2018).

<sup>69</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Niger-Diffa: Les incidents liés au groupe Boko Haram (1 Janvier au 31 Aout 2018) [Niger-Diffa: Incidents Related to Boko Haram Group (1 January to 31 August 2018)]," Reliefweb, 10 September 2018, accessed 11 March 2019, [https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ner-diffa-les\\_incidents\\_de\\_janvier\\_a\\_aout\\_2018.pdf](https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ner-diffa-les_incidents_de_janvier_a_aout_2018.pdf).

<sup>70</sup> Personal analysis by author.

“Patients physically injured by an attack or having felt a threat to their bodily integrity (physical, auditory or visual proximity to the site of the attack), present a greater risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorder.”<sup>71</sup> This risk is also correlated to the importance of physical lesions, particularly in terms of aesthetics (amputation, facial or hand injuries) and the loss of a close person (family, friend, colleague) in the attack.<sup>72</sup> According to the author’s firsthand experience, there are approximately one thousand Nigerien soldiers who have suffered serious injuries and amputations.<sup>73</sup> The injuries reduce or eliminate an injured soldier’s ability to continue service in the Army. Additionally, in the absence of real support mechanisms and follow-up care, injured soldiers experience feelings of rejection or uselessness that can lead to smoking, alcohol abuse, and suicide. Soldiers who are unable to continue service because of injuries influence other young men and women to avoid serving in the military. This ultimately adversely affects recruiting efforts and overall negatively impacts military readiness. Youth are less likely to serve in the military because of the possible negative effects of fighting terrorists in Niger.

Armed conflict has increased indiscriminate deaths since 2012 in Niger. Civilians, especially youth, are killed when they refuse to join terrorist groups. These deaths,

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<sup>71</sup> Pierre-Nicolas Carron, Philippe Reigner, Stefan Vetter, and Bertrand Yersin, “Conséquences Psychologiques Individuelles et Communautaires Du Terrorisme [Individual and Community Psychological Consequences of Terrorism],” *Revue Medicale Suisse* 4, no. 173 (October 2008): 1.

<sup>72</sup> Carron et al., 2.

<sup>73</sup> Unpublished report on the update of conflict victims from the Department of Social Action of the Army in Niger, Direction Centrale du Service de Sante des Armees et de l’Action Sociale where the thesis author worked. 2 March 2019.

especially youth, negatively affect development in Niger. “Between 2015 and 2017, UN monitors recorded 582 civilian casualties during 244 raids in Diffa attributed to Boko Haram.”<sup>74</sup>

The *Global Terrorism Index-2016* reported that Niger registered more than 250 deaths from Boko Haram attacks alone in 2015. Niger and Burkina Faso suffer from Boko Haram-associated spillover effects. Boko Haram attacks accounted for an eightfold increase in deaths in 2015 over preceding years in Niger.<sup>75</sup> Niger has the highest rate of lethality with an average of 19.7 people killed per attack, resulting in a total of 649 deaths in 2015.<sup>76</sup> The terrorist threat increases the vulnerability of women and children. On 24 November 2018, fifteen girls were kidnapped by an armed commando group during the night in southeastern Niger near the border with Nigeria according to the mayor of Toumour in the Diffa region.<sup>77</sup> This attack led President Mamadou Issoufou of Niger to proclaim that “Women and children pay a heavy price for terrorism in a direct way as . . . innocent victims and, indirectly, as mothers and wives; they come once more to lose sons

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<sup>74</sup> Agence France-Presse, “5 Killed in Boko Haram Terror Attack on Niger Market,” Straights Times, 16 March 2018, accessed February 2019, <https://www.straits.com/world/africa/5-killed-in-boko-haram-terror-attack-on-niger-market>.

<sup>75</sup> Institute for Economics and Peace, 15.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>77</sup> Al Jazeera, “10 civilians killed in suspected Boko Haram attack in Niger town,” accessed 1 April 2019, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/10-civilians-killed-suspected-boko-haram-attack-niger-town-190327144532205.html>.

and husbands” in his speech at the opening of the First Ladies Forum of the Economic Community of West African States.<sup>78</sup>

### Education and Terrorism

Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.

—Nelson Mandela, “Top Nine Nelson Mandela Quotes about Education”

This section analyzes the impact of terrorism on education. Individual education allows one to transfer from a state of obscurity to a state of light, which demonstrates human progress. Most schools in Niger are public, secular, and compulsory from age six to sixteen. The French educational model partly inspired the system. In general, the educational system already suffered before increased terrorist activities because of rapid population growth, low rate of school attendance, and a high dropout rate. Terrorism has aggravated these existing challenges.

Terrorist groups like Boko Haram target Western schools in their operating areas. Boko Haram originates from Hausa and Arabic languages. In Hausa, Boko means *book* (especially Western or foreign) while Haram is an Arabic word meaning *forbidden*, *ungodly*, or *sinful*.<sup>79</sup> Together, Boko Haram means *Western education or book or*

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<sup>78</sup> Agence France-Presse and Reuters, “Le Niger Frappé Par Une Attaque «terroriste» [Niger hit by “terrorist” attack],” *Le Monde Afrique*, 6 October 2017, accessed 1 March 2019, [https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger\\_5196282\\_3212.html](https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2017/10/05/des-soldats-nigeriens-et-americains-tues-dans-une-embuscade-au-niger_5196282_3212.html).

<sup>79</sup> Andrew Ponfa Wuyep, “Terrorism in Nigeria – Revisiting Nigeria’s Socio-Political Approach to Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2015), 13.

*knowledge is forbidden.* Since 2014, parents across Niger have hesitated to send their children to school because of the possibility of attacks and kidnappings.

According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, hundreds of schools have closed because of jihadist threats since 2015. According to the same source, more than thirty-three schools in the Tillabery region have been suspended, and eighteen have closed. In the Diffa region, forty-four schools were shut down because of Boko Haram related violence directed primarily at teachers.<sup>80</sup> Many in Niger still recall the kidnapping of two hundred female students of Chibok by Boko Haram in 2014, adding to their hesitance to allow children to go to school.<sup>81</sup> The effects of terrorism limit access to education for young people and encourages engagement in illicit activities because of limited employment options for young adults. Limited options for the future complicate Niger's ability to improve the overall socio-economic condition of the country.

In addition, the terrorist threat indirectly impacts university-level education, although there are only a few registered attacks on universities. The threat limits student attendance at the primary and secondary levels, which in turn impacts the number of students able to enter and graduate from universities. This phenomenon especially

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<sup>80</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2018 "Humanitarian Response Plan," December 2017, Niger, 31, accessed 3/12/2019, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/niger>. <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/niger/document/niger-plan-de-r%C3%A9ponse-humanitaire-2019>.

<sup>81</sup> Emma Supple, "When Will They #BringBackOurGirls? Fembot," Fembot, accessed 18 April 2019, <https://fembotmag.com/2014/08/06/when-will-they-bringback-ourgirls/>.

impacts young girls. Niger increased the security budget again in 2012, which also included support to ensure school security.<sup>82</sup> However, this measure failed to resolve security issues, and in fact, further eroded the fragile socio-economic condition in the country.<sup>83</sup> Without education, Niger will suffer from a lack of educated and trained citizens that can lead the country's development efforts, especially once the country enters development after the terrorist threat is terminated.

### Respect for Humans Rights

Well-being and freedom of movement are integral aspects of human rights. As part of the *1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, Niger must respect the value of human life through respect for human rights. In Niger, terrorism directly infringes on human rights through the catastrophic negative consequences associated with the loss of life, liberty, and the physical integrity of Nigeriens.<sup>84</sup> From January to December 2018, there were 107 civilian deaths in the Diffa, Tillabery, and Tahoua regions because of terrorist attacks. During the same period, official records indicate there were 184 active

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<sup>82</sup> Global Security, "Niger – Military Spending," accessed 4 May 2019, <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/africa/ne-budget.htm>.

<sup>83</sup> Institute of International and Strategic Relations, *Niger: Analyse de scénario à l'horizon 2021* [Niger: Scenario Analysis for 2021] (Paris, France: Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques, 2016), 7, accessed 1 March 2019, <http://www.iris-france.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/FR-Observatoire-Prospective-Huma-NIGER-06-2016.pdf>.

<sup>84</sup> Ewelina Ochab and Kelsey Zorzi. *Effects of Terrorism on Enjoyment of Human Rights: ISIS/DAESH and Boko Haram* (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 2016), 4.



armed groups that abducted 131 people and wounded 97. The Army Social Services registered more than eight hundred war orphans.<sup>85</sup> Many women and young girls were abducted to likely provide forced sexual services.<sup>86</sup>

### Right to Liberty and Personal Security

The right to liberty and personal security is protected under Article 9 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* and other international law provisions.<sup>87</sup> The terrorist threat in Niger deprives Nigeriens of these protections. The terrorist threat disrupts normal market operations. These disruptions occur frequently when local authorities received notice of impending threats or attacks, often occurring during cultural or national celebrations. Security forces are more willing to make arrests based on suspicion because of increased vigilance. In addition, recreational events are prohibited in effort to prevent the infiltration of terrorists into densely populated areas that could cause heavy casualties. Restrictions on gathering also include cinemas, bars, and dance clubs that are likely rich targets for terrorists. These emergency measures

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<sup>85</sup> Unpublished hierarchical report on Statistics of victims of conflicts from the Army Social Service in Niger. Central Directorate of the Health Service of the Armies and Social Action DCSSA/AS from 2013 to 2018, accessed 2 February 2019.

<sup>86</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Aperçu des incidents sécuritaires en 2018 dans les régions de Diffa, Tillabéri et Tahoua” [Overview of Security Incidents in 2018 in the Diffa, Tillabéri and Tahoua Regions],” 31 December 2018, accessed 21 March 2019, <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/niger/infographic/niger-aper%C3%A7u-des-incidents-s%C3%A9curitaires-en-2018-dans-les-r%C3%A9gions-de>.

<sup>87</sup> Ochab and Zorzi, 4.

infringe upon the basic rights of citizens by using terrorist threats as a justification. The laws extend to property rights, personal movement, and include imprisonment for non-compliance.<sup>88</sup>

The Diffa region is a good example of how rights are impacted by emergency measures. On 26 February 2015, the National Assembly decreed a state of emergency in the region. The ongoing state of emergency prohibits the use of two-wheeled vehicles at any time. Vehicles registered in Nigeria are prohibited, which limits freedom of movement.<sup>89</sup> The emergency state also prohibits merchants from exporting their products (pepper and fish) because Boko Haram members can use the products for food or income.<sup>90</sup> On 8 March 2019, the government reviewed the state of emergency and decided to open fishing activities in the Diffa region after a two-year ban.<sup>91</sup> Although, the state of emergency is certainly necessary, it diminishes freedoms, and gives more powers

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<sup>88</sup> Ochab and Kelsey Zorzi, 8.

<sup>89</sup> Survie, “État d’urgence, Surveillance et Interventionnisme Militaire en Afrique les Dangereuses Impostures de la Guerre Contre le Terrorisme [State of Emergency, Surveillance and Military Interventionism in Africa: The Dangerous Impostures of the War Against Terrorism]” 2 February 2016, 30. Accessed 21 March 2019. [http://survie.org/IMG/pdf/Dossier\\_etat\\_d\\_urgence\\_terrorisme\\_VFinale\\_mise\\_en\\_page-2.pdf](http://survie.org/IMG/pdf/Dossier_etat_d_urgence_terrorisme_VFinale_mise_en_page-2.pdf).

<sup>90</sup> International Crisis Group, *Le Niger face à Boko Haram au-delà de la contre-insurrection Rapport Afrique 245* [Niger and Boko Haram: Beyond Counter-Insurgency, Africa, Report no. 245] (Brussels, Belgium: International Crisis Group, 27 February 2017), 3.

<sup>91</sup> Presidency of the Republic of Niger, “Conseil des Ministres du 08 Mars 2019, secretariat general du gouvernement de la Republique du Niger [Council of Ministers of 08 March 2019, General Secretariat of the Government of the Republic of Niger],” 8 March 2019, accessed 3 March 2019, <https://www.presidence.ne/conseils-des-ministres/2019/3/8/communiqué-du-conseil-des-ministres-du-vendredi-08-mars-2019>.

to the *Forces de Defense et de Securite* [Defense and Security Forces] (FDS). Thus, this crisis of security undermines human rights and could give rise to abuse.

Religion is another liberty under attack in Niger. The country was once a peaceful country where all religions coexisted in peace. Terrorists actively work to impose sharia law and Islam. The attacks have created an atmosphere of fear between Christians and Muslims in Niger. The current environment challenges individual rights to freely express any other religious affiliation besides Islam. Girls now feel compelled to wear a hijab that covers their faces.

#### The Human Level of Analysis Summary

The human level analysis discussed key points using the evaluation indicators of health, education, and human rights. The indicators helped explore links to terrorism. In the area of health, there is reduced access to services, and many centers have been destroyed. Additionally, citizens do not feel safe traveling to gain access to medical services. The sustained terrorist state also affects a patient's mental state. The situation leads some to depression and chemical dependence, and possibly a state of worthlessness. The military and future recruits all face similar outcomes as the general public. This directly impacts military readiness and future recruiting efforts.

Terrorism has disrupted the education system and consequently development in Niger. Schools have closed because of the threat. Teachers are legitimate Boko Haram targets, and kidnapping is a constant fear among parents. With respect to human rights, persistent terrorism has led to increased state control and reduced individual rights. In some cases, the infringement on individual rights has led to imprisonment and reduced

economic gains. Authorities justify many of these measures as protection against attacks, but Nigeriens question the need for such drastic measures, such as banning two-wheeled vehicles and other measures that limit large group gathering.

Review of Key Takeaways at the Human Level of Analysis

Table 4. Key Takeaways at the Human Level
<b>Key Takeaways</b>
Destruction and inaccessibility of health centers
Increased dropout rate and destruction of schools
Reduced recruiting pool for military service
Restricted respect for human rights/freedoms

*Source:* Created by author.

There are four key takeaways from this level listed in table 4 above. The first key takeaway is “Destruction and Inaccessibility of Health Centers.” This is an important point because health is a central pillar in the development of the country. It is even more important when considering the future condition of the state. A healthy work force with a developed ability to function is essential. Improving health care will support future development in Niger, and support strong and healthy security forces required to fight against the persistent terrorist threat.

“Increased dropout rate and destruction of schools” and “reduced pool of recruits for military service” are the second and third key takeaways. Terrorists attack schools, kill teachers, and kidnap mainly women and young girls to force them to serve as sexual servants. This fear leads parents to keep children out of school. This directly impacts

development in Niger. Uneducated adults cannot adequately contribute to economic growth. The terrorist situation has reduced the pool of available military recruits that are qualified to support the fight against terrorism and other security challenges in Niger or in the region.

The fourth key takeaway is “restricted respect for human rights and freedoms.” Authorities in Niger, in their aim to protect society from terrorist attacks, have likely overstepped its bounds. Citizens now question why there are so many restrictions and wonder if the extreme security measures are too much. These measures restrict society and perhaps change attitudes with respect to how the government responds to terrorism in Niger. There must be a balance between restrictions and civil liberties. This is one of the more important dilemmas Niger faces today. Getting this right in the future will positively affect recruiting, social well-being, and future leadership.

### The National Level of Analysis

The analysis of the national level will discuss relationships between terrorism and the political and security structures of the country. Although there are many factors that influence the national level, this study is limited to two areas that support answers to the secondary research questions.

### Niger’s Political System and Terrorism

The Republic of Niger is a semi-presidential democratic republic. The President of the Republic is the head of state, and the Prime Minister is the head of government. The political system allows political parties to advocate for constituents and serve as one component of the political structure’s checks and balance system. The government

controls the power of the executive power solely, and both the government and the national assembly control the legislature. The judiciary is independent of the other two powers. The current president, Mahamadou Issoufou, assumed his duties on 7 April 2011. The National Assembly last held an election on 21 February 2016.<sup>92</sup> The legislative, judicial, and executive powers govern Niger and share power like many other countries in the world. Niger's political apparatus is affected by numerous forms of terrorism, but transnational terrorism is the most impactful.<sup>93</sup> Transnational terrorism thrives because Niger lacks sufficient political and financial resources as well as physical presence required to control a vast territory. Despite governmental efforts, transnational terrorism is increasing largely because of Niger's long porous borders. An increase of terrorism is especially apparent in Diffa, Tahoua-Agadez, northern Tillabery, and in western Niger where authorities constantly confront threats from numerous terrorist groups.<sup>94</sup> Unchecked terrorism in Niger will eventually overwhelm the state's ability to provide basic services. Damage in the areas of education, health, basic social services, and the economy have suffered in the current environment. Niger will face almost insurmountable challenges once recovery begins.

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<sup>92</sup> Niger Inter-Parliamentary Union, Assemblée Nationale (National Assembly), Last Elections (Niamey, Niger, 29 August 2018), accessed 16 March 2019, <http://archive.ipu.org/parline/reports/2237.htm>.

<sup>93</sup> Bandyopadhyay and Younas; Simplice A. Asongu, and Jacinta C. Nwachukwu, "The Impact of Terrorism on Governance in African Countries," *World Development* 99 (November 2017): 2.

<sup>94</sup> Ramesh Chandra Das, *The Impact of Global Terrorism on Economic and Political Development: Afro-Asian Perspectives* (Bingley, England: Emerald Publishing Limited, 2019).

Niger initially responded to its security challenges by increasing the defense budget in 2007 as discussed in the first chapter of this thesis. Unfortunately, this increase failed to relieve the adverse impact of terrorism on health and education systems. In 2011, concerned by the security situation, the government created the High Authority for Consolidation of Peace. A senior officer leads this organization tasked to manage a portfolio of security related programs. The portfolio includes intercommunal dialogue, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants and development projects aimed at strengthening cohesion and peace in various regions.<sup>95</sup>

Besides the persistent threats from terrorists, Niger is essentially under siege and faces an unending challenge to its sovereignty with a steady flow of refugees seeking security from threats or passing through the country en route to Libya. Currently, there are over 300,000 refugees and displaced persons fleeing the crises in Nigeria, Mali, and Libya. Refugee camps are concentrated in the southeastern region of Diffa, and in the northern and northwestern regions of Tahoua and Tillaberi where currently there is a full-blown major humanitarian crisis. Niger is implementing a \$40 million emergency plan and has requested assistance from development partners to cope with immediate humanitarian needs.<sup>96</sup>

Niger's persistent problems require aid from its partners. There are 175 humanitarian organizations in Niger. These include fourteen UN entities, ninety-eight

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<sup>95</sup> International Crisis Group, 10.

<sup>96</sup> World Bank, "The World Bank in Niger: Overview." 5 December 2017, accessed 21 April 2019, <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/niger/overview>.

national and sixty-three international non-governmental organizations and Red Cross societies. There are seventy-four humanitarian organizations present in the Diffa region.<sup>97</sup>

In 2014, Niger joined forces with the United States, France, and the Africa Union to create a multi-regional force to fight against terrorism in Niger and in the Lake Chad Basin. Additionally, Niger faces recurring droughts, food crises, and a continual weak economy, especially commodity prices. These issues combined with security threats along the borders with its neighbors at the borders with Mali, Libya, and Nigeria exposes Niger to potential serious macroeconomic risks.<sup>98</sup>

### Defenses and Security and Terrorist Groups

The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Interior of Decentralization, and Ministry of Religious Affairs provide leadership and direction for Niger's FDS. The Army, Air Force, National Gendarmerie, and the National Guard execute FDS missions to protect Niger's sovereignty. Primary functions include defending civilians, reducing the spread of small arms weapons, contributing to regional security missions, and national development activities. In general, the defense mission in Niger includes:

1. Preservation of national institutions and the territory of the Republic of Niger.
2. Protection of people and their property

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<sup>97</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *2018 Plan De Reponse Humanitaire Decembre 2017* [Humanitarian Response Plan December 2017] (New York: United Nations, 27 December 2017), 7, <https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/niger-2018-plan-de-r-ponse-humanitaire-janvier-d-cembre-2018>.

<sup>98</sup> World Bank. The World Bank supports projects in water, rural development, HIV/AIDS, education, health, natural disaster management, and emergency food security.



### 3. Support to peacekeeping operations<sup>99</sup>

Niger, despite its numerous border and internal security issues, contributes troops to UN peacekeeping missions throughout Africa. Currently Niger has a contingent of 894 soldiers servicing as observers and staffs in various missions in Mali, Ivory Coast, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Further, Niger served in the past on UN missions in Haiti, Sudan, Burundi, and Liberia.

Since the beginning of conflict in Libya in 2011, the FDS has faced challenges to defending Niger's territorial integrity from heavily armed terrorist groups largely originating in Mali and Nigeria. Many of these armed groups have close ties to drug, weapons, and human and contraband trafficking organizations.<sup>100</sup>

Ensuring territorial security in an environment of persistent terrorism remains a challenge for the FDS. The FDS is not trained to work with communities and foreign organizations. Additionally, the FDS does not have a force management system like the U.S. that evaluates friendly and enemy capabilities and develops doctrine and systems that support missions to defeat adversaries.<sup>101</sup> According to Camille Everard, militaries have had “difficulties to ensure security and maintaining contact with their populations

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<sup>99</sup> Niger, Statut général des forces de défense et de sécurité, Décret no. 2002-126/PRN/MDN du 18 Juin 2002 [General Statute of the Defense and Security Forces, Decree No. 2002-126/PRN/DND of 18 June 2002], accessed 21 March 2019.

<sup>100</sup> de Tésières, *At the Crossroads*, 14, 71.

<sup>101</sup> Army Force Management School, “Army Force Management Model,” accessed 27 April 2019, <https://www.afms1.belvoir.army.mil/files/publications/ArmyForceManagementModel1Oct%2013.pdf>.

through military sector,” and lack training in how to fight the current conflict.<sup>102</sup> These management and training deficiencies add difficulty to military’s fight against terrorism.




Figure 5. War Games in the Sahel/Foreign military bases in the Sahel map

Source: Jeremy Keenan, “War games in the Sahel,” *NewAfrican*, 1 December 2017, accessed 17 March 2019, <https://newafricanmagazine.com/news-analysis/politics/war-games-sahel/>.

<sup>102</sup> Camille Evrard, *Enjeux et défis des forces armées et de sécurité: retour sur leur formation dans les États postcoloniaux du Sahara ouest-africain* [Issues and Challenges of the Armed and Security Forces: A Review of their Training in the Postcolonial States of West African] (Paris: Study Committee of National Defense, February 2017), 2, accessed 1 April 2019, <https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01475475/document>.

## Force Capability and Terrorism

The FDS is fighting against terrorist groups with limited abilities. As mentioned prior in this thesis, the FDS is not extremely proficient in counterterrorism operations. The various conflicts along Niger's borders force a continued FDS presence to counter emergent threats. The author has observed during counselling sessions that many FDS members are mentally and physically broken from conflict. The socio-medical monitoring mechanism for conflict victims needs improvement. Lack of sufficient medical care undermines soldier morale who face determined, well-armed terrorist groups. According to statistics from the NAF Social Services, as of the writing of this thesis, approximately one thousand soldiers were wounded and more than four hundred soldiers were found dead between 2013 and 2018.<sup>103</sup> This resulted in approximately eight hundred war orphans. As a result of the continued trauma during combat, cases of post-traumatic stress disorders, and other associated illnesses are on the rise. Many young FDS recruits have turned to drug use because they think usage makes them invulnerable to this enemy, which of course is false. Drug use undermines personal health and renders a soldier unfit for military service. Additionally, many soldiers have abandoned their fighting positions while facing heavily armed terrorist groups.

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<sup>103</sup> Equipe de le Sous Direction Action Sociale [Team of the Social Action Sub-Directorate], 2018 Compte rendu périodique de la Sous Direction Action Sociale des Armees sur la situation des victimes des conflits armés de la Direction Centrale du Service de Sante des Armees et de l'Action Sociale des Forces Armees Nigeriennes [Unpublished 2018 periodic report of the Sub Directorate Social Action of the Arms on victims of armed conflicts for the Central Direction of the Service of Health of the Weapons and the Social Action of the Nigerian Armed Forces], Naimey, Niger.

## Training and Equipment

Nigerien authorities continue improving the military's ability to effectively fight against terrorism. Niger has created three new military zones and increased from five to eight motorized infantry companies. Authorities have increased equipment purchases to support the counterterrorism fight.<sup>104</sup> Niger's leadership now recognizes how the equipment is a force multiplier and the importance of proper equipment maintenance. Terrorist groups wage unconventional warfare and easily adapt to the terrain in their operational environment. Regular armies, including the FDS, are trained for conventional war according to International Humanitarian Law.<sup>105</sup> Mentioned earlier, this type of training is insufficient and not easily adaptable to new unconventional warfare tactics and advanced technology that terrorist groups use in Niger. This new reality is a catalyst for Niger's ongoing equipment upgrades and changes in FDS training. The new reality highlights the increased need to strengthen cooperation with international partners. The United States and France are lead partners in improving the capacity of the NAF to confront and defeat terrorist threats. China, Canada, and the European Union also provide training the FDS.

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<sup>104</sup> Etat-Major des Armées [Military Staff], "Décret, portant statut General des Forces Armees Nigeriennes [Decree, on the General Statute of the Nigerian Armed Forces]" (PowerPoint presentation sur les Commandements et Directions [PowerPoint presentation on Commandments and Directions], Naimy, Niger, 18 June 2002).

<sup>105</sup> International Committee of the Red Cross, "Niger: Humanitarian law manual for armed forces," 25 March 2015, accessed 4 May 2019, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/niger-humanitarian-law-manual-armed-forces>.

France hosts training to support its annual Reinforcing African Peacekeeping Capabilities exercise. The European Union Mission trains and equips forces to fight against terrorism and organized crime in Agadez and Tahoua regions.<sup>106</sup> The United States Department of Defense provides Special Forces training in Niger. Niger participates in the Security Governance Initiative that seeks to strengthen defense institutions and assist in coordinating Department of Defense support. Niger participates in Flintlock, which is a joint military exercise with forces from several African countries and the United States.<sup>107</sup> Flintlock is an annual exercise of Multinational Special Operations Forces to build the military capabilities of participating countries. Exercises like Flintlock offer a unique opportunity to increase interoperability required to face common security challenges across the region. Niger will benefit from increased U.S. intelligence support, likely prior to 2020, from drones flown out of the future base in Agadez in the northern part of the country.<sup>108</sup>

#### The National Level of Analysis Summary

The analysis of the national level revealed important key points based on the indicators used at the national level. Politically, many of Niger's problems are attributable to governance issues that contribute to the spread of terrorism in Niger.

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<sup>106</sup> International Crisis Group.

<sup>107</sup> Gueye, 15.

<sup>108</sup> Nick Turse, "U.S. Military Says It Has a 'Light Footprint' in Africa, These Documents Show a Vast Network of Bases," *The Intercept*, 1 December 2018, accessed 18 March 2019, <https://theintercept.com/2018/12/01/u-s-military-says-it-has-a-light-footprint-in-africa-these-documents-show-a-vast-network-of-bases/>.

Terrorism increases the negative effects of poor governance in Niger. Additionally, transnational terrorism challenges Niger's ability to provide basic goods and services for its citizens. Combined with long porous borders, the country's political and financial structures are constantly in crisis mode. Niger is unable to provide basic social services such as community health and education because of reduced budgets, which are justified by the persistent security crisis. Reduced budgets disrupt the government's ability to operate and leave many of citizens who depend on government services feeling marginalized. This governmental crisis also manifests itself statistically with lower rates of development. The influx of refugees has complicated government's management task and further strained financial resources.

The FDS has nascent counterterrorism skills and is engaged in a fight against well-armed and equipped terrorists. Further impeding the fight against terrorists is a lack of specialized equipment required in a terrorist environment. These factors limit FDS effectiveness on the battlefield and hamper recruiting efforts among youth. Young people are not motivated to join the FDS because of numerous factors. Several important negative influences include a poorly defined mechanism for taking care of wounded soldiers and wounded veterans. Persistent terrorism has prompted international partners to sustain training and various exercises that improve FDS ability to fight terrorism.

Review of Key Takeaways at the National Level

Table 5. Key Takeaways at the National Level
Key Takeaways
Transnational terrorism largely from Boko Haram plagues Niger
Political system sovereignty is challenged by terrorists and refugees
Persistent insecurity and lack of soldier care hinders FDS recruiting
Reduced soldier readiness in combat

*Source:* Created by the author

There are four key takeaways from the analysis at the national level. The author listed these key takeaways in table 5 above. The first one is “transnational terrorism largely from Boko Haram plagues Niger.” Understanding that the major terrorist threat does not originate in Niger changes the country’s approach. This allows Niger to focus its efforts on improving regional and international relationships to counterterrorism as a regional problem.

“Political system sovereignty is challenged with terrorists and refugee” is the second key takeaway point. A country without sovereignty cannot exist. Terrorism adds pressure to Niger’s stressed political system and increased refugees looking for security or transiting the country. These increased pressures threaten Niger sovereignty and increase the need for continued security cooperation with regional and international partners.

The author’s third key takeaway is “Persistent insecurity and lack of soldier care hinders FDS recruiting.” Without motivated volunteers to join the FDS, the country will

have a deficit of soldiers for the defense of the territorial integrity. This exposes Niger to the mercy of the enemies and the loss of the State. Many Nigerien soldiers have been victims of terrorist attacks and are physically and psychologically affected. Terrorism has led to inefficacy and incapacitated soldiers due to injury and trauma. This situation affects the effectiveness of military.

The fourth key takeaway is “reduced soldier readiness in combat.” Facing terrorism requires advanced training and appropriate equipment. The absence and inadequacy of right type of equipment required to confront terrorists has resulted in heavy losses to the FDS. Soldiers suffer from extended operations that require short-notice deployments to different areas in Niger, which reduces readiness and hinders recruiting.

#### The Regional and International Level of Analysis

As part of the fight against terrorism and armed conflict, Niger participates in peacekeeping missions across the African continent. Nigeriens sever as general support troops, observers, staff members, gendarmes, and as police officers. Niger is also involved in organizations or groups to support its efforts in the counterterrorism fight. Niger is active in the following regional and international cooperation on the continent: African Union, ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Sahelian Saharan States, and the organization of the Islamic Conference. Niger also cooperates with partners of the European Union as EUCAP, and African forces like Chad or Nigeria.



Table 6. Partnership Relations and Activities

<b>Regional Partners</b>		
<b>Partner</b>	<b>Purpose/Relationship</b>	<b>Note/ Activities</b>
AU	Continental-wide supranational governing body. Validates security requirements. Execute the defense and security architecture, and early warning architecture.	AU authorities work together with Niger to generate greater support for the fight against terrorism.
ECOWAS	ECOWAS works for democracy, peace and security in its member states; has a counterterrorism strategy based on three main pillars: prevent, pursue, reconstruct. <sup>109</sup>	Sets up ECOWAS Standby Force, trains Niger's Forces and Niger's. ECOWAS manages a regional intelligence and information sharing to fight terrorism. <sup>110</sup>
G5 Sahel	Combats terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking, and other organized criminal groups. Supports plans aimed at improving socio-economic development of the Sahel.	Establish CONOPS for current operations. The creation and operationalization of the G5 Sahel has stabilized certain terrorist threats.
Lake Chad Basin	The mandate of Lake Chad Basin is to regulate and control the use of water and other natural resources in the basin and to initiate, promote, and coordinate natural resource development projects and research.	Established the Joint Multinational Task Force.

<sup>109</sup> Benjamin Maiangwa, "Assessing the Responses of the Economic Community of West African States to the Recurring and Emerging Security Threats in West Africa," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 52, no. 1 (2016): 111.

<sup>110</sup> Peter Clottey, "ECOWAS Implements Measures to Combat Terrorism," Voice of America, 2 December 2015, accessed 5 May 2019, <https://www.voanews.com/a/ecowas-implements-measures-to-combat-terrorism/3084994.html>.

Table 6: Partnership Relations and Activities, Continued		
International Partners		
Partner	Purpose/Relationship	Note/ Activities
EUCAP	Has a security and defense policy mission to improve the capabilities of the Nigerien security forces <sup>111</sup>	EUCAP experts train Niger's Security forces, equip NAF.
U.S.	Fights terrorism in the African and Sahel countries	Develops programs to reinforce country and region security structures. Conducts operations in Niger.
France	Fights terrorism in Sahel countries	Executes the annual Reinforcing African Peacekeeping Capabilities exercise.

Source: Created by author.

### The G5 Sahel: A Limited Response to Terrorism

The G5 Sahel is a UN-sanctioned group of five countries in the Sahel (Mauritania, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad) that willingly fight against terrorism. On 9 September 2014 in Niger during the first meeting, the Chiefs of Staff of the G5 Sahel and the French Armed Forces agreed to combine their efforts to provide a regional and coordinated response to the current security challenges linked to the threats of terrorist armed groups, including cross-border.<sup>112</sup> “The mandate of the force is exceptionally

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<sup>111</sup> Aomar Baghzouz, “Le Maghreb Et L’Europe Face à La Crise Du Sahel: Coopération Ou Rivalités? [The Maghreb and Europe face the Crisis of the Sahel Cooperation or Rivalries?]” *L’Année Du Maghreb* [The Year of the Maghreb], no. IX (2013): 184.

<sup>112</sup> Signe Marie Cold-Ravnkilde, *A Fragile Military Response: International support of the G5 Sahel Joint Force* (Copenhagen, Denmark: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2018), 3.

ambitious. It includes fighting terrorism, organized crime, and human trafficking; restoring state authority; assisting displaced people to return; contributing to humanitarian operations; and assisting with the implementation of development projects.”<sup>113</sup> Niger held the G5 Sahel presidency for one year from 8 February 2018 to 8 February 2019.

The Joint Force G5S has about five thousand troops, which include forces from the five partner countries.<sup>114</sup> All countries involved felt the initiative would provide the best mechanism to combat cross-border terrorist-linked incursions. The G5 Sahel faces crippling financial and human resource issues. The U.S. and the United Kingdom advocated against establishing a Chapter 7, UN mission, which would provide much needed funding to support counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. Up until 2019, the mission has operated on G5 Sahel and partner support.<sup>115</sup> As of the date of publication, the G5 Sahel has not diminished cross-border terrorist attacks.

#### Cooperation with Other Units in the Sahel

In addition to contributing major support to the G5 Sahel, France operates counterterrorism units in Niamey and in the Agadez region to support operations in Mali; these units operate under Task Force Barkhane. U.S. Special Forces operates in the

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<sup>113</sup> Cold-Ravnkilde, 3.

<sup>114</sup> Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

northern Niger out of Madama to support regional operations.<sup>116</sup> The Multinational Joint Task Force operating out of Chad is tasked with restoration of a safe and secure environment parts of the Lake Chad region affected by Boko Haram through increased regional cooperation. The contributing countries are Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin. The task force operates in the Lake Chad region close to Boko Haram's operational area. Member countries provide troops to secure borders and conduct joint military operations. The size of the joint task force is between 7,500 and 10,000 soldiers.<sup>117</sup>

#### The Regional and International Level of Analysis Summary

The regional and international level analysis discussed key points using the evaluation indicators. Regional and international cooperation support overall assisted Niger improve its fight against terrorists. The Nigerian Armed Forces have become more experienced in the fight against terrorism, operational motorized companies, and special forces units. However, despite these positive aspects, there is still room for improvement in area of cooperation with partners and funding. Consequently, these issues relegate the G5 Sahel to an ambitious initiative with limited authority and funding to combat cross-border terrorist-linked incursions. As published in June 2017 the U.S. and the United Kingdom remain reluctant to fund the G5 Sahel coalition. Despite the G5 Sahel coalition,

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<sup>116</sup> International Crisis Group, 17.

<sup>117</sup> Natasja Rupesinghe, "The Joint Force of the G5 Sahel: An Appropriate Response to Combat Terrorism?" *Conflict Trends* 2 (2018): 16.

terrorism continues to expand in the territory. The Task Force Barkhan, U.S. Special Forces and the Multinational Joint Task Force all conduct operations in Niger.

Table 7. Key Takeaways at the Regional and International Level	
Priority	Key Takeaways
1	Countering terrorism requires frank bilateral and multilateral cooperation between all stakeholders.
2	Continued FDS professionalization and inclusion of local community needed to ensure have a set of common objectives in the fight against terrorism.

*Source:* Created by author.

#### Review of Key Takeaways at the Regional and International Level

There are two key takeaways from the regional and international level review, listed at table 7 above. The first key takeaway is “countering terrorism requires frank bilateral and multilateral cooperation between all stakeholders.” A frank partnership to really fight terrorism is needed in Niger with all stakeholders from the local to international levels. Despite the establishment of these partnerships, terrorism has not been eradicated. Discussions must include authorities and funding that will increase multilateral efforts to fight terrorists.

The second key takeaway is “continued FDS professionalization and inclusion of local community needed to ensure have a set of common objectives in the fight against terrorism.” There are more and more attacks in refugee camps and attacks on the civilian population, especially in the Diffa region by Boko Haram. These attacks clearly identify that civilians and major targets. In order to leverage increased partner cooperation that

focuses on the enemy and the targeted population, the FDS needs to continue building a professional army. The need for a more professional and multidisciplinary army will facilitate the relationship between military and communities. The author favors the creation of civil affairs units, which will enable cooperation between forces and locals, and enhance civilian resilience against the impacts of terrorism on communities.

#### Summary of Chapter 4

In chapter 4, the researcher analyzed the evaluation criteria. This analysis highlighted key takeaways at the human, national, and regional levels. Chapter 5 will address the research questions, suggest recommendations to counter the effects to terrorism in Niger and introduce topics for further research.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study is to identify the impacts of terrorism on Niger. The author used human, national, and regional level analysis to determine these impacts. The author introduced the topic and relevant literature in chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 3 covered the methodology and chapter 4 presented and analyzed data collected in this study. This concluding chapter answers the research questions. Afterwards, there is a discussion on the most important takeaways on terrorism's impact in Niger. Finally, the study concludes with a look at future areas of research related to terrorism and limitations encountered during this study.

Primary question: What are the impacts of terrorism on Niger?

Secondary questions:

1. How does terrorism affect the Nigerien Armed Forces?
2. How does terrorism affect the socio-political level?
3. How does terrorism influence the regional and international cooperation level?

The author covers “how does terrorism influence Armed Forces?” in chapter 4 during the analysis of the human and national levels. Table 8 below represents the most important impacts on the armed forces. These impacts impede the *Forces de Defense et de Securite* [Defense and Security Forces] (FDS) from effectively accomplishing its mission, supporting national development and regional security.

In addition, the Niger FDS have lost a significant number of soldiers because of deaths or injuries because of terrorism. This reduces the force’s ability to fight terrorism. Soldiers in the military are exhausted because they are constantly in a state of deployment to support domestic and external security operations.

Table 8. How does terrorism affect the Nigerien Armed Forces
<b>Answers</b>
Persistent insecurity and lack of soldier care hinder FDS recruiting
Reduces soldier readiness in combat
Impedes professionalization in the FDS

*Source:* Created by author.

The author addresses “How does terrorism affect the socio-political level?” in the analysis of the national level. Table 9 records the impact of terrorism at socio-political level in Niger.

Table 9. How does terrorism affect the socio-political level?
<b>Answers</b>
Hinders government ability to governed properly and provide goods and services
Affects the social stability among local communities and among community and refugees

*Source:* Created by author.

These impacts in a persistent terrorism environment have greatly reduced Niger’s ability to develop and maintain social-economic stability and cohesion.



To answer the question, “how does terrorism influence the regional and cooperation level,” the researcher analyzed regional and international engagement in support of Niger’s counterterrorism fight; these impacts are listed in table 10. The persistent terrorism threat environment has encouraged partnerships to address terrorism and the effects of terrorism. These partnerships include military and development components that were discussed throughout the thesis and highlighted in Table 6.

Table 10. How does terrorism influence the regional and international level?	
<b>Answers</b>	
	Enhances regional and international partnerships to counterterrorism and develop economic opportunities
	Generates multinational forces to fight against regional security threats

*Source:* Created by author.

Table 11 answers the primary question, what are the impacts of terrorism on Niger? The response synthesizes impacts all three levels analyzed in this thesis. Overall terrorism has reduced the government’s ability to sustain socio-economic development of the country, reduced patriotism, affected the morale and effectiveness of NAF, and increased costs associated with caring refugees, IDPs.

Additionally, terrorism has undermined the democratic foundations, worsened the humanitarian situation with population displacements, hindered commerce, increased the small arms proliferation, and significantly reduced overall health in Niger. The next section offers some suggestions that could help improve Niger’s fight against terrorism.

Table 11. What Are the Impacts of Terrorism on Niger?	
Key Takeaways	
	Terrorism impedes Niger’s ability to effectively provide govern, protect its citizens and secure its borders. It increases refugee flows that require resources otherwise used to support national development.
	Terrorism contributes to increased dropout rates and school destruction, which retards long-term development in Niger.
	Terrorists target and destroy health centers, which decreased overall health and increases vulnerability among those most needy. Heath care shortages also adversely affect military care, which reduces the attractiveness of military service.
	The persistent terrorist environment forces Niger to develop mil-mil relationships that will improve counterterrorism fighting capacity. Existing security challenges dissuade youth from jointing the military service.
	The persistent terrorist environment requires continued FDS professionalization and acquisition of specialized equipment that supports current terrorist threat. State on State external threats are no longer the readiness priority.

*Source:* Created by author.

### Recommendations and Potential Solutions

#### Reduce Dropout Rate and Improve School Security

Action 1: Revitalize the educational system by emphasizing the securing of schools and remote communities.

Action 2: Motivate teachers by valuing their remuneration, especially for those who are in the affected areas.

Action 3: Increase communication between communities and leaders.

Action 4: Finance infrastructure and community development in remote locations.

### Secure and Increase Access to Health Centers

Action 1: Reenergize the health system by emphasizing the securing of health centers in remote communities.

Action 2: Create discussion and exchange groups within local communities to find solutions.

Action 3: Motivate medical personnel by increasing their pay especially for those who in know terrorist areas of operation.

### Tailor Equipment Needs Based on the Level of Insecurity

Action 1: Improve and increase military training for counterterrorism.

Action 2: Properly equip the FDS and use defense dollars wisely.

### Improve Motivation and Patriotism for Joining the FDS

Action 1: Sensitize communities and youth on the benefits of serving in the army.

Action 2: Improve institutional mechanisms of care for the wounded soldiers by providing health insurance for life. This could improve minimize negative perceptions of choosing the FDS as a career.

Action 3: Teach patriotism to the communities.

### Build a Professional Army

Action1: Provide the FDS with a tailored doctrine and a strategy for creating a professional army.

Action 2: Strengthen military capabilities in the area of community of development.

Action 3: Creation of a social action directorate that focuses on moral development and implementation FDS resilience policies.

Action 4: Create a civil affairs unit that improves civil military relationships.

Action 5: Create a global and integrated system to anticipate the actions of enemies, such as the establishment of the Force Management System.

#### Engage in Real and Frank Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation between Partners to Effectively Address the Terrorist Problem

Action 1: Clarify partnerships and submit for approval to the National Assembly.

Action 2: Ensure all execution represents African leadership addressing African problems.

As a military member, the author brings her experiences fighting terrorism in Niger to this research. One recommendation is to work closely with communities in the capacity as military member to gather information and enhance remote communities' behavior and wellbeing. As social worker, the researcher suggests expansion of laws and improving the framework to care for military members who are victims of conflict. The author's final thought is to advise commanders to acquire planners to anticipate and counter the enemy capabilities.

#### Suggestions for Future Research

The study of the impact of terrorism on Niger will remain a long-term issue. Additional periodic, exhaustive studies and updates are recommended as a priority for future study. Although the researcher covered important issues during this study, another subject for future study is why terrorism continues to flourish certain locations despite

dedicated military cooperation against terrorists with Western partners. Further, a study on how Niger can develop and fund a civil affairs unit in the FDS is warranted. This unit would reconcile military requirements with community concerns and execute projects that improve troop morale during operations. Another area of interest is the economic impact of terrorism on Niger.

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